SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120330. November 18, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . WENCESLAO

JAYSON , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant, a bouncer in one nightclub, shot one Nelson Jordan. When

arrested, a .38 caliber revolver, four live bullets, and one empty shell were recovered from
him. The rearm and the ammunition were covered by a memorandum receipt and a
mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano of the Davao Metropolitan District
Command authorizing appellant to carry the said rearm and twelve rounds of
ammunition. He was charged of illegal possession of rearm. The Regional Trial Court
found him guilty and sentenced him to 20 years imprisonment, ruling that appellant acted
in good faith, believing that the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him
were valid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue the
mission order in question, as he was not any of the o cers mentioned in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866. Neither was appellant quali ed to have a mission
order because he was a mere reserve of the CAFGU without regular monthly
compensation. Good faith is not a valid defense where the offense committed is malum
prohibitum. TAacCE

The penalty for illegal possession of rearm reduced under R.A. No. 8294, amending
P.D. No. 1866 cannot be applied in this case in view of the proviso that the lighter penalty
does not apply to cases where another crime has been committed. Nor can illegal
possession of rearm be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance because
although the gun seized was used in the commission of a crime, this case concern solely
the charge of illegal possession of rearm. The criminal case for homicide is not here
under consideration. Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. ATCEIc

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST AND

SEARCH; LAWFUL IN CASE AT BAR. — SPO1 Loreto Tenebro testi ed that in the evening of
March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Racolas were patrolling in their car,
they received a radio message from their camp directing them to proceed to the "Ihaw-
Ihaw" on Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting. Accordingly, they proceeded to
the place and there saw the victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to accused-
appellant as the one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested accused-appellant. Seized
from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955. Considering these facts, the
warrantless arrest was valid under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
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 Procedure. The arresting o cers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death
of the victim and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant. The
subsequent search of accused-appellant's person and the seizure from him of the rearm
was likewise lawful under Rule 126, Section 12.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM; PRESENT WHERE
MEMORANDUM RECEIPT AND MISSION ORDER NOT VALID. — Accused-appellant is liable
for illegal possession of rearm. His defense is that the gun is covered by a memorandum
receipt and mission order issued by Major Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of the Civil-
Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District Command. The
issuance of mission orders is governed by Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16,
1986 of the then Ministry of Justice. Under the same, Major Arquillano was not authorized
to issue the mission order in question. Neither was accused-appellant quali ed to have a
mission order. Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission orders to civilian
agents of the AFP as he was not any of the following o cers mentioned in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, Section 5(a). That Colonel Calida
had authorized him (Major Arquillano) to exercise this function is a bare assertion that
cannot be given credit. Neither was there a written delegation of authority to Major
Arquillano. It is even doubtful whether Col. Calida who had authority to issue mission
orders, could delegate this authority to his deputy. Accused-appellant also was not
quali ed to be issued a mission order because he was a mere reserve of the Citizens
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without regular monthly compensation. In fact he
worked as a "bouncer" in a nightclub, and it was as a "bouncer" that he used the gun seized
from him. And even assuming that the issuance of the mission order was valid, carrying the
rearm inside the nightclub where accused-appellant was working as a "bouncer," is a
violation of the restrictions in the mission order. The restrictions prohibited him from
carrying rearms in places where people converge unless on o cial mission. In any event,
accused-appellant's claim that he acted in the good faith belief that the documents issued
to him su ced as legal authority for him to carry the rearm and that there was absence
of criminal intent are not valid defenses because the offense committed is malum
prohibitum punishable by special law.
3. ID.; ID.; RA 8294 PROVIDING FOR A LESSER PENALTY NOT APPLICABLE;
CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of the recently enacted R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No.
1866, cannot be applied to this case. Even though the penalty for illegal possession of
rearm has been reduced in the new law, the latter cannot be applied in this case so as to
favor accused-appellant in view of the proviso in Sec. 1 that the rst paragraph, providing
for lighter penalty, does not apply to cases where another crime has been committed. Nor
can the third paragraph be applied by considering the illegal possession of rearm as a
mere aggravating circumstance because, although the gun seized was used in the
commission of a crime, this case concerns solely the charge of illegal possession of
rearm. The criminal case for homicide is not before us for consideration. Consequently,
this case must be decided in accordance with the ruling in People v. Quijada , that a person
who kills another with the use of an unlicensed rearm is guilty of homicide or murder as
the case may be under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of
firearm under P.D. No. 1866, Sec. 1, par. 2.
aSTAHD

DECISION

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 MENDOZA , J : p

Accused-appellant Wenceslao Jayson was charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 in
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. The amended information alleged —
That on or about March 16, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to possess, had in his possession
and under his custody one (1) .38 caliber revolver (Paltik), with Serial Number
91955 and four (4) live ammunitions inside the chamber of said revolver, without
first securing the necessary license to possess the same.
That the same .38 caliber revolver was used by the accused in killing
Nelson Jordan on March 16, 1991. cda

Contrary to law.

Davao City, Philippines, July 12, 1991.

The prosecution evidence shows that in the evening of March 16, 1991, accused-
appellant, then a bouncer at the "Ihaw-Ihaw" nightclub on Bonifacio Street, Davao City, shot
one Nelson Jordan. He was arrested after he had been pointed by eyewitnesses as the
gunman. Recovered from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955, 1 four
live bullets, and one empty shell. 2 The rearm and ammunition were covered by a
memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, Deputy
Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan
District Command. 3 The mission order authorized accused-appellant to carry the said
rearm and twelve rounds of ammunition "[t]o intensify intel[ligence] coverage" and was
for a three-month duration (from February 8, 1991 to May 8, 1991), subject to the
following restrictions: 4
VII. The carrying of firearms is prohibited in places where people gather for
political, religious, social, educational, and recreational purposes, such as
churches or chapels, carnival grounds or fans, nightclubs, cabarets, dance
halls, dancing places during fiestas and other celebrations, bars, liquor
drinking places, theaters or movies, cockpits, race tracks and the like,
except when the personnel concerned is on official mission in such places
for which he was authorized to carry firearms.

Accused-appellant was initially charged with murder 5 in an information led on

March 20, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 22,456-91 in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 of Davao City but, after plea-bargaining, he was allowed to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide. 6 In a decision dated September 24, 1991, the trial court
sentenced him to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12
years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. 7
On July 15, 1991, he was charged with illegal possession of rearm. 8 The
information against him was amended on October 8, 1991 in order to allege that the
rearm subject of the charge had been used in the killing of a person (Nelson Jordan) on
March 16, 1991.
On June 17, 1993, 9 he was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and sentenced to
20 years imprisonment. The trial court found accused-appellant acted in good faith,
believing that the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him were valid.

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 On appeal, the Court of Appeals 1 0 increased the penalty on accused-appellant to
reclusion perpetua and, in accordance with Rule 124, §13 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, certi ed the case to this Court for review. Both accused-appellant and plaintiff-
appellee have filed supplemental briefs.
Accused-appellant maintains that he acted m the good faith belief that he was
authorized to carry the rearm by virtue of the mission order and memorandum receipt
issued to him by Major Francisco Arquillano of the Davao Metropolitan District Command.
He argues that the failure of the prosecution to present as witness the government o cial
who had certi ed that accused-appellant was not the holder of a rearms license is fatal
to the prosecution of this case.
I.
Although not raised as an error by the accused-appellant, it is pertinent to consider
the circumstances surrounding accused-appellant's arrest and the seizure from him of the
firearm in question considering that both were made without any warrant from a court.
With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Loreto Tenebro 1 1 testi ed that at around 10:00 in
the evening of March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Reinerio Racolas
were patrolling in their car, they received a radio message from their camp directing them
to proceed to the "Ihaw-Ihaw" on Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting.
Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there saw the victim, Nelson Jordan.
Bystanders pointed to accused-appellant as the one who had shot Jordan. They then
arrested accused-appellant. Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number
91955. The rearm was covered by a mission order and memorandum receipt.
Considering these facts, we hold that the warrantless arrest and search were valid.
Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant ; when lawful. — A peace o cer or
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: . . .
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of
the crime found the victim. Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only
moments after the shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten
meters away from the "Ihaw-Ihaw"), although he was then eeing. The arresting o cers
thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts
indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant. llcd

This Court has upheld a warrantless arrest under analogous circumstances. In

People v. Tonog, Jr ., 1 2 the police found the lifeless body of a person with several stab
wounds. An informer pointed to the accused as the person who had killed the victim. That
afternoon, police o cers arrested the accused. On their way to the police station, a
policeman noticed bloodstains on the accused's pants which, when examined, was found
to be the same blood type "O" found on the fatal knife. The Court upheld the warrantless
arrest and ruled that the blood-stained pants, having been seized as an incident of a lawful
arrest, was admissible in evidence.
In People v. Gerente, 1 3 the police arrested the accused three hours after the victim
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 had been killed. They went to the scene of the crime where they found a piece of wood and
a concrete hollow block used by the killers in bludgeoning the victim to death. A neighbor
of the accused who witnessed the killing, pointed to him as one of the assailants. The
warrantless arrest was held valid under Rule 113, §5(b).
In People v. Acol, 1 4 a group held up a passenger jeepney. Policemen immediately
responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking
towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. He pointed them to the
policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions.
Three were caught and arrested. Each was found in possession of an unlicensed revolver
and charged with illegal possession of rearms. The accused claimed that the warrantless
seizure of rearms was illegal. The Court rejected their plea and held that the search was a
valid incident of a lawful arrest.
The subsequent search of accused-appellant's person and the seizure from him of
the firearm was likewise lawful. Rule 126, §12 states:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

In People v. Lua, 1 5 a buy-bust operation was conducted against the accused. After
accused had gone inside his house and returned with the three tea bags of marijuana and
received the marked money, the designated poseur-buyer gave the signal to his fellow
police o cers who closed in and arrested the accused. In the course of the arrest, a police
o cer noticed something bulging at accused's waistline, which turned out to be an
unlicensed .38 caliber "paltik" with two live bullets. Accused was charged with illegal
possession of firearm. The search was held to be a valid incident of a lawful arrest.
II.
We now come to the main question of accused-appellant's liability for illegal
possession of rearm. There is no dispute that accused-appellant was in possession of
the gun in this case. His defense is that the gun is covered by a memorandum receipt and
mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of the Civil-
Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District Command.
The issuance of mission orders is governed by Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated
October 16, 1986 of the then Ministry of Justice, which in pertinent part states: 1 6
. . . It is unlawful for any person or o ce to issue a mission order
authorizing the carrying of firearms by any person unless the following conditions
are met:
1. That the AFP o cer is authorized by the law to issue the mission
order;
2. That the recipient or addressee of the mission order is also
authorized by the law to have a mission order, i.e., he must be an organic member
of the command/unit of the AFP o cer issuing the mission order. If mission
orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must
be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency
involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the
services they are rendering. (In this case, the agency head or o cials so
designated by the law shall issue the mission order.). . .
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 As the Court of Appeals held, however, Major Arquillano, who had issued the mission
order in question, was not authorized to do the same. Neither was accused-appellant
qualified to have a mission order.
Admittedly, Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission orders to civilian
agents of the AFP as he was not any of the following o cers mentioned in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, §5(a), to wit: 1 7
(1) The Minister of National Defense and such other Ministry o cials
duly designated by him;
(2) The Chief of Staff; AFP;
(3) Chief of the General/Special/Technical and Personal Staffs of
GHQ AFP;
(4) Commanders of the AFP Major Services including the Chiefs of
their respective General/Special/Technical and Personal Staffs;
(5) Commanders and Chiefs of Staffs of AFPWSSU and major
commands/units of the AFP and the Major Services;
(6) Commanders of battalions and higher units and their equivalent in
the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy;
(7) Commanders of AFP intelligence units from GHQ AFP down to
regional command levels;
(8) Provincial Commanders, METRODISCOM Commanders, company
commanders and their equivalent in the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy;
and

(9) Detachment commanders in remote areas whose higher

commanders are not easily available to issue such orders.

Major Arquillano claimed, however, that Colonel Franco Calida, had authorized him
(Major Arquillano) to exercise this function so that people would not be "swarming [in
Calida's] o ce." 1 8 As the appellate court well stated, full faith and credit cannot be given
to such bare assertion. Not only was there no written delegation of authority to Major
Arquillano, it is even doubtful whether Col. Calida, who, as commander of the unit had
authority to issue mission orders, could delegate this authority to his deputy.
Nor was accused-appellant quali ed to be issued a mission order because he was a
mere reserve of the Citizen Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without regular monthly
compensation. In fact he worked as a "bouncer" in a nightclub, and it was as a "bouncer"
that he used the gun seized from him.
Even assuming that the issuance to accused-appellant of the mission order was
valid, it is clear that, in carrying the rearm inside the nightclub where he was working as a
"bouncer," accused-appellant violated the restrictions in the mission order. These
restrictions prohibited him from carrying rearms in places where people converge unless
on o cial mission. Accused-appellant's claim that he had been told by Major Arquillano
that he could carry the rearm anywhere in Davao City 1 9 was atly denied by Major
Arquillano who testi ed that precisely he called accused-appellant's attention to the
restrictions. 2 0

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 Nevertheless, it is argued that the prosecution failed to prove accused-appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution did not present SPO4 Welliejado
S. Sim of the FAS/Explosive NCO Davao Metropolitan District Command, who had certi ed
that "per records on le [in] this Command Mr. Wenceslao Jayson does not exist/appear in
the list of license holders as of this date." Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution
merely presented as Exhibit H the certi cation without calling the "issuing authority" to
testify so that he could be cross-examined with regard to his certification.
Objection based on this ground must be deemed waived in view of accused-
appellant's failure to object to the presentation of the evidence. The certi cation in
question was marked when the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, 2 1 but accused-
appellant's counsel did not object. Neither did counsel object when the certi cation was
offered in evidence by the prosecution. 2 2
In any event, accused-appellant does not claim to be the holder of a regular license
but only of a mission order and memorandum receipt. Considering the invalidity of these
documents, both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals correctly held accused-
appellant liable under P.D. No. 1866.
Nor can accused-appellant claim to have acted in the good faith belief that the
documents issued to him su ced as legal authority for him to carry the rearm. As the
Court of Appeals pointed out, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid
defenses because the offense committed is malum prohibitum punishable by special law.
23

III.
It remains for us to determine whether the provisions of the recently enacted R.A.
No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866, 2 4 can be applied to this case on the theory that it is
more favorable to accused-appellant. 2 5 R.A. No. 8294, provides in pertinent part:
§1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a ne of not less than Fifteen thousand
pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered rearm, such
as rim re handgun, .380 or .32 and other rearm of similar repower, part of
rearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of any rearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime
was committed.
xxx xxx xxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed rearm,
such use of an unlicensed rearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. (Emphasis added)

Apparently, even though the penalty for illegal possession of rearm has been
reduced in the new law, the latter cannot be applied in this case so as to favor accused-
appellant in view of the proviso in §1 that the rst paragraph, providing for lighter penalty,
does not apply to cases where another crime has been committed. Nor can the third
paragraph be applied by considering the illegal possession of rearm as a mere
aggravating circumstance because, although the gun seized was used in the commission
of a crime, this case concerns solely the charge of illegal possession of rearm. The
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 criminal case for homicide is not before us for consideration.
Consequently, this case must be decided in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Quijada, 2 6 that a person who kills another with the use of an unlicensed rearm is guilty of
homicide or murder as the case may be under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated
illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2. LibLex

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, J ., concurs.
Regalado, J ., concurs, pro hac vice.

Footnotes
1. Exh. A.
2. Exh. B.

3. Exh. D, id., p. 46.

4. Ibid.
5. Exh. I, Records, p. 50.
6. Exh. J, id., p. 51.
7. Exh. F, id., p. 47. Per Judge Romeo D. Marasigan.

8. Id., p. 1.
9. Id., pp. 68-72. Per Judge Augusto V. Breva.
10. Per Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Justices Gloria C. Paras and
Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr.
11. TSN, pp. 2-3, 9-10, Nov. 11, 1992.
12. 205 SCRA 774 (1992).
13. 219 SCRA 756 (1993).

14. 232 SCRA 406 (1994).

15. 256 SCRA 539 (1996).
16. Records, pp. 5-6.
17. 80 O.G., No. 10 1510 (March 5, 1984).

18. TSN, p. 6, April 20, 1993.

19. TSN, p. 5, Jan. 29, 1993.
20. TSN, p. 8, April 20, 1993.
21. TSN, p. 13, Nov. 11, 1993.

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 22. Id., p. 18.
23. See People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 (1996).
24. Approved by the President of the Philippines on June 6, 1997 effective July 6, 1997.

25. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 22 provides: "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as
this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same." This provision has been applied to special offenses. See People v.
Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994); Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95523, August 18,
1997 (R.A. No. 8294 was retroactively applied to reduce the sentence of petitioner).
26. 259 SCRA 191 (1996).

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