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4.

March 15, 2017 G.R. No. 164749


ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR, Petitioners
vs
COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES, INC., Respondents

Facts:

To promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized an
endurance running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held on June
15, 1980. The organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the premises of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa (IBP for brevity), through public roads and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial
Circle. Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the defendants to be allowed to participate in the contest and
after complying with defendants' requirements, his application was accepted and he was given an
official number. Consequently, on June 15, 1980 at the designated time of the marathon, Rommel joined
the other participants and ran the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned out, the plaintiffs'
further alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate safety and precautionary measures and to
exercise the diligence required of them by the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to insulate
and protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers along the marathon
route. Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon on
Don Mariano Marcos A venue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical treatment given to him at the
Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan, he died later that same day due to severe head injuries.

Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it had not been the organizer of the marathon, but only its
sponsor; that its participation had been limited to providing financial assistance to Intergames;  that the
financial assistance it had extended to Intergames, the sole organizer of the marathon, had been in
answer to the Government's call to the private sector to help promote sports development and physical
fitness; that the petitioners had no cause of action against it because there was no privity of contract
between the participants in the marathon and Cosmos; and that it had nothing to do with the
organization, operation and running of the event.

Issue:

Whether the organizer failed to observe the diligence required to it as organizer

Held:

YES

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code,  it consists of the "omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the
time and of the place." The Civil Code  makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article
20.
To determine the existence of negligence, the following time-honored test has been set in Picart v.
Smith:

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias  of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of
course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said:
Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them.
They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take
care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in
the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the
duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a
given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. 37 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

A careful review of the evidence presented, particularly the testimonies of the relevant witnesses, in
accordance with the foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to the conclusion that the safety and
precautionary measures undertaken by Intergames were short of the diligence demanded by the
circumstances of persons, time and place under consideration. Hence, Intergames as the organizer was
guilty of negligence.

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