Rights and Responsibilities:

Communitarian Perspectives
Series Editor: Amitai Etzioni

In yesterday’s America, in the world

before September 11, civil rights and public safety were often discussed
in this way. On the one side, libertarians made strong, uncompromising
cases for liberty. In effect, practically any suggestions made in the name
of shoring up our safety, including the antiterrorism measures urged on
the country by a 1996 commission on national security, were severely
criticized as unnecessary invasions of our freedoms. The government
(a.k.a. Big Brother), not terror, was considered the main threat to liberty.

On the other side, the political right characterized the American

Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and its generally liberal sister organizations
as undermining the moral fabric of the country, destroying its social
order, and inviting terrorism.
In the weeks that followed September 11, the country pulled together.
A strong spirit of community prevailed. Bipartisanship governed. Ix

Differences were not suppressed, but they were worked out. Posturing
was replaced largely by a competition for who could do more and better
for the nation by working with the other side. Congress-working
with the White House-sorted out where the new point of balance
would be between our all-too-evident need to enhance public safety (especially
facing the threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction)
and our profound commitment to respect and uphold our rights. X

Even if we were to stick merely to the Founding Fathers’ text, the

governing Fourth Amendment is not phrased in the absolute way
the First Amendment is. It does not state that Congress “shall make no
law allowing search and seizure” or anything remotely like that. It states
that there be no unreasonable searches. It is one of only two rightsdefining
amendments that recognize, on the face of it, the importance
of taking into account the public interest. Indeed, the courts have long
recognized that our right to privacy must be weighed against our need
for public safety (and public health). Xi

Requiring all Americans to carry government-issued ID cards at all

times and stopping people at random to demand identification, common
in Europe, is another measure that is both a gross violation of our basic
rights and contributes very little to public safety.
Still other measures may require considerable deliberation. Stopping
and questioning all Arab Americans constitutes a massive violation of
privacy and does little for public safety other than squander police and
FBI resources. However, paying special attention to young males with
new flight licenses seeking to travel on a major airline who seem Middle
Eastern may be a kind of profiling that is justifiable. It seems to meet
the criteria often used by law: it is what a reasonable person would find,
well, reasonable. Xi
HOMELAND SECURITY STARTS OVERSEAS xvii

To watch Congress take up a complex set of antiterrorism measures

with lightning speed, with the usually lumbering Senate passing the
whole legislative package in less than thirty minutes, is a refreshing
change. 15

USA PATRIOT ACT

Enhancing Criminal Investigative Authorities
T h e USA Patriot Act permits seizure of voice mail pursuant to a
search warrant, allows victims of computer trespassing (i.e., hacking) to
invite law enforcement to monitor attacks on their computer networks
without needing a court order, and allows pen registers and “tap and
trace” devices-traditionally used on phones to detect numbers dialed
by, and those dialing in to, a target phone-to be used on computer
transmissions to obtain “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information.”
Officials can subpoena the addresses and times of e-mail
messages sent by terrorism suspects, equating e-mail communications 19

with those made by telephone, for which authorities can already obtain
records of numbers called and the duration of calls. However, the law
also prohibits investigators from including the content of those electronic
communications. Likewise, the act includes Internet sessions in
the scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications but
not the content of those sessions. It also allows federal officials to obtain
nationwide search warrants for terrorism investigations, including for
electronic surveillance. 20

The USA Patriot Act expands grounds for deeming an alien inadmissible
to or deportable from the United States for terrorist activity, provides
for the mandatory detention of aliens whom the attorney general
or the commissioner of immigration certifies as posing a risk to national
security, and facilitates information sharing within the United States and
with foreign governments. For the purposes of deportation or denying
admission to the United States, the bill also expands the definition of
terrorists to include public endorsement of terrorist activity or provision
of material support to terrorist organizations. Detained aliens may be
held for up to seven days for questioning, after which time they must
be released if they are not charged with violations of the criminal or
immigration codes. In cases where deportation is determined appropriate
but not possible, detention may continue on a review by the attorney
general every six months. Originally, the administration sought the
power to detain indefinitely and without charges immigrants suspected
of involvement in terrorism. 21

The safer the nation

feels, the more weight judges will be willing to give to the liberty interest.
The greater the threat that an activity poses to the nation’s safety, the
stronger will the grounds seem for seeking to repress that activity even
at some cost to liberty. This fluid approach is only common sense. 26
Specifically, the USA Patriot Act allows
the commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
in consultation with the attorney general, to recommend the detention of
any noncitizen if there is reason to believe the alien poses a risk to national
security. 33

Three principles in particular should guide our response to the threat

of terrorism. First, we should not overreact in a time of fear, a mistake we
have made all too often in the past. Second, we should not sacrifice the
bedrock foundations of our constitutional democracy-political freedom
and equal treatment-absent a compelling showing of need and adoption
of narrowly tailored means. And third, in balancing liberty and security,
we should not succumb to the temptation to trade a vulnerable
minority’s liberties, namely, the liberties of immigrants in general or Arab
and Muslim immigrants in particular, for the security of the rest of us.
Unfortunately, the USA Patriot Act, our government’s first legislative
attempt to respond to the threats posed by September 11, violates all
three of these principles. It overreacts in just the way that we have so often
overreacted in the past: by substituting g d t by association for targeted
measures directed at gu~ltyc onduct. It violates core constitutional 35

principles, rendering immigrants deportable for their political associations,

excludable for pure speech, and detainable on the attorney general’s
say-so. And by reserving its harshest measures for immigrants-in the immediately
foreseeable future, Arab and Muslim immigrants-it sacrifices
commitments to equahty by trading a minority group’s liberty for the majority’s
security. In addition to being unprincipled, our response will in all
likelihood be ineffective. Painting with a broad brush is not a good law enforcement
tool. It wastes resources on innocents, alienates the very communities
we need to be working with, and makes it all the more difficult
to distinguish the true threat from the innocent bystander.
The Patriot Act’s principal flaws are as follows: (1) It imposes gullt by
association on immigrants, resurrecting a long-abandoned philosophy of
the McCarthy era; (2) it authorizes executive detention on mere suspicion
that an immigrant has at some point engaged in a violent crime or
provided humanitarian aid to a proscribed organization; and (3) it resurrects
ideological exclusion, denying admission to aliens for pure speech,
resurrecting yet another long-interred relic of the McCarthy era. 36

And in the fight against Communism,

which reached its height in the McCarthy era, we made it a crime even to
be a member of the Communist Party and passed the McCarran-Walter
Act, which authorized the government to keep out and expel noncitizens
who advocated Communism or other proscribed ideas or who belonged to
groups advocating those ideas. Under the McCarran-Walter Act, which remained
a part of our law until 1990, the United States denied visas to,
among others, writers Gabriel Garcia Mhquez and Carlos Fuentes and
to Nino Pasti, former deputy commander of NATO, because he was going
to speak against the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles. 37
The extent of these preexisting powers is illustrated by the unprecedented
incarceration of between 1,500 and 2,000 persons in connection
with the investigation of the September 11 attacks. 37

O n e thing that has become clear since September 11 is that Americans

at large are much more tolerant of racial profiling than they were before
the terrorists struck. This fact was illustrated shortly after the attacks, on
September 20, when three men “of Middle Eastern appearance” were
removed from a Northwest Airlines flight because other passengers refused
to fly with them. A Northwest spokesman explained that under
Federal Aviation Administration rules, “the airline has no choice but to
reaccommodate a passenger or passengers if their actions or presence
make a majority of passengers uncomfortable and threaten to disrupt
normal operations of flight.” Compare this incident with the experience of movie actor James
Woods. Woods took a flight from Boston to Los Angeles one week before
the World Trade Center attacks, The only other people in first class
with him were four men “of Middle Eastern appearance” who acted
very strangely. During the entire cross-country flight, none of them had
anything to eat or drink, nor did they read or sleep. They only sat upright
in their seats, occasionally conversing with each other in low tones.
Woods mentioned what he had noticed to a flight attendant who
“shrugged it off.” Amving in Los Angeles, Woods told airport authorities,
but they “seemed unwilling to become involved.” You can see the 57

great change in our attitudes by imagining the consequences if the first

incident had happened two weeks earlier or the second two weeks later.
The first would then have generated a nationwide storm of indignation
about racial profiling and stupendous lawsuits, the second a huge police
manhunt for the four men concerned. 58

In the aftermath of September 11, journalists also have to be much

more aware of providing information that can be useful to terrorists.
A good example: Experts fear that terrorists could hijack a crop-dusting
plane, load it with deadly bacteria, and contaminate a wide area.
Should we publish stories detailing the possibility of such attacks? Absolutely.
Such information is clearly “instrumental” to public safety.
People who guard airports or service planes could provide useful intelligence
about suspicious characters. But should we publish details
about which planes or nozzle technology could do the most damage in
the hands of hijackers? Absolutely not. Those facts could clearly be
“detrimental” to public safety without providing any real value to the
public. 82

So who are we? What do we value? For many people, including many
Americans and a number of signatories to this letter, some values sometimes
seen in America are unattractive and harmful. Consumerism as a
way of life. The notion of freedom as no rules. The notion of the individual
as self-made and utterly sovereign, owing little to others or to society.
The weakening of marriage and family life. Plus an enormous
entertainment and communications apparatus that relentlessly glorifies
such ideas and beams them, whether they are welcome or not, into
nearly every corner of the globe.
One major task facing us as Americans, important prior to September
11, is facing honestly these unattractive aspects of our society and
doing all we can to change them for the better. 103

Following the September 11,2001, suicide attacks on the World Trade

Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, U.S. President
George W. Bush has declared an open-ended “war on terrorism.” This
war has no apparent limits in place, time, or the extent of destruction
that may be inflicted. There is no telling which country may be suspected
of hiding “terrorists” or declared to be part of an “axis of evil.”
The eradication of “evil” could last much longer than the world can
withstand the destructive force to be employed. The Pentagon is already
launching bombs described as producing the effect of earthquakes and
is officially considering the use of nuclear weapons, among other horrors
in its constantly improving arsenal. The material destruction envisaged
is immeasurable. So is the human damage, not only in terms of lives, but 123

also in terms of the moral desperation and hatred that are certain to be
felt by millions of people who can only watch helplessly as their world is
devastated by a country, the United States, which assumes that its moral
authority is as absolute and unchallengeable as its military power. 124

Self-celebration is a notorious feature of United States culture, perhaps

as a useful means of assimilation in an immigrant society. Unfortunately,
September 11 has driven this tendency to new extremes. Its effect
is to reinforce a widespread illusion among U.S. citizens that the
whole world is furated, in admiration or in envy, on the United States as
it sees itself: prosperous, democratic, generous, welcoming, open to all
races and religions, the epitome of universal human values and the last
best hope of mankind. 124

In this ideological context, the question raised after September 11,

‘Why do they hate us?” has only one answer: “Because we are so good!”
Or, as is commonly claimed, they hate us because of “our values.”
Most U.S. citizens are unaware that the effect of U.S. power abroad
has nothing to do with the “values” celebrated at home, and indeed often
serves to deprive people in other countries of the opportunity to attempt
to enjoy them should they care to do so. 125

Since September 11, the United States feels under attack. As a result
its government claims a “right to self-defense” enabling it to wage war
on its own terms, as it chooses, against any country it designates as an
enemy, without proof of guilt or legal procedure.
Obviously, such a “right of self-defense” never existed for countries
such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Libya, Sudan, or Yugoslavia when
they were bombed by the United States. Nor will it be recognized for
countries bombed by the United States in the future. This is simply the
right of the strongest, the law of the jungle. Exercising such a “right,”
denied all others, cannot serve “universal values” but only undermines
the very concept of a world order based on universal values with legal
recourse open to all on a basis of equality.
A “right” enjoyed only by one entity-the most powerfd-is not a right
but a privilege exercised only to the detriment of the rights of others. 125

What is being defended is related to what was attacked.

Traditionally, “defense” means defense of national territory. On September
11, an attack actually took place on and against U.S. territory.
This was not a conventional attack by a major power designed to seize
territory. Rather, it was an anonymous strike against particular targeted
institutions. In the absence of any claim of responsibility, the symbolic
nature of the targets may have been assumed to be self-explanatory. The
World Trade Center clearly symbolized U.S. global economic power,
while the Pentagon represented U.S. military power. Thus, it seems
highly unlikely that the September 11 attacks were symbolically directed
against “American values” as celebrated in the United States.
Rather, the true target seems to have been U.S. economic and military
power as it is projected abroad. 126

September 11 suggests that the

nation projecting its power abroad is vulnerable at home, but the real issue
is U.S. intervention abroad. Indeed the Bush wars are designed precisely
to defend and strengthen U.S. power abroad. It is U.S. global
power projection that is being defended, not domestic freedoms and
way of life. 127

Twice in recent years, Americans have been

victims of murderous terrorist attacks at home: one took place in Oklahoma,
the other in lower Manhattan and on the outskirts of Washington,
D.C. Oklahoma, in many ways the most conservative state in the 149

union, symbolizes the side in the culture war that stands for a return to
the religion, values, and morality of years past. Lower Manhattan,
probably the most liberal slice of America, represents modem urbane
cosmopolitanism, racial and ethnic diversity, and openness to the rest
of the world. And Washington, as the nation’s capital, stands in the con servative
mind for big government and in the liberal mind as the embodiment
of U.S. military power. Yet what the terrorists proved by their
acts is that, no matter how different Americans may be from one another
in their religious beliefs or political views, they are all equal
before the onslaught of machinery transformed into weapons. The
United States really is one nation, even if it needs other nations, or international
bandits without a nation, to remind it of that fact.
America was the target of the September 11 attacks because its commitments
to free speech, religious liberty, gender equality, and racial
and ethnic diversity were intolerable to theocrats persuaded that only
one truth exists and that it is their mission to ensure that no one thinks
otherwise. The United States was made vulnerable to terrorist attack because
it has open borders, a dedication to civil liberties, an aversion to
discrimination on the basis of group characteristics, a free market, and
a strong belief that the pursuit of the good life and the quest for zealotry
are incompatible. How much will change as a result of September ll?
Certainly airport security will be tightened, electronic and other forms
of communication will be more closely monitored, and police will be
more forthright in their use of profiling-racial and otherwise-to stop
violent acts before they happen. But none of these steps will change
America’s commitment to liberal and democratic values. Instead, the
most likely effect of the terrorist attacks will be to strengthen American
liberties by grounding them in reality and underscoring why we value
them in the first place. 150

Over the past twenty-five years, Americans

largely stressed the market and the private sphere over collective action,
religious commitments over secular community, and individual
rights over civic obligation. While it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions,
the nation appears to have embarked in a different, more
communitarian direction-rethinking the rights and the responsibilities
of citizenship. 157

Over a year after September 11, the implications of the current crisis
are beginning to emerge. While it is too soon to know for sure, a number
of trends point toward a new vision of community: secular, public spirited,
and oriented more toward social responsibility than individual rights. 158

Americans have not only reconsidered the role of public institutions

but have also taken to the nation’s streets despite continued concerns
about security. Indeed, the outpouring of assemblies in public spacesvigils,
marches, athletic events, concerts, charitable functions, and holiday
celebrations-goes beyond a defiant response to the terrorist
attacks. Rather, it suggests a new understanding of the need to build
civic community outside the home and the marketplace, to reclaim and
rebuild genuine public spaces. Americans seek settings for informal social
interaction and democratic exchange.
This vibrant street life suggests a reversal of the nation’s dependence on
quasi-public spaces, such as privately owned and operated shopping malls,
hotel atria, and commercial complexes connected by skyways and underground
tunnels. Over the past three decades, the United States witnessed
a thoroughgoing privatization of everyday life. Corporations and private organizations
gradually assumed control over the basic services Americans
relied on, the spaces where they congregated, and even the nation’s hallowed
instruments of self-rule. These facilities served some of the purposes
of sidewalks, town squares, parks, and community centers, but lacked the
openness, spontaneity, and potential for social interaction and community. 159

Cortada – Betting on America

On October 25, 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney announced that America had better get used to a
"new normalcy," one marked by greater security checks within the nation, in a new kind of war in
which the number of casualties within the U.S. could exceed those incurred on the battlefield. That
same day, Congress finalized passage of legislation giving government officials vast new powers to
monitor telephone and Internet dialogues and to arrest and hold suspected terrorists. One
adjustment quickly followed another. Long lines at airport security points replaced quick boarding
by frequent flyers arriving at the last minute. Border crossings in North America began to look like
entrances to military bases. Working on the top floors of tall buildings suddenly seemed dangerous,
rather than prestigious. Lower became better. 8

Prior to 9-11, air passengers had been told for years that, if their plane was hijacked, they were to
remain quiet and passive so that nobody would be hurt. The strategy worked, since hijackers usually
just wanted a free ride to some other country. But the rules of the game changed after 9-11, when
hijackers crashed aircraft into buildings, giving passengers the choice of either dying that way or
trying to foil the hijackers. It might still cost them their lives. Or save them, as happened with the
mentally unbalanced passenger. In the weeks that followed the pilot's suggestion that passengers take
charge of their situation, passengers all over the United States commented to the press on how they
would do the same thing. They felt empowered and responsible.
The incident symbolized what was happening. Americans were being asked to take charge of their
circumstances in a nation whose culture always celebrated personal initiative. 17

The new normalcy calls for us to recognize that the Middle East will probably remain highly
unstable for years to come. The area's governments need to sort out a large number of regional,
historical, economic, even religious tensions, many brought on by themselves, others exacerbated
by European colonialism and the rivalries of the past 10 decades. Arab governments are paying the
price of failing to create stable middle classes by capitalizing on oil revenues and of not addressing
the harsh realities of poverty and ages-long competition for limited supplies of food and water.
Meanwhile, religion continues as a powerful incendiary force that inflames the atmosphere,
threatens internal stability, and motivates terrorist actions. The situation calls for recognition of a
clash of cultures, which hundreds of years ago would have been called a rivalry between Christians
and Muslims, a view still widely held in the Middle East but which seems anachronistic to Western
minds. As the area remains volatile, to the extent that we can extricate ourselves from the ups and
downs of its conflicts, so much the better. 21

For us as 21st-century Americans, the objectives are clear and unequivocal:

• To preserve national security
• To protect individuals from physical harm
• To preserve a national way of life
• To ensure the viability and prosperity of the economy
• To bring justice and peace to various parts of the world
• To heal the pains of national tragedy and personal loss 22
 The change highlights the difference between feeling at home and feeling secure. The latter is a
tactical state of mind—being on guard, maintaining awareness, and anticipating the
breakdown of things around us. It signifies a fear of things outside our control. The former
carries with it a sense of happiness or contentedness, where we feel safe, not because we are
hunkered down against any potential threat but because we are cared for and loved by others
and feel connected to them. After 9-11, the feeling of at-homeness gave way to the pursuit of
security 28

As 9-11 showed, unpredictability is a key element in terrorist strategy. Terrorists want to make sure
that no one knows what is coming. This multiplies exponentially the impact of their attacks. There
are few, if any, secrets about the array of tools of terror—various kinds of bombs and biological,
chemical, or nuclear weapons. What we do not know, but need to know, is where, when, and how—
uncertainties that have a pervasive impact on our daily lives. This unpredictability is designed to
keep us off-guard, living under a cloud of uncertainty.
Part of the logic behind establishing the Office for Homeland Security was to regain some
element of predictability by coordinating intelligence findings in order to avert terrorist
attacks and to make it possible for Americans to go back to some facsimile of pre-9-11 life.
Meanwhile, the unpredictability of global affairs has been "brought home" to us, and it seeps
into our everyday lives, in the way we feel about our surroundings, in our confidence in the
infrastructure of services we rely on, and in deciding how to plan activities at work or leisure.
Terrorism, as has become clear, is about the threat of attacks as much as about the actual
attacks. It exacts multiple kinds of costs—economic, in the security measures that are taken;
political, in the impacts of security measures on the basics of American civic life; and
psychological, in the malaise we feel in not knowing what will happen or when. The terrorist
threat and the consequent war on terrorism threaten and disrupt our everyday living. 29
Astrada

The PA is premised upon the following assertion: it is a juridical “act to

deter and punish terrorist acts in the US and around the world, to enhance law
enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes” 60

Barkun – Chasing phantoms

Yet if one thinks

for a moment about the 9/11 attacks, it is obvious that the intangible effects
were at least as great as the tangible ones. There was, at the most general
level, the sudden sense of vulnerability; but there was also the awareness
that the perpetrators had long lived unmolested and effectively invisible
as they prepared. It was assumed, too, that al-Qaeda had already secreted
second-wave sleeper cells for post-9/11 attacks, a belief that only gradually
dissipated. It in fact received pseudoconfirmation from the mysterious appearance
of the envelopes containing anthrax spores in October, the origin
of which was not determined until many years later. These circumstances
led many Americans to believe quite suddenly that they were living in a
very dangerous place. 16

“disaster obsessions,” where large numbers

of people become convinced that they live in an insecure world on 29
the verge of cataclysmic events. There have been two such periods in the
recent American past. The first occurred in the 1970s. The second began in
the mid-1990s and is still in progress. In both periods, disaster obsessions
were conditioned by both religious and secular factors. On the religious
side, the rise of evangelicalism carried a strong millenarian current. This
apocalyptic view of the end of history assigned special significance to both
natural calamities and wars, especially those in the Middle East, as markers
of the “last days.” 30

The East-West conflict

imposed on the world both a geopolitical order and a psychic order. The
geopolitical order forced a significant number of states to fall into the orbit
of either the United States or the Soviet Union and, if neither, then to band
together as “non-aligned.” By the psychic order, I refer to the tendency of
many, particularly in the United States, to conceive of the world in Manichean
terms, to utilize, as President Reagan did, the polarity of “free world”
and “evil empire.” The effect of both the geopolitical and the psychic conceptions
was to simplify and organize an otherwise complex reality. When,
however, the Soviet Union broke up in the early 1990s and the Cold War
ended, these conceptions suddenly became meaningless. The world that
emerged was immediately more complicated, more difficult to understand,
and more frightening, even though the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear
exchange had been removed. Now there were no overarching organizing
concepts, no clear notions of good and evil, only conflicts in strange places
few knew anything about, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia.
The locus of evil could no longer be clearly identified, as it had been from
the late 1940s until the collapse of the USSR. The rise of the terrorist to a
premier position in both public and official imagination was a response
not only to the attacks that had been perpetrated but to the need to fill the
“enemy vacuum” that the end of the Cold War had created. 34

In a general sense, profiling seeks to identify malefactors through some

set of background characteristics, ties to associates, or behaviors. In its
crudest form, it leads to the unproductive and ethically questionable phenomenon
of overinclusive classes, such as all Muslims or all Arabs. Well
before 9/11 the issue had become highly charged because of allegations that
some police profile all African Americans as potential criminal suspects.
The application of profiling to terrorists clearly requires a finer-grain methodology,
which, like sensors, would need to be relatively free of both false
positives and false negatives.
42

Intrusive technologies vary considerably in the degree to which they are

accepted by the public. Video surveillance seems to be broadly accepted,
not only in the United Kingdom, where it first reached saturation levels in
urban areas, but more recently in the United States, where its growth has
been exponential. A Harris poll revealed that 63 percent of Americans surveyed
approving CCTV monitoring in September 2001— hardly a surprising
finding. However, the level rose to 70 percent in July 2006, by which time
the number of cameras was much greater. A CBS News poll found that onethird
of respondents to a 2002 survey considered such surveillance to be an
infringement of their privacy. However, when in 2007 the “threat of terrorism”
was added to the question, the number criticizing CCTV dropped to
23 percent. 53

After the attacks, the filmmaker Robert Altman remarked, “Nobody would
have thought to commit an atrocity like this unless they’d seen it in a
movie.”14 Altman’s observation hinted at a larger set of influences emanating
from popular culture. Whether films had any influence on those who
planned and carried out the hijackings is unknown, but they certainly influenced
public understanding of the attacks. To raise this possibility is to
risk being accused of trivializing horrible events and devaluing the victims.
I hope it is clear that I intend neither. But I do want to suggest that images
and motifs from both high and popular culture can become so embedded
in our consciousness that they contribute to the way in which we understand
the sources and nature of terror. 73

the vulnerability of cities has become a motion picture

cliché. And no city has been destroyed on film more often than New
York. 75

Prior to the September 11th attacks, the continuing stream of popular

culture New York fantasies involved a number in which the World Trade
Center was completely or partly destroyed. These appeared in conventional
and animated films, as well as comic books, graphic novels, and computer
games. As a conspicuous part of the city skyline, the World Trade Center
was scarcely immune from depredations of various destructive forces let
loose in disaster narratives.35
Consequently, by the time the Twin Towers were actually destroyed, on 78

September 11, 2001, not only had they been destroyed in works of the imagination
but, regardless of whether those fantasies had actually been read
or seen by anyone, the idea of the towers’ destruction had been firmly implanted.
That is what Max Page means when he suggests that even though
the attacks were frequently said to be “unimaginable,” “our culture has been
imagining and even rehearsing these events for decades.”36 Popular culture
has become so saturated with disaster motifs, and the destruction of New
York has been so common a focus in these stories, that a massive attack on
a New York landmark can seem simultaneously inevitable and profoundly
shocking. 79

“The war on terror” has become a big story for journalists, perhaps one
of the biggest stories of the early twenty-first century. Like all “big stories,”
this one affects news judgments, which in turn affect public attitudes. 105

John Mueller, in his contrarian examination of the “terrorism industry,”

argues that communications media are complicit in spreading exaggerated
conceptions of the danger terrorists pose. Thus the twenty-three terror 105

ism alerts that were announced between 2001 and 2004 were all treated
as major news stories by television evening news programs, but the same
programs gave comparable coverage to only 13 percent of the subsequent
reductions in alert levels. 106
Unlike conventional military defeats, terrorist attacks
are increasingly regarded as failures of expertise— failures to understand
arcane belief systems, unfamiliar cultures, or novel modes of organization.
The cliché “connecting the dots” is merely a catchphrase for the role
of experts in creating a coherent narrative out of what the layperson might
consider merely random pieces of information, a task we shall examine
in detail in the next chapter. The role of the expert becomes all the more
important in situations where evil is equated with invisibility. For the terrorism
expert is believed to be the person who by dint of special training
and techniques can enter the realm of the unseen. He or she can then reveal
or make visible what cannot be seen either by the general public or by nonexpert
policymakers. 106

First, because the September 11th attacks were covered by television in

real time and occurred over a sufficiently long period to acquire a mass
audience, millions of people outside the greater New York City and Washington,
D.C., areas became, as it were, vicarious victims. The sense of victimization
extended beyond those who worked in the World Trade Center
towers and the Pentagon, and those related to the passengers on the
airliners, and even beyond those living and working in Lower Manhattan
and Arlington, Virginia. This vicarious victimization was significantly reinforced
by the fact that the events preempted virtually all programming
on major television channels, caused the cancellation of many community
events all over the country, and caused the unprecedented cessation of
commercial air service. We know also that psychological trauma symptoms
not only varied with distance from the attack sites but increased with the
number of hours individuals watched television coverage.37 These findings
mimic those of studies conducted after the 1963 assassination of President
John F. Kennedy38 and strongly suggest that certain forms of media coverage
of traumatic national events can induce trauma symptoms in those not
in physical proximity to the events themselves. 111

Having fallen into the trap of

false negatives, those with expertise are more than willing to risk false positives,
not only because their self-interest favors it, but also because they now
genuinely believe the world is a much more dangerous place than they once
thought. This may have paradoxical consequences. Thus, one unintended
result is the often remarked upon “alert exhaustion,” when the general public
ceases to take warnings seriously and lapses into complacency. 112

A genuine crisis
cannot continue indefinitely. Yet the structured amplification of danger
after 9/11, by normalizing danger, has gone far toward creating an ambiance
of chronic crisis. The threat level never dipped below yellow, and the
“war on terror” was projected to continue indefinitely into the future. 112

While the American public appears generally skeptical about the effectiveness
of homeland security measures, there has been a continuing drop
in fears of an imminent terrorist attack. CNN polls conducted since 2001
show that in recent years these fears have substantially declined. A majority
of Americans questioned between 2002 and 2006 believed a terrorist
attack was imminent. However, by 2007 the number had declined to 41
percent, and in 2008 it dropped to just 35 percent 123
On the other hand, judgments about terrorists’
capabilities have remained relatively constant since 2002. Most see their
capabilities as the same as on 9/11, although the percentage regarding the
capabilities as greater has fallen, from 22 percent in 2002 to 18 percent in
2008. 123

While terrorism has moved steadily off of the public’s “radar,” replaced
by such issues as the economy, it continues to occupy a significant place on
the agenda of experts, both in and out of government. 124

Few events as brief as the September 11th attacks have stimulated such
broad changes in the national government. Some of these consequences
were the result of decisions taken quickly, in a semi-improvisatory way,
during the first days and weeks after the attacks, but they often resulted in
patterns of behavior that were subsequently institutionalized. Some of the
outcomes are obvious, such as the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The former would surely not have been undertaken otherwise, and the latter,
while it might have happened eventually in the absence of the attacks,
was clearly facilitated by the post-9/11 atmosphere.
Other consequences were organizational. They include the development
of a system of detention for suspected terrorists and terrorist supporters
outside the United States, in the expectation that they would also be outside
the jurisdiction of American courts. Two parallel systems of detention
arose, one administered by the army, the other by the Central Intelligence
Agency. In conjunction with the creation of external detention, a conscious
decision was reached for the first time to utilize torture as an instrument of
national policy, although cloaked in legal rationalizations. The passage of
terrorism-related legislation had been a standard response to earlier attacks
against Americans and American installations, but no previous measure
approached the scope of the USA PATRIOT Act passed after 9/11. 140

ted the attacks. The president ordered sweeping forms of surveillance performed
by the National Security Agency (NSA), some of which, such as
“warrantless wiretapping,” were subsequently revealed but some of which
remain classified. A new military command, NORTHCOM, was created in
October 2002 with the central mission of homeland security. And, most
ambitious of all, the Department of Homeland Security was brought into
being in 2003 in the greatest effort at federal government reorganization
since the creation of the Defense Department in 1947.
These transformations were not all equally well entrenched, as became
evident when the Obama administration took control in early 2009. The
CIA prisons were closed. A firm commitment was made to close the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay, and “enhanced” means of interrogation
were repudiated. While the new administration was not as forthcoming as
some had hoped in making information available about the use and justification
of torture, significant new documentation was released, particularly
about the involvement of the CIA. Combat forces in Iraq were redeployed
and drawn down, although with the likelihood that a significant American
military presence would remain for many years. At the same time, consistent
with campaign promises, President Obama ordered additional combat
forces to Afghanistan. The Department of Homeland Security showed no
signs of contracting. Indeed, an immense, $3.4 billion campus remained
under construction on the grounds of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington.
However, under a new secretary, Janet Napolitano, the department’s
mission began to broaden significantly. 141

The disproportion in the distribution of attention and resources reflected

states of mind in the fall of 2001 and beyond. Fear, bordering on
hysteria, was rampant, with widely reported speculation that al-Qaeda
had already planted second-strike sleeper cells. It was speculation most
Americans were prepared to believe. The enigmatic anthrax letters seemed
only to confirm these rumors. It seems entirely reasonable to assume that
the psychological atmosphere among policymakers was no different than
that prevalent in the general population. Indeed, emotions in government
circles likely ran higher, given the fragments of intelligence to which their
members were privy.
Given what had occurred, these feelings were understandable. They did
not, however, provide the soundest basis for the formation of policy, and
certainly not for the massive changes in governmental structure and functioning
that occurred, particularly between late 2001 and 2004. Action at
times of high emotion carries the risk of excess or rashness, causing us to
do what in calmer moments we might regret 142

The invisibility of the adversary carried the danger

that potential victims would project upon the enemy characteristics,
capabilities, and intentions that it did not possess, and— further— make
policy on the basis of those putative characteristics, capabilities, and intentions,
only to learn much later of their insubstantiality. Overreaction to
terrorist threats has been common. It usually takes the form of excessive
repression by target governments, as they lash out against imagined enemies. 142

in the 9/11 case, although

there were some unnecessarily harsh actions taken against American
Muslims, in general excesses were not in the direction of repression of
the American population. Rather, they lay elsewhere, in the treatment
of detainees, almost none of whom were American citizens; in the expansion
of governmental investigative and security powers; and in the creation
of a large and cumbersome homeland security bureaucracy. 143

For the expansion of governmental authority

during World War II was based upon enemies that could be seen, engaged,
and definitively defeated, and once the conflict ended, so too did the
sense of crisis and the expedients associated with it. When, however, the
cause of the crisis is deemed to be unseen, and the crisis itself— what was
at first called “the global war on terror”— is said to be a battle that will go
on indefinitely, the temptation exists to leave in place what might otherwise
be temporary. When does an unseen danger cease to exist? As we have
seen, that is as much a question about the perceptions of those who regard
themselves as potential victims as it is a question about an objective reality.
As long as the problem of terrorism is dominated by fear of the unseen,
subjective considerations are likely to have the upper hand. As a result, the
policies and governmental structures that persist are likely to be not only
those that deal with “facts on the ground,” as it were, but also those that are
most responsive to the emotional factors put in play by the fear of unseen
danger. 143
The fear
that one cataclysm would beget others was reinforced by the anthrax letters
episode, even though the notes that accompanied the virus, which sought
to link it with al-Qaeda, were recognized by many as crude fabrications.
The FBI did not close the anthrax letters case until February 2010, when it
announced with finality that the letters had been sent by Bruce E. Ivins, a
scientist at the United States Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases,
who by that time had taken his own life. 150

In this charged atmosphere, terrorism blotted

out every other policy concern: Iran, the rise of China, energy, the environment,
international economic stability, and so on. For both the public
and policymakers, there was one and only one issue: terrorism and its correlative,
homeland security.
Although these issues dominated perceptions and consumed attentions,
none of the other issues went away. The world did not stand still. The eruption
of the global financial meltdown in 2007, along with the escalation
of the Iranian nuclear program, tension on the Korean peninsula, and a
number of other issues, provides ample demonstration. 151

Education

I explained to the students that I was frustrated with the commodification of the
September 11 tragedy in flag stickers, car flags, pins, T-shirts, and posters, and that
I was tired of what I considered rampant uncritical nationalism that was sweeping
the country. 93

Most
recently, September 11 has appeared in popular culture as a plot point or backdrop
to other events or narratives suggesting that the event has become integrated into
the way America thinks about itself.

One of the most visible shifts in everyday life after September 11 was the prevalent display
of patriotism. In responding to the devastation of the attacks, the fear of what might
happen next, and the uncertainty about how the country might react, Americans began
to noticeably exhibit their support for, and belief in, the United States. The U.S. flag,
perhaps the most obvious example of U.S. patriotism, appeared everywhere. 1

On
September 11 alone, Walmart sold 116,00 U.S. flags, compared to only 6,400 sold on
the same day a year earlier (“Remains of the Day,” 2002). By the end of September
orders for flags had increased 10-fold 1

Additional expressions of patriotic spirit were apparent in the creation of items like
9/11 bumper stickers that included messages such as “9/11: Never Again.” Greeting card
companies created cards that could be either sent to those who had lost loved ones or
given simply to inspire people to believe in the country and its ability to recover.
Advertisements emphasized U.S.-made products and encouraged consumers to “buy
American.” In fact, in the weeks after the attacks patriotism was often linked to shopping,
as then President George W. Bush suggested in his 8:30 p.m., September 11
speech in which he assured the people of the United States that the nation was still
“open for business” (Bush, 2001, para. 9).
Another example of post-9/11 patriotism was the 9/11 Ribbon, sometimes called
the “loyalty ribbon,” which appeared within days of the attacks. The first ribbon,
attributed to graphic artist Robert M. “Bob” West, was posted on the Internet as an
animated image of red, white, and blue ribbon tied around a flickering candle and
marked with the tragic date. The image was downloaded, reproduced, and eventually
transformed into different variations including cloth-loop ribbons and metal pins
sometimes embellished with images of the Twin Towers or the date 2

One of the most common responses was a renewed interest in hearth and home.
Known as “cocooning” or “nesting,” this trend emphasized home life and time spent
with family. The most obvious manifestation of cocooning could be seen in the sales
of specific home and home-related items, which increased in the weeks and months
after 9/11. Home furnishings, for example, were purchased in large numbers in the
months after the attacks. Popular stores such as Pottery Barn reported increased sales
in upholstered furniture, while Martha Stewart’s home goods sales—both in her catalog
and online—also showed growth after September 11. Earnings at do-it-yourself stores
also saw increases. Home Depot, for example, reported record sales in the quarter after
the attacks (McGuigan, 2001). Home magazines, also called “shelter magazines,”
similarly rose in popularity after the attacks with more than 40 new titles appearing
on stands in 2002 (Lloyd, 2004).
Other evidence of the nesting trend was also apparent. DVD rentals—which
increased by some accounts as much as 10 percent—reflected the nation’s desire to
stay close to home rather than venture out for entertainment (Sporich, 2001). Baking
goods supplies and cookbooks for foods such as soup also saw greater sales numbers as
people sought comfort in the familiar acts of cooking and baking (Streisand, 2001).
Comfort foods in general—such as macaroni and cheese, stews, and other nourishing
hearty meals—found renewed popularity at dinner tables across the country. Americans
also became more interested in doing crafts and hobbies after September 11. According
to the National Needleworkers Association, yarn sales grew by 40 percent a year after
September 11. Sewing machines and craft sales increased as well 3

Spontaneous
gatherings sprang up across the country, from the crash sites where vigils were
held in honor of victims, to small towns and large cities where people felt drawn to
interact with others during the time of crisis. People reported they felt closer to their
neighbors, were more likely to greet strangers on the street, and experienced a general
increased sense of humanity in the period directly after the attacks. While these feelings
dissipated as life returned to normal, many still associate the terrible events of
9/11 with memories of kindness among strangers and support within communities. 3

Many Americans turned to religion as a way to cope with the events of September 11.
Churches, mosques, and synagogues reported a surge in the number of worshippers
whose interest ranged from attending organized services to simply finding a sacred
place to pray. A Time/CNN poll (2001) reported that 57 percent of the people
surveyed said they had “thought more about the spiritual part” of their life since the
attacks. Attendance at religious services was not the only way Americans expressed
their revival of faith. In the days after the attacks Bible sales increased 42 percent over
the same time period the prior year, and Christian crosses were popular items at
jewelers 4
Going hand-in-hand with the increased attendance at religious services, a spirit of
volunteerism and philanthropy marked post-9/11 life. From money to time, Americans
gave of their resources and themselves to support 9/11 victims, survivors, and the recovery
effort. One poll determined that 7 out of 10 Americans gave money or material
goods after the attacks and that by October 22, just six weeks later, the total funds raised
in response to September 11—$934 million—was the largest in the nation’s history of
financial aid (Cannon, Shapiro, & Perry, 2001, para. 3). From popular musicians
like Mick Jagger and Paul McCartney, who were featured in a benefit concert, to
high-profile politicians such as former President Bill Clinton and former Senator Bob
Dole, who raised scholarship money for children who lost a parent in the attacks, there
was no lack of effort or generosity. Proceeds of many books about 9/11, as well as
memorial objects, were donated to charities set up specifically to help the families of
victims and other relief efforts. 4

People from all over the world volunteered their time,

especially at Ground Zero, during the recovery effort. From donating blood to
serving food at Ground Zero, Americans gave their time and energy wherever
they were needed. 4

Volunteers showed up in droves to serve food, give massages, donate blankets and
clothes, or offer counseling to those engaged in the grim recovery process. 5

The first post-9/11 holidays gave Americans the chance to reflect on, and respond to,
the changes the attacks had rendered on the country. Halloween’s usual emphasis on
ghosts and goblins was tempered by awareness of the lives lost on September 11.
Thanksgiving offered people a chance to gather together in the face of tragedy, while
New Year’s Eve gave symbolic closure to the difficult year. 5

Premillennial apocalypticism is a belief expressed by some leaders

within evangelical and fundamentalist Christianity. This position claims that the
world is “wrecked” and will continue to decline until the End of Days (Balmer, 2006,
p. 147). More specifically, according to Preston Shires (2007) it is believed that
Americans will play a role in the unfolding of such biblical prophecy. Hailing from this
perspective, after 9/11 some prominent Christian conservatives referred to the terrorist
attacks as either evidence of God’s judgment or the approaching End of Days. For
example, during an appearance on network television, Anne Graham Lotz, daughter
of evangelist Billy Graham, suggested that the attacks on 9/11 were a result of secularization
within the public school system. The result was the removal of God’s protection
(Lotz, 2006). In another interpretation, Jerry Falwell claimed the attacks were caused
by people with alternative lifestyles, including gays and lesbians 5

Costumes usually advertised as appropriate

for Halloween—those celebrating blood and gore, bones and ghosts—seemed too
closely associated with the real events of September 11. 6

The most popular costumes of the season reflected a patriotic spirit: firefighters,
police officers, soldiers, Uncle Sam, and the Statue of Liberty were best sellers.
Especially popular were masks of U.S. leaders such as Bill Clinton, George W. Bush,
and—in specific reference to his role in the response to 9/11—Rudy Giuliani. Store
displays featured red, white, and blue rather than the more traditional orange and
black. Many of the large-scale trick-or-treating events at malls were cancelled because
of security concerns and a reluctance by many people to venture out into those and
other public spaces. In contrast, small-town and neighborhood events flourished.
Events that a year earlier would have seemed entirely appropriate in their
Halloween-themed emphasis on death and gore were renamed or reshaped out of
respect for the real death and destruction that had occurred just a month earlier. In contrast to
Halloween’s customs, which were altered in response to post-9/11
sentiment, Thanksgiving’s traditions seemed to reflect exactly the mood of American
culture. The literal meaning of the holiday—to give thanks—captured the sense of
gratitude Americans felt for their nation and their lives, for the lives of the 9/11 victims,
and for the heroism of those who aided in the recovery. Connecting with family
and friends, as is typical on Thanksgiving Day, registered the post-9/11 surge in caring
and outreach to others. Americans made extra efforts to gather together for the 2001
Thanksgiving holiday. A Time magazine poll found that approximately three-fourths
of those surveyed believed they were “more appreciative” on Thanksgiving 2001 than
they had been in the past6

Christmas’s emphasis on shopping as an expression of patriotism was apparent

during the holiday season. Increased sales ranged across the spectrum of gifts. Religious
items such as Bibles and crosses were popular, as were gifts that supported the
country’s nesting trend such as DVD players, an item that increased 50 percent in
sales from the year before. Classic children’s toys—rescue heroes, G.I. Joe, and
Shrinky Dinks—found their way into homes across the country reflecting nostalgia
for the “simpler times” of the past (Song & van Dyk, 2001). Traditional red and green
Christmas cards were supplemented by Hallmark’s best-selling cards sporting patriotic
greetings in red, white, and blue. 7

On New Year’s Eve, for

example, there was high security at public celebrations such as the traditional Times
Square countdown and ball drop. Backpacks and bags were examined at numerous
checkpoints, and 7,000 police officers were on duty. Despite the new restrictions
around gathering in public spaces, large numbers of revelers came out for the celebration
registering a patriotic spirit and belief in the future. New Year’s Eve in Times
Square was not only about celebration, however. In 2001, the crystal ball that drops
every year at midnight was inscribed with the names of Americans who had been lost
in the 9/11 attacks, as well as the names of other countries who had lost citizens 7

Another significant holiday was July 4, 2002, the first Independence Day after the
attacks. The Fourth of July was marked by both high security and patriotic celebrations.
No-fly zones were enforced over national monuments and major cities such as
New York and Washington, D.C., while across the country increased police presence
and security checkpoints were apparent at public gathering places 7

TV programming in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 focused exclusively on

coverage of the attacks. Capturing the events live during regularly scheduled shows,
the TV and cable networks worked together to provide viewers with correct and
up-to-date information. Within a week, many viewers had fatigued of the intense coverage
of the attacks and their aftermath, and networks sought to return to regularly
scheduled programming. Not all was as it had been prior to September 11, however.
Shows that seemed inappropriate in light of the attacks were edited or held from
release. Televised benefits, hosted by Hollywood stars and TV personalities, aired to
raise money for the families of victims. 9

Movie theaters followed a similar path, holding off on releasing films with
excessive violence or destruction, altering scenes and plots deemed too evocative of
the attacks, and promoting positive images of Americans and the United States. As
time went by, however, movies reclaimed their place as a popular form of entertainment
and provided viewers much needed relief from daily realities. Harry Potter and
the Sorcerer’s Stone (2001), Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring (2001), and
Zoolander (2001) were especially welcome movies in the weeks and months following
9/11 9

One of the most immediate and long-lasting changes to life after September 11
involved travel and security. On the day of the attacks, the Federal Aviation Association
(FAA) closed airspace across the country for several days, leaving the skies empty
and quiet in the aftermath. Flights scheduled to land in the United States were
diverted to Mexico and Canada, leaving passengers temporarily stranded or forced
to find their own way to their destination. When air travel resumed on September 13,
airport security was at an all-time high with new policies and procedures in place. Sky
marshals were assigned to travel undercover on planes, especially those flying in and
out of major U.S. cities. Armed guards were on duty at many airports for weeks after
the attacks. Most significant for travelers, however, were the newly enforced security
guidelines. Restrictions on what could and could not be carried onto planes meant
that airport security checks took long periods of time, and travelers were forced to
adjust to changes in carry-on luggage requirements. 11

In addition to airspace being shut down and heavily monitored, some public venues
and tourist attractions were closed or evacuated on September 11 and afterwards.
Closings included the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island, a number of state capitols,
national landmarks such as the Space Needle in Seattle,Washington, federal buildings
throughout Washington, D.C., and the Washington Monument. While most
reopened relatively quickly, the Statue of Liberty remained shut until the summer of
2009. 12

Other changes to the nation’s security were apparent in creation of the Patriot Act,
the Homeland Security Advisory System, and the Department of Homeland Security.
The USA Patriot Act, popularly called simply the Patriot Act, was signed into law on
October 26, 2001. In the name of protecting the United States from further terrorist
attacks, the law gave the government unprecedented access to the records of everyday
citizens, including e-mails, telephone calls, financial statements, and library records.
These changes had implications for Americans long after 9/11, shifting the landscape
of civil liberties indefinitely. While many Americans accepted the changes in order to
feel more secure after the attacks, others resisted what was considered an invasion of
privacy, pushing back in public ways against the new regulations.
Shortly after the attacks, then President Bush put into motion the establishment of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a government agency created to oversee
the American homeland and protect the country against acts or threats of terror.
In March 2002, a new Homeland Security Advisory System was released to the public
consisting of color-coded levels of threats to the country. The threat levels—red being
a severe risk of threat and blue being a low risk of threat—became familiar to Americans
in the years after September 11. 12

While new laws and agencies were created to protect the country, particular groups
within the nation’s borders faced intimidation and threats because of the color of their
skin, their dress, or their clothing. Arab Americans and those practicing the Muslim
faith were particular targets because they appeared to be of a similar background to
the hijackers. In fact, between September 11 and September 13, 2001, the Council
on American-Islamic Relations reported receiving “more than 300 reports of harassment
and abuse . . . nearly half the number it received all” the previous year (“Hate
Crime,” 2002, para. 2). Local and national groups fought to educate Americans about
the Islamic religion and to keep people safe regardless of their beliefs or appearance.
Another form of terrorism also haunted Americans in themonths after September 11.
In addition to concerns about attacks on buildings or forms of transport, biological
weapons—specifically anthrax—frightened people across the country as cases of the
weapons being delivered through the daily mail were reported in New York and Florida. 12

Americans’ interpretation of the world after 9/11 was impacted by President Bush’s use
of the iconic cowboy to frame his foreign policy in simplistic terms of good versus evil.
Long an icon in American culture, the cowboy’s association with good and bad, righteous
justice, protection of Edenic communities, and the eradication of a threat from a
new frontier made the cowboy an ideal figure for the President to use in generating
support for his post-9/11 foreign policy goals. A week after the attacks, for example,
Bush evoked the cowboy when he claimed: “I want justice. There’s an old poster out
West, as I recall, that said, ‘Wanted: Dead or Alive’” (Bush, 2001). When the press
questioned the President about his reference, he recalled, “When I was a kid I remember
that they used to put out there in the Old West, a wanted poster. It said ‘Wanted
Dead or Alive.’ All I want and America wants him [Osama bin Laden] brought to
justice” (Bush, 2001).
In response to the President’s remarks, three New York newspapers printed headlines
reading “Wanted: Dead or Alive,” with a picture of bin Laden underneath the
emblazoned words (Chetwynd, 2001, p. 1). The New York Post printed “a double page
pullout ‘Wanted: Dead or Alive’ poster that could be seen pasted on shop windows and
vehicles around the city, sometimes with the ‘Alive’ scratched out” (Chetwynd, 2001).
T-shirts with the saying also proliferated in kiosks across the country (Stein, 2001). By
employing the iconic cowboy, Bush drew upon a historical myth that resonated with
most Americans. Popular culture took hold of the cowboy narrative that helped
channel feelings of anger and revenge in the aftermath of September 11. 14

In the aftermath of September 11, video games were faced with a particular visual
dilemma: Would the images they typically include be inappropriate for a nation so
deeply impacted by the attacks? Several companies withdrew their games from the
shelves or temporarily held back release dates. Activision’s “Spider-Man 2 Enter:
Electro,” for example, was delayed in its release because twin buildings suggestive of
the Twin Towers appeared in game. The logo of Arush Entertainment’s “Duke Nukem:
Manhattan Project”—which included the World Trade Center—was removed from its
Web site. Microsoft deleted images of the World Trade Center from its popular “PC
Flight Simulator,” a computer game in which players learn to fly airplanes. As one
spokesperson stated, “We don’t want to have any imagery in there that would upset
anyone” (“Game Makers,” para. 6). Despite such concerns, in 2003 “9–11 Survivor”
was briefly available on the Internet. The game placed the player in the burning Twin
Towers from which the player must try to escape. In 2008, a French company released
“New York Defender.” The object of the game is to prevent planes from hitting towers;
players do so by shooting the planes down. Families of the 9/11 victims expressed outrage
at the game’s premise, despite the fact that the company said they just wanted to
teach players a lesson about terrorism 18

a physical and ritualistic way through which Americans

can display their patriotism. Sometimes called “sacred consumerism,”42

One object that offered people the chance to participate in sacred consumerism is
the September 11 commemorative coin designed and distributed by the National
Collector’s Mint. Minted from silver that was housed in a vault beneath the World
Trade Center towers, the coin features a gold bust of the World Trade Center towers
that pops up to stand perpendicular to the coin when a tab is pressed on the coin
itself. In its physical representation of the fallen towers, the coin connects the purchaser
to the event much like religious relics or souvenirs because it is actually made
from material from the disaster site. The bust of the towers standing on the coin, and
standing in for the real towers which no longer exist, is symbolic of a set of American
ideals—that are supposed to bind together a community who shares those ideas. By
purchasing the coin, individuals imaginatively participate in that community and
uphold those ideas 42

All of these purchasable relics—the commemorative coin, the snow-globe, the

“I Heart NY” T-shirt, or even a “Support Our Troops” magnetic ribbon—are meant
to be identified with, and to imbue their beholders with, a national identity as
Americans. More than this, because the objects are instilled with a sense of sacredness,
they give the memory of September 11 more meaning. 42

Identifying the media’s role in a time of crisis is not a new concept. Graber (1980)
claims that during crises there are three notable stages in news media coverage. First,
the media provides information to the general public and public officials. Second, the
media tries to make sense out of the situation. Third, the media begins to frame and discuss
the crisis in long-term and big-picture perspectives. 51

Like the rest of the country, the news media was caught off guard on September 11,
2001. After it became clear that the first plane crashes in New York City were not accidental,
the news media worked together to convey information about the unfolding
events to the public, pooling resources in unprecedented ways to do so. In the attacks’
aftermath, the events of September 11 maintained a presence on television, radio,
newspapers, and the Internet evolving over time from around-the-clock broadcast
coverage to daily stories to routine coverage. Digital archives of September 11-
oriented material were created, and along with numerous Web sites, maintain an
online presence today as available resources. 62

An opinion poll released a week after the tragedies of September 11, 2001, found that
although most Americans wanted some sort of action against the terrorists and
favored the assassination of Osama bin Laden, many did not like the idea of military
operations in a country they had never heard of; people were uncomfortable with the
bombing of a distant nation. To appease these skeptics, the George W. Bush
administration decided to use what today has become a common and recognizable
image—the image of a burqa-clad Afghani woman. Video news packages released
by the White House featuring the shrouded women were immediately picked up by
mainstream as well as by alternative news outlets such as feminist Web sites and
magazines. The images of these women were so racially charged that within a few days
another poll showed that a majority of Americans were now in favor of the war. 74

eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury

European scholarship and travel writing constructed a very careful
and specific image of the East, or the Orient. In contrast to the West, the East was
depicted as unchanging, mysterious, indolent, and steeped in traditions that
kept them backward (Abu Odeh, 1993; Kabbani, 1994; Lewis; 1996, Lowe, 1991).
The post-September 11 media images of the burqa-clad Afghani woman can be
viewed as an example of Said’s argument; that these images suggest that Eastern
women are stuck in a “backward” culture and need help from theWest, or the United
States.
After September 11, mainstream and feminist media suggested that the Afghani
woman were helpless and weak by the use of a number of photographs. At the height
of the bombing in Afghanistan, Ms. Magazine (see Vol. XII, No. 1, December 2001–
January 2002; Vol. XIII, No. 2, Summer 2003, etc.) and Off Our Backs published 74
several photographs of Afghani women in their burqas. Often the women were
shown alone in a barren landscape, and at times no text accompanied the image.
Readers were never told who the women in the images were, where they came from,
how representative they were of women in their country, and whether they were
wearing the burqa by choice or by force. In photograph after photograph, the
Afghani women were seen as hapless, helpless victims—victimized by their own
faith, culture, and men (see Ong, 1994; Mohanty, 2000 for context).
The November 2001 issue of the feminist publication Off Our Backs, featured six
women in their burqas on the cover. The women were lined up so that only the full
front of two of the women was visible. The black and white photograph was accompanied
by the headline: “Will Bombing Help These Women?” The photograph was
cropped so closely that we cannot see where the women are situated or headed. Other
than what some see as the “offending” burqa, there was nothing in the image to suggest
that these women needed any help. These photographs, shown without any information
about the women themselves, their history, their perspectives, their opinions
about what they are wearing, lead to the veil then becoming a one-dimensional indicator
of gender oppression, marking the Muslim woman as different and in need of
Western help.
The use of these images may have functioned to increase support for the war after
September 11, when the United States began its military operations in Afghanistan.
The images of women in burqas may have suggested to readers that all Afghani
women were victims, oppressed, and hoping to be liberated. 75

Many books, reports, and academic journal articles address numerous facets of news
coverage on and after September 11, discussing topics such as news bias, quality of
reporting, appropriateness of sources, and the presence of American ideals in news
content. A number of topics continue to be addressed in ongoing analyses of news
after the terrorist attacks.
One theme that can be examined is whether or not post-9/11 news coverage served
the political goals and agenda of the Bush administration. For example, an analysis of
9/11 television coverage indicated that images and narratives were present in ways that
reinforced American patriotism and unification as country (Martin & Phelan, 2003).
This unification was the first step to garnering American support for a war or military
strike and that media coverage was constructed in such a way to gain such support 79

The main theme of unity on CNN suggested

that the two political parties were united and were going to support the president.
Reynolds and Barnett (2003) argue,
It is noteworthy that unity was defined in such a narrow way. CNN gave viewers the
perception that because government leaders from the two dominant American political
parties were unified, the entire country was unified. While this most likely accurately
reflected a majority view, it discounted many other available viewpoints that in theory
might have altered, or at least encouraged some substantive debate. CNN’s sources
repeatedly connected the keyword “America” with freedom and other American ideals,
which included the implied notion that it would be un-American to voice political
dissent given the magnitude of the day’s events. 80

The concept of whether the U.S. media was taking on the form of a “patriotic
press,” a term that refers to news content as representative of the views of the
government in order to ease concerns in times of war or uncertainty, was also discussed
after September 11. A Project for Excellence in Journalism (2002) report published
about the post-9/11 media coverage noted that although in the weeks following the
attacks many of the stories in the newspapers and television programs they analyzed
were factual in nature, by November 2001, media coverage had shifted to more analysis,
speculation, and opinion-based content. Within the speculative and opiniondriven
content, aspects of patriotic journalism were identified. Complementing this
shift in content was the decision of many television stations to display patriotic 80
symbols or use patriotic slogans in their reporting. Shortly after the attacks, many cable
news programs were using flags in their broadcasts. Many local television stations
followed the lead of their networks in choosing to display symbols of a patriotic nature,
such as flag lapel pins and flag or red, white, and blue backdrops, or use patriotic
slogans such as “America Stands Together,” “America Fights Back,” and “The Spirit
of America” (Lambe & Begleiter, 2002). This marked a change in broadcast policy;
during the Gulf War in 1991 television journalists did not wear flags on their person,
and patriotic colors and the U.S. flag were not used in newscasts. Not since World
War II had American viewers seen overt displays of patriotism on their television news
screens (Lambe & Begleiter, 2002).81

In comparing the four years prior to 2001 and

the four years since 2001, the Project for Excellence in Journalism noted that minutes
devoted to coverage of terrorismwas up 135 percent, foreign policy was up 102 percent,
and armed conflict was up 69 percent. Coverage of domestic issues decreased. Crime
coverage dipped by 47 percent; science and technology decreased by 50 percent.
Coverage of alcohol and other drug issues decreased by 47 percent. 81

Book covers with

images of cities under attack, plane crashes, or other destructive themes seemed too
close to the very real images running over and over on television screens and in
newspapers. Publishers, aware of the impact such pictures could have on potential
readers, made changes to book jackets. Headwind (2001), for example, a thriller by
John Nance, was released in hardcover six months before the attacks. The cover
illustration showed an airplane careening downward with a blaze of fire pouring from
its tail. The paperback version, released five months after the attacks, depicted the
same plane flying in a takeoff position without the fiery tail 90

Out-of-print books
about the World Trade Center, terrorism, and the Middle East were quickly reissued.
University presses issued online lists of books they believed would be of interest to
readers—on topics from terrorism and Islam to airline security and Osama bin Laden
(Milliot, Zeitchik, & Baker, 2001). Publishers also printed “instant books”—books
published quickly after a significant event occurs. 90

Reflecting the public’s interest in learning more about how and why the attacks had
happened, in the weeks after 9/11 book sales increased around topics related to the
Middle East, the Taliban, Islam, and terrorism. Other popular reading topics were
related to grief and loss as readers sought ways to cope with such a dramatic, unexpected
day in U.S. history. Prophetic books about Nostradamus, who was said to have
predicted the disaster, also found a wide reading audience (Abbott, 2001). Escapist
fiction rose in sales 91

Religious books were also very popular in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Sales at
Family Christian Stores increased 30 percent and pocket Bible sales increased by
150 percent (Fitch, 2001, p. 28). By September 17, titles like the Prophecy Study
Bible (1997) had increased in sales by 80 percent; by September 21, Bible publisher
Zondervan doubled its shipment of Bibles to 1 million copies. Books on non-Christian
religions found new audiences, especially copies of the Koran 91

In contrast to these areas of increased interest, travel books fell in popularity as

Americans adjusted to a world that felt less safe and more unpredictable than ever
before. Many people chose to remain close to home because of uncertainty about
another attack, making travel guides and other materials seem irrelevant to fearful
readers. As part of what became known as the “cocoon” effect—the tendency to stay
safely at home after 9/11 91

The Best-Loved Poems of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, selected by Caroline

Kennedy
Germs—Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad
Fire—Sebastian Junger
War in a Time of Peace—David Halberstam
Crossing Over—John Edward
Twin Towers—Angus Kress
An Open Heart—Dalai Lama
Living a Life That Matters—Harold S. Kushner
The New Jackals—Simon Reeve 92

A year after 9/11, more than 300 books—including approximately 25 best

sellers—had been published about the attacks 94

In the year following 9/11 the nation pondered the impact the attacks would have
on personal and national security. Books interested in these topics explored how the 94
United States had—or possibly would—change in light of terrorism in its own
borders. 95

Analysis of the events leading to 9/11 eventually became available to readers 95

There were, in the immediate aftermath, poems everywhere. Walking around the city
you would see them—stuck on light posts and phone stalls, plastered on the shelters
at bus stops and the walls of subway stations. In neighborhood newspapers the lettersto-
the-editor pages were full of them. Downtown, people scrawled poems in the ash that
covered everything. And on the brick walls of police stations and firehouses, behind
mountains of flowers and between photos of the dead, poetry dominated. . . . There
was something more to be said that only poetry could say. Everybody, apparently, knew
this. (p. ix)
By its nature personal, expressive, and relatively short, poetry became an outlet for
those in and around the World Trade Center, a way to put into words—in even a temporary
way—the overwhelming fear, grief, anger, and disbelief that people were feeling.
The use of poetry to capture the immediate experience of 9/11 extended beyond the
streets of New York City, however. Poems circulated on the Internet, were posted on
Web sites, and eventually gathered in anthologies such as Cohen and Matson’s An Eye
for an Eye Makes the Whole World Blind: Poets on 9/11 (2002) and September 11, 2001:
America Writers Respond (2002) 96

Plays about 9/11 were written and produced relatively quickly. Anne Nelson’s The
Guys, for example, was written in the first months after the attacks and performed in
December 2001. The play, which starred SigourneyWeaver, focuses on the experience
of a New York fire captain and writer who work together in the painful process of
writing eulogies the captain must give for the firefighters he lost in the Twin Towers.
The Guys was later produced as a film also with Weaver in the lead female role. 96

Among the earliest works of fiction to be published about 9/11, Fre´de´ric

Beigbeder’s Windows on the World (2004) tells the story of people trapped at the top
of the North Tower in the Windows on the World restaurant. While there are no
actual records of what occurred on the 110th floor of the North Tower after the plane
hit, other than phone calls and e-mails sent by those who died there, Beigbeder’s story
offers readers a novel organized around each minute of the day—from the first chapter
titled “8:30 a.m.” (just prior to the first plan crashing into the North Tower) to the
last chapter, 102 minutes later, titled “10:29 a.m.,” just 1 minute after the North
Tower collapsed. 97

Standing in contrast to the stark, raw emotion

of the earliest poems and essays written after and about 9/11, these most recent works
of fiction register the fact that time has distanced writers and readers alike from the day’s
events. Here, 9/11 stands as a metaphor, a symbol, for loss, pain, and sometimes renewal
quite distinct from the earlier words that recorded raw emotion, shock, and awe. 98

Initial writings focused on representing and witnessing the attacks. As time went by,
the need to record shifted to the need to understand, to analyze, even to question
and synthesize the events that shook the nation on that fall day in 2001. From poetry
and novels to comics and nonfiction, books engaged with 9/11. They serve as a “cultural
response to national wounds that are sustained intimately, by ordinary citizens 102

Similar to the choices made by Hollywood

executives regarding the release of certain films, television executives also cancelled
planned television airings of movies deemed insensitive in the wake of the terrorist
attacks. For example, the terrorist film, The Siege (1998), the violent movie, Lethal
Weapon (1987), and the New York City destroyer film, King Kong (1933), were replaced
with films considered less disturbing to audiences, such as Look Who’s Talking (2005),
Grease (1978), and Jaws (1975) (Spigel, 2004). A made-for-TV terrorist movie, originally
titled Ground Zero and slated to air in the fall of 2001, was shelved by NBC until
2003 and released under the name Critical Assembly (Erickson, 2003). In addition, a
scene with an exploding airplane was edited out of an episode of Fox’s 24 (2001–
2010); an episode of CBS’s The Agency (2001–2003), which featured an anthrax
attack was cancelled; and NBC’s UC: Undercover (2001–2002) eliminated a script
with a terrorist plot (Spigel, 2004). In general, the television industry hoped to provide
light, escapist entertainment as an alternative to the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks being covered on news programming 132

television comedy immediately began to reflect the new post-9/11 environment.

In general, out of respect for the victims, survivors, and rescue workers still
in the heartbreaking process of recovering and identifying those who had been lost in
the attacks, it was not seen as appropriate to make jokes, laugh, or find humor in the
face of such tragedy. Late-night television comedy shows stopped airing the day of the
attacks and cautiously resumed about a week later. One of the first late-night talk
shows to start up again, Late Night with David Letterman began with Letterman’s
emotional speech praising New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and reflecting 132 on the terrible
circumstances with which New Yorkers were currently faced. Other
comedic talk show hosts followed suit, replacing their opening monologues with serious,
heartfelt speeches. 133

Celebrity appearances on television also reflected the somber state of the nation
and celebrity participation in the first televised events after September 11 focused on
themes of national unity rather than the usual emphasis on self-promotion or gossip.
For example, on September 21, 2001, the major television networks collaborated to
broadcast America: A Tribute to Heroes (2001), a two-hour telethon where celebrities
raised money for victims’ families. This special was telecast live from New York City,
Los Angeles, and London on more than 320 national broadcast stations and was one
of the most watched programs of the year (Spigel, 2004). America featured a wide
variety of celebrities including musicians, singers, actors, and athletes both performing
and answering phones. In between performances, celebrities would share stories of
those who died or risked their lives on September 11. The following month, a number
of musicians participated in The Concert for New York, a live 9/11 charity performance
at Madison Square Garden that was broadcast on VH-1 and featured a number
of rescue workers who reflected on lost loved ones and introduced the musical
performances. 133

While celebrities would play a role in other fundraising and memorial events, the
53rd Annual Emmy Awards ceremony, usually an anticipated event in Hollywood 133 and on the
networks, was canceled twice because Hollywood was reluctant to flaunt
its usual star-studded glamour during such a difficult time. The ceremony finally aired
on November 4 with a theme of national unity prominently displayed through images
of the U.S. flag, the Statue of Liberty, and historic footage of events such as the Civil
Rights movement. 134

The other widely viewed awards program, The 2002 Academy Awards, carried on as
planned in March. During the ceremony actor and writer Woody Allen, whose films
are known for their celebration of New York City and who had never before accepted
an invitation to the Academy Awards, performed a comedy routine and then introduced
a montage of film clips from films shot in New York City. Allen’s presence
and participation helped mark, and begin to memorialize, the World Trade Center
attacks (“Oscar-Shy Allen’s NY Tribute,” 2002). Later in the program, actor Kevin
Spacey invited people to stand in silence for those who died on September 11. However,
despite these program additions, the nation may have still been reluctant to view
the Hollywood spectacle; viewership of the awards show was the lowest since 1997 134

The initial changes made

by some producers were simple, such as removing the images of the World Trade
Center towers from the opening of HBO’s hit series Sex and the City (1998–2004). 134

As television adjusted to post-

9/11 life, September 11 was woven into the experiences of television characters, rather
than being the focus of stand-alone episodes. 135

The Flight That Fought Back (2005) offers a documentary account of the events aboard
United Airlines Flight 93 based on the small amount of available information. Scenes
mixed reenactments of what took place aboard the plane, and the experiences of passengers’
families on the ground, with interviews of family members and voice recordings
drawn from cell-phone conversations (Craig & Goodison, 2005). Directed by Bruce
Goodison and using no well-known actors, the film first aired on September 8, 2005,
on the Discovery Channel, and takes a more general approach to the topic, chronicling
the hijacking and the passengers’ response without focusing too closely on any specific
individuals.
Flight 93 (2006) offers amore fully dramatized account of the events aboard Flight 93,
using recognizable actors (including Jeffrey Nordling as Tom Burnett, Brennan Elliott as
Todd Beamer, Ty Olsson as Mark Bingham, Colin Glazer as Jeremy Glick, and Kendall
Cross as Deena Burnett) to portray the passengers and family members on the ground,
while also augmenting the narrative with use of the cell-phone voice recordings
(Gerber & Markle, 2006). Directed by Peter Markle, the film first aired on January 30,
2006, on A&E, and centers on the purported revolt effort led by Burnett, Beamer,
Bingham, and Glick. 138

ABC’s miniseries, The Path to 9/11 (2006) told the story of

government officials who have been tracking Osama bin Laden for the majority of their
careers, notably John P. O’Neill (played by Harvey Keitel) who was killed in the World
Trade Center attacks. The five-hour docudrama hones in on the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and identifies the events that led to the attacks on September 11,
2001. The series also highlights bureaucratic battles within the government, particularly
between the CIA and FBI, and is critical of the Clinton administration. Although its
narrative was culled from The 9/11 Commission Report and a variety of government
interviews, many of the scenes are fictitious, and members of the 9/11 Commission were
critical of what they labeled distortions in the program 138

On television, quick alterations of program content eventually were replaced with

an integration of the post-9/11 environment into entertainment programming. In
response to the terrorist attacks, some programs made minor alterations to their content
while others purposefully integrated content related to September 11 into their
programming. Over time, existing television programs reflected the post-9/11 environment
by altering their scripts to incorporate new aspects of life after 9/11. Newly
conceived television programs addressed life after September 11 with a focus on the
military, counterterrorism units, and characters who find themselves in uncertain
times. 143

When the planes crashed into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, it looked—
for a moment at least—like something out of a movie. Long the focal point of action
films containing dramatic, extravagant scenes of destruction, New York City had been
attacked on the big screen so often that the images of such attacks were oddly familiar.
As the facts about what was actually happening in New York became clear, however, it
was quickly and frighteningly apparent that the attacks were not the result of special
effects, stunt artists, or Hollywood’s imagination. This time, the city—along with
Washington, D.C.—was under attack for real.
The close relationship between New York City and Hollywood movies made the
film industry’s response to 9/11 especially interesting. Since their origins in the
1920s, moving pictures, as they were once called, have reflected a culture’s concerns,
beliefs, uncertainties, and ideals. At the same time, films have shaped the way members
of a culture understand and interpret the events, ideas, and changes that inevitably
change during a given time. After September 11, filmmakers across the board were
unsure how to proceed. Would audiences seek escape in movie entertainment? What
types of entertainment were appropriate? Would new forms of movies draw viewers’
attention in the aftermath of the attacks?
The answers to such questions unfolded in the weeks, months, and years after
September 11. Changes to films in production were immediately made. Images of
the Twin Towers or scenes of death and destruction were eliminated to respect the
nation’s understandable sensitivity to such imagery. Release schedules were altered so
that films deemed possibly upsetting to audiences were held, and more comforting
lighthearted movies were distributed. In light of both the attacks on U.S. soil, and
the military response to those attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, films with themes of
patriotism were encouraged by the Bush administration, and Hollywood responded. 196

At least 45 films were cancelled, altered, or delayed. Of particular

concern were images of the Twin Towers, which were commonly included in films set in
New York City. After the attacks, the Twin Towers were quickly edited out of comedies
such as Zoolander (2001), Serendipity (2001), and Kissing Jessica Stein (2001) (Germain,
2002). Similarly, Men in Black II’s (2002) ending was reshot to include the Chrysler
Building in the final sequence rather than the Twin Towers (Bell-Metereau, 2004).
Some filmmakers elected to leave the Twin Towers in their films but made different
choices about where and when in the film the images would appear. For example, the
Spider-Man (2001) trailer contained an action scene in which a helicopter is captured
in Spider-Man’s web—a web that is woven and hung between the Twin Towers. Both
the trailer and the action scene in the film were pulled after the attacks.However, scenes
of the Twin Towers were not entirely edited out of the movie and remained part of the
scenic backdrop of the film.
In addition to changes made to images of the Twin Towers, films with terrorism
plots were also put on hold for release. For example, the Schwarzenegger terrorist
action-film, Collateral Damage (2002), initially slated for a fall 2001 opening, was
delayed until April 2002, and the film’sWeb site was edited to omit the gamesWeb site
visitors could play, which included tracking of terrorists (Horrmann, 2002). Big
Trouble (2002) was also postponed until April 2002 because the plot included a bomb
on an airplane. 174

The government’s choice to launch a military “war on terrorism” in

response to September 11 also placed the industry in an unusual position. According
to CNN, then President Bush asked his advisors to meet with top Hollywood
representatives to see how they could help with the war effort and whether films could
provide “patriotic escape” to the nation’s viewers (“Uncle Sam,” 2001). In accordance
with this request, in November 2001 then Senior White House Advisor Karl Rove led
a group of senior officials to Hollywood to meet with studio executives as part of a
series of meetings. CNN reported that Rove was concerned that a poor filmic image
of the United States could negatively influence international support for the war,
and the administration hoped that moviemakers would make films in line with the
campaign against terrorism (“Uncle Sam,” 2001).
According to the New York Times, at the meeting Rove made suggestions to executives
that Hollywood could help clarify the war was on terrorism and not Islam;
encourage volunteerism across the country; and organize entertainment and support
for U.S. troops and the families 175

Described as an accidental
product, the documentary 9/11 (2002) is perhaps the most accurate account of what
happened in New York on September 11, 2001. At the time, brothers Jules and
Gedeon Naudet were in the city filming a documentary about a New York City firefighter.
On the morning of September 11, both brothers were filming in different
locations and turned their attention to the attacks, rescue operations, and reactions
of the firefighters as the situation unfolded. With the help of New York City firefighter,
James Hanlon, the footage was edited into a documentary 176

One of the most notable and popular films to be released about 9/11 was Michael
Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004). Moore, known for his prior movies, Roger and
Me (1989) and Bowling for Columbine (2002), uses documentary filmmaking as a tool
to raise issues, pose questions, criticize the government, share documented information,
entertain, and make people laugh. Moore won an Academy Award for his 2002 film,
Bowling for Columbine, and generated significant press for Fahrenheit 9/11 in advance
of its release, stating that he hoped it would impact the upcoming presidential elections
(Higgins, 2004). Fahrenheit 9/11, with a title that conjures up the Ray Bradbury
science-fiction novel, Fahrenheit 451, about a dysfunctional society, is a critical documentary
that questions then President GeorgeW. Bush and his administration’s foreign
policy, reaction to the events of 9/11, and decision to go to war. Moore argues in the
film that the terrorist attacks were unfairly and dishonestly used by the Bush
administration to justify and garner support for a war in Iraq.
In its first weekend of release, Fahrenheit 9/11 was number one at the box office, and
in its first month earned more than $100 million, an amount never seen before for a
nonfiction film (Toplin, 2006). Considerable controversy surrounded the film and
Moore’s somewhat unique approach to documentary filmmaking. When Fahrenheit 9/11
was released in 2004, George W. Bush was running for reelection, the United States
was fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and there was considerable public debate
about the Iraq war. The film impacted national politics and prompted a number of
responses from politicians, pundits, film critics, and scholars.Much of the controversy
surrounding Fahrenheit 9/11 were heated debates over whether or not it was a true
documentary; a label many felt was disingenuous to the partisan perspective offered
in the film 178

Hollywood films have regularly depicted scenes in which cities are obliterated, and
New York City has been a favorite target of such destruction. The interest in New
York lies, at least in part, in the fact that the diverse, active city contains recognizable
symbols of U.S. strength and power—including Wall Street, the Empire State Building
and, until 2001, the Twin Towers. The destruction of those symbols—and the city
itself—contributes to dramatic film narrative (Salamone, 2008). Beginning as early as
1933, New York was submerged by a tidal wave in Deluge. In years prior to the terrorist
attacks, the city was attacked and/or destroyed in blockbuster films such as Independence
Day (1996), Mars Attacks (1996), Armageddon (1998), Deep Impact (1998),
Godzilla (1998), and Artificial Intelligence: A.I. (2001).
The September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers seemed, at first, to replicate the
filmic destruction of New York City so familiar to movie goers. The destruction, however,
was not fictional. The images that had once been created for, and contained by,
the big screen were all too real in their impact on lower Manhattan. The question
for filmmakers, then, was when would it once again be acceptable for films to make
New York City the focus of attacks and destruction? 180

Within a few years, this question was answered as newly released films featured
attacks on New York. Such films were perhaps deliberately fantastic so as to maintain
some distance from both the real events of 9/11 and more representative 9/11 films
such as World Trade Center. In The Day after Tomorrow (2004), for example, New York
is largely destroyed by first a tidal wave and then a new Ice Age as a result of global
warming. King Kong (2005) re-creates a 1930s New York terrorized by the now iconic
beast, another example of New York under attack. I Am Legend (2007) projects New
York into the year 2012 where a lone scientist works in the destroyed city to cure a disease
that transformed some people into terrifying mutants and killed many others.
Most notably perhaps, Cloverfield (2008) depictsManhattan under attack by a monster.
The film’s visuals can be read as references to the attacks: The streets are cloudy and
smoky; the Chrysler Building collapses; reams of paper fall from the sky; and the head
of the Statue of Liberty falls into the city streets.
The first films to return to the familiar images of New York City under attack were
well received. 180

Lists of top grossing movies obtained from the InternetMovie Data

Base for the years following 2001 show that the top selling movies fell into identifiable
categories: novel adaptations (such as four Harry Potter films in 2002, 2004, 2005,
2007; The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers in 2002, and The Return of the King
in 2003; The Chronicles of Narnia: The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe in 2005);
family films (such as Ice Age in 2002, Finding Nemo and Elf in 2003, Shark Tale
in 2004, and Happy Feet in 2006); blockbuster sequels (such as Terminator 3: Rise of
the Machines; StarWars: Episode III—Revenge of the Sith in 2005; and National Treasure:
Book of Secrets in 2007); and superhero movies. 181

Other films addressed the post-9/11 culture metaphorically. New York Times
critic Stephen Farber (2005) noted that by 2005 a number of apolitical films focussing
on grief, anger, and profound sadness, were on the horizon. Films such as Hide 182 and Seek (2005), Fear
X (2003), Winter Solstice (2004), Bereft (2004), Imaginary
Heroes (2004), and The Upside of Anger (2005) all contained characters who suffered
immeasurable, long-standing grief after a traumatic event, perhaps representing the
post-9/11 zeitgeist of a nation still trying to come to terms with loss. 183

Comedies about the political world post-9/11 were scarce 185

After the terrorist attacks, a number of war-oriented films made their way to the big
screen. 185
Despite the increase in war-oriented films, however, by Hollywood standards these
films did not perform well at the box office 185
[Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker did for the Iraq War what Oliver Stone’s Platoon did for Vietnam two
decades before: give audiences a down-and-dirty look at what it was like to be in the middle of the
conflict. Based on the wartime experiences of journalist Mark Boal, the film follows an Army Explosive
Ordnance Disposal team around Baghdad as it goes about its job of defusing IEDs. Stuffed with
suspenseful scenes, The Hurt Locker is an intense ride, with Jeremy Renner giving a memorable
performance as the team’s lead specialist, perched between confidence and insanity. 2009 -- 7]

After the attacks on September 11, the film industry first reacted by altering release
dates of films and editing or reshooting imagery of the World Trade Center towers.
Within a few years, films about 9/11 were released, and films that were reflective of
the post-9/11 zeitgeist of uncertainty, mourning, anger, and fear became part of the
cinematic landscape. Different types of military-oriented films surfaced, and 185 Hollywood eventually
returned to producing its standard fare of violent films where
cities and people were under attack. A number of prominent directors addressed the
events of September 11 directly or metaphorically in their work as the years passed. 186

An overview of popular music related to 9/11 provides a unique opportunity to

explore the connections between music and the political world. There are many
examples of music that supply different interpretations of 9/11 and the event’s lasting
impact on the United States. Through this lens, perhaps, lessons can be learned that
will prove useful in understanding the impact of a major national crisis on popular
music. Popular music supplied a variety of responses to 9/11; some were immediately
evident, whereas others took more time to emerge. In the days after the terrorist
attacks new releases, album art, and lyrics were delayed or changed. Benefit concerts,
albums, and singles were produced to raise money for 9/11 victims. At the same time,
the concert industry experienced tour cancellations from international performers.
Long-term responses included a diverse collection of musical styles that interpreted
and reflected on the consequences of the terrorist attacks and the world that emerged
in its aftermath. 213
Most
of this self-censorship took place during a period of time when the nation was in a
siege-like mentality, overwhelmed with raw emotions, and uncertain whether
additional terrorist attacks were forthcoming. A number of changes were related to
titles, song titles, and even musical group names that now seemed inappropriate in their
initial forms. For example, the DaveMatthews Band decided not to release “When the
World Ends” (2001) as a single. The Strokes dropped the song “New York City Cops”
from the U.S. version of “Is This It” (2001), which necessitated a recall of the copies
that had already been distributed. The band Bush changed the title of the single “Speed
Kills” to “The People That We Love” (2001). An electronic group called, prior to the
9/11 attacks, I Am World Trade Center released an album whose track 11 was coincidently
titled “September” (2001). As a result of allegations of exploiting the tragedy,
even though the song and album were produced prior to the terrorist attacks, the group
changed their name to I Am the World for a short period of time 214

The attacks prompted changes to music visuals as well. Imagery that once was seen
as edgy or provocative now could be labeled insensitive, and in some cases, ironic. For
example, the Cranberries recalled the video for their song “Analyse” (2001) because it
contained images of an airplane flying over two skyscrapers. Album cover artwork
produced prior to September 11 that depicted the World Trade Center in distress
was recalled and replaced. 214

The world’s largest radio network, Clear Channel, sent a memo to its radio stations
soon after the attacks on September 11. In it, the network listed about 150 songs that
were “recommended” to be eliminated from airplay because of assumptions that lyrics
would be perceived as offensive or otherwise problematic (“America under Attack,”
2001). The so-called “banned songs” list included titles such as Billy Joel’s “Only the
Good Die Young”(1977), AC/DC’s “Safe in New York City” (2000), Drowning Pool’s
“Bodies” (2001), the Beatles’ “Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds” (1967), and Dave Matthews
Band’s “Crash into Me”(1997) 214

Dream Theater’s September 11, 2001, release of Live

Scenes from New York was immediately recalled to change the cover image because it
initially featured an image of the New York skyline, including the World Trade
Center, in flames. 215

The
music community was quick to take an active role in organizing and participating in
benefit concerts to honor victims, recognize emergency response workers, and raise
funds. 215

On October 2, 2001, at Radio City Music

Hall, the previously scheduled Come Together: A Night for John Lennon’s Words and
Music expanded the focus of the concert for the additional purpose of marking the
9/11 attacks. Performers who participated in the concert included the Dave Matthews
Band, Nelly Furtado, Moby, and Stone Temple Pilots. The Concert for New York City,
organized by Paul McCartney, took place on October 20, 2001, at Madison Square
Garden. The audience consisted of New York fire department and police personnel
and their family members who listened to performers such as The Who, David Bowie,
Five for Fighting, Jay Z, Elton John, Destiny’s Child,Mick Jagger, Keith Richards, and
others. On October 21, 2001, United We Stand: What More Can I Give? was staged at
the Robert F. KennedyMemorial Stadium (RFK Stadium) inWashington, D.C. It was
taped for broadcast on the ABC television network and featured artists such as James
Brown, America, Rod Stewart, Usher, Janet Jackson, and Pink. The classic rock concert
Volunteers for America took place in Atlanta and Dallas from October 20 through
21, 2001, and it included appearances by Styx, Journey, REO Speedwagon, Peter
Frampton, and Bad Company.
The onslaught of benefit concerts sharply contrasted with the reality of the dramatically
altered live music business because of fears of large public gatherings and a
deteriorating economic climate. On 9/11 and during the subsequent week, much of
the United States came to a standstill: Concerts, along with professional sporting
events, live theater, and other major entertainment events, were cancelled. In the following
months a number of concert tours were canceled 215

On the first anniversary of September 11, choirs around the world participated in a
“Rolling Requiem.” Beginning at the international date line, a series of Mozart
requiems were performed at each time zone’s 8:46 a.m., the time of the first attack
on the World Trade Center. The performances followed the “sun around the world,
providing 24 hours of musical unity, reflection and solace” (Bargreen, 2002, para 3).
Choir members who participated donned heart badges marked with the name of a
person who died in the attacks. 217

After the terrorist attacks, the industry quickly packaged and released music with sales
that would benefit September 11-oriented charities in the form of benefit singles and
albums. Many of these musical compilations were well received by the public. The
music industry also noted the public’s displays of patriotism and responded accordingly.
For example, God Bless America (2001) was an immediate Billboard chart
topper album that contained an assortment of patriotic songs including a rendition
of “God Bless America” by Celine Dion, Frank Sinatra’s “America the Beautiful,”
and Pete Seeger’s “This Land Is Your Land” (Moody, 2001). A live recording of
America: A Tribute to Heroes sold 600,000 copies and the Concert for New York City
live album had sales of 431,000 217

Randy Travis’s “America Will Always

Stand” (2001) was released in October, and proceeds were donated to the American
Red Cross. 218
In time, entire collections of songs were produced about September 11. Bruce
Springsteen’s The Rising (2002) was the number one album in 11 countries the week
it was released.Many of the songs on the album were written after 9/11 and examined
the attacks from a variety of individual perspectives; the album was hailed as the first
significant cultural response to the events that took place on September 11. Given
the subject matter and the popularity of the artist, the release was widely covered
in the press. In addition to the expected reviews in publications such as Rolling Stone,
the mainstream media honed in on Springsteen’s and the E Street Band’s collection
of songs that mainly were written about working people who were personally impacted
by the terrorist attacks. A Time magazine cover story describes the process Springsteen
engaged in while working on the album, which included calling families of those killed
in the attacks and hearing about their loved ones (Tyrangiel, 2002). A provocative
track on the album called “Paradise” demonstrated Springsteen’s willingness to probe
the mindset of suicide bombers. Although some were uncomfortable that The Rising
was marketed as a “September 11 record” and thus was potentially exploitative, the
music was mainly critically acclaimed and positively received by the public. 221

Music has historically been a vehicle for political expression and a means for artists to
both support and challenge government actions. After September 11, a number of
songs emerged that addressed the U.S. government’s response to the terrorist attacks.
A few songs conveyed strong support for military action and retaliation by the U.S.
government. 222

Many songs, however, challenged or protested the way the government handled
September 11 and the aftermath. 222

That Day” (2006), Leonard Cohen, a highly acclaimed former poet laureate of Canada
and vocalist, offered a haunting consideration of 9/11, referring to it as that day “they”
wounded New York. Apart from Cohen’s distinctive vocal style, the song is unique in
the way it raises possible explanations for the attacks without reaching any conclusions. 223
Disagreement among musicians themselves also emerged as some musical artists
began expressing growing resentment at the exploitation of the powerful emotional
responses and profound sacrifices that were caused by the 2001 attacks. Artists such as
Paris, Beastie Boys, Sleater-Kinney, Michael Franti, and Sheryl Crow wrote songs that
reflected their beliefs that the widespread public shock and tragedy experienced after
the terrorist attacks was exploited by the Bush administration to pursue a number of
policies, including, but not limited to, the IraqWar, that were unrelated to 9/11. 229

The 9/11 attacks were themselves visual events, targeted at buildings recognized around
the world as symbols of U.S. life, and captured live by television cameras and photographers.
Visual images played an important role in the days, months, and years after
September 11. Most immediately, they served as visible expressions of the wide range
of emotions surrounding the attacks, as evidenced in the outpouring of spontaneous 260 As the shock of
9/11 wore off, new forms of visual culture appeared. Exhibits and
collections began to give shape to the events surrounding the day and formed narratives
about what had taken place. More recently, the establishment of official museums and
memorials commemorating September 11 suggest that the attacks have become part of
U.S. history and will be stored in the nation’s memory for generations to come. 261

The most complex 9/11 memorial site to be undertaken was in and around Ground
Zero, the location most symbolically associated with the attacks. The earliest memorials
were unveiled on the six-month anniversary. The first, known as “Tribute in
Light,” consisted of two beams of light shining straight into the night sky over Lower
Manhattan. The beams, which were created by searchlights, evoked the presence of
the Twin Towers, which had once soared above the city. Tribute in Light appeared
on the New York skyline every night beginning at dusk between March 11 and
April 14, 2002, and reappeared on each anniversary of the attacks through 2008.
The other memorial, The Sphere, a bronze and steel sculpture that once stood between
the Twin Towers and was recovered from the wreckage at Ground Zero, was installed
in Battery Park with an eternal flame beneath it. A similar object, known as Double
Check, was also reinstalled in its original space near Ground Zero.
A firefighter memorial, known simply as the FDNY Memorial Wall, was among
the first permanent memorials at Ground Zero. Unveiled in June 2006, the mural is
a bronze relief installed on the side of Ten House, the fire station adjacent to where
the Twin Towers stood. The images on the relief tell the story of the station’s 343 firefighters
who fought to save victims of the attacks and died doing so. The name of each
firefighter lost as a result of September 11 is listed on the memorial, which is a popular
site among visitors to Ground Zero 275

The development of a permanent memorial atGround Zero was more complex. The
site itself—the space where the Twin Towers had once stood—became a memorial
almost immediately, drawing mourners from around the world. Visitors left flowers,
messages, flags, and other tokens on the fence that had been erected around the site
creating a shrine around the perimeter. In an effort to both contain and assist visitors
in viewing Ground Zero, the city built viewing platforms in December 2001. At the
same time that the platforms—set 13 feet above the ground and giving a clear view at
the site—were being constructed to meet the immediate needs of mourners, longterm
plans for the reconstruction of Ground Zero were being debated. 276

After much debate and discussion, plans for an official memorial and museum at
Ground Zero were released. A design competition in which 13,683 participants from
63 nations submitted 5,201 proposals resulted in the winning plans for Ground Zero
created by Michael Arad and Peter Walker. Entitled “Reflecting Absence,” the design
selected and being brought to life at the former location of the Twin Towers was
selected for its ability to make “the voids left by the destruction the primary symbols
of our loss. It is a memorial that expresses both the incalculable loss of life and its consoling
renewal, a place where all of us come together to remember from generation to
generation” (www.national911memorial.org).
Known as the National September 11 Memorial and Museum at the World Trade
Center, this complex site includes both a memorial site—meant to recognize the site as
sacred ground—and a museum—meant to educate and inform visitors of the events.
The memorial is being built in the footprint of the Twin Towers, consisting of two
massive pools of water and man-made waterfalls. Names of all those who died in the
9/11 attacks, as well as those who perished in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
will be inscribed around the pool and a Memorial Plaza will surround the pools with
trees and grass. 276

Poljak

IN THE EARLY 1990s, during the heady months that followed

the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the world’s diplomats, statesmen,
and journalists competed to describe and define the shape
of the new, post–Cold War world. The straightforward set of
rules that had governed American foreign policy since the 1940s
no longer applied. Our “friends” were no longer defined by
their anticommunism, and our “enemies” were no longer defined
by their affiliation with the Soviet Union. Many of the
institutions created during the Cold War suddenly seemed irrelevant—
NATO among them—and many of the specialists
who had worked in these institutions suddenly found themselves
at loose ends.
Some of the responses to the new situation were philosophical.
Optimists like Frances Fukuyama claimed that we
had reached the “End of History”: liberal democracy and capitalism
had triumphed, ideological struggle was over for good. 5 Pessimists like Samuel Huntington
predicted the opposite: the
onset of new “civilizational” wars between the West, Islam,
and the Confucian world. Almost unnoticed, a very, very few
people—oddballs like Gary Hart and Peggy Noonan—predicted
that international terrorism would soon threaten American
society, replacing the threat of nuclear war.
In the event, most of the institutional and political responses
to the new situation had very little to do with any of
these schools of thought. Instead, they developed ad hoc, in
response to crises like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or the Balkan
wars. If American policymakers had any philosophy at all, it
was usually a rather superficial version of Fukuyama’s optimism:
the world is getting safer, and our job is to help it get
safer faster. During what will now be remembered as the post–
Cold War era—the long decade that stretched from November
1989 to September 2001—many practitioners of foreign policy 5 did not think much about new
threats that might face the
United States. Instead, they argued about what it meant to
conduct foreign policy in a world without any central threat at
all.
As a result, there was no real organizing American diplomatic
principle to speak of. True, George Bush Senior invented
the phrase the “New World Order.” But he had no policy to go
with it: once the Gulf War ended, the coalition he had built to
fight it quickly fell apart. Bill Clinton did have plenty of policies,
but no philosophy with which to link them. “Nationbuilding”
was the phrase sometimes used to talk about American
policy in the Balkans and in Haiti. “Democracy-promotion”
is perhaps more accurate. In practice, this meant that all
around the world—in China, in Russia, in Malaysia, all over
Africa, and above all in Serbia—the United States lectured and
scolded and promoted its system, complaining about the closure
of opposition newspapers, protesting the incarceration of opposition leaders. Some of these
policies were not new. The United States
had been promoting human rights abroad at least since the era
of Jimmy Carter. In the past, however, democracy-promotion
was part of the Cold War, and could be justified at home and
abroad on those grounds. Promoting democracy for its own sake
turned out to be more difficult, politically, than might have
been expected. 6

From the time of his election, George W. Bush’s

administration had a very different foreign policy agenda from
that of its predecessors. More interested in self-defense, less
interested in self-promotion, the new government had, by the
autumn of 2001, already begun to prepare the American public
and the rest of the world for a long debate about missile defense.
In effect, the administrationwas already thinking about fighting
terrorism, albeit a very specific, missile-guided sort of terrorism.
This was not enough to prepare the United States for the attacks
on New York and Washington, but it did mean that when
the attacks occurred, the Bush administration was able to turn
American foreign policy around very quickly. But the situation
itself also made the government’s task easier. Suddenly, the
War on Terrorism, like the Cold War, provided the administration
with both a practical and a philosophical guide to foreign
policy, of a kind that the United States had not had since 1989.
Within days, the first building blocks of the New New
World Order fell into place. Immediately, we had new allies,
selected not for the quality of their free press but for the degree
of cooperation they seemed likely to provide for the duration
of what is going to be a long struggle against a new kind of
enemy. Notably, they include Russia and China, two states
with which we had previously been at odds. They also include 8

In the wake of the attacks, Hollywood toyed with various

theories about the way it would have to change to fit the new
national mood. No more violent films, some said; until it turned
out that violent films were flying off the shelves at video-rental
stores. No war movies, it was said; until a modest effort called
Behind Enemy Lines made $19 million in its first weekend in
November. 86

A month before the attack, a New York Times-CBS News

poll asked New Yorkers whether they thought the city would
be a better or worse place in which to live in ten or fifteen years:
34 percent said it would be better, and 25 percent said it would
be worse; 32 percent said it would be the same. But in a similar
poll a month after the attack, 54 percent said that in ten or
fifteen years the city would be a better place in which to live,
while only 11 percent said it would be worse; 26 percent said
it would be the same. The poll the month before the attack
also found that 59 percent of New Yorkers thought life in the
city had improved in the previous four years. In the second
poll, taken the month after the attack, even as smoke still rose
from the World Trade Center, 69 percent said they thought life 93 had improved. No doubt that
was an expression of defiance,
but there was something else, too. September 11 had been
horrendous, but it had also awakened a new appreciation of the
city. 94

At the present
time, American foreign policy unquestionably lends credence to the perception,
worldwide, that the United States views its own role in global matters as
assuredly benign, a priori, so that (as in its role in UN peacekeeping efforts
in Bosnia, for instance) it ought not be subject at all to UN-sponsored war
crimes tribunals. 50

Actual history changes the capacity for further history—

and our capacity to understand and judge it. 92