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Daluraya VS oLIVA FULL CASE
Daluraya VS oLIVA FULL CASE
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
MARLA OLIVA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the
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Resolution dated November 22, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
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125113 finding petitioner Antonio L. Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of Marina Arabit
Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite having been acquitted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
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Homicide in connection with the death of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the
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afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing
plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran
her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention,she eventually
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died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle. 7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-
witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading
towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate
number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the
civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mother’s death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz),
who presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police
Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident
and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not
witness the incident. 8
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
(demurrer) asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution
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witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent
evidence of how the incident transpired. 10
In an Order dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC)
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granted Daluraya’s demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It found that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in material details and that they failed to
sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him. Deconstructing the
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testimonies of the prosecution witnesses individually, the MeTC found that: (a) Marla merely testified
on the damages sustained by her family but she failed to identify Daluraya as the driver of the
vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did not identify
Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results; and
(d) PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident, likewise declared thathe did not witness the
same. 13
Marla moved for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in an Order dated November 4, 2010,
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clarifying that the grant of Daluraya’s demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and that reconsideration
of its Order granting Daluraya’s demurrer would violate the latter’s right against double
jeopardy. With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the same, holding
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that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that Daluraya was the person
responsible for Marina Oliva’s demise. 17
Aggrieved, Marla appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC), insisting
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that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya, which finding was not
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In a Decision dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTC’s
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ruling,declaring that "the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist."
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Marla filed a motion for reconsideration which, although filed beyond the reglementary period, was
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nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC found the same without merit and thus, sustained the
factual findings and rulings of the MeTC in its Order dated May 10, 2012. Dissatisfied, Marla
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elevated the case to the CA via petition for review, maintaining that Daluraya must be held civilly
liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC Decision,
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ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of P152,547.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, andP50,000.00 as moral damages. In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC’s Order
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showed that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability. 26
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of evidence to support its finding that Daluraya
must be held civilly liable: (a) the inadmissible sworn statement executed by Daluraya where he
admitted that he drove the subject vehicle which hit Marina Oliva; (b) the conclusion derived from
Serrano’s testimony that the woman he saw crossing the street who was hit by a Nissan Vanette
with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who eventually died, are one and the same; (c) the
Philippine National Police Referral Letter of one Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying
Daluraya as the suspectin the case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the
death of Marina Oliva, and stating that he brought the victim to the Quezon City General Hospital for
treatment but was declared dead on arrival; and (d) the subject vehicle was registered in the name
of Daluraya’s aunt, Gloria Zilmar, who authorized him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC.
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Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated November
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The sole issue advanced for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA was correct in finding
Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. CA, the
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Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects
on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated inRule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. 33
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action doyes not carry with it the extinction of the civil
1âwphi1
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delictmay be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files
a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of
the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court
should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case. 35
(Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist."36
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that Daluraya’s
acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that "the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently
establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against him." Furthermore, when
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Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and
firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the
Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva" and that "there is no competent evidence on hand
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which proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva." 39
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that
Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand
of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on the civil aspect. Records
1âwphi1
disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he
was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed
as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution
dated November 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September 8,2011 and the Order dated May 10,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.