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G.R. No. 125138.

  March 2, 1999.

NICHOLAS Y. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
respondent.

Where a passenger was fully aware of the need to send a letter to a particular office of an airline for the
extension of the period of validity of his ticket, he cannot subsequently use what was done by airline
agents, who acted without authority, in confirming his flights.

FACTS 
On March 27, 1989, the private respondent, Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), issued to the herein
petitioner, Nicholas Cervantes (Cervantes), a round trip plane ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-
Honolulu-Manila, which ticket expressly provided an expiry date of one year from issuance, i.e., until
March 27, 1990. The issuance of the said plane ticket was in compliance with a Compromise Agreement
entered into between the contending parties in two previous suits. 

On March 23, 1990, four days before the expiry date of subject ticket, the petitioner used it. Upon his
arrival in Los Angeles on the same day, he immediately booked his Los Angeles-Manila return ticket with
the PAL office, and it was confirmed for the April 2, 1990 flight. 

On April 2, 1990, when the petitioner checked in at the PAL counter in San Francisco, he was not allowed
to board because his ticket was already expired. 

Aggrieved, petitioner Cervantes filed a Complaint for Damages, for breach of contract of carriage. The
case was dismissed by the RTC for lack of merit. The dismissal was affirmed by CA. 

ISSUES 

1) Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the period of validity
of petitioner’s ticket; (No) 
2) Whether or not the defense of lack of authority was correctly ruled upon; and (Yes) 
3) Whether or not the denial of the award for damages was proper. (Yes) 

RULING 
1) The plane ticket itself provides that it is not valid after March 27, 1990. The ticket constitute the
contract between the parties. It is axiomatic that when the terms are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, contracts are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning. 

In his effort to evade this inevitable conclusion, petitioner theorized that the confirmation by the PAL’s
agents in Los Angeles and San Francisco changed the compromise agreement between the parties. This
contention has no merit. The employees had no authority to do so. Appellant knew this from the very
start when he called up the Legal Department of appellee in the Philippines before he left for the United
States of America. He had first hand knowledge that the ticket in question would expire on March 27,
1990 and that to secure an extension, he would have to file a written request for extension at the PAL’s
office in the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, appellant persisted to use the ticket in question.
Under Article 1898 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do
not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when
the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority,
the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such
limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent, unless the
latter undertook to secure the principal’s ratification. 

2) Petitioner stresses that the alleged lack of authority of the PAL employees was neither raised in the
answer nor in the motion to dismiss. But records show that the question of whether there was authority
on the part of the PAL employees was acted upon by the trial court when Nicholas Cervantes was
presented as a witness and the depositions of the PAL employees were presented.

Notwithstanding PAL’s failure to raise the defense of lack of authority of the said PAL agents in its
answer or in a motion to dismiss, the omission was cured since the said issue was litigated upon. 

3) An award of damages is improper because petitioner failed to show that PAL acted in bad faith in
refusing to allow him to board its plane in San Francisco.

In awarding damages, breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted
fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he could not
use the subject ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. What the
employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence.

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