21-04-02 Ericsson Response Brief CAFC

Case: 21-1565 Document: 25 Page: 1 Filed: 04/02/2021
No. 2021-1565
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
ERICSSON INC., TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS

AMERICA, INC., SAMSUNG RESEARCH AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas
No. 2:20-CV-380, Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap
RESPONSE BRIEF FOR APPELLEES ERICSSON INC.

AND TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON
Theodore Stevenson, III Jeffrey A. Lamken

Nicholas M. Mathews Counsel of Record
MCKOOL SMITH, P.C. Michael G. Pattillo, Jr.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 1500 Rayiner I. Hashem
Dallas, TX 75201 MOLOLAMKEN LLP
(214) 978-4000 (telephone) The Watergate, Suite 500
(214) 978-4044 (facsimile) 600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 556-2000 (telephone)
(202) 556-2001 (facsimile)
[email protected]
Counsel for Ericsson Inc. and Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson

(Additional Counsel Listed on Next Page)
(
Nicholas T. Matich Elizabeth K. Clarke
MCKOOL SMITH, P.C. MOLOLAMKEN LLP
1717 K Street, N.W., Suite 900 300 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 5350
Washington, D.C. 20006 Chicago, IL 60654
(202) 221-6267 (telephone) (312) 450-6700 (telephone)
(212) 402-9444 (facsimile) (312) 450-6701 (facsimile)
Christine M. Woodin Jennifer E. Fischell

MCKOOL SMITH, P.C. MOLOLAMKEN LLP
300 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2900 430 Park Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90071 New York, NY 10022
(213) 694-1200 (telephone) (212) 607-8160 (telephone)
(213) 694-1234 (facsimile) (212) 607-8161 (facsimile)
Blake H. Bailey
MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
600 Travis Street, Suite 7000
Houston, TX 77002
(713) 485-7300 (telephone)
(713) 485-7344 (facsimile)
Samuel F. Baxter
MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
104 E. Houston Street, Suite 300
Marshall, TX 75670
(903) 923-9000 (telephone)
(903) 923-9099 (facsimile)

FORM 9. Certificate of Interest Form 9 (p. 1)

July 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
Case Number 2021-1565

Short Case Caption Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Filing Party/Entity Ericsson Inc.; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson
Instructions: Complete each section of the form. In answering items 2 and 3, be

specific as to which represented entities the answers apply; lack of specificity may
result in non-compliance. Please enter only one item per box; attach
additional pages as needed and check the relevant box. Counsel must
immediately file an amended Certificate of Interest if information changes. Fed.
Cir. R. 47.4(b).
I certify the following information and any attached sheets are accurate and
complete to the best of my knowledge.
04/02/2021
Date: _________________ Signature: /s/ Jeffrey A. Lamken
Name: Jeffrey A. Lamken


July 2020
1. Represented 2. Real Party in 3. Parent Corporations

Entities. Interest. and Stockholders.
Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(1). Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(2). Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(3).
Provide the full names of Provide the full names of Provide the full names of
all entities represented all real parties in interest all parent corporations
by undersigned counsel in for the entities. Do not for the entities and all
this case. list the real parties if publicly held companies
they are the same as the that own 10% or more
entities. stock in the entities.
‫܆‬
✔ None/Not Applicable ‫ ܆‬None/Not Applicable
Ericsson Inc. See addendum.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson See addendum.
✔ Additional pages attached


July 2020
4. Legal Representatives. List all law firms, partners, and associates that (a)
appeared for the entities in the originating court or agency or (b) are expected to
appear in this court for the entities. Do not include those who have already
entered an appearance in this court. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(4).
None/Not Applicable ✔ Additional pages attached
See addendum.
5. Related Cases. Provide the case titles and numbers of any case known to be
pending in this court or any other court or agency that will directly affect or be
directly affected by this court’s decision in the pending appeal. Do not include the
originating case number(s) for this case. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(5). See also Fed. Cir.
R. 47.5(b).
None/Not Applicable ✔
Additional pages attached
See addendum.
6. Organizational Victims and Bankruptcy Cases. Provide any information

required under Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (organizational victims in criminal cases)
and 26.1(c) (bankruptcy case debtors and trustees). Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(6).
✔ None/Not Applicable Additional pages attached
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
Addendum to Questions 3, 4, and 5
3. Parent Corporations and Stockholders. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(3). Provide the

full names of all parent corporations for the entities and all publicly held
companies that own 10% or more stock in the entities.
Ericsson Inc. is a Delaware corporation that is wholly owned by Ericsson

Holding II Inc., which is also a Delaware corporation. Ericsson Holding II
Inc. is wholly owned by Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson is a publicly traded Swedish corporation

that has no parent corporation. No publicly held company owns more than
10% of its stock.
4. Legal Representatives. List all law firms, partners, and associates that (a)
appeared for the entities in the originating court or agency or (b) are expected to
appear in this court for the entities. Do not include those who have already entered
an appearance in this court. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(4).
McKool Smith, P.C.:

Jennifer L. Truelove
Erik Bruce Fountain (withdrawn)
5. Related Cases. Provide the case titles and numbers of any case known to be
pending in this court or any other court or agency that will directly affect or be
directly affected by this court’s decision in the pending appeal. Do not include the
originating case number(s) for this case. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(5). See also Fed. Cir.
R. 47.5(b).
The decision in this case may affect or be directly affected by Samsung

Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, E 01 Zhi Min Chu
No. 743 (2020), currently pending in the People’s Republic of China Wuhan
Intermediate People’s Court, Hubei Province.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES .....................................................................x
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1
ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................4
I. Wireless Standards, SEPs, and FRAND Licensing ........................................... 5
A. ETSI’s Wireless Communications Standards ............................................ 5
B. The FRAND Commitment and Reciprocal Obligations ............................6
II. Proceedings Below ............................................................................................. 7
A. The Parties Reach an Impasse in Renewing Cross-Licenses ..................... 7
B. Ericsson Files Suit Where It Is Headquartered and Where Samsung

Has a Substantial Presence ......................................................................... 7
C. Samsung Secretly Files Suit in Wuhan and Obtains an Ex Parte

Injunction Against U.S. Proceedings ....................................................... 10
1. Samsung Secretly Files an Incomplete Action in a Jurisdiction

It Has Decried and That Lacks Connection to the Parties and
Their Dispute .................................................................................... 10
2. Samsung Obtains an Ex Parte Injunction To Prevent Ericsson

from Pursuing U.S. Remedies .......................................................... 11
D. The U.S. District Court Issues a Defensive TRO and Preliminary

Injunction To Protect U.S. Proceedings ...................................................13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................18
i
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................20
I. The District Court Properly Granted a Defensive Injunction .......................... 22
A. The District Court Had Unquestioned Authority To Issue a

Defensive Injunction To Protect U.S. Proceedings from Foreign
Interference ............................................................................................... 22
B. The Defensive Anti-Interference Injunction Was Proper Under

Fifth Circuit Law ...................................................................................... 31
C. Samsung’s Putative “Incorrect Assumptions” Fail To Establish an

Abuse of Discretion .................................................................................. 39
1. The District Court Correctly Understood the Wuhan

Injunction .......................................................................................... 40
2. The District Court Understood the Procedural Disadvantage

Samsung Had Imposed on Ericsson ................................................. 41
3. The District Court Properly Considered the Inequitable Effect

Samsung Imposed ............................................................................. 44
D. The Defensive Injunction Does Not “Offend” Principles of Comity ...... 45
II. The Anti-Interference Injunction’s Scope Was Commensurate With the

Threat—and Well Within the Court’s Discretion ............................................ 52
A. The Nationwide Anti-Interference Injunction Was an Appropriate

Response to the Wuhan Court’s Nationwide Interference ....................... 53
B. The District Court Properly Required Samsung To Indemnify

Ericsson for Violations of the Wuhan Injunction .................................... 56
C. The District Court Properly Permitted Ericsson To File Suits

Related to Its 4G and 5G SEPs ................................................................59
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................62
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Agora Syndicate, Inc. v. Robinson Janitorial Specialists, Inc.,

149 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 1998) .............................................................................. 36
Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.,

765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 56
Amchem Prods. Inc. v. B.C. Workers’ Comp. Bd.,

[1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 (Can.) ................................................................................. 46
Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,

No. 2010-1377, 2011 WL 5275848 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4, 2011) ............................ 62
Associação Brasileira de Medicina de Grupo v. Stryker Corp.,

891 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2018) .............................................................................. 43
Bethell v. Peace,
441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971) .............................................................................. 48
Bowne v. Joy,
9 Johns. 221 (N.Y. 1812) .................................................................................... 22
Bugliotti v. Republic of Argentina,

952 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2020) .........................................................................25, 34
China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong,

837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987) ...............................................................24, 29, 48, 50
Cohen v. Rothfield,
[1919] 120 LT 434 (Eng.) (appeal)...............................................................23, 25
Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States,

424 U.S. 800 (1976) ......................................................................................34, 36
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,

651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981) .........................................................................23, 48
Compania Naviera Joanna SA v. Koninklijke Boskalis

Westminster NV, 569 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2009) .................................................. 43
iii
The Corfu Channel,

Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) ........................................................................ 24
Donovan v. City of Dallas,

377 U.S. 408 (1964) ............................................................................................ 23
E.&J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.,

446 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 24
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,

547 U.S. 388 (2006) ............................................................................................ 55
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle,

394 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... 48
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link, Sys., Inc.,

773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .................................................................... 33, 35
FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc.,

523 F.3d 566 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................57, 58
Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Roehrs,

470 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................ 54
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,

746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ............................................................................ 57
Gon v. First State Ins. Co.,

871 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989) .............................................................................. 56
Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113 (1895) ............................................................................................ 47
Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp.,

174 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999) .............................................................................. 42
Houston Agric. Credit Corp. v. United States,

736 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1984) ........................................................................22, 40
HTC Corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,

No. 18-cv-243, 2019 WL 4734950 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2019) ....................30, 52
iv
Huawei Techs. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,

No. 16-cv-2787, 2018 WL 1784065 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) .................passim
Hyman v. Helm,
[1883] 49 LT 376 (Eng.) (appeal)....................................................................... 23
Innovation First Int’l v. Zuru, Inc.,

513 F. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2013) ....................................................................... 43
InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Commc’ns Co.,

Landgericht München [Munich Regional Court I],
Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276/20 (Ger.) ........................................................26, 27, 42
Interdigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Corp.,

Delhi HC, Oct. 9, 2020, I.A. 8772/2020
in CS(COMM) 295/2020 (India) ..................................................................26, 27
IPCom GmbH & Co. KG v. Lenovo Tech. (U.K.) Ltd.,

[2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030 (Eng.) ........................................................................ 27
Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp.,

274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................................................................. 39
Janvey v. Alguire,
647 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 22
Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp.,

76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996) ....................................................................21, 49, 52
Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas

Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2003) .................................................23, 41
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,

260 U.S. 226 (1922) ............................................................................................ 23
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,

731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .....................................................................passim
Landis v. N. Am. Co.,

299 U.S. 248 (1936) ............................................................................................ 62
v
Lenovo (U.S.) Inc. v. IPCom GmbH & Co. Kg,

Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ.,
Mar. 3, 2020, 14/2020 (Fr.) ................................................................................ 27
Louisiana v. Union Oil Co.,

458 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................ 9
Maule v. Murray,
7 T.R. 470 (1798) ................................................................................................ 22
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,

549 U.S. 118 (2007) ............................................................................................ 36
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,

696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................passim
Moses v. CashCall, Inc.,

781 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 2015) ................................................................................ 45
MWK Recruiting Inc. v. Jowers,

833 F. App’x 560 (5th Cir. 2020) ................................................................passim
Newby v. Enron Corp.,

302 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 34
Nokia v. Cont’l,
Oberlandesgericht München [Munich Higher Regional Court],
Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19 (Ger.) ...............................................................26, 27
Pan Austl. Shipping Pty. Ltd. v. The Ship ‘Comandate’,

[2006] FCA 881 (Austl.) ..................................................................................... 27
Porter v. Lee,
328 U.S. 246 (1946) ......................................................................................54, 60
Positive Software Sols., Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp.,

619 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 58
Quaak v. Kylnveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren,

361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004) ..........................................................................passim
Renner & Bussard v. Marshall,

14 U.S. 215 (1816) .............................................................................................. 22
vi
The Salvore,
36 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1929) ................................................................................. 50
SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd.,

952 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2020) ..................................................................46, 49, 53
The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon,

11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) ........................................................................... 24
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp.,

549 U.S. 422 (2007) ............................................................................................ 43
Spansion, Inc. v. ITC,

629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 54
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

571 U.S. 69 (2013) .............................................................................................. 36
Stanton v. Embrey,
93 U.S. 548 (1876) .............................................................................................. 22
Takiguchi v. MRI Int’l, Inc.,

611 F. App’x 919 (9th Cir. 2015) ....................................................................... 61
TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,

No. 14-cv-341, Dkt. 279-1 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) ....................................... 28
TEC Eng’g Corp. v. Budget Molders Supply, Inc.,

82 F.3d 542 (1st Cir. 1996) ................................................................................. 61
Texas v. United States,

809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) .............................................................................. 53
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,

434 U.S. 159 (1977) ............................................................................................ 34
In re Unterweser Reederei GmbH,

428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) ..................................................................31, 32, 48
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co.,

[2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (Eng.) .......................................................................... 51
vii
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co.,

[2017] EWHC (Pat) 2831 (Eng.) ........................................................................ 49
In re VoIP-PAL.com, Inc.,
No. 2021-112, 2021 WL 650626 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2021) ............................... 48
Waffenschmidt v. MacKay,
763 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1985) .............................................................................. 53
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,

515 U.S. 277 (1995) ............................................................................................ 36
Wise v. Wilkie,
995 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 41
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. I ................................................................................................ 53
28 U.S.C. § 284 ........................................................................................................ 33
28 U.S.C. § 1332 ...................................................................................................... 33
28 U.S.C. § 1367 ...................................................................................................... 33
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) .................................................................................................. 33
35 U.S.C. § 271 ........................................................................................................ 33
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ...................................................................................................... 9
35 U.S.C. § 287 ........................................................................................................ 33
RULES
Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(b) ............................................................................................ 62
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(3) ......................................................................................... 62
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2)............................................................................................ 15
viii
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ................................................................. 56
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1834) ................................. 24
ix
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
No appeal in or from this civil action was previously before this or any other
appellate court. The decision in this case may directly affect or be directly affected
by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, E 01 Zhi Min
Chu No. 743 (2020), currently pending in the People’s Republic of China Wuhan
Intermediate People’s Court, Hubei Province.
x
INTRODUCTION
Samsung’s effort to overturn the district court’s discretionary decision to pro-
tect its authority—through a defensive, anti-interference injunction—rests on a fun-
house-mirror version of international norms. Samsung argues that the district court
was required to surrender its constitutional and statutory authority over the case
before it in view of an order issued by a court in Wuhan, China. It demands that the
district court do nothing to protect that authority, as Samsung invokes the U.S. legal
system to attack Ericsson’s U.S. patents, while simultaneously using a foreign
decree to prevent Ericsson from invoking the U.S. legal system to vindicate its U.S.
patent rights. Samsung insists the district court stand by, even though the parties
and the dispute have a strong connection to it, in favor of a foreign jurisdiction with
almost no connection to either. And Samsung insists the district court sit on its hands
after Samsung brought the Wuhan suit and obtained the Wuhan injunction in secret.
Courts have long rejected such theories and have protected themselves from efforts
to undermine their lawful authority.
Ericsson and Samsung own numerous patents essential to the 4G and 5G
standards (“SEPs”) and have entered into contractual commitments to license those
patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. Both manu-
facture cellular equipment that must comply with industry standards. Both have long
cross-licensed each other’s SEPs. When negotiations to renew cross-licenses failed,
1
Ericsson filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Texas, where Ericsson Inc. is
headquartered and Samsung has major operations. Ericsson seeks damages for Sam-
sung’s infringement of Ericsson’s SEPs; a declaration that Samsung has breached
its FRAND commitment in connection with the parties’ negotiations over a cross-
license, thereby forfeiting any right to a FRAND license from Ericsson; and a dec-
laration that Ericsson complied with its FRAND commitment in connection with
cross-license negotiations. Unbeknownst to Ericsson, however, Samsung had filed
its own suit days before in Wuhan—where no part of the licensing dispute took
place—seeking adjudication of a FRAND rate for a “one-way” Samsung license to
use Ericsson’s SEPs.
Under international norms recognized by the Supreme Court for over a
century, those two cases should proceed in parallel, with neither court interfering
with the other’s sovereignty. But Samsung secretly urged the Wuhan court to issue
an ex parte global anti-suit injunction. The district court responded with a protective
injunction to maintain the status quo. It did not attempt to shut down the Wuhan
case. It merely enjoined enforcement of the Wuhan court’s injunction so both suits
could proceed.
Attacking the district court’s injunction, Samsung contends that U.S. courts
must surrender their jurisdiction when there is a “first-filed action” in a foreign court.
But the international norm is for parallel cases in courts of different sovereigns to
2
proceed undisturbed. When confronted by actions that would upset that norm, courts
are empowered to issue anti-interference injunctions to protect their authority.
Confronted by injunctions similar to the one the Wuhan court issued, other Nations’
courts have protected their authority. The district court had no less authority to
protect its jurisdiction here.
Samsung cannot show an abuse of discretion. Wuhan has almost no ties to
the parties or the case. Samsung’s suit there is deliberately partial: Samsung and
Ericsson negotiated over a cross-license, but Samsung asked the Wuhan court to
calculate a FRAND rate only for Ericsson SEPs, while excluding its own SEPs from
that proceeding. The resulting suit cannot decide any rights, because Ericsson’s
FRAND commitment is expressly conditioned on Samsung providing Ericsson with
reciprocal FRAND terms for Samsung SEPs; Ericsson has no obligation to offer
Samsung the one-way license for which the Wuhan court allegedly will calculate a
rate. Samsung’s effort to forestall U.S. authority in favor of an incomplete foreign
suit smacks of “litigious gamesmanship” intended to tilt the negotiation playing
field.
Samsung disagrees with the district court’s reading of the Wuhan injunction.
But the district court properly concluded that the injunction threatened the proceed-
ings properly before it. Samsung downplays its inequitable behavior in obtaining
the Wuhan injunction in secret. But Samsung attacked similar Chinese proceedings
3
as “antithetical” to due process. And while Samsung attempts to aggrandize a
mistake in the district court’s description of related ITC proceedings, the court was
entitled to consider the inequity of Samsung seeking to prevent Ericsson from
invoking U.S. proceedings to enforce its 4G and 5G patents, while reserving to itself
the right to use those proceedings to assert its own patents and attack Ericsson’s.
The Eastern District of Texas has an overwhelming interest in adjudicating this case;
Wuhan has virtually none. It did not offend comity for the district court to issue a
defensive injunction that merely restored the norm of parallel proceedings.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the district court properly issued an anti-interference injunc-
tion to protect its jurisdiction over a case with strong connections to the U.S.
2. Whether the terms of the district court’s anti-interference injunction
were permissible given the threat to its jurisdiction posed by the Wuhan injunction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, a Swedish company, and
Ericsson Inc., a Delaware company headquartered in Plano, Texas (collectively,
“Ericsson”). Appx426(¶¶ 10-11). Ericsson is a leader in wireless communications.
Appx430(¶ 25). Ericsson builds cellular infrastructure equipment used by carriers
around the world; Ericsson equipment serves over one billion subscribers in 180
4
countries. Id. Ericsson invests $4-5 billion yearly in innovation, Appx430(¶ 27),
and holds more than 54,000 patents worldwide, Appx423(¶ 2).
Defendants are Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., a Korean company, Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., a New York company headquartered in New Jersey, and
Samsung Research America, a California company headquartered in Mountain
View, California (collectively, “Samsung”). Appx426-427(¶¶ 12-14). Samsung is
the world’s largest mobile-phone maker and manufactures myriad other products.
Appx424(¶ 5). Samsung’s Plano, Texas office employs over 1,000 people.
Appx427(¶ 15).
I. WIRELESS STANDARDS, SEPS, AND FRAND LICENSING
A. ETSI’s Wireless Communications Standards
Today, cellular devices and networks use one or more of the 2G, 3G, 4G, or
5G wireless communications standards. Appx2; Appx423-424(¶¶ 3, 5). Developed
by members of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”),
those standards specify how cellular phones and network infrastructure must
operate, ensuring interoperability. Appx423-424(¶¶ 3, 5). Standards also incor-
porate advances to improve the speed, reliability, security, and energy efficiency of
wireless devices and communications. Id.
ETSI members include companies that make infrastructure equipment, such
as Ericsson, Samsung, and Nokia, as well as mobile-phone providers, such as Apple,
5
LG, and Samsung. Appx431(¶ 30). Thousands of engineers from ETSI members
spend years working in technical committees to develop each standard. Appx431-
432(¶ 31). Ericsson has made more than 60,000 contributions to the 2G, 3G, 4G,
and 5G standards. Appx430(¶ 27).
B. The FRAND Commitment and Reciprocal Obligations
ETSI standards often incorporate patented technology. Appx432(¶ 32). Pat-
ents covering such technologies are called standard-essential patents (“SEPs”), be-
cause devices implementing standards necessarily infringe those patents. Id. To
ensure fair access and to protect patent holders’ rights, ETSI has adopted an Intel-
lectual Property Rights (“IPR”) policy. Appx432(¶ 33). Under the policy, com-
panies holding patents that may be standard-essential can voluntarily declare that
they are “prepared to grant licenses” on “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory”
or “FRAND” terms and conditions. Appx431(¶ 30); Appx432-433(¶ 34). That dec-
laration creates a contractual obligation, governed by French law, which can be
enforced by third parties that implement the standard. Appx432(¶ 33). Ericsson and
Samsung have both committed to license their SEPs on FRAND terms.
Appx431(¶ 30); Appx427(¶ 15).
Pursuant to ETSI’s IPR Policy, Ericsson’s FRAND “undertaking is made sub-
ject to the condition that those who seek licenses agree to reciprocate.” Appx1243.
Consequently, where a party has SEPs, Ericsson must license its SEPs on FRAND
6
terms only if the party is also willing to cross-license its own SEPs to Ericsson on
FRAND terms. Appx1236-1237. Samsung likewise insists upon reciprocity.
Appx1187-1190.
II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. The Parties Reach an Impasse in Renewing Cross-Licenses
For years, Ericsson and Samsung cross-licensed each other’s SEPs for the 2G,
3G, and 4G standards. Appx2. In February 2019, Ericsson contacted Samsung to
negotiate a new license, as their existing cross-license would expire on December
31, 2020. Id.; Appx434(¶ 40). Consistent with the reciprocity conditions, the parties
began negotiations for a cross-license covering both companies’ SEPs. Appx2.
In July 2020, Ericsson offered Samsung a cross-license, specifying that Sam-
sung would make a net balancing payment to Ericsson to reflect the greater value of
Ericsson’s patented technologies. Appx434(¶ 42). Samsung made a counteroffer,
also for a cross-license (with a much smaller balancing payment), which Ericsson
regarded as non-FRAND. Appx435(¶ 44). To resolve the impasse, Ericsson pro-
posed that a third-party arbitrator determine binding FRAND cross-license terms.
Appx435(¶ 45). Samsung refused. Appx435(¶ 46).
B. Ericsson Files Suit Where It Is Headquartered and Where

Samsung Has a Substantial Presence
Ericsson sued Samsung on December 11, 2020, in the Eastern District of
Texas, where Ericsson Inc. is headquartered and where Ericsson representatives
7
involved in negotiations with Samsung are based. Appx429(¶ 22); Appx1404.
Many of Ericsson’s SEPs are U.S. patents. Appx436-437(¶¶ 48-55). Samsung has
a major presence in the Eastern District, including a large R&D facility.
Appx427(¶ 15). The U.S. is Ericsson’s and Samsung’s largest market. See Appx335;
Appx388.
Ericsson’s original complaint alleged that Samsung breached its contractual
obligations to negotiate in good faith and offer FRAND terms for cross-licensing its
SEPs to Ericsson. See Appx214-217(¶¶ 45-64); Appx1-2. Invoking diversity juris-
diction, Appx206(¶¶ 15-16), Ericsson sought damages, specific performance, and
declarations that Samsung violated, and Ericsson complied with, FRAND obliga-
tions, Appx217-220(¶¶ 65-77 & Prayer for Relief ). An Ericsson negotiator based in
Texas promptly gave his Samsung counterparty a copy of the complaint.
Appx394(¶ 4).
Once the parties’ cross-license expired on December 31, 2020, Ericsson
amended its complaint to assert federal claims for infringement of eight U.S. patents.
Appx422. Samsung thus concedes subject-matter jurisdiction. Br.x. Nonetheless,
Samsung asserts in its Statement that Ericsson’s original complaint “Manufacture[d]
Diversity Jurisdiction” by naming Ericsson’s and Samsung’s U.S. subsidiaries to
“gain[ ] a toehold in the Eastern District of Texas” until Ericsson’s federal infringe-
ment claims ripened. Br.14-17; see Br.x-xi, 62-63. That accusation, never made
8
below and asserted without supporting argument or facts, is frivolous. Parties are
“nominal” and can be “disregarded” for diversity-jurisdiction purposes only if they
have “no real interest in the dispute.” Louisiana v. Union Oil Co., 458 F.3d 364,
366 (5th Cir. 2006). Samsung never attempts to show the U.S. entities here—
plaintiff Ericsson Inc., a Delaware and Texas corporation, and defendants Samsung
Electronics America, Inc. (“SEA”), a New York and New Jersey corporation, and
Samsung Research America (“SRA”), a California corporation, Appx205(¶¶ 9, 12-
13)—lack a genuine interest.
Nor could it. The original complaint sought declarations that Ericsson com-
plied with FRAND in negotiations over a cross-license, and specific performance of
Samsung’s obligation to offer Ericsson a FRAND license. Appx220. Ericsson Inc.,
SEA, and SRA have a strong interest in those claims because they each “import[ ]”
and “sell[ ]” products implementing 4G and 5G standards in the U.S.; they risk
liability for infringing U.S. SEPs absent a license. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). “Ericsson
Inc.” thus “requires a license on FRAND terms” to Samsung’s SEPs, Appx207(¶ 20),
and SEA and SRA require a license on FRAND terms to Ericsson’s SEPs, Appx206-
207(¶¶ 18-19). They are proper parties. Samsung’s contrary accusation is not color-
able.
9
C. Samsung Secretly Files Suit in Wuhan and Obtains an Ex Parte

Injunction Against U.S. Proceedings
1. Samsung Secretly Files an Incomplete Action in a Jurisdiction It

Has Decried and That Lacks Connection to the Parties and Their
Dispute
In the meantime, Samsung secretly filed suit against Ericsson in China—in
the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court of Hubei Province. Appx2. Samsung did
not notify Ericsson of the Wuhan lawsuit when it was accepted for filing on Decem-
ber 7, 2020. Appx3. It did not notify Ericsson when a panel was assigned on
December 11, 2020 (the same day Ericsson filed its complaint in the Eastern District
of Texas). Id. Because the Wuhan filings are not available electronically, Ericsson
had no access to information regarding the suit. Id. n.4.
While Ericsson’s U.S. suit seeks to resolve the parties’ reciprocal obligations
with respect to negotiations over cross-licenses, Samsung’s Wuhan suit requests
determination of a “one-way” FRAND royalty for just Ericsson SEPs, without cross-
licenses for Samsung SEPs. Appx2; Appx11-12 & n.10. Samsung’s suit thus avoids
putting Samsung’s own SEPs or FRAND commitments before the Wuhan court.
Samsung identified no connection between the dispute and Wuhan. None of
the parties’ negotiators reside in Wuhan and no negotiations took place there.
Appx1404(12:13-24). Neither party has a major presence in Wuhan. Id.; see also
Appx334-340; Appx388. China is Samsung’s 30th largest market for cellular de-
vices. Appx1404-1405(12:25-13:1); see Appx334-340. Samsung, moreover, had
10
previously told a U.S. district court that the Chinese court system is “antithetical to
the United States judicial system,” and that “there’s no due process requirements
like the[re] are in this country.” Appx392.
2. Samsung Obtains an Ex Parte Injunction To Prevent Ericsson

from Pursuing U.S. Remedies
On December 14, 2020—three days after Ericsson filed its U.S. suit—Sam-
sung filed a “Behavior Preservation Application” in Wuhan, seeking an anti-suit
injunction to prevent Ericsson from seeking relief relating to its 4G and 5G SEPs
anywhere else in the world. Appx3; see Appx978-980. Samsung included a copy
of Ericsson’s Texas complaint. Appx721; Appx724-745.
To keep the application secret, Samsung asked the Wuhan court to “hold the
service” until after the injunction issued. Appx3; Appx9; see Appx713; Appx715.
If the application became known, Samsung warned, other courts would act to prevent
enforcement of the anti-suit injunction. Appx3. The “legal opinions of [Samsung’s]
UK, German and Indian counsels,” Samsung advised, indicated a “high” and “real-
istic probability” that other courts would grant a “pre-emptive interim injunction” to
protect their authority. Appx714. Even when Samsung notified Ericsson of the
Wuhan suit on December 17, 2020, it kept the application secret. Appx3;
Appx394(¶ 6).
11
On December 25, 2020, the Wuhan court issued its injunction. Appx4. That
injunction prohibits Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson and its affiliates—including
Ericsson Inc., which is not a party to the Wuhan suit—from:
 “[A]pplying for any preliminary and permanent injunctive relief or

administrative measures” against Samsung relating to its 4G and 5G
SEPs from any other court or agency in the world. Appx4; see
Appx573-575.
 “[R]equesting” that any court “adjudicate the licensing terms” for its
4G and 5G SEPs, including the “royalty rate” and “royalty amount.”
Appx574.
 Seeking a determination that Ericsson had “fulfilled [its] FRAND

obligations” in negotiating with Samsung. Id.
The Wuhan injunction also ordered Ericsson to “immediately withdraw or suspend
such claims that have already been filed,” and prohibited Ericsson from seeking to
force Samsung to seek withdrawal of the injunction or precluding its enforcement.
Appx574-575. The injunction, which threatens substantial fines, was to remain in
effect “for the duration” of the Wuhan case. Appx5 (emphasis added); Appx573;
Appx575.
The Wuhan court did not notify Ericsson until the day its injunction issued—
December 25, 2020. Appx2-3; Appx5; see Appx369-370. It gave Ericsson five days
to “apply for reconsideration,” Appx575, which Ericsson did, Appx1480(88:10-11);
Appx1486-1487(94:25-95:1). That request was recently denied.
12
D. The U.S. District Court Issues a Defensive TRO and Preliminary

Injunction To Protect U.S. Proceedings
On December 28, 2020, Ericsson filed an emergency application in the East-
ern District of Texas to prevent Samsung from interfering with the action pending
there. Appx225. The court granted a temporary restraining order, invited briefing
from Samsung, and set a hearing on Ericsson’s preliminary-injunction request.
Appx17-20. Following the hearing, it issued a defensive, anti-interference prelim-
inary injunction. Appx15-16.
The court emphasized the “well established” principle “that a federal court is
empowered to issue injunctions to protect its jurisdiction.” Appx5. The court dis-
tinguished the relief Ericsson requested, which sought to preserve the authority of
each court, from the injunction Samsung procured in Wuhan:
Ericsson is not seeking an anti-suit injunction to prevent the Chinese

Action from proceeding. Rather, Ericsson is seeking an anti-anti-suit
injunction (sometimes called an anti-interference injunction) to prevent
Samsung from attempting to enforce the [Wuhan anti-suit injunction]
and thereby interfering with [the district court’s] exercise of its own
jurisdiction.
Appx7 (emphasis added).
Consistent with Fifth Circuit law, the court considered “ ‘principles of inter-
national comity,’ ” “ ‘the need to “prevent vexatious or oppressive litigation,” ’ ” and
the need “ ‘to protect the court’s jurisdiction’ ” over cases properly before it. Appx6.
The court found that enforcement of the Wuhan injunction would interfere with its
13
“compelling interest in ensuring that litigation within its legitimate jurisdiction
proceed in this forum.” Appx8. Enforcement would not merely “frustrate and
delay” adjudication of causes of action before it, but would “prohibit[ ] their adjudi-
cation” altogether. Appx10-11. It would bar litigation of “causes of action properly
raised in this Court and not raised in the Chinese Action.” Appx11. The court
acknowledged that some of Ericsson’s causes of action might not be covered by the
Wuhan injunction, but held that “the inability for this Court to hear one or many
causes of action equally offends the efficient adjudication of such issues.” Appx11
n.8.
The Wuhan proceedings, the district court continued, would not be adversely
affected by an injunction allowing Ericsson’s U.S. suit to proceed. Appx8. The
claims before each court “are different.” Id. The parties had been negotiating a
reciprocal cross-license. But Samsung’s action in Wuhan sought a one-way rate
determination only for Ericsson’s 4G and 5G SEPs, excluding Samsung’s SEPs
from the case. Appx11-12; see Appx517-518. Ericsson’s suit, by contrast, asked
the U.S. court “to look at the parties’ pre-suit negotiation conduct and determine
whether the parties breached or complied with their mutual FRAND obligations.”
Appx11-12 (emphasis added). The “Wuhan Court is asked to provide [an Ericsson-
only] number,” while “[t]his Court is asked to evaluate [both parties’] conduct.”
Appx12. At the hearing, Samsung itself had distinguished the Chinese action, which
14
it described as limited to “set[ting] a rate which is FRAND,” Appx1492(100:1), from
the U.S. claims “deal[ing] with the conduct of the parties,” such as “breach of con-
tract, [and] breach of good faith,” Appx1493(101:16-19). Samsung agreed that
“[w]hether [Ericsson’s] conduct was FRAND,” and “what the actual FRAND rate is
as a matter of dollars and cents,” are distinct. Appx1496(104:10-15).
Because the issues are different, the court found, “the causes of action [in the
U.S. court] have no implication on the speedy and efficient determination of the
issues raised before the Wuhan Court.” Appx11. “The Wuhan Court can continue
to adjudicate the claims that Samsung has brought before it, pursuant to its laws and
its rules of civil procedure.” Id. The fact that “both Courts can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the respective causes of action brought before them” weighed
strongly in favor of the anti-interference injunction. Appx8.
The balance of hardships likewise favored a protective injunction. Enforce-
ment of the Wuhan injunction would deprive Ericsson—“[w]ithout notice or an
opportunity to be heard”—of its “right to attempt to obtain redress for claims it has
the right to bring under the laws of the United States.” Appx9. At the hearing,
Samsung had agreed that the Wuhan court had “imposed a preliminary injunction ex
parte.” Appx1437(45:1-6).1 It did “not dispute[ ]” that “Ericsson had no notice” of
1
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2), ex parte TROs expire automati-
cally at the end of 14 days. The ex parte Wuhan injunction was in place for months
until the Wuhan court denied reconsideration, and will remain in place indefinitely.
15
the Wuhan litigation “until well after [Ericsson] filed” its complaint in the Eastern
District. Appx1452(60:19-24). Samsung would suffer no hardship from proceeding
in both courts: It had “agreed on the record . . . that parallel actions are inevitable”
and “readily admitted” that Ericsson’s U.S. action was not “vexatious or oppres-
sive.” Appx10 (citing Appx1428(36:4-10); Appx1468(76:18-21)).
The district court rejected Samsung’s rationalizations for the Wuhan injunc-
tion. It had no doubt the “real motivation” for procuring the Wuhan injunction was
to “put Ericsson in a weaker negotiating position.” Appx10. The parties had been
negotiating reciprocal cross-licenses. But the Wuhan suit put only the value of
Ericsson’s SEPs at issue, and restrained only Ericsson’s ability to assert its patents.
Appx11-12. The Wuhan injunction would “prevent Ericsson from seeking injunc-
tive relief relating to its 4G and 5G SEPs in any tribunal in the world except in the
Wuhan Court,” while not limiting Samsung’s options. Appx12. Indeed, Samsung
thereafter asserted patents against Ericsson in the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion (“ITC”), and challenged Ericsson patents in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”). Allowing Samsung to “seek redress of its claims” in the U.S., while
“[tying] Ericsson’s hands from doing the same,” “would be the height of inequity
(and hypocrisy).” Appx13.
The district court entered a defensive anti-interference injunction prohibiting
Samsung from:
16
(1) Taking “action in the Chinese Action that would interfere with this
Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether Ericsson or Samsung have
met or breached their FRAND obligations” relating to their 4G and 5G
SEPs or “with any other cause of action before this Court”; and
(2) Taking “action in the Chinese Action that would deprive Ericsson” of
its “rights to assert the full scope” of U.S. patent rights “in the United
States.”
Appx15 (footnote omitted). The court ordered that Samsung indemnify Ericsson for
fines imposed to enforce the Wuhan anti-suit injunction insofar as they were
imposed against Ericsson for engaging in otherwise lawful U.S. litigation over
“claims relating to the 4G and 5G SEPs identified or involved in this case.” Id.
The court deemed the indemnification provision critical to address its “con-
cern that Samsung may seek the imposition of substantial fines in the Chinese Action
for the purpose of creating economic leverage against Ericsson to achieve practically
what it may not be able to obtain legally.” Appx14. Indemnification was especially
necessary given the risk of ex parte communications. Samsung had agreed that, in
Chinese proceedings, “the judge can call either side and meet with them separately.”
Appx1476(84:8-10). Thus, there would be “[n]o record” if Samsung suggested to
the Chinese court that a penalty be imposed. Appx1417(25:5). The indemnity
would “put both parties in the same position.” Appx1418(26:18-19). Samsung
would not “have a sword and [Ericsson] be unarmed” in what should be “parallel
litigation.” Appx1441(49:5-7).
17
After the district court issued its order, Samsung filed a “notice to clarify” that
the ITC proceeding referenced in the order did not involve SEPs. Appx1501-1502.
Ericsson responded, explaining why the clarification is “irrelevant to the scope of
the” anti-interference injunction. Appx1545.
This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.A. Under centuries-old principles, cases in courts of different Nations
ordinarily proceed concurrently. Where one court disturbs that norm with an anti-
suit injunction, other courts are authorized to respond with orders to protect their
jurisdiction. Courts worldwide issue injunctions similar to the one the district court
issued here; courts in Germany and India took identical action in response to an
indistinguishable injunction by the same Wuhan court. Samsung is wrong to suggest
that U.S. courts would have enjoined foreign litigation under the same circum-
stances—especially given that the Wuhan action is unlikely to produce a binding
outcome, since it involves calculating FRAND terms for a one-way license, while
the contract entitles Ericsson to insist on a two-way cross-license.
I.B. The protective injunction was appropriate under governing Fifth Circuit
law. The district court properly concluded that enforcement of the Wuhan injunction
would frustrate important congressional policies by barring Ericsson from seeking
patent and declaratory-judgment remedies Congress empowered federal courts to
18
grant. The Wuhan injunction threatened all of Ericsson’s claims, including claims
not raised in Wuhan. Enforcement of the Wuhan injunction also would have been
vexatious and oppressive, denying Ericsson remedies available in the U.S. but not
in China. And the equities favored a protective injunction—Samsung obtained the
Wuhan injunction in secret without Ericsson’s participation. The Wuhan injunction
also left Samsung free to file enforcement actions with respect to its SEPs all over
the world while tying Ericsson’s hands with respect to enforcement of Ericsson
SEPs.
I.C. Samsung nitpicks the district court’s analysis but fails to show abuse of
discretion. The court reasonably found the Wuhan injunction—a decree of indefinite
duration—threatened many if not all of Ericsson’s U.S. claims. Samsung’s contrary
arguments are wrong and employ the wrong test. The court also correctly evaluated
the inequity and prejudice to Ericsson from Samsung obtaining a lopsided anti-suit
injunction in secret from the Wuhan court. Samsung’s comparison to forum non
conveniens underscores why the district court acted within its discretion. Had
Samsung filed such a motion here, it certainly would not have prevailed. Samsung
should not be permitted to accomplish the same result through an anti-suit
injunction. While Samsung notes an error in the description of a related ITC case,
the district court’s point was correct: The Wuhan injunction left Samsung free to
file injunctive actions in the U.S. while denying Ericsson that same U.S. remedy.
19
I.D. The district court correctly concluded that comity did not require it to
surrender its jurisdiction to the Wuhan court. A court’s authority to issue a protective
injunction in response to a foreign court’s overreach reflects comity principles.
Samsung’s attempt to conjure a rule that district courts must defer to “first-filed”
foreign actions falls short. Courts have long rejected any such rule. And the notion
that China is an especially appropriate forum because it will adjudicate FRAND rates
on a global basis is a fiction. No court will impose contracts on parties without
consent, and Ericsson does not consent to the one-way rate Samsung seeks. Where
parties consent, however, U.S. courts can impose FRAND licenses.
II. The scope of the district court’s anti-interference injunction is support-
ed by Fifth Circuit precedent and necessary for its efficacy. Without nationwide
reach, indemnification, and permission for Ericsson to seek U.S. injunctive relief,
the injunction would not remedy the Wuhan court’s interference with U.S. courts’
and agencies’ lawful jurisdiction. The district court properly restored the status quo
with an injunction narrowly tailored to address Samsung’s overreach in procuring
the Wuhan injunction, but which avoids interfering with the Wuhan litigation on the
merits.
ARGUMENT
District courts have unquestioned authority to issue orders to protect their
jurisdiction—their authority to grant relief in cases properly before them—from out-
20
side interference. The longstanding norm is that proceedings in the courts of differ-
ent Nations, even related proceedings, may proceed in parallel. Anti-interference
injunctions like the one the district court entered here reflect that principle. When
the same Wuhan court issued an almost indistinguishable injunction seeking to claim
exclusive jurisdiction over an SEP dispute in the past, German and Indian courts
issued decrees to protect the rights of the patentees to seek relief in their courts. The
district court had no less authority here.
The district court did not foreclose Samsung’s Wuhan suit. It allowed that
case to proceed. It merely protected its authority to adjudicate a dispute properly
before it. That was especially appropriate as both parties and the dispute have strong
connections to the Eastern District of Texas—and virtually no connection to Wuhan.
Samsung attempts to rewrite centuries of law to suggest a “first-to-file”
system under which one Nation’s courts may halt proceedings in other Nations. That
proposed rule has been repeatedly rejected. Samsung assails the district court’s de-
scription of the Wuhan injunction, its analysis of Chinese procedure, and the details
of a related ITC case that Samsung filed. But those arguments show neither revers-
ible error nor an abuse of discretion. The district court’s injunction was no broader
than necessary to allow Ericsson’s U.S. claims to proceed.
Standard of Review. Under governing Fifth Circuit law, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles
21
Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 1996). Factual findings “ ‘are not overturned unless
“clearly erroneous.” ’ ” Houston Agric. Credit Corp. v. United States, 736 F.2d 233,
235 (5th Cir. 1984). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See Janvey v. Alguire,
647 F.3d 585, 592 (5th Cir. 2011).
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A DEFENSIVE INJUNCTION
Samsung’s argument begins with a false narrative of international norms and
Fifth Circuit law. Samsung treats it as routine for one Nation’s courts to assert ex-
clusive authority and prohibit other courts from adjudicating claims. Br.36-37. It
then rewrites Fifth Circuit law to forbid district courts from responding to such over-
reaching unless the foreign court’s “exercise of jurisdiction is improper or funda-
mentally unfair (to the point of being illegitimate).” Br.51. Both suppositions are
wrong. Under settled law, the district court’s exercise of authority to protect pro-
ceedings and the rights of the parties before it was unquestionably proper.
A. The District Court Had Unquestioned Authority To Issue a

Defensive Injunction To Protect U.S. Proceedings from Foreign
Interference
1. Courts have long followed the “rule” that they will not surrender
jurisdiction notwithstanding the “pendency of a suit in a foreign court” even if it
involves the same parties and claims. Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns. 221 (N.Y. 1812) (citing
Maule v. Murray, 7 T.R. 470 (1798)); see Renner & Bussard v. Marshall, 14 U.S.
215, 217 & n.a (1816); Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 554 (1877). Conversely,
22
courts ordinarily will not “interfere with or try to restrain proceedings in another”
Nation’s courts. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964)),
aff ’d sub nom. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982); Hyman v. Helm, [1883] 49 LT 376, 380 (Eng.) (Bowen LJ) (appeal)
(Appx1557-1561). Such “interfere[nce]” would “clash” with fundamental princi-
ples of sovereignty. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 372-73 (5th Cir. 2003); Cohen v. Rothfield, [1919]
120 LT 434, 434 (Eng.) (Scrutton LJ) (appeal) (Appx1554-1556) (injunctions
against pursuit of foreign proceedings “exercised with great caution, to avoid even
the appearance of undue interference with another court”).
Instead, when parallel cases are filed in courts of different sovereigns, “[e]ach
court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the
proceedings in the other court.” Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230
(1922); see Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d
11, 16-20 (1st Cir. 2004) (“presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction”).
“[P]arallel proceedings”—even “on the same in personam claim”—“should
ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously, at least until a judgment is reached
in one which can be pled as res judicata in the other.” Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see, e.g., Karaha,
23
335 F.3d at 372 n.59 (citing Laker); China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong
Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987) (same). Each Nation’s courts exercise
“independent sovereign power” and have “exclusive and absolute” jurisdiction over
cases within their borders. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 136 (1812); see Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 8 (1834);
The Corfu Channel, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (Appx1993-2067). “For
this reason, injunctions restraining litigants from proceeding in courts of
independent countries are rarely issued.” Laker, 731 F.2d at 927; E.&J. Gallo
Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2006) (anti-suit injunc-
tions to “ ‘be used sparingly’ ”); MWK Recruiting Inc. v. Jowers, 833 F. App’x 560,
564 (5th Cir. 2020) (“ ‘extraordinary remedy’ ” that should not be “commonplace”).
Samsung never reconciles the Wuhan injunction with those principles. That
injunction proscribes Ericsson’s ability to pursue its U.S. claims, requiring it to
“withdraw or suspend” claims “that have already been filed.” Appx574. It bars
Ericsson from seeking statutorily authorized injunctive relief on its 4G and 5G SEPs.
Id. It forecloses any effort to “adjudicate the licensing terms” for Ericsson’s 4G and
5G SEPs, including “royalty rate” and “royalty amount.” Id. And it bars Ericsson
from seeking a determination that it had “fulfilled [its] FRAND obligations” in
negotiating with Samsung—precisely what Ericsson had sought. Id. Samsung never
argues the suit in the Eastern District is so “vexatious or oppressive” as to justify
24
foreign-court interference. To the contrary, Samsung agreed these proceedings were
“[a]bsolutely not” oppressive or vexatious. App1468(76:21-24). While Samsung
asserts that allowing Ericsson to pursue such claims “would plainly interfere with
the global rate-setting action” the Wuhan court would allegedly conduct, Br.36,
nothing about Ericsson’s U.S. suit impedes the Wuhan court’s ability to address
Samsung’s claims.
Samsung’s assertion that the existence of overlapping issues “plainly threat-
en[s] interference with the Chinese action,” Br.44, defies international norms. “ ‘The
general rule . . . is that concurrent proceedings regarding the same question are toler-
ated.’ ” Bugliotti v. Republic of Argentina, 952 F.3d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 2020). Over-
lapping issues are not “ ‘exceptional circumstances’ ” that justify departure from the
norm but are “ ‘generally present as a result of parallel litigation.’ ” Id.; see Laker,
731 F.2d at 928; Cohen, 120 LT at 436 (Eve J) (Appx1556) (existence of “overlap-
[ping]” issues in parallel cases is “quite insufficient” for anti-suit injunction).
2. Samsung ignores “[t]he logical reciprocal of the parallel proceeding
rule”: Where a foreign Nation’s court reaches across the border to interfere with law-
suits here, this Nation’s courts may protect the parties and matter before them. Laker,
731 F.2d at 929. “Just as” the law “counsels against” interfering with “concurrent
jurisdiction,” it “authorizes the domestic court to resist the attempts of a foreign
25
court to interfere with an in personam action before the domestic court.” Id.
(emphasis added).
When a foreign court “attempts to carve out exclusive jurisdiction over con-
current actions” by enjoining litigation here, domestic courts may issue injunctions
to “conserve [their] ability to reach a judgment.” Laker, 731 F.2d at 929-30; see id.
at 938 (distinguishing “defensive” and “offensive” injunctions); Quaak, 361 F.3d at
20-21 (affirming “defensive injunction that sought only to preserve the court’s abil-
ity to adjudicate the claims before it”). “Our courts are not required to stand by”
when a foreign court “attempts to close a courthouse door” that Congress, exercising
“territorial jurisdiction, has opened.” Laker, 731 F.2d at 936. Courts worldwide
recognize the legitimacy of defensive injunctions against foreign efforts to restrict
domestic relief. Appx1116; see, e.g., Nokia v. Continental, Oberlandesgericht
München [Munich Higher Regional Court], Dec. 12, 2019, 6 U 5042/19 (Ger.),
translation at 8 (Appx1858-1867) (granting anti-interference injunction “as a
defense against” interference with enforcement of German “patent rights in
Germany”).2 Anti-interference injunctions “merely serve[ ] as a defense against”
2
See also InterDigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi Commc’ns Co., Landgericht München
[Munich Regional Court I ], Feb. 25, 2021, 7 O 14276/20 (Ger.), translation at 39
(Appx1868-1922) (confirming anti-interference injunction to ensure patentee is not
“deprived of his right[s]” to “enforcement”); Interdigital Tech. Corp. v. Xiaomi
Corp., Delhi HC, Oct. 9, 2020, I.A. 8772/2020 in CS(COMM) 295/2020 ¶ 76 (India)
(Appx252-324) (granting anti-interference injunction to protect “jurisdiction of
26
encroachments on domestic authority and thus “do not constitute an interference
with the sovereign rights” of other Nations. Nokia, No. 6 U 5042/19, supra,
translation at 8 (Appx1865).
Other courts have issued protective injunctions to address a decree from the
same Wuhan court nearly indistinguishable from the one here. India’s Delhi High
Court issued an injunction to address the Wuhan court’s attempt to seize exclusive
jurisdiction over another FRAND dispute. Interdigital Tech. Corp., CS(COMM)
295/2020 ¶¶ 1-39, 75-76 (Appx252-276; Appx321). A German court, dealing with
the same Wuhan injunction, followed suit, declaring the decree was “not to be
recognized in Germany.” InterDigital Tech. Corp., 7 O 14276/20, supra, translation
at 39 (Appx1906); see Appx985. As the German regional court panel explained, the
Wuhan injunction “threatened” patent holders and created a “coercive situation” that
limited the freedom of companies holding German patents to protect their rights in
Germany. InterDigital Tech. Corp., 7 O 14276/20, supra, translation at 39
[Indian] Court”); Pan Austl. Shipping Pty. Ltd. v. The Ship ‘Comandate’, [2006]
FCA 881 ¶ 31 (Austl.) (Appx1935-1948) (anti-interference injunction to protect
right to “pursue[ ]” claims under Australian law); IPCom GmbH & Co. KG v. Lenovo
Tech. (U.K.) Ltd., [2019] EWHC (Pat) 3030 ¶¶ 52-54 (Eng.) (Appx1098-1109) (anti-
interference injunction to protect English proceedings); Lenovo (U.S.) Inc. v. IPCom
GmbH & Co. Kg, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, civ., Mar. 3,
2020, 14/2020 ¶ 36 (Fr.) (Appx1923-1934) (requiring party to withdraw request for
anti-suit injunction that constituted “manifestly unlawful disturbance”).
27
(Appx1906). The U.S. district court had no less authority to protect its jurisdiction
and the parties before it here.
Samsung knows that rule—which is why it urged the Wuhan court to withhold
service (i.e., notice) of its application for the injunction. If the application became
known, Samsung warned, there was a “high” probability other courts would issue
“pre-emptive interim injunction[s]” to protect their authority to grant relief.
Appx714; see Appx303-317.
3. Seeking to normalize the Wuhan decree it procured, Samsung urges that
U.S. courts would interfere with foreign proceedings just as the Wuhan court
interfered with U.S. proceedings here. See Br.3, 40-41; see Professors’ Br.15-16
(Fed.Cir.Dkt. 23). The three cases it cites show no such thing.
TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson, No. 14-cv-341, Dkt. 279-1 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015), involved a “mutual
agreement ” between the parties to stay foreign suits in favor of a “global resolution”
of their FRAND dispute in the U.S. Id. at 11. That consensual resolution provides
no support where the propriety of the interference is disputed.
And Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012), and
Huawei Technologies v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 16-cv-2787, 2018 WL
1784065 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018), undermine Samsung’s position. Those cases
invoke the generally accepted view that parties seeking to enjoin foreign suits must
28
make a “threshold” showing that “ ‘the parties and the issues are the same’ in both
the domestic and foreign actions” such that the domestic action “ ‘is dispositive of
the [foreign] action to be enjoined.’ ” Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 882 (emphasis added);
see Huawei, 2018 WL 1784065, at *8, *10; accord Quaak, 361 F.3d at 18; China
Trade, 837 F.2d at 35; MWK, 833 F. App’x at 564-65 (must consider whether actions
are legally “duplicative”). Efforts to litigate absolutely “identical” or “duplicative”
actions, some authorities reason, may sometimes constitute “ ‘vexatious’ litigation.”
Laker, 731 F.2d at 928 & n.55. But if the suits are not duplicative, U.S. courts will
“go no further and refuse the issuance of an international antisuit injunction.”
Quaak, 361 F.3d at 18; cf. Professors’ Br.15 (conceding that action pending before
court must be “dispositive of the foreign action” to be enjoined).
Samsung never suggests that the Wuhan injunction would be issued by U.S.
courts under that standard—because it flunks the test. The U.S. action extends well
beyond the case Samsung filed in Wuhan. The Wuhan case seeks determination of
one-way “royalty rates” solely for a license to Ericsson SEPs; Samsung excluded its
own SEPs from that case. Appx410. The U.S. case, by contrast, addresses the parties’
compliance with their FRAND obligations in negotiations over “a cross-license” to
both parties’ SEPs. Appx12 n.10; see Appx480; Appx442-445. Whereas the Wuhan
case involves forward-looking royalty numbers, the U.S. case involves conduct:
compliance with FRAND obligations by “offering a license on FRAND terms” or
29
“negotiating in good faith towards a FRAND license.” HTC Corp. v. Telefon-
aktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. 18-cv-243, 2019 WL 4734950, at *6 (E.D. Tex. May
22, 2019); see Appx12. The district court case also seeks damages for past
infringement. Appx481. The Wuhan action does not. Samsung thus concedes that
this action is not “vexatious or oppressive,” and that the Wuhan action cannot be
dispositive of this one. Appx10.
The Wuhan action thus concerns less than half the controversy here:
Samsung’s suit there seeks a FRAND rate for a license from Ericsson to Samsung,
not the two-way cross-license that the parties were negotiating. See pp. 6-7, supra;
Appx12 n.10. For that reason, the Wuhan case cannot even produce the binding
global license Samsung purports to seek there. Ericsson’s FRAND commitment
(like Samsung’s) is “ ‘made subject to the condition that those who seek licenses
agree to reciprocate.’ ” Appx1237. Ericsson must offer Samsung FRAND terms
only if Samsung reciprocates with a FRAND cross-license to its own SEPs. See pp.
6-7, supra. The one-way license rate Samsung seeks from the Wuhan court thus
cannot result in a license; Ericsson has no obligation to enter a one-way licensing
agreement. Appx211; see Appx12 n.10. It is doubtful the Wuhan case can provide
a meaningful result, let alone dispose of this action. A U.S. court likely would not
even entertain a suit seeking to enforce half of a bilateral contractual commitment.
Samsung’s suggestion that U.S. courts would go further to invoke such a suit to
30
enjoin another sovereign from adjudicating disputes respecting patents that
sovereign issued defies credulity.
Samsung also ignores the inequitable effect of the Wuhan injunction. Erics-
son and Samsung need licenses for each other’s SEPs. The Wuhan injunction Sam-
sung obtained, however, would “prevent Ericsson” alone “from seeking injunctive
relief relating to its 4G and 5G SEPs,” while leaving Samsung free to pursue
injunctions around the globe to halt sales of Ericsson products. Appx12. The district
court recognized the “hypocrisy” of such a decree, and that its unbalanced impact
could force Ericsson to surrender its U.S. rights without a proper adjudication.
Appx12-13. Samsung never suggests U.S. courts would issue such an unbalanced
injunction, and Microsoft and Huawei reject such one-sided pressure tactics.
Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 886; Huawei, 2018 WL 1784065, at *10.
B. The Defensive Anti-Interference Injunction Was Proper Under

Fifth Circuit Law
The district court’s anti-interference injunction was a proper exercise of dis-
cretion. Confronted with Samsung’s effort to wrest away district court authority
relating to Ericsson’s 4G and 5G SEPs, the court reasonably defended its lawful
power to resolve the case before it. In the Fifth Circuit, courts may issue anti-suit
relief, even to proscribe a foreign action, where that action would “frustrate a
policy” of the U.S. courts; be “vexatious [and] oppressive”; or “prejudice other
equitable considerations.” In re Unterweser Reederei GmbH, 428 F.2d 888, 890
31
(5th Cir. 1970), aff ’d on reh’g, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (per curiam),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972). Any “one of ” those “ ‘Unterweser factors’ ” is sufficient; those considera-
tions are then weighed against any resulting intrusion on “international comity.”
Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 881; MWK, 833 F. App’x at 562. The Unterweser factors,
which Samsung barely addresses, amply support the district court’s protective
injunction.
Moreover, Unterweser overstates the necessary showing here. “[D]efensive”
injunctions seeking only to restore the norm of parallel proceedings and “preserve
the district court’s” authority—like the order here—are more easily justified than
“offensive” injunctions that would foreclose relief in foreign courts. Laker, 731 F.2d
at 938 (emphasis omitted). That injunctions are reserved for “extraordinary” situa-
tions, Br.36, adds nothing. Samsung cites no court that has ever refused to protect
itself from foreign court interference on such a theory; and a foreign court’s effort
to deny U.S. courts their ability to adjudicate matters within their jurisdiction is
exceptional regardless. E.g., Quaak, 361 F.3d at 20; see also Laker, 731 F.2d at 929;
Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 881, 889; Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 890. Application of ordi-
nary standards for anti-interference injunctions confines that relief to exceptional
cases. MWK, 833 F. App’x at 562.
32
1. Frustration of Policy. The district court’s injunction was an appropriate
response to a decree that would frustrate U.S. policy. Congress empowered federal
courts to adjudicate infringement of U.S. patents and to enjoin infringement. 35
U.S.C. §§ 271, 287. Congress authorized them to issue declaratory judgments. 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a). And Congress granted supplemental and diversity jurisdiction to
adjudicate contract claims, including breaches of FRAND obligations. Id. §§ 1332,
1367.
Enforcement of the Wuhan injunction “frustrate[s]” those congressional deci-
sions. Appx11. Clause 1 of the Wuhan injunction prohibits Ericsson from seeking
an injunction for the SEPs asserted here, despite Congress’s determination that fed-
eral courts have injunctive authority. Appx4. Clause 3 prohibits Ericsson from re-
questing that courts “adjudicat[e ] the licensing terms (including the royalty rate) or
royalty amount ” for Ericsson 4G and 5G SEPs. Id. (emphasis added). That threat-
ens even damages for infringement under § 284—which are no less than a reasonable
royalty—as FRAND “limits” reasonable royalties for any SEP. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-
Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2014). And Clause 4 prohibits Erics-
son from filing a case “to determine whether [Ericsson] fulfilled [its] FRAND obli-
gations,” Appx4, even though Congress authorized district courts to issue such dec-
laratory relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
33
The effort to deny Ericsson Inc.—a U.S. citizen and U.S. patentee—the right
to seek relief Congress made available “frustrate[s]” Congress’s policy and U.S. law.
Federal courts have unquestioned authority to resist foreign efforts to “supersede the
right and obligation of the United States courts” to adjudicate matters properly be-
fore them. Laker, 731 F.2d at 935-36; Quaak, 361 F.3d at 20-21. They may defend
the “ ‘virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction
given them.’ ” Appx8 (quoting Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)); see Bugliotti, 952 F.3d at 414-15 (district court defies its
“ ‘unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction’ ” and abuses its discretion in
“ ‘surrender[ing]’ ” jurisdiction to foreign court absent “ ‘exceptional circumstan-
ces’ ”). That authority has a long pedigree: The first Judiciary Act of 1789 author-
ized federal courts to “ ‘issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respec-
tive jurisdictions,’ ” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977), includ-
ing “injunction[s] to preserve and protect [their] jurisdiction,” Newby v. Enron
Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 300-01 (5th Cir. 2002).
The district court’s exercise of that authority was particularly warranted to
resist the extreme intrusion on federal authority Samsung sought to impose. First,
the Wuhan court’s injunction threatened all of Ericsson’s U.S. claims in the Eastern
District. The Wuhan injunction does not merely proscribe injunctive relief. It bars
any “adjudicat[ion of ] the licensing terms (including the royalty rate) or royalty
34
amount . . . of [Ericsson] 4G and 5G SEPs,” as well as Ericsson’s compliance with
its FRAND obligations. Appx4. Because calculating damages requires determining
reasonable royalties in view of “limits” imposed by FRAND commitments, see
Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1231, that language could easily be read to preclude calculating
damages, too. P. 33, supra.
The Wuhan injunction would also foreclose Ericsson’s contract and declara-
tory-judgment claims (Counts I-V), including Ericsson’s charge that Samsung
breached its FRAND obligations. As explained above (at 6-7), Ericsson’s and
Samsung’s FRAND obligations are reciprocal; neither has an obligation to comply
with FRAND obligations absent the other’s compliance. There is thus no way to
adjudicate Ericsson’s claim that Samsung breached its FRAND commitment, see
Appx440-445; Appx480, without deciding whether Ericsson met the condition that
it comply with FRAND as well—a condition Ericsson cannot litigate under Clause
4 of the Wuhan injunction. Moreover, Ericsson’s and Samsung’s offers were both
for cross-licenses that included a net balancing payment reflecting the difference in
value between Ericsson’s SEPs and Samsung’s SEPs. See p. 7, supra. Whether the
cross-license Samsung offered was FRAND thus requires determining the value of
both Ericsson’s and Samsung’s SEPs. But the Wuhan injunction’s Clause 3
forecloses royalty determinations for Ericsson SEPs. See Appx4.
35
Samsung’s assertion that the “unflagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction
under Colorado River does not apply to declaratory relief, Br.43, is thus beside the
point and wrong. The district court here did not merely protect its declaratory-relief
authority; it preserved authority to adjudicate patent-infringement claims, injunctive
relief and damages, and breach-of-contract claims. And declaratory-judgment claims
are not exempt from the district court’s “virtually unflagging” obligation to exercise
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013).
Under Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995), district courts may in their
discretion deny relief based on factors such as “usefulness of the declaratory
judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for resolution.” Id. at 289. But nothing
exempts courts from exercising that discretion to make “decisions about the
propriety of ” declaratory relief. Id. at 289-90; see, e.g., Agora Syndicate, Inc. v.
Robinson Janitorial Specialists, Inc., 149 F.3d 371, 372-74 (5th Cir. 1998); MedIm-
mune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136-37 (2007) (remanding for court to
consider appropriateness of declaratory relief ).
Second, the U.S. has a “compelling interest” in providing a U.S. forum for a
case with overwhelming ties to the U.S., in a district “where both parties have a
significant presence”—Ericsson Inc. is headquartered in the Eastern District and
Samsung maintains a large office there—and where the conduct at issue occurred.
Appx8; Appx10; see Appx429(¶ 22); Appx1404. The U.S. is the largest market for
36
both companies. See pp. 7-8, supra. Ericsson seeks damages for infringement of
U.S. patents based on Samsung’s conduct in the U.S. Appx445-480 (Counts VI-
XII).
Wuhan, by contrast, has little connection to or interest in the dispute.
Appx1404-1405(12:9-13:1). No infringement claims involving Chinese patents
have been filed. China is not a major market for Samsung. Appx1404-1405(12:25-
13:1); see Appx334-340. No negotiations took place in Wuhan. Appx1404-
1405(12:25-13:1). Indeed, as explained above (at 30-31), the reciprocity condition
of Ericsson’s FRAND commitment renders the Wuhan court’s interest in
determining a one-way rate for Ericsson patents illusory, as the court cannot legally
impose a one-way license on Ericsson.
2. Vexatious and Oppressive. Nor did the district court abuse its discre-
tion in finding enforcement of the Wuhan injunction “vexatious or oppressive.”
Appx8. In deciding whether foreign action is “vexatious or oppressive,” the Fifth
Circuit considers (1) whether it produces inequitable hardship; (2) whether it
frustrates or delays the district court proceedings; and (3) the extent to which the
domestic and foreign cases overlap. See MWK, 833 F. App’x at 562. Enforcement
of the Wuhan injunction would not merely “frustrate” and “delay” the Texas case; it
threatens to halt the case entirely. That imposes “inequitable hardship” on Ericsson,
37
“depriv[ing]” Ericsson “of the right to attempt to obtain redress for claims it has the
right to bring under the laws of the United States.” Appx9.
Ericsson would be deprived of “remed[ies] sought in the domestic forum”
unavailable in Wuhan. Laker, 731 F.2d at 930. The U.S. case presents infringement
claims absent in the Wuhan case. The contract and declaratory-judgment claims in
the U.S. case involve compliance with FRAND obligations in negotiations for a
reciprocal cross-license, while the Wuhan case only involves computation of a one-
way FRAND rate to Ericsson’s SEPs alone. Appx12 & n.10. The “legal questions”
in the proceedings thus are different, and a decision in the Wuhan case “is unlikely
to obviate” the U.S. suit. Appx11-12 & n.10. Nearly all the remedies Ericsson seeks
here are unavailable in the Wuhan suit, including damages for infringement of
Ericsson’s U.S. patents and adjudication of the parties’ compliance with FRAND
obligations in their negotiations over a cross-license. Appx480-481(Prayer for
Relief). Because the Wuhan injunction sweeps wider than the case Samsung filed
there, its enforcement would foreclose Ericsson from obtaining those remedies in
the U.S. despite their unavailability in Wuhan. See pp. 34-35, supra. That makes
the need for a defensive injunction “particularly” pressing. Laker, 731 F.2d at 929-
30. By contrast, Samsung has “readily admitted” that “parallel actions” would not
be vexatious or oppressive to it, and that adjudication here is inevitable regardless.
Appx10 (citing Appx1428(36:4-10); Appx1468(76:18-21)).
38
3. Equitable Principles. The district court properly found that “equitable
principles” supported its injunction. Appx12-13. Samsung displayed “litigious games-
manship.” Appx13. Had Samsung believed Wuhan was the better forum for this
dispute, it would have filed a forum non conveniens motion in the district court. But
that would have failed—“the lawsuit’s bona fide connection . . . to the forum of
choice,” “residence” of the parties, “availability of witnesses or evidence,” and
similar relevant factors, Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.
2001), all clearly favor the U.S., see pp. 36-37, supra.
Instead, Samsung sued in China secretly and sought an ex parte injunction,
asking the Wuhan court not to notify Ericsson. Appx9-10. Samsung only put Erics-
son’s SEPs at issue, not its own. Samsung pursued that strategy to “put Ericsson in
a weaker negotiating position when it comes to cross licensing its 4G and 5G SEPs.”
Appx10. Nothing requires a U.S. district court to relinquish jurisdiction to allow
Samsung to preserve “unfair economic leverage gained through litigious gamesman-
ship.” Appx13.
C. Samsung’s Putative “Incorrect Assumptions” Fail To Establish an

Abuse of Discretion
Samsung does not deny the district court applied the correct legal standard.
See Br.38. Instead, it points to three supposedly “incorrect assumptions” underlying
the conclusion that enforcement of the Wuhan injunction would be “vexatious and
39
oppressive.” Id. Those unmeritorious quibbles do not approach the high bar for
overturning a preliminary injunction. See Houston Agric., 736 F.2d at 235.
1. The District Court Correctly Understood the Wuhan Injunction
Samsung asserts that the district court “misapprehended” the Wuhan injunc-
tion’s “scope,” challenging its conclusion that the injunction threatened to prevent
the U.S. case from proceeding. Br.4, 38-42. But Samsung’s contention that some
small piece of that case could proceed is irrelevant and mistaken. It is irrelevant
because the district court ruled that, even if “not all causes of action before this Court
are enjoined by the” Wuhan injunction, the court would still issue the anti-
interference injunction to preserve its authority over the whole case, including all
the causes of action Ericsson joined. Appx11 n.8. Samsung never shows that to be
an abuse of discretion.
Regardless, as explained above, the Wuhan injunction threatens every claim
in Ericsson’s Amended Complaint. See pp. 34-35, supra. Samsung asserts that the
claims charging Samsung with breaching its FRAND obligations, as well as dam-
ages claims for infringement, can proceed. But the Wuhan injunction could reach
those claims for the reasons above. Samsung offers no argument to support the
contrary assertion. Reproducing a slide it used at the hearing below (Br.42), it
merely states those portions can proceed. Samsung’s position is thus not merely
40
wrong but waived. It cannot provide the missing argument for the first time in reply.
Wise v. Wilkie, 955 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2020).
Moreover, because injunctions are addressed to threatened harm, the district
court was entitled to consider the risk the Wuhan court might read its order broadly.
See Karaha, 335 F.3d at 369. As the district court found, “Samsung furnished
Ericsson’s [U.S.] Complaint to the Wuhan Court and specifically asked for an in-
junction preventing this case from moving forward.” Appx11. While Samsung
disputes that characterization, Br.42, its injunction application included a copy of
the U.S. complaint, describing it as “a repeated lawsuit based on the same portfolio,
patent licensing negotiation facts, and legal issues” as the Wuhan case. Appx721;
Appx982. It asserted that the Wuhan suit would resolve “all the parties’ previous
disputes regarding Ericsson’s 4G and 5G patents,” rendering any suit by Ericsson
“unnecessary” and a “repeated lawsuit.” Appx989. It was not clear error for the
district court to conclude that the Wuhan injunction threatened many if not all the
U.S. claims. Appx11. Samsung offers no basis for overturning the district court’s
exercise of discretion to protect the proceedings before it.
2. The District Court Understood the Procedural Disadvantage

Samsung Had Imposed on Ericsson
Samsung argues that the district court overstated the unfairness resulting from
Samsung’s secretive maneuvering in Wuhan. Br.45-48. But Samsung never
disputes that “Ericsson had no notice” of the Wuhan suit “until well after” Ericsson
41
filed and notified Samsung of this suit. Appx1452(60:19-24). Samsung agreed that
the Wuhan court “imposed a preliminary injunction ex parte,” without providing
Ericsson opportunity to oppose. Appx1437(45:1-6). Nor can Samsung contest the
resulting prejudice. Samsung urged the Wuhan court to keep the injunction appli-
cation secret precisely because there was a “high” “probability” that other courts
would issue defensive injunctions if Ericsson learned of the application and sought
relief. Appx714. That Samsung had to keep the application secret because other
courts would respond speaks volumes.
Samsung urges that the district court failed to appreciate Ericsson’s right to
seek “reconsideration.” Br.45-46. But the possibility of reconsideration does not
eliminate prejudice from being denied the opportunity to be heard in the first place.
See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 422 (4th Cir. 1999).
A German court faced with a nearly identical Wuhan injunction came to the same
conclusion. See InterDigital, No. 7 O 14276/20, supra, translation at 31 (Appx1898).
Samsung’s discursions on inquisitorial systems and burdens of proof are beside the
point. Br.46-47. They are inapt coming from a company that decried Chinese courts
as “antithetical to the United States judicial system” and lacking “due process
requirements like the[re] are in this country.” Appx392. None rebut the district
court’s concern that reconsideration is no substitute for the opportunity to be heard
in the first instance. Appx9.
42
Samsung’s citation of forum non conveniens cases supports the decision
below. Br.48. “Given the ‘virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to
exercise the jurisdiction given them,’ . . . forum non conveniens should be invoked
only in ‘rather rare cases.’ ” Associação Brasileira de Medicina de Grupo v. Stryker
Corp., 891 F.3d 615, 618 (6th Cir. 2018). While U.S. courts “regularly defer to
Chinese courts” on forum non conveniens grounds, Br.48; see Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 435-36 (2007), they do so where the
U.S. contacts are so tenuous it is unclear the district court has jurisdiction. Innova-
tion First Int’l, Inc. v. Zuru, Inc., 513 F. App’x 386, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2013) (events
took place in China and evidence in China); Compania Naviera Joanna SA v.
Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster NV, 569 F.3d 189, 201 (4th Cir. 2009) (collision
“in Chinese territorial waters”).
That rule, and this case’s tenuous connection to China compared to its strong
connection to the U.S., mean that Samsung would not have prevailed on forum non
conveniens in district court. See pp. 36-37, supra. That is why Samsung circum-
vented the district court’s discretion to decide whether this suit should be litigated
in Wuhan, and attempted to force abstention by obtaining an injunction from a
foreign court. The district court was not required to allow itself to be strong-armed
in that manner.
43
3. The District Court Properly Considered the Inequitable Effect

Samsung Imposed
The district court properly considered the fact that Samsung sought to restrict
Ericsson’s access to U.S. proceedings but left itself free to pursue them at will. “If
Samsung can seek redress of its claims through injunctive relief in the United
States,” the court found, “it would be the height of inequity . . . to allow the [Wuhan
injunction] to tie Ericsson’s hands from doing the same.” Appx13 (emphasis added).
Samsung complains that the district court, in illustrating that inequity, erron-
eously stated that Samsung had asserted 4G and 5G SEPs in the ITC. The point
remains: Samsung and Ericsson both seek to license each other’s SEPs, but Sam-
sung seeks to deny Ericsson a U.S. remedy (injunctive relief ) that Samsung pre-
serves for itself. And Samsung has attacked Ericsson 4G and 5G SEPs through IPRs
in the U.S., see Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, IPR Nos.
2021-487, -447, -446, -486 (Jan. 29, 2021), -730 (Mar. 26, 2021), but seeks to
foreclose Ericsson from asserting those same SEPs as a basis for injunctive relief in
the U.S. The court was entitled to consider the “inequity” of that result. Appx12-
13.
Samsung also accuses the district court of having “conducted independent
research.” Br.48-49. But Samsung filed the ITC complaint “the day of the hearing”
in district court, without informing the court about that impending suit. Id.
44
Samsung’s lack of candor about facts relevant to the court’s consideration of the
preliminary injunction reflects poorly on Samsung, not the court.
Nor is it true that the district court imposed the protective “injunction . . . to
‘balance’ Ericsson’s global negotiating leverage against Samsung’s.” Br.50. Far
from relying on a mistaken “legal principle that all parties to a negotiation should
have equal leverage,” id., the court found that Samsung’s “litigious gamesmanship”
sought to force Ericsson to settle without exercising its legal rights, Appx13.
Neutralizing gamesmanship and “external pressure” to settle a case “before the
litigation is complete” can support protective decrees. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 886;
Moses v. CashCall, Inc., 781 F.3d 63, 82 (4th Cir. 2015).
D. The Defensive Injunction Does Not “Offend” Principles of Comity
The district court correctly found that “international comity is not offended by
the issuance of an anti-interference injunction which seeks to preserve the ability for
litigation to proceed in parallel.” Appx13 (citing Laker, 731 F.2d at 926-27). Sam-
sung’s contrary argument rests on the false premise that federal courts violate comity
by defending their authority to adjudicate cases before them whenever the foreign
action was filed first—here, by a few days, without notice until after the district court
action was filed. E.g., Br.2, 18, 33, 53-56; see Professors’ Br.26-27. The contention
is especially unfounded here, given the U.S. court’s overwhelming connections to
the dispute and the foreign court’s scant connections.
45
1. Samsung overlooks a precondition to comity. When a foreign-court
order invades U.S.-court authority in violation of comity principles, the party that
sought the foreign order cannot invoke comity to prevent U.S. courts from protecting
themselves. Quaak, 361 F.3d at 21; SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 952
F.3d 513, 525 (4th Cir. 2020). Here, Samsung urges that comity precluded the
district court from protecting itself unless stringent standards are met. Br.51. But it
nowhere suggests the Wuhan court invoked those standards before attempting to
wrest authority from U.S. courts. Samsung conceded that the U.S. proceedings are
“[a]bsolutely not” oppressive or vexatious. Appx1468(76:21-24). Having procured
an injunction contrary to comity principles, it cannot invoke comity to prevent the
district court from protecting itself from the resulting interference. See, e.g., Quaak,
361 F.3d at 20-21. A foreign injunction “specifically intended to interfere with and
terminate” a U.S. lawsuit is “not entitled to comity” from U.S. courts “by any
definition.” Laker, 731 F.2d at 938; see Amchem Prods. Inc. v. B.C. Workers’ Comp.
Bd., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 902 (Can.) (Appx1949-1992) (“[A] foreign court, not
having, itself, observed the rules of comity, cannot expect its decision to be respected
on the basis of comity.”); pp. 25-28, supra.
The district court’s decision to ensure both proceedings can continue in
parallel does not “[o]ffen[d]” comity, Br.51; it arises out of comity principles, pp.
22-28, supra. The international norm in favor of parallel proceedings flows from
46
the “deference and mutual respect” courts of different Nations owe each other to
avoid interfering in each other’s domestic affairs pursuant to those principles of
comity. Laker, 731 F.2d at 928. Comity is not offended when the court of one
Nation acts to protect itself from another court’s “attempts to carve out exclusive
jurisdiction” through an anti-suit injunction, because it is “the foreign injunction
which creates” international conflict in the first place. Id. at 930, 939.3
2. Samsung attempts to invent a rule that U.S. courts must tolerate such
intrusions if imposed by a “foreign court having jurisdiction over the first-filed ac-
tion.” Br.2; see id. at 18, 33, 53-56; see also Professors’ Br.13-14. Samsung told
this Court the opposite in litigation against Huawei, urging “The Timing Of The
Parties’ Pleadings Is Irrelevant.” Samsung C.A. Br.36-37 in Huawei Techs. Co. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 18-1979 (Fed. Cir. filed Aug. 27, 2018) (reproduced
Appx1055-1056) (emphasis added). Samsung admitted below that “first filed” is
not dispositive as to foreign lawsuits, Appx1451(59:21-24), and the district court
properly rejected any such rule, Appx1. There is no “first-filed principle” (Br.54) in
suits before separate sovereigns. See Laker, 731 F.2d at 927 (“The mere filing of a
suit in one forum does not cut off the preexisting right of an independent forum to
regulate matters subject to its prescriptive jurisdiction.”); Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 887
3
Another precondition for comity, that “due notice” was given to the party affected
by the foreign order, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166-67 (1895), was also absent
here.
47
(“The order in which the domestic and foreign suits were filed . . . [is] not
dispositive.”).
Samsung analogizes to a rule “favoring the forum of the first-filed case” when
two or more federal district courts hear overlapping litigation. Br.55; see Elecs. for
Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re VoIP-PAL.com,
Inc., No. 2021-112, 2021 WL 650626, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2021). But that rule
“has never been applied, and in fact it was never meant to apply[,] where the two
courts involved are not courts of the same sovereignty.” Compagnie des Bauxites,
651 F.2d at 887 n.10 (emphasis added).
Comity and U.S. law defy any such notion. Allowing the first court to seize
jurisdiction, and to enjoin all other sovereign courts, would “destroy the principle of
concurrent jurisdiction.” Laker, 731 F.2d at 929 n.63. It would render interference
with other sovereigns the default, rather than the exception. MWK, 833 F. App’x at
564-65. Court after court has held that first-filed status cannot be given such weight
in the international anti-suit context. See Laker, 731 F.2d at 929 n.63; Compagnie
des Bauxites, 651 F.2d at 887 n.10; China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36; see also Unter-
weser, 428 F.2d at 890 (upholding injunction against prior-filed English action);
Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1971) (similar). It does not prevent
district courts from protecting their authority, much less where the “prior” suit was
filed just days earlier and kept secret until after the U.S. suit was filed.
48
Samsung’s authorities are not to the contrary. In Kaepa, the Fifth Circuit
upheld an anti-suit injunction in part because the case had been “long and firmly
ensconced” in the U.S. court such that permitting the foreign suit would “entail ‘an
absurd duplication of effort.’ ” 76 F.3d at 627-28. Samsung nowhere argues the
then-days-old and still-secret Wuhan case was “firmly ensconced” when Ericsson
sought relief in district court; nor would the two very different cases result in “absurd
duplication of effort.” See pp. 29-31, supra. In Unwired Planet International Ltd.
v. Huawei Technologies Co., [2017] EWHC (Pat) 2831 (Eng.) (Appx1562-1567),
the U.K. court indicated it would have issued an anti-suit injunction where a party
initiated proceedings in China to “relitigate matters that the UK court ha[d] already
decided ” and entered judgment upon. Id. ¶ 7 (Appx1564) (emphasis added). Pre-
venting a party from undermining a final judgment is a well-established basis for
injunctive decree, see, e.g., SAS, 952 F.3d at 524, 529; foreclosing pre-judgment
parallel proceedings in different Nations is not, see pp. 22-25, supra.
Filing order might matter if it “ ‘raises the concern that [a party] is attempting
to evade the rightful authority of the district court.’ ” Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 887.
Here, Ericsson could not have brought the U.S. suit to “evade” the Chinese court’s
49
jurisdiction—Ericsson did not know about the Wuhan case when it filed this action.
Not one of Samsung’s cases creates the first-filed rule it demands.4
3. Samsung purports to seek a “neutral principle” to “resolve conflicts”
when “courts of two sovereign nations have jurisdiction over the same controversy.”
Br.54 (emphasis omitted). But there is an established “neutral principle” to resolve
such conflicts: the “principle of concurrent jurisdiction.” Laker, 731 F.2d at 929
n.63. When sovereigns confine themselves to their own cases, no “ ‘jurisdictional
ping-pong,’ ” Br.55, results. Because “both Courts can properly exercise jurisdiction
over the respective causes of action brought before them,” both suits should proceed,
and filing order is “not dispositive.” Appx8. U.S. law “has not departed so far from
common sense that it is reversible error for a court not to capitulate to a foreign
judgment . . . designed to prevent the court from resolving legitimate claims placed
before it.” Laker, 731 F.2d at 939.
Samsung’s contrary first-filed rule is terrible policy. It would encourage
parties to race to their chosen forums and obtain global injunctions. The result would
be the “endless[ ]” escalation of conflicts Samsung predicts (Br.54), as courts of each
Nation rush to seize exclusive jurisdiction at the expense of others. It would en-
courage the gamesmanship Samsung engaged in here, attempting to supersede U.S.
4
Samsung cites The Salvore, 36 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1929), as supporting a first-to-file
rule. But Second Circuit precedent clearly holds that first-to-file is not dispositive.
See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36.
50
actions encompassing the whole dispute with a foreign action covering just the
fraction it deems advantageous. See pp. 30-31, supra.
4. Finally, Samsung argues that China is an especially appropriate forum.
Br.2, 52. The U.S court’s overwhelmingly greater connection to the dispute and the
parties, and the partial nature of Samsung’s suit, demonstrate the opposite.
Samsung claims that China “is one of two jurisdictions (the other is the United
Kingdom) that will determine worldwide FRAND rates without requiring bilateral
consent.” Br.2. That is false. As Ericsson explained below, “[n]o court, whether
here or in China, can simply create binding contracts for private parties without their
express consent.” Appx697. It submitted an affidavit of a retired Chinese judge
specializing in intellectual property in support. See Appx1257. Samsung has never
refuted that or explained how a Chinese court could impose a one-way rate on
Ericsson when Ericsson’s FRAND commitment is conditioned on reciprocity.
U.K. courts will not impose licenses without consent either. In Unwired Plan-
et International Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co., [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 ¶¶ 793-
794 (Eng.) (Appx1568-1733), the U.K. court issued a domestic injunction as a
remedy for infringement because the infringer would not consent to a global license.
51
Samsung has no support for the theory that the Wuhan court—or any other court—
could impose a global license on Ericsson without its consent.5
Regardless, U.S. courts have “subject matter jurisdiction” to declare FRAND
terms on a global basis with consent. HTC, 2019 WL 4734950, at *5; see Microsoft,
696 F.3d at 884. Nothing about power to declare FRAND terms globally supports
foreclosing claims that Congress authorized in U.S. courts in favor of a lawsuit in
China.
II. THE ANTI-INTERFERENCE INJUNCTION’S SCOPE WAS COMMENSURATE

WITH THE THREAT—AND WELL WITHIN THE COURT’S DISCRETION
Samsung argues that the district court “overreached” by (1) protecting Erics-
son’s ability to assert its patent rights—including injunctive relief for infringe-
ment—throughout the U.S., rather than just in the Eastern District of Texas; and
(2) requiring that Samsung indemnify Ericsson if Ericsson is fined by the Wuhan
court for lawfully litigating claims in the U.S. Br.64-75. Samsung fails to show an
abuse of discretion. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626.
5
Samsung’s suggestion (Br.12-13, 52) that Ericsson took the opposite position in
Unwired Planet is baseless. Ericsson argued only that global license offers (rather
than country-by-country licenses) could be FRAND. Appx1327-1331. Ericsson
nowhere endorsed anti-suit injunctions, nor did the U.K. court issue one.
52
A. The Nationwide Anti-Interference Injunction Was an Appropriate

Response to the Wuhan Court’s Nationwide Interference
Samsung insists without citation that there was no “basis in law or equity” for
an anti-interference injunction that extends beyond the Eastern District of Texas,
Br.67, or protects Ericsson’s right to petition for “redress of grievances” before U.S.
government agencies, U.S. Const. amend. I. The law recognizes, however, that
nationwide injunctions may issue in “appropriate circumstances.” Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 & n.211 (5th Cir. 2015); see Waffenschmidt v. MacKay,
763 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985). Where a foreign court decree seeks to
“undermine” a company’s ability “to enforce” its U.S. legal rights “in U.S. courts”
generally, federal courts may respond by protecting those rights nationwide. SAS,
952 F.3d at 524-25 (affirming nationwide defensive injunction).
Nor can Samsung rely on the assertion that “ ‘the sweep of an injunction
should be no broader than necessary to avoid the harm on which [it] is predicated.’ ”
Br.64 (quoting Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 887). The district court’s anti-interference
injunction meets that standard. The Wuhan injunction was not limited to actions in
the Eastern District of Texas; it barred Ericsson from seeking relief “before any
courts, customs offices, or administrative enforcement agencies” anywhere besides
the Wuhan court. Appx4. The district court’s anti-interference injunction responded
by prohibiting Samsung from enforcing that decree to deprive Ericsson of the ability
to assert its U.S. patent rights “before any Article III Court, customs office, or
53
administrative agency in the United States.” Appx15. The sweep of the district
court’s anti-interference injunction is commensurate with the sweep of the Wuhan
anti-suit injunction’s interference with U.S. authority. See Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v.
Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1159 (5th Cir. 2006) (injunctions should “ ‘remedy the
specific action necessitating the injunction’ ”). The district court’s anti-interference
injunction also “restore[d] the status quo” that existed before Samsung provided an
injunction that disturbed it—a legitimate exercise of equitable discretion. Porter v.
Lee, 328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946).
Samsung’s assertion that, insofar as “the Chinese injunction threatens other
tribunals’ jurisdictions, those other tribunals are the proper places to make those ar-
guments,” Br.66, has it backwards. If Samsung thought proceedings in a particular
U.S. tribunal would improperly threaten Wuhan proceedings, Samsung should raise
that with the U.S. tribunal rather than seeking a foreign coercive decree. And Sam-
sung nowhere explains how tribunals like the ITC, with limited statutory authority,
could grant Ericsson protection from the Wuhan injunction regardless. See Span-
sion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
The district court was also permitted to ensure that the “unbalanced economic
pressure” resulting from the Wuhan decree would not have the practical effect of
preventing Ericsson from pursuing its case “on the merits.” Appx13-14; pp. 34-38,
supra. Samsung protests that, without the Wuhan injunction, Ericsson can use U.S.
54
suits to “force Samsung to take a license at holdup rates.” Br.73. U.S. law, however,
is calibrated to prevent that. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
394 (2006). Regardless, as the district court found, the Wuhan injunction enables
Samsung to do exactly that to Ericsson, leaving Samsung free to enforce its SEPs
while tying Ericsson’s hands. Appx12-14; Appx1441(49:5-7). Samsung could
apply that pressure across the country. On January 29, 2021, Samsung filed IPR
petitions in the PTO seeking to invalidate Ericsson 4G and 5G SEPs, including two
patents Ericsson asserted here. See Samsung, IPR Nos. 2021-487, -447, -446, -486.
Samsung seeks to use U.S. forums to attack Ericsson patents, including the patents
in this case, while restraining Ericsson’s access to U.S. courts and agencies to assert
those patents. The district court’s injunction simply restores both parties’ ordinary
ways of protecting their rights before both relevant sovereigns.
Nor is there is any inconsistency between the injunction’s nationwide scope
and the district court’s effort “ ‘to preserve its jurisdiction,’ ” while “ ‘allowing both
[the U.S. and Chinese] suits to proceed without interference.’ ” Br.64-65 (quoting
Appx13-14). The court explained that it had limited relief to “preserv[ing] the ability
for litigation to proceed in parallel” in both the U.S. and China, Appx13, as opposed
to taking more drastic measures and “insert[ing ] itself into” the Wuhan action,
Appx14. Nothing about the injunction’s scope is inconsistent with that “targeted
55
purpose.” Appx13. It “preserve[s]” the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and agencies to
“proceed in parallel,” without interfering with the Wuhan action. Id.
B. The District Court Properly Required Samsung To Indemnify

Ericsson for Violations of the Wuhan Injunction
Samsung argues the district court should not have required it to indemnify
Ericsson for fines the Wuhan court might impose as a result of Ericsson’s U.S.
efforts “to lawfully litigate or adjudicate claims relating to the 4G and 5G SEPs
identified or involved in this case.” Appx15. Samsung again fails to show an abuse
of discretion.
1. Samsung errs by deeming the indemnification provision a “sanction”
for conduct Samsung undertook in Wuhan. Br.68. It is not a “sanction,” and the
district court never suggested it was. Sanctions are penalties for past misconduct.
See Sanction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The indemnification pro-
vision does not punish Samsung for anything that has already happened. It is a
forward-looking measure necessary to protect Ericsson; Samsung may never pay
anything. “[W]here an order for the payment of money is forward-looking and in-
volves an amount that cannot be calculated with specificity” at the time it is entered,
“it is equitable” relief, and may take the form of an “injunction.” Aleynikov v. Gold-
man Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 356-57 (3d Cir. 2014). Samsung calls such
relief “unprecedented,” Br.68, but courts routinely issue injunctions requiring one
party to indemnify another for costs it may incur in the future. See, e.g., Gon v. First
56
State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1989); Friends for All Children, Inc. v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The district court explained why that was necessary here. Samsung could
“seek the imposition of substantial fines in the Chinese Action for the purpose of
creating economic leverage against Ericsson to achieve practically what it may not
be able to obtain legally”—the withdrawal of Ericsson’s U.S. lawsuit, foreclosing
Ericsson’s ability to obtain relief Congress authorized Ericsson to seek in district
court. Appx14.6 The indemnification provision was particularly necessary because
ex parte communications are permitted in Chinese proceedings. Consequently, there
would be “[n]o record” if Samsung asked the Chinese court to impose a penalty.
Appx1417(25:5). The indemnity, by contrast, would “put both parties in the same
position of precariousness.” Appx1418(26:18-19).
The cases Samsung invokes show that the indemnification provision would
be permissible even if it were a sanction. In FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566
(5th Cir. 2008) (cited Br.68), the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court’s award of
sanctions for conduct in an “administrative proceeding” separate from proceedings
before the district court. Id. at 593. The court of appeals stressed that the court’s
6
Samsung’s claim that “[t]he court’s reference to ‘what [Samsung] may not be able
to obtain legally’ is inexplicable except as an insinuation that the Chinese courts may
behave illegitimately,” Br.69, misreads the opinion. The court meant only that fines
could force Ericsson to withdraw its suit, where Samsung could not “obtain legally”
a dismissal of the suit by the district court.
57
inherent powers “did not grant a district court the power to police the administrative
courts . . . when those courts do not threaten the court’s own judicial authority or
proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added). It distinguished situations—like those here—
where the conduct might “directly interfere with the district court’s authority.” Id.
at 952. Likewise, Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp.,
619 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2010) (cited Br.68), acknowledged that courts have the
“power to sanction conduct” where “ ‘essential to preserve the authority of the
court.’ ” Id. at 460. The Fifth Circuit explained that such “power” thus “does not
extend to collateral proceedings” if those proceedings “ ‘do not threaten the court’s
own judicial authority.’ ” Id. at 460-61. Here, the indemnification provision was
appropriate precisely to avoid efforts to enforce the Wuhan injunction that would
“threaten the [district] court’s own judicial authority or proceedings,” Maxxam, 523
F.3d at 593, and “prejudice[ ] Ericsson’s right to assert lawful causes of action,”
Appx13.
2. Samsung’s throwaway line that the indemnification provision violates
due process by “ punish[ing]” Samsung for doing “what the law plainly allows [it]
to do” in China, Br.70 (quotation marks omitted), is rich. Any penalties the Wuhan
court imposed on Ericsson under its injunction would likewise “punish” Ericsson for
doing “what the law plainly allows [it] to do”—enforce its rights in U.S. courts.
58
Samsung objects that requiring it to “bear the consequences” of an injunction
it procured “blocks the Chinese court’s ability to enforce its order”; that court, Sam-
sung insists, is “entitled” to greater “respect.” Br.70. But the whole problem here
is that Samsung procured a foreign-court order to “block” the U.S. court’s ability to
adjudicate this case. The U.S. court was “entitled” to far greater “respect” than Sam-
sung gave it. Samsung’s argument reduces to the complaint that the indemnification
order actually protects Ericsson from the effects of the Wuhan injunction, ensuring
that “both proceedings can progress on the merits.” Appx14. That the indemnifi-
cation order works as intended is a reason to uphold it, not overturn it.
Samsung’s passing complaint about the “indemnity provision’s breadth,”
Br.69, is waived and meritless. Pressed by the district court to suggest a more tailor-
ed approach, Samsung offered nothing. Appx1475-1476(83:21-84:4). The court did
not clearly err in finding that indemnification was the most narrowly targeted means
of addressing its concern that Samsung might “leverage” the Wuhan injunction’s
fines provisions to deprive U.S. courts of the ability to resolve Ericsson’s claims.
Appx14.
C. The District Court Properly Permitted Ericsson To File Suits

Related to Its 4G and 5G SEPs
Samsung argues it should be able to “enforce the Chinese court’s injunction
against claims for injunctive relief on Ericsson’s 4G and 5G SEPs” because Ericsson
is not currently seeking such relief. Br.71-72. But Samsung thought such claims
59
were sufficiently likely to warrant asking the Wuhan court to prohibit them. Appx4.
The district court simply “restore[d] the status quo,” so Ericsson could seek relief
that U.S. law permits. Porter, 328 U.S. at 251. Regardless, if Ericsson will not bring
such claims, Samsung suffers no effects from the portion of the anti-interference
injunction protecting their assertion.
That portion of the district court’s order is hardly “an unnecessary affront to
the Chinese court.” Br.72. The district court’s action to protect its own jurisdiction,
and “to preserve the ability for litigation to proceed in parallel,” Appx13, is no
commentary on the legitimacy of the Chinese proceedings. Having procured a
foreign injunction that is itself “an unnecessary affront” to U.S. courts and agencies
that lawfully entertain requests for injunctive relief for patent infringement, Sam-
sung is ill-positioned to complain. See pp. 34-35, supra.
Samsung’s reasons why such injunctions would be problematic—that they
“might force Samsung to take a license at holdup rates, preempting the Chinese
court’s rate-setting adjudication,” Br.73—are misplaced. In considering whether to
grant Ericsson an injunction, a district court could consider those arguments.
Indeed, Samsung asserts that “American courts” recognize the same principles
regarding FRAND-encumbered patents as foreign courts, Br.73-74, and that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s “eBay factors” will “nearly always favor money damages” rather
than injunctive relief, Br.75. None of that, however, justifies Samsung procuring an
60
anti-suit injunction from a foreign court to preemptively take that decision away
from the U.S. courts and agencies lawfully tasked with adjudicating such issues. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in preserving U.S. sovereign authority
against that overreach.
* * * * *
The district court’s legal authority to issue the anti-interference injunction is
unchallenged. All of Samsung’s arguments concern the district court’s exercise of
its broad discretion, not its power to grant relief. Consequently, were this Court to
identify any error warranting further consideration by the district court, the proper
remedy would not be to vacate the injunction, as Samsung requests. Br.76. It would
be to “leave the preliminary injunction in place” while “remand[ing] the case to the
district court for further” consideration. TEC Eng’g Corp. v. Budget Molders
Supply, Inc., 82 F.3d 542, 546 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Takiguchi v. MRI Int’l, Inc.,
611 F. App’x 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2015).
It is the district court that must exercise discretion in the first instance.
Vacatur pending that exercise could preclude it entirely and harm Ericsson irrepa-
rably. The district court found an emergency TRO necessary “to prevent Samsung
from interfering with this action or attempting to prevent Ericsson from asserting the
full scope of its patent rights.” Appx5. Samsung obtained an injunction from the
Wuhan court in secret and initiated other litigation bearing on this case without in-
61
forming the district court. Lifting the district court’s injunction, even momentarily,
would allow Samsung to engage in further litigious gamesmanship, such as rushing
to the Wuhan court for enforcement to cripple Ericsson and preclude remand pro-
ceedings altogether. Remand without vacatur would protect the status quo while the
district court conducts any necessary reconsideration.
Alternatively, this Court could stay the mandate and allow Ericsson to seek
an indicative ruling from the district court in light of this Court’s decision. Landis
v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (courts have “inherent” “power to stay
proceedings”). Were the district court to indicate it would grant the injunction again,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a)(3), this Court could remand to the district court for that pur-
pose and then review the resulting decision. See Fed. R. App. P. 12.1(b); Arlington
Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 2010-1377, 2011 WL 5275848, at *1
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 4, 2011).
CONCLUSION
The district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction should be affirmed.
62
April 2, 2021 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jeffrey A. Lamken

Theodore Stevenson, III Jeffrey A. Lamken
Nicholas M. Mathews Counsel of Record
MCKOOL SMITH, P.C. Michael G. Pattillo, Jr.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 1500 Rayiner I. Hashem
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63
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7) and Fed. Cir. R. 32(b) because this brief contains 13,991 words as
measured by the word count function of Microsoft Word, excluding the parts
of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f ) and Fed. Cir. R. 32(b)(2).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
Microsoft Word in Times New Roman 14-point font.
April 2, 2021 /s/ Jeffrey A. Lamken

Jeffrey A. Lamken
Counsel for Ericsson Inc. and

Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson

21-04-02 Ericsson Response Brief CAFC

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21-04-02 Ericsson Response Brief CAFC

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Case: 21-1565 Document: 25 Page: 1 Filed: 04/02/2021

ERICSSON INC., TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS

On Appeal from the United States District Court

RESPONSE BRIEF FOR APPELLEES ERICSSON INC.

Theodore Stevenson, III Jeffrey A. Lamken

Counsel for Ericsson Inc. and Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson

Christine M. Woodin Jennifer E. Fischell

Counsel for Ericsson Inc. and Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson

FORM 9. Certificate of Interest Form 9 (p. 1)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Case Number 2021-1565

Instructions: Complete each section of the form. In answering items 2 and 3, be

Name: Jeffrey A. Lamken

FORM 9. Certificate of Interest Form 9 (p. 2)

1. Represented 2. Real Party in 3. Parent Corporations

Ericsson Inc. See addendum.

Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson See addendum.

✔ Additional pages attached

FORM 9. Certificate of Interest Form 9 (p. 3)

6. Organizational Victims and Bankruptcy Cases. Provide any information

3. Parent Corporations and Stockholders. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(3). Provide the

Ericsson Inc. is a Delaware corporation that is wholly owned by Ericsson

Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson is a publicly traded Swedish corporation

McKool Smith, P.C.:

The decision in this case may affect or be directly affected by Samsung

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES .....................................................................x

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................4

I. Wireless Standards, SEPs, and FRAND Licensing ........................................... 5

A. ETSI’s Wireless Communications Standards ............................................ 5

B. The FRAND Commitment and Reciprocal Obligations ............................6

II. Proceedings Below ............................................................................................. 7

A. The Parties Reach an Impasse in Renewing Cross-Licenses ..................... 7

B. Ericsson Files Suit Where It Is Headquartered and Where Samsung

C. Samsung Secretly Files Suit in Wuhan and Obtains an Ex Parte

1. Samsung Secretly Files an Incomplete Action in a Jurisdiction

2. Samsung Obtains an Ex Parte Injunction To Prevent Ericsson

D. The U.S. District Court Issues a Defensive TRO and Preliminary

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................18

A. The District Court Had Unquestioned Authority To Issue a

B. The Defensive Anti-Interference Injunction Was Proper Under

C. Samsung’s Putative “Incorrect Assumptions” Fail To Establish an

1. The District Court Correctly Understood the Wuhan

2. The District Court Understood the Procedural Disadvantage

3. The District Court Properly Considered the Inequitable Effect

II. The Anti-Interference Injunction’s Scope Was Commensurate With the

A. The Nationwide Anti-Interference Injunction Was an Appropriate

B. The District Court Properly Required Samsung To Indemnify

C. The District Court Properly Permitted Ericsson To File Suits

Agora Syndicate, Inc. v. Robinson Janitorial Specialists, Inc.,

Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.,

Amchem Prods. Inc. v. B.C. Workers’ Comp. Bd.,

Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,

Associação Brasileira de Medicina de Grupo v. Stryker Corp.,

Bugliotti v. Republic of Argentina,

China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong,

Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States,

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,

Compania Naviera Joanna SA v. Koninklijke Boskalis

The Corfu Channel,

Donovan v. City of Dallas,

E.&J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.,

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,

Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle,