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    Kuljeet_Singh_and_Ors__vs_Governor_of_Delhi_and_Ors820221COM224247

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    In The Supreme Court of India

    Uploaded by

    Mirza

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 2

    MANU/SC/0221/1982

    Equivalent Citation: AIR1982SC 774, 1982C riLJ624, 1982(1)SC ALE1, (1982)1SC C 417, [1982]3SC R58, 1982(14)UJ176

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


    Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 8193-A of 1981
    Decided On: 20.01.1982
    Appellants: Kuljeet Singh and Ors.
    Vs.
    Respondent: Governor of Delhi and Ors.
    Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
    Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., A.N. Sen and O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.
    Counsels:
    For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: R.K. Garg, V.J. Francis, Sunil Kumar Jain, Dinesh
    Kumar Garg and R.K. Jain Advs
    For Respondents/Defendant: N.C. Talukdar, R.N. Poddar, K. Parasaran, Attorney
    Genrel, M.K. Banerjee and A. Subhashini, Advs.
    JUDGMENT
    1. The question as regards the scope of the power of the President under Article 72 of
    the Constitution to commute a sentence of death into a lesser sentence may have to
    await examination on an appropriate occasion. This clearly is not that occasion
    because in so far as this case is concerned, whatever be the guidelines observed for
    the exercise of the power conferred by Article 72, the only sentence which can
    possibly be imposed upon the petitioner is that of death and no circumstances exist
    for interference with that sentence. Therefore we see no justification for saying that
    in refusing to commute the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner into a
    lesser sentence, the President has in any manner transgressed his discretionary
    power under Article 72. Undoubtedly, the President has the power in an appropriate
    case to commute any sentence imposed by a court into a lesser sentence and as said
    by Chief Justice Taft in James She wan & Sons v. United Stares 69 L Ed. 527 the
    "executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake
    in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law" and that the administration of
    justice by the courts is not necessarily or certainly considerate of circumstances
    which may properly mitigate guilt. But the question as to whether the case is
    appropriate for the exercise of the power conferred by Article 72 depends upon the
    facts and circumstances of each particular case. The necessity or the justification for
    exercising that power has therefore to be judged from case to case. In fact, we do
    not see what useful purpose will be achieved by the petitioner by ensuring the
    imposition of any severe, judicially evolved-constraints on the wholesome power of
    the President to use it as the justice of a case may require. After all, the power
    conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the purpose of reducing the sentence,
    not for enhancing it. We need not, however, go into that question elaborately
    because in so far as this case is concerned, we are quite clear that not even the most
    liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded the President to interfere
    with the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner, in view particularly of the
    considerations mentioned by us in our judgment in Kuljeet Singh @ Ranga v. Union

    24-02-2021 (Page 1 of 2) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT


    of India and Anr. MANU/SC/0169/1981 : 1981CriL J1045 . We may recall what we
    said in that judgment that "the death of the Chopra children was caused by the
    petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning which bears a professional
    stamp", that the "survival of an orderly society demands the extinction of the life of
    persons like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and security", and that
    "they are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the
    evolving standards of decency of a mature society".
    2. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
    3. We have heard Shri R. K. Jain as amicus on behalf of the accused Billa. We see no
    substance in Shri Jain's contentions also.
    4 . The order of stay of execution of the death sentence which we had passed in
    favour of the accused Ranga and Billa as also the general order of stay are hereby
    vacated. If in any specific case or cases there is an express order of stay, it will not
    be affected by the order which we are passing today.

    © Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

    24-02-2021 (Page 2 of 2) www.manupatra.com CNLU STUDENT

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