See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/304057660

Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship Design— A Rational Approach

Article  in  Naval Engineers Journal · June 2016

CITATIONS READS
2 3,650

1 author:

Omri Pedatzur
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
7 PUBLICATIONS   13 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Finite elements of stiffened plates View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Omri Pedatzur on 26 February 2018.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2016 | Vol. 128 | No. 2

A Next Generation Integrated Power System

for Legacy Naval Platforms 51

Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship Design—

A Rational Approach 57

Toward Resilient Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) 65

Distributed Lethality, Command and Control Software

Engineering, and Navy Laboratories 72

www.navalengineers.org
TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S

FEATURES AND NEWS

16 2016–2017 Scholarship Winners
17 Student Scholarship Winner Profiles

DEPARTMENTS
5 ASNE Corporate Supporters 18 2016 Annual State of the Society Address
ASNA President Tony Lengerich delivered the annual State
7 President’s Page of the Society address on 6 July, 2016.
8 ASNE Upcoming Events 21 ASNE Day 2016
9 Secretary’s Notes 30 Annual ASNE Awards
10 New & Reinstated Members The Annual ASNE Awards celebrate excellence in the
profession. Find out who won the Society’s most prestigious
12 ASNE Contributors awards.
14 ASNE Section Directory 31 ASNE 50-year Members
15 ASNE Committee Directory 32 The Gold Medal Award

20 Code of Ethics 34 The Harold E. Saunders Award

36 The Solberg Award
79 Know Brainer
The Naval Research Laboratory: 39 The Clifford G. Geiger Award
The Site That Might Have Been 41 The Claud A. Jones Award
43 The Rosenblatt Young Naval Engineer Award
Brooklyn 46 The Frank C. Jones Award
Staten
Island 48 The Frank G. Law Award
Lower
New York Bay

Raritan Bay Atlantic

Ocean

^
New Jersey N

2 | June 2016 | No. 128-2 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL

 June 2016 | Vol. 128 | No. 2

TECHNICAL PAPERS
51 A Next Generation Integrated Power System for Legacy Naval Platforms
This paper describes in detail how an NGIPS can be deployed on legacy platforms within the existing space
limitations, using the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer as an example. In terms of mission and quantity in
the fleet, the Arleigh Burkeclass destroyer is one of the most likely platforms for an NGIPS. By using an
innovative approach and currently available technology, an NGIPS can not only be deployed on this and
other legacy platforms in the next five to seven years, but also without significantly increasing the cost and
weight of the ship.
Lee A. Condor

57 Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship Design—

A Rational Approach
This paper reviews a few failures and design flaws from the last
decade, associated with insufficient weight design margins and
poor weight control. The paper suggests an easy way to implement
weight design margins into naval ship design according to the
complexity and risk level of the vessel and its sub-systems.
CDR Omri Pedatzur

65 Toward Resilient Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS)

This paper introduces Unmanned Maritime Systems and their high level characteristics, introduces
resilience and applications to Engineered Systems, discusses important resilience attributes of Unmanned
Maritime Systems, and concludes with recommendations for further research.
Andrew Nuss, Timothy Blackburn, Ph.D., P.E., Andreas Garstenauer, Ph.D., P.E.

72 Distributed Lethality, Command and Control Software Engineering,

and Navy Laboratories
This article examines the benefits of having the government serve as an engineer and integrator of
software-intensive tactical systems, and the capabilities the government—along with industry partners—
brings to such an enterprise. This article also focuses on how U.S. Navy laboratories can bring together
the multi-discipline approach and diverse team needed to leverage advancements in data science, brain
cognition, augmented reality, emerging distributed software architectures and agile software development
methods to support improved U.S. Navy command and control solutions. Further, this article will discuss
how such an approach can support emerging dynamic operational constructs like distributed lethality.
Captain Kurt J. Rothenhaus USN, Mr. Bill Bonwit, Captain George Galdorisi (USN, retired), Ms. Anna Stang, Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2016 | Vol. 128 | No. 2

ON THE COVER
MEDITERRANEAN SEA (July 31, 2016) The
amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD
1) transits the Mediterranean Sea. Wasp is
A Next Generation Integrated Power System
for Legacy Naval Platforms 51 deployed with the Wasp Amphibious Ready
Group to support maritime security operations
Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship Design—
A Rational Approach 57

Toward Resilient Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) 65

Distributed Lethality, Command and Control Software and theater security cooperation efforts in the
Engineering, and Navy Laboratories 72

U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations.

www.navalengineers.org
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist
1st Class Eric S. Garst/Released

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2016 | No. 128-2 | 3

 TECHNICAL PAPER

CDR Omri Pedatzur

Israeli Navy

Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship

Design—A Rational Approach
INTRODUCTION

P
ROPER SYSTEM ENGINEERING of a naval vessel leads to optimal ABSTRACT
and safe design parameters; the vessel fulfils all customer require- Optimal design of a ship requires a
ments, abides by all design standards and mandatory regulations, and fine balance between all the classic
includes acceptable margins for future growth over the life expectancy key parameters of naval architecture:
of the vessel. weight, stability, speed, range, etc. The
On the other hand, poorly executed system engineering leads to unbalanced, methodology of the design spiral is well
overweight vessels that don’t meet the customer requirements, don’t follow the established, but many recent projects
applicable standards, have almost zero margins for future growth, and (worst present examples of poor implementation
of all) may present severe safety problems. of the methodology, proving that anything
that can go wrong—and as Murphy
Increase in the vessel’s weight is the biggest enemy of the optimal design
promised, actually will.
spot, because it immediately leads to degradation in stability, speed, range, and
structural integrity. Needless to say, every weight increase during the design This paper reviews a few failures and design
phase or during the construction phase results in smaller margins for future flaws from the last decade, associated with
growth, leaving the new vessel limited for decades to come, sometimes with insufficient weight design margins and
poor weight control. The paper suggests
severe initial problems that will get even worse as years go by.
an easy way to implement weight design
It seems that a significant portion of new vessels suffer from this problem,
margins into naval ship design according to
regardless of size, type of vessel, or designer. Numerous naval projects have
the complexity and risk level of the vessel
made headlines in the last few years because of their weight problems, remind- and its sub-systems.
ing us that there is always room for improvement in the art of design margins
and weight control.

New Zealand Royal Navy Protector Class Offshore Patrol

Vessels
In July 2004, the New Zealand Ministry of Defence ordered two offshore patrol
vessels (OPVs) from Tenix Defense (later BAE Systems) as part of the $500
million defense acquisition project named Protector. The first of them, HMNZS
Otago (Figure 1) was launched in 2006 with 100 tons of weight above the max-
imum design displacement of about 1,800 tons (Grevat, 2008), which affected
its operational capability, including its ability to sail in Antarctic waters (in
order to minimize the ship’s weight its ice strengthening was reduced, leaving
the ship’s plates vulnerable to pounding by blocks of ice).
The New Zealand Ministry of Defense claimed that the two OPVs are unsea- KEY WORDS
worthy and refused to accept the vessels, leaving them in limbo at the William- ■■ WeightDesign Margin
stown docks. The initial crew of 70 stationed in Melbourne for the sea trials ■■ Bonen Scale
and commissioning of the vessel returned home until the problems with the ■■ Key Weight Estimate

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2016  |  No. 128-2  |  57

Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship Design—A Rational Approach

Affairs Minister Murray McCully said a planned patrol of

the Antarctic fishery was canceled due to concerns about
the ability of the vessel to operate in the Southern Ocean.
He claimed that he was advised that the mission was not
possible because it was ‘’not within the capabilities of the
vessel’’ (Manins, 2013).

Spanish Navy Isaac Peral-class AIP Submarines

Submarine design projects suffer from the same problem,
however, for these types of projects it is not just a matter
of meeting customer requirements or following the design
standards, but rather having (or not having) enough buoy-
Figure 1: HMNZS Otago (P148) Protector-class Offshore ancy to balance their own weight.
Patrol Vessel IMAGE CREDIT: ROYAL NEW ZEALAND NAVY The new project of the Spanish Navy, the S-80 Isaac
Peral-class submarine (Figure 2), consists of designing and
building four state-of-the-art AIP submarines with a total
price tag of $3 billion.
The first of the four submarines is 70 to 100 tons over-
weight, out of 2,430 tons maximum design displacement.
According to Navantia, the Spanish shipbuilding company
responsible for its design, that excess bulk is enough to
prevent the Isaac Peral submarine from successfully resur-
facing once submerged. (Davis, 2013).
Construction on the S-80 class submarines began in
early 2005, but the weight problems emerged just as the
hull of the first submarine was nearly completed in 2013.
Spain will now pay the U.S. Navy contractor Electric Boat
millions of dollars over three years to assess the issue and
carry out the work required to correct it. The problems
Figure 2: S-80 Isaac Peral-class submarine under can be fixed by extending the length of the submarine’s
construction IMAGE CREDIT: NAVANTIA hull, perhaps by a few meters, in order to increase buoyan-
cy. However, this kind of major redesign at this advanced
vessels weight could be solved, resulting in a huge crisis stage of the project has an enormous price tag. According
and unflattering headlines in the media (Gordon, 2009). to a former director of Spain’s Office of Strategic Assess-
This kind of problem doesn’t stay static but rather de- ment, “The buoyancy problem alone could cost up to half
teriorates with time. New Zealand Defense Minister Dr. a billion euros to cover redesign and extra construction,
Wayne Mapp expressed his disappointment in 2008, “Nor- without considering the propulsion problem.” (Kington,
mally, they can just add whatever they like to these ships, 2013).
but with these ones, loads will have to be managed very The final price tag will be reflected not only in terms
carefully. There are usually [weight] margins to play with, of money, but also in a significant delay in the delivery
but with these ships that margin is less” (Porteous, 2008). date, and a potential threat to Navantia sales as well as
After long and problematic contract negotiations be- to the Spanish Navy’s budget. The Isaac Peral-class sub-
tween the shipyard and the Ministry of Defence, both marine might float again in the future, but nothing will
ships were commissioned in 2010, nearly two years after compensate for the poorly executed system engineering
the original target date (De Silva, 2010). The OPVs have and inadequate general arrangement of the vessel.
already served on several lengthy patrols of the Antarc- In both cases, New Zealand and Spain, neither the gov-
tic, though they lack the capability of operating in heavi- ernment authorities nor industry supplied explanations
er levels of ice coverage. In 2013, New Zealand Foreign regarding the root causes of the problems. Several broad

58 | June 2016 | No. 128-2 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL

explanations as to the lack of design margins and loss of
weight control in naval ship design are discussed later on.

The Need for Weight Margins

Good management of design and construction margins re-
quires allocating virtual extra weight onboard the vessel
and making sure that the ship design maintains its key
performance parameters even with the added weight. As
the design and construction progresses, the virtual weight
may turn out to be the actual weight. Thus, the “big ques-
tion” is how much weight should be added as a design and
construction margin?
There are multiple codes of practice and rules of thumb Figure 3: Swedish Navy Visby-class corvette
to cope with this question, but it seems that some of the  IMAGE CREDIT: KOCKUMS

recommended practices fail to differentiate between the

various types of projects, resulting in excessive margins LEVEL 2—Upgrading an Existing System
for simple and almost risk-free designs, and insufficient There is sometimes a need to change, upgrade, or add new
margins for complex ship designs that are subject to higher features to a previously designed system. The performance
risk. key parameters can be predicted with a decent level of
Managing the design margins according to the risk level certainty. Usually, 2 to 3 design cycles are needed before
of the vessel requires a standard scale to evaluate the risk the design phase ends. For instance: adding a helicopter
and complexity of the project. landing pad and a light aluminium hangar to the existing
Israel Navy SAAR 4 missile ship design without changing
The Project’s Risk and Complexity Level the propulsion, electrical, and auxiliary systems to receive
According to the “Bonen Scale” the SAAR 4.5 Hohit-class, a new variant of the missile ship
Long time Rafael Advanced Defense Systems director-gen- that can carry a small helicopter, (a project that was ac-
eral, Dr. Zeev Bonen, defined a standard scale, commonly complished by Israel Shipyards, LTD for the Israel Navy).
known as the “Bonen Scale,” to quantify the complexity
and risk associated with R&D projects in the defense in- LEVEL 3—Development of a New System
dustry (Bonen, 1969). The “Bonen Scale” has become a A brand new design with no previous versions, but other sim-
national standard in system engineering all across the Is- ilar projects have demonstrated that the project is feasible.
raeli defense industry, including air, land, naval, and space However, more investment is needed to enter a new de-
systems. According to Bonen, every system or subsystem sign arena to deal with unfamiliar subjects. An example of
can be ranked on a 1 to 4 scale, which will eventually de- this is the development of the Arleigh Burke-class destroy-
termine the number of design cycles. er by the U.S. Navy and Bath Iron Works.
According to Bonen, in this type project the design
LEVEL 1—Duplicating an Existing System teams do not always choose the right solution in the be-
The design phase presents common engineering problems ginning and might complete multiple design cycles before
that have successfully been dealt with before. The tools and they reach the proper system architecture. Once the right
methods are well known and practiced and the exact per- solution is chosen, three design cycles are usually needed
formance key parameters are guaranteed. Usually, the de- in order to complete the design phase.
sign phase of the project demands 1-2 design cycles.
An example of this phase is the design of a new regu- LEVEL 4—Technological Breakthrough
lar size container ship by Hyundai Heavy Industries. It is Nothing like this has ever been done before. Total pioneer-
unusual to find a new naval ship design (not commercial ing that requires learning new disciplines, developing new
off-the-shelf) that qualifies for “Level 1,” and this example theories, designing tools, etc. For instance, the develop-
is taken from the Merchant Marine market to emphasize ment of the Visby-class corvette (Figure 3) by the Swedish
this point. Navy and Kockums Naval Solutions. The Visby-class hull

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2016  |  No. 128-2  |  59

Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship Design—A Rational Approach

Figure 4: U.S. Navy’s Sea Jet IMAGE CREDIT: U.S. NAVY

Complexity Stage of the project

and risk level
according to the Feasibility Contract Detailed
Construction
“Bonen Scale” study design design
Level 1 5% 4% 2% 1%
Level 2 10% 8% 5% 2%
Level 3 15% 12% 8% 4%
Level 4 25% 15% 10% 5%

Table 1. Managing the weight design margins according to

the ship’s features.

and superstructure design is considered to be a techno-

logical breakthrough mainly because the 72.7 m vessel is Figure 5: Management of weight margins in a naval vessel.
made of composite materials, and the ship design heavily
emphasizes low signatures and stealth technology. The design margin values listed in Table 1 are the author’s
In this type of project, Bonen recommends conducting a recommendations and may vary depending on the effec-
pre-project R&D effort, and even building a small scale tiveness of the other activities in the vessel’s weight con-
prototype before starting full scale development in order trol plan.
to test and demonstrate the feasibility of the solution. The ship’s service life weight margins have to comply
One example of this risk reduction process is the 133-ft. with the naval authority requirements that are set in ad-
Sea Jet (Figure 4) that was built as a technology test bed vance, regardless of the risk level or the current phase
in order to test and demonstrate some of the breakthrough of the project. Therefore, the service life weight margins
technologies that were later integrated into the U.S. Na- should be added on top of the values listed above.
vy’s 600-ft. Zumwalt-class destroyer (Palmer, 2005). The values listed in Table 1 should not be added to the
vessel’s initial weight estimate as a whole, but rather to the
Management of Design Margins According to the different SWBS groups according to each group risk and
Complexity and Risk Level of the Project complexity level.
Originally, the “Bonen Scale” was used to define various For instance, a vessel design that incorporates break-
system characteristics, such as the number of design cy- through hull design with existing propulsion system will
cles before the final design freeze can be reached, or the add, during the feasibility study phase, 25% extra weight
number of testing prototypes before serial production can in SWBS group 1, but only 5% in SWBS group 2. The final
begin. weight design margin of the whole vessel will rarely reach
This paper suggests using the same scale to quantify the highest values associated with “level 4” risk, because
the recommended weight design margins according to the even if both the hull and the propulsion system are inno-
stage of the project and the level of complexity and risk. vative, other components like auxiliary systems, outfit and

60  |  June 2016  |  No. 128-2 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL

furnishing are usually associated with lower levels of risk.
The U.S. Navy utilized a more refined methodology, al-
though conceptually similar to the one presented above.
U.S. Navy margin policy has a total acquisition weight
margin range from 6% to 17.5% of lightship and a total
acquisition KG margin range from 4.8% to 14.5% of light-
ship with associated confidence intervals of 50% and 82%,
respectively (International Society of Allied Weight Engi-
neers, 2001). These figures quite match the values listed in
Table 1, as most of the U.S. Navy new vessels projects can
be considered as a “Level 3” since only in rare cases is the
ship design a total pioneering effort that requires learning
new disciplines and developing new theories.
Using the predetermined values listed in Table 1, fol- Figure 6: USS Freedom IMAGE CREDIT: U.S. NAVY

lowed by the process presented in Figure 5, is an easy way

to implement design margins into naval ship design, and requirements and design standards.
it is crucial that the extra weight will be followed by extra Insufficient service life allowance may result in a ship
KG to present degradation in the stability of the vessel. being removed from service well before the end of the pro-
The values of the KG margins in each SWBS group can be jected service life due to inability to accept modifications
obtained by the same method to reflect the uncertainty of needed to preserve its mission effectiveness.
the design.
Both the weight of the vessel and ship’s center of grav- Critical Design Limits and Performance Traps
ity above keel (KG) must be monitored carefully from the Each ton of overweight causes a small degradation in the
very beginning, and it is both the designer’s and the cus- vessel’s performance. However, it is definitely not a linear
tomer’s responsibility to make sure the weight margin is function; in some cases, a small amount of overweight can
not expended too quickly. be a game changer, reducing the overall performance of
In case of deviation, there is an urgent need to make a the vessel by an order of magnitude. One example is the
correction in the design and not to skip to the next design weight of submarines, as previously mentioned, that can
phase with insufficient margins, risking or limiting the ves- tolerate overweight only up to the point in which it can no
sel both in the short term (right after launching) and in the longer float.
long term (during its service). In the case of high speed planing craft, one extra ton
The suggested method should not replace the project’s can make the difference between successful hydrodynamic
official weight control plan, the periodical detailed weight lift, resulting in a top speed of 35+ knots, to hydrostatic
reports, and all other weight control activities. In addition, lift that ends up with barely half of the declared top speed.
having sufficient margins in the current design phase does In other cases, a few extra tons can make the difference
not mean that weight control issues should be disregarded. between meeting the design standards and failing to com-
Unlike a merchant vessel that carries the same number ply with regulations.
of containers or the same amount of oil on its first and last Other critical design limits might be draft or weight
journey, the margins left for future growth are extremely limitations with the purpose of compatibility with specific
crucial for naval ships. facilities or infrastructure (cranes, docking yards, etc.).
Naval vessels are expected to be in active service for Special attention should be given to carefully identify-
25 to 35 years and in rare cases even longer, while the ing those critical design limits in advance and making an
weapons systems are often changed and replaced. Naval extra effort to steer clear of performance traps.
ships need to undergo significant overhauls and upgrades
during their service life, and the future growth margins Case Study: The U.S. Navy Littoral Combat
enable the ship to successfully cope with these demands Ship (LCS) Program
as well as carry various as yet unknown payloads in the The U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program in-
years to come, all while continuing to maintain the initial cludes ships from two different variants: the Freedom vari-

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2016  |  No. 128-2  |  61

Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship Design—A Rational Approach

service life allowance for weight and restricts the ship’s

ability to execute its required missions... Operating a ship
in excess of its naval architectural limit can make it prone
to failure in certain weather or damage conditions, and
the ship can also see a decreased service life due to struc-
tural fatigue.”
U.S. Navy officials have also stated “they will limit fuel
loads on LCS 2, as necessary, to ensure the naval architec-
tural limit is not exceeded.” (GAO, 2014).
The weight problems in the LCS project are far smaller
than the other examples listed above, but they are pre-
sented here as a case study in order to examine the weight
problems of the two LCS variants with respect to the risk
and complexity level of each variant.
The Freedom variant could be considered as “Level
3” in SWBS Level 1 group mainly because it’s based on a
monohull, the most common hull shape for both merchant
and naval ships. As presented in Table 2, the overweight
of USS Freedom was considerably smaller than that of the
other variant, and the recovery after the first prototype
Figure 7: USS Independence
 IMAGE CREDIT: AUSTAL USA/GENERAL DYNAMICS
was quick and quite remarkable.
The Independence variant could be considered as “Lev-
ant—a classic monohull designed and built by Lockheed el 3.5” in the same SWBS group level and on the same
Martin (Figure 6)—and the Independence variant—a scale, mainly because it’s based on a trimaran, a unique
unique trimaran designed and built by Austal USA and multihull and quite uncommon form for naval application
General Dynamics (Figure 7). Although the two variants that incorporates many risks and a higher level of com-
differ widely from each other, they both suffer from the plexity, primarily in ship structural strength and general
same problem of overweight, resulting in lower-than-de- arrangement issues.
signed speed in the Independence variant, shorter than We would therefore expect, based on this rough tech-
designed range at 14 knots in the Freedom variant, and nological risk analysis, that the higher Bonen scale variant
smaller than designed margins for future growth in both would experience larger weight excess in its various de-
variants. sign and manufacturing stages. And indeed, according to
In July 2014, the United States Government Accountabil- the data presented in Table 2, the Independence variant
ity Office (GAO) submitted a report titled Littoral Combat not only gained more weight, but also had a slower recov-
Ship—Additional Testing and Improved Weight Manage- ery rate, and even after the first three ships there is still
ment Needed Prior to Further Investment that discussed the more to be done in order to meet the U.S. Navy service life
overweight of LCS. By the time the report was submitted, allowance requirements.
four out of the first six LCS had 19 to 67 tons overweight
and didn’t meet the life allowance requirement of 50 tons. Discussion
USS Freedom (LCS 1) can meet its sprint speed of 40 Weight control programs are not new concepts. The U.S.
knots but it hasn’t been able to reach the distance and Navy weight control program was formulated in 1961 and
speed requirement of 3,500 nautical mile range at 14 established formal weight margins in 1963.
knots (Phelps, 2014). It took 15 years to accumulate a database large
USS Independence (LCS 2) can only sprint at 39.5 enough to be considered reasonable for a statistical study
knots, under the required 40 knots, since the vessel is at a of weight margins, and in 1978 this database was used
weight in which it “exceeds its naval architectural limit,” to update the Weight Margin Policy for Surface Ships and
according to the GAO report. expand it to include a KG margin policy (Cimino & Fil-
The GAO report states that LCS 2 weight “provides no iopoulos, 1997).

62  |  June 2016  |  No. 128-2 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL

 Processes and procedures, acquisition margins, and ser- Currently meets service life
Variant Ship
vice life allowances, as practiced today, have been in place allowance requirements?a
and successfully executed since the late 1970s.
No—24 tons less than
It has been within the last decade or so that almost ev- LCS 1
requirement
ery design has been plagued with serious weight control Freedom Yes—exceeds requirement
LCS 3
problems, and the lack of weight control appears to be Variant by 106 tons

endemic to most navies. This paper offers several broad LCS 5b

Yes—exceeds requirement
by 17 tons
potential explanations for this phenomenon.
No—67 tons less than
LCS 2
requirement
Flexible Gate Reviews Independence No—34 tons less than
LCS 4
Acquisition reform in the U.S. Navy placed the feasibility Variant requirement

study, and in some cases even the preliminary design, ex- LCS 6b
No—19 tons less than
requirement
clusively in the hands of industry vs. government. aLCS has a service life allowance requirement of 50 metric tons.
This approach has proved to be detrimental to weight Numbers are rounded.
bLCS 1-4 have been delivered, and therefore builder’s remaining margin
control because the ship design spiral was well understood has become part of the service file allowance.
and practiced within the U.S. Navy; designs were conduct-
ed until every functional area was satisfied before exiting Table 2. Status of recent Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) service
life allowances. (UNITED STATES GAO, 2014)
to the next design phase.
This practice has been substituted with other less effec-
tive methods and pseudo-design gate reviews geared only Contractual Issues
to meeting schedule. Successful weight control programs must include Not-to-
The U.S. Navy 1978 Acquisition Margin Policy defined Exceed displacement and KG values in the contract, and
an upper value for the Detail Design and Build (D&B) most importantly, liquidated damages for exceeding these
phase as 5.3% of lightship at contact award. The 1992 up- values. The value of liquidated damages does not consti-
date of the policy increased this value to 9.8%. tute arbitrary penalties, but rather an attempt by the cus-
Nowadays, many ship designs proceed to the D&B phase tomer to recover the partial costs of corrective measures or
with insufficient weight margins, without design closure loss of performance.
and before proper design maturity is accomplished. Insuf- This policy is not uniformly applied to naval ship de-
ficient weight margins in the design phase almost auto- signs, or when applied the liquidated damages amount is
matically lead to overweight and the results are inevitable. farcical and can be easily absorbed as a cost to do business.

The Lost Art of Weight Estimation Reduction Of Acquisition Margins To Meet The
The key weight estimate is the initial development of the Cost Budget
baseline. During this time, ship systems are not fully de- The U.S. Navy 1984 Weight Task Force concluded “pres-
tailed out and this is the time when credible weight esti- sures to underestimate weights during early stage design
mators earn their keep. in response to concern that the ship would be cancelled if
It seems that this art of weight estimation and engineer- it could not be acquired within the allocated budget” is as
ing has been lost or substituted by CAD systems. CAD sys- relevant today, which dictates reduced acquisition margins
tems do not account for weight estimating relationships, as the least resistant approach to meet the cost budget.
distinction of normal growth patterns versus abnormal
growth, and inputs from historical databases. CAD sys- Management Awareness
tems can provide only accurate estimates as final weight Project managers acknowledge weight control but are less
reports. sensitive to adverse weight trends unless they exceed the
A fully modeled compartment will provide the weight applicable naval architecture rules and standards.
of every nut and bolt, however, by the time compartments
reach their 75-90% modeling completion, the design trade Tendency to Consume the Service Life Allowances
space has closed out and only minimal changes can be in- before Launching the Vessel
duced (such as weight reduction). Service life allowance is one of the few areas in a design that

NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2016  |  No. 128-2  |  63

Weight Design Margins in Naval Ship Design—A Rational Approach

can be reduced or eliminated without compromising the lead a project to a total catastrophe resulting in unaccept-
ship’s present mission. Unfortunately, both the industries and able performance and not meeting the mandatory design
the navies trend to compromise future growth capacity for standards even before the vessel enters active service. The
immediate project-based acquisition concerns (Peer, 2012). vessel can be fixed only at a few points in time, mainly
during the early design phase, when the change is cheap
Summary yet effective, and can be implemented easily while still
This paper focuses mainly on the issue of weight, which maintaining proper systems engineering. During the con-
may be the most harmful effect on the vessel’s performance struction phase and after launching there is often almost
and safety. Good management of design margins requires nothing to be done, forcing designers and customers to ac-
implementing the same methodology to other key param- cept poor performance and limitations, though they were
eters such as speed, drag, range, electric power load, etc. set in motion during the design phase.
Poor management of design and construction weight This paper proposes a methodical design weight margin
margins reduces the margins remaining for future growth. system based on project complexity and in turn has the
This can leave the vessel limited for decades and in the potential to ensure future ship designs have appropriate
worst case, as presented in this paper, poor practice can expected lifetime weight and KG margins at delivery.

REFERENCES AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Bonen Z., On the Planning of Development Kington T., “Navantia Gets U.S. Help To Fix CDR OMRI PEDATZURserves as a
Projects, Proceeding of the 3rd Annual Overweight Sub,” Defense News, 5/6/2013. technical program manager in the Israel
Conference on Operation Research, Tel Aviv, Manins R., “Captain Defends Otago’s Defence Forces (IDF). Pedatzur earned his
Israel, July 1969. Capabilities in Ice,” Otago Daily Times, B.Sc degree in mechanical engineering
Cimino D. & Filiopoulos C., Weight and KG 1/3/2013. from the Tel Aviv University and his M.E.
Margin Analysis of Naval Surface Ships, 56th Palmer W., “Advanced Electric Ship degree in quality assurance and reliability
Annual Society of Allied Weight Engineers Demonstrator—Sea Jet Serves as a from the Technion—Israel Institute of
Conference, Bellevue, Washington, Technology Testbed,” SeaFrame, Vol 1, Issue Technology. He graduated the Israeli
19/5/1997. 2, Fall 2005. Naval Academy with distinction, served
Davis C., Spain’s S-81 Isaac Peral Submarine Peer D., “Future Growth Margin is The Real onboard a SAAR 5 missile corvette, and
Cost $680 Million to Build... And Can’t Issue,” Canadian Naval Review, 26/3/2012. received The Israel President’s Award
Float,” The World Post, 24/5/2013.
Phelps N., “Report: Littoral Combat Ships for Outstanding Military Service. Omri
De Silva R., “Boon or Curse? Royal New Too Heavy,” Navy Times, 4/8/2014. graduated the Naval Construction and
Zealand Navy Struggles to Make ‘Otago’
Porteous D., “Problem Ships Not For Sale,” Engineering Program at MIT (Course
Operational,” Defence IQ, 9/6/2010.
Otago Daily Times, 20/12/2008. XIII-A) with dual SM degrees in both
Gordon J., “Biggest losers: New Zealand mechanical engineering and naval
United States Government Accountability
Rejects Our ‘Fat’ Frigates,” The Age National,
Office (GAO), Littoral Combat Ship - architecture & marine engineering. He
3/5/2009.
Additional Testing and Improved Weight served in a series of positions related to
Grevat J., “Safety and weight worries delay Management Needed Prior to Further ship design and maintenance and has
Project Protector Deliveries,” Jane’s Navy Investments, GAO Report 14-749 to published papers in the Naval Engineers
International, 24/12/2008. Congressional Committees, 30/7/2014. Journal, Ship and Offshore Structures,
International Society of Allied Weight SNAME Marine Technology, and Military
Engineers, Weight Estimating and Margin
Simulation & Training. He graduated the
Manual for Marine Vehicles, SAWE
IDF Command and Staff College with
Recommended Practice Number 14,
22/5/2001. distinction and received The Commander
of the IDF Military Colleges’ Award for Best
Paper in 2012.

64  |  June 2016  |  No. 128-2 NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL

View publication stats