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Security Cooperation: Joint Publication 3-20
Security Cooperation: Joint Publication 3-20
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Security Cooperation
23 May 2017
PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing security
cooperation activities.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance
of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and
prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and
executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force Development
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Preface
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................v
CHAPTER I
SECURITY COOPERATION IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT
CHAPTER II
SECURITY COOPERATION RELATIONSHIPS
Introduction ................................................................................................................II-1
Security Cooperation Related Activities and Operations ..........................................II-1
Security Cooperation and Joint Operations ...............................................................II-9
Security Cooperation Authorities and Programs .....................................................II-14
Security Cooperation Roles and Responsibilities ....................................................II-15
CHAPTER III
SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING
CHAPTER IV
SECURITY COOPERATION EXECUTION
iii
Table of Contents
CHAPTER V
SECURITY COOPERATION ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND
EVALUATION
APPENDIX
GLOSSARY
FIGURE
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW
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Executive Summary
Security Sector Assistance and United In accordance with foreign policy direction
States Foreign and Defense Policies established by the Department of State (DOS),
DOD leads on defense policy issues that involve
national security interests with military or
defense equities. Presidential Policy Directive
(PPD)-23, Security Sector Assistance, details the
USG effort to implement security sector
assistance (SSA) more efficiently, including the
strategy to build security relationships, partner
capacity, and capabilities to achieve national
security objectives. PPD-23 establishes the
integrated country strategy (ICS) as the core
organizing document for USG foreign
assistance activities supporting a particular PN.
ICSs link goals for the PN to US national
security priorities, SSA objectives, and if
appropriate, to regional security objectives.
Internal Defense and Development Internal defense and development is the full
range of measures taken by a nation to promote
its growth and protect itself from subversion,
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Executive Summary
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DOD SC Roles and Responsibilities The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(USD[P]) oversees, integrates, and coordinates
DOD policies and plans for coordination of SC
policies, goals, and priorities for the Secretary of
Defense (SecDef) with the Military
Departments (MILDEPs), DOS, and other
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Executive Summary
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Executive Summary
While SC activities are conducted As planners develop all the plans that
primarily for routine shaping as part operationalize the GCC’s strategy, DOD
of the theater campaign plan, SC can components plan and execute SC activities, such
be conducted in all phases of an as training, exercises, military engagement,
operation and across the range of SSR, experimentation, education, personnel
military operations. exchanges, and armaments cooperation
resourced through Services’ SC funds, SA
programs, and other funding lines and
authorities.
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Executive Summary
Identifying Resources and Authorities CCMD SC planners should be familiar with the
various resources available to support the
anticipated SC activities with the PNs in their
theater. This includes Title 10, United States
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Interagency Coordination While neither the COM nor DOS have formal
approval authority over CCMD CSCSs/country
plans, the plans should be consistent with the
objectives and priorities of the ICSs developed
by the COMs for DOS and should align with the
country plans of DOS, US Agency for
International Development, and other
government agencies working in the security
sector of the PN.
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Executive Summary
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CONCLUSION
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Executive Summary
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CHAPTER I
SECURITY COOPERATION IN STRATEGIC CONTEXT
“The US military strengthens regional stability by conducting security
cooperation activities with foreign defense establishments. Such activities
support mutual security interests, develop partner capabilities for self-
defense, and prepare for multinational operations. Strengthening partners is
fundamental to our security, building strategic depth for our national defense.”
1. Introduction
The basic nature of war has not changed, but the character of conflict has evolved to
include increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) threats.
Security cooperation (SC) activities are as likely to be conducted as an element of
contingency operations as they are in a combatant command’s (CCMD’s) daily operations.
TMM challenges will cut across multiple CCMDs, across land, maritime, air, space, and
cyberspace. The strategic environment is fluid, with changing alliances, partnerships, and
national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. These
factors will demand efficient planning efforts and the sound application of intelligence in
concert with the other joint functions to address the uncertainty and ambiguity of future
strategic and operational environments (OEs) and will significantly affect how the joint
force conducts SC. SC strengthens and expands the existing network of US allies and
partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and
enables more effective multinational operations.
a. SC provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy
objectives. Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance emphasizes the importance
of defense relationships with allies and partner nations (PNs) to advance national security
objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to employ US
military forces in a conflict. SC activities, many of which are shaping activities within the
geographic combatant commanders’ (GCCs’) theater campaign plans (TCPs), are deemed
essential to achieving national security and foreign policy objectives. Accordingly,
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities
Relating to Security Cooperation, requires SC activities to be planned, programmed,
budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other DOD
activities.
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Chapter I
numerous forms, has an overarching functional relationship with all other associated
programs, activities, and operations.
(1) Apply Capacity and Capabilities. As our national policy acknowledges, the
US will rarely conduct unilateral military operations. Capability refers to the PN’s ability
to execute a given task while capacity refers to the PN’s ability to self-sustain and self-
replicate a given capability. Building partner capacity and capabilities through SC requires
a long-term mutual commitment to improve PN capacity and capabilities in support of US
strategic objectives. For example, the PN:
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Security Cooperation in Strategic Context
(d) Conducts personnel recovery (PR) or foreign disaster relief (FDR) with
regional neighbors to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
incident response activities.
(g) Coordinates the use of HN electrical power, fuels, and other sources of
energy in support of US SC activities and joint operations.
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b. SC by itself generally cannot prevent conflict, but it provides a security aspect that
complements the reduction of other drivers of conflict (e.g., social, informational,
economic, and political factors). TMM threats require adaptive planning to integrate allies
and partners as an element of national strategy. SC strengthens the US network of allies
and partners that can improve the overall warfighting effectiveness of the Joint Force and
enable more effective coalition operations. This may necessitate key leader engagement
with foreign dignitaries; application of effective information-related capabilities (IRCs) as
part of commander’s communication synchronization; encouragement to leverage capital
and economic investment for growth or utilization of sanctions; and, when necessary,
application of military force, including SC activities with a PN. Therefore, it is important
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to understand the strategic direction and guidance (and statutory authorities) applicable to
SC, which will be discussed in later paragraphs.
For additional details regarding the application of the instruments of national power, see
Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
a. The GEF issues Presidential and SecDef politico-military guidance that serves as
the basis for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS’s) JSCP. The GEF and
JSCP provide principle source guidance to planning efforts by all DOD components. The
GEF translates strategic priorities into policy guidance and strategic objectives essential to
the planning of CCMDs’ campaign and contingency plans, as well as theater distribution
plans (TDPs). Contingency plans tasked by the President in the Contingency Planning
Guidance are considered branches to the JSCP-guided campaign plans that integrate
CCMD activities, which include ongoing operations, SC, and other shaping or preventive
activities. CCMD campaign plans should include all activities and requirements to achieve
US objectives, as well as those associated with shaping for contingency plans for which
the CCMD is responsible. GCCs develop TCPs to satisfy those requirements, and Service
component commands develop their campaign support plans (CSPs) for the GCCs.
b. CCDRs may participate in strategy discussions with the President and SecDef, as
well as the CJCS, and may engage with PNs through coordination with the COMs. A
CCDR’s guidance relates to both the US national strategy and operational-level activities
within a theater. Based on theater and functional objectives and anticipated resources,
CCDRs provide SC requirements to USD(P) through the CJCS. DOS joint regional
strategies and ICSs inform, and are informed by, the various CCDRs’ theater strategies,
TCPs, and CSCSs/country plans, thus influencing planned SC activities.
c. DOS produces two key documents, derived from national-level guidance (e.g., NSS
and PPDs), that indirectly influence CCDRs’ planning and SC activities. The Strategic
Plan, developed jointly by DOS and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), contains the strategic-level framework that guides all planning and
budgeting throughout both organizations, and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review defines the strategic and institutional priorities, provides a
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Chapter I
5. Security Sector Assistance and United States Foreign and Defense Policies
a. DOD and DOS share primary responsibility for several of the goals outlined in the
NSS, including security and international order. On behalf of the President, DOS conducts
and coordinates foreign affairs, which refers to actions the USG takes abroad on behalf of
its national interests to ensure the security and well-being of Americans and the strength
and competitiveness of the US economy. In accordance with foreign policy direction
established by DOS, DOD leads on defense policy issues that involve national security
interests with military or defense equities. PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance, details the
USG effort to implement security sector assistance (SSA) more efficiently, including the
strategy to build security relationships, partner capacity, and capabilities to achieve
national security objectives. As defined in PPD-23, SSA should not be confused with
SSR, which is the assisted operational application of programs and activities to improve
the way an HN provides safety, security, and justice from ministerial level down to tactical
units. Per PPD-23, SSA refers to the strategic policies, programs, and activities the USG
uses to:
(1) Engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the
security sector;
(2) Help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of
legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and
(3) Enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security
challenges.
c. DOS is the lead agency responsible for the policy, supervision, and management of
USG SSA, as well as the congressional appropriations that fund programs used for SA,
with the exception of those appropriations that fund DOD programs used for SA. PPD-23,
Security Sector Assistance, provides an approach to align strategic goals and guidelines
with comprehensive strategic planning and budgeting across the USG, primarily enabled
through the collaborative efforts of DOS and DOD with the other interagency partners.
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d. DOD ensures defense strategies and policies are synchronized with US foreign
policy and overall SSA efforts and may provide assistance in coordination with the DOS.
DOD assumes the lead SSA integrator role in specific cases that are appropriate and
consistent with authority granted by Congress, particularly when related to strategic
planning, assessment, program design, and implementation of SSA programs.
e. SSA provides the process for the USG to strengthen its own capacity with an
effective and deliberate whole-of-government approach to planning and budgeting for
activities, develop resources, and help to achieve national security objectives. According
to PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance, with DOS as the lead federal agency, DOD and the
Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and USAID will participate in interagency coordination at the department
level to approve SSA strategic objectives and to ensure collaborative planning, assessment,
program design, and implementation processes. DOS convenes the Interagency SSA
Oversight Board, co-chaired with DOD, on a biannual basis to review the USG SSA
processes, coordination, authorities, resourcing, and reporting, as well as to ensure SSA is
executed in a timely and effective manner. See Figure I-1 to understand the level of
interagency coordination required in the whole-of-government approach to SSA and
developing ICSs.
For additional details regarding SSA, see PPD-23, Security Sector Assistance.
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Who: CCMD Planners Who: GCCs, Who: CCMDs Who: OSD, Joint Who: OUSD(P)
How: Informed by Services, Level: GO/FO Staff, Services, Level: Regional
GEF, JSCP, Components, How: Post to MILDEPs, DASDs
theater strategy, Country Teams, G-TSCMIS CCMDs, and How: Post to
ICS, and TCP (SCO), DOD Agencies G-TSCMIS
Functional Level: GO/FO
CCMDs, Joint How: JSAP/Action
Staff Memo
Level: AO/Planner
How: CCMD Staffing
Process
DOS for
Country Team Washington Washington COM
SCO Develops ICS Approves
Review Review
Legend
AO action officer ICS integrated country strategy
CCMD combatant command JSAP joint staff action package
COM chief of mission JSCP joint strategic capabilities plan
DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense MILDEP Military Department
DOD Department of Defense NSC National Security Council
DOS Department of State OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
GCC geographic combatant commander OUSD(P) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force for Policy
GO/FO general officer/flag officer SCO security cooperation organization
G-TSCMIS Global Theater Security Cooperation TCP theater campaign plan
Management Information System USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Figure I-1. Interagency Coordination Processes for Security Sector Assistance and
Integrated Country Strategy Objectives
country level; the DOS’s ICS support team facilitates the ICS planning process; and,
following a formal Washington review that specifically includes DOD, the COM
approves an ICS. Based on the ICS and coordination with the PN, SCOs and Service
component SC planners support development of the CCDR’s country plan for each PN.
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Theater strategy bridges national strategic guidance and joint planning. It outlines a
GCC’s vision for integrating resources and synchronizing military activities and operations
in conjunction with the application of other instruments of national power to achieve
theater objectives and GEF-directed strategic objectives. The GCC’s analysis of changing
events in the OE influences theater strategy. Theater strategy must be adaptable and
flexible to react to the changing environment; prepare for, prevent, or mitigate
contingencies; seize opportunities; and mitigate risk. GCCs’ theater strategies, as reflected
in their TCPs, typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence through
routine shaping activities. SC activities are specifically suited for building partnerships
and partner capacity in coordination with DOS and other interagency partners through
COMs and country teams. See Chapter III, “Security Cooperation Planning,” for additional
information about the effects of theater strategy on SC planning and activities.
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d. Strategic Estimate. The CCDR and staff (with input from subordinate commands
and supporting commands and agencies) prepare a strategic estimate by assessing and
describing the broad political, military, economic, and social factors, as well as threats and
opportunities, that determine strategic objectives and, ultimately, facilitate or hinder
attainment of the strategic end state. This estimate, which is continually updated, helps to
determine the missions, objectives, and potential activities required in the campaign plan.
For additional information on the strategic estimate, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.01, Campaign Planning
Procedures and Responsibilities.
Internal defense and development (IDAD) is the full range of measures taken by a
nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,
terrorism, and other threats to its security. It focuses on both security and building viable
civic, social, and economic institutions that respond to the needs of that nation’s
population. Ideally, IDAD represents a preemptive strategy. A foreign nation establishes
an IDAD strategy in collaboration with the USG to combine internal defense with other
needed developmental efforts and then implements that strategy through an IDAD
program. US involvement may vary from simple military engagement and routine SC
activities up to a complex foreign internal defense (FID) program. For example, SC
activities for security force assistance (SFA) to build a PN’s capacity for CT support the
US global campaign against transnational terrorists or SC activities for SSA to build
capacity for counterinsurgency (COIN) developing a PN’s executive, generating, and
operating functions in anticipation of an identified insurgency. If SC activities are not
enough and the threat to a PN becomes overwhelming, then a USG FID operation may be
required. In any case, execution of an IDAD program requires a collaborative effort by the
US and PN governments. Likewise, foreign assistance can support routine SC activities or
a FID program for HN IDAD.
For more information regarding an IDAD and FID, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.
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JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, contains a detailed
discussion of sanitization and foreign disclosure procedures.
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CHAPTER II
SECURITY COOPERATION RELATIONSHIPS
“The only way human beings can win a war is to prevent it.”
1. Introduction
b. Services have Title 10, United States Code (USC), responsibilities to organize,
train, and equip US forces to maintain readiness and support GCC theater objectives, which
include funds for SC activities by the Services. Service components posture forces to
conduct SC activities and to execute theater campaigns and operations, as directed. These
activities help shape the OE and produce the conditions necessary for a joint force
commander (JFC), when directed, to seize the initiative, dominate, and establish stability
within the operational area during a joint operation/campaign. Conducting sustained SC
activities in an AOR typically requires a combination of assigned and attached forces,
composed of conventional forces (CF) and SOF. Those forces may include DOD civilian
personnel and contractors. A number of permanent and temporary funding authorities are
used for SC and are briefly discussed in paragraph 4, “Security Cooperation Authorities
and Programs.” Provisions of Title 10, USC, are permanent authorities, while annual
authorities (e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015) are often used
for temporary authorities and funding. The two can be used to authorize certain military
engagements, multinational exercises, military-to-military exchanges, advising defense
institutions, and similar SC activities.
a. SC can be conducted across the range of military operations and during all phases
of an operation or campaign. DOD policy supports SC activities that enable building
security relationships, building partner capacity, and gaining/maintaining access.
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(b) Shares expense with USG for updating PN ballistic missile defense
forces.
(d) Provides electrical power and other essential fuels and utilities as host-
nation support (HNS) of a US contingency operation.
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humanitarian assistance (FHA), PR, and other stability activities. SC also can be used by
the USG to help PNs develop or sustain capabilities to operate with the US and other
partners in multinational operations (e.g., Operation DESERT STORM). In cases where
the SC effort is large-scale and enduring, the GCC may establish an additional subunified
command or joint task force in a particular country or region. Examples include Combined
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and the Combined Joint Task Force One. Other
interagency partners normally focus on improving/reforming those PN forces assigned to
other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services.
However, DOD maintains capabilities for these other requirements, in addition to SFA,
should the security environment limit participation of other interagency partners.
d. SA. SA is a group of programs the USG uses to provide defense articles, military
training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to advance
national policies and objectives. SA includes programs authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 (Title 22, USC, Chapter 32), as amended; the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA) of 1976 (Title 22, USC, Chapter 39), as amended; and other related
authorities and statutes such as Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse), USC. SA
programs and funding are coordinated by DOS and, as authorized by DOS, some SA
programs are administered by DSCA for DOD. Those SA programs that are administered
by DOD or DSCA for DOD are considered part of SC by DOD.
(1) SA includes foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF),
international military education and training (IMET), peace operations (PO), and excess
defense articles (EDA). DOS also provides financial support to international peacekeeping
operations (PKO), a subset of PO, through a PKO fund. The US uses these tools, combined
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with the Economic Support Fund and commercial sales licensed under the AECA, to
further its national interests. They may also be used to complement, or be complemented
by, development assistance. Generally, SA is subject to legal and funding authorities,
through which the US provides articles, training, and other defense-related services such
as those provided through SFA activities; and in many cases, the funding authority may
require a PN to pay for SA, so it is not always an expense to the USG.
(2) Those SA programs named above, that are administered by DOD for
implementation through DSCA, are summarized as follows:
(b) FMS is the sale of defense articles, military training, and defense-related
services to eligible foreign governments and international organizations. The majority of
FMS cases are paid with national funds from the PN. The FMS program is measured in
billions of dollars of sales annually and is the largest of the SA programs under DOS
direction that are administered by DSCA.
(e) EDA involves the transfer, either on a grant basis or by FMS, of defense
articles no longer needed by the USG. EDA may allow for the transfer of USG articles to
countries at no cost. Transfer of EDA occurs on an “as is, where is” basis and the recipient
nation typically pays for any associated costs, including transportation, repair,
refurbishment, spares, and training, through an FMS case.
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Unless directed otherwise, DOD’s primary role in SSR is supporting the reform,
restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and defense and security institutions
within the security sector, from the highest ministerial/department level, down to the
tactical unit level. Other interagency partners assist in the reform of institutions of justice
and safety. DOD can support SSR using SFA activities and SA as part of routine SC for
shaping as part of a TCP or, for example, through FID as a contingency operation
supporting an HN IDAD program. Normally, SFA activities and SA are used in any unified
action for SSR. SFA activities can support an SSR program by creating effects for a PN
to achieve transformational objectives and sustain them. As noted in Chapter I, “Security
Cooperation in Strategic Context,” SSR should not be confused with the term SSA. SSA
refers to the overarching USG policy, processes, programs, and activities that integrate and
synchronize DOS and DOD strategies, planning, programming, and budgeting for foreign
assistance involving the security sectors of PNs. The development, restructuring, or reform
of a PN’s defense institutions at the ministry/department or joint/Service military
headquarters level is more specifically characterized as DIB, whether conducted as part of
a larger SSR effort, or not.
f. DIB. DOD policy states that defense institutions include the people, organizations,
policies, rules, regulations, values, and behaviors that enable oversight, governance,
management, and the functioning of the defense establishment within a nation-state’s
security sector. DIB comprises SC typically conducted in the form of SFA activities
focused on building capacity at the ministerial/department, military staff/service
headquarters, and related agency/supporting entity level to develop the strategic and
operational aspects of a PN’s defense institutions. DIB may be conducted through routine
SC activities or as part of a more comprehensive program for SSR. DIB may complement
building partner capacity and capability at tactical and operational levels as delivered
through SFA and SA-supported SC programs including train-and-equip and military-to-
military exchanges performed by CCMDs, Services, and their component
organizations/headquarters.
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(2) DIB is conducted pursuant to appropriate legal authority. GCCs are required
to annually prioritize DIB requirements to the USD(P) through the Joint Staff (JS) to ensure
DIB efforts align with current defense and foreign policy strategies for efficient and
effective use of relevant DIB resources. DIB mentors, trainers, and advisors should be of
sufficient rank, position, and experience to be a credible and positive influence on the PN’s
defense institutions. GCCs are responsible for recording all DIB activities in the Global
Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS).
For additional information on DIB, see DODD 5205.82, Defense Institution Building
(DIB).
g. SFA. SFA is the set of DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG
to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of FSF and their supporting
institutions, (i.e., building partner capacity and capabilities), whether of a PN or an
international organization (i.e., regional security organization). SFA offers a means by
which SC activities support shaping as part of a GCC’s TCP or a means of building
capability and capacity of FSF while conducting crisis response or a contingency operation
in support of a PN. DOD policy describes SFA as a subset of SC initiatives designed to
build capacity and capability; SC activities that only serve to gain access, or influence other
actions that do not enhance the FSF capacity or capabilities, or that are outside the security
sector fall outside the scope of SFA. Other interagency partners focus on
improving/reforming PN forces assigned to non-defense ministries (or their equivalents)
such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. If the OE limits participation of other
interagency partners, DOD may be required to develop capabilities of non-defense PN
forces as part of SFA. For example, a FID operation includes the FSF and other HN
government and civilian institutions; the focus of SFA activities is just with the FSF, and
the other interagency activities support specific FID objectives shared by the HN and the
USG. See Figure II-1 for the role of SC activities, which include SFA, among notional
operations across the conflict continuum. SFA can be used during all military operations
and during all phases of an operation/campaign. Normally, SFA activities are part of any
unified action by the USG to include multinational or international organization forces
conducting SFA-equivalent activities.
(1) FSF are all organizations and personnel under PN control with the mission of
securing the PN’s population and protecting its sovereignty from internal and external
threats. FSF generally include military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces such
as border police, coast guard, and customs organizations, as well as prison guards and
correctional personnel and their supporting institutions. SFA activities may occur in
situations not immediately recognizable as SC, such as ad hoc arrangements made by local
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Chapter II
Range of
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Military
Operations
Security force assistance, among other security cooperation activities, may be conducted continuously
across the conflict continuum alongside a wide variety of operations and activities that span the range of
military operations.
(2) SFA activities are conducted to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and
advise (OTERA) FSF from the ministerial/department level down to the tactical unit level.
DOD maintains capabilities for SFA in SOF, CF, the DOD CEW and, when necessary,
contractor personnel. SFA activities are most effective when conducted by carefully
selected, properly trained, and well experienced personnel (as trainers or advisors). In
addition to being SMEs, they should also have the sociocultural understanding, language
skills, and seasoned maturity to relate more effectively with and train FSF. Ideally, SFA
activities help build the FSF’s capacity to manage and maintain their own forces
independent of sustained USG efforts.
With, through, and by. Describes the process of interaction with foreign
security forces (FSF) that initially involves training and assisting
(interacting “with” the forces). The next step in the process is advising,
which may include advising in combat situations (acting “through” the
forces). The final phase is achieved when FSF operate independently
(act “by” themselves).
(3) GCCs incorporate SFA requirements into plans and must maintain a record
in the G-TSCMIS of all subordinate commands and DOD entities conducting SC activities
in their respective AORs. GCCs forecast their annual SFA requirements based on
collaborative assessments of the needs of FSF and in coordination with the JS. The Office
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A significant number of SC activities are conducted as a part of the GCCs’ TCPs, but
limited contingencies, crises responses, or major operations can also involve some form of
SC. For example, an HN reforming or upgrading its security and defense institutions with
SC activities supporting SSR could discover a significant and emerging internal threat,
which could lead the USG to determine that a contingency FID operation is warranted. In
situations that have deteriorated to the point of potentially overwhelming the HN, US
forces committed in the third category of FID (US combat operations) for a US COIN
operation could continue training and equipping (indirect support) the HN security forces
until they are fully capable of taking over all combat operations. The following represent
the most likely US joint operations in an affected HN that could also require concurrent
and related SC support.
(2) Other SC initiatives dedicated to the security sector that may support FID,
such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs activities, fall outside the scope of SFA.
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For additional information regarding FID, see JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.
c. CT. CT are those activities and operations conducted to neutralize terrorists and
their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to
instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. If necessary for
national defense, the President or SecDef may approve a unilateral CT operation by US
forces against transnational violent extremist organizations and their associated terrorist
organizations in other countries. Improving a PN’s CT capacity and capabilities will
enable a PN to ultimately defeat terrorism within its borders with minimal, if any, US
assistance. Ultimately, the goal is to make countries more self-sufficient and reduce the
need for US intervention in support of US interests.
d. CWMD Operations. CWMD, across the three LOEs (prevent acquisition, contain
and reduce threats, and respond to crises), includes activities conducted across the USG to
counter efforts to coerce or attack the US, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests
with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. This includes efforts against
WMD actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession,
proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, as well as related expertise, materials, technology,
and means of delivery. SC activities to build a PN’s CWMD capacity enhance collective
regional and national capabilities to receive timely warnings, track materiel of concern,
secure illicit WMD materials and stockpiles, respond to and defeat WMD threats and, when
necessary, respond to effects of an attack using WMD. CWMD SC-related activities,
programs, and training promote common threat awareness; develop CWMD self-
sufficiency, military interoperability, military and civilian preparedness; mitigate WMD
risk; and assist PN forces to conduct CWMD operations, alone or with the assistance of
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US forces. Examples include training PN forces to use CBRN detection equipment at ports
of entry (e.g., airfields, border crossings, seaports); participating in maritime, land, and air
interdiction exercises; and CBRN response tabletop exercises.
For additional information regarding CWMD, see JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
(1) Led by DOS, and normally coordinated within each HN through the COM
and country team, the USG conducts stabilization efforts worldwide. Military support of
routine USG stabilization efforts is normally part of the shaping activities of a CCDR’s
campaign plan for security sector issues to prevent conflict and may occur as SC activities
or joint combined exercises for training conducted by Service/SOF component units.
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For additional information regarding stabilization and stability activities, see JP 3-07,
Stability.
g. FHA. FHA consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories
to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Various
statutes and policies govern these activities, which range from routine military
engagements to limited contingency operations. US forces normally conduct FHA
operations in support of another USG department or agency, including FDR operations and
international CBRN response. US forces also conduct FHA activities as part of a GCC SC
program and/or to achieve specific TCP objectives. SC activities can be used to support
USG efforts to build partner capacity of FSF to conduct or support humanitarian assistance
activities, with a focus on civilian institutions.
For additional information regarding FHA, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
h. PO. PO are crisis response and limited contingency operations that can involve all
instruments of national power. PO normally include international efforts and military
missions to contain conflict, reestablish the peace, shape the environment to support
reconciliation and rebuilding between two or more factions within the indigenous
population, and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. The UN or another
international organization typically sponsors PO, but a coalition or unilateral US mission
may also conduct PO. Examples of SC activities in PO include establishment of an
indigenous security force to help enforce peacekeeping and other PO, or development of a
third-party nation’s military capacity and capabilities to participate in a multinational PO
force. Upon completion of the PO mission, and with reasonable certainty of stabilization,
the USG may choose to enter a new routine SC relationship with the established HN
government as part of the TCP.
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For additional information regarding MISO, see JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support
Operations.
l. Counter Threat Finance (CTF). CTF activities and capabilities are employed to
deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat finance systems and networks that negatively affect US
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interests in compliance with all existing authorities and procedures. It includes those
activities and capabilities undertaken with other USG departments and agencies or PNs.
DOD CTF counters financing used to enable terrorist activities and illicit networks that
traffic narcotics; WMD; improvised explosive devices; other weapons, persons, precursor
chemicals; and related activities that support an adversary’s ability to negatively affect US
interests.
m. PR. PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery
and reintegration of isolated personnel. Commands conducting SC activities within a PN
should ensure appropriate coordination with the supported CCMD, their Service
component command, and the SCO within the HN to facilitate PR of deployed individuals.
SC activities also present opportunities to establish relationships with HN forces that could
facilitate PR mechanisms for future situations.
a. SC activities are conducted with DOD funds, forces, and authorities, and with DOS
SA funds and authorities, administered by DOD. In many cases, SC activities complement
foreign assistance of other USG departments and agencies and those efforts of
multinational partners in support of a friendly nation. Thus, multiple sources may support
the planning, coordination, funding and other authorities that link USG strategy to SC
activities. Examples include:
(1) Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET). The primary purpose of the
JCET authority (Title 10, USC, Section 2011) is to foster the training of US SOF in
essential skill sets by training with FSF in their indigenous environments. JCET uses SOF
Major Force Program 11 funds to build the capability of US SOF by conducting combined
operations in unfamiliar environments in order to develop language, instructional, and
advisory skills, as well as familiarity with PN geography and sociocultural factors. JCET
must clearly link the training provided to the PN with the SOF unit’s mission-essential task
list. Although JCET usually provides some benefits to PN forces, it does not fall within
the scope of SFA because the intent is not to develop an enduring FSF capacity or
capability, but to provide training for US SOF. However, since JCET improves
interoperability between the US and PN forces and supports both CCDR campaign plan
and COM ICS objectives, it should be recognized during campaign and country planning
for its coincidental benefit to SC.
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(3) Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF). The CJCS may use the
CCIF (Title 10, USC, Section 166a) to provide the CCDR funds for a wide variety of
activities, including joint exercises (including participation by PNs or other foreign
countries), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), IMET to foreign military and related
civilian personnel (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses), and
personnel expenses by defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.
For further details, see CJCSI 7401.01, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF).
b. Legal Authorities for SC. The primary statutory authorizations for SA are the
FAA of 1961, as amended (Title 22, USC, Section 2151), and the AECA of 1976, as
amended (Title 22, USC, Section 2751), which are typically used for SC activities.
Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 consolidates
multiple SC authorities into a single, dedicated chapter (Title 10, USC, Chapter 16) on SC.
Various sections therein provide authorizations spanning military-to-military
engagements, training with foreign forces, support for operations and capacity building,
and educational and training activities, among other limitations, administrative, and
miscellaneous matters. These statutory authorities are subject to changes in USC and
through subsequent national defense authorization act (NDAA) adjustments related to SC
(similarly the annual DOS, foreign operations, and related programs appropriations acts
may adjust SA authorizations). DOS has the primary responsibility, authority, and funding
to conduct foreign assistance, including SA programs that may be administered by DOD
as a part of SC, on behalf of the USG.
For more specific information about SC programs and authorities, see Appendix A,
“Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities.”
a. DOD. The USD(P) oversees, integrates, and coordinates DOD policies and plans
for coordination of SC policies, goals, and priorities for SecDef with MILDEPs, DOS, and
other interagency partners to enable greater unity of effort in activities that support national
security objectives. DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security
Cooperation, details USD(P) responsibilities for SC. USD(P) and DOS counterparts are
responsible for the approvals, the funding, and other authorities required by CCDRs and
the Services for planning and executing SC activities in support of PN requirements and
US security objectives. USD(P) typically designates/delegates certain responsibilities for
SC to assistant or deputy assistant secretariat levels. USD(P) also oversees the
development of policy governing the use of the G-TSCMIS to support the resourcing,
assessment, planning, and monitoring of SC activities.
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(1) DSCA. DSCA is a separate agency of DOD under the direction, authority,
and control of USD(P). DSCA represents the interests of SecDef and USD(P) in SC
matters and is charged to direct, administer, and provide DOD-wide guidance to DOD
components and representatives to execute DSCA-managed SC programs. DSCA serves
as the resource sponsor for G-TSCMIS and oversees the development and continued
sustainment of the enterprise system. DSCA conducts SC and sales negotiations with
foreign countries in accordance with USD(P) and DOS guidance and negotiates and
concludes SC-related international programs. DSCA delegates the administration of SC
programs, as appropriate, to either the MILDEPs, CCMDs, DOD agencies, or DOD field
activities. DSCA establishes appropriate agreements and procedures with CCMDs and the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the respective SDOs/DATTs, to provide guidance
and oversight of SC programs for which DSCA is responsible. DSCA advises the Defense
Technology Security Administration (DTSA) of proposed transfers of significant new
technologies and/or weapons systems and determinations of whether significant items or
specific sales must be sold exclusively through FMS.
(2) DTSA. DTSA is a DOD field activity under the authority, direction, and
control of the USD(P) that serves as the point of contact for development and
implementation of DOD policy concerning technology security, export controls, and
certain non-proliferation for military and dual-use items. DTSA identifies and mitigates
national security risks associated with the international transfer of advanced technology
and critical information. DTSA provides new and emerging partners with technological
awareness via bilateral and multilateral engagements and negotiations, thereby ensuring
applicable PNs have the agreements and security mechanisms in place to properly protect
US technology. This assistance facilitates DOD objectives to build partnership capacity
and capability and enhance interoperability. Additionally, DTSA responsibilities include
managing the Space Launch Monitoring Program; DOD’s patent security review process;
the development of DOD policy on technology security and foreign disclosure processes;
and advising DOD leadership on the development of policy and procedures governing the
disclosure and protection of classified military, and controlled unclassified information, to
international partners.
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(5) JS. The JS assists the CJCS regarding statutory responsibilities for the unified
strategic direction of the US Armed Forces. However, the JS exercises no executive
authority. The JS represents CJCS’s implementation guidance for military plans and
programs and provides the CJCS with military advice concerning SC. In conjunction with
USD(P), the JS reviews the SC activities included in CCMD campaign plans to ensure the
planning guidance has been met. The JS also reviews allocation recommendations prior to
SecDef approval of forces and other resources for the execution of military activities in
campaign plans and operation orders. The JS produces the annual DOD campaign plan
assessment template in consultation with USD(P) to integrate and coordinate Service
support of CCMD campaign plans, as required. The JS recommends force and activity
designators for priorities in the distribution of defense articles, defense services, and
military education and training between and among PNs, organizations, and the US Armed
Forces and recommends priorities for allocation of materiel and equipment for PNs when
competing needs cannot be resolved by Director, DSCA. The JS collects and reviews the
CCDRs’ campaign plans and the CCDRs’ assessments and evaluations, and advises the
CJCS on the effectiveness of DOD SC efforts.
(6) CCMDs. Geographic CCMDs are the primary organizations for SC planning
and integrating SC activities into their TCPs. Functional CCMDs prepare campaign plans
that integrate their forces, resources, and funding for SC activities in coordination with the
geographic CCMDs, their Service components, international organizations and, when
appropriate, the affected SCOs. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
coordinates SC activities to be executed by SOF with the geographic CCMDs through their
theater special operations commands (TSOCs), including the deployment of special
operations liaison officers, as well as SOF Service components. US Transportation
Command coordinates movement within the Defense Transportation System, including
integration of DOD and PN cargo distribution into existing force flow and global
synchronization activities, as well as TDPs. CCMD planners should coordinate with
COMs, through the SDO/DATTs, during the development of ICSs. These ICSs should, in
turn, inform CCMD SC planners in the development of their required CSCSs/country
plans. SC planning is typically led by the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) and
supported by the other directorates (e.g., logistics directorate of a joint staff [J-4] for
building PN logistic capacity). CCMD desk officers often lead country planning and work
directly with the SDO/DATTs in their AORs and their counterparts in the Service
component commands to develop country-level plans and identify forces and resource
requirements. These desk officers are also the principal link between DOD-level staffs
(OSD and JS) and the SDO/DATTs and their applicable country teams. CCMDs review
their campaign plans by objectively and subjectively assessing, monitoring, and evaluating
the effects of their SC activities in achieving desired objectives relative to attaining the
intended end state. CCDRs must prioritize and approve the SC requirements of PNs
established through coordination by the SDO/DATTs (as DOD members of COMs’
country teams) and Service component commands. CCMDs integrate SC activities into
their CSCSs/country plans and campaign plans as necessary.
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USSOCOM, and under the operational control of the GCCs. Normally, GCCs exercise
operational control of SOF through the TSOCs when operating within their AORs. TSOCs
coordinate SOF integration and Service component support of SOF for FID, SFA, COIN,
CT, FHA, unconventional warfare, and other special operations core activities in all
campaigns and operations. TSOCs support SOF conducting SFA activities and other SC
activities in support of the GCCs’ TCPs.
(9) SCO. This organization includes all DOD elements located in a foreign
country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA/SC management functions. An
SCO works under the authority of the COM. SCOs may be referred to as military
assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military
cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel who have been designated to
perform SA/SC functions. Military units conducting SC activities in an HN normally work
closely with and coordinate with the SCO, but their lines of authority are through their
Service components and the supported CCDR, not through the SDO/DATT to the COM.
The SCO is responsible for assessing whether a PN can build and sustain capacity and has
the greatest visibility over the execution of SC activities. Generally, the SCO is responsible
for evaluating the results of SC activities and investments for the COM and GCC. Title
22, USC, Section 2321i (FAA) outlines the seven legislated SCO SA functions as follows:
(a) Equipment and services case management (i.e., FMS case management).
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(11) The National Guard may appoint an officer to serve at the US mission under
the SDO/DATT as the State Partnership Program (SPP) liaison for the partner state’s
National Guard with the GCC and HN. The National Guard officer is nominated by the
partner state’s adjutant general, approved by the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and
accepted by the supported GCC. The National Guard officer coordinates all SPP events
and activities among the NGB, US partner state, the specific country team, and the HN to
facilitate the supported GCC SC policies, plans, and objectives. Also, the National Guard
officer may assist in coordinating required support for bilateral and/or multilateral military
engagements between the US and the HN, including activities not under SPP.
b. DOS. DOS maintains bureaus and offices (e.g., Office of US Foreign Assistance
Resources, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) functionally and/or geographically
aligned with interagency partners (especially DOD), international organizations, and
foreign nations to coordinate effective execution of the diplomacy, development, and
defense aspects of US foreign policy. DOS analyzes the requirements for security-related
assistance as part of USG foreign assistance. DOS maintains interagency coordination
with respective counterparts in DOD concerning future SA programs and SC activities
with PNs.
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(1) COM. The COM, typically the US ambassador, is the principal officer in
charge of a US diplomatic facility abroad. The COM is the personal representative of the
President to the country of accreditation, and is responsible to the Secretary of State
(SECSTATE) for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch
employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area military
commander). As statutorily mandated, the COM directs and supervises all activities in
country and coordinates the resources and programs of the USG through the country team.
COMs approve the ICSs developed through their country teams in coordination within
DOS and through interagency coordination with DOD and other interagency partners at
the national level. COMs, through the SDO/DATTs on their country teams, coordinate on
the CCDRs’ CSCSs/country plans that will become part of the campaign plans. COMs
facilitate the coordination of PN security-related requirements that become part of the
specific SA programs and SC activities conducted by US military with those PNs.
(2) Country Team. The country team is the senior USG coordinating and
supervising body in a foreign country. Headed by the COM, it includes the SDO/DATT,
heads of all US embassy sections, and the senior member of each of the other represented
USG departments or agencies, as desired by the COM. The country team issues directives
to consulates, tasks action items for DOS offices and bureaus, and works to
deconflict/balance all agency programs and priorities within the context of the COM’s ICS
for that country. Depending on the size of a US embassy and the nature of US interests in
a country, each country team may be configured differently—and some may include more
than 40 interagency representatives, in addition to section chiefs and the head of the local
USAID mission. With guidance from DOS and the COM, the country team develops the
ICS regarding the PN, which influences the CCDR’s development of a CSCS/country plan
for that PN.
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CHAPTER III
SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING
“Principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of
reference.”
1. Introduction
This chapter provides planners with an approach to planning SC activities through the
development and execution of TCPs and CSCSs/country plans, subordinate and supporting
plans, and posture plans. As planners develop all the plans that operationalize the GCC’s
strategy, DOD components plan and execute SC activities, such as training, exercises,
military engagement, SSR, experimentation, education, personnel exchanges, and
armaments cooperation resourced through Services’ SC funds, SA programs, and other
funding lines and authorities. While SC activities are conducted primarily for routine
shaping as part of campaign plans, SC can be conducted in all phases of an operation and
across the range of military operations. Conducting SC activities in the midst of an
insurgency or major combat operation has proven a difficult challenge for US forces and
other interagency partners. The inherent cultural, political, leadership, and other
complexities associated with any SC activity demand careful and deliberate attention from
planners, especially at the component level. SC activities should be an essential
consideration of strategic and operational level contingency planning from the beginning,
including OE shaping during GCC’s theater strategy and theater campaign and contingency
planning. SC should be integrated into the specific operation or campaign plans in all
phases, not just as an afterthought for the stabilize and enable civil authority phases
following combat operations. Early planning should involve all relevant interagency
partners, whenever possible, to marshal and focus US and HN capabilities. Military
oversight and administration of SC during routine activities (as part of a campaign plan)
and in initial phases of an operation (such as deploying flexible deterrent or flexible
response options) are normally conducted by the SCO in the HN, or a designated JFC. A
JFC, or a designated Service or functional component commander, typically conducts
military oversight and administration of SC activities during combat operations and
through the transitions and transfers of authorities. As the transition progresses, oversight
and administration transfers back to the SCO. This chapter will not discuss how to develop
ICSs, TCPs (or other campaign plans), country plans, component support plans, posture
plans, or contingency plans, but will discuss how some of those strategies and plans relate
to SC planning and activities.
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GCC’s TCP operationalizes the theater strategy, as do the supporting plans of all DOD
components. NOTE: The term “all DOD components” means: OSD, the MILDEPs,
CJCS and the JS, CCMDs, the Office of the Inspector General of DOD, DOD
agencies, DOD field activities, and all other organizational entities in DOD.
(2) During strategy and plans development, GCCs coordinate with country teams
to integrate the COM’s guidance for each country involved. In the case of a conflict
between guidance by the COM and the GEF/JSCP, SecDef, normally through USD(P),
facilitates further coordination between DOD and DOS and may provide additional or
clarifying guidance to the GCC. Complementary strategies among interagency partners
are key to planning effective interactions with PNs that include SC activities.
(3) The initial strategic estimate is a prerequisite to preparing theater strategy that
provides an understanding of the factors and trends that influence the CCMD’s strategic
environment and informs the ends, ways, means, and risk involved in pursuit of GEF- and
National Military Strategy-directed objectives. The operational approach outlines the
missions, operational concepts, tasks, and activities needed to achieve TCP objectives and
describe the priorities for shaping, force posture and access, building partner capacity, and
routine operations support. This process may also identify intermediate objectives and the
milestones that must be met over time to reach the strategic end state and introduce LOEs.
b. TCPs
(2) TCPs, with their nested CSCSs/country plans, are the primary documents
used to plan, organize, integrate, and execute SC activities in the GCCs’ AORs. TCPs
implement the GCCs’ theater strategies and provide a comprehensive framework for
integrating SC activities for routine shaping (“setting the theater”) to achieve US national
objectives and as required by the GCC’s contingency plans and other military stabilizing
activities that complement ongoing DOS diplomacy and USAID development efforts in
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support of USG foreign policy. TCPs have a programmatic dimension and articulate the
GCC’s rationale for sufficient resources to fund and authorize SC activities. TCPs provide
LOEs to the objectives that establish SC activities and resource investments as well as to
integrate and synchronize operations throughout the theater. When applicable, lines of
operation (LOOs) may also be established in the TCP for specific objectives. The joint
planning process guides the development of TCPs. The SC aspect of a TCP requires a
planning process that is iterative and often requires assembling various resources and
funding streams into a coherent, actionable plan. TCPs provide an important link to the
resources necessary to implement the theater strategy; they should anticipate threats and
assess risks associated with limited resources to execute the TCP. SC planning and
execution are conducted in four stages and are conducted concurrently as part of the TCP.
Unlike joint planning, SC planning and execution follow programmatic timelines for USG
budget cycles and are based on US-assessed PN requirements presented as SC activities
and investments that must be approved and resourced (i.e., funds and forces) before
mission planning by the tasked DOD components.
(3) A CSCS is nested with the TCP for each PN where the GCC intends to apply
significant time and resources. At a minimum there should be a CSCS/country plan for
each ally and PN identified in campaign objectives in the GEF. The CSCS/country plan
provides PN focused objectives and resources and should be linked to the campaign plan
objectives, which directly link to the GEF-directed prioritized objectives, as well as
resources that should be outlined in the TCP. Accordingly, geographic CCMD planners
and desk officers should coordinate each CSCS/country plan and associated resource
requirements to reflect inputs from applicable DOD components.
c. Posture Plan. USD(P) manages the global defense posture that supports DOD
activities worldwide. SecDef provides posture planning direction to the CCDRs in the
GEF; the CJCS implements planning guidance specified in the GEF via the JSCP and tasks
CCDRs to submit annual theater posture plans to include pending overseas force structure
changes, which require coordination with DOS and the affected COMs. The CCDR’s
posture strategy links campaign objectives with the means to achieve them and identifies
posture requirements and initiatives (i.e., forces, footprints, and agreements). Posture
planning includes an analysis of how force structure will affect access arrangements and
the values and relative risks with respect to operation planning and warfighting capability,
SC activities/presence, force management, force protection, and PR. Posture plans align
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basing and forces to ensure theater and global security, respond to contingency scenarios,
and provide strategic flexibility. Theater posture planning is an important consideration as
CCMD planners determine the resources their command has available and begin to develop
the operational approach to a TCP. Posture initiatives may also alter the requirement for
certain kinds of forces and increase the need for others. Annually, GCCs submit theater
posture plans; integrated into TCPs, they support contingency plans and influence SC
planning. SC planners within the theater CCMDs and theater Service/SOF component
commands should be involved in the coordination of theater posture planning.
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for the out-years. See paragraph 5, “Timeline for Funding and Authorities,” regarding the
“SC planning timeline” on the importance of DOD components projecting SC requirements
for the future.
SC planning is the process by which planners understand the USG’s security strategy
and the relationship with a PN, where they want that relationship to lead, and how to get
there. The willingness and ability of the PN to cooperate with the US shapes the objectives
the CCMD pursues with that country—and with countries in the region and theater as a
whole. SC planning determines mutually agreed-upon PN capabilities for which assistance
is required, then applies the necessary resources (e.g., funding, materiel, and training) that
will be provided through SC.
b. TCP Characteristics. The TCP (and other plans) should identify the ends-ways-
means-risk questions that help structure the planning for the respective campaign or
operation. The TCP establishes a known point of departure with agreed-upon objectives.
SC planners must understand the differences in US-PN relationships for all countries in
theater that are covered by the TCP objectives. As a mechanism for SC planning, the TCP
typically addresses various levels of conflict that involve operations, activities, and
investments that may include the following:
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should clarify their requirements to the subordinate entity and develop an evaluation (or
follow-on assessment) plan during SC planning.
(5) Mission Planning. At some point during the requirements planning, the
execution or fragmentary order for the TCP and other approvals for funding and authorities
will allow both headquarters and units to begin mission planning for their SC activities.
Mission planning requires predeployment interorganizational coordination and
establishment of working relationships to finalize most of the details before the SC
activities are executed. Mission planning also requires certain authorities to expend funds
for site surveys and meetings with the SCO and PN counterparts, coordinate for logistics,
establish contracts and agreements, etc. In all cases, SC is executed subject to the bilateral
agreements that govern the US-PN security relationship. The individuals, units, and
organizations, especially those certified for SFA, and identified SA programs provided for
mission planning provide the means aspect of the SC part of the planning process.
d. G-TSCMIS. G-TSCMIS is the authoritative data source for DOD SC. G-TSCMIS
is a collaborative tool that can be used to comprehensively track, plan, forecast, monitor,
assess, and evaluate SC resources, programs, and activities around the globe. It enables
US under secretaries of defense, CCDRs, combat support agencies, Service chiefs, and
directors of DOD agencies/field activities to prioritize, support, and synchronize SC
activities with defense strategy objectives. It also provides commands the ability to link
associated SC activities through the use of key SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET) or Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network databases to foster
transparency, prevent duplication, and drive DOD toward greater SC activity-strategy
alignment. In addition, G-TSCMIS enables users to identify gaps in SC authorities,
programs, and resources. DOD guidance mandates G-TSCMIS as the system of record for
DOD SC reporting requirements. Each organization using G-TSCMIS should establish
business rules consistent with USD(P) and Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy]
business rules and policy guidance.
(1) The country team (including the SCO) develops an ICS for a PN from national
and DOS strategies and policies with COM guidance. Upon approval by COM and
following coordination at the department level (DOS-OSD), DOS approves the ICS.
(2) CCMD develops CSCSs/country plans for PNs based on ICSs and other
strategic guidance (e.g., GEF, JSCP, and theater strategy) in coordination with the SCOs
and DOD components (e.g., Services/SOF components and other relevant SMEs).
(3) CSCSs/country plans are nested within TCP, which also is informed by ICSs
and other national and defense strategies and policies.
(4) TCP provides objectives and priorities with LOEs that include SC activities
and investments.
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(6) DOD components develop TCP supporting plans and anticipate their force,
resource, and funding requirements to plan and execute specific SC activities with PN
based on requirements planning. Components support parts of their POMs, based on SC
planning requirements.
(7) SCO and Service/SOF components coordinate with CCMD to vet and
forward SC activities to OSD and DOS for authorities and funding.
(8) Geographic CCMD coordinates with OSD for authorities and funding and
with DSCA for management and administration of certain SA and other statutory
authorities and funding.
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(10) DOS provides certain authorities and funding (Title 22, USC) to OSD for
administration by DOD/DSCA.
(12) Service/SOF and other DOD components complete mission planning and,
upon approval by the President or SecDef, execute SC activities in coordination with SCO
(and PN) and DSCA; CCMD and OSD monitor and evaluate SC activities.
For more information on foreign disclosure, see NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures
for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and
International Organizations, and DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military
Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
a. Analyze OE. To gain insight into the OE, geographic CCMD planners use their
strategic estimate, the annually produced Joint Intelligence Estimate, biennially produced
Joint Strategic Assessment, intelligence estimates produced through the joint intelligence
preparation of the OE process, and relevant reports and sources to analyze the OE of the
AOR. They may also request and utilize DIA-produced theater intelligence estimates.
Additionally, for each country considered for PN status and SC, the CCMD and
Service/SOF component planners should develop specific information in coordination with
the SCO and, when possible, with PN representatives. At a minimum, planners should
identify:
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(3) USG departments and agencies on the country team and how their efforts
impact the CSCS/country plan.
(6) The capabilities and resources of the PN, such as force structure, defense
budget, and expenditures on weapon systems; the ability to absorb and sustain building
capacity and capabilities efforts; and institutional ability to sustain and retain USG efforts.
(9) Friendly and neutral actors who may mitigate the actions of those opposed to
USG efforts.
(10) Security, diplomatic, and economic actors with interests and strategic goals
in the country and their relationships.
b. Framing PN Requirements. At the theater level, the JFC initially assesses the
PN’s strategic and political situation in coordination with the SCO and component
commands. At the operational level (component commander or subordinate JFC), the
initial or baseline assessment by Service/SOF SMEs depends more on technical and tactical
considerations: the required (or desired) capability, the capability gaps, and the tasks the
components can execute to mitigate those gaps. Any initial CCMD-led collaborative
assessment efforts should identify a PN’s capability gaps in the context of an institutional
perspective, that is, from the ministerial/department level down to the tactical unit level.
This process should use a recognized methodology to analyze PN DOTMLPF-P, and it will
serve as a baseline assessment for all follow-on assessments.
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(1) Political Will and Capability for Partnership. Upon the identification of a
PN’s security role (i.e., the particular behavior or activity required of the PN), additional
analysis is performed to assess the PN’s political will and capability required to perform
the desired role(s). Planners should answer three main questions: Does the PN have
enough popular support for partnership with the US, and is the necessary degree of
consensus among the political leadership and, more broadly, among civil society, available
for the country to perform these roles? What operational capacity and capabilities does the
PN require for it to perform their role efficiently? What institutional capacity is needed to
sustain the required operational capability and capacity? Specific institutional factors to
consider include degree of legitimacy and legal status; capability of planning and
leadership; effectiveness of decision making; quality of resource management; availability
of human resources; status of equipment and logistics; consistency of essential services
such as clean water, waste management, electrical power generation, and availability of
fuels; and local civilian-military and integrating mechanisms.
(c) The extent to which the PN is capable of defense strategic planning and
resource management processes (e.g., processes to convert resources to military capability,
evidence of a national defense strategy and the role of the PN defense ministry in resource
allocation, separation of branches of Service and their roles, role of the legislative branch
in the government.)
(e) Complicity of security forces in past human rights abuses, manner and
extent to which past abuses have been addressed, and degree to which the human rights of
the population are currently respected and protected.
(f) Status of the PN’s defense sector human resource processes and efficacy
of military education and training programs; source of military manpower, volunteer or
conscripted; quality of life for military members (barracks, food, pay, medical care);
existence of a noncommissioned officer corps; provisions for systematic career
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(b) Will the PN provide access to US personnel, and what restrictions are
imposed on them?
(d) Is there popular support within the PN for US access with or without
meeting certain conditions?
(4) A qualifying analysis of the will, capacity, and access should be done for all
PNs to begin or continue SC activities and likely would be addressed with each iteration
of an ICS (every three years by DOS), or with a change to the CSCS/country plan or TCP
by the COM.
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TCP objectives and available forces and resources. Concurrently, GCC’s CSCSs/country
plans will summarize PN requirements and detail the GCC’s approach to addressing the
prioritized gaps assessed across four areas of concern: political will, institutional capacity
and capabilities, operational capacity and capabilities, and access.
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(6) Operational support entails the provision of defense articles, services, and
logistical support to PN military forces to enable them to conduct or sustain active military
operations. Operational support may include activities such as the provision of fuel,
maintenance of aircraft, or resupply of munitions, or may involve rapid capacity-building
to enable PN forces to operate within a coalition. In many cases, operational support is
provided under the auspices of a bilateral ACSA.
For more information, refer to Department of Defense Guidance for Security Cooperation.
e. Not always military in nature, SC objectives may be oriented to the security sector
or defense support to civilian authority, to support law enforcement, justice, emergency
management, disaster response, and other PN security reforms. Any SC objective must
support the TCPs and nested CSCSs/country plans. In such cases, other interagency partner
involvement and support are essential to making progress. CCMD planners should focus
on the role of DOD organizations and document what needs to be done by non-DOD
organizations. It is possible to have a CCMD SC objective that depends heavily (or totally)
on DOS—or other government agency—resources (e.g., Title 22, USC, funding and
authority) and also for DOD efforts to complement those of other government agencies
that are working toward the same goal. However, DOD involvement in some law
enforcement-related activities requires specific direction through statutory or
Presidential/SecDef authority and may require strict DOD/DOS oversight.
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g. CCMD and component planners identify how they expect the actual SC activity to
support theater and national objectives. They define assessment, monitoring, and
evaluation criteria that identify both how they will determine if the event results in the
expected outcome (e.g., trained PN forces) and how that outcome supports the broader
theater and national objectives.
a. Planning for SC activities should inform global force management (GFM), program
and budget review (PBR), the Annual Joint Assessment (and CJCS’s Risk Assessment),
CCMD integrated priority lists, and the DOD Legislative Program.
(1) SC planning should integrate the CCMD’s directorates and offices when
developing and submitting CCMD inputs into DOD resource allocation processes. For
example, the operations directorate of a joint staff may be the lead for submitting rotational
and emergent force requirements through the GFM process; the force structure, resource,
and assessment directorate of a joint staff may be the lead for developing funding
requirements in the PBR; and the J-4 or J-5 may develop posture requirements.
(1) One of the most significant aspects of SC planning involves gaining the
funding and authorities to identify resources for mission planning and execution of SC
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activities. CCMD SC planners should be familiar with the various resources available to
support the anticipated SC activities with the PNs in their theater. This includes Title 10,
USC, funding for which the country may be eligible, such as the various DOD SC programs
(e.g., Developing Country Combined Exercise Program) and other resources provided by
MILDEPs through their theater Service components. Theater Service components and
TSOCs normally have knowledgeable SC planners for their levels of participation. Title
22, USC, funding, such as FMF and IMET, is another key resource. Other interagency
partners and other countries may also provide resources that support CSCS/country plan
implementation coordinated through the TCP. Planners should also take into account
defense spending and other resources allocated by the PN toward its national security.
For additional details regarding GFM, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and CJCSM 3130.06,
Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.
d. If CCMDs determine that new or modified authorities are required, they can pursue
changes through the DOD Legislative Program. DOD authorities beyond those codified in
Title 10, USC, are established each year in the NDAA. OSD’s Office of Legislative
Counsel conducts the DOD Legislative Program to develop DOD’s annual request for
authorities in the NDAA for the program year (FY3), which is designated in a fiscal
planning cycle as FY3 (see paragraph 5, “Timeline for Funding and Authorities”). CCMDs
submit legislative proposals for new authorities through this process.
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programs and activities. Modified, postponed, or cancelled plans, programs, and activities
need to be fed back into the planning process so the CCMD can evaluate the actual
resourcing’s impact on its plan and accomplishment of its theater objectives (and possible
impact on achieving national objectives).
Each year, SC planners at all levels work at least four iterations of planning and
executing specific SC activities: evaluating and reporting on the last fiscal year (FY),
planning and executing SC in the current fiscal year (FY1), developing PN requirements
and mission planning for the next budget year (FY2), and coordinating and negotiating
DOD-DOS support of FY3. Some SC planners also project PN requirements and desired
SC activities through the out years (FY4 and FY5 or longer) to justify a continuing fiscal
investment in the approved security strategy and objectives for each PN. Figure III-2
graphically depicts FY1 through FY5 periods with notional SC activities in a simple
format. Such a timeline provides a graphic presentation to synchronize SC activities at one
or more levels (i.e., strategic, operational, and tactical) that, for example, may correspond
with an LOE in a TCP CSCS/country plan.
a. SC planning enables the GCC and staff to articulate the risk associated with
resource availability. The long lead times inherent in USG funding cycles mean GCCs
must provide funding requirements sufficiently early to influence budget decisions and
help direct resources to the GCC’s priorities. CCMDs must focus on establishing clear and
compelling narratives for the type of SC activities required to achieve the theater objectives
and by extension the resources to do this—at least two to three years ahead of
implementation (FY2, FY3, and FY4).
(1) The CCMD has greater influence in the resource picture in FY4 and FY5
when it clearly articulates the essential link between its resource requirements and the
implementation of its strategy. It is in the CCMD’s interest to map out a clear long-term,
time-phased plan of action with near-term and mid-term objectives so resource providers
can understand what the command is attempting to accomplish.
(3) Developing this mid- and long-term framework allows planners to provide
the commander with the analytic underpinnings and justification for required resources.
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Collective Exercise
Training FMS Case 2
Communication Strategies
Legend
DIRI Defense Institution Reform Initiative Info information
FMS foreign military sales Intel intelligence
FY1 current fiscal year ISAF International Security Assistance Force
FY2 budget year Mil-to-Mil military-to-military
FY3 program year SA security assistance
FY4 out year SOFA status-of-forces agreement
FY5 out year wrt with respect to
Figure III-2. Notional Timeline for Security Cooperation Planning and Execution
Resource constraints will drive a CCMD to phase its objectives in such a way that
succeeding objectives cumulatively build upon preceding ones. Each LOE should tell its
own “sub-narrative” that contributes to the broader narrative related in the CCMD’s
operational approach.
(4) Planners should be aware that within the planning timeline, future SC
activities are dependent on current year execution. As such, planning for anticipated SC
activities should be flexible, based on the monitoring and evaluation of activities that
require synchronized completion. CCMDs should be prepared to change their SC planning
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and justify proposed changes in FY1 and FY2 programs based on evaluations of previous
years’ activities and realize the effects created by SC activities could lag by several years.
c. DOS SA programs, such as FMF grants and IMET, that directly support efforts to
build the capacity of and strengthen relationships with partners require lead time for
programming and planning, thus FY4 and FY5 coordination/negotiation for funding. A
process managed by DSCA develops FMF and IMET requirements for FY3. Because of
the size and scope of those SC activities, SCOs and CCMD staffs develop specific
recommendations for FMF and IMET funding and submit these recommendations to OSD,
DSCA, and the JS for coordination and eventual submission to DOS.
d. The availability of DOD resources will vary over time as a result of the
Department’s resource allocation processes and political and budgeting decisions. In FY1,
a CCMD will have limited ability to obtain additional funds or forces, except what may
become available when other commands do not use the resources allocated to them.
However, allocation of funding for certain SC programs may occur in FY1 or FY2. Even
in such cases, resources may not be identified until late in the year, the amount may be
limited, as multiple contenders compete for these resources.
e. Planning for FY3, FY4, and FY5 focuses on identifying forces, resources, and
capabilities. The apportionment tables, located on the Joint Staff J-8 [Joint Staff
Directorate for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment] SIPRNET website, inform
planning by providing the quantities of forces reasonably expected to be available along
general timelines. During planning, forces are input into a time-phased force and
deployment list which sequences the forces required to execute the plan. SC planners
should collaborate funding issues with the respective stakeholders regarding the PBR;
submissions to the DOD Legislative Program; the Future Years Defense Program; and the
construction, acquisition, and research requirements of DOD.
f. SC planners should identify all the viable options that could be used to resolve
funding requirements and select those that achieve the best balance between being effective
and being cost efficient. For example, a PN capability gap may be rooted in a lack of
training, sustainment capability, or doctrine rather than an equipment shortfall, but fielding
new equipment might be the most expedient solution. Rectifying a training, sustainment,
or doctrine shortfall will usually be less expensive than solving a problem with an
equipment solution. While this approach may take more time to effect the desired change,
it may also provide a more sustainable solution. If the timeline for a PN to gain a capacity
is critical to US objectives, planners should consider what a third-party partner, such as an
ally or a capable regional PN, might be able to offer as an alternative to US SC. However,
there could be significant future interoperability and national policy considerations with
this approach, dependent upon the specific type of SA that is required (e.g., buy US Army
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weapons and systems). Accordingly, OSD policy and COM coordination with DOS would
be required.
g. Planners and resource managers should work together to determine creative ways
to plan and execute SC activities, as governed by policy and law. Historically, several
funding sources were used to support single events, and several programs were used to
support broader initiatives. This required the CCMDs to examine considerable challenges,
internally and externally, to planning, resourcing, assessing, monitoring, and evaluating SC
activities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 facilitates DOD
(a) Title 22, United States Code (USC), Section 2348 (Foreign Assistance
Act, Sections 571-574).
(b) Title 10, USC, Section 127c (Purchase of weapons overseas: force
protection).
(c) Title 10, USC, Section 333 (Foreign security forces: authority to build
the capacity).
(d) Title 10, USC, Section 345, (Regional Defense Combating Terrorism
Fellowship Program).
(d) The National Security Council, the DOS, the Department of Justice,
National Counterterrorism Center, National Joint Terrorism Task Force,
Department of Defense components, partner nations, and indigenous or
surrogate entities.
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6. Interagency Coordination
a. The primary conduit for interagency coordination during SC planning is the country
team and its DOD representatives, the SCO. At the country level, DOD is in a supporting
role to the COM. While neither the COM nor DOS have formal approval authority over
CCMD CSCSs/country plans, the plans should be consistent with the objectives and
priorities of the ICSs developed by the COMs for DOS and should align with the country
plans of DOS, USAID, and other government agencies working in the security sector of
the PN. Ultimately, the CCMD plans and DOS strategies both serve to achieve US strategic
objectives for the country and region. DOD’s participation through the SCO in country
team planning informs interagency partners’ plans.
b. SCO staff should brief their interagency counterparts on DOD planning guidance,
objectives, and priorities for the country. As the SCO and CCMD work to develop a
CSCS/country plan, the SCO should conduct targeted interaction with various members of
the country team and COM if necessary. For example, when developing elements of the
plan that could involve DOD humanitarian assistance or exercise-related construction
activities, the SCO should consult the USAID mission director to ensure USAID
development objectives, priorities, and activities inform the DOD CSCS/country plan.
Similarly, planners should coordinate elements of the CCMD plan related to building PN
security capacity with DOS counterparts responsible for SA programs.
d. Promote cooperation events provide an opportunity for CCMD planners and staff
to meet with representatives from interagency partners. Meetings are typically conducted
in the Washington, DC area and held at various levels of authority from action officer or
planner-level up to general officer/flag officer/senior executive service, and include
plenary sessions, panel discussions, and staff visits to individual partner agencies. These
events should be viewed as two-way discussions designed to generate synergy and
synchronization of activities. CCMDs request these events through the JS J-5, which will
organize a promote cooperation event. Promote cooperation events are required for TCPs
and can be scheduled at any point in the planning process. A promote cooperation event
provides the opportunity to synchronize the theater strategy with US foreign policy for the
region, as established by DOS, and obtain interagency input at the beginning of TCP
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development. Usually, they are more successful when planned earlier rather than later, in
particular after the initial concept development and identification of LOEs/focus areas but
before the concept is fully developed. Finally, CCMDs can address country-level issues
and plans with interagency partners at a promote cooperation event. Because DOS,
USAID, and other interagency partners conduct their overseas activities primarily on a
bilateral basis, examining issues with interagency partners at the country level may be
easier and more productive than reviewing them at the regional level.
f. Many resource streams come from non-DOD agencies other than DOS and USAID.
Federal departments and agencies such as the Department of the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control; the DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration and Federal Bureau
of Investigation; and the DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and
Border Protection, and United States Coast Guard (USCG) provide specialized functions
and capabilities to inform country planning. These agencies routinely have objectives,
programs, and resources in the same countries as DOD. The GEF provides consultation
procedures for instances when these organizations’ interests, goals, or activities overlap
with DOD’s. SSA provides the processes to focus interagency coordination of plans,
priorities, objectives, and budgeting affecting the security sector of a PN.
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b. Theater Campaign Order. CCDRs may issue an order initiating the execution of
their campaign plans; if issued, this order is called a theater campaign order. A theater
campaign order may be issued annually or as deemed appropriate by the CCDR, but all
such orders should be issued at a consistent point in time each FY, and up to a year before
execution, to allow the CCMD staff, subordinate commands, components, and supporting
agencies time to synchronize their planning, execution, evaluation, and assessment cycles
and activities with the strategic planning cycles in DOD. For coordination and
accountability, orders and authorities must be promulgated to all concerned DOD
components, especially DSCA, which has DOD responsibilities for accounting and
management of certain statutory programs for SC, to include those Title 22, USC, funds
from DOS to be administered by DOD for SC. Thus informed, the SCOs will normally
coordinate with their country teams and the PNs in support of the tasked individuals and
units, to include facilitation of contracting requirements for US military with PN entities.
Normally, execution of specific SC activities requires additional and separate orders or
authorities for the individuals and units through their appropriate chain of command in
coordination with the SCOs for the participating PNs.
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SECURITY COOPERATION EXECUTION
“Global engagement is fundamental to US leadership and influence. The US
military forward and rotationally deploys forces—which routinely provide
presence and conduct training, exercises, and other forms of military-to-
military activities—to build security globally in support of our national security
interests.”
1. General
This chapter describes execution of the SC plan, which includes combined exercises,
joint interoperability training, individual and small unit training of fielded forces, and
HCA.
a. The theater campaign order may be considered the beginning of the execution phase
of the TCP, which includes the CSCSs/country plans and supporting components’ plans,
but that order does not necessarily authorize execution of all SC activities. Collaborative
planning among the SCO, PN, DOD component(s), OSD, DSCA, COM, DOS, and
geographic CCMD results in the timely release of authorities and orders for synchronized
execution of the approved and funded SC activities throughout a GCC’s theater. As stated
in the previous chapter, certain aspects of SC planning may be considered part of the
execution phase. Planning conferences and site surveys require authorities and funds to
finalize plans for deployment and redeployment, movement, sustainment, protection,
command and control (C2), and other preparations months before the actual SC activities
begin with the PN.
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d. The components’ support plans to the CSCSs/country plans outline plans of action,
required resources, milestones, and necessary military engagements to support TCP
objectives. Implementing organizations execute SC activities under the direction of the
component command plans in support of the TCP objectives. Implementing organizations
may be individuals or any component element or combination of elements of a joint
force—military forces from the Active Component or Reserve Component, USG civilians,
and contractors. While implementing organizations may plan and coordinate their
activities with the component command headquarters and/or the CCMD, they will
normally work directly with the SCO during execution.
2. Services
a. The Services’ Title 10, USC, responsibilities to organize, train, equip, and resource
Service component commands enable and support the conduct of SC activities. The
Services support Service component commands’ execution of SC activities in support of
GCC objectives based on the available Service capabilities and resources and may also
support institutional objectives consistent with national strategic and theater objectives.
Institutional objectives should align with national strategic and theater guidance, and
provide a Service-specific focus that allows for more efficient and effective allocation of
resources in support of global SC priorities. The Services and GCCs should work together
to ensure Service institutional objectives and priorities are considered in the development
of the TCP. These activities include senior leader defense contacts and familiarization,
foreign participation or attendance at Service schools, cooperative research and
development programs, foreign comparative testing, and equipping activities.
c. Services’ CSPs outline these activities, as well as Service support for theater and
global objectives. A Service CSP further explains how the Service, according to their Title
10, USC, responsibilities, organizes, trains, and equips forces to support GCC theater
objectives, maintain readiness, and execute SC activities. Service CSPs should be
coordinated with CCMDs through the Service component commands and should address
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d. Service efforts should be coordinated with the GCCs within whose theater the SC
activity is executed, as well as with their respective Service component commands.
3. Combatant Commands
Throughout the execution of SC activities, CCDRs and their staffs continually direct,
assess, monitor, evaluate, and adjust the SC activities when possible and the
CSCSs/country plans as required, while the component commands do the same with their
supporting plans. However, once resourced, execution of specific SC activities occurs as
planned unless a crisis affecting US forces and/or the PN precludes completion of those
SC activities. SC activities normally take place through bilateral agreements that constitute
binding legal obligations for both the USG and PN. As a result, any deviation from the
terms of a bilateral agreement likely requires the consent of both governments.
Consequently, major changes are unlikely during the execution of a specific SC activity.
However, in the absence of a governing bilateral agreement and with several FYs of SC
activities at various stages of planning, programming, and budgeting during any given
calendar year, this process can make changes for the future.
a. Direct
(1) The supported GCC may use assigned or attached forces for SC activities that
require operational forces for training and military exercises. In coordination with the
MILDEPs, USSOCOM, and Reserve Component, the CCMD and theater component
commands will determine who supports the SC requirements and agrees to the necessary
command authorities, relationships, and necessary C2.
(2) The CCMD issues annual orders and fragmentary orders to inform its
subordinates and force providers of the desired objectives and the assigned tasks that have
been identified to achieve TCP SC objectives. The CCMD aligns and coordinates
operations and activities based on the dynamic situation, resources available, assessment,
and evaluation.
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which to monitor progress and provide detailed analysis to identify and inform
requirements, resources, and program planning. Assessment should also be repeated to
update analysis and identify mid-course corrections of SC activities.
(1) Monitoring is an essential C2 function for the CCDR and staff during the
execution of SC activities. CCMD monitoring of SC activities should include:
(2) The CCMD continually monitors the political and military situations relevant
to SC activities and other operations in execution and may integrate this information into
its common operational picture. CCMD monitoring of SC activities facilitates analysis
required for follow-on assessment and functional evaluation.
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(2) CCMD analysis of Service component evaluations should consist of, but is
not limited to, the following:
a. At the end of the resourcing process, components should know which resource
requests were funded and which were not. If all component resource requests were
approved, the country plan can be executed without any changes. However, the more likely
scenario is that one or more of the resource requests has been denied or only partially
funded. In this scenario, the first step in the execution process would be to modify the
country plan based on available resources.
c. The next step is executing the SC activity. The primary role of the component
planner is to ensure appropriate tasking of activities to organizations within the component
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CHAPTER V
SECURITY COOPERATION ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND
EVALUATION
1. Introduction
SC activities conducted by DOD entities with other nations’ defense organizations range
from the very visible—training, equipping, and exercising together—to those less obvious,
such as holding bilateral talks, workshops, and conferences and providing education. Often,
it is challenging to determine if these activities have contributed to US objectives—whether
at the level of national security, department or agency, Service, or CCMD—and if so, by
how much or in what ways. Because SC activities are dispersed and generally support long-
term objectives, the impacts can be difficult to immediately measure above the tactical and
operational levels (i.e., operation assessments and Service or functional component-level
evaluations). Those who plan and execute SC intuitively know whether they have gained
ground with the respective PNs as a result of individual programs and activities. However,
SC can be conducted in conjunction with a larger whole-of-government effort of interrelated
activities for the security sector. Therefore, it may be more difficult to validate a general
sense of accomplishment empirically, especially to decision makers across several
collaborating departments and agencies. For these reasons, a conglomeration of initial
interagency assessments should provide the basis upon which to foster a PN’s strategy
development (e.g., ICSs), encourage unity of effort by interagency partners, focus resources,
and better anticipate a PN’s overall needs. Moreover, monitoring throughout the
implementation of an SC activity or initiative enables regular feedback on the extent to which
expected objectives are being achieved on expected timelines to inform decisions or
corrective actions. Finally, functional evaluations at the strategic level involve systematic
collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes
of an ongoing or completed initiative, its design, implementation, and results. Supplemented
by operation assessment where applicable, such evaluations determine the relevance, value,
effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact of activities, and help planners
understand the impacts of tactical and operational activities in the context of broader
interagency efforts in the security sector. Progress toward established goals (e.g., one year
intermediate objectives or five year objectives) may be updated regularly or at a period
defined by a statute, or the CCDR, in coordination with the COM. Recurring assessment,
monitoring, and evaluation help determine whether resources have been effectively allocated
and used, and allows for program and activity adjustments.
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3. Monitoring
b. Monitoring, which may also include site visits, should also review and identify any
changes in the OE since the initial assessment and identify any unforeseen challenges that
impact initiative execution and implementation. Monitoring should be used for early
identification of where plans must be adjusted or canceled.
4. Functional Evaluation
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PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION
b. Evaluations should always result in reports that identify clear observations and
recommendations to inform future SC planning. These reports should always be
disseminated to all relevant stakeholders, including CCDRs, relevant SCOs and country
teams, SC program managers, and DSCA. These reports should be uploaded to G-
TSCMIS.
5. Operation Assessment
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operations to make efficient use of limited resources. All key participants in a particular
activity or operation should be involved in development of the operation assessment plan,
collection of relevant data, and reporting.
b. While there is no one set formula for developing operation assessments, this chapter
provides an approach to qualify them according to commander’s insight. Operation
assessment will inform (and be informed by) the commander’s personal assessment and
evaluation and supports functional assessment at the CCMD level as to whether or not SC
activities and objectives are supporting theater-strategic or campaign objectives (objective-
oriented). Based on these determinations, commanders may recommend adjustments to
ensure continued progress. DOD, through the GCCs and CJCS, also conducts long-term
strategic evaluations focused on SC objectives, PN conditions, and application of available
resources to achieve objectives while the operation assessment process begins during
mission analysis and continues throughout all phases. Both involve, but are not limited to,
the following:
c. Operation assessments of joint operations involving SC are different than the initial
or follow-on assessments preceding those SC activities, especially with SC activities
conducted for shaping as part of a GCC’s TCP. SC activities typically focus on building
partnerships and improving the capacity and capabilities of security or civil sectors within
PNs for stabilization and to prevent conflict. Because SC requires stringent DOD
oversight, some aspects of operation assessments, as well as the functional evaluations they
may support, will be qualitative in nature to comply with policy guidance, and funding and
other resource accountability. GCCs, in coordination with the CJCS (to assist USD[P] and
Director, DSCA), should establish all operation assessment, evaluation, and reporting
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requirements through their TCP and theater SC guidance. Service component commanders
should establish related guidance in their supporting plans, including guidance as required
by their supported GCC; MILDEPs; and Commander, USSOCOM, when applicable.
b. Different level headquarters will likely have different focuses for the assessment,
monitoring, and evaluation of SC activities. Consider the following:
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and paragraph 5, “Operation Assessment,” DOS and other interagency partners that work
security sector issues, often use the term assessment when referring to an initial analysis of
the OE prior to planning or project execution. This use of assessment should not be
confused with the DOD usage of the term operation assessment, which refers to the planned
and continuous analysis of the efficacy of activities that are already underway. The
following describes four basic considerations:
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Security Cooperation Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation
(d) Adjust. The CCDR decides when to modify plans and operations,
typically based on guidelines in the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation plans, but may
also be required by changes in a TCP (or another campaign or contingency plan) driven by
changes in the OE or strategic security environment that, in turn, may result in policy or
strategy changes. Adjustments do not change end states that are established through policy
and strategy. Changes in SC activities should be anticipated, because SC activities are
typically associated with an end state that requires a long-term US and PN commitment
and eventual sustainment of capacity by the PN.
b. Adjust priorities.
V-9
Chapter V
Intentionally Blank
V-10 JP 3-20
APPENDIX A
SECURITY COOPERATION: RELATED PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES
1. Introduction
This appendix describes DOD and DOS programs that have been used to support a
variety of SC activities. This appendix is not all inclusive and provides only an overview
of the programs. In most cases, planners should consult with legal advisors to identify the
proper USC section, regulation, or directive prior to any expenditure of resources. As a
matter of fiscal law, funds may only be expended for the purpose for which they were
authorized. Consequently, the planners and appropriate commander must ensure any
expenditure of funds for an SC activity complies with the associated fiscal mandates.
Failure to do so can result in a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.
For additional information see the most current version of the Defense Institute of Security
Assistance Management’s handbook, Security Cooperation Programs.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 enacted significant
reforms to DOD SC authorities, and established a dedicated chapter within Title 10, USC
(Chapter 16, Security Cooperation). Title 10, USC, Chapter 16 contains specific DOD
authorities for conducting military-to-military engagements, training with foreign forces,
support for operations and capacity building, and educational and training activities. DOD
authorities for conducting activities under the category of international armaments
cooperation are found elsewhere in Title 10, USC. In addition, Title 10, USC, contains
several targeted, niche, or temporary authorities for conducting SC under particular
circumstances. These DOD authorities closely reflect the capabilities-based categories of
SC activities identified in Chapter III, “Security Cooperation Planning:” defense contacts
and familiarization, personnel exchange, combined exercises and training, train-and-
equip/provide defense articles, DIB, operational support, education, international
armaments cooperation (see Figure A-1 for a partial list of these categories of SC activities
alongside their associated SC programs and authorities).
(1) SecDef is authorized to enter into international agreements for the exchange
of US defense personnel and foreign personnel. Under this authority, exchanges may be
conducted on a reciprocal or non-reciprocal basis; US personnel may include military or
civilian personnel. Exchanges may be conducted with personnel of foreign defense
ministries or, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, foreign non-defense security ministries
or international or regional security organizations.
(2) SecDef may pay certain personnel expenses of foreign personnel as necessary
for theater SC. Eligible expenses include travel, subsistence, and similar personnel
expenses, administrative services, and support for foreign liaison officers who are assigned
A-1
Appendix A
Security Cooperation
Category Related Programs and Authorities
International Military Education and Training (IMET; Title 22, USC, Section 2347)
Education Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (Title 10, USC, Section 345)
Regional Centers for Security Studies
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
Legend
FMF foreign military financing P&R Personnel and Readiness
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense USC United States Code
Figure A-1. Security Cooperation Categories with Related Programs and Authorities
to any headquarters in the DOD, or travel, subsistence, and medical care for such liaison
officers.
A-2 JP 3-20
Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities
b. Training with Foreign Forces (Title 10, USC, Sections 321-322). The US Armed
Forces are authorized to train with military forces or other security forces of foreign PN in
cases where SecDef determines it is in the national security interests of the US. Under this
authority, the US Armed Forces may conduct training with, or bilateral or multilateral
exercises with, counterpart forces, and may pay the incremental expenses of a country
(except under certain circumstances, a developing country) to participate in such training.
Authorized expenses include the travel, subsistence, and other personnel expenses of the
developing countries defense personnel. Combined training and exercises may be
conducted with nonmilitary security forces only by specialized forces of the US Armed
Forces; US CF may only train with the military forces of a PN.
c. Support for Operations and Capacity Building (Title 10, USC, Sections 331-333)
(1) Support for Operations (Title 10, USC, Section 331). SecDef, with the
concurrence of SECSTATE, may provide support to friendly foreign countries in the
context of specifically designated operations. Such support may include logistics support,
supplies, and services; procurement of equipment for the purposes of loaning such
equipment to enhance capabilities and interoperability; provision of specialized training;
and small-scale construction to enable countries to participate or continue participating in
designated operations. Under this authority, SecDef may provide support to military forces
or, if it directly benefits US Armed Forces, nonmilitary forces who are participating in a
combined operation with US forces or in a military operation or stability activity that
benefits the US. For operations in which the US is not participating, SecDef and
SECSTATE must jointly certify to Congress that the operation is in the national security
interests of the US prior to the provision of assistance under this authority.
(2) Defense Institution Capacity Building (Title 10, USC, Section 332).
SecDef, with the concurrence of SECSTATE, may provide programs for training and
training support programs and may assign DOD civilian employees as advisors to the
ministries of defense (or security agencies serving a similar defense function) to provide
institutional, ministerial-level advice, and other training in support of stabilization or post-
conflict activities or assist in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and
capabilities to manage defense-related processes. Programs should enhance civilian
oversight; establish responsible defense governance; assess and address shortfalls; and
enhance overall ministerial, general, or joint staff or service-level core management
competencies. See the DIB policy discussion in Chapter II, “Security Cooperation
Relationships,” for further information. DOD applications of this authority include the
following programs:
A-3
Appendix A
appropriate to the national context and within a framework that supports transparency and
accountability. Established in 2010, DIRI is one of DOD’s primary SC tools to support a
PN’s efforts to develop its defense institutions’ ability to perform these functions and direct
their use in a legitimate manner. Ultimately, PNs that are able to maintain their own security
and join the US in supporting international peacekeeping and security operations are
important to US interests and to international and regional stability. This approach requires
close coordination and cooperation between the DOS, DOD, and the PN. The Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense directs DIRI in close coordination with CCMDs and
country teams. DSCA is responsible for program and fiscal management.
(b) Wales Initiative Fund (WIF). In January 1994, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program to increase
stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened security relationships among
individual nations in Europe and the former Soviet Union and with NATO. The US
established the Warsaw Initiative Fund shortly thereafter to provide support to developing
nations that are members of the PfP. The program’s primary objectives are to improve
NATO/PfP partner interoperability, advance PfP partner DIB/defense reform, and support
PfP partner integration with NATO. During the NATO summit in Wales in September
2014, SecDef renamed the Warsaw Initiative Fund as WIF and opened eligibility for the
program to include not just the PfP countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but all
developing NATO partners, including the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative countries. Eligible activities will strengthen partner defense
institutions and promote interoperability through military-to-military contacts, exchanges,
workshops, conferences, and advisory efforts. This approach requires close coordination
and cooperation between DOS, DOD, and the PN. WIF is directed by the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, in close coordination with
CCMDs and SDO/DATTs. DSCA is responsible for program and fiscal management.
WIF may be used in conjunction with other types of funding, to include CCIF, traditional
CCDR activity, Official Representation Funds, Emergency Extraordinary Expense, FMF,
IMET, and NATO funds.
(3) Building Capacities (Title 10, USC, Section 333). SecDef, with the
concurrence of SECSTATE, is authorized to build the capacity of a foreign country’s
national security forces to conduct CT operations, CWMD operations, CD trafficking
A-4 JP 3-20
Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities
operations, counter transnational organized crime operations, maritime and border security
operations, military intelligence operations, and other operations or activities that
contribute to multinational operations that benefit the national security interests of the US.
Programs may include the provision of equipment, supplies, training, defense services, and
small-scale military construction. Sustainment support may be provided for a period
extending up to five years after the provision of equipment under the authority. Any
assistance provided under this authority must be accompanied by parallel assistance
programs aimed to address institutional capacity-building and respect for human rights.
Assistance will generally be provided to foreign military forces, but may be provided to
other security forces under certain circumstances.
(1) Regional Defense CTFP (Title 10, USC, Section 345). CTFP seeks to
educate and train mid- and senior-level partner defense and security officials in threats,
strategies, and operations relating to CT. Through such education, it builds and strengthens
a global network of combating terrorism (CbT) experts and practitioners at the operational
and strategic levels, and reinforces the CbT capabilities of PNs. CTFP also invests to create
new curricula and training modules to address emerging CbT areas of interest to fill gaps
in existing academic programming.
(2) Regional Centers for Security Studies (Title 10, USC, Section 342). DOD
maintains five regional centers for security studies: the Africa Center for Security Studies,
the Near East and South Asia Center for Security Studies, and the William J. Perry Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, each located at Fort McNair in Washington, DC; the
Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, located in Honolulu, HI; and
the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, located in Garmisch,
Germany and co-sponsored by the Government of Germany. Regional centers offer
platforms for convening leaders from across assigned regions for training, education, and
discussion. These unique academic forums build strong, sustainable international networks
of security leaders. The regional centers support defense strategy objectives and policy
priorities through:
(c) Enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of the region. The
regional centers accomplish their mission primarily through resident and in-region
programs including seminars and courses, as well as through bilateral workshops, alumni
outreach events, and research publications.
(3) SPP (Title 10, USC, Section 341). SecDef, with the concurrence of
SECSTATE, is authorized to establish a program of activities, known as a “State
A-5
Appendix A
(5) No-cost equipment loans for research, development, testing, and evaluation.
(1) Purpose. Under this authority, DOD may enter into bilateral agreements
for the reimbursable mutual exchange of logistical support, supplies, and services with
NATO countries, NATO subsidiary bodies, other designated-eligible countries, the UN,
A-6 JP 3-20
Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities
and other international organizations. The purchase and sale of logistic support does not
extend to major end items of equipment (e.g., trucks, weapons systems). Per Title 10,
USC, Section 2350, the term “logistic support, supplies, and services” includes temporary
use of general purpose vehicles and other nonlethal items of military equipment which
are not designated as significant military equipment on the US Munitions List. Examples
include vehicles, communications equipment, and training aids. This authority allows
DOD to acquire or transfer logistic support outside the AECA channels. This is a limited,
DOD-specific authority to both acquire logistic support without resorting to commercial
contracting procedures and to transfer logistic support outside of AECA channels.
However, pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 2341, the authority to acquire logistic
support, services, and facilities may only be used to support US forces deployed outside
of the US. Pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 2342, cross-servicing agreements may not
be used to procure any goods or services from any foreign government or international
organization when those are reasonably available from US commercial sources.
(2) Procedures. After consulting with DOS, DOD may enter into agreements
with NATO countries, NATO subsidiary bodies, and other designated-eligible countries
for reciprocal logistic support, supplies, and services. However, major end items are
excluded. Acquisitions and transfers are on a cash, replacement in kind (RIK), or equal
value exchange (EVE) basis. RIK or EVE must be accomplished within 12 months after
the date of delivery of the logistic support, supplies, or services. After 12 months,
reimbursement must be on a cash basis. OSD is the policy and legal authority for the use
of ACSA authorities and may only delegate down to the CCMD the authority to negotiate
new ACSA orders.
For further details, see CJCSI 2120.01, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.
(2) Procedures. The SCO typically forwards requests through the supported
GCC for review and approval by DSCA in coordination with the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. Upon DSCA approval, or
CCMD approval, if below the “minimal cost” threshold, the CCMD determines if and when
to fund approved projects, and execution is typically delegated to the project submitter
(e.g., SCO or a civil affairs team). Projects require USAID coordination. For urgent
disaster relief, DOD typically proves support after receipt of a DOS Executive Secretariat
A-7
Appendix A
request for DOD assistance to further the USG response whereby tasking the affected GCC
to provide assistance. DSCA provides funding to the GCC as authorized by SecDef.
For more information, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and DSCA
Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual.
(2) Procedures. Private aid donors apply for transportation via the web
(https://hatransportation.ohasis.org). DOD is also authorized to transport donated supplies
from NGOs and international organizations intended for humanitarian assistance purposes.
This transportation is authorized without charge but on a space-available basis. Before
supplies can be transported, DOD must determine their transportation is consistent with
US foreign policy, they are suitable for humanitarian purposes and in usable condition, a
legitimate humanitarian need exists for them by the people for whom they are intended,
they will be used for humanitarian purposes, and adequate arrangements have been made
for their distribution in the destination country by the NGO or international organization.
DSCA manages the program and the funds. Requests should be forwarded by the
supported CCDR to the JS for approval by DSCA.
(1) Purpose. This authority allows the Service components to carry out HCA
activities abroad. Projects must promote US and HN security interests, as well as enhance
readiness skills of the US forces that participate. These projects are to be conducted in
conjunction with authorized military operations and can complement, but not duplicate,
other assistance provided by the USG. HCA is confined to four general areas which are
defined by statute: medical, dental, surgical, and veterinary care provided in rural or
underserved areas of a country, including education, training, and technical assistance
related to the care provided; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;
well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction
and repair of public facilities. HCA projects cannot benefit any individual or organization
engaged in military or paramilitary activity.
A-8 JP 3-20
Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities
(1) Purpose. This section provides the President with the authority to direct
SecDef to provide disaster assistance outside the US to prevent loss of lives or serious harm
to the environment. It enables DOD to utilize its unique airlift and rapid deployment
capabilities to address humanitarian problems caused by natural or man-made disasters
worldwide. Assistance provided under this section may include transportation, supplies,
services, and equipment, and possibly humanitarian daily rations, which are managed by
DSCA. Foreign disaster assistance requirements are validated by USAID, Office of US
Foreign Disaster Assistance. The military mission should be clearly defined, as military
assets are provided primarily to supplement or complement the relief efforts of the affected
country’s civil authorities or humanitarian relief community. Any assistance provided
under this section must be reported to Congress within 48 hours of commencement of the
assistance activities. As appropriate, DOD may also support USG FDR efforts under Title
10, USC, Section 2561.
For additional information see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and DSCA
Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual.
e. Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program, Title 10, USC, Section 407
A-9
Appendix A
other ERW (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting US
military operations). To a limited degree, supplies, services, and equipment are provided
to assist in the conduct of training. Total cost of supplies, services, and equipment provided
to foreign governments may not exceed 10 million dollars per FY (all participating
countries).
(2) Procedures. SCO identifies, plans, coordinates, and submits HMA requests
through the supported GCC for review and approval by DSCA in coordination with Deputy
Assistance Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. All projects must
be coordinated with the PM’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. Additional
information on HMA can be found in DSCA Manual, 5105.38-M, Security Assistance
Management Manual; CJCSI 3207.01, Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian
Mine Action; JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles,
and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.
(1) Purpose. Allows for the provision of surplus DOD equipment (excluding
weapons, ammunition, or other equipment or material that is designed to inflict serious
bodily harm or death) for the purpose of building partner capacity to deliver essential
services to the civilian population in support of TCP objectives. The EP program supports
the same areas as humanitarian assistance activities executed under Title 10, USC, Section
2561, and may be used to provide equipment that improves a PN’s ability to respond to
disasters or deliver health or education services. The EP program is designed for civilian
use. However, EP may be provided to an HN military unit by exception, as long as the
unit is responsible for performing a humanitarian mission and the HN’s civilian population
remains the ultimate beneficiary.
A-10 JP 3-20
Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities
(1) Purpose. FMS is the primary authority to sell and lease defense articles and
services (procured with DOD appropriations) to foreign allies, friendly nations, and
international organizations; the other authority comes through ACSAs.
b. IMET (FAA, Sections 541-545 and Title 22, USC, Sections 2347-2347h)
(1) Purpose. The IMET program provides training and education opportunities,
on a grant basis, to students from allied and friendly countries. It is a key component of
US SA that is an investment in ideas and people and has an overall positive effect on the
numerous foreign military students educated and trained under the program. For a
relatively modest investment, it presents democratic alternatives to key foreign military
and civilian leaders.
(2) Procedures. DOS obtains a request for training from the PN government and
passes the request to DOD. If the GCC desires to provide military education or training to
countries in the AOR, usually this is arranged through the country team at the embassy.
The GCC may also submit the proposal to the JS J-5 for interagency review. Once
approved by DOS, DOD through DSCA will attempt to provide the services directly. If
DOD is unable, then DSCA will authorize the use of contracted training to meet the
requirement.
c. FMF Program (FAA Section 503; AECA, Section 23 [Title 22, USC, Section
2763]; and appropriated under DOS Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Appropriations Act: Title IV)
(2) Procedures. DOS’s PM initiates the annual budget development process for
the FY plus three future years. Annual FMF strategic budget guidance is issued to US
embassies and DOD stakeholders to develop program requests which are based on
established national and country-specific SA objectives. CCMDs forward their prioritized
and consolidated submissions to the JS. The JS then forwards the consolidated input to
DSCA, for coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and
DOS. Accompanying OSD policy and JS, the CCMDs also have the opportunity to defend
their recommendations to DOS staff during the annual SA roundtable meetings. The Office
of US Foreign Assistance Resources will then develop and compile the final DOS budget
request to the White House OMB and Congress and approves the release of all foreign
A-11
Appendix A
assistance funds. The program requests are reviewed by the OMB and Congress. Once
approved through the President’s budget, DOS PM will process execution notifications to
Congress and funding releases from the Department of the Treasury to DSCA.
(1) Purpose. EDA authority provides for the sale or no-cost transfer of EDA no
longer needed by DOD, which is deemed excess and includes property of the USCG.
Delivery priority is given to eligible NATO members, major non-NATO allies on the
southern and southeastern flank of NATO, and to the Philippines. This excess equipment
is offered at reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients on an “as is, where is” basis.
EDA recipients are responsible for packaging, crating, handling, and transportation costs,
as well as refurbishment work and follow-on support. The EDA program works best for
assisting friends and allies to augment current inventories of like items with a support
structure already in place. Numerous statutory authorizations govern the transfer of EDA.
A summary of the legal references can be found in Chapter 11 of DSCA
Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual,
(http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-11#C11.3).
5. Drawdown Authorities
This authority provides DOD articles, equipment, military education, and training to
respond to unforeseen emergencies or requirements. It can also provide DOD services.
A-12 JP 3-20
Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities
Examples include military transportation and military personnel offloading ships. This
authority cannot be used for new contracting or procurement. It can be cited by DOD to
contract for commercial air- or sealift if more economical. However, it cannot be used to
provide housing and food under a logistic civil augmentation program contract to members
of a foreign country or an international organization. There are three drawdown authorities
contained within the FAA of 1961. All three require a Presidential determination and
report, in advance, to Congress that it is in the national interest to execute the drawdown.
They are available for use within each FY up to a specified dollar amount. The calculation
of costs for all goods and services provided under these authorities, and reported to
Congress, is on the basis of “full cost to the government.” The calculation of costs includes
the full cost of all military and civilian labor associated with the drawdown. Although
these authorities are limited to existing defense stocks, a reduction of items from inventory
below the reorder point may cause a new procurement action to replenish stocks. Such
authority generally does not have funding attached. Drawdown authority does not draw a
distinction between stocks that are at the retail or wholesale level. When drawdown
authority is granted, there are very specific statutes that require the President to report to
Congress the extent that stocks and services are drawn down. DSCA is the DOD agency
responsible for reporting this information. DSCA must account for how much drawdown
authority has been used and establish the reporting requirements for this type of support.
Using this authority, DSCA normally directs the provision of supplies in two ways. First,
DSCA may assemble a push package to be sent to the appropriate foreign contingent.
Second, DSCA may direct, through an execute order, that certain stocks be provided to a
specific foreign contingent.
(1) Purpose. Under Section 506(a)(1) of the FAA, military assistance (defense
articles and defense services, and military education and training) can be furnished to a
foreign country or international organization on a non-reimbursable basis due to an
unforeseen emergency. It requires a Presidential determination and report in advance to
Congress that an unforeseen emergency exists that cannot be met under the AECA or any
other law. Peacekeeping is a recognized purpose for use of this drawdown authority.
b. Drawdown in National Interests (FAA, Section 506[a][2] and Title 22, USC,
Section 2318[a][2])
(1) Purpose. The President can draw down DOD stocks for CD, disaster relief,
antiterrorism, nonproliferation assistance, and refugee and migrant assistance purposes.
This authority provides articles, equipment, and military equipment and training. It can
A-13
Appendix A
also provide DOD services. Examples include military transportation and military
personnel offloading ships.
c. Drawdown for PKO (FAA, Section 552[c] and Title 22, USC, Section 2348)
(1) Purpose. The President can drawdown commodities and services from any
USG department or agency for unforeseen emergencies to support peacekeeping activities.
This authority can be used for new contracting or procurement and it can be cited by DOD
to contract for commercial air- or sealift if more economical. However, it cannot be used
to provide housing and food. It requires a Presidential determination and report, in
advance; to Congress that an unforeseen emergency exists that requires the immediate
provision of assistance.
A-14 JP 3-20
APPENDIX B
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE
a. SFA activities are often used to shape the OE or assist a PN in defending against
internal and transnational threats to security or stability (i.e., supporting FID, CT, COIN,
or other stability activities). SFA activities may be used to assist a PN to defend against
external threats or help contribute to multinational operations and help develop or reform
another country’s security forces or supporting institutions. SFA also contributes to DOD’s
role in USG efforts to support PN SSR, whether through routine SC activities or a FID
operation.
(1) SFA activities are conducted across the range of military operations and
across the conflict continuum (i.e., from peace through war) supporting Service and joint
operations/missions. Significant SC activities and military engagements are routinely
conducted worldwide for peacetime theater and global shaping through the GCCs’ TCPs.
Some of those SC activities are likely to include, for example, SFA activities or an SSR
effort in the lower range of the conflict continuum. Timely and effective execution of
relevant SFA activities as part of SC for shaping in the theater campaign may contribute to
stabilization and perhaps a measure of deterrence to prevent the requirement for US forces
having to conduct a contingency operation. These activities can develop effective PN
security forces supporting US or US-led multinational operations.
(2) Joint forces must have the ability to conduct SFA and associated OTERA
tasks throughout the conflict continuum. Planners should address SFA requirements
throughout all phases of an operation/campaign.
For more information on the range of military operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
Congress provides oversight of SFA activities and allocates resources under strict
guidelines and implementation instructions. CCDRs are required to provide annual
estimates to SecDef for SFA requirements. As a result, the funding authorities for SFA
activities must be prioritized within each theater and then for global application by DOD
in coordination with DOS. For contingencies, funding for SFA would be made available
based on the priority of the requirement. Figure B-1 depicts SFA coordination.
a. SFA Activities. Typically planned and executed like other SC activities in support
of a GCC’s TCP, or in conjunction with a contingency plan, SFA activities will generally
focus on building the capacity or capability of PN military forces. However, under certain
conditions, SFA activities may have to support the development of nonmilitary security
B-1
Appendix B
United President
States
Congress
Funding
Authorities
Allied Nation/
Department of Department of Coalition
Defense State Government
Country
Team
United States Army
Component Command
United States
Marine Corps Partner Nation
Component Command Combatant Allied Nation/
Commanders Security Force Coalition
United States Navy Security Assistance Security
Component Command Force Program Force
Assistance Assistance
United States Air Force Activities Activities
Component Command
Unified Commands
Legend
lines of coordination lines of communication
forces and their supporting institutions; and to the extent authorized by law, DOD shall be
prepared to provide capabilities to do the following:
(1) Support and coordinate with other USG departments and agencies that are
leading USG efforts to support non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting
institutions.
(2) Advise and support the training of foreign paramilitary security forces such
as border and coastal control forces, counterterrorist forces, and paramilitary or special
police forces at all levels, in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies.
(3) Support the training of PN civil police in individual and collective tasks in
hostile or uncertain environments when other USG department or agency trainers and
advisors are unable to do so. Coordinate the transition of responsibilities for such training
and advisory duties to other USG departments and agencies as conditions allow.
B-2 JP 3-20
Security Force Assistance
b. SFA Imperatives. SFA activities strive to create FSF that are competent,
capable, sustainable, committed, confident, and support the security of the PN and
regional stability. The following imperatives enable SFA activities and have universal
application for the numerous SC activities and larger-scale Service/joint operations and
missions supported by SFA activities.
(2) Ensure Unity of Effort. The SFA effort may include multinational partners
or an international organization. Effective command organizational and stakeholder
relationships warrant special consideration. Unity of command is typically preferable,
but often impractical. Unity of effort is imperative to successful SFA efforts. Command
relationships and organizational relationship agreements may range from simple to
complex and military commanders may answer to nonmilitary personnel such as a COM.
Regardless of the relationship, clear delineation and understanding of authorities is
essential to avoid confusion. Additionally, establishing coordinating boards or centers
assists unity of effort among US and multinational partners.
B-3
Appendix B
(4) Support Legitimacy. SFA develops FSF that should contribute to the
legitimate governance of the PN population. This is done by developing FSF that are
competent, capable, committed, and confident, not only in the eyes of the US, other
countries, and PN governments, but more critically, in the eyes of the PN population.
(a) Legitimacy of the PN government and of the forces providing SFA may
be tenuous during some phases of a complex operation, but it is an essential consideration
for achieving the SC or contingency objective(s). A PN’s security policies and practices
should be founded upon the rule of law and linked to the broader justice sector to facilitate
resolution of potential conflict drivers. SFA should aim to ensure all FSF operate within
the bounds of domestic and international laws, respect human rights, and they support
wide-ranging efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law, thus supporting legitimacy
and transparency. Legitimacy fosters transparency and confidence among PN government,
FSF, PN population, and USG departments and agencies. Another aspect of legitimacy is
supporting PN ownership in the SFA effort, because it facilitates sustainability for building
a capacity or security reform through acceptance and expectation by the PN population.
SFA should put a PN face on all forms of success and positive reinforcement and properly
mitigate any negatives, so the FSF appears righteous even when mistakes are made.
(b) The police in particular should operate as an integral part of the justice
system and directly support other parts of the justice sector, including the courts and
corrections institutions. This is particularly important in rebuilding countries where legacy
of abuse by security personnel may have eroded public confidence in the sector overall.
SFA programs should include accountability and oversight mechanisms, including
thorough direct collaboration with civil society, to prevent abuses of power and corruption,
and to build public confidence. Assistance to the police and other state security providers
may need to be complemented with other efforts to strengthen these institutions, to avoid
unintended consequences, and to ensure the security forces operate according to the law.
In addition, although the tendency may be to focus on criminal justice systems, civil justice
reform may have important implications for law and order, particularly with respect to the
resolution of potential conflict drivers, such as land disputes, and provides another avenue
for the redress of government malfeasance. Leaders, planners, and practitioners at all
levels who integrate SFA activities into SC planning efforts must consider how each action
may affect popular perceptions, and focus activities that enable the legitimacy of the PN
government and FSF, not just make them technically competent. While it is important to
assist PN forces to develop professionally, a mirror image US model may not be the
optimum solution for some FSF, because of sociocultural or other factors. Legitimacy may
be difficult to measure objectively.
B-4 JP 3-20
Security Force Assistance
(1) Security forces perform three generic functions: executive, generating, and
operating. The executive function includes strategic direction that provides oversight,
policy, and resources for the FSF generating and operating functions. FSF generating
forces refer to the capacity and capabilities of the FSF to organize, train, equip, and build
operating force units. FSF operating forces form operational capabilities through the use
of concepts similar to the US joint functions to achieve FSF security objectives. Of note,
specific generating and operating forces will likely have some overlap of requirements and
responsibilities. In some FSF, a single organization may perform all three functions.
(2) The SFA planners require knowledge of how their own organization
distributes these functions as well as how the FSF implement them in their system in order
to identify the SFA tasks that will support the FSF’s model rather than simply importing a
B-5
Appendix B
US model to the FSF organization. Figure B-2 shows the primary duties of each function
and identifies the relationship of the OTERA tasks.
(3) Executive Function. All security forces apply some level of executive
function which empowers the generating and operating functions. The entities that perform
this function direct and develop national policy and resources for their security forces. The
executive organization justifies, authorizes, and directs parameters for the generating and
operating forces. The OSD, the JS, and the Service staffs perform this function for the US.
The duties associated with the executive function are:
Advise
B-6 JP 3-20
Security Force Assistance
include, but are not limited to, force employment options, operational requirements, or
military and political consequences of pending decisions.
(e) Review and Analysis. The executive provides insights into current or
future capability and capacity gaps as they relate to fulfilling known or anticipated roles
and missions for the security force. As a function, it requires the capability to collect and
process relative information from operations, exercises, or experiments and then package
and distribute the analysis in a manner useful to decision makers.
(4) Generating Function. The generating function develops and sustains the
capabilities of the operating forces. In the US, the generating function is primarily
performed by the Services and is performed by military schools, training centers, and
arsenals. The duties associated with the generating function are:
B-7
Appendix B
(a) US operating forces are typically better suited to develop FSF operating
forces or operational capabilities than they are to developing FSF generating forces or
generating capabilities. Typically, they are tasked to train and/or advise FSF operating
forces.
d. FSF Development Tasks. SFA activities normally use the tasks of OTERA to
develop the functional capabilities required by the FSF. OTERA tasks are a tool to
develop, change, or improve the capacity and capabilities of FSF. Through a baseline
assessment of the subject FSF, and considering US interests and objectives, planners can
determine which OTERA tasks will be required to build the proper capability and capacity
levels within the various units of the FSF. Assessments of the FSF against a desired set of
capabilities will assist in developing an OTERA-based plan to improve FSF. The
following are basic descriptions of the OTERA tasks:
(1) Organize. All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal
principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management.
This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff
processes, and recruiting and manning functions.
(2) Train. All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader
development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may
include task analysis, the development and execution of programs of instruction,
implementation of training events, and leader development activities.
B-8 JP 3-20
Security Force Assistance
(3) Equip. All activities to design, improve, and integrate materiel and
equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle
management. This may also include fielding of new equipment, operational readiness
processes, repair, and recapitalization.
(4) Rebuild or Build. All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities.
This may include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of
communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.
a. General
(1) Discussion of SFA in the previous sections has generally centered on strategic
and operational levels. This section transitions to a more focused examination of
employment principles, techniques, and procedures used in conducting SFA activities.
(2) SFA activities that are part of unified action by the GCC require interagency
coordination. Even small tactical operations usually require interagency coordination,
most often through the SCO with the country team as a part of the CCMD’s routine
activities (as part of a campaign plan) and in initial phases of an operation (such as
deploying flexible deterrent or flexible response options) campaign and through a
joint/multinational force or Service component headquarters organization during combat
operations and again through the SCO as operations transition back to civilian control.
(3) Interagency coordination for SC such as SFA activities is led by the COM
and coordinated through the country team. In the rare circumstance there is a complete
absence of a COM, the senior USG official may be the JFC who would lead the interagency
coordination, and if required, interorganizational coordination for all participants.
Civilian-military teaming is a product of interagency coordination, and an example is the
provincial reconstruction teams used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The strategic and
operational level coordination results in planning and resources for effective tactical level
application. SFA activities may be conducted with FSF through large joint/Service task
forces, as well as through smaller civilian-military teams. Figure B-3 depicts a model for
SFA activities.
B-9
Appendix B
Legend
BPC building partner capacity IMET international military education and training
CNT counter narcoterrorism NDAA national defense authorization act
DOJ Department of Justice PEP personnel exchange program
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation PfP Partnership for Peace
FMF foreign military financing USC United States Code
FMS foreign military sales USCG United States Coast Guard
FY fiscal year USG United States Government
A continuous intelligence effort will gauge the reaction of the local populace and determine
the effects on the infrastructure of US efforts, as well as evaluate strengths, weaknesses,
and disposition of opposition groups in the area. Ultimately, intelligence supports the US
B-10 JP 3-20
Security Force Assistance
and PN leaders’ decision-making processes and supports the protection of friendly forces
and assets.
(2) Force Selection. US forces have some inherent ability to assess, train, advise,
and assist foreign forces. The degree to which they can be tasked depends on their
preparation in terms of cultural knowledge, language, functional skills, and the ability to
apply these skills within the OE. Employing operational designs that provide a
combination of CF while leveraging the unique capabilities of SOF will assist in achieving
objectives. The planning for and selection of the appropriate mix of CF, SOF, CEW, and/or
civilian personnel and contractors should be a deliberate decision based on thorough
mission analysis and a pairing of available capabilities to requirements. Important factors
to consider in these decisions include the nature of the PN force, the nature of the skills or
competencies required by the PN force, and the nature of the situation and environment
into which US forces will deploy.
(a) USCG training teams, personnel, and platforms are well suited to support
the development of stable, multi-mission maritime forces to respond to many transnational
threats. USCG SFA activities reach beyond normal military to military relations to a
broader maritime audience, including, but not limited to, law enforcement agencies,
maritime administrations, and transport ministries.
(b) SFA for non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting
institutions. If required to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of
non-defense ministry security forces, such as the police and their supporting institutions,
and to the extent authorized by law, DOD is prepared to employ the requisite task-
organized capabilities to affect the following:
B-11
Appendix B
(4) Public Information. Public information is key during all phases of any
mission with SFA activities. While it is important to support the USG effort through IRCs
such as MISO, it is also important to employ effective public affairs (PA) programs,
coordinated with the COM and PN, to inform the US and PN populations of current SFA
activities and USG objectives. Without popular support it may be impractical to fully
develop and sustain missions that require USG support for FSF. The supported JFC’s PA
activities will seek to disclose the appropriate amount of information in accordance with
USG PA guidelines and applicable security restrictions. Coordination is important
between the PA staff and the media, the country team, the MISO unit, and other information
agencies within the PN and region.
(5) Logistics Support. Logistics support of SFA activities might include support
of both US and PN forces to conduct operational missions (e.g., supporting PN civilians or
military forces with medical, construction, power generation, maintenance, supply, or
transportation capabilities). There are several general guidelines for logistic issues in
support of US forces conducting SFA activities.
B-12 JP 3-20
Security Force Assistance
through a port on a daily basis), airlift resupply, and inter-Service support agreements
should also be considered.
(b) Commanders should carefully balance the advantages of using HNS with
the risks of establishing dependency on potentially unreliable sources.
(d) Other supporting multinational forces may require support beyond their
organic logistic capabilities. Accordingly, if there is a need for the USG to establish
logistic support agreements with multinational partners providing SFA-like capabilities
that –should occur during the planning phase and be finalized –prior to beginning SFA
activities. ACSAs negotiated with multinational partners are beneficial, as they allow US
forces to exchange most common types of support. SecDef typically delegates authority
to negotiate these agreements to the supported GCC.
(b) Insider attacks are a threat in any operational area. Commanders should
ensure personnel are trained to identify behavioral indicators of possible insider threats and
understand the means to apply prevention tools to mitigate this threat. Cultural awareness
yields situational awareness and leads to increased force protection for SFA personnel.
(7) OPSEC. A significant challenge during SFA activities is the need to deny
critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to hostile
elements. The nature of SFA implies that many PN officials and the populace will know
of certain US activities as they occur. Criminal and insurgent groups may have members
or sympathizers within PN institutions acting as informants. US and foreign personnel
involved in SFA activities and programs should be provided extensive OPSEC training to
ensure effectiveness of their operations.
B-13
Appendix B
For further information for specific reporting procedures, refer to CJCSI 3150.25, Joint
Lessons Learned Program.
B-14 JP 3-20
Security Force Assistance
(1) Defense Activities That Are Not SFA. US forces may also conduct other
activities in the security sector that do not clearly provide a direct contribution to the
capacity and capabilities of the FSF and therefore are not SFA activities. These might
include military-to-military contacts whose purpose is simply to negotiate access or status
agreements. Many key leader engagements, wherein senior US military leaders meet with
senior officers of the PN military, ministry of defense (MOD), or other officers of the PN
government, are military engagement or SC activities, but not SFA activities, because they
establish or reaffirm relationships or enhance US access to PN ports, airfields, or
infrastructure. Despite their classification as something other than SFA activities, it is
important to understand other SC activities are part of comprehensive USG effort to
achieve the military objectives and reach the end state expressed in the TCP, CSCS/country
plan, or a contingency plan.
B-15
Appendix B
address them. However, DOD will not execute or support such activities without proper
authority.
(c) In some situations, other interagency partners may have the appropriate
skills and personnel, but existing security conditions may prevent their use. In those
environments, subject to proper coordination and authorization, DOD may be required to
develop those non-MOD security capabilities or capacity. The GCC should make
provisions for transition of responsibilities to other interagency partners as the security
situation allows.
For additional details regarding FSF assessments, see Army Techniques Publication
(ATP) 3-07.10/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33.8A/Navy Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.5/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.76, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Advising Foreign Security Forces.
b. FSF Assessment Workflow. The FSF assessment enables the SFA organization
to establish the correct developmental objectives. Individual unit specific FSF assessments
of individual FSF units allow for effective alignment of feasible developmental tasks. The
comprehensive FSF assessment provides a thorough understanding of the FSF and presents
a baseline in FSF capability requirements within the context of the OE. The FSF
assessment task workflow consists of five steps (see Figure B-4).
B-16 JP 3-20
Security Force Assistance
*Conduct FSF
unit specific
organization
assessment and
*Conduct core observations
analysis and *Form Estimate
scope Foreign hypothesis(s) progress and
Service Force and develop *Conduct institutional
or capability assessment/analysis
(FSF) unit assessment gaps
specific plan
problem(s) *Conduct FSF
unit specific
environmental
assessment and
observations
c. Planners and advisors can apply this FSF assessment process as a primary
developmental tool in day-to-day activities, as well as broader program development to
synchronize development objectives of FSF generating and operating forces. Finally, when
standardized among SFA organizations, the FSF assessment workflow provides a
collective understanding of trends and progress across the FSF.
B-17
Appendix B
Intentionally Blank
B-18 JP 3-20
APPENDIX C
NOTIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITY CHECKLIST
b. Command guidance.
3. Identify and read relevant operational doctrine and directives for SC activity.
a. Activity objectives.
c. Strategic guidance.
d. PA guidance.
a. JLLIS.
C-1
Appendix C
12. Identify HN, interagency, international organizations, and NGO points of contact
for coordination.
14. Contact component/CCMD country desk officer for advisement and coordination.
15. Establish contact with SCO at US embassy in the PN for advisement and
coordination.
C-2 JP 3-20
Notional Security Cooperation Activity Checklist
a. Schedule specific training on customs, cultural sensitivities, and norms for unit
leaders and those who will interact with HN.
22. Publish evasion plan of action prior to mission in accordance with JP 3-50,
Personnel Recovery.
24. Draft lessons learned during activity planning and execution. Submit upon
completion or as directed.
25. Draft after action report per higher headquarter direction and update G-TSCMIS
event entry to lessons learned as applicable.
C-3
Appendix C
Intentionally Blank
C-4 JP 3-20
APPENDIX D
REFERENCES
1. Law
a. National Security Directive Decision 38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their
Overseas Constituent Post.
e. NSS.
f. GEF 2015-2017.
h. Strategic Plan.
j. NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military
Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
D-1
Appendix D
m. DODI 5132.14, Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security
Cooperation Enterprise.
o. Memorandum of Agreement Between DOD and DHS on the Use of the US Coast
Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy.
D-2 JP 3-20
References
p. JP 3-07, Stability.
y. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
z. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.
D-3
Appendix D
5. Multi-Service Publications
D-4 JP 3-20
References
D-5
Appendix D
Intentionally Blank
D-6 JP 3-20
APPENDIX E
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the
Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf
and e-mail it to: [email protected]. These comments should address
content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorship
The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor
for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).
3. Change Recommendations
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
4. Lessons Learned
The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in DOTMLPF-P. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness
of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the
development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil
(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).
5. Distribution of Publications
E-1
Appendix E
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.
E-2 JP 3-20
GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS
GL-1
Glossary
GL-2 JP 3-20
Glossary
JP joint publication
JS Joint Staff
JSCP Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
OE operational environment
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPSEC operations security
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTERA organize, train, equip, rebuild/build, and advise
PA public affairs
PBR program and budget review
PfP Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PKO peacekeeping operations
PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS)
PN partner nation
PO peace operations
POM program objective memorandum
PPD Presidential policy directive
PR personnel recovery
SA security assistance
SC security cooperation
SCO security cooperation organization
GL-3
Glossary
UN United Nations
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United States Code
USCG United States Coast Guard
USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics
USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USG United States Government
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
GL-4 JP 3-20
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
foreign military sales. That portion of United States security assistance for sales programs
that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an
authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and
services to be provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under
Department of Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also
called FMS. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
partner nation. 1. A nation that the United States works with in a specific situation or
operation. (JP 1) 2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of
Defense conducts security cooperation activities. (JP 3-20) Also called PN.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related
statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and
other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance
of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through
the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense
Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. Also called
SA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
GL-5
Glossary
security force assistance. The Department of Defense activities that support the
development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their
supporting institutions. Also called SFA. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
GL-6 JP 3-20
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-20 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
Initiation
ENHANCED
JOINT JOINT
WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
CAPABILITY PUBLICATION
Approval Development