EN BANC

December 3, 1948

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects

in the 1948 Bar Examinations.

Felixberto M. Serrano for respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the
Philippine Lawyers' Association) as amici curiae.

MONTEMAYOR, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel
J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that
appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the
headline in large letters - "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller
letters - "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name - "By
Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full:

Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of
the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this
morning.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one
subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal
School.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions
on said subject fully one week before the tests.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests
actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this
private university holding proudly around the city.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the
Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of
the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university
possessed of those tests before the examinations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on
the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body
of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions
had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical
schools.

To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr.
Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for
this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the
assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In
this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and
its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of
the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was
promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a
Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the
report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and
examinees who have passed the examinations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he
testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted
that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good
faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information
which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the
information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities
revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence
of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court
which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public
service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme
Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their
charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged
irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the
revelation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate
Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman
of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The
writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on
September 18, 1948, and he made a report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of
the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:

In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter,
issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination
questions, which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as
Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice
Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an
investigation thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the
reporter responsible for and author of said news item. An investigation was conducted
on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo,
and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar
examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and
consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have
given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite the
repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperations, in order to enable
this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination
anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him,
explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he
reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn him
that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court
and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the result.

Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on
October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest
of the State demands and this court requires that he reveal the source of sources of his information
and of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in
general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of
the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who
are appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and
correct the examinations questions and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the
confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar
examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in
investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is determined to
punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of
the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and
evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from
which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under
the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even
involve imprisonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the
consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the
editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at
his request, the investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared,
accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of
his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr.
Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under
oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before
this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the
Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of
which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of
Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:

SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper,

magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source
of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or
committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the
state.

This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does
interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends
that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and
refers only to the security of the state, that is to say - that only when National Security or public
safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news
report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the
conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the Justice is not
unanimous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly
the Senate were it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body
when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the
original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor,
or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to
reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however, under the
chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of section
1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the  public
interest."chanrobles virtual law library

When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the
author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee
- "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said
clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various
Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without
such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be
committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto
amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the
Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may
be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state required that the
names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case of a newspaperman
publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued that if the
immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the
author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was
disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public
interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the
phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much
discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally
approved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases
involving the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last
amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the
state," was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on
and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by
some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by
the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest, "when Senator Cuenco
sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the
State" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and
discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to the
exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the
Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of the two
phrases "public interest" and "interest of the estate," may account for the readiness or lack of
objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the
second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."chanrobles
virtual law library

In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the
theft of the plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what
he meant by "interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not
propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that
the phrase "interest of the state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or
to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, - "security of the state" and "public safety," -
are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The
phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where
it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section
10(2) of the same Constitution provided that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of
habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
Title I, - Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, - Crimes
against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "National Security" was used in section 2,
and the phrase "public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682
creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine
Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of
newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is involved, it
could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public
safety," "National Security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not
do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and
that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the exception
when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and
broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest"
which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for
instance, the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks,
markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the estate" even under a conservative interpretation, may and
does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and nations, not only
a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is
interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of Government like administration of
justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law
or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of
the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of
their functions, etc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under
constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court
takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has
prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed
the subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners
who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and
later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found
to have obtained to passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are
now thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or
occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every
year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court
and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in
academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the
licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways
of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are
known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the
law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular
and usual manner. It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions
obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared
to other professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of
members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions,
attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme
Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys,
and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions.
Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity
is imbued with wide and general interest and national
importance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get
into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof
some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted
to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members
of the legal profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would
not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose
confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court
to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom
he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate
preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded
in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and
then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by
intense study and conscientious preparations, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are
admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be under a
cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had
made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the
hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for
the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that
there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to
obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the
Bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent
lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of
Examiners at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, - one or two or
more of them - that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made
possible the release if they have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the
questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar
Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar
examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court
itself which has to overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion,
as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the
members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All
these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present
case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as it
does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the
entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the
Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and
connections with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents
one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine
Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this
Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as
representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their
integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present
case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates,
including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S.
41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity
of his informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the
publication already mentioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that,
informants, law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly - consisting
of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions - to the Supreme Court for due investigation.
If those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with
expectation of results, the right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a
newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished
or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead
of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination
questions in at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a
certain university, one week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements
and answers during the investigation said that examination questions in several subjects were
involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No
one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they
were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the day
of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the
persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions, although
they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which
the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity
of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these
things.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar Examinations held in August, 1948,
approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for
each subject. There were eight subjects, each belonging to and corresponding to each one of the
eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying
these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two
hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hand of eight different examiners. The
examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said
ownership and identification will not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and graded.
Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had
actually been committed, - evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies
of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects or subjects
involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does not feel capable of or
warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the
7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the
answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from
the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and
conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence.
Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct,
nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of
his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and
cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges contained in
the news items, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or
foundation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of
his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on
which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean
and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for
membership therein and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who
cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting
the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High
Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law.
These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and
punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges
as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of
evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court
did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and
cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly
committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties,
if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to
the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every
examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are
unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the
correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the
examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to
understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the
examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge
and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his
correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees,
especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examinations day, and study and
prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the
examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were
too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade
below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent
Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news
items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his
decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed
contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the
names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted
and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule
64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely
until he complied with the demand. However, considering that case like the present are not common
or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a
heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe
penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave,
and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this
Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a
period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the
revelation demanded of him. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library

Perfecto, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, justify
conclusively the finding of the majority that respondent is guilty of contempt for his stubborn refusal
to obey an order of this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does not protect him. It
would protect him only if we could agree with his theory that the words "interest of the state" used in
the law should be read to mean security of the state or public safety. But there is nothing in the
whole text of Republic Act No. 53 and/or in the intention of those who drafted and enacted it, as can
be gleaned in the Senate journal, or in the grammatical, rhetorical, or philosophical meaning of the
words in question, that can justify the limiting or narrowing of the scope of the ideas that they
embrace within the small circle of public security or safety of the
state.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of ideas and concepts
within the ideas of security or safety occupy a place, however privileged, insignificant in magnitude.
There is no legal basis for us to reduce the purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words, to a
minimum that, if given effect, would virtually amend the law without the benefit of congressional
enactment. Such would be violative of the Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the original bill and the
Senate committee that would limit the privilege up to the point where it runs in conflict with the wide
area of public interest, the opposing sides arrived at a meeting ground in which the line of limitation
was pushed up to the place where the privilege may be in conflict with the interest of the state. No
one is authorized to push that line of limitation still farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the
state. We have to stop at the line of limitation set by Congress. To hurdle it is to transgress the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute privilege or reducing any
limitation to an imaginable minimum, or how much we may sympathize with its failure in the Senate
or in Congress, we are powerless to retrieve that side from its plight. We are not authorized to inject
in the statute a law of our own creation, or make of a legislative failure a success, and thus defeat
the legislative intent. There is no alternative for the losing legislative side except to bide for time and
wait for a more respective mood of Congress.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially if it consists in the
disobedience of a judicial order. The orders of a court demand obedience for their effectiveness.
Administration of justice is impossible with unenforceable judicial orders. The effectiveness of judicial
orders is the elan vital of the administration of justice. To disobey an order of court is a terrible thing
because it means sowing the seeds of anarchy and chaos. The Supreme Court, if it can help it, will
never allow such a thing to obtain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning without an executive
department or without a legislative department. As a matter of fact, in this Republic, Congress
functions only one third of the year. During the remaining two thirds of the year the life of the nation
does not suffer any impairment. It can even be said that during those two thirds of the year there is
more normalcy than during the Congressional session when legislative reforms and the enactment of
new laws cannot but produce some public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis in the
way of life of the people. No one can imagine the possibility of an orderly human society without
some effective system of administration of justice, functioning without long
interruptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial authority to its full measure and
this Supreme Court will never take lightly any disobedience to or defiance of its orders, and it should
mete out to all affected parties the tremendous weight of its power and will punish, without fear or
favor, the guilty parties, regardless of who they may be, in the present case we are constrained to
disagree with the penalty imposed upon respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Respondent is punished under section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have already declared
invalid in our opinion in the Harden case, 81 Phil., 741. The provision of law applicable to respondent
is contained in section 6 of Rule 64, under which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a sum
not exceeding P1,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Considering that there
are mitigating circumstances that attenuate respondent's responsibility, - youthfulness, honest but
wrong belief in the existence of a privilege, absence of substantial harm, - we should not impose
upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that which we imposed in the case of Benito M. Sakdalan, L-
278 1 , the very one which, as can be gleaned from the Senate journal, prompted the enactment of
Republic Act No. 53.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to respondent the discretion to
reduce the imprisonment imposed by the simple process of making the revelation exacted from him.
The penalty should be measured by the responsibility, and that measure cannot be left at the
discretion of the guilty one. His future revelation will not diminish or in any way affect his
responsibility for the offense he has already perpetrated. His past disobedience cannot be attenuated
by a future action. The past cannot be remade. What has been done cannot be undone. These are
verities no one can eloign.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library

PARAS, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper Star Reporter the
story (Claim "Leak" in Last Bar Tests) quoted in full in the decision of the majority, in good faith and
in a spirit of public service, he voluntarily should have revealed the identities of his informants,
thereby enabling this Court, conformably to the alleged demands of denouncing bar examinees, to
"institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annual the
test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the
examinations." If he was in fact motivated by a spirit of public service, he should at least have tried
to secure their consent to the revelation. The point I want to underscore is that newspaper reporters
should be fearless as well in publishing stories as in substantiating their truth. And if I am
constrained to dissent from the ruling of the majority, it is only because the respondent, in my
opinion, cannot legally be compelled to make the revelation, in view of Republic Act No. 53 - which
this Court is bound to enforce - providing that "the publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of
any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the
source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of
Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state." I have no hesitancy in
believing that the phrase "interest of the state," as used in the Act, refers exclusively to matters
affecting the security or safety of the state.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored by Senator Sotto
provided for absolute immunity. The committee on revision of laws, however, inserted an
amendment by adding the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
public interest." Senator Sotto's attempt to suppress this clause failed, after which, in view of the
remarks of the Chairman of the committee presently to be mentioned, Senator Sotto proposed to
change the words "public interest" into "interest of the state," a proposal that was readily accepted.
Hence, the use of the latter phrase in Republic Act No. 53.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Our task now is to discover the meaning and scope of the phrase "interest of the state," as intended
by the lawmakers. In this task, it is important to recall that the original intention of the author of the
bill was to provide for absolute immunity, and this purpose should not of course be unduly defeated
by any subsequent exception, especially when the limited sphere of the change is apparent from the
deliberations of the lawmakers. For instance, in explaining the reason of the committee for opposing
Senator Sotto's advocacy of absolute immunity and of the suppression of the clause "unless the court
finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," added to the original bill, Senator
Cuenco gave the example of a newspaperman who publishes an information regarding theft of plans
of forts and fortifications, in which case Senator Cuenco believed that "el interes publico y el interes
mismo del Estado requieran que se publique el nombre del informante." Again, after proposing the
change of "public interest" to "interest of the state," Senator Sotto, when asked by Senator Garcia as
to the essential difference between the two phrases, explained that "La diferencia esta en que puede
haber un caso de espionaje, como el citado por el Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el
Estado y no se puede discutir al autor, y la frase `public interest' es muy elastica. En cambio, se se
pone `interest of the state,' claramente se entenderia que mediando el interes del Estado, el
periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion." Last but not least, it should be
noted that the Act in question was prompted by the desire of its sponsor to prevent the repetition of
the case of Benito Sakdalan, a reporter who was imprisoned for refusing to reveal the source of the
information contained in a news item admittedly not affecting, like the story published by the
respondent, the security or safety of the State. It logically follows that the phrase "interest of the
state" was intended to be limited to cases portrayed by the examples (theft of plans of forts and
fortifications and espionage), given during the deliberations which solely affect the security or safety
of the state.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is immaterial whether the law did not employ phrases like "public safety," "national Security," or
"public security," or whether "public interest" and "interest of the state" were interchangeably used in
the discussions, as long as in using the phrase "interest of the state" in Act No. 53, the lawmakers
definitely knew and accordingly recorded, by specific examples, what they intended to convey.
Conjectures cannot prevail over the clear legislative intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so as not to frustrate the
main purpose of the law. This would further make the law more consonant with the spirit of the
constitutional provisions that "the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the Court or when public safety and order require otherwise"(Article III,
section 1, paragraph 5), and that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of the press (Article
III, section 1, paragraph 8).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It may not be amiss to add that the refusal of the respondent to disclose the source of his
information does not absolutely prevent this Court from verifying, by any reasonable and feasible
means, the truth of the alleged anomaly; and it is certainly not required, by the mere publication of
the story in question, to admit the accuracy of said story if its investigation should fail because of
lack of evidence or of the refusal of those who know to come out and
testify.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In my opinion, the respondent has not committed any contempt of this

Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Briones, M., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library

Deploro no podeer estar conforme con la decision de la mayoria sobre este incidente. Me preocupa
como al que mas el buen nobmre, el prestigio, la respetabilidad de esta Corte Suprema - baluarte
inexpugnable de las libertades y fueros civiles - pero hay algo que me preocupa mas y esla
substancia misma de esas libertades y fueros. En realidad, en tanto la Corte Suprema crece y se
agiganta en el concepto publico en cuanto ella se mantiene enhiesta en la cima de la cumbre donde
la coloca su categoria y constituye la ultima esperanza del ciudadano cuando en su derredor todo
parece crujir y requebrajarse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
El recurrido, Angel Parazo, es reportero del periodico diario "The Star Reporter" que se edita en
Manila. A raiz de los ultimos examenes de abogacia, publico un articulo informativo en el que se
decia que algunos examinandos habian visto copias de algunos cuestionarios antes de la celebracion
de los examenes y que dichas copias fueron utilizadas por los examinandos procedentes de cierta
universidad privada. El Magistrado encargado de los examenes emplazo al recurrido para que
explicase la noticia y diese los nombres de sus informantes a fin de poder investigarles
minuciosamente y ver la manera de adoptar las medidas que fueran procedentes. El recurrido
comparecio, pero se nego en absoluto a revelar el origen de su informacion. De ahi el presente
expediente por desacato.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

La controversia gira en torno a la interpretacion del articulo 1 de la Ley de la Republica No. 53,
aprobada por el Congreso en su ultimo periodo de sesiones. Dicho articulo se lee como sigue:

El publicista, editor o reportero debidamente acreditado de cualquier periodico, revista

o publicacion periodica de circulacion general, no puede ser compelido a revelar el
origen de cualquier noticia o informacion que le haya sido transmitida en confianza y
que haya aparecido en dicho periodico, revista o publicacion, a menos que el tribunal o
una camara del Congreso o un comite del mismo halley y determine que el interes del
Estado requiere que se haga tal revelacion.

Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial de las motivaciones de esta ley como tema de historia
contemporanea. Hace dos años un juez del Tribunal del Pueblo (People's Court) lanzo publicamente
algunos ataques contra esta Corte. Un periodista, Benito Sakdalan, se hizo eco de dichos ataques
publicando bajo su firma y responsabilidad un articulo informativo acerca del particular. A instancia
de parte, un Magistrado de esta Corte mando emplazar a Sakdalan para una investigacion del
incidente. Sakdalan comparecio, pero cuando se le pregunto de quien habia recibido su informacion,
negose en absoluto a hacer la revelacion exigid. El Magistrado de referencia ordeno entonces que se
le detuviera a Sakdalan en la escribania de esta Corte por dos dias, en castigo por lo que se creyo un
desacato.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

El caso Sakdalan causo un revuelo tremendo en la prensa, despertando entre sus camaradas una
general simpatia perfectamente explicable. Sakdalan se convirtio en heroe del dia, por lo menos en
las columnas de los periodicos. El tono predominante de los comentarios periodisticos era que
Sakdalan estaba justificado en su negativa,que el sagrado de la conciencia del periodista debia ser
respetado, y que la orden de detencion constituia una violacionde la libertad de la prensa. El revuelo
repercutio en los circulos legislativos, culminando en las aprobacion de la Ley de la Republica No. 53
que nos ocupa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Resulta importante y util destacar este fondo historico, pues por ello se explican ciertas
caracteristicas del proyecto de ley original presentado en el Senado. Una de las mas salientes, por
ejemplo, era lo absoluto del privilegio: no se proveia ninguna excepcion, ninguna salvedad, no
pudiendose obligar al periodista a revelar el origen de su informacion bajo ninguna
circunstancia.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

La medida tiene antecedentes bien conocidos en nuestra misma legislacion. Primeramente en el

antiguo Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, y ahora en el Reglamento de los Tribunales, figuran ciertas
disposiciones que restringen la libertad para testificar o el derecho de examinar a ciertos testigos
sobre determinadas materias. Verbigracia, en nuestra ley sobre pruebas y evidencias, regla 123,
seccion 26, se provee lo siguiente:

 chanrobles virtual law library

(e) El abogado no puede, sin el consentimiento de su cliente, ser examinado respecto a

una conversacion que tuvo con este, o acerca de algun consejo que le diera como tal, ni
tampoco el secretario,taquigrafo o empleado de un abogado, sin el consentimiento del
cliente y del abogado, pueden ser examinados respecto a un hecho cuyo conocimiento
hayan adquirido en el desempeño de sus deberes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

(f) A ninguna persona debidemante autorizada para ejercer la medicina, la cirugia o la

obstetricia, se obligara en alguna causa civil, a revelar, sin el consentimento del
paciente, cualquier informe que dicha persona haya adquirido al sistir al paciente con
caracter profesional, que necesariamente hubo de adquirir para poder obrar con tal
caracter, y que tienda a denigrar la dignidad del
paciente.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
 (g) El clerigo o sacerdote no puede ser examinado sin el consentimiento de su
penitente, respecto a la confesion que le haya hehco este, en su caracter sacerdotal, y
en cumplimiento de los deberes que le impone la religion a que
pertenece.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(h) El funcionario publico no puede ser examinado mientras este en el ejercicio de su

cargo, o despues, respecto a lo que se le hubiese comunicado en confidencia oficial,
cuando el tribunal determine que el interes poublico se perjudicara con la revelacion.

Es indudable que la medida coloca al periodista en la categoria de estas exenciones especialisimas,

situandole al nivel del sacerdote, del abogado y del medico. El Senador Cuenco, ponente del proyecto
de ley al ponerse a discusion, dijo en parte lo que sigue a modo de explicacion de sus elevados fines:

El proyecto de ley que esta ahora bajo la consideracion de esta Camara tiene por objeto
eximir al director, redactor o reporter de un periodico, de la obligacion de revelar el
nombre de la persona de quien haya obtenido una informacion, a menos que el interes
del Estado asi lo requiera. La legislacion que se trata de dictar ne es del todo nueva.
Nuestra ley procesal considera como privilegiada y digna de ser mantenida en secreto
toda communicacion recibida por el sacerdote, el abogado y el medico en el ejercicio de
su ministerio o profesion. El proyecto no solo dignifica y eleva la profesion periodistica,
sino que da facilidades a los periodicos para obtener noticias. (El subrayado es
nuestro.)chanrobles virtual law library

El periodismo, mas que un medio para obtener bienes materiales, es un apostolado, un

sacerdocio. El periodista no es un mercachifle, sino una persona llamada a cumplir una
mision elevada, sublime, augusta. La hoja periodica es catedra. De ella irradia la luz
que difunde la cultura, la instruccion, los principios eticos y morales, las reglas de una
ciudadania honrada y patriotica. (Diario de sesiiones del Senado, Julio 9, 1946.)

Elevar y ennoblecer la profesion del periodista y dar facilidades a los periodicos para obtener una
informacion honrada, veridica, imparcial y constructiva - cometido essencial de una buena prensa,
digna del apelativo de cuarto poder del Estado - tal es el objeto fundamental de la medida, en franse
definidora del Senador Cuenco, ponente de la misma y chairman del comite de revision de leyes del
Senado. Es importante destacar esta motivacion legislativa, pues ello nos ayuda, al interpretar la ley,
a determinar si el privilegio debe ser entendido rigidamente en contra o liberalmente en pro del
periodista. Estimo que la indicada exposicion de motivos justifica, mas aun, requiere una
interpretacion liberal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Como queda dicho, en el proyecto de ley original presentado por el Senador Sotto el privilegio se
establecia de una manera absoluta, incondicional. Sin embargo, el comite de revision de leyes del
Senado al cual se habia endosado el bill, lo informo con una enmienda, añadiendo al final del articulo
1 transcrito arriba las siguientes palabras: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded
by the public interest." * Al discutirse, sin embargo, el proyecto en pleno Senado, Sotto formulo una
enmienda mediante la supresion de la salvedad insertada por el comite, tratando asi de restaurar la
fraseologia original del proyecto. Cuenco, en su caracter de ponente y chairman del comite de
revision de leyes, se opuso a la enmienda Sotto por supresion y siguio un debate bastante extenso.
Sotto dijo enfaticamente que "esas palabras deben suprimirse porque matan el objeto del proyecto
de ley. Si, como ha dicho el sesudo presidente del comite de revision de leyes, el pretende colocar al
periodista en el mismo nivel del sacerdote, tengamos en cuenta que en el caso de este no hay esa
excepcion."chanrobles virtual law library

Cuenco, cerrando el debate, hizo las siguientas manifestaciones en contra de la enmienda Sotto:

El Sen. CUENCO. Señor Presidente, como ya he manifestado el Comite siente no poder

aceptar la enmienda, porque puede haber casos, quiza muy contados, en que el interes
publico y el interesmismo del Estado requieran que se publique el nombre del
informante. Supongamos que un periodista publicara una informacion referente al hurto
o sustraccion de unos planos de fortalezas o de un sitio importante de defensa. Si la
inmunidad que se otorga al periodista fuese absoluta, como la que se propone en la
enmienda, el autor de la sustraccion pordria quedar
impune.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Señor Presidente: he sido periodista por espacio de veinticinco años y me honro en

serlo, antes que abogado, antes que legislador, pero, por lo mismo que tengo un
concepto elevado de la profesion no quisiera que se diese el caso de que una traicion al
 estado quedase impune: que nosotros llevasemos a extremos exagerados la proteccion
que se da al periodista.

Puesta a votacion la enmienda, fue rechazada, votanda a favor 3 y en contra

7.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Sotto, sin embargo, no se dio por enteramente derrotado. Esforzandose por sacar avante su proyecto
de ley con la menor cortapisa posible para la lilbertad de la prensa, propuso otra enmienda en el
sentido de sustituir las palabras "public interest" con "interest of the State," de tal suerte que la
salvedad se leyera como sigue: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the
interest of the State." * Ya no hubo debate sobre esta enmienda: el mismo comite la acepto, por
boca de su chairman el Senador Cuenco. Puesto a votacion, la misma se aprobo por unanimidad. Sin
embargo, antes de la votacion, el Senador Garcia pregunto que diferencia esencial habia entre las
frases "public interest" e "interest of the State". Sotto contesto que "la diferencia esta en que puede
haber uncaso de espionaje como el citado por el Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el
Estado y no se puede descubrir al autor," mientras que, por otro lado, la frase "public interest" es
muy elastica." "En cambio - continuo Sotto - si se pone "interest of the State", claramente se
entenderia que mediando el interes del Estado, el periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su
informacion." (Diario de Sesiones del Senado, supra.)chanrobles virtual law library

De lo expuesto resulta evidente que la sustitucion de la frase "public interest" por la de "interest of
the State"no fue simplemente casual e inimportante, sino que fue harto deliberada, hecha con el
proposito de restringir el alcance de la salvedad. Se dijo que la frase "public interest"es muy elastico
y el Senado, en pleno, acepto este pronunciamiento. Asi que se puso "interest of the State" para
denotar que solo se podria obligar al periodista a descurbirir, como testigo, la fuente de su
informacion cuando el Estado estuviese vitalmente interesado en la materia; es decir, cuando
estuviese envuelta la seguridad del Estado, de la Nacion, conceptos que en este caso se confundirian.
En ejemplo del espionaje citado por el Senador Cuenco, abona esta interpretacion. "Interes del
Estado" tiene aqui un significado particularisimo, repelente de otros casos extraños a la seguridad
nacional: ese significado no puedeser mas que el interes del Estado en su propia viad, en su propia
seguridad. No cabe extender el alcance de la frase a otros casos en que el Estado pudiera estar mas
o menos interesado, porque si la intencion del Congreso fuera esa, la frase "public interest" seria mas
que suficiente, pues la misma cubre y comprende todos los matices publicos desde la seguridad del
Estado y de la Nacion hasta el ultimo asunto en que el publico tuviera interes hasta cierto punto. Esta
forma de interpretar es tanto mas logica, obligada, cuanto que los legisladores aceptaron y
aprobaron unanimemente el pronunciamiento de que la frase "public interest" era muy elastica,
cubria demasiado. Por tanto, hay que concluir que cuando adoptaron la frase sustitutiva "interest of
the State," la adoptaron para limitar, para restringir la salved, reduciendola solamente a algunos
casos, muy contados, segun expresion del Senador Cuenco. "Que casos son estos" Entiendo que
deben ser congeneres, es decir, del mismo tipo que el caso de espionaje citado; es decir, casos que
afecten vitalmente a la seguridad del Estado, de la Nacion. Verbigracia: una conspiracion para
derrocar violentamente nuestra forma de gobierno y establecer en su lugar una dictadura comunista
totalitaria al estilo sovietico, seria uno de esos muy contados de que habla el Senador ponente. No
cabe aplicar, extender la frase a casos de otra especie, de otro genero, porque ese equivaldria a
establecer un "standard," una norma de interpretacion arbitraria, hasta caprichosa, como mas
adelante voy a demostrar, apreciando que el interes del Estado esta entrañado en algunos asuntos y
matices de caracter publico y excluyendolo, sin embargo, de otros, yen esto sin mas guia y norma
que la opinion harto debatible del juez o tribunal sentenciador sobre lo que es digno de ser
catalogado bajo la frase "interes del Estado" y sobre lo que no lo
es.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Resulta evidente, de lo dicho, que no es exacto y carece de fundamento lo que en la decision de la

mayoria se afirma, a saber: que las frases "public interest" o "interest of the State" se entendieron y
usaron indistintamente por los Senadores. Por el contrario, el Diario de Sesiones del Senado
demuestra de un modo inequivoco que los Senadores sabian muy bien lo que hacian al cambiar una
frasse por otra y se daban perfecta cuenta de que el cambio no era simplemente gramatical o
lexicografico, sino qu entrañaba una considerable diferencia en cuanto al significado y alcance de la
salvedad o excepcion. Sabian muy bien quela frase "public interest" es muy  elastica, al decir del
Senador Sotto, y que desde luego tiene un marco mucho mas amplio que la frase "interest of the
State." La presuncion es que los legisladores toman muy en serio la tarea de legislar y que cuando
cambian una frase por otra lo hacen no por simple capricho, sino con verdadera deliberacion. La
tarea legislativa no es un juego de niños. Pero que mejor prueba de la diferencia entre ambos
conceptos que la misma admision de la mayoria en su decisional decir que "interest of the State" is
not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything though of
minor importance but affecting the public" 1 ...?chanrobles virtual law library
La endoblez de la teoria de la mayoria salta a la vista si se examinan sus implicaciones y
consecuencias. Por que decide la mayoria que en el presente caso se halla envuelto el interes del
Estado y que, por tanto, el recurrido esta obligado a revealr la fuente de su informacion y si no lo
hace incurre en desacato, punible con prision? Por varias razones que se exponen en la decision,
entre las cuales se destacan las siguientes: (a) los examenes de abogados estan colocados bajo la
alta supervision de esta Corte Suprema, cuyo prestigio, buen nombre y respectabilidad es de
supremo interes del Estado el conservar y mantener; (b) miles de abogados se hallan esparcidos por
el pais ejerciendo su noble profesion, y centenares si no miles se anaden cada año a esa vasta
legion; asi que la Corte Suprema y esta enorme masa de letrados estanvitalmente interesados en
elevar el "standard" profesional, procurando que entren solo los idoneos, moral e intelectualmente, y
este interes cae tambien bajo la catagoria de "interes del Estado"; (c) acaso por natural inclinacion,
la abogacia es la profesion mas popular en Filipinas; de ahi la abundancia de colegios y escuelas de
derecho en donde estudian miles de jovenes de ambos sexos aspirando a ponerse la toa de Marco
Tulio; de ahi naturalmente tambien el interes del Estado en que esa profesion tan popularno caiga en
descredito, cosa que ocurriria facilmente si los examenes de abogados no se efectuasen propia y
honradamente como una prueba rigida de la capacidad y caracter de los examinandos, circulando
previamente cuestionarios de "contrabando" tal como se ha denunciado en el articulo informativo que
nos ocupa; (d) entre los abogados se escoge el personal para la judicatura y la administracion de
justicia - magistrados, jueces de primera instancia, fiscales, jueces de paz y letrados en las
diferentes oficinas y agencias del gobierno; de ahi que sea naturalmente tambien interes del Estado
el conservar la integridad y buen nombre de una profesion que proporciona al gobierno y a la nacion
tan valiosos servidores y elementos; (e) en la pureza de los examenes de abogados esta envuelto no
solo el buen nombre de la Corte Suprema como queda dicho, sino tambien el buen nombre de la
junta examinadora y de los empleados de la Corte que intervienen y vigilan dichos examenes; asi
que todo cargo de venalidad y corrupcion tiene que afectar a dicho buen nombre y proyectar una
sombra de sospecha sobre el mismo; de ahi que sea interes del Estado el que se investiguen
implacablemente los cargos para depurar los hechos y hallar la verdad castigando a los culpables si
los hay, y purificando de tal manera los examenes, pero si, por otro lado, los cargos resultaren
falsos, reivindicando el buen nombre de los afectados; (f) en resumen, de lo dicho se sigue que los
examenes de abogados tienen importancia nacional y, por tanto, cualesquier cargos de venalidad,
corrupcion e irregularidad tienen tambien importancia nacional y es interes del Estado el que se
investiguen hasta el limite maximo de las posibilidades legales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

En ultimo analisis, se puede decir que la mayoria estima envuelto en el presente caso el "interes del
Estado, "primero, porque se trata de la profesion de abogado - profesion de noble y vasta
significacion social, juridica y politica - y, segundo, porque tratandose de acusaciones referentes a los
examenes de abogados cuya supervision corresponde a esta Corte Suprema, el buen nombre, el
prestigio y la respetabilidad de este alto tribunal estan necesariamente afectados. Veamos ahora si la
tesis puede resistir a un examen rigido, objetivo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

No sere yo quien discuta o ponga en tela de juicio la prestancia, el elevado rango de la profesion de
abogado a la cual me honro en pertenecer. Pero que hay de las otras profesiones? Son ellas menos
dignas de merecer el supremo interes del Estado? Durante las deliberaciones sobre el presente
asunto tuve ocasion de formular estas preguntas y otras semejantes. Recuerdo que inclusive cite
casos especificos preguntando, por ejemplo, si en los examenes de medicos, farmaceuticos,
ingenieros, dentistas y nurses, no podira tambien considerarse envuelto el interes del Estado si al
igual que en este asunto se formulasen graves cargos de irregularidad, corrupcion y venalidad.
Respecto al caso de los medicos no obtuve una contestacion categorica, definitiva; pero con relacion
a las otras profesiones, la respuesta fue decididamente negativa; respecto a ellas, no cabria invovar
el interes del Estado - su rango, su significacion social no justificarian tal invocacion. Ahora veo que
en la decision de la mayoria el ejercicio de la medicina se incluyo entre los "casos y materias de
importancia nacional, en los cuales el Estado o la nacion entera, y no solo un ramo o instrumento del
mismo como una provincia, una ciudad o una pueblo, o una parte del publico, esta interesado o
podrina quedar afectado." Asique, a juicio de la mayoria, el ejercicio de la medicina es al parecer de
indole tan nacional y tan importante como "interes del Estado"; al paso que las otras profesiones y
vocaciones quedan definitivamente excluidas del coto
privilegiado.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Los farmeceuticos, sin embargo, podrian naturalmente formular las siguientes preguntas: Por que se
va a postergar nuestra honrada y benemerita profesion? no nos cuesta tanto tiempo y tantos
esfuerzos, si no mas, hacer la carrera que el abogado, verbigracia? no prestamos acaso a la
sociedad, a la humanidad, un servicio tan util, tan indispensable y tan importante como el de
cualquier otro profesional? no somos quienes preparamaos con infinito ciudado las drogas y
medicamentos que prescribe y receta el medico? no esta en nuestras manos la salud, la vida, e
incluso la muerte de los ciudadanos, de los hombres? por que, pues, se va a sentenciar que el interes
del Estado no esta vinculado en nuestra profesion?chanrobles virtual law library

Por su parte, los ingeniereos de todas clases - civiles, industriales, quimicos, mecanicos, navales,
mineros, etc. - podrian hacer estas embarazosas preguntas: "Por que todos los mimos y caricias van
a ser para los abogados? nada mas que porque la mayor parte del tiempo nos ponemos la humilde
blusa del obrero y estamos casi siempre sucios -- la suciedad inherente al sudor y mugre del trabajo?
no construimos acaso los caminos, los puentes, los sistemas de aquas, los sistemas de regadio, los
hermosos y enormes edificios particulares y publicos, las ingentes fabricas, en una palabra, todo eso
que constituye la maravillade los presentes tiempos, traduciendo en realidad tangible lo que no
parecia ser mas que loca fantasia de la imaginacion de los poetas? no hemos acaso conquistado el
secreto divino de los atomos, desencadenando, es verdad, las fuerzas ciegas de la destruccion sobre
el mundo, pero tambien abriendo para el genero humano vastos panoramas y perspectivas de
progreso y bienestar casi ilimitado? Se dice que la abogacia es la carrera mas popular y mas
codiciada en Filipinas, pero no existe el peligro de que esta popularidad se este fomentando
insensatamente a expensas de la vitalidad de la nacion? nose cree acaso llegado el momento de que
los caudillos y directores del pensamiento en este pais emprendan una seria cruzada para orientar las
aficiones y energias de nuestra juventud hacia carreras mas practicas y mas constructivas no solo
para ellos particularmente, sino sobre todo para la nacion? por que se va a consagrar precisamente
con una sentencia judicial - nada menos que del mas alto tribunal - la supremacia de la profesion de
abogado en este pais, en desdoro de las otras profesiones, por que?"chanrobles virtual law library

Y asi, por el estilo, las otras profesiones podrian reclamar y pretender con jusiticia que tienen tanta
categoria como los abogados para que se considere aplicable a ellas el concepto juridico "interes del
Estado" de que habla la ley de la Republica No. 53 que nos ocupa. Y si esto fuese asi, esto es, se
estimase envuelto el "interes del Estado" en casi todas las materias, verbigracia, hasta en los
examenes de nurses, al punto de que interes del Estado equivaldria practicamente a interes publico
que quedaria entonces del privilegio concedido por dicha ley a la prensa? no seria mas bien una letra
muerta, como predijo el Senador Sotto al pedir la supresion de la salvedad o excepcion? chanrobles
virtual law library

Se dice, con cierto enfasis, que la profesion de abogado tiene una calidad excepcional, un rango
privilegiado, porque de ella se escogen y nombran los magistrados, los jueces de primera instancia,
los jueces de paz y los fiscales, en una palabra, el personal basico de la administracion de justicia. Se
ha insinuado inclusive que de esa profesion surgen regularmente los lideres politicos y sociales de las
naciones y pueblos. Comencemos por esto ultimo. Tienen los abogados la exclusiva del liderato
publicos y social del mundo? Esto lo diria un panegirista de la profesion en un discurso de fin de
curso de un colegio de leyes, pero la historia nos dice que el liderato no ha sido nunca cuestion
profesional, sino que el lider ha surgido como un precipitado individual o social independientemente
de las profesiones y oficios. Ha habido y hay en el mundo muchos caudillos no abogados y, por
cierto, los mejores no siemprehan sido siempre los de esta clase. Es verad que hubo un Lincoln -
abogado - uno de los caudillos mas sobresalientes que la democraica produjera en el mundo; pero
tembien hubo un Washington - agrimensor - padre de la nacion que produjo a Lincoln. Y el caso de
Filipinas es todavia mas tipico como demostracion de las tesis de que el cuadillaje no es cuestion
profesional. Como todo el mundo sabe, nuestros dos mas grandes caudillos en el pasado no eran
abogados; Rizal era medico; y Bonifacio, el llamado padre de la democracia filipina, no solo no era
profesional, sino que apenas era nada, academicamente hablando - era un simple bodeguero, un
verdadero plebeyo. Sin embargo, esto no le impidio, mientras fraguaba el acero candente del
Katipunan, empaparse en las gestas de la revolucion francesa leyendo a Thiers en español. (Cuantos
de nuestros abogados - dicho sea entre parentesis - sobre todo de la epoca de Bonifacio, habran
leido, o siquiera visto el forro, de la Revolucion Francesa de Thiers?)chanrobles virtual law library

Es verdad que el personal basico de la administracion de justicia esta compuesto de abogados, pero
en la misma decision de la mayoria se reconoce que la administracion de justicia es solo una de las
principales funciones del gobierno y a renglon seguido se apunta el sistema de enseñanza
publica (public school system) como otra funcion de importancia nacional. Entonces cabe preguntar:
porque no se va a considerar tambien envuelto el "interes del Estado" en los examenes de maestros,
sobre todo si sonde servicio civil? No solo los maestros constituyen la base de nuestro sistema de
enseñanza publica, sino que incluso tienen mas envergadura nacional porque se cuentan por miles,
formando la clase mas numerosa de nuestros servidores publicos. Sin embargo, en opinion de la
mayoria los maestros no tienen suficiente calibre como los abogados para que se extienda aplicable a
ellos la frase "interes del Estado" usada en la referida ley de Republica No. 53. Este no es mas que
uno de los absurdos a que conduce la arbitrariedad de la norma adoptada por la mayoria en su
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Analizare ahora el argumento aquiles de la mayoria. Se dice que el interes del Estado se halla
envuelto en el presente caso porque de por medio anda el prestigio, el buen nombre de esta Corte
Suprema en virtud de las facultades de alta supervision que ejerce sobre los examenes de abogados.
El que escribe estas lineas no cede a nadie en su celo por mantener incolume el prestigio de esta
Corte; pero, al propio tiempo, no puede cerrar los ojos a la realidad, a saber: que no somos mas que
uno de los tres poderes del Estado; que estos poderes son iquales y ninguno de ellos tiene mas
prestigio que el otro. Los examenes de abogados no tienen mas importancia y envergadura nacional
porque los supervisamos que, por ejemplo, los examenes de ingenieros y farmeceuticos, cuyas
juntas examinandoras son nombradas por el poder ejecutivo y son responsables ante el mismo. El
poder ejecutivotiene tanto derecho como esta Corte para velar por su prestigio y buen nombre. Si,
como al parecer admite la mayoria, el interes del Estado no se extiende a los examenes de
ingenieros y farmaceuticos por no ser materia de suficiente monta nacional, luego tampoco debe
extenderse a los examenes de abogados tan solo porque la Corte Suprema tiene intima relacion con
estos en virtud de sus facultades de supervision, pues, como queda dicho, ningun poder es mas
prestigioso que el otro - desde luego esta Corte no puede pretender se mas que los otros poderes del
Estado.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Puede aducirse, por analogia, otro buen argumento en favor de la tesis de esta disidencia. Una de las
garantias constitucionales es la inviolabilidad del secreto del la comunicacion y correspondencia,
excepto cuando la seguridad publica y el orden requieran otra cosa y mediante una orden legal del
tribunal. (Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo III, seccion 5, bill de derechos.) Es verdad que la
constitucion habla de seguridad publica, mientras que la ley de la Republica No. 53 habla de interes
del Estado, pero la letra aqui no es lo importante, sino la identidad del fondo, de la substancia del
privilegio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Se ha insinuado que si se permitiera al periodista ocultar la fuente de su informacion tratandose de

asuntos publicos de reconocida seriedad, ello fomentaria la intriga y la cobardia entre los ciudadanos,
sancionando la abyectada anonimidad, aquello de "tirar la piedra escondiendo la mano." El
argumento tiene cierta fuerza, pero es de dobrel filo. Si se admite la falta o flojedad del valor civico
entre los ciudadanos "que de malo hay en que, mientras se fomente y fortalezca esa virtud con la
educacion de las masas y los habitos de una ciudadania militante, se deje a la prensa cierta latitud y
cierta libertad para sacar el mejor partido posible de la anonimidad informativa en sus campañas
contra la corrupcion, los abusos y las anomalias? Con esto se lograria, por lo menos, que la prensa
cumpliese y realizase su cometido social concierta efecacia descorriendo parte del velo, y dejando
que el Estado, con sus agencias de investigacion del crimen y de los chanchullos, haga el resto. Por
ejemplo, en el presente caso: por quela Corte Suprema va a insistir en actuar como se fueseuna
agencia policiaca? por que va a tratar al periodista como se este fuese un detective, obligandole a
revelar todos sus datos, incluso los nombres de sus informantes? Nos quejamos de nuestra
impotencia ante al silencio contumaz del recurrido: por que no entregar el caso a la National Bureau
of Investigation - la famosa NBI cuya eficiencia todos reconocen - y dejar que la misma sea guien se
entienda con el recurrido y maneje la informacion de estecon la tecnica y medios de que dispone
para sus investigaciones?chanrobles virtual law library

En realidad, el periodista ya rinde un buen serviciocuando denuncia un anomalia si bien reservandose

el nombre de su informante. Por que castigarle si insiste en conservar su secreto, excepto cuando
medie la seguridad del Estado y de la Nacion, unica salvedad que establece la ley? Esta bien que no
se le premie o aplauda por el bien que hace, pero castigarle? Es el colmo! chanrobles virtual law
library

Es que, se dira, el periodista puede obrar de mal fe denunciando unas anomalias imaginarias y
provocando conello un tremendo escandalo con todos los daños y perjuicios que de ello pueden
seguirse para el buen nombre y la reputacion de las personas y de las instituciones. Es verdad. No se
puede negar que hay bribones en la prensa - esos que en otras ocasiones he llamado "tuisanes de la
pluma," peores a veces que los salteadores de caminos. Tampoco se puede negar que hay lo que se
llama prensa amarilla, dedicada a cultivar el sensacionalismo malsano y morboso. Pero el remedio
contra esto no es la ley de la Republica No. 53 que nos ocupa; existen otros remedios, unos en el
codigo penal; otros, en la misma ley de desacato; y otros, en el desprecio, repulsa y hostilidad de la
misma opinion publica, ya que, despues de todo, la prensa no puede vivir sino del favor publico. Poco
despues de la liberacion un periodista publico un articulo virulento denunciando supuestas anomalias
o irrigularidades en relacion con los examenes de abogados celebrados durente la ocupacion
japonesa. Se le emplazo para que probase sus cargos. No los probo: era evidente la mala fe. Le
castigamos por desacato y si no se le impuso una pena mas severa fue porque canto la palinodia
retractandose. (Vease In re Francisco Brillantes, por desacato.)chanrobles virtual law library

La Ley de la Republica No. 53 es una medida liberal, progresiva, concebida y promulgada par
capacitar la prensa a realizar su transcendental cometido del mejor modo posible. La prensa es una
de las mas preciosas conquistas y posesiones de nuestra civilizacion. Se puede prescindir de algunas
cosas - jamas de una prensa libre, veraz, eficiente. Sin este formidable implemento social, la
democracia no se puede concebir. Por tanto, la ley debiera interpretarse libremente, hasta el maximo
grado de liberalidad, compatible con la vida y seguridad del
Estado.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

El caso Sakdalan, que se origino en esta Corte, fue la causa ocasional que determino la aprobacion
de esa ley. Es, en verdad, una deplorable coincidencia que el caso Sakdalan se repita en esta misma
Corte con el presente caso de Parazo, y en peores terminos y circunstancias, pues mientrs a
Sakdalan se le tuvo arrestado por solamente dos dias, a Parazo se le va a encarcelar ahora por un
mes. Mucho me temo que esta decision enturbie una ejecutoria tan preclara de liberalismo como la
que abrillanta nuestra jurisprudencia en materias sobre libertad de
imprenta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Voto en favor de la exoneracion de recurrido.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22979             June 26, 1967

RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
ZOILO R. FERRER, ET AL., respondents.
IN RE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, MANUEL G.
MONTECILLO, ENRIQUE M. BELO, OSCAR R. ONGSIAKO, and JOSE S. ARMONIO, members of the
Philippine Bar.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioners.

Jose T. Valmonte for respondents.

RESOLUTION

SANCHEZ, J.:

Contempt proceedings. The following from the motion to reconsider the decision herein, filed by counsel for
petitioners —

One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to whether or not a
particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the tendency of this Honorable
Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand
or contract through its decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This error is manifested
by the decisions of this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in this
Honorable Court's decision in the instant case. As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .

It may also be mentioned in passing that this Honorable Court contravened Rule 2, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
when it applied the so-called "rule against splitting of jurisdiction" in its Decision in the present case. As applied by
this Honorable Court, the rule means that when an employee files with the Court of Industrial Relations numerous
claims relative to his employment but only one [of] which is cognizable by said court under the law, while the others
pertain to other tribunals, that court has authority to entertain all the claims to avoid multiplicity, of suits. . . . .

drew from the Court an order directing counsel to show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of
court.

In respondent attorneys' verified return, they offered "their most sincere apologies for the language used" and stated
that "[i]t was not and it has never been their intention to be disrespectful." They manifested that the language "was
the result of overenthusiasm on the part of Atty. [Jose S.] Armonio, who thought best to focus the attention of this
Honorable Court to the issue in the case, as not in any way meant to slight or offend this Honorable Court. They
also said that the unfortunate Motion for Reconsideration was prepared and filed by Atty. Armonio who had been
personally handling the case since its inception at the Court of Industrial Relations, and who had, perhaps, become
too emotionally involved in the case."

Respondent members of the law firm, namely, Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G.
Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako assumed "full responsibility" for what appears in the motion for
reconsideration. They submitted, not as an excuse, but as fact, that not one of the partners was able to pass upon
the draft or final form of the said motion, and that Atty. Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed and filed the motion
"without clearing it with any of the partners of the firm." The return winds up with an expression of deep regret about
the incident, coupled with an earnest pledge that it "shall never happen again."

Subsequent to the return, respondent attorneys appeared in court. Attys. Ponce Enrile and Armonio were orally
heard.1äwphï1.ñët

1. As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has  repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency
of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge
that the decisions of this Court blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making "any reference to and
analysis of" the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that
this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to
the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements
of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from
the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and — some former
members — of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm when counsel
labelled as "so-called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction." 1

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse
for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out
one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is
the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts
"can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold." 2

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.

2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in
varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this
Court or the lower courts. 3 Resort by an attorney — in a motion for reconsideration — to words which may drag this
Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call
the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the
force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous."  4 It is in this
context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the
issue in the case" does not give him in bridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various
methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle
does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.

To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and encouraging discontent
which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark
called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief."  5 Stability of judicial institutions
suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.

The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea
when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue,
if channelled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due
regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government.  6

We are not unmindful of counsel's statement that the language used "was not in any way meant to slight or offend"
this Court. Want of intention, we feel constrained to say, is no excuse for the language employed. For, counsel
cannot escape responsibility "by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them
as meaning." 7 At best, it extenuates liability.

3. We now turn to the partners of the law firm. They explained that not one of them cleared the motion in which the
questionable portion appears. Their reason is that they were not in the office at the time said motion was filed —
which was the last day. They added that "it is the policy of the firm known to all its members and associates that
only the partners can sign court pleadings except in rare cases where, for want of time or due to unexpected
circumstances, an associate has to sign the same." We understood Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile to have said in open
court that in his long years of practice, he knows that it serves no useful purpose to downgrade the dignity of the
Court. We may overlook the shortcomings of the members of the law firm; except that, as we see it, partners are
duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the
name of their law firm. Seemingly, such control was absent here.

In the end, we admonish Atty. Jose S. Antonio, with the warning that repetition of this incident will be dealt with
accordingly. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his record.

Attention of Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and
Oscar R. Ongsiako is invited to the necessity of exercising adequete supervision and control of the pleadings and
other documents submitted by their law firm to the courts of justice of this country.

So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 7253, February 18, 2020 ]

ATTY. PLARIDEL C. NAVA II, COMPLAINANT, VS ATTY. OFELIA M. D. ARTUZ,* RESPONDENT.

[A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 07-1911-MTJ)]

ATTY. PLARIDEL C. NAVA II, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE OFELIA M. D. ARTUZ, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
IN CITIES, BRANCH 5, ILOILO CITY, ILOILO, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution are two (2) administrative cases for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ofelia M. D.
Artuz (respondent), namely: (a) A.C. No. 7253 filed by complainant Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II (Atty. Nava II) for
respondent's acts of allegedly willfully and viciously maligning, insulting, and scorning him and his father, in a case;
and (b) A.M No. MTJ-08-1717 where the Court dismissed her from the service as a judge, and thereafter, directed
her to show cause why she should not be disbarred for the same acts which caused her dismissal.

The Facts

Sometime in 2006, Atty. Nava II filed a Petition for Disbarment 1 against respondent for violation of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and for Grave Misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 6713,
docketed as A.C. No. 7253. He claimed that on July 28, 2005, he filed a Request for Inhibition and Re-Raffle 2 of his
client's case before the City Prosecutor's Office on the ground that he and respondent, then a Prosecutor, are not in
good terms as they are adversaries in various administrative and criminal cases. In her comment 3 to his request,
however, she willfully and viciously maligned, insulted, and scorned him and his father, who is not a party to the
case. Further, Atty. Nava II alleged that respondent: (1) falsely and maliciously imputed a crime against him; (2)
maliciously filed criminal cases against him, along with others, before the Department of Justice (DOJ), intended
clearly to harass, annoy, vex, and humiliate them; and (3) maligned her former superior and colleague, City
Prosecutor Efrain V. Baldago. 4

During the pendency of A.C. No. 7253, respondent was appointed and subsequently took her Oath of Office as
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Iloilo City on October 9, 2006, 5

notwithstanding Atty. Nava II's written opposition 6 thereto. Thus, Atty. Nava II filed a complaint-petition 7 docketed
as A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, seeking to nullify respondent's nomination and appointment as judge. In said complaint-
petition, Atty. Nava II alleged that respondent is unfit and incompetent to be appointed as a judge as she faces
"several criminal and administrative cases, the nature of which involves her character, competence, probity, integrity
and independence which should not have been disregarded in her application to the judiciary." 8 Upon verifying that
there are indeed pending cases against respondent which she failed to disclose in her Personal Data Sheets (PDS)
dated October 28, 2005 and November 6, 2006, the Court directed 9 her to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her.10 Due investigation and proceedings commenced thereafter.

The two (2) cases were subsequently consolidated in a Resolution 11 dated June 17, 2015.

In a Decision12 dated August 29, 2017, the Court found respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and
Falsification in connection with A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, and accordingly, meted her with the penalty of dismissal
from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or agency of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, without prejudice to her criminal liabilities therein. In addition, the Court: (a) in connection
with A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, required respondent to show cause why she should not be disbarred for the acts she
committed which led to her dismissal, i.e., failure to disclose in her PDS the pendency of various cases against her;
and (b) in connection with A.C. No. 7253, required respondent to comment on Atty. Nava II's complaint, which she
has yet to submit.

Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration, 13 praying for the reversal of the August 29, 2017 Decision,
including the removal of the penalties of dismissal and disqualification, as well as for permission to retire with all the
benefits due her. She also filed a Comment 14 dated November 30, 2017 which: (a) simply denied the allegations in
the disbarment petition in A.C. No. 7253 and instead largely discussed the administrative cases filed and sanctions
meted against Atty. Nava II; and (b) attributed the false statements in her two (2) PDS subject of A.M. No. MTJ-08-
1717 to mere error in judgment, explaining that while she was aware that there were complaints lodged against her,
the clearance from the DOJ led her to honestly believe that the same have not ripened into formal charges to be
disclosed in her PDS. Thereafter, respondent filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration 15 dated
December 4, 2018, which the Court noted without action in a Resolution 16 dated January 8, 2019.

In a Resolution17 dated January 10, 2018, the Court resolved to, among others: (1) deny with finality respondent's
motion for reconsideration; and (2) referred the Petition for Disbarment, as well as respondent's Comment, to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In a Report and Recommendation 18 dated March 22, 2019, the OBC recommended that respondent be disbarred
pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 7, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and
Canon 11 of the CPR, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and that her name be ordered stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys.19 The OBC noted that respondent was already found by the Court guilty of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of Official Documents for her false statements in her two (2) PDS and for
her willful defiance of Court directives, which findings, it held, already constitute sufficient grounds to warrant her
disbarment. Moreover, notwithstanding the opportunity given her, she failed to provide sufficient explanation why
she should not be suspended, disbarred, or otherwise administratively dealt with, after having been dismissed from
the service, and instead opted to focus more on attacking and impugning Atty. Nava II's integrity and credibility. 20

Meanwhile, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration with the Attached
Second Motion for Reconsideration21 in connection with A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, arguing that there were no evidence
showing that she had knowledge of the cases allegedly filed against her nor was there a showing that she received
any notice, order or resolution requiring her to comment on the same. Additionally, she reiterates that she was
denied due process as the investigating Judge, Vice Executive Judge Danilo P. Galvez, did not inform her of the
hearing between the parties.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, the Court notes that the above report and recommendation of the OBC resolved to disbar respondent
based on the Court's findings in the August 29, 2017 Decision in A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 sans any findings on the
subject matter of A.C. No. 7253. Thus, while the Court is inclined to adopt the OBC's findings and recommendations
relative to A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, the Court shall also determine respondent's administrative liability, if any, in  A.C.
No. 7253 in order to write finis to these consolidated cases against respondent.

I.

Anent A.M No. MTJ-08-1717, it is well to note that in an earlier Decision dated August 29, 2017, the Court had
already found respondent guilty of the administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of
Official Documents for deliberately and calculatedly lying in her October 28, 2005 and November 6, 2006 PDS about
the fact that she had been formally charged and had pending cases to make it appear that she is qualified for the
judgeship position. Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC 22 - which provides that administrative cases against a judge for
grave misconduct, dishonesty, and falsification are automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against him
or her as a member of the Bar - respondent was made to show cause why she should not be disbarred. As the OBC
correctly pointed out, "[i]nstead of showing cause and proving to the Court why she should not be suspended,
disbarred, or otherwise administratively dealt with, [respondent] opted to focus more on attacking and impugning
[Atty. Nava II's] integrity and credibility" 23 and conveniently brushed aside her omissions in her PDS as "mere error
in judgment."24 Verily, respondent's untruthful statements in her PDS constitute breaches of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
Canon 7, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Canon 11 of the CPR, all of which respectively read:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the integrated bar.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.

Furthermore, said misdemeanor likewise constitutes a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:

Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases supplied)
It cannot therefore be denied that Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of Official Documents constitute
grounds to disbar an attorney. In respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all of these grounds
warranting her immediate disbarment as a consequence.

II.

As for A.C. No. 7253, it is well to recall that in his complaint, Atty. Nava II claimed, among others, that respondent
willfully and viciously maligned, insulted, and scorned him and his father, who was not a party to the case, in her
comment to his request for her inhibition from said case then being investigated by her as the Prosecutor. Said
comment pertinently states:

1. That Plaridel C. Nava, II should not compare me to the barbaric, nomadic and outrageous attitude he had

displayed when he kicked one Som1y Decena on December 8, 2004, while his otherwise barbaric, nomadic and
outrageous father would punch Decena on his eyes which I have seen with my own two eyes at the Lobby of the
Hall of Justice x x x;

2. That Nava, II should be made aware that as Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Guimaras, his practice of
law is with limitations. Unless he can show proof that he was authorized by his immediate supervisor in the dates
and time that he acts as Guiamaras legal Officer and at the same time, counsel of any party in this case with the
Iloilo City Prosecutor's Office, I WILL ACCEDE to such request. Otherwise, this Office should not make itself bound
by all the malicious allegations of counsel and should not allow a barbaric and nomadic person to rule this Office.

Lastly, counsel should not flaunt the personal circumstances of this Investigating Prosecutor, as he himself is a
respondent of DISBARMENT cases not only from me, but likewise from the residents of Guimaras, hence, he
should not boldly display his bad manners and wrong conduct and arrogance in this Office, by virtue of his being the
godson of the City Prosecutor and that the latter should not only take cognizance, but should handle with care.

x x x25 (Emphases supplied; underscoring in the original).

In her defense, respondent simply contended that there was no intention to malign, insult, or falsely accuse Atty.
Nava II or anyone else as she simply wanted to defend her impartiality. She also denied all the other charges
against her.

The Court finds respondent's contentions untenable.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute, and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the Bar
imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly. 26 Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability.27 To this end, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the CPR commands:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity[,]
and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with
their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and
respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward
each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations[,] and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract
from the dignity of the legal profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary
action."28 Thus, in Noble III v. Ailes,29 the Court held that the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing
counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession which, as ruled in Buot v. Jubay,30 should never
be countenanced as it tends to degrade the dignity of the legal profession.

In this case, respondent's acts of calling Atty. Nava II and his father "barbaric, nomadic, and outrageous" and
baselessly imputing to Atty. Nava II the use of his alleged influence as the godson of the City Prosecutor who, by
virtue thereof, allegedly had the audacity to display "his bad manners and wrong conduct and arrogance" in an
official pleading falls short of the conduct being exhorted by Canon 8 to all members of the Bar. Verily, such use of
intemperate language and aspersions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 31 On this score, it must be
emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a lawyer's words and
actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Any violation of these conditions exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability,32 as in this case.

III.
All told, the Court finds that respondent had violated several canons of professional and ethical conduct expected
from her as a lawyer and an officer of the court. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw the same. 33

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Ofelia M.D. Artuz (respondent) GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's
Oath, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 7, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Accordingly, she is hereby  DISBARRED from
the practice of law and her name is ordered STRICKEN off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office
of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.

The Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration and the attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated August 12, 2019 in A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 are NOTED WITHOUT ACTION in view of the
Resolution dated January 10, 2018 denying with finality respondent's Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision
dated August 29, 2017).

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C. J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang,
Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[ A.C. No. 8789, March 11, 2020 ]

ATTY. HONESTO ANCHETA CABARROGUIS, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. DANILO A. BASA, RESPONDENT.

 DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint 1 for disbarment filed by complainant Atty. Honesto
Ancheta Cabarroguis (Atty. Cabarroguis) against respondent Atty. Danilo A. Basa (Atty. Basa) before this Court.
Atty. Cabarroguis accuses Atty. Basa of violations of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.03; 2 Canon 8, Rule 8.01;3 Canon
10;4 Rules 12.02 and 12.04;5 Rule 15.05;6 and Rule 19.017 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Case

Atty. Cabarroguis alleged in his complaint that he was the retained legal counsel of his friend, Godofredo V. Cirineo,
Jr. (Godofredo), who filed an estafa case against his sister-in-law, Erlinda Basa-Cirineo (Erlinda) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 11. Erlinda was represented by her brother, Atty. Basa. 8 Atty.
Cabarroguis accused Atty. Basa of dilatory tactics when, after eight years of court trial, Atty. Basa asked for the
inhibition of the presiding judge, Hon. Renato Fuentes (Judge Fuentes). After Judge Fuentes inhibited himself, all
the other presiding judges of the other regular RTCs to whom the case was raffled, also inhibited themselves one
after the other and for one reason or another.9

Atty. Cabarroguis further alleged that Atty. Basa exhibited his immaturity on two occasions. First was through an
omnibus motion filed by Atty. Basa in a civil case on behalf of his clients, Raul and Evelyn Molabola (collectively, the
Molabolas), where he repeatedly spelled Atty. Cabarroguis' first name, Honesto, as "HONESTo." Second was
through a demand letter involving the same case in which Atty. Basa purportedly misspelled the first name of Atty.
Cabarroguis as "Honest."10

Atty. Cabarroguis also alleged that in retaliation against him for being the private prosecutor in the  estafa case
against Atty. Basa's sister, Erlinda, Atty. Basa filed numerous administrative, civil, and criminal cases against him
which were all malicious and unfounded. Atty. Cabarroguis enumerated these cases, to wit:

1. CBD-ADM Case No. 6629 Danilo Basa v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification

2. CBD-ADM Case No. 07-2110 Raul Molabola and Evelyn Molabola v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for
Falsification and Perjury

3. CBD-ADM Case No. 08-2223 Atty. Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury

4. I.S. No. 03-E-3753 Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification

5. I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification

6. I.S. No. 2006-E-3378 Atty. Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis and Godofredo Cirineo for Falsification

7. I.S. No. 08-E-4146 Atty. Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification (2 counts)

8. I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 Erlinda B. Cirineo v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis and Atty. Dante C. Sandiego for
Falsification

9. I.S. No. 2008-[G]-5045-A Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification

10. I.S. No. 07-F-4093 Raul Molabola, et al. v. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury (2 counts)

11. I.S. No. 07-F-4094 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury

12. I.S. No. 07-F-4095 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury

13. I.S. No. 07-F-4096 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury

14. I.S. No. 07-F-4097 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury

15. I.S. No. 07-[F]-4098 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury

16. I.S. No. 07-F-4099 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification and Perjury

17. I.S. No. 07-G-4682 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Falsification

18. A-RSPO XI No. 2004-004 Atty. Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification

19. A-RSPO XI No. 2006-062 Danilo A. Basa v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification

20. A-[ORSPXI No. 2009-K-080 to 2009-K-081 Erlinda Basa-Cirineo v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis and Atty. Dante C.
Sandiego for Falsification

21. A-[ORSP] XI No. 2008-G-025 to 2008-G-[031 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Atty. H. A. Cabarroguis for Falsification
and Perjury

22. Criminal Case Nos. 134-394 to 400-C-2009 People of the Philippines v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for
Falsification and Perjury

23. Civil Case No. 35041 Raul Molabola, et al. v. Atty. Honesto A. Cabarroguis for damages and attorney's fees with
preliminary attachment pending trial11

Atty. Cabarroguis also pointed out that in a complaint for malicious prosecution he filed against Atty. Basa, the latter
offered in evidence different court records in several cases where Atty. Cabarroguis was counsel or party-litigant to
prove that he was engaging in patently dishonest and deceitful conduct. 12 Atty. Cabarroguis prayed that the Court
orders Atty. Basa to suppress or destroy this extensive database gathered about him in violation of the Writ of
Habeas Data.13

In his Comment to the Complaint, 14 Atty. Basa attempted to set the record straight about the alleged numerous
cases he filed against Atty. Cabarroguis. In CBD-ADM Case No. 6629, contrary to Atty. Cabarroguis' assertion that
it was dismissed, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) found him guilty of ethical
misconduct and admonished him for preparing the affidavit-complaint for estafa against Erlinda, signing it and
swearing it before an administering officer despite having no personal knowledge of the facts recited therein.

Atty. Cabarroguis was also being untrue when he said in his complaint that CBD-ADM Case No. 07-2110 was
awaiting the outcome of the eight criminal complaints filed with the City Prosecution Office of Davao City against
him. Atty. Basa countered that there was nothing in the record of CBD-ADM Case No. 07-2110 which showed this
status. On the contrary, before the filing of the administrative complaint, the City Prosecution Office of Davao City
had already filed against Atty. Cabarroguis two Informations for Perjury and five Informations for Falsification in the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities in Davao City.

Atty. Basa also cleared up that CBD-ADM Case No. 08-2223 was already decided by the IBP-BOG, finding Atty.
Cabarroguis guilty of violating Canon 10 of the CPR and meting him with the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year.

Atty. Basa clarified further that it was not he who personally filed or instituted several of the criminal cases adverted
to by Atty. Cabarroguis, but his clients. Specifically, I.S. Nos. 07-F-4093, 07-F-4094, 07-F-4095, 07-F-4096, 07-F-
4097, 07-F-4098, 07-F-4099 and 07-G-4682 were supported with affidavit-complaints of the Molabolas, while I.S.
Nos. 2008-G-5045 and 2008-G-5045-A were supported with the affidavit-complaints of Erlinda.

Moreover, A-RSPO XI No. 2004-004, A-RSPO XI No. 2006-062, A RSPO XI, A-ORSP XI No. 2008-G-025 to 2008-
G-031 were appealed cases of the Resolutions of the City Prosecution Office before the Regional State Prosecutor,
specifically, of I.S. Nos. 03-E-3753, 2006-D-2748, 2008-G- 5045, 2008-G-5045-A, 07-F-4093-99, and 07-G-4682.

Thus, according to Atty. Basa, Atty. Cabarroguis was then facing in court two counts of Perjury and five counts of
Falsification, together with administrative sanctions recommended by the IBP-BOG in three separate administrative
cases.15 He stressed that the instant complaint against him was only filed by Atty. Cabarroguis after all the other
cases against the latter were filed. The truth then was that Atty. Cabarroguis was the one motivated by vengeance
in filing the instant disbarment suit against Atty. Basa.

Lastly, as to the voluminous evidence he offered in the complaint for malicious prosecution that Atty. Cabarroguis
filed against him, Atty. Basa maintained it was done in the exercise of his right to defend himself and to disprove the
several self-laudatory allegations contained in the complaint.

After the Court referred the Complaint and the Comment to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation,
Atty. Cabarroguis filed three more supplemental complaints. In his first Supplemental Complaint and Reply to the
Comment to the Complaint,16 Atty. Cabarroguis alleged that Atty. Basa filed another retaliatory complaint for
falsification against him, which was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City for lack of probable
cause. He also insisted how obvious it was that all the other complaints against him were commenced after he filed
an estafa case against Erlinda.

In his Second Supplemental Complaint, 17 Atty. Cabarroguis narrated the various motions and pleadings filed by the
parties in said falsification case adverted to in the first supplemental complaint to underscore the further retaliatory
acts of Atty. Basa against him.

In his Third Supplemental Complaint, 18 Atty. Cabarroguis alleged that Atty. Basa filed two new retaliatory complaints
for disbarment against him in the form of: (1) a manifestation and motion (in the malicious prosecution case filed by
Atty. Cabarroguis against Atty. Basa) to take judicial notice of a complaint Atty. Cabarroguis filed against a certain
Dario Tangcay for collection of unpaid attorney's fees; and (2) a supplement to the motion for reconsideration Atty.
Basa filed in CBD-ADM Case No. 08-2223.

The IBP Proceedings

After the mandatory conference and the submission of the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner
issued a Report and Recommendation 19 to suspend Atty. Basa from the practice of law for one (1) year. The
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Basa to have clearly breached his ethical duty towards his fellow lawyer
under Canon 8 of the CPR when he showed extraordinary zeal in representing his sister in the estafa case filed by
Atty. Cabarroguis' client, Godofredo. He employed harassing and annoying tactics while the case was being tried,
evidenced by the several cases Atty. Basa filed against Atty. Cabarroguis. These cases had been clearly triggered
by the estafa case against Erlinda as all had been instituted after the filing of the estafa case.

The Investigating Commissioner also held that Atty. Basa had shown abuse of processes when he filed the multiple
suits against Atty. Cabarroguis and when he moved for the inhibition of the judges handling the estafa case. He
clearly prostituted the judicial processes manifestly for delay and did not advance the cause of law or his client by
commencing such unmeritorious cases.

Also, by poking fun at the name of Atty. Cabarroguis in his letter and his omnibus motion, Atty. Basa denied the
esteem his fellow lawyer deserved and instead, denigrated and belittled him.

The IBP-BOG, in Resolution No. XXI-2014-484 20 dated August 10, 2014, resolved to adopt the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Atty. Basa argued that Atty. Cabarroguis was guilty of
forum shopping, particularly insofar as CBD-ADM Case Nos. 6629, 07-2110, and 2223 were concerned. 21 Atty.
Cabarroguis, on the other hand, argued that Atty. Basa's actions merited a disbarment and not just a suspension. 22

On June 17, 2017, the IBP-BOG issued Resolution No. XXII-2017-1238 23 granting the Motion for Reconsideration of
Atty. Basa, and reversing its earlier decision on the ground that there is no showing that he acted with bad faith in
filing the cases against Atty. Cabarroguis.

In the Extended Resolution24 dated June 18, 2018 penned by Deputy Director Franklin B. Calpito for the Board, the
IBP-BOG found that although several cases against Atty. Cabarroguis were dismissed, some were subsequently
found to be substantiated. For instance, in CBD-ADM Case Nos. 07-2110 and 08-2223, Atty. Cabarroguis was
meted with a penalty of one-year suspension in each case for violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR. In CBD-
ADM Case No. 6629, Atty. Cabarroguis was also admonished.

The IBP-BOG held further that there is no standard definition of bad faith and its presence cannot be automatically
inferred from the sheer number of cases filed by Atty. Basa against Atty. Cabarroguis. The Board noted that in
falsification cases, one act of falsification is tantamount to one cause of action and as such, Atty. Basa can have as
many causes of action as he may have against Atty. Cabarroguis.

The IBP-BOG likewise pointed out that there were only six cases which Atty. Basa filed in his name against Atty.
Cabarroguis. In all the other cases he filed as counsel, it cannot be immediately inferred that Atty. Basa instigated
the parties in filing them.

Atty. Cabarroguis thereafter filed the instant petition for review before the Court where he maintained that Atty.
Basa's act of filing and/or instigating the filing of multiple cases against him clearly constitutes bad faith.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue here is whether the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Atty. Basa.

Ruling of the Court

The Court reverses the findings of the IBP-BOG in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1238 and reinstates the previous
Resolution No. XXI-2014-484 dated August 10, 2014. The Court finds that Atty. Basa violated the Lawyer's Oath,
Canon 1, Rule 1.03,25 Canon 8, Rule 8.01, 26 Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 12.04, 27 and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 28 of the
CPR when he: (1) filed baseless criminal suits against Atty. Cabarroguis; (2) poked fun at Atty. Cabarroguis by
deliberately misspelling his name in an omnibus motion; and (3) caused delay in the estafa case after moving for the
inhibition of the presiding judge after eight years in trial. The Court agrees with the original findings of the IBP that
Atty. Basa employed harassing tactics against Atty. Cabarroguis after he, on behalf of his client, filed an estafa case
against Atty. Basa's sister in 2002.

Firstly, the Court does not wholly agree with the more recent findings of the IBP in its Resolution No. XXII-2017-
1238 that Atty. Basa did not act with malice or bad faith in filing all of the 17 complaints against Atty. Cabarroguis.
True, the administrative cases were proved to be substantiated as Atty. Cabarroguis was eventually disciplined in all
three. Also, the eight counts for falsification and perjury initiated by Atty. Basa's clients, the Molabolas, were later
filed in court. However, there are criminal complaints relative to, or were offshoots of, the  estafa case filed against
Erlinda which were dismissed for lack of merit, and which the Court believes were frivolous and had no other
apparent purpose to serve but to vex Atty. Cabarroguis.

In I.S. No. 03-E-3753 filed by Atty. Basa against Atty. Cabarroguis for falsification under Article 172, paragraph 1 or
2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the cause of action was founded on the complaint-affidavit executed by
Godofredo through his attorney-in-fact, Atty. Cabarroguis, in the estafa case filed against Erlinda. Atty. Cabarroguis
allegedly averred facts therein not of his own personal knowledge and had subscribed and sworn to the truthfulness
of these allegations before an authorized officer. I.S. No. 03-E-3753 was dismissed because the prosecutor held
that one of the elements of the crime, which is "that the offender knew that a document was falsified by another
person" was not present. The prosecutor went on to say that there can be no false narration of facts when the
allegations averred in the subject complaint-affidavit was attested to as being hearsay, i.e. there was an admission
that the facts narrated are not within the personal knowledge of Atty. Cabarroguis. At the most, complainant can
only argue that said allegations cannot be used as evidence for being hearsay. 29

The dismissal of I.S. No. 03-E-3753 prompted Atty. Cabarroguis to file a complaint for malicious prosecution with
damages against Atty. Basa. In his complaint-affidavit, Atty. Cabarroguis stated that he enjoys the honor and
distinction of being President Emeritus of the Davao Jaycees, Inc. (JCI). This allegation, in turn, impelled Atty. Basa
to tile another complaint for falsification which was docketed as I.S. No. 08-E-4146. In his complaint, Atty. Basa
alleged that JCI certified that it has not, at any time, bestowed the title or position of President Emeritus to any of its
members. I.S. No. 08-E-4146 was, however, dismissed on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in
view of the pendency of the civil case for malicious prosecution with damages. 30 The essence of the resolution for
dismissal was that the question as to whether the claim of Atty. Cabarroguis is true can best be threshed out in the
very civil case for malicious prosecution and damages. The resolution of the issue would henceforth determine
whether a criminal case for falsification could indeed proceed.

The frivolity in filing I.S. No. 03-E-3753 and I.S. No. 08-E-4146 is readily apparent. Representation by the principal
of an attorney-in-fact is sanctioned by law. This representation to act on behalf of the principal includes the filing of
complaints. Thus, there is nothing irregular for an agent duly armed with a special power of attorney to aver facts in
an affidavit-complaint and to subscribe and swear to the truthfulness of the same before an authorized officer on
behalf of a principal.

Insofar as I.S. No. 08-E-4146 was concerned, the dismissal of the complaint was likewise called for. In the first
place, the alleged falsity does not involve a fact that is material or relevant to the crime of malicious prosecution,
which only has as its elements the presence of malice and absence of probable cause. More significantly, in the
crime of falsification of making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, one of the elements is that there is a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by the respondent. Legal obligation means that there is a
law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. 31 While arguably, Atty. Cabarroguis was morally
obliged not to falsely claim that he was accorded the status of a President Emeritus by the JCI, there is,
nevertheless, no law which requires him to disclose the truth of the matter.

Moreover, Atty. Basa initiated four more criminal complaints against Atty. Cabarroguis for the same cause of action,
in violation of Canon 12, Rule 12.02, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the CPR, to wit:

Canon 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

xxxx

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Canon 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.

The four criminal complaints were all in relation to the same affidavit-complaint Atty. Cabarroguis filed as the
attorney-in-fact of Godofredo in the estafa case against Erlinda. In I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 for falsification, Atty. Basa
accused Atty. Cabarroguis of making a false allegation in paragraph 1 of said affidavit-complaint when he said that
Godofredo inherited his parents' part in the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14402, when
in truth, Godofredo did not. The prosecutor dismissed I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 on the grounds that there can be no
perjury because the allegation of inheritance in the subject complaint-affidavit was not material to the charge
of estafa, and that the element of willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood was not sufficiently established. The
prosecutor noted that Atty. Cabarroguis only acted as an attorney-in-fact when he signed the subject complaint-
affidavit and, hence, prepared and signed the same in accordance with the facts narrated to him by Godofredo. 32
In another complaint docketed as I.S. No. 2006-E-3378, Atty. Basa charged Atty. Cabarroguis and Godofredo with
falsification of public document under Article 172(1) of the RPC. The complaint shared the same cause of action
with I.S. No. 2006-D-2748, in that Atty. Cabarroguis purportedly made a false allegation by stating in the same
affidavit-complaint in the estafa case against Erlinda that Godofredo acquired the subject property by succession or
inheritance, when in truth, he purchased it from his parents. I.S. No. 2006-E-3378 was likewise dismissed for lack of
probable cause on the same grounds that I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 was dismissed.

Two years after, the same cause of action in I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 and I.S. No. 2006-E-3378 was again alleged in
two more complaints for falsification under Article 172 of the RPC, that is, the allegation in the affidavit-complaint of
Godofredo against Erlinda in the estafa case that he and his brother inherited the subject property from their parents
was false. The truth, rather, according to Erlinda, was that Godofredo and his brother purchased the subject
property from their parents. This time, the complaints, which were docketed as I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 and I.S. No.
2008-G-5045-A, were filed by Erlinda against Atty. Cabarroguis and Atty. Dante C. Sandiego. There was also the
additional allegation that Godofredo, although an American citizen, made it appear in his affidavit-complaint that he
was qualified to acquire and own the subject land because he and his brother inherited it from their parents. I.S. No.
2008-G-5045 and I.S. No. 2008-G- 5045-A were also dismissed for lack of probable cause because the alleged
false statement of fact was, on the contrary, a mere conclusion of law and that Godofredo was a former Filipino
citizen who later acquired an American citizenship and was not, therefore, absolutely disqualified from acquiring
lands in the Philippines.

The foregoing shows how Atty. Basa recklessly applied the same cause of action in four different complaints that
were all dismissed for lack of probable cause. He cannot validly argue that it was not he who initiated I.S. No. 2008-
G-5045 and I.S. No. 2008-G-5045-A but his client, Erlinda. He cannot deny the fact that these complaints were filed
two years after similar complaints, which he personally filed himself, were already dismissed for lack of probable
cause. It is inexcusable for Atty. Basa to not be aware of his duty under his Lawyer's Oath not to "wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same." This duty has
also been expressly provided for in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the CPR, to wit:

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man's cause.

Hence, inasmuch as lawyers must guard themselves against their own impulses of initiating unfounded suits, 33 they
are equally bound to advise a client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his or her case. If the lawyer finds that his or her client's cause is defenseless, then it is his or her
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. 34 Lawyers must
resist the whims and caprices of their clients and to temper their propensities to litigate. 35

Atty. Basa, by all means, is given the liberty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal. 1âшphi1 This obligation,
however, is not without reasonable limitations. The filing of frivolous suits against his opposing counsel manifests, at
the very least, his gross indiscretion as a colleague in the legal profession and his malicious desire to vex Atty.
Cabarroguis. Atty. Basa's act ultimately exhibits his intent to paralyze Atty. Cabarroguis from exerting his utmost
effort in protecting his client's interest. 36 Verily, the rendition of improper service by lawyers which does not meet the
strictest principles of moral law invites stern and just condemnation from the Court because by doing so, they fail to
advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients. 37

In the same vein, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the crafty way with which Atty. Basa disrespected Atty.
Cabarroguis via an Omnibus Motion38 dated June 22, 2007. In this omnibus motion filed by Atty. Basa on behalf of
his clients, the Molabolas, in a special proceeding case where Atty. Cabarroguis was the petitioner, Atty. Basa
misspelled the first name of Atty. Cabarroguis, Honesto, as "HONESTo." The Court notes that this was not the first
time that Atty. Basa misspelled the first name of Atty. Cabarroguis. In a previous demand letter 39 dated May 31,
2007 drafted by Atty. Basa and addressed to Atty. Cabarroguis, the latter's name had also been misspelled as
"Honest." While the mistake in the demand letter may be dismissed as unintentional, the Court cannot arrive at the
same conclusion with regard to the omnibus motion. By spelling the first six letters of Atty. Cabarroguis's first name
in capital letters and leaving the last letter in lowercase, the impression given to the reader is that the author is
attempting to illustrate an irony at the expense of Atty. Cabarroguis. The misspelling was far from being a mere
inadvertence as it had consistently appeared in all 14 pages of the omnibus motion. Atty. Basa, as a lawyer, ought
to know that his action becomes all the more malicious given that the omnibus motion was not a mere private
communication but formed part of public record when he filed it in court. 40

In a long line of cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers who resorted to clearly derogatory, offensive, and virulent
language against their opposing counsels, in violation of Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the CPR, viz.:

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
While it may be argued that the omnibus motion did not use language that can easily be characterized as such, the
Court finds Atty. Basa's method underhanded, a subtle way of name-calling, and was improperly offensive to Atty.
Cabarroguis just the same.

Inasmuch as the Court has exhorted lawyers not to be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticisms
(especially those which are fair or mild) against them as litigation is inherently a hostile endeavor between adverse
or contending parties,41 this has been weighed against an oft-repeated similar exhortation of the Court to treat their
opposing counsels with courtesy, dignity and civility. 42 To the mind of the Court, the act of Atty. Basa in poking fun at
the name of Atty. Cabarroguis has traversed these bounds and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court.

Finally, the Court also finds merit in the claim of Atty. Cabarroguis that Atty. Basa has failed to measure up to Canon
12, Rule 12.04 of the CPR when, apart from the baseless criminal complaints mentioned earlier, Atty. Basa also
caused the filing of a motion for inhibition against the presiding judge in the estafa case against Erlinda. While the
Court will not presume to evaluate the soundness of Judge Fuentes' discretion to inhibit from the case, the Court
finds it imperative to consider the unfortunate timing of the filing of the motion, which was after the trial of the case
had taken eight years to conclude, as well as its bearing in light of the totality of the other infractions of Atty. Basa
which meant to vex and harass Atty. Cabarroguis. The Court cannot likewise fail to observe how the inhibition of
Judge Fuentes led to five more inhibitions of the other judges to whom the case was re-raffled, which thus ultimately
presented the problem of unavailability of a judge who would try and hear the case. Needless to say, this turn of
events caused untold delay in the resolution of the case to the prejudice of Atty. Cabarroguis' client.

In sum, the Court agrees with the previous Resolution No. XXI-2014-484 43 of the IBP finding Atty. Basa guilty of
violating his Lawyer's Oath and multiple Canons of the CPR. In previous cases, the penalties handed down by the
Court against lawyers who violated Canon 8 of the CPR ranged from admonition to suspension for periods ranging
from one (1) month to three (3) months. 44 In Atty. Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr. v. Atty. Rizal P. Balbin, 45 following
precedents,46 the Court suspended respondent therein from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for
violating various Canons of the CPR, including Canon 8, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, Rule 12.04, Canon 19, and Rule
19.01 of the CPR. Similarly in In Re: G.R. No. 157659 "Eligio P. Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System
and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga," 47 the Court suspended respondent therein from the practice of law for two
(2) years for violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canons 10 and 12, Rules 10.03, 12.02, and 12.04 of the CPR. As
applied to the facts of this case, the Comt deems it best to modify and temper the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from one (1) year to six (6) months. The Court also takes into consideration that
this is the first administrative case against Atty. Basa in his more than three decades in the legal profession. 48

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo A. Basa is hereby found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1,
Rule 1.03, Canon 8, Rule 8.01, Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of
Atty. Danilo A. Basa as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.