8. People of the Philippines Vs.

Domingo Arcega y Siguenza

FACTS: Domingo Arcega, waited for AAA (19 yo) to pass by after she took a bath at
their neighbor's deep well. He gave a fistic blow on her nape, covering her mouth,
followed by another blow on her eye causing her to fall to the ground and while she
was lying on the ground, accused placed himself on top of her, naked. AAA tried to
resist by kicking him on his private part, displacing him and giving her the opportunity
to run away. BBB, AAA's aunt, heard screams and saw AAA arrived trembling, shock,
pale, crying and her hair disheveled. AAA's parents submitted her to a medical
examination and reported the incident to the police.
On August 23, 2010, respondent, duly assisted by counsel, was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charge, claiming he was with his wife at San Isidro, Magarao,
Camarines Sur and taking care of his child who was then suffering from asthma attacks.
The RTC of Iriga City rendered judgment finding him guilty. Arcega appealed
the RTC Judgment to the CA. CA affirmed the decision but modified it to acts of
lasciviousness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it modified the conviction of attempted rape
to acts of lasciviousness

HELD: NO. The CA did not err. In People v. Balunsat, where the CA modified the
accused-appellant's conviction from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness, we held
that since the CA had already acquitted the accused of attempted rape, a review of the
downgrading of the crime will violate the respondent's right against double jeopardy.
We stated as follows:
Concerning Criminal Case No. 781-T, the Court of Appeals modified the guilty
verdict of the RTC against Nelson from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness. We can
no longer review the "downgrading" of the crime by the appellate court without
violating the right against double jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal from a
judgment of acquittal or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the
accused. In effect, the Court of Appeals already acquitted Nelson of the charge of
attempted rape, convicting him only for acts of lasciviousness, a crime with a less severe
penalty. x x x.
 A judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is
final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The case of
People v. Hon. Velasco provides the reason for such rule, to wit:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the
rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. x x x." Thus, Green
expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his
guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to
try him, for society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial
represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit
Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government
oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed
in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause
is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the
criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
With the CA's modification of respondent's conviction from attempted rape to
acts of lasciviousness, it has already acquitted respondent of attempted rape, which is
already final and unappealable. Thus, double jeopardy has already set in and petitioner
is already barred from filing the present petition for review on certiorari assailing
respondent's acquittal of attempted rape on such ground.
The rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where
there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or
(2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. x
x x.
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and CA decision is AFFIRMED.

35. Reynaldo Valencia Vibar Vs. People of the Philippines

FACTS: Reynaldo Valencia was driving a passenger jeepney. While he was traversing
Sagumayon Bridge, the jeep suddenly shook and the passengers at the back of the
jeepney, namely Reymer Añonuevo (Añonuevo) and Richard Nicerio (Nicerio), heard a
loud thud, as if the jeep hit something solid. They stopped, and when Añonuevo and
Nicerio looked out towards the road, they saw a person lying face down. Valencia,
instead of helping, backed the Jeepney up, continued driving, and told his passengers
that he would tell the police about the incident. Añonuevo noted down the jeepney’s
plate number when he alighted and reported the incident to the police.
Valencia was arrested but posted bail. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. The RTC found him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
culpable felony of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN HOMICIDE defined and
penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by failing to lend on
the spot to the victim such help as may be in the hands of the accused to give.
Valencia appealed the judgment against him which was denied. In his Petition
for Review on Certiorari, petitioner maintains that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged. He insists that none of the prosecution witnesses testified to seeing the jeepney
he was driving actually run over the victim and that their testimonies are circumstantial
at best.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding petitioner’s guilt for
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.

HELD: YES. Review of appeals filed before the Court is “not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion[.]’” Only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition
as this Court is not a trier of facts, and factual findings are “final, binding, or conclusive
on the parties and upon this court when supported by substantial evidence.”
However, exceptions to the general rule exist and the Court may pass upon the
findings of fact of the lower courts in the following instances:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record.
A careful review of the records convinces this Court that an exception to the
general rule exists in this case, particularly the first exception, or “[w]hen the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures.”
No one testified as to the manner by which petitioner was driving before he
supposedly hit Jaquilmo, or of personally witnessing the jeepney hit Jaquilmo. The
Regional Trial Court surmised that because of the early hour, petitioner was probably
not yet fully alert when he drove the jeepney; thus, he failed to notice Jaquilmo cross the
street. The Court of Appeals likewise concluded that petitioner must have been driving
“at a high speed” because prosecution witnesses felt the jeepney tilt and thud before
they spotted the victim lying on the road.
The prosecution was able to prove that Jaquilmo died on the bridge, but it failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner’s imprudence in driving the jeepney
was the proximate cause of his death. The prosecution must show the direct causal
connection between a motorist’s negligence and the injuries sustained to substantiate a
charge for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. Further, mere negligence will not
suffice because it is the motorist’s willful and wanton act done in utter disregard of the
consequence of his or her action, which criminalizes an imprudent or negligent act.
Here, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner’s
inexcusable lack of precaution in driving the jeepney was the proximate cause of
Jaquilmo’s death. In fact, the lower courts had diverging opinions on petitioner’s
imprudent act, with the Regional Trial Court stating that petitioner was probably sleepy
when he drove the jeepney, and the Court of Appeals concluding that petitioner was
driving the jeepney too fast.
Petition GRANTED AND REVERSED. Valencia is ACQUITTED.

36. Central Realty and Development Corporation Vs. Solar Resources, Inc.
[ G.R. No. 229408, November 09, 2020 ]
 LAZARO-JAVIER, J

FACTS: PNB sold to petitioner Central a parcel of land located in Binondo, Manila.
Dolores Molina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim on its TCT No.
198996, claiming that Central sold the property to her sometime in 1993. Central filed
with the RTC of Manila a case for cancellation of adverse claim, disputing the alleged sale
of the property to Molina, claiming that its board of directors did not actually meet to
confirm the alleged sale. 
Molina demanded that Central cause the issuance of a new title in her name and
to deliver the possession of the property to her, free from any liens and encumbrances.
She filed with RTC-Manila a complaint for specific performance and declaration of
nullity of real estate mortgage with injunctive relief. Solar purchased the property from
Molina
The RTC ordered the RD of Manila to cancel the notice of adverse claim. It ruled
that Central was able to prove that it did not sell the property to any third party. Thus,
Molina’s adverse claim had no basis at all and Central remained to be the owner of the
property.
On June 9, 2014, Solar annotated its notice of adverse claim on TCT No. 198996.
When Molina died in 2014, Solar moved to be substituted in the other civil as party-
plaintiff. Central initiated another petition to cancel Solar’s notice of adverse claim.
The RTC rendered summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The court ruled
that Central’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was improper. For while Solar
admitted the allegations in the petition, it also raised affirmative defenses thereto. The
court likewise denied Solar’s motion to dismiss on ground of litis pendentia, there being
allegedly no common cause of action between the petition for cancellation of adverse
claim and the separate action for specific performance.
In the same omnibus resolution, the trial court also rendered summary judgment
in the case. It held that a full-blown trial was no longer necessary where the only issue
was the validity of the adverse claim, hence, there was no need for the court to pass
upon the parties’ respective claims of ownership over the property, the same being the
subject of another case. Based on the recitals in the Affidavit of Adverse Claim, it found
sufficient basis to sustain the annotation of Solar’s adverse claim, flowing as it did from
the deed of sale it had with Molina.
Petitioner filed its direct recourse to the Court via Rule 45

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court render summary judgment motu proprio?
HELD: NO. Summary Judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to
any material fact in the action, and if there is no question or controversy upon any
question of fact.
While respondent SOLAR has raised issues, those issues do not call for the
presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial considering that the instant case is
confined only as to the determination of the validity of the adverse claim and not the
declaration of the rights of the parties over the disputed property.
SEC. 3 of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on summary judgment provides that a motion
shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The
adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three
(3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file,
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Here, the trial court rendered summary judgment motu proprio, sans any motion
from either of the parties. In Calubaquib v. Republic, the Court set aside the summary
judgment for being rendered without any motion filed by either of the parties.
In determining the genuineness of the issues, the court is obliged to carefully
study and appraise, the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in
the affidavits that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition.
Thus, it is held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a
summary judgment is proper so long as “the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.”
The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore
important because these enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits in support of or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome
the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the
claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action. The non-observance of
the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said
motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Case REMANDED to the and to
be CONSOLIDATED.