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AEL Compiled Cases Digests 1 25 2B
AEL Compiled Cases Digests 1 25 2B
FACTS:
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act) provides that
all citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by
law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for
president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 disqualifies from voting an immigrant or
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, UNLESS
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by
the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under the said law. -Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in
relation to Section 4 of the same Act empowers the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of the winning candidates (president, vicepresident, senators
and party-list representatives).
Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the “Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee” with the power to review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC.
Arguments of Macalintal: (1) Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the
voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
an election. He cites the ruling of the Supreme Court in Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals, wherein it was held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the
United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the
Philippines; (2) Section 18.5 is unconstitutional, as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-
president; (3) Sections 19 and 25 creating the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee are unconstitutional intrudes into the independence of the
COMELEC. Should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it
is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V
of the 1987 Constitution;
(2)Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional insofar as
it involves the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president;
(3)Whether or not the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee violates Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
RULING:
(1)No. Contrary to Macalintal’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas
absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate
expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that
necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad”
is not physically present in the country.
The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of
overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino
abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in
the Philippines.
He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host
country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return
to his domicile of origin, the Philippines.
Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that
he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the
affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
x x x x Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person
cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under
our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining
to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines
as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. x x x x For political
purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. x x x x
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the
affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
(2)Yes. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority
given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for
the positions of president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed
the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly
stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the
votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions.” x x x x The canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for
the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
NOTE: Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL with
respect only to the power given to the Comelec to canvass the votes and
proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President, which is
lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, its consitutionality was UPHELD insofar as the authority given to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives.
(3)Yes. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and
revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. The second
sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that, “the Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval,” and the second
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that, “it shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both provisions,
arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution,
should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
Facts:
1. Petitioner are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act) [basically dual citizens sila].
2. Long before the May 2004 elections, petitioners sought registration as
“overseas absentee voter” under RA 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting
Act/Law) only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that,
as per a COMELEC letter, they have yet no right to vote because of their
lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the
constitution. Such letter also stated that PH posts abroad should
continue voter’s registration.
3. Petitioner Nicolas-Lewis asked COMELEC for a clarification, in light of the
Macalintal ruling. The COMELEC replied that the petitioners still cannot
exercise the right to vote as the OAVL was not applicable to them. Only
Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on Sept 18 2003,
at the earliest, are considered regular voters who have to meet the
residency requirement.
4. On April 1, 2004, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus. A week before the May 10 elections, COMELEC prayed for
the denial of the petition, arguing that the “duals” must first meet the
requirements in Sec. 1, Art. V; and that they have already renounced
their PH citizenship. As expected, petitioner failed to register; hence,
they failed to vote.
5. On May 20, 2004, OSG, in resolving COMELEC’s prayer, stated that all
qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens, may exercise the
right to vote. However, such was already moot and academic as the
2004 elections has already concluded.
6. SC: Although moot and academic, such petition must be resolved
because of a broader and transcendental issue of the propriety of
allowing “duals” to participate and vote as absentee voter in future
elections.
Issue: W/N petitioners who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 may vote as absentee voter under RA
9189
Important Provisions:
RA 9189 or OAVL
Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and
other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ;
xxx;
FACTS:
On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC
of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position. Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San
Francisco California on September 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen
under US laws.
On August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second
Division and declared Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano
is also a Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 constitution and he has effectively
renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-
mayor of Makati. Hence, Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the
elections filed this petition
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of
jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of
allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent
his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of
his election of Philippine citizenship.
FACTS:
This pertains to a petition to set aside and reverse the Decision rendered
by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declaring the Jose
Ong Chuan, Jr., herein respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 2nd
Legislative District of Northern Samar during the May 1987 elections. Ong
Chuan bested several adversaries including herein petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co. The petitioner alleges that the private respondent is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and he is not a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar, thereby not meeting the qualification provided under the Sec
6, Art. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
Per records, Ong Te, respondent’s grandfather, arrived in the Philippines
from China and subsequently established his residence in Laoang, N. Samar.
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, he was issued a Certificate of Residence. Ong
Te then brought Jose Ong Chuan, respondent’s father, to the said Municipality
in 1915 where the latter spent his childhood. There, he easily assimilated with
the community by adapting various Filipino values and practices. Jose Ong
Chuan then married Agripina Lao, a Filipino, and had eight (8) children including
herein respondent. Respondent’s father founded a hardware store which then
prospered and resulted in branching out in Binondo Manila. When the private
was respondent was nine (9) years old, his father’s application for naturalization
was approved.
Jose Ong, Jr. was born and raised in Laoang Northern Samar. His family
rebuilt their house as it was likewise burned. After completing his elementary
education, he stayed in Manila for his studies and thereafter practiced his
profession as an employee of the Central Bank of the Philippines. The
respondent eventually decided to manage their family business and then
married Desiree Lim, a Filipina. It was notable that during such years, the
respondent made periodical journeys back to the province.
The HRET ruled for the private respondent declaring him as a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, N. Samar for voting purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent, Jose Ong Chuan, Jr is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes. Article IV of 1987 Constitution provides that under Section 1, the
following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Mr. Jose Ong Chuan, Jr traces his natural born citizenship from his mother
thereby expecting him to elect the same upon his age of maturity. However, it
was evident in this case, that the respondent’s father has been naturalized when
he was nine (9) years old, likewise making him a natural born Filipino citizen at
said age. Hence, there is no need for him to elect his citizenship upon his age
of majority as there is no other nationality he could choose pursuant to his
father’s naturalization.
Petitioned DISMISSED.
Facts:
On March 20, 1995, Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23,
1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the
Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any
public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines",
and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until
after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted
for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election
returns and a Certificate of Votes dated May 27, 1995, and Frivaldo got the
highest number of votes followed by Lee.
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. Accordingly, at 8:30
in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for
the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted.” As such, when "the said
order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received
by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor. On
December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein
assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number
of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor;
and that Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of
Governor of Sorsogon.
Issue(s):
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure
his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office
of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino
citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold
the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in
light of existing jurisprudence?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. The law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike
that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three
years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship
on June 30, 1995, the very day the term of office of governor began, therefore
he was already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge
the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.
If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to
election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it
would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. Therefore, the law
intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even
if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him
to vote actually. Hence, registration, not the actual voting, is the core of this
"qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement
is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he
seeks to govern and not anywhere else. In fact, Frivaldo has voted in all the
previous elections including on May 8, 1995, thus, it is clear that he is a
registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen,
having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day of
the proclamation and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-
declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible. To
remove all doubts, the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the
filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
2. No. The decision of the Supreme Court that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen and thus disqualified was for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992
elections; and that there is no record of any "final judgment" of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of
the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
3. No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will, and
that he is "a second placer, . . . just that, a second placer.” The rule, therefore,
is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous.
FACTS
Teodoro C. Cruz was born in San Clementte, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United States, became a naturalized US
citizen on June 5, 1990, and as a consequence, lost his Filipino citizenship
(Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4).
On March 17, 1994, the respondent reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA No. 2630. He ran for was e ran for was elected
a lected as the Re s the Representativ presentative of the S e of the Second
District of Pangasinan in May11, 1998 elections.
Bengson filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the House of Representative since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Art. VI, Section 6 of themConstitution.
The HRET dismissed the petition for quo warranto on March 2, 2000. Cruz was
declared as the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the decision in the resolution
dated April the resolution dated April 27, 2000.
Petitioner then filed a petition asserting that the HRET had committed serious
error and grave abuse of direction, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when
it ruled that private respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
despite the fact that the respondent lost his Philippine citizenship when he
swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born
status.
Respondents contends that he acquired his status as natural born citizen when
he was repatriated since the phrase “from birth” in Art. IV, Section 2 refers
to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristics of being a natural born
citizen.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino considered a natural-
born Filipino upon his upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING
The petition is without merit.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Respondent Cruz took the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and has
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision to recover his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. The act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
7. LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009
FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn
Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position
as Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the
parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen,
hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the
constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was
eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned
in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply
to disqualification based on citizenship.
RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one
person should be in accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under
the law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor General or the
representative designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate
denaturalization proceeding.
3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not
apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure.
FACTS:
The respondent ran in the May 11, 1998 elections and was elected Mayor of
Tubao, La Union.
Thereafter, during the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioner ran for re-
election and won. She was proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor on May 16,
2001.
On May 26, 2001, the petitioner, also a candidate for Mayor during the May
2001 elections, filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Agoo, La
Union. He prayed that (a) the respondent be declared disqualified to hold the
position of Mayor of Tubao, La Union; (b) the respondent’s proclamation as
winner be declared null and void; and (c) the petitioner be proclaimed as the
duly-elected mayor.
In her Answer, the respondent argued that she had clearly and unequivocally
shown, through direct and positive acts, that she already renounced and
waived her right to permanently reside in the U.S.A. even before she
surrendered her "green card" in 1998. As a counterclaim, she prayed for the
payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, moral damages, and
exemplary damages.
On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition
for quo warranto. The RTC ruled that the respondent was qualified to occupy
the position as Municipal Mayor.
The RTC held that the respondent’s act of registration as a voter, or of filing
an income tax return, does not constitute an abandonment or waiver of her
status as a permanent resident of the U.S.A. 11 Nonetheless, it declared that
the respondent was no longer such permanent resident during the May 2001
elections because she had already waived her green card even prior to the
filing of her certificate of candidacy when she first ran for mayor in the 1998
elections. The RTC held that the waiver of the status as a permanent resident
under Sec. 68(e) of the Omnibus Election Code is still effective. It ruled that
Sec. 40(f) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 did not repeal Sec.
68(e). For one, there is nothing in the repealing clause of the LGC that
indicates an intention to repeal or modify the Omnibus Election Code.
Moreover, the two provisions are not inconsistent with each other. In fact,
Section 68(e) of the Omnibus Election Code complements Section 40(f) of the
LGC, in the sense that the former may supply the condition when permanent
residents may be qualified to run for public office. Dissatisfied, the petitioner
filed this petition for review.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondent was able to meet the residency requirement
for the position of municipal mayor during the May 2001 elections.
RULING:
Yes, the respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for the
position of municipal mayor during the May 2001 elections.
The issue in this case involves one of the essential qualifications for running
for public office, that is, the one-year residency requirement prescribed under
Section 39 of the LGC, thus:
The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for
like reasons, one intends to return.
(1) Residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain
there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.
Applying case law to the present case, it can be said that the respondent
effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the
status of a permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, we find that the respondent
reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of the May
2001 elections. The records show that she surrendered her green card to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way back in
1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S. residency could not have
been made clearer. Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the Philippines
for good in 1993, she continued living here and only went to the U.S.A. on
periodic visits to her children who were residing there. Moreover, she was
elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and served as such for the duration of her
term. We find such acts sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to
stay in the Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has once again
made the Philippines her permanent residence.
As ruled in Perez v. Commission on Elections:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew
up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a
U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was
approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel
Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the
two year residency in Oras was a material representation as he only resided
therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on
January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
Issues:
Held:
The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before
the election shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be
counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had
been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the
complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds
for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are
strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for
the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun
before the elections, should continue even after such elections and
proclamation of the winners.
2. No. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a
U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until
November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was
an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration
laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United
States by virtue of a “greencard,” which entitles one to reside permanently in
that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With
more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
In the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the
motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,[or
(2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings
and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely
alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse
party was not given notice thereof.
The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en
banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the
COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere “rehash” of his
earlier pleadings or did not raise “new matters.” Hence, the filing of the motion
suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case,
which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by
law.
10. Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999
Facts:
DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item
nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately
preceding the election.
Private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO is not a resident, much less a
registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year
residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since
January 1997.
The COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, his address
indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This negates all his protestations that he
established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent
registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on
May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency
requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives
On the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but
to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution
disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.
The result of the election shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number
of votes over his opponents
DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution which was denied
by the COMELEC en banc
Issues:
Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final,
conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on
Elections
Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional
district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998
elections
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo
for the disqualification of petitioner.
Ruling:
The first issue.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus
Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence
of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts
was made in the certificate of candidacy, That will include, among others, the
residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the
exclusion proceedings does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination
of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance
with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are
summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its
resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings not conclusive upon the
COMELEC.
However, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.
it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take
concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding.
Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the
voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be
registered as a voter in any other election.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province
of Sarangani.
It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings,
to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to
determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that
the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is
registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.
The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration
from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the election
Registration Board
The Second Issue.
the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that... place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until
a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile
at a time.
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and
that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio
St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence"
in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province
of Sarangani.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona... fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
There must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the
locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order
to establish a new domicile.
No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention
to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in
acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without
intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative
of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how
long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts
in Quezon City.
It give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay.
The Third Issue.
The COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has
jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no
final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number
of votes[38] and provided further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the
Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House
of Representatives.
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.[41] A candidate must
be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be
considered a member of the House of Representatives.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in
the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be
deemed a member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC
and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner and respondent, who was
the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, ran for the position of
Mayor of Tuburan, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction and also filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking the
issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) of Tubaran to count and tally the ballots cast in his favor.
On May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELEC issued an order
suspending the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected
mayor of Tubaran pending the resolution of this present petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion in lieu of a comment,
recommending that this Court grant the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has complied with the residency requirement for
elective positions
RULING:
YES.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner has duly proven that,
although he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, he later
transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as shown by
his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14,
2001 elections.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and
"residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election
law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. The Court
explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention
to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The record shows that when petitioner and his wife got married in 1990, they
resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on
the part of petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place
of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that he and his wife transferred
residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing
his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be
his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of
the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This is
proof of animus manendi.
Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner
was registered as a voter in Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate
of candidacy although he later withdrew the same. In the May 8, 1999
registration of voters, he was again registered as a voter in Barangay
Tangcal, Tubaran.
FACTS:
On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong
Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. Election
Officer Josefina P. Jareño ("Election Officer Jareño") refused to accept
Bautista's certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in
Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against
Election Officer Jareño with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14
("trial court").3 On 1 July 2002, the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareño
to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the
certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that
Section 7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandates Election Officer
Jareño to include the name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates until
the COMELEC directs otherwise. In compliance with the trial court's order,
Election Officer Jareño included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for
Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareño referred the
matter of Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the
COMELEC Law Department on 5 July 2002. On 11 July 2002, the COMELEC
Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of
candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC
en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department's recommendation
before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002.
During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private
respondent Divina Alcoreza ("Alcoreza") were candidates for the position of
Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of
votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197
votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers ("Board of Canvassers")7
proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the
alleged disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista.
HELD:
Under the Revised Administrative Code,33 one of the qualifications of an
elective municipal officer is that he must be a "qualified voter" in his
municipality. Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code reads:
On the other hand, under the Republic Act No. 2370,34 otherwise known as
the Barrio Charter, a candidate for the barrio council 35 must be a "qualified
elector." Section 8 of the Barrio Charter reads:
(b) Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or of a
crime which carries a penalty of at least one year imprisonment. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, in the 1958 case of Rocha v. Cordis, the Court held that a candidate for
an elective municipal office did not have to be a registered voter in the
municipality to qualify to run for an elective municipal office. Citing the earlier
case of Yra v. Abaño, the Court ruled that the words "qualified elector" meant
a person who had all the qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not
a person registered in the electoral list. In the same vein, the term "qualified"
when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registered voter.
However, under the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992, an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, must not
only be a "qualified elector" or a "qualified voter," he must also be a registered
voter. It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right
to vote and to be voted for public office. As early as 2001, he was already
aware that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters.
Yet, Bautista chose not to register anew that year despite his knowledge that
he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of Punong
Barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy should be disqualified and/or be
cancelled on the ground of material misrepresentation.
HELD:
NO. Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy should not be disqualified and/or be cancelled
on the ground of material misrepresentation.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which
a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities
under such circumstances.
A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on
the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any
effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No.
9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all
the Municipality of General MacArthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year
period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered
a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.
In Aquino v. COMELEC, the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is
able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of
residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this
Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence
that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General
MacArthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14
May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the
Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
To successfully challenge Ty’s disqualification, Japzon must clearly
demonstrate that Ty’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect
to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to
the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to
substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the
instant Petition for Certiorari is dismissed.
Facts:
ISSUE:
RULING:
No, for election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The
Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her
certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months,
because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents;
Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her
father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when
there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the
concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue;
(c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law;
when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even
assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the
right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the
residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.
HELD:
Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency
requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.
Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that he
was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a
resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election.
His certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace
of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands consistently
clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin was Concepcion,
Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a
lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in
Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency req uired to
prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its
terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino
himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because
he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City.
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of
the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself
claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short
length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in
Makati indicate that the sole purpose of transferring his physical
residence is not to acquires new residence or domicile but only to qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible
to impose the one-year residency requirement in a newly created political
district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not
created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing
geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati.
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before
the HRET praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a
Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative
District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.
Issue:
WON petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement
to be a Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987
Constitution.
Held/Ratio:
YES. The SC found the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement
under the Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the
factual circumstances of this case. SC find nothing wrong if petitioner
sometimes transacted business or received visitors in his Cabuyao house,
instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence, as there is nothing in the residency
requirement for candidates that prohibits them from owning property and
exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places aside from the
address they had indicated as their place of residence in their COC. It also
stated that there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which
require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one
district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to
qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither does the SC see
the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time
of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. It stated that the
Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property
owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that
district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property
in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the
residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property
requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement
would be unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to
establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin
and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have
owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have
attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. Although ownership of
property should never be considered a requirement for any candidacy,
petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently reside in Sta.
Rosa by purchasing residential properties in that city even prior to the May
2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of title issued in the name of
petitioner and his wife. In all, SC found that petitioner had adequately shown
that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona fide and was not merely
for complying with the residency requirement under election laws.
17.
Facts:
Issue:
Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?
Held:
Police power
Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image,
do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support
for such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product
endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their
exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.
Non-impairment of contract
Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his
disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to
enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this
Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract,
or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general
welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
Overbreadth
FACTS:
Petitioner Carmelo and private respondent Lorenzo Timbol were among the
candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga. Private
respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns during the
canvassing of the votes in which the Municipal Board of Canvasser did not rule
on his objections hence he brought the case to the COMELEC. The COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate. However, later on, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim
the winner. Petitioner Lazatin was proclaimed as winner. Private respondent
thus filed with the COMELEC petitions to declare petitioners proclamation as
void and to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to
act on the second petition and later on declared petitioner's proclamation as
void. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC’s revocation of petitioner's
proclamation in which the SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Private
respondent filed in the HRET an election protest. Petitioner moved to dismiss
private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing
Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET
filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the
HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by
private respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest.
Held:
Yes, HRET has jurisdiction over the protest filed by the private respondent.
The SC ruled that Sec. 250 of the OEC must be applied only to petitions filed
before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Art. VI,
Sec. 17 of the 1987 Consitution expressly stated that the Electoral Tribunals
of the Senate and the House of Representatives has the power to solely judge
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members. Therefore, HRET has jurisdiction over the protest.
Additional facts:
After the issue on jusrisdiction was resolved, in the Private-Respondent's
Counter/Cross Petition, Private respondent in HRET Case prayed for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner
herein from discharging his functions and duties as the Representative during.
However, the HRET resolved to defer action on said prayer as the grounds
therefor did not appear to be concrete. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration which was denied. Thus, private respondent asks the SC to
annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC can annul and set aside the HRET resolutions and issue
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
Held:
No, the SC cannot annul and set aside the HRET resolutions and issue a
Restraining Order/WPI. The power to issue a restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
issue such during the pendency of the protest, lies within the HRET. Moreover,
considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action with regard to
his prayer therefore there is actually nothing to review or and set aside.
Furthermore, the SC cannot review any final action taken by HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction unless it can be shown that there is grave abuse of
discretion in which in the instant case, there is none.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's
Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED.
FACTS:
On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates
for Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
the winner having garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s
28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a protest with the HRET, composed of 9
members, 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members of the House chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from political parties. A decision
was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was
insisted by the LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107
votes more than Pineda’s. Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the
Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner. Thereafter, Congressman
Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from the LDP
for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and
inviting LDP members to join. The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal
from the HRET and that his vote be withdrawn.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with
election protests in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the
majority party in the HRET.
No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all contests in
relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members. It is
created as non-partisan court to provide an independent and impartial tribunal
for determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate
the political component for their benefit and interests. The alleged “party
disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as a reason for his removal from the party,
when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the independence of the HRET.
Such members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be replaced
in cases of term expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the
party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause of termination.
Issues:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be
filled up completely and all the time?
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided
in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory.)
Ruling:
Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified,
but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of
the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941.
As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary
to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in
order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this
percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have
more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant
portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently
that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely
provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers
of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them.
But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the
mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative
districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"[22] to ensure
meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement
is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress
set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold.
Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations
into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to
be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first
party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be
entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received
500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it
garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on
the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of
seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less
than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than
the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first
party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of
mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a
seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient
violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number
of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end
up in such constitutional contravention.
Principles:
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number
of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the
parameters of the Filipino party-list system. They are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum
of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
"qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,
one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes."
ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec
5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2)Is the
2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional.
DECISION: Dismissed
FACTS:
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted
from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It
also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not
be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On
April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.
On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also
set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed
respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five
days from notice.
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the
second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15,
2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added
that the COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast
for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein,
until further orders of the Court.
Issues:
2. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list
elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
3. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group
for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not self-
executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance
with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to
sculpt in granite to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.
“The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give
more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but
also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to
benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's
benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those
which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to
participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics. “
23. ANG BAGONG BAYANI – OFW LABOR PARTY VS. POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMELEC, GR NO. 147589 (6-26-2001)
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their
petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-
list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and
RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
2. Yes, political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the
people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more
so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent
with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise
clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law
is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied
and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear
state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political
parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
24.
April 8, 2010
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma.
2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application
was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section
5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality
must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be
repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community
is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the
basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system
on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own
laws nor by any international laws to which we adhere.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be
filled up completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the
House of Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at
least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided
in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that
only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The
two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
Under a republican or representative state, all government authority
emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have
the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative
districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to
be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first
party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.
elections, directly or indirectly.