CASE NO.

G.R. No. L-2747  April 11, 1906

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AGUSTIN BASCO,Defendant-
Appellant.

MAPA, J.:

Topic: Making, importing, and uttering false coins - Art 163

FACTS:
The defendant Agustin Basco was arrested for arguing, insisting that the Philippine copper cent
(which was whitened with quicksilver), he offered as payment for a package of cigarettes should
be accepted the same as a peseta, a twenty cent piece, in which the store owner refused upon
noticing the real value and denomination of the coin.
 
ISSUE:
W.O.N the defendant is liable for the crime of counterfeiting money [NO]
 
RULING:
It was held that the facts do not constitute the crime of counterfeiting money but that of estafa.
 
There can be no counterfeiting of money when no spurious or clipped coin was used. The coins in
question were genuine copper cents and bore their original designs and inscriptions. The
defendant did not make or attempt to make any alteration in the designs and inscriptions of the
said coins.
 
The acts committed by the defendant for the purpose of defrauding third persons by deceiving
them the real value of the coins in question constitute the crime of estafa and not counterfeiting
money.
 
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant acquitted of the charge of
counterfeiting money contained in the complaint, and the Attorney-General is directed to present
another complaint against him for the crime of estafa.

CASE NO. 2
PEOPLE vs TIN CHING TING
G.R. No. L-4620 
January 30, 1952

TOPIC: COUNTERFEITING COINS – MUTILATION OF COINS; IMPORTATION AND UTTERANCE OF

MUTILATED COINS (ARTICLE 164 OF THE RPC)

FACTS:
 On March 14, 1950, the Provincial Delegate Prosecutor of the province of Rizal filed a
complaint for violation of Article 165 of the Revised Penal Code against Tin Ching Ting
alleging that said defendant had in its possession a counterfeit gold coin of five dollars, an
imitation of the currency of genuine gold from the United States of America.
 On March 15, 1950, the defendant's attorney filed a motion for dismissal, alleging that for
the defendant to incur criminal responsibility, it was necessary that the counterfeit
currency be legal tender in the United States; and that the currency imitated by the
defendant is no longer legal tender in the United States and much less in the Philippines.
 The Court dismissed the complaint, and the Provincial Prosecutor appealed immediately.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Tin Ching Ting is liable for the crime of Mutilation of coins - Importation and
utterance of mutilated coins under Article 164 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING: 
The Court held NO. This is based on the contention that the defendant had not committed any
infraction since the counterfeit currency was no longer legal tender, hence, the complaint was
dismissed. 
"Mutilation" means to take off part of the metal either by filing it or substituting it for another
metal of inferior quality. 
Mutilation is to diminish by ingenuous means the metal in the coin. One who mutilates a coin
does not do so for the sake of mutilating, but to take advantage of the metal abstracted; he
appropriates a part of the metal of the coin. Hence, the coin diminishes in intrinsic value. One
who utters said mutilated coin receives its legal value, much more than its intrinsic value. Thus, it
is only in Article 164 of the Revised Penal Code does the law require “legal tender” as an element
of the offense in the case of mutilation. It is indispensable that the mutilated coin be of legal
tender.
On the other hand, Article 165 of the Revised Penal Code does not require that the coin be of
legal tender. Thus, a person in possession of, with intention to put into circulation, a false five-
dollar gold coin, an imitation of the genuine five-dollar gold coin of the United States, is liable
under Article 165 of the Revised Penal Code, even if such gold coin is no longer legal tender in the
United States, and much less than in the Philippines. But if the coin being uttered or possessed
with intent to utter is a multilated coin, it must be of legal tender coin, because of Article 164 to
which Article 165 is related. 
Article 163 of the Revised Criminal Code punishes: (a) whoever manufactures, imports, or sells
counterfeit currency with a higher prison and a fine that does not exceed 10,000 pesos, "if the
counterfeit currency is gold or silver of the United States or the Philippine Islands. " (b) with
correctional prison in its degrees minirao and a half and a fine that does not exceed 2,000 pesos,"
if the counterfeit currency is fractional currency of the United States or the Philippine Islands ";
and (c) with correctional imprisonment in its minimum degree and a fine that does not exceed
1,000 pesos, "if the counterfeit currency is from a foreign country." Nor does this article require
that the currency be legal tender.
Article 169 of the Revised Penal Code is similar to Article 300 of the Spanish Penal Code, which
punishes those who circulate counterfeit currency, without requiring that the currency be legal
tender.
The contention of the defense is completely unfounded, therefore, when it maintains that, for the
accused to incur criminal responsibility, it is essential that the counterfeit currency be legal
tender. 
Applying the provisions of Articles 163, 164 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code, the dismissal
order is revoked, and the case is returned to the court of origin to be decided on its merits.

CASE NO. 3
G.R. No. L-62943 July 14, 1986

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Now INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT) and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
respondents.

Facts:

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) is a government owned and controlled
corporation is the successor-in- interest of the defunct NWSA. The Philippine National Bank (PNB), on the
other hand, is the depository bank of MWSS and its predecessor-in-interest NWSA. 

Among the several accounts of NWSA with PNB is NWSA Account No. 6. The authorized signature for said
Account No. 6 were those of MWSS treasurer Jose Sanchez, its auditor Pedro Aguilar, and its acting
General Manager Victor L. Recio. By special arrangement with the PNB, the MWSS used personalized
checks in drawing from this account. These checks were printed for MWSS by its printer, F. Mesina
Enterprises

During the months of March, April and May 1969, twenty-three (23) checks were prepared, processed,
issued and released by NWSA, all of which were paid and cleared by PNB and debited by PNB against
NWSA Account No. 6

The foregoing checks were deposited by the payees Raul Dizon, Arturo Sison and Antonio Mendoza in their
respective current accounts with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and Philippine Bank
of Commerce (PBC) in the months of March, April and May 1969. Thru the Central Bank Clearing, these
checks were presented for payment by PBC and PCIB to the defendant PNB, and paid, also in the months of
March, April and May 1969. 

Subsequent investigation however, conducted by the NBI showed that Raul Dizon, Arturo Sison and
Antonio Mendoza were all fictitious persons

On June 11, 1969, NWSA addressed a letter to PNB requesting the immediate restoration to its Account
No. 6, of the total sum of P3,457,903.00 corresponding to the total amount of these twenty-three (23)
checks claimed by NWSA to be forged and/or spurious checks. "In view of the refusal of PNB to credit back
to Account No. 6 the said total sum of P3,457,903.00 MWSS filed the instant complaint on November 10,
1972 before the Court of First Instance of Manila

In its answer, PNB contended among others, that the checks in question were regular on its face in all
respects, including the genuineness of the signatures of authorized NWSA signing officers and there was
nothing on its face that could have aroused any suspicion as to its genuineness and due execution and; that
NWSA was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the loss.

Issue:

Whether or not the drawee bank PNB should be liable and bear the loss for the cash paid on the forged
checks of MWSS

Ruling:

No. There was no categorical finding that the 23 checks were signed by persons other than those
authorized to sign. On the contrary, the NBI reports shows that the fraud was an “inside job” and that the
delay in the reconciliation of the bank statements and the laxity and loss of records control in the printing
of the personalized checks facilitated the fraud. It further doesn’t provide that the signatures were
forgeries.

Forgery cannot be presumed. It should be proven by clear, convincing and positive evidence. This wasn’t
done in the present case. 

The petitioner cannot invoke Section 23 because it was guilty of negligence not only before the questioned
checks but even after the same had already been negotiated .

We cannot fault the respondent drawee Bank for not having detected the fraudulent encashment of the
checks because the printing of the petitioner's personalized checks was not done under the supervision
and control of the Bank. There is no evidence on record indicating that because of this private printing the
petitioner furnished the respondent Bank with samples of checks, pens, and inks or took other
precautionary measures with the PNB to safeguard its interests.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the petitioner was in a better position to detect and prevent the
fraudulent encashment of its checks.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1982 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
CASE NO. 4
Case # 4 – Forging Treasury or bank notes of Other Documents Payable to Bearer;
Importing and uttering such false or forged Notes and Documents.

JN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and SPS. RODRIGO and LEONOR STA.

ANA, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE
CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 151060 August 31, 2005

NARCISO V. CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE EXPORT and FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 151311. August 31, 2005

FACTS:
On December 13, 1979, petitioner JN Development Corporation (JN) and Traders Royal
Bank (TRB) entered into an agreement whereby TRB would extend to JN an Export
Packaging Credit Line for 2,000,000 pesos. The loan was covered by several securities
including a real estate mortgage and a letter of guarantee from respondent
“PhilGuarantee '' covering 70% of the credit line. With PhilGuarantee issuing a guarantee
in favor of TRB, JN, spouses Rodrigo and Leonor Sta. Ana and petitioner Narciso Cruz
executed a Deed of Undertaking to assure repayment to PhilGuarantee.
On October 08, 1980, TRB requested PhilGuarantee to make good its guarantee because
of JN’s failure to pay the loan upon maturity. PhilGuarantee then informed JN and inquired
about the latter of its settlement. Because of no response, PhilGuarantee paid TRB
934,824.34 pesos. PhilGuarantee made several demands on JN, but the latter failed to
pay. 
On May 30, 1983, JN, through Rodrigo Sta. Ana, proposed to settle the obligation by way
of development and sale of the mortgaged property which, however, PhilGuarantee
rejected. 
PhilGuarantee thus filed a Complaint for collection of money and damages against herein
petitioners which the RTC dismissed. It ruled that petitioners are not liable to reimburse
PhilGuarantee what it had paid to TRB. In addition, the RTC held that since
PhilGuarantee’s guarantee was good for only one year from 17 December 1979, or until
17 December 1980, and since it was not renewed after the expiry of said period,
PhilGuarantee had no more legal duty to pay TRB on 10 March 1981. The RTC likewise
ruled that Cruz cannot be held liable under the Undertaking since he was not the
one who signed the document, in line with its finding that his signature found in
the records is totally different from the signature on the Undertaking.
According to the RTC, the failure of TRB to sue JN for the recovery of the loan precludes
PhilGuarantee from seeking recoupment from the spouses Sta. Ana and Cruz what it paid
to TRB. 
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, PhilGuarantee appealed to the CA which reversed the
decision of the RTC and ordered petitioners to pay PhilGuarantee ₱934,624.34, plus
service charge and interest.
Also, the CA found that Narciso Cruz was unable to prove the alleged forgery of
his signature in the Undertaking, the evidence presented not being sufficient to
overcome the presumption of regularity of the Undertaking which is a notarized
document. 
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but the motion for reconsideration was
denied by the CA for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review. 
Cruz questions the reversal of the ruling of the trial court anent his liability as a signatory
to the Undertaking. PhilGuarantee maintains that there is no sufficient evidence proving
the alleged forgery of Cruz’s signature on the Undertaking, which is a notarized document
and as such must be accorded the presumption of regularity.
 ISSUE:
WON Cruz is not liable as a signatory to the undertaking because of the alleged forgery. 
RULING:
The Court ruled that there was no Forgery in this case. The CA is correct in reversing the
decision of the trial court. 
Save for the denial of Narciso Cruz that it was not his signature in the Undertaking and
the perfunctory comparison of the signatures, nothing in the records would support the
claim of forgery. Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Mere
denial will not suffice to overcome the positive value of the Undertaking, which is a
notarized document, has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. Even in cases
where the alleged forged signature was compared to samples of genuine signatures to
show its variance therefrom, this Court still found such evidence insufficient. Mere
variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same were
forged.
“WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision  of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61318 is AFFIRMED.”

CASE NO. 5
CASE NO. 6

G.R. No. L-22032             March 4, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
CAMOLO DIGORO alias  PANONDIONGAN, defendant and appellant.
TOPIC: Illegal possession and use of false treasury and bank notes and other
instruments of credit

FACTS: An information charging Counterfeiting of Treasury and Bank Notes

under Article 166 of the Revised Penal Code was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Lanao on June 3, 1959 against Camolo Digoro alias Panondiongan,
Hadji Solaiman Digoro and Macasasab Dalomangcob. Amended information
charging the same offense were filed on June 5, 1959 and August 13, 1959.
On August 14, 1959, upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, on March 20, 1961, the case was provisionally dismissed, upon
the Provincial Fiscal's motion, in regard to the accused Hadji Solaiman Digoro
and Macasasab Dalomangcob. On that date, however, an amended information
was filed against Camolo Digoro alias Panondiongan. It was captioned "For:
Illegal Possession of Counterfeit Treasury and Bank Notes".
A decision was thereupon rendered sentencing the accused to suffer
imprisonment of not more than ten (10) years and one (1) day and not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day, and to pay the costs.
From said judgment the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that the amended information to which he pleaded guilty, does not
charge an offense. Said appeal was thereafter certified to this Court, by
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 11, 1963, as involving
questions purely of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Digoro is criminally liable in violation of Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code?
RULING: No. Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone without
anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense
under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code the possession must be
with intent to use  said false treasury or bank notes. From the provision
of the law the foregoing is clear:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other
instruments of credit.—Unless the act be one of those coming under the
provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use
or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed in said articles.
It follows that an information, as in this case, alleging possession of false
treasury and bank notes without alleging intent to use the same but only
"intent to possess" them, charges no offense.
From the allegations in the information to which the accused pleaded guilty,
intent to use cannot be clearly inferred. It is true it was stated that the
accused possessed the false treasury and bank notes "unlawfully and
feloniously ... Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code". Such statements, however, are not allegations of facts but
mere conclusions that the facts alleged constitute the offense sought to be
charged. Furthermore, the information alleged "intent to possess" instead of
intent to use. Such allegation precludes clear inference of intent to use, in the
absence of express allegation of the latter, since intent to use entails intent to
part with the possession.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed is hereby set aside and the case is
remanded for new prosecution under an appropriate and valid information.
Costs de oficio. So ordered.

CASE NO. 7

CASE NO. 8

G.R. No. 194367

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ alias EMMANUEL DINO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Facts

1. The informant Francis dela Cruz narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from
Petitioner with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery
employee, however, recognized the bill as a fake and refused to accept bill.
2. JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise
inspection and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-
three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit, which was later on
confirmed by a representative of Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas to be counterfeited bills.
3. Petitioner was convicted of illegal possession and use of false bank notes under Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
4. Petitioner filed for appeal and raised the defense of frame-up and contended that one of the
elements of the crime which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because
the informant Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.

Issue

Whether Petitioner is guilty of violating Article 168 or the Revised Penal Code?

Held
No, one of the elements of the crime charged is that the person in possession should either used or
possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. The mere possession of false
treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. A crime to constitute an
offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or
bank notes.

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
1avvp

intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake
₱500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only
informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila jail bakery
using a fake ₱500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner
asked Francis dela Cruz use the ₱500.00 bill it is therefore a hearsay and not based on their personal
knowledge.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 29, 2010
and Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are
REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized
under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

CASE NO. 9

JOVEN VS CARUNGIN
G.R NO. 140472
June 10, 2002

FACTS:

1. The controversy revolves around the allegedly forged signatures on documents that could
be examined by the Court of Appeals (CA).
2. The petitioners are sisters and the children of Nicanor Teodoro and Francisca Ciriaco. They
filed their complaint in 1982 alleging that their mother was the owner of the subject
property which was titled in her name.
3. Said property is now in the name of respondent United Church of Christ in the Philippines
(or UCCP) for this was donated to it by the Commission on Ecumenical Mission in that
Deed of Donation.
4. Petitioners claim that their parents never sold the lot to the Board of Foreign Missions nor
anyone else, and that their purported signatures on the impugned Deed of Sale have been
found to be forgeries by government handwriting experts.
5. Respondents filed this suit imputing the fraudulent act upon respondents and thus asked for
the declaration of nullity of the subject deed and of TCT issued in the name of UCCP, the
reconveyance of the subject property in their favor, and for the award of damages.
6. Respondents denied that there was forgery and insisted that the said spouses legally
conveyed their property under a valid deed of sale. They likewise averred that the action
was already barred by prescription and/or laches for petitioners filed this suit after sleeping
on their alleged rights for forty-five (45) years.
7. In its ‘Questioned Document Report, the NBI made the finding that the sample and
questioned signatures of Francisca were not written by the same person, while no definite
opinion was given as to Nicanor’s signatures because of the insufficiency in numbers of his
sample signatures.
8. The PC Crime Laboratory examination came to the conclusion that the signatures of both
Francisca and Nicanor were written by persons other than the said spouses.
9. The court a quo rendered its first decision of the case dismissing the complaint of
petitioners on the grounds of prescription and laches, and as such it did not anymore see it
fit to resolve the other issues of the case.
10. The CA reversed the RTC, which had "placed unquestioning faith and reliance on the
findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) Crime Laboratory Service.
11. The CA denied having ever made a finding that the alleged forgery in the questioned Deed
of Sale had never been rebutted by respondents when they failed to raise the matter in their
Brief or Memorandum. Rather, the appellate court supposedly confined itself to determining
whether petitioners’ Complaint was barred by prescription and laches. "The case would not
have been remanded to the court a quo if there had been a finding that respondents had
indeed admitted the fact of forgery."
 12. The appellate court doubted the findings of the NBI and the PC handwriting experts,
because "the documents from which the sample signatures were taken were either mere
photocopies, or dated years away from the questioned Deed of Sale of 1936."
13. The CA relied on the validity of the Deed of Sale, because it was notarized. Moreover,
Francisca Ciriaco, during her lifetime, never protested the building of the church in 1936.
Her nonchalant attitude towards the "intrusion" on the subject property was likewise
displayed by her husband and her sister who was the administrator/caretaker of her
properties.

ISSUE:
WON PETITIONERS SUCCEED IN PROVING THAT THE SIGNATURES OF
FRANCISCA CIRIACO AND NICANOR TEODORO HAD BEEN FORGED.

RULING:
No. Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence.
The burden of proof lies in the party alleging forgery.

After comparing the questioned signatures, the CA concluded that they were not forged. The SC
affirms its finding. Indeed, the best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the
instrument itself showing the alleged forgeries. The fact of forgery can be established by comparing
the allegedly false signature with the authentic or genuine one.

It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the NBI and
the PC, are not binding upon courts. This principle holds true especially when the question
involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.

Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting.

A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because
the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at
a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

Finally, the fact that petitioners waited until 1982 to file their Complaint assailing the validity of
the 1936 Deed of Sale detracts from their credibility. To repeat, petitioners’ mother, father or aunt
(who was the administrator/caretaker of their mother’s properties) had not done anything to protest
the building of the church on the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

CASE NO. 10

People vs. Reodica and Cordero 

No. 42557. December 7, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
LORENZO REODICA and SINFOROSO CORDERO, defendants. LORENZO
REODICA, appellant
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:

FACTS
REODICA WAS THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF BACUIT, PROVINCE OF
PALAWAN.
The information alleges that he falsified the municipal payroll for the month of
July making it appear therein that Cordero, rendered services as municipal
secretary from July 23 to July 31.

CORDERO WAS ACTUALLY ABSENT FROM 1931 OF JULY UNTIL 1933

Which was not true, for said Cordero was absent from the municipality of
Bacuit from July 23, 1931, and did not return until 1933. 

ISSUE
Whether or not Reodico is liable for Falsification of Documents by a public
official.

RULING
No. The Reodico is not guilty of the falsification of the payroll.

ALTERATIONS NOT AFFECTING THE DOCUMENT

Alterations made in a public document not affecting either the veracity thereof
or its effects, do not constitute the crime of falsification.

The evidence discloses that this municipal payroll was submitted to

the Reodica by the municipal president, already prepared, together
with a letter (Exhibit 3) authorizing him to pay Sinforoso Cordero's salary for
the second half of that month.

And other documents showing that said Sinforoso Cordero was granted a leave
of eight days from July 23 to July 31.

PAYROLL WAS ALREADY SIGNED WHEN REODICA RECEIVED THE

PAYROLL
When this payroll was received by the appellant on July 23, it was already
signed and payment thereof approved by the president, with the latter's
certification that the services therein mentioned were rendered. 

PRESIDENT CERTIFIES THE SERVICES RENDERED, NOT REODICO

This being the case, the appellant is not guilty of the falsification of this
payroll, as alleged in the information, because the president and not he is the
one who certifies that the services of the officers mentioned therein were in
fact rendered. 
However, in view of the leave granted to Sinforoso Cordero from July 23 to
July 31, for the purposes of the payment of his salary, this amounted to his
having rendered services during this period. 

While the information likewise states that Reodico certified in the payroll that
he paid Sinforoso Cordero's salary on July 31, 1931, it does not allege,
however, that this was not true, and although it appears that Reodico made
this payment on July 23, he was not charged with falsification in this sense.

At any rate, Sinforoso Cordero having been in fact paid, it was immaterial
whether this was done on July 23 or July 31. 

Such alterations, even granting that the appellant was responsible therefore,
do not affect either the veracity of the document or the effects thereof, and do
not constitute the crime of falsification. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 25, 1885, and June 21, 1886.) 

For the foregoing considerations, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio. 

So ordered. 

CASE NO. 11
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PATRIA E. YANZA, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-12089
April 29, 1960
Topic: Falsification by Pubic Officer, Employee or Notary or ecclesiastic minister
FACTS:
1. Defendant-appellee Patria Yanza was elected municipal councilor in the municipality of
Tayabas, Quezon Province in a general elections held in November 8, 1955.
2. The Provincial Fiscal filed an information charging her with falsification because she made
the false statement that she was “eligible” to the said office although she knew fully well
that she was under 23 years old, thereby making an untruthful statement in the narration of
facts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of falsification.

RULING:
No. The Court held that she may not be declared guilty of falsification, especially because the law
which she has allegedly violated (Art. 171) punishes the making of untruthful statements in a
narration of facts. When the defendant certified that she was eligible for the position, she
practically wrote a conclusion of law, which turned out to be inexact or erroneous, not entirely
groundless.

Had she stated that she was born on March 29, 1931, she would undoubtedly have been guilty of
falsification, because the date of her birth was a matter of fact. When she declared that she was
“eligible”, she merely expressed her belief that the 23-year requirement could be adequately met if
she reached 23 years upon assuming the councilorship.

Unfortunately, she made a mistake of judgement, but she could not have been held to have
intentionally made a false statement of fact in violation of Art. 171 of the RPC.

Wherefore, the dismissal of the charges must be, and is hereby affirmed. So ordered.

CASE NO. 12
ADOLFO CAUBANG, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. L-62634

June 26, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Topic: Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2.
Digested by: Servienrey P. Taño

This is a petition filed by the accused Adolfo Caubang to review the Court of Appeals decision
which affirmed in toto his conviction of the crime of falsification of a public document punished
under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2.
At the time Caubang was charged with committing the crime, he was the incumbent mayor of
Baganga, Davao Oriental.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction for falsification
of the official document in question, where the entries therein are not absolutely false and no
damage was caused to the government or third parties, and in the absence of criminal intent.

RULING:

No. The Court held that the CA did not err in affirming the judgment of conviction for falsification
of the official document, and is convinced that there is strong evidence that leaves no doubt as to
the guilt of the accused.

In the case of United States v. Castillo, the Court ruled that the utterance of such an instrument,
when unexplained is strong evidence tending to establish the fact that the utterer either himself
forged the instrument or cause it to be forged, and that this evidence, taken together with the
further evidence set out . . . and brought out on the trial of the case establishes the guilt of the
accused with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt."

In the case at bar, the filing of the statement of assets and liabilities remained unexplained. The
evidence conclusively shows that the statement of assets and liabilities was not among those
brought by the petitioner from Davao to Manila. The statement was not an authentic
representation of the assets and liabilities of the BCASSI. It was surreptitiously signed by someone
who imitated the signature of Baltazar Pagaduan. This fact, together with other proofs presented
by the prosecution, is strong evidence tending to show that the accused Adolfo Caubang either
himself forged the statement or caused it to be forged by someone else. Worthy of note is the
willingness of the accused to accomplish all that were necessary to acquire a certificate of
incorporation.

The petitioner contends that there were absolutely no false entries in the statement of assets and
liabilities as to make its execution injurious or damaging to the government or third parties. The
claim is without merit. In the falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or not the
contents set forth therein were false. What important is the fact that the signature of another was
counterfeited.

In a crime of falsification of a public or official document, the principal thing punished is the
"violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed."
(People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 [1924]; People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913 [1955]; Sarep v.
Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 440 [1989]) Thus, intent to gain or to injure is immaterial. Even more
so, the gain or damage is not necessary.

The SC also discussed the presumption of Material Authority, it where, if a person had in his
possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for absence of reversible error on the part of the
respondent court. The appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

CASE NO. 13

LAYNO VS. PEOPLE

GR. NO. 93842
7 SEPTEMBER 1992
TOPIC: Article 171 (Falsification of Public Officer)

FACTS:
 The petitioner was the incumbent municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
As chief executive of the municipality, he had the authority to appoint
employees in the municipal government of Lianga.chanroblescom : v
 On 16 March 1980, the petitioner appointed Fernando Y. Layno, his
legitimate son, meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer of
Lianga. He signed the appointment document twice, first as the appointing
authority and second, as the personnel officer, certifying" that all the
required supporting papers have been complied with, reviewed and found to
be in order.
 Among the supporting papers required for the appointment is the
Certification signed by the petitioner, reading as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In connection with the appointment of MR. FERNANDO Y. LAYNO, Lianga,

Surigao del Sur, in the Office of Municipal Treasurer, Lianga, Surigao del Sur at
the rate of FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS ONLY per
annum (P4,632.00), effective March 16, 1980. I HEREBY CERTIFY
THAT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. He is not related to me to any person exercising immediate supervision

over him within the third degree of either consanguinity or affinity.
 On the same day, Fernando Y. Layno took his oath of office with the
petitioner as the administering officer.
 Thereafter, the appointment paper, together with the required supporting
documents, was forwarded to the Davao Regional Office of the Civil Service
Commission and was received by the said office on 17 May 1980. On 20 May
1980, the appointment of Fernando Y. Layno was approved. Three days later,
the approved appointment was returned to the office of the petitioner.
 On 28 September 1988, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan
with the crime of falsification of public document defined in Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
 When arraigned, petitioner assisted by counsel de parte pleaded not guilty.
 At the pre-trial held on 9 February 1989. the petitioner admitted that: (1) he
was the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, on the date alleged in
the information; (2) that, as mayor, he had the authority to appoint
employees in the municipal government of Lianga; (3) that on 16 March 1980,
he appointed Fernando Y. Layno meat inspector in the office of the municipal
treasurer of Lianga, Surigao del Sur; and (4) that the appointee is his
legitimate son. Upon motion of the Petitioner, his admission that he
appointed Fernando Y. Layno was made subject to the qualification that he
later on revoked the appointment upon being advised that it was against the
law on nepotism.
 On 15 June 1990, the Sandiganbayan as aforestated promulgated its decision
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of public document defined and penalized in Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not good faith is a valid defense in a charge of falsification of
public documents in the case at bar.

RULING:
 No, The Court has indeed ruled that good faith is a valid defense in a charge
of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts. In the present case, however, the petitioner’s claim of
good faith is unavailing as it is inconsistent with his very defense that he did
not sign nor issue the certification in question. As held by the Sandiganbayan-
 “The plea cannot be accepted. He expressly admitted that Fernando Y. Layno
was his legitimate son. Nevertheless, he deliberately disregarded that fact,
brazenly certifying that he was not related to him within the third degree of
consanguinity. The perversion was designed to conceal his father-son
relationship from the Civil Service Commission and thereby deceived it, as it
was in fact deceived, in approving the appointment he extended to him. The
criminal intent is not only obvious, but is also presumed, from the untruthful
narration of fact. The crime of falsification having already been committed,
no acts showing subsequent repentance and abandonment of purpose, even
if true, can relieve the accused of his penal liability."
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED.

CASE NO. 14
G.R. No. 146731             January 13, 2004
AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and SERVANDO BERNANTE
CARPIO, J.:
TOPIC: Falsification by public officer or employee- Art. 171 RPC

FACTS:

Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio is a utility worker at the Cebu State College of Science and
Technology, College of Fisheries Technology ("CSCST-CFT"), Carmen, Cebu while Private
respondent Servando Bernante is an Assistant Professor IV.

On 30 March 1998, Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, falsification

of public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against Bernante. She also filed
with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification of public document.

Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-painting of obscene and unprintable words
against her on the walls of the Campus; that Bernante shouted defamatory words against her
while she was inside the school premises; and that Bernante made it appear in his leave
application that he was on forced leave and on vacation, but in truth, Bernante was serving a 20-
day prison term because of his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Bernante was able to receive his salary during his incarceration since the school Superintendent
approved Bernante’s application for leave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to
receive salary for that period because of his "falsified leave applications."

For his part, Bernante did not deny that he was in prison from 15 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. He
maintained that he received his salary for that period because of his duly approved leave
applications.
The Ombudsman dismissed the administrative and criminal complaints against Bernante on the
ground that there is no regulation restricting the purpose or use of an employee’s earned leave
credits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission to state the location of a vacationing employee constitutes the crime
of falsification of public document

RULING:

No, the omission to state the location of a vacationing employee does not constitute the crime of
falsification of public document.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification of public
documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third
person.

As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon
Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his leave of absence. "Legal
obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.
Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making false
statements in a narration of facts absent any legal obligation to disclose where he would spend
his vacation leave and forced leave.

The Court’s evaluation of the records leads it to the conclusion that the Ombudsman has carefully
studied the merits of the criminal complaint. Where the Ombudsman has thoroughly examined
the merits of the complaint, it would not be right to subject the private respondent to an
unnecessary and prolonged anguish. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

CASE NO. 15

Galeos v. People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 174730-37
February 9, 2011

Facts:

Ong was the Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu from 1986 to 1998. On June 1994, he extended
permanent appointments to Rosalio Galeos for the position of Construction and Maintenance Man in the
Office of the Municipal Engineer. In his 1993 SALN, Galeos answered “No” to the question: “To the best of
your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working
in the government?”.

In Galeos 1994 and 1995 SALNs, the boxes for “Yes” and “No” to the same query were left in blank. In all
these documents, Ong’s signature appears as the person who administered the oath of Galeos. It turned
out however that Ong and Galeos are related since their mothers are sisters.

Because of this, Ong and Galeos were charged with falsification of public documents under Article 171, par.
4. Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local Government Code has been complied with in
the issuance of the appointments" are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as both require the
application of the rules on relationship under the law of succession. Galeos argues that he did not make
untruthful or false statements in his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive averment and thus
silence or non-disclosure cannot be considered one.

Issue:

Whether the accused are guilty as charged.

Held:

Yes, the accused are guilty of the crime of falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:

Article 171, Paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastical minister—The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those
in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
xxxx

The elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts
are the following:

a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

b) he has legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.

In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had
taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the
offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when:

1. he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or
2. he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.

Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of
gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not call for
an application of law in a particular set of facts. Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in
his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he
made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor,
within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins. By withholding information on
his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification
considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in
the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991.

Moreover, while it is true that as a general rule, it is not the duty of the administering officer to ascertain
the truth of the statements found in a document. The reason for this is that the administering officer has
no way of knowing if the facts stated therein are indeed truthful. However, when the facts laid out in the
document directly involves the administering officer, then he has an opportunity to know of their truth or
falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless administers the oath despite the false contents of the
document, which are known to him to be false, he is liable, not because he violated his duty as an
administering officer, but because he participated in the falsification of a document.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is AFFIRMED.

CASE NO. 16
LAMSEN VS PEOPLE

HILARIO LAMSEN, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

G.R. NO.: 227069

DATE: November 22, 2017
TOPIC: Falsification of Public Documents
DIGEST BY: Camille Aubrey Villaflor

FACTS:

1. Hilario Lamsen, being then a private individual, prepared, forged, and falsified, or caused to be
prepared, forged, and falsified, a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 21, 1993 notarized and
acknowledged before Santiago R. Reyes, Notary Public for and in the City of Manila.

2. That spouses Aniceta Dela Cruz and  Nestor Tandas, the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.  V-16641, sold, transferred, and conveyed to Lamsen
for and in consideration of P150,000.00, by feigning, simulating and counterfeiting the
signatures of said spouses. Thus, making it appear as it did appear the spouses indeed had
transferred ownership of the said parcel of land  subject matter of said deed of sale of herein
accused, and that the spouses participated and intervened  in the signing of the said document,
when in truth and in fact, as the said  accused well knew that such was not the case. The
spouses did not sell the said property to Lamsen and that they did not participate and intervene
in the signing  of the said deed of sale, much less did they authorized the said accused or 
anybody else to sign their names or affix their signatures thereon, to the damage and prejudice
of public interest.

3. Teresita and Carmelita who were the surviving heirs was looking for Aniceta’s duplicate title of
the subject property, but the same was allegedly nowhere to be found. Teresita then executed an
affidavit of loss and concurrently executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Aniceta.
She also filed a petition for the issuance of second owner's duplicate copy before the RTC of
Valenzuela City. However, the petition was dismissed because of the opposition of Lamsen, who
claimed that the original copy of the owner's duplicate title could not have been lost because it
was with him.

4. Teresita went to the Notarial Section of Manila to get a certified true copy of the subject deed
but was given a mere photocopy thereof, since the original was no longer on file. She then
submitted the photocopy of the deed to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, as the
signatures of the spouses appeared to be forged. Upon examination, Document Examiner II
Alex Batiles (Batiles) confirmed that the subject deed was indeed falsified. He revealed that
there were dissimilarities between the questioned and standard signatures of Aniceta and
Nestor (spouses Tandas), and that they were not written by one and the same person.

5. Thus, an Information was filed before the MeTC, charging Lamsen of the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents. The MeTC found Lamsen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document. With the subsequent denial of Lamsen’s motion for
reconsideration, he filed an appeal before the RTC which affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto.
Undaunted, Lamsen filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Aggrieved,
he filed an appeal before the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. With the subsequent
denial of his motion for reconsideration/new trial, Lamsen filed the instant petition before the
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lamsen is guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, as defined
and penalized under Article 172 (1) of the RPC.

RULING: No, Lamsen is not guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, as defined and
penalized under Article 172 (1) of the RPC.

The elements of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172 (1) are as follows: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
in Article 171; and (c) the falsification was committed in a public document.

In this case, Lamsen is the offender which is then the private individual. Then it was alleged
that he committed acts of falsification through forging the signature of the spouses in the Absolute
Deed of Sale he presented. The prosecution presented an expert witness, Batiles, to prove its allegation
of falsification or forgery.  While Batiles testified during cross-examination that the questioned
1âwphi1

signatures were not written by one and the same person, and that there is a certainty that the subject
deed was falsified, the Court, however, finds this declaration unreliable and inconclusive,
as it is inconsistent with the Questioned Document Report No. 130-03. In the said Report, which
Batiles himself issued after examining the allegedly falsified subject deed, Batiles found that no
definite conclusion can be rendered because the documents submitted by the
prosecution were mere photocopies of the original.

Batiles further clarified that there are other handwriting elements which could not be
determined in the photocopy, such as minor details which could not be visibly detected by the naked
eye. Notably, the genuineness and due execution of a photocopy could not be competently established
without a copy of the original. Photocopies are considered secondary evidence which can be rendered
inadmissible absent any proof that the original was lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered.

Here, not only did the prosecution fail to present the original copy of the subject
deed in court, it likewise did not provide ample proof that the same was lost, destroyed,
or in the custody or under the control of Lamsen. Since mere photocopies of the subject deed
were used to examine the questioned and standard signatures of spouses Tandas, no valid
comparison can be had between them, thereby rendering Batiles' declaration
inconclusive to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen.

Thus, the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to grant the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35283 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Hilario Lamsen
is ACQUITTED of the crime of Falsification of Public Document on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The bail bonds posted for his provisional liberty are consequently cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 17

G.R. No. 194390               August 13, 2014

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public
document, penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

Venancio M. Sevilla, a public officer, being then a memberof the [S]angguniang [P]anlunsod of
Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make a
false statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his
C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an official document, which he submitted
to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he
stated that no criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the accused fully well knew, he
has a pending case before the MTC.

He averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza),
a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.

The Sandiganbayan found him GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless
Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the RPC because he merely failed to ascertain for himself the
veracity of narrations in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing of the PDS
without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act. He should have been more
mindful of the importance of the PDS and should have treated the said public document with due
respect.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the
intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
RULING:

Yes. in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convictedof the offense
proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.

While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice
of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in our Penal
Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information
exclusively charging the commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser offense.

Reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily

included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As
such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents
notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.

Petition was dismissed.

CASE NO. 18

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMAN INFANTE and TOMAS BARRETO, Defendants-Appellants.

US VS. INFANTE
G.R. No. 11448
January 25, 1917
CARSON, J.:
Topic: Falsification of Private Documents (Art. 172)

FACTS:

1. In a previous case, Appellants were convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document.
2. They falsified a pawn ticket issued by the Monte de Piedad, to the prejudice/ with intent to
prejudice the complaining witness. The accused changed the description of the pawned article as it
appeared on the face of the pawn ticket and substituted therefor another article of greatly
superior value, and that thereafter the falsified ticket was itself pawned in the pawnshop of the
complaining witness for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned in the
Monte de Piedad, for which the original pawn ticket was issued.
3. In the present case, the appellants are convicted for the falsification of another pawn ticket issued
by the Monte de Piedad, and the evidence discloses that this pawn ticket was falsified by these
accused at or about the same time when they falsified the pawn ticket for the falsification of which
they were convicted at the former case.
4. The falsification was made in a similar manner to that in which the other ticket was falsified; and
that both the falsified tickets were pawned in the pawnshop of the complaining witness at the
same time and to procure a loan far in excess of the true value of the articles originally pawned in
the Monte de Piedad.
5. The counsel of the accused contends that since both tickets were falsified at the same time and for
the same purpose, and since both were used at the same time to procure a certain sum of money
from the pawn-broking establishment of the complaining witness, the falsification of the tickets
only constitutes one crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the falsification of the two pawn tickets constitutes for only one crime of
falsification of private document.

RULING:

No, the falsification of the pawn tickets does not constitute for only one crime.

The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and distinct documents. They had no relation to each
other as members of a series of instruments. The crime of falsification of a private document was complete
and consummated when, with intent to prejudice a third person, the first pawn ticket was actually falsified;
and a wholly separate and distinct crime was initiated and consummated when the second ticket was
falsified.

Furthermore, under the definition of the crime of falsification of private documents set out in
article 304 of the Penal Code (Art. 172 in Revised Penal Code), the crime is consummated and complete at
the moment when such a document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of, or with intent to prejudice a
third person, it matters not to what use the document may be put thereafter.

CASE NO. 19

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. 
TAN BOMPING, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
G.R. No. L-24187 March 15, 1926

Topic: Falsification by Private Individual and use of falsified

documents (Art. 172)
Digested by: Zalavarria, ZAO

FACTS:
On or about November 21 and 22, 1923, defendants Tan
Bomping, Leon Galindo, Policarpi Tamborm Lucio Macalisang,
and Andres Burias willfully, unlawfully and criminally prepare
and cause to be prepared eight fictitious and simulated
documents acknowledged before a notary public.
The documents made it seem that Tan Bomping conveys
to his co-accused eight parcels of land owned by him and said
documents were executed in the years 1919 to 1923. In truth,
said documents were executed and signed by all five
defendants on November 21, 1923, and acknowledged by
them before a notary public on November 22. The evidence
showed that Tan Bomping, in order to escape the attachment
of his property in a civil action then pending, executed the
eight deeds of conveyance and intentionally antedated the
documents.
The Court of First Instance found all the defendants guilty
of the falsification of private documents.

CHANGE IN INFORMATION (BACKGROUND)

In the original information filed in the present case, the
defendants were accused of the crime of estafa with falsification of
public documents. A demurrer to this information was sustained and
the present a new one. In compliance with this order, the fiscal
amended the information so as to charge falsification of public
documents
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tan Bomping is guilty of the falsification of public
documents?

RULING:
The Court held yes.
Upon the facts stated, Tan Bomping is manifestly guilty of the
falsification of public documents and not merely of private ones as
found by the trial court; he not only falsified the documents, but was
also directly instrumental in causing them to be made public
documents.
As we have already stated, the court below erred in holding that
the crime committed was falsification of private documents. A deed
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document and the
fact that the false dates were written into the documents here in
question before said documents were presented to the notary, does
not alter the case if they were so presented by the parties who
committed the falsification or at their instance.

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, the appellants Leon Galindo, Policarpo
Tambor, Lucio Macalisang and Andres Burias are hereby acquitted of the crime
charged in the complaint with their proportional shares of the costs de oficio.

We find the appellant Tan Bomping guilty of the crime of the falsification of
public documents and hereby sentenced him to suffer prision correccional for
the term of four years, nine months, and eleven days, and to pay a fine of
250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
one-fifth of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

CASE NO. 20
LUDWIG H. ADAZA, Petitioners,

vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (the First DIVISION composed of Justices GREGORIO S. ONG,

CATALINO R. CASTANEDA, JR. and FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICE, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 154886. July 28, 2005

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

TOPIC: Article 172 Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.

FACTS:
DPWH AWARDED PTA SCHOOL BUILDING

In 1996, the DPWH of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte awarded to the Parents
and Teachers Association of Manawan National High School in Manawan, Jose
Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte a contract for the construction of a school building
consisting of two classrooms, Petitioner at that time was municipal mayor of Jose
Dalman.

Completed on June 24, 1997 per Certificate of Completion and Turnover for Custody
issued by the DPWH, but the PTA failed to receive the last installment payment
therefore in the amount of P20,847.17.50.

MEJORDA DISCOVERED THE CHECK WAS ENCASHED

PTA President Felix Mejorada was informed by Hazel Peñaranda, Cashier II of the 1st
Engineering District, that the check for P20,847.17 had been released to the
petitioner. Then he requested all that he be furnished with certified true copies of the
documents. He noticed that the signature in the disbursement was not his but the
petitioner and his wife Aristela. Peñaranda then explained what happened when the
petitioner approached her and asked if he could get the document and check be
signed by Mejorda, upon returning the documents the check remained in her custody,
boring the signature of Mejorda. Peñaranda, released the check but asked the
petitioner to affix his signature to exculpate herself from liability. Check was then
encashed by Aristela.

THE CASE WAS HANDLED BY THE SANDIGAN BAYAN PETITIONER WAS FOUND GUILTY

Complaint for falsification of public document was filed, Sandiganbayan found

petitioner Ludwig H. Adaza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public
Document penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS FILED BY THE ADAZA

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 19, 2002
Decision and July 3, 2002 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan and denying his motion
for reconsideration, respectively, was filed

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Ludwig H. Adaza is guilty for Falsification of Public Document

penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code.

RULING:

No, Ludwig H. Adaza is not guilty under Falsification of Public Document penalized
under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
but only for Article 172 Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified
documents.

ART. 172. FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND USE OF

FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS.—The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any
other kind of commercial document;

The offender under Article 172 must be a private individual or maybe a public
officer, employee or notary public who does not “take advantage of his
official position.” Under Article 171, an essential element of the crime is that the
act of falsification must be committed by a public officer, employee or notary who
“takes advantage of his official position.”

Although herein petitioner was described in the information as “a public officer

being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose Dalman, Zamboanga del
Norte,” there was no allegation showing that the act of falsification of public
document attributed to him was intimately connected to the duties of his office as
mayor to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither was
there any allegation to show how he made use of his position as mayor to facilitate
the commission of the crimes charged. The information merely alleges that the
petitioner falsified the disbursement voucher by counterfeiting therein the signature
of Mejorada.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 19, 2002 and
Resolution dated July 3, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE and declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 21

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE

CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG,
as Administratrix, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM
SATO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 181409
February 11, 2010
Topic: Falsification by private individual and use of falsified
documents

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:

I. On or about November 24, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines,

accused Willian Sato induced said Manolita Gonzales De
Carungcong, who was already then blind and 79 years old, to
sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney in favor of
Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her
believe that said document involved only her taxes. Accused
knowing fully well that said document, authorizes Wendy Mitsuko
C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose
of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay
City: (1) covered by T.C.T. No. 3147; (2) covered by T.C.T. No.
3148; (3) covered by T.C.T. No. 3149; (4) with Tax Declaration No.
GR-016-1735. All registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales De
Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said special power
of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made
Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale
covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for
₱250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for ₱250,000.00 and [Tax
Declaration] GR-016-0735 for ₱650,000.00 and once in possession
of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of Manolita Gonzales De Carungcong who died in 1994.

II. The prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information

so as to increase the amount of damages from ₱1,150,000, the
total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to ₱22,034,000, the
actual amount received by Sato.

III. Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the
person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his
mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.

IV. The trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal
of the criminal case.

V. Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of

Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals, which, however, was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Sato may not be held criminally liable for
simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:
NO. Accused Sato should be criminally liable not because of simple
estafa but by the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document.

The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address

specific crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other
crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the
absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply
Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa
as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in
that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate
charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a
single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through
falsification of public document. For, in the latter instance, what
is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family
relation but a paramount public interest.

Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means

for Committing Estafa

The phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is

committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other. In
this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA,
was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to
facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle
his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the
Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.

When the offender commits in a public document any of the

acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime,
like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a
complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. The
falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a
means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document
is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has
already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage
not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official
or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification
was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.
Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in

the Information show that the falsification of public document
was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA
to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her
intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification
was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the
consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later
utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the
properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale.
Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the
falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign
the document) but by the subsequent use of the said
document. That is why the falsification of the public
document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a
necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision

dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial
court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.

*Mentioned in this case: (Baka langs)

It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on

criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal
liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership
of the property between the offender and the offended
party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned
by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s
wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became
a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three
parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother’s
death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no
such right came about and the mantle of protection provided
to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.

For purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold

that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving
spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the
death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity.
(The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of
defense of one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal
Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of
grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5]
of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor
of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

CASE NO. 22

G.R. No. 179003               January 9, 2013

ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and CAROLINA T ANJUTCO, Respondents

FACTS:

- On or about the period from 21 December 1996 to 09 January 1997, Mr. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA,
Ms. HIROKO MATSUURA and Mr. RUBEN JACINTO have had stolen company’s properties and my
personal belongings which were kept "under lock and key". Among those stolen was my pre-signed
DEED OF TRUST, whose date and number of shares, and the item witness were all in BLANK.

-In the said "blank" Deed of Trust, the entries as to the number of shares and the date of the instrument
were then inserted, that is, 28,500 as shares and 20th day of January, and the signatures of Hiroko
Matsuura and Lani C. Camba appeared in the item WITNESS, all without my participation whatsoever,
or without my consent and authority. A copy of the "filled in" Deed of Trust is attached as Annex "A"
and made part hereof;

- Sometime on 19 June 1997, the said Deed of Trust, was made to be notarized by JULIE O. CUA, a
Notary Public for and in the City of Makati, and entered in her Notarial Register as Doc[.] No. 2; Page
No. 1; Book No. 1 and Series of 1997, WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT I HAVE NEVER APPEARED,
SIGNED OR TOOK [sic] MY OATH BEFORE THE SAID NOTARY PUBLIC AND ON THE SAID DATE
OF NOTARIZATION because the document (Deed of Trust) was stolen as earlier stated, and the
relation between us (Mr. and Ms. Matsuura, or Mr. Jacinto, and the undersigned) had become hostile
and irreconcilable. A copy of the notarized Deed of Trust is attached as Annex "B" and made part
hereof.

- On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City a Complaint-
Affidavit5 charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco)
and Atty. Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

- On July 13, 1998, the OCP issued a Resolution11 dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint
against Matsuura and Tanjutco. It considered the fact that Tan had voluntarily signed the subject deed,
and further noted that "whether or not the same document is notarized, the deed has the effect of a
binding contract between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown." 12

- Undaunted, Tan filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by then Acting Secretary of
Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution16 dated July 1, 2004. In finding probable cause to
indict the respondents for the crime of falsification, the DOJ noted that a copy of the deed of trust
attached by Matsuura and Tanjutco to Matsuura’s Answer dated October 30, 1997 in an intra-corporate
dispute before the SEC was not yet notarized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Matsuura and Tanjutco is criminally liable under the crime of falsification under Article
172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6) of the RPC, and another information for a violation of Article 171
(2) of the RPC.

RULING:

The court held No. Under Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.
– The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

(2) Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in
any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

In the first information, the charge was under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), for the
alleged insertions in the deed of trust on its number of covered shares, its date and the witnesses to
the instrument’s execution. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 39 we identified the elements of falsification
under Article 171 (6) of the RPC, to wit:

(1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document;

(2) that it was made on a genuine document;

(3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and

(4) that the changes made the document speak something false. 40

When these are committed by a private individual on a private document, the violation would
fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the
aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third
person.41

Logically, affidavits and evidence presented during a preliminary investigation must at least show these
elements of the crime and the particular participation of each of the respondents in its commission.
Otherwise, there would be no basis for a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that
the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof. Probable cause can only find support in facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the person being charged
warrants a prosecution. Upon the Court’s review, we affirm the ruling that Tan had failed to adequately
show during the preliminary investigation all the aforementioned elements of the offense.

Petitioner Tan was not able to establish when and how the alleged unauthorized insertions in the
subject document were effected, and that Matsuura and Tanjutco should be held liable therefor. To
warrant an indictment for falsification, it is necessary to show during the preliminary
investigation that the persons to be charged are responsible for the acts that define the crime.
Contrary to this, however, there were no sufficient allegations and evidence presented on the specific
acts attributed to Matsuura and Tanjutco that would show their respective actual participation in the
alleged alteration or intercalation.

WHEREFORE, the Court ruled In G.R. No. 179003, the petition for review is DENIED.

CASE NO. 23
CASE NO. 24
A.M. No. 06-4-219-RTC             November 2, 2006
RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT AND PHYSICAL INVENTORY OF CASES IN THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 54, BACOLOD CITY.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
TOPIC: False medical certificates, false certificates of merits or services- Art. 174
FACTS:
This administrative case stems from the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch
54, Bacolod City presided over by Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes. The audit team was able to
audit 450 cases comprising of 164 criminal cases and 286 civil cases and had observed the snail
pace movement of cases in the court, thus depriving the accused of their constitutional right to a
speedy trial.

Judge Magallanes explained that his health problems contributed to the delay in the disposition of
the cases. However, he claims that he has not requested extensions of time to decide the said
cases.

Records also disclose that Judge Magallanes falsified his Monthly Certificate of Service for the
months of September 2005 and October 2005 by stating that "all special proceedings,
applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under
submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety (90) days or more have been
determined and decided on or before" the month concerned. However, the submitted Monthly
Report of Cases for the months of September 2005 and October 2005 reveal that there were
cases submitted for decision but not decided in the months involved.
In September 2005, Judge Magallanes had 76 cases submitted for decision. His Certificate of
Service however attested that all cases submitted for decision have been decided on or before the
30th of September 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Magallanes is guilty of undue delay in rendering decision and making
untruthful statements in his Certificate of Service
RULING:
Yes, Judge Magallanes is guilty of undue delay in rendering decision and making untruthful
statements in his Certificate of Service.
As held in the Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Aquino, the members of the judiciary
have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. For failing to do so, respondent
Judge has to suffer the consequences of his omission. Any delay in the disposition of cases
undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. The Court has consistently
impressed upon members of the judiciary the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously
under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Judge Magallanes did not
exert any effort to request for an extension of time from the Court to decide these numerous
cases comprising the backlog in the said court, which to our mind, is already a denial of justice to
party litigants due to its long delay and snail pace resolution. Worse, he even waited for the audit
team to find out his gross inefficiency and even had the temerity to reflect in the certificate of
service untruthful statements.
In Enriquez v. Camarista, we held that a judge who falsifies his Certificate of Service is
administratively liable for serious misconduct and inefficiency under the Rules of Court and
likewise under the Penal Code. For it must be remembered that the Certificate of Service is not
merely a means to one's paycheck, but an instrument by which the courts can fulfill the
Constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy disposition of cases.

Considering that the backlog in the court docket of Judge Magallanes docket started from 1993
and continues up to the present or for almost 13 years and considering the absence of a medical
certificate to support the alleged illnesses of Judge Magallanes which does not serve to mitigate
his liability, the penalty of suspension in its maximum period of three months without salary and
other benefits should be imposed, not just a fine of ₱20,000.00 as recommended by the OCA,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes, Regional Trial Court, Branch
54, Bacolod City guilty of undue delay in rendering decision and making untruthful statements in
his Certificate of Service and is SUSPENDED for three months without salary and other
benefits WITH STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

NOTE:

Under Sections 9 and 11 (B) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision
and untruthful statements in the certificate of service are less serious charges punishable by: (1)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.

CASE NO. 25
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, RTC, BRANCH 90, DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE, Complainant,

Vs. JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO-MUPAS, MTC, DASMARIÑAS CAVITE, Respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-03-1462

February 11, 2010

Topic: False medical certificates, false certificates of merit, etc.

Facts:

1. Respondent judge urges for a second Motion for Reconsideration for its decision.
2. The decision in question is that Judge Toledo-Mupas, the respondent, was found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
all benefits due her, excluding her accrued leave benefits, and with perpetual disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public service including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Respondent begs the Court for compassion arguing that her act of issuing the "Detention
Pending Investigation" Orders were not motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, or some other similar
motive, and claiming that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh.

Issue:

WON the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon respondent judge should be reconsidered.

Ruling:

No, there is no compelling reason to warrant a reconsideration of this Court's Decision and its
Resolution. Respondent judge committed several acts that failed to live up to the exacting standards of her
office, including:

(1) Respondent was found guilty of failing to act on motions for execution filed by the prevailing
parties in cases which have already become final and executory, it was held that the
respondent "failed to explain why there were motions for execution of decided cases which
she had not acted upon for a considerably long time."
(2) respondent failed to forward to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Cavite the
records of at least 370 cases which she dismissed after preliminary investigation.
(3) (** relevant to the topic) Respondent neither denied nor refuted the charge that she was
able to draw her salaries by submitting fraudulent certificates of service to the effect that she
had no undecided cases. Falsification of one's certificate of service, renders a public officer
not only administratively liable for serious misconduct under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court but also criminally liable under Articles 174 and 175 of the Revised Penal Code.
(4) Cases remain undecided even beyond the reglementary period, it appears that in most of these
cases, thirty (30) days had elapsed from the date of submission of the case for decision.
(5) Respondent also failed to refute the findings of the OCA that the court records in her sala were
in disarray which compromises their confidentiality and integrity.
(6) Respondent judge continued with the practice of issuing documents denominated "Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case" even after her attention had been called.
(7) Lastly, the respondent insists that the report of the OCA did not reflect the true and factual
circumstances involved in the cases which were pending and decided by the MTC, Dasmarinas,
Cavite while she was its Presiding Judge. However, respondent failed to present substantial and
convincing evidence to refute the charges made by the OCA.