Senador vs. People

G.R. No.
201620 March 6, 2013
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA JAIME, Respondents.
FACTS:
In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador

(Senador) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 in
Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, viz:
That on or about the 10th day of September 2000 in the City of Dumaguete,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
having obtained and received from one Cynthia Jaime various kinds of
jewelry valued in the total amount of ₱705,685.00 for the purpose of selling the
same on consignment basis with express obligation to account for and remit the
entire proceeds of the sale if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed
period of time and despite repeated demands therefor, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to remit proceeds of the sale of said items or to
return any of the items that may have been unsold to said Cynthia Jaime but
instead has willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to his/her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of
said Cynthia Jaime in the aforementioned amount of ₱705,685.00.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial on the

merits ensued.
Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing

evidence of the prosecution, and instead, she relied on the defense that the facts
alleged in the Information and the facts proven and established during the trial
differ. In particular, Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party
in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed the
complaint. According to Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by
the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned out
to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as witness. Hence,
citing People v. Uba, et al. (Uba) and United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog
(Lahoylahoy), Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
her has been violated.
RTC’S RULING:
Despite her argument, the trial court, by Decision dated June 30, 2008,
found Senador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA under Par. 1
(b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of four
(4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the private complainants.
CA’s
Senador questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. However, on May 17,
2011, the appellate court rendered a Decision upholding the finding of the
RTC that the prosecution satisfactorily established the guilt of Senador
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of the offended

party violates, as petitioner argues, the accused’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling her
to an acquittal.
SC’s RULING:
NO.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of

the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle
the accused to an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the designation of the
offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights
of the accused.
As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador’s reliance on Uba is

misplaced. In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime against
honor, wherein the identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were
directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person
injured is material.
On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a
crime against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper
designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary
is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the information. Thus, in
case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property,
Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the
information, not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.—The complaint or information must state
the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has
been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is

unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property
the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court
must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information
and the record. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the
materiality of the erroneous designation of the offended party would depend on
whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described and
identified.
Lahoylahoy cited by Senador supports the doctrine that if the subject matter
of the offense is generic or one which is not described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended
party is material and would result in the violation of the accused’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such
error, Lahoylahoy teaches, would result in the acquittal of the accused, viz:
The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that

when an offense shall have been described with sufficient certainty to identify the
act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial.
Court is of the opinion that this provision can have no application to a case where
the name of the person injured is matter of essential description as in the case at
bar; and at any rate, supposing the allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the
robbery charged in this case would not be sufficiently identified.
In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the offense was money in the total sum
of PhP 100. Since money is generic and has no earmarks that could properly
identify it, the only way that it (money) could be described and identified in a
complaint is by connecting it to the offended party or the individual who was
robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus, the identity of the offended party is
material and necessary for the proper identification of the offense charged.
Corollary, the erroneous designation of the offended party would also be material,
as the subject matter of the offense could no longer be described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v. Kepner, Sayson v. People, and Ricarze

v. Court of Appeals support the doctrine that if the subject matter of the
offense is specific or one described with such particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended
party is not material and would not result in the violation of the accused’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her. Such error would not result in the acquittal of the accused.
In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction of Sayson for attempted estafa,
even if there was an erroneous allegation as to the person injured because the
subject matter of the offense, a check, is specific and sufficiently identified. We
held, thus:
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down the rule that when an offense
shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to identify the
act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as
the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial
right of the defendant.
In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine espousing an erroneous designation of

the person injured is not material because the subject matter of the offense, a check,
was sufficiently identified with such particularity as to properly identify the
particular offense charged.
Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses
against property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not
identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in
the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal
of the accused.
However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and

identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as
in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended party is
immaterial.
ANALYSIS:
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money
or any other generic property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the
offense as "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of ₱705,685.00." The
charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt
Agreement signed by Senador and presented during trial, which enumerates these
"various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685.
The error in the designation of the offended party in the information is

immaterial and did not violate Senador’s constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her.
Lest it be overlooked, Senador offered to pay obligations through Keppel Check No.
0003603, which was dishonored because it was drawn against an already closed
account. The offer indicates her receipt of the pieces of jewelry thus described and
an implied admission that she misappropriated the jewelries themselves or the
proceeds of the sale. Rule 130, Section 27 states:
In criminal cases. except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or

those allowed by law to be compromised. an offer of compromise by the accused
may he received in evidence as implied admission of guilt.
Taken together, the C A did not err in affirming petitioner's conviction for the
crime of estafa.1âwphi1

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Senador vs. People

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G.R. No.

201620 March 6, 2013

In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial on the

Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing

Whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of the offended

At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of

As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador’s reliance on Uba is

(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is

The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that

The holdings in United States v. Kepner, Sayson v. People, and Ricarze

In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine espousing an erroneous designation of

However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and

The error in the designation of the offended party in the information is

In criminal cases. except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or

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