PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES

MORAL VS MOMENTUM PROPERTIES

Petitioner was not illegally dismissed. Probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is
being observed and evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment.
Article 292 (b) of the Labor Code and can be found in Department Order No. 147-15 of the Omnibus Rules
implementing the Labor Code does not apply with respect to the termination of the probationary employee.
The two-notice rule applies only to employee to give him a chance to explain his side on the charges against
him. It is enough that a written notice is served to the employee within a reasonable time from the effective
date of termination. Since Moral did not meet the standards required for the regular employment based on
the performance appraisal given. The termination of the employment to Moral does not warrants the illegal
dismissal. However, the respondent company failed to give a formal written notice of the dismissal within
the reasonable time and informed moral via series of text messages.

ABERDEEN VS AGUSTIN

According to Article 281 of the Labor Code, there are two grounds to legally terminate a probationary
employee. It may be done either for a just cause, or when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the start of the
employment.

Aberdeen said that Agustin was terminated because he failed to qualify as a regular employee. However,
Aberdeen did not show that respondent was apprised of these reasonable standards at the start of the
employment. The rule in Article 281 however, should not exculpate a probationary employee who acts in
a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense, in regard to which there is no need to spell out
a policy or standard to be met. Even if the reading of air exhaust balancing is not within his realm of
expertise, he should have acted with due diligence not to accept the report. He is required only to inquire
from the workers the difficulties encountered and to observe for himself the progress of the work
performed. The Court find it hard to believe that Agustin would have just been made to sign the report to
signify his presence. The Court also concur with Aberdeen that Agustin has shown himself to be
undeserving of continued employment from probationary employee to regular employee by his omission,
lack of concern and grasp of basic knowledge and common sense.

ENCHANTED KINGDOM VS VERZO

The Supreme Court held that a probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is being
observed and evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A
probationary appointment affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence and
attitude of a probationer. The word probationary, as used to describe the period of employment, implies
the purpose of the term or period. While the employer observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a
probationer, to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, at the same
time, seeks to prove to the employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for
permanent employment.
Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code also provides that if the employer
fails to inform the probationary employee of the reasonable standards on which his regularization would
be based at the time of the engagement, then the said employee shall be deemed a regular employee.

In this case, a written letter dated August 26, 2009 was provided to Verzo, clearly reflects not only the
agreement of both parties as to the probationary status of the employment and its duration, but also the
fact that Enchanted informed Verzo of the standards for his regularization. This was acknowledged by
Verzo through his letter dated September 2, 2009.

Suffice it to state that Enchanted was able to substantially comply with the requirement of the law in
apprising him of the standards for his regularization. Verily, the purpose of the law in requiring that an
employee be notified of the standards for his regularization during his probationary employment is to
simply afford him due process, so that the employee will be aware that he will be under close observation
and his performance of his assigned duties and functions would be under continuous scrutiny by his
superiors.

SKYWAY VS REINANTE

Though not on the same plane as that of a permanent employee, a probationary employee enjoys security
of tenure. Other than being terminated for a just or authorized cause, a probationary employee may be
dismissed due to his or her failure to qualify in accordance with the standards of the employer made known
to him or her at the time of his or her engagement. Simply put, the services of a probationary employee
may be terminated for any of the following: (1) a just cause; (2) an authorized cause; and (3) failure to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.

Here, the fact that Wilfredo was deliberately given an baseless rating to prevent him from attaining the
status of a regular employee was acknowledged by his supervisor, Wilfredo's supervisor. Skyway argues
that the previous settlement between the parties constitutes a valid waiver. As stated by NLRC, there was
no reasonable consideration stipulated in the settlement agreement inasmuch as it failed to specify when,
how, and in what manner the agreement is to be fulfilled by the parties. He is entitled to backwages and
reinstatement. As to reinstatement, payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is proper due to the
strained relations between the parties. Hence, Wilfredo is entitled to separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole
year, from the time of his illegal dismissal by Skyway until the finality of this Decision.

DE LA SALLE ARANETA VS MAGDURULANG

Respondent was a probationary employee but has not acquired regular status.

A probationary employee or probationer is one who is on trial for an employer, during which the latter
determines whether or not the former is qualified for permanent employment. Case law has provided that
the probationary period of employment of academic personnel such as professors, instructors, and teachers
- including the determination as to whether they have attained regular or permanent status - shall not be
governed by the Labor Code but by the standards established by the DepEd and the CHED, as the case
may be. In this regard, Sec. 92 of the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (8th Edition)
explicitly provides that: xxx (b) for those in the tertiary level, such period shall be six (6) consecutive
semesters or nine (9) consecutive trimesters, as the case may be.
For an academic personnel to acquire a regular and permanent employment status, it is required that: (a)
he is considered a full-time employee; (b) he has completed the required probationary period; and (c) his
service must have been satisfactory. However, it must be emphasized that mere completion of the
probationary period does not, ipso facto, make the employee a permanent employee of the educational
institution, as he could only qualify as such upon fulfilling the reasonable standards for permanent
employment as faculty member. This is especially true in the case of institutions of higher education which,
consistent with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, has the prerogative to provide standards
for its academic personnel and determine whether the same have been met. Thus, at the end of the
probation period, the decision to re-hire a probationary employee, and thus, vest upon him a regular and
permanent status, belongs to the educational institution as the employer alone. Otherwise stated, upon the
expiration of their contract of employment, academic personnel on probation cannot automatically claim
security of tenure and compel their employers to renew their employment contracts which would then
transform them into regular and permanent employees.

A probationary employee may also be a victim of constructive dismissal. The Supreme Court has upheld a
ruling of the Court of Appeals that a school’s unjustified acts of depriving a teacher of her of teaching loads,
as well as her functions as BSBA Program Coordinator during the pendency of her appointment for two
semesters of an academic year constitute constructive dismissal.

In sum, the respondent is a probationary employee who was constructively dismissed by petitioner during
the course of her probationary employment.

SPECIAL EMPLOYEES

BERNARDO VS NLRC

The fact that 37 out of 56 of the handicapped workers’ contracts were renewed, leads to the conclusion that
their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank and that they are qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. With this, Section 5 of the Magna Carta for Disabled persons mandates
that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and condition of employment as a
qualified able-bodied person. Because they are qualified disabled persons, Article 80 is no longer
applicable. Instead, it is Article 280 of the Labor Code which provides for the Regular and Casual
employees, that must now be applied.

the test of whether an employee is regular as discussed in De Leon v. NLRC which provides that in
determining regular employment which is that whether the particular activity performed by the employee
is desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Here, the task of counting and sorting bills is
necessary and desirable to the business of the respondent bank. Also, that the contract signed by petitioners
is similar to a probationary employment, during which the bank determined the employees’ fitness for the
job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of six-month probationary period, the employees
became regular employee. Thus, the Court held that the twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed
regular employees, with the exception of sixteen of them, because they only worked for six months and not
entitled to the benefits. The rest are deemed regular and are entitled to.

The provisions of the said contract cannot be upheld over the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons since such
contract of employment is impressed with public interest.
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP VS CASTANEDA

Castaneda is a regular employee. A house helper in the staff houses of an industrial company was a regular
employee of the said firm. Under Rule XIII, Section 1, of the Labor Code, “The word ‘househelper’ as used
herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any person, whether male or female,
who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or
desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employer’s family.” She works within company premises, and that she does not cater
exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s
right of CONTROL over her functions, which is the PRIMARY indicator of the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.

ATIENZA VS SALUTA

Respondent is the personal/family driver of the petitioner.

Settled is the tenet that allegations in the complaint must be duly proven by competent evidence and the
burden of proof is on the party making the allegation. In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests
on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case
for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established. Thus, in
filing a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, based on the premise that he was an
employee of CRY Corporation, it is incumbent upon the respondent to prove the employer-employee
relationship by substantial evidence. Apart from his staunch insistence that he was a company driver of
CRV Corporation, respondent did not proffer any competent evidence, documentary or otherwise, as
would prove his claimed employment with the company.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations exclude family drivers from the definition, but this is a debatable
proposition since driving for a family is clearly “work performed for a household.”The Supreme Court
however has upheld the DOLE' interpretation (Atienza vs Saluta 17 June 2019) "Family drivers" are
formerly categorized as domestic workers under Art. 139 of the Labor Code. The exclusion has negligible
practical effect insofar as security of tenure is concerned. Both the Kasambahay Law and the Civil Code
offer no security of tenure. The employer can dismiss with or without cause anytime, with or without prior
notice, subject only to compensation equivalent to 15 days salary.

PT & T vs NLRC

In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups
or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against
discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.

De Guzman performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT
& T. The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer.

A termination motivated by the employee having contacted marriage has been deemed illegal.
STAR PAPER CORP VS TIMBOL

The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides that “it shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed separated or resigned, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

Petitioners failed to show how the aforementioned marriages of its employees could be detrimental to its
business operations.

The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
disproportionate effect under the disparate impact theory. The only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is
a showing that it is reasonable despite discriminatory, albeit its disproportionate effect.

Lastly, the absent of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit
the petitioners.

The employees married their co-employees, and the company imposed the sanction of dismissal provided
by the company policy is illegal. This is not exactly a female discrimination case, since even the male
employees benefited from the SC’s decision, this is a marital prohibition case. The Supreme Court held that
the policy was unreasonable as the company failed to prove a legitimate business concern that would justify
the discrimination.

CAPIN-CADIZ VS BRENT HOSPITAL & COLLEGES

The company imposed as condition for reinstatement that she marry her boyfriend. The indefinite
suspension was held tantamount to illegal dismissal, as sex between two consenting adults with no
impediment to marry and the consequent pregnancy were deemed not a disgraceful and immoral conduct.
The condition that she marry her boyfriend was held coercive and oppressive, and violative of the Magna
Carta for Women. The remedy for sectarian institutions with certain religious tenets, as suggested by the
Supreme Court, is to craft an express statement in its manual of personnel policy prescribing such religious
standard as gauge for employee conduct.

Court stated that jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be
gauged - it is public and secular, not religious. The fact that a particular act does not conform to the
traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act as
immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and secular standards, which must be established
by substantial evidence.

While a marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification,"
Brent must prove two factors necessitating its imposition, viz: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform
the duties of the job.
ESTRADA VS ESCITOR

The Supreme Court adopts the Benevolent neutrality doctrine, from the American jurisprudence, which
gives room for different kinds of accommodation. Religious freedom is a fundamental personal right and
liberty and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights must yield to freedom of
religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary.

The Court stated that it is inappropriate for Estrada to present evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue, the government should be given the opportunity
to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing Escritor's stance that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise
protection.