9. Aranas v. Mercado, GR No.

156407, 12 January 2014

10. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, GR No. 230404, 31 January 2018

Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court
(probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."

Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises limited
jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the
probate court for adjudgment.

Such waiver was evident from the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative relief before the
court a quo as they claimed ownership over the funds in the joint account of their father to the
exclusion of his co-depositor.

FACTS:

Respondents Rolando Rodriguez, RacquelGegajo, Rosalinda Landon, Reynaldo Rodriguez, Jr., Ester
Fulgencio, Rafael Rodriguez and Reynest Rodriguez are children of Reynaldo Rodriguez and Ester
Rodriguez, who died in 2008 and in 2004 respectively.

Reynaldo and Ester left several properties to their surviving children. In 2009, respondents executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Reynaldo and Ester.

On the other hand, petitioner Anita Ong Tan is a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the name Anita
Ong Tan and Reynaldo in the Bank of the Philippine Islands. When Reynaldo passed away, said joint
account continued to be in active status. When Anita decided to withdraw her funds, BPI required her to
submit an extrajudicial settlement of the heirs of Reynaldo. To comply with the same, Anita approached
respondents and asked them to sign a waiver of rights to the said joint account. Respondents refused to
sign the waiver as they believed that the funds in the said joint account belonged to their father.

Anita filed before the trial court a petition for the settlement of the Intestate Estate of the late Reynaldo
and issuance of letters of administration to any competent neutral willing person, other than any of the
heirs of Reynaldo. Anita alleged that the funds used to open the BPI joint account were her exclusive
funds, which came from her East West Bank account. To prove her claim, she presented as evidence a
Debit Memo from East West Bank, which was used for the issuance of a Manager's Check in the amount
of P 1,021,868 which exact amount was deposited to the BPI joint account. Anita presented the
testimony of a Branch Manager of East West to corroborate her testimony.

The RTC ruled in favor of Anita and held that Anita sufficiently adduced evidence to rebut the
presumption that the funds deposited under the BPI joint account of Anita and Reynaldo were owned by
them in common.
The CA however reversed the ruling of the RTC. In giving credence to respondents' contention, the CA
maintained that the presumption of co-ownership as regards the nature of joint accounts was not
sufficiently overturned, as Anita failed to prove that she is indeed the sole owner of the funds therein.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in declaring Anita and Reynaldo as co-owners of the subject bank deposits despite
the evidence submitted by Anita to prove otherwise. (Yes)

RULING: A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more
juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said
account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. The
nature of joint accounts is governed by the rule on co-ownership embodied in Article 485 of the Civil
Code.

While the rule is that the shares of the owners of the joint account holders are equal, the same may be
overturned by evidence to the contrary. Hence, the mere fact that an account is joint is not conclusive of
the fact that the owners thereof have equal claims over the funds in question.

In line with this, it is also indispensable to consider whether or not there exists a survivorship agreement
between the co-depositors. In said agreement, the co-depositors agree that upon the death of either of
them, the share pertaining to the deceased shall accrue to the surviving co-depositor or he can
withdraw the entire deposit. It must be noted that there exists no survivorship agreement between
Anita and Reynaldo. Hence, it is but rightful to determine their respective shares based on evidence
presented during trial.

On this note, the Court agrees with the findings of the lower court that Anita sufficiently proved that she
owns the funds in the BPI joint account exclusively. It can be gleaned from the records that the money in
the BPI joint account amounts to P1,021,868, and it is undisputed that said amount came from Anita's
personal account with East West. Based on East West's records, as testified to by its Branch Manager,
two withdrawals were subsequently made: first, in the amount of P1,021,868; and second, in the
amount of P1,003,111. In all such withdrawals, manager's checks were issued.

The amount which was first withdrawn from the East West account, i.e., P1,021,868, was the exact
amount used to open the BPI joint account. Notable is the fact that these transactions occurred within
the same day. It is also significant to consider that no further transaction in said joint account was made
after the same was opened until the death of Reynaldo.

With all these, it is apparent that Anita owned the funds exclusively as she sufficiently overturned the
presumption under the law.

Noteworthy is the fact that even if the probing arms of an intestate court is limited, it is equally
important to consider the call of the exercise of its power of adjudication especially so when the case
calls for the same, to wit:

While it may be true that the RTC, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a
probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the
inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over
properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence,
should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each
individual case.

The facts obtaining in this case call for the determination of the ownership of the funds contained in the
BPI joint account; for the intestate estate of Reynaldo has already been extrajudicially settled by his
heirs. The trial court, in this case, exercised sound judiciousness when it ruled out the inclusion of the
BPI joint account in the estate of the decedent.

Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court
(probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."

Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises limited
jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the
probate court for adjudgment.

Such waiver was evident from the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative relief before the
court a quo as they claimed ownership over the funds in the joint account of their father to the
exclusion of his co-depositor.

In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the intestate court in
settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which hypothetically admitted all the allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise sought affirmative
relief from the intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in respondents' claim of ownership
over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita, when in fact said funds in the joint account
was neither mentioned nor included in the inventory of the intestate estate of the late Reynaldo.
Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed to submit the issue of ownership before the trial court, acting
as an intestate court, when they raised an affirmative relief before it. To reiterate, the exercise of the
trial court of its limited jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but procedural; hence, waivable.

SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

11. In Re Delgado, GR No. 155733, 27 January 2006

FACTS:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may be divided
into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia,
particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child
(ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and
her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the
first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son,
Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is
disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the
youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa,
however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent
Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

ISSUES:

Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of
representation?

Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?

RULING:

The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-
blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,
were her natural children.

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her
half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces
of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral
line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently,
it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their
children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to
participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to
determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time
of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:

Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-
half.

The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional
rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to present authentic proof
of recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceased
spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.

Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore,
the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and
nephews.

Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived
her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her,
also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded
from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita)
and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective
shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

12. Vda de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 92436, 21 July 1991

FACTS:

During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less,
located atSangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of
the Torrens Systemof registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having
been issued to him. Theapplication was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the
administrator of his property.

 In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the
subdivisionplan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir.
It appears thereinthat two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to
Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children
thereafter secured tax declarations for theirrespective shares.
 In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for
the wholeproperty-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-inlaw of
Marcelo Reyes,who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this
fact.
 On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square
meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the
vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed
of sale, however, did notspecifically mention Lot No. I-A-14. The vendee immediately took
possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
 In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally
partitioned the property. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land. Including Rafael
Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land which should have
been received by his father.
 Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the land, as
shown by the torrens title over the land. Gardiola’s defense was that he bought the land from
Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. could not have inherited this land for it was disposed of by his
father way before he inherited it. The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.’s heirs. Stating that
there was no evidence that the Gavino’s children had a written partition agreement. CA
reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA IS correct in reversing the trial court?

Held:

NO. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936,
although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing
to be valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against
tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play
when there are no creditors or the rights of

creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate
to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided
by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is
an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid. Barcelona, et
al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by
the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not
exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from
one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Additionally, the validity of
such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August
1990 in G.R. No. 92811.

But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partitio executed in 1936 was not valid for some
reason or another, we would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in
1921, his heirs automatically became co-own, era of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the
succession. Are transmitted horn the moment of death of the decedent,26 The estate of the decedent
would then be held in coownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his
share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually
allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share
in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually
adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in
the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.

The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino.
Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire
that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot
No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of
Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never
became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. As this Court
stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus,
since he never had any title of right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not
improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any
title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr, The latter cannot give them
what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest,
Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot
to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the owner.
ship and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by
petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when,
after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they
were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents
were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and onehalf (13 1/2) years
later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original
complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial
court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4)
years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes,
Jr.
13. Spouses Villafria v. Plazo, GR No. 187524, 5 Aug 2015

FACTS: On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his
children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several
properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355,
each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which it stands is covered by
TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.

In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession
dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that
their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the subject properties to
petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by
their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about the sale,
Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her
share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by
Pedro and Benita from a bank. The document actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the
amount of P87,352.62 releasing her and her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom. Upon inquiry, the
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction involving
the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents
went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been
demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of
estate of their late father was published in a tabloid calledBalita. Because of this, they caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu
and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the
subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal
knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial,
petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also presented
an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which
provides, among others, that respondents’ co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and
Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners
for P650,000.00.

On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and
spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was
notarized by a notary public who was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed. The
Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the typewritten
name “Pedro Riñoza, Husband” on the left side of the document was not signed. The trial court also
observed that both documents were never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for
registration and that the titles to the subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and his second
wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties were not even
presented as witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the documents of
conveyance.

ISSUE:

A. WON THE ACTION IS FOR PARTITION AND NOT FOR SETTLEMENT OF INTESTATE ESTATE.

B. WON THE RTC HAS THE POWER TO ANNUL THE TITLE OF THE PETITIONER IN A PARTITION
PROCEEDINGS.

HELD:

A. YES. As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their
complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly,
the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs,
are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial representative duly
authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that
there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro’s estate has no
known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the
partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the
allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of
action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not
perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.

It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to
name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to
furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court,then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due
from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without
submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by
the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity
for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real
owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a
will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate to a special
proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned,
judicially or extrajudicially.

B. YES. The fact that respondents’ complaint also prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of
possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the
annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action for partition, as can
be seen in cases where courts determine the parties’ rights arising from complaints asking not only for
the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership and possession of
property. In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas, wherein a complaint for annulment of sale and partition was
dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted a
collateral attack on the certificates of title of the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to
be improper in the following manner:

In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on
the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:

There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not
material to the case at bar. What cannot he collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the
title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT.
In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by
that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although
both are interchangeably used.

Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner’s petition for annulment of sale on the ground that it
constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando’s title to the subject
lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the same.

Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership.

14. Neri v. Heirs of Uy, GR No. 194366, 10 Oct 2012

15. Bautista v. Bautista, GR No. 160556, 3 Aug 2007

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it confers no rights upon the transferees under the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet.

FACTS:

During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80 square meter parcel of land (the
property) in Pangasinan. She died intestate leaving the said property behind to her spouse Isidro
Bautista, and five children namely: Teofilo, Alegria, Angelica, Pacita, and Gil Bautista. Later on, Isidro and
four of his five children, Pacita, Gil, Alegria and Angelica (Teofilo not included), executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition of the property where Isidro waived his share in favor of his four children.

Alegria and Angelica, sold the ½ of the property they have acquired to Pacita and her common-law
husband Pedro Tandoc, by Deed of Absolute Sale. Pacita, with Pedro‘s consent, later sold ½ of the
property in favor of Cesar Tamondong, Pedro‘s nephew via Deed of Absolute Sale. Teofilo, represented
by his Attorney-in-Fact Francisco Muñoz, then filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against his
siblings claiming that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of the property and that the Deed
of Sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar was fictitious because she was already seriously ill that time.

The RTC ruled in favor of Teofilo declaring null and void and no force and effect the documents
mentioned. On appeal by Tandoc and Tamondong, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court‘s
decision and dismissed Teofilo‘s complaint on the ground of prescription. The CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Teofilo. Thus, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo Bautista‘s co-heirs is valid

HELD:

The Court of Appeals applied the prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of fraud and for
reconveyance of property under a constructive trust.

The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo‘s co-heirs was invalid, however. As previously held by
this Court in Segura v. Segura, ―no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof.‖ As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect
the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition
had prescribed after two years.

The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does
not prescribe.

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilo‘s co-heirs.
Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her
husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of ½ of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence,
conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.

16. Macababbad Jr. v. Masirag, GR No. 161237, 14 Jan 2009

FACTS :

On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon
Masirag (Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively called
the respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint[5] against Macababbad, Chua and Say.[6] On May 10,
1999, they amended their complaint to allege new matters. The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag
(Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were the original registered owners of Lot No. 4144 of the
Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
1946. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of Valeriano and
Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did
not know of the demise of their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their
parents in the first week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent
Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter.
The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled Extra-judicial Settlement
with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967[12]
(hereinafter referred to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that the respondents were
deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The document purportedly bore the respondents signatures,
making them appear to have participated in the execution of the document when they did not; they did
not even know the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to Macababbad
for the sum of P1,800.00.[13] Subsequently, OCT No. 1946 was cancelled and Lot No. 4144 was
registered in the names of its new owners under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13408,[14]
presumably after the death of Pedro and Pantaleona. However, despite the supposed sale to
Macababbad, his name did not appear on the face of TCT No. 13408.[15] Despite his exclusion from TCT
No. 13408, his Petition for another owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 13408, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan, was granted on July 27, 1982. Subsequently, Macababbad registered portions of
Lot No. 4144 in his name and sold other portions to third parties.[17]

On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408 and the issuance of a title
evidencing his ownership over a subdivided portion of Lot No. 4144 covering 803.50 square meters. On
May 23, 1972, TCT No. T-18403 was issued in his name. The RTC, after initially denying the motion to
dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its Order[19] dated May 29, 2000 on the
grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed 32 years after the property was partitioned and after a
portion was sold to Macababbad, had already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead
indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have
already acquired title to portions of the subject property in good faith. The petitioners moved to dismiss
the appeal primarily on the ground that the errors the respondents raised involved pure questions of
law that should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents insisted that their appeal involved mixed questions of fact and
law and thus fell within the purview of the CAs appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and
set aside the RTCs dismissal of the complaint

ISSUE:

WON CA erred in reversing the RTC decision

HELD:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[34] A question of
law may be resolved by the court without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.[35] No examination of
the probative value of the evidence would be necessary to resolve a question of law.[36] The opposite is
true with respect to questions of fact, which necessitate a calibration of the evidence. The nature of the
issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellants notice of appeal filed in the trial court
and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.[38] In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents
manifested their intention to appeal the assailed RTC order on legal grounds and on the basis of the
environmental facts.[39] Further, in their Brief, the petitioners argued that the RTC erred in ruling that
their cause of action had prescribed and that they had slept on their rights.[40] All these indicate that
questions of facts were involved, or were at least raised, in the respondents appeal with the CA

Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on the respondents for
invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal. (1) ordinary appeal or appeal
by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of
original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and (3) petition for review to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the
Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the plaintiffs cause of action based on the
allegations of the complaint and the documents attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based
on prescription hypothetically admits the allegations relevant and material to the resolution of this
issue, but not the other facts of the case.

Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the presentation of
evidence stage and what the RTC had for its consideration were merely the parties pleadings. Laches is
evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.[49] Without solid
evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss the respondents complaint.

when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either
motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give
the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff
to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.
[51] Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action
dismissed. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to be recovered are
indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners
Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the
action is for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties
who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. This case, however,
is not without its twist on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as the RTC never issued an order
directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules
of Court, there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal of the action.