PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ABELARDO PARUNGAO
G.R. No. 125812 November 28, 1996
MELO, J.

FACTS:
At about 7 P.M. on May 29, 1989, Mario Quito, a detention prisoner in Cell No. 2 of the
Provincial Jail of San Fernando, Pampanga, was asked by his cell mates Jun Solis and
Edgar Pabalan, if he wanted to join them in a jailbreak and escape. Solis and Pabalan
told Quito there is no problem because many prisoners were joining, adding that herein
accused-appellant Parungao was the mastermind. Sometime thereafter, Ramon Sevilla,
a detainee and trustee, come and handed a letter to Pabalan. Quito read the letter
which allegedly instructed Pabalan and Solis to tie Jail Guard Basa and to put off the
main switch.

Early the following morning, at about 1 o'clock, prisoner Sevilla came and opened the
gate of Cell No. 2, and the prisoners therein, including Quito, went out. While Quito was
in the jail yard, he saw accused-appellant Parungao near the gate of Cell No. 1 shouting
out to Sevilla to open also their Cell No. 1. Sevilla opened the gate of Cell No. 1 but
accused-appellant Parungao and his cell mates Feliciano and Javier did not go out of
their cell.

In the meantime, the prisoners from Cells No. 2 and 6, ran out and on their way out,
they passed by Jail Guards Basa, Valencia, Aldana, and Pacheco, in their respective
gates, all sleeping. To ensure their escape, the escapees tied the guards, beat them
with bamboo sticks, and/or stabbed them with knives. Basa and Valencia were killed;
Aldana was seriously wounded, but Pacheco was unharmed.

As the prisoners were beating up the jail guards, accused-appellant who remained in his
cell was heard by Pacheco shouting to Briones words which were ungrammatically
translated during the trial as: "Alright, go ahead and kill those sons of a bitch”.

Later, an investigation by the Integrated National Police (INP) of San Fernando,

Pampanga, showed that 6 firearms were missing from the prison armory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Abelardo Parungao is considered principal by inducement

RULING:
No, accused-appellant's remarks or utterances did not make him a principal by
inducement. This Court has held that for utterances of an accused to make him a
principal by inducement, the same must be of such a nature and uttered in such a
manner as to become the determining cause of the crime to serve such purpose, and
that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the result.
In other words, the inciting words must have great dominance and influence over the
person who acts; they ought to be direct and as efficacious, or powerful as physical or
morel coercion or violence itself. Thus, where the alleged inducement to commit the
crime was no longer necessary to incite the assailant, the utterer cannot be held
accountable for the crime as a principal by inducement (People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA
634, [1972]); People vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203).

In the case at bar, considering that the accused-appellant uttered the words only after
the prisoners who had escaped had already beaten up and killed jail guards Basa and
Valencia and seriously injured Aldana, accused-appellant's statement cannot be taken
as an order to kill. It taxes the imagination how the ungrammatically translated
declaration imputed to accused-appellant could become the moving cause without
which the jailbreakers would not have killed or harmed the victims. The jailbreakers had
already killed the guards and needed no prodding or instigation from anybody to kill. It
appears, therefore, that the alleged proddings and urgings were no longer necessary to
induce the assailants to commit the crime.

All told, the criminal complicity of accused-appellant, either as a co-conspirator or a

principal by inducement in the crime charged, has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED.
Accused-appellant Abelardo Parungao is hereby ACQUITTED and his immediate
release from custody is ordered unless he is being held on other legal grounds.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUDY FRONDA
G.R. Nos. 102361-62 May 14, 1993
BIDIN, J.
FACTS:
Deceased Eduardo Balaan And Esminio Balaan who are brothers, were taken by seven (7) armed men,
suspected to be NPA members, accompanied by accused Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua. The said
Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua are residents of the same place. The armed men tied the hands of the
deceased at their back lying down face downward. The armed men together with Roderick Padua and
Rudy Fronda proceeded towards sitio Tulong, Cataratan, Allacapan, Cagayan passing through the
ricefields (taking along with them the Balaan brothers).

Accused Rudy Fronda testified that he was taken by the NPA's from his house, accompanied by Robert
Peralta, alias Ka Jun and Roderick Padua, to look for the Balaan brothers. They were around nine (9)
NPA's with then. They found Edwin Balaan and Esmineo Balaan, at the house of Ferminio Balaan, a
brother. They tied their wrists/hands and brought them to the mountain at Sitio Tulong, Cataratan,
Allacapan, Cagayan. After that, the NPA's instructed them to go home, but in the afternoon of the same day
he was ordered to get a spade and a crowbar. They were ordered to dig a hole in the mountain, one (1)
kilometer away from his house.

On March 21, 1989, the bodies or remains of the Balaan brothers were examined by the 17th Infantry
Battalion, under Capt. Benedicto. After which, the remains, (bones) were brought to the house of one
Freddie Arevalo, a relative of the deceased, at Barangay Cataratan, where they were laid in state for the
wake.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rudy Fronda is considred a principal by indispensable cooperation.

RULING:
No, In the absence of evidence to show that the accused acted in conspiracy with the NPA armed group in
killing the victims nor that his acts were of such importance that without which the crime could not have
been committed nor that he participated in the killing, said accused cannot be held liable as principal by
indispensable cooperation. — Paragraph 3, Article 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers as principals
by indispensable cooperation “those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it could not have been accomplished”. Its requisites are (1) participation of the subject accused in the
criminal resolution and (2) performance by him of another act indispensable to the accomplishment of the
crime. The acts performed by appellant are not, by themselves, indispensable to the killing of the brothers
Balaan. As aforesaid to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, there must be direct
participation in the criminal design by another act without which the crime could not have been committed.
We note that the prosecution failed to present any evidence tending to establish appellant’s conspiracy with
the evil designs of the members of the NPA armed group. Neither was it established that appellant’s acts
were of such importance that the crime would not have been committed without him or that he participated
in the actual killing. Under the circumstances, appellant cannot therefore be considered as a principal by
indispensable cooperation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARQUILLOS TABUSO y SISTER @ BULAG
G.R. No. 113708. October 26, 1999
PURISIMA, J.

FACTS:
On July 29, 1992, at 8:40 o’clock in the evening, Renato Datingginoo passed by the
group of Arnold Mendoza, accused Arquillos Tabuso and some other companions in an
alley, on his way to Sevilla Street, Tondo, Manila, to buy food. He heard Tabuso utter
nandiyan na si Dagul. Referred to as Dagul was the deceased Roberto Bugarin.

When Renato was near the store, he heard two (2) gunshots coming from the direction
of the said alley. He went back to the alley and met one Banong who uttered, Utol, wala
iyon, binanatan lang si Dagul. Banong is Arnold Mendozas brother. He heard another
gunshot. Thereafter, he saw Arnold Mendoza, Banong, Arquillos Tabuso and another
person hurriedly coming out from the alley, and proceeding to their house.

Then, Renato went to the place where the incident happened, near his house, and he
saw Roberto Bugarin lying prostrate on the ground, stiffening (naninigas, nakatumba,
nangingisay). Thereafter, he brought him to the Mary Johnston Hospital. At around
10:00 o’clock in the evening, he learned that Bugarin died.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presence of the person in the scene of the crime make him a co-
conspirator

RULING:
The mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-
conspirator.” (People v. Ortiz, 266 SCRA 641, 643) “Assumed intimacy between two
persons of itself does not give that much significance to the existence of criminal
conspiracy.” (People v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432) “Conspiracy certainly transcends
companionship.” (supra) “Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of
actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.”

The mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-
conspirator.” (People v. Ortiz, 266 SCRA 641, 643) “Assumed intimacy between two
persons of itself does not give that much significance to the existence of criminal
conspiracy.” (People v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432) “Conspiracy certainly transcends
companionship.” (supra) “Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of
actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.”

Absent enough evidence to establish conspiracy, acquittal of accused-appellant is in

order since his guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA
G.R. No. 128966 August 18, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:
Edwin de Vera y Garcia, together with Roderick Garcia, Kenneth Florendo and
ElmerCastro, was charged with Murder in connection with the killing of one Frederick
Capulong. De Vera and Garcia "pleaded not guilty during arraignment. The other two
accused, Florendo and Castro, were at large. During trial, the prosecution presented as
witness one Bernardino Cacao who testified that he saw De Vera in the car, where an
altercation later occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle
anapparently disabled Capulong and shot him in the head moments later.

Aside from Cacao’s testimony, the prosecution also presented De Vera’s extrajudicial
statement which established that he knew that Florendo intended to kill the victim and
that the three co accused were carrying weapons and that he acted as a lookout to
watch for passersby. Thereafter, the trial court convicted De Vera.

ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court erred in convicting De Vera as principal

RULING:
In other words, appellant's presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo
intended to kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had
acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at
the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime. These facts,
however, did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice.

The Revised penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it."17 To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites:
"(1) that two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned
the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony [was] decided
upon."18 Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that
the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.19 The Court has
held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be
established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a
joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest.20

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons
who, not being included in Article 17,21 cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts."22 The Court has held that an accomplice is "one who
knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally
therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the
same." To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the
"community" of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the performance
of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime.

The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect
on appellant's penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not
individual. The act of one of them is deemed the act of all. In the case of an accomplice,
the liability is one degree lower than that of a principal.

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they
themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about
it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to
cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed;
accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should
be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.
Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who
perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO JORGE Y RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 99379 April 22, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS:
The case of the government is woven mainly around the testimony of Patricio Ocenar, a
barangay tanod of Barangay Doña Imelda, Quezon City. Ocenar narrates that on 26
June 1990, at around nine-thirty in the evening, he was at the barangay hall. Then a
person informed him that Francisco Palma was being molested by three men. 3 Taking
with him his "knife-stick," Ocenar proceeded to Paui Street pointed to by the informer.
There, at a distance of some ten arm’s length, 5 Ocenar saw Eduardo Jorge and
Romeo Lajera holding the hands of Palma and a woman stabbing him on the left chest
with a long instrument. Ocenar could not tell exactly what kind of weapon was used. He
shouted at them and all three ran away leaving Palma behind to chase
his aggressors but he collapsed immediately on Baloy Street. According to
Dr. Renato Bautista who examined the victim, the stab wound on his left chest was the
cause of his death.

On the part of appellant Jorge, he denies any participation in the crime. He claims he
was sleeping in his house at the time of the killing and was only awakened when
policemen, led by the widow, forced him out of his house despite his protestations and
profession of innocence, and brought to the police station. But, as earlier mentioned, the
trial court convicted him of murder with abuse of superior strength.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding him guilty of murder as principal without
sufficient proof of conspiracy among him and his co-accused

RULING:
In order to convict appellant as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it
is necessary that conspiracy among him and his co-accused be proved. No conspiracy
here was established. Conspiracy; like any other ingredient of the offense, must be
proved as sufficient as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not only
by mere conjectures. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish the
presence of criminal conspiracy. In fact, the appealed decision does not mention, much
less discuss, conspiracy.

Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to
establish the existence of conspiracy. In this case, no unity of purpose was shown. The
only involvement of appellant was his holding of the hand of Palma when he was
stabbed by Bernales on the left chest. There was no other evidence to show unity of
design. The simultaneousness of the act of stabbing the victim by Bernales with the
holding of the hand of the same victim by appellant does not of itself demonstrate
concurrence of wills or unity of purpose and action. For, it is possible that the appellant
had no knowledge of the common design, if there was any, nor of the intended assault
until the victim was actually stabbed. The thrust could have been made at the spur of
the moment, totally unexpected by appellant. The mere holding of the victim's hand
does not necessarily prove intention to kill. If the tragedy was a chance stabbing, there
can be no conspiracy to speak of. Perhaps it would have been different if the victim was
stabbed more than once and appellant still held on to the hand of the victim. That would
have indicated intent to kill and a community of purpose and design. But the evidence
does not show that appellant knew that Bernales had a knife; that she intended to use it
to stab the victim; and, even if she had such intention and appellant knew it, that he held
the victim's hand to insure the effectiveness and fatality of Bernales' attack.
While the holding of the hand of the victim could demonstrate unity of purpose, yet, it
could also mean a desire on the part of appellant to avoid a physical encounter between
Palma and Bernales, a woman, who was not known to appellant to be armed with a
knife. The distance of some ten arm’s length from the startling occurrence could have
blurred the vision of Ocenar, the only eyewitness for the prosecution, who could no
longer identify the weapon used except to say it was a long instrument. This also casts
doubt on some of his factual accounts. The rule is well settled that if the facts apparently
inculpatory may equally be explained consistent with one's innocence, the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty to support a conviction.

Although Ocenar appears credible in his version, his testimony unfortunately does not
establish the existence of conspiracy. It is elementary that, in the absence of
conspiracy, each of the accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own
acts. All that appellant did was to hold the hand of Palma, which is not a crime.

Neither can the appellant be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation, nor

an accomplice in the crime of murder. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation,
one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose
and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. In order that a person may be considered
an accomplice, the following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e.,
knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered, which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to
be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by
indispensable cooperation, or as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation. There is indeed nothing on record
to show that appellant knew that Bernales was going to stab Palma, thus creating a
doubt as to appellant's criminal intent.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLOS BOCO y ALEJO and INOCENTES y
CRUZ
G.R. No. 129676 June 23, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
About 2:00 o'clock in the morning on 22 October 1996, a confidential informer arrived in
the District Anti-Narcotic Unit, Eastern Police District (DANU-EPD), Camp Miguel Ver,
Capitol Compound, Pasig City and talked with Capt. Rodrigo Bonifacio [who, in turn,]
tol[d] SPO1 Emmanuel Magallanes that the informer [would] come back and if the
suspect [was] available, he [would] act as poseur-buyer. When the confidential informer
returned and informed Capt. Bonifacio that the suspect [was] available, Capt. Bonifacio
formed a team to effect a buy-bust operation. The team left their headquarters about
3:15 a.m. on 22 October 1996 and arrived at the target area about 3:45 a.m. on the
same date. Upon arrival in the place, SPO1 Magallanes with the confidential informer
proceeded to the pre-arranged meeting place located at Martinez St., corner Gen.
Kalentong St., Brgy. Vergara, Mandaluyong City. The rest of the team members placed
themselves in strategic places in the area, while SPO1 Magallanes and the confidential
informer stood-by in the designated meeting place. Soon thereafter, a Mitsubishi Lancer
car arrived and stopped at where SPO1 Magallanes and the confidential informer were
standing by. On board the car were two (2) men, the driver and a passenger. When the
confidential informer recognized @ Caloy, the man seated in th[e] passenger seat [o]f
t[h]e Mitsubishi Lancer, he introduced SPO1 Magallanes to him telling @ Caloy that he
would be a potential regular customer. After a short conversation, SPO1 Magallanes
asked @ Caloy if he ha[d] the shabu which was previously ordered. Alias Caloy told
SPO1 Magallanes that he ha[d] the shabu and it [would] cost him P20.000.00. SPO1
Magallanes then showed @ Caloy his P20,000.00, but before giving it, he asked [if he
could] examine first the shabu. Alias Caloy then asked his companion, @ Boyet Paa, to
get the shabu. Boyet Paa then got one (1) piece of heat sealed plastic from the glove
compartment of the car and handed it to @ Caloy who in turn handed it over to SPO1
Magallanes who examined it and found that it contained crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. SPO1 Magallanes then made the pre-arranged signal to his
back-up who rushed to where he was and after introducing themselves as policemen,
arrested the suspects. SPO1 Magallanes then frisked @ Caloy and found five (5) pcs.
of heat sealed plastic bags neatly taped around his right leg weighing about 210 grams.
SPO1 P[o]ngyan who frisked "Boyet Paa found from his right front pocket one (1) piece
of heat sealed plastic containing crystalline substance weighing about 5 grams. They
were also identified as Carlos Boco y Alejo @ Caloy and Ronaldo Inocentes y Cruz @
Boyet Paa. Thereafter, they were brought to the police headquarters together with the
confiscated items. At the headquarters, the suspects were turned over to the police
investigator and the suspected shabu forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Crame for examination and P/Insp. Isidro Cariño to whom the required examination was
assigned, found the same positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant co -transpired with his co-appellant

RULING:
Yes. In the case at bar, both appellants arrived at the crime scene on board the same
vehicle. While only Appellant Boco talked to the informant and the police officer who
posed as the buyer, it was Appellant Inocentes who took out the sample shabu from the
glove compartment of the car and handed it over to Policeman Magallanes. When both
were frisked right after their arrest, packs of the regulated substance were found in their
respective bodies. Obviously, their behavior and demeanor were indicative of a joint
purpose — to sell the shabu.

One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-
conspirators, and he can no longer repudiate the conspiracy after it has materialized.
Conviction is proper upon proof that the accused-appellants acted in concert. The act of
one then becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed
equally guilty as co-principals of the crime committed.

It is settled in our jurisprudence that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy,
as it may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, all of which indubitably point to or indicate a joint purpose, a
concert of action and a community of interest.

Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that conspiracy was not proven, the appellants may
still be convicted of the attempt to sell. A mere attempt to commit a felony is surely
subsumed in the full execution thereof. To attempt is to commence the commission of a
crime by overt acts. If one has been proven to have completely carried out all the acts
necessary to commit the crime, he has certainly been proven to have executed the
initial act required in an attempt.

In any case, we quote with approval the trial court's comment that a "violation of
Section[s] 15 and 21 of the [Dangerous Drugs] law provides the same penalty." Thus,
the appellants could have suffered no prejudice, had they been tried under either one or
the other section.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERIGEL OLIVA
G.R. No. 122110 September 26, 2000
PARDO, J.

FACTS:
On August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino Manguba
(hereinafter referred to as "Avelino") and his family were sleeping in their house in San
Jose, Claveria, Cagayan. Avelino went out of the house to urinate.4 He saw Ferigel set
the roof of their house on fire with a lighted match.5

Awakened by the loud barking of dogs, Avelino's wife sensed danger and peeped
through a hole in their wall. she also saw Ferigel burn the roof of their house.6 She
shouted, "Perry is burning our house!" and called out to the neighbors for help.7

While the fire razed Avelino's house, Ferigel and three others, Dominador Oliva, Marcos
Paderan and Arnel Domingo watched at a distance of about five (5) meters.8

One of the neighbors, Benjamin Estrellon (hereinafter referred to as "Benjamin") went to

the nearby river and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire,
he was shot by Ferigel at close range.9 Benjamin tried to run, but he slumped and fell to
the ground. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ferigel's innocence cannot be deduced from Dominador's acquittal.

RULING:
Yes, Ferigel's innocence cannot be deduced from Dominador's acquittal. Even
assuming that Dominador Oliva's presence was impossible, such has no bearing in this
appeal. Here, it is the guilt of Ferigel Oliva that is in issue. The trial court acquitted
Dominador of the charges, but convicted Ferigel.

Ferigel harps on the testimony of acting Barangay Captain of Filomena, Calanasan,

Kalinga-Apayao, which he avers must not be disregarded. He feebly argues that the
testimony of Barangay Captain Isabel Ramos conclusively established the impossibility
of the presence of accused Dominador Oliva at the time of the commission of the
crimes. From this, accused-appellant reasons that it "follows that the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused-appellant as the assailant should not be
believed." This is non-sequitur.

The "inconsistencies" pointed out by accused-appellant are on minor details. To acquit

one who was positively identified on the basis of inconsequential matters would result in
mischief and injustice.We have held that minor inconsistencies are not enough to impair
the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO DE LA CRUZ Y CUMPIO
G.R. No. 100386 December 11, 1992
NOCON, J.

FACTS:
Alfred Dizon went to the house of the Clarito Olivares at around 4 o'clock in the
afternoon and proceeded to Morlow's a pub, where they drank two (2) Tanduay
"lapads" and stayed there up to about 9 o'clock in the evening. At around 9:30 that
same evening, Dizon heard Olivares arguing with someone at the gate of St. Louis
University Girls High. Dizon called Olivares and told him that it was time to go home. It
was at this point that Dizon saw Olivares crying.

Dizon testified that Olivares looked depressed and told the former that he was in trouble
but did not reveal the reason why he was bothered.

At around 10 o'clock that same evening, they went home walking down Session Road.
They suddenly met suddenly by three men, one of whom is the accused-appellant, who
immediately drew a fan knife and stabbed Olivares in the stomach. Olivares in his
attempt to elude the knife thrust of appellant accidentally warded off Dizon and in doing
so, the former landed on top of the latter.Olivares tried to get up but accused-appellant
stabbed him again on the chest.

Dizon was able to free himself as soon as Olivares tried to stand up. He tried to fight
accused-appellant but the latter lunged at him with his knife. Dizon stepped backward
and with his left hand grabbed appellant's right wrist and in so doing Dizon's finger got
lacerated. Then, accused-appellant and his companions ran away.

Olivares was brought to the Baguio General Hospital but was pronounced dead on
arrival.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty

RULING:
We return to our original interpretation and hold that Art. III, Sec. 19(1) does not change
the periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion
perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the
medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248, which conformably to the new
doctrine here adopted and announced, it is still reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERARDO LATUPAN Y SIBAL, alias JERRY
G.R. Nos. 112453-56 June 28, 2001
PARDO, J.

FACTS:
On April 29, 1991, at around 4:00 in the afternoon, Ceferino Dagulo was chopping
firewood outside his house in Angang, Tuao, Cagayan. Suddenly, he heard the shouts
of a woman and a child coming from the north.

Moments later, Ceferino saw accused Gerardo Latupan y Sibal walking in his direction,
carrying a thin, bloodied knife. Accused Latupan entered the house of Ceferino and
started chasing Ceferino's wife, who was able to run to another house nearby. Unable to
catch Ceferino's wife, accused Latupan turned to Ceferino and said, "I will kill you all."
At that time, accused Latupan's clothes, chest, hands and legs were full of blood.
Accused Latupan attempted to thrust the knife into Ceferino, who was able to parry it.
Later on, accused Latupan told Ceferino to bring him to the authorities and tried to give
the knife to Ceferino. Ceferino refused to touch the knife and told accused to go to the
authorities by himself. Hearing this advice, accused ran away.

The house of Emilio Asuncion was 100 meters from Ceferino's house. At around 4:00 in
the afternoon of the same day, Emy Asuncion was returning to his house from a store.
He reached his house and found his wife, Lilia, dead on the ground with several stab
wounds on her body. His one-year old son, Leo, was lying on top of Lilia Asuncion. Emy
picked up Leo and saw that the left side of Leo's face was lacerated. He saw Jaime, his
three-year old son and asked where Jose, his eldest son, was. At that moment, Emy
heard the voice of Jose from upstairs of the house, asking for medicine. He ran upstairs
and saw that Jose was wounded. He asked Jose who stabbed him. Jose replied, "Uncle
Jerry, Tatang." Seeing that Jose needed immediate medical treatment, Emy brought
him to the house of Ceferino and then returned to his house to get his two other
children, Leo and Jaime. They left the corpse of Lilia Asuncion inside Emy's house.

Ceferino went to a military camp to borrow a vehicle to bring the children to the hospital.
During the trip to the hospital, Emy's son, Jose, saw accused Latupan inside the jeep.
Jose pointed to accused Latupan as the one who stabbed him.
At the hospital, the doctors treated the injuries of Leo and Jaime. Sadly, Jose was dead
on arrival.

Acccused Latupan was convicted of the complex crime of double murder and
sentencing him to "life imprisonment". The court also convicted accused Gerardo
Latupan of inflicting physical injuries to Jaime Asuncion, and sentenced him to "ten days
imprisonment"
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty

RULING:
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder at the time of the
commission of the crime in April 1991 was reclusion temporal maximum to death. The
trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder and sentenced him to "life
imprisonment." The proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, not life
imprisonment. Obviously, the trial court intended to impose reclusion perpetua.

However, the penalty of life imprisonment is not the same as reclusion perpetua. They
are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties.18 First, "life imprisonment"
is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is
prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, "life imprisonment" does not carry
with it any accessory penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties. Third, "life
imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict
becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case
exceed forty (40) years.19

We likewise note that the trial court sentenced accused to "ten days of imprisonment"
for each count of slight physical injuries. We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the
courts to employ the proper legal terminology in the imposition of penalties because of
the substantial difference in their corresponding legal effects and accessory
penalties.20 The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified inasmuch as under
the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the principal penalty for a felony
has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties.21 Thus, the courts
must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the Revised Penal Code, such as
"reclusion perpetua," not "life imprisonment" or "ten days of arresto menor," not "ten
days of imprisonment."

Hence, the proper penalty for each murder committed in April 1991, considering the
absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is reclusion perpetua, with its
accessory penalties. Further, accused-appellant is liable for two counts of slight physical
injuries and must be sentenced to twenty (20) days of arresto menor, each, likewise
with its accessory penalties under the Revised Penal Code.
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD,
VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and NICANOR MARGALLO
G.R. No. 131012 April 21, 1999

FACTS:
Private respondents are public school teachers. During the teachers' strikes, they did
not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1) grave
misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross... violation of Civil Service Law Rules
and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to perform official duty,
(5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
(7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive... suspension...
investigation was concluded before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private
respondents were found guilty

Margallo was ordered dismissed from the service effective October 29, 1990, while
respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered
suspension for six months.

CSC affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other
three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations by failing to file applications for leave of... absence and, therefore,
reduced the penalty imposed on them to reprimand and ordered them reinstated

Court of Appeals which, on September 3, 1996, rendered a decision (1) affirming the
decision of the CSC with respect Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth
Somebang but (2) reversing it insofar as the CSC ordered the suspension of Nicanor
Margallo. The appellate court found him guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations only and imposed on him the penalty of... reprimand.

Court of Appeals, while maintaining its finding that private... respondents were guilty of
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for which they should be
reprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled to the payment of salaries
during their suspension "beyond ninety (90) days." Accordingly, the appellate court
amended the dispositive portion.

Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, moved for a
reconsideration insofar as the resolution of the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of
private respondents' salaries during the period of their appeal.[7] His motion was,
however, denied by the appellate court.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Preventive suspension pending investigation is a penalty

RULING:
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended
to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by
preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If
the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the
suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after
investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should
be reinstated.

Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but

only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is
exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he
should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, §47(4) states
that respondent "shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the other hand, if his conviction is
affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal.

The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty,

oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service
Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered “unjustified,” even if later the charges are
dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is one
of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this
reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of the
investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the
investigation is not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be automatically
reinstated.

Though an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency

of his appeal, in the event he wins, his suspension is unjustified because what the law
authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days—beyond that
period the suspension is illegal.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS
PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001

FACTS:
Miriam Defensor Santiago was criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan for
allegedly approving applications for legalization of the stay of a number of aliens in the
Philippines. She was charged in relation to her position as the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Pursuant to the information filed with the
Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena suspended Miriam from her position as
Senator of the Philippines and from any gov’t position she was holding for 90 days. This
is in the form of a preventive suspension pending investigation of the case before the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to order preventive suspension to
the petitioner

RULING:
Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. It would appear, indeed, to be a
ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the
validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in
form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” In issuing the preventive
suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has,
more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public
officials and employees indicted before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned
must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts
with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office”
would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and
not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, in his capacity
as Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 22, Cabagan, Isabela; ELVINO
AGGABAO and VILLA SURATOS
G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990
CORTES, J.

FACTS:
Upon complaint by Alma T. Aggabao, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan,
Isabela filed on July 25, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch
22, an information against private respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the
crime of concubinage allegedly committed in September 1983. Upon being arraigned,
private respondents entered a plea of not guilty. The complainant was represented
before the trial court by a private prosecutor. During the trial, private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that concubinage,
under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is punishable with prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods, which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, well within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the Regional Trial Court. The
prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the imposable penalty
on the concubine [Art. 334, RPC] has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years [Art. 27, RPC]. The trial court sustained private respondent's position and
granted the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage

RULING:
According to Sec. 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (hereinafter referred to as the inferior courts) shall exercise "[e]xclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof . . ." On the other hand, the "Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. . ." [Sec. 20. B.P. Blg. 129].

The penalty imposable on the husband who commits concubinage is prision

correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Hence, as regards the husband, there
is no question that concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. The problem concerns the concubine upon whom the imposable penalty is
destierro.

The Solicitor General and the private prosecutor point out that the duration of destierro,
which is between six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC], is
beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to impose. Thus, they conclude that either
(1) the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the
crime of concubinage [Solicitor General's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 11; Rollo, p.
521; or (2) the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have "split jurisdiction," the
latter having jurisdiction over the crime as regards the husband and the former as
regards the concubine.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), the inferior courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment
of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months [Sec. 32 (2)] while the Regional Trial
Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body" [Sec. 20]. Ostensibly, Sec. 20 of B.
P. Blg. 129 would grant to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes punishable
with destierro, such as concubinage, since destierro is not an offense punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months.

More particularly in this case, the crime of concubinage has two penalties, one for the
husband and another for the concubine. The penalty for the husband, prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, is unquestionably within the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts. Considering that Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code
states that "[t]he offended party [in the crime of concubinage] cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties," it is clearly in the interest of the
orderly administration of justice that the concubine be tried with the erring husband
before the inferior courts. The legislature could not have intended to allow the absurd
situation wherein the inferior court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage only
as regards the husband while the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the same
crime with respect to the concubine.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES
G.R. Nos. 108172-73 May 25, 1994
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
Complainant Chanda Lucas, who was born on 2 June 1973, testified that their house at,
has only one bedroom. On 26 November 1983, she was sleeping in the bedroom with
her brother and sisters. Their mother did not sleep in their house at that time. At about
2:00 to 3:00 a.m., she awoke and realized that her father was removing her panty and
shorts. He cautioned her to keep quiet. Then, her father, who was already naked, went
on top of her and placed his sexual organ inside her vagina. She was hurt but did not
resist because her father threatened to kill her. Only her older sister Cynthia witnessed
the incident. Chanda reported the incident to her mother and her aunt but the former did
nothing. When her aunt said that her father should be jailed, her mother did not agree.

The 26 November 1983 incident was only the first of many atrocities. Since then, her
father had been repeatedly molesting her, especially when her mother was not around.
Before he had sex with her at 3:00 a.m. on 12 February 1991, he first moved her
brothers and sisters, who were sleeping in the same room with her, to another place.
She did not resist because he had a balisong with him and told her that he can take her
life anytime. After the sexual assault, he stood up holding his balisong and again said
that she has only one life and that he can take it anytime.

On the morning of 16 February 1992, in the company of her mother and uncle, she
reported the incident to the police in their area.

ISSUE:
Whether or not reclusion perpetua is indivisible penalty

RULING:
Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20] years
and one [1] days to forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions.
Prior to R.A. No. 7659, 36 the presence of modifying circumstances would not affect the
penalty of reclusion perpetua prescribed for the crime of rape because such a penalty
was then indivisible and under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed. However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659, which amended Article 27 of
the Revised Penal Code, reclusion perpetua has now a defined duration, i.e., from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years. There is, however, no
corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the same Code for the purpose of converting
reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty with three specific period — minimum,
medium, and maximum — and including it in the table provided therein showing the
duration and the time included in each of the periods.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON
G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
TINGA, J.

FACTS:
Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001
by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon
(appellant), charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older
brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have
been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and BBB
testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had
raped them.

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further considered the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and
appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and
6908 to attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which ended the imposition of death penalty. The
proximate concern as to the appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified
rape which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated
rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
What is the properly penalty for the crimes committed

RULING:
The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can
no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in
lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower
courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.

Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that the penalty
to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by
two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed
upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.

The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is
the prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been
under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower
than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than
death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted
rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum
penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346
had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without
complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem
concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within
reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the
elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced
to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty
with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be
sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.

The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by

reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would,
under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death,
or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of
reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony.

Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to

death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear
and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and
attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices. In the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees
lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum
term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO
and ROCHE IBAO
G.R. No. 132676 April 4, 2001

FACTS:
Ruben Meriales testified that in the evening of 25 August 1996, he saw Jaime Carpo
together with Warlito Ibao and his son Roche all looking in the direction of Florentino
Dulay’s house which was about a meter to the south from where he was. He also saw
Oscar Ibao, another son of Warlito, striding towards Dulay’s hut. As soon as he reached
the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near the wall and hurled something inside. Oscar
then scurried off towards the nearby creek with Roche following him. Seconds
later, a loud explosion shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulay’s screams
broke into the night.

Ruben rushed outside and ran towards Florentino’s hut where he saw the bloodied
Florentino, Norwela and Nissan lying side by side, both doused in blood, and a
motionless Norma whose head was oozing with blood.On their way to the hospital,
Norwela who had injuries on her chest and lower appendage died. Nissan who was five
years old, also died later. Noemi luckily survived. The trial Court gave full credit to the
testimony of Ruben and convicted Carpo. It accepted his straightforward testimony.
Accordingly, in accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48 of the RPC the trial court
imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty of death and ordered them to
solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death to all the accused

RULING:
Since the three (3) murders and attempted murder were produced by a single act,
namely, the explosion caused by the hurling of a grenade into the bedroom of the
Dulays, the case comes under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code on complex crimes.
Article 48 provides that the penalty for the more serious crime, which in the present
case is reclusion perpetua to death, should be applied in its maximum period. As the
crime was complexed, the death penalty was properly imposed by the trial court.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIO TABACO
G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

FACTS:
The group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit
arena while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at
the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, from the place
where the late Mayor and his group were seated when he suddenly without warning or
provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several
successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of Mayor Arreola, Capt.
Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter
managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was
chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs.
Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co’s canteen, saw the
accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. He tried
to pacify Tabaco. Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo, one of those assigned to maintain
peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks,
heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena, and saw the
accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. They stood face to face holding
their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta
grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun
went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who happened to be near
Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due
to adequate medical treatment.

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision, found accused-appellant guilty as charged
with four counts of Murder. The trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
all four murder charges.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the single penalty of reclusion perpetua

RULING:
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion
perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was
committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one
single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous
(emphasis ours) 24 does not hold water.
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was
only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which
produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound
crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the
case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in
killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco
entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the weapon,
which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was
recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent
shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in
People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case
at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29 The accused in that case
killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like
the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:

In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the
death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries
inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the
performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although
it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of
time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused
or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot
fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as
those resulting from every single act that produced the same. Although apparently he
perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person
killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate
crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide
and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the tragic
incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its
companion offenses. (emphasis ours)

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be
considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must
therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced
accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMMY SABREDO y GARBO
G.R. No. 126114 May 11, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:
Jimmy Sabredo is the uncle of complainant.

On June 27, 1994, Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There,
Jimmy grabbed and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made
her board a truck for Bogo,Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy
continuously poked a knife under cover of his jacket at her. Thence he brought her to
Estampar, Cataingan, Masbate, where they stayed at the house of Conchita Tipnit.
Conchita was Jimmy's sister and Judeliza's aunt. Judeliza tried to escape but was
caught by Jimmy, who severely mauled her until she lost consciousness. Suspecting
that Conchita would report the matter to the police, Jimmy took Judeliza by jeepney to
Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate.

On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted
Judeliza. He covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. After satisfying his lust,
Jimmy inserted three fingers into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza
screamed and cried for help. Later, Jimmy struck Judeliza with a piece of wood,
rendering her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to the house of his sister, Nilda
Polloso, also at Cagba.

On July 8, 1994, Judeliza recovered sufficiently from her injuries. Nilda brought her to
the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal. That same day, while Jimmy was
sleeping, Nilda managed to take away from him the blade, made of stainless steel,
which he had used in the rape of Judeliza. After the initial police investigation, Judeliza
was brought to Masbate Provincial Hospital, where she was confined for four days.

The trial court charged the accused of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape
and is meted the extreme penalty of death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court erred in charging the accused of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape

RULING:
Yes. the sentence on appellant should only be reclusion perpetua. In sentencing
appellant to death, the trial court noted that the victim was his niece, a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree. Section 11 (1) of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the
death penalty when the rape victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. However, R.A.
No. 7659 cannot be made to apply in the instant case for two reasons: First, at the time
the rape was committed, private complainant was already more than eighteen years of
age. 10 Second, the information did not allege that offender and offended party were
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. We have held that the seven
circumstances in R.A. No. 7659 which warrant the automatic imposition of the death
penalty partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and as such should be alleged
in the information to be appreciated as such. 11 In view of the failure of the information
to comply with this requirement, said degree of relation could not be taken into account
in considering the penalty to be imposed.

When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, such as
forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove
the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the
crime of rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the
purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb
forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.

When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is

charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the
prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements for
forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime of rape.—While
it may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and
penalized by Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code was also committed,
we are not totally disposed to convict appellant for the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape. We note that while the information sufficiently
alleges the forcible taking of complainant from Cebu to Masbate, the same
fails to allege “lewd designs.” When a complex crime under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code is charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is
axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all
the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime
of rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for
the purpose of sexually assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape
may then absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the crime committed by
appellant is simple rape only. People vs. Sabredo, 331 SCRA 663, G.R.
No. 126114 May 11, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RADEL GALLARDE
G.R. No. 133025 February 17, 2000
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

FACTS:
In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses of Eduardo and Elena Talan,
their neighbors converged. Among them were appellant and others. Idling by was
Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen
and took hold of a kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going.
Editha answered that she would look for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to where
appellant. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing.
Roger asked the group to help look for her. The searchers found appellant squatting
with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil. Asked where Editha
was, appellant replied: “I do not know, I did not do anything to her.” The searchers,
thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide hole among the
disheveled grass. They found the dead body of the victim. Mindful of appellant’s safety,
Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring appellant to the municipal building. On their
way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned
over the person of appellant, saying that he is the suspect in the disappearance of the
little girl. The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found
Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was
completely naked when she was recovered.
The trial court found the appellant guilty of homicide sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting him of murder in an information
charging him of rape with homicide.

RULING:
We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder
in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory
portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying
circumstance. Although it is true that the term "homicide" as used in special complex
crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes
murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape,13 it
is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence
fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be
convicted of the other.14 In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in
case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must
be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged.15 It is
fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out
in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance,

GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An accused cannot be convicted of an
offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under
which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may
be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the
complaint or information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is
charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is
charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher offense than that
charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried would be an
unauthorized denial of that right.

Homicide, which we find to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the
absence of any modifying circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period.
GALLARDE is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly,
he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of
the medium period of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs. HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA,

SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
QUIASON, J.

FACTS:
On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was
intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that
this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that
"(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.

On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after,
the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a
member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6,
1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a
pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of
particulars. However, on November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied
the motion to defer the arraignment.

More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice
Francis Garchitorena who would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship
because of graft charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country
without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the
hold-departure order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in
defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons
facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave
the country.

The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice
Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his
disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated
March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations
and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code

RULING:
The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado
or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the
Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the
concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it
is to define and more difficult to apply.

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has
been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145
penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war
veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter
provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be
applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the
criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No.
324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the
Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.

The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No.
16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal
Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the
original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE,
SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINA GRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS,
BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG,
LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO
GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA GARCIA PADILLA vs. MINISTER JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT.
COL. MIGUEL CORONEL
G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985

FACTS:
At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July 6,
1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room of Dr.
Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14)
detainees were under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using
the house of detainee Dr. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as their
headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered
towards different directions leaving on top of their conference table numerous
subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationeries,
and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student
sector (code-named YORK). Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live
bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six
hundred fifty pesos P l8,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted
medicine packed and ready for distribution, a sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia,
which were then seized.

RULING:
In the comment of respondents on the motion for reconsideration, it was the submission
of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that the right to bail
cannot be invoked during such a period. On the question of whether or not the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus vests the President with the
power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders, this is what the
Comment stated: "It is to be pointed out that this argument was not raised in the
petition. Nonetheless, suffice it to point out that an arrest order by the President incident
to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially preventive
in nature." 15 It added: "Besides, PD No. 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a
law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest incident to the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In addition, however, it should
be noted that the PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA),
pursuant to PD No. 1877 dated July 21, 1983. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA
constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the
aforementioned crimes, for a period not exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or
causes of their arrest subjected to review by the President or by the Review Committee
created for that purpose." 16 The last argument of petitioner, namely that the detainees
were not caught in flagrante delicto and therefore the arrest was illegal was refuted in
the Comment thus: "Again petitioner simply misses the point. As this Court correctly
observed, the crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses. Besides this
point involves an issue of fact.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of

the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion
for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering
the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but in the light of the
foregoing manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divina
gracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito
Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada, and
Tom Vasquez, having been released, the petition as to them has been declared moot
and academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a warrant of arrest against her was
issued by the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot and academic. No
costs.

SANTIAGO IBASCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 117488 September 5, 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:
he complaining witness Maria Negro Trivinio and her late husband Manuel Trivinio
operate an animal feed mill in Gumaca, Quezon while accused-appellant Santiago
Ibasco and his wife operate a piggery in Daet, Camarines Norte. On or about October
26, 1983, accused-appellant Santiago Ibasco and his wife, came to the residence of the
Trivinios at Sitio Seawall, Bgy. Camohaguin, Gumaca, Quezon and requested credit
accommodation for the supply of ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds. In
accordance with the agreed credit arrangement, the Trivinios made three delivered of
darak with a total value of P51,566.49 and in payment, accused-appellant issued three
(3) postdated checks. All checks were drawn against United Coconut Planters Bank,
Daet Branch. Upon presentment to the Bank for payment of their due dates, the checks
bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. The Trivinio spouses notified
accused-appellant of the dishonor. Accused-appellant replied by telegram offering his
real property in Daet as security. Accused-appellant invited the Trivinios to come to
Daet and inspect the property. When the Trivinios arrived in Daet, the accused told
them that the property is across the sea, and, not wanting to cross the sea, the couple
did not anymore inspect the property. For failure of the accused to settle his account
with the Trivinios, the instant case was filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a continuing crime

RULING:
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined by
the place where the elements of making, issuing, or drawing of the check and delivery
thereof are committed. Thus, as explained in People vs. Yabut, 29 "[t]he theory is that a
person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where
the offense was in part committed. . . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or
dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What
is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the
final act essential to its consummation as an obligation."

In respect of the Bouncing checks case, the offense also appears to be continuing in
nature. It is true that offense is committed by the very fact of its performance
(Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the
Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act
of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II,
No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523).

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FAUSTINO TOLENTINO Y DE DIOS

G.R. No. L-48740 August 5, 1942
OZAETA, J.

FACTS:
In the municipal court of Manila, where this action was commenced, as well as in the
Court of First Instance, to which it was appealed, both of the above-named defendants
pleaded guilty to the charge of theft of seven shirts valued at P14 belonging to one
Cosme Famorca. Both being, recidivists, were sentenced in the Court of First Instance
to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay the corresponding civil
indemnity to the offended party. Faustino Tolentino y de Dios was further sentenced to
suffer an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for habitual
delinquency. He alone appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Faustino should be imposed an additional penalty for recidivism

RULING:
A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, and in imposing the principal penalty
upon him the aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be taken into account. In
fixing the penalty provided by law for the last crime " as required in paragraph 5 (a) (b),
and (c) of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, the court cannot disregard articles 14
(9) and Revised Penal Code, which respectively define recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance and lay down the rule for the application of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. However, for the purpose of fixing the additional penalty, recidivism
cannot be taken as an aggravating circumstance for the reason it is inherent in habitual
delinquency.

Neither can we accept the recommendation for affirmance made by the Solicitor
General on the theory that the present is appellant's fourth conviction. We cannot
disregard his previous fourth conviction alleged in the information solely because the
date of his release in connection therewith has not been shown. It appearing that he
was sentenced for the fourth time on September 30, 1935, to suffer two months and
done day of arresto mayor plus an additional penalty of two years, four months, and
twenty-one days of prision correctional, we can readily see that he must have been
released in connection therewith less than ten years previous to August 13, 1941, the
date of the commission of the offense complained of in the present case. The stand
taken by the trial court and the Solicitor General is untenable because if appellant's
fourth previous conviction be disregarded, he could not be sentenced to any additional
penalty as a habitual delinquent, his previous third conviction and release having taken
place more than ten years prior to August 13, 1941.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. PEDRO MASONSON Y KATIGBAK

(alias CRISPIN GONZALO)
G.R. No. L-44527 March 31, 1936
AVANCEÑA, C.J.

FACTS:
The undersigned accuses Pedro Masonson y Katigbak (alias Crispin Gonzalo), of the
crime of theft, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1935, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of
gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away one tan
leather pocketbook, money and eight gold teeth of different size to Fausto Veloso.

That the said accused is a habitual delinquent, having been convicted four times of a
similar offense by virtue of final judgments rendered by competent courts, the date of
the last convictions being September 9, 1935.
The appellant having pleaded guilty upon arraignment, the court sentenced him to six
months and one day of prision correccional, to indemnify the offended party, Fausto
Veloso, in the sum of P120, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and also to the additional penalty of six months and one day of prision
mayor, having considered him a habitual delinquent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing additional penalty

RULING:
The court erred in imposing the additional penalty upon the appelllant. The information
does not allege sufficient facts whereby the appellant should be considered a habitual
delinquent. Under the law (art. 62, subsec. 5, par. 5, of the Revised Penal Code), a
person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent ". . . if within a period of ten years
from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or
falsification, he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener." The allegation
in the information that the appellant was already convicted four times of similar crimes,
is not sufficient to show that the said crimes were precisely those enumerated by the
law and for the conviction of which the appellant should be considered a habitual
delinquent. The word similar has no legal definition in the Penal Code and it is too
abstract in its general acceptation. There may be crimes similar in some sense to that
charged in the present case, which are not those enumerated in the law, the conviction
of which constitutes an element of habitual delinquency.

Aside from this, it appears in the information that the last of these former convictions
was on September 9, 1935, and the crime charged was committed prior thereto, that is,
on August 6th of said year. This court has already held in former cases that in order that
former convictions may constitute an element of habitual delinquency, they must
precede the commission of the crime charged (People vs. Santiago, 55 Phil., 266).

Discarding this last conviction of September 9, 1935, it appears that the information no
longer contains any allegation of the date of the other three former convictions, and it
cannot be stated whether they also were subsequent to the commission of the crime
charged, or, if prior thereto, they were rendered more than ten years before the
commission of the crime charged. In either case, there would be no habitual
delinquency herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that if the allegations of the information relative to the
former convictions of the appellant are insufficient to warrant his being declared a
habitual delinquent, they are sufficient, at least, to constitute the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism or reiteracion. This court does not agree to this proposition.
In order that the former convictions may constitute the circumstance of recidivism or
reiteracion, they must arise from the crimes prior to the charged, and there is no such
allegation in the information.

The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of theft punished in article 309,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period. The appellant's plea of
guilty upon arraignment should be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance, and as no aggravating circumstance was present, the penalty prescribed
by law should be imposed in its minimum period.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABENIR BRUSOLA y BARAGWA

G.R. No. 210615 July 26, 2017
LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
Abenir and Delia's children, Joanne, Abegail, and Kristofer, testified that they, together
with their parents and other sister Jessica, were at home on July 12, 2006, at around
6:45 p.m. Their house was a one (1)-storey building and had an open sala, a kitchen,
and one (I) bedroom. Kristofer was asleep in the bedroom. Joanne was eating with her
back turned to her father, who was preparing for work. Jessica, Abegail, and Delia were
watching the television, with Delia seated on the floor near the toilet. Joanne would
occasionally glance at her father and noticed that he seemed restless. Suddenly,
Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second blow hit the cement
wall. Joanne yelled, "Tay!" and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he did it. Abenir said
he saw a man in the bathroom with Delia. Joanne looked in the bathroom but saw no
one. Kristofer was awoken. When he emerged from the bedroom, he saw his father still
holding the maso while his sisters Joanne and Abigail were attending to Delia, who was
on the floor and had blood on her head. Kristofer held Abenir. Delia was rushed to the
hospital by their neighbors. Joanne lost consciousness but arose when their neighbors
massaged her head. Abenir was brought to the police station. The next day, their
neighbor Joy Tabamo informed the Brusola siblings that Delia had passed away.

Accused was charged with parricide and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing reclusion perpetua

RULING:
The trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant Abenir to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. As appreciated by the Court of Appeals, where there are mitigating
circumstances in a parricide case, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua.26 In People v. Sales,27 this Court explained:

As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death . . . the

presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no
aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the
proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
However, there is no basis to apply Article 64 to the crime of parricide. Articles 63 and
64 of the Revised Penal Code provide:

Article 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. - In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of
the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission
of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their
number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the
preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABENIR BRUSOLA y BARAGWA

G.R. No. 210615 July 26, 2017
LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
Abenir and Delia's children, Joanne, Abegail, and Kristofer, testified that they, together
with their parents and other sister Jessica, were at home on July 12, 2006, at around
6:45 p.m. Their house was a one (1)-storey building and had an open sala, a kitchen,
and one (I) bedroom. Kristofer was asleep in the bedroom. Joanne was eating with her
back turned to her father, who was preparing for work. Jessica, Abegail, and Delia were
watching the television, with Delia seated on the floor near the toilet. Joanne would
occasionally glance at her father and noticed that he seemed restless. Suddenly,
Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second blow hit the cement
wall. Joanne yelled, "Tay!" and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he did it. Abenir said
he saw a man in the bathroom with Delia. Joanne looked in the bathroom but saw no
one. Kristofer was awoken. When he emerged from the bedroom, he saw his father still
holding the maso while his sisters Joanne and Abigail were attending to Delia, who was
on the floor and had blood on her head. Kristofer held Abenir. Delia was rushed to the
hospital by their neighbors. Joanne lost consciousness but arose when their neighbors
massaged her head. Abenir was brought to the police station. The next day, their
neighbor Joy Tabamo informed the Brusola siblings that Delia had passed away.

Accused was charged with parricide and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing reclusion perpetua

RULING:
Article 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. - In
cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a
single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which
forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall
observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there
are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose
the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.

2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they
shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.

3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they
shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative weight.

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number
and nature of such circumstances.

6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the
courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum
period.

7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.
Considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties-
reclusion perpetua to death-Rule 63, and not Rule 64, is applicable. Thus, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

People of the Philippines vs. Eric Mendoza

G.R. No. 123186 July 9, 1998
PUNO, J.

FACTS:
In the evening of August 22, 1991, Andrelita Sto. Domingo’s husband went to San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan to haul chicken. She retired to their bedroom. She as joined by her
three (3) children, while their maid went down to the basement to sleep.

Private complainant woke up when she felt her thighs being rubbed. Thereupon, she
saw two (2) men in black jackets with their faces covered with handkerchiefs. She
described one of them as medium built and the other as a small man. The medium-built
man poked a 6-inch knife at her neck and ordered her to open the vault inside the room.
10 The two men took the cash in the vault amounting to P2,000.00 and jewelry worth
P12,000.00. 11
Upon orders of the medium-built man, the small man untied the curtain band and
handed the same to him. While undoing the curtain, the handkerchief loosened,
revealing the small man's face to be that of Eric Mendoza. Private complainant
recognized him because he used to work in her uncle's steel factory in Tumana, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. 13 After the medium-built man had tied her hands with the curtain band
and gagged her with a torn t-shirt, the small man helped him carry private complainant
to the bathroom. It was then that she noticed the missing jalousie blades on the window.

The medium-built man sent the small man out of the bathroom, through the window, to
stand guard on the terrace roof. Alone with private complainant inside the bathroom, the
medium-built man removed the handkerchief covering his face, raised her t-shirt and
began sucking her breast. While keeping the knife pointed at her neck, he forcibly
removed her jogging pants and underwear, laid her on the bathroom floor, and sexually
abused her for about two minutes. 16 In the meantime, private complainant could see
the small man peeping through the window and watching her being raped.

After satisfying his lust, the medium-built man threatened to kill her and her family if she
would tell anyone about what had happened. He went out through the bathroom window
and joined the small man on the terrace roof.

In the early morning of August 23, 1991, private complainant's husband arrived and
learned of the incident from her. At about 10:00 o'clock that morning, they reported the
crime to Mr. Rico Jude Sto. Domingo, the Barangay Chairman of Tumana, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. On August 25, 1991, they also informed the Sta. Maria Police of the incident,
but they deliberately left out the details regarding the rape to avoid public
embarrassment. They reconsidered later their decision to keep the rape a secret.

The court finds the accused Eric Mendoza and Angelito Balagtas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape. The Court imposes upon the
accused the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority in his favor

RULING:
After going through the said evidence, we find that Mendoza was born on June 30, 1974
and was thus 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The special
mitigating circumstance of minority under Paragraph 2, Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code should, therefore, be appreciated in Mendoza's favor. Said provision reads:

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. . . .
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed but always in the proper period.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of robbery with rape is reclusion perpetua to
death. Applying Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in
degree is reclusion temporal. We agree with the trial court that the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of
the crime. Even the defense did not make any issue of this. When one or more
aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime, with no ordinary
mitigating circumstances to offset them, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period. 54 The imposable penalty prescribed by law, therefore, is reclusion temporal in
its maximum period. We further apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law authorizing the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense. 55 In view of all these, this Court imposes upon
Mendoza the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its
maximum period to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD O. SARCIA

G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:
Sometime on December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her cousin and two
other playmates, was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited AAA to go with him to the backyard of
Crisologo’s house. Upon reaching the place, appellant removed AAA’s shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered AAA to lie
down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into AAA’s private
organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). AAA felt
severe pain inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside
her stomach.
At home, AAA did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she
feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she
felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, AAA called for her cousin. AAA’s
cousin came to their house and told AAA’s mother again that appellant had earlier made
an up-and-down movement on top of AAA. AAA’s mother, however, did not say
anything. At that time, AAA’s father was working in Manila. After almost four years,
AAA’s father filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-
appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape. The CA modified the penalties
imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty. On September 30, 2005, the case
was elevated to the Supreme Court for further review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper

RULING:
Under Art. 335 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for statutory rape is death. However,
accused-appellant is entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because
he was 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Since the prosecution
was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not
certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in
1996.

No suspension of sentence. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-

appellant by the RTC cannot be suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that
time.

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time
he/she is found guilty of the offense charged.

However, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said
child reaches the maximum age of 21.

Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot
and academic.

However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of

R.A. No. 9344 which provides for confinement of convicted children.

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA

G.R. No. 183563 December 14, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:
The accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla was charged with eight (8) counts of
rape. The first count of rape against private complainant AAA was committed by Arpon
in the house of the former in 1995 when she was 8 yrs old. AAA also testified that
theaccused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on different nights. The
accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the
house of AAA’s neighbor. AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her
again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. She related that the accused-appellant was her
uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about
the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She
only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD. The
accused-appellant deny the informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of
AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995, he
was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH

RULING:
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No.
2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant
sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure
of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e.,
whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt
therein "should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter."76 The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from criminal liability for the
first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344.
The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.

For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the
accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said instances,
the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In Madali v. People,77 the Court had the
occasion to reiterate that "[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case." In this case, the fact that the accused-appellant
acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which
we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell
anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant
because the latter told her that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-
appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that
he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the
consequences thereof.

Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor
under eighteen (18) years of age, "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining
the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the
penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with." Thus, for the second and third
counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua for each count.

Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the
circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been entitled to a suspension of
sentence for the second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No.
9344, which reads:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.

JERWIN DORADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 216671, October 03, 2016
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:
On April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was talking to his
friends Raniel, Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin
(Ronald's group) along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At that very time,
Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his friends, Confessor and Cabiaso (Dorado's group),
arrivedand threw stones and bottles at Ronald's group.Ronald's group scampered for
shelter toward the talipapa and hidinside to avoid being hit by the stones and bottles.
When Ronald thought that Dorado's group was no longer-in thevicinity, they came out of
hiding. Dorado's group, however, was out there waiting for them. When they
finallysurfaced, Dorado's group resumed throwing stones at Ronald's group. During the
commotion, Dorado fired hissumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell
unconscious for about ten (10) minutes while Dorado'sgroup ran away. Thereafter,
Ronald was brought to the Rizal Medical Center by Raniel and Delon Busan.
Ronald was operated on his forehead and was confined for a month at the Rizal
Medical Center. As a result of the shooting incident, Ronald lost his left eye while his
right eye could only see some light. Dr. Artes, the operating surgeon, testified that
without medical intervention, Ronald could have died.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER WHO IS A MINOR FOR THE CRIME CHARGED

RULING:
A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old minor
at the time of the commission of the crime. The Informations filed against him
consistently stated his minority. For said reason, he must benefit from the provisions of
R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. To recapitulate, R.A.
No. 9344 provides that only those minors above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal
responsibility. After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution
did not make an effort to prove that Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted
with discernment at the time of the commission of the crime. The RTC decision simply
stated that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must be
appreciated as it was proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly,
there was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted with discernment when he
committed the crime imputed against him. The judgment of conviction of Jerwin Dorado
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. He is hereby referred to the local social welfare
and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.
ROSVEE C. CELESTIAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 214865, August 19, 2015
VELASCO JR., J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Rosvee Celestial was employed by Glory Philippines as its "Accounting-in-
Charge." As such, she handles the company's bank transactions and accounting
ledgers. She was terminated in 2006 when it was discovered that she made anomalous
withdrawals from the company's dollar account.

According to Akihiro Harada, the president of Glory Philippines, petitioner's modus was
to prepare and ask him to sign withdrawal slips allegedly to pay for company expenses.
Afterwards, petitioner would photocopy the signed slips and submit the said copies for
the company's documentation. Later, she would insert additional figures in the originally
signed forms to be able to withdraw an amount higher than what was intended, keeping
for herself the excess amount and the duplicate original of the form. It was only when
Harada noticed the discrepancies between the photocopied slips and the actual
amounts withdrawn that he discovered petitioner's criminal acts.

The trial court indicted her with six (6) counts of qualified theft and hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment consisting of TWENTY (20) years of Reclusion
Temporal for Each Count.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty

RULING:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the
convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to
the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may
be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same
maximum period. Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
Therefore, in spite of the six (6) penalties of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua,
petitioner shall only suffer imprisonment for a period not exceeding 40 years. A
downward modification of the penalty imposed by the RTC is then in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused ROSVEE

CELESTIAL y CALDEJON guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 94-07
to 99-07 of the crime of six (6) counts of Qualified Theft through Falsification of
Commercial Documents and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
consisting of six (6) penalties of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided in Art. 40 of the RPC. But with the application of Art. 70 of the RPC, accused-
appellant shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 40 years.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF PETE C. LAGRAN,
PETE C. LAGRAN
G.R. No. 147270 August 15, 2001
PUNO, J.

FACTS:
On April 18, 1994, petitioner Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City of three (3) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year for each count and to pay a fine of
P125,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.1 He appealed the
decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals but the appeal was dismissed on July
11, 1997 for failure to file appellant's brief. The decision became final and executory on
August 6, 1997 and entry of judgment was made on March 5, 1998.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus on March 19, 2001. He prayed for
his immediate release as he had allegedly completed the service of his sentence. Citing
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, he argued that if the penalties or sentences
imposed on the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences emanated from
one court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously. He stated
that he has been incarcerated for two (2) years and four (4) days, counted from
February 28, 2001, thus, his detention in the New Bilibid Prison is now without legal
basis. Hence, the issue.

RULING:
Section 70 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"ARTICLE 70. Successive service of sentences. — When the culprit has to serve two or
more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so
permit; otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed
so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a
pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they
have been served out.

In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every
count of the offense committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to
serve all the prison terms simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service of
sentence, we find that petitioner has not yet completed the service of his sentence as
he commenced serving his sentence only on February 24, 1999. His prayer, therefore,
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.

SPOUSES JOSE and TRINIDAD BACAR vs. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN,

JR.
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349 April 18, 1997
PADILLA, J.ES

FACTS:
In this petition by way of complaint, dated 11 April 1994, petitioner-spouses Jose and
Trinidad Bacar pray for the dismissal from the service of respondent Judge Salvador P.
de Guzman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, on
the grounds of: 1) gross ignorance of the law, and; 2) rendering an unjust judgment in
Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 for homicide and attempted homicide
respectively, both entitled "People of the Philippines v. Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial".

Respondent judge modified his decision on the aforesaid cases after considering the
two (2) mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and
sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act, set forth in the motion for
reconsideration filed by the accused.

On rendering an unjust judgment, petitioners allege that in imposing a straight penalty of

six (6) years imprisonment for homicide, after taking into consideration the aforesaid
mitigating circumstances, the respondent judge has rendered an unjust judgment in
Criminal Case No. 89-1360. It is contended that under the graduation and application of
penalties, the penalty that should be imposed can in no case be justified to only six (6)
years “flat”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the the penalty of imprisonment of six years “flat” proper?

RULING:
No. respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing a straight
penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the accused in his modified judgment in the
case for homicide. It is basic law that, as stated above, the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year,
except only in certain cases.

In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions of the
Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted. However,
the aforesaid rules and provisions in those articles, particularly Arts. 50 to 57, 62, 64
and 65, are not applicable in fixing the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty. The
Court has unqualified discretion to fix the term of the minimum. The only limitation is
that it is within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense committed, without regard to its three (3) periods.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to
enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and
moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal
offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws, with definite minimum and
maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty
specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.

In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions of the
Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, and
FRANCO BRILLANTES
G.R. No. L-28547 February 22, 1974
AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
Around eleven o'clock in the evening of January 9, 1966, Gorriceta, who had just come
from Fort San Pedro in Iloilo City, was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his
sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in front of the Elizalde Building on J. M. Basa
Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They hailed
Gorriceta who stopped the truck. Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a
district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He told Jaranilla that he
(Gorriceta) was on his way home. Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to
Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place.
So, Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to
Mandurriao.

Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to
seventy meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted from
the vehicle. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the
direction of the plaza. After an interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared.
Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck. Jaranilla directed
Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck
to Jaro (another district of the city) on the same route that they had taken in going to
Mandurriao.

While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under
construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and
Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after
Patrolman Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that
the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan
approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of
the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman.
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a
sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta. He immediately
started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the
city. Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not recidivists are entitled for indeterminate sentence

RULING:
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They
are entitled to an indeterminate sentence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BETH TEMPORADA
G.R. No. 173473 December 17, 2008
Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:
Beth Temporada is an accused for the crime of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment in which
the prosecution alleged that the accused recruited and promised overseas employment,
for a fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad
Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong.
After collecting the alleged placement fees amounting to P282,160, it was also noted
that such placement fees are in excess of or greater than that specified in the scheduled
of allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and without reasons and without fault of the
said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse them the
expenses they incurred in connection with the documentation and processing of their
papers for purposes of their deployment. The accused-apellant now contends that the
prosecution failed to establish all the elements of the offense that were charged to them.

RTC Judgment convicted the said accused, as principal of the offenses charged and
she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment; and the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to nine
(9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum for the estafa committed
against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.; the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one day of
prision mayor as maximum each for the estafas committed against complainants,
Dennis Dimaano, Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to eleven (11)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the estafa committed against
Evelyn Estacio.

CA Judgment affirmed with modification. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the

indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum; and in Criminal
Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the indeterminate penalties imposed for the five (5) counts of estafa
were proper.

RULING:
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is intended to favor the accused, particularly to
shorten his term of imprisonment. The reduction of his period of incarceration
reasonably helps "uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." The law, being
penal in character, must receive an interpretation that benefits the accused. This Court
already ruled that "in cases where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence
would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison
sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be applied." In the same vein,
if an interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is unfavorable to the accused
and will work to increase the term of his imprisonment, that interpretation should not be
adopted. It is also for this reason that the claim that the power of this Court to lighten the
penalty of lesser crimes carries with it the responsibility to impose a greater penalty for
grave penalties is not only wrong but also dangerous.
Nowhere does the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribe that the minimum term of the
penalty be no farther than one degree away from the maximum term. Thus, while it may
be true that the minimum term of the penalty in an indeterminate sentence is generally
one degree away from the maximum term, the law does not mandate that its application
be rigorously and narrowly limited to that situation.

PABLO C. FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE

MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
BELLOSILLO, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5)
separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging
him with gravely maligning them on four different days.

Petitioner’s woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans.
Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —
“You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo
walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.”

After nearly ten (10) years, Makati MeTC found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation
in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of
one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional
“in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleqed in the information(s),”
ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena
Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit. He was acquitted in the other
information for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and
testify.

Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner
elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed his conviction. Accordingly,
petitioner was sentenced “in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment . . . . “

After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision of the RTC became final.

The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a
consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But before he could be arrested petitioner filed
an application for probation which the MeTC denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation

RULING:
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.

First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not
expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty
imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special
prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by
all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which
is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for
the benefit of the accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to
divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies,
unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person
should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.

Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which
interprets the quoted provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the
application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner. While
the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if
the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be
equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing law and
jurisprudence.

Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable.
Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of
several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of
the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of
his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are
distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the
Probation Law

Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties
imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that
petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his
penalties to make him eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the
MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of
any other purpose.

Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.
ROLANDO P. DELA TORRE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARCIAL
VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 121592 July 5, 1996
FRANCISCO, J

FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari seeks the
nullification of two resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in SPA No. 95-
047, a case for disqualification filed against petitioner before the COMELEC.
The first assailed resolution dated May 6, 1995 declared the petitioner disqualified from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 elections,
citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991)2 which provides as follows:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after
serving sentence;The second assailed resolution, dated August 28, 1995, denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)'s applicability

RULING:
Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation had the effect of
suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code, suffice it
to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the
sentence.16 Petitioner's conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a
crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in
Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality
when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution
of the application for probation.17 Clearly then, petitioner's theory has no merit.

ALEJANDRA PABLO vs. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding Judge, Branch

43, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Dagupan City and PEOPLE of the
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125108 August 3, 2000
PURISIMA, J.

FACTS:
On January 12, 1994, petitioner Alejandra Pablo was charged with a violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate
Informations, for issuing three bad checks in the total amount of ₱2,334.00 each to
complainant Nelson Mandap. All three Informations alleged that on or about the 25th of
May, 1993, petitioner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally draw, issue
and deliver various checks to Nelson Mandap, in partial payment of a loan she obtained
from him, knowing that at the time of the issuance of such checks, she did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the bank. Subject checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank upon presentment for payment, it appearing that the current account of
petitioner had been closed, and she failed to pay the amount or make arrangements for
the payment thereof, despite notice of dishonor.

Petitioner applied for probation in Criminal Cases. It denied petitioner’s application for
probation on the ground that the petitioner is disqualified under Section 9 of P.D. 968
(Probation Law). Respondent judge denied petitioner’s application for probation in the
Order dated March 25, 1996. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to no avail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s application for probation on the ground of disqualification from probation
under Section 9 of P.D. 968.

RULING:
No, The National Probation Office denied petitioner’s application for probation under
Section 9 paragraph (c) P.D. 968 because a prior conviction was entered against the
petitioner on June 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 94-0199, penalizing her with a fine of
₱4,648.00; thereby placing her within the ambit of disqualification from probation under
Section 9 paragraph (c) of P.D. 968

In the case of Rura vs. Lopeña relied upon by petitioner, the Court declared that
"previous" refers to conviction, and not to commission of a crime. At the time Rura was
convicted of the crime for which he was applying for probation, he had no prior
conviction. In the present case of petitioner, when she applied for probation in Criminal
Cases Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-D, she had a previous conviction in Criminal
Case No. 94-00199-D, which thereby disqualified her from the benefits of probation.

MICHAEL PADUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:
June 16, 2003, Padua and Edgar Ubalde were charged before the RTC Pasig of
violation of R.A. No. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act of 2002] for selling
dangerous drugs. When arraigned, Padua assisted by counsel de officio entered a plea
of not guilty. During the pre-trial, Padua’s counsel de officio manifested that his client
was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail the
benefits granted to 1st time offenders. The prosecutor interposed no objection, thus the
not guilty plea was withdrawn, Padua re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.
Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging that he is a minor and a 1st time
offender, and that he possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications of the
probation law. RTC ordered for the post-sentenced investigation and recommendation
and comment of the probation office and the city prosecutor relatively.

Pasana, the chief probation and parole officer recommended Padua to be placed on
probation. However, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an order denying the petition for
probation on the ground that under R.A. No. 9165, any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He filed for a petition
for certiorari, but the CA dismissed his petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Michael Padua can avail the benefits of the Probation Law.

RULING:
adua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No.
9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that
any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:

SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. –
Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the
penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation
Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory
construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.30
Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of
a statute there should be no departure.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators
in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those
persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and
magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation
of Sections 1132 and 1533 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of
illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence,
while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from
availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike,
are given the chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also correctly stated
that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section
24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law
could have easily declared so.

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
SERENO, CJ

FACTS:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (including Leonardo "Lenny" Villa) of
the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).

On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were "briefed" and brought to the
Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. The rites
were scheduled to last for three days.
The neophytes were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These
rites included:

1. Indian Run – which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes;

2. Bicol Express – which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs
against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran
over their legs;

3. Rounds – in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes
during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with
knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and

4. Auxies’ Privilege Round – in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes.

They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic plays,
play rough basketball, and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they
would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of
hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation.

After a while, accused alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of
physical pain.

Lenny received several paddle blows. After their last session of physical beatings,
Lenny could no longer walk that he had to be carried to the carport. The initiation for the
day was officially ended. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really
feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and
helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened,
the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans.

The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide. The criminal case against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew.

The CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal
liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. One accused had by
then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries.
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether Tecson et. al. can be covered by the Probation Law despite their appeal of
conviction?

RULING:

First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and
parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to
adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of
the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That power
and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a
punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance
with law.

The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of
Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not
have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the
court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally
rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the
Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)

It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant,
meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced
Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the
Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in
their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special authority that
would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken
cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous
case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion
G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was
made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion,
Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36

Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications
with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that
applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as
the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on an
unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never
acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch
130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court
in which the criminal action has been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial
court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The
execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned.39
The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other
party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall
cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment the
complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it
is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and
decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant
thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally
disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if
the nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
place.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed
except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the
accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions
among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the
accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when
the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the
accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final
order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously
appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached
to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which
the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case
for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter
of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the
convicts’ applications for probation.

MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA MARUHOM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHIILPPINES

G.R. No. 206513 October 20, 2015
PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
On September 24, 2005, in the City of Las Piñas, accused, with lewd designs, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit a lascivious conduct upon the
person of one AAA, who was then a sixteen year old minor, by then and there
embracing her, touching her breast and private part against her will and without her
consent and the act complained of is prejudicial to the physical and psychological
development of the complainant. After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision which
convicted petitioner of the crime charged. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing, among other things, that even assuming he
committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that the same were done
without the victim’s consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence upon her.
The CA rendered a Decision adopting the recommendation of the OSG. Petitioner
received a copy of CA Decision on July 6, 2012. Instead of further appealing the case,
he filed on July 23, 2012 before the CA a manifestation with motion to allow him to
apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail the benefits of Probation Law

RULING:
Verily, Section 4 of the Probation Law provides that the application for probation must
be filed with the trial court within the 15-day period for perfecting an appeal. The need to
file it within such period is intended to encourage offenders, who are willing to be
reformed and rehabilitated, to avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity.34 If
the application for probation is filed beyond the 15-day period, then the judgment
becomes final and executory and the lower court can no longer act on the application
for probation. On the other hand, if a notice of appeal is perfected, the trial court that
rendered the judgment of conviction is divested of any jurisdiction to act on the case,
except the execution of the judgment when it has become final and executory.

In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation Law that "no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal
from the judgment of conviction," prevailing jurisprudence35 treats appeal and probation
as mutually exclusive remedies because the law is unmistakable about it.36 Indeed, the
law is very clear and a contrary interpretation would counter its envisioned mandate.
Courts have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where
the words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of that statute,
leave no room for doubt or interpretation.37 To be sure, the remedy of convicted felons
who want to avail of the benefits of probation even after the remedy of an appeal is to
go to the Congress and ask for the amendment of the law. To surmise a converse
construal of the provision would be dangerously encroaching on the power of the
legislature to enact laws and is tantamount to judicial legislation.

To note, what Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal from the judgment
of conviction, which involves a review of the merits of the case and the determination of
whether the accused is entitled to acquittal. However, under the recommended grounds
for appeal which were enumerated earlier, the purpose of the appeal is not to assail the
judgment of conviction but to question only the propriety of the sentence, particularly the
penalty imposed or the crime for which the accused was convicted, as the accused
intends to apply for probation upon correction of the penalty or conviction for the lesser
offense. If the CA finds it proper to modify the sentence, and the penalty finally imposed
by the appellate court is within the probationable period, or the crime for which the
accused is eventually convicted imposes a probationable penalty, application for
probation after the case is remanded to the trial court for execution should be allowed.

It is believed that the recommended grounds for appeal do not contravene Section 4 of
the Probation Law, which expressly prohibits only an appeal from the judgment of
conviction. In such instances, the ultimate reason of the accused for filing the appeal
based on the afore-stated grounds is to determine whether he may avail of probation
based on the review by the appellate court of the crime and/or penalty imposed by the
trial court. Allowing the afore-stated grounds for appeal would give an accused the
opportunity to apply for probation if his ground for appeal is found to be meritorious by
the appellate court, thus, serving the purpose of the Probation Law to promote the
reformation of a penitent offender outside of prison.

On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in the following
instances:

1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty
imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of
appeal; and

2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in
issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for the correction of the penalty imposed by
the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the
crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.

Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as Section 4 of the Probation Law
prohibits granting an application for probation if an appeal from the sentence of
conviction has been perfected by the accused.

In this case, petitioner appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction before the CA
alleging that it was error on the part of the RTC to have found him guilty of violating
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He argued that the RTC should not have given
much faith and credence to the testimony of the victim because it was tainted with
inconsistencies. Moreover, he went on to assert that even assuming he committed the
acts imputed on him, still there was no evidence showing that the lascivious acts were
committed without consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence because
the victim at that time was in deep slumber. It is apparent that petitioner anchored his
appeal on a claim of innocence and/or lack of sufficient evidence to support his
conviction of the offense charged, which is clearly inconsistent with the tenor of the
Probation Law that only qualified penitent offender are allowed to apply for probation.
The CA, therefore, did not err in applying the similar case of Lagrosa v. People46
wherein the protestations of petitioners therein did not simply assail the propriety of the
penalties imposed but meant a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence.

To be sure, if petitioner intended in the first instance to be entitled to apply for probation
he should have admitted his guilt and buttressed his appeal on a claim that the penalty
imposed by the RTC was erroneous or that he is only guilty of a lesser offense
necessarily included in the crime for which he was originally convicted. Unfortunately for
him, he already perfected his appeal and it is late in the day to avail the benefits of
probation despite the imposition of the CA of a probationable penalty.