CASE DIGEST: [G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017].

SALVADOR ESTIPONA,
JR. Y ASUELA, PETITIONER, HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, LEGAZPI CITY,
ALBAY, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the

constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under
any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall
not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No.
13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs).

On June 15,2016, a motion to allow the accused to enter into a plea bargaining
agreement was filed. The motion seeks to withdraw the not guilty plea into a guilty
plea for violation Section 12 of the above stated Article with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of
the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner further avers that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in
all violations of said law violates the following: (a)the intent of the law expressed in
paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (b) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (c)the principle of
separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

Consequently, the prosecution opposed and moved for the denial the said motion as it
is contrary to R.A. No. 9165 Section 23 which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. And that
thereafter, on June 29, 2016 in its comment it shows that it "is open to the Motion of
the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as
provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9165, however, with the express
mandate of Section 23 Article prohibiting plea bargaining, it is left without any choice
but to reject the proposal of the accused."

An order of denial of the motion was issued by the respondent judge Frank E.
Lobrig, dated July 12, 2016

on July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.

ISSUE: Is Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes, Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165

is UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution. Section

5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the exclusive domain of
the Supreme Court and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.

The trias politica principle prevents Congress from promulgating rules

regarding pleading, practice and procedure. The separation of powers among the
three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact
laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted
its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the
exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the
Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive
and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to

issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive
rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. "Substantive
law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."
It is towards the aim of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a
way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is
considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate"
component of the administration of justice.

Plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality -
can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not
do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a
lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is
that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is
to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what
the evidence on hand can sustain.

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon
the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the
point when the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during
the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave
abuse thereof. "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or
tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in
allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing
less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made
his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the
judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679               August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal

protection clause
 PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a
Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and,
instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have
been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of
his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug
seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining

in all violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches
of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it

encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being
violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of

pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court.  The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the
Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot
replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS
from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In
Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et
al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are
not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the
Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our
institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in
order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy
considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in

toto or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as
invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless
it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circularduly issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for

the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure,
that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may
be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule

violates substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in
all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is
considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and
“legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby

the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining.  The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.
Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief
virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused,
the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on

plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested
right.Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.  Under the present Rules,
the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but
depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the offense charged.  The reason for this is that the
prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to
always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to

the point when the prosecution already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail

hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish
the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the
court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty
could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The
ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on
hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and
irregular.