#11 - Mun. of Tupi - V - Faustino
#11 - Mun. of Tupi - V - Faustino
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Tupi enacted a speed limit ordinance which in
practice reduced the number of accidents at the covered roads but unfortunately
did not comply with legal requirements
The Ordinance further prescribes penalties for violations, i.e. a fine of
P1,000.00 for the first offense, P1,500.00 for the second offense, and fine of
Php2,000.00 or thirty (30) day imprisonment or both for the third offense.
Atty. Faustino was flagged down by local traffic enforcers for over
speeding. He was running at seventy kilometers per hour (70 kph) along the
expanse of the highway bordering Crossing Acmonan to Crossing Cebuano
which had a maximum speed set of 40 kph per the Ordinance. He was fined
Php1,000.00 which he paid under protest.
The petitioner countered that the present action for declaratory relief was
unavailing because the Ordinance had already been breached and it was in
accord with Section 36 of RA No. 4136.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment through the
Provincial Prosecutor of South Cotabato. The OSG noted that the Ordinance
imposed stiffer penalties than those imposed by RA No. 4136 specifically on the
30-day imprisonment. The OSG further observed that violation of the Ordinance
authorized the confiscation of driver's license and issuance of Temporary
Operator's Permit (TOP), which only a deputized Land Transportation Office
(LTO) personnel can legally do.
The OSG submitted that the Ordinance did not conform with RA No. 4136
which itself enjoined all local government units: (a) to enact or enforce
ordinances fixing maximum allowable speeds other than those provided in
Section 35 of RA No. 4136; (b) classify public highways for traffic purposes and
make appropriate signs therefor; and (c) submit a certification to the LTO
Commissioner of the names, locations, and limits of all "through streets"
designated as such.
The trial court declared the Ordinance void ab initio. It further ordered
petitioner to refund all the fines thus far collected by virtue of the Ordinance.
Petitioner now urges the Court to exercise its power of judicial review on a
pure question of law
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief the proper remedy at the
first instance to assail the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014;
and
Whether or not the operative doctrine apply in the directive to refund the
P1,000.00 fine imposed on respondent.
RULING:
No.
The petition for declaratory relief initiated by respondent below is not the
proper remedy to challenge the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 688, Series
of 2014. For the Ordinance has already been enforced and the penalty for its
violation imposed against respondent. Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan,
et al.31 decreed:
In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable
by EO 10's enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the
hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court
for carrying out the directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred
when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a situation.
No.
Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a "legislative
or executive measure," meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated
by the court. From the passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance
until its invalidation by the court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when
relied upon by the public in good faith, may have to be recognized as valid. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
One. This doctrine was not raised by any party at any time the instant case
was before the trial court and before us. Hence, as to this doctrine, the parties
have not been heard. It would not be fair to prejudice any of them on a point that
neither has argued. Besides, Section 8, Rule 51, in relation to Section 4 of Rule 56,
Rules of Court, precludes us from deciding a case on the basis of an alleged error
that the parties have not raised before the Court.
Two. There was no reliance by the public in good faith upon the
Municipal Ordinance. In fact, the public was upfront in challenging the
validity of the Municipal Ordinance. There were no public beneficiaries of the
Municipal Ordinance at least none that we know of, precisely because the
doctrine was not raised and argued by any of the parties. Further, it cannot be
said that the assailed effect of the Municipal Ordinance - collection of fines -
cannot be undone. The fines can in fact be restored to the respondent. No one
has come forward to argue that the fines can no longer be refunded because,
for example, the Municipality has become bankrupt. The fines to be reimbursed
to the respondent are in the form of fungible goods that can be satisfied by any
other collection of money in the amount collected. There is also no inequity or
injustice that would arise from the refund of the fines. To be sure, the converse is
true. It would be iniquitous and unjust to deny respondent the refund of the
moneys he had paid under protest pursuant to an illegal exaction when (i) the
Municipality had then and has now neither the authority nor the right to get the
money from him, and (ii) in similar situations in the past, the Court has
consistently decreed the refund of illegal collections, and therefore, in the
process, treat respondent differently from similarly situated members of the
public.