b. Ocampo vs.

Enriquez

G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016

i. Case digest

Facts: During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate
Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9,
2016 elections.

On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP

Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the
Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

Issues:

1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse
of discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance
with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to
have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?

2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violated the Constitution, and domestic and international laws?

3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses
and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have
nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB?

4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of
former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by
which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petitions.

Procedural issues

Political question

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public
domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President
Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national
healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such
discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that political question is
outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and
personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of public
funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either
express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or potential
injury which they may suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their interest in this
case is too general and shared by other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of
law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.
Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this point
in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national
military cemetery and declared a national shrine would have no profound effect on the
political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more than
twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already
passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to
their fundamental constitutional rights.

As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that the
burial of Marcos encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim of

lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should
be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive
before the Secretary ofNational Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should be
given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G
161-375 was issued upon his order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation
thereof demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion, requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of his office to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary,
they could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).

Hierarchy of Courts

While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this
case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that
requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its
original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven
necessary.
Substantive issues

I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.

While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety
should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely
related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering

that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle
embodied therein. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted the Code of Conduct on Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act,
and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has
issued various orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of
behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees; workflow
charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and
reporting; and client feedback program

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is
also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational
institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human
rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze
orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to
these provisions, there is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the
LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public respondents.
Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department.
Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and
proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of
its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive
functions. It is best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power.
The provision simply underscores the rule of law and, corollary, the cardinal principle
that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
There is no violation of RA 289.

Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition
that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all
unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned
in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino’s Proclamation No.
431, which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay’s Proclamation No. 42, is
different from that covered by Marcos’ Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon
does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any
funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is
indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a
singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes, and patriots.

Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the “decent and
the brave” or “hero” would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the
validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon
the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on
the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the
Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the
consecration of Marcos’ mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the
status of a “hero.” Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the purpose of the
LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the
people buried there the title of “hero” nor to require that only those interred therein
should be treated as a “hero.” Lastly, petitioners’ repeated reference to a “hero’s burial”
and “state honors,” without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be
accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment have
been finalized by public respondents.

No violation of RA 10639.

The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners’ logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No.
10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos’ burial at the LNMB. It
would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-
oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically
proscribing Marcos’ interment at the LNMB as a “reparation” for the Human Rights
Violations Victims (HRVVs). The law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court
cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional,
for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That
would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

The enforcement of the HRVV s’ rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired
by the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no
causal connection and legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and directive
of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with the statutory powers and
functions of the Board and the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs’ entitlements
to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed.
R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether express or implied, the provisions of
the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375.

There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws.

The nation’s history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte,
acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners
admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees,
in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must
be said that the preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole
responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every
freedom-loving citizen of this country.

Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights
Victims’ Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of
HRVV s, the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known
as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the primary government
agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all factual matters relating
to official Philippine history.

II. The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105.
P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D.
No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the
latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and
others which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because:
(1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of
statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth,
exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation,"; and
(3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of
the PVAO.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed"
refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein.
Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered
and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual or collective
"heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried therein. The "nation's esteem
and reverence for her war dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in
issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the interment of
Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural
integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is
empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the
supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the Office of the
President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation,
nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why
President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President
Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos
Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political
agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he
considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in
carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for
public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that
the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until
otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive
issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was
originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB
for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of
National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether
recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use
requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the
burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered.

Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the

LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed
factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief
Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang
(payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden
of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, this Court
cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of facts.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB:
(a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c)
Secretaries of National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag Officers of the
AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and
trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA)
who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the
AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine
Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries,
Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment
has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National
Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen,
National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief
of Staff.

Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the
LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service; and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude.
In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G
161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified
to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former
Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves
aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial
of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be
sustained for having been issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of
the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and
unmistakable showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly
providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for qualification for burial at
the LNMB.

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue
that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of
heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same
does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to those who were
already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB, both from the
legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the
title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero."

In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years.
Since 1986, the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service
or military-related activities but also non-military personnel who were recognized for
their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as government dignitaries,
statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment
has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National
Defense). In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and
Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to
civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order to be consistent with the
original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is
indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-
related activities.

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief,
a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal
of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may
disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the
right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received.
In this sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in
his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly,
just a human who erred like us.

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final
judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense
involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person
shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to
safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only
give him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable
recommendation from the Commander- in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of
National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is
not legally demandable and enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection
clause are not met. 181 In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a
military personnel and a former President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge
under the Articles of War attach only to the members of the military. There is also no
substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents buried at the
LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification between a military
personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208
and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also
an active military cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons
interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly
recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners
have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged from military service under APP
Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of
Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War. The NHCP study is
incomplete with respect to his entire military career as it failed to cite and include the
official records of the AFP.

The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that rendered by
a military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission,
enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or
retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from the
AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during
the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge
from the military service. The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian
authority over the military. Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before
the court martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations G
161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional
and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let
alone a mere administrative regulation.

It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people
through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be
automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its obvious consequence - that
of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous and
perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories arising
from the various acts of the people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to
divine the exact implications or significance of the number of votes obtained in elections,
or the message from the number of participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not
to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and oftentimes emotional, if not
acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding stars -
clear constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing
messages from the actions of the people.

ii. Discussion
The Supreme Court, in ruling this case, observe the principle of separation of power. It
was held that the issue in this case is a political question which should be determine by
the legislative or executive branch. In the event that the interment of Marcos in the
LNMB is to be denied, it will put into question, as well, the validity of the burial of each
and every mortal remains resting therein that would result to the violation of the
principle of separation of power since the authority to whom to allocate the plots in the
LNMB is granted to the President.

The decision of the case is classified as intuitive which is a product of a hunch, the feeling
of what is right for this case, which is thereafter reasoned out since if the decision is to
deny the interment of Marcos in the LNMB, it will be contrary to public policy.

c. Vinuya vs. Exec. Sec. Romulo

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

i. Case digest

FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and
the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to
assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing
to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed
against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology
and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the
war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former
comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.

RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’
claims against Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by
the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power
is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the
authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but
to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that
it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular
and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be
inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn
the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign
policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where
such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our
consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the
interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies
are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring
a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to
persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case
of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right
that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting
consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in
international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a
view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the
duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used
as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as
a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the
field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all
States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation,
and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.

ii. Discussion

The resolution of this case falls under the analytic category. In the study and conduct of
International Relations, one has to understand that despite the existence of international
laws, treaties, conventions, and the like, the world is in a state of anarchy. There is no
supreme authority which governs over all the states similar to executive, legislative, and
judiciary departments that most states have and recognize who can maintain the world
order. It is the states themselves who are left to deal with one another. They are, in
theory, considered as equals. In light of this, since each state is sovereign, one cannot just
impose obligations on another state based on claims of their nationals. There are
processes to be followed, relations to be maintained, and interests to be considered.
Despite the valid claims for the actions of the Japanese during the war, there is not much
relief which our courts can grant to these victims for it is the executive branch which has
the power to deal with Japan and enforce such obligation should it decide to do so.