G.R. No.

L-23002             July 31, 1967

CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ., ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for plaintiff-appellant.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is an appeal by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 2565, which she commenced on May 28, 1962, to secure
declaration, of nullity of two contracts executed on January 24, 1934 and for recovery of certain
properties.

The facts of this case may be briefly stated as follows:

Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with whom she had one living child,
Concepcion Calderon, contracted a second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo Rodriguez,
widower with four children by a previous marriage, named Geronimo, Esmeragdo, Jose and
Mauricio, all surnamed Rodriguez. There was no issue in this second marriage.

Prior to her marriage to Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix was the registered owner of 2 fishponds
located in the barrio of Babañgad, municipality of Bulacan, Bulacan province. with a total area of
557,711 square meters covered by OCT Nos. 605 and 807. Under date of January 24, 1934,
Concepcion Felix appeared to have executed a deed of sale conveying ownership of the aforesaid
properties to her daughter, Concepcion Calderon, for the sum of P2,500.00, which the latter in turn
appeared to have transferred to her mother and stepfather by means of a document dated January
27, 1934. Both deeds, notarized by Notary Public Jose D. Mendoza, were registered in the office of
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on January 29, 1934, as a consequence of which, the original titles
were cancelled and TCT Nos. 13815 and 13816 were issued in the names of the spouses Domingo
Rodriguez and Concepcion Felix.

On March 6, 1953, Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, survived by the widow, Concepcion Felix, his
children Geronimo Esmeragdo and Mauricio and grandchildren Oscar, Juan and Ana, surnamed
Rodriguez, children of a son, Jose, who had predeceased him.

On March 16, 1953, the above-named widow, children and grandchildren of the deceased entered
into an extra-judicial settlement of his (Domingo's) estate, consisting of one-half of the properties
allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership. Among the properties listed as conjugal were the
two parcels of land in Bulacan, Bulacan, which, together with another piece of property, were divided
among the heirs in this manner:

WHEREAS, the parties have furthermore agreed that the fishpond covered by TCT Nos.
13815, 13816 and 24109 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, containing an
area of 557,971 sq. m., which is likewise the conjugal property of the deceased and his
surviving spouse; 1/2 of the same or 278,985.5 sq. m. belongs to said Concepcion Felix Vda.
de Rodriguez, as her share in the conjugal property; and 3/4 of the remaining half or
209,239.125 sq. m. are transferred in full ownership to Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo
Rodriguez and Mauricio Rodriguez, share and share alike, while the other 1/4 or 69,746.375
 sq. m. of the said remaining half goes in equal shares to Oscar Rodriguez, Juan Rodriguez
and Ana Rodriguez.

As a result of this partition, TCT Nos. 13815 and 13816 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-11431 and
T-14432 were issued in the names of the said heirs of the deceased.

On March 23, 1953, in a power of attorney executed by the children and grandchildren of Domingo
Rodriguez, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez was named their attorney in-fact, authorized to
manage their shares in the fishponds (Exh. 4).

On July 2, 1954, the heirs ended their co-ownership by executing a deed of partition, dividing and
segregating their respective shares in the properties, pursuant to a consolidation and subdivision
plan (PCS-3702), in accordance with which, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez obtained TCT No.
T-12910, for the portion pertaining to her (Exh. L), while TCT No. T-12911 was issued to the other
heirs, for their shares. This latter title was subsequently replaced by TCT No. 16660 (Exh. M).

On October 12, 1954, the Rodriguez children executed another document granting unto the widow
lifetime usufruct over one-third of the fishpond which they received as hereditary share in the estate
of Domingo Rodriguez, which grant was accepted by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez.

Then, in a contract dated December 15, 1961, the widow appeared to have leased from the
Rodriguez children and grandchildren the fishpond (covered by TCT No. 16660) for a period of 5
years commencing August 16, 1962, for an annual rental of P7,161.37 (Exh. 5). 1äwphï1.ñët

At about this time, it seemed that the relationship between the widow and her stepchildren had
turned for the worse. Thus, when she failed to deliver to them the balance of the earnings of the
fishponds, in the amount of P3,000.00, her stepchildren endorsed the matter to their lawyer who, on
May 16, 1962, sent a letter of demand to the widow for payment thereof. On, May 28, 1962,
Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez filed the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
naming as defendants, Geronimo Rodriguez, Esmeragdo Rodriguez, Oscar Rodriguez, Concepcion
Bautista Vda. de Rodriguez, as guardian of the minors Juan and Ana Rodriguez, and Antonio Diaz
de Rivera and Renato Diaz de Rivera, as guardians of the minors Maria Ana, Mercedes, Margarita,
Mauricio, Jr. and Domingo (Children of Mauricio Rodriguez who had also died).

The action to declare null and void the deeds of transfer of plaintiff's properties to the conjugal
partnership was based on the alleged employment or exercise by plaintiff's deceased husband of
force and pressure on her; that the conveyances of the properties — from plaintiff to her daughter
and then to the conjugal partnership of plaintiff and her husband — are both without consideration;
that plaintiff participated in the extrajudicial settlement of estate (of the deceased Domingo
Rodriguez) and in other subsequent deeds or instruments involving the properties in dispute, on the
false assumption that the said properties had become conjugal by reason of the execution of the
deeds of transfer in 1934; that laboring under the same false assumption, plaintiff delivered to
defendants, as income of the properties from 1956 to 1961, the total amount of P56,976.58. As
alternative cause of action, she contended that she would claim for her share, as surviving widow, of
1/5 of the properties in controversy, should such properties be adjudged as belonging to the conjugal
partnership. Thus, plaintiff prayed that the deeds of transfer mentioned in the complaint be declared
fictitious and simulated; that the "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate" be also declared null and void;
that TCT No. 16660 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan be cancelled and another one be issued in
the name of plaintiff, Concepcion Felix Vda. de Felix; that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff the
sum of P56,976.58, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint, and for
appropriate relief in connection with her alternative cause of action.
In their separate answers, defendants not only denied the material allegations of the complaint, but
also set up as affirmative defenses lack of cause of action, prescription, estoppel and laches. As
counterclaim, they asked for payment by the plaintiff of the unpaid balance of the earnings of the
land up to August 15, 1962 in the sum of P3,000.00, for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

On October 5, 1963, judgment was rendered for the defendants. In upholding the validity of the
contracts, the court found that although the two documents, Exhibits A and B, were executed for the
purpose of converting plaintiff's separate properties into conjugal assets of the marriage with
Domingo Rodriguez, the consent of the parties thereto was voluntary, contrary to the allegations of
plaintiff and her witness. The court also ruled that having taken part in the questioned transactions,
plaintiff was not the proper party to plead lack of consideration to avoid the transfers; that contracts
without consideration are not inexistent, but are only voidable, following the ruling in the case
of Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana (87 Phil. 787); that there was ratification or confirmation by the plaintiff of
the transfer of her property, by her execution (with the other heirs) of the extrajudicial settlement of
estate; that being a voluntary party to the contracts, Exhibits A and B, plaintiff cannot recover the
properties she gave thereunder. Plaintiff's alternative cause of action was also rejected on the
ground that action for rescission of the deed of extrajudicial settlement should have been filed within
4 years from its execution (on March 16, 1953).

From the decision of the Court of First Instance, plaintiff duly appealed to this Court, insisting that the
conveyances in issue were obtained through duress, and were inexistent, being simulated and
without consideration.

We agree with the trial Court that the evidence is not convincing that the contracts of transfer from
Concepcion Felix to her daughter, and from the latter to her mother and stepfather were executed
through violence or intimidation. The charge is predicated solely upon the improbable and biased
testimony of appellant's daughter, Concepcion C. Martelino, whom the trial court, refused to believe,
considering that her version of violence and harassment was contradicted by Bartolome Gualberto
who had lived with the Rodriguez spouses from 1917 to 1953, and by the improbability of Rodriguez
threatening his stepdaughter in front of the Notary Public who ratified her signature. Furthermore, as
pointed out by the appealed decision, the charge of duress should be treated with caution
considering that Rodriguez had already died when the suit was brought, for duress, like fraud, is not
to be lightly paid at the door of men already dead. (Cf. Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.] 481, 498;
Sinco vs. Longa, 51 Phil. 507).

What is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or defect of consent, an action based upon
it must be brought within four years after it has ceased;1 and the present action was instituted only in
1962, twenty eight (28) years after the intimidation is claimed to have occurred, and no less than
nine (9) years after the supposed culprit died (1953). On top of it, appellant entered into a series of
subsequent transactions with appellees that confirmed the contracts that she now tries to set aside.
Therefore, this cause of action is clearly barred.

Appellant's main stand in attacking the conveyances in question is that they are simulated or
fictitious, and inexistent for lack of consideration. We shall examine each purported defect
separately.

The charge of simulation is untenable, for the characteristic of simulation is the fact that the apparent
contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effects or in way alter the juridical situation
of the parties. Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors,
simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control
of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. But appellant contends that the sale by
her to her daughter, and the subsequent sale by the latter to appellant and her husband, the late
Domingo Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of converting the property from paraphernal to
conjugal, thereby vesting a half interest in Rodriguez, and evading the prohibition against donations
from one spouse to another during coverture (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 1334). If this is true, then the
appellant and her daughter must have intended the two conveyance to be real and effective; for
appellant could not intend to keep the ownership of the fishponds and at the same time vest half of
them in her husband. The two contracts of sale then could not have been simulated, but were real
and intended to be fully operative, being the means to achieve the result desired.

Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these contracts the law against donations
between spouses make them simulated ones.

Ferrara, in his classic book, "La Simulacion de los Negocios Juridicos" (Sp. trans, 1926), pp. 95,
105, clearly explains the difference between simulated transactions and transactions in fraudem
legis:

Otra figura que debe distinguirse de la simulacion es el fraus legis. Tambien aqui se da una
gran confusion que persiste aun en la jurisprudencia, apegada tenazmente a antiguos
errores. Se debe a Bahr el haber defendido con vigor la antitesis teorica que existe entre
negocio fingido y negocio fraudulento y haber atacado la doctrina comun que hacia una
mescolanza con los dos conceptos.

Se confunde — dice (2) —, el negocio in fraudem legis con el negocio simulado; aunque la

naturaleza de ambos sea totalmente diversa. El negocio fraudulento no es, en absolute, un
negocio aparente. Es perfectamente serio: se quiere realmente. Es mas, se quiere tal como
se ha realizado, con todas las consecuencias que correspondent a la forma juridica elegida.
Muchas veces, estas consecuencias con incomodas para una u otra de las partes, aunque
serian mucho mas incomodas las consecuencias que lievaria consigo el acto prohibido.

xxx     xxx     xxx

El resultado de las precedentes investigaciones es el siguiente el negocio simulado quiere

producir una apariencia; el negocio fraudulente, una realidad; los negocios simulados son
ficticios, no queridos; los negocios in fraudem son serios, reales, y realizados en tal forma
por las partes para consequir un resultado prohibido: la simulacion nunca es un medio para
eludir la ley sino para ocultar su violation. La transgresion del contenido verbal e inmediato
de la norma se encubre bajo el manto de un negocio licito, lo cual no altera el caracter
del contra legem agere. Tan verdad es, que si se ha redactado una contra-escritura que
documentary y declara la verdadera naturaleza del negocio realizado, no queda mas que
aplicar pura y simplementela prohibicion.

Tambien el fraude quiere perjudicar la ley, pero emplea para ello medios diversos y sigue
distintos caminus. No oculta el acto exterior, sino que lo deja claro y visible, tratando de huir
sesgadamente de la aplicacion de la ley merced a una artistica y sabia combinacion de
varios medios juridicos no reprobados.

Appellant invokes our decision in Vasquez vs. Porta, 98 Phil. 490, but to no purpose. The mortgage
and foreclosure sale involved in that case were typical simulations merely apparent but not really
intended to produce legal effects, as approved by the Court's finding that the alleged creditor and
buyer at the foreclosure sale "Porta himself ostensibly acknowledged by his inertia in allowing the
doctor (alleged mortgagor debtor) to exercise dominical power thereon without any protest on his
part." (cas. cit., p. 495). Not only this, but the mortgagor's wife, when her husband died, "found
among his papers Porta's cancellation of the mortgage in his favor and the draft of the complaint for
foreclosure." Plainly, the precedent cited is here inapplicable.

Were the two conveyances from appellant to her daughter and from the latter to the spouses
Rodriguez void ab initio or inexistent for lack of consideration? We do not find them to be so. In the
first transaction, the price of P2,500.00 is recited in the deed itself (Exh. A); in the second (Exh. B),
the consideration set forth is P3,000.00. Now, Article 1274 of the Civil Code of 1889 (in force when
the deeds were executed) provided that —

In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the
prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other. (emphasis supplied.)

Since in each conveyance the buyer became obligated to pay a definite price in money, such
undertaking constituted in themselves actual causa or consideration for the conveyance of the
fishponds. That the prices were not paid (assuming ad arguendo that Concepcion Martelino's
testimony, to this effect is true) does not make the sales inexistent for want of causa. As ruled
in Enriquez de la Cavada vs. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982, "the consideration (causa) need not pass from one
(party) to the other at the time the contract is entered into x x x . The consideration need not be paid
at the time of the promise. The one promise is a consideration for the other."

What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact that they were resorted to in
order to circumvent the legal prohibition against donations between spouses contained in Article
1334, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. That illegal purpose tainted the
contracts, for as held by the Spanish Tribunal Supreme in its decision of 2 April 1941.

ha de ser reputado ineficaz, por exigencias includibles del caracter social y moral del
Derecho, todo contrato que persiga un fin ilicito o immoral, sea cualquiera el medio
empleado por los contratantes para lograr esa finalidad, no justificada por un interes digno
de ser socialmente protegido.

The illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the old Civil Code, for as declared
by the same Spanish Court in its decision of 14 December 1940 —

toda vez que lo que caracteriza fundamentalmente la ilicitud de la causa es la lesion de un

interos general juridica 6 moral.

a ruling reiterated in the decision of 2 April 1941 when the Court ruled:

El concepto de la causa ilicita, tal como la desenvuelve y aplica con gran amplitud y
flexibilidad la doctrina moderna, permite cobijar, no solo las convenciones ilicitas por razon
de su objeto o de su motivo ... sino tambien multiples convenciones que no encerrando en si
ningun elemento de directa antijuricidad son ilicitas por el matiz immoral que reviste la
operation en su conjunto x x x .

Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject matter or illegal causa,
Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non
oritur action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. And appellant is clearly as guilty as
her husband in the attempt to evade the legal interdiction of Article 1334 of the Code, already
cited. Wherefore, her present action to reivindicate the, conveyed properties was correctly repulsed
by the Court below.
 Art. 1306. If the act which constitutes the illicit consideration is neither a crime nor a
misdemeanor, the following rules shall be observed:

1. When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may have given by
virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance of the undertaking of the other party;

xxx     xxx     xxx

That Article 1306 applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or
the purpose of the contract was expressly recognized by this Supreme Court in Gustilo vs. Maravilla,
48 Phil. 449-450.2

Finally, it cannot be denied that plaintiff-appellant had knowledge of the nullity of the contract for the
transfer of her properties in 1934, because she was even a party thereto. And yet, her present action
was filed only on May 28, 1962 and after the breaking up of friendly relations between her and
defendants-appellees. Appellant's inaction to enforce her right, for 28 years, cannot be justified by
the lame excuse that she assumed that the transfer was valid. Knowledge of the effect of that
transaction would have been obtained by the exercise of diligence. Ignorance which is the effect of
inexcusable negligence, it has been said, is no excuse for laches. (Go Chi Gun, etc., et al. vs. Co
Cho, et al., G.R. No. L-5208, Feb. 28, 1955). Even assuming for the sake of argument that appellant
held her peace, during the lifetime of her husband, out of legitimate fear for her life, there is no
justification for her future to bring the proper action after his death in 1953. Instead, she entered into
a series of agreements with herein appellees, the children of her husband by a prior marriage, of
partition, usufruct and lease of their share in the fishponds, transactions that necessarily assumed
that Rodriguez had acquired one-half of the litigated fishponds. In the circumstances, appellant's
cause has become a stale demand and her conduct placed her in estoppel to question the Validity of
the transfer of her properties. (Manila, et al. vs. Galvan, et al., G.R. No. L-23507, May 24, 1967;
Perez vs. Herranz, 7 Phil. 695-696).

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant Concepcion
Felix Vda. de Rodriguez. So ordered.

Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

Footnotes

1
Article 1301 of the Civil Code of 1889, in force when the assailed contracts were executed
(1934).

2
See also Liguez vs. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 581582; Perez vs. Herranz, 7 Phil. 695.
A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543             April 26, 1991

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.

CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING, respondents.

LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice
and misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession committed in the following manner:

1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.

In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a
parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of
Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer
certificate of title in their names.

Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to
settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro
Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos.
Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the Valencias could show documents evidencing
ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed
that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their
differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).

On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against
Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-
2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).

Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private
document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to
pay the person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A
"Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in
favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is
not authentic. (Report, p. 14)

Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before
the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his
house. While the petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of
execution stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3
and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the
remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex
"A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).

On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.
1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of
property under litigation by a counsel.

On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.

On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding
(docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the
forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and
also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property
allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for
allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia
Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:

1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:

In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia
Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by
one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal
had died already about eight years before in the year 1965.

2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:

In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with
Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two
(2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds
were not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino
Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said sales (p. 7,
Report)

2. Administrative Case No. 1543.

A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of

Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this
reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter
nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed,
her grandmother still offered to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to
strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).

On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly
prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of
signing) with her grandmother's approval.

Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her
(Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-
2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against
Lydia Bernal.

On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case
No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.

Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution
of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both
dated December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these
cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten
directive of March 9, 1976.

On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.  When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-
1âwphi1

Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar
Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.

In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the
person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.

The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.

After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against
Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and
the additional charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos;
however, he recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months
finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."

The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:

I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of
the New Civil Code.

II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial
documents.

III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
 I

Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either
in person or through the mediation of another:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
make take part by virtue of their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to
curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments
of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re:
Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70
Phil. 248).

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.
(Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of
judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if
there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject
to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates,
in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is
not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the
judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress.
Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of
Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for
suspension.

The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client
relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as
counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons
adverted to.

II

It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in
consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that
Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that
affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785,
Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity
is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm.
Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not
corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt
on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he
fabricated his evidence.

There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale,
and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as
an officer of the court.

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but
not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The
first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115
SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause
in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to
illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan
vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is
mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This
Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of
the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment
depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in
order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125
SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.

The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for
lack of evidence.

During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct
examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-
examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.

Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him.  He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
1âwphi1

charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must
be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616,
February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper
that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.

In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No.
1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of
interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an
erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss
the same because there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.

The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the
information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L.
Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p.
486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.

The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative
Case No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.

III

There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases
conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.

Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are
neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty.
Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house
with the intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the
differences between the parties in a meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-
2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.

Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood
among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the
opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They
may "do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship
does not connote conspiracy.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the
practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3.
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein,
and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.