Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116100             February 9, 1996

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1

On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by
Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and
Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22
thereof.
2

The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:

Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the
pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and
children].

The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at
Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire
said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero
as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of
reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows:
That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos
and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and
then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property,
there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide
and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is
passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is
about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is
about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through
the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
 When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the remises
and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in
February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went
to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first
passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway.
Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way
that the entire passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for
plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that the remaining tenants of said
apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed
said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle
pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She
also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway
such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows.
Some of their footwear were even lost. . . . (Emphasis in original text; corrections in
3 

parentheses supplied)

On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress
and egress, to the public street;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight
Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.

The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses. 4

Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to
the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding
damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which
disposes as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The
Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five
Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral
Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the
appealed decision is affirmed to all respects. 5

On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then
6 

took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way
to herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.

With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right
of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the
judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has
already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain
any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the
court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed,
by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an
appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief
other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any
argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that
is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views
expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate
court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing
or modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs. 7

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred
in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial
legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages
was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. 8

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. 9

In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying
10 

basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely
because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering. 11

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or
loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no
cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong.
12

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not
only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a
13 

person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining
any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is
regarded as damnum absque injuria. 14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of
private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In
order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There
was damage or injury to the plaintiff.15

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as
owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the
owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of
16 

the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of
walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon."

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that
private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners
not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of
fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and
exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. 17

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure,
for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is
no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper
manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such
damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.  When the owner of property makes use thereof in the
18 

general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same
as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the incovenience arising from
said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.  19

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will
lie,  although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded.  One
20  21 

may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may
cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's favor. An injury or damage
occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an
individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.  22

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial
court is correspondingly REINSTATED.

Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., took no part.
Footnotes

Penned by Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, with Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Jesus
1 

M. Elbinias, concurring.

Original Record, 1.
2 

Rollo, 28-29.
3 

Ibid., 38.
4 

Ibid., 31.
5 

Ibid., 34.
6 

See Lumibao vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 64677, September 13, 1990,
7 

189 SCRA 469; SMI Fish Industries, Inc., et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al., G.R. Nos. 96952-56, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 444; Heirs of Juan Oclarit, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 96644, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 239.

22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, Sec. 4, 35-36.

8 

Ibid., 13.
9 

1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 65, 595; see The Board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw, et al., L-18805,
10 

August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987.

11 
Plummer vs. Abbott Laboratories (DC RI), 568, F Supp. 920, CCH Prod Liab Rep 9878.

12 
Ibid., 598.

Comstock vs. Wilson, 257 NY 231, 177 NE 421, 76 ALR 676; Haldeman vs. Bruckhart, 45,
13 

45 Pa 514.

14 
U.S.-Premier Malt Roducts Co. vs. Kasser, 23 F. (2d) 98.

15 
Jurado, D.P., Personal and Family Law, 1984 ed., 41.

Jovellanos, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992, 210 SCRA
16 

126.

See Escano, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA
17 

197; Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 53401, November 6,
1989, 179 SCRA 5; Albenson Enterprises Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16.

18 
1 C.J.S., Actions, Sec. 15, 1007-1008.
 Tolentino, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.
19 

II (1987), 59, citing 8 Salvat 614.

20 
Coyne vs. Mississippi & R.R. Boom Co., 72, 533, 75 NW 748.

21 
White vs. Kincaid, 149 NC 415, 63 SE 109; Fahn vs. Reichart, 8 Wis 255.

O'Keefee vs. Local 463, United Asso. P. & G. 277 NY 300, 14 NE 300, 14 NE 2d 77, 117
22 

ALR 817.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970

VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A. QUINTOS, AND JULITA A.
QUINTOS, respondents.

Laurea and Pison for petitioner.

Bonifacio M. Abad, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The basic facts are set forth in said
decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:

At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class passenger bus
owned and operated by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan and
driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying
passengers was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat,
second row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was
nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in
barrio Sto. Domingo, municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side
of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the
hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of
the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of
the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the face of
Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell from his seat and was
sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye and the bone of the left side of
his face was fractured. He suffered other multiple wounds and was rendered
unconscious due, among other causes to severe cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca
passenger bus going in the opposite direction towards San Fernando, Pampanga,
reached the scene of the mishap and it was stopped by Patrolman Felino Bacani of
the municipal police force of Minalin who, in the meantime, had gone to the scene to
investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other injured
men who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus and brought them to the
provincial hospital of Pampanga at San Fernando for medical assistance.
Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m. on the
same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries.
The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima and Julita, all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and only
surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr., who died single, leaving no descendants nor ascendants.
Said respondents herein brought this action against herein petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., as
owner and operator of said passenger bus, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan, for breach of the
contract of carriage between said petitioner and the deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the
aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as damages, including attorney's fees. Said petitioner — defendant in
the court of first instance — contended that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this
pretense was rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both of which found that the
accident and the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom
petitioner was liable under its contract of carriage with the deceased. In the language of His Honor,
the trial Judge:

The mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable fortuitous event or emergency
but was the direct result of the negligence of the driver of the defendant. The
defendant must, therefore, respond for damages resulting from its breach of contract
for carriage. As the complaint alleged a total damage of only P63,750.00 although as
elsewhere shown in this decision the damages for wake and burial expenses, loss of
income, death of the victim, and attorneys fee reach the aggregate of P79,615.95,
this Court finds it just that said damages be assessed at total of only P63,750.00 as
prayed for in plaintiffs' amended complaint.

The despositive part of the decision of the trial Court reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay to the

plaintiffs the amount of P63,750.00 as damages for breach of contract of carriage
resulting from the death of Policronio Quintos, Jr.

which, as above indicated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari, filed by Villa Rey Transit, Inc.

The only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private respondents
herein. The determination of such amount depends, mainly upon two (2) factors, namely: (1) the
number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed and (2) the rate at which the
losses sustained by said respondents should be fixed.

The first factor was based by the trial court — the view of which was concurred in by the Court of
Appeals — upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which was placed at 33-1/3 years —
he being over 29 years of age (or around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the time of his
demise — by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-301 = life expectancy) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. Upon the
other hand, petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting said formula and in not
acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Surro1 in which the damages were computed on a four (4) year
basis, despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of his death, and had a life
expectancy of 28.90 years.

The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one at bar. In the Alcantara case, none of the
parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its
award of damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards the amount thereof. The plaintiffs
assailed the non-inclusion, in its computation, of the bonus that the corporation, which was the
victim's employer, had awarded to deserving officers and employees, based upon the profits earned
less than two (2) months before the accident that resulted in his death. The defendants, in turn,
objected to the sum awarded for the fourth year, which was treble that of the previous years, based
upon the increases given, in that fourth year, to other employees of the same corporation. Neither
this objection nor said claim for inclusion of the bonus was sustained by this Court. Accordingly, the
same had not thereby laid down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of
damages. On the contrary, it declared:

The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person

has therefore no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court considering
the moral and material damages involved, and so it has been said that "(t)here can
be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure
of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the
amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an
important factor.' (25 C.J.S. 1241.) Other factors that are usually considered are: (1)
pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary (25 C.J.S. 1243-1250) ; (2) loss of support
(25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3) loss of service (25 C.J.S. 1251-1254); (4) loss of society
(25 C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries (25 C.J.S., 1258-1259) ;
and (6) medical and funeral expenses (26 C.J.S., 1254-1260)." 2

Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important  element in fixing the amount
recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said
amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the case at bar, of
a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals has not erred in basing
the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.

With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner impugns the decision
appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be paid now,
whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This argument is
basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Alcantara case points out the
absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the
one at bar. Just the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that,
although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the
decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00 a year,
which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as a young "training
assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on
which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider, in the present case, Policronio's potentiality
and capacity to increase his future income. Indeed, upon the conclusion of his training period, he
was supposed to have a better job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to earn more, if
not — considering the growing importance of trade, commerce and industry and the concomitant rise
in the income level of officers and employees
therein — much more.

At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned with the determination of the
losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the
deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support,
they received or would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of
petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary
expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been
consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by
wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the
necessary expense for his own living.3 Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire
earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received.4 In
other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered 5 that is, the total of the
earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income 6 and less living and other
incidental expenses.7

All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living
and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and
that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year
or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following
should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this Court; 8 (b) P1,727.95,
actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fee, which was
fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the
Court of Appeals and later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the
amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28,
with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision
of the trial court.

Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of Appeals are hereby affirmed, in all other
respects, with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 93 Phil. 472.

2 Emphasis supplied.

3 Pitman v. Merriman, 117 A. 18, 19, 80 N.H. 295.

4 Lynch v. Lynch, 195 A. 799; Lockerman v. Hurlock, 126 A. 482, 2 W.W. Harr. 479;
Lemmon v. Broadwater, 108 A. 273, 7 Boyce 472; Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v.
Reverman's Adm'x, 15 S.W. 2d 300; Heppner v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 297
S.W. 2d 497; Darnell v. Panhandle Co-op. Ass'n 120 N. W. 2d 278 175 Neb. 40.

5 Meehan Y. Central R. Co, of New Jersey, D.C.N.Y. 181, F. Supp. 594.

6 Frasier v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., C.A.N.Y., 244 F. 2d. 668.

7 Hanks v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 52 S.E. 2d 717, 230 N.C. 179; Gardner v.
National Bulk Carriers, Inc., D.C. Va. 221 F. Supp. 243, affirmed, C.A., 333 F. 2d
676; Meehan v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, D.C. N.Y., 181 F. Supp. 594; Frazier
v. Ewell Engineering & Contracting Co., 62 So. 2d 51. See, also, 2 Cooley on Torts,
168-169.

8 People v. Pantoja L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968; People v. Sangaran, L-21757, Nov. 26,
1968; People v. Gutierrez, L-25372, Nov. 29, 1968; People v. Buenbrazo, L-27852,
Nov. 29, 1968; People v. Bakang, L-20908, Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Labutin L-
23513, Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Acabado L-26104, Jan. 31, 1969; People v. Vacal,
L-20913, Feb. 27, 1969, People v. Gonzales, L-23303-04, May 20, 1969; People v.
Tapac, L-26491, May 20, 1969; People v. Aranas, L-27851, Oct. 28, 1969.
G. R. No. 154278           December 27, 2002

VICTORY LINER, INC. petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDAN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 3082-R,
ordering petitioner and its driver, Ricardo Joson, Jr., to pay damages to the heirs of Andres
Malecdan, who had been killed after being hit by a bus while attempting to cross the National
Highway in Barangay Nungnungan 2 in Cauayan, Isabela.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner is a common carrier. Private respondent Elena Malecdan is the widow of the deceased,
while private respondents Veronica, Virginia, Mary Pauline, Arthur, Viola, Manuel and Valentin
Malecdan are their children.

Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer residing in Barangay Nungnungan 2, Municipality of

Cauayan, Province of Isabela.3 On July 15, 1994, at around 7:00 p.m., while Andres was crossing
the National Highway on his way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane
stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass. However, as Andres was crossing the highway, a bus
of petitioner Victory Liner, driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doing,
respondent hit the old man and the carabao on which he was riding. As a result, Andres Malecdan
was thrown off the carabao, while the beast toppled over. 4 The Victory Liner bus sped past the old
man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its destination without helping him.

The incident was witnessed by Andres Malecdan's neighbor, Virgilio Lorena, who was resting in a
nearby waiting shed after working on his farm. Malecdan sustained a wound on his left shoulder,
from which bone fragments protruded. He was taken by Lorena and another person to the Cagayan
District Hospital where he died a few hours after arrival. 5 The carabao also died soon
afterwards.6 Lorena executed a sworn statement before the police authorities. Subsequently, a
criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property was filed
against the Victory Liner bus driver Ricardo Joson, Jr.7

On October 5, 1994, private respondents brought this suit for damages in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Baguio City,8 which, in a decision rendered on July 17, 2000, found the driver guilty of
gross negligence in the operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross negligence
in the selection and supervision of Joson, Jr. Petitioner and its driver were held liable for damages.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally to
the plaintiffs the amounts of:

a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;

b. P88,339.00 for actual damages;

 c. P200,000.00 for moral damages;

d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e. Thirty percent (30%) as attorney's fees of whatever amount that can be collected by the
plaintiff; and

f. The costs of the suit.

The counterclaim of the defendant Victory Liner, Inc. against the plaintiffs and the third-party
complaint of the same defendant against the Zenith Insurance Corporation are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.9

On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with the modification that the award of
attorney's fees was fixed at P50,000.00.10

Hence, this appeal raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING P200,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES WHICH IS DOUBLE THE P100,000.00 AS PRAYED FOR BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR COMPLAINT AND IN GRANTING ACTUAL DAMAGES NOT
SUPPORTED BY OFFICIAL RECEIPTS AND SPENT WAY BEYOND THE BURIAL OF THE
DECEASED VICTIM.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE AFFIRMATION BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE AWARD OF MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH WERE NOT PROVED AND
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS NO FINDING OF BAD FAITH AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF THE PETITIONER WAS NOT ESTABLISHED, IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
APPEALED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH DISREGARDED THE
APPELLANT'S TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THAT IT HAS EXERCISED
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES,
OR STATED DIFFERENTLY, WHETHER OR NOT THE AFFIRMATION BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE AND EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. 11

We find the appealed decision to be in order.

First. Victory Liner, Inc. no longer questions the findings of the Regional Trial Court that Andres
Malecdan was injured as a result of the gross negligence of its driver, Ricardo Joson, Jr. What
petitioner now questions is the finding that it (petitioner) failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employee. Petitioner argues,

With all due respect, the assignment of three inspectors to check and remind the drivers of petitioner
Victory Liner of its policies in a two-and-a-half hour driving distance, the installation of tachometers
to monitor the speed of the bus all throughout the trip, the periodic monitoring and checking of the
trips from one station to another through a trip ticket from station to station, the regular periodic
conducting of safety and defensive driving [training sessions] for its drivers are concrete and
physical proofs of the formulated operating standards, the implementation and monitoring of the
same, designed for the exercise of due diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees.12

It explained that it did not present bus driver Joson, Jr. on the witness stands because he had been
dismissed from the company after the incident, which it found was a breach in the company
regulations. Petitioner blames private respondents for the death of their father, Andres Malecdan,
who was already 75 years old, for allowing him to plough their field by himself. 13

The contention has no merit.

Article 2176 provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-delict committed by an
employee. The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance
of their duties is primary and, therefore, the injured party may recover from the employers directly,
regardless of the solvency of their employees.14 The rationale for the rule on vicarious liability has
been explained thus:

What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are
sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a
required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an
enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of
employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff,
should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them and to distribute them, through
prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at
large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is under
the greatest incentive to be careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and
to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.15

Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees acting within
the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage."16 For this purpose, they have the burden of proving that they
have indeed exercised such diligence, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision
of the performance of his duties. 17

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records.18 With respect to the supervision of employees,
employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.19 These facts must be shown by concrete proof,
including documentary evidence. 20

In the instant case, petitioner presented the results of Joson, Jr.'s written examination, 21 actual
driving tests,22 x-ray examination,23 psychological examination,24 NBI clearance,25 physical
examination,26 hematology examination,27 urinalysis,28 student driver training,29 shop training,30 birth
certificate,31 high school diploma32 and reports from the General Maintenance Manager and the
Personnel Manager showing that he had passed all the tests and training sessions and was ready to
work as a professional driver.33 However, as the trial court noted, petitioner did not present proof that
Joson, Jr. had nine years of driving experience.34

Petitioner also presented testimonial evidence that drivers of the company were given seminars on
driving safety at least twice a year.35 Again, however, as the trial court noted there is no record of
Joson, Jr. ever attending such a seminar. 36 Petitioner likewise failed to establish the speed of its
buses during its daily trips or to submit in evidence the trip tickets, speed meters and reports of field
inspectors. The finding of the trial court that petitioner's bus was running at a very fast speed when it
overtook the Dalin bus and hit the deceased was not disputed by petitioner. For these reasons, we
hold that the trial court did not err in finding petitioner to be negligent in the supervision of its driver
Joson, Jr.

Second. To justify an award of actual damages, there should be proof of the actual amount of loss
incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim. 37 We cannot take into account
receipts showing expenses incurred some time after the burial of the victim, such as expenses
relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st year death anniversaries. 38 In this case, the trial court
awarded P88,339.00 as actual damages. While these were duly supported by receipts, these
included the amount of P5,900.00, the cost of one pig which had been butchered for the 9th day
death anniversary of the deceased. This item cannot be allowed. We, therefore, reduce the amount
of actual damages to P82,439.00.00. The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages should likewise
be reduced. The trial court found that the wife and children of the deceased underwent "intense
moral suffering" as a result of the latter's death.39 Under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse,
legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Under the circumstances of
this case an award of P100,000.00 would be in keeping with the purpose of the law in allowing moral
damages.40

On the other hand, the award of P50,000.00 for indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the
Court.41

Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in cases involving quasi-delicts if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions.42 In this case, petitioner's driver Joson, Jr. was grossly negligent in driving at
such a high speed along the national highway and overtaking another vehicle which had stopped to
allow a pedestrian to cross. Worse, after the accident, Joson, Jr. did not stop the bus to help the
victim. Under the circumstances, we believe that the trial court's award of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages is proper.

Finally, private respondents are entitled to attorney's fees. Under Art. 2008 of the Civil Code,
attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. In
the recent case of Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,43 we held an award
of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees to be reasonable. Hence, private respondents are entitled to
attorney's fees in that amount.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 17, 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Victory Liner, Inc. is ordered to pay the following amounts to
the respondent heirs of Andres Malecdan:

1. Death indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);

 2. Actual damages in the amount of Eighty-Two Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos
(P82,439.00);

3. Moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

4. Exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);

5. Attorney's fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and

6. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

 Per Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with the concurrence of Justices Conchita Carpio-
1

Morales and Sergio L. Pestaño.

2
 Per Judge Antonio M. Esteves.

3
 Certificate of Death, Records, p. 409

4
 TSN (Virgilio Lorena) pp. 4-8, July 29, 1997.

5
Id., pp. 8-10.

6
 id., p. 10.

7
Exhs. C and D; Records, pp. 406-407.

8
 Records, pp. 1-5.

9
 RTC Decision dated July 17, 2000, p. 14; Rollo, p. 50.

10
 CA Decision dated Jan. 17, 2002; id., pp. 26-33.

11
 Petition for review, pp. 7-8; id., pp. 10-11.

12
 Id., p. 17; id., p. 20.

13
 Id., pp. 17-19; Records, pp. 20-22.
  Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 495 (1998); Philtranco
14

Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 495 (1997).

 William L. Prosser And Robert E. Keeton, The Law Of Torts 500-501 (1989), cited in Metro
15

Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 359 SCRA 18 (1998).

16
 Pestaño v. Sumayang, 346 SCRA 870 (2000); Bahia v. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624 (1915).

 Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 495 (1998); Baliwag
17

Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 230 (1996); China Airlines, Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, 185 SCRA 449 (1990); Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384
(1989); Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 623, (1976); Lilius v. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil.
758 (1934).

18
 Campo v. Camarote, 100 Phil. 459 (1956).

19
 Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 521 (1993).

 Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 495 (1998); Central
20

Taxicab Corporation v. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Corporation, 54 O.G. 7415

(1958).

21
 Exh. 3; Records, p. 505.

22
 Exh. 4; Id., p. 506.

23
 Exh. 10; id., p. 512.

24
 Exh. 5; id., p. 507.

25
 Exh. 8; id., p. 510.

26
 Exh. 9; id., p. 511.

27
 Exh. 11; id., p. 513.

28
 Exh. 12; id., p. 514.

29
 Exh. 14; id., p. 516.

30
 Exh. 15; id., p. 518.

31
 Exh. 6, id., p. 508.

32
 Exh. 7, id., p. 509.

33
 Exhs. 16 and 17; id., pp. 519-520.

34
 RTC Decision, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 46-47.
35
 TSN (Virgilio Punzalan), pp. 7-8, February 3, 1999.

36
 RTC Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 47.

37
 People v. Guillermo, 302 SCRA 257 (1999).

38
 People v. Mangahas, 311 SCRA 384 (1999).

39
 RTC Decision, p. 13; Records, p. 49.

40
 See Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 14 (1999).

41
 Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 14 (1999); Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 534 (1997); Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 273 SCRA 562 (1997).

42
 Macenas v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 83 (1989).

43
 298 SCRA 495 (1998).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 172122              June 22, 2007

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES RICHARD HUANG and CARMEN HUANG, and STEPHEN HUANG, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

On appeal are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83981,
dated February 16, 2006 and March 30, 2006, respectively which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, dated September 29, 2004. The trial court
found petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay respondents damages for the injuries sustained
by respondent Stephen Huang, son of respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang.

First, the facts:

Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990
Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641 (truck). It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del
Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent
Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan with plate number PTT 775 (car).

These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within the
municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was driving the car, weighing
1,450 kg., while petitioner Del Rosario was driving the truck, weighing 14,058 kg. Both were
traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going to
Pasig City. The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right,
when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The
collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the
opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally
stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.

At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His
driver’s license had been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for reckless
driving.

The car, valued at ₱300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive
injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen
Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation
treatment.

Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence
while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was
respondent Stephen Huang’s recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he was driving on
the left innermost lane when the car bumped the truck’s front right tire. The truck then swerved to the
left, smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and stopped on the other side of the
highway. The car likewise crossed over the center island and landed on the same portion of C-5.
Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of all its employees.

The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29, 2004, found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del
Rosario jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding defendants Mercury Drug Corporation, Inc. and
Rolando del Rosario, jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiffs Spouses Richard Y. Huang and
Carmen G. Huang, and Stephen Huang the following amounts:

1. Two Million Nine Hundred Seventy Three Thousand Pesos (₱2,973,000.00) actual damages;

2. As compensatory damages:

a. Twenty Three Million Four Hundred Sixty One Thousand, and Sixty-Two Pesos (₱23,461,062.00)
for life care cost of Stephen;

b. Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) as and for lost or impaired earning capacity of Stephen;

3. Four Million Pesos (₱4,000,000.00) as moral damages;

4. Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

5. One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation expense. 4

On February 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the
award of moral damages to ₱1,000,000.00. The appellate court also denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners.

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioners cite the following grounds for their appeal:

1. That the subject Decision which dismissed the appeal of petitioners herein but AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City, in that the award of
moral damages was reduced to ₱1,000,000.00 and its Resolution dated March 30, 2006, which
dismissed outright the Motion for Reconsideration must be set aside because the Honorable Court of
Appeals committed reversible error:

A. IN DENYING OUTRIGHTLY THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON ALLEGEDLY BEING

FILED OUT OF TIME FOR ONE DAY;

B. IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENTS

HEREIN AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE
PETITIONERS HEREIN;
C. IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY ALL EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN AND PROCEEDED TO RENDER ITS DECISION BASED ON PRESUMPTIONS AND
PERSONAL OPINIONS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT WITNESSES TO THE ACCIDENT;

D. IN AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS HEREIN;

E. IN FINDING THAT MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION FAILED TO EXERCISE THE DILIGENCE

REQUIRED IN SUPERVISING ITS EMPLOYEES DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY PETITIONER COMPANY;

F. IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO WAS NEGLIGENT IN DRIVING

THE TRUCK AT THE TIME OF ACCIDENT AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCES
PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.

G. IN PRESENTING ONLY IN THE DECISION TESTIMONIES FAVORABLE TO THE

RESPONDENTS HEREIN AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED
BY THE PETITIONERS HEREIN WHICH CONTRADICTED SUCH TESTIMONIES NOT ONLY
THROUGH ORAL TESTIMONIES BUT AS WELL AS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES.5

We affirm the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that petitioner Del Rosario was
negligent. The evidence does not support petitioners’ claim that at the time of the accident, the truck
was at the left inner lane and that it was respondent Stephen Huang’s car, at its right, which bumped
the right front side of the truck. Firstly, petitioner Del Rosario could not precisely tell which part of the
truck was hit by the car,6 despite the fact that the truck was snub-nosed and a lot higher than the car.
Petitioner Del Rosario could not also explain why the car landed on the opposite lane of C-5 which
was on its left side. He said that "the car did not pass in front of him after it hit him or under him or
over him or behind him."7 If the truck were really at the left lane and the car were at its right, and the
car hit the truck at its front right side, the car would not have landed on the opposite side, but would
have been thrown to the right side of the C-5 Highway. Noteworthy on this issue is the testimony of
Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an expert in the field of physics. He conducted a study based on the
following assumptions provided by respondents:

1. Two vehicles collided;

2. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than the other;

3. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at the same speed of about 85 to 90
kilometers per hour;

4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right.

Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right front
portion of the heavier vehicle, the general direction of the light vehicle after the impact would be to
the right side of the heavy vehicle, not the other way around. The truck, he opined, is more difficult to
move as it is heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which would move to the right of, and away
from the truck. Thus, there is very little chance that the car will move towards the opposite side, i.e.,
to the left of the truck.

Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the same assumptions except that the car is on
the left side of the truck, in accordance with the testimony of respondent Stephen Huang. Dr. Daza
concluded that the general direction of the car after impact would be to the left of the truck. In this
situation, the middle island against which the car was pinned would slow down the car, and enable
the truck to catch up and hit the car again, before running over it. 8

To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the damages that the truck sustained at its front
right side. The attempt does not impress. The photographs presented were taken a month after the
accident, and Rogelio Pantua, the automechanic who repaired the truck and authenticated the
photographs, admitted that there were damages also on the left side of the truck. 9

Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further admitted that after the impact, he lost control of the truck
and failed to apply his brakes. Considering that the car was smaller and lighter than the six-wheeler
truck, the impact allegedly caused by the car when it hit the truck could not possibly be so great to
cause petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on the brakes. He testified, as follows:

ATTY. DIAZ:

May I proceed, Your Honor. You were able to apply the brakes, were you sir?

WITNESS:

No more, sir, because I went over the island.

ATTY. DIAZ:

Because as you said you lost control, correct sir?

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

ATTY. DIAZ:

In other words, sir from the time your truck was hit according to you up to the time you rested on the
shoulder, you traveled fifty meters?

WITNESS:

Yes, sir, about that distance.

ATTY. DIAZ:

And this was despite the fact that you were only traveling at the speed of seventy five kilometers per
hour, jumped over the island, hit the lamppost, and traveled the three lanes of the opposite lane of
C-5 highway, is that what you want to impress upon this court?

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.10

We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The
evidence proves petitioner Del Rosario’s negligence as the direct and proximate cause of the injuries
suffered by respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario failed to do what a reasonable and
prudent man would have done under the circumstances.

We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del Rosario. Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.

xxx

The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of
such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee. 11

To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. 12 With respect
to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish
compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.13

In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure.
According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of petitioner Mercury Drug,
applicants are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological examination. In
the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic admitted that he took the driving tests and
psychological examination when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied
for the position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant
which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted
on the motor skills development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and
hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were also
presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars – on June 30, 2001,
February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the accident which
occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.

It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At
the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than thirteen
hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of any company policy
requiring back-up drivers for long trips.14

Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and
discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving
without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the
incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not suspended or reprimanded. 15 No
disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the
finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.

We now consider the damages which respondents should recover from the petitioners.

The trial court awarded the following amounts:

1. Two Million Nine Hundred Seventy-Three Thousand Pesos (₱2,973,000.00) actual damages;

2. As compensatory damages:

a. Twenty-Three Million Four Hundred Sixty One Thousand, and Sixty-Two Pesos (₱23,461,062.00)
for life care cost of Stephen;

b. Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) as and for lost or impaired earning capacity of Stephen;

3. Four Million Pesos (₱4,000,000.00) as moral damages;

4. Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

5. One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as attorney’s fees and litigation expense.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of moral
damages to ₱1,000,000.00.

With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that "[E]xcept as provided by
law or by stipulation one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved x x x." In the instant case, we uphold the finding that the
actual damages claimed by respondents were supported by receipts. The amount of ₱2,973,000.00
represented cost of hospital expenses, medicines, medical services and supplies, and nursing care
services provided respondent Stephen from December 20, 1996, the day of the accident, until
December 1998.

Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of.16 The doctors who attended to respondent Stephen are one in their
prognosis that his chances of walking again and performing basic body functions are nil. For the rest
of his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications such as
pneumonia, bladder and rectum
infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and other spinal
cord injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent on the care and support of his family.
We thus affirm the award of ₱23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of respondent Stephen Huang,
based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining years that he
is expected to live; and the conservative amount of ₱10,000,000.00, as reduced by the trial court, for
the loss or impairment of his earning capacity,17 considering his age, probable life expectancy, the
state of his health, and his mental and physical condition before the accident. He was only
seventeen years old, nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in fourth year high school,
and a member of the school varsity basketball team. He was also class president and editor-in-chief
of the school annual. He had shown very good leadership qualities. He was looking forward to his
college life, having just passed the entrance examinations of the University of the Philippines, De La
Salle University, and the University of Asia and the Pacific. The University of Sto. Tomas even
offered him a chance to obtain an athletic scholarship, but the accident prevented him from attending
the basketball try-outs. Without doubt, he was an exceptional student. He excelled both in his
academics and extracurricular undertakings. He is intelligent and motivated, a go-getter, as testified
by Francisco Lopez, respondent Stephen Huang’s godfather and a bank executive. 18 Had the
accident not happened, he had a rosy future ahead of him. He wanted to embark on a banking
career, get married and raise children. Taking into account his outstanding abilities, he would have
enjoyed a successful professional career in banking. But, as Mr. Lopez stated, it is highly unlikely for
someone like respondent to ever secure a job in a bank. To his knowledge, no bank has ever hired a
person suffering with
the kind of disability as Stephen Huang’s.19

We likewise uphold the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

"The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante."20 Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 21 The
amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.

In the instant case, respondent Stephen Huang and respondent spouses Richard and Carmen
Huang testified to the intense suffering they continue to experience as a result of the accident.
Stephen recounted the nightmares and traumas he suffers almost every night when he relives the
accident. He also gets depression when he thinks of his bleak future. He feels frustration and
embarrassment in needing to be helped with almost everything and in his inability to do simple
things he used to do. Similarly, respondent spouses and the rest of the family undergo their own
private suffering. They live with the day-to-day uncertainty of respondent Stephen Huang’s condition.
They know that the chance of full recovery is nil. Moreover, respondent Stephen Huang’s paralysis
has made him prone to many other illnesses. His family, especially respondent spouses, have to
make themselves available for Stephen twenty-four hours a day. They have patterned their daily life
around taking care of him, ministering to his daily needs, altering the lifestyle to which they had been
accustomed.

Respondent Carmen Huang’s brother testified on the insensitivity of petitioner Mercury Drug towards
the plight of respondent. Stephen, viz.:

Maybe words cannot describe the anger that we feel towards the defendants. All the time that we
were going through the crisis, there was none (sic) a single sign of nor offer of help, any consolation
or anything whatsoever. It is funny because, you know, I have many colleagues, business
associates, people even as far as United States, Japan, that I probably met only once, when they
found out, they make a call, they sent card, they write small notes, but from the defendant, absolute
silence. They didn’t care, and worst, you know, this is a company that have (sic) all the resources to
help us. They were (sic) on our part, it was doubly painful because we have no choice but to go back
to them and buy the medicines that we need for Stephen. So, I don’t know how someone will really
have no sense of decency at all to at least find out what happened to my son, what is his condition,
or if there is anything that they can do to help us.22

On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of quasi-
delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. The
records show that at the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license
because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving. The evidence also shows that he failed to
step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had petitioner Del Rosario done so, the injuries
which respondent Stephen sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that
committed by petitioner Del Rosario need be suppressed; and employers like petitioner Mercury
Drug should be more circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. The award of exemplary damages in favor of the respondents is
therefore justified.

With the award of exemplary damages, we also affirm the grant of attorney’s fees to
respondents.23 In addition, attorney’s fees may be granted when a party is compelled to litigate or
incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party. 24

Cost against petitioners.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated February 16, 2006 and March 30, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 83981, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 9-72.

2
 Id. at 74-75.

3
 Id. at 523-564.

4
 Id. at 563-564.

5
 Id. at 90-92.

6
 TSN, March 27, 2000, p. 16.

7
 TSN, April 12, 2000, pp. 53-58.

8
 TSN, March 23, 2003, pp. 5-29.

9
 TSN, June 14, 2000, pp. 10-11.

10
 TSN, April 12, 2000, pp. 27-29.

 Art. 2194, Civil Code. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
11

delict is solidary.

 Estacion v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 222; Campo v.
12

Camarote, 100 Phil. 459, 463 (1956).

 Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Andres Malecdan, G.R. No. 154278, December 27, 2002, 394
13

SCRA 520.

14
 TSN, January 2002, pp. 39-42.

15
 TSN, April 2000, pp. 11-16; TSN, November 28, 2001, pp. 35-37.

 Art. 2202, Civil Code. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
16

damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

17
 Art. 2205, Civil Code. Damages may be recovered:

(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal
injury;

xxx
18
 TSN, September 24, 1999, pp. 28-29.

19
 TSN, September 24, 1999, pp. 30-31.

 Cesar Sangco, Torts and Damages 986 (Rev. ed., 1994), cited in Roque v. Torres, G.R.
20

157632, December 6, 2006.

21
 Philippine National Railways v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006.

22
 TSN, January 11, 1999, pp. 23-24.

23
 Art. 2208 (1), Civil Code.

24
 Art. 2208 (2), Civil Code.