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MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR.

, petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

Facts:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother.
Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits. Respondent,
presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of
merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before
this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay
the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R.
No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction
to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue:
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?
Ruling:
Fornier petition – Yes. In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC,
Fornier relied on the following:
“A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 is false…” (Omnibus Election Code,
Sec. 78)
“…the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of enduring free, orderly
and honest elections…” (Sec. 52, same)
“any interested party” authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. 69, same)
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court under the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Aside from that,
according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, “any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt thereof.”
Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality
of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1, Constitution).
As regards Tecson petition and Velez petition. No
The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in
assailing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the Fornier petition
because the “Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
A “contest” refers to a post-election scenario. Election contests are either election
protests or a quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winner from
office. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:
“Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests…relating to qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.” (Rule 12)
“An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election contest or a petition for quo-
warranto against the President or Vice-President.” (Rule 13)
“Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or
the Vice-President…by filing a verified petition…within 30 days after the proclamation
of the winner.” (Rule 14)
The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates for
President or Vice-President.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President",
of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election
contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes
could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.

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