Cathrine C.

Lagodgod REMEDIAL REVIEW II

JD 4 Case Digests on Hearsay

1. Pp v Estibal; GR No. 208749

Facts:

Anecita raped his 13 year-old daughter, AAA to which he

pleaded not guilty to. BBB, the wife of the accused and mother of
AAA, together with AAA, went and complained to Police Officer 3
Cobardo, the officer assigned at the PNP Women and Children
Protection Center of Taguig City. It PO Cobardo who investigated
the whole incident and took the sworn statement of AAA. The
members of the Barangay Security Force Estudillo and Perlas
arrested Anecito Estibal. However, AAA, failed to appear in court
despite several subpoenas. Later on, BBB and AAA, manifested their
desistance stating that AAA has already forgiven her father.

As a result, the incriminatory statements, which were allegedly

made by AAA, were conveyed to the court by Police Officer 3
Fretzie Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In particular, PO3
Cobardo made a summation of what she claims was the narration
of AAA’s ordeal, along with her observations of her demeanor during
the investigation. The trial court convicted Estibal, ruling that the
testimony of PO3 Cobardo was part of the res gestae.

On appeal, Estibal maintained that due to the absence of

AAA’s testimony, the prosecution failed to establish the
circumstances proving beyond reasonable doubt that he raped his
daughter; that the testimonies of the prosecuting witness PO3
Cobardo and other, not being themselves victims or witnesses to the
“startling occurrence” of rape cannot create the hearsay exception
of res gestae. The CA convicted the accused. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the testimonies are admissible in evidence.

Ruling:

No. The testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since AAA’s

statements were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with
the constitutional right of the accused-appellant to confront
evidence against him. The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is
based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability
of the hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or
solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-
examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or
actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.

Excluding hearsay aims to preserve the right of the opposing

party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have direct
knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed,
the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It
is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse
party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of
justice.

2. Pp v Valdez; GR No. 127753, Dec 11, 2000

Facts:

Marcelo Valdez was under his  nipa  house talking with his son
Labrador Valdez. While his wife, son Rolando Valdez, daughter-in-
law Imelda Umagtang and an eight-year-old boy named
Christopher Centeno were staying upstairs preparing to sleep. In the
course of their conversation, Labrador was facing his father at the
eastern side of the house, at a distance of about less than two
meters from each other. Suddenly, two consecutive gunshots were
fired coming from the western side of the house by an assailant.

After the incident, the assailant immediately ran away towards

the west direction. Marcelo Valdez who was talking to his son,
immediately called for help while the victim managed to walk
upstairs towards the kitchen. Imelda Umagtang and her common-
law husband Rolando Valdez saw the victim bathed in his own
blood. When Rolando inquired from the victim who shot him, the
latter replied that it was Domingo Valdez. At this time, the victim’s
brother and in-laws arrived. After an hour, they were able to find a
passenger jeep but the victim was already dead prior to his transport
to the hospital.

The next day, Dr. Asuncion Tuvera conducted the autopsy on

the cadaver of the deceased. Domingo Valdez was charged before
the trial court with two separate information for murder and illegal
possession of firearms to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial,
judgment was rendered and he was convicted of the crimes
charged against him.

Issue:

Whether the testimony is admissible in evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no rule that a person who hears something cannot

testify on what she heard. A dying declaration need not be
particularly directed only to the person inquiring from the declarant.
Anyone who has knowledge of the fact of what the declarant said,
whether it was directed to him or not, or whether he had made
inquiries from the declarant or not, can testify thereto. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, possesses no probative value
unless the proponent can show that the same falls within the
exception to the hearsay rule. The statement of the deceased
uttered shortly after being wounded by the gunfire is a "dying
declaration," which falls under the exception to the hearsay rule.

It may be proved by the testimony of the witness who heard

the same or to whom it was made. Appellant contends that the
identification by the deceased of his assailant, which was admitted
as a "dying declaration" under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, cannot be admitted because "when the said statements
were uttered the declarant was not conscious of his imminent
death,"

Ultimately, the issues raised by appellant fall within the sphere

of credibility of witnesses which, the reviewing court on appeal,
ordinarily gives deference to the assessments and conclusion of the
trial court provided it is supported by the evidence on record.
Findings of facts by the trial court are usually not disturbed on
appeal on the proposition that the lower court had the unique
opportunity of having observed the elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying.

3. Pp v Mayorga; GR No. 135405

Facts:

Leney Linayao, five years of age raped by the accused. On the

day of the crime, the child was by the seashore when the accused
came up to him and asked her to buy a bottle of gin. He then
brought the child to a marshy area nearby where he boxed her on
the face and chest and wrung her neck until she fainted. By the time
Leney recovered consciousness,  accused  had already raped her
and then disappeared. Leney, bleeding and muddied, stood up
and went home. On her way home, Leney was taken by Gonzales
who Brough her to the tanods to whom she narrated her experience;
then to the clinic of Dr. Ngo who examined and attended to her.

Leney’s grandmother, while looking for Leney, chanced upon

Puroy’s cousin, Edwin—who told Alfonsa that Puroy had something to
do with Leney. Upon knowing Leney’s whereabouts, Alfonsa rushed
to Dr. Ngo’s clinic and found Leney lying protestate with her vagina
and anus bleeding. Leney was later examined at the provincial
hospital by Dr. Gonzales and found that, among others, the
presence of spermatozoa revealed a negative result. Puroy, for his
part, filed with leave of court a demurrer to evidence which was
denied by the trial court. In his defense, he claimed that at the time
of the supposed rape, he was “patay lasing” and was blacked out
due to intoxication.

RTC did not sustain Puroy’s defense of alibi. Solely on account

of Leney’s testimony, the court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of rape. In Puroy’s
appeal, he averred that Leney’s testimony should not be given
credence since she had been coached by her grandmother. Also,
he averred that Edwin’s testimony was given under compulsion of
threat and does not deserve credit.

Issue:

Whether the testimonies are admissible in evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. The argument that Leney has lost her credibility since she
admitted that she had been coached by her grandmother has no
merit. The victim, an innocent and guileless five-year old when the
crime was committed against her, cannot be expected to recall
every single detail and aspect of the brutal experience that she
went through in the hands of the accused. The lower court's ruling
that the admission of the declaration of the accused would
constitute a violation of his constitutional right is misplaced. His
declaration was not made under custodial investigation; hence, it
does not come within the gamut of Sec. 12, Art. III, of the 1987
Constitution.

Nor is there merit to the court’s finding that Edwin’s testimony

was hearsay. This is a misinterpretation of the hearsay rule. It must be
pointed out that the statement to him of the accused constitutes
an  extrajudicial admission. This admission can be received against
the accused since it is not within the purview of the hearsay rule.
Wigmore explains that the hearsay rule is intended to give the parties
a right to object to the introduction of a statement not made under
oath and not subject to cross-examination. Its purpose is to afford a
party the privilege, if he desires it, of requiring the declarant to be
sworn and subjected to questions. Wigmore then adds that where
the evidence offered are his statements, the purpose does not
apply, and so the hearsay rule does not likewise apply, as "he does
not need to cross-examine himself."

In the face of Edwin's testimony that the accused had made

the admission, it becomes imperative for the latter to disprove it. His
explanation that Edwin was coerced to testify against him is at best
a futile attempt to prop a tottering defense. The allegation can be
no better than pure speculation as nothing was offered to support it.
On the other hand, it is indeed incredible that Edwin could be
frightened by the threat of a five-year old child.

4. Pp v Umapas; GR No. 215742, March 22, 2017

Facts:

Appellant Jose Umapas mauled his wife Gemma and with the
use of 100% alcohol intended for lantern, doused her with it and set
her ablaze inside their home located in Kalakhan, Olongapo.
Thereafter, Gemma was brought to the hospital by Rodrigo Dacanay
who informed the attending hospital personnel whom one of which
was Dr. Tamayo, that it was Jose who set Gemma on fire. Gemma
suffered contusions, lacerations, and thermal burns over 57% of her
body according to Dr. Tamayo. The victim died 5 days after the
commission of the crime.

Jose, for his part, alleged that on the same date he was with a
certain Rommel fishing in Kalakhan. That, he left at 5pm and
returned 2am the next day. Upon arriving their home, he learned
from his neighbors and children that Gemma was already in the
hospital. On his way to the hospital, he was stopped by the people
from the barangay and was brought to the police precinct and was
detained. Further, he claimed that he believed that his wife pointed
to him as the perpetrator of the crime because she suspected him of
womanizing while he was working. He maintained that he was out
fishing and was not present when the crime happened. On
arraignment, Jose pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Issue:

Whether the testimonies are admissible in evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. All the requisites of a dying declaration were met. Gemma

communicated her ante-mortem statement to SPO1 Garcia,
identifying Jose as the person who mauled her, poured gasoline on
her, and set her ablaze. Gemma’s statements constitute a dying
declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and
circumstances of her death and taking into consideration the
severity of her wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that she
uttered the same under the belief that her own death was already
imminent. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s
belief in the imminence of her death can be shown by the
declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as
the nature of the wounds, statements made in her presence, or by
the opinion of her physician.

Given the circumstances Gemma was in, even if there was

sufficient lapse of time we could only conclude that at the time of
her declaration, she feared that her death was already imminent.
While suffering in pain due to thermal bums, she could not have
used said time to contrive her identification of Jose Umapas as her
assailant. There was, thus, no opportunity for Gemma to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement. Moreover, Gemma would have
been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had she
survived. There is nothing in the records that show that Gemma
rendered involuntary declaration. In the face of the positive
identification made by deceased Gemma of appellant Jose, it is
clear that the latter committed the crime.

Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for

convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can
sufficiently establish his guilt. Conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person.

In the instant case, the testimonies of Ginalyn, Rodrigo

Dacanay, and the hospital nurse were not presented in court to
prove their statements. These may be admitted not necessarily to
prove the truth thereof but at least for the purpose of placing on
record to establish the fact that those statement or the tenor of such
statements, were made. Thus, the testimonies presented by the
prosecution’s witnesses are in the nature of an independently
relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Ginalyn
and Dacanay made such statement, and the truth and falsity
thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is
admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.

5. Porteria v Pp; GR No. 233777, March 20, 2019

Facts:

Mien is the owner of a blue motorcycle which was stolen on

December 10, 2010. He reported the incident to the police station of
Naga City, CamSur and to the highway patrol of CamSur. On
February 1, 2011, the police officers of CamSur received a report
that there was a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist.
This resulted in the arrest of Marvin Portieria (appellant) for illegal
possession of firearm. Consequently, the police conducted bodily
search on Marvin and found that a bag was allegedly found in his
possession. Inside the bag, the arresting officer found documents
including photocopies of the OR and CR of Christian’s stolen
motorcycle.

At the police station, Marvin was asked regarding the

documents discovered in his bag and he allegedly voluntarily
conveyed to P/Insp. Villamer that the motorcycle was in the
possession of a certain Felix Maratas in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When
Christian’s mother also visited Marvin at the police station, she
obtained a confession from the latter, admitting that it was he who
stole the motorcycle and left it with a certain Insan Joy in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna.

A month later, at a checkpoint conducted by the PNP of Sta.

Rosa, Laguna, Albert Orino, who was driving a blue motorcycle was
apprehended because he was not wearing a helmet. When asked
for his license and motorcycle’s registration, he was unable to
present any. He was later taken to the police station of Sta. Rosa
together with the motorcycle. At the police station, Albert
supposedly told the police that he does not own the motorcycle.
According to SPO3 Caraiso, Albert stated that a certain Marvin left
him the motorcycle. The police charged Albret with a traffic
violation. After verifying the ownership of the motorcycle, the police
notified Christian Mien regarding its recovery.

Issue:

Whether the testimony is a sufficient proof of its veracity.

Ruling:

No. In the present case, the Court cannot determine the

voluntariness of Marvin's supposed confession to Virgie because it
was not reduced into writing or recorded in another manner. The
Court can only rely on the testimony of Virgie as to the substance of
Marvin's confession. Aside from her testimony, there is no
independent evidence that establishes the voluntariness and
substance of Marvin's alleged extrajudicial confession.

The testimony of Virgie as to the supposed confession of Marvin

may, nonetheless, be admitted as an independently relevant
statement, which proves only the fact that such statement was
made. The admission of this testimony does not necessarily mean
that the Court is persuaded. Virgie is competent to testify only as to
the substance of what she heard — not the truth thereof. Her
testimony, by itself, is not sufficient proof of its veracity.
 For these reasons, the totality of the evidence does not
corroborate the extrajudicial confession of Marvin. His conviction
rests on tenuous grounds —t he OR and CR were products of an
illegal search, the admission to P/Supt. Villamer was in violation of his
right to counsel, and the Court cannot determine the voluntariness
and veracity of Marvin's oral confession of guilt to Virgie. The doubts
as to the guilt of Marvin are, therefore, more than reasonable, which
warrants his acquittal.

6. Fuentes, Jr v CA; GR No. 111692

Facts:
               
  Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of
mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for
murder.  Petitioner stabbed Julieto Malaspina, the victim, in the
abdomen with a hunting knife. Before the victim succumbed to the
gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes,
Jr., stabbed him.
               
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that "Jonie" admitted
spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing
match before the latter untied his gloves and punched
him. Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and
therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession
of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of
petitioner and Zoilo.

Issue:

Whether the testimony of the accused-petitioner is admissible

as a declaration against interest and therefore an exception to the
hearsay rule.

Ruling:
 No. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is
that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against
third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is
grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a

declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available
to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that
a motive to falsify existed.

The far weightier reason why the admission against penal

interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant
is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead,
mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38
obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does
not make him  ipso facto  unavailable under this rule. The records
show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce
Zoilo as a witness. The idea that the Court is always for the admission
of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the
real culprit can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial
statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability
of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie
and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is
unable to testify.

7. Pp v Damaso; GR No. 93516, Aug 12, 1992

Facts:
 The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was charged in an
information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City
with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, for
allegedly being in possession, custody and control one m-14 rifle with
live ammunition as well as other subversive items. Damaso pleaded
not guilty.

The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for
admission. The counsel for accused-appellant interposed his
objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on
grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for
lack of a search warrant. TC held him guilty of the crime.

Issue:

Whether the evidence is admissible for conviction.

Ruling:

No. In the case at bar, the evidence as presented against the

accused is weak to justify conviction. The accused-appellant was
singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is
no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the
appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house
where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the
owner of the said items.

In this case, the testimonies of the witnesses are hearsay

because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own personal
knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the
testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible because of
the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto. It is true that
the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being
admitted as evidence. But, one should not be misled into thinking
that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now
have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, cannot be given credence.

In People vs. Valero, The failure of the defense counsel to

object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or
his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such
evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence
whether objected to or not has no probative value.

It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as

witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as the lessee and
owner of the M-14 rifle. But even assuming for the sake of argument
that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still
will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to
comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure
proceedings.

8. Tison v CA; GR No. 121027, July 31, 1997

Facts:

Martin Guerrero, the surviving spouse and only heir of Teodora

Dezoller Guerrero (TDG), sold the property originally owned by the
latter to herein respondent Teodora Domingo. Thereafter, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter’s name. When
Martin Guerrero died, herein petitioners, alleging to be TDG’s niece
and nephew, filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they
are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation from TDG. During the trial, Corazon, one of the
petitioners, testified that she is the niece of TDG and submitted
documentary evidence such as pictures, baptismal certificate etc.
to prove the alleged filiation.

Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on

the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation
with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. The trial court issued an order
granting the demurrer to evidence. In upholding the dismissal,
respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary
evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal
certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible
and insufficient to prove and establish filiation

Issue:

Whether the testimony as to filiation to a deceased person is

inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.

Ruling:

No. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the

relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the
former is Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to
the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person
whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be
shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth

elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is,
whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently
corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in
her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller
Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such
declaration. Distinction must be made as to when the relationship of
the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by
other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported
by evidence aliunde. The general rule, therefore, is that where the
party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the
declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be
some independent proof of this fact.

As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof

than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does
not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant
himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to
the property of some other member of the family. The court is
sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one
instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may
be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of
the declarant herself.

9. Pp v Mercado; GR No. 218702, Oct 17, 2018

Facts:

Evelyn Santos (Evelyn) and Alicia Mercado (Alicia), were

partners who lived together in Bulacan. Patrick Mercado (Patrick)
was the nephew of Alicia. He was enrolled at the nearby STI College
in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and used to live in the same house.

One night, Patrick was in the house, having come home from
school. After a few hours, the house of Evelyn and Alicia was
reported to be on fire. While the house was burning, Evelyn and
Patrick were observed on the terrace supposedly trying to find a way
to escape the blaze. Through the help of neighbors, Evelyn and
appellant were brought out of the burning house. Evelyn looked
weak and unable to walk as she was badly burnt.

Witnesses declared that as soon as Evelyn was carried out to

safety, she promptly accused and pointed to Patrick as the person
responsible for attacking her and Alicia as well as for setting the
house on fire. Specifically, Evelyn claimed that Patrick hit her and
Alicia with a baseball bat then set them on fire. Despite medical
attention, Evelyn succumbed to her injuries and died. Based on the
declarations of Evelyn, Patrick was charged for the killing of Evelyn
and Alicia. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Patrick of the
crime of Double Murder, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA).

Issue:

Whether Evelyn’s dying declaration in the case is admissible in

evidence.

Ruling:

Yes. In questioning his conviction, Patrick harps on his defense

of denial, and the supposed weakness of the evidence of the
prosecution. He argues that the testimony of Dacallos that there was
a bloodied man who came out of the house as it was on fire should
be believed over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to
Evelyn's dying declarations. Time and again, the Court has ruled that
denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime. A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength
of the prosecution evidence which is independently assessed. When
the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime
and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible.

The failure of the prosecution to present the baseball bat

allegedly used and to prove the presence of the gasoline is of no
moment. The evidence presented and the testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses were more than sufficient to establish
Patrick’s guilt for the crime charged. These testimonies specifically
recounted the dying declarations/part of the res gestae of Evelyn
Santos which prove that Patrick hit the victims with a baseball bat
before placing them and the house on fire. Furthermore, the failure
to present the baseball bat actually did not, in any way affect, the
strength of the prosecution's evidence. In this connection, both the
RTC and CA correctly held that the evidence of the prosecution – as
independently assessed –- sufficiently established the guilt of
Mercado.

As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is

admissible as evidence because it is "evidence of the highest order
and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation”. For
a "dying declaration" to be admissible in court, the following
requisites must concur: (a) That the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b)That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was
under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) That the
declarant is competent as a witness; and (d)That the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which
the declarant is the victim.

The Court, in People v. Umapas, explained and expounded on

how each of the four requisites is to be understood. Four requisites
must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible,
thus:

First, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding

circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the
facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after
the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements
involving the nature of the declarant's injury or the cause of death;
those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating
the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the
accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the act are
admissible.

Second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant

must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is
that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief
in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant.
It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible.
It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the
personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant
has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending.

Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that

where the declarant would not have been a competent witness
had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible.
Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could
not have been competent to be a witness had he survived, the
presumption must be sustained that he would have been
competent.

Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for

homicide; murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
The first and fourth requisites are undoubtedly present in this case.
With regard to the third requisite, since there was no evidence
presented to show that Evelyn could not have been competent to
be a witness had she survived, the presumption that she would have
been competent would be sustained in accordance with the
foregoing rule discussed in Umapas. The Court holds, therefore, that
the third requisite is sufficiently met.

With regard to the second requisite, the Court in Umapas

considered the severity of the declarant's wounds to reasonably
presume that she uttered her words under the belief that her own
death was already imminent. The Court therein held that, ”[t]here is
ample authority for the view that the declarant's belief in the
imminence of her death can be shown by the declarant's own
statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of
her wounds, statements made in her presence, or by the opinion of
her physician."

In the present case, Evelyn made the declarations just as she

was pulled out of the fire, with blood coming out of her forehead,
when she was having difficulty breathing, and with second- and
third-degree burns affecting 74% of the total surface area of her
body. Considering the foregoing facts — along with the principle
enunciated in Umapas that the declarant's belief in the imminence
of her death can be shown by the nature and severity of the
declarant's wounds — then the Court is convinced that the second
requisite for a dying declaration is sufficiently met. Without doubt,
therefore, the dying declarations of Evelyn to numerous witnesses
that it was Mercado who had attacked her and her partner and
eventually set their house on fire are admissible in evidence.

10. Pp v De Joya; GR No. 75028, Nov 8, 1991

Facts:

The Spouses Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son
Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia
Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. In the
afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Valencia and his son left the
house. Eulalia Diamse was then left at the house [sitting] at their sofa
watching the television set. When Alvin reached home, he saw his
grandmother Eulalia lying down prostrate and drenched with her
own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He
then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?”.
Eulalia held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying
these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away. Dr.
Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and
examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that
said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death.
When asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother's ears were
punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia found out
that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right
earring of her mother was likewise missing.

That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the ground

floor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador)
were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. Herminia
also found a beach walk step-in by the side of the cabinet near the
door of their room downstairs, more or less one meter from where the
victim was lying prostrate. Herminia was able to recognize the said
step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she
bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de
Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when
she saw the old and worn-out pair of slippers of the latter. An
information for the crime of robbery with homicide was filed against
Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz. The accused pleaded not guilty at
arraignment.

The trial court found the accused guilty and ruled that: ”the
prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the
death of the victim as testified to by the witnesses and proven during
the trial, also the dying statement of the deceased, which are:
Herminia testified that two weeks before the incident the accused
and the deceased quarreled over a bicycle which the former took
from their house without the consent of the latter; that Exhibit
"B" (step-in beach walk type) which was found near the cabinet one
meter away from the body of the victim was identified by Herminia
as the step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and which
she saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when she visited
them in their house; the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw
the accused in the afternoon of January 31, 1978 at around 3:00
p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the
accused admitted, although his wife is the sister of the husband of
Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four days that it
was lying in state without any justifiable reason and contrary to the
ordinary experience of man; last but most convincing is the dying
statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her
"Apo, Apo, what happened?" and she answered, "Si Paki", then she
expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this Paki,
he identified the accused. The accused during his testimony never
denied that he is called Paki.”

Issue:

Whether or not the dying declarations of Eulalia is admissible.

Ruling:

No. It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible

must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean
that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res
gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any
given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as
conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The reason upon
which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if
admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant
was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that
he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the
statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of
truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying
declarations are received.

It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the

deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply
assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had
intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument
through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself
did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her
communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We
are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration
naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.

11. Pp v Santos; GR No. 94545, Apr 4, 1997

Facts:

Corazon Dayao was visiting at the Ambre residence to see her

husband Pedro, who was the driver of Mr. & Mrs. David Ambre. That
evening of September 18, 1987, she was in the terrace of the victim's
house sorting dirty clothing. She noticed Lolita beside her husband.
Just then, she heard five (successive gunshots, and she saw David
fall prostrate to the ground. Seeing that David wanted to say
something, she called Lolita's attention and said " Ate, it looks like
Kuya has something to tell you." She pulled Lolita towards the victim.
Lolita asked her husband who had shot him and the latter answered,
"It was Pare Pran." She heard David's words because, like Lolita, she
had also placed her head near David who was still alive at the time.

Lolita Ambre, the widow, testified that she and her husband
had just come out of their canteen. She washed her feet while her
husband, facing north, looked at the driver's side of their jeep. Then
she heard a gunshot and her husband cried, "Apo!" Startled, Lolita
jumped up and down until she was told by Corazon that her
husband wanted to tell her something. When she went near him, he
said, "Pare Pran." She knew that her husband was referring to
Francisco Santos, the godfather of their youngest child. She held her
husband, but their driver took her inside the house.

Pedro Dayao Jr., the Ambre spouses' driver, testified that he was
inside the Ambres' house that evening, when he heard five (5) gun
bursts. It was followed by the cry of Lolita bellowing, "Jun, they have
shot your Manong!" He rushed outside and then escorted Lolita and
his wife Corazon back to the house. Dr. Teodomiro Hufana Jr.,
municipal health officer of Maddela, Quirino, conducted an autopsy
on the victim's cadaver. He clarified that, although the Certificate of
Death he issued indicated that the "Interval Between Onset and
Death" was "instant," he was sure the victim still had "a few seconds
or minute" before he actually died. He opined that during those few
seconds or minute; it was possible for a victim to utter "about two or
three words," which could be "audible" and "intelligible." Death due
to bullet wounds in the heart or lungs is not as instantaneous as that
due to a bullet in the head.

Issues:

1. Whether the death was instantaneous, rendering a dying

declaration physically impossible; and

2. Whether trial court's decision to consider the victims

revelation to Lolita and Corazon as a dying declaration and as a
part of res gestae was correct.

Ruling:
 1. No. The evidence on record does not at all support
appellant's contention that the victim died instantaneously as to
render a dying declaration physically impossible. Despite the
statement in the victim's Certificate of Death that the "interval
between onset and death" was "instant," the undisputed fact as
positively and categorically testified to by Corazon and Lolita is that
the victim remained alive for a few seconds during which he was
able to say "Pare Pran." This view is bolstered by the expert witnesses,
Dr. Hufana and Dr. Longid himself who was presented by the
defense, who both testified that a bullet that had hit the heart and
lungs did not necessarily result in instantaneous death.

Sometimes it is necessary to determine whether a victim of a

fatal wound is still capable of speaking, walking or performing any
other volitional acts. A dying declaration may be presented by the
prosecutor mentioning the accused as the assailant; the offender
may allege that the physical injuries inflicted by him while the victim
was inside his house and that he walked for some distance where he
fell, or that the victim after the fatal injury made an attempt to inflict
injuries to the accused which justified the latter to give another fatal
blow. The determination of the victim's capacity to perform volitional
acts rests upon the medical witness.

2. Yes. A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence

because no person who knows of his impending death would make
a careless and false accusation. As an exception to the hearsay
rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the
declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his
impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a
witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; and (4) the declaration is
offered in a criminal care wherein the declarant's death is the
subject of inquiry.

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a

realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence
— not so much the rapid eventuation of death — is at hand. This
may be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may
be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent's wounds, or
other relevant circumstances. In the case at bar, the victim's
declaration consisted of the words "Pare Pran." Under the
circumstances, however, he could not have been expected to
articulate his awareness of something so obvious — the inevitability
of his demise — or to have the energy to do so. The nature and
extent of said injuries underscored the seriousness of his condition
and they later proved by themselves that the utterances of the
deceased were made under a consciousness of an impending
death. That his demise thereafter came swiftly, although not
instantaneously, further emphasized the victim's realization of the
hopelessness of his recovery.

The court stressed that when a person is at the point of death,

every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by
the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. It was the height
of jocularity for appellant to have suggested that it was highly
possible that the deceased mentioned his name to Lolita so that she
would tell him to come to decedent's succor, or for another reason.
Such conjecture finds no basis record. On the other hand, this
speculation is belied by the clear, straightforward testimonies of
Lolita and Corazon. Despite several attempts, counsel for the
defense failed to make Lolita admit that the victim mentioned
appellant's name for a vague and undefined purpose, other than to
identify his assailant.

Lolita adamantly stuck to her testimony that her husband told

her that he was shot by "Pare Pran." The unrebutted testimony of
Corazon further clarified that the victim said those words in answer to
his wife's question as to who shot him. The deceased's
condemnatory antemortem statement naming appellant as his
assailant deserves full faith and credit and is admissible in evidence
as a dying declaration.

12. Pp v Sergio & Lacanilao; GR No. 240053, Oct 9, 2019

Facts:
 Mary Jane Veloso, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius
L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and neighbors in Talavera, Nueva
Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility,
Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in
Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a
luggage to bring on her trip. She then asked Cristina why the
luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was
new. The luggage was the same bag she used on her trip to
Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at the airport
when Mary Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian

Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It
informed the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and
traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her
testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius. The
Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions
relative to the taking of Mary Jane's testimony,  viz.: (a) Mary Jane
shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia; (b)  No  cameras
shall be allowed; (c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present;
and (d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in
writing. 

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take

the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories. " It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's
testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories
is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is
out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before
the court due to her imprisonment. Cristina and Julius objected to
the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before and
not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the
Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of
the witness in open court and the use thereof is confined only in civil
cases.
 Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will
violate their right to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her
face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases and the Judicial
Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the affiants therein were still
subject to cross-examination.

Issue:

Whether Mary Jane’s testimony may be validly acquired

through deposition by written interrogatories.

Ruling:

Yes. The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary

circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane’s conviction by final judgment and
her detention in a prison facility in Indonesia, while awaiting
execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of
an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings
against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions
attached to the reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain
in confinement in Indonesia, and any question propounded to her
must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to have
allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

Inapplicability of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in this

case. Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be
taken before the court where the case is being heard, it must be
shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b)
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. The
case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category.

The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the

United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the
capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in
order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead
prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause ‘gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course
of the decisions of cases as they arise’. Capsulized, it refers to ‘the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It relates to certain
immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government.

Thus, it behooved upon the Court of Appeals to have provided

some leeway in its interpretation of the subject provision. The
extraordinary factual circumstances surrounding the case of Mary
Jane warrant the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The Rules are
silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to
testify in open court because he is imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it
may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there
is compelling reason.

The Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally

construe procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial
justice. The deposition by written interrogatories is pursuant to Mary
Jane’s right to due process. The benchmark of the right to due
process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the parties have their
day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow
a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of
his liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this constitutional
protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal
prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present its
evidence in support of a charge.

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary

Jane face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However,
the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that
they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by
way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of
their constitutional right. Finally, it must be mentioned that a “dying
declaration” is one of the recognized exceptions to the right to
confrontation. In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state that
Mary Jane’s deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her
dying declaration.

13. Pp v Lazarte; GR No. 89762, Aug 7, 1991

Facts:

Lorenzo Lara was sleeping in his residence at Zone 5 Signal

Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. A knock at the door, awakened him.
He stood up and opened the door, but he saw nobody. Then, to his
surprise, someone entered the house through the window. It was
Nonito Jambunganan y Hundana, the owner of the house which
Lara was occupying for free, as a caretaker. Seeing Lara, Nonito
embraced him. As Lara held Nonito, he felt blood in the latter's
clothes and sensed that he had wounds in his body. When he asked
Nonito what happened, the latter replied, "Tol, sinaksak ako sa
labas." "Who stabbed you?" Lara asked. "Tony, Suay Ric and Junior,"
he answered. Nonito also "shouted" twice, "Help me!" Frantically,
Lara called out to his neighbors for help. Neighbors came running.
When Nonito was about to be placed on board a jeep, he
collapsed. He was declared "DOA," dead on arrival, at the Nichols
Airbase Hospital. Nonito sustained three stab wounds at the back
and died of hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds.

Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, a medical specialist, and the

medicolegal officer and in-charge of the clinical application of
medicine, of the National Bureau of Investigation, opined that of
these three wounds, all at the back, only one was fatal which alone
could have caused the death of the victim. He also testified that
"one kind of single bladed sharp pointed instrument produced the
wounds," albeit he admitted that it is possible that there could have
been more than one instrument. Solely on the deductions or
conclusions of Lara that the four nicknames or aliases allegedly
"whispered" by Nonito to him correspond to Antonio Lazarte for the
nickname or alias "Tony," "Rodolfo Mundido" for "Suway" or "Su-ay" (in
his direct testimony he said "Romulo Cahiwat"), while on cross-
examination he mentioned "Romulo Mundido," and Ricardo Ignacio
for "Ric" and "Eliseo Henares" or "Romulo Cahiwat" for "Junior," an
information for murder was filed against the four aforenamed on
October 14, 1986.

Only Antonio Lazarte y Mogallon and Ricardo Ignacio were

apprehended, as the other two, "Rodolfo Mundido" and "Eliseo
Henares," were never arrested, and remain at large. Ricardo Ignacio
was only apprehended during a "saturation drive" conducted by the
military and police authorities on August 30, 1987. He was acquitted
on a demurrer to evidence pursuant to the Resolution of the trial
court dated February 9, 1989. The defense of Antonio Lazarte, the
appellant in the case at bar, consists of denial and alibi, and points
to two others -persons-Milo Veloso and a certain Miguel-as the
assailants.

Issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the dying

declaration of the victim; and

2. Whether the dying declaration may be considered as part of

res gestae.

Ruling:

1. No. From the records of the case, it is clear that the

conviction of the appellant had been based largely on the alleged
dying declaration of the victim. It behooves the court therefore to
determine not only the admissibility, but also appreciate the weight
of the oral dying declaration of the deceased Nonito Jambunganan
testified on by the principal witness for the prosecution, Lorenzo Lara.
As a rule a dying declaration is hearsay, and inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to the mandate of the Rules of Court, Rule 130,
Section 30 which states: SEC. 30. Testimony generally confined to
personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided
in these rules.

The above-quoted section of the Revised Rules of Court

expresses the hearsay rule in evidence. However, there are several
exceptions to this rule on inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the first
one being a dying declaration given under the circumstances
specified in Section 31, likewise of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, to
wit: SEC. 31. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person,
made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry,
as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such
death.

Thus, in order that a dying declaration may be admissible as

evidence, four requisites must concur:

1) That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding

circumstances of the declarant's death;
2) That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was
under a consciousness of an impending death;
3) That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
4) That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.

Lara recalled that on the fateful night of October 8, 1986,

Nonito, who had multiple, stab wounds, entered the house through
the window. Upon seeing Lara, Nonito embraced him and uttered
the nicknames or aliases of the persons who inflicted the injuries. The
testimony of Lara may be accepted as sufficient compliance with
the first requisite above specified. And it may be apt to state that
although a dying declaration may be made orally, that does not
militate against its admissibility. Dying declarations are not
necessarily either written or spoken. Any method of communication
between mind and mind may be adopted that will develop the
thought, as the pressure of the hand, a nod of the head or a glance
of the eye.
 However, a close scrutiny of Lara's testimony cannot support
the finding of the trial court that the "victim was conscious of his
imminent death when he relayed the statement to Lorenzo Lara. This
finding is gratuitous and has no clear basis in the records. Although
the words of the transcript are already cold, they are nonetheless
eloquent. No ceremonial words are required to be uttered or
written, no special action or movement is needed, no incantation is
necessary to invest such words, action, or movement with the
sanctity of a dying declaration as to exempt it from the exclusionary
effect of the hearsay rule. Even if death supervenes after such a
declaration is made is not primordial, all that is to be proven is that
the declaration was made under a "consciousness of impending
death," which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he
is dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently,
or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand, or there
must be a settled hopeless expectation.

2. Yes. The ante mortem statements of Nonito may be

considered as part of the res gestae. In any event, whatever they
are, even if they constitute part of the res gestae or they constitute
indeed a dying declaration as foisted by Lara and accepted by the
trial court and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule, this
admissibility notwithstanding does not suffice to satisfy the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt against any of the
four accused, much less against the accused-appellant.
Significantly, the ante-mortem statements of Nonito consists of no
other than that "Tony, Su-ay, Ric, and Junior" were his assailants.
Specifically, the trial court anchored the conviction of Antonio
Lazarte on the premise that the name "Tony" referred to him and to
no other, which was deduced, concluded, or translated by Lara.

14. Pp v Basay; GR No. 86941, March 3, 1993

Facts:

Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple

Murder with Arson in a criminal complaint filed on 24 March 1986
with the MCTC of Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose in the Province of
Negros Oriental for having allegedly killed the spouses Zosimo and
Beatrice Toting and their six-year old daughter, Bombie, and for
having burned the said spouses' house to conceal the crime; as a
consequence of such fire, the spouses' other daughter, Manolita,
was burned to death.

Issue:

Whether the statement given by Bombie toting be considered

as dying declaration.

Ruling:

No. The Court harbor very serious doubts about the alleged
statement given by Bombie Toting to Sgt. Tabanao and Jaime
Saguban identifying the appellant and Teodoro Basay as the
perpetrators of the heinous crime. In the first place, the trial court
itself ruled that Bombie was not a competent witness. We agree with
such a conclusion, not necessarily because she was only six (6) years
old, but because her condition at the time she supposedly gave her
statement made it impossible for her to have communicated
effectively. She suffered the following injuries: "Infected hack wound
from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid abdomen,
inguinal area left to the medial thigh left through and through, with
necrotic transected muscle."

She was taken from the crime scene only on 6 March 1986, or
two (2) days after the commission of the crime, and died in the
hospital on 7 March 1986. The doctor who first attended to her when
she arrived at the Provincial Hospital, a certain Dr. Sy, was not
presented as a witness. On the other hand, the doctor who
attended to her before she died, Dr. Edgar Cantalao, testified that
when he last saw Bombie alive, she could not talk. It was this inability
to talk which led the trial court to express its doubts on the veracity
of the latter's supposed statement.

There is no evidence to show that Bombie Toting told the

doctor as to who were the perpetrators of the crime; neither did she
tell her own brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused,
Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez who killed her parents and her
brother and sisters and burned their house. The Court cannot
understand why P.C. Sgt. Tabano did not ask Bombie Toting
questions concerning the commission of the crime by the accused.
Neither did the P.C. or the police take any statement from her on her
way to the hospital or at the hospital.

Surprisingly, Bombie Toting did not even tell her own brother,
Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused who committed the crime.
Had the statement of Bombie Toting been made to the doctor or to
the barangay captain or to any reputable member of the
community where the incident happened, the Court will have to put
weight and consider her statement as a dying declaration. Our
experience has shown that persons in authority are prone to
fabricate or misrepresent the facts to serve their own purpose.
Innocent people had been charged in Court simply by the false
statements of peace officers. The Court therefore has to be cautious
when these peace officers testify in Court.

15. Garcia v Vda de Caparas; GR No. 180843, April 17, 2014

Facts:

Flora Makapugay (Makapugay) is the owner of a 2.5-hectare

farm in Barangay Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan (the land) which was
being tilled by Eugenio Caparas (Eugenio) as an agricultural lessee
under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed away and was
succeeded by her nephews and niece, namely Amanda dela Paz-
Perlas (Amanda), Justo dela Paz (Justo) and Augusto dela Paz
(Augusto). On the other hand, Eugenio’s children – Modesta Garcia
(Garcia), Cristina Salamat (Salamat) and Pedro – succeeded him.
Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as her
attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died, or in 1974, Amanda and Pedro
entered into an agreement entitled "Kasunduan sa Buwisan",
followed by an April 19, 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract,
covering the land. In said agreements, Pedro was installed and
recognized as the lone agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land.
 Pedro and his wife, herein respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de
Caparas (Dominga), took over as agricultural lessee. On July 10,
1996, the landowners Amanda, Justo and Augusto, on the one
hand, and Pedro’s sisters Garcia and Salamat on the other, entered
into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" whereby Garcia and
Salamat were acknowledged as Pedro’s co-lessees. On October 24,
1996, herein petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint for
nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural
lessees against Pedro’s heirs, represented by his surviving spouse and
herein respondent Dominga. Before the office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan.

In their Complaint, Garcia and Salamat claimed that when

their father Eugenio died, they entered into an agreement with their
brother Pedro that they would alternately farm the land on a "per-
season basis"; that the landowner Makapugay knew of this
agreement; that when Makapugay passed away, Pedro reneged
on their agreement and cultivated the land all by himself,
deliberately excluding them and misrepresenting to Amanda that he
is Eugenio’s sole heir; that as a result, Amanda was deceived into
installing him as sole agricultural lessee in their 1979 Agricultural
Leasehold Contract; that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s
misrepresentations, she executed on July 10, 1996 an Affidavit stating
among others that Pedro assured her that he would not deprive
Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights"; that in order to
correct matters, Amanda, Justo and Augusto executed in their favor
the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa", recognizing them as
Pedro’s co-lessees; that when Pedro passed away, Dominga took
over the land and, despite demands, continued to deprive them of
their rights as co-lessees; that efforts to settle their controversy proved
futile, prompting the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee to issue
the proper certification authorizing the filing of a case; and that they
suffered damages as a consequence. Petitioners prayed that the
1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract between Pedro and Amanda
be nullified; that they be recognized as co-lessees and allowed to
cultivate the land on an alternate basis as originally agreed; and
that they be awarded ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation.

Respondent Dominga claimed that when her father-in-law

Eugenio died, only her husband Pedro succeeded and cultivated
the land, and that petitioners never assisted him in farming the land;
that Pedro is the sole agricultural lessee of the land; that Amanda’s
July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even
date between her and the petitioners are self-serving and violate
the existing 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract; that under Section
38  of Republic Act No. 3844 (RA 3844), petitioners’ cause of action
has prescribed. Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in
possession of the land even while Eugenio lived; that petitioners
have never cultivated nor possessed the land even for a single
cropping; that Pedro has been the one paying the lease rentals as
evidenced by receipts; that when Pedro died in 1984, she
succeeded in his rights as lessee by operation of law, and that she
had been remitting lease rentals to the landowners since 1985; and
that petitioners had no right to institute themselves as her co-lessees.
She prayed that the Complaint be dismissed; that the July 10, 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" be nullified; that the execution of a
new leasehold agreement between her and the landowners be
ordered; and by way of counterclaim, that moral damages  and
litigation costs be awarded her.

Issue:

Whether the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro

Caparas (Pedro) that he entered into a sharing of leasehold lights
with the petitioners can be used as evidence against herein
respondent.

Ruling:

No. The DARAB Case which was filed in 1996 or long after
Pedro’s death in 1984, has no leg to stand on other than Amanda’s
declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit that Pedro falsely
represented to Makapugay and to her that he is the actual
cultivator of the land, and that when she confronted him about this
and the alleged alternate farming scheme between him and
petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters had
an understanding about it and he did not have the intention of
depriving them of their cultivatory rights." Petitioners have no other
evidence, other than such verbal declaration, which proves the
existence of such arrangement. No written memorandum of such
agreement exists, nor have they shown that they actually cultivated
the land even if only for one cropping. No receipt evidencing
payment to the landowners of the latter’s share, or any other
documentary evidence, has been put forward.

Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged

admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is
inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which
provides that, “if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." Thus,
since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains
to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan
ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and
which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim
against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest
Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used against
the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being
unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her
husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death.

If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under

their supposed mutual agreement with Pedro, to cultivate the land
under an alternate farming scheme, then they should have
confronted Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss
the possibility of their institution as co-lessees of the land; and they
should have done so soon after the passing away of their father
Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was
installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they
came forward to question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold. As
correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are
thus precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural leasehold
contract.

Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro

deceived her into believing that he is the sole successor to the
leasehold. Part of her duties as the landowner’s representative or
administrator was to know the personal circumstances of the lessee
Eugenio; more especially so, when Eugenio died. She was duty-
bound to make an inquiry as to who survived Eugenio, in order that
the landowner — or she as representative — could choose from
among them who would succeed to the leasehold. Under Section 9
of RA 3844, Makapugay, or Amanda — as Makapugay’s duly
appointed representative or administrator — was required to make a
choice, within one month from Eugenio’s death, who would
succeed as agricultural lessee.

There is no other logical conclusion than that the 1996

"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda and petitioners,
which is grounded on Pedro’s inadmissible verbal admission, and
which agreement was entered into without obtaining Dominga’s
consent, constitutes an undue infringement of Dominga’s rights as
Pedro’s successor-in-interest under Section 9, and operates to
deprive her of such rights and dispossess her of the leasehold against
her will. Under Section 7 of RA 3844, Dominga is entitled to security of
tenure; and under Section 16, any modification of the lease
agreement must be done with the consent of both parties and
without prejudicing Dominga's security of tenure.