Sebastian vs. Bajar
Sebastian vs. Bajar
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Words and Phrases; The term “noted” means that the Court has
merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter—it does not imply agreement or approval.—As culled
from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which recommended
respondent’s indefinite suspension. “The term ‘noted’ means that the Court has merely taken cognizance
of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a
decision on the matter—it does not imply agreement or approval.” Hence, the penalty of indefinite
suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139B
provides: Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.—x x x (b) If the Board, by the vote
of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations
which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
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* EN BANC.
436
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance; Clear preponderant evidence is necessary
to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings.—Administrative
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis and they belong to a class of their own. They are neither civil
nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officer. They involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. A disciplinary action against a lawyer is
intended to protect the administration of justice from the misconduct of its officers. This Court requires
that its officers shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom the public may repose
confidence. “Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts,
and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or
suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor—or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.”
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or
suspension proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; A respondent-lawyer’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution—such conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility.—The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to comply with the
Court’s lawful orders in two instances: x x x These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause
for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed as a mere request, nor should
it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.” Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court’s orders “not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her
disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.”
437
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the
final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of
438
Same; Same; Same; Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law.—Respondent abused her right of
recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and
Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the
same issues. The Court held that “an important factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is
the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim
substantially the same reliefs. Indeed, “while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should
not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice.” Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. It
is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final
judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly, respondent violated the proscription in Canon 19.
Same; Same; Same; While respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an officer of the
court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession, the Court will not, however, disbar a
lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.—The penalty of
suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity
to disregard court orders. Respondent’s acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as
439
an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the
Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior
court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her suspension is
consequently warranted.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Facts
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1 Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 1-2.
440
ant’s spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case
against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to
residential. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment 2
ordering Tanlioco’s
ejectment subject to the payment of 3disturbance compensation.4
The RTC’s judgment
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
2. Respondent, as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to
produce the conversion order. The 5
RTC dismissed the complaint due to res
judicata and lack of cause of action.
3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication 6 Board. The case raised the same issues of conversion
and disturbance compensation.
4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since she
misused the7
rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration
of justice.
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2 Id., at pp. 88-93.
3 Id., at pp. 96-100.
4 Id., at pp. 101-105.
5 Id., at pp. 3, 15-16.
6 Id., at pp. 3-4, 16.
7 Id., at pp. 18-19.
8 Id., at p. 21.
9 Id., at p. 26.
441
VOL. 532, SEPTEMBER 7, 2007 441
Sebastian vs. Bajar
On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply. Complainant alleged that respondent did not
confront the issues of13her disbarment squarely but raised issues that were decided upon with
finality by the courts.
On 25 March 1992, the Court14
issued a Resolution requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder
within 10 days from notice. On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation dated 2 June
1992 stating15that respondent failed to comply with the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution to file
a Rejoinder.
On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be
subjected to disciplinary action for failure to comply with the Court’s 25 March 1992
Resolution. The 16
Court also required respondent to Comment on the complainant’s 2 June 1992
Manifestation.
On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation alleging that she had substantially
complied with the Court’s orders relative to her defenses. She advised the Court that she had
transferred to the Public Attorney’s Office and since
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10 Id., at pp. 39-41.
11 Id., at p. 44.
12 Id., at p. 52.
13 Id., at p. 74.
14 Id., at p. 193.
15 Id., at p. 194.
16 Id., at p. 209.
442
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17 Id., at pp. 225-226.
18 Id., at p. 228.
19 Id., at p. 229.
20 Id., at pp. 230-231.
21 Id., at pp. 233-234.
22 Id., at p. 238.
23 Id., at p. 245.
24 Id., at p. 247.
443
protecting the interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of office. Respondent
contended that “she had comported herself as [an] officer25 of the court, at the risk of being
disciplined by the latter if only to impart truth and justice.”
On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating
Commissioner Jose) submitted his report and recommendation to the IBP. Investigating
Commissioner Jose enumerated respondent’s violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that rendered her unfit to continue the practice of law:
1. Respondent
26
appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an obstruction of
justice.
2. Respondent abused her right of recourse 27
to the courts. The duplication or
multiplication of suits should be avoided, and respondent’s acts were tantamount to
forum-shopping
28
which is a reprehensible manipulation of court processes and
proceedings.
3. Respondent uttered disrespectful
29
language and shouted at everybody during the
hearing on 25 May 1995. The want of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful
language used.
On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149
dated 30 March 1996. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Investigating
Commissioner Jose’s recommendation that respondent be “SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY
from the practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and
incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility rendering
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25 Id., at p. 251.
26 Id., at p. 301.
27 Id., at pp. 306-308.
28 Id., at pp. 308-312.
29 Id., at pp. 296-300, 303-304.
444
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30 Id., at p. 262.
31 Id.
32 Id., at p. 316.
33 Id., at p. 322.
34 Id., at p. 327.
35 Id., at p. 332.
36 Rollo, Vol. 2, p. 11.
37 Id., at p. 13.
38 Id.
445
In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in
Mandaluyong City despite her suspension because she believed that a notation by the Court in
the 20 January 1997 Resolution
39
did not mean an implementation of the IBP’s Resolution on
her indefinite suspension.
Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel, another hearing was held on 19
September 2003. Complainant’s counsel asserted that respondent had been practicing law in
the midst of her suspension
40
and this constituted a violation of the suspension order which she
wanted to be lifted. Investigating 41Commissioner Raval asked respondent to present a valid
ground to lift the suspension order. Respondent requested that her detention for five days at
the NBI be converted into a five-year suspension, one year42 for every day of detention such that
she would have served five years of indefinite suspension.
Investigating Commissioner
43
Raval then directed the parties to file simultaneously their
Verified Position Papers.
In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited that respondent’s motion did not
state valid grounds to convince the Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant stated that
by continuing to practice law, “she is flaunting her defiance of44 the Supreme Court by showing
that she can hoodwink another branch of government.” 45
Complainant also prayed for
respondent’s disbarment due to the gravity of her offense.
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39 Id., at pp. 15-18.
40 Id., at pp. 53-54.
41 Id., at p. 59.
42 Id., at p. 60.
43 Id., at p. 84.
44 Id., at pp. 89-90.
45 Id., at p. 97.
446
In respondent’s Position Paper, she reiterated that complainant is not the real party-in-
interest since the property that was litigated was owned by complainant’s wife. She asserted
that she never betrayed her client’s cause, she was never unfaithful to her oath, and it was
complainant who filed this case for harassment. 46Respondent prayed that the case be
considered closed and terminated due to lack of merit.
Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a
Resolution in a Preliminary Investigation case which she handled. Respondent contended that
in this Preliminary Investigation case, 47she recommended its dismissal because the offended
party was not the real party-in-interest.
Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the personality 48
to file the disbarment
complaint against her; hence, it should have been dismissed outright.
After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XVI-2004-229 dated 16 April 2004. The IBP adopted Investigating Commissioner Raval’s
Report and Recommendation that respondent be disbarred for 49her “manifest flagrant
misconduct in disobeying the SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension.”
As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149
which recommended respondent’s indefinite suspension. “The term ‘noted’ means that the
Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising
a judicious50 deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter—it does not imply agreement or
approval.” Hence, the penalty of indefinite suspen-
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46 Id., at p. 93.
47 Id., at p. 100.
48 Id.
49 IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-229.
50 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 310, 321.
447
VOL. 532, SEPTEMBER 7, 2007 447
Sebastian vs. Bajar
sion imposed by the IBP Board of Governors has not attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B
provides:
“Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.—
xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.” (Emphasis supplied)
Necessarily, the Court will now give its “final action” on this complaint.
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to
support the IBP’s findings. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed on
respondent. 51
Administrative
52
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis and they belong to a class of
their own. They are neither civil53
nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the Court
into the conduct 54of its officer. They involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance.
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the administration of justice
from the misconduct of its offi-
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51 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 317.
52 Heck v. Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 823; 423 SCRA 329, 350 (2004).
53 Arienda v. Aguila, A.C. No. 5637, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 282, 287.
54 Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 349 Phil. 7, 15; 285 SCRA 93, 101 (1998).
448
1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to file a rejoinder
within 10 days from notice. However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November
1993 after she was detained at the NBI for five days for failure to heed the Court’s
order.
2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent was required to comment on
complainant’s manifestation. She instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February
1993 or almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation, respondent alleged that
she had substantially complied with the Court’s orders. However, the Court in its 1
March 1993 Resolution stated that nothing
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55 De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, 111 Phil. 569, 572; 1 SCRA 954, 957 (1961).
56 Barriosv. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, 12 November 2004, 442 SCRA 324, 335-336.
57 Berbano v. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 341; 410 SCRA 258, 265 (2003).
449
set out in respondent’s manifestation excused her failure to obey the Court’s
Resolutions.
These acts constitute58 willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring
59
the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed
60
as a mere request,
nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.” Respondent’s obstinate
refusal to comply with the Court’s orders “not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character;
it also underscores
61
her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof.”
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than 62
any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to their processes.
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58 Sec. 27 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.—A member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
59 Ong v. Grijaldo, 450 Phil. 1, 12; 402 SCRA 1, 10 (2003).
60 Id., at p. 13; pp. 10-11.
61 Id.
62 Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., A.C. No. 6589, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 443, 448-449.
450
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63 Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 6585, 21 April 2005, 456 SCRA 475, 491-492.
64 A.M. No. P-05-2045, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 29, 33.
65 A.C. No. 4334, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 479, 484-485.
66 Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, supra note 54 at p. 15; p. 101.
67 Pariñas v. Paguinto, A.C. No. 6297, 13 July 2004, 434 SCRA 179, 184.
451
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68 Supra note 52 at p. 822; p. 349.
69 Navarro v. Meneses III, 349 Phil. 520, 582; 285 SCRA 586, 592-593 (1998).
70 A.C. No. 6542, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 129, 140.
71 Id., at pp. 139-140.
452
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72 Foronda v. Guerrero, A.C. No. 5469, 10 August 2004, 436 SCRA 9, 23.
73 Id.
453
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.