Government of The U.S.A. V Purganan

3/10/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 389
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 623

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan
*
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Motions for

Reconsideration; As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a
higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to it; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a petition for
certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a
chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2)
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a
fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of
certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the
same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from being of
this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with. Likewise, this Court has
allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons
therefor.
International Law; Extradition; Treaties; A cardinal rule in
the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect
to its intent.—The substantive issues raised in this case require
an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a
law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since PD 1069 is
intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001781cba3779575b759b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/28
to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding certain

postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the
issues raised here.
Same; Same; Postulates of Extradition; Extradition is a major
instrument for the suppression of crime.—Extradition treaties are
entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating
the arrest and the
_______________
* EN BANC.
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624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other. With

the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the
flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the
purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become
more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend
international boundaries. Today, “a majority of nations in the
world community have come to look upon extradition as the major
effective instrument of international co-operation in the
suppression of crime.” It is the only regular system that has been
devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent
to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.
Same; Same; Same; The requesting State will accord due
process to the accused.—An extradition treaty presupposes that
both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and
trust, each other’s legal system and judicial process. More
pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the
person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full
faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the
requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked
for its unconstitutionally.
Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceedings are sui generis.—
As pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings,

the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition
which is sui generis—in a class by itself—they are not. “An
extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the
guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked
by an extraditee x x x.
Same; Same; Same; The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the
person sought is extraditable.—Given the foregoing, it is evident
that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt
or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such
determination during the extradition proceedings will only result
in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a
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VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 625
measure of international judicial assistance through which a

person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a
jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of
the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions
that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose
of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and
whether the person sought is extraditable.
Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; We are bound by
pacta sunt seruanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Extradition Treaty.—Our executive branch of
government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and
our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the
presumption that its implementation will serve the national
interest. Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty
promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other hand,
failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of
our country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good
faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if
the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty,
are satisfied. In other words, “[t]he demanding government, when
it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is
entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper
warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make
the surrender.” Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in
a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
Same; Same; Same; Persons to be extradited are presumed to
be flight risks.—Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight
risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement
can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Treaty, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the
arrest of the accused, a qualification would be rendered nugatory
by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant—arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
“immediate.”—It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails
626
sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and

arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing
can no longer be considered “immediate.” The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a
means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Same; Same; Same; By using the phrase “if it appears,” the
law fur ther conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage.—By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law
further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such
early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive

determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge
and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely
to get a good first impression—a prima facie finding—sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Grave Abuse of Discretion; A
judge gravely abuses his discretion when he sets for hearing the
application for the issuance of an arrest warrant in an extradition
proceeding after having already determined from the petition itself
and its supporting documents that a prima facie finding exists.—
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The silence of the
Extradition Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.—Moreover, the
law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the
answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving
the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word “hearing” is notably absent from the provision.
Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been
intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty
leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings.
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Same; Same; Same; Proper Procedure in Extradition

Proceedings.— Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem
it wise to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition
for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must
study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the
person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If,
in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is
determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge
must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency
of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape
and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases.
Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; As suggested by
the use of the word “conviction” in Art. III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, the constitutional provision on bail, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws—it does not apply to extradition proceedings where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue.—We agree with
petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The provision in the Constitution
stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not
detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings.—The provision in the
Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is sus-
628
pended” does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be
noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application “only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.” Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The detention of a potential
extraditee prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings
does not amount to a violation of his right to due process—while
the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, it does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.—Contrary to his
contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point
out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. Where the circumstances—such as those present in
an extradition case—call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court
hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of
his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any provision—in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty—expressly guaranteeing the
right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of
not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards
deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or
evade their prosecutors.—Too, we cannot allow our country to be a
haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing
the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence,
it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our
treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal
treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade
arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision
—in the Constitution, the law or the treaty—expressly
guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting
the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be
a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines
to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
Same; Same; Same; To best serve the ends of justice, the Court
holds that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed
under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted
as an exception,
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only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.—The rule,
we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.
However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave
abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad
enough to induce the grant of basic fairness to extraditees.
Indeed, the right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or
property” of every person. It is “dynamic and resilient, adaptable
to every situation calling for its application.” Accordingly and to
best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody
of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception,
only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Same; Same; Same; Since the exception to the grant of bail in
extradition proceedings has no express or specific statutory basis,
and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice
and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the two-
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness.—Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden
of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations.
In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative.
Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power
should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international
and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of “the sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the
limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.
Same; Same; Congress; The constituents of a potential
extraditee who elected him to Congress while a foreign country was
requesting his extradition were or should have been prepared for
the consequences of the extradi-
630
tion case against their representative, including his detention

pending the final resolution of the case—his election to public
office is not, by itself, a compelling reason to grant him bail.—
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was
elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that
basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila
district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v.
Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement
argument when it ruled thus: “When the voters of his district
elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so
with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with
full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term
in office. x x x It must be noted that even before private
respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was
already of public knowledge that the United States was
requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the
final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with
Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant
him bail.
BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; It is settled that the

power to admit to bail exists in extradition proceedings, although
as a matter of policy it may only be granted under “exceptional
circumstances.”—The Government maintains that an extradition
court has no power to authorize bail in the absence of any law
conferring such power; and that the 1987 Constitution, as well as
the Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to persons arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine Laws, but not to
extradition proceedings in which courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal. The argument is as ingenious as it is
fallacious. It is settled that the power to admit to bail exists in
extradition proceedings, although as a matter of policy it may only
be granted under “exceptional circumstances.” This,
quintessentially, has been the doctrine advocated in a cavalcade
of American cases starting with Wright v. Henkel, 190 US 40
(1902); and worth mentioning, of course, are Paretti v. United
States, 112 F.3d 1363 (1977), Bealieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp.
915 (1977), and In re Kirby, et al, 106 F.3d 855 (1996); which are
also discussed extensively by Mr. Justice Puno.
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VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 631
Same; Same; Same; There is neither logic nor persuasion to

the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal cases,
or that class of cases where courts must “render judgments of
conviction or acquittal”—bail as a remedy is available where there
is deprivation of liberty prior or during trial.—Significantly, both
the extradition treaty between the United States and the
Philippines, and the Philippine Extradition Law (PD 1069)
contain no provision expressly withholding from the courts the
power to grant bail. Had the intention of the parties to the treaty
been to totally nullify the pre-existing power of the extradition
court on the matter of bail, they could have easily provided for it
in the treaty. But since they had not done so, it would be
reasonable to presume that they had not so intended. Indeed, the
treaty fails to even remotely suggest such judicial limitation
insisted upon by the Government. Truly, there is neither logic nor
persuasion to the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in
criminal cases, or that class of cases where courts must “render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.” Bail as a remedy is
available where there is deprivation of liberty prior or during
trial. In the 1909 case of United States v. Co Siaco, akin to the
situation confronting us but involving a deportation proceeding,
this Court allowed the potential deportee to post bail although a
deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was

then no law providing for bail in deportation cases.
Same; Same; Same; We cannot curtail a citizen’s right to
freedom on speculations and fears where there exist reasonable
mechanisms appropriate to address them—the risk of flight does
not ipso facto call for denying his right to bail.—We cannot curtail
a citizen’s right to freedom on speculations and fears where there
exist reasonable mechanisms appropriate to address them. To my
mind, the risk of flight does not ipso facto call for denying his
right to bail. Trial judges must henceforth weigh carefully and
judiciously other methods to assure the presence of the accused
during the proceedings and right after, when he ought to be
deported already. Bail may be set at huge amounts or passports
cancelled and hold-departure orders issued or border patrols
heightened, in order that the extraditee may not flee from our
jurisdiction. In this regard, while I agree that it is the extraditee’s
burden to prove the least likelihood of flight, the extradition court
is also entitled to presume that the executive branch has done all
it can to forestall his sudden disappearance. The executive branch
cannot plead its helplessness and inutility to defeat the grant of
bail to the extraditee.
Same; Same; Same; To unduly sacrifice the civil liberties of an
individual by reason of an unfounded fear of being unable to fulfill
treaty obligations, would be to render impotent the ideals of the
dignity of the human person, thereby destroying something of what
is noble in our ways of life.—
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In our society—and even in the United States, I am sure—

freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
civil liberties protected by the Constitution. To unduly sacrifice
the civil liberties of an individual by reason of an unfounded fear
of being unable to fulfill treaty obligations, would be to render
impotent the ideals of the dignity of the human person, thereby
destroying something of what is noble in our way of life.
Certainly, if civil liberties may be safely respected without
imminently or actually impairing faithful compliance with treaty
obligations, as in this case, then there is no valid reason for
disregarding them.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Due Process; While the

Supreme Court is obliged to accord due respect to the state’s
interests to comply with its treaty obligations, it cannot also shirk
from its duty to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens—a
full and careful weighing of these warring interests is imperative;
It is my humble submission that the majority failed to allocate the
proper weight due to the constitutional rights of the private
respondent to life, liberty and to due process.—There can be no
disagreement that P.D. No. 1069 deserves an interpretation that
would blend with the purpose of the RP-US Extradition Treaty,
i.e., the minimization of flight risk and the facilitation of an
extraditee’s surrender to the requesting state. But this stance
should not be taken to mean that this Court can cast a blind eye
to the private respondent’s constitutional rights to life, liberty and
to due process. While this Court is obliged to accord due respect to
the state’s interests to comply with its treaty obligations, it cannot
also shirk from its duty to protect the fundamental rights of its
citizens. Thus, a full and careful weighing of these warring
interests is imperative as we did in its predecessor case Secretary
of Justice vs. Lantion. With due respect, it is my humble
submission that the majority failed to allocate the proper weight
due to the constitutional rights of the private respondent to life,
liberty and to due process. These rights are now conceded in the
civilized world as universal in character and it was never the
intent of the RP-US Extradition Treaty to trivialize their
significance.
Same; Same; Same; Where the extradition process has moved
away from the stage of evaluation to the stage where a formal
petition for extradition has been filed in court, the competing
interests of our government and of the potential extraditee have
developed new dimensions and they need to be rebalanced.—The
extradition process against the private respondent has, however,
moved away from the stage of evaluation of documents by the
executive officials of the Philippine government. A formal petition
for the extradition of the private respondent has now been filed
with our court of justice. With this development, the competing
interests of our govern-
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VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 633
ment and of the private respondent have developed new

dimensions and they need to be rebalanced.
Satne; Same; Same; It is my humble submission that from the

moment the petition for extradition is filed before the extradition
court, a potential extraditee has the right to demand that he be
furnished a copy of the petition.—It is my humble submission that
from the moment the petition for extradition is filed before the
extradition court, a potential extraditee has the right to demand
that he be furnished a copy of the petition. This right inheres from
the duty imposed by P.D. No. 1069 to the extradition judge to
summon a potential extraditee to appear and answer the petition
“as soon as practicable.” It is a mandatory duty that should be
carried out by the extradition judge; the law does not give him
any discretion. This submission is in accord with our ruling in
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, where we held that: “P.D. No.
1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides
the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the
petition for extradition as well as the supporting papers, i.e., after
the filing of the extradition in the extradition court.”
Same; Same; Same; I submit that the decision whether to send
notice to an extraditee and hear him before ordering his arrest
should be left to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge.—I
submit that the decision whether to send notice to an extraditee
and hear him before ordering his arrest should be left to the
sound discretion of the extraditing judge. This is crystal clear
from section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 which provides: “x x x He may
issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the
presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will serve the ends of justice.” (Italics
supplied) Under this provision, the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is dependent on a big “if,” or to an all important condition—if it
will serve the ends of justice. The determination of whether a
warrant of arrest against an extraditee will serve the ends of
justice is certainly not a cut and dried duty. It involves the
appreciation of highly contentious facts, both objective and
subjective in nature. Their appreciation requires a judicial mind
honed in the law of evidence. The history of extradition will reveal
that, initially, the task of determining whether an extraditee
should be immediately arrested was given to the executive
authorities of the extraditing state. The matter, in other words,
was treated purely as an executive function but unfortunately,
the practice was given to abuses. Recognizing that certain human
rights are universal in nature and beyond violation, the task of
adjudging whether a potential extraditee should be immediately
arrested pending his extradition proceeding was transferred to
judges. The office of the judge was called upon to insure that
fundamental fairness is not denied to a potential extraditee.
634
The extraditing judge is not to act as a stamp pad but has to

exercise his sound discretion on whether to issue the warrant.
Same; Same; Same; The view that the extraditing judge has
no discretion to determine whether to notify and hear a potential
extraditee before ordering his arrest cuts too much on the freedom
of action of the extraditing judge.—Under our law on extradition,
P.D. No. 1069, section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on
whether to order the arrest of the extraditee is guided by the
following consideration—whether the arrest will serve the ends of
justice. The grant of this judicial discretion will be rendered
naught if we subject the action of the extraditing judge to
unnecessary fetters. With due respect, the view that the
extraditing judge has no discretion to determine whether to notify
and hear a potential extraditee before ordering his arrest cuts too
much on the freedom of action of the extraditing judge. I submit
that we should give the extraditing judge more discretion on the
matter. If the extraditing judge feels that the notice and hearing
will allow an extraditee to flee, I have no doubt, he will
immediately order his arrest. If, however, he believes that notice
and hearing will not pose such danger and that he needs to hear
the parties to make a better determination on whether the
immediate arrest of an extraditee will serve the ends of justice, let
us not deny him the discretion to do so. The essence of discretion
is freedom of action and we negate that essence when we impose
needless limits on the judge’s freedom of action.
Same; Same; Same; We should not lay down the doctrine that
speed should be preferred to accuracy for speed breeds recklessness
and we cannot be reckless with our right to life and liberty.—
Prescinding from these premises, I cannot also subscribe to the
submission of the majority that the phrase “if it appears” in
section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 conveys the message that accuracy is
not as important as speed in issuing a warrant of arrest against a
potential extraditee. We are concerned here with the priceless
right to life and liberty, with the right to due process before one’s
liberty is taken away. We are not dealing with chattels. We
should not lay down the doctrine that speed should be preferred to
accuracy for speed breeds recklessness and we cannot be reckless
with our right to life and liberty.
Same; Same; Same; The petition for extradition may be in due
form but it does not establish sufficient factual basis to justify the
immediate issuance of warrant of arrest against the potential
extraditee.—Even a cursory reading of these documents will not
sustain the thesis of the majority that “it is evident that the
respondent could have already gotten an impression from these
records adequate for him to make an initial deter-
635
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 635
mination of whether the accused was someone who should

immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice.”
The documents are evidence tending to prove the guilt of the
private respondent in regard to the cases filed against him in the
United States. They are not evidence, however, to prove that the
private respondent will flee the Philippine jurisdiction while his
extradition petition is being heard. In other words, the petition for
extradition may be in due form but it does not establish sufficient
factual basis to justify the immediate issuance of warrant of
arrest against the private respondent. The probability of his flight
from our jurisdiction is central to the question of whether he
should be arrested. In the absence of evidence establishing that
private respondent will flee, I cannot join the majority in holding
that the respondent extraditing judge gravely abused his
discretion in calling for a hearing so that the parties can adduce
evidence on the issue.
Same; Same; Same; The matter of whether there ought to be a
hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest is addressed to the
discretion of the extraditing judge.—Once more, I beg to disagree
from the reading of our law on extradition by the majority. The
law, it is true, did not provide that the extraditing judge must
hold a hearing before he issues a warrant of arrest. The call for a
hearing is not mandatory but neither is it prohibited. Ergo, the
matter of whether there ought to be a hearing before issuance of
warrant of arrest is addressed to the discretion of the extraditing
judge. The exercise of this discretion depends on the configuration
of the facts of each case.
Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; The mere silence of
our extradition treaty with the United States and our extradition
law does not negate the right to bail of a potential extraditee; While
an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant depends on presentation
of clear and convincing evidence that the extraditee will not
frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction.—I
respectfully submit that a potential extraditee can hinge his right
to bail in our Constitution. The mere silence of our extradition
treaty with the United States and our extradition law (P.D. No.
1069) does not negate the right to bail of a potential extraditee.

Our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well
as international norms, customs and practices support an
extraditee’s right to bail. But while an extraditee may apply for
bail, its grant depends on presentation of clear and convincing
evidence that the extraditee will not frustrate the ends of justice
by fleeing from our jurisdiction.
636
Same; Same; Same; The right to bail inheres from the rights
to life, liberty and to due process.—The right to bail inheres from
the rights to life, liberty and to due process. Our Constitution
jealously guards every person’s right to life and liberty against
unwarranted state intrusion; indeed, no state action is permitted
to invade this forbidden zone except upon observance of due
process of law. Like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
right to bail gives flesh to the guarantee to liberty, without which,
the right to liberty can prove meaningless, and due process will
only be an empty slogan. However, unlike the privilege of habeas
corpus which is principally a remedy against illegal restraint on
liberty, the right to bail is available even when the reason for the
detention is lawful. The purpose of bail is to relieve a person the
rigors of prolonged imprisonment until the main case against him
is resolved, and at the same time, insure his attendance when
required by the authorities. It is the prospect of prolonged
detention, not the detention itself, which offends the
constitutional right to due process.
Same; Same; Same; The right of an extraditee to apply for bail
should be treated in light of our other treaty obligations, especially
those concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.—
The right of an extraditee to apply for bail should be treated in
light of our other treaty obligations, especially those concerning
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the Philippines is a
party, a treaty shall be interpreted “in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose,” taking into account the “relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.” As members of the family of nations, the Philippines and
the United States have the responsibility to uphold fundamental
human rights, and the dignity and worth of the human person.
They are mandated to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained. Being signatories

to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both
countries are committed to protect and promote the right of every
person to liberty and to due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can take proceedings before a court, in order that such
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention,
and order his release if the detention, is not lawful. Although the
right to liberty is a relative right and may be suspended or
derogated in exceptional circumstances, it is a generally accepted
principle in international law that the presumption lies in favor of
the existence of the right, and the burden lies with the authorities
to justify the lawfulness of the arrest or detention. This
presumption creates an obligation on state authorities to make
effective remedies avail-
637
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 637
able to every person under detention for the enjoyment of his

fundamental right to liberty.
Same; Same; Same; There is no customary rule of
international law prohibiting bail in extradition cases.—There is
no customary rule of international law prohibiting bail in
extradition cases. At present, there is no customary norm
prohibiting bail in extradition cases. On the contrary, most
countries, including Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom,
South Africa and Pakistan, among others, allow a potential
extraditee to be released on bail. Members of the European Union
have recently ratified the European Convention on Extradition,
which also provides a procedure for bail.
Same; Same; Same; Even the United States grants bail to an
extra-ditee, albeit in exceptional circumstances.—Even the United
States grants bail to an extraditee, albeit in exceptional
circumstances. In the United States, the ruling case law upholds
the right of a potential extraditee to apply for bail. The US
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Wright vs. Henckel,
recognized the authority of the circuit courts to receive application
for and grant bail in certain exceptional case, thus: “We are
unwilling to hold that the circuit court possess no power in
respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically vested by
statutes, or that, while bail should not be ordinarily granted in
cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not in any case, and
whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief.”
Same; Same; Same; While an extraditee may apply for bail, its
grant is discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate the
ends of justice.—While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant
is discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate the ends of
justice. In extradition cases, the extradition court does not inquire
into the guilt or innocence of the accused. Neither does the court
measure the injury caused to the community, as the offense was
not committed within its jurisdiction. The court, therefore, cannot
base its decision to grant or deny bail on the gravity of the offense,
as it could in criminal cases. Rather, it should base its decision on
whether it will frustrate the ends of justice. The risk of flight of
an extraditee is an important factor to consider, in determining
whether his bail will frustrate justice. Whether or not a potential
extraditee is a flight risk is determined by two factors: (1) capacity
to flee; and (2) intent to flee. The combination of these two factors
determines the degree of risk that the trial court must assess and
weigh. While there is no mathematical formula to guide the court
in gauging the precise risk posed by a particular combination of
these two factors, it is commonsensical to assume that one
without the other would not result to any risk at all. For while
638
one has the capacity to flee, if he does not intend to flee, the fear
of flight would be for naught, and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof to justify the arrest
and detention of the potential extraditee initially rests on the
petitioning executive authorities.—The burden of proof to justify
the arrest and detention of the potential extraditee initially rests
on the petitioning executive authorities. Under our extradition
treaty and law, a potential extraditee may be arrested and
detained under any of the following circumstances: (a) upon the
receipt of the request for the arrest of the potential extraditee and
even before the filing of the request for extradition; (b) upon the
filing of the petition for extradition before the extradition court; or
(c) during the hearing of the petition for extradition. In all the
above circumstances, the issuance of a warrant of arrest depends
on a showing that it will serve the ends of justice. Initially, it is
the burden of the petitioning executive authorities to prove that
the warrant against the extraditee will serve the ends of justice.
Same; Same; Same; After the warrant of arrest is issued, the

burden of proof on the right to be admitted to bail shifts on the
potential extraditee; The presumption of innocence, from which the
ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail emanates, is
inoperative in extradition cases.—After the warrant of arrest is
issued, the burden of proof on the right to be admitted to bail
shifts on the potential extraditee. In criminal cases, the
presumption lies in favor of granting bail. This is so because of
the constitutional presumption of innocence, which is not
overturned by the finding of probable cause upon which the
warrant of arrest against the accused was issued. However, the
presumption of innocence, from which the ordinary presumption
in favor of granting bail emanates, is inoperative in extradition
cases. The issuance of the warrant of arrest in extradition cases is
not based on the finding that the accused is probably guilty of the
offense for which he was charged in the requesting State. The
warrant is predicated on the finding that it will serve the ends of
justice. Once issued, it raises a presumption of the continuing
presence of the circumstances upon which the issuance of the
warrant was based. More often than not, this circumstance is the
probability that the extraditee will flee from the jurisdiction of the
extraditing court. The burden of proving admittance to bail is
thus shifted to the extraditee.
Same; Same; Same; In fairness to both parties, the case
should be remanded to the extradition court so that the proper
procedure and standard to determine the right to bail can be
complied with.—I respectfully submit that in fairness to both
parties, the case should be remanded to the extradition court so
that the proper procedure and standard to determine
639
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 639
the right to bail can be complied with. I put no blame on the

extradition court nor to the parties in this regard for we are still
developing our jurisprudence on extradition.
Same; Same; Same; The Court should fashion out a higher
standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible extraditee.—With
humility, I submit that the Court should fashion out a higher
standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible extraditee. The
higher standard is demanded by the fact that our extradition
treaty obligates us to assure that an extraditee will not abscond
from our jurisdiction. Failure to comply with this obligation will
expose our country to international embarrassment. It will defeat

the purpose of extradition treaties, i.e., the suppression of crimes,
especially transnational crimes to which the Philippines is very
vulnerable. The standard, I propose, is the standard of clear and
convincing evidence which is higher than mere preponderance of
evidence but lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If this
new and stricter standard would be adopted, it ought to follow
that the parties should be given a chance to offer evidence to meet
the same. Contrary the claim of the majority, the voluminous
pleadings already filed by the parties are insufficient to resolve
the issue of whether the private respondent is entitled to bail.
These pleadings proffer legal arguments but not proof of facts.
The remand of the case at bar is therefore not a cop-out but is
proper and it will not delay the proceedings. The extradition court
can be ordered to finish the hearing on the limited issue of bail
within one (1) week. After all, extradition proceedings are
summary in nature.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; The edict in the Bill of

Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the
fundamental right to bail, is clear—no statute or treaty can
abrogate or discard its language and its intent.—Treaty laws,
particularly those which are self-executing, have equal stature as
national statutes and, like all other municipal laws, are subject to
the parameters set forth in the Constitution. The Constitution,
being both a grant and a circumscription of government authority
by the sovereign people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power
and its limitation upon which an act of government is justly
measured. This instrument contains a rule for all agencies of the
government and any act in opposition thereto can only be struck
down as being invalid and without effect. When the great Charter
gives a mandate, the government can do no less than to accept it;
its rejection would be an act of betrayal. The edict in its Bill of
Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the
fundamental right to bail, is clear. No statute or treaty can
abrogate or discard its language and its intent.
640
Same; Same; Same; The Eighth Amendment of the U.S.

Federal Constitution does not expressly provide for the grant of
bail—it recognizes merely by implication the right to bail by
simply disallowing excessive bail.—The draft ponencia would rely

heavily on foreign jurisprudence, notably American cases, to
belabor the point that the right to bail is extraneous to extradition
proceedings. The citation, particularly of the jurisprudence
obtaining in the United States, could be predicated on the Eighth
Amendment of the US Federal Constitution. This amendment
however, recognizes merely by implication the right to bail by
simply disallowing excessive bail; it does not expressly provide for
the grant of bail. Individual states have incorporated into their
own state constitutions various versions—some give it as a matter
of right and some do not—a fact which partially explains the lack
of uniformity in state jurisprudence on the matter. Where some
states provide for a constitutional right to bail, the same is almost
invariably viewed as affording a greater right than that provided
in the federal charter.
Same; Same; Same; Philippine courts need not really bother
borrowing from dicta in foreign jurisdictions—the absoluteness of
the constitutional grant under Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution precludes any need for further standards than those
explicitly expressed by it.—But Philippine courts need not really
bother borrowing from dicta in foreign jurisdictions. The
absoluteness of the constitutional grant under Section 13, Article
III of the Constitution precludes any need for further standards
than those explicitly expressed by it. Judicial discretion is
confined to the issue of whether or not the offense charged is a
capital crime and a determination of whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong. The rule may appear to be too simplistic but it is
the correct approach. At all events, I would not be comfortable in
developing a “special circumstances” standard on the basis of
mere pro hac vice pronouncements from elsewhere. In Herras
Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, this Court has expressed
unqualified acquiescence to the deeply ingrained policy of
restraint against unwarranted judicial adventurism that can
otherwise easily get out of hand.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; We must consider the

implications of a ruling that in criminal proceedings, the
constitutional rights of the accused must be protected, but in a case
neither criminal nor civil, one which we call “sui generis,” basic
freedoms become irrelevant and non-available.—I submit that we
must consider the implications of a ruling that in criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused must be
protected, but in a case neither criminal nor civil, one which we
call “sui
641
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 641
generis,” basic freedoms become irrelevant and non-available. A

non-criminal proceeding, less onerous and repulsive to society
than prosecution for crime, and where the penalty is only to be
brought for trial before the court with jurisdiction, is stripped of
guarantees and protections given to hard-boiled recidivists
pending arrest and trial.
Same; Same; Same; I cannot see how compliance with the
requirements for notice and hearing and the ascertainment of
reasonable cause would hamper the suppression of crime.—The
majority opinion gives five (5) postulates of extradition. With all
due respect, I fail to see how compliance with these postulates
should result in a disregard for constitutional liberties. I agree
with the first postulate. It is a general proposition that
extradition is a major instrument for the suppression of crime and
the Philippines should cooperate in facilitating the arrest and
custodial transfer of a fugitive from one State to another.
However, I cannot see how compliance with the requirements for
notice and hearing and the ascertainment of reasonable cause
would hamper the suppression of crime. If they do, why should
they appear in our laws and in the decisions of this Court? Does
obedience to the dictates of due process and the prohibition
against unreasonable seizures mean any lesser determination to
eradicate crime? Effective extradition arrangements and
deterrence of flight abroad by felons are not incompatible with
fundamental liberties. The act of according due process and
reasonable seizures does not make the Philippines an isolationist
state. The employment of beneficial objectives to justify the
repression of far more worthy values is pejorative in nature, one
in which the Court should not engage.
Same; Same; Same; To say that all persons sought to be
extradited have a propensity to flee is too sweeping a statement to
be adopted as an axiom.—The fifth and last postulate uses the
underlying risk of flight. To say that all persons sought to be
extradited have a propensity to flee is too sweeping a statement to
be adopted as an axiom. In every criminal prosecution, the
prosecution can, with greater reason, argue that the accused will
escape and go into hiding. But never has the possibility of flight
sufficed to always require incarceration while court proceedings
are going on. The opposite practice is the one we have adopted.
The right to bail has been elevated into a constitutional
guarantee. Only for the most serious of offenses when evidence of
guilt is strong may an accused be denied freedom upon the
posting of bail prior to his conviction. In fact, the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure, as amended, provide that any person in
custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held.
The respondent is not charged of any crime before our courts.
642
Same; Same; Same; I submit that it is a dangerous precedent

for the Supreme Court to rule that the prima facie existence of
probable cause for a warrant of arrest can be derived from a mere
reading of the petition for extradition and its supporting
documents.—I submit that it is a dangerous precedent for this
Court to rule that the prima facie existence of probable cause for a
warrant of arrest can be derived from a mere reading of the
petition for extradition and its supporting documents. The
determination of probable cause is effectively taken away from
the judge and transferred to the Department of Justice. Worse,
the determination could come directly from an office not equipped
to make it, namely the Department of Foreign Affairs. In either
case, the Constitution is infringed.
CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; Supreme Court; The

constitutional duty and power of the Supreme Court to protect and
enforce the fundamental rights of all persons in the country,
should include, to the extent that the Court can grant under its
power, the right of extraditees to avail of the same or similar
remedies that courts in the countries of our treaty partners have
accorded to their own extraditees.—I concur with the well-written
ponencia of Justice Panganiban. I write this concurring opinion to
afford extraditees in this country the right to bail, in carefully
limited exceptions, under the equity and rule making power of the
Court. It is the constitutional duty and power of the Court to
protect and enforce the fundamental rights of all persons in this
country. This should include, to the extent that the Court can
grant under its power, the right of extraditees in this country to
avail of the same or similar remedies that courts in the countries
of our treaty partners have accorded to their own extraditees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Following the emerging trend in
the United States, and guided by our own experience in combating
transnational crimes including international terrorism, the
Supreme Court should rule that our extradition courts may, after
the arrest of the extraditee, grant the extraditee bail if he

establishes that he does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and there is no other special circumstance that would
warrant denial of bail.—Thus, following the emerging trend in
the United States, and guided by our own experience in
combating transnational crimes including international terrorism,
the Court should rule that our extradition courts may, after the
arrest of the extraditee, grant the extraditee bail if he establishes
that he does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community,
and there is no other special circumstance that would warrant
denial of bail. The burden of proving he is entitled to bail rests on
the extraditee because by resisting the extradition to face a fair
643
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 643
trial abroad, the extraditee is presumed to be a flight risk. This is

why courts have consistently held that the presumption is against
bail in extradition cases.
Same; Same; Same; State Witnesses; Witness Protection
Program; Under the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act,
the Certificate of Admission is essential to the discharge of the
accused and his utilization as a state witness.—For the same
reason, Jimenez’s claim that he is a state witness in the plunder
case against ex-President Joseph Estrada, and that “his flight
would strip him of (the) immunity he is entitled to,” cannot be
given credence. Under the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefits Act, the Certificate of Admission is essential to the
discharge of the accused and his utilization as a state witness.
Without the Certificate of Admission, Jimenez is not entitled to
immunity under the Program. The Department of Justice will
issue the Certificate of Admission only if it is satisfied with the
proposed testimony of the witness as disclosed in his sworn
statement. Since until now the Department of Justice has not
issued a Certificate of Admission to Jimenez, it could mean that
the Department is either not satisfied with what Jimenez is
bargaining to testify against ex-President Joseph Estrada, or that
Jimenez may not be the least guilty. Unless Jimenez presents to
the extradition court the Certificate of Admission, and this he has
not done, Jimenez’s claim of beings state witness against ex-
President Estrada is baseless and self-serving.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mario Luza Bautista for Mark Jimenez.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees

entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their
arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled
to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the
answer to these two novel questions is “No.” The
explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions
to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
644

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court, seeking
1
to void and set aside
2
the Orders
dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued 3
by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first
assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand,
directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time
granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the
Order reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds

probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let
a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued.
Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the
reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at
ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in
cash.
“Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender
to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is likewise directed to 4include the name of the
respondent in its Hold Departure List.”
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail

Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of
Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No.

5
139465 entitled
Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 74.
2 Id., pp. 122-125.
3 Presided by Judge Guillermo G. Purganan.
4 Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125.
5 322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000; and 343 SCRA 377, October 17,
2000.
645
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 645

6
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
United States Government, through diplomatic channels,
sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597,
0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duty authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for
appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining
7
Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of
the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
before this Court in the said G.R. No. 139465. Initially, the
Court—by a vote of 9-6—dismissed the Petition. The SOJ
was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant
the latter a reasonable period 8within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by 9 the

SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By
an identical vote
_______________
6 Signed on November 13, 1994, and concurred in by the Philippine

Senate on November 29, 1995.
7 In Civil Case No. 99-94684.
8 The 40-page Decision (322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000) was penned
by Justice Jose A. R. Melo with the concurrence of Justices Josue N.
Bellosillo, Jose C. Vitug, Santiago M. Kapunan, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
Fidel P. Purisima, Arturo B. Buena, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and
Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. Dissenting were Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.;
and Justices Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Artemio V.
Panganiban, Bernardo P. Pardo and Minerva P. Reyes, with Justices Puno
and Panganiban writing separate Dissents.
9 Penned by Justice Puno and concurred in by Chief Justice Davide;
and Justices Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Reyes
and De Leon, Jr. Dissenting were Justices Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapu
646

of 9-6—after three justices changed their votes—it

reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that
private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the
United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition
Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that
Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-
00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title
18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of
Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation
of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001
and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of
Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title
18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of

Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent
Jimenez 10filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion,” which prayed that petitioner’s application for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the
Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5,
2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought
_______________
nan, Buena and Ynares-Santiago, with Justices Melo and Ynares-

Santiago writing separate Dissents (343 SCRA 377, October 17, 2000).
10 Annex “E” of the Petition.
647
VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 647

an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue,

he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
11
for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he
had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional 12
liberty via the
challenged Order dated13July 4, 2001.
Hence, this Petition.

Government of The U.S.A. V Purganan

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3/10/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 389

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 623

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Motions for

to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding certain

624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the other. With

proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings,

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 625

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

measure of international judicial assistance through which a

particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.

626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and

early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 627

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

Same; Same; Same; Proper Procedure in Extradition

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 629

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

tion case against their representative, including his detention

BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Opinion:

International Law; Extradition; Bail; It is settled that the

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 631

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

Same; Same; Same; There is neither logic nor persuasion to

deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

In our society—and even in the United States, I am sure—

PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:

International Law; Extradition; Due Process; While the

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 633

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

ment and of the private respondent have developed new

Satne; Same; Same; It is my humble submission that from the

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

The extraditing judge is not to act as a stamp pad but has to

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 635

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

mination of whether the accused was someone who should

1069) does not negate the right to bail of a potential extraditee.

636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

sources of international law can be maintained. Being signatories

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 637

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

able to every person under detention for the enjoyment of his

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

Same; Same; Same; After the warrant of arrest is issued, the

VOL. 389, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002 639

Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

the right to bail can be complied with. I put no blame on the

expose our country to international embarrassment. It will defeat