United States Court of Appeals For The Federal Circuit: Plaintiffs-Appellees, V

Case: 20-1812 Document: 24 Page: 1 Filed: 09/28/2020
No. 2020-1812
__________________________________________________________________
United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit
MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD., HITACHI MAXELL, LTD., nka
Maxell Holdings, Ltd., MAXELL, LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
LG ELECTRONICS INC., LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY, CASE NO. 2:15-CV-04431-SRC-CLW, JUDGE STANLEY R. CHESLER
__________________________________________________________________
LG ELECTRONICS INC. AND LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.’S

NONCONFIDENTIAL OPENING BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
Michael J. McKeon
Christian A. Chu
R. Andrew Schwentker
Michael J. Ballanco
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
1000 Maine Ave. SW, Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 783-5070
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counsel for LG Electronics Inc. and

LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.
U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180 Claim 14
14. A display unit for displaying an image based on video signals

inputted from an externally connected video source, comprising:
a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the video

signals sent by the externally connected video source;
a memory in which at least display unit information is stored,

said display unit information including an identification number for
identifying at least a type of said display unit and characteristic
information of said display unit; and
a communication controller capable of bi-directionally

communicating with said video source;
wherein said communication controller is capable of

communicating said display unit information other than said
characteristic information to said video source.
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics
U.S.A., Inc. certifies the following:
1. The full name of every party represented by me: LG Electronics Inc. and LG
Electronics U.S.A., Inc.
2. The name of every real party in interest represented by me, and not identified
in response to Question 3: LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A.,
Inc.
3. Parent corporations and publicly held companies that own 10% or more of the
stock in the party: LG Electronics Inc.: LG Corporation; LG Electronics
U.S.A., Inc.: LG Electronics Inc.
4. The names of all law firms and the partners and associates that appeared for
the party or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or agency or are
expected to appear for the party in this court (and who have not or will not
enter an appearance in this case) are:
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.: Ralph A. Philips; Scott A. Elengold*; Jared M.

Hartzman*; Ryan M. Teel*
WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP: Liza M. Walsh; Selina M. Ellis
MAYER BROWN LLP: Jamie B. Beaber; Michael W. Maas*; Hyunho Park*;
Lisa Ferri; William J. Barrow; Anita Y. Lam*
POTTER MINTON: Michael E. Jones; Allen F. Gardner*
CONNELL FOLEY LLP: Jennifer Critchley; Reade W. Seligmann*
* No longer with the firm
5. The title and number of any case known to counsel to be pending in this or
any other court or agency that will directly affect or be directly affected by
this court’s decision in the pending appeal are as follows: Mondis Tech. Ltd.
et al. v. LG Electronics Inc. et al., No. 2:15-CV-04431-SRC-CLW (D.N.J.)
(damages trial)
Dated: September 28, 2020 /s/ Michael J. McKeon

Michael J. McKeon
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST .................................................................................i
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................vi
I. STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES........................................................... 1
II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ................................................................ 1
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .................................................................... 2
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................... 3
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .............................................................. 4
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................. 7
VII. MERITS ARGUMENTS ................................................................................. 8
A. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found Written Description Support

for the ’180 Patent’s “Type” Limitation ............................................... 8
1. Background Relevant to Invalidity .............................................8
2. The Undisputed Evidence Shows that Claims 14 and 15 Fail to

Satisfy the Written Description Requirement ...........................13
The ’180 Patent Does Not Disclose the “Type” Limitation

........................................................................................14
The Experts Agreed the ’180 Patent Does Not Disclose the
“Type” Limitation...........................................................16
3. The District Court’s Post-Trial Denial of JMOL Is Not Supported

by the Record ............................................................................19
Dr. Stevenson’s Alleged Noninfringement-Related

Impeachment Cannot Create Written Description Support
........................................................................................19
Appellees’ Alternative Noninfringement-Related
ii
Argument Cannot Create Written Description Support .22
No Substantial Evidence Exists to Support the Jury’s

Verdict of No Invalidity .................................................24
B. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found that LG’s Televisions Included
the Claimed “Communication Controller”.......................................... 25
1. Background Relevant to Noninfringement ...............................25
The Accused Televisions and Standards ........................25
Appellees Failed to Present Evidence of a Communication

Controller at Trial ...........................................................26
2. A Jury Verdict Cannot Be Based on Speculation and Conjecture

...................................................................................................30
3. Lamm’s Reliance on Industry Standards Cannot Prove that the

“Communication Controller” Is Necessarily Present ...............32
4. Lamm’s Reliance on a Third Party Datasheet Is Insufficient to

Show the Claimed “Communication Controller” .....................34
As Lamm Admitted, the Datasheet Has Nothing to Do

with LG’s Televisions ....................................................35
The Microchip EEPROMs Cannot Be the Claimed

“Communication Controller” .........................................36
5. Appellees Cannot Rely on Improper or Unreasonable Inferences

...................................................................................................37
C. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found Willfulness.......................... 41
VIII. JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS ............................................................. 44
A. The Court Should Dismiss this Litigation for Lack of Standing ........ 44
1. Background Relevant to Standing ............................................44
The Relevant Agreements ..............................................44
Procedural Background ..................................................46
iii
APPELLEES’ CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL REDACTED
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Where No Plaintiff

Has Proper Standing .................................................................47
Each Plaintiff Must Have Both Constitutional and

Statutory Standing ..........................................................47
Atypical Patent Transfer Agreements May Leave No Party

with Standing ..................................................................48
3. Hitachi Cannot Be a Named Plaintiff Because It Lacks

Constitutional Standing to Sue LG ...........................................50
Maxell, Ltd. Lacks Standing...........................................50
Hitachi Lacks Constitutional Standing, Because It Lacks

an Exclusionary Right to[PSALA info.] Sue LG...............51
FRCP 19 and the Need to Cure Statutory Standing Cannot

Confer Constitutional Standing ......................................53
4. Without Hitachi, Mondis Lacks Statutory Standing .................55
Mondis Lacks Legal Title to the ’180 Patent .................55
Mondis Lacks All Substantial Rights and Cannot Sue

Alone...............................................................................56
5. This Case Should Be Dismissed Because No Single Plaintiff Has

Both Constitutional and Prudential Standing ...........................59
6. If the Court Rules that Hitachi Has Standing, It Should Enforce

the Statutory Limitation on Damages .......................................60
B. This Court Has Jurisdiction over this Appeal ..................................... 62
1. Background Relevant to Appellate Jurisdiction .......................63
2. This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction Under §1292(c)(2) ......64
3. LG’s Notice of Appeal Was Timely under FRAP 4(a)(4) ........64
FRAP 4(a)(4) Tolled the Time to Appeal while LG’s

Unresolved Post-Trial Motions Remained Pending .......64
iv
The District Court’s Partial Decision on Post-Trial

Motions Does Not Alter the Timeliness of LG’s Appeal
........................................................................................66
IX. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 69
ADDENDUM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Material Redacted from this Nonconfidential Opening Brief
As explained in LG’s Motion to Mark 235 Unique Words as Confidential in
Its Opening Brief (filed concurrently herewith), LG’s Confidential Opening Brief
contains 235 words marked confidential that relate to an agreement between
Appellee Mondis Technology Ltd. (“Mondis”) and Appellee Hitachi Maxell, Ltd.’s
predecessor-in-interest. That agreement was produced by Appellee Mondis and
designated by Mondis as “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” pursuant to a protective order in
the underlying district court action. Thus, while LG takes no position on the nature
of the information, out of an abundance of caution, it has marked the words
confidential in its Confidential Opening Brief and has redacted those same words in
this Nonconfidential Opening Brief. The redactions appear on pages iv, 6, 44-46,
51, 52, 54-59, 61, and 62 of this brief.
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec,
626 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 55
Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp.,

47 F.3d 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ......................................................................55, 57
Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v. Cochlear, Ltd.,

604 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ..............................................................56, 57, 59
Am. Humanist Ass’n, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

859 F. 3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2017) ......................................................................... 50
Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy,

29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994) .............................................................................. 50
Ariad Pharmas., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) ......................................................8, 24
Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc. v. Perrigo Co.,

761 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ...................................................31, 32, 37, 39
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

509 U.S. 209 (1993) ............................................................................................ 30
Brown v. Daniels,
290 F. App’x 467 (3d Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 60
Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,

636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................8, 16, 18
In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va.,

622 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2010) ............................................................................... 61
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works,
261 U.S. 24 (1923) ........................................................................................55, 59
vi
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

554 U.S. 724 (2008) ............................................................................................ 54
Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n,

655 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 58
DeVona v. Zeitels,
766 F. App’x 946 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..................................................................... 40
Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am.,

823 F.3d 615 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ......................................................................48, 55
Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC,

725 F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...............................................................31, 32
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,

637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980) ...................................................................37, 38, 39
Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co.,

2017 WL 3034655 (E.D. Tex. July 18, 2017) .................................................... 43
Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight Co.,

399 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .......................................................................... 47
Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc.,

630 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Del. 2007).................................................................... 49
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,

620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ....................................................................33, 34
Garvin v. City of Phila.,

354 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2003) ............................................................................... 60
Grocery Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA,

693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ......................................................................50, 60
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,

136 S.Ct. 1923 (2016) ...................................................................................41, 51
Havird Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co.,

149 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 1998) .............................................................................. 65
vii
Helpert v. Walsh,
759 F. App’x 199 (5th Cir. 2018) ....................................................................... 67
Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc.,

941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................................................................ 7, 8
Imperium IP Holds. (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,

757 F. App’x 974 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..................................................................... 33
Integra Lifescience I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,

496 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ....................................................................20, 21
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co.,

850 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 7
Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,

465 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................................................31, 32, 35, 39
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.,

560 U.S. 538 (2010) ............................................................................................ 60
Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp.,

925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ....................................................................47, 53
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) ......................................................................................52, 54
Morrow v. Microsoft Corp.,

499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ........................................................48, 49, 53, 59
Nelson v. Cty. of Allegheny,

60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995) .........................................................................60, 61
Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS,

723 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ....................................................................15, 16
Nuvo Pharm. (Ireland) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Inc.,
923 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......................................................................... 21
Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp.,

185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .......................................................................... 41
viii
Orr v. Plumb,
884 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2018) .............................................................................. 67
OSI Pharm., LLC v. Apotex Inc.,

939 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 8
Pa. Prison Society v. Cortés,

622 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2010) .........................................................................48, 52
Palm Beach Atl. College, Inc. v. First United Fund, Ltd.,

928 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1991) ................................................................4, 38, 65
Paradox Sec. Sys., Ltd. v ADT Sec. Servs, Inc.,

388 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ...............................................................35, 37
Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc.,

711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .......................................................................... 35
PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,

522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 14
Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co.,

222 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ................................................................7, 57, 59
Propat Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc.,

473 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ....................................................................58, 59
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc.,

230 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .......................................................................... 18
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133 (2000) ......................................................................................31, 33
Rivera v. ITC,
857 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 17
Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp.,

719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) .......................................................... 64
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,

418 U.S. 208 (1974) ............................................................................................ 54
ix
Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc.,

427 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................ 57
Spine Sols., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.,

620 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 50
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..............................................................37, 41, 42
Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc.,

619 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 47
Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc.,

665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 13
Sycamore IP Holds. LLC v. AT&T Corp.,

294 F. Supp. 3d 620 (E.D. Tex. 2018) ................................................................ 32
Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,

137 S.Ct. 1645 (2017) ...................................................................................47, 54
TQ Delta, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,

942 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .......................................................................... 31
Two-Way Media LLC v. AT&T, Inc.,

782 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .......................................................................... 67
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,

358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................ 16
Vulcan Eng’g Co. v. Fata Aluminium, Inc.,

278 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................................................................... 43
WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc.,

631 F.3d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ....................................................................51, 52
Willy v. Coastal Corp.,

503 U.S. 131 (1992) ............................................................................................ 53
Wisconsin Alumni Research Found. v. Apple Inc.,

905 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................7, 31, 40
x
Statutes
28 U.S.C. §1292(c)(2) ..........................................................................1, 6, 64, 66, 68
28 U.S.C. §1295 ....................................................................................................... 68
28 U.S.C. §1331 ......................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. §1338(a) .................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. §2072 ....................................................................................................... 53
28 U.S.C. §2107 ....................................................................................................... 65
35 U.S.C. §112, ¶1 ................................................................................................... 13
35 U.S.C. §281 ......................................................................................................... 47
35 U.S.C. §286 ...................................................................................................60, 62
Rules
Fed. R. App. P. 4 ...............................................................................................passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) ...........................................................................................61, 62
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ....................................................................................................... 7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 .........................................................................................60, 61, 62
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 .............................................................................46, 47, 53, 54, 60
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 ..................................................................................................... 53
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) ................................................................................6, 63, 65, 66
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)...........................................................................................66, 67
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 .........................................................................................63, 65, 66
Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 ..................................................................................................... 53
xi
I. STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
This appeal arises from proceedings in Mondis Tech. Ltd. et al. v. LG
Electronics Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 15-04431 (D.N.J.), which are final except
for a new trial that was granted solely on the issue of damages. There are no other
appeals from the proceedings below. This Court’s decision may affect the pending
damages proceedings in the underlying district court action.
Appellants LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (together
“LG”) and their undersigned counsel are unaware of any other actions pending in
this or any other court or agency that may directly affect or be directly affected by
this Court’s decision in the present appeal.
II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1338(a). This
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1292(c)(2). See Part VIII.B, infra.
1
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the District Court erroneously denied judgment as a matter of
law (“JMOL”) of invalidity based on lack of written description for the limitation
“identification number for identifying at least a type of said display unit” when, as
Appellees’ expert admitted, there is no express support for the limitation in the
specification and LG’s expert testimony on point stood unrebutted?
2. Whether the District Court erroneously denied JMOL of
noninfringement when Appellees presented no direct evidence that the accused
products satisfy the “communication controller” limitation and relied merely on
speculation?
3. Whether the District Court erroneously denied JMOL of no willfulness
when LG independently developed its accused televisions years before the patent-
in-suit issued?
4. Whether the District Court erred by not dismissing this case when no
plaintiff has both constitutional and statutory standing to sue, and by permitting
relation back to the original complaint?
5. Whether this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal filed within thirty
days of the District Court’s order disposing of the final post-trial motion?
2
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2014, Mondis sued LG in the Eastern District of Texas on five patents.
Appx1001-1024. After transfer to New Jersey, the case was stayed pending
reexamination. Appx1050-1069. After some claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180
(“the ’180 patent”) survived reexamination, the litigation proceeded on these
surviving claims. Appx1070-1121. As trial approached, Hitachi Maxell Ltd. and
Maxell Ltd. were joined as co-plaintiffs in early 2019 over LG’s objections.
Appx225, Appx227-233.
A jury trial took place on April 2-12, 2019, with the liability and remedy
phases tried before the same jury. On April 9, 2019, the jury found that LG infringed
two claims of the ’180 patent, and that these claims were not invalid. Appx274-275.
On April 12, 2019, the jury returned a verdict awarding $45 million in damages and
finding willful infringement. Appx295-296.
In two orders resolving post-trial motions, the District Court upheld the jury’s
findings on invalidity, noninfringement, and willfulness, but vacated the damages
award and ordered a new trial on damages. Appx297-329, Appx330-338. LG’s
notice of appeal followed shortly after the District Court resolved the last remaining
post-trial motion.
Per this Court’s directive, LG responds to Appellees’ challenge to appellate
jurisdiction in Section VIII, infra. For the Court’s convenience, that jurisdictional
3
section also addresses LG’s challenge to the District Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. LG separately presents its merits-related arguments in Section VII,
infra. Factual and procedural backgrounds relevant to each issue appear in the
corresponding Argument sections.
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The jury’s verdict against LG must be set aside, in full, for three independent
reasons.
First, the ’180 patent is invalid because there is no written description support
for the “type” limitation in the two asserted claims. This limitation fundamentally
differs from the specification’s description of identifying a specific display unit, not
a type of display unit. Appellees, who put on no written description rebuttal case,
could not muster any support in the specification for this limitation. Instead,
Appellees’ own expert admitted that the specification contains no express written
description for this limitation.
The District Court likewise did not identify written description support for
this limitation, as its order denying JMOL did not even cite the ’180 patent when
discussing written description. Instead, the District Court accepted Appellees’
incorrect argument that an alleged impeachment of LG’s expert during his
noninfringement testimony somehow negated his written description testimony. Not
4
only did the alleged impeachment not occur, but the cited testimony does not bear
on his invalidity testimony, which stood unrebutted. Without any basis in the patent,
the jury was not free to ignore the uncontroverted evidence of no written description.
The denial of invalidity JMOL must be reversed.
Second, substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding that the LG
televisions satisfy the “communication controller” limitation in both asserted claims.
Appellees could not, and did not, present any direct evidence showing that LG’s
televisions meet this limitation. Instead, Appellees relied on their expert’s
conclusory, and incorrect, testimony that a technology standard required a
communication controller. However, the relied-upon standard focuses on
communications protocols and is completely silent about any communication
controller hardware. While LG’s televisions implement the standard, they employ
a configuration that does not use a communication controller. Appellees also relied
on a third-party datasheet of a memory chip, even though their expert admitted he
did not know whether any LG television incorporated that chip. Appellees could
only present conclusory opinions built on mere speculation for this limitation. That
is not substantial evidence. The denial of noninfringement JMOL must be reversed.
The finding of willfulness must also be set aside, because LG developed its
accused televisions years before the ’180 patent issued. Thus, LG could not have
pirated Appellees’ purported invention, and thus lacked the willful intent necessary
5
for willful infringement. The denial of no willfulness JMOL must be reversed or
vacated as moot.
Third, this case must be dismissed for lack of standing. Appellees Hitachi
and Mondis created an incurable standing defect through their atypical contractual
arrangement regarding the ’180 patent. Mondis received a “hunting license” to
[PSALA info.] while Hitachi retains nearly all substantial patent rights. This
arrangement created a predicament where Mondis has constitutional—but not
statutory—standing, while Hitachi has statutory—but not constitutional—standing.
Thus, neither Hitachi nor Mondis has both constitutional and statutory standing.
Although unusual, past cases facing similar circumstances preclude jurisdiction
where no single plaintiff has proper standing.
Finally, contrary to Appellees’ motion to dismiss, this Court has jurisdiction
over this timely-filed appeal under §1292(c)(2). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”) tolled the deadline for filing a notice of appeal while several
post-trial motions, including a FRCP 50(b) JMOL motion, remained pending. LG
filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of the order disposing of the last
remaining post-trial motion. There is no exception to the FRCPs’ tolling provision
for patent appeals under §1292(c)(2). This appeal is properly before this Court.
6
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for JMOL or new trial under
regional circuit law. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found. (“WARF”) v. Apple Inc.,
905 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Applying Third Circuit law, this Court
“exercise[s] plenary review over a district court’s rulings on motions for JMOL,
applying the same standard as the district court.” Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis.
Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “A grant of JMOL is
appropriate where a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the
court finds that a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis to find for the party on that issue.” Id. at 1153-54.
“Whether a party has standing to sue is a question that this court reviews de
novo.” Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
This Court applies regional circuit law when reviewing a district court’s decision on
a jurisdictional motion to dismiss under FRCP 12, and the Third Circuit reviews
such decision de novo. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d
1315, 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
7
VII. MERITS ARGUMENTS
A. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found Written Description Support for

the ’180 Patent’s “Type” Limitation
There was insufficient evidence for the jury to find written description support
for the limitation “identification number for identifying at least a type of said display
unit” (“the ‘type’ limitation”) in the asserted claims. In denying JMOL, the District
Court did not even identify any support for this limitation in the specification.
Appx299-300. Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, this
deference is not limitless. See OSI Pharm., LLC v. Apotex Inc., 939 F.3d 1375, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Mere speculation is not substantial evidence.”). Under similar
situations where there was insufficient evidence to sustain a validity verdict, this
Court has reversed denials of written description JMOL. E.g., Ariad Pharmas., Inc.
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Idenix Pharm.
LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Centocor Ortho
Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2011). This Court
should do so here as well.
1. Background Relevant to Invalidity
The ’180 patent-in-suit generally discloses a system for controlling a specific
display unit (e.g., computer monitor) configured to receive video signals from an
external video source (e.g., computer). Appx339. Figure 1 depicts this system:
8
Appx344.
The display unit (“display device 6”)’s memory stores one or more
identification numbers. Appx345, Fig. 2. A computer may request control of a
newly-connected display unit by transmitting the computer’s individualized
identification number, which the display unit then compares to a stored list of known
identification numbers. Appx358, 5:38-42. If the computer’s identification number
matches a registered identification number in the display unit’s memory, that
computer can control various aspects of the display unit (e.g., position, brightness,
contrast). Id., 5:43-47. If there is no match, the computer cannot control the display
unit. Figure 3 depicts this operation:
9
Appx346, Fig. 3. Alternatively, the computer can store registered identification
numbers for specific display units, and gain control of the display unit by matching
the display unit’s identification number against its stored list. Appx358, 5:61-6:4.
In either case, each identifier is associated with a specific computer or a
specific display unit. That is, the patent consistently describes one identification
number for one device. For example, “the microcomputer 7 in the display device 6
waits for sending of the identification number assigned to the computer 1, that is,
the so-called ID number from the computer 1.”1 Id., 5:35-38. After this registration
process, “the computer 1 is allowed to control the display device 6[.]” Id., 5:43-44.
Similarly, for the alternative embodiment, “an ID number is sent to the computer 1
1
All emphases in this brief are added unless otherwise noted.
10
from the display device 6 so that the computer 1 identifies that the display
device 6 … is connected,” and “[b]y doing this, the computer 1 communicates with
a specific display device 6.” Id., 5:62-6:6.
This one-to-one relationship is consistent throughout the specification, except
in one embodiment which uses “a plurality of display devices.” Appx359, 7:12.
Even in this embodiment, “[e]ach of the display devices 6B, 6C, and 6D has … a
registered ID number.” Id., 7:18-20. Figure 5, depicting this embodiment, shows a
unique identification number for each display unit:
Appx348, Fig 5 (highlighting added); Appx359, 7:25-33.
As initially filed, claim 14 (then numbered 40) mirrored the specification’s
disclosure of a specific identifier by reciting “an identification number for
identifying said display unit.” Appx11044-11045; Appx15157 (Tr.615:22-616:11).
11
Fourteen years after the effective filing date, however, Appellees amended the claim
during prosecution by inserting the phrase “at least a type of” to overcome a prior
art rejection. Appx11055-11056; Appx11061-11062. After this amendment, the
limitation reads “an identification number for identifying at least a type of said
display unit.” Appx11055-11056; Appx15107 (Tr.417:13-23); Appx15147
(Tr.576:1-577:3); Appx15157 (Tr.616:12-21). Appellees thus changed the nature of
the claim’s identification number from one identifying a specific display unit to one
identifying a class or “type” of display unit. Appx1155 (Appellees admitting that
the 2007 “amendment expressly changed the function of the ID number from one
that identifies the display unit to one that identifies the type of the display unit”
(underlining in original)).
At trial, Appellees asserted claim 14 and dependent claim 15. Claim 14 is
representative:
14. A display unit for displaying an image based on video signals

inputted from an externally connected video source, comprising:
a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the video

signals sent by the externally connected video source;
a memory in which at least display unit information is stored,

said display unit information including an identification number for
identifying at least a type of said display unit and characteristic
information of said display unit; and

communicating with said video source;
12
wherein said communication controller is capable of

communicating said display unit information other than said
Appx361.
LG challenged the claims’ validity for lack of written description for the
“type” limitation. Although Appellees did not put on a rebuttal, the jury found in
their favor. Appx274. After trial, LG moved for JMOL of invalidity. Appx298.
Relying on the presumption of validity, the District Court denied the motion without
identifying support for the “type” limitation in the specification. Appx298-301.
Instead, the District Court relied on the purported impeachment of LG’s expert, even
though no such impeachment occurred and the cited testimony was unrelated to
invalidity. Appx300.
2. The Undisputed Evidence Shows that Claims 14 and 15 Fail to

Satisfy the Written Description Requirement
Section 112 provides that a patent specification “shall contain a written
description of the invention[.]” 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶1 (pre-AIA). The key written
description inquiry “is whether the disclosure conveys to those skilled in the art that
the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”
Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This test requires an objective inquiry
into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary
skill in the art.” Id. The inquiry focuses strictly on possession, “not whether a
13
claimed invention is an obvious variant of that which is disclosed in the
specification.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed.
Cir. 2008). Under this framework, it is indisputable that the ’180 patent lacks
support for the “type” limitation.
The ’180 Patent Does Not Disclose the “Type” Limitation
The specification does not describe the “type” limitation recited in claims 14
and 15. Rather than describing a class of display units, the specification describes a
different invention in which the identification number identifies a specific display
unit.
The specification, as described above, is clear: the ’180 patent’s disclosed
embodiments associate specific computer(s) with specific display device(s). That
is, “an identification number is set to each device.” Appx360, 10:28; see also
Appx358, 6:5-6 (“[C]omputer 1 communicates with a specific display device 6[.]”).
This specific identification number is what facilitates communication in the
disclosed system. Appx360, 10:28; Appx358, 5:36-38 (“[D]isplay device 6 waits
for sending of the identification number assigned to the computer 1, that is, the so-
called ID number from the computer 1.”). Appellees’ own expert confirmed this
operation, by admitting the computer performs this comparison of “that particular
number against a list that it has to check to see if it can talk to this particular display
unit.” Appx15098 (Tr.382:22-383:1).
14
Although the specification discloses the use of an identification number to
identify a specific display unit (as originally claimed), there is no disclosure of an
identification number for identifying a type of display unit anywhere in the patent.
See generally Appx339-368.
This difference is fundamental. Appellees successfully relied on this
distinction during prosecution to overcome the prior art by changing “identifying
said display unit” to “identifying at least a type of said display unit.” Appx11044-
11045; Appx11055-11056; Appx11061-11062; Appx11202; Appx15107
(Tr.417:13-23); Appx15147 (Tr.576:1-577:3); Appx15157 (Tr.615:22-616:21).
Yet, in making this amendment, Appellees did not cite any specification support.
Appx11061-11062; Appx11202. Nor could they have, as no support exists in the
’180 patent for the “type” limitation.
Under these facts and controlling precedent, the jury’s written description
verdict cannot stand. For example, in Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition
Biosciences APS, the patent included a claim targeting defendant DuPont’s novel
enzyme variant. 723 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Although the Novozymes
claim’s three limitations could separately “be found at points within the underlying
2000 application,” the patentee “never presented them together in any particular
embodiment.” Id. at 1341-42. Affirming the JMOL of no written description, this
Court reasoned that by “[t]aking the claims as a whole rather than as the sum of their
15
individual limitations, nothing in the 2000 application indicates that Novozymes
then possessed what it now claims,” because the original application “contains no
disclosure of any variant that actually satisfies the claims.” Id. at 1346, 1348.
Likewise here, Appellees’ 2007 amendment significantly changed the claim’s
focus and scope, without support in the patent specification. Appx15146-15147
(Tr.572:12-574:20). Worse than the Novozymes patent which had disparate support
for each individual limitation, there is no support for the “type” limitation anywhere
in the ’180 patent. See generally Appx339-368; Appx15107-15108 (Tr.417:24-
418:15); Appx15157 (Tr.616:24-617:10).
The utter lack of support for the “type” limitation compels entry of judgment
in LG’s favor. “[A] patent can be held invalid for failure to meet the written
description requirement, based solely on the language of the patent specification …
[as] it is in the patent specification where the written description requirement must
be met.” Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 927 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Centocor, 636 F.3d at 1347 (“A patent also can be held invalid for failure to
meet the written description requirement based solely on the face of the patent
specification.”); Novozymes, 723 F.3d at 1350.
The Experts Agreed the ’180 Patent Does Not Disclose the
“Type” Limitation
Appellees’ expert, Joseph Lamm (“Lamm”), admitted that the ’180 patent’s
written description fails to expressly disclose the asserted claims’ “type” limitation:
16
Q. And you agree that the specification of the ’180 patent does not
expressly recite an identification number for identifying a type
of display unit. Correct?
A. Yes.
Appx15107-15108 (Tr.417:24-418:2); see also Appx15108 (Tr.418:10-15).
Further, Lamm never, at any point during trial, testified that a skilled artisan would
have found any support for this limitation in the patent. This alone should be
dispositive. See Rivera v. ITC, 857 F.3d 1315, 1319-22 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming
lack of written description where patentee’s expert “agreed that ‘the patent is silent
on” claimed configuration).
LG’s expert, Dr. Robert Stevenson (“Stevenson”), also testified that the ’180
patent nowhere discloses an identification number to identify a type of display unit.
Appx15157 (Tr.616:24-617:10); see also Appx15146 (Tr.570:24-571:1). Stevenson
explained that, when Appellees amended claim 14, they changed the claimed
function of the identification number from uniquely identifying an “exact monitor”
to identifying “a particular type of a computer monitor.” Appx15157 (Tr.616:12-
21); see also Appx1155. This change was consequential because “it’s a different
idea” that is “not expressed anywhere in the patent.” Appx15157 (Tr.614:5-
616:23); see also Appx15158 (Tr.618:15-23). The idea of the identification number
identifying a type of display unit “doesn’t show up until someone wrote that claim
in 2007.” Appx15158 (Tr.618:24-25). Because of this lack of disclosure, Stevenson
17
concluded that the asserted claims are “invalid because of this lack of written
description.” Appx15158 (Tr.619:4-15). Given the lack of specification support, it
is unsurprising that Appellees did not present a rebuttal case. Consequently, no
witness, including Lamm, testified that the written description requirement is
satisfied. Thus, Stevenson’s testimony stood unrebutted.
Although a patent does not need to recite the claimed subject matter verbatim,
it must convey possession with reasonable clarity to a skilled artisan. See Purdue
Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2000). That
showing was not possible here, because Lamm admitted there is no express support
for the “type” limitation and failed to rebut LG’s evidence of no written description
support. There was simply no evidence the jury could have relied upon to establish
the legally-required possession.
The lack of rebuttal written description testimony makes this case even
weaker than Centocor, where the patentee also “presented no expert testimony on
written description at trial and chose to rest on the [asserted] patent specification[.]”
636 F.3d at 1348-49. The Centocor patentee at least provided some written
description testimony from the patent’s inventor. Here, in contrast, Appellees have
no evidence that a skilled artisan would find written description support in the ’180
patent. As Centocor dictates, the denial of JMOL of invalidity must be reversed. Id.
at 1353.
18
3. The District Court’s Post-Trial Denial of JMOL Is Not Supported

by the Record
Unable to point to any evidence that a skilled artisan would find specification
support for the “type” limitation, Appellees’ post-trial briefing advanced two main
arguments to avoid invalidity: (1) Stevenson had been impeached during his non-
infringement testimony; and (2) “serial numbers,” a term the ’180 patent never uses,
provide written description support. The District Court accepted Appellees’ first
argument without commenting on the second. Appx300. Like Appellees, the
District Court did not identify specification support for the “type” limitation.
Appx298-301. These arguments cannot avoid invalidity or JMOL.
Dr. Stevenson’s Alleged Noninfringement-Related

Impeachment Cannot Create Written Description Support
The order denying JMOL of invalidity relies on Appellees’ flawed argument
that Stevenson was impeached during his testimony on noninfringement. Appx300.
This purported impeachment did not occur and, importantly, does not impact his
unrebutted written description testimony.
Specifically, during Appellees’ cross-examination regarding Stevenson’s
noninfringement testimony that LG’s televisions do not meet the “type” limitation,
id.; Appx15136 (Tr.533:12-14), Stevenson acknowledged that the accused
televisions include red-green-blue (“RGB”) data bits that an accused technical
standard characterizes as a “display type.” Appx15169 (Tr.665:10-17).
19
This was not an impeaching statement. Stevenson never denied that these
RGB bits exist, and his testimony regarding these bits never changed. Instead,
Stevenson consistently opined that, despite the accused standard’s “display type”
nomenclature, the RGB bits are “characteristic information,” rather than the claimed
“identification number” which the patent distinguishes from characteristic
information. Appx15148 (Tr.579:1-581:1); Appx15149 (Tr.585:11-18);
Appx15153 (Tr.599:2-5); Appx15153-15154 (Tr.601:10-605:11); Appx15155
(Tr.606:8-18); Appx361, Claim 14 (claiming each separately). Moreover,
immediately after providing the cited testimony, Stevenson emphasized that the
presence of these RGB bits was “[d]efinitely not” enough to establish infringement.
Appx15169 (Tr.665:18-20). The alleged impeaching statements on which the
District Court relied did not involve any actual contradiction or inconsistency that
could qualify as impeachment. The District Court’s sole basis for denying JMOL is
thus flawed.
Regardless, these alleged impeachments do not affect Stevenson’s invalidity
testimony, because they all relate to noninfringement. In determining whether a
jury had a reasonable basis, the law asks whether the testimony specific to an issue
was controverted and impeached, which did not happen here. Integra Lifescience I,
Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007), illustrates this principle. When
patentee Integra questioned the credibility of three experts, this Court focused on the
20
testimony about the issue at hand, and disregarded the “cross-examination of these
witnesses [that] was directed to general issues[.]” Id. at 1344. This Court also
rejected Integra’s attack on the credibility of a fourth expert for “chang[ing] his
position,” because “this criticism was not directed to the validity of the information
obtained.” Id. at 1346. And this Court rebuffed Integra’s challenge to a fifth expert
for misunderstanding the certification process, as the Court “cannot discern an
impeachment of credibility” and the “scientific bases of the experiments performed
and the information they produced was not challenged by any contrary witness.” Id.
Under Integra, because the alleged impeachment testimony does not relate to
the written description requirement or the patent’s actual disclosure, Appellees
cannot misuse them to salvage their claims’ validity. Id.; see also Nuvo Pharm.
(Ireland) Designated Activity Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Inc., 923 F.3d 1368, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding no written description where cited “testimony is irrelevant
to the written description inquiry, because it does not point to any disclosure in the
specification to which the testimony could relate”). Under Integra, the jury cannot
ignore Stevenson’s uncontradicted and unimpeached expert testimony on written
description, even if his testimony on noninfringement was allegedly contradicted or
impeached.
21
Appellees’ Alternative Noninfringement-Related Argument

Cannot Create Written Description Support
Although not addressed by the District Court, Appellees also argued that
Stevenson’s testimony on “serial numbers”—a term never used in the ’180 patent—
somehow provides written description support for the limitation. Specifically,
Appellees cited Stevenson’s testimony that “serial numbers” (1) could be used to
“identify a particular display unit,” Appx15146 (Tr.570:18-571:13), and
(2) hypothetically could be a “type ID,” Appx15170 (Tr.667:6-12). Neither of these
infringement-related statements about the standard implemented in LG’s televisions
addresses whether a skilled artisan would find support in the specification for the
“type” limitation, especially since Appellees’ argument misrepresented and took
Stevenson’s testimony out of context.
In the first cited passage, Stevenson discussed—with respect to
noninfringement—whether the accused “EDID” data format standard described
anything like the unique identification number disclosed in the specification and
original claims. Appx15146 (Tr.571:4-13) (“So everything is supposed to have a
unique serial number, and so that’s a number that could be uniquely used to identify
a particular display unit.”); Appx15146 (Tr.570:18-571:13). On its face, this
testimony does not relate to the claimed identification number for a “type of said
display unit,” which is the relevant written description inquiry. Appx15146
(Tr.572:12-14) (emphasizing that serial number does not “correspond[] to what is
22
actually claimed by Claim 14”).
Appellees also twisted the second cited passage of Stevenson’s testimony on
noninfringement. Appx15169-15170 (Tr.664:8-667:12). Addressing a testing
report for LG televisions, Stevenson explained that a serial number could
hypothetically be an identification number for identifying a type of display unit.
Appx15170 (Tr.667:6-12) (“Q. And you had told me before that a serial number
would be a type ID, right? A. It could be.”). But as Stevenson further underscored,
“no one has made that allegation” for infringement, i.e., “that an ID serial number
would be an identification number for identifying a type of display unit.”
Appx15173-15174 (Tr.681:24-682:11). No one made such allegations because, as
Stevenson elaborated, it would require hypothetically mapping the serial number
onto the model number to see if the serial number could be used to “figure out the
model number.” Id. No such mapping or correspondence between model number
and serial number is ever disclosed or suggested in the ’180 patent. See generally
Appx339-368. Nor is there anything in the patent describing a serial number that
identifies any type of display unit. Id.
Thus, Stevenson’s noninfringement-related testimony about a serial number
is irrelevant to written description, and it is unsurprising that the District Court did
not even mention Appellees’ argument. Appx298-301.
23
No Substantial Evidence Exists to Support the Jury’s Verdict

of No Invalidity
The District Court reasoned that the jury could find that LG did not establish
invalidity despite Appellees’ lack of rebuttal testimony on written description.
Appx300-301. But the District Court’s opinion did not identify any evidence on
which the jury could make this finding.
To satisfy the written description requirement, there must be support in the
specification for the challenged limitation upon which the jury may rely. See Ariad,
598 F.3d at 1351 (requiring “objective inquiry into the four corners of the
specification”). No reasonable jury performing this objective inquiry into the four
corners of the ’180 patent could have found written description support for the “type”
limitation. Indeed, this Court has reversed denial of written description JMOL in
cases where it found just a “thin thread of support” for a challenged limitation in the
specification. Id. at 1358. Here, there is no support, and the District Court identified
none in upholding the verdict.
Ultimately, all trial evidence on this issue—including the patent itself,
Lamm’s admission that the patent fails to disclose the relevant limitation, and
Stevenson’s uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony of inadequate written
description—points to the inescapable conclusion that the ’180 patent fails to satisfy
the written description requirement for the “type” limitation. The Court should
reverse the denial of JMOL on written description.
24
B. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found that LG’s Televisions Included

the Claimed “Communication Controller”
The asserted claims require “a communication controller capable of bi-
directionally communicating with said video source.” Appx361, 11:51-52.
Although relying solely on literal infringement, Appellees did not present any direct
evidence that LG’s televisions contain any communication controller. They instead
asserted that a communication controller must be in the televisions based on (i) a
standard that does not require communication controllers and (ii) a datasheet for a
particular memory chip that is not in any LG televisions. Undeterred, Appellees’
expert speculated that LG’s televisions must have a communication controller even
though he could not locate one. This is not substantial evidence. The infringement
verdict must be reversed.
1. Background Relevant to Noninfringement
The Accused Televisions and Standards
Appellees accused 630 LG televisions of infringement. Appx15080
(Tr.308:3-4). Like most modern televisions, LG’s televisions have HDMI ports,
which comply with the HDMI standard. Appx15068 (Tr.260:12-261:2); Appx15070
(Tr.269:4-5), Appx15081 (Tr.314:21-23); Appx15076 (Tr.293:23-294:2). These
HDMI ports allow the televisions to connect with video sources like DVD/Blu-Ray
players. Appx10696. Some LG televisions also have VGA ports, which comply
25
with the Video Electronics Standards Association’s (“VESA”) “‘Plug & Play’ (PnP)
Standard for the Display/Graphics Subsystem.” Appx15067 (Tr.258:21-259:4);
Appx15080 (Tr.309:2-10); Appx15081 (Tr.314:19-20); Appx15084 (Tr.325:2-6);
Appx15144 (Tr.565:10-16). These VGA ports can connect televisions to personal
computers. Appx10701.
The HDMI and PnP standards both require compliance with a subsidiary
VESA standard called Enhanced Display Data Channel (“E-DDC”). Appx12427-
12460; Appx15077 (Tr.296:13-19); Appx15079 (Tr.306:5-7); Appx15141
(Tr.550:21-551:2, 553:8-18). The E-DDC standard describes a bi-directional
communications protocol called “DDC2B,” which can be used to transmit a
television’s “EDID” data to a connected video source. Appx12435; Appx15088-
15089 (Tr.343:6-344:11). The DDC2B protocol relies on the “I2C” communications
protocol from the 1980s. Appx15089 (Tr.344:12-345:8); Appx12435.
Appellees Failed to Present Evidence of a Communication

Controller at Trial
In discovery, LG produced over 180,000 pages of technical documents and
provided a key engineer for deposition. Appx15210 (Tr.814:15-25). Despite this
wealth of technical information, Appellees did not present any direct evidence that
LG’s televisions contain the claimed communication controller. Instead, they
attempted to build their case on the VESA E-DDC standard and on a third-party
datasheet.
26
Because Lamm lacked evidence that LG’s televisions actually have a
communication controller, he conclusorily asserted “that a bidirectional
communication controller is necessarily present in all the accused products” because
the televisions must comply with the E-DDC standard’s “protocol functions, and that
requires a communications controller and it’s clearly bidirectional.” Appx15091
(Tr.354:6-22); see also Appx15088-15091 (Tr.342:16-354:22).
Worse yet, Lamm simply drew his own “comm. controller” box into the LG
televisions’ memory or “EEPROMs,” where he speculated that a communication
controller should be, as shown in his demonstrative below:
Appx1397.
27
While predominantly relying on the E-DDC standard, Lamm also tried to
buttress that testimony with an EEPROM datasheet/specification from a third-party
company called Microchip Technology, Inc. (“Microchip”). Appx15092
(Tr.356:11-359:3); Appx15121 (Tr.472:24-473:22); Appx12493-12508. According
to Lamm, the “I/O Control Logic” block in the Microchip datasheet (which was not
produced by LG) was supposedly a “communication controller.”
Appx12493 (highlighting added); Appx15122 (Tr.476:5-20).
28
But Lamm conceded on cross-examination that he did not know whether LG’s
televisions used a Microchip device or whether the Microchip datasheet
corresponded to anything in LG’s televisions:
Q. Okay. But you don’t know whether LG Electronics’ televisions,

in fact, use anything from this company called Microchip
Technology, Inc. Isn’t that right?
A. That’s correct.
….
Q. And you don’t know, sitting here on the stand in front of this
jury, whether LG Electronics has this chip, this memory, inside
of its television. Is that right? You don’t know?
A. I do not know.
Appx15122 (Tr.474:8-475:2).
Appellees’ lack of evidence is no accident. LG’s televisions do not have a
communication controller because they implement the standards by incorporating a
slave, bare interface responsive to an external video source’s instructions.
Appx15155-15156 (Tr.609:1-612:5). As Stevenson explained, the EEPROM
memory chips in LG’s televisions cannot be the bidirectional communication
controller because the EEPROM chips “in no way can control the flow of
information out of the television,” and instead provide “a bare interface … to the
memory” that “in no way can control any communications.” Appx15155-15156
(Tr.609:14-610:5). In other words, the bare interface in LG’s televisions cannot
control communications; it merely responds to communications sent to it by a
separate external device connected to it. Appx15156 (Tr.611:18-24). As a result,
29
“[t]here is … nothing in the accused televisions in these components that can act as
an I2C master that can control the communications,” and thus no “communication
controller.” Appx15156 (Tr.612:3-10).
LG moved for noninfringement JMOL. While agreeing “that Mondis offered
no direct evidence that the accused televisions contain [a communication
controller],” the District Court held that, based on “circumstantial evidence,” the
jury could have drawn an “inference that the accused televisions contain a
communications controller.” Appx301-303. According to the District Court,
“Lamm stated that, for an LG television to communicate the EDID data to the video
source as required by the [E-DDC’s] DDC2B protocol, it must have a
communications controller to perform six functions that enable the communication.”
Appx302. The District Court thus concluded that the jury could have believed
Lamm’s assertions that a communication controller is “necessarily present.”
Appx302 (quoting Appx15091 (Tr.354:6-23)).
2. A Jury Verdict Cannot Be Based on Speculation and Conjecture
“When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in
the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render
the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury’s verdict.” Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993). Further, a “court
should give credence to the evidence … supporting the moving party that is
30
uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from
disinterested witnesses.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
151 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As this Court has remarked, “[a]lthough a jury is entitled to draw reasonable
inferences from circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences themselves must be
more than speculation and conjecture.” Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc. v. Perrigo
Co., 761 F. App’x 995, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “[A] party cannot
rest on ‘conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, [or] unsupported
speculation[.]’” Id. “Conclusory expert testimony does not qualify as substantial
evidence.” TQ Delta, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Where an expert offers conclusory testimony on infringement, JMOL is
appropriate. Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
An expert “just saying that something is so does not make it true, especially when
there is no record support and, in fact, the [evidence] indicates otherwise.”
Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725 F. App’x 980, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
This Court has often reversed a denial of noninfringement JMOL where there
was insufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict of infringement. E.g., WARF, 905
F.3d at 1347-50; Dominion, 725 F. App’x at 987. It should do so here as well.
31
3. Lamm’s Reliance on Industry Standards Cannot Prove that the

“Communication Controller” Is Necessarily Present
Lamm asserted that the E-DDC standard necessarily requires a
communication controller. E.g., Appx15091 (Tr.354:6-22). This assertion is
flawed.
Lamm’s conclusory assertion cannot, alone, support the jury verdict. See Kim,
465 F.3d at 1320. To be legally sufficient, Lamm had to support his testimony with
corroborating evidence. See id. (criticizing expert who “did not support this
determination with any examinations or tests of the actual accused products”);
Brigham, 761 F. App’x at 1005 (rejecting “uncorroborated, conclusory, and
interested” testimony of expert/inventor as insufficient to “sustain the jury verdict”);
Dominion, 725 F. App’x at 986-87 (rejecting expert’s “conclusory testimony”
having “no record support”).
There was no corroboration here. Nowhere in the E-DDC standard’s 34-page
specification does the phrase “communication controller” appear. See generally
Appx12427-12460. Nor is there any requirement for a communication controller in
the standard, which is why Lamm could not point to any. Appx15088-15091
(Tr.342:16-354:22). Because the E-DDC specification does not require a
communication controller, no reasonable jury could conclude that practicing the E-
DDC standard would necessarily infringe this limitation. Sycamore IP Holds. LLC
v. AT&T Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 620, 642-44 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (Bryson, C.J., sitting
32
by designation), aff’d, 773 F. App’x 624 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Fujitsu Ltd. v.
Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
The E-DDC standard’s silence about a communication controller is
unsurprising, because the standard focuses on communications protocols like
DDC2B and I2C for data transmission. Appx15088-15089 (Tr.343:6-345:8);
Appx12427-12460. As such, the E-DDC standard does not address, much less
dictate, the hardware to implement these protocols. See generally Appx12427-
12460. With the hardware implementation left to the manufacturer’s discretion,
devices can—and do—comply with the standard and implement these protocols
without a communication controller. Notably, LG’s televisions implement the
standard by incorporating a bare interface responsive to an external video source’s
instructions. Appx15155-15156 (Tr.609:1-612:5). Lamm, however, testified that
the claimed “communication controller” cannot be just a “bare interface.”
Appx15121 (Tr.470:20-23).
This uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony about the bare interface—
something that the jury was not free to ignore—devastates Lamm’s assertion that a
communication controller is necessarily present in any E-DDC-compliant device.
See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (“[A] court should give credence to the evidence …
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached.”); Imperium
IP Holds. (Cayman), Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 757 F. App’x 974, 978-80
33
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (reversing JMOL denial where defendant’s expert offered
uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony).
And given the E-DDC standard’s lack of specificity about the implementing
hardware, precedent precludes any reliance on this standard to satisfy the
“communication controller” limitation. As this Court cautioned, “in many instances,
an industry standard does not provide the level of specificity required to establish
that practicing that standard would always result in infringement.” Fujitsu, 620 F.3d
at 1327. When the standard is not suitably specific, “it is not sufficient for the patent
owner to establish infringement by arguing that the product admittedly practices the
standard, therefore it infringes.” Id. at 1328; see also id. (ruling that only when a
patent covers “every possible implementation of a standard” will it be “enough to
prove infringement by showing standard compliance”). Such caution is particularly
apt here, where the E-DDC standard lacks the requisite specificity because it never
mentions, describes, or discloses a communication controller. Fujitsu therefore
precludes Appellees from taking the standards-based shortcut that they presented to
the jury.
4. Lamm’s Reliance on a Third Party Datasheet Is Insufficient to

Show the Claimed “Communication Controller”
The Microchip datasheet is likewise legally insufficient to sustain the verdict
because it is irrelevant to LG’s televisions, as evidenced by the District Court’s
silence about it when addressing LG’s JMOL motion. Appx301-303.
34
As Lamm Admitted, the Datasheet Has Nothing to Do with

LG’s Televisions
As Lamm conceded, the Microchip datasheet is “a specification that LG had
nothing to do with putting together” and is “[n]ot an LG document.” Appx15122
(Tr.474:18-22). Worse yet, although Lamm used this datasheet to suggest “what
was inside LG’s televisions,” he admitted that he did not perform a “search of the
[LG] products to see whose [EEPROM] manufacturer they used,” and conceded that
he did not know “whether LG Electronics has this chip, this memory, inside of its
television.” Appx15121-15122 (Tr.473:19-474:3, 474:23-475:2). His testimony
about the lack of connection between the datasheet and LG’s televisions speaks for
itself. Appx15122 (Tr.474:8-11, 474:15-475:2). He could only say that this
Microchip EEPROM is “a compatible memory,” even though compatibility is
irrelevant to whether a Microchip EEPROM is present in LG’s televisions.
Appx15121-15122 (Tr.473:23-474:3). Hence, his opinion based on the Microchip
datasheet was speculative and unreliable. Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Where the expert’s “statements were entirely conclusory” and where he
“pointed to no structure [in the accused products] that were admitted into evidence”
to meet the limitation, no reasonable jury could have found that the limitation was
met. Paradox Sec. Sys., Ltd. v ADT Sec. Servs, Inc., 388 F. App’x 976, 981-82 (Fed.
Cir. 2010); see also Kim, 465 F.3d at 1320.
35
The Microchip EEPROMs Cannot Be the Claimed

“Communication Controller”
Not only is there no evidence of a Microchip EEPROM in LG’s televisions,
but there is also no evidence that the “I/O control logic block”—which is Lamm’s
alleged “communication controller,” Appx15122 (Tr.476:5-20)—in the Microchip
datasheet even meets this term’s ordinary meaning.
The District Court gave “communication controller” its ordinary meaning,
which Lamm testified requires (i) “circuitry that elevates it beyond … a bare
interface,” Appx15121 (Tr.470:20-23); (ii) “address parsing capability,”
Appx15121 (Tr.470:24-471:2); and (iii) “basic controlling functions to control the
flow of messages between the display unit and the computer,” Appx15120
(Tr.468:15-23). But Lamm never testified that the “I/O control logic block” had
these attributes.
First, there is no evidence that the Microchip I/O control logic block includes
Lamm’s required “circuitry that elevates it beyond … a bare interface.” Appx15121-
15122 (Tr.470:20-23, 473:23-474:3). Instead, Lamm testified to the contrary.
Appx15121 (Tr.472:1-5) (testifying that EEPROM has “an interface”); Appx15155
(Tr.608:22-25).
Second, there is no evidence that the Microchip I/O control logic block
performs address parsing and decoding. In fact, Lamm mentioned “parse”/“parsing”
only twice, with neither instance occurring in connection with this Microchip block.
36
Appx15091 (Tr.354:1-2); Appx15121 (Tr.470:24-471:2). Likewise, Lamm only
mentioned “decode”/“decoding” three times, with no mention of these words in
connection with this Microchip block. Appx15072 (Tr.278:22-23); Appx15091
(Tr.354:1-2); Appx15112 (Tr.437:25).
Third, there is no evidence that the Microchip I/O control logic block can
control the transmission of data or the flow of messages between televisions and
video sources. Lamm did not even discuss such control during his testimony.
Appx15088-15092 (Tr.342:16-359:21), Appx15124-15125 (Tr.482:1-486:15).
Each of these failures alone mandates JMOL of noninfringement. See
Paradox, 388 F. App’x at 981-82 (affirming JMOL where expert failed to identify
any infringing structure).
5. Appellees Cannot Rely on Improper or Unreasonable Inferences
Appellees cannot argue that the jury drew proper inferences that LG’s
televisions have the claimed “communication controller.” A jury can only draw
reasonable inferences, and cannot speculate. Brigham, 761 F. App’x at 1004-05;
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 116 (3d Cir. 1980).
As relevant Third Circuit precedent explains, “[i]nferred factual conclusions
based on circumstantial evidence are permitted only when, and to the extent that,
human experience indicates a probability that certain consequences can and do
follow from the basic circumstantial facts.” Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 116; SRI Int’l, Inc.
37
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 930 F.3d 1295, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (applying regional circuit
procedural law in reviewing JMOL rulings). If the Court “decides that no reasonable
person could reach the suggested conclusion on the basis of the hard evidence
without resorting to guesswork or conjecture[,]” permitting “a jury to draw an
inference of the ultimate fact under these circumstances is to substitute the
experience of logical probability for what the courts describe as ‘mere speculation.’”
Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 116. Under Sweeney, a reasonable jury cannot draw the
necessary inferences from the evidence at trial here.
First, the jury cannot make a giant leap to infer that a communication
controller is necessarily present in LG’s televisions based on the E-DDC standard,
when this standard does not require specific hardware implementation and does not
disclose or require a communication controller. See Part VII.B.3, supra. There is,
in fact, ample evidence that LG’s televisions operate with a bare interface instead of
the claimed communication controller. There is also no “logical probability” as
required by Sweeney, because it is not probable to find a communication controller
when the underlying evidence—the E-DDC standard—does not mention or require
such a controller. Nor does it arise from any “shared experience in human
endeavors” or “factual conclusions from circumstantial evidence in daily life,”
Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 116, since lay jurors do not deal with this industry standard in
their daily life. The only way to make this giant leap is improper speculation and
38
conjecture. See id.; Brigham, 761 F. App’x at 1003-05 (affirming JMOL of no literal
infringement where “only speculation” supported jury verdict).
Second, there is a wide logical chasm between the Microchip datasheet and
finding a communication controller in LG’s televisions. As Lamm conceded, this
Microchip datasheet is not an LG document and does not correspond to any chip in
the LG televisions. See Part VII.B.4.a, supra. Given his admission that there is a
myriad of memory manufacturers, Appx15091-15092 (Tr.355:22-356:6), no
reasonable jury could find that it was probable for the televisions to have memories
supplied by Microchip. Nor do lay jurors encounter this technical information in
their daily life. Only guesses could lead them to find a communication controller in
LG’s products.
Third, no reasonable jury can infer that a Microchip EEPROM, if one could
even be found in LG’s televisions, could satisfy Lamm’s ordinary meaning of
“communication controller” by having circuitry beyond a bare interface, performing
address parsing and decoding, and controlling data transmission and message flow.
Lamm never provided any testimony linking the Microchip EEPROM to these
requirements. See Part VII.B.4.b, supra.
Fourth, each of these bases cannot together support a reasonable inference
that LG’s televisions have the claimed “communication controller.” Kim, 465 F.3d
at 1320. Otherwise, it would be speculation built upon guesses.
39
Finally, a reasonable jury could not infer the presence of a communication
controller from Stevenson’s testimony. During trial, Appellees cross-examined him
about out-of-context statements from his invalidity report regarding the prior art I2C
specification. Appx15172-15173 (Tr.674:3-678:24). In response, Stevenson
repeatedly indicated that the statements about the pre-1993 prior art do not apply to
LG’s televisions: “LG TVs don’t implement this this way.” Appx15173 (Tr.678:4-
11); see also Appx15172 (Tr.676:13-18, 675:14-15); Appx15173 (Tr.681:7-11).
Stevenson’s distinctions between the pre-1993 prior art and LG’s televisions were
clear, uncontradicted, and unimpeached. A reasonable jury was not free to disregard
this testimony and to draw unsupported inferences. See DeVona v. Zeitels, 766 F.
App’x 946, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
In sum, while the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in Appellees’
favor, there is nothing here but wild speculations and conjectures untethered to any
concrete evidence that LG’s televisions have the claimed communication controller.
Under controlling law, that is not enough for Appellees to meet their burden of proof,
and JMOL of noninfringement is imperative. See WARF, 905 F.3d at 1349-50.
40
C. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found Willfulness
No reasonable jury could have found that LG acted with deliberate or reckless
disregard of Appellees’ patent rights, because LG independently developed products
compliant with the HDMI standard years before the ’180 patent even issued.
As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he sort of conduct warranting enhanced
damages has been variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious,
bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of
a pirate.” Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016). “[A]s
Justice Breyer emphasized in his concurrence, it is the circumstances that transform
simple ‘intentional or knowing’ infringement into egregious, sanctionable behavior,
and that makes all the difference.” SRI, 930 F.3d at 1308 (emphasis in original).
The District Court relied heavily on LG’s purported post-lawsuit behavior to
show willfulness. Appx327-328. Under the facts of this case, this is erroneous given
LG’s development of its televisions. In SRI, this Court vacated the denial of
defendant Cisco’s JMOL motion of no willful infringement, because “culpability is
generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged
conduct.” SRI, 930 F.3d at 1309 (quoting Halo, 136 S.Ct. at 1933); see also Odetics,
Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming
exclusion of evidence post-dating defendant’s learning of patent because “[t]he
proper time to assess willfulness is at the time the infringer received notice”). The
41
evidence in SRI did not meet this requirement, because it was “undisputed that
[defendant] Cisco did not know of SRI’s patent until May 8, 2012, when SRI sent
its notice letter to Cisco” and further “undisputed that this notice letter was sent years
after Cisco independently developed the accused systems and first sold them in
2005 (Cisco) and 2007 (Sourcefire).” SRI, 930 F.3d at 1309. In fact, “the patents
had not issued when the parties met in May 2000” and “the patent application for
the parent ’203 patent was not even filed until several months after the parties met.”
Given these circumstances, “Cisco could not have been aware of the patent
application” when it independently developed its products, such that no substantial
evidence could support the jury’s finding of willfulness. Id. at 1309-10.
The similarities between this case and SRI are striking. Here, it is undisputed
that LG first learned of the ’180 patent after its issuance in 2009, when Mondis tried
to add this newly-issued patent in a prior case against LG. Appx15050 (Tr.189:21-
25); Appx10912-10928. But there is no evidence in the trial record that LG knew
of the ’180 patent before 2009. As in SRI, LG independently developed and began
manufacturing televisions with HDMI ports—the feature accused of infringement—
in 2005, many years before LG first learned of the ’180 patent in 2009 and even
before the asserted claims were amended to their present form in 2007. Appx15185
(Tr.721:4-7); Appx15050 (Tr.188:13-189:25, 190:7-191:4); Appx15259
(Tr.1006:25-1007:6). Without any knowledge of the ’180 patent when it
42
incorporated HDMI ports into its televisions in 2005, LG could not have “copied,”
much less “plundered,” this patent. Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 2017 WL 3034655, at *10 (E.D. Tex. July 18, 2017) (Bryson, C.J., sitting by
designation) (finding no copying where development and marketing of accused
product occurred years before the patent).
Moreover, developing products to comply with a technological standard,
standing alone, cannot form the basis of willful infringement. Past decisions
analyzing willful infringement have recognized that “[t]he rules of patent
infringement are rules of business ethics, and require prudent commercial actions in
accordance with law.” Vulcan Eng’g Co. v. Fata Aluminium, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Against this commercial reasonableness backdrop, imposing
willfulness merely because a company complies with a technology standard divorces
the analysis from the patent itself and discourages the wide adoption of technology
standards. LG’s compliance with industry standards was, at most, nothing more than
evidence of possible infringement, rather than proof of willfulness.
For these reasons, the jury’s finding of willfulness cannot stand.
43
VIII. JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS
A. The Court Should Dismiss this Litigation for Lack of Standing
Patents, like any property, may have their rights divided as the owner sees fit.
But such division can severely impact the requirements for standing in patent
lawsuits. Past cases demonstrate that some agreements may leave no party with
standing to sue. That is what happened here.
In a complicated contractual arrangement, Mondis and Hitachi divided the
rights in the ’180 patent in a way that defeats standing for each co-plaintiff: Hitachi
lacks constitutional standing against LG by surrendering its right to sue LG, while
depriving Mondis of statutory standing by keeping nearly all substantial patent
rights. Because no single co-plaintiff has both constitutional and statutory standing
to assert the patent against LG, this action should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
1. Background Relevant to Standing
The Relevant Agreements
In 2007, Hitachi and Mondis entered into a “Patent Sale, Assignment and
License Agreement” (“PSALA”), Appx11170-11201, through which Hitachi
purportedly sold the [PSALA info.] (including the ’180 patent-in-suit) to Mondis,
in exchange for [PSALA info.] and a [PSALA info.] license-back to Hitachi
[Mondis-Hitachi PSALA info.] Appx11171-11174. This [PSALA info.] appears
44
in Annex 4 and is titled “Patent License Agreement” (“PLA”). Appx11172;
Appx11187-11201.
Under the PLA, Hitachi has a [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi
PSALA] including the right to [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi

PSALA] Appx11190-11191
(§2.1).
Hitachi also retains the [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
Hitachi has
[information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA] Appx11188 (§§1.8-1.9);
Appx11192-11193 (§4.1(a)-(d)). Hitachi’s rights regarding the [Mondis-Hitachi
PSALA info.] Hitachi can [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
(i.e.,
[PSALA info.] and [PSALA info.] Appx11193 (§4.1(e)-(f)); Appx11189-
11190 (§§1.16-1.17). The only limitation on Hitachi’s rights regarding this
[information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
Appx11188-11189 (§§1.12-1.13),
Appx11193 (§4.1(e)-(f)). But because
[information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA] Hitachi retains
[PSALA info.] Appx11192-11193; Appx11200. As a result, Mondis—the
45
supposed “assignee”—effectively has the [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi
PSALA] Appx11192-11193.
Further, Hitachi maintains [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
If Hitachi chooses to
[information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA] . Appx11193-11194
(§§4.3(a)-(b)). And Mondis cannot
Appx11190 (§§1.20-1.21); Appx11195 (§§7.4-
7.5).
Procedural Background
In October 2018, LG moved to dismiss the complaint, because Mondis lacks
statutory standing. Appx1168-1169. To avoid dismissal, Mondis proposed to add
Hitachi as a co-plaintiff, and the District Court granted leave to join Hitachi while
denying LG’s motion as moot. Appx1315; Appx225.
LG then filed a motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction based on
Hitachi’s lack of constitutional standing. Appx1328-1329. In denying this motion,
the District Court ruled that there is “no controlling authority for the proposition that
it must test the patent owner for constitutional standing before allowing joinder
under” FRCP 19. Appx229. The District Court declined to address constitutional
standing, reasoning that joining a patentee is a prudential matter, and that Hitachi
46
could be added under FRCP 19. Appx230-231. The District Court also saw no
mandate to “re-apply the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement before
allowing joinder,” no appellate authority “requir[ing] a showing of an injury-in-fact
by the owner,” and no precedent insisting that “the owner has constitutional
standing.” Appx231.
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Where No Plaintiff Has

Proper Standing
Each Plaintiff Must Have Both Constitutional and Statutory

Standing
“The doctrine of standing limits federal judicial power and has both
constitutional and prudential components.” Evident Corp. v. Church & Dwight Co.,
399 F.3d 1310, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Derived from Article III’s “Cases” or
“Controversies” provision, constitutional standing requires a plaintiff to show that
“it suffers an injury which can be fairly traced to the defendant and likely redressed
by a favorable judgment.” Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp.,
925 F.3d 1225, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Prudential standing—now renamed “statutory
standing”—in patent law arises from 35 U.S.C. §281, and requires a plaintiff to have
all substantial patent rights or to jointly sue with the patentee. Id. at 1235-36.
Each named plaintiff must establish both components of standing. See Town
of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1645 (2017) (“Chester”). This principle
applies to constitutional standing. Id.; Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321,
47
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Every plaintiff must demonstrate standing, a jurisdictional
prerequisite under Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”); Pa. Prison
Society v. Cortés, 622 F.3d 215, 227-32 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming plaintiff-by-
plaintiff inquiry and dismissing fourteen plaintiffs lacking constitutional standing).
And it applies equally to statutory standing. Diamond Coating Techs., LLC v.
Hyundai Motor Am., 823 F.3d 615, 618 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Atypical Patent Transfer Agreements May Leave No Party

with Standing
Although parties may transfer patent rights as they wish, certain contractual
arrangements create a situation where no party has both constitutional and statutory
standing. While rare, the pertinent cases demonstrate that, like here, such a situation
destroys subject matter jurisdiction.
In Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2007), this
Court addressed whether a plaintiff had constitutional standing. The patent rights in
Morrow were contractually divided between a trust called AHLT and another trust
called GUCLT. Id. at 1335. AHLT retained patent ownership and all patent rights,
except that GUCLT held the “exclusive right” to sue and collect damages for
infringement. Id. at 1338. Under these facts, this Court found that GUCLT did not
suffer an injury-in-fact from infringement because, although GUCLT had the right
to sue, AHLT held the exclusionary rights violated by infringement. Id. at 1341-43.
GUCLT therefore lacked constitutional standing. Moreover, co-plaintiff AHLT
48
could not proceed alone because it had contractually transferred the right to sue to
GUCLT. See id. at 1342-43. As this Court warned, “[w]hile parties are free to assign
some or all patent rights as they see fit based on their interests and objectives, this
does not mean that the chosen method of division will satisfy standing
requirements.” Id. at 1341 n.8.
Applying Morrow, the District of Delaware similarly found that no plaintiff
could sue the defendant for infringement. Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Power
Integrations, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372-73 (D. Del. 2007). There, plaintiff
Fairchild’s agreement with patentee Intersil gave Fairchild the “sole and exclusive
right, exclusive even as to Intersil, to enforce the Patents” against defendant Power
Integrations. Id. at 367. Fairchild and Intersil also “agree that only Fairchild shall
have the authority to threaten, commence, maintain or settle any claim, suit or
proceeding based upon Infringements of the Patents … by [Power Integrations].”
Id. (bracketing in original). After finding Fairchild to be a nonexclusive licensee
without constitutional standing, the court refused to add Intersil, because Intersil did
not have constitutional standing as “Fairchild is the only party with the right to sue
Power Integrations” given that “Intersil has contracted that right away to Fairchild.”
Id. at 372-73. The court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Id. at 373.
Beyond the patent context, other circuits have concluded that, where no single
plaintiff has both constitutional and prudential standing, a suit cannot proceed. E.g.,
49
Grocery Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 175-79 & 181 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(dismissing case where two plaintiffs with prudential standing lacked constitutional
standing, while the third one, which two judges determined had constitutional
standing, lacked prudential standing); Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d
720, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (ordering dismissal where “none of the[] parties satisfies
both the constitutional and prudential standing components”); see also Am.
Humanist Ass’n, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 859 F. 3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2017).
Like these cases and as discussed below, neither Mondis nor Hitachi has both
constitutional and statutory standing to sue LG because of the atypical way they
contractually divided the patent rights.
3. Hitachi Cannot Be a Named Plaintiff Because It Lacks

Constitutional Standing to Sue LG
The operative complaint names two companies as co-plaintiffs with Mondis:
Hitachi Maxell Ltd. (as the successor-in-interest to Hitachi, Ltd.), Appx13243-
13244, and its subsidiary Maxell, Ltd. Appx1316-1327. Neither company has
constitutional standing.
Maxell, Ltd. Lacks Standing
Maxell, Ltd., has no property interest in the patent-in-suit, as the complaint
makes clear. Appx1316-1327 (¶¶3-4, 14). There is not even any evidence that this
company has a license. Id. Yet, the District Court allowed Maxell, Ltd. to join as a
co-plaintiff. This is error. Spine Sols., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc.,
50
620 F.3d 1305, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding joinder of related corporations
lacking property interest was abuse of discretion), abrogated on other grounds,
Halo, 136 S.Ct. 1923.
Hitachi Lacks Constitutional Standing, Because It Lacks an

Exclusionary Right to [PSALA info.] Sue LG
More fundamentally, Hitachi Maxell Ltd., whether alone or joined with
Maxell, Ltd. (together “Hitachi”), lacks constitutional standing.
“[T]he touchstone of constitutional standing in a patent infringement suit is
whether a party can establish that it has an exclusionary right in a patent that, if
violated by another, would cause the party holding the exclusionary right to suffer
legal injury.” WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
2010). Because a plaintiff “derives its standing from the exclusionary rights it holds,
it follows that its standing will ordinarily be coterminous with those rights,” such
that the plaintiff “may have standing to sue some parties and not others.” Id. at
1266. In contrast to statutory standing, the constitutional standing inquiry does not
focus on whether the plaintiff “has the right to exclude all others from practicing the
patent.” Id. at 1267 (italics in original). For constitutional standing, “[t]he question
is whether [the plaintiff] has shown that it has the right under the patents to exclude
the Defendants from engaging in the alleged infringing activity and therefore is
injured by the Defendants’ conduct.” Id. (italics in original; bolding added).
Although Hitachi [information regarding PSALA] , the constitutional
51
standing inquiry focuses on the specific defendant—LG. Id. [PSALA info.] , Hitachi
lacks the [PSALA info.] and lacks “the right to assert infringement of those
interests” against LG. Id. at 1264. Indeed, LG is
Appx11188-11189; Appx11192-11193. As the District Court found, “Hitachi has
no right to sue LG for infringement of the ’180 patent.” Appx232. Because Hitachi
relinquished its right to sue LG on the ’180 patent-in-suit, LG’s alleged infringement
cannot impede Hitachi’s patent rights. Hence, Hitachi has no injury-in-fact with
respect to LG. See WiAV, 631 F.3d at 1266.
Appellees’ own statements confirm that Hitachi lacks constitutional standing.
For example, they told the District Court that “
[information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA] ” and that “Hitachi did not
assert its own claim for infringement damages in the amended complaint[.]”
Appx1339; Appx1355. The operative complaint even lacks any allegation regarding
Hitachi’s standing, including no allegation that Hitachi has any exclusionary rights
against LG. Appx1378-1389. This complaint only alleges harm to Mondis, not
Hitachi, from LG’s supposed infringement. Appx1387 (¶36). Per Appellees’ own
allegations, Hitachi lacks constitutional standing against LG.
Without constitutional standing, Hitachi should be dismissed. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992); Pa. Prison Society, 622 F.3d at
52
227-32.
FRCP 19 and the Need to Cure Statutory Standing Cannot

Confer Constitutional Standing
The District Court assumed that adding a patentee under FRCP 19 to cure
statutory standing obviates the need for constitutional standing. Appx229. But a
plaintiff can have statutory standing while lacking constitutional standing, e.g.,
Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1338-43, or have constitutional standing without having
statutory standing, e.g., Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1234-35. Satisfying one component
of standing does not necessarily satisfy the other.
The FRCPs, including FRCP 19, cannot confer constitutional standing where
none exists. While providing a procedure to join patentees, FRCP 19 cannot
override the Constitution. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135 (1992)
(“The Rules, then, must be deemed to apply only if their application will not
impermissibly expand the judicial authority conferred by Article III.”). Otherwise,
a party without constitutional standing could bootstrap itself into federal court
without satisfying Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.
Neither Congress nor the courts have condoned such an expansive
understanding of the FRCPs, having made the contrary quite clear. See 28 U.S.C.
§2072 (“[The FRCPs] shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”);
FRCP 82 (“These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district
courts[.]”). That is why, in an intervention under FRCP 24, the Supreme Court
53
required the intervening plaintiff to establish constitutional standing. Chester, 137
S.Ct. at 1651. There is no reason to create an exception to Article III through
FRCP 19, nor did the District Court identify any.
Instead, the District Court essentially treated satisfaction of one of the separate
constitutional and statutory components of standing as sufficient to satisfy both.
Appx230-231. Under this logic, federal courts could ignore the Constitution
whenever they need to add a necessary party, thus violating Article III’s “irreducible
constitutional minimum” of standing, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, and eviscerating the
principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the District Court’s focus on curing Mondis’s statutory standing
defect led it to disregard Hitachi’s constitutional standing problem. As discussed
above, Hitachi contracted away [PSALA info.] and thus its constitutional
standing, to sue LG. Because “standing is not dispensed in gross,” Davis v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008), curing one plaintiff’s standing defect
does not justify ignoring the constitutional restrictions on all plaintiffs and the
federal courts. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
227 (1974) (“The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”). Hitachi should be
dismissed.
54
4. Without Hitachi, Mondis Lacks Statutory Standing
Mondis Lacks Legal Title to the ’180 Patent
Statutory standing does not turn on contractual labels, but rather on the
substance of the transaction. E.g., Diamond, 823 F.3d at 618-20 (rejecting reliance
on “assignment” label on contract with non-party Sanyo, and finding no statutory
standing because Sanyo retained right to practice and controlled Diamond’s ability
to license and litigate); see also Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine
Works, 261 U.S. 24-26, 39 (1923); A123 Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Quebec, 626 F.3d 1213,
1218 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
An analysis of the PSALA and PLA shows that Hitachi, not Mondis, holds
essentially all substantial patent rights. The purported patent “assignment” under
the PSALA required Mondis to grant a license-back to Hitachi [Mondis-Hitachi
PSALA info.] . Appx11174, Appx11172. Hitachi’s retained rights are extensive,
including the right to [PSALA info.], Appx11190-11191, and [information regarding
Mondis-Hitachi PSALA] , Appx11192-11193, Appx11188, Appx11200.
These two factors alone suffice to show that Mondis did not receive all substantial
rights. See Crown Die, 261 U.S. at 39; Diamond, 823 F.3d at 619-21; Abbott Labs.
v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding no standing where
transferor retained right to make, use, and sell patented products).
55
What’s more, Hitachi [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
. Appx11193. Mondis can
[information regarding PSALA] . Appx11194. Contractual restrictions
on Mondis—including the [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
—confirm that,
unlike a patentee with unfettered discretion over his property, Mondis lacks legal
title to the ’180 patent.
Because “a patent may not have multiple separate owners for purposes of
determining standing to sue,” Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v.
Cochlear, Ltd., 604 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Mann”), either Mondis or
Hitachi, but not both, can be the patentee. The [PSALA info.] gives
Hitachi the [PSALA info.] of sticks in the ’180 patent’s bundle of rights, with Mondis
keeping only a [PSALA info.] for itself. That is simply insufficient to confer legal title
on Mondis. See id. at 1359-60.
Mondis Lacks All Substantial Rights and Cannot Sue Alone
Under Mann, Mondis cannot sue on its own as an “exclusive licensee”
because it lacks all requisite substantial rights. Mann, 604 F.3d at 1360-61.
Factor 1: “[T]he nature and scope of the licensor’s retained right to sue
accused infringers is the most important factor in determining whether an exclusive
license transfers sufficient rights to render the licensee the owner of the patent.” Id.
56
For example, in Abbott, 47 F.3d at 1132, licensee Abbott did “not enjoy the right to
indulge infringements, which normally accompanies a complete conveyance of the
right to sue” because patentee Diamedix could sue without Abbott. Here, Mondis
has even less rights than Abbott, because
Appx11192-11193. Mondis [information regarding Mondis-
Hitachi PSALA] . Appx11194.
Factor 2: This Court “pay[s] particular attention to whether the agreement
conveys in full the right to exclude others from making, using and selling the
patented invention in the exclusive territory.” Prima Tek II, 222 F.3d at 1379
(emphasis in original). Here, the [Mondis-Hitachi PSALA info.] “the exclusive
right to make, use, and sell products or services under the patent.” Mann, 604 F.3d
at 1360. Instead, [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
. Appx11190-11191.
Factor 3: Hitachi’s right to [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
Appx11191. Hitachi can [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi
PSALA] , and can [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
Appx11192-11193. Hitachi’s [Mondis-Hitachi PSALA info.]
show that it retains substantial patent rights. See Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs.,
Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding no statutory standing where
57
licensor retained right to “offer sublicenses” and “veto any sublicense”). Moreover,
Hitachi [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
. Thus, Hitachi [information
regarding PSALA] . See Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape
Comm’n, 655 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding restraints on sublicensing a
strong indicator of no statutory standing).
Factor 4: The PLA [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
. Appx11190. [PSALA info.] where a licensor contractually
receives a percentage of proceeds, this Court has found no statutory standing. Propat
Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1190-91 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Factor 5: While [PSALA info.] , there is no need for such right
because Hitachi holds [PSALA info.] sticks in the bundle of patent rights.
Factor 6: [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
Appx11193.
[information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA] Appx11193-11194.
Factor 7: Although Mondis [PSALA info.] , Appx11174,
[information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA] Appx11195 (§7.4).
58
[Mondis-Hitachi PSALA info.] shows Mondis lacks all substantial patent rights.
Propat, 473 F.3d at 1191.
Factor 8: Mondis can [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
Appx11176. And Mondis [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
Appx11176; Appx11195.
In sum, the Mann factors establish that Hitachi, not Mondis, has nearly all
substantial rights in the ’180 patent-in-suit. Mondis has [information regarding
Mondis-Hitachi PSALA] —in violation of the Supreme
Court’s prohibition on such a “hunting license.” Crown Die, 261 U.S. at 38-39;
Prima Tek, 222 F.3d at 1381. Consequently, Mondis lacks statutory standing and
cannot proceed without Hitachi.
5. This Case Should Be Dismissed Because No Single Plaintiff Has

Both Constitutional and Prudential Standing
Because of the atypical contractual arrangement, Hitachi lacks constitutional
standing and cannot continue as a co-plaintiff. Without Hitachi, Mondis cannot
proceed alone because it lacks statutory standing. While their standing problems are
different, neither Mondis nor Hitachi individually has both constitutional and
prudential standing to sue LG because of the way they deliberately divided the patent
rights among themselves to create a “hunting license” against LG. This case should
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1338-
59
42; Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 175-79.
6. If the Court Rules that Hitachi Has Standing, It Should Enforce the
Statutory Limitation on Damages
Should the Court decide that Hitachi has standing, then it should enforce the
damages time-bar under 35 U.S.C. §286. This statutory limitation on damages
reduces the damages period to thirteen months, because six years before the addition
of Hitachi is January 8, 2013, and the patent expired on February 3, 2014. The
District Court, however, stated that the First Amended Complaint “did not change
Mondis’ claims for damages…. Relation back is not an issue here.” Appx232. This
was erroneous.
A plaintiff bears the burden of proof on relation back, Garvin v. City of Phila.,
354 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2003), and Appellees failed to meet their burden under
FRCP 15(c), which governs relation back when adding a new party. Krupski v.
Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 & 547 (2010). Even for joinder under
FRCP 19, FRCP 15’s requirements must still be satisfied. Brown v. Daniels, 290 F.
App’x 467, 474 (3d Cir. 2008) (“While the motion was captioned under Rule 19 of
the [FRCP], the Court properly analyzed it under Rule 15, which governs the
amendment of pleadings.”).
Third Circuit law governing FRCP 15(c) precludes relation back here. See
Nelson v. Cty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1011-12 (3d Cir. 1995). In Nelson, the
Third Circuit considered “whether Rule 15(c) … would permit relation back of an
60
amendment to a pleading that names new plaintiffs after expiration of the statute of
limitations when those new plaintiffs are neither substituted nor have shown mistake
concerning identity.” Id. at 1011. On this question, the Nelson court first noted that
FRCP 15(c) applies to amendments adding plaintiffs as well as defendants. Id. at
1014 n.7; see also In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 297 (3d Cir. 2010). For
an amended pleading adding new plaintiffs to relate back, the Third Circuit required
compliance with “all three conditions specified in Rule 15(c)(3)” (now FRCP
15(c)(1)(C)), including showing a mistake concerning the identity of the correct
party, and notice within the time provided by FRCP 4(m). Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1014.
The new plaintiffs in Nelson were time-barred since they could not show that their
untimely joinder “was due to a mistake.” Id. at 1015.
Appellees cannot satisfy the requirements of FRCP 15(c)(1)(C) because they
cannot show that LG knew or should have known within the required timeframe that
Hitachi would sue LG on the ’180 patent, but for a mistake about the proper
plaintiffs. In addition to Appellees’ failure to include any relevant allegation in the
operative complaint, Appx1316-1327, [Mondis-Hitachi PSALA info.] show the
opposite. [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
Appx1208 (“ [information regarding Mondis-Hitachi PSALA]
”). In response to LG’s
61
further inquiry, Hitachi asserted, in no uncertain terms, that “

” Appx1210.
Nor is this an instance where Appellees made a mistake in selecting the named
plaintiffs. They crafted the PSALA and PLA to govern the rights to the ’180 patent,
knew the terms of these agreements, and understood their respective rights. Nor can
they satisfy the timing requirement of FRCP 15(c)(1)(C). Within FRCP 4(m)’s then-
applicable 120-day period after the original complaint’s filing (i.e., June 21-October
19, 2014), there was no reason for LG to expect Hitachi to assert the ’180 patent
against LG, especially given [Mondis-Hitachi PSALA info.]

.
Because there is no relation back to the 2014 filing date of the original
complaint, §286 limits the damages period to thirteen months.
B. This Court Has Jurisdiction over this Appeal
Appellees moved to dismiss this appeal, claiming that LG’s notice of appeal
was untimely. Appeal Docket Item (“A.D.I.”) 12. This Court denied the motion
“without prejudice to the parties addressing the jurisdiction issue in the merits
briefs.” A.D.I.22. Per this directive, LG addresses this Court’s jurisdiction.
62
1. Background Relevant to Appellate Jurisdiction
After trial, the District Court did not immediately enter judgment, but instead
set a briefing schedule for post-trial motions. Appx1390-1391. LG timely filed
three post-trial motions: (1) a motion for JMOL under FRCP 50(b) and/or new trial
under FRCP 59 regarding invalidity; (2) a motion for JMOL and/or new trial
regarding noninfringement; and (3) a motion for JMOL, new trial, and/or remittitur
regarding remedy.
On September 24, 2019, the District Court issued an order (“the 2019 Order”)
disposing of several, but not all, of the pending post-trial motions. Appx297-329.
This order denied LG’s post-trial motions on invalidity, noninfringement, and
willfulness. Appx298-304, Appx327-329. The District Court also vacated the
damages award because the evidence was “insufficient, as a matter of law, to support
the jury’s damages verdict.” Appx326. The order, however, reserved final decision
on LG’s post-trial remedy motion pending further briefing on Appellees’ possible
waiver of damages. Appx326-329.
On April 22, 2020, the District Court issued a second order holding that
Appellees had not waived their right to damages, denying LG’s damages JMOL and
remittitur motions, and granting LG’s motion for new trial on damages. Appx330-
338. With this second order resolving the last remaining post-trial motions, LG filed
its notice of appeal on May 8, 2020. Appx1392-1395.
63
2. This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction Under §1292(c)(2)
This Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§1292(c)(2), because the case is “final except for an accounting.” Robert Bosch,
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (ruling
that, under §1292(c)(2), this Court has jurisdiction over “appeals from patent
infringement liability determinations when a trial on damages has not yet occurred”).
A jury found infringement and no invalidity, Appx274-275, and the District
Court denied LG’s post-trial motions on those liability issues. Appx298-304,
Appx327-329. Although the District Court ordered a new damages trial, the
proceedings are “final except for an accounting,” as Appellees concede. A.D.I.12.
3. LG’s Notice of Appeal Was Timely under FRAP 4(a)(4)
Appellees argued that the time for appeal under §1292(c)(2) started on
September 24, 2019—when the District Court disposed of the liability-related post-
trial motions—and ended 30 days later. A.D.I.12 at 5-8. Appellees are incorrect
because the 2019 Order resolved some, but not all, of the pending post-trial motions.
Under the governing rules, these unresolved motions tolled the time for appeal until
the last such motions were resolved on April 22, 2020.
FRAP 4(a)(4) Tolled the Time to Appeal while LG’s

Unresolved Post-Trial Motions Remained Pending
With certain exceptions, “no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree
in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review
64
unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment,
order or decree.” 28 U.S.C. §2107(a). Implementing §2107, Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 4(a)(1)(A) requires filing a notice of appeal “within
30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from,” subject to certain
exceptions. FRAP 4(a)(1)(A), 4(a)(4).
FRAP 4(a)(4) provides one of these exceptions by stating that, if a party timely
files qualifying post-trial motions such as a motion under FRCP 50(b) or 59, “the
time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of
the last such remaining motion.” FRAP 4(a)(4)(A). Under the Rule, where
multiple qualifying post-trial motions are timely filed (such as here), a ruling
disposing of only some of those motions will not start the 30-day clock for appeal.
Id. Only after the district court resolves “the last such remaining motion” does FRAP
4(a)(1)(A)’s 30-day clock begin to run. Id.; Havird Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
149 F.3d 283, 287-89 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[A] holding that the time for appeal does not
run until the district court disposes of all outstanding motions listed in Rule
4(a)(4)(A) through (F) is consistent with the decisions of other circuits that have
considered the issue.”); Palm Beach Atl. College, Inc. v. First United Fund, Ltd.,
928 F.2d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir. 1991).
FRAP 4(a)(4) applies here. After trial, LG timely filed several qualifying
post-trial motions under FRCP 50(b) and 59. While the 2019 Order addressed LG’s
65
post-trial motions regarding invalidity, noninfringement, and willfulness, it
expressly reserved a decision on LG’s motions regarding damages. Appx329. The
District Court disposed of these last qualifying post-trial motions on April 22, 2020,
when it denied LG’s FRCP 50(b) motion on damages and remittitur motion, but
granted LG’s motion for a new damages trial under FRCP 59. Appx330-338. Only
then did the District Court dispose of the “last such remaining motion” listed in
FRAP 4(a)(4)(A), thus starting the 30-day period to appeal under FRAP 4(a)(1)(A).
LG’s notice of appeal filed on May 8, 2020—just sixteen days later—was therefore
timely.
The District Court’s Partial Decision on Post-Trial Motions

Does Not Alter the Timeliness of LG’s Appeal
Disregarding FRAP 4(a)(4)(A), Appellees’ dismissal motion argued that LG’s
time to appeal started on September 24, 2019, when the post-trial motions on liability
were resolved. A.D.I.12 at 7-8. Appellees are wrong.
First, Appellees incorrectly assume that the only “‘judgment’ for purposes of
§1292(c)(2) is the September 24 Order.” Id. at 7. That Order—like the April 22,
2020 Order—merely disposed of post-trial motions seeking to alter the underlying
judgment. The underlying judgment here is the jury’s special verdict, which was
constructively entered as a judgment by operation of FRCP 58(c). Under this rule,
a judgment requiring, as here, a separate document is deemed entered “when the
judgment is entered in the civil docket under Rule 79(a) and the earlier of these
66
events occurs: (A) it is set out in a separate document; or (B) 150 days have run
from the entry in the civil docket.” FRCP 58(c)(2); see also FRAP 4(a)(7)
(containing similar language). Although there is no entry of a separate document
titled “judgment,” FRCP 58(c)(2)(B) constructively entered the jury’s verdict as a
judgment after 150 days from the entry of that verdict onto the docket. See Orr v.
Plumb, 884 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2018).
While FRCP 58(c)(2) constructively entered the underlying judgment on
September 9, 2019, FRAP 4(a)(4)(A) tolled the time for appeal until resolution of
the last pending post-trial motion. See Two-Way Media LLC v. AT&T, Inc., 782 F.3d
1311, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Helpert v. Walsh, 759 F. App’x 199 (5th Cir. 2018)
(ruling that post-trial motions filed before entry of judgment tolled time for appeal,
even after entry of judgment, until disposition of last post-trial motion); FRAP
4(a)(4).
Second, under FRAP 4(a)(4)(A)’s tolling provision, it is irrelevant that LG
challenges the 2019 Order months after the order’s issuance. FRAP 4(a)(4)(A) is
agnostic about the timing and sequence of intervening orders disposing of qualifying
post-trial motions. What matters under the Rule is “the entry of the order disposing
of the last such remaining motion,” and it is from the date of this last order that “the
time to file an appeal runs for all parties.” FRAP 4(a)(4)(A).
67
If FRAP 4(a)(4)(A) is not already dispositive, FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(ii)
conclusively undercuts Appellee’s position by stating: “A party intending to
challenge an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A) … must file
a notice of appeal … within the time prescribed by this Rule measured from the
entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion.” FRAP
4(a)(4)(B)(ii). Under this Rule, the 2019 Order is “an order disposing of any motion
listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A)” and LG’s time to challenge this order is “measured from
the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion,” i.e., from the
April 22, 2020 Order disposing of the last remaining post-trial motions.
Third, it is irrelevant, as Appellees argue, that the 2019 Order rendered the
case “final except for a damages determination.” A.D.I.12 at 6-7. FRAP 4(a)’s
tolling provision makes no exception for patent cases where a district court resolved
post-trial motions related to liability, but had not yet disposed of other pending post-
trial motions unrelated to liability. Nothing in this Rule creates an exception
requiring the time for an interlocutory appeal under §1292(c)(2)—instead of an
appeal under §1295—to start before the “dispos[al] of the last such remaining
motion.” A contrary reading would insert into the Rule a patent-specific exception
for appeals under §1292(c)(2) absent from the Rule itself.
*******
68
Under a straightforward application of FRAP 4(a), LG’s notice of appeal was
timely, and this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
IX. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, LG requests reversal of the judgment below.
69
Dated: September 28, 2020 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Michael J. McKeon

Michael J. McKeon
Christian A. Chu
R. Andrew Schwentker
Michael J. Ballanco
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
1000 Maine Ave. SW, Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 783-5070
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Counsel for LG Electronics Inc. and

LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.
70
ADDENDUM
APPENDIX DESCRIPTION
PAGE NOS.
Appx225 Order Denying as Moot LG’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Appx227-233 Order Denying LG’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Appx297-329 Omnibus Order on Post-Trial Motions
Appx330-338 Order on LG’s Motion for JMOL, a New Trial and/or

Remittitur regarding Damages and Willfulness
Appx339-368 U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180

ADDENDUM
Case 2:15-cv-04431-SRC-CLW Document 369 Filed 01/07/19 Page 1 of 1 PageID: 23301
Case 2:15-cv-04431-SRC-CLW Document 367-1 Filed 12/28/18 Page 1 of 1 PagelD: 23242
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD.,

Civil Case No.: 2:1 5-cv-0443 1 (SRC/CLW)
Plaintiff,
v. IPROPOSEDI ORDER
LG ELECTRONICS, INC. and

Filed: 09/28/2020
LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., Electronically Filed
Defendants.
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon the motion of Defendants LG
Page: 86
Electronics, Inc., and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (collectively “LG”) to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, D.I. 308, and upon consideration of the parties’ briefing, and the
arguments made at the hearingpDecem r 12, 2018, and in the interests ofjustice,
Document: 24
IT IS on this day
ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff Mondis Technology, Ltd.’ s request in the alternative to pennit the

Case: 20-1812
joinder of the relevant Hitachi party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, 17(a)(3), 19, 20 and 21 is
GRANTED, and the amended complaint attached to this order shall be filed forthwith.
2. The parties shall have 30 days from entry of this order to supplement the pretrial
order, exhibit list, and deposition designations to reflect any matters made relevant by the
joinder; and
3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED as moot.
iStafIey R. Ctesler, U.S.D.J.
Appx225
Case: 20-1812
Case 2:15-cv-04431-SRC-CLW Document:
Document 24
393 Page: 87 Filed:
Filed 02/27/19 09/28/2020
Page 1 of 7 PageID: 24118
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No. 15-4431 (SRC)
:
v. :
: OPINION & ORDER
LG ELECTRONICS, INC. :
et al., :
:
Defendants. :
____________________________________:
CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss the First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), by Defendants LG Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.
(collectively, “LG”). Plaintiff Mondis Technology Ltd (“Mondis”) opposes the motion. For the
reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.
On October 25, 2018, LG filed a first motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. LG argued, in short, that Mondis does not hold legal title to the ‘180 patent,
pursuant to Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
and lacks prudential standing to sue LG on its own. In opposition, Mondis disagreed, but argued
in the alternative that any defect in prudential standing could be easily cured by allowing it to
join putative patent owner Hitachi Maxell, Ltd. (“Hitachi”). On December 12, 2018, the Court
heard oral argument on the motion and gave leave to Mondis to file an amended complaint
which joined Hitachi as a party to the case. This Court subsequently denied the motion to
dismiss as moot. The FAC, filed January 8, 2019, added Hitachi as a co-plaintiff.
Appx227
Case: 20-1812
Document 24
393 Page: 88 Filed:
Filed 02/27/19 09/28/2020
LG then filed the instant motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. LG argues, in short, that Hitachi cannot be a named plaintiff because it lacks
constitutional standing to sue LG. LG contends that the FAC should be dismissed because
Mondis, alone, does not have both constitutional and prudential standing.1
The instant motion builds on the arguments made in the prior motion. LG’s argument
can be broken into two parts: 1) as previously argued, the Court should recharacterize the
October 30, 2007 transaction between Hitachi and Mondis to find that there was no effective
transfer of legal title to the ‘180 patent to Mondis, pursuant to Bell Intercontinental Corp. v.
United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 1071, 1077 (1967),2 and its progeny, and therefore Hitachi retains the
legal title; and 2) Hitachi transferred to Mondis its right to sue LG for infringement and therefore
lacks constitutional standing to be in this case. LG argues that, because Mondis lacks prudential
standing and Hitachi lacks constitutional standing, neither Plaintiff has standing to pursue this
case, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
For the sake of discussion only, this Court will consider LG’s first proposition to be
correct: the 2007 transaction, although labeled a sale of the ‘180 patent, was ineffective as an
assignment of the ‘180 patent, and Hitachi retains legal title. Even if this proposition is taken as
true, LG must still demonstrate that the second proposition is true, and it has not done so. The
problem for LG is that it has inserted into the law a new requirement that Hitachi fails: the holder
1
Mondis and LG do not dispute that Mondis has constitutional standing to sue LG for
patent infringement.
2
“[I]n order that a transfer constitute a sale, there must be a grant of all substantial rights
of value in the patent. The transfer of anything less is a license which conveys no proprietary
interest to the licensee.” Id.
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of legal title to the patent must show constitutional standing to be joined, pursuant to Rule 19, to
a suit for damages against an infringer. LG has shown no controlling authority to support this
proposed requirement.
LG’s proposed new requirement holds that, when a licensee seeks to join, pursuant to
Rule 19, the entity holding legal title to a patent as a party to the case to remedy a defect in
prudential standing, the Court must first test that owner for constitutional standing. And not just
any constitutional standing, but an infringement injury-in-fact. The problem for LG is that it has
not demonstrated that the Federal Circuit has expressly established this requirement or that it is
implicit in its jurisprudence. This Court finds no controlling authority for the proposition that it
must test the patent owner for constitutional standing before allowing joinder under these
circumstances. The cases all but state that no such requirement exists. Consider the statement of
the “general rule” in Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted, emphasis added):
Although an exclusive licensee may have standing to participate in a patent

infringement suit, in some cases it must still be joined in suit by the patent owner.
In Independent Wireless, the Supreme Court held that, where a patent
infringement suit was brought by an exclusive licensee, the patent owner was an
indispensable party who was required to be joined, either voluntarily as a
plaintiff or involuntarily (by process) as a defendant, in order to satisfy the
requirements of standing. The holding of Independent Wireless was incorporated
into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 with the adoption of Rule 19.
As a general rule, this court continues to adhere to the principle set forth in
Independent Wireless that a patentee should be joined, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, in any infringement suit brought by an exclusive licensee.
However, this general rule – which we recognize as being prudential rather than
constitutional in nature – is subject to an exception. The exception is that, where
the patentee makes an assignment of all substantial rights under the patent, the
assignee may be deemed the effective “patentee” under 35 U.S.C. § 281 and thus
may have standing to maintain an infringement suit in its own name.
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Note that the Federal Circuit held that the prudential standing problem could be solved by
joining the patent owner either as a plaintiff or as a defendant.3 This necessarily implies that
the joined owner need not meet requirements specific to plaintiffs.
To restate what the Federal Circuit held in Prima Tek: 1) in Independent Wireless,4 the
Supreme Court established the general rule that a patentee should be joined in any infringement
suit brought by an exclusive licensee; and 2) this general rule is prudential rather than
constitutional in nature. This makes clear that these principles do not invoke or rely on
constitutional requirements, such as the case-or-controversy requirement. The Supreme Court
has described prudential standing requirements as “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise
of federal jurisdiction.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Because they are judicially
self-imposed limits, they do not invoke constitutional requirements.5
3
The Supreme Court, in Independent Wireless, stated the same.
4
“The presence of the owner of the patent as a party is indispensable not only to give
jurisdiction under the patent laws but also, in most cases, to enable the alleged infringer to
respond in one action to all claims of infringement for his act, and thus either to defeat all claims
in the one action, or by satisfying one adverse decree to bar all subsequent actions.” Indep.
Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 468 (1926).
5
Similarly, in WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1265 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
2010), the Federal Circuit stated: “An exclusive licensee generally must join the patent owner to
the suit to satisfy prudential standing constraints . . .” The Court stated no constitutional
requirements or considerations.
In Propat Int'l Corp. v. RPost US, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the Federal Circuit
characterized the case law as follows:
We explained that the requirement that the exclusive licensee must normally join
the patent owner in any suit on the patent is a “prudential” requirement, not a
constitutional requirement based on Article III limitations, and that an action
brought by the exclusive licensee alone may be maintained as long as the licensee
joins the patent owner in the course of the litigation.
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This understanding is supported by the Federal Circuit’s explanation of the policy
rationales underlying the general rule: “principally, from the standpoint of an accused infringer,
avoidance of multiple lawsuits and liabilities, and, from the standpoint of the patentee, ensuring
that its patent is not invalidated or held unenforceable without its participation.” Evident Corp.
v. Church & Dwight Co., 399 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Both of these fundamental
policy concerns stem from prudential considerations, not constitutional requirements.
Constitutional standing permits the exclusive licensee to bring suit for infringement, but not to
bring suit alone. As outlined above, the law allows that, under certain circumstances, the holder
of legal title to the patent should be joined as an indispensable party, pursuant to Rule 19.
LG has shown no authority for the proposition that the Court, in exercising its authority
under Rule 19, must re-apply the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement before allowing
joinder. Nor has LG cited any Federal Circuit case in which the Court, examining the joinder of
a patent owner, required a showing of an injury-in-fact by the owner. There is no controlling
authority for the proposition that a licensee who joins a patent owner to satisfy prudential
requirements must demonstrate that the owner has constitutional standing.
In sum, the Court finds that if, for the purpose of consideration of this motion only, we
take LG’s first proposition as true – that the 2007 transaction failed to transfer legal title in the
‘180 patent from Hitachi to Mondis, and that the Court casts aside the parties’ labels and
concludes that, in effect, Hitachi retained legal title and Mondis emerged in the position of an
Note that the final clause states only one condition for the maintenance of an action for
infringement brought by an exclusive licensee: the patent owner must be joined in the course of
the litigation. No constitutional requirement is stated, and the Court affirmatively declared that
this is not a constitutional requirement.
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exclusive licensee from the 2007 transaction – , there is a well-worn path in Federal Circuit law
to resolve the resultant prudential standing problem: Mondis, pursuant to Rule 19, joins Hitachi
as an indispensable party. LG argues unpersuasively that Mondis is barred from that well-worn
path by a constitutional standing requirement that has gone unmentioned in Federal Circuit
jurisprudence. This Court today does not decide any questions about the theory that the 2007
transaction should be recharacterized, but holds that, even if that theory is correct, Rule 19
authorizes a solution to the potential prudential standing problem. Mondis solved the potential
prudential standing problem when it joined Hitachi as a plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 19. Mondis
has now met the constitutional and prudential requirements for standing. The motion to dismiss
the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be denied.
LG argues that, should the Court decline to dismiss the FAC, it should reset the clock on
damages based on the date of filing the FAC, on a theory that Rule 15 requires it. LG is
incorrect. The FAC did not change Mondis’ claims for damages.6 As LG knows well, Hitachi
has no right to sue LG for infringement of the ‘180 patent. Relation back is not an issue here.
LG’s request that this Court reset the damages clock in some way is denied.
For these reasons,
IT IS on this 26th day of February, 2019
ORDERED that LG’s motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
6
LG points out that there is one material change related to the damages claim: the factual
allegation regarding the date of notice of infringement. The original Complaint alleges: “LG has
had knowledge of the ’180 patent since no later than March 9, 2009.” (Compl. ¶ 60.) The FAC
alleges: “LG has had knowledge of the ‘180 patent since January 15, 2009.” (FAC ¶ 30.) The
Court will not permit this modification and Mondis shall file a further amended complaint to
restore the original allegation as to the date of notice.
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(Docket Entry No. 379) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Mondis shall file a further amended complaint to restore the original
allegation as to the date of notice.
s/ Stanley R. Chesler
Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J.
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____________________________________
:
:
:
v. :
: OPINION & ORDER
et al., :
:
Defendants. :
____________________________________:
CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on six motions: 1) the motion by Defendants LG
Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (collectively, “LG”) for judgment as a matter
of law under Rule 50(b), a new trial under Rule 59, and/or remittitur regarding damages and
willfulness; 2) LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and/or a new trial
under Rule 59 regarding invalidity; 3) LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule
50(b) and/or a new trial under Rule 59 regarding noninfringement; 4) the motion by Plaintiff
Mondis Technology Ltd (“Mondis”) for enhanced damages, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284; 5)
Mondis’ motion for attorney fees, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285; and 6) Mondis’ motion for pre-
judgment and post-judgment interest. For the reasons that follow, as to the motion for a new
trial on damages, the Court grants it in part, denies it in part, and reserves decision on it in part,
pending further briefing; the remaining motions are denied.
This case arises from a dispute between Mondis, owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180
(the “’180 patent”), and LG, a television manufacturer, over allegations that LG manufactured
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and sold televisions that infringed claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent. A jury trial was held on
April 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, 2019. At the conclusion of the liability phase of the trial, the
jury returned a verdict that claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent were valid and infringed. At the
conclusion of the damages phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict that the infringement
was willful, and awarded Mondis compensatory damages of $45 million.
I. LG’s motions regarding patent validity
LG moves for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50(b), and/or a new trial,
pursuant to Rule 59, on the issue of the invalidity of claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent for
failure to satisfy the written description requirement. At the conclusion of the liability phase of
the jury trial, the jury returned a verdict stating, inter alia, that LG did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent are invalid. At trial, LG had
argued to the jury that claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent are invalid for failure to satisfy the
written description requirement, pursuant to § 112, paragraph 1.
In moving for judgment as a matter of law and/or a new trial, LG argues that no
reasonable jury could have found that the ’180 patent meets the written description
requirement. LG contends that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find in Plaintiff’s
favor on this issue.
At the outset, the Court notes that the present case presents challenging circumstances for
LG to succeed on this motion: 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) states that a “patent shall be presumed valid”
and, under Federal Circuit law, “[t]o overcome the presumption of validity of patents, the
accused must show that the claims lack a written description by clear and convincing evidence.”
Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As Mondis
notes, the Federal Circuit has held:
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[E]ven though a patentee never must submit evidence to support a conclusion by a

judge or jury that a patent remains valid, once a challenger introduces evidence
that might lead to a conclusion of invalidity--what we call a prima facie case--the
patentee would be well advised to introduce evidence sufficient to rebut that of
the challenger.
However, this requirement does not in substance shift the burden of persuasion,
because the presumption of validity remains intact and the ultimate burden of
proving invalidity remains with the challenger throughout the litigation.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “Under the
law set by Congress, a jury or a court may reach a conclusion that a patent remains valid solely
on the failure of the patent challenger’s evidence to convincingly establish the contrary.”
Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, for
LG to succeed on this motion, it must show that its written description case was so clear and so
convincing that no reasonable jury could have found otherwise.
LG states its argument on this motion as follows:
LG’s expert, Dr. Stevenson, testified from the perspective of a person of ordinary
skill in the art that the ’180 patent failed to comply with the written description
requirement. Plaintiffs’ own expert, Mr. Lamm, conceded that the patent
specification does not expressly recite claim 14’s limitation “an identification
number for identifying at least a type of said display unit.” And contrary to what
Plaintiffs promised at the summary judgment stage, Mr. Lamm did not provide
any trial testimony that the inventors were in possession of the claimed invention
at the time of filing.
Mr. Lamm’s failure to provide at trial the very testimony that served as Plaintiffs’
entire basis for avoiding a judgment as a matter of law at the summary judgment
stage left Dr. Stevenson’s expert testimony that the ’180 patent is invalid for lack
of written description unrebutted and unimpeached. There was no longer a factual
dispute for the jury to decide, thus requiring entry of JMOL of invalidity.
(D.’s Br. 1.) There are two crucial flaws in this argument: 1) the assertion that Dr. Stevenson’s
testimony was unimpeached; and 2) the unspoken assumption that, in the absence of a rebuttal
case, the jury had no role to perform. Neither is correct.
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Mondis points to several examples of how Dr. Stevenson was impeached. For example,
on direct examination, Dr. Stevenson testified: “The LG TVs do not claim the -- do not contain
the claimed identification number for identifying a type of display unit.” (Tr. 533:12-14.) On
cross-examination, Dr. Stevenson was shown a test report on an LG television that he had
generated (LG-297 at LGEMOND00183157), and he testified:
Q. You came to Dechert's Austin office and you printed out this report, correct?
A. I printed it out and I spent a fair of amount looking at the raw data just to make
sure it printed out something reasonable.
Q. You printed it out and you saw that it said “display type RGB color,” right?
A. Yes.
(Tr. 665:10-17) A reasonable jury could have heard this testimony and concluded that Dr.
Stevenson’s credibility as a witness had been impaired.
Second, LG’s implicit assumption that, in the absence of a rebuttal case, there was
nothing for the jury to decide, is just wrong. Again, consider Orthokinetics: “Under the law set
by Congress, a jury or a court may reach a conclusion that a patent remains valid solely on the
failure of the patent challenger’s evidence to convincingly establish the contrary.” 806 F.2d at
1570. The proper role of the jury was to hear Dr. Stevenson’s testimony, weigh it, and weigh all
relevant evidence to determine whether LG had met its burden of proof, which is what the jury
did. The jury reached the conclusion that the claims were valid based on the failure of the patent
challenger’s evidence to clearly and convincingly establish the contrary. The jury concluded that
the clear and convincing standard had not been met, which appears to be a reasonable
conclusion, in view of the evidence presented at trial.
This Court is not persuaded that LG’s invalidity case was so clear and so convincing that
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no reasonable jury could have found claims 14 and 15 to be valid. LG’s motion will be denied.
II. LG’s motions regarding noninfringement
LG moves for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50(b), and/or a new trial,
pursuant to Rule 59, on the issue of infringement. At the conclusion of the liability phase of the
jury trial, the jury returned a verdict stating, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had proven that it is more
likely than not that LG infringed claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent. LG challenges the
verdict of infringement on two grounds: 1) no evidence supports the inference that LG’s
televisions contain the claimed communication controller; and 2) no evidence supports the
inference that LG’s televisions contain the claimed identification number.
As to the communication controller, LG contends, correctly, that Mondis offered no
direct evidence that the accused televisions contain one. LG argues that, therefore, the jury’s
determination of infringement must be due to improper speculation and conjecture. LG has,
however, overlooked the role of circumstantial evidence: “Although a jury is entitled to draw
reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences themselves must be
more than speculation and conjecture.” Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., LLC v. Dell Comput.
Corp., 519 F. App’x 998, 1004 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The question is, then, whether the jury
could have drawn a reasonable inference about the presence of a communications controller
based on the circumstantial evidence presented to them, or whether it could only be speculation
and conjecture.
Mondis, in opposition, lays out the circumstantial evidence presented to the jury on this
issue: 1) LG stipulated:
All of the accused instrumentalities include at least one HDMI input port.
All of the accused instrumentalities include a memory-storing EDID data that is
connected to at least one HDMI port.
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(Tr. 269:4-8.) 2) practice of the HDMI standard requires implementation of the VESA DDC
standard (MON-0516 at 9 (“HDMI carries a VESA DDC channel”)); 3) LG’s televisions
implement the DDC2B and I2C communications protocols, which allow bidirectional
communication and allow a video source to read the television’s EDID data (Tr. 342:16-344:11);
4) Lamm explained how use of the DDC2B and I2C protocols enabled an LG television to
communicate the EDID data to the video source (Tr. 345:9-352:21); 5) Lamm stated that, for an
LG television to communicate the EDID data to the video source as required by the DDC2B
protocol, it must have a communications controller to perform six functions that enable the
communication. (Tr. 353:3-354:5.) Having presented this foundation, Lamm then stated his
conclusions:
Q. In your opinion, is there any way for the accused LG televisions to implement
the VESA Plug-N-Play EDID and DDC standards without using a bidirectional
communication controller?
A. No. The standards require that you perform these protocol functions, and that
requires a communications controller and it’s clearly bidirectional.
Q. And same question with respect to the HDMI standard. Could you implement
an HDMI capability in the television without using a bidirectional
communication controller to implement the DDC2B protocol?
A. No. The HDMI standard says you have to do it this way, and there is no way
to not do it this way.
Q. So would it be your opinion that a bidirectional communication controller is

necessarily present in all the accused products?
A. Yes, it is.
(Tr. 354:6-23.) As Mondis contends, a reasonable jury could have heard this evidence and
concluded that Lamm’s conclusions were more likely than not to be correct.
Lamm’s conclusions constitute a reasoned inference from the underlying evidence and
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are not speculative and conjectural. The Federal Circuit approved similar reasoning in Fujitsu
Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010):
We hold that a district court may rely on an industry standard in analyzing

infringement. If a district court construes the claims and finds that the reach of the
claims includes any device that practices a standard, then this can be sufficient for
a finding of infringement. We agree that claims should be compared to the
accused product to determine infringement. However, if an accused product
operates in accordance with a standard, then comparing the claims to that standard
is the same as comparing the claims to the accused product.
In the present case, Mondis presented evidence that the accused televisions operate in accordance
with the DDC2B standard, and then compared the claims to that standard. The jury’s inference
that the accused televisions contain a communications controller was reasonable, not speculative
and conjectural.
As to the identification number, LG argues: “there was no showing that these two bits
actually identify a type of display unit in accordance with the Court’s construction of the
term.”1 (D.’s Br. 1.) The Court does not agree. As already discussed, Dr. Stevenson was
cross-examined about a report he generated using a publicly available software program. The
evidence indicates that the program read the two bits in question inside an LG television and
correctly identified the type of display unit as “RGB color.” (Tr. 665:10-17.) The evidence
contained a document describing the VESA EDID 1.3 standard, which showed that bits 3 and 4
of Feature Support byte 1 are labeled, “Display Type,” with values indicating “monochrome
display,” “RGB color display,” “non-RGB multicolor display,” and “undefined.” (MON-0509
at 14, MONLG 00023168.) Lamm provided testimony that confirmed this understanding of the
1
To be precise, during claim construction, this Court determined that “identification number”
has its ordinary meaning. (Opinion dated September 28, 2017 at 14.) The Court, in passing, also
stated: “The ordinary understanding of “identification number” is that it is for the purpose of
identifying something . . .” (Id. at 13.)
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EDID standard. (Tr. 333:19-334:2.) This evidence constitutes a showing that, in an actual LG
television, those two bits actually identified a type of display unit, which, in the example just
described, was “RGB color.” LG did not explain how this is inconsistent with the Court’s
construction of “identification number.” This, along with other evidence, constitutes a
sufficient basis for the jury to have determined that LG’s televisions contain the required
identification number.
LG has not demonstrated that no evidence supports the jury’s determination that LG’s
televisions contain the claimed communication controller or the claimed identification number.
To the contrary, substantial evidence supports the finding of infringement. LG’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50(b), and/or a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59, on
the issue of infringement, will be denied.
III. LG’s motion for a new damages trial
LG challenges the jury’s verdict in the damages phase of the trial: the jury awarded $45
million in damages and found that LG’s infringement was willful. LG moves for judgment as a
matter of law under Rule 50(b), a new trial under Rule 59, and/or remittitur regarding damages
and willfulness. As to the damages verdict only, the jury verdict will be vacated.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1) states:
Grounds for New Trial. The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or
some of the issues—and to any party—as follows:
(A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been
granted in an action at law in federal court . . .
When reviewing damages in patent cases, the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to
procedural issues and Federal Circuit law to substantive and procedural issues pertaining to
patent law. Wordtech Sys. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
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2010). Under Third Circuit law, “[a] new trial should be granted only where the great weight of
the evidence cuts against the verdict and where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict
were to stand.” Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 2006).
A. The $45 million damages verdict
“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made
of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” 35
U.S.C. § 284. The Federal Circuit has established two basic methods for determining a
reasonable royalty:
Two alternative categories of infringement compensation are the patentee’s lost

profits and the reasonable royalty he would have received through arms-length
bargaining. . . .
The second, more common approach, called the hypothetical negotiation or the
“willing licensor-willing licensee” approach, attempts to ascertain the royalty
upon which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an
agreement just before infringement began.
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
This case involves patents for electronics technology developed by Hitachi and
transferred to Mondis. As Plaintiff’s expert Bratic explained in his expert report, and the parties
do not dispute, the relevant patents transferred from Hitachi to Mondis are the DDC patents,
which form two patent families: 1) the ’090 patent family, which relates to DDC/2 and DDC/2B
technology; and 2) the ‘812 patent family, which relates to DDC/CI and later technologies.
(Walsh 11/28/18 Dec. Ex. A at ¶ 10.) The ’180 patent is a member of the ’090 patent family;
technical expert Lamm testified that there were eight patents in the ’090 patent family, and Bratic
agreed. (Tr. 1045:10-12; 1099:18-21.) Bratic contended as well that his observations, based on
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review of over 25 relevant license agreements, fit with a document provided by Hitachi to a
California court, which indicates that Hitachi generally applied a “DDC Royalty Norm,” which
Bratic explained as follows:
At the time, the DDC Royalty Norm required licensees of the DDC Patents to pay
Hitachi a royalty rate of either: (1)1% for all DDC-compliant monitors, regardless
of whether they complied with the DDC/2 and DDC/2B or the DDC/CI standard;
or (2) 0.25% for monitors compliant with the DDC/2 and DDC/2B (“Pre-
DDC/CI”) standard and 1.75% for monitors compliant with the DDC/CI (“Post-
DDC/CI”) standard (or any smaller or larger percentage for Pre-DDC/CI and
Post-DDC/CI compliant monitors so long as the sum of the corresponding royalty
percentages was 2%).
(Walsh 11/28/18 Dec. Ex. A at ¶ 48.) Bratic concluded that the “implicit royalty rate” for a
license for the ‘090 family of patents was 0.25%. (Id.; Id. at ¶ 222.)
Mondis contends that its prior licenses were negotiated on a “threshold basis,” charging a
royalty for use of the DDC technology, rather than the use of particular patents. (Tr. 966:7-18.)
The royalty rate did not change according to the number of patents licensed. (Id.)
Bratic also stated that the past licenses showed a two-tiered rate schedule with a lower
pre-litigation royalty rate and a post-litigation royalty rate that was three times higher. (Walsh
11/28/18 Dec. Ex. A at ¶¶ 46, 47, 226.) Bratic characterized these rates as reflecting an
“uncertainty discount,” with the pre-litigation rate at one-third of the post-litigation rate as a
discount because of the uncertainty about patent validity and infringement. (Id.) Bratic
concluded that, because the hypothetical negotiation rate would not include an uncertainty
discount, the hypothetical negotiation would have resulted in a reasonable royalty rate of 0.75%
of sales for the ’180 patent. (Walsh 11/28/18 Dec. Ex. A at ¶ 228.) Mondis therefore contends
that it is entitled to a reasonable royalty of 0.75% of the sales revenue for LG’s infringing
televisions. The parties did not dispute that the entire market value of the 19 million infringing
10
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televisions was about $10 billion. Mondis thus asked for a reasonable royalty of $75 million. As
already stated, at the conclusion of the damages phase, the jury awarded $45 million in
compensatory damages and found that LG’s infringement was willful.
LG challenges the damages verdict on three grounds: 1) Plaintiff’s damages theory
violates the apportionment requirement; 2) Plaintiff’s threshold theory violates Federal Circuit
law; and 3) Plaintiff’s use of a damages multiplier is legally improper.
As to the apportionment requirement, LG’s argument is straightforward: Federal Circuit
law requires that patent damages be apportioned to the incremental value that the patented
invention adds to the end product, and the damages case presented to the jury by Mondis did not
comply. The parties do not dispute the first proposition: Federal Circuit law requires that patent
damages, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284, be so apportioned. The post-trial dispute here concerns
the question of whether Plaintiff’s damages case complies with the apportionment requirement.
At the conclusion of the liability phase of the trial, the jury found that Mondis had proven
that LG infringed claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284, therefore,
Mondis is entitled to, at a minimum, a reasonable royalty. During the damages phase of the trial,
the jury was tasked with determining that reasonable royalty. Under Federal Circuit law, “where
multi-component products are involved, the governing rule is that the ultimate combination of
royalty base and royalty rate must reflect the value attributable to the infringing features of the
product, and no more.” Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The question presently in dispute, then, is whether Mondis presented a damages case that
satisfies this governing rule.
LG begins by pointing to the testimony of Plaintiff’s damages expert, Mr. Bratic, who
stated that he did not do any apportionment because he believed none was necessary. (Tr.
11
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1161:19-21.) Plaintiff’s opposition brief does not dispute that he stated this. Instead, Mondis
contends that it used the approach to apportionment approved by the Federal Circuit in
Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Cisco Sys., 809 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (“CSIRO”). Mondis argues that, in CSIRO:
the apportionment function was achieved through application of comparable

licenses or negotiations, which reflected “already built in apportionment.” 809
F.3d at 1303. That is what happened here.
(Pl.’s Opp. Br. 7.) This the crux of Plaintiff’s argument that it did indeed satisfy the
apportionment requirement: the damages analysis was based on comparable licenses which
reflected “already built-in apportionment,” just as was done in CSIRO. This is unpersuasive,
because this case is distinguishable on the facts.
First, consider the facts and holding of CSIRO, as stated by the Federal Circuit:
Fundamentally, the smallest salable patent-practicing unit principle states that a

damages model cannot reliably apportion from a royalty base without that base
being the smallest salable patent-practicing unit. That principle is inapplicable
here, however, as the district court did not apportion from a royalty base at all.
Instead, the district court began with the parties' negotiations. At trial, the district
court heard evidence that, around the time of the hypothetical negotiations, the
parties themselves had brief discussions regarding Cisco taking a license to the
‘069 patent. According to the district court's factual finding—which is supported
by the testimony at trial—Cisco informally suggested $0.90 per unit as a possible
royalty for the ‘069 patent. The district court used this rate as a lower bound on a
reasonable royalty. For the upper bound, the district court looked to the $1.90 per
unit rate requested by CSIRO in its public Rate Card license offer. Because the
parties' discussions centered on a license rate for the ‘069 patent, this starting
point for the district court’s analysis already built in apportionment. Put
differently, the parties negotiated over the value of the asserted patent, ‘and no
more.’
809 F.3d at 1302-03 (italics added). CSIRO concerned infringement of the ‘069 patent. During
the damages trial, the court heard evidence that Cisco informally suggested a possible royalty of
$0.90 per unit, and that CSIRO had offered Cisco a license to the ‘069 patent on terms stated in a
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standardized form license offer, termed the “Rate Card.” The Federal Circuit found that “this
starting point for the district court’s analysis already built in apportionment.” Id. at 1303. The
Court then explained its reasoning: “the parties negotiated over the value of the asserted patent,
and no more.” Id. The key characteristic of this fact pattern is that the district court used, as a
starting point, evidence of negotiations over the same intellectual property that was the subject of
the infringement action, the ’069 patent. Because the negotiation positions used as a starting
point had a scope identical to the property at issue at trial, there was no need to perform
additional apportionment: the negotiation positions had the apportionment built in, because they
concerned the value of the asserted patent “and no more.”2 Id.
The Federal Circuit has held: “The essential requirement is that the ultimate reasonable
royalty award must be based on the incremental value that the patented invention adds to the end
product.” Ericsson at 1226. In CSIRO, the patentee presented evidence of the incremental value
of the ‘069 patent, as reflected in negotiation positions taken by the parties. Crucially, in the
instant case, Mondis has not argued that any of the previous licenses on which it based its
damages case were limited to the incremental value of the ’180 patent.
The facts of the instant case are thus distinguishable from those in CSIRO. Here, the
starting point was a set of licenses not limited to the ’180 patent, nor to claims 14 and 15 of the
2
The Federal Circuit confirmed this reading of CSIRO in Elbit:
In CSIRO, the district court started with evidence of proposed royalty rates from
the parties' prior attempts at negotiating a license for the patent. Id. at 1300, 1302-
03. We determined that the district court’s analysis was not in error because it
“already built in apportionment” by starting from “discussions centered on a
license rate” for the same patent, those discussions having already informally
apportioned the proposed license rates to the value of the patented technology.
Elbit Sys. Land & C4I Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC, 927 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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’180 patent. Instead, here is Plaintiff’s description of the evidence presented at the damages
trial:
The evidence at trial was that licensing is on a threshold basis where the licensee
pays one price for access to the patented technology, rather than on a patent-by-
patent basis. The price is to use the technology. The number of patents doesn’t
matter. Threshold licensees seek to avoid further exposure on products licensed
and paid for. So after the agreed threshold royalty is paid, there would be no
charge for additional patents, even subsequently acquired ones.
(Pl.’s Opp. Br. 9-10.) Thus, the threshold licenses here were not structured to have a scope
limited to particular patents, but to particular technology. Plaintiff’s opposition brief cites as an
example the 2009 Mondis/LG monitor license agreement, admitted into evidence at trial. Here is
how that license defined its scope:
“Licensed Patents” means any and all patents, utility patents and utility models
that, at any time during the Term or before, are owned or controlled by Mondis
and its Affiliates, and that would be infringed, or that Mondis contends would be
infringed, by a Computer Monitor's compliance with any Video Electronics
Standards Association (VESA) DDC standard, whether the DDC/2B (or prior)
standard or the DDC/CI (or subsequent) standard, a full list of which patents (so
far as Mondis is aware) is set out in Annex 2 hereto, together with all divisions,
continuations, continuations-in-part, reissues and reexaminations thereof, and all
foreign counterparts of any thereof.
(Walsh Dec. Ex. 4/Ex. 2 § 1.12, Plaintiff’s Exhibit MON-0010 at MONLG 00036697.) The
scope of this licensing agreement is all patents that would be infringed by a monitor’s use of the
VESA DDC standard. The provision states that Annex 2 contains a list of the included patents.
Annex 2 identifies by number 17 United States patents, 4 German patents, and 15 Japanese
patents. (Walsh Dec. Ex. 4/Annex 2, Plaintiff’s Exhibit MON-0010 at MONLG 00036710-12.)
Annex 2 includes the ’180 patent in the list. (Id.)
The scope of this exemplary agreement differs substantially from the scope of the
property found to be infringed at trial, claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent. The 2009 license
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covered 35 other patents insofar as those patents would be infringed by use of the VESA DDC
standard. The 2009 license does not have apportionment built in, because the scope of the
license is far beyond claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent. As Mondis explained in its brief, the
scope of the license is defined by the infringing use of the VESA DDC standard, without regard
for whether claims 14 or 15 of the ’180 patent are infringed.
As Mondis contends, the other licenses on which Bratic based his analysis had the same
structure. None of these licenses can be said to have apportionment built in. None of these
licenses reflects the value attributable to the features of the product which infringe claims 14 and
15 of the ’180 patent, and no more. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226.
This leads to LG’s second challenge, which focuses on the threshold basis. Mondis built
its damages case on evidence of previous licenses which were all structured on a threshold basis.
Mondis defined threshold licensing as follows: “Threshold licensing involves a single rate for
access to the technology of the patent family being licensed, regardless of the number of patents,
and regardless of how many of them block.” (Pl.’s Opp. Br. 12.) Mondis now claims that, also,
these threshold licenses built in apportionment, but this is paradoxical: a license which is
designed so that the underlying patents have no incremental value cannot at the same time be
evidence of “the incremental value that the patented invention adds to the end product.”3
Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226.
By relying on this “threshold” theory of value, Mondis has truly painted itself into a
corner. Having built its damages case on licenses which assigned no value to particular patents,
3
This is not to say that threshold licenses cannot be input for the reasonable royalty analysis.
Although the Federal Circuit does not require that comparable licenses show “identity of
circumstances,” VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 767 F.3d 1308, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the analysis
must account for the differences. Elbit, 927 F.3d at 1300. Mondis did not account for the
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but only on access to DDC technology, it cannot now claim that such licenses isolate the
incremental value of the ’180 patent to the final product. The problem is not that these licenses
are simply too different from the subject matter of the hypothetical negotiation, but that Mondis
did not account for or adjust for the differences so as to satisfy the apportionment requirement.
The Federal Circuit has stated:
Prior licenses, however, are almost never perfectly analogous to the infringement
action. For example, allegedly comparable licenses may cover more patents than
are at issue in the action, include cross-licensing terms, cover foreign intellectual
property rights, or, as here, be calculated as some percentage of the value of a
multi-component product. Testimony relying on licenses must account for such
distinguishing facts when invoking them to value the patented invention.
Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1227 (citation omitted). Neither Mondis nor its witnesses accounted for
the distinguishing facts when invoking the threshold licenses to value the patented invention.
LG also argues that Mondis’ damages case captured the value of the VESA DDC
standard rather than the incremental value of the ’180 patent. Mondis, in opposition, denies this,
but, given Plaintiff’s definition of “threshold licensing,” as just quoted, it is undeniable:
“Threshold licensing involves a single rate for access to the technology of the patent family
being licensed, regardless of the number of patents, and regardless of how many of them block.”
(Pl.’s Opp. Br. 12.) The “single rate for access to the technology of the patent family” is a price
for access to the technology that enables use of the DDC standard. The previous licenses
charged a royalty based on access to the DDC standard; Mondis has pointed to no license which
charged a royalty based on use of the ’180 patent alone.
Bratic testified that he relied on the opinions of Mondis’ technical expert, Mr. Lamm, as
to all technical questions. (Tr. 1070:18-22.) Lamm testified that four patents in the ‘090 family
differences between the threshold licenses and the conditions of the hypothetical negotiation.
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were standard-essential patents.4 (Tr. 1050:11-20.) At trial, LG confirmed that Bratic
understood from Lamm’s testimony that four patents could block a manufacturer’s use of the
Plug and Play standard. (Tr. 1165:8-18.) LG then asked Bratic if that testimony changed
Bratic’s opinion that LG would have paid the full threshold rate to get a license to only one
patent of those four, and it did not. (Tr. 1165:19-1166:2.) As LG contends, with this point,
Bratic moved into an insupportable position, as he maintained that the result of the hypothetical
negotiation was that LG would have paid top dollar for a license that LG, without licenses to the
three other standard-essential patents, could do nothing with commercially. No reasonable jury
could accept this proposition, that a business would willingly agree to pay the threshold rate but
receive nothing usable in return. And, indeed, why would any business pay anything for a
license that did not allow that business to make and sell its product? If there are four patents that
are essential to the DDC2B standard, of what value is a license to only one of the four?
In the instant case, there is good reason to wonder whether the “threshold licensing”
approach conflicts with the principles of CSIRO. Consider again Plaintiff’s description of the
evidence presented at the damages trial:
The evidence at trial was that licensing is on a threshold basis where the licensee
pays one price for access to the patented technology, rather than on a patent-by-
patent basis. The price is to use the technology. The number of patents doesn’t
matter. Threshold licensees seek to avoid further exposure on products licensed
and paid for. So after the agreed threshold royalty is paid, there would be no
charge for additional patents, even subsequently acquired ones.
(Pl.’s Opp. Br. 9-10.) Mondis states that, with a threshold license, the licensee pays one price
for access to the patented technology. As already discussed, the 2009 Mondis/LG monitor
4
To be fully accurate, Lamm actually testified that four and one-half patents out of the eight in
the ‘090 patent family were standard-essential patents: the ‘088, ‘970, ‘342 and the ‘180 patents
are standard-essential, and the ‘090 patent is “half standard-essential.” (Tr. 1047:21-1050:10.)
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license agreement, admitted into evidence at trial, defined the scope of that license as those
patents that would be infringed by a monitor’s “compliance” with the VESA DDC standard,
whether the DDC/2B (or prior) standard or the DDC/CI (or subsequent) standard. (Walsh Dec.
Ex. 4/Ex. 2 § 1.12, Plaintiff’s Exhibit MON-0010 at MONLG 00036697.) Such a license does
not capture the incremental value of the patented technology apart from “value flowing to the
patent from the standard’s adoption.” CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1305. Mondis’ threshold model
rests on the predicate that the constituent (licensed) patents have no value apart from their
standard-essential status, which enables them to block unlicensed use of a standard. Does the
threshold model assign any value to patents apart from their ability to block? If a threshold
license is negotiated without concern for the number of licensed patents, and if the royalty rate
for existing licenses does not change when a new patent, such as the ’180 patent, issues, is it
possible for that royalty rate to capture the incremental value of a particular individual patent?
Mondis argues, in opposition, that LG has cited no case in which a court rejected use of
a threshold license. That, of course, does not mean that any court has ever addressed the issue
or found that a past threshold license already built in apportionment, nor does it solve the
substantial problems with Plaintiff’s damages case.
LG is correct that Mondis and Bratic confused the value of the ’180 patent with the value
of the DDC/Plug and Play standard.5 The Federal Circuit has stated:
Just as we apportion damages for a patent that covers a small part of a device, we
must also apportion damages for SEPs that cover only a small part of a standard.
In other words, a royalty award for a SEP must be apportioned to the value of the
patented invention (or at least to the approximate value thereof), not the value of
the standard as a whole. A jury must be instructed accordingly. Our decision does
5
At trial and in the post-trial briefing, the parties appeared to use the terms “DDC standard” and
“Plug and Play standard” interchangeably. (See Tr. 968:2-3: “DDC2B is the core of the Plug-N-
Play Technology.”)
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not suggest that all SEPs make up only a small part of the technology in the
standard. Indeed, if a patentee can show that his invention makes up the entire
value of the standard, an apportionment instruction probably would not be
appropriate.
Turning to the value of a patent's standardization, we conclude that Supreme

Court precedent also requires apportionment of the value of the patented
technology from the value of its standardization. . . . In other words, the patent
holder should only be compensated for the approximate incremental benefit
derived from his invention.
This is particularly true for SEPs. When a technology is incorporated into a

standard, it is typically chosen from among different options. Once incorporated
and widely adopted, that technology is not always used because it is the best or
the only option; it is used because its use is necessary to comply with the
standard. In other words, widespread adoption of standard essential technology is
not entirely indicative of the added usefulness of an innovation over the prior art.
This is not meant to imply that SEPs never claim valuable technological
contributions. We merely hold that the royalty for SEPs should reflect the
approximate value of that technological contribution, not the value of its
widespread adoption due to standardization.
Because SEP holders should only be compensated for the added benefit of their
inventions, the jury must be told to differentiate the added benefit from any value
the innovation gains because it has become standard essential. Although the jury,
as the fact finder, should determine the appropriate value for that added benefit
and may do so with some level of imprecision, we conclude that they must be told
to consider the difference between the added value of the technological invention
and the added value of that invention’s standardization.
Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232-33 (citations omitted). This states clearly that, when dealing with a
standard-essential patent, the value added by the patented technology must be differentiated from
the value added by the standardization of that technology. At trial, Mondis presented extensive
evidence – the licensing history – about the value of the DDC standard and the royalties that
various manufacturers agreed to pay in order to manufacture monitors and televisions which
incorporated the standard. No attention was paid to “the difference between the added value of
the technological invention and the added value of that invention’s standardization.” Id. at 1233.
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Mondis did not address the question of what value was added by the invention’s
standardization. This is error under the Federal Circuit’s decision in CSIRO: the Federal Circuit
found that the district court, which had increased the royalty rate because of the patent’s status as
standard-essential, had erred. 809 F.3d at 1305. And the Federal Circuit did not stop there: it
proceeded to question whether the starting rates (the royalty rate bounds of $.090 and $1.90)6 for
the analysis had been misvalued because of considerations of standardization, and instructed the
district court, on remand, to “consider whether the initial rates taken from the parties’ discussions
should be adjusted for standardization.” Id. at 1305-06.
Mondis, in opposition, contends that Mr. Bratic accounted for differences between the
comparable licenses and the hypothetical negotiation, and points to the adjustment of a 1% rate
to .25%. Mondis does not explain this in the opposition brief, but it appears to refer to Bratic’s
efforts to separate the royalty rate for the ’090 family of patents from the royalty rate for patents
from the ’812 family. Bratic did thus make some effort to adjust for the difference in scope
between the comparable licenses and the hypothetical negotiation: he attempted to carve out the
value contributed by the ’090 patent family. The problem, of course, is that the entire ’090
patent family is not at issue in this case; only one patent from that family, the ’180 patent, is at
issue. A damages model that begins with previous threshold licenses, and attempts to adjust the
royalty based on patent family membership, has taken a step in the right direction, but still has
not apportioned to the incremental value added by the ’180 patent.
In its opposition, Mondis contends that “Mr. Bratic’s opinion about the value of the ’180
patent was based on the patent’s own technical value.” (Pl.’s Opp. Br. 22.) While it is true that
6
Note that these are the same rates that the Federal Circuit determined reflected “already built in
apportionment.” Id. at 1303.
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Bratic did state opinions about the value of the ’180 patent, that does not undo the fact that the
“threshold license” theory treated the value of each individual patent as equal to the value of the
standard, contrary to Ericsson.
LG also argues that Mondis has violated the evidentiary corollary to the Federal Circuit’s
governing rule:
Our cases have added to that governing legal rule an important evidentiary
principle. The point of the evidentiary principle is to help our jury system reliably
implement the substantive statutory requirement of apportionment of royalty
damages to the invention's value. The principle, applicable specifically to the
choice of a royalty base, is that, where a multi-component product is at issue and
the patented feature is not the item which imbues the combination of the other
features with value, care must be taken to avoid misleading the jury by placing
undue emphasis on the value of the entire product. It is not that an appropriately
apportioned royalty award could never be fashioned by starting with the entire
market value of a multi-component product—by, for instance, dramatically
reducing the royalty rate to be applied in those cases—it is that reliance on the
entire market value might mislead the jury, who may be less equipped to
understand the extent to which the royalty rate would need to do the work in such
instances.
Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226-27. LG argues that Mondis misled the jury during the damages phase
by placing undue emphasis on the value of the entire product. The jury’s decision here is
opaque: we know the verdict, but not the underlying reasoning, and cannot know what rationale
led them to their decision. Nonetheless, the Court agrees with LG that Mondis repeatedly
emphasized the entire market value of LG’s accused televisions, $10 billion, and that this may
have skewed the damages horizon for the jury. As the Federal Circuit has held:
We have articulated that, where multi-component products are accused of

infringement, the royalty base should not be larger than the smallest salable unit
embodying the patented invention. We have cautioned against reliance on use of
the entire market value of a multi-component product that includes a patented
component because it cannot help but skew the damages horizon for the jury,
regardless of the contribution of the patented component to this revenue.
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Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 894 F.3d 1258, 1270 (Fed. Cir.
2018). It seems quite possible that Mondis may have placed undue emphasis on the value of the
entire product and did not particularly take care to avoid skewing the damages horizon for the
jury. Mondis did not offer the jury a method to estimate the incremental value of the ’180 patent
from the much broader prior licenses.
The Court finds it possible, even probable, that Mondis’ overall approach did skew the
damages horizon for the jury, even if it did not mislead the jury. As already noted, Mondis failed
to adjust for the differences between the threshold approach to valuation in the previous licenses
from the apportioning approach to patent damages required by the Federal Circuit. Moreover,
Mondis did not attempt to disentangle the incremental value added by the ’180 patent to the
finished product from the value of the DDC standard captured in the prior licenses.
` Third, LG argues that Mondis’ use of a damages multiplier – which Mondis called the
“uncertainty discount” – is legally improper and not supported by substantial evidence. LG
contends that the use of the damages multiplier conflicts with Federal Circuit law, citing
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc, 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), which
held:
At all times, the damages inquiry must concentrate on compensation for the
economic harm caused by infringement of the claimed invention. . . .
Thus, the trial court must carefully tie proof of damages to the claimed invention's
footprint in the market place.
LG argues that the use of the damages multiplier allows compensation based not on economic
harm caused by infringement of the claimed invention, as well as compensation not carefully
tied to the claimed invention’s footprint in the marketplace. LG argues, furthermore, that the
damages multiplier is a penalty provision intended to discourage licensees from challenging the
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validity of any licensed patents.
In opposition, Mondis argues that the tripling of the royalty rate to remove the effect of
the uncertainty discount was both supported by substantial evidence and legally proper.7 First,
Mondis contends that LG’s expert Hansen agreed that this was appropriate, which is correct,
although Hansen did not testify that he believed that tripling the royalty rate was appropriate in
this case. Hansen testified:
A. Uncertainty generally results in a little bit lower royalty rate, so, a patent
that’s determined to be valid and infringed, there’s upward pressure on the
rate to pay for such a license.
Q. Right. And that upward pressure, you criticized Mr. Bratic for saying that
the rate would have been three times the DDC norm rate of .25 percent.
You thought that was too much upward pressure. Right?
A. Yes. Nobody’s ever paid that.
(Tr. 1230:6-14.) Furthermore, Hansen also testified:
Q. So, an upward evaluation is something that’s appropriate and it’s up to the jury
to decide how much that should be in this case based on the facts that they've
heard. Correct?
A. Yes. It’s the jury’s decision.
(Tr. 1232:13-17.) LG’s expert thus conceded that an increase in damages due to the
uncertainty discount is a proper matter for the jury to consider.
Moreover, Mondis argues correctly that Hansen’s concession is in accord with Federal
7
In short, the theory here is that a patent that is known to be valid and infringed has a greater
market value than one for which there is uncertainty about validity and infringement. As Bratic
pointed out, the hypothetical negotiation presumes validity and infringement: “now, under the
hypothetical negotiation, we have the ironclad presumption of validity and infringement.” (Tr.
1085:4-6.) This is correct under Federal Circuit law. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325 (“The
hypothetical negotiation also assumes that the asserted patent claims are valid and infringed.”)
Thus, Mondis argues, it is appropriate for the jury to increase the award of compensatory
damages to reflect the absence of uncertainty about validity and infringement.
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Circuit law. The Federal Circuit has recognized the appropriateness of considering an
uncertainty discount in the damages inquiry. This is shown most clearly in Spectralytics, Inc. v.
Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011), in which the Federal Circuit reviewed a
jury verdict awarding a reasonable royalty for compensatory patent infringement damages. In
deciding a post-trial motion, the district court had found that the jury’s verdict, which reflected
a “very deep” uncertainty discount, was not unreasonable:
In this case, the significance of the price paid by Preco to acquire Spectralytics in
2003 depends on what that price suggests about the outcome of the hypothetical
license negotiation in 1998. The jury could reasonably have concluded that the
former had little to do with the latter. At the time of the 2003 sale, Spectralytics
knew that the value of the '277 patent ranged from nothing to possibly tens of
millions of dollars, depending on (among other things) whether Noble and Cordis
were infringing and whether, if sued for infringement, Noble and Cordis could
successfully challenge the patent’s validity. Spectralytics suspected that Noble
and Cordis might be infringing the '277 patent and hoped that the patent would
survive any challenge to its validity, but Spectralytics did not really know for
certain, and it could not really know for certain without paying millions of dollars
in legal fees to launch lengthy and risky litigation. Thus, the value assigned to the
‘277 patent in 2003 would have reflected a very deep discount.
Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 650 F. Supp. 2d 900, 915-16 (D. Minn. 2009). The Federal
Circuit reviewed and affirmed, specifically stating that it agreed with the district court that it
was appropriate for the jury to weigh this “very deep discount” in computing damages. 649
F.3d at 1347. In short, the Federal Circuit agreed that it was reasonable for the jury to apply a
pre-litigation uncertainty discount which deeply reduced the patent’s value. LG has not pointed
to any material difference between the uncertainty discount weighed by the jury in
Spectralytics and the uncertainty discount in the instant case.
Similarly, recognition of the uncertainty discount is implicit in this statement in Prism
Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017): “the earlier suit’s
settlement figure may be too low to the extent that it was lowered by the patent owner’s
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discounting of value by a probability of losing on validity or infringement.” Discounting the
value of a patent to adjust for uncertainty about validity or infringement appears to be
uncontroversial in Federal Circuit jurisprudence.
Because LG’s expert conceded that it was reasonable for the jury to consider
application of the uncertainty discount in determining a reasonable royalty, and because the
Federal Circuit recognizes such an adjustment to patent value to be proper, the only remaining
question is whether the evidence supports the extent to which the jury adjusted damages. The
parties agree that all we have from the jury is the $45 million verdict, with no explanation of
the underlying computation. The parties agree that a jury which applied a .25% royalty rate to
the $10 billion in revenue would award $25 million. The parties also are in agreement in
speculating that the $45 million verdict likely includes a $20 million upward adjustment. (See
LG’s Br. 26 n.9; Pl.’s Opp. Br. 16.) If this speculation is correct, the jury applied the .25%
royalty rate to the $10 billion in revenue, and then adjusted the $25 million upward by 80%
($20 million). The question is, then, whether the evidence supports an 80% upward
adjustment.
This Court concludes that it does, for two reasons. First, on cross-examination, LG’s
expert Hansen admitted that he had testified in a prior case that he had adjusted for the
uncertainty discount by tripling the royalty rate:
Q. Do you recall, sir, testifying in a case in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania called University of Pittsburgh of the
Commonwealth System of Higher Education vs. Varian?
A. I do.
Q. Did you testify in that case under oath?
A. Yes, I did.
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MR. BLACK: And could we pull up Page 97 of the transcript of that case, and I'd
like you to highlight lines 4 to 13 please.
Q. Did someone, not me, ask you the question:
"And did you, using that provision, did you attempt to demonstrate what the
impact of an assumption of validity and infringement would have with respect to
the royalty rates at issue in the Stanford license?”
Did you give this answer?
"Yes. For the royalty rates in this particular license, I simply took the effective
royalty rates that I calculated, multiplied them by three to reflect validity and
infringement. So this would be illustrative of the range of rates after accounting
for validity and infringement which would range in the percentages on the far
right-hand column."
Do you recall that?
A. Yes.
(Tr. 1230:23-1231:22.) The jury was entitled to conclude from this evidence that tripling the
royalty to adjust for the uncertainty discount could be reasonable and valid.
Second, Mondis points to the evidence about the Innolux jury verdict. The jury in this
case heard testimony from both Bratic and Spiro about the 2011 Innolux jury verdict. Spiro
testified:
Q. All right. So, there are three defendants when the trial started and we're down
to one defendant. Who's that defendant?
A. We were left just with Innolux.
Q. And on June 27, 2011, what happened?
A. We got a verdict.
Q. And what was the rate that the jury determined for televisions in that case?
A.That was three-quarters of a percent.
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Q. And which patents did the verdict for televisions cover?
A. They covered the 2B patents. That was the three that I mentioned before, all
the 2B patents.
Q. Which just -- do you know the patent numbers that were actually –
A. Yes. Again, based on the last three numbers, it's the ’180, the ’342 and the
’090.
Q. Okay. Did Innolux appeal the award, the jury verdict?
A. Yes, they did. But they eventually settled it.
Q. Did the settlement involve any reduction of the jury's award?
A. No, none at all. They paid the full rate, whatever was determined.
Q. So, under the agreement with Innolux, what royalty rate did Innolux pay
Mondis for the DDC patents for its televisions?
A. It was three-quarters of a percent, 0.75 percent.
(Tr. 989:17-990:19.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Bratic testified:
Q. All right, sir. Let's move on to another topic you covered in your direct
testimony, namely that the Innolux verdict confirmed -- further confirmed your
tripling opinion, right?
A. No, I don't believe I said that.
Q. Well, you did discuss the Innolux decision as confirmatory of your .75
percent rate, right?
A. Of the .75 percent rate, but there was no trebling.
Q. Okay.
A. That was a verdict that reflected validity and infringement because the
jury reached a conclusion of a royalty of .75 percent for TVs.
Q. I see. So you're saying you're not exactly sure how they got there, but they
wound up at the same place you did through tripling. Is that right?
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A. No, the point -- no, not quite.
Q. Okay. Well, at the end of the day, the jury there found a rate of .75 percent
applicable for televisions, right?
A. Correct.
Q. And that's the same -- same number in that red box in your summary chart,
right?
A. It's consistent with that number.
(Tr. 1146:11 - 1147:8.) Although Bratic denied that the Innolux jury’s .75% royalty rate
included a tripling uncertainty adjustment, he admitted that the jury verdict “reflected validity
and infringement.”
The jury in this case thus heard that the Innolux jury awarded damages using a royalty
rate of .75%, and that Innolux eventually settled the case by agreeing to pay that rate. The jury
also heard that Mondis believed that the .25% royalty rate should be tripled to adjust for the
uncertainty discount. The jury had substantial evidence to support a determination that an 80%
increase in royalties to adjust for the uncertainty discount was proper and supported by the
evidence, since Innolux agreed to a settlement paying triple the .25% rate.
Furthermore, Mondis aptly cites Prism, 849 F.3d at 1369: “a settlement reached after a
determination of liability (though subject to appeal) is particularly reliable as evidence of
value.” This is entirely on point, since the Innolux settlement was reached after a
determination of validity and infringement. Thus, under Prism, it is particularly reliable as
evidence of value. In this case, the parties agree that the jury seems to have chosen a royalty
rate that reflects an 80% upward adjustment for the uncertainty discount, which is somewhere
in between the .25% rate that LG thought was reasonable, and the .75% rate Mondis thought
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was reasonable. The evidence supports the jury’s decision.
In conclusion, while this Court has determined that Plaintiff’s damages case is
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the jury’s damages verdict, the problem lies in the
failure to apportion, not in the use of the uncertainty discount. In a new trial, Plaintiff may
again present the jury with its uncertainty discount theory.
The present case is similar to Wordtech Sys. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609
F.3d 1308, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010), in which the Federal Circuit, applying the law of the Ninth
Circuit, reversed the denial of a Rule 59(a) motion and remanded for a new trial on damages.
In short, in Wordtech, the Federal Circuit determined that the plaintiff’s comparable license
evidence did not support the verdict. Id. In the instant case, this Court finds that Mondis failed
to present a damages case which satisfies the apportionment requirement fundamental to the
law of patent infringement damages:
When the accused technology does not make up the whole of the accused product,
apportionment is required. The ultimate combination of royalty base and royalty
rate must reflect the value attributable to the infringing features of the product,
and no more.
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., 879 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Garretson v. Clark, 111
U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . . must in every case give evidence tending to separate
or apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented feature
and the unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not
conjectural or speculative.”) In making its case for damages, Mondis failed to remove the
value of non-infringing features from its damages estimates. This Court finds that, as a matter
of law, Plaintiff’s damages case did not satisfy the apportionment requirement. As in Finjan,
“[f]urther apportionment was required to reflect the value of the patented technology compared
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to the value of the unpatented elements.” 879 F.3d at 1311.
As already stated, under Third Circuit law, “[a] new trial should be granted only where
the great weight of the evidence cuts against the verdict and where a miscarriage of justice would
result if the verdict were to stand.” Springer, 435 F.3d at 274. This standard has been met here.
Plaintiff’s damages case, as a matter of law, is insufficient to support the damages verdict, due to
the failure to apportion. Because Mondis failed to comply with the apportionment requirement,
the jury did not hear evidence sufficient to support the verdict. This Court determines that a
miscarriage of justice would occur if the verdict were allowed to stand. The Third Circuit’s
requirements for granting a motion for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59, have been met.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s damages case is insufficient, as a matter of law, to
support the jury’s damages verdict. The damages verdict will be vacated. The only remaining
question is one that has not been briefed: has Plaintiff now waived its right to a damages award?
In Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 875 F.3d 651, 666 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the Federal Circuit
held:
But, as explained above, a patent owner may waive its right to a damages award
when it deliberately abandons valid theories of recovery in a singular pursuit of an
ultimately invalid damages theory. When a plaintiff deliberately takes a risk by
relying at trial exclusively on a damages theory that ultimately proves
unsuccessful, and, when challenged, does not dispute that it failed to present an
alternative case for damages, a district court does not abuse its discretion by
declining to give that plaintiff multiple chances to correct deficiencies in its
arguments or the record.
The parties must now have an opportunity to brief this issue, so that this Court may decide
whether, having vacated the damages verdict, to grant the motion for a new damages trial. The
parties shall confer and present to the Court a briefing schedule for this next phase of hearing the
motion for a new trial.
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B. The willfulness verdict
LG moves for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial, on the
ground that no reasonable jury could have found that LG’s infringement was willful. “We
review the denial of a motion for JMOL . . . under the law of the pertinent regional circuit.”
Power Integrations, 843 F.3d at 1326. “A motion for judgment as a matter of law under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable
inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.”
Avaya Inc., RP v. Telecom Labs, Inc., 838 F.3d 354, 373 (3d Cir. 2016).
In Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016), the Supreme
Court revised the willfulness standard, eliminating the objective prong from the standard, but
leaving the subjective prong intact: “The subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional
or knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was
objectively reckless.” Under this revised standard, Mondis bore the burden of proof at trial, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that LG’s infringement was subjectively intentional or
knowing.
In brief, this Court cannot conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding of willfulness. Ample evidence shows that the parties had been litigating and
negotiating licenses regarding the DDC patents It is undisputed that Mondis first sued LG,
along with other defendants, for infringement of the ‘090 and other patents in 2007, and that
LG resolved that litigation by entering into a settlement agreement with Mondis in September
of 2009. It is also undisputed that this original case against LG went to trial after LG settled,
and that, on June 27, 2011, the jury returned a verdict that found that the televisions of
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defendant Innolux infringed claim 14 of the ’180 patent, which is at issue in the present case.
The jury in the present case heard extensive testimony about the history of the dispute from Mr.
Spiro, among others. (See, e.g., Tr. 98:9-128:9.) It is also undisputed that, in the instant case,
the period of alleged infringement extended from the date of issuance of the ’180 patent in
2009 until the ’180 patent expired in February of 2014. There is ample evidence from which a
jury could reasonably conclude that LG’s infringement of the ’180 patent through the
manufacture and sale of televisions was, for at least some of the period of alleged infringement,
done with knowledge that LG was infringing asserted claims of the ’180 patent. Substantial
evidence supports the jury’s determination of willful infringement. The motion for judgment as
a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial, on the matter of the jury’s finding of
willfulness, will be denied.
The decision to vacate the jury’s damages verdict impacts several pending motions.
Because the issue of the amount of damages is now unresolved, the motion for enhanced
damages, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284, is premature: there is no damages award to enhance.
Because this case has not reached final judgment, the motion for a declaration of an exceptional
case, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, is also premature. For the same reason, the motion for
prejudgment and post-judgment interest is premature. These premature motions will be denied.
For these reasons,
IT IS on this 24th day of September, 2019
ORDERED that LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and/or
a new trial under Rule 59 regarding invalidity (Docket Entry No. 486) is DENIED; and it is
further
ORDERED that LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and/or
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a new trial under Rule 59 regarding noninfringement (Docket Entry No. 487) is DENIED; and
it is further
ORDERED that LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), a new
trial under Rule 59, and/or remittitur regarding damages and willfulness (Docket Entry No.
489) is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and decision is RESERVED in part pending
further briefing; and it is further
ORDERED that the jury verdict returned on April 12, 2019, finding that LG’s
infringement was willful and awarding $45 million in compensatory damages, is VACATED
in part, and the jury’s verdict awarding $45 million in compensatory damages is hereby
VACATED, but the jury verdict of willful infringement is unchanged; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall confer and present to the Court a schedule for briefing
the issue of the application of Promega to the motion for a new trial on damages; and it is
further
ORDERED that Mondis’ motion for enhanced damages (Docket Entry No. 493),
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284, is DENIED without prejudice as premature; and it is further
ORDERED that Mondis’ motion for attorney fees (Docket Entry No. 491), pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 285, is DENIED without prejudice as premature; and it is further
ORDERED that Mondis’ motion for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest (Docket
Entry No. 495) is DENIED without prejudice as premature.
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____________________________________
:
:
:
v. :
: OPINION & ORDER
et al., :
:
Defendants. :
____________________________________:
CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on the motion by Defendants LG Electronics, Inc.
and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (collectively, “LG”) for judgment as a matter of law under
Rule 50(b), a new trial under Rule 59, and/or remittitur regarding damages and willfulness.
This Court had previously considered this motion and, in the Opinion of September 24, 2019,
granted the motion in part, denied it in part, and reserved decision in part, pending further
briefing. The Court ordered supplementary briefing on the question of the application of the
Promega case. After the supplementary briefing was completed, the Court held further oral
argument on April 8, 2020. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion for a new
trial, and denies both the motion for judgment as a matter of law and the motion for remittitur.
In the Order of September 24, 2019, this Court held that the jury verdict returned on
April 12, 2019, finding that LG’s infringement was willful and awarding $45 million in
compensatory damages, was vacated in part: the Court vacated the jury’s verdict awarding $45
million in compensatory damages, but did not alter the jury verdict of willful infringement.
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The parties then submitted supplemental briefing on the question of whether Plaintiff had
waived its right to a damages award, pursuant to Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 875 F.3d
651, 666 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and argued this question at the telephonic hearing.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not waived its right to a damages award, and that
Promega is distinguishable. In Promega, the Federal Circuit held:
But, as explained above, a patent owner may waive its right to a damages award
when it deliberately abandons valid theories of recovery in a singular pursuit of an
ultimately invalid damages theory. When a plaintiff deliberately takes a risk by
relying at trial exclusively on a damages theory that ultimately proves
unsuccessful, and, when challenged, does not dispute that it failed to present an
alternative case for damages, a district court does not abuse its discretion by
declining to give that plaintiff multiple chances to correct deficiencies in its
arguments or the record.
875 F.3d at 666. This Court has ruled that the principal damages theory Mondis pursued at trial,
the threshold theory, is not valid under Federal Circuit law, for failure to satisfy the
apportionment requirement. The Court had queried whether Mondis, in its pursuit of this invalid
damages theory, had abandoned all valid theories, and whether the Promega decision controlled
the outcome of this case. The Court concludes that Promega does not determine the proper
remedy for the defects in Mondis’ damages case at trial.
At the hearing, Mondis argued persuasively that, under both Federal Circuit and Third
Circuit law, this Court cannot properly grant LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. This
is correct. Under Third Circuit law:
Entry of judgment as a matter of law is a sparingly invoked remedy, granted only

if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it
the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence
from which a jury reasonably could find liability.
Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). At trial, LG’s
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expert, Mr. Hansen, based on a theory that apportioned, testified that his expert opinion was that
Mondis was entitled to damages in the amount of $1.9 million. Hansen’s opinion constitutes
sufficient evidence from which a jury might reasonably award damages.
The parties do not dispute that the Federal Circuit reviews JMOL motions under the law
of the regional Circuit. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 918 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In
SRI, the district court was in the Third Circuit, and the Federal Circuit applied the Marra
standard, quoted above. Id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
Mondis, the Court cannot conclude that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury
could reasonably award some amount of damages. 1 This Court may not, therefore, grant LG’s
Rule 50(b) motion. As Mondis argued, that option is not available. This Court need not strain to
apply Promega, because it may not be construed to contradict the Third Circuit law which is
controlling on this issue. 2 Promega cannot justify a grant of JMOL under these facts. LG’s
motion for judgment of no damages, as a matter of law, must be denied.
1
Moreover, LG contends, incorrectly, that this Court, in its Opinion vacating the jury’s damages
award, “rejected Plaintiffs’ reliance on their license agreements.” (LG Supp. Br. 17.) This Court
found Plaintiff’s threshold theory to violate the Federal Circuit’s apportionment requirement; it
did not reject the use of prior licenses as evidence relevant to the Georgia-Pacific analysis.
2
The Court observes, however, that Mondis effectively distinguished Promega on the facts: the
Federal Circuit found that the patentee had expressly disavowed any claim to reasonable royalty
damages, relying exclusively on a lost profits damages theory at both trial and during litigation
of the subsequent JMOL motion. 875 F.3d at 661. After an adverse Supreme Court decision
invalidated the lost damages approach, the Federal Circuit held that, in essence, the patentee,
having waived any reasonable royalty, had run out of options for patent damages. Id. at 666. As
the Federal Circuit stated, it was “an unusual case,” and it is not analogous. Id. LG has not
persuaded this Court that Mondis has run out of options for a patent damages case. Certainly,
having put on a case seeking reasonable royalties, Mondis cannot be said to have disavowed a
claim to reasonable royalty damages, as Promega had. Mondis may have offered expert
testimony for an invalid theory, but that is quite different from waiving an entire category of
damage theories, as Promega did.
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In the alternative, LG moves for a new trial, or remittitur to reduce the amount of
damages to $1,904,998 million. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states:
The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues—and to
any party—as follows: (A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial
has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court . . . .
“The authority to grant a new trial resides in the exercise of sound discretion by the trial court.”
Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir. 1995). This Court finds that,
having already vacated the jury’s damages verdict, it is in the interest of justice to grant the
motion for a new trial on the amount of damages. Although, at trial, Mondis relied principally
on a theory of damages that did not meet the requirements of Federal Circuit law, the record
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could make a damages determination
that would be legally valid. The best and most just remedy here is a new trial. Indeed, LG
sought a new damages trial as one outcome in its initial motion to vacate the damages verdict. 3
Although, in its initial response to LG’s moving brief, Mondis sought to defend the jury award,
once this Court issued its decision to vacate the damages verdict, and Ordered supplementary
briefing, Mondis requested a new damages trial.
Mondis now argues that one important reason why there should be a new trial is that 35
U.S.C. § 284 requires the Court to award damages not less than a reasonable royalty. There is
merit to what Mondis contends, even if it may not be as absolute as Mondis would like. The
3
In the supplemental briefing, LG shifted course and argued that the Court should not allow
Mondis to proceed with a new trial premised on an undisclosed theory of damages. LG here
conflates two distinct issues. The Court today grants LG’s motion for a new trial, but does not
have before it any application from Mondis to present a new damages theory at that trial. While
this may well be the subject of future litigation in this case, the Court will cross that bridge if and
when it comes to it. Furthermore, LG appears to have forgotten that this Court has before it a
motion for a new trial filed by LG, not Mondis.
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statute says:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
35 U.S.C. § 284. Mondis points out, correctly, that the wording of this provision is mandatory,
not discretionary: “the court shall award.” As the discussion that follows will show, the Federal
Circuit has limited this mandate to a damages award that is reasonably supported by the evidence
at trial.
In support of this argument, Mondis points to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Dow
Chemical, in which it held:
The statute is unequivocal that the district court must award damages in an
amount no less than a reasonable royalty. Further, section 284 is clear that expert
testimony is not necessary to the award of damages, but rather “may [be] received
. . . as an aid.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (emphasis added).
The district court’s conclusion that no damages could be awarded, in light of the
presumption of damages when infringement is proven, was in error. But, the
district court’s obligation to award some amount of damages does not mean that a
patentee who puts on little or no satisfactory evidence of a reasonable royalty can
successfully appeal on the ground that the amount awarded by the court is not
‘reasonable’ and therefore contravenes section 284. Should Dow prove
infringement of claims 23 and 24 the district court should consider the so-called
Georgia-Pacific factors in detail, and award such reasonable royalties as the
record evidence will support.
Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee Indus., 341 F.3d 1370, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted.)
This indeed supports Mondis’ position. In Dow, the Federal Circuit made clear three key points.
First, after a patentee has proven infringement, § 284 gives rise to a presumption of entitlement
to an award of damages. Second, the absence of admissible expert testimony in support of a
damages theory does not alter this presumption. Third, under such circumstances, the trial court
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must apply the Georgia-Pacific analysis and award such reasonable royalties as the record
evidence will support.
This is not a case in which the exclusion of Bratic’s testimony, advancing a legally
invalid damages theory, leaves Mondis with no evidence of damages. To the contrary, at trial,
Mondis presented a great deal of relevant evidence, particularly the past licensing agreements
and the Innolux verdict. The record evidence without Bratic’s testimony was sufficient to allow
a reasonable jury to award reasonable royalties. Moreover, LG’s expert, Mr. Hansen, testified
that Mondis was entitled to an award of $1.9 million in damages. As Mondis argues, this in
itself provides a basis in evidence to calculate a reasonable royalty.
Mondis argues, persuasively, that, under Federal Circuit law, defects in a patentee’s
damages case do not mandate an award of zero damages, and that the proper remedy for material
and prejudicial defects at trial that require a verdict to be vacated is a new trial without those
defects. 4 Mondis also cites the Federal Circuit’s decision in Apple, where it held:
The district court agreed and concluded that Apple was not entitled to any
measure of damages because Apple had failed to show that its measure of
damages was correct. We disagree and hold that a finding that a royalty estimate
may suffer from factual flaws does not, by itself, support the legal conclusion that
zero is a reasonable royalty.
Due to the procedural posture in this case, we must assume that the patents at
issue are valid and infringed. With infringement assumed, the statute requires the
court to award damages “in no event less than a reasonable royalty.” 35 U.S.C. §
284. Because no less than a reasonable royalty is required, the fact finder must
determine what royalty is supported by the record.
4
LG cites the pre-Federal Circuit decision by the Third Circuit in Devex, but the Devex Court
took the same position: “In the absence of any evidence as to what would constitute a reasonable
royalty in a given case, a fact finder would have no means of arriving at a reasonable royalty, and
none could be awarded.” Devex Corp. v. GMC, 667 F.2d 347, 361 (3d Cir. 1981). The Devex
Court held that an award of zero damages is appropriate when there is no evidence to support
damages, not when a patentee’s case has legal defects. Id.
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If a patentee’s evidence fails to support its specific royalty estimate, the fact
finder is still required to determine what royalty is supported by the record.
Indeed, if the record evidence does not fully support either party’s royalty
estimate, the fact finder must still determine what constitutes a reasonable royalty
from the record evidence. Certainly, if the patentee’s proof is weak, the court is
free to award a low, perhaps nominal, royalty, as long as that royalty is supported
by the record.
Thus, a fact finder may award no damages only when the record supports a zero
royalty award. For example, in a case completely lacking any evidence on which
to base a damages award, the record may well support a zero royalty award.
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
Mondis argues, persuasively, that this confirms that the trial court has an obligation to award
damages in whatever amount is supported by the evidence of record. Furthermore, an award of
zero damages is appropriate only when the record supports it. The evidentiary record at trial
does not support an award of zero damages. Apple also supports Mondis’ position that the
proper remedy here is a new trial. See also Info-Hold, Inc. v. Muzak LLC, 783 F.3d 1365, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“a patentee’s failure to show that its royalty estimate is correct is insufficient
grounds for awarding a royalty of zero.”)
Another apposite Federal Circuit case is Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild
Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., 904 F.3d 965, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In Power, in short, the Federal
Circuit found that the patentee’s damages evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to
support the jury’s damages award – just as this Court has found in the instant case. Id. The
Federal Circuit held that the proper remedy was a new trial: “Because the evidence presented by
Power Integrations was insufficient as a matter of law to invoke the entire market value rule, we
vacate the award of damages and remand for a new trial.” Id. This Court having determined that
the patentee’s damages evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury’s
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damages award, and having vacated the award of damages, the proper remedy is a new trial.
There is one subsequent Federal Circuit decision that cites Promega on these issues. In
Finjan, the Federal Circuit held:
While it is clear that Finjan failed to present a damages case that can support the
jury’s verdict, reversal of JMOL could result in a situation in which Finjan
receives no compensation for Blue Coat’s infringement of the ‘844 patent.
Ordinarily, the district court must award damages in an amount no less than a
reasonable royalty when infringement is found, unless the patent holder has
waived the right to damages based on alternate theories, Promega Corp. v. Life
Tech. Corp., 875 F.3d 651, 660 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We therefore remand to the
district court to determine whether Finjan has waived the right to establish
reasonable royalty damages under a new theory and whether to order a new trial
on damages.
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., 879 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). This
supports Mondis’ argument that defects in a patentee’s damages case should not foreclose an
award of damages, unless the patentee has waived the right to establish damages under a new
theory. It also supports the position that proof of infringement gives rise to a presumption of
entitlement to an award of damages. A new trial is the appropriate remedy in this case.
LG’s motion sought, in the alternative, remittitur of the damages award. The Court
concludes that a new trial is the better remedy. Were the Court to decide to grant the motion for
remittitur, it would be required to apply the maximum recovery rule. Shockley v. Arcan, 248
F.3d 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This would require a course of briefing, reweighing the
evidence at trial, making factual determinations, and calculation of the maximum damages award
supported by the evidence. Plaintiff would then have the right to decline the award and obtain a
new trial. Id. Mondis has made clear that, at this juncture, it seeks a new trial. There is no
advantage to anyone to litigate the damages award in post-trial proceedings, only to have Mondis
then assert its right to decline the award and obtain a new trial. It is a far more efficient use of
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everyone’s resources to proceed directly to a new trial.
This Court grants LG’s motion for a new trial, subject to the following limitations. At the
new trial, the parties may not offer evidence that was not presented at the previous trial, with one
potential exception: should Mondis seek to offer the expert testimony of Mr. Bratic, based solely
on the evidence presented at the previous trial, Mondis may submit an updated expert report,
which this Court will consider in a Daubert hearing. All expert testimony must reflect the
Federal Circuit law on apportionment, as discussed in the Court’s Opinion in which it vacated
the jury damages verdict.
For these reasons,
IT IS on this 22nd day of April, 2020
ORDERED that LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), a new
trial under Rule 59, and/or remittitur regarding damages and willfulness (Docket Entry No.
489) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and/or remittitur is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that LG’s motion for a new trial is GRANTED.
Appx338
USOO747518OB2
(12) United States Patent (10) Patent No.: US 7475,180 B2

Arai et al. (45) Date of Patent: Jan. 6, 2009
(54) DISPLAY UNIT WITH COMMUNICATION (58) Field of Classification Search ......... 710/301-304,
CONTROLLER AND MEMORY FOR 710/8-10, 15-16, 305,313, 62-64, 72-73,
STORING IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FOR 710/6, 306–308, 104-110; 34.5/58, 99-100,
IDENTIFYING DISPLAY UNIT 345/132, 204
See application file for complete search history.
(75) Inventors: Ikuya Arai, Yokohama (JP): Kouji (56) References Cited
Kitou, Yokohama (JP) U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS
(73) Assignee: Mondis Technology Ltd., Hempstead, 3,691.295 A 9, 1972 Fisk
London
(*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this (Continued)

patent is extended or adjusted under 35 FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS
U.S.C. 154(b) by 25 days.
DE 2413839 9, 1975
(21) Appl. No.: 10/160,022
(22) Filed: Jun. 4, 2002 (Continued)
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
(65) Prior Publication Data
US 20O2/O147879 A1 Oct. 10, 2002 Nasa Tech Brief, “Interface for Color-Video Monitor”, Apr. 1988, pp.
246-247.
Related U.S. Application Data (Continued)
(63) Continuation of application No. 09/732,292, filed on Primary Examiner Raymond N Phan
Dec. 8, 2000, now Pat. No. 6,513,088, which is a (74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm—Antonelli, Terry, Stout &
continuation of application No. 09/265,363, filed on Kraus, LLP.
Mar. 10, 1999, now Pat. No. 6,247,090, which is a
continuation of application No. 08/833,346, filed on (57) ABSTRACT
Apr. 4, 1997, now Pat. No. 5,887,147, which is a con
tinuation of application No. 08/598.903, filed on Feb. A display unit for displaying an image based on video signals
9, 1996, now Pat. No. 5,652,845, which is a continua and synchronization signals inputted from an externally con
tion of application No. 08/190,848, filed on Feb. 3, nected video source, includes a video circuit adapted to dis
1994, now abandoned. play an image based on the video signals sent by the exter
(30) Foreign Application Priority Data nally connected video source, a memory which stores an
identification number for identifying the display unit, and a
Feb. 10, 1993 (JP) ................................... 5-022212 communication controller which sends the identification
number stored in the memory to the video source. The com
(51) Int. Cl. munication controller is capable of bi-directionally commu
G06F 3/00 (2006.01) nicating with the video source.
(52) U.S. Cl. ........................... 710/305: 710/62; 710/64;
710/104; 345/99 29 Claims, 12 Drawing Sheets
COMPUTER
Appx339
US 7475,180 B2
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OO1135-1171. "Access.bus, an Open Desktop Bus'. Peter A. Sichel, Digital Tech
Fax from Anthony Cox entitled “VDIF Proposal Revision No. nical Journal, vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1991.
p0.94.” dated Jan. 13, 1993, TPV-VESA 008537-8542. Barco n.V Video & Communications, The Calibrator Explained, Part
VDIF Proposal, Revision p0.95.c4, dated Jan. 13, 1993, TPV-VESA 1, Apr. 1990, pp. 1-40.
O08582-8622. Fernseh-und Kinotechnische Gesellschaft e.V., Tagungsband, 10.
VDIF Proposal, Revision p0.96, dated Jan. 15, 1993, TPV-VESA Jahrestagung vom 13. bis 17. Sep. 1982, pp. 153-167.
OO3743-3782. Floyd, Digital Fundamentals, 3" Ed., 1990, pp. 600-602.
VDIF Proposal, Revision p1.00, dated Apr. 14, 1993, TPV-VESA The I-C Bus and How to Use It, Philips Semiconductors, Jan. 1992.
OO7640-7684. Wischermann, G., “Verfahren Zur Bildkompression und Bildexpan
VDIF Proposal, Revision p1.01, dated Apr. 14, 1993, TPV-VESA sion”, FKTG, 10 " Annual Mtg., Munich, Sep. 13-17, 1982, pp.
OOT597-7638. 153-167 (including translation).
VDIF Proposal, Revision p1.03, dated Apr. 16, 1993, TPV-VESA Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. Ltd.'s Answer and Counterclaims,
OOT555-7595 TPV-VESA 004679-4718. Apr. 14, 2008.
VDIF Proposal, Draft 1.0, dated Aug. 23, 1993, TPV-VESA 003986 Innolux Display Corporation's Answer and Counterclaims, Apr. 14.
4022. 2008.
DDC Initial Proposal, Version 1.0p, Revision 0.1p, dated Oct. 10, LG Electronics, USA, Inc.'s Answer and Counterclaims, Apr. 14.
1993, TPV-VESA 005038-5035. 2008.
DDC Initial Proposal, Version 1.0p, Revision 0.21p, dated Nov. 1, U.S. Appl. No. 10/661.527, Office Action, Nov. 16, 2007.
1993, TPV-VESA 007294-7313. U.S. Appl. No. 10/661.527, Amendment, May 16, 2008.
DDC Initial Proposal, Version 1.0p, Revision 0.22p, dated Nov. 3, U.S. Appl. No. 10/832,442, Office Action, Sep. 26, 2007.
1993, TPV-VESA 005336-5355. U.S. Appl. No. 10/832,442, Amendment, Mar. 25, 2008.
Monitor Device Protocol Specification, Draft Version, dated Dec. 3, U.S. Appl. No. 1 1/176,880, Office Action, Nov. 2, 2007.
1993, TPV-VESA 005407-5438. U.S. Appl. No. 1 1/176,880, Amendment, Mar. 25, 2008.
DDC Proposal, Version 1.0p, Revision 0.40p, dated Dec. 8, 1993,
TPV-VESA OO5378-5403. * cited by examiner
Appx343
U.S. Patent Jan. 6, 2009 Sheet 1 of 12 US 7.475,180 B2
7
|
|6
B)O\WITA&BS0O
Appx344
U.S. Patent Jan. 6, 2009 Sheet 2 of 12 US 7475,180 B2
FIG 2
ADDRESS NUMBER OF DATA SET REGISTERED ID NUMBERS
ADDRESS 2 DATA AREA FOR DELIVERY ADJUSTMENT
ADDRESS 3 DATA AREA 2 FOR DELIVERY ADJUSTMENT
ADDRESS i ADJUSTMENT DATA AREA 1 FOR USER

ADDRESS - ADJUSTMENT DAA AREA 2 FOR USER
Appx345
FIG 3
STEP 1 POWER ON
SEP 2 INITIALIZING
SEP 3 WAITING TO RECEIVE ID

NUMBER SENT FROM COMPUTER
COM
SEP A- PARING NOT MATCHED
RECEIVED ID NUMBER WITH
REGISTERED ID
MACED STEP 6
NOT ALLOWING DISPLAY
ALOWING DISPLAY DEVICE TO DEVICE O BE
BE CONTROLLED BY EXTERNA CONTROLLED BY EXTERNAL
CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS CONTROL INS RCTIONS
Appx346
Appx347
098 Appx348
U.S. Patent US 7475,180 B2
Appx349
FIG 7
- - ----~-
- -- - - - ---
3 5 3
DISPLAY COMMUNICATION AUDIO D
CONTROLLER CONTROLLER CONTROLLER
32
—s
Appx350
FIG 8
STEP 0 STARTING
STEP 1 STARING COMMUNICAON
STEP 12 SUCCEEDING NO
IN COMUNICATION
YES
SEP A FETCHING INFORMATION OF ANNOUNCING SEP 3

OPERATION OF CIRCUIS ERROR MESSAGE
STEP 5 NO
NOMAY OPERAING 2
YES
DISPLAYING AND --SEP 16
SEP 7 PROCESSING NORMA ANNOUNCING
OPERATION ERROR MESSAGE
Appx351
F
------------
O
- El
list 12 3
1A
34- LCD
5. 3.
DISPLAY COMMUNICATION AUDIO
= 32
CPU 2 MEMORY -- 4
Appx352
DISPLAY COMMUNICATION AUDIO D

it 32
CPU 2 MEMORY -- 4 CD CONTROR --35
3. A.
Appx353
U.S. Patent US 7475,180 B2
Appx354
XX
L- - j
2 5
COMMUNICATION CONTROLLER
MEMORY -4
COMPUTER
Appx355
US 7,475,180 B2
1. 2
DISPLAY UNIT WITH COMMUNICATION prior art is indicated in Japanese Patent Application Laid
CONTROLLER AND MEMORY FOR Open No. 61-84688. According to this prior art, a discrimi
STORING IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FOR nation pulse is superimposed at the blanking interval of a
IDENTIFYING DISPLAY UNIT video signal outputted from the computer and the deflection
frequency of the display device is changed on the basis of this
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED discrimination pulse.
APPLICATION According to the former prior art among the aforemen
tioned prior arts, the control of the display position and size
This is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 09/732, on the screen is managed by the display device. Therefore,
292, filed Dec. 8, 2000, now U.S. Pat. No. 6,513,088, issued 10
when adjustment is required or requested from the user of
Jan. 28, 2003, which is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. display device, it is necessary to perform manual adjustment
No. 09/265,363, filed Mar. 10, 1999, now U.S. Pat. No. 6,247, using the adjustment switch of the display device each time
090, issued Jun. 12, 2001, which is a continuation of U.S. and it is rather troublesome to operate the system.
application Ser. No. 08/833,346, filed Apr. 4, 1997, now U.S. According to the latterprior art among the aforementioned
Pat. No. 5,887,147, issued Mar. 23, 1999, which is a continu 15
prior arts, the control can be operated by the computer. How
ation of U.S. application Ser. No. 08/598.903, filed Feb. 9, ever, since the operation is such that the deflection frequency
1996, now U.S. Pat. No. 5,652,845, issued Jul. 29, 1997, is simply changed on the basis of the discrimination pulse
which is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 08/190. superimposed on the video signal, an image cannot be
848, filed Feb. 3, 1994, now abandoned, the subject matter of adjusted to the display image (display position and size)
which is incorporated by reference herein, and is related to which is required by a user of the computer. Namely, there is
U.S. application Ser. No. 09/732.291, filed Dec. 8, 2000, now a problem imposed that the status which is simply desired by
U.S. Pat. No. 6,549,970, issued Apr. 15, 2003. the user cannot be obtained. Furthermore, no consideration is
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION given to prevention of display (indication) of careless images
25
(information) and restraining of unnecessary power con
The present invention relates to an information output sys sumption. Even if the discrimination pulse is superimposed at
tem or display apparatus including a computer and an infor the blanking interval of the video signal, the video blanking
mation output device such as a display device or a printer as level is generally shallow in the case of the display device, so
a computer terminal and more particularly to an information that the discrimination pulse is displayed. Furthermore, the
output system or display apparatus for performing various 30 control is applied only in one direction from the computer to
types of control such as the information output method and the display device and no information is sent in the reverse
allowing or not allowing of information output from the com direction, so that there is another problem imposed that a
malfunction cannot be avoided.
puter connected to the above information output device via a
communication interface.
In current display devices as computer terminals, a wide 35 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
variety of display positions and sizes on the screen and video
signal frequencies to be displayed are used depending on An object of the present invention is to provide an infor
video signals to be inputted. Therefore, a display or a so mation output system wherein a computer can exercise Vari
called multi-scan display has been used so that a display ous types of control of an information output device such as a
device can handle various video signals. 40 display device. Another object of the present invention is to
A microcomputer or a memory LSI is used to provide a provide an information output system for maintaining
most suitable display image for each video signal as this type secrecy of information and for restraining power consump
of display device. Such a prior art is indicated in Japanese tion. A further object of the present invention is to provide an
Patent Application Laid-Open No. 1-321475. information output system for informing the computer of the
According to this prior art, the microcomputer controls the 45 operation status of the information output device so as to
memory which stores information of the display position and allow easy maintenance.
size on the screen for each video signal beforehand and reads To accomplish the above objects, according to the present
the information of the most suitable display position and size invention, in an information output system consisting of at
on the screen depending on the input video signal from the least a computer and an information output device, the com
memory. The microcomputer outputs a control signal on the 50 puter is equipped with a first communication means and the
basis of the read information. This control signal is applied to information output device is equipped with a second commu
the deflection circuit as a control voltage or control current nication means. Furthermore, a control processing means and
through a D-A converter so as to control the Voltage or current a memory means for storing the identification number of the
at a predetermined part of the deflection circuit. By doing this, computer beforehand are added to the information output
the display size and position of the display device can be 55 device, or a memory means for storing the identification
adjusted. When a video signal inputted to the display device is number of the information output device beforehand is
not a known signal, no corresponding information is kept in mounted in the computer in addition to the first communica
the above memory. Therefore, the switch mounted on the tion means. The above second communication means has a
front of the display device is operated so as to input the plurality of communication interfaces. Furthermore, a detec
adjustment information of the display position and size on the 60 tion means for detecting the internal operation status and a
screen. The control circuit of the above microcomputer cre control processing means for judging the detection result are
ates deflection control information on the basis of the above added to the information output device and an audio output
input information and adjusts the display position and size. means for outputting the operation status in Voice is added to
According to the aforementioned prior art, the display the computer. A second display means for displaying the
device obtains a most suitable screen display according to the 65 operation status is mounted in the information output device.
input video signal. However, according to another prior art, Or, a display means for displaying the operation status of the
the computer controls and changes the display status. Such a information output device is mounted in the computer.
Appx356
US 7,475,180 B2
3 4
The first communication means in the computer controls FIG.9 is a block diagram showing the fifth embodiment of
communication with the information output device and the the present invention.
second communication means in the information output FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing the sixth embodiment
device controls communication with the computer. The con of the present invention.
trol processing means operates and generates control signals
for exercising various types of control for the information FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing the seventh embodi
output device on the basis of control instructions from the ment of the present invention.
second communication means and compares the identifica FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing the eighth embodiment
tion number of the computer stored in the memory means of the present invention.
with the identification number sent from the computer via the 10
first and second communication means. When a comparison DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED
result match occurs, the control processing means controls a EMBODIMENTS
predetermined part in the information output device.
In the memory means mounted in the computer, the iden The embodiments of the present invention will be
tification number for identifying the information output 15 explained with reference to the accompanying drawings here
device is stored beforehand. When the identification number under.
which is sent from the information output device via the FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the first embodiment of
second and first communication means matches with the
the present invention. In the drawing, a section 1 enclosed by
identification number which is stored in the memory means a chained line indicates a computer. In the section 1, a refer
beforehand, the computer communicates with the informa ence numeral 2 indicates a CPU (central processing unit), 3 a
tion output device. display controller for generating various signals for video
When no comparison result match occurs, the above con display, 4 a memory, and 5 a communication controller for
trol processing means controls so that information which is communicating with peripheral devices. In addition, a mag
sent from the computer to the information output device is not netic recording unit is mounted as a data storage device which
normally outputted from the information output device. By 25
is not shown in the drawing.
doing this, information of a computer user will not be indi
cated carelessly. A section 6 enclosed by another chained line indicates a
When the second communication means has a plurality of so-called multi-scan display device which can be applied to
communication interfaces, it can communicate with another various video signal specifications. In the section 6, a refer
plurality of information output devices and the computer and 30 ence numeral 7 indicates a microcomputer for controlling
in the state that a plurality of similar information output display of the display device 6, 8 a second communication
devices are connected to the computer, it can exercise various controller for communicating with the above communication
types of control for the information output devices and can controller 5, 9 a second memory, 10 a general deflection
inform the computer of the status of each information output circuit of the display device, 11 a video circuit of the display
device. 35 device, 12 a horizontal deflection yoke, 13 a vertical deflec
The detection means detects the internal operation status of tion yoke, and 14 a color cathode-ray tube (hereinafter called
the information output device and the control processing a CDT (color display tube)) for displaying color images.
means judges the detection result. The audio output means The operation shown in FIG. 1 is as shown below. The
indicates the operation status of the information output device computer 1 has a structure which is the same as the general
in voice on the basis of the judgment result which is sent from 40 structure of a conventional personal computer or work station
the information output device to the computer via the second and the communication controller 5 controls a communica
and first communication means. Furthermore, the display tion interface such as RS-232C which is installed in the stan
means mounted in the information output device displays the dard type. When a control instruction of the display device 6
above operation status. The display means mounted in the is inputted firstly by a user of the computer from a general
computer performs the same operation as that of the display 45 keyboard which is not shown in the drawing of the computer
means mounted in the information output device. In this case, 1, it is coded digitally by a keyboard controller which is
information which is sent to the computer via the second and neither shown in the drawing and CPU 2 identifies the instruc
first communication means is used as display information. tion and controls the communication controller 5. The com
munication controller 5 sends the control instruction of the
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 50 display device to the display device 6. When a control instruc
tion of the display device 6 which is included in the software
FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the first embodiment of for allowing the computer 1 to operate is read from the exter
the present invention. nal storage device Such as a floppy disk drive or hard disk
FIG. 2 is a memory map showing the contents of the drive which is not shown in the drawing, CPU 2 identifies the
memory in the display device shown in FIG. 1. 55 instruction and controls the communication controller 5. The
FIG.3 is a flow chart showing the operation of the essential communication controller 5 also sends the control instruction
section shown in FIG. 1. of the display device to the display device 6.
FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the second embodiment Next, the display device 6 sends the control instruction
of the present invention. from the computer 1 which is received by the communication
FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing the third embodiment of 60 controller 8 to the microcomputer 7. The microcomputer 7
the present invention. identifies this control instruction and generates control sig
FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing the internal structure of nals to the relevant portions to be adjusted in the deflection
the display device 6B shown in FIG. 5. circuit 10 or video circuit 11. The aforementioned deflection
FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing the fourth embodiment circuit 10 and video circuit 11 can be adjusted in the same way
of the present invention. 65 as with a conventional multiscan display and the adjustment
FIG. 8 is a flow chart showing the operation outline shown means has a structure which is the same as that of a conven
in FIG. 7. tional multiscan display. By doing this, the display size and
Appx357
US 7,475,180 B2
5 6
position, brightness, contrast, and hue of images displayed on the computer 1 controls the display device 6 by a predeter
the CDT 14 are made most suitable to a user of the computer mined control instruction. When it is not registered, the com
system. puter 1 judges that it cannot control the display device 6 and
Furthermore, WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get) will not control the display device 6.
control which makes an image displayed on the display 5 By doing this, the computer 1 communicates with a spe
device 6 similar to print output of an output device other than cific display device 6 and can exercise control Such as chang
the display, for example, a printer can be realized only by ing the color temperature of animage displayed on the display
sending a control instruction for changing the display posi device 6 or changing the display size depending on the appli
tion and size to the display device 6 instead of operating and cation Software.
generating display data by the computer 1. The interface part 10
According to this embodiment, RS-232C is used as a com
of the above display device 6 Such as the communication munication interface. However, a general-purpose interface
control terminal is mounted on the back or side of the display such as RS-422, RS-423, SCSI or GP-IB, or network inter
device from a viewpoint of easy connection to the computer 1 face may be used. Furthermore, the embodiment may be
and appearance. applied to an interface using optical signals instead of electric
Furthermore, the aforementioned communication function 15
signals. The above interface may be installed in the neighbor
is used for adjustment at a factory. In this case, necessary hood of the rear cabinet or lower pedestal of the display
information is all written into the memory 9 in the display device 6 for convenience of a user.
device 6. FIG. 2 is a memory map showing the contents of the FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing the second embodiment
memory 9 in the display device 6. For adjustment at factory, of the present invention. According to this embodiment, when
data to be written can be all set. In a case other than factory the ID number sent from the computer to the display device is
adjustment, namely, for adjustment in a system as shown in not registered in the memory 9, another operation which is
FIG. 1, to prevent data requiring no rewriting, namely, preset different from the operation shown in the first embodiment is
values at factory such as, for example, the number of all data performed. Namely, according to this embodiment, when the
or the data within the corresponding frequency range from ID numbers do not match with each other, nothing is dis
being erased by mistake or rewritten, the computer 1 sends the 25
played on the display device so as to enhance the secrecy of
ID number and the microcomputer 7 in the display device 6 information.
checks the ID number with the registered ID number stored in Next, the structure of FIG. 4 will be explained. In the
the memory 9.
A flow chart of this check is shown in FIG. 3. As shown in drawing, a reference numeral 6A indicates another display
the drawing, when the computer 1 and display device 6 are 30 device which is different from the display device 6 shown in
turned on at Step 1, each device is initialized at Step 2. FIG. 1, 15 a horizontal deflection circuit, 16 a vertical deflec
Concretely, CPU2 and the microcomputer 7 read the starting tion circuit, 17 a synchronizing signal processing circuit, 18 a
system software and put the peripheral circuit to be connected horizontal phase control circuit, 19 a horizontal oscillating
to the CPU into the active state so that the next operation can circuit, 20 a horizontal driving circuit, 21 a horizontal deflec
be performed. Then, at Step 3, the microcomputer 7 in the 35 tion output circuit, 22 a video pre-amplifier circuit, 23 a video
display device 6 waits for sending of the identification num blanking circuit, and 24 a video output circuit. The other
reference numerals which are the same as those shown in FIG.
ber assigned to the computer 1, that is, the so-called ID
number from the computer 1. Next, at Step 4, the microcom 1 indicate the same functions. The video circuit 11 is a general
puter 7 receives the ID number which is sent from the com Video circuit consisting of the video pre-amplifier circuit 22,
puter 1 and checks whether the received ID number is regis 40 video blanking circuit 23, and video output circuit 24. The
tered in the registered ID number list which is stored in the horizontal deflection circuit 15 is a general deflection circuit
memory 9 in the display device 6. consisting of the synchronizing signal processing circuit 17.
When it is registered, at Step 5, the computer 1 is allowed horizontal phase control circuit 18, horizontal oscillating cir
to control the display device 6 by external control instructions cuit 19, horizontal driving circuit 20, and horizontal deflec
so that the user control of the display size, position, bright 45 tion output circuit 21. The vertical deflection circuit 16 is also
ness, and contrast can be performed by control instructions a general circuit which has a structure similar to that of the
horizontal deflection circuit 15.
sent from the computer 1 thereafter. On the other hand, when
the received ID number is not registered in the memory 9, at Next, the operation shown in FIG. 4 will be explained. In
Step 6, the display device 6 is not allowed to be controlled by the drawing, an ID number sent from the computer 1 is
external control instructions thereafter. Therefore, even if any 50 inputted into the microcomputer 7 via the communication
control instruction is sent from the computer 1, the display controller 8. The microcomputer 7 checks the above ID num
device 6 will not accept it. ber with the ID number stored in the memory 9. When the ID
Or, at Step 5, the computer 1 may be allowed to performall number stored in the memory 9 matches with the ID number
the adjustments which can be performed by the display device sent from the computer 1, the microcomputer 7 receives the
6, that is, the same control as that for adjustmentat factory and 55 control from the computer 1.
at Step 6, a part of the control of the display device 6 such as On the other hand, when the check results do not match
display control may be allowed. with each other, the microcomputer 7 controls the horizontal
By doing this, the display device 6 can be prevented from oscillating circuit 19, fixes the oscillation frequency to a
careless control. predetermined value, and allows the display device 6A to
The above is an example that an ID number is sent to the 60 perform a horizontal deflection operation at a value different
display device 6 from the computer 1. However, needless to from the horizontal frequencies of the video signal and Syn
say, the reverse case of the above is possible. Namely, an ID chronizing signal which are sent from the computer. There
number is sent to the computer 1 from the display device 6 so fore, the image displayed on the CDT 14 is not synchronized
that the computer 1 identifies that the display device 6 having horizontally in this case and the screen content cannot be
a communication function is connected and the computer 1 65 judged. When the vertical deflection circuit 16 is controlled in
compares the ID number with the ID number registered in the the same way, the image displayed on the CDT 14 is not
computer 1. When the corresponding ID number is registered, synchronized vertically on the screen. By controlling the
Appx358
US 7,475,180 B2
7 8
video blanking circuit 23 of the video circuit 11, the video When the computer 1B and display device 6E are started at
display period may be blanked so that no image is displayed Step 10 as shown in FIG. 8, they start communication with
on the CDT 14. each other via the communication controllers 5 and 8 at Step
By using the aforementioned methods independently or 11 next. Then, at Step 12, the computer 1B calls the display
combined, only when a user of the computer system enters a 5 device 6E. When no response is received, the computer 1B
predetermined ID number from the keyboard, it is displayed judges that the display device 6 E is faulty, starts the audio
correctly on the display device 6A and information displayed control circuit 31 at Step 13, and informs the user of the
on the CDT 14 can be prevented from careless indication. computer 1B that the display device 6E is faulty from the
FIG. 5 is a block diagram of the third embodiment of the speaker.
present invention. According to this embodiment, the display 10
device is provided with a plurality of communication func When the communication succeeds, at Step 14, the micro
tions and a plurality of display devices can be connected with computer 7 fetches information of the operation status of the
the communication interface. In the drawing, reference deflection circuit 10 or video circuit 11 in the display device
numerals 6B, 6C, and 6D indicate display devices having the 6E from the voltage at a predetermined part in the circuit as
same structure, V1,V2, and V3 lines for video signals and 15 digital information via the ADCs 27 and 28. Next, at Step 15.
synchronizing signals, C1, C2, and C3 communication lines the microcomputer 7 judges whether the value which is
for, for example, RS-232C, and 1 the aforementioned com fetched at Step 14 is a value in the normal operation status.
puter. Each of the display devices 6B, 6C, and 6D has a When the microcomputer 7 judges it as an error, it informs the
plurality of video signal I/O terminals and communication computer 1B of the faulty value via the communication con
interface I/O terminals and a registered ID number. Accord troller 8 and CPU 2 of the computer 1B allows the audio
ing to this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 5, 1 is assigned to control circuit 31 to operate and generates a message inform
the display device 6B as an ID number, 2 to the display device ing an error of the display device 6E from the speaker 32.
6C as an ID number, and 3 to the display device 6D as an ID Furthermore, CPU2 allows the display controller 3 to operate
number. and displays also a message informing an error on the CDT 14
Next, the operation shown in FIG. 5 will be explained. In 25 via the video circuit 11.
the drawing, for example, when controlling the display device In this case, when an indication code informing the faulty
6B from the computer 1, the ID number 1 is sent to the line C1 part is sent to the computer 1B from the display device 6E
and the display device 6B is controlled appropriately from the simultaneously, the computer 1B judges the indication code
computer 1. Next, when controlling the display device 6C, the and can inform the user or a customer engineer of the display
ID number 2 is sent from the computer 1 in the same way. 30 device 6E of the faulty part by sound or display.
Then, the ID number is received by the display device 6C via When the display device 6 E is normal at Step 15, the
the lines C1 and C2 and the display device 6c can be con computer 1B can exercise the communication control such as
trolled appropriately from the computer 1. the display size, hue, and brightness of the display device 6E
Since a plurality of display devices can be controlled by a at Step 17. At this step, when a control instruction is sent to the
computer in this way, a plurality of display devices can be 35 display device 6E from the computer 1B, the microcomputer
adjusted at a time, for example, at the time of delivery adjust 7 decodes the instruction and outputs the control code to the
ment at a factory. Furthermore, by using a multi-display sys corresponding DAC 29 or 30. The DAC 29 or 30 controls a
tem for displaying an image by assembling a plurality of predetermined control part at the DC control voltage corre
display devices and for displaying various images on each sponding to the above control code and controls the display
screen, the display devices can be hued and adjusted in bright 40 size, position, and hue of the image displayed on the CDT 14.
ness simply. When the above series of operations ends, the computer 1B
FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing the internal structure of returns to Step 14 and repeats the operations from the monitor
the display device 6B shown in FIG. 5. In the drawing, a mode of a faulty operation of the display device 6 E to the
reference numeral 25 indicates a communication controller normal operation at Step 17.
having two communication ports and 26 a divider of video 45
As mentioned above, the computer 1B can be informed of
signals and synchronizing signals. The communication con a faulty operation by using the communication function of the
troller 25 sends or receives data to or from the computer 1 in display device 6E. Therefore, the user can judge the faulty
the same way as the communication controller 8 of the dis part and can maintain the system easily.
play device 6 shown in FIG. 1 and also divides the commu FIG.9 is a block diagram showing the fifth embodiment of
nication lines and relays other display devices. On the other 50
hand, the divider 26 divides video signals or synchronizing the present invention. This embodiment obtains the same
signals sent from the computer 1 or signal source to other effect as that of the embodiment shown in FIG. 7. In FIG. 9,
display devices. By using Such a structure, a plurality of a reference numeral 6F indicates a display device, 33 a liquid
display devices can be connected to a computer as shown in crystal display controller in the display device 6F, and 34 a
FIG.S. 55 liquid crystal display panel mounted in the display device 6F.
The other reference numerals which are the same as those
Next, the fourth embodiment of the present invention will shown in FIGS. 1 and 7 indicate the same functions.
be described. FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing the fourth
embodiment of the present invention. In the drawing, a ref The operation shown in FIG.9 is basically the same as that
erence numeral 1B indicates a computer, 31 an audio control shown in FIG. 7. The operation of the deflection circuit or
circuit for producing a Sound, 32 a speaker, 6E a display 60 video circuit 11 is monitored by the microcomputer 7 via the
device, 27 and 28 analog-digital converters (hereinafter ADC 27 or 28. When an error occurs, the microcomputer 7
abbreviated to ADC), and 29 and 30 digital-analog converters transmits an indication code informing the occurrence of an
(hereinafter abbreviated to DAC). The other reference numer error to the computer 1B via the communication line and
als which are the same as those shown in FIG. 1 indicate the informs the user of it by voice from the speaker 32.
same functions. The operation of FIG. 7 will be explained 65 Furthermore, the microcomputer 7 allows the liquid crystal
hereunder with reference to the operation flow chart shown in display controller 33 in the display device 6F to operate and
FIG 8. displays information of the occurrence of the fault and faulty
Appx359
US 7,475,180 B2
10
part on the liquid crystal display panel 34. By doing this, are the same as those shown in FIG. 1 indicate units perform
information when an error occurs in the display device 6F can ing the same functions as those shown in FIG. 1.
be obtained more surely. Next, the operation of FIG. 12 will be explained. In FIG.
FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing the sixth embodiment 12, video information is sent to the display device 6 from the
of the present invention. This embodiment obtains the same 5 communication controller 5 in addition to a control instruc
effect as that of the embodiment shown in FIG.9. In FIG. 10, tion of the display device 6 which is explained in the embodi
a reference numeral 1C indicates a computer and 35 a liquid ment shown in FIG. 1. This video information is a digital
crystal display controller in the computer 1C. The other ref signal in the same way as a signal which is inputted to the
erence numerals which are the same as those shown in FIGS. display controller 3 in the embodiment shown in FIG.1. The
1 and 9 indicate the same functions. In FIG. 10, the display 10 communication controller 8 of the display device 6 sends
function for a fault and faulty operation of the display device Video information among the received signals to the display
shown in FIG. 9 is mounted in the computer 1C. controller37. The display controller 37 performs an operation
Namely, when an error occurs in the internal circuit of the which is the same as that of the display controller shown in
display device 6E, the voltage detected by the ADC 27 or 28 FIG. 1 and generates a video signal to be inputted to a general
is digitized and processed by the microcomputer 7 as faulty 15 display. By doing this, also in the embodiment shown in FIG.
Voltage occurrence information and information informing 12, an effect which is the same as that shown in FIG. 1 can be
an error is transmitted to the computer 1C via the communi obtained. Furthermore, in FIG. 12, since video information is
cation controller 8. In the computer 1C, CPU 2 decodes the transmitted via a communication interface which is con
transmitted faulty information. When CPU 2 identifies the nected between the computer 1 and display device 6, a video
faulty part of the display device 6E, it allows the audio control signal line which is conventionally necessary is not necessary.
circuit 31 to operate as an audio signal and informs the user of According to the present invention, a user of a computer
the fault by an audio message from the speaker 32 on one can exercise various types of control for an information out
hand. On the other hand, CPU 2 controls the liquid crystal put device such as a display device from the keyboard of the
display controller35 So as to display characters or graphics on computer or by the Software incorporated in the computer.
the liquid crystal display panel 34. By doing this, the user of 25 Therefore, the operability of the computer system is
the display device 6E can be informed of an error or fault of improved so that the system can be used easily and the user
the display device 6E and can maintain the system easily. can obtain a desired information output status easily.
FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing the seventh embodi Whenanidentification number is set to each device, a value
ment of the present invention. In the drawing, a reference which is set by the above control will not be lost by a careless
numeral 36 indicates a power supply of the deflection circuit 30 operation of a user. By setting an identification number for a
10 and video circuit 11. The other reference numerals which specific user, the secret of information can be protected
are the same as those shown in FIG. 1 indicate the same inversely. Since the power supply for the information output
functions. device can be controlled by the computer when necessary,
Next, the operation shown in FIG. 11 will be explained. unnecessary power consumption can be restrained.
35
In FIG. 11, when a control instruction to the display device Since the status of the information output device can be
6 is issued from CPU 2 of the computer 1, the communication monitored simply, the system can be protected against a mal
controller 5 changes the control instruction to a one in the function and maintained easily. Furthermore, the aforemen
tioned control hardware can be realized in a minimum struc
signal format Suited to communication and sends it to the ture.
display device 6. The display device 6 returns the signal 40
received by the communication controller 8 to the control What is claimed is:
instruction which can be identified by the microcomputer 7
and sends it to the microcomputer 7. The microcomputer 7 1. A display unit for displaying an image based on video
judges the control instruction and decides the part of a pre signals and synchronization signals inputted from an exter
determined section in the display device 6 to be controlled. 45
nally connected video source, comprising:
When the control instruction relates to control of the power a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the
Supply 36 and is an instruction for stopping power Supply video signals sent by said externally connected video
from the power supply 36 to the deflection circuit 10, or video Source;
circuit 11, or both circuits, the microcomputer 7 controls the a memory which stores an identification number for iden
power supply 36 so as to stop the above power supply. There 50
tifying at least a type of said display unit; and
fore, the image display on the CDT 14 is also stopped. a communication controller which sends said identifica
By doing this, for example, when the computer 1 is not in tion number stored in said memory to said video source;
operation for a predetermined period, the operation power wherein said communication controller is capable of bi
Supply for the display device 6 can be automatically put into directionally communicating with said video source.
the off state. Therefore, unnecessary power consumption can 55 2. The display unit according to claim 1, wherein said
be restrained and the life span of the display device can be identification number stored in said memory is utilized for
lengthened. The aforementioned is power Supply off control. comparison with an identification numberstored in said video
However, needless to say, power Supply on control is also SOUC.
possible. Namely, in this case, when the computer 1 is turned 3. The display unit according to claim 1, wherein said
on or the computer 1 is changed from the function stop state 60 identification number stored in said memory is utilized for
to the active state, the microcomputer 7, power supply 36, executing a predetermined process in said video source in
deflection circuit 10, and video circuit 11 perform the reverse accordance with a result of comparison between said identi
operation of the aforementioned so that the display device fication number and an identification number stored in said
automatically starts to display. Video source.
FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing the eighth embodiment 65 4. The display unit according to claim 1, wherein said
of the present invention. In the drawing, a reference numeral identification number stored in said memory is utilized for
37 indicates a display controller and the other numerals which executing a predetermined process in said video source based
Appx360
US 7,475,180 B2
11 12
on a result of comparison of whether said identification num a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the
ber stored in said memory is an identification number stored video signals sent by said externally connected video
in said video source. Source;
5. The display unit according to claim 1, wherein said a memory in which at least display unit information is
identification number stored in said memory is sent to said stored, said display unit information including an iden
Video source in response to power on of at least one of said tification number for identifying at least a type of said
display unit and said video source. display unit; and
6. The display unit according to claim 2, wherein said a communication controller capable of bi-directionally
identification number stored in said memory is sent to said communicating with said video source:
Video source in response to power on of at least one of said 10 wherein said communication controller is capable of com
display unit and said video source. municating said identification number stored in said
7. The display unit according to claim 3, wherein said memory and no other display unit information to said
identification number stored in said memory is sent to said video source.
Video source in response to power on of at least one of said 18. The display unit according to claim 17, wherein said
display unit and said video source. 15 display unit information includes characteristic information
8. The display unit according to claim 4, wherein said of said display unit.
identification number stored in said memory is sent to said 19. The display unit according to claim 18, wherein said
Video source in response to power on of at least one of said display unit information is sent to said video source in
display unit and said video source. response to power on of at least one of said display unit and
said video source.
9. The display unit according to claim 1, wherein said 20. The display unit according to claim 18, wherein said
display unit receives a signal from said video source that is display unit receives a signal from said video source that is
generated by using said identification number. generated by using said identification number stored in said
10. The display unit according to claim 1, wherein said memory.
display unit receives a signal from said video source that is 25 21. A display unit for displaying an image based on video
generated in accordance with a result of comparison between signals inputted from an externally connected video source,
said identification number stored in said memory and an comprising:
identification number stored in said video source.
a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the
11. The display unit according to claim 1, said display unit video signals sent by said externally connected video
receives a signal from said video source that is generated 30 Source;
based on a result of comparison of whether said identification a memory in which at least display unit information is
number stored in said memory is an identification number stored, said display unit information including an iden
stored in said video source. tification number for identifying at least a type of said
12. The display unit according to claim 1, further compris display unit; and
ing a processor adapted to control display of said display unit. 35 a communication controller capable of bi-directionally
13. The display unit according to claim 12, wherein said communicating with said video source:
display unit information is sent to said video source in wherein said communication controller is capable of send
response to power on of at least one of said display unit and ing said display unit information stored in said memory
said video source. to said video source and of receiving a control signal
14. A display unit for displaying an image based on video 40 from said video source, and said displayed image is
signals inputted from an externally connected video source, controlled based on said control signal received by said
comprising: communication controller.
a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the 22. The display unit according to claim 21, wherein at least
Video signals sent by the externally connected video one of color and size of said image displayed on said display
Source: 45 unit is changed by using said control signal.
a memory in which at least display unit information is 23. A display unit for displaying an image based on video
stored, said display unit information including an iden signals inputted from an externally connected video source,
tification number for identifying at least a type of said comprising:
display unit and characteristic information of said dis a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the
play unit; and 50 video signals sent by said externally connected video
a communication controller capable of bi-directionally Source;
communicating with said video source: a memory in which at least display unit information is
wherein said communication controller is capable of com stored, said display unit information including an iden
municating said display unit information other than said tification number for identifying at least a type of said
55 display unit;
15. The display unit according to claim 14, wherein said communicating with said video source, said communi
display unit information is sent to said video source in cation controller being capable of sending said display
response to power on of at least one of said display unit and unit information stored in said memory to said video
said video source. 60 Source and of receiving a control signal from said video
16. The display unit according to claim 14, wherein said Source; and
display unit receives a signal from said video source that is a processor adapted to control said displayed image on said
generated by using said identification number stored in said display unit by using said control signal received by said
memory. communication controller.
17. A display unit for displaying an image based on video 65 24. The display unit according to claim 23, wherein at least
signals inputted from an externally connected video source, one of color and size of said image displayed on said display
comprising: unit is changed by using said control signal.
Appx361
US 7,475,180 B2
13 14
25. A display unit for displaying an image based on video a memory in which at least display unit information is
signals inputted from an externally connected video source, stored, said display unit information including an iden
comprising: tification number for identifying at least a type of said
a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the display unit; and
Video signals sent by said externally connected video a communication controller capable of bi-directionally
Source: communicating with said video source:
a processor adapted to control display of said display unit; wherein said communication controller is capable of com
a memory which stores an identification number for iden municating said display unit information from said dis
tifying at least a type of said display unit; and play unit to said video source, said display unit being
a communication controller capable of bi-directionally 10 capable of receiving a signal from said video source that
communicating with said video source: is generated based on said display unit information, said
display unit being capable of controlling said displayed
wherein said communication controller is capable of send image on said display unit by using a control signal
ing said identification number stored in said memory to received from said video source via said communication
said video source and of receiving a control signal 15 controller.
received from said video source, and at least one of color 27. The display unit according to claim 26, wherein at least
and size of said displayed image on said display unit is one of color and size of said image displayed on said display
controlled by using said control signal received by said unit is changed by using said control signal.
communication controller.
26. A display unit for displaying an image based on video 28. The display unit according to any one of claims 1-27.
signals inputted from an externally connected video source, wherein said video source is a computer.
comprising: 29. A display unit according to any one of claim 1, 14, 17.
21, 23, 25 and 26, wherein the identification number provides
a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the at least a unique identification of the type of said display unit.
Video signals sent by said externally connected video
Source: k k k k k
Appx362
USOO7475180C1
(12) EX PARTE REEXAMINATION CERTIFICATE (10784th)

United States Patent (10) Number: US 7475,180 C1
Arai et al. (45) Certificate Issued: Dec. 28, 2015
(54) DISPLAY UNIT WITH COMMUNICATION (52) U.S. Cl.

CONTROLLER AND MEMORY FOR CPC G06F 3/153 (2013.01); G09G 1/16 (2016.01);
STORING IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FOR G09G 1/167 (2013.01); G06F 3/1423
IDENTIFYING DISPLAY UNIT (2013.01); G06F 3/1446 (2013.01); G09G
2360/04 (2013.01); G09G 2370/04 (2013.01);
(75) Inventors: Ikuya Arai, Yokohama (JP): Kouji G09G 2370/042 (2013.01)
Kitou, Yokohama (JP) (58) Field of Classification Search
None
(73) Assignee: MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD., See application file for complete search history.
Hampstead, London (GB) (56) References Cited
Reexamination Request: To view the complete listing of prior art documents cited
No. 90/013,237, May 13, 2014 during the proceedings for Reexamination Control Numbers
No. 90/013,390, Nov. 3, 2014 90/013,237 and 90/013,390, please refer to the USPTO's
public Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR)
Reexamination Certificate for: system under the Display References tab.
Patent No.: 7,475,180
Issued: Jun. 6, 2009 Primary Examiner — Christopher E Lee
Appl. No.: 10/160,022 (57) ABSTRACT
Filed: Jun. 4, 2002
A display unit for displaying an image based on video signals
and synchronization signals inputted from an externally con
Related U.S. Application Data nected video source, includes a video circuit adapted to dis
play an image based on the video signals sent by the exter
(63) Continuation of application No. 09/732,292, filed on nally connected video source, a memory which stores an
Dec. 8, 2000, now Pat. No. 6,513,088, which is a identification number for identifying the display unit, and a
continuation of application No. 09/265,363, filed on communication controller which sends the identification
Mar. 10, 1999, now Pat. No. 6,247,090, which is a number stored in the memory to the video source. The com
continuation of application No. 08/833,346, filed on munication controller is capable of bi-directionally commu
Apr. 4, 1997, now Pat. No. 5,887,147, which is a nicating with the video source.
continuation of application No. 08/598.903, filed on
Feb. 9, 1996, now Pat. No. 5,652,845, which is a Attention is directed to the decision of Mondis Technology,
continuation of application No. 08/190.848, filed on Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd., et al. No.
Feb. 3, 1994, now abandoned. 2012-1004 (Fed. Cir.), dated Mar. 13, 2013. This reexami
nation may not have resolved all questions raised by this
(30) Foreign Application Priority Data decision. See 37 CFR 1.552(c) for exparte reexamination
and 37 CFR 1.906(c) for interpartes reexamination.
Feb. 10, 1993 (JP) ....................................... 5-022212
At the time of issuance and publication of this certificate,
(51) Int. Cl. the patent remains subject to pending reexamination
G06F I3/00 (2006.01) control numbers 95/000,480 and 90/013,481 filed Jun. 4,
G06F 3/53 (2006.01) 2009 and Mar. 27, 2015 respectively. The claim content of
G09G L/I6 (2006.01) the patent may be subsequently revised if a reexamination
GO6F 3/14 (2006.01) certificate issues from the reexamination proceedings.
EMORY
COMMUNICATION
CONTROLLER
COMPUTER
Appx363
US 7,475,180 C1
1.
EX PARTE
REEXAMINATION CERTIFICATE
THE PATENT IS HEREBY AMENDED AS 5
INDICATED BELOW.
AS A RESULT OF REEXAMINATION, IT HAS BEEN

DETERMINED THAT:
The patentability of claims 14-16, 28 and 29 is confirmed. 10

Claims 17-20, 23 and 24 are cancelled.
Claims 1-13, 21, 22 and 25-27 were not reexamined.
k k k k k
Appx364
USOO7475180C2
(12) INTERPARTES REEXAMINATION CERTIFICATE (1278th)

Arai et al. (45) Certificate Issued: Jun. 6, 2016
(54) DISPLAY UNIT WITH COMMUNICATION 3/1446 (2013.01); G09G 2.360/04 (2013.01);
CONTROLLER AND MEMORY FOR G09G 2370/04 (2013.01); G09G 2370/042
STORING IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FOR (2013.01)
IDENTIFYING DISPLAY UNIT (58) Field of Classification Search
USPC .......................................................... 710,305
(75) Inventors: Ikuya Arai, Yokohama (JP): Kouji See application file for complete search history.
Kitou, Yokohama (JP)
(73) Assignee: MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD., (56) References Cited
Hampstead, London (GB)
To view the complete listing of prior art documents cited
Reexamination Request: during the proceeding for Reexamination Control Number
No. 95/000,480, Jun. 4, 2009 95/000,480, please refer to the USPTO's public Patent
Reexamination Certificate for: Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system under the
Patent No.: 7,475,180 Display References tab.
Issued: Jan. 6, 2009
Appl. No.: 10/160,022 Primary Examiner — Christopher E. Lee
Filed: Jun. 4, 2002 (57) ABSTRACT
Reexamination Certificate C1 7,475,180 issued Dec. 28, A display unit for displaying an image based on video signals
2015 and synchronization signals inputted from an externally con
Related U.S. Application Data nected video source, includes a video circuit adapted to dis
play an image based on the video signals sent by the exter
(63) Continuation of application No. 09/732,292, filed on nally connected video source, a memory which stores an
Dec. 8, 2000, now Pat. No. 6,513,088, which is a identification number for identifying the display unit, and a
Mar. 10, 1999, now Pat. No. 6,247,090, which is a number stored in the memory to the video source. The com
continuation of application No. 08/833,346, filed on munication controller is capable of bi-directionally commu
Apr. 4, 1997, now Pat. No. 5,887,147, which is a nicating with the video source.
Feb. 9, 1996, now Pat. No. 5,652,845, which is a Attention is directed to the decision of Federal Circuit’s
continuation of application No. 08/190.848, filed on March 13, 2013 the parties to dismiss the appeal. Mondis
Feb. 3, 1994, now abandoned. Technology, Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd., et
(30) Foreign Application Priority Data al., No. 2012-1004 (Fed. Cir.), dated March 13, 2013 relat
ing to this patent. This reexamination may not have
Feb. 10, 1993 (JP) ....................................... 5-022212 resolved all questions raised by this decision. See 37 CFR
1.552(c) for exparte reexamination and 37 CFR 1906(c)
(51) Int. Cl. for interpartes reexamination.
G06F I3/00 (2006.01)
G06F 3/53 (2006.01) At the time of issuance and publication of this certificate,
G09G L/I6 (2006.01) the patent remains subject to pending reexamination
GO6F 3/14 (2006.01) control number 90/013,481 filed Mar. 27, 2015. The claim
(52) U.S. Cl. content of the patent may be subsequently revised if a
CPC ................ G06F 3/153 (2013.01); G09G 1/167 reexamination certificate issues from the reexamination
(2013.01); G06F 3/1423 (2013.01); G06F proceeding.
-----,
Appx365
US 7,475,180 C2
1.
INTERPARTES
THE PATENT IS HEREBY AMENDED AS
INDICATED BELOW.

DETERMINED THAT:
Claims 17-20, 23, 24, 28/18, 28/19, 28/20, 28/23, 28/24, "
29/17 and 29/23 were previously cancelled.
Claims 1-13, 21, 22, 25-27, 28/1-13, 28/21, 28/22, 28/25,
28/26, 28/27, 29/1, 29/21, 29/25 and 29/26 are cancelled.
Claims 14-16, 28/14, 28/15, 28/16 and 29/14 were not 15
reexamined.
Appx366
USOO7475180C3
(12) EX PARTE REEXAMINATION CERTIFICATE (10903rd)

Arai et al. (45) Certificate Issued: Jun. 28, 2016
(54) DISPLAY UNIT WITH COMMUNICATION G09G L/I6 (2006.01)

CONTROLLER AND MEMORY FOR GO6F 3/14 (2006.01)
STORING IDENTIFICATION NUMBER FOR (52) U.S. Cl.
IDENTIFYING DISPLAY UNIT CPC ................ G06F 3/153 (2013.01); G09G 1/167
(75) Inventors: Ikuya Arai, Yokohama (JP): Kouji (2013.01); G06F 3/1423 (2013.01); G06F
Kitou, Yokohama (JP) 3/1446 (2013.01); G09G 2.360/04 (2013.01);
G09G 2370/04 (2013.01); G09G 2370/042
(73) Assignee: MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD., (2013.01)
Hampstead, London (GB) (58) Field of Classification Search
None
Reexamination Request: See application file for complete search history.
No. 90/013,481, Mar. 27, 2015
(56) References Cited
Reexamination Certificate for:
Patent No.: 7,475,180 To view the complete listing of prior art documents cited
Issued: Jan. 6, 2009 during the proceeding for Reexamination Control Number
Appl. No.: 10/160,022 90/013,481, please refer to the USPTO's public Patent
Filed: Jun. 4, 2002 Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system under the
Display References tab.
Reexamination Certificate C1 7,475,180 issued Dec. 28,
2015 Primary Examiner — Christopher E. Lee
Reexamination Certificate C27,475,180 issued Jun. 6, 2016 (57) ABSTRACT
Related U.S. Application Data A display unit for displaying an image based on video signals
and synchronization signals inputted from an externally con
(63) Continuation of application No. 09/732,292, filed on nected video source, includes a video circuit adapted to dis
Dec. 8, 2000, OW Pat. No. 6,513,088, which is a play an image based on the video signals sent by the exter
continuation of application No. 09/265,363, filed O nally connected video source, a memory which stores an
Mar. 10, 1999, now Pat. No. 6,247,090, which is a identification number for identifying the display unit, and a
Apr. 4. 1997, OW Pat. No. 5,887,147, which is a number stored in the memory to the video source. The com
continuation of application No. 08/598.903, filed on munication controller is capable of bi-directionally commu
Feb. 9, 1996, now Pat. No. 5,652,845, which is a nicating with the video source.
Feb. 3, 1994, now abandoned. Attention is directed to the decision of Federal Circuit’s
(30) Foreign Application Priority Data March 13, 2013 the parties to dismiss the appeal. Order,
Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Industry
Feb. 10, 1993 (JP) ....................................... 5-022212 Co., Ltd., et al., No. 2012-1004 (Fed. Cir.), dated March 13,
2013 relating to this patent. This reexamination may not
(51) Int. Cl. have resolved all questions raised by this decision. See 37
G06F I3/00 (2006.01) CFR 1.552(c) for ex parte reexamination and 37 CFR
G06F 3/53 (2006.01) 1906(c) for interpartes reexamination.
- o
W
DEFECTION CIRCUI
2
Cp U DISPLAY CONTROLLER
W
i
2
RGB
C. tal
VIDEO CIRCUIT D
}
12 13
7 MICROCOMPUTER
4.
A- MEMORY COMMUNICATION CONTROLLER 5

8 COMMUNICATION MEMORY --9
t COMPUTER CONTROLER
DISPLAY DEVICE
Appx367
US 7,475,180 C3
1.
EX PARTE
NO AMENDMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO 5
THE PATENT

DETERMINED THAT:
The patentability of claims 14-16, 28/14, 28/15, 28/16 and "

29/14 is confirmed.
Claims 1-13, 17-27, 28/1-13, 28/17-27, 29/1, 29/17, 29/21,
29/23, 29/25 and 29/26 were previously cancelled.
k k k k k
Appx368
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on September 28, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing LG
Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.’s Nonconfidential Opening Brief
using the Court’s CM/ECF filing system. Counsel for plaintiffs-appellees were
electronically served by and through the Court’s CM/ECF filing system per Fed. R.
App. P. 25 and Fed. Cir. R. 25.
/s/ Michael J. McKeon

Michael J. McKeon
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.’s Nonconfidential
Opening Brief is submitted in accordance with the type-volume limitation of Fed.
Cir. R. 32(b)(1). The Brief contains 13,998 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f) and Fed. Cir. R. 32(b)(2). This Brief has been
prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2016 in Times
New Roman, 14 Point.
Dated: September 28, 2020 /s/ Michael J. McKeon

Michael J. McKeon

United States Court of Appeals For The Federal Circuit: Plaintiffs-Appellees, V

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United States Court of Appeals For The Federal Circuit: Plaintiffs-Appellees, V

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Case: 20-1812 Document: 24 Page: 1 Filed: 09/28/2020

United States Court of Appeals

LG ELECTRONICS INC., LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,

LG ELECTRONICS INC. AND LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.’S

Counsel for LG Electronics Inc. and

U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180 Claim 14

14. A display unit for displaying an image based on video signals

a video circuit adapted to display an image based on the video

a memory in which at least display unit information is stored,

a communication controller capable of bi-directionally

wherein said communication controller is capable of

Counsel for Defendants-Appellants LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics

U.S.A., Inc. certifies the following:

FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.: Ralph A. Philips; Scott A. Elengold*; Jared M.

* No longer with the firm

Dated: September 28, 2020 /s/ Michael J. McKeon

CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST .................................................................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................vi

I. STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES........................................................... 1

II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ................................................................ 1

III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .................................................................... 2

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................... 3

V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .............................................................. 4

VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................. 7

VII. MERITS ARGUMENTS ................................................................................. 8

A. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found Written Description Support

1. Background Relevant to Invalidity .............................................8

2. The Undisputed Evidence Shows that Claims 14 and 15 Fail to

The ’180 Patent Does Not Disclose the “Type” Limitation

3. The District Court’s Post-Trial Denial of JMOL Is Not Supported

Dr. Stevenson’s Alleged Noninfringement-Related

Appellees’ Alternative Noninfringement-Related

Argument Cannot Create Written Description Support .22

No Substantial Evidence Exists to Support the Jury’s

1. Background Relevant to Noninfringement ...............................25

The Accused Televisions and Standards ........................25

Appellees Failed to Present Evidence of a Communication

2. A Jury Verdict Cannot Be Based on Speculation and Conjecture

3. Lamm’s Reliance on Industry Standards Cannot Prove that the

4. Lamm’s Reliance on a Third Party Datasheet Is Insufficient to

As Lamm Admitted, the Datasheet Has Nothing to Do

The Microchip EEPROMs Cannot Be the Claimed

5. Appellees Cannot Rely on Improper or Unreasonable Inferences

C. No Reasonable Jury Could Have Found Willfulness.......................... 41

VIII. JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENTS ............................................................. 44

1. Background Relevant to Standing ............................................44

The Relevant Agreements ..............................................44

Procedural Background ..................................................46

APPELLEES’ CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL REDACTED

2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Does Not Exist Where No Plaintiff

Each Plaintiff Must Have Both Constitutional and

Atypical Patent Transfer Agreements May Leave No Party

3. Hitachi Cannot Be a Named Plaintiff Because It Lacks

Maxell, Ltd. Lacks Standing...........................................50

Hitachi Lacks Constitutional Standing, Because It Lacks

FRCP 19 and the Need to Cure Statutory Standing Cannot

4. Without Hitachi, Mondis Lacks Statutory Standing .................55

Mondis Lacks Legal Title to the ’180 Patent .................55

Mondis Lacks All Substantial Rights and Cannot Sue

5. This Case Should Be Dismissed Because No Single Plaintiff Has

6. If the Court Rules that Hitachi Has Standing, It Should Enforce

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction over this Appeal ..................................... 62