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GR No.

: 132916
Title: Tancinco v GSIS

Date: November 16, 2001


Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J

DOCTRINE: Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the former Revised Rules of Court, which was then
still in effect, an appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals to this Court must be
made within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or the denial of a motion for
reconsideration filed in due time. In the case at bar, petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration
from receipt of the resolution of dismissal two hundred thirty-one (231) days late, thereby
rendering the said resolution final and executory. The gap of more than seven (7) months is too
large for us to ignore. Petitioner did not even offer any explanation to account for the tardiness.
It behooves the party invoking liberality in the application of procedural rules to at least explain
his non-compliance therewith. We have held that the period of appeal is not only mandatory, but
more importantly, it is jurisdictional. Even we cannot ignore the immutable character of a final
judgment

FACTS:

At around noon of July 17, 1995, while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of his
house along the National Road in Barangay Palanas, Lemery, Batangas, SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco
was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men. SPO1 Tancinco was a member of the NCR
Security Protection Group of the Philippine National Police, and at the time of his death, was
assigned as part of the close-in security detail of then Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada. SPO1
Tancinco was off-duty at the time inasmuch as the former Vice-President was in the United States
for medical treatment.
His widow, petitioner Rufina Tancinco, filed a claim for benefits before the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). On February 19, 1996, the GSIS denied petitioner's claim on
the ground that there was no proof that petitioner's husband's death was work-related. Petitioner
appealed the denial to the Employees' Compensation Commission (Commission) which, on
December 19, 1996, issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. As ruled by the
Commission:
It is evident that the death of SPO1 Tancinco on July 17, 1995, when he
was on off-duty status did not arise out of and in the course of his employment
as a member of the PNP Security Command.
Apparently, the conditions aforementioned were not satisfied in the
present case. Notably, SPO1 Tancinco was repairing his service vehicle at the
time of his death. He was neither executing an order for VP Estrada nor

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performing an official function on that fateful day inasmuch as Police
Superintendent Atilano Miranda duly certified that SPO1 Tancinco was on "off-
duty status" on July 17, 1995.
We would like to stress once more that not all contingencies such as
injury, disability, or death which befall an employee are compensable. The same
must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
Since the cause of SPO1 Tancinco's death is no longer part of his official
functions, the claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No.
626, as amended, cannot be given due course.
Petitioner filed a petition for review from the aforesaid decision of the Commission
before the Court of Appeals. On May 30, 1997, the appellate court issued the first assailed
resolution dismissing the petition for review on the following grounds: (a) that the certification
of non-forum shopping was defective; (b) that certified true copies of material portions of the
record were not attached to the petition; and (c) that the petition failed to state all the material
dates which would establish the timeliness thereof. As admitted by petitioner herself, she
received a copy of the resolution on June 9, 1997, and yet it was only on January 27, 1998, or
seven-and-a-half (7 1/2) months later, that she filed a motion for reconsideration. As can be
expected, the appellate court denied her motion in the second assailed resolution of March 5,
1998.
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ISSUE/S

Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion or a reversible error in not
entertaining the petition filed by petitioner which substantially complied with the rules and was
on its face meritorious.

RULING

The conclusion is inevitable because the instant petition was not timely filed. Under
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the former Revised Rules of Court, which was then still in effect, an
appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals to this Court must be made within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or the denial of a motion for reconsideration filed
in due time. In the case at bar, petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration from receipt of the
resolution of dismissal two hundred thirty-one (231) days late, thereby rendering the said
resolution final and executory. The gap of more than seven (7) months is too large for us to
ignore. Petitioner did not even offer any explanation to account for the tardiness. It behooves the
party invoking liberality in the application of procedural rules to at least explain his non-

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compliance therewith. We have held that the period of appeal is not only mandatory, but more
importantly, it is jurisdictional. Even we cannot ignore the immutable character of a final
judgment.
Prescinding from the finality of the appealed resolutions, the appeal will still fail on the
merits. Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
for the employer.

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