ROBERT LASTRILLA, 

Petitioner, 
vs.
RAFAEL A. GRANDA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Rafael Granda is a grandson and legal heir of the deceased spouses Rafael and
Aurora Granda, who died in June 1989 and September 16, 2000, respectively. The Granda
spouses had ten children.

During Aurora's lifetime, she owned several parcels of land with some improvements thereon in
Tacloban City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-249, T-1312, T-816 and T-
9874, all registered in her name.Said parcels of land were allegedly sold by the Granda spouses,
as evidenced by the deeds, witnessed by petitioner and the deceased spouses' youngest daughter
Silvina and notarized by Atty. Camilo Camenforte.

On February 21, 2001 or more than five months after Aurora's death, respondent filed the instant
complaint7 for Violation of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner,
Silvina, Atty. Camenforte, Norma Lastrilla, Mary UyCua, NecitaUy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy,
TinongUy and Rosa Uy. Respondent claimed that a month after his grandmother's death, he
learned that all of the latter's properties in Tacloban were sold to different persons sometime in
1999-2000. 

To verify such reports, he requested copies of the purported deeds of absolute sale with the
Register of Deeds and was able to obtain copies of the three (3) deeds of absolute sale in
question. Upon careful scrutiny of the subject deeds, he noticed that the signatures of his
deceased grandparents were falsified.

Upon verification, the examining officers of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed that the
signatures of respondent's deceased grandfather Rafael in the deeds and his specimen signatures
"were not written by one hand and the same person." They also found that the signatures of his
deceased grandfather and the signatures of the deceased spouses' youngest daughter Silvina
"reveal some similarities in stroke structure, indicative of one writer." Likewise, the examining
officers found that the signatures of respondent's grandmother Aurora in the questioned deeds
and her specimen signatures "were not written by one and the same person."

There are allegations that: first, he knew that the three deeds of sale were falsified and, despite
such knowledge, he still signed them as an instrumental witness; second, he was personally and
directly responsible for registering the falsified deeds with the Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City; third, he caused the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Aurora
Granda; finally, he effected the issuance of the new Transfer Certificates of Title.
Petitioner lays stress on the ruling of the DOJ that "in the absence of criminal intent, there is no
falsification and the absence of damage negates criminal intent." 

Issue:

1. Whether or not Robert Lastrilla is guilty under Article 171 of RPC?

Held:

1. Yes.

In the case at bar, there is no question that all the elements of falsification are present. The issue
is whether there is probable cause to engender the belief that petitioner is one of the authors of
the falsification.

From the records, there is no question that petitioner signed as an instrumental witness to the
subject deeds of absolute sale. As such, he attested that the Granda spouses, as vendors, signed
the said deeds in his presence on December 7, 1985.

Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner "was personally and directly
responsible for registering the falsified deeds with the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City" and
that "he caused the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Aurora" and
"effected the issuance of the new Transfer Certificates of Title." 

ROSALIO S. GALEOS
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011

FACTS:

 Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu

on April 16, 1986.
 He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998.
 On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T.
Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I,
respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer.3 Prior to their permanent
appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual employees of the municipal government
 In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year
1993, Galeos answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the
government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the names of
relatives referred to in the said query.4 The boxes for "Yes" and "No" to the said query
were left in blank by Galeos in his 1994 and 1995 SALN.5 Rivera in his 1995 SALN
answered "No" to the question on relatives in government.6 In their 1996 SALN, both
 Galeos and Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same
query.7Ong’s signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who
administered the oath when Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.
 On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a letter-
complaint9 before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas against Ong (then
incumbent Vice-Mayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation
of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employeesand Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of falsification of
public documents.
 On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of
OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong,
Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in connection with the Certification dated June 1, 1994 issued
by Ong and the false statements in the 1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera and the
1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Galeos. It is alleged there that with intent to falsify
they, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document
the accused, Galeos, made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, when in truth and in fact he was related to Ong
within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since the mother of accused Galeos
is the sister of the mother of accused Ong. While accused Rivera made it appear
therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
working in the government, when he is related to accused Ong within the fourth degree of
affinity, since the mother of Rivera’s wife being the sister of the mother of Ong.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners lack of knowledge of their relationship at the time of the execution of
the public document could exempt them from criminal liability of falsification of public
document?

HELD:

No. Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26

In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee
had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public
document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he
has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2)
he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.27Likewise, in falsification of
public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent
to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.28

Falsification of Public Document

by making untruthful statements
concerning relatives in the
government service

All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been
established by the prosecution.

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it
does not call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963
to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what
constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of
whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, statements concerning relationship may
be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion

When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in the government service,
such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts contemplated under Article
171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress that the untruthful
statements on relationship have no relevance to the employee’s eligibility for the position but
pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in
the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful
statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the
fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to
his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar
query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong,34 it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the
accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which
would have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position.
By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN,
Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such relationship with then
Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment
pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending
authority.

ARTICLE 172- FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND USE OF

FALSIFIED DOCUMENT

THE UNITED STATES v. DAMIAN ORERA (alias KIM CUAN)

G.R. No. 3810. October 18, 1907

FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT; THEATER TICKETS. — The counter-feiting and

simulation of the signature and rubric and the imitation of the figures, letters, and other
characters contained in a Chinese theater ticket to the damage of the company issuing the same,
constitutes the crime of falsification of a private document, punishable under the provisions of
article 304 of the Penal Code. 

FACTS:

Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted of the crime charged in the complaint, namely, of
having falsified, to the damage of a Chinese theatrical company of the Philippine Islands, called
Eng Ning, "a Chinese theater ticket which entitled the bearer thereof to admission to a
performance held in the theater of the above company at Manila, by counterfeiting and
simulating the signature and rubric of Eng Ning on the said ticket, and stamping, writing and
placing on the said ticket the same figures, letters, dragons, ornaments, and signatures, as placed
by Eng Ning and the above-mentioned Chinese theatrical company . . ." The accused was
sentenced to be imprisoned at the Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period of six months and one
day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, Philippine currency, and the costs of the suit, from which
judgment the accused appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the theatre ticket is considered as private document/ instrument?

HELD:

Yes. That the court did not err in qualifying such ticket as a document in order to prosecute and
punish the crime of falsification, the subject-matter of the complaint, because if, according to the
authority cited by the appellant, a document is "a deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper
by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth," and a private document is, according to
another authority cited by the same appellant, "every deed or instrument executed by a private
person, without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by
which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth," it follows that
the ticket in question, being an authorized document evidencing an agreement for the rent of a
place in a theater to enable the possessor to witness a theatrical performance, is a private
document.

PEOPLE v. BENITA DOMINGO ET AL

GR No 24086, Mar 25, 1926

FACTS:

 Defendant Benita Domingo, upon learning that Estanislao Sanchez, executor and judicial
administrator of the testate estate of Josefa de Leon, was desiring to alienate, sell, or
mortgage a fishery situated in the municipality of Bocaue, presented herself to said
administrator as real estate broker, and through false and fraudulent representations to the
effect that she, had found a person who had stated his desire to purchase said fishery, and
wanted to examine first the title deed and other documents relating to said property

 Benita Domingo, succeeded in obtaining the certificate of title relative to the said fishery,
together with her codefendants Zacarias Modesto, Mary Doe, and Jane Doe they
presented themselves to Moises Buzon, Mary Doe, as Hilaria de Leon, and her
codefendant Jane as Josefa de Leon, and offered to sell the said fishery for P5,000 upon
the condition that he could repurchase the same within the period of one year,

 On August 22, 1924, before Domingo Sandoval, notary public for the City of Manila, and
under the names of Hilaria de Leon and Josefa de Leon and representing themselves to be
the owners of said fishery, the defendants Mary Doe and Jane Doe did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally execute, subscribe, and ratify before said notary
public, Domingo Sandoval, a deed of sale with right of repurchase of the aforesaid
fishery in favor of Moises Buzon in consideration of the sum of P5,000.

 The court acquitted Zacarias Modesto but found Benita Domingo guilty accused of the
crime of estafa through falsification of a public document

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of accused of the crime of estafa through falsification of a
public document

HELD:
Yes. It appears in evidence that Hilaria de Leon and Josefa de Leon died on January 20, 1913,
and November 22, 1923, respectively, leaving, among other things, a Torrens registered fishpond
in the municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan. One Estanislao Sanchez was appointed administrator of
the estate of Josefa de Leon. Having learned that Sanchez wanted to sell or mortgage the
fishpond in question for the payment of debts of the estate, the accused Benita Domingo went to
his house in the City of Manila on July 4, 1924, and, representing herself to be a real estate
broker, offered to look for a purchaser for which purpose she requested that she be given
temporary possession of the plan of the property. As Sanchez was in need of funds with which to
pay certain debts of the estate, he gave her the plan, fixing the price of the property at P22,000. A
few days afterwards, Benita returned to Sanches' house and stated that she had received an offer
in the amount of P20,000 for the fishpond and that the prospective purchaser desired to see the
certificate of title to the property. Sanchez handed her the certificate on condition that she should
return it in the afternoon of the following day. She failed to return the document as promised by
her, and when seen by Sanchez in her house in Malabon, Rizal, told him that it was then in the
possession of the prospective purchaser, but that at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that day she
would return it to him at his house in Manila. Again she failed to fulfill her promise to return the
certificate, and though Sanchez made diligent search he was thereafter unable to find her.

Shortly afterwards Estanislao Sanchez was informed by one Pedro del Rosario that the accused
Zacarias Modesto was trying to mortgage the fishpond. He, therefore, went to see Zacarias
Modesto at the latter's house on Antipolo street, Manila, but was told by Zacarias that he did not
have the certificate of title to the property. On or about August 3, 1924, Zacarias, accompanied
by one Simplicio de los Santos, called on Moises Buzon and offered to sell him the same
fishpond, which after some negotiations, Buzon finally agreed to purchase pacto de retro for
P5,000. Zacarias then left the aforementioned certificate of title with Moises in order that the
deed might be prepared and the sale registered. The deed was signed at the office of Attorney
Domingo Sandoval on August 22, 1924, by two won who were represented by Zacarias Modesto
as the owners of the fishpond, Buzon paying the women the sum of P5,000 as the price of the
property. Before the parties left the office of Attorney Sandoval, the supposed vendors gave a
certain amount of money to the accused Zacarias Modesto, presumably as commission. The sale
with pacto de retro was afterwards entered by way of memorandum on the back of the original
certificate of title.

The testimony of the accused Benita Domingo is to the effect that she did not know her
coaccused Zacarias Modesto; that she never had the certificate of title in her possession and had
never seen it before the trial; and that while she had received the plan of the property from
Estanislao Sanchez, the same was subsequently returned to him because she could find no
purchaser for the fishpond.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. 

TOMAS MANANSALA, ET AL., 
GALICANO ALON and RICARDO CABRALES
G.R. No. L-38948, November 18, 1933

FACTS:
On or about the 19th day of February, 1932, Appellants Galicano Alon ( alias Grego), and
Ricardo Cabrales ( alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro
Mendoza by means of false and fraudulent representations which may made Perfecto Abordo to
the effect that they had for sale six hundred (600) tins of opium, a prohibited drug, and that they
would deliver the same to him upon paying them P600 in advance and by means of other similar
deceit, induced the said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver to them, as in fact he gave and
delivered to them, the said sum of P600, in consideration of which the accused gave him a
gasoline can which they represented to contain the 600 tins of opium, when in truth and in fact,
as the said accused well knew, the said can contained only six small tin cans containing a black
substance which was not opium, the accused thereby wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
defrauding the said Perfecto Abordo in the sum of P600 to his damage and prejudice in said
amount.chanrobl

Upon the termination of the trial, Judge Pedro Concepcion found the defendants Galicano Alon
and Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa, in accordance with the provisions of article 354, No. 2, of
the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244, and sentenced each of them to suffer four months
and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
offended party, Perfecto Abordo, in the sum of P600, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the proportionate part of the costs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused were guilty of estafa

HELD:

Yes. The crime committed by the appellants is that of estafa as defined in article 315, paragraph
1 ( a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that any person who shall defraud another
through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of
anything of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even
though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration. The amount of the fraud
being P600, the penalty applicable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional
in its minimum period, and it appearing that the appellant Galicano Alon has already been
convicted of estafa, he is therefore a recidivist, and the penalty applicable to him should be
imposed in the maximum degree.

BARTOLOME ALONZO
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
The accused Bartolome G. Alonzo, was appointed as Clerk-typist in the Fire Department of
Olongapo City, designated as Personnel Officer in charge of Finance. Some of his duties was
(sic) to prepare payrolls, vouchers and others which are relevant to his position. Sometime on
October, 1974, the accused prepared the voucher for the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for the month
of October, 1974, who was employed as Firefighter in the Olongapo City Fire Department. After
preparing said voucher, the accused placed the same on his table in the outgoing box as a usual
practice in his office. It is the duty of the messenger-clerk Rogelio Pangilinan to see to it that all
the vouchers prepared by the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo and placed in the outgoing box will
be signed by those concerned and to follow it up until the vouchers will be paid.

In the afternoon of October 30, 1974, Rogelio Pangilinan informed the accused that he has
already converted the voucher into cash and handed to the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo the
amount of P166.67 appearing in the voucher of Wilfredo Cadua informing him (Alonzo) that he
was in a hurry. Some of his (Alonzo) officemates including the Administrative Officer was (sic)
present when Rogelio Pangilinan handed to him the P166.67 and because Wilfredo Cadua was
not around at the time, he looked for him in the office and when he saw Cadua, he handed to him
the full amount appearing in the voucher in the amount of P166.67. The accused informed
Wilfredo Cadua that he is badly in need for money for his X-ray and asked a loan of P66.00 from
Cadua which the latter consented. No receipt was signed for the loan since they worked in the
office "through trust and confidence."

The following morning, Cadua and the accused had a confrontation in the presence of the Fire
Chief. The Fire Chief inquired from Alonzo why Cadua received less than what he expected to
receive and after the accused explained the circumstances about the loan, the Fire Chief advised
the accused to return the amount loaned.

A week after or on November 10, 1974, the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo returned the amount
of P66.00 which he loaned from Wilfredo Cadua in the presence of their Fire Chief but the
accused did not ask Cadua to issue receipt for the return of his loan since it was in the presence
of their Fire Chief. (t.s.n., p. 114, Id)

Sometime on March 1975, or four months after payment of the loan of P66.00, Wilfredo Cadua
filed a criminal complaint against Bartolome G. Alonzo as a consequence of the loan of P66.00
but which was already paid on November 10, 1974. And as a result, an Information for Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents was filed against the accused, and the lower court
convicted the accused of the crime charged in the information.

In short, these were in synthesis, the basic facts of this unfortunate case of the herein accused
Bartolome G. Alonzo which were clearly and conclusively established during the brief trial of
this criminal case. And this Honorable Court shall have that opportunity now to fathom the noble
dignity of our proofs tested in this regard for we are confident that there is no room to hold the
memory of "Wrong Judgment" in the hall of this Honorable Court, presided by jurists whose
appointments were a real credit to the Philippine judiciary

n the afternoon of October 30, 1974, Rogelio Pangilinan informed the accused that he has
already converted the voucher into cash and handed to the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo the
amount of P166.67 appearing in the voucher of Wilfredo Cadua informing him (Alonzo) that he
was in a hurry. Some of his (Alonzo) officemates including the Administrative Officer was (sic)
present when Rogelio Pangilinan handed to him the P166.67 and because Wilfredo Cadua was
not around at the time, he looked for him in the office and when he saw Cadua, he handed to him
the full amount appearing in the voucher in the amount of P166.67. The accused informed
Wilfredo Cadua that he is badly in need for money for his X-ray and asked a loan of P66.00 from
Cadua which the latter consented. No receipt was signed for the loan since they worked in the
office "through trust and confidence."

The following morning, Cadua and the accused had a confrontation in the presence of the Fire
Chief. The Fire Chief inquired from Alonzo why Cadua received less than what he expected to
receive and after the accused explained the circumstances about the loan, the Fire Chief advised
the accused to return the amount loaned (t.s.n., pp. 2-12, hearing of December 7, 1977; Decision,
Crim. Case No. 2526, p. 35 hereof).

A week after or on November 10, 1974, the accused Bartolome G. Alonzo returned the amount
of P66.00 which he loaned from Wilfredo Cadua in the presence of their Fire Chief but the
accused did not ask Cadua to issue receipt for the return of his loan since it was in the presence
of their Fire Chief. (t.s.n., p. 114, Id)

Sometime on March 1975, or four months after payment of the loan of P66.00, Wilfredo Cadua
filed a criminal complaint against Bartolome G. Alonzo as a consequence of the loan of P66.00
but which was already paid on November 10, 1974. And as a result, an Information for Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents was filed against the accused, and the lower court
convicted the accused of the crime charged in the information.

In short, these were in synthesis, the basic facts of this unfortunate case of the herein accused
Bartolome G. Alonzo which were clearly and conclusively established during the brief trial of
this criminal case. And this Honorable Court shall have that opportunity now to fathom the noble
dignity of our proofs tested in this regard for we are confident that there is no room to hold the
memory of "Wrong Judgment" in the hall of this Honorable Court, presided by jurists whose
appointments were a real credit to the Philippine judiciary. (Appellant's brief in the Court of
Appeals, pp. 4-8; Rollo, pp. 31-33).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner misappropriated P66.67 by forging another person's signature on
the salary voucher

HELD:

No.The petitioner could not possibly be guilty of wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously preparing
the complainant's voucher, considering that it was his official duty to do so. He prepared the
voucher of Wilfredo Cadua in the amount of P166.67 for the month of October. There was no
alteration made in the amount stated in the voucher because the stated amount is the correct
salary of the complainant for that period. It was not the petitioner who presented the voucher for
payment but their office messenger, Pangilinan. The appellant did not misappropriate the full
amount of P166.67 nor did he refuse or continue to refuse to remit the amount. In fact, he handed
to Wilfredo Cadua the amount of P100.00 on that same day while, at the same time informing
Cadua that he was borrowing the amount of P66.67 for his x-ray expense. On November 10,
1974, the appellant paid the complaining witness the amount of P66.67 upon the advise of the
chief of the Olongapo City Fire Department.

The evidence adduced by the prosecution is, therefore, entirely different from what the
information alleges.

In the instant case, there is no direct evidence showing that Bartolome G. Alonzo himself forged
Cadua's signature on the original voucher. Nobody actually saw him affix the alleged signature
(See Ranon v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 495; and Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, 134 SCRA 105).
Even Rogelio Pangilinan. who was responsible for routing the voucher to all those who had a
hand in approving the same could not categorically state that he saw the accused forge
complainant's signature.

Further, the forgery is supposed to be on a voucher showing the amount of P100. 00. I t was this
voucher which was allegedly shown to the complainant. This second voucher had nothing to do
with the original voucher used to collect the salary. If there was such a second voucher, it was a
non-official voucher used to lull the complainant into believing his salary was only P100.00.
However, this story of a supposed forged document does not explain how the complainant could
have been hoodwinked because the original voucher for P166.67 carried his correct salary.

The fact that the petitioner prepared the voucher, considering it was his official duty to prepare
the payroll, vouchers, and other documents assigned to him is not a sufficient reason for the
respondent court to conclude that "there is no doubt that the forgery or falsification was effected
by the appellant." Unfortunately, the respondent court mistakenly applied the rule that: "one
found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger or the one who caused the
forgery and, therefore, is guilty of falsification (See Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 19 SCRA 688).
The accused is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence especially where the
evidence on the alleged forged voucher is extremely doubtful. As held in the case of People v.
Clores, (125 SCRA 67):

... Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered. Suspicion no
matter how strong should not sway judgment, for well-established is the rule that the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; that appellants
need not prove their innocence because that is presumed; that the presumption of innocence is a
conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his innocence is not only established but
continues until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created
that is, his innocence; that conscience must be satisfied that defendant has been proven guilty of
the offense charged. Only by proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty, "a
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it"
may the presumption of innocence be overcome.

SIQUIAN VS PEOPLE
FACTS:

Jesusa Carreon went to the office of Manuel Siquian, the municipal mayor of Isabela,
to apply for a job in the office of the mayor. Siquian then appointed her as a clerk in
the office of the mu nic ipal   secret ary and even  sai d that  her  salary would be
included in the budget. Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others,
of the availability of funds through a form issued by Siquian and addressed to the CSC, pursuant
to the requirements of the latter.It should be noted that the Municipal council of Isabela,
failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-76. As such, the
annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-75, was deemed re-enacted.

No such position existed then. Car reon  wor ked for  five  mon ths  and was  supposed  to
receive her salary of P120. She approached the municipal treasurer to ask for the money but the
latter said that there was no money yet. She then sued Siquian for falsification of a public
document. 

Th e R TC and  CA ruled  in  favor of Carrion S iq uia n interposed the defense of a lack
of criminal intent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Siquian is guilty of falsification of document?

HELD:

Yes. The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by "any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making
untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of
falsification, the following requisites must concur:

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No.
67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then
the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the
narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the
appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public
official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil.
765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the
certification was addressed received the document issued by petitioner. Since the certification
was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by the government
(specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with
the character of a public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209
(1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here,
falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were
available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality,
the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal
year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan,
Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal
Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was
appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year
1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification utterly
false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there
exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v.
Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and
third requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and
regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original
Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to
be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated
the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is
designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said certification which includes information as
to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not
necessary when the falsified document is a public document. This has already been
authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The
Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused
to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public
document. The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private
documents has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present
the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to
private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing
People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the
controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice
caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People
v. Pacana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the
absence of criminal intent on his part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as
a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate
the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at
bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela
presides at all meetings of the municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative
Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section 2624
(c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for
the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela
which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was
re-enacted and (2) that under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were
no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these
facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of
these documents; i.e.  Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1"
and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of
the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification
on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance
creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the
municipal council.

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of
issuing the absolutely false certification as to the availability of funds for the subject position.
The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of
facts in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to
commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the
law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In
this case, the presumption that petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose
from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.

Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in
falsifying the document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a
public document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the
influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v.
Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender
falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or
preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil.
376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was
charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa
Carreon.

VIOLETA BAHILIDAD vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 185195
FACTS:

A complaint filed by a Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the
Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious
grants and donations using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in
Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its investigation
from June 1 to July 31, 2003, and submitted the following findings:
 
1. Release of financial assistance intended to NGOs/POs and LGUs were
fraudulently and illegally made thus local development projects do not exist
resulting in the loss of P16,106,613.00 on the part of the government.
 
2. Financial Assistance were also granted to Cooperatives whose officials and
members were mostly government personnel or relative of the officials of
Sarangani Province resulting to wastage and misuse of government fund
amounting to P2,246,481.00.[2]
 
 
Included in the list of alleged fictitious associations that benefited from the financial assistance
given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Peoples Organizations (POs), and
Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in
the amount of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer
thereof.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner Bahilidad and Zoleta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bahilidad is guilty Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents

HELD:

Yes. In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public
officials in the commission of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of
Public Documents. The trial court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. The
Sandiganbayan explained petitioners complicity in the crime, to wit:
 
The facts taken together would prove the existence of conspiracry. Zoleta,
as president of an inexistent association and a co-terminus employee at the office
of her father, [accused Constantino,] initiated the request for obligation of
 allotments and certified and proved the disbursement voucher. There is no doubt
that accused Constantino facilitated the illegal release of the funds by signing the
questioned voucher. Without the signatures of
accused Constantino, Zoleta and Bahilidad, the amount could not have been
disbursed on that particular day. When the voucher with its supporting documents
was presented to accused Constantino, Diaz and Camanay for approval and
signature, they readily signed them without further ado, despite the lack of proper
documentation and non-compliance of the rules. Zoleta had contact with the
payee of the check, Bahilidad, and received the amount. Their combined acts,
coupled with the falsification of the signature of Remulta, all lead to the
conclusion that the accused conspired to defraud the government.
 
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need
not be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, which are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs
with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an
overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated.
 
The circumstances that Zoleta placed her initials on the voucher knowing
that there was really no WIP, that the other accused likewise signified their
approval to the disbursement and allowed payment, and that payee received and
encashed the check out of the fund of the provincial government instead of
depositing it, shows that there was connivance between the accused. The
unavoidable conclusion is that the accused were in cahoots to defraud the
provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by using a dummy
organization as a payee.

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED vs. Hon. APOLONIO G. EXEVEA

G.R. No. 117565; November 18, 1997

FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the DAR-CAR before his dismissal in 1993.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by Jeannette Obar-Zamudio, the
Regional Cashier, of malversation through falsification of official documents; concealing of
unliquidated cash advances through falsification of accounting entries; oppression and
harassment. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,[1] charged Lumiqued with
malversation through falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989,
Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline
receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from
the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified
receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent
added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it
impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989,[2] private respondent accused
Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded
the government by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the
falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on `Cash advances of other officials
under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules.
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989,[3] charged Lumiqued with oppression
and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted
Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro
issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against
Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee
chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as
members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the
order, and to submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.

Following the conclusion of the hearing, the investigating committee rendered a report finding
lumigued liable for all charges against him. Accordingly, the investigating committee
recommends lumigued’s dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice the filling of the
appropriate charges against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of public document?

HELD:

Yes. That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement
of his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of
the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different
gasoline stations where the respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes `G-1 to `G-15 show that the
actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of
P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45
liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his
act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends.
While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the
pattern and the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government has,
nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had
in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of
108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office.
Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts.

Respondents act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying

receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal offense for
Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.

This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the
year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances
totalling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of
allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification
issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete
evidences (sic).

On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondents act in relieving the
complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of
harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges
against her (sic). The recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came
only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondents order relieving the complainant
was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she filed
constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of the respondent who is a head of office.

THE UNITED STATES v. ROMAN INFANTE and TOMAS BARRETO

G.R. No. 11448. January 25, 1917

 ID.; ID.; EACH FALSIFICATION SEPARATE OFFENSE. — Two pawn tickets were falsified
at or about the same time by the same persons in a substantially similar manner, that is to say, by
the substitution in each of an article of much higher value than the article for which it was
originally issued. These pawn tickets were thereafter presented and made use of together as a
pledge to procure a loan far in excess of the true value of the articles originally pawned. Held:
That the falsification of each of these documents constituted a single consummated offense
wholly separate and distinct from the other and wholly separate and distinct from the crime of
embezzlement which was committed when illegal and improper use was made of these falsified
pawn tickets as pledges; and that a plea of a former conviction of the falsification of one of these
pawn tickets is not a bar to the prosecution and maintenance of a criminal action wherein the
accused are charged with the falsification of the other.

FACTS:

Appellants in this case were convicted in the former case of the crime of falsification of a private
document, in that they falsified a pawn ticket issued by the Monte de Piedad, to the prejudice of
and with intent to prejudice the complaining witness. The evidence disclosed that these accused
changed the description of the pawned article as it appeared on the face of the pawn ticket and
substituted therefor another article of greatly superior value, and that thereafter the falsified
ticket was itself pawned in the pawnshop of the complaining witness for an amount largely in
excess of the true value of the article pawned in the Monte de Piedad, for which the original
pawn ticket was issued. 

In the present case these appellants were convicted in the court below of the falsification of
another pawn ticket issued by the Monte de Piedad, and the evidence discloses that this pawn
ticket was falsified by these accused at or about the same time when they falsified the pawn
ticket for the falsification of which they were convicted at the former trial; that the falsification
was made in substantially similar manner to that in which the other ticket was falsified; and that
both the falsified tickets were pawned in the pawnshop of the complaining witness at the same
time and for the same purpose, that is to say, to procure a loan far in excess of the true value of
the articles originally pawned in the Monte de Piedad. 

The contention of counsel would seem to be that, since both these tickets were falsified at or
about the same time and for the same purpose, and since both were used at the same time to
procure unlawfully a certain sum of money from the pawn-broking establishment of the
complaining witness, there was but one crime committed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the two separate charges against the accused constitute only one crime

HELD:

No. The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and distinct documents. They had no relation to
each other as members of a series of instruments, so intimately related, that the falsification of
one individual of the series would be, in effect, a falsification of the entire series. The crime of
falsification of a private document was complete and consummated when, with intent to
prejudice a third person, the first pawn ticket was actually falsified; and a wholly separate and
distinct crime was initiated and consummated when the second ticket was falsified. That both
documents may have been falsified to be used together in the perpetration of an embezzlement in
no wise affects the case, as under the definition of the crime of falsification of private documents
set out in article 304 of the Penal Code, the crime is consummated and complete at the moment
when such a document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of, or with intent to prejudice a third
person, it matters not to what use the document may be put thereafter, as will readily be seen
from the express terms of that article, which are as follows:

"Any person who, to the damage of another, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in article three hundred
shall suffer the penalty of presidio correccional in its minimum and medium degrees and be fined
in a sum not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred
and fifty pesetas
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. TAN BOMPING, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-24187 March 15, 1926

FACTS:

The defendants Tan Bomping, Leon Galindo, Policarpo Tambor, Lucio Macalisang and Andres
Burias are accused of the crime of falsification of public documents, it being alleged in the
information upon which the case went to trial "that on or about the 21st and 22d of November,
1923, in the municipality of Jimenez, Province of Misamis, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, confederating together and cooperating with
one another, did willfully, unlawfully and criminally prepare and cause to be prepared eight
fictitious and simulated documents acknowledged before a notary public wherein the accused
Tan Bomping conveys to his co-accused Leon Galindo, Policarpo Tambor, Lucio Macalisang
and Andres Burias eight parcels of land belonging to said accused Tan Bomping, making it to
appear in said documents that the same were executed on previous dates, about the years 1919,
1920, 1921, 1922 and August of 1923, when as a matter of fact said documents were executed
and signed by all the five defendants on November 21, 1923, and acknowledged by them before
a notary public on November 22d of the same year." chanrobles virtual law library

Upon trial Court of First Instance found all of the defendants guilty of the falsification of private
documents and sentenced Tan Bomping to suffer one year, eight months and twenty-one days
of presidio correccional and to pay a fine of 625 pesetas. Each of the other defendants was
sentenced to six months of arresto mayor with the same fine as that imposed on Tan Bomping.
All of the defendants appeal to this court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of public documents

HELD:

Yes. The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Tan Bomping, in order to
escape the attachment of his property in a civil action then pending, on the 21st of November,
1923, executed eight deeds of conveyance various parcels of land, of which he was the owner, to
his codefendants, and that he intentionally antedated the documents. Duly certified copies of the
deeds are in evidence and are marked Exhibits A to H, inclusive. Two of them, Exhibits A and B
were executed in favor of Leon Galindo and given the date of January 15, 1920. These
documents were witnessed by Policarpio Tambor and Andres Burias. Two other deeds, Exhibits
C and D, were made out in favor of Policarpo Tambor and dated October 10, 1921, and October
15, 1920, respectively, and were witnessed by Leon Galindo and Andres Burias. Exhibits E and
F were executed in favor of Andres Burias, dated August 15, 1923, and witnessed by Leon
Galindo and Policarpo Tambor. Exhibits G and H were executed in favor of Lucio Macalisang
and dated January 20, 1919. The subscribing witnesses were Leon Galindo and Policarpo
Tambor. On the following day Tan Bomping took the documents to a notary public and
acknowledged them in the usual manner. The notary, observing that the documents bore earlier
dates, apparently became suspicious and at his instance, Tan Bomping stated under oath that they
were executed and signed on the dates therein stated.

Upon the facts stated, Tan Bomping is manifestly guilty of the falsification of public documents
and not merely of private ones as found by the trial court; he not only falsified the documents,
but was also directly instrumental in causing them to be made public documents. The case
against his codefendants is not quite as clear and there is room for a reasonable doubt as to their
knowledge of the true character of the transactions described. The majority of the members of
this court are therefore of the opinion that said codefendants should be acqui tted.

THE UNITED STATES v. FERNANDO NIETO

G.R. No. 2607, February 2, 1906

PRIVATE DOCUMENT; FALSIFICATION. — The mere fact that a receipt taken by a a private
person from a private person was intended for use in support of a claim against the public funds
does not of itself raise it to the dignity of a public document before it has become a part of some
official record and prior to its certification by some public official clothed with authority for that
purpose.

FACTS:

Fernando Nieto, the appellant in this case, was charged with the falsification of a public
document, with abuse of his office as municipal president. 

It appears that the accused, who at that time was president of the municipality of Meycauayan,
bought a typewriter for the use of the said municipality for which he paid $90, gold, and at the
same time caused the vendors to sign a receipt and a reimbursement voucher setting out the facts
connected with the sale of the machine and the amount paid therefor. It appears further that the
accused changed the amount as set out in the receipt and voucher from $90, gold, to $95, gold,
and on the presentation of these falsified documents, recovered from the treasurer of the
municipality the sum of 190 pesos, Philippine currency, in reimbursement of his expenditure in
the purchase of the machine. 

The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of falsification of a private document

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused guilty of the crime of falsification of a private document

HELD:
No. We think the evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court, and we are
agreed that the documents in question at the time when they were falsified were private and not
public documents, and that the offense was not committed with abuse of a public office. In the
purchase of the machine the accused was acting as a private person and not in his official
capacity as municipal president, and the receipt and voucher at the time when they were altered
were merely evidenced of a private transaction between the accused and the vendors of the
machine. They did not emanate from any public office; they were not a part of any public or
official record, nor were they certified by any person authorized to certify public documents. The
mere fact that they were intended for use in support of a claim against the public funds could not
of itself raise them to the dignity of public documents before they had become a part of some
official record, and prior to their certification by some public official clothed with authority for
that purpose. 

The accused admitted that he had made the alterations in the documents as alleged, but attempted
to justify or rather to explain his action by stating that at the time when he bought the machine he
also bought $5 worth of typewritter supplies; that at the time when he recovered the amount paid
for the machine he had mislaid his receipt for these supplies, and believed that without that
receipt he could not recover the price paid therefor; and that he altered the receipt and voucher so
as to include this $5, not with any intention of defrauding the municipality, but merely for the
purpose of recovering from the municipality the full amount he had expended on its behalf. 

Taking this view of the case counsel for the appellant insists that as there was really no loss
(perjuicio) to the municipality resulting from the alteration of the document, there can be no
conviction for that alteration, as loss or damage to a third person is an essential requisite to the
crime of falsification of a private document, as defined in article 304 of the Penal Code. 

ARTICLE 172- FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE

INDIVIDUALSAND USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS

K. PEOPLE VS. PACANA

47 PHIL 48
DEC. 19, 1924

FACTS:

These are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of public documents
and estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents, in which the accused are
Pedro A. Pacana, secretary of the provincial board of Misamis, Isidro Adorable, member of the
provincial board of Misamis, and Vicente P. Castro, member of the provincial board of Misamis.

The charge in the first numbered case against Pedro A. Pacana relates to the falsification
by the accused of minutes of the meeting of the provincial board on June 9, 1923, for the alleged
purpose of permitting the district engineer to incur illegal expenses in the reconstruction of a
provincial road.
 The charge in the second case against the same accused relates to the falsification of
minutes of the provincial board on June 16, 1923.

The charge in the third case against the same accused relates to the falsification of an
excerpt from the minutes of the provincial board of June 9, 1923.

And the last two cases, one against provincial board member Isidro Adorable and Pedro
A. Pacana, and the other against provincial board member Vicente P. Castro and Pedro A.
Pacana, relate to the crimes of estafacommitted by means of falsification of public documents,
whereby it is alleged Adorable and Castro were each able to collect the sum of P25 as per diems
for two fictitious meetings of the provincial board.

It is the theory of the prosecution that exhibit documents were prepared by the provincial
secretary with the connivance of the members of the provincial board for illegal purposes. To
substantiate this theory, attention is concentrated on the following prominent facts:

1. Exhibits C and D were seen by the chief clerk of the district auditor, Juan Callante, in the
office of Pacana on the afternoon of June 18, 1923. Copies of Exhibits C and D were
made by a clerk in the office of the district auditor, Juan Borja, on the morning of June
19, 1923.

2. An excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 224 was received in the office of the
provincial treasurer of Misamis before 5:50 o'clock on the afternoon of June 19, 1923.

3. Another excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 225, Exhibit Q-3, the basis of
the third prosecution, was received in the office of the district engineer on June 27, 1923,
and when the chief clerk of this office noted the date June 9, 1923, on the minutes and
brought it to the attention of the provincial secretary, the date was changed to June 16,
1923.

The mistake of the secretary was attempted to be rectified by the provincial board on
September 20, 1923, by changing the dates of the excerpts to June 16, 1923, and thus another
error was perpetrated. The originals of Exhibits C and D have disappeared, possibly through the
machinations of the provincial secretary. The provincial board of Misamis could not have
celebrated a session at Cagayan before June 18, 1923, because of its absence on an inspection
trip, and could not have celebrated a session on the afternoon of June 19, 1923, as claimed by the
defense, because of a velada held on the same afternoon in the intermediate school of Cagayan at
which the provincial governor and member Castro were present. And finally, before the district
auditor, the three accused re-affirmed the fact that sessions of the provincial board were held on
June 9 and 16, 1923.
The theory of the defense is diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution. Defendants thesis is
simple and is to the effect that on account of the carelessness of the provincial secretary and the
amount of work thrown on his inexperienced shoulders, error was committed, and that, instead of
meetings of the provincial board being held on June 9 and 16, 1923, meetings were in reality
held on June 19 and June 21, 1923.

ISSUE:

WON there was an international and deliberate falsification of public documents on the part of
the accused, or whether there was merely a human error committed, in which criminal intent was
wholly lacking.

HELD:

YES.(in favor of the accused)

Oral testimony I this case is mostly circumstantial in nature, thus, that which presented by the
prosecution, is hard to say, unless there was exaggeration on the part of some of the witnesses.

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be crime. Actus non facitreum,
nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Ignorance or
mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from
criminal responsibility. The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a duty or
indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent. The element of malicious
intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence.

Citing the decision of Supreme Court of Spain on February 25, 1885

(U.S. vs. Mateo [1913], 25 Phil., 324, 334; U.S. vs. Reyes [1902], 1 Phil., 341; U.S. vs. Ah
Chong [1910], 15 Phil., 488; U.S. vs. Catolico [1911], 18 Phil., 504; and Guevara's Penal Code,
2nd edition, pp. 1-3, 401-406)

Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents,

whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that,
in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed, it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public
document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to change the
effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could
not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is
required by article 1 of the Penal Code; considering that the fact that Don
 Augustin Montes Moreno set out the proceedings as of a date prior to that on
which they actually occurred, and therefore incorrectly, the remaining part of the
document being true, ... neither affected the integrity or truth of said proceedings
not affected in any essential way their results or effects, it is necessary to
conclude that the criminal intent mentioned in the previous observation was
absent; considering that, even though the accused consciously attached incorrect
dates to the proceedings, nevertheless that act does not take on the character of a
crime, and for that reason the Audiencia de Huelva erred in convicting the
accused …

It is a serious matter to be responsible for sending the accused to prison for long terms. All
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in to the
benefit of the prisoners at bar. The Government has suffered no loss. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
We cannot bring ourselves to find these accused guilty on the facts of record.

It results, therefore, that we must, as we hereby do, reverse the judgments appealed from and
acquit the accused of the charges laid against them, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

PEOPLE VS. SERGIO MENDOZA

93 PHIL 581
JULY 31, 1953

FACTS:

Sergio Mendoza was charged with falsification of a public or official document.

On July 27, 1949, Mendoza, being then employed as inspector of the Division of Sanitary
Engineering, of the Office of the City Health Officer in Manila, commit various acts of
falsification on a public and official document, to wit:

1. Official Receipt No. 188903-V, issued by the City Treasurer's Office, City of Manila, by
erasing the name "Elena Manansala" and the figure "P1.00" therein and

2. Afterwards, writing, inserting and intercalating, or, causing it to be written, inserted and
intercalated thereon in such a way as to change its import and meaning, the words
"Roberto B. Almaden," "forty-six only" and the figure "46" thereby making it appear that
 said receipt was issued to the said Roberto B. Almaden and that the latter paid the sum of
P46 to the City Treasurer's Office, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well
knew, Official Receipt No. 188903-V was in the name of Elena Manansala as aforesaid
and said receipt was issued to her when she paid the amount of P1 to the Department of
Engineering and Public Works, in said City, for the issuance of a duplicate copy of a
building fee.

Upon arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty, but on 18 February 1952, the date set
for the trial of the case, with the consent of the trial court and the prosecuting attorney, the
defendant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty for the crime of falsification described
and punished in the last paragraph of article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.  The trial court
sentenced him to suffer 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P50, or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs.  From this sentence the defendant has
appealed.

On 14 June 1952, Vicente T. Velasco, Jr., the attorney de oficio appointed by the court,
filed a motion stating that he could not find a way to question the legality of the penalty imposed,
which is the only question raised by the appeal. 

In the Solicitor General’s brief, he recommends that the penalty be not less than 1 month
and 1 day nor more than 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and not less than 1 year and 1
day nor more than 1 year and 8 months of prisioncorreccional, as maximum, because the penalty
imposed by the lower court is below the range provided by law.

ISSUE:

WON the penalty imposed for the crime of Falsification of Public Document by public officer
was proper.

HELD:

NO.Neither the penalty imposed by the trial court nor that recommended by the Solicitor
General is in accordance with law.  The penalty should be not less than 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, and not less than 3 years, 6 months and 21 days and not more
than 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prisioncorreccional, as maximum, the accessories of the
law and a fine of P50, or subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs.

Falsification of a public document by a public officer or employee or by a private person

is a very serious crime punished with prision mayor to its full extent and
with prisioncorreccional  in its medium and maximum periods, respectively, and in both with a
fine not to exceed P5,000. 

Being an employee or inspector of the Division of Sanitary Engineering of the Office of

the City Health Officer the defendant was not a private person.  He could be considered as such
if notwithstanding his government employment he took no advantage thereof in committing the
falsification.  The crime of falsification described and punished in article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed by a private individual who does any of the falsifications described in
the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other
kind of commercial document; and by a person who, to the damage of a third party, or with
intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

The last paragraph of article 172 punishes a private person who introduces in evidence in
any judicial proceeding and uses any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding
article or in any of the subdivisions of the article.  For that reason the crime of falsification
defined and punished in the last paragraph of article 172 is not necessarily included in the
offense charged in the information for falsification of a public document by a public officer or
employee or by a private individual. 

The crime punished in the last paragraph of article 172 of the Revised Penal Code may be
a lesser offense but it certainly cannot be deemed necessarily included in the crime of
falsification of a public document by a public officer or employee or by a private person.  Hence
section 4, Rule 114, was misapplied.

The trial court allowed the defendant to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense for that
of not guilty, to a more serious crime previously entered under and pursuant to section 4, Rule
114.  The substitution of plea could not lawfully be made taking into consideration the fact that
the crime charged in the information is falsification of a public document.

ARTICLE 173: FALSIFICATION OF WIRELESS CABLE

U.S. VS. ROMERO

17 PHIL 76

ARTICLE 174: FALSE MEDICAL CERTIFICATES, FALSE CERTIFICATE O MERIT

OR SERVICE

U.S. VS. MICHELENA

4 PHIL 492
APRIL 29, 1905

FACTS:
 In an application to the Civil Service Board for examination, a document printed in
accordance with the form prescribed by said Board, and in that part thereof which contains
recommendations of the applicant, certificate No. 3 appears to be subscribed by Frank N. West,
the latter having neither subscribed it nor written the contents thereof, the same not being correct
in some respects, viz, as regards the age of the party certifying and the length of time which he
knew the candidate recommended. The crime was fully proven. The candidate, now the
defendant, failed to present himself for examination, notwithstanding having in his possession
the ticket of admission. 

The judge in his judgment qualifies this fact as an attempt at falsification of a public document. It
is an attempt because the examination did not take place, and not having taken place the
document was not put on record, for which reason it never became a public document. Therefore,
the court sentenced the defendant to six months’ arresto mayor and a fine of 1,000 pesetas, or the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment.

ISSUE:

WON the crime is falsification of a public instrument.

HELD:

NO.

The fact that the defendant did, in one of the certificates in an application for an examination to
the Civil Service Board, and, in that part thereof containing recommendations of the applicant,
subscribe the name of a person, the latter neither having subscribed nor written the contents
thereof, same not being true in some respects, is neither falsification nor attempt of falsification
of a public instrument, but merely a falsification of a certificate of merit, provided for and
punished in article 311 of the Penal Code.

U.S. VS. DELOSO

11 PHIL 180
AUGUST 13, 1908

FACTS:

Rufino Deloso stated under oaththat he was a resident of the said town, and that at the
date of the next municipal election he would have resided therein for a period of six months; and
that he was in every way entitled to vote.
 At the municipal elections held in the town of Oroquieta, in the same province, on the 5th
of December, 1905, RuflnoDeloso was elected by a majority vote to the office of municipal
president.  The election was protested by several residents of the town on the ground that the
successful candidate had no legal residence therein.   In his defense Deloso stated under oath on
the 4th of January, 1906, before Vicente Fortich, notary  public of Oroquieta, that he had been,
and was at the time, a resident of the said town, and that he had resided therein from the month
of April, 1902, until the above-mentioned date.

A complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging Rufino Deloso with the crime of
falsification of official documents, and the court below, in view of the evidence adduced at the
trial, found him guilty of the crime defined and punished by Article 311, in connection with
article 310, of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to the penalty of four months of arresto mayor,
to suffer the accessory penalties and to pay costs.  From this judgment the accused has appealed.

ISSUE:

WONDeloso is guilty of Falsification.

HELD:

YES.(Trial court is affirmed, against the accused)

From the above stated facts, fully established in the case, it appears that the crime of falsifying a
certificate issued by a public officer was committed by a private person, who used it, perverting
the truth in the narration of facts, when exercising the right of suffrage at the municipal elections
held in December, 1904, in the pueblo of Jimenez, Province of Misamis.

Article 310 of the Penal Code provides that

"A public official who shall issue a false certificate of merit or service, of, good
conduct, of property or of other similar circumstances, shall be punished with the
penalties of suspension in its medium and maximum degrees and a line of from
325 to 3,250 pesetas."

Article 311 of the said code prescribes that

"An individual who shall falsify a certificate of the kinds mentioned in the
preceding articles shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor.
 This provision is applicable to the person who shall knowingly make use of such
falsecertificate."

The document offered in evidence, issued by the municipal secretary of Jimenez, is not,
strictly speaking, a public document, but it belongs to the class of documents the
falsification of which is specially punished by articles 306 to 311 of the Penal Code;
therefore, the provisions of articles 301 and 302, in connection with article 300 of said
code, are not applicable to the present case.

The said document or certificate was used with a knowledge that its contents were false,
in that Deloso was not a resident of Jimenez. The falsity of the statement, made by him to
the municipal secretary of said pueblo, was proven by another notarial document
executed by the same Deloso who also stated under oath, that he was a resident of
Oroquieta both before and after the year 1904;it is therefore unquestionable that the
accused has incurred the penalty imposed by article 311 of the Penal Code, above quoted.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that he signed the document marked Exhibit
B, without having read it, and that he was not acquainted with the provisions of the
Municipal Code as to the residence required of an elector. These allegations cannot be
sustained, nor do they constitute an exemption of the accused, inasmuch as, according to
article 2 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law does not excuse a person from
compliance therewith.

Furthermore, in view of the degree of education and intelligence of the accused who, as
appears in the proceedings, assisted a  resident of the pueblo of Jimenez in his complaint
against the municipal president for violation of the Municipal Code, there can be no
doubt but that he was acquainted with the said code, and that he maliciously and
knowingly made use of the certificate issued by the municipal secretary of Jimenez,
containing the false declarations made by himself, in order to exercise the right of
suffrage at the elections in that town, although he was well aware that he was neither a
resident of Jimenez nor entitled to participate in such elections.

ARTICLE 175: USING FALSE CERTIFICATES

NEGROS MERCHANTSENTERPRISES, INC.

VS. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150918
CIVIL CASE

RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.   The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

ARTICLE 176: MANUFACTURING AND POSSESSION OF INSTRUMENTS OR

IMPLEMENTS FOR FALSIFICATION
U.S. VS. ANGELES
6 PHIL 435
CASE NOT FOUND

PEOPL VS. FELIPE MAGPALE

70 PHIL 177

FACTS:
 A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe Magpale charging him with a violation
of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 25th day of March, 1938, Magpaleknowingly and without lawful purpose, have in his
possession, custody and control one brand of the municipal government of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, with the intent of using it for falsifying the official brand of the said municipality of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, in public documents, to wit: Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. All
contrary to law.

Convinced, from the evidence and that there was reasonable ground to believe that the defendant
committed the crime complained of, the justice of the peace remanded the records of the case to
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for further proceedings. In CFI, Magple was informed
with the information charging him an offense, to wit:

That on about the 25th day of March, 1938, Magpale did then and there voluntarily, maliciously,
illegal and criminally make an iron brand purported to be of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, with the intention of using it knowingly in the falsification of certificates of ownership of
large cattle, said manufactured brand having been found in the possession of said accused, which
is contrary to law.

CFI finds the defendant Felipe Magpale guilty of a violation of article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code.

ISSUE:

WONthe lower court erred in finding the acts imputed to the defendant punishable, as coming
within the purview of article 176 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

NO. Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements

for falsification. — The penalty of prisioncorreccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not to exceed 10,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who shall make or introduce into the Philippine Islands
any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or implemented intended to
be used in the commission of the offenses of counterfeiting or falsification
mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter.
 Appellant himself admits that the ordered the questioned iron brand to be made,
wherefore, he is criminally liable for the making thereof. (Article 17, Revised Penal Code.) It
also appears that the said brand is an exact imitation of that owned and used by the municipality
of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to brand its own large cattle and to counterbrand large cattle belonging
to its inhabitants.

ARTICLE 177: USURPATION OF AUTHORITY AND OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS

PEOPL VS.FELIPE HILVANO

99 PHIL 655
JULY 31, 1956

FACTS:

When Mayor FidencioLatorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official

business early in the morning of September 22, 1952, he designated the herein defendant
Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his office.

Later, during office hours on that same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre went to the
municipal building. And having found Hilvano acting in the place  of the Mayor, he
served written notices to the corresponding municipal officers, including Hilvano, that he
(Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent mayor. However,
Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that he had beendesignated by the Mayor.  Whereupon
the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary informing the latter of the
controversy.  And the said Secretary replied byletter,that under sec. 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code it  was  the  Vice-Mayor who should discharge the duties of the
Mayor during the latter's temporary absence.   Shown  this official pronouncement,
Hilvano  still  refused  to surrender  the position.  Again the Vice-Mayor sought the 
opinion  of the  Provincial Fiscal,  who by letter,  replied  that the Vice-Mayor had the
right to the office.   Notwithstanding such opinion which was exhibited to him Hilvano 
declined to vacate the post, which  he held for  about a month,  appointing some
policemen, solemnizing marriages and  collecting the corresponding salary for  mayor.

ISSUE:

WON Francisco Hilvano is guilty of usurpation of public authority.

HELD:

YES.Republic  Act No. 379  which  amended, Article 177  of the Revised  Penal Code, reads:

"Usurpation of authority or official functions. Any person  who shall knowingly and
falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or 
agency  of the Philippine Government or of any  foreign government, or who, under
pretense of official  position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority
or public officer of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correctional in its minimum and medium periods.”

It is contended however for the appellant that he committed no usurpation of authority because
he was a councilor, an official of the Government, and that such crime may only be committed
by private individuals.  He cited a decision of  the Supreme Court of Spain  of 1880 interpreting
the corresponding  article of  the  Spanish Penal Code, which is the origin of our own Penal
Code/  But it appears that in subsequent decisions the same court convicted of  the offense of
usurpation certain officials who without proper authority discharged the functions of other
officials, e.g.,  a municipal judge (Jan. 22, 1890)  and  a vice-mayor (teniente de alcalde) who
discharged the functions of the  alcalde.

There is actually no reason to restrict the operation of Article 177 to private individuals.  For one
thing it applies to "any person"; and where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.

Furthermore, contrary to appellant's  assumption that  Articles 238-241  of  the Revised Penal
Code penalize  all kinds of usurption  of official functions by public  officers, said articles merely
punish interference by officers of one of the three departments of government (legislative,
executive and judicial) with the  functions  of  officials of  another department. Said articles do
not cover usurption of one officer or employee of a given  department of the  powers
of another officer in the same department.   For instance, the exercise by a bureau employee of
the powers of his director.

There  is  no  excuse for  defendant-appellant.  In  the beginning he might have pleaded
good faith, invoking  the designation by the Mayor;  but after he had been  shown the letter of the
Executive Secretary and the opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no  right thereafter
stubbornly to stick to the position.  He was rightfully convicted.

PEOPLE VS. LIDRES

G.R. No. L-12495
July 26, 1960

FACTS:
Dionisio Lidres was charged in CFI o Cebu with the crime of usurpation of official
functions as defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 10.
 On 22nd day of February, 1954, Lidres, with deliberate intent and without pretense of
official position perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade class of the Biasong
Elementary School of the aforementioned municipality, a position assigned to and occupied by
Miss JosetaDiutay who had been duly appointed to said position.The records disclose that
Magdalena P. Echavez is a public school teacher who was granted maternity leave beginning the
first school day of January, 1954 and ending on March of the same year. To fill up the vacancy
expected to be created by said leave of Echavez, JositaDiotay and defendant Lidres filed their
respective applications as substitute teachers.

On December 30, 1953, Diotay was recommended by the supervising teacher of the
aforementioned school Hilario Laspiñas, to fill up the position of Echavez. Laspiñas, however,
requested Diotay to sign agreement take over Echavez' position on a "50-50" basis, that is, the
period from January, 1954 would be equally divided between them. Thereafter, Diotay received
her appointment (Exh. B) as substitute teacher, vice Echavez, effective January 4, 1954. Diotay
then took over the job of Echavez and began teaching the second grade class in said school.

On February 12, 1954, apparently on the strength of the agreement, defendant appeared at
Biasong Elementary School, armed with a prepared letter of resignation for the signature of
Diotay. When the defendant asked Diotay to sign said letter of resignation, the latter refused.
Subsequently, defendant made known to Diotay that whether she liked it or not, he would take
over her class on Monday, (date February 22), went to the classroom where Diotay was
conducting her classes, and insisted to take over the same, but Diotay tried to hold on. As a
consequence, both held classes, Diotay on 2 rows of pupils and defendant, on the remaining 2
rows. In order to assert his authority, defendant also erased Diotay's named from the attendance
chart, and placed his own. Annoyed by defendant's actuation, Diotay, left the classroom, and
reported the matter to the principal teacher, ExequielTecson, at Balamban. The latter advised her
to return to her post, which she did. When she arrived at her classroom in the afternoon of the
same day (February 22), defendant was still there, holding the class until 4:00 o'clock. In view of
this, Diotay went back to inform said principal about defendant's insistence in taking over her
class.

On the following day, February 23, 1954, both Diotay and defendant were summoned by the
supervising teacher (Laspiñas) for a conference in Cebu City. At said conference, said
supervising teacher told Diotay to continue teaching, while defendant was advised not to go back
to school. Without heeding said instruction, defendant, on February 24, 1954, without any
authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay's class, against the latter's will.

ISSUE:
WON Lidres is guilty of usurpation of official functions.

HELD:

YES.

the law, as originally appearing in Article 177 of Act No. 3815 (Revised Penal Code), provides:

ART. 177. Usurpation of official functions. — Any person who, under

pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any
person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do
so, shall suffer the penalty of  prisioncorreccional in its minimum and
medium periods. (Emphasis supplied.)

Granting, arguendo, that Republic Act No. 10 is an amendment to Article 177 of the

Revised Penal Code and not merely an implementation thereof (2 Padilla, Revised Penal Code
Annotated [1958 Ed.] 267), or an emergency measure as stated, the subsequent enactment of
Republic Act No. 379 effective June 14, 1949, would constitute an amendment thereof by
restoring the element of pretense of official position in the offense of usurpation of official
functions, originally required by Article 177 prior to its amendment by the latter Act.

Under Republic Act No. 379 then, the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense by defendant, pretense of official position is an essential element of the crime of
usurpation of official functions. But the information specifically charges that defendant
committed the offense "without pretense of official position". Under circumstances, the facts
alleged in the information fail to constitute an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of
usurpation of authority, as distinguished from usurpation of official functions, under the first
paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said Republic Act No. 379, namely, that of representing
to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government, inasmuch as the information does not charge the
same.

ARTICLE 178: USING FICTITIOUS NAME AND CONCEALING TRUE NAME

U.S. VS. TO LEE PIU

35 PHIL 4

FACTS:
The appellant was charged with using a false name. The evidence is to the effect that he
came to the Philippine Islands in 1911 and presented a section six certificate, which is attached
to the record as Exhibit A, wherein his name appears as To Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to an
application for a passport the name Toribio Jalijali. Said application was accompanied by the
affidavits of two witnesses and by a baptismal certificate showing that a person by that name was
born in the Philippine Islands in 1878.

On the trial there was no denial of the fact that appellant signed the name Toribio Jalijali
to the application for a passport. And the only evidence which may be regarded as having been
contradicted in the case is that given by the defendant himself when he testified that he was born
in the Philippine Islands, that his name is Toribio Jalijali, that he went to China at an early age,
and, feeling doubtful as to his ability to prove his right to reenter, applied to the American consul
at Canton for a section six certificate; that, on such application, he stated to the consul that his
name was Toribio Jalijali, and that, upon being told by the clerk of the consulate that it was not
necessary to put his surname in such application, wrote therein the Christian name Toribio alone.

The charge is prosecuted on the theory that To Lee Piu appellant's correct name and that
the name Toribio Jalijali is false.Counsel for appellant maintains that the Government, in order to
maintain the action, must prove

(a) that the two names in question were different, and

(b) that the name alleged to be false was in fact false; and that the failure of the
Government to meet these, or either these, requirements must result in an
acquittal.It is contended on this appeal that the Government did not meet either of
these requirements.

ISSUE:

WON To Lee Piu used fisctitious name/ concealed his true name.

HELD:

YES. It is undoubted that To Lee Piu was the name by which the appellant was known in China.
It is the name he gave to the American consul and it is the only name he gave. He alleged that he
was born in China in October, 1878, and applied for a certificate which is required of Chinese
persons only. Upon his own statements and the statement of his government he was given a
section six certificate. It would seem to us that these facts are sufficient to establish, prima
facie at least, that the appellant is a Chinese person and a Chinese subject; that he was born in
China in October, 1878; and that his name is To Lee Piu.

These facts being established it is incumbent on the appellant to relieve himself of the charge
that, when he stated under oath in his application for a passport that his name was Toribio Jalijali
and that he was born in Santa Cruz, Manila, on the 27th of April, 1878, he did not tell the truth;
or to give such proof with reference thereto as would raise in the mind of the trial court a
reasonable doubt as to his true name. The only evidence offered by the appellant in this
connection was a certificate of baptism of an infant named Toribio Jalijali, born in Santa Cruz,
Manila, in April, 1878. The names of several witnesses appear in this certificate. None of them
were produced on the trial; nor was it shown that these witnesses, or any of them, were dead, or
that the appellant was unable to procure their presence at the trial. No effort was made to find or
offer as a witness his alleged father or mother.

HOCK LIAN VS. REPUBLIC

17 SCRA 188

FACTS:

Appellant contends that the lower court erred:

(1) in holding that the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation;

(2) in not holding that appellee uses an alias without court authority and in violation of
the Anti-Alias Law;

(3) in not holding that appellee had failed to report his true income; and (4) in not holding
that appellee has no lucrative occupation.

Appellee, a citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in the Philippines on April 30, 1927.
He used to reside in Zamboanga City but since March 1, 1940 he has been living in Dumaguete
City. He is married to Tan Ko Kiem, also known as Alice Tan, a Chinese national, by whom he
has three children, two of whom are school age and are enrolled at the St. Paul's College,
Dumaguete City, an educational institution recognized by the government, not limited to any
particular race or nationality and where subjects on Philippine history, government and civics are
part of the curriculum. Appellee himself finished his first year high school education at the
Zamboanga Chinese High School, Zamboanga City.

He speaks the English, language and the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. A merchant by

occupation, he has a store in Colon Street, Dumaguete City where he sells rice, corn and general
merchandise. He has two cargo trucks worth P17,000 and office equipment worth about P200.
His net income was P5,939.36 in 1958; P4,114.49 in 1959, and P5,659.30 in 1960. To prove that
he has none of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, he presented tax and
police clearances; clearances from the Philippine Constabulary, the City Fiscal, the Provincial
Fiscal, the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and the Municipal Court of Dumaguete
City; and a medical certificate of the City Health Officer.
ISSUE:

WON appellant Hock Lian has committed the crime of using fictitious name:

HELD:

YES. For the purposes of this appeal only the second, third and fourth errors assigned by
appellant need be considered. The first of them refers to appellee's use of alias. Under the law,
except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one
with which he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142).
Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no
evidence that appellee has been baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it
since childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore
committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law.

ARTICLE 180- FALSE TESTIMONY AGAINST DEFENDANT

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv. DIONISIO A. MANEJA

[G.R. No. 47684. June 10, 1941.]

FACTS: Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in criminal case No. 1872
on December 16, 1933, as the lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in December, 1938, as the prosecution contends
that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. With regard to the crime of false
testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal
Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the
principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense
until the principal case is finally decided.

ISSUE:Whether or not the period of prescription for the offense of false testimony which, in the
instant case, is five years should commence from the time the appellee adduced the supposed
false testimony.

RULING: Yes. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal
Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties provided
therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not
therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. v.
Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People v. Marcos, G. R. No. 47388, October 22, 1940.) And before
an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents.The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the
offense of false testimony is the name, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were
convicted or acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure co-incidence. The four cases
enumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code — and the instant case falls on one of them
— uniformly presuppose a final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a
prerequisite to the action ability of the crime of false testimony. 

Art. 181. False testimony favorable to the defendants.  —afflictive penalty, and the penalty
of arresto mayor in any other case.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.MELECIO A. REYES,

November 10, 1931G.R. No. 34516
VILLAMOR,J.:

FACTS: Melecio A. Reyes was chargedwith the crime of estafa through falsification of

a private document, committed as follows:That during the period from July 1, 1929, to July 31,
1929, both dates inclusive, in themunicipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction ofthis court, the accuse above-named, being then employed as
timekeeper of the CalambaSugarEstate, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
withanimuslucrandi and the deliberate intent ofdefrauding and injuring said Calamba Sugar
Estate, made it appear in the time book prepared bysaid accused for the aforementioned period of
time, to wit, from July 1, 1929 to July 31, 1929, both dates inclusive, that the day-
laborerCiriacoSario had worked twenty-one days, whereas hewas fully aware that CiriacoSario
had worked but eleven days only during that period of time;thereby committing a falsehood in
the narration of facts in said time book, and by means of thisfalsification, the aforesaid defendant
appropriated the sum of ten pesos to his own use and personal benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the Calamba Sugar Estate in that amount, whichis equivalent to fifty pesetas. But he
defends himself,alleging that it was on Erquiza, who collected the wages appertaining to Sario.
At any event, it appears that the accused,knowing that CiriacoSario worked only eleven days,
altered and falsified the time book, puttingdown twenty-one workdays for CiriacoSario, and this
constitutes the crime of falsification of a private document to the prejudice of a third person.

ISSUE: Whether or not Reyes is guilty of falsification of a private document.

RULING:Yes, inview of the fact that the offense isestafa, as defined and penalized in article 304
in connectionwith article 300, paragraphs 2 and 4, as amended, and article 535 of the Penal
Code. This article provides that any person who, to the damage of another, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in article three hundredshall suffer the penalty of presidiocorreccionalin its minimum
and medium degrees and befined in a sum not less than six hundred and twenty- five and not
more than six thousand twohundred and fifty pesetas. Inasmuch, however, as the one crime was a
necessary means of committing the other,the accused can not be punished for both offenses.
However, the offense was not consideredto constitute the complex crime ofestafa through
falsification of a private document, nor was therule contained in article 89 applied, so as to
impose the penalty for the more serious offense in itsmaximum degree.The crime committed
should be classified only as that of falsification of a private document, forthe reason that the
fraudulent gain obtained by the falsifier is involved in the harm causedanessential and
indispensable ingredient for the existence of the crime of falsification of a privatedocument; and
it cannot be classified asestafa with falsification, nor may the penalty for a moreserious crime be
applied, pursuant to the provision of article 89 of the Penal Code, inasmuch asthe harm
occasioned on intended by the perpetrator of the crime does not constituteestafa

THE UNITED STATES v. CHAUNCEY MCGOVERN

[G.R. No. 2029. April 25, 1905. ]
WILLARD, J. :

FACTS: Chauncey McGovern, in a criminal case against Dean Tompkins, falsely testified (1)
that he was an expert in handwriting and had had a technical training in the science of the
discovery of forged handwriting; (2) that he had testified as a handwriting expert in the Dreyfus,
Capt. Oberlin Carter, Roland Molineaux, Fair, Dr. Kennedy, Dolly Reynolds, and other cases;
(3) that he had worked as an expert in handwriting for about three years for the Sunday World;
and (4) that he had examined twenty-four documents which were exhibits in the Tompkins case
under powerful magnifying glasses. The Government did not, in our opinion, prove the second of
these charges, viz, that the defendant testified in the Tompkins case that he had been a witness in
the Dreyfus and other cases mentioned. A statement that he had testified as an expert in the
Dreyfus, Molineaux, Carter, and Fair cases was so thoroughly improbable on its face that it
would at once have challenged the attention of every person present, and would have led the
prosecuting attorney at the commencement of his cross-examination to inquire about his
connection with those cases. The record, however, shows that the fiscal, after cross-examining
the witness through fifteen pages of testimony upon subjects which had little or no connection
with the case, excused him without making any such inquiries and it was not until six days
afterwards, when he was recalled for further cross-examination, that the matter was gone into.
That the Government did not then understand him to have positively stated that he was a witness
in those cases is shown by the form of the question which was asked McGovern.
library

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused is guilty of Perjury.

RULING:No, In a prosecution for perjury the testimony of one witness is not as general rule
sufficient to convict. Treating of an expert in handwriting, the statement that he was such an
expert is a statement of a mere opinion, the falsity of which is not sufficient to convict the person
making it, of perjury. In judicial trials the mere affirmation of a witness that he is an expert in
handwriting is of no value. Upon such statement he is not allowed to testify as an expert. He is
required to give the experience which he has had in the art in question. The judge then decides
whether he is or is not an expert. This was the procedure followed in the Tompkins case.
McGovern stated at considerable length what experience and practice he had. None of these
statements have been proved to be false. McGovern has never said that any of them were untrue.
Under these circumstances the bare statement of McGovern made out of court, that he was not an
expert, is not sufficient to convict him of perjury. 

THE UNITED STATES vs. GABINO SOLIMAN, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-11555            January 6, 1917
CARSON, J.:

FACTS:The evidence of record conclusively discloses that the defendant and appellant in this
case, GabinoSoliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in which
he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of
fact.On that occasion he testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in support of
the charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been
executed voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by the use of
force, intimidation and prolonged torture.It appears however that since judgment was entered in
this case on November 23, 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 has been expressly repealed by the
enactment of the Administrative Code, which became effective on July 1, 1916, and it has been
suggested that the judgment convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that
statute should not be sustained, and that the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect
of remitting and extinguishing the criminal responsibility of the accused incurred under the
provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE:Whether or not a prosecution for perjury should be instituted against an accused person
whose testimony in his own behalf would seem to be perjured.
RULING:Yes, This court has so held, it being a settled rule, that the false testimony given by a
litigant as a witness constitutes the crime of giving false testimony inasmuch as such a
declaration, according to the new laws in force, may determine a judgment in his favor and to the
prejudice of the adverse party, and that a litigant who, in sworn testimony given by him as a
witness in a civil cause, shall pervert the truth and give false testimony, incurs as such witness
the penalties imposed by article 321 of the Penal Code."

But when, as in the case at bar, an accused person voluntarily goes upon the witness stand and
falsely imputes some other person the commission of a grave offense, it would seem to be highly
proper that he should be called to account in a criminal action for perjury upon the complaint of
the person against whom such false charges are made.

Article 319 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Any person who shall give false testimony in favor of a defendant in a criminal case shall suffer
a penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prisioncorreccional in its
medium degree and a fine of not less than three hundred and seventy-five and not more than
three thousand seven hundred and fiftypesetas, if the case were for a felony, and the penalty
of arresto mayor if it were for a misdemeanor.

We conclude that the judgment of conviction entered in the court below should be affirmed but
that the sentence imposed therein should be reversed, and that giving the accused the benefit of
the provisions of Act No. 2142.

Furthermore, section 12 of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) which is found in Article
III, [Chapter I] dealing with the form and effect of laws in general, provides that "when a law
which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed the law first repealed shall not be thereby
revived unless expressly so provided." From which it may fairly be inferred that the old rule
continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, it
itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless
the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.Applying this rule, we conclude that the
express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act
No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves
repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ILDEFONSO SARMIENTO and PIO

JUMARANG

[G.R. No. 46776. June 17, 1940.]

FACTS: In the afternoon of January 31, 1939, at about three o’clock, Maria Arellano, an
octogenarian, was found dead on the barrio road of Amuyong, municipality of Mabitac, Laguna,
at a distance of about 55 meters from her house. Beside her dead body were found her wooden
cane, an empty "pandan" bag where she kept the family’s savings amounting to P200, two pieces
of cloth, a package of cigarettes, and a white blanket. The medical examination points to death
through asphyxia as a result of strangulation. Thereafter, Ildefonso Sarmiento and PioJumarang
were charged with robbery with homicide, and found guilty.
Ildefonso Sarmiento is, doubtless, guilty of the crime charged. Freely and spontaneously he
confessed his guilt before the justice of the peace. On the other hand, PioJumarang made to rest
solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of his coaccused, Ildefonso Sarmiento which, in very
important respects, is contradicted by his own previous written statements. Thus, while, in his
written confession, Sarmiento admitted having planned, with Jumarang, the death of the old
woman, in his testimony in court he averred that, when he was invited by Jumarang to go to her
place, he had no knowledge whatsoever of the purpose which Jumarang had in mind. Again,
while in his written confession, Sarmiento admitted having assisted in the killing of the old
woman by holding her by her hands, in his testimony in court he denied having had such
intervention, stating that he confined himself to passively standing by while she was being
strangled to death by Jumarang. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of an accomplice shall be sufficient as ground for
conviction.

RULING: No, The testimony of an accomplice should be received with caution, since, as is usual
with human nature, a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame as far as possible on
others rather than himself. (People v. Mandangan, 52 Phil., 62.) The general rule is that the
testimony of an accomplice shall not be sufficient as ground for conviction, unless supported by
other evidence. (People v. De Otero, 51 Phil., 201.) There are, undoubtedly, certain exceptional
instances in which the sole testimony of an accomplice may, even if uncorroborated, be
sufficient, as when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because given unhesitatingly and in a
straightforward manner, and is full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the
result of deliberate afterthought. In the instant case, the testimony of S is lacking in those
characteristics of sincerity. It is not only contrary to his previous written statements on material
points, but also is shown to be false on other respects, as the lower court itself declares. The
lower court observed that "there is absolutely nothing in the conduct of Jumarang to demonstrate
a guilty conscience or the existence of remorse on his part. He had been subjected to very strict
questioning by the constabulary and by the officials, and he has consistently denied participation.
His testimony in court, while apparently weak in connection with the close friendship between
him and Sarmiento and with respect to that he had been doing between 11: 30 in the morning and
1: 30 in the afternoon, is entirely natural and coherent in all other respects and shows no signs or
evidence of a guilty conscience." This observation is amply borne out by the evidence of the
case. The lower court observed that "there is absolutely nothing in the conduct of Jumarang to
demonstrate a guilty conscience or the existence of remorse on his part. He had been subjected to
very strict questioning by the constabulary and by the officials, and he has consistently denied
participation. His testimony in court, while apparently weak in connection with the close
friendship between him and Sarmiento and with respect to that he had been doing between 11: 30
in the morning and 1: 30 in the afternoon, is entirely natural and coherent in all other respects
and shows no signs or evidence of a guilty conscience." This observation is amply borne out by
the evidence of the case.

Art. 182. False testimony in civil cases. 

THE UNITED STATES vs. ISIDORO ARAGON

G.R. No. L-2709 December 28, 1905
JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS:This was an action for the crime of giving false testimony.The complaint filed in said
cause was as follows:

1. That the plaintiff is the plain and absolute owner of a great extension of land commonly
known by the name of Hacienda of Pasay, situated partly in Malate and Singalong, in the
jurisdiction of the city of Manila,

2. That the defendant, as a tenant, occupied a small piece of the said hacienda located in
Singalong, in the jurisdiction of the city of Manila, which measured approximately 10,000
meters square, and for the occupation of which as a tenant he paid an annual rental of 13 pesos 3
reales and 12 cuartos.

That on the 4th day of March of the present year the accused was summoned as a witness to
appear before the justice of the peace court of Manila. The accused had heard about the Pasay
estate prior to the four last years, and he well knew that at that time there were brought in the
justice of the peace court at Pineda when he was filing that office many actions for forcible entry
and detainer, instituted by Agustin J. Montilla against tenants of the estate, he having received an
order from the Court of First Instance asking for a list of said actions, with a statement of the
actions for forcible entry and detainer and the answers filed by the defendants, and the accused
himself signed three lists which he forwarded to the Court of First Instance; because the accused
himself received an order from the Court of First Instance enjoining him to notify all the tenants
of the Pasay estate of the decision rendered in favor of Don Agustin J. Montilla, in the suit
brought by him against the Augustinian Friars, and the accused himself having rendered an order
wherein the proper action was taken for the compliance with such order of the Court of First
Instance, and the accused himself having taken part in various other proceedings had for the
purpose of complying with such orders from the Court of First Instance; because the accused
knew that Don Agustin Montilla was the administrator of the Pasay estate, was substituted by
reason of the suit by him brought against the Augustinian Friars by the curate of the pueblo,
Father Benito Ibañez, and he, the accused, likewise knew that Father Martin Arconada, the
procurator of the convent of the Augustinian Fathers, did intervene in the management of the
Pasay estate, and because, he, the accused, likewise knew that in the years 1895 and 1898 there
was brought by the Augustinian Friars against Mr.Montilla an action for forcible entry and
detainer of the Pasay estate, the result of which was that said Mr.Montilla, together with many
other tenants of the Pasay estate, were ousted; all contrary to the form of the statute in such cases
made and provided.At the close of the trial in the inferior court the defendant was found guilty of
the crime charged From this sentence the defendant appealed to this court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused-appellant may be convicted under article 321 of the Penal
Code for giving false testimony,

RULING: No, It is admitted that the defendant gave the testimony set out in the complaint,
during the trial of a civil case in the court of a justice of the peace of the city of Manila, between
Edwin H. Warner, plaintiff, and Claro Magcauas, defendant, an action brought by the plaintiff to
recover of the defendant the annual rent for a certain tract of land for the years 1899, 1900, 1901,
1902, and 1903.

Chapter VI of Title IV of the Penal Code provides the punishment for false testimony in both
criminal and civil cases, but this chapter makes no attempt to define false testimony or in any
way to indicate of what false testimony consists.

"Falsotestimonio" under Spanish law corresponds to "false swearing" under English law. False
swearing, under the English law, is committed by a person who swears falsely before any person
authorized to administer an oath upon a matter of public concern, under such circumstances that
the false swearing would have amounted to perjury if committed in a judicial proceeding.

Bishop in his work on criminal law (Vol. 2, p. 588) says:

False swearing is the name given in the statutes of some of the States to false declarations on
oath which, while not within any common law or statutory designation of perjury, are, by such
statutes, rendered otherwise indictable.

Article 321 of the Penal Code provides that —

False testimony given in a civil cause shall be punished with a penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree to presidiocorreccional in its medium degree and a fine of from 625 to 6,250
pesetas.

If the amount of the claim should not exceed 625 pesetas, the penalties shall be those of arresto
mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.
During the examination of the defendant as a witness in the cause in which it is alleged he gave
false testimony he was asked certain questions with reference to the existence of certain facts.
His answers invariably were that he did not remember, or that he had no recollection concerning
those facts. The prosecuting attorney proved the existence of the facts with reference to which
the defendant was questioned, but failed to prove that the statements of the defendant with
reference to those facts were false. The mere fact that the defendant had had to do in the year
1896 with certain facts and relations was not sufficient to prove that he stated a falsehood when
he stated in December, 1904, that he had "no recollection with reference to such facts or
relations." The evidence adduced during the trial fails, in our judgment, to show that the
defendant testified falsely or gave false testimony as was charged in the complaint.
In order that a defendant may be convicted under article 321 of the Penal Code for giving false
testimony, the following facts must be shown:

First. The testimony must be given in a civil cause.

Second. The testimony must relate to the issues presented in said cause.
Third. The testimony must be false.
Fourth. The false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false.
Fifth. Such testimony must be malicious and given with an intent to affect the issues presented in
said cause.

US VS VASQUEZ (NOTE:No case found)

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. 

UNITED STATES vs. LOPE ESTRAÑA

G.R. No. 5751           September 6, 1910
TRENT, J.:

FACTS: The Roman Catholic priest in charge of the parish in the town of Escalante, Province of
Occidental Negros, was fatally wounded on the night of May 15, 1909, and died about 5 a.m. on
the following morning. Subsequently thereto criminal case No. 1055, wherein the United States
was plaintiff and Gil Gamao et al. were defendants, charged with the assassination of the said
priest, was instituted in the Court of First Instance in the said province. The appellant, Lope
Estraña, was called as a witness for the defense in said criminal case and after being duly sworn
according to law, testified, among other things, that he was then living in the barrio of Japitan,
jurisdiction of the said town of Escalante, and that one DionisioTambolero came to his house in
the said barrio about 7 p.m. on May 15, 1909, and remained there all night, leaving about 5 a.m.
on the following morning. The prosecuting officers, believing this testimony to be false, filed a
complaint against the appellant, charging him with the crime of perjury. On the trial of this
case ,the appellant again testified that the said Tambolero passed the night of May 15, 1909, at
his house, and called as witnesses to corroborate him on this point his wife and stepson who did
in fact corroborate the testimony of the appellant, in that the said Tambolero came to the
appellant's house and passed the night of May 15, there, but they could not specifically state the
hour he left the following morning. DionisioTambolero testified in this case that he did not know
exactly where the defendant's house is situated in the barrio of Japitan and that he never was at
any time in the house of the defendant in the said barrio; that on the morning of the 15th of May,
1909, he went to the church in Escalante, heard mass, and returned to his house in the said town
of Escalante; that at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon he returned the sacristia, arriving there
about 5 o'clock that afternoon, had a conversation with NatalioInson about certain baptisms
which had taken place on that afternoon, and that on leaving the sacristia he went to the store of
one Jose Nieva and remained there until about 6.30 or 7 o'clock in the evening. Considering the
distance from the appellant's house to the town of Escalante, which requires at least two and one-
half hours, either by land or water, and the difficulties to be encountered in making this journey,
it was a physical impossibility for Tambolero to have left the house of the appellant at the time
stated by him (the appellant) and to have arrived at the convent at the time he appeared there to
assist in the burial of the priest. Counsel for the appellant insists that the court below should have
dismissed this case for the reason that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute the
crime of perjury as defined and punished by Act No. 1697, basing his contention on the ground
that in order to sustain a conviction under said Act it was necessary to show that the appellant
had testified twice about a certain matter, his latter testimony testified once he should have been
charged with the crime of false swearing (falsotestimonio), under the provisions of Chapter VI of
the Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crime of perjury under section 3 of Act No.
1697, when it is not alleged in the complaint.

RULING:No, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is well settled that an indictment for
perjury must show conclusively that the testimony given or assertion made by the defendant on
the trial on which he was sworn or it will be fatally defective. This may be done either by a direct
allegation that it was material, or by the allegation of facts from which its materiality will appear.
The complaint in the case at bar is fatally defective for the want of an allegation that the
testimony, alleged to be false, was material to the issues involved in the murder case. Our statute
(section 3 of Act No. 1697, supra) specifically makes materiality an essential element of the
crime of perjury and without this the crime can not legally exists. As no objection to the
sufficiency of the complaint was raised this fatal defect could have been supplied by competent
testimony on the trial.

The term "material matter" means the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of the inquiry, or which
legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies. (In re Franklin County, 5 Ohio S. and
C. PI.Dec. 691; 7 Ohio, N. P., 450; People vs. Green well, 5 Utah, 112, 13 Pac., 89.) By the
common law perjury is the willful and corrupt taking of a false oath, lawfully administered in a
judicial proceeding or the course of justice in regard to a matter material to the issue or point of
inquiry. This definition of perjury, as modified by statute, may be more accurately defined to be
the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath or information administered by
authority of law, in a material matter, the offense being enlarged and made to extend to other
false oaths than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings. There is a distinction between
perjury and false swearing; the one is stubborn and corrupt, while the other is simply not true,
lacking the elements which go to constitute the crime of perjury. (Miller vs. State, 15 Fla., 577.)
Counsel in his printed brief in this court states that the witness Tambolero testified in said
murder case that when the murder was committed he saw one of the defendants come out of the
lower part of the convent with a bolo in his hands. This is not a confession, as there is a marked
difference between a confession and such a statement, but this is purely a statement by counsel
made in the appellate court. It is more than probable that the appellant himself knows nothing of
this statement; no doubt he has never seen the brief filed in this case. So such a statement made
for the first time on appeal is not competent proof to established the guilt of the appellant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, v. RUFO B. CRUZ

G.R. No.L-15132. May 25, 1960.]

FACTS: On or about the 19th day of October, 1948, in the municipality of Cainta, province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
a private person and applicant for Civil Service Examination (Patrolman) did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, falsify or cause to be falsified and commit acts of
falsification in the Philippine Civil Service Form No. 2 (Application for examination) in the
following manner to wit: Said accused, under oath prepared, filled up or cause to be filled up the
blanks in said Philippine Civil Service Form No. 2, by stating and making it appear in said
document that he had never been accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law, ordinance or
regulation before any court, when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew, that this
statement or fact is false and untrue, because he had been accused and tried in Criminal Cases
Nos. 522, 542 and 547 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Cainta, Rizal, thus making untruthful
statements in the narration of facts; that said accused filed or caused to be filed said Philippine
Civil Service Form No. 2 to the Bureau of Civil Service. The record shows that on October 19,
1948, the accused Rufo B. Cruz filled up an application blank (Civil Service Form No. 2) for the
patrolman examination that was given by the Bureau of Civil Service on November 13 of that
year. The application was signed and sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of Cainta,
Rizal. Defense counsel, however, contends that the crime committed by the accused, as stated in
the application form itself, 1 is perjury, which has already prescribed in accordance with Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of perjury.

RULING:Yes, we are inclined to agree with the defense that the crime committed is perjury.
That offense as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt
assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material
matter. The said article provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisióncorreccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included
in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires. 

"Any person who, in the case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any
of the falsehood mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein."cralaw virtua1aw library

This article is similar to section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, which was
formerly the law punishing perjury. Under said section 3 of that Act, An applicant for patrolman
examination given by the Bureau of Civil Service who states under oath that he has never been
accused of any violation of any law, ordinance or regulation before any court, when in fact he
has, is guilty of the crime of perjury and not that of falsification of a public document.  The
penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall, according to the last paragraph
of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, be made the basis of the application of the rules
contained therein. The penalty for the crime of perjury being a compound one, the highest of
which is prisioncorreccional, the said crime prescribes in ten years. The penalty for perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, as already seen, is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prisióncorreccional in its minimum period. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty should be from 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year and
1 day of prisióncorreccional as maximum. 

Wherefore, with the modification that the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
from 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year and 1 day of prisióncorreccional as
maximum, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

G.R. No. L-40574         December 29, 1934

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. HILARIA CABERO
G.R. No. L-40574         December 29, 1934
HULL, J.:

FACTS:On or about the 6th day of December, 1932, in the municipality of Caloocan, Province
of Rizal, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused,
HilariaCabero, presented a written complaint to the court of the justice of the peace of the said
municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, duly subscribed and sworn to by
her, the said accused HilariaCabero, before SofronioAbrera, the justice of the peace of the said
court and a competent person authorized by law to administer oath, alleges that HilariaCabero
filed and subscribed under oath a complaint before the justice of the peace of Caloocan, Rizal,
charging Teresa Santos with having used violence on, assaulted, struck and attacked the
complainant (the herein accused), with a blunt instrument, without any justifiable motive
whatsoever, inflicting upon her, as a consequence thereof, various bruises and injuries on
different parts of her body, which required about fifteen days of medical attendance and
incapacitated her from engaging in her customary work during the same period, notwithstanding
that said accused fully knew and was aware that such facts or allegations are
false.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The information, as formulated, does not fall under article 183 of the Penal Code inasmuch as,
according to the allegations thereof, the alleged false statements have been made in a criminal
case by means of a complaint filed by the herein accused. Therefore the information should be
treated in the light of article 180 of said Code. However, neither can this case prosper under the
latter article on the ground that, from the statements of said fiscal and from the very information,
it may be inferred that said complaint has not been acted upon nor judgment rendered thereon
sentencing the therein accused to a penalty prescribed in any of the four paragraphs of the latter
article, which penalty would be made the basis of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused if
found guilty under article 180.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ISSUE:Whether or not the information filed in the case at bar do not constitute perjury or a
violation of the provisions of article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and in dismissing on that
ground the information.

RULING: Yes, there is no contention that it is good under article 180. The pertinent portions of
article 183 read:
ART. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. - The penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included
in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires. . . .

The indictment in the complaint closely follows article 183 and alleges every fact required by
that article. An affidavit was made upon material matters before a competent person authorized
to administer an oath required by law. It is further clearly alleged that the accused well knew that
the affidavit in question made by her was false and untrue upon the material matters recited. It
would seem that the court had the opinion that an affidavit to a criminal complaint has an
entirely different status from an affidavit for other purposes.

ARTICLE 183- FALSE TESTIMONY IN OTHER CASES AND PERJURY IN SOLEMN

AFFIRMATION

US v. JURADO
31 Phil. 491

FACTS:
This cause was initiated by a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu by the
provincial fiscal charging Francisco Jurado with the crime of perjury.

DionisioJacosalem, proceeded to investigate the matter of the robbery of some tins of opium,
committed in the house of Francisco Jurado by Alejandro Albao, a municipal policeman, through
threats and intimidation and by availing himself of his office. This opium belonged to Vicente
Lizarraga who had taken it to the said house to sell it to some residents of the town. Lizarraga,
the owner of the drug, stated that Francisco Jurado was present at the time of the robbery; but
when Jurado was called to testify as an eyewitness to the crime he denied that he was at home on
the night of the robbery, as he was then in a cinematograph with his family. He further testified
that he did not know either Vicente Lizarraga or Alejandro Albao.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jurado is guilty of the crime of perjury.

HELD:

No.

In order that a witness, in testifying under oath before a public official authorized to administer
same commit the crime of perjury and incur the penalty prescribed by section 3 of Act No. 1697,
it is necessary and indispensable that he testify to and declare under oath with regard to
some material matter which he does not believe to be true, or that such false testimony tend
to establish something which conflicts with the truth of an essential or important fact which
has been proven by the evidence; because, if the false testimony of the witness is not
important, essential, or material to the principal matter under investigation, it can not
properly be held that the crime of perjury has been committed.

The principal object of the investigation held by the provincial fiscal of Cebu was to find out
whether Alejandro Albao had actually been in Jurado's house where Lizarraga was that night
with several tins of opium for sale, and whether on that occasion Albao, availing himself of his
office of municipal policeman, by intimidation with a revolver, succeeded in compelling
Lizarraga to deliver to him the tins of opium which Lizarraga was carrying and which Albao
seized, took away with him and appropriated to himself, and which have not yet been recovered.

The defendant, the owner of the house where the robbery was committed, testified that he
learned from IsabeloAlburo that Lizarraga had in fact been in the house with tins of opium for
sale, but that witness did not see them because he was that night in the cinematograph with his
family. This testimony is not contradicted by any evidence in the record. For lack of sufficient
proof of the falsity of that statement by the owner of the house, the defendant Jurado, for it was
not proven that it was false and, as he certainly was in his own house on the said night of the
robbery, it cannot be held that, in testifying as he did, he perjured himself.

The witness Jacosalem testified that, in his capacity of fiscal, he made the said investigation and
that the defendant's testimony in connection with that of the other witnesses of the prosecution in
the cause for robbery was material and important for the purpose of proving this crime; but, as
the testimony of these witnesses does not appear in the record of the case at bar, it is impossible
to determine whether or not the defendant's testimony, alleged to be false, was material and
important in its bearings on the said testimony of the other witnesses given in connection with
the said crime of robbery. If this cause had been instituted after the final adjudication of the said
cause for robbery, as it should have been, perhaps another result would have been obtained.

In a criminal cause the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is conclusively proven,
for even in a case of reasonable doubt, and when his guilt does not appear to be satisfactorily
established, as occurs in the case "at bar, he is entitled to acquittal.

Francisco Jurado is hereby acquitted.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 

vs.FRANCISCO ABAYA, defendant-appellee
G.R. No. L-47710
December 28, 1942

FACTS:

In civil case No. 6190 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, a judgment against Francisco
Abaya was rendered for the sum of P4,000, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. To satisfy this
judgment, the provincial sheriff sold at public auction Abaya’s undivided half interest in certain
parcels of land to Zosimo Fernandez for the sum of P4,382.99. The sheriff executed the
corresponding certificate of absolute sale. Thereafter, Felicita Abaya, sister of Francisco and
owner of the other undivided half of the aforesaid land, instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna an action against Zosimo Fernandez to recover the interest which the latter bought at the
public auction, on the ground that, prior to said sale, Francisco had conveyed the latter's interest
to Felicita Abaya. Judgment was rendered in favor of Zosimo Fernandez, which was affirmed by
the CA. Francisco field a petition for voluntary insolvency. In the schedule of debts
accompanying the petition, Francisco included the item of P4,000 as a debt to Zosimo
Fernandez; and in the inventory of properties, he listed his undivided half in the land above
referred to as being among the properties "registered in his name in the Registry of Property of
the Province of Laguna." Both the schedule and the inventory were under oath.

Then, Francisco was charged in the Court of First Instance of Laguna with a violation of article
183 of the Revised Penal Code, in that he — so the information alleged — wilfully, maliciously
and feloniously stated under oath in his insolvency case that the undivided half of the land
therein mentioned was his, when he fully knew that the same no longer belonged to him, as it
was and still is owned by Zosimo Fernandez. The lower court, sustaining Francisco’s motion to
quash, dismissed the information on the ground that the acts charged therein do not constitute
false testimony as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence this appeal by the
Government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Francisco committed a crime under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:

No.

The record fails to show that the defendant maliciously committed the acts imputed to him. They
could not be malicious because, at the time the petition for insolvency was filed, the land in fact
was still registered in the name of Francisco; and it might have been included in the inventory for
fear that he might be accused of concealing property standing in his name in the registry of
property, in violation of the Insolvency Law. In other words, Francisco — who could not be
expected to determine the propriety, from a legal point of view, of the inclusion — merely stated
a fact in said inventory. The acts charged could not be malicious as against Francisco’s creditors
because, instead of concealing assets, he listed property which should not be included in the
inventory. They could not be malicious as against Zosimo Fernandez because the Torrens titles
covering the land and specified in the inventory, bore annotations of the writ of execution issued
in civil case No. 6190 and of the auction sales in favor of Zosimo Fernandez, which of course
duly protected the latter's rights; and Francisco has not made any allegation either in the petition
for insolvency or in the inventory which could militate against or defeat said rights. On the
contrary, Francisco made particular reference in the inventory to civil case No. 6190 and to the
auction sales. He included his indebtedness to Zosimo Fernandez in the schedule, probably in his
very desire to be consistent with the inclusion of the land in the inventory and to safeguard the
rights of Zosimo Fernandez.
PEOPLE v. ANGANGCO
74 Phil 59
GR No. L-47693
October 12, 1943

*Guys, sorry wajuy full text ang case animaskinunsaonpangita. Mao rajudniakongnakita.

Fourth Element of Perjury

The fourth element of perjury requires that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
For instance, in consonance with Section 1 (a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for offenses where a preliminary investigation is required, a criminal action is
instituted by filing a complaint with the proper officer, such as a public prosecutor, for the
purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation.
That complaint, in turn, must be made under oath, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
“Sec. 3. Complaint defined. – A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with
an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged
with the enforcement of the law violated.”
Thus, a person who executes a criminal complaint containing a falsity upon a material matter
may be held liable for perjury.
However, in an unpublished decision (People v. Angangco, G.R. No. L-47693, October 12,
1943) it was held that the word “requires” in the phrase “in cases in which the law so
requires” (in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code) may be given the meaning of
“authorizes.” Hence, the fourth element may be read “that the sworn statement (or
affidavit) containing the falsity is authorized by law.”
Thus, even if there is no law, requiring the statement to be made under oath, as long as it is made
for a legal purpose, it is sufficient.
PEOPLE v. WILFREDO G. CAINGLET
GR Nos. L-21493-94
Apr 29, 1966

FACTS:
Wilfredo G. Cainglet, a private individual, in order to deceive the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur in rendering a decision in a Cadastral Case declared Lot No. 8492, Pls-248
and its Improvements as his private property thru false and fraudulent representations.
The accused deliberately made the following untruthful statement of facts:
(1) That he is the owner of Lot No. 8492, Pls-248;
(2) That he is the owner of the buildings and improvements existing on the land;
(3) That he has been in possession of said land as owner for over 3 years;
(4) That the said land was acquired by occupation and purchase from a predecessor in Interest;
(5) That his predecessor in interest had been in possession thereof for almost 30 years;
(6) That there is no person having interest to the said land; which allegation of facts as contained
in the above-mentioned document are necessary and essential, as required under Section 9 of Act
No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act, in order that any person claiming to have an
interest on the land subject of the cadastral proceedings, may present his claim and thus
preventing the Court from declaring the land as public land.

The land is actually possessed and occupied by MindetElon since before the war

ISSUE:
Whether or not Wilfredofalsely stated in his answers in said Cadastral Case that he possessed
and owned Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492.

HELD:
No. This case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
The lower court holds the opinion and appellee maintains that for the falsification cases to
prosper, the trial court must necessarily find that the latter's allegations of possession and
ownership in his answers filed in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 are
false. Allegedly, this matter has already been directly adjudged in said cadastral case, and the
judgment therein is conclusive in subsequent proceedings, pursuant to Sections 44 and 45 of
Rule 39 in relation to Section 48 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. Appellee then submits to the
proposition that a judgment of guilt of the accused in the falsification cases would nullify the
validity and conclusiveness of the previous cadastral proceedings, subject the cadastral titles to
collateral attack and destroy the indefeasibility of the Torrens titles Issued.
It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding a proceeding in
rem is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. Reason is that public policy and public
order demand not only that litigations must terminate at some definite point but also that titles
over lands under the Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends the
stability of the country's economy. Interest reipublicaeut sit finis litium. However, this
conclusiveness of judgment in the registration of lands is not absolute.
The State may criminally prosecute for perjury the party who obtains registration through
fraud, such as by stating false assertions in the sworn answer required of applicants in
cadastral proceedings. For Section 116 of the Land Registration Act states:
"SEC. 116, Whoever knowingly swears falsely to any statement required to be made under oath
by this Act shall be guilty of perjury and liable to the penalties provided by laws for perjury."
And in this case, Section 116 of the Land Registration Act is applicable to cadastral proceedings
under Act 2259, by virtue of Section 11 thereof.
From its wording, Section 116 applies to all and does not distinguish between those who make
false statements and successfully procure registration by such statements,, and those whose
statements were not given credence by the land registration court. The law therefore applies with
equal brunt on both types of offenders. This is rightly so, for to give immunity from prosecution
to those successful in deceiving the registration court would, in effect, be putting a premium on
perjury and making the punishment therefor dependent upon the non-realization of the object of
its commission.
For the Court, therefore, to sustain appellee's view would be to unduly discriminate in the
prosecution of persons charged with falsification or perjury. While public policy, on one hand,
demands an end to litigation, and hence puts forward the doctrine of res judicata, yet, on the
other hand, every interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial
refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very administration of the
laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free
from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be
punished if they do not.
As afore-stated, a judgment on the guilt of the appellee would not undermine the indefeasibility
of the titles over Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492. Neither would the criminal proceeding for
falsification or perjury be a collateral attack on the titles in question. The prosecution for
falsification or perjury is a proceeding in personam which inquires into the criminal liability of
the accused. Not being an attack on the validity of the titles in question, any judgment rendered
therein would leave said titles undisturbed.
This case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.BARBARA CAPISTRANO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-15001
March 15, 1920

FACTS:

Barbara Capistrano made a sworn declaration before the fiscal of the city of Manila, accusing her
father, Alejo Capistrano, of the crime of rape committed upon her person. Several days before
the hearing of the case, Barbara Capistrano filed a motion with the court praying for the
dismissal of the cause against her father on the ground that it was not the latter who had raped
her, as she has previously stated before the fiscal of the city, but a Spaniard named Juan, an
employee of the Lerma Park Cabaret and that if she had made a different statement before at the
police station, it was on account of the instructions of the said Spaniard Juan. From this
testimony, the fiscal having been obliged to move for the dismissal of the cause, same was
dismissed by the court in his decree of the 15th of the same month of May, ordering Alejo
Capistrano's immediate release. In view thereof, the fiscal filed against said Barbara Capistrano
the information giving rise to the present cause for the crime of perjury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Barbara has committed the crime of perjury.

HELD:

NO. It is not proper to hold the accused guilty of the crime of perjury nor to impose upon her any
penalty for said crime.

For the crime of perjury to be punishable, the false testimony willfully taken or subscribed
contrary to the oath must related to, or concern, "any material matter which he (the
witness) does not believe to be true." "Perjury, as modified by statute (Act No. 1697), may be
defined to be the willful and corrupt assertion to a falsehood, under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law, in a material matter, the offense being enlarged and made to
extend to false oaths other than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings.

In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is well settled that an indictment for perjury
must show conclusively that the testimony given or assertation made by the defendant and
charged to be false was material to the issue on the trial in which he was sworn or it will be
fatally defective. This may be done either by a direct allegation that it was material, or by
allegations of facts from which its materiality will appear.

It is, therefore, necessary that in the information filed in this instant case against Barbara
Capistrano, it should have been expressly and definitely stated that the testimony — alleged to be
false according to said information, and given by the accused Barbara Capistrano before the
Court of First Instance whereby she stated that the real author of the crime denounced by her was
not her father Alejo Capistrano but one Juan, a Spaniard — was important and material to the
issues involved in the said case for rape against Alejo Capistrano.

The testimony of the accused taken under oath, which is alleged as false in the information, was
the second statement or that one taken by her before the Court of First Instance at the hearing of
the cause for rape, and the one alleged in said information as true was her statement under oath
before the fiscal of the city at the preliminary investigation. Wherefore, in order to hold the
accused guilty of the crime of perjury, it was necessary to prove that she did not believe said
testimony as true or, what amounts to the same thing, that which she testified to before the Court
of First Instance was not true.

A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely on the contradictory sworn

statements of the defendant, but the state must prove which of the two statements is false
and must show that statement to be false by other evidence than the contradictory
statement. . . . Of course where perjury is charged in giving testimony contrary to that
given on a prior examination, the accused is entitled to show that his statements on the
prior examination were induced by threats and duress; and after adducing evidence in
 support of this contention, he properly may insist that the court explicitly instruct the jury
to determine whether or not such testimony was voluntary.

On the other hand, after considering as real and true the facts recited by the accused at the
preliminary investigation before the fiscal of the city in the presence of the policeman Varsovia,
the lower court in the same decision declares that latter when they had possessed their right
spirit, and by means of undue influence, undoubtedly the influence exercised by the father of the
accused, the latter falsely took her oath at the hearing of the case for rape, saying that she was
not raped by her said father but by a Spaniard called Juan Sol. The court further adds that the
father of the accused induced her daughter to tell a falsehood at the hearing of the said cause in
order to free himself thereof. These assertions of the trial court do not find any support or
basis in the evidence for there is not a word of record expressing, or even indicating, that
Alejo Capistrano, the father of the accused, has exercised upon the latter undue influence
or employed means to induce her to tell a falsehood at the hearing of the case for rape
aforementioned, as the judgment of the lower court speaks. The lower court's assertion in this
sense is completely inaccurate and with this inaccuracy is certainly contrasted the fact that in the
said judgment no mention has been made, for the just and upright appreciation of the facts
submitted during the trial, concerning the insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution in not
presenting as witness Juan Sol in order to rebut and impugn, as has been already said, what the
accused has testified to regarding the particular aforementioned.

In the face of the notorious insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the effect
of the evidence adduced by the accused, it not being, on the other had, improbable that the
accused, a young woman 14 years of age, would have declared in the terms she did before the
fiscal of the city at preliminary investigation of the cause for rape against her father Alejo
Capistrano, compelled by threats alleged by her to have been made upon her by Juan Sol, nor is
it also improbable that the latter was the one who raped her and not her own father, and it not
being proven that when the accused testified under oath before the court of first instance at the
hearing of the said cause for rape, giving the statements which gave rise to the dismissal of said
cause, she would have transgressed the truth, and there being on the contrary, sufficient reasons
leading us to believe, with sufficient ground, that she (the accused) was induced or compelled by
threats and duress, to state what she had stated before the fiscal of the city at the preliminary
investigation of the cause for rape aforesaid — it is not proper to hold the accused guilty of
the crime of perjury aforementioned nor to impose upon her any penalty for said crime.

For the foregoing reasons and considerations, we reverse the judgment appealed from and acquit
the accused, with the costs of both instances de officio.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs. LEONCIO BALLENA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-6294
February 10, 1911

FACTS:
There was tried in the Court of First Instance of the subprovince of Masbate criminal case No.
163, entitled "United States vs. Ana Ramirez," in which the defendant was charged with the
crime of perjury. The basis of this prosecution was the false testimony given by the defendant in
a certain criminal case tried in that court wherein one CiriacoPellejera was defendant, charged
with homicide, in that the said Pellejera did, by means of blows, cause the death of the husband
of Ana Ramirez. In this homicide case Ana Ramirez was called as a witness, and, after being
duly sworn, testified that her husband died of fever and that during his illness, which lasted more
than two weeks, she observed no contusions or other injuries on his body. She denied having
testified under oath before the provincial fiscal in the town of Dimasalang, contrary to her
testimony in this case, and she also denied having been in the house of one Jose Largo for the
purpose of testifying with reference to the death of her husband. Whereas, as a matter of fact, she
did testify, under oath, before the said fiscal, in that town, that her husband died as a direct result
of the blows inflicted by Pellejera and that his death occurred within three days after having
received these blows. Ana Ramirez was found guilty as charged and sentenced accordingly.

In the trial of this perjury case on EstefaniaBarruga, mother of the defendant Ana, was a witness
for the defendant, and at the instigation of one LeoncioBallena she testified that the fiscal,
SeñorBailon, at the time he was in Dimasalang making the investigation into the cause of the
death of Ana's husband, attempted to rape her daughter Ana, and asked for the hand of the girl in
marriage, but she did not desire to accept this proposition of the fiscal because he was a married
man.

Subsequently thereto, the fiscal filed an information against the said LeoncioBallena, charging
him with the crime of subornation of perjury. Upon this complaint the defendant was duly tried,
found guilty, and sentenced to six month's imprisonment.

From this sentence and judgment the defendant appealed, and now insists that the testimony by
given by EstefaniaBarruga in that perjury case was immaterial to the issues involved therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not perjury was committed.

HELD:

YES.

There are certain well-defined and indispensable requisites which must be established in every
case of subornation of perjury before an accused person, charged with the commission of this
crime, can be convicted. Every essential element constituting the crime of perjury must be
established by competent testimony. The prosecution must show the nature of the
proceedings in which the alleged perjury was committed, the court, or officer, in which, or
before whom, the false oath was taken; that the witness was duly sworn; that the testimony
was material, and false; that the defendant knowingly and willfully procured another to
swear falsely, and that the witness suborned did testify under circumstances rendering him
guilty of perjury.
In the case at bar the record shows beyond any question of a doubt that the witness Barruga, after
being duly sworn, did knowingly and willfully testify falsely in a criminal case before a duly
constituted tribunal; that this witness so testified at the instigation of the defendant Ballena; and
that the defendant knew that the testimony given by the witness Barruga was false. The witness
so informed the defendant. Notwithstanding this information, the defendant strongly insisted that
by the witness Barruga testifying that the fiscal committed those acts would be the only was to
save her daughter from imprisonment. The defendant Ballena not only knowingly and willfully
induced this witness to swear falsely, but he did so maliciously, as it appears from the record that
he was an enemy of the fiscal at that time, the fiscal having prosecuted him previous to this trial.

So the only question to be determined is, as we have said, Was the testimony of Barruga material
to the issues involved in that criminal case against her daughter for perjury? Materiality is an
essential element in the crime of perjury. It, therefore, necessarily follows that materiality is
likewise an indispensable requisite in the crime of subornation of perjury, as the latter is derived
from the former.

The term 'material matter' means the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or
any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact, or circumstance, which
tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to such inquiry, or which
legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.

In the criminal case in which the witness Barruga gave that false testimony, the main question
involved was whether or not Ana Ramirez testified before the provincial fiscal that her husband
died as a result of the blows inflicted by CiriacoPellejera, as she had testified in the trial of the
case against Pellejera that she did not so testify before the fiscal. It is clear that the false
testimony of Ana Ramirez against Pellejera was material. In the trial of the case against Ana for
perjury there was presented a question of fact as to whether or not Ana testified, under oath,
before the fiscal in that investigation that her husband did in fact die as a result of the wounds
inflicted by Pellejera. The court found this to be true. It was important to know whether or not
the fiscal, at the time Ana testified before him, attempted to rape her or asked her mother for
permission to marry her. If the fiscal had committed these acts they would have constituted a
strong circumstance showing the innocence of Ana. The fiscal was the moving party in the
perjury case and it was upon his sworn complaint that Ana was prosecuted. If he should have
attempted to prosecute Ana after having committed these acts the court would not only have
disbelieved the fiscal, testifying as a witness, but it would have looked upon the whole
prosecution as a fabrication.

The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the merits of the case, same is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant.
PEOPLE v. ESMINIA PUDOL
GR No. 45618, Oct 18, 1938
66 Phil. 365

FACTS:
An information had been filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur charging EsminiaPudol
and Alberto Reyes with having committed the crime of perjury, the former by subscribing a false
affidavit by induction and with the further cooperation of the latter.
When the case was called for trial, the provincial fiscal filed a motion asking for the discharge of
EsminiaPudol in order to be utilized as a witness for the prosecution against her coaccused. Upon
arraignment, Alberto Reyes pleaded not guilty, although his plea was withdrawn shortly
thereafter. The courtdismissed the case as to EsminiaPudol. The accused Alberto Reyes, in turn,
asked for the dismissal of the case as to him, alleging: (1) That once the case is dismissed as to
Pudol, the alleged principal by direct participation, there is no longer any ground for prosecuting
the case against the suborner Reyes, and (2) that the Revised Penal Code does not penalize
subornation of perjury, as it was formerly penalized by section 4 of Act No. 1697, which has
expressly been repealed by article 367 of said Revised Penal Code. The court, favorably
sustaining the first ground of the motion and deeming it unnecessary to pass upon the second
ground, also dismissed the case as to the accused Alberto Reyes. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the order of dismissal restores to the accused Pudol the presumption of
innocence.- NO.

2. Whether or not the Revised Penal Code does not penalize subornation of perjury, as it
was formerly penalized by section 4 of Act No. 1697, which has expressly been repealed
by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code. – NO

HELD:
I.
The court states: "if the guilt of the latter (Pudol) cannot be proven and the dismissal of this case,
as to her, restores and places her under the protection of a strong presumption of innocence, it
would seem soundly logical that her said innocence cannot be made the basis of a judgment of
guilt for Reyes."
The court was not right in affirming that the order of dismissal restores to the accused
(Pudol) the presumption of innocence. The fiscal did not ask for the dismissal of the case on
the ground of Pudol's innocence, but because she did not appear to be the most guilty. The fiscal
has asked for her discharge in order to be utilized as a witness for the prosecution against the
accused. If she really testifies in support of the allegations of the information, Act No. 2709
affords her certain immunity, but this is not tantamount to restoring the presumption of
her innocence, and her discharge does not affect the status of the accused Reyes.
II.
As to the second point of the motion of the accused, that is, that the Revised Penal Code does not
penalize subornation of perjury, as it was formerly penalized by section 4 of Act No. 1697,
which has expressly been repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code, suffice it to state
that, according to article 17 of said Code, the following are considered principals:
"1. * * * * * *
"2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it. (Underscoring ours.)
"3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished."
The information charges Alberto Reyes not only with having directly induced EsminiaPudol to
testify falsely under oath and to subscribe the affidavit before a person authorized by law to
administer oath, but also with having cooperated and taken a direct part in the execution of said
false affidavit, without which induction, cooperation and participation the false affidavit in
question would not have been accomplished.
Therefore, the fact that subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in the Revised
Penal Code does not mean that the direct induction of a person by another to commit
perjury has ceased to be a crime, because said crime is fully within the scope of that defined
in article 17, subsection 2, of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, Alberto Reyes, as already
stated, is charged in the present case not only as suborner of the perjury committed by his
coaccused but also as principal by cooperation and participation in the preparation of the false
affidavit subscribed by EsminiaPudol.
The order appealed from is reversed and this case is ordered remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, so that it may proceed with the hearing thereof and decide the same in
accordance with law, with the costs to the appellee.
ARTICLE 185- MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS

VICENTE DIAZ, complainant, 
vs. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, respondent.
December 8, 1923

FACTS:

*short summary sa facts sa case:

This action for malpractice brought by Vicente Diaz against Attorney RupertoKapunan, has to do
with the conduct of Attorney Kapunan during the legal proceedings which followed the business
troubles of Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona. The ultimate question concerns the
agreement between Diaz and Kapunan at the time of the sale of the property of Mendoza,
whereby Kapunan, on the promise of Diaz to pay him P1,000, agreed to desist from further
participation in the sale, all in alleged violation of article 1459 of the Civil Code and article 542
of the Penal Code.
*detailed facts sa case:

Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a partnership and entered into business
transactions. Unfortunately, however, the business failed to prosper, with the result that on
liquidation, it was found to have suffered a loss. When Diaz and Mendezona came to settle up
their affairs, they eventually formulated a document of sale and mortgage in which Mendezona
recognized a debt in favor of Diaz, laid upon the hacienda  "Mapuyo," and to be paid within the
term of one year. When the year had expired Mendezona was not to be found and his family was
unable to meet the payment. There followed the usual proceedings for foreclosure and sale,
which, after considerable delay, resulted in the hacienda's being offered for sale at public
auction.

At the time fixed for the sale, Vicente Diaz, accompanied by his lawyer Emilio Benitez, and
Attorney RupertoKapunan bid on the property in order to assist the Mendezona family which
was in financial straits.Kapunanoffered P12,000 for the property and with Diaz and Kapunan
raising the bids until finally Diaz offered P12,500. There the bids stopped on account of Diaz and
Kapunan entering into the agreement. Don RupertoKapunanagreed to withdrew his bid and
refrained from bidding at the said auction and Mr. Diaz offered him a premium of one thousand
pesos (P1,000). Mr.Kapunan accepted.

Diaz then filed with the court charges against Attorney Kapunan for alleged unprofessional
conduct. Undoubtedly, before Kapunan had knowledge of the disbarment proceedings, he
presented a motion asking that he be permitted to retain the P500 in question, in part payment of
his professional fees.

From correspondence, it further is evident that the family of Mendezona was led to believe that
the P500 would shortly be sent them. Without doubt, the Mendezona family would have been
gratified to receive even the P500 pittance out of the business wreck in Leyte of the senior
Mendezona.

During much of the time here mentioned, Kapunan was the attorney of Mendezona. Kapunan
was given extensive authority by the letter of Mendezona. When Kapunan took part in the sale, it
must be assumed that he was bidding in representation of his client and for the benefit of the
client.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Attorney Kapunan has committed the crime under Article 185 (Article 542, old
Penal Code).

HELD:

Yes.
The more puzzling question relates to the alleged violation by Attorney Kapunan of article 542
of the Penal Code. This article punishes "any person who shall solicit any gift or promise as a
consideration for agreeing to refrain from taking part in any public auction." The crime is
consummated by the mere act of soliciting a gift or promise for the purpose of abstaining
from taking part in the auction. Not permitting our minds to be confused by the varied
explanations of Diaz and Kapunan, the document formulated by them and hereinbefore quoted,
demonstrates that Kapunan, on the promise of Diaz to pay P1,000, refrained from further
participation in the sale of the property of Mendezona, which is exactly the situation covered by
article 542 of the Penal Code.

Public policy discountenances combinations or agreements on the part of bidders at execution

sales, the objects and effects of which are to stifle competition. The courts will consider an
agreement between a judgment creditor and one claiming an interest in the thing about to be sold
under an execution, that neither shall bid against the other, as void, unless all parties concerned
know of the arrangement and consent thereto. Execution sales should be open to free and full
competition, in order to secure the maximum benefit for the debtor. Article 542 of the Penal
Code is, therefore, a wise provision even though rarely invoked, and should be used to
discourage the stifling of bids at judicial sales.

We conclude that Attorney Kapunan has been guilty of a technical violation of article 542
of the Penal Code. But we cannot adopt the vigorous recommendation of the Attorney-
General, for we consider present certain mitigating circumstances which exert an influence
in favor of the respondent. In the first place, as disclosed by the judicial records, no reported
prosecution under article 542 has been attempted, which is eloquent proof of the practical disuse
of this article; and the Spanish jurisprudence, while indicative of the meaning of the article, relies
principally on the decisions of the French Court of Cassation.

In the next place, the complainant Diaz is equally guilty with the respondent Kapunan.

And lastly, Kapunan appears to have been acting in good faith for his client, although
adopting an irregular procedure, and although attempting to make tardy restitution of the
money received by him.

Our judgment is that Attorney RupertoKapunan shall stand reprimanded and that the
complainant, Vicente Diaz, shall immediately return to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte the P500 received by Diaz from the clerk and receipted for by Diaz, and the clerk of court
shall transmit the P500 to Secundino de Mendezona or, in case of his absence, to Miss Carmen
de Mendezona.
ARTICLE 186- MONOPOLIES AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. CANDIDO FULGUERAS, Defendant-

Appellant. 
G.R. No. 2176. April 18, 1905

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MACHINATIONS TO ALTER THE PRICE OF THINGS. — The

fact that the defendant attributed to himself a supernatural power and, pretending to hold a
commission from a powerful chief, went about distrubuting papers and proclamations to the
people of a certain town, spreading subersive and fanatical ideas, and with orders from his
alleged chief to lower the prices of needful commodities and to reform the customes under the
penalty of being visitedd with floodd and other calamities, and through these machinations and
deceits succeeded in deceiving ignorant people and causedd them to provide themselves with
instruments of measure larger than they formerly had and different from the regular size and
also succeeded in making them lower the prices of commodities, constitutes the crime provided
for and punished in article 544 of the Penal Code.

FACTS:

The defendant is charged with the crime of seeking to alter the price of things, committed,
according to the complaint, as follows:

"That the defendant CandidoFelguerasin the months of March to July, 1904, attributed to himself
a supernatural power and, pretending to hold a commission from a powerful chief in Manila,
went about distributing papers and proclamations to the people of Oroquieta, Province of
Cagayan de Misamis, spreading subversive and fanatical ideas, and with orders from his alleged
chief to lower the prices of needful commodities and to reform the customs under the penalty of
being visited with flood and calamities. That by these machinations and deceits the defendant
succeeded in deceiving ignorant people and causing them to provide themselves with instruments
of measure larger than they formerly had and different from the regular size and also succeeded
in making them lower the prices of commodities of everydaylife, all with violation of law."

ISSUE:
Whether or not Candido is guilty of the crime under Article 186.

HELD:

Yes. *walay explanation ang SC nganoperomaoraniangsa ruling nila based sa full text

We agree with the conclusions of law and fact set forth in the judgment appealed from, the
former being in accordance with the facts in the case and the latter with the provisions of
the mentioned code. In the commission of the penalty prescribed therefor, and it therefore
should be imposed on the defendant in its medium degree and not in its maximum degree as was
done by the judgment appealed from. 
We affirm the judgment appealed from, it being understood that the penalty imposedd on the
defendant shall be four months’ arresto mayor and a fine of 1,250 pesetas. The defendant shall be
credited in the fulfillment of this penalty with one-half of the time which he has remained in
prison, and the imprisonment which he shall suffer by reason of subsidiary liability in case of
insolvency shall not exceed one-third of the time of his principal imprisonment, in accordance
with rule 1 of article 50 of the Penal Code. We also impose on defendant the costs in this
instance.

Article 186. Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.

c) R.A. No. 6361

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6361

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6361 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FIXING OF THE
MAXIMUM SELLING PRICE OF ESSENTIAL ARTICLES OR COMMODITIES,
CREATING THE PRICE CONTROL COUNCIL, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the national policy to prevent monopoly, hoarding,

injurious speculation, manipulation and profiteering with respect to the supply, distribution and
marketing of the following articles or commodities, whether imported or locally produced or
manufactured, and to fix the maximum prices, consistent with the policies of the State to increase
production and productivity, of such of these commodities as are essential to the public interest.

(1) Medicines, drugs, surgical, optical and dental supplies;

(2) Essential food and foodstuffs including milk, soft drinks and other beverages;

(3) Animal and poultry feeds and veterinary supplies;

(4) Clothes, clothing, and sewing and weaving materials and supplies;

(5) Fuels, lubricants, crude oil and petroleum products, without prejudice to any action which
the Oil Industry Commission may hereafter take under the provisions of R.. 6173.

(6) Construction materials;

(7) Educational and office supplies and equipment;

(8) Fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides and other agricultural inputs;

(9) Motor vehicles and spare parts, tires, batteries, engines and other machineries;

(10) Household utensils, appliances and other household necessities;

(11) Footwear including all the components thereof.

Sec. 2. To carry out the above policy, there is hereby created a Price Control Council
hereinafter referred to as the "Council"), which shall be composed of the Secretary of Commerce
and Industry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Secretary of Health, the
Chairman of the National Economic Council, and three representatives of consumers one of
which shall be from qualified nominees of nationwide government employees' organization, the
second from qualified nominees of the private labor sector and the third from qualified nominees
of nationwide women's organization, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments and who shall have the following
qualifications: a natural-born Filipino citizen; at least thirty years of age; and not connected with
the production, supply, distribution or marketing of any of the items mentioned in Section One:
provided, that the above-named government officials, except the Chairman, may authorize their
respective undersecretaries to represent them in the meetings of the Council. A majority of the
members shall constitute a quorum and four affirmative votes shall be necessary for any action
or decision of the Council: provided, further, that the representative of consumers shall receive as
emolument or compensation for services rendered to the Council a per diem of P50.00 for every
meeting attended: provided, finally, that the total emolument or compensation that may be
received by said representative of the consumers shall not exceed the amount of P1,000.00 a
month. The Council shall elect the Chairman from among themselves. The Director of
Commerce shall serve as the Executive Director of the Council and the Bureau of Commerce
(hereinafter referred to as the "Bureau") shall provide staff support to the Council.

Within 10 days after the assumption of office of the Chairman or any member of the Council, the
members thereof including the Executive Director of the Council shall submit a statement of
their assets and/or liabilities and a full and fair disclosure of all their interests and professional
connections as of the date of their assumption of office. A copy each of said statements shall be
filed with the office of the Secretary of the Senate and with the Office of the Secretary of the
House of Representatives.

In each province and chartered city, there shall be a local price council whose composition,
functions and scope of authority shall be determined by the Price Control Council, and which
shall be under its immediate control and supervision: provided, that the government employees,
the private labor sector and the women's organization in the area are each represented therein.

Sec. 3. The maximum prices of any of the articles or commodities mentioned in section one
hereof established by the Price Control Council under Republic Act No. 6124 and enforced as of
June 30, 1971, shall become effective immediately upon approval of this Act, subject to such
modifications as the Council may authorize under the provisions of Sec. 4 of this Act: provided,
that the Council shall, within thirty days after the filing of any petition for review, act on the
same in accordance with the guidelines established in Sec. 4 hereof.

Sec. 4. Whenever the market price of any of the articles or commodities mentioned in Section
One hereof has risen or threatens to rise by 20% or more over its price on March 1, 1970, or
whenever the Council deems that the prevailing price should be reduced because it has risen due
to monopoly, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation and profiteering, the Council shall,
after notice and hearing, establish or order such maximum price as shall be fair, just and
reasonable: provided, that the maximum price shall not exceed the production cost plus a mark-
up of ten per centum thereof to the manufacturer or producer, five per centum of the net cost of
acquisitions to the wholesaler and ten per centum to the retailer if the articles or commodities are
locally manufactured, or the landed cost plus a markup of five per centum to importer or
indentor, and ten per centum to the retailer, if the articles or commodities are imported.

The following factors shall be taken into consideration by the Price Control Council in the fixing
of the maximum prices of articles, commodities or goods to be used by the producer or
manufacturer:

1. In case machineries are used, if obtained through credit, the increase in the price brought
about by the enforcement of the floating rate;

2. The increase in the interest for amortization purposes also brought about by the floating rate;

3. Increase in the price of ingredients or materials used as a result of the floating rate:

(a) The increase in the cost of labor brought about by the increase of the minimum wage;

(b) Cost of raw materials, imported or domestic, and in case of imported raw materials, the
landed cost of the same, meaning the price paid, cost of transportation to the Philippines,
customs and other government imposts, storage fees and transportation expenses to the site of the
factory or plant;

(c) Increase in the cost of transportation and such other factors as may be brought about by the
increase in the cost of production.

The prices fixed by the Council shall become effective ten days after publication in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, one in English and one in the National
Language.

Production cost shall include all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in
manufacturing or producing the commodity, but shall not include marketing costs unless at least
70% of the total volume of sales are made directly by the manufacturer or producer.n no case
shall the production acquisition cost include any taxes which are passed on to consumers; and
marketing costs shall in no case exceed the average marketing cost for the period from 1966 to
1970, inclusive, as allowed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and certified by an independent
certified public accountant.

Sec. 5. (a) Whenever any of the articles or commodities mentioned in Section One hereof is in
short supply, the Council, after notice and hearing, shall certify to the needs of local producers or
manufacturers thereof and recommend to the Monetary Board that the Central Bank make
available the foreign exchange to import adequate raw materials and supplies which may be
necessary to produce or manufacture said article or commodity in the quantity required to cover
the shortage in supply.
(b) If said article or commodity in short supply is not locally produced or manufactured or if
the local producers or manufacturers thereof can not fully cover the shortage in supply, the
Council after notice and hearing shall certify to such shortage or to the deficiency which the local
producers or manufacturers cannot cover, and recommend to the Monetary Board that the
Central Bank make available to importers the necessary foreign exchange to import said article
or commodity in the quantity required to cover the shortage in supply.

(c) If these measures should still fail to arrest the rise of the market prices of such article or
commodity in short supply, the Council, after notice and hearing, may recommend, and the
President may authorize, any agency of the government, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, except government financial institutions, to import directly the article or
commodity in short supply for distribution in the local market through such channels as may be
chosen for the purpose.

Sec. 6. The Council shall promulgate such rules and regulations as shall be deemed necessary
for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Act subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines. The rules and regulations that may be promulgated by the Council
shall take effect fifteen days after their publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in at
least two newspapers, one in English and another in the National Language of general circulation
in the Philippines. They shall be posted at the entrance of the City Hall or Municipal Building of
each city, municipality or municipal district in English and in the local dialect.

In the exercise of its powers, the Council, by unanimous vote shall have the power to issue,
under the signature and authority of the Chairman, subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, which
shall be duly entered in a record book indicating the facts attendant thereto, and, notwithstanding
the provisions of sections 81, 347 and 349 of the National Internal Revenue Code, to require the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to submit any sales, income or other tax returns filed by any
producer, manufacturer or retailer of products listed in section one hereof whenever relevant to
any public hearing and any inquiry under this Act.

The Council shall submit a quarterly report to Congress of all its actuations under this Act
beginning January 1, 1972 and every quarter thereafter.

Sec. 7. Imprisonment for a period of not less than six months nor more than five years or a fine
of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than twenty thousand pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who sells any commodity in excess of the maximum selling price
established by the Council, or who violates any provision of this Act or any order, rule or
regulation issued pursuant to the provisions of this Act. Provided, however, that in the case of
aliens, in addition to the penalty herein provided, the offender shall, upon conviction and after
service of sentence, be immediately deported without any further proceedings.

Whenever any of the offenses described above is committed by a corporation or association, the
president and each of the directors or managers of said corporation or association, or its agent or
representative in the Philippines in case of a foreign corporation or association who shall have
knowingly permitted or failed to prevent the commission of such offenses, shall be held liable as
principals thereof.

Any government official or employee, who by neglect or connivance has in any manner aided or
abetted in the violation or circumvention of the provisions of this Act, shall be held criminally
liable as co-principal under this section and shall, in addition, suffer the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification to hold public office. Any government official or employee who, being
duly authorized by the Council to act as its authorized agent, shall divulge to any person, or
make known in any other manner than may be authorized by law, any information regarding the
income, method of operation or other confidential information regarding the business of any
person, association or corporation, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the course of the
discharge of his official duties, shall be punished by both fine of not less than two thousand
pesos nor more than twenty thousand pesos and imprisonment of not less than two years nor
more than five years.

Sec. 8. If any provision of this Act or the applicability of such provision to any person or
circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the other provisions of this Act and the
applicability of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Sec. 9. The President is hereby authorized to allot from the unprogrammed appropriations for
the Executive Departments from the General Fund under Republic Act No. 6130, the sum of
Two hundred fifty thousand pesos for necessary operating expenses to carry out the provisions of
this Act during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, and under the next General Appropriations
Act, the sum of one million pesos for the same purpose during the fiscal year ending June 30,
1973: provided, that not more than one hundred thousand pesos shall be spent for personal
services for a full year.

The Council and the Bureau of Commerce may call upon any official, agent, employee, agency
or instrumentality of the government for staff or any other assistance that they may deem
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act and said agency or instrumentality of the
government shall, with the approval of the President, assign the official, agent, or employee and
provide the assistance requested by the Council and the Bureau of Commerce.

SECTION 10. The decisions of the Council on questions of fact shall be final and executory
while those involving questions of law shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court by certiorari.

SECTION 11. This Act takes effect upon its approval and shall continue in force up to June 30,
1973: provided, however, that convictions rendered under this Act or under the duly promulgated
orders, rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall remain valid and enforceable, and
prosecutions of offenses committed during the effectivity thereof shall commence and shall not
be barred until terminated by convictions or acquittal of the accused.

Approved: July 27, 1971

d) R.A. No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180
AN ACT TO REGULATE THE RETAIL BUSINESS

Section 1. No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no association, partnership, or
corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage
directly or indirectly in the retail business: Provided, That a person who is not a citizen of the
Philippines, or an association, partnership, or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, which is actually engaged in the said business on May, fifteen, nineteen hundred and
fifty-four, shall be entitled to continue to engage therein, unless its license is forfeited in
accordance herewith, until his death or voluntary retirement from said business, in the case of a
natural person, and for a period of ten year from the date of the approval of this Act or until the
expiration of the term of the association or partnership or of the corporate existence of the
corporation, whichever event comes first, in the case of juridical persons. Failure to renew a
license to engage in retail business shall be considered voluntary retirement.

Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way impair or abridge whatever rights may be granted
to citizens and juridical entities of the United States of America under the Executive Agreement
signed on July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six, between that country and the Republic of
the Philippines.

The license of any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and of any association,
partnership or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines to engage in retail
business, shall be forfeited for any violation of any provision of laws on nationalization,
economic control, weights and measures, and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce
and industry.

No license shall be issued to any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and to any
association, partnership or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, actually
engaged in the retail business, to establish or open additional stores or branches for retail
business.

Section 2. Every person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and every association, partnership
or corporation not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, engaged in the retail business,
shall, within ninety days after the approval of this Act and within the first fifteen days of January
every year thereafter, present for registration with the municipal or city treasurer a verified
statement containing the names, addresses, and nationality of the owners, partners or
stockholders, the nature of the retail business it is engaged in, the amount of its assets and
liabilities, the names of its principal officials, and such other related data as may be required by
the Secretary of Commerce and Industry.

Section 3. In case of death of a person who is not a citizen of the Philippines and who is entitled
to engage in retail business under the provisions of this Act, his or her heir, administrator or
executor is entitled to continue with such retail business only for the purpose of liquidation for a
period of not more than six months after such death.
Section 4. As used in this Act, the term “retail business” shall mean any act, occupation or
calling of habitually selling direct to the general public merchandise, commodities or goods for
consumption, but shall not include:

(a) a manufacturer, processor, laborer, or worker selling to the general public the products
manufactured, processed or produced by him if his capital does not exceed five thousand pesos,
or

(b) a farmer or agriculturist selling the project of his farm.

Section 5. Every license to engage in retail business issued in favor of any citizen of the
Philippines or of any association, partnership or corporation wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines shall be conclusive evidence of the ownership by such citizen, association,
partnership or corporation of the business for which the license was issued, except as against the
Government or the State.

Section 6. Any violation of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three
years and not more than five years and by a fine of not less than three thousand pesos and not
more than five thousand pesos. In the case of associations, partnerships or corporations, the
penalty shall be imposed upon its partners, president, directors, managers, and other officers
responsible for the violation. If the offender is not a citizen of the Philippines, he shall be
deported immediately after service of sentence. If the offender is a public officer or employee, he
shall, in addition to the penalty prescribed herein, be dismissed from the public service,
perpetually disenfranchised, and perpetually disqualified from holding any public office.

Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 19, 1954

Article 187. Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or merchandise made
gold, silver; or other precious metals or their alloys.

A. Section 121, R.A. No. 8293

Republic Act No. 8293 June 6, 1997

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE AND

ESTABLISHING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, PROVIDING FOR ITS
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::
CHAPTER II
PATENTABILITY

Section 21. Patentable Inventions. - Any technical solution of a problem in any field of human
activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable shall be
Patentable. It may be, or may relate to, a product, or process, or an improvement of any of the
foregoing. (Sec. 7, R.A. No. 165a)

B. U.S. vs Kyburz, 28 Phil 475

THE UNITED STATES v. J. KYBURZ

G.R. No. 9458
November 24, 1914

Facts:Greilsammer Hermanos is a regularly organized partnership engaged in the retail jewelry

business in Manila. It engraves a trade-mark consisting of a sphere across which runs a scroll
bearing the word Meridian. The watches thus inspected and marked have been advertised and put
on sale in this country for several years under the trade name of Meridian watches.

In the month of September, 1913, Kyburz, the defendant in this case, was the owner of two retail
jewelry stores in Manila.The said J. Kyburz, with intent to defraud the public and the said firm of
Greilsammer Hermanos, owner of the above described trade-mark, used the word Meridian on
cards placed on and in connection with his watches, for the purpose of selling the same as
genuine Meridian watches, at his place of business, the said Manila Jewelry Store and with the
intention of making the purchasers believe that the said watches thus offered for sale and sold by
the said J. Kyburz were genuine Meridian watches when in truth and in fact they were watches of
some other make, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Greilsammer Hermanos. The
defendant testifying in his own behalf, swore that the clerk was not instructed or authorized to set
forth in the guaranty that these watches were Meridian watches.

The appellant contends thatisn trial court erred in holding that Kyburz directed or authorized the
action of his employees in the Manila Jewelry Store, in view of the positive denials of that fact
by both Kyburz and the clerk who made the sale.

Issue: Whether or not Kyburz should be held criminally liable knowing that the defendant did
not place the trade-mark or trade name on the watches sold by him.

Held:YES. Sec. 5 of Act No. 666provides that: "A trade name is the name, device, or mark by
which is intended to be distinguished from that of others the business, profession, trade, or
occupation in which one may be engaged and in which goods are manufactured or sold to the
public, work is done for the public, or professional services are rendered to the public. It is not
essential that the trade name should appear on the goods manufactured or dealt in by the person
owning or using the same. It is sufficient if the trade name is used by way of advertisements,
signs over the place of business, upon letter heads, and in other ways to furnish to the public a
method of distinguishing the business, trade, or occupation of the person owning and using such
name. Property in trade names shall be as fully protected as property in a trade-mark by the civil
remedies provided in section three of this Act for the protection of property in trade-marks."

Trade names are protected against use or imitation upon the ground of unfair competition, and an
examination of the statute clearly indicates its purpose to protect the manufacturer or dealer as
well as the public.

Greilsammer Hermanos import watches of a certain make and standard, stamp them with their
trade-mark, put them on the market under the trade name of Meridian watches, and have
advertised them and established a market for them. By so doing they give the public to
understand that watches known in Manila as Meridian watches are of a certain make, standard,
and quality, guaranteed by them.

Nothing that has been said should be construed as a holding that Greilsammer Hermanos have an
exclusive right to sell watches of the make or standard of those on which they engrave their
trade-mark, and which are there-after sold by them under the trade name of Meridian watches.
No person is entitled in these Islands to sell watches, whether of the same make and quality as
those of the defendant or of any other make and quality, under the trade name of Meridian
watches, which by adoption and user has become the property of Greilsammer Hermanos. The
use of the trade name Meridian by any other firm than Greilsammer Hermanos can have but one
reasonable explanation, and that is the intent to take advantage of the favorable opinion formed
by the public of the quality and standard of the watches sold by that firm under the trade name
adopted by it for advertising purposes, and as a guaranty to the public that such watches have
passed through its hands and are up to the standard set by it for watches advertised and sold as
Meridian watches.

C. E. Spinner & Co. vs Hesslein Corporation, 54 Phil 224

SPINNER and COMPANY v. NEUSS HESSLEIN CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-31380
January 13, 1930

Facts:E. Spinner & Co. is a co-partnership with head offices in Manchester, England and
Bombay, India, being represented in the Philippine Islands by Wise & Co., a domestic
corporation with principal office in the City of Manila.Defendant on the other hand is a
corporation organized in December, 1922, under the laws of the Philippine Islands, with its
principal office in the City of Manila. The defendant is a subsidiary of Neuss Hesslein& Co.,
Inc., of New York, U. S. A., for whom it acts as selling agent in the Philippine Islands.

E. Spinner & Co., has long been engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile fabrics, including
khaki clothand beginning with 1923, plaintiff began exporting khaki to the Philippine Islands.
Among the brands of khaki was the grade indicated by the manufacturer as "Wigan." All of the
different grades of khaki were marketed by the plaintiff under a common trade-mark, which was
first registered in the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks of the Philippine
Government in the year 1905.

This trade-mark consists of a large label representing the profiles of two elephant heads placed
close to each other in the upper middle center of the label and looking in opposite directions,
with trunks extending respectively to the right and left. This device has for its rectangular border
a garland of leaves; while over the point of union between the two heads appear several flags.
Inside the space formed by the trunks of the elephants and the garland of leaves appears a label.

Plaintiff learned in 1924 that the defendant, the Neuss Hesslein Corporation, was selling a brand
of khaki in the Philippine Islands with the word "Wigan".As thus employed by the defendant, the
word "Wigan" purports to show the color of the defendant's khaki.

After discovering this fact, the plaintiff, in April, 1925, caused its trade-mark, consisting of the
two elephant heads, to be again registered in the Bureau of Commerce and Industry.

In its essential features, this trade-mark is identical with the trade-mark registered by the plaintiff
in 1905, but in the latter trade-mark the word "Wigan" is inserted after the word "Quality." The
purpose of this registration was of course to incorporate the word "Wigan" as an integral part of
the registered trade-mark.

Issue:Whether or not the defendant corporation has a right to use the word "Wigan" on khaki
sold by it in the Philippine Islands.

Held: No.As stated in section 7 of Act No. 666, a person is guilty of unfair competition who "in
selling his goods shall give them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or
dealer, either in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or
words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence
purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the
actual manufacturer or dealer.”

This language is very broad; and as applied to the case before us it is evident that, in using the
word "Wigan" on the khaki cloth sold by it, the defendant has appropriated a word likely to lead
purchasers to believe that the goods sold by the defendant are those of the plaintiff. The
representation that the khaki sold by the defendant is of the kind known to the trade as "Wigan"
directly tends to deceive the purchaser and, therefore, constitutes unfair competition as against
the plaintiff.

With respect to the question of infringement of trade-mark right, it is clear that the appropriation
by the defendant of the word "Wigan" for use in the sale of its khaki did not constitute a violation
of trade-mark prior to April, 1925, when the word "Wigan" was first incorporated in the
plaintiff's registered trade-mark; but after that date it was certainly illegal for the defendant to use
the word "Wigan" stamped upon the khaki sold by it; and this act was an infringement of trade-
mark right.
 D. Mead Johnson & Co. vs Van Dorp, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. L-17501, April 27, 1963

MEAD JOHNSON and COMPANY v. N. V. J. VAN DORP, LTD., ET AL

G.R. No. L-17501
April 27, 1963

Facts: On June 2, 1956, Van Dorp, filed an application for registration of the tademark
“ALASKA” and pictorial representation of a Boy’s head within a rectangular design. The
trademark was published in the issue of Official Gazette on June 5, 1956.

Mead Johnson being the owner of the trademark "ALACTA" used for powdered half-skim milk,
which was registered with the Patent Office on June 12, 1951, filed an opposition on the ground
that it will be damaged by the said registration as the trademark "ALASKA" and pictorial
representation of a Boy's Head within a rectangular design (ALASKA disclaimed), used for
milk, milk products, dairy products and infant's foods, is confusingly similar to its trademark
"ALACTA".

Mead Johnson alleged that:

1. In appearance and sound the trademarks "ALASKA" and "ALACTA" are sufficiently
close.
2. The three vowels are the same in both and the public would pronounce them short
accenting on the second syllable.
3. Both marks have the same number of letters and the vowels are placed on the same
position. The general form and sound of the words are of marked similarity so as to
suggest the likelihood of confusion. While "ALACTA" and "ALASKA" differ entirely in
meaning, they are confusingly similar in appearance.
4. The three letter prefixes of both marks are identical. Both marks end with the same letter
"A". The only difference lies in the letters "CT" in "ALACTA" and "SK" in "ALASKA".
5. Citing the case of Esso Standard Oil Company v. Sun Oil Company, et al., 46 TMR 444,
wherein it was held that SUNVIS and UNIVIS are quite different in sound and meaning
but in their entireties they are confusingly similar in appearance.

Alaska alleged that alleged that its trademark and product "ALASKA" are entirely different from
oppositor's trademark and product "ALACTA", since applicant's product covers milk, milk
products, dairy products and infant's foods which fall under Class 47 Foods and Ingredients of
Foods, while oppositor's products cover pharmaceutical preparations for nutritional needs which
fall under Class 6, which refers to Medicines and Pharmaceutical Preparations.

Issue: Whether or not there is trademark infringement.

Held:It is true that between petitioner's trademark "ALACTA" and respondent's "ALASKA"
there are similarities in spelling, appearance and sound for both are composed of six letters of
three syllables each and each syllable has the same vowel, but in determining if they are
confusingly similar a comparison of said words is not the only determinant factor. The
trademarks in their entirety as they appear in the respective labels must also be considered in
relation to the goods to which they are attached. The discerning eye of the observer must focus
not only on the predominant words but also on the other features appearing in both labels in
order that he may draw his conclusion whether one is confusingly similar to the other. Having
this view in mind, we believe that while there are similarities in the two marks there are also
differences or dissimilarities which are glaring and striking to the eye as the former. Thus,the
court finds the following dissimilarities in the two marks:

(a) The sizes of the containers of the goods of petitioner differ from those of respondent. The
goods of petitioner come in one-pound container while those of respondent come in three sizes,
to wit: 14-ounce tin of full condensed full cream milk; 14-1/2-ounce tin of evaporated milk; and
6-ounce tin of evaporated milk.

(b) The colors too differ. One of petitioner's containers has one single background color, to wit:
light blue; the other has two background colors, pink and white. The containers of respondent's
goods have two color bands, yellowish white and red.

(c) Petitioner's mark "ALACTA" has only the first letter capitalized and is written in black.
Respondent's mark "ALASKA" has all the letters capitalized written in white except that of the
condensed full cream milk which is in red.

In the petitioner's certificate of registration, it appears that the same covers "Pharmaceutical
Preparations which Supply Nutritional Needs" which fall under Class 6 of the official
classification as Medicines and Pharmaceutical Preparations", thus indicating that petitioner's
products are not foods or ingredients of foods but rather medicinal and pharmaceutical
preparations that are to be used as prescribed by physicians. On the other hand, respondent's
goods cover "milk, milk products, dairy products and infant's foods" as set forth in its application
for registration which fall under an entirely different class, or under Class 47 which refers to
"Foods and Ingredients of Foods", and for use of these products there is no need or requirement
of a medical prescription.

E. Etepha vs Director of Patents, et al., 16 SCRA 495

ETEPHA, A.G., v. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and WESTMONT PHARMACEUTICALS,

INC.,
G.R. No. L-20635
March 31, 1966

Facts:Respondent Westmont Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a New York corporation, sought registration

of trademark"Atussin" placed on its "medicinal preparation of expectorant antihistaminic,
bronchodilator sedative,ascorbic acid (Vitamin C) used in the treatment of cough". The
trademark is used exclusively in the Philippines since January 21, 1959.
Petitioner, Etepha, A. G., a Liechtenstin (principality) corporation, objected claiming that it will
be damaged because Atussin is so confusedly similar to its Pertussin used on a preparation for
the treatment of coughs, that the buying public will be misled into believing that Westmont's
product is thatof petitioner's which allegedly enjoys goodwill.

The Director of Patents ruled that the trademark ATUSSIN may be registered even though
PERTUSSINhad been previously registered from the same office, hence, this appeal

Issue: Whether or not trademark ATUSSIN be registered, given the fact that PERTUSSIN,
another trademark, had been previously registered in the Patent Office

Held: Yes. The objects of a trademark are to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the
article to which it is affixed, to secure to him who has been instrumental in bringing into market
a superior article of merchandise the fruit of his industry and skill, and to prevent fraud and
imposition.

A practical approach to the problem of similarity or dissimilarity is to go into the whole of the
two trademarks pictured in their manner of display. Inspection should be undertaken from the
viewpoint of prospective buyer. The trademark complained of should be compared and
contrasted with the purchaser’s memory (not in juxtaposition) of the trade mark said to be
infringed.

That the word “tussin” figures as a component of both trademarks is nothing to wonder at. The
Director of Patents aptly observes that it is “the common practice in the drug and pharmaceutical
industries to ‘fabricate’ marks by using syllables or words suggestive of the ailments for which
they are intended and adding thereto distinctive prefixes or suffixes”. And appropriately to be
considered now is the fact that, concededly, the “tussin” (in Pertussin and Atussin) was derived
from the Latin root-word “tussis” meaning cough.

“Tussin” is merely descriptive; it is generic; it furnishes to the buyer no indication of the origin
of the goods; it is open for appropriation by anyone. It is accordingly barred from registration as
trademark. With jurisprudence holding the line, we feel safe in making the statement that any
other conclusion would result in “appellant having practically a monopoly” of the word “tussin”
in a trademark. While “tussin” by itself cannot thus be used exclusively to identify one’s goods,
it may properly become the subject of a trademark “by combination with another word or
phrase”. And this union of words is reflected in petitioner’s Pertussin and respondent’s Atussin,
the first with prefix “Per” and the second with Prefix “A.”

F. R.A. No. 166

Republic Act No. 166 June 20, 1947

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE REGISTRATION AND PROTECTION OF TRADE-

MARKS, TRADE-NAMES AND SERVICE-MARKS, DEFINING UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND FALSE MARKING AND PROVIDING REMEDIES AGAINST
THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

CHAPTER I - Powers, Duties and Functions of Patent Office

Section 1. Transfer of powers from Bureau of Commerce to Patent Office. - The powers, duties
and functions vested in, or performed and exercised by, the Bureau of Commerce in connection
with the registration of trade-marks, trade-names and other marks are hereby transferred to the
Patent Office. The administration of this Act shall devolve upon the Patent Office.

All books, records, documents and files of the Bureau of Commerce relating to trade-marks,
trade-names and other marks, and such personnel of the said Bureau as is now discharging the
functions or performing the duties of the Bureau of Commerce in connection with the
registration of trade-marks, trade-names and other marks together with the corresponding
appropriation, are transferred to the Patent Office, and the Budget Commissioner shall make
immediate provision for such transfer.

CHAPTER II - Registration of Marks and Trade-Names

Section 2. What are registrable. - Trade-marks, trade-names and service-marks may be registered
in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 3. Application by non-residents. - Any person filing an application for the registration of
a mark or trade-name, who is not a resident of the Philippines, must appoint an agent or
representative in the Philippines upon whom notice or process relating to the application or
registration of the mark or trade-name may be served. In the event of death, absence or inability
of the agent or representative, a new agent or representative must be appointed, and notice
thereof must be filed in the Patent Office. Upon failure to maintain an agent or representative of
record in the Patent Office, service on the Director shall be deemed sufficient.

Section 4. Registration of trade-marks, trade-names and service-marks. - The owner of a trade-

mark, trade-name or service-mark used to distinguish his goods, business or services from the
goods, business or services of others shall have the right to register the same, unless it:

(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute;

(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the Philippines or any of
its political subdivisions, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof;

(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living

individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased
President of the Philippines, during the life of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of
the widow;
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark or trade-name which so resembles a mark or trade-name
registered in the Philippines or a mark or trade-name previously used in the Philippines by
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to or used in connection with the goods,
business or services of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchases; or

(e) Consists of a mark or trade-name which, when applied to or used in connection with the
goods, business or services of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of
them, or when applied to or used in connection with the goods, business or services of the
applicant is primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, or is
primarily merely a surname.

(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section, nothing herein
shall prevent the registration of a mark or trade-name used by the applicant which has become
distinctive of the applicant's goods, business or services. The Director may accept as prima facie
evidence that the mark or trade-name has become distinctive, as applied to or used in connection
with the applicant's goods, business or services, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous
use thereof as a mark or trade-name by the applicant in connection with the sale of goods,
business or services for the five years next preceding the date of the filing of the application for
its registration.

Section 5. Requirements of the application. - The application for the registration of a mark or
trade-name shall be in English or Spanish, or in the national language, with its corresponding
English translation, and signed by the applicant, and shall include:

(a) Sworn statement of the applicant's domicile and citizenship, the date of the applicant's first
use of the mark or trade-name, the date of the applicant's first use of the mark or trade-name in
commerce or business, the goods, business or services in connection with which the mark or
trade-name is used and the mode or manner in which the mark is used in connection with such
goods, business or services, and that the person making the application believes himself, or the
firm, corporation or association on whose behalf he makes the verification, to be the owner of the
mark or trade-name sought to be registered, that the mark or trade-name is in use in commerce or
business, and that to the best of his knowledge no person, firm, corporation or association has the
right to use such mark or trade-name in commerce or business either in the identical form thereof
or in such near resemblance thereto as might be calculated to deceive;

(b) Such number of specimens or facsimiles of the mark or trade-name as actually used as may
be required by the Director;

(c) Power of attorney, if the filing is through attorney;

(d) The appointment of an agent or representative, if the applicant is not domiciled in the
Philippines; and

(e) The required fee.

Section 6. Classification of goods and services. - The Director shall establish a classification of
goods and services, for the convenience of the Patent Office administration, but not to limit or
extent the applicant's rights. The applicant may register his mark or trade-name in one
application for any of all the goods or services included in one class, upon or in connection with
which he is actually using the mark or trade-name. The Director may issue a single certificate for
one mark or trade-name registered in a plurality of classes upon payment of a fee equaling the
sum of the fees for each registration in each class.

Section 7. Examination and publication. - Upon the filing of an application for registration and
the payment of the required fee, the Director shall cause an examination of the application to be
made, and, if on such examination it shall appear that the applicant is entitled to registration, the
Director, upon payment of the required fee, shall cause the mark or trade-name to be published in
the Official Gazette.

If the applicant is found not entitled to registration, the Director shall advise the applicant thereof
and of the reasons therefor. The applicant shall have a period of three months in which to reply
or amend his application, which shall then be re-examined. This procedure may be repeated until
the Director finally refuses registration or the applicant fails within the required period to reply
or amend or appeal, whereupon the application shall be deemed to have been abandoned, unless
it can be shown to the satisfaction of the Director that the delay in responding was unavoidable,
in which event such time may be extended in the discretion of the Director. An abandoned
application may be revived as a pending application within three months from the date of
abandonment, upon good cause shown and the payment of the required fee.

Section 8. Opposition. - Any person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration
of a mark or trade-name may, upon payment of the required fee and within thirty days after the
publication under the first paragraph of section seven hereof, file with the Director as opposition
to the application. Such opposition shall be in writing and verified by the oppositor, or by any
person on his behalf who knows the facts, and shall specify the grounds on which it is based and
include a statement of the facts relied upon. Copies of certificates of registration of marks or
trade-names registered in other countries or other supporting documents mentioned in the
opposition shall be filed therewith, together with the translation thereof into English, if not in the
English language. For good cause shown and upon payment of the required surcharge, the time
for filing an opposition may be extended for an additional thirty days by the Director, who shall
notify the applicant of such extension.

Section 9. Notice and hearing. - Upon the filing of an opposition, the Director shall forthwith
serve notice of the filing on the applicant, and of the date of the hearing thereof upon the
applicant and the oppositor and all other persons having any right, title or interest in the mark or
trade-name covered by the application, as appear of record in the Patent Office.

Section 10. Issuance and publication of certificates. - When the period for filing the opposition
has expired, or when the Director shall have denied the opposition, the Director, upon payment
of the required fee, shall issue the certificate of registration. Upon issuance of a certificate of
registration, notice thereof making reference to the publication of the application shall be
published in the Official Gazette.
Section 11. Issuance and contents of the certificate. - Certificates of registration shall be issued in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines under the seal of the Patent Office, and shall be
signed by the Director, and a record thereof together with a copy of the specimen or facsimile
and the statement of the applicant, shall be kept in books for that purpose. The certificate shall
reproduce the specimen or facsimile of the mark or trade-name, contain the statement of the
applicant and state that the mark or trade-name is registered under this Act, the date of the first
use, the date of the first use in commerce or business, the particular goods or services for which
it is registered, the number and date of the registration, the term thereof, the date on which the
application for registration was received in the Patent Office, a statement of the requirement that
in order to maintain the registration, periodical affidavits of use within the specified times
hereinafter in section twelve provided, shall be filed, and such other data as the rules and
regulations may from time to time prescribe.

Section 12. Duration. - Each certificate of registration shall remain in force for twenty years:
Provided, That registrations under the provisions of this Act shall be cancelled by the Director,
unless within one year following the fifth, tenth and fifteenth anniversaries of the date of issue of
the certificate of registration, the registrant shall file in the Patent Office an affidavit showing
that the mark or trade-name is still in use or showing that its non-use is due to special
circumstances which excuse such non-use and is not due to any intention to abandon the same,
and pay the required fee.

The Director shall notify the registrant who files the above-prescribed affidavits of his
acceptance or refusal thereof and, if a refusal, the reasons therefor.

Section 13. Disclaimers before issue. - The Director shall require unregistrable matter to be
disclaimed, but such disclaimer shall not prejudice or affect the applicant's or owner's rights then
existing or thereafter arising in the disclaimed matter, nor shall such disclaimer prejudice or
affect the applicant's or owner's rights of registration on another application of later date if the
disclaimed matter has become distinctive of the applicant's or owner's goods, business or
services.

Section 14. Voluntary surrender, cancellation, amendment and disclaimer after registration. - At
any time, upon application of the registrant and payment of the required fee, the Director may
permit any registration to be surrendered, cancelled, or for good cause shown to be amended, he
may permit any registered mark or trade-name to be disclaimed in whole or in part: Provided,
That the registration when so amended shall still contain registrable matter and the mark or
trade-name as amended shall still be registrable as a whole, and that such amendment or
disclaimer does not involve such changes in the registration as to alter materially the character of
the mark or trade-name. The Director shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent
Office and upon the certificate of registration or, if said certificate is lost or destroyed, upon a
certified copy thereof. The Director in his discretion and upon payment of the required fee, may
issue a substitute certificate limited to the term of the original certificate and incorporating such
amendment or correction.
CHAPTER III - Renewals of Certificate of Registration

Section 15. Renewal. - Each certificate of registration may be renewed for periods of twenty
years from the end of the expiring period upon the filing of an application therefor and the
payment of the required fee. Such application for renewal shall include a sworn statement of the
applicant's domicile and citizenship, the specific goods, business or services in connection with
which the mark or trade-name is still in use, the period of any nonuse in reference to the specific
goods, business or services covered by original or renewed certificates of registration and any
rights granted third parties for the use of the mark or trade-name, any additional goods, business
or services to which the mark or trade-name has been extended during the period of the original
or renewed certificates of registration, and any material variation in the manner of display of the
mark or trade-name from that shown in the original or renewed certificate of registration. The
applicant shall file the application within six months before the expiration of the period for
which the certificate of registration was issued or renewed, or it may be made within three
months after such expiration for good cause shown and upon payment of the required surcharge.

In the event the applicant for renewal be not domiciled in the Philippines, he shall be subject to
and comply with the provisions of paragraph (d), section five, Chapter II hereof.

Section 16. Effect of failure to renew registration. - Mere failure to renew any registration shall
not affect the right of the registrant to apply for and obtain a new registration under the
provisions of this Act, nor shall such failure entitle any other person to register a mark or trade-
name unless he is entitled thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

CHAPTER IV - Cancellation of Registration

Section 17. Grounds for cancellation. - Any person, who believes that he is or will be damaged
by the registration of a mark or trade-name, may, upon the payment of the prescribed fee, apply
to cancel said registration upon any of the following grounds:

(a) That the registered mark or trade-name becomes the common descriptive name of an article
or substance on which the patent has expired;

(b) That it has been abandoned;

(c) That the registration was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of section four,
Chapter II hereof;

(d) That the registered mark or trade-name has been assigned, and is being used by, or with the
permission of, the assignee so as to misrepresent the source of the goods, business or services in
connection with which the mark or trade-name is used; or

(e) That cancellation is authorized by other provisions of this Act.

Section 18. Requirements of petition; notice and hearing. - Insofar as applicable, the petition
herein shall be in the same form as that provided in section eight, Chapter II hereof, and notice
and hearing shall be as provided in section nine, Chapter II hereof.

Section 19. Cancellation of registration. - If the Director finds that a case for cancellation has
been made out he shall order the cancellation of the registration. The order shall not become
effective until the period for appeal has elapsed, or if appeal is taken, until the judgment on
appeal becomes final. When the order or judgment becomes final, any right conferred by such
registration upon the registrant or any person in interest of record shall terminate. Notice of
cancellation shall be published in the Official Gazette.

CHAPTER V - Rights and Remedies

Section 20. Certificate of registration prima facie evidence of validity. - A certificate of

registration of a mark or trade-name shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registration, the registrant's ownership of the mark or trade-name, and of the registrant's
exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods, business or services specified in the
certificate, subject to any conditions and limitations stated therein.

Section 21. Requirements of notice of registration of trade-mark. - The registrant of a trade-

mark, heretofore registered or registered under the provisions of this Act, shall give notice that
his mark is registered by displaying with the same as used the words "Registered in the
Philippines Patent Office" or "Reg. Phil. Pat. Off."; and in any suit for infringement under this
Act by a registrant failing so to mark the goods bearing the registered trade-mark, no damages
shall be recovered under the provisions of this Act unless the defendant has actual notice of the
registration.

Section 22. Infringement, what constitutes. - Any person who shall use, without the consent of
the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark
or trade-name in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to
deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods or services, or identity of
such business; or reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such mark or trade-name
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection
with such goods, business or services, shall be liable to a civil action by the registrant for any or
all of the remedies herein provided.

Section 23. Actions, and damages and injunction for infringement. - Any person entitled to the
exclusive use of a registered mark or trade-name may recover damages in a civil action from any
person who infringes his rights, and the measure of the damages suffered shall be either the
reasonable profit which the complaining party would have made, had the defendant not infringed
his said rights, or the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement, or in the
event such measure of damages cannot be readily ascertained with reasonable certainty, then the
court may award as damages a reasonable percentage based upon the amount of gross sales of
the defendant of the value of the services in connection with which the mark or trade-name was
used in the infringement of the rights of the complaining party. In cases where actual intent to
mislead the public or to defraud the complaining party shall be shown, in the discretion of the
court, the damages may be doubled.

The complaining party, upon proper showing, may also be granted injunction.

Section 24. Power of court to order infringing material destroyed. - In any action arising under
this Act, in which a violation of any right of the registrant shall have been established, the court
may order that all labels, sign, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles and advertisements in the
possession of the defendant, bearing the registered mark or trade-name or any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation thereof, and all plates, molds, matrices and other means
of making the same, shall be delivered up and destroyed.

Section 25. Authority to determine right to registration. - In any action involving a registered
mark or trade-name the court may determine the right to registration, order the cancellation of
registrations, in whole or in part, restore cancelled registration, and otherwise rectify the register
with respect to the registration of any party to the action. Judgments and orders shall be certified
by the court to the Director, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent
Office, and shall be controlled thereby.

Section 26. Action for false or fraudulent declaration. - Any person who shall procure
registration in the Patent Office of a mark or trade-name by a false or fraudulent declaration or
representation, oral or in writing, or by any false means, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person injured thereby for any damages sustained in consequence thereof.

Section 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. - All actions under this Chapter and Chapters
VI and VII hereof shall be brought before the proper Court of First Instance.

Section 28. Appeal. - Appeal may be taken from any judgment or final order of the Court of First
Instance in the same manner as in other actions.

CHAPTER VI - Unfair Competition

Section 29. Unfair competition, rights and remedies. - A person who has identified in the mind of
the public the goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others,
whether or not a mark or trade-name is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said
goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner as other
property rights. Such a person shall have the remedies provided in section twenty-three, Chapter
V hereof.

Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he
shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services
for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to
produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action
therefor.
In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of unfair competition, the following shall
be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who in selling his goods shall give them the general appearance of goods of
another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the
packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of
their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered
are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who
otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another
of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor
engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to
induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such
services in the mind of the public;

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit
any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or
services of another.

CHAPTER VII - False Designation of Origin and False Description

Section 30. False designation of origin and false description forbidden. - Any person who shall
affix, apply, annex or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or
containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall
cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge
of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the
same to enter into commerce, shall be liable to a civil action for damages and injunction
provided in section twenty-three, Chapter V hereof, by any person doing business in the locality
falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description
or representation.

CHAPTER VIII - Assignment and Transmission of Rights

Section 31. Rights assignable and form of assignment. - A registered mark or trade-name, or one
for which application to register has been filed shall be assignable with the goodwill of the
business in which the mark or trade-name is used, or with that part of the goodwill of the
business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark or trade-name, and in any such
assignment it shall not be necessary to include the goodwill of the business connected with the
use of and symbolized by any other mark or trade-name used in the business or by the name or
style under which the business is conducted. Upon payment of the required fee, the Director shall
record assignments in due form in books kept for that purpose.
The assignment must be in writing, acknowledged before a notary public or other officer
authorized to administer oaths or perform other notarial acts and certified under the hand and
official seal of the notary or other officer.

An assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent Office within three months after the date
thereof or prior to such subsequent purchase.

Section 32. Issuance of certificate of registration to assignee. - A certificate of registration of a

mark or trade-name may be issued to the assignee of the applicant, but the assignment must first
be recorded in the Patent Office. In case of change of ownership the Director shall, at the request
of the owner and upon proper showing and payment of the required fee, issue to such assignee a
new certificate of registration of the said mark or trade-name in the name of such assignee, and
for the unexpired part of the original period.

CHAPTER IX - Review of Orders or Decisions of Director

Section 33. Appeal from action of Director. - Any party who has been denied registration of a
mark or trade-name, or to the renewal of the registration, or to any cancellation proceeding in the
Patent Office, may appeal to the Supreme Court from the final order or decision of the Director.

Section 34. Procedure on appeal. - Sections sixty-three to seventy-three, inclusive, Chapter VIII,
of Republic Act No. _____ entitled "An Act creating a Patent Office, prescribing its powers and
duties, regulating the issuance of patents, and appropriating funds therefor," shall be applicable
to the appeals herein provided.

CHAPTER X - Importations Prohibited

Section 35. Goods bearing infringing marks or trade-names. - No article of imported

merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of any domestic product, or manufacturer, or
dealer, or of any manufacturer or dealer located in any foreign country which, by treaty,
convention or law affords similar privileges to citizens of the Philippines, or which shall copy or
simulate a mark or trade-name registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or shall
bear a mark or trade-name calculated to induce the public to believe that the article is
manufactured in the Philippines, or that it is manufactured in any foreign country or locality
other than the country or locality where it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted to entry at
any customhouse of the Philippines. In order to aid the officers of the customs service in
enforcing this prohibition, any person who is entitled to the benefits of this Act, may require his
name and residence, and the name of the locality in which his goods are manufactured, a copy of
the certificate of registration of his mark or trade-name to be recorded in books which shall be
kept for this purpose in the Bureau of Customs, under such regulations as the Collector of
Customs with the approval of the Secretary of Finance shall prescribe, and may furnish to the
said Bureau facsimiles of his name, the name of the locality in which his goods are
manufactured, or of his registered mark or trade-name, and thereupon the Collector of Customs
shall cause one or more copies of the same to be transmitted to each collector or other proper
officer of the Bureau of Customs.
Section 36. Goods with false designation of origin and false description. - Any goods marked or
labeled in contravention of the provisions of section thirty, Chapter VII hereof, shall not be
imported into the Philippines or admitted to entry at any customhouse in the Philippines.

CHAPTER XI - Provisions in Reference to Foreign Industrial Property

Section 37. Rights of foreign registrants. - Persons who are nationals of, domiciled in, or have a
bona fide or effective business or commercial establishment in any foreign country, which is a
party to any international convention or treaty relating to marks or trade-names, or the repression
of unfair competition to which the Philippines may be a party, shall be entitled to the benefits
and subject to the provisions of this Act to the extent and under the conditions essential to give
effect to any such convention and treaties so long as the Philippines shall continue to be a party
thereto, except as provided in the following paragraphs of this section.

No registration of a mark or trade-name in the Philippines by a person described in the preceding

paragraph of this section shall be granted until such mark or trade-name has been registered in
the country of origin of the applicant, unless the applicant alleges use in commerce.

For the purposes of this section, the country of origin of the applicant is the country in which he
has bona fide and effective industrial or commercial establishment, or if he has not such an
establishment in the country in which he is domiciled, or if he has not a domicile in any of the
countries described in the first paragraph of this section, the country of which he is a national.

An application for registration of a mark or trade-name under the provisions of this Act filed by a
person described in the first paragraph of this section who has previously duly filed an
application for registration of the same mark or trade-name in one of the countries described in
said paragraph shall be accorded the same force and effect as would be accorded to the same
application if filed in the Philippines on the same date on which the application was first filed in
such foreign country: Provided, That -

(a) The application in the Philippines is filed within six months from the date on which the
applicant was first filed in the foreign country; and within three months from the date of filing or
within such time as the Director shall in his discretion grant, the applicant shall furnish a
certified copy of the application for or registration in the country of origin of the applicant,
together with a translation thereof into English, if not in the English language;

(b) The application conforms as nearly as practicable to the requirements of this Act, but use in
commerce need not be alleged;

(c) The rights acquired by third parties before the date of the filing of the first application in the
foreign country shall in no way be affected by a registration obtained on an application filed
under this paragraph; and
(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall entitle the owner of a registration granted under this section to
sue for acts committed prior to the date on which his mark or trade-name was registered in this
country unless the registration is based on use in commerce.

The registration of a mark under the provisions of this section shall be independent of the
registration in the country of origin and the duration, validity or transfer in the Philippines of
such registration shall be governed by the provisions of this Act.

Trade-names of persons described in the first paragraph of this section shall be protected without
the obligation of filing or registration whether or not they form parts of marks.

Any person designated in the first paragraph of this section as entitled to the benefits and subject
to the provisions of this Act shall be entitled to effective protection against unfair competition,
and the remedies provided herein for infringement of marks and trade-names shall be available
so far as they may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition.

Citizens or residents of the Philippines shall have the same benefits as are granted by this section
to persons described in the first paragraph hereof.

CHAPTER XII - Construction and Definitions

Section 38. Words and terms defined and construed. - In the construction of this Act, unless the
contrary is plainly apparent from the context -

The term "trade-name" includes individual names and surnames, firm names, trade-names,
devices or words used by manufacturers, industrialists, merchants, agriculturists, and others to
identify their business, vocations or occupations; the names or titles lawfully adopted and used
by natural or juridical persons, unions, and any manufacturing, industrial, commercial,
agricultural or other organizations engaged in trade or commerce.

The term "trade-mark" includes any word, name, symbol, emblem, sign or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and
distinguish them from those manufactured, sold or dealt in by others.

The term "service-mark" means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the
services of one person and distinguish them from the services of others and includes without
limitation the marks, names, symbols, titles, designations, slogans, character names, and
distinctive features of radio or other advertising.

The word "business" includes vocations or occupations.

The term "mark" includes any trade-mark or service-mark entitled to registration under this Act
whether registered or not.

The word "registrant" includes the owner of a registered mark or trade-name.

Section 39. Fees. - The following fees shall be paid:

For filing application for registration for each class included in the application, fifty pesos;

For filing application for revival of abandoned application for registration, twenty-five pesos;

For publication in the Official Gazette of allowance of application, fifty pesos;

For filing of opposition, fifty pesos;

For issuance and publication of certificate of registration, twenty-five pesos;

For filing each affidavit required by section twelve, Chapter II hereof, twenty-five pesos;

For filing disclaimer, amendment, surrender or cancellation after registration, twenty pesos;

For issuance of a substitute certificate of registration following correction of a registrant's

mistake, twenty-five pesos;

For issuance of a new certificate of registration following change of ownership of mark, twenty-
five pesos;

For filing petition for renewal of certificate of registration for each class, fifty pesos;

For filing petition for cancellation, fifty pesos;

For surcharge for any delayed payment or any delayed action of an applicant or registrant,
twenty-five pesos;

For notice of appeal from orders or decisions of Commissioner, twenty-five pesos;

For recording assignments for each mark or trade-name, ten pesos;

For issuance of a certificate regarding the registration or non-registration of each mark or trade-
name, ten pesos;

For issuance of an affirmative or negative certificate regarding the registration of any document
in connection, with a mark or trade-name, ten pesos;

For filing any other documents in connection with marks or trade-names not required by law to
be filed, ten pesos;

For certifying a copy to be a true and exact copy, one peso;

For copies of records, two pesos per photostat sheet; one peso per one hundred words of
typewritten copy; and
For services not otherwise specified, the Director shall, by regulation, provide the fees therefor.

Section 40. Collective marks and collective trade-names. - Collective marks and collective trade-
names belonging to cooperatives, associations or other collective groups or organization may
also be registered under the provisions of this Act, even though the said collectivities may not
possess an industrial, commercial or agricultural establishment. Foreign collectivities may not,
however, procure such registration if the existence of such collectivities is contrary to the laws of
the country of origin.

Such collective marks and collective trade-names, when registered, shall be entitled to the
protection provided herein in the case of marks and trade-names, except when used so as to
represent falsely that the owner or a user makes or sells the goods on which the mark or trade-
name is used, or so as to represent falsely the origin of the goods or services.

The other provisions of this Act relating to marks and trade-names shall apply to collective
marks and collective trade-names, except that the part of paragraph (e), section four, Chapter II
hereof, relating to geographically descriptive marks or trade-names shall not be applicable in
appropriate cases.

A "collective mark" or collective trade-name" is a mark or trade-name used by the members of a

cooperative, an association or other collective group or organization.

CHAPTER XIV - Miscellaneous Provisions

Section 41. Reservation in favor of prior registration. - Owners of marks or trade-names

registered under the provisions of the laws in force prior hereto, the registrations of which are
still subsisting under the said laws are hereby granted the right:

(a) Within one year after the taking effect of this Act to surrender their certificates of registration
and procure the issuance of new certificates, in which event they shall be entitled to the benefits
and subject to the provisions of this Act; or

(b) Within one year before the expiration of the period for which the certificates of registration
was issued or renewed, the registrant may renew the registration upon filing an application
therefor, as provided in section fifteen, Chapter III hereof. If said application is granted a renewal
certificate shall be issued by the Director in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 42. Renewal of registrations which expired during the war. - The provisions of this Act
to the contrary notwithstanding, registrations under prior laws which expired after the eighth day
of December, nineteen hundred forty-one, and which the owners were not able to renew for
causes arising out of the war, may be renewed within one year after this Act takes effect, and
non-use of the mark or trade-name may be shown to be due to special circumstances. If the
application for renewal is granted, a renewal certificate to commence from the date of the
expiration of the prior registration shall be issued by the Director in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
Section 43. Pending applications. - All applications for registration pending on the effective date
of this Act may be amended, if practicable, to bring them under the provisions of this Act,
without the payment of any additional fee. The prosecution of such applications whether
amended or not and the grant of registrations thereon shall conform to the provisions of this Act.

Section 44. Repealing clause. - Act Numbered Six hundred and sixty-six of the Philippine
Commission, approved March six, nineteen hundred and three, and all laws amendatory thereto;
Act Numbered Thirty hundred and seventy of the Philippine Legislature, approved March
sixteen, nineteen hundred and twenty-three; Act Numbered Thirty-two hundred and two,
approved December three, nineteen hundred and twenty-four, and all other acts, or parts of acts
inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed.

Section 45. Effective date. - This Act shall take effect on its approval.

G. Chua Che vs Philippine Patent Office, et al., 13 SCRA 67

CHUA CHE v.PHILIPPINES PATENT OFFICE and SY TUO

G.R. No. L-18337
January 30, 1965

Facts: On October 30, 1958, Chua Che presented with the Philippines Patent Office a petition
for the registration in his favor the trade name of "X-7". Chua Che declares that the trade name
was used by him in commerce within the Philippines on June 10, 1957, and had been
continuously used by him in trade in the Philippines for more than one year.

Sy Tuo opposed, claiming that he owns the trademark and had been using it since 1951 as mark
for perfume, lipstick, and nail polish as opposed to Chua Che's use which was admittedly only in
1957.

The Director of Patents denied the application for use on soap Class 51, being manufactured by
said Chua Che, upon the opposition of respondent Sy Tuo. The Director of Patents held that the
products of the parties, while specifically different, are products intended for use in the home and
usually have common purchasers. Furthermore, the use of X-7 for laundry soap is but a natural
expansion of business of the opposer.

Issue: Whether or not allowing Chua Che to register the same mark for laundry soap would
likely to cause confusion on the purchasers of X-7 products by SY Tou.

Held: Yes. While it is no longer necessary to establish that the goods of the parties possess the
same descriptive properties, as previously required under the Trade Mark Act of 1905,
registration of a trademark should be refused in cases where there is a likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception, even though the goods fall into different categories
The products of appellee are common household items now-a-days, in the same manner as
laundry soap. The likelihood of purchasers to associate these products to a common origin is not
far-fetched. Both from the standpoint of priority of use and for the protection of the buying
public and appellee's rights to the trademark "X-7", it becomes manifest that the registration of
said trademark in favor of applicant-appellant should be denied.

H. Sta. Ana vs Maliwat, et al., 24 SCRA 1018

Sta.Ana v. Maliwat
G.R. No. L-23023
August 31, 1968

Facts:In 1962, Florentino Maliwat sought to register the trademark "FLORMANN" used on
shirts, pants, jackets and shoes for ladies, men and children. He claimed its first use in commerce
in 1955. Also, in the same year (1962), Jose P. Sta. Ana (Petitioner) filed an application for the
registration of the trademark "FLORMEN" (used in ladies and children shoes). he claimed its
first use in commerce in 1959. Due to the confusing similarity, the Director of the Patent Office
ordered an interference. Maliwat's application was then granted due to his prior adoption and use
while that of Sta. Ana was denied. It was stipulated by the parties that 'Flormann' was used as a
trademark in 1953 and Maliwat used it on shoes in 1962.

Issue: Whether or not both products of the parties have the same descriptive properties.

Held: Yes. Modern law recognizes that the protection to which the owner of a trademark mark is
entitled is not limited to guarding his goods or business from actual market competition with
identical or similar products of the parties, but extends to all cases in which the use by a junior
appropriator of a trademark or tradename is likely to lead to a confusion of source, as where
prospective purchasers would be misled into thinking that the complaining party has extended
his business into the field or is in any way connected with the activities of the infringer; or when
it forestalls the normal potential expansion of his business.
The law does not require that the goods of the previous user and the late user of the same mark
should possess the same descriptive properties or should fall into the same categories in order to
bar the latter from registering his mark. The meat of the matter is the likelihood of confusion,
mistake or deception upon purchasers of the goods of the junior user of the mark and the goods
manufactured by the previous user. Here, the resemblance or similarity of the mark
FLORMANN and the name FLORMEN and the likelihood of confusion, one to the other, is
admitted; therefore, the prior adopter, respondent Maliwat, has the better right to the use of the
mark.

I. Masso Hermanos S.A. vs Director of Patents, 94 Phil 136

MASSO HERMANO v. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

G.R. No. L-3952
December 29, 1953
Facts:Masso Hermanos, S.A., is the registered owner under Act No. 666 of the trademark
composed of the word "Cosmopolite" used on canned fish. Said trademark was first registered
issued therefor on March 16, 1917, by the Director of the Philippine library and museum for a
period of thirty years, under the provisions of Act No. 666. A renewal of the certificate of
registration was applied for and issued on June 6, 1947 by the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce also under the provisions of said Act.

On June 14, 1948, the petitioner, Masso Hermanos, applied to the Director of Patents for a new
certificate of registration of said trademark under the provisions of section 41 (a) of Republic Act
No. 166.

A trademark examiner of the Patents Office denied the petition on the ground that the word
"Cosmopolite", as a trademark for canned fish is descriptive of said goods and, therefore, could
not have been legally registered as a trademark under the provisions of Act No. 666 and,
consequently, is not entitled to registration under section 41 (a) of Republic Act No. 166.

Issue: Whether or not the word "Cosmopolite" is descriptive.

Held: No. Section 13 of Act No. 666 provides that — ". . . But no alleged trademark . . . shall be
registered which is merely the name, quality or description of the merchandise upon which it is
to be used.”

The word "Cosmopolite" does not give the name, quality or description of the canned fish for
which it is used. It does not even describe the place of origin, for it does not indicate the country
or place where the canned fish was manufactured. it is a very general term which does not give
the kind or quality of the goods. For example, a dealer in shoes cannot register a trademark
"Leather Shoes" because that would be descriptive and it would be right to use the same words
with reference to their merchandise.

The court is, therefore, of the opinion that the registration of the trademark "Cosmopolite" under
Act No. 666 was valid and is subsisting. The Director of Patents should not for light and
unsubstantial reasons reverse the ruling of the former officer in charge of trademark registration,
which has been accepted and in force since 1917 up to the present.

Case of acquittal: based on non-compliance of chain of custody

ARTICLE 188. SUBSTITUTING AND ALTERING TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES

OR SERVICE MARKS

HENG AND DEE VS WELLINGTON

92 PHIL 448
G.R. No. L-4531. January 10, 1953

FACTS:
  Si Heng& Dee are engaged in the businessof manufacturing shirts, pants, drawers, and
other articles of wear for men, women, andchildren. They have been in that businesssince
the year 1938, having obtained theregistration for the said articles thetrademark of
"Wellington."
 Benjamin Chua applied for the registrationof the business name "WellingtonDepartment
Store" on May 7, 1946. Hisapplication therefor was approved by theBureau of
Commerce, and a certificateissued in his favor.
 Petitioners allege that the use of the words"Wellington Department Store" as abusiness
name and as a corporate name bythe defendant-appellee deceives the publicinto buying
defendant corporation's goodsunder the mistaken belief that the namesare the plaintiff's or
have the same sourceas plaintiffs' goods, thereby resulting indamage to them.
 Defendants raises the defense ofdissimilarity of the goods that they deal incourt a quo
dismissed the complaint andheld that Wellington Co. has not been usedby any enterprise.

ISSUE:

 WON Wellington, being a geographical canbe registered – negative

 WON defendant is guilty of unfaircompetition – negative

HELD:

 Mere geographical names are ordinarilyregarded as common property, and it is ageneral

rule that the same cannot beappropriated as the subject of an exclusivetrademark or
tradename.
 As the term cannot be appropriated as atrademark or a tradename, no action forviolation
thereof can be maintained, asnone is granted by the statute in suchcases.
 no action may lie in favor of the plaintiffsappellantsherein for damages or injunctiverelief
for the use by the defendantsappelleesof the name "Wellington."

Issue of unfair competition:

 While there is similarity between thetrademark or tradename "WellingtonCompany" and

that of "WellingtonDepartment Store," no confusion ordeception can possibly result or
arise fromsuch similarity because the latter is a"department store," while the former
doesnot purport to be so.
 Neither can the public be said to bedeceived into the belief that the goods beingsold in
defendant's store originate from theplaintiffs, because the evidence shows thatdefendant's
store sells no shirts or wearbearing the trademark "Wellington," butother trademarks
 doctrine in Ang vs Teodoro cannot beapplied because the evidence submitted bythe
appellants did not prove that theirbusiness has continued for so long a timethat it has
become of consequence andacquired a goodwill of considerable value,such that its
articles and products haveacquired a well-known reputation, andconfusion will result by
the use of thedisputed name by the defendants'department store.
 plaintiffs- appellants have not been able toshow the existence of a cause of action
forunfair competition against the defendantsappellees.
GUILLERMO BAXTER AND G. GAXTER & CO., vs.
ZOSIMO ZUAZUA, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-1750 October 26, 1905

FACTS:

August 30, 1894: Guillermo Baxter (P) after complying with the necessary formalities,had
secured the right to use the trade-mark "Agua de Kananga", as well as the labels annexed
thereto.
July 23, 1901: Guillermo Baxter associated himself with certain merchants in Manila for the
purpose of organizing a limited partnership for a period of 5 years, under the firm name and style
of "Baxter & Company," for manufacturing toilet water and perfume. Guillermo Baxter, as the
manager & administrator of the partnership, contributed the business which is now the basis of
that carried on by the said partnership. Also, he contributed his title to certain trade-marks,
among them the one described as "Agua de Kananga."This trade-mark is actually used by the
plaintiffs to designate the ownership and origin of a certain toilet water manufactured and sold
by them under the said name of "Agua de Kananga."
The plaintiffs brought this action for unfair competition under section 7 of Act No. 666
of the Philippine Commission. It is alleged that
1. the (D) ZosimoZuazua, for the purpose of imitating and fraudulently simulating
the "Agua de Kananga" by selling a certain toilet water under the name of "Kananga
Superior" and "Kanangue"
2. Zuazuadisposed of the same in bottles with labels similar to those used by the plaintiffs
for their own goods.
3. that the other defendants were engaged in retailing to the public the product
manufactured by the defendant Zuazua.
Zuazuaadmitted that:
1. he had manufactured certain toilet water under the denomination of "Kananga
Superior"and "Kanangue", and
2. that he had also sold the same in bottles labeled as alleged in the complaint. As to the
bottles, it was stipulated, page 19 of the bill of exceptions, that "those used by the
defendant Zuazua, as well as those used by the plaintiffs, were universally used by all
persons engaged in the manufacture of toilet water, and that the fact that they were used
by the defendant did not, of itself, constitute a violation of the rights of the plaintiffs, nor
a fraud or deceit upon the public."
TC:enjoined Zuazua from the further manufacture of toilet water based upon the ground that
1. the labels, words, and bottles in question, taken together, were an imitation of those used
by the plaintiffs, and tended to deceive the public by making it appear that the toilet water
manufactured and sold by the defendants was the same toilet water manufactured by the
plaintiffs,
2. that the use of the said labels, words, and bottles was therefore illegal, and constituted a
violation of plaintiff's rights.
3. the grant by the Government did not give the plaintiffs an exclusive right to the use of the
 word "Kananga," but to the phrase "Agua de Kananga;"
4. that"Kananga" was the name of a well-known tree of the Philippine Islands, and held
that, although the plaintiffs had a right to the exclusive use of the phrase "Agua de
Kananga," it did not follow that they had an exclusive right to the use of any of the words
contained in the said phrase.
Zuazua alleged that the labels used on his goods differed from those used by the plaintiffs
as to the drawing, color, and general appearance of the design, and he denies emphatically that
he had any intention to deceive the public thereby, alleging that the people clearly distinguished
the goods of the plaintiffs from those of the defendants, the former being known from the picture
on the bottle as the "Payo Brand" and the latter as the "Señorita Brand."
ISSUE: 

W/N there is unfair competition.

HELD:

NO.There is no identity nor even any similarity whatsoeverbetween the goods, either in
detail or as a whole. The difference between the two is so apparent that it can be readily noticed.
We do not believe that the public could have been deceived by the appearance of the labels to the
extent of taking the goods of the plaintiffs for those manufactured and sold by the defendant. We
make no finding as to the bottles because they were not forwarded to this court for inspection,
and, moreover, because it was stipulated by the parties that the said bottles were universally used
by all manufacturers of toilet water, and that their particular use by defendant was not, therefore,
an act of fraud or deceit practiced by him upon the plaintiffs or the public generally.
Section 7 of Act No. 666 provides in part as follows:
And in order that the action shall lie under this section, actual intent to deceive the public
and defraud a competitor shall affirmatively appear on the part of the person sought to be
made liable, but such intent may be inferred from similarity in the appearance of the
goods as packed or offered for sale to those of the complaining party.
Baxter has not proved, or attempted to prove, the fraudulent intent attributed to Zuazua
by any means other that the alleged similarity between the labels used by him and those used by
the defendant to designate his own goods. There being no such similarity between the labels, we
find no reason for even inferring that the defendant had any such intention, and therefore the
action brought by the plaintiffs in this case can not be maintained under the law. The judgment
appealed from should be reversed in so far as it holds that such an action lies in this case.
The ownership of the trade-mark "Agua de Kananga" did not give the plaintiffs a
right to the exclusive use of the word "Kananga." Zuazua alleged that "Kananga" could not
be used as a trade-mark because it was the name of a flower.
"Kananga" represents the name of a well-known tree in the Philippines. It is apparent,
therefore, that the said word could not be used exclusively as a trade-mark, any more than could
the words "sugar," "tobacco," or "coffee." The law is clear and conclusive upon the subject.
"A designation or part of a designation," says section 2 of Act No. 666, "which relates
only to the name, quality, or description of the merchandise ... can not be the subject of a trade-
mark." This provision is in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 5 of the royal
decree of the 26th of October, 1888, under which Guillermo Baxter secured the registration of
his trade-mark. The said royal decree provided that the denominations generally used in
commerce for the purpose of designating a class of goods could not be the subject of labels or
trade-marks.
Baxter alleges that the Zuazua did not prove, or even attempt to prove, that the goods
manufactured by them had anything to do with the "Kananga" flower. If the goods in question
had really nothing to do with the said flower, then it was not lawful for the plaintiffs to sell them
to the public under the name of "Agua de Kananga,"because the people might be deceived as to
the nature of the goods, taking for "Kananga" an article which, as a matter of fact, had nothing to
do with the said flower. Both plaintiffs and defendant would be exactly in the same position as
one who should sell goods as "coffee" or "tobacco" which were neither one nor the other.
Such being the case the plaintiffs could not have maintained this action for unfair
competition, because under section 9 of said Act No. 666 such action would not lie "when
the trade-mark or designation of its origin, ownership, or manufacture has been used by
the claimant for the purpose of deceiving the public as to the nature of the goods in which
he deals, his business, profession, or occupation." The law can not and does not permit that
trade-marks shall contain indications capable of deceiving the public as to the nature of the
goods. This would be exactly the case if under the trade-mark of "Agua de Kananga" the
plaintiffs should sell goods that had in fact nothing to do, as they say, with
the "Kananga" flower. However the contention of the plaintiffs may be considered, the proof is
nevertheless insufficient to show that the word "Kananga," the name of a flower, can be
appropriated as the subject of a trade-mark, under the law.
JUDGMENT REVERSED. SC IN FAVOR OF Zuazua. The Baxter have no right to the
exclusive use of the word "Kananga".
THE UNITED STATES v. VICENTE MANUEL
G.R. No. L-1999. December 27, 1906

TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE NAMES; UNFAIR COMPETITION. — The true test of unfair
competition is whether certain goods have been intentionally clothed with an appearance which
is likely to deceive the ordinary purchases exercising ordinary care, and not whether a certain
limited class of purchasers with special knowledge not possessed by the ordinary purchases
could avoid mistake by the exercise of this special knowledge.

FACTS:

 On the 30th day of September, and for many years prior thereto. A. S. Watson, and Co.,
limited, a corporation duly organized under the laws of Great Britain and registered in the
Mercantile Register of the Philippine Islands, was extensively engaged in the city of
Manila and the Philippine Islands in the business of manufacturing and selling soda
water, lemonade, ginger ale, and other aerated waters.

 On August 14, 1903, the said A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, registered with the Bureau
of Patents, Copyrights, and Trade marks of the Philippine Islands a trade mark consisting
of the words "A. S. Watson and Company, Limited," together with the figure of a unicorn
and dragon on either side of a Chinese pagoda, which had been adopted and appropriated
by said A. S. Watson and Co., Limited. as their trade mark for many years prior to its
registry.

 It was the custom of the said A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, to give the purchaser of its
aerated waters what was called a deposit slip with each case of such goods sold,
obligating themselves to refund a stipulated amount on the return of the empty bottles
together with this deposit slip.

 On and about the 30th of September, 1903, the defendant, Vicente Manuel, manufactured
and sold a number of bottles of aerated waters in bottles identical in form and appearance
with those used by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, with the trade mark of that firm blown
on the side in the same manner in which it is blown on their bottles, there being no
reasonable doubt that the bottles used by the defendant were bottles which had been
formerly used by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited in their business as manufacturers and
vendors of aerated waters.

Trial court: convicted the accused of "unfair competition," and sentenced him to pay a fine
of $50, gold, and the costs of the trial, and to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and nonpayment of the fine.

Counsel for defendant insist that:

 Use of different labels pasted on the bottles forbids the inference of an intent to device
the public or defraud A. S. Watson and Co., Limited.
  It is also contended that since A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, sold the bottles containing
their aerated waters, these bottles became the property of the purchaser, who could not be
deprived of the privilege of doing what he pleased with his own property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Vicente manuel is guilty of unfair competition.

HELD:

YES. The true test of unfair competition is whether certain goods have been clothed with an
appearance which is likely to deceive the ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care, and not
whether a certain limited class of purchasers with special knowledge not possess by the ordinary
purchaser could avoid mistake by the exercise of this special knowledge.
While it is true that a cautious purchaser who was acquainted with the English language need not
have been deceived if he took the pains to read the printed matter on the label, nevertheless the
difference in the general appearance of the labels is not sufficient to protect from mistake the
ordinary purchaser who is unacquainted with the English language, unless he took the
extraordinary precaution of having with him a sample of the label of A. S. Watson and Co.,
Limited, with which to make a direct comparison, on each occasion when he bought a bottle of
aerated water; by far the most striking and noticeable characteristics of the bottles of aerated
waters sold by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, is the evidence blown on the side, upon seeing
which the ordinary purchaser might well be excused from a too careful scrutiny of the wording
of the much less noticeable and less easily remembered label, printed in a language known to but
a small percentage of the residents in Manila and the Philippine Islands.
It is not true, however, that the right of ownership carries with it the right to use one’s property
as we hold this defendant used these bottles that is, for the purpose of deceiving the public and
defrauding one’s neighbors.
NELLE vs SENIOR & Co.
5 Phil 608

FACTS:

 The plaintiff is the owner of a cigar factory in Manila, called "Dos Hermanas." In August,
1903, he commenced to use upon his brand of cigars known as "perfectos" a small paper
ring, placing one of these rings upon each cigar.

 The defendant, the owner of another cigar factory in Manila, commenced in May or June,
1904, to use for its brand of cigars known as "perfectos" a ring similar to the ring used by
the plaintiff.

 The plaintiff brought this action in the Court of First Instance to enjoin the defendant
from the use of this ring, and for damages. Judgment was entered in the court below in
favor of the plaintiff to the extent of perpetually enjoining the defendant from the use of
said ring.

 The plaintiff, on the 13th of July, 1903, filed for registration in the Bureau of Archives,
Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-Marks facsimiles of a certain trade-mark, and on the 24th
day of May, 1904, said trade-mark was duly registered.

 Among the facsimiles so deposited by the plaintiff was a facsimile of the ring in question,
but in the affidavit which the plaintiff made in his application for registration no
reference is made to the ring. The claim is limited to two other designs, intended to be
used upon cigar boxes. The design thus specified in the claim filed by the plaintiff does
not appear upon the ring in question. The court below properly held that the ring was not
duly registered as a trade-mark.chanrobles

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is unfair competition.

HELD:

YES. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was, however, based upon section 7 of Act No. 666
of the Philippine Commission, which provides that -

Any person who, in selling his goods, shall give them the general appearance of goods of
another manufacturer or dealer, either in the wrapping of the packages in which they are
contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance
which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those
of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, and who
clothes the goods with such appearance for the purpose of deceiving the public and
defrauding another of his legitimate trade ... shall be guilty of unfair competition; ... and
in order that the action shall lie under this section, actual intent to deceive the public and
 defraud a competitor shall affirmatively appear on the part of the person sought to be
made liable, but such intent may be inferred from similarity in the appearance of the
goods as packed or offered for sale to those of the complaining party.

Facsimiles of the two rings are in the record before us, and they are so nearly alike in general
appearance that one might pass for the other. These rings so used on cigars are, however, so
small, and are necessarily so similar in design and appearance, that we should hesitate to say that
"actual intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor ... may be inferred from similarity
in the appearance of the goods." There is in the case, however, evidence which we think shows
such actual intent.
FLAMING AND CO. VS ONG TAN CHUAN
26 Phil 579

NOTE: NO CASE FOUND

PEOPLE VS ARUTA
GR NO. 120915
APRIL 3, 1998

FACTS:

Without a warrant of arrest,

(1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information
from an informant named "Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for Baguio City
on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a
large volume of marijuana;
(2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory
Liner Bus carrying a traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement
officers;
(3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents;
(4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her traveling bag, she gave the same to him;
(5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves;
(6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless search violated Aruta’s constitutional rights.

HELD:

YES.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accused-appellant must
have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when
the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect
that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant.
This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any
compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having
been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows
that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor
of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-
appellant for these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to
Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond
cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search
is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such
search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law to be the exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
PEOPLE VS ANGELES
218 SCRA 352
G.R. No. Nos. 95761-62
February 2, 1993

FACTS:

 At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of January 24, 1989, Sgt. Carlos Guillen was in the
headquarters of the 11th Narcotics Command Unit Office at Camp Capt. Domingo
Leonor in Davao City, together with Sgts. BenedictoRedoble, Ludovico Cuaton and
David Lastimosa, when a confidential informant arrived and told Guillen that a certain
"Jun Kuwago," the herein appellant, whose house is in front of the San Pedro Hospital at
Guerrero Street in Davao City, was still active in the peddling of marijuana in that area.

 Sgt. Guillen forthwith reported the "tip" to his commanding officer, Major
TanganKadalim, who then formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation.

 At approximately 1:15 p.m. appellant came out of his house, whereupon Guillen asked
him, "Pare, mayroonbatayodiyan?" Appellant then reached into his pocket and handed to
Guillen one cellophane pack containing dried marijuana leaves, and, in turn, the latter
gave the payment of P20.00. Shortly after the exchange, Guillen made the pre-arranged
signal, indicating that the sale had been consummated, by scratching his head with his
right hand.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of:

(a) illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended); and
(b) illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4 Article II of the said Act.

HELD:

YES. With the failure of appellant to present clear and convincing evidence of any dubious or ill
motives on the part of the arresting officers to impute such a serious crime to him, we, therefore,
find no compelling reason to depart from the well-entrenched principle that credence is generally
accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers as they are presumed
to have regularly performed their duties in a regular manner.

When appellant made an attempt to elude arrest, he was caught at the back of his house by the
NARCOM agents. There, they confiscated from him another three packs of marijuana, together
with the P20.00 bill which Guillen earlier gave to appellant. Accordingly, it may then be asked:
If appellant had never sold or been in possession of marijuana when he was in front of Guillen,
what reason was there for him to suddenly run away to the back of his house where he was
eventually apprehended?
Lt. Salome Jose, a forensic analyst at the PC Crime Laboratory in Davao City, testified that she
conducted an analysis on all the four packs by taking samples of each pack and on which she
applied the Duquenois-Levine test and subjected them to microscopic examination. According to
her Chemistry Report No. D-016-89, all the specimens submitted for analysis were positive for
marijuana.
At this juncture, it bears mention that the general rule is that possession of marijuana is absorbed
in the sale thereof. The exception thereto is where, aside from his sale and delivery of the
marijuana to the buyer pursuant to the sales transaction, the seller is further apprehended in
possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and
which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. 35 Accordingly, in the
cases at bar, appellant was properly charged with, and correctly convicted of, the separate crimes
of illegal sale and illegal possession of marijuana.
PEOPLE VS BARITA
GR NO. 123541
FEBRUARY 8, 2000

FACTS:

 On June 9, 1994 at about 12:00 oclock noon Police Supt. Felix Cadalli of the 14th
Narcotics Regional Field Unit, Camp BadoDangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet received a
report from a civilian informer that one alias Jun, a taxi driver, who usually waits for
passengers at Nelbusco Terminal, Otek St., Baguio City is the middleman of those selling
marijuana at Justice Village, Baguio City.

 After evaluating the information, P/Supt. Cadalli organized a buy-bust team.

 In accordance with instructions, the police left for Justice Village at about 3:00 p.m,
Juanata (poseur-buyer) introduced himself as Jojo while the sellers introduced themselves
as Diolo, later identified as DioloBarita and Denver, later identified as Denver Golsing.
Juanata ordered three kilos of marijuana and was told by accused Golsing that a kilo costs
P800.00. Then accused Barita and Golsing told them to wait as they will get the
marijuana.

 After about 5 minutes, accused Golsing and Barita returned. Accused Barita was carrying
a transparent plastic bag which he handed to Juanata. After examining the contents of the
plastic bag (Exh. G), consisting of three bundles (Exhs. H, I, J), two wrapped in a brown
paper (Exhs. H and I) and the third wrapped in a newspaper page (Exh. J), and
determining the contents thereof as marijuana, Juanata handed the boodle money to
accused Golsing and immediately gave the pre-arranged signal by removing his cap.

 Forthwith, the group of Insp. Pelaez rushed to where the transaction took place, identified
themselves as Narcom agents, and arrested accused Barita, Golsing and Cuison. The
accused together with the marijuana confiscated and the boodle money recovered were
brought to the 14th Narcotics Regional Field Unit at Camp Dangwa. The accused were
turned over for investigation while the marijuana was turned over to the evidence
custodian after Juanata, Gamit and Sisoninscribed and signed their initials on the
transparent plastic bag (Exh. G) as well as on the wrappers of the three bundles (Exhs. H,
I, J) contained therein to identify the confiscated items and avoid tampering. The
Booking Sheet and Arrest Reports (Exhs. B, C, D) of the accused were made.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act 6425 (Sales, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs).

HELD:
YES. JUANATAs testimony is corroborated by the testimonies of GAMITand SISONwho gave
similar accounts of the events that transpired. The alleged inconsistencies and/or flaws in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pointed out by accused-appellants are insufficient to
overturn the judgment of conviction against them inasmuch as the testimonies of these witnesses
are consistent with each other on material points. Their testimonies sufficiently establish all the
facts necessary for the conviction of the accused for what is material and indispensable is the
submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the seller and the poseur-
buyer. At any rate, the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellants are trivial in nature
and do not prove that they did not commit the crime charged.

Furthermore, the testimonies of the three police officers carry with it the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. Accused-appellants failed to convincingly
prove that in testifying against them, these witnesses were motivated by reasons other than their
duty to curb the sale of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, it is presumed that
none exists.

We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted
of selling 2,800 grams of marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that
Republic Act 7659 imposes a penalty dependent on the amount or the quantity of drugs seized or
taken. This Court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to
be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-
appellant.
PEOPLE VS CHEN TIZ CHANG and CHENG JUNG SAN
245 SCRA 733
G.R. Nos. 131872-73. February 17, 2000

FACTS:

 In the early morning of October 31, 1996, through the informant, members of Task Force
Spider were able to get in touch with appellants with a use of a cellular phone and
negotiate a drug deal with them. Appellant agreed to deliver and sell two (2) kilos of
shabu at the parking lot of the Maalikaya Health Palace located at Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City.

 "PO2 Hilarion Juan, a member of Task Force Spider, testified that on October 31, 1996,
at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Police Superintendent Allan Purisima conducted a
briefing at Camp BagongDiwa, Taguig, Metro Manila. The subject of the briefing was
the buy-bust operation involving the sale of shabu by appellants at the Maalikaya Health
Palace parking lot at Quezon City.

 PO2 Hilarion Juan was designated to act as the poseur-buyer together with the informant,
while the three (3) other police officers were tasked to position themselves at some
distance from the poseur-buyers and assist in the buy-bust operation.

 "The informant instructed PO2 Juan to hand over the suitcase containing buy-bust money
to Chen Tiz Chang which Juan did and in return Chen Tiz Chang handed to PO2 Juan a
black bag (Exhibit 'D') which contained 2 plastic transparent bags of shabu. After the
exchange, PO2 Juan opened the black bag examined the two (2) plastic bags and signaled
his companions to approach him. PO2 Juan introduced himself as a police officer and
tried to arrest appellant Chen Tiz Chang who, after Juan took hold of him, resisted

 Trial Court findings: Defendants are guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was sufficiency of evidence to convict the defendants as guilty.

HELD:         

YES. "It is an established rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are accorded great respect, unless the court a quo overlooked substantial
facts and circumstances which if considered, would materially affect the result of the case. Here,
we see no reason to depart from the general rule."
In every prosecution, the guilt of the accused has to be established invariably by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime must be shown to exist and be adequately proven.
As we stated in People v. Boco,1[23] what is "material to a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence."

On the other hand, in a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it must be shown
that:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a

regulated drug,

(2) such possession is not authorized by law and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug

In this case, the prosecution witnesses were able to establish these elements.

1
PEOPLE VS ONG
245 SCRA 733
G.R. No. 137348
June 21, 2004

FACTS:

Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the afternoon of
July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP
Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit
drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief
Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed the
meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages rendered
of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused Ong and boodle
money placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested Ong
while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.

The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets
and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was
referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese
citizen from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to the Philippines in
1997 to look for a job. Initially, he worked in a pancit factory in Quezon City, but later hunted
for another job, was referred by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as a technician
in a bihon factory owned by Sin. Subsequently, without any knowledge of his new job, William
Ong was later taken to the police station and there he met the other accused Ching De Ming for
the first time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged.

On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the
RTW business. On that same date of the commission of the crime, while waiting for his
girlfriend and her mother, whose mother AvenlinaCardoz, testified in De Ming’s favor and
corroborated with his story, that he was approached by persons unknown to him. He was
misidentified as one of the accused and dragged him out of his car and brought to the other car,
took his clutch bag, then after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they removed his blindfold. He
denied knowing Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila,
Quezon City.

On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the
penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos. However, the
case was on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are guilty of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article III, in
relation to Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972.

HELD:    

NO. The aforementioned provision on Arraignment and Plea provides that (a) The accused must
be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial.
The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge of clerk by furnishing the accused with
a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to
him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

The trial court held that the arraignment of appellants violated the above rule. Appellants are
Chinese nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the
accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate whether the information was read in the
language or dialect known to them.

Both accused Ong and De Ming were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, and both entered a
plea of not guilty. From the records, it was clear that appellants only knew the Chinese language,
however the appellants were arraigned on an information written in the English language. The
requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is
mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause the of the accusation against him. The
constitutional protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies
the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower court had to
secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter.

Hence, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he was likewise
the one who closed the deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and time of the
meeting. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the court held
that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the “poseur-buyer” but merely the deliveryman. His
testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot
be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.

The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. However, to determine whether
there was valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken by the police officers,
in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details
of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent
evidence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential information who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started
and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by
SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same and not part of the buy-bust
operation.

Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential
informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once the identity of the
informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the
privilege is no longer applicable.

In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The
problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in
protecting the people from crimes against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The
balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the
crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the informer’s
testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.

In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result
in the imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of
the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the
informer is indispensable. It should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high
importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher
significance. Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no
crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the substance
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.

The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and De Ming @
Tiu are acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.     
TITLE V
ARTICLE 190 - 195

People vs zervocalous 241 scra 625 (CASE NOT FOUND)

PEOPLE vs. WILLY YANG

G.R. No. 148077
February 16, 2004

FACTS: In February 2000, the NBI received a tip from a confidential informer that appellant
Yang and one Henry Yeung alias Yu Chi, were dealing in prohibited drugs. At around 5:00 p.m.
of March 6, 2000, several operatives of the NBI National Capital Region Office in Taft Avenue,
Manila staked out Savory Restaurant. Inside were Mapoy and the confidential informer who
were supposed to meet the suspected drug dealers. Shortly thereafter, appellant arrived in a car,
driven by another unidentified male. The informant then introduced appellant to Mapoy as Henry
Yu.

On appellants suggestion, the informant and Mapoy boarded his car. They then proceeded
to the rear parking area of the Manila Doctors Hospital. Appellant then asked Mapoy to show
him the cash payment for the shabu. Mapoy complied and showed him bundles of boodle money
contained in a plastic bag. The bundles of boodle money were so arranged so each bundle had
genuine P1,000 bills on top and at the bottom of each bundle.

After seeing the bundles of cash, appellant and his unnamed companion alighted the car,
with Mapoy and the informant following close behind. The suspects driver remained on board
the vehicle.

All four of them walked to an unmanned black Kia Sportage van in the hospitals parking
lot. Appellant and his companion opened the right front door of the van and got a carton from the
right front seat. They showed Mapoy its contents, which consisted of five (5) transparent plastic
bags containing a powdery white substance, and a smaller sachet which contained a similar
substance. Mapoy was still examining the plastic bags when a group of people unexpectedly
came out of the back of the hospital. This caused appellant and his companion to run to their
waiting car, which immediately sped away, leaving Mapoy and the informer behind. Since they
had no vehicle, Mapoy could not give chase.
 The law enforcers searched the van and among the items found inside were the carton
containing the packets of shabu. The NBI operatives and arrested him there at eight oclock in the
evening of March 6, 2000.

Later that same evening, the five (5) bags of whitish substance which had been
confiscated were turned over to NBI Forensic Chemist II Felicisima M. Francisco for laboratory
examination. The haul, which amounted to 4.450 kilograms, were tested and confirmed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, a regulated drug.

Appellant assails the credibility of the testimony by NBI Special Investigator Rodrigo
Mapoy as an eyewitness for being rife with inconsistencies and improbabilities.
ISSUE:Whether or not there was an illegal sale of shabu?

HELD: YES
There illicit transaction took place. The offer to sell and then the sale itself arose when
the poseur-buyer showed the money to appellant, which prompted the latter to show the contents
of the carton, and hand it over to the poseur-buyer.
Mere showing of the said regulated drug does not negate the existence of an offer to sell
or an actual sale. Before appellant and Mapoy met, the informant had already disclosed to
appellant the intention of Mapoy to buy shabu.
Thus, when appellant and Mapoy met, appellants intention of selling shabu to Mapoy was
undeniably manifest. The consummation of the crime charged herein may be sufficiently
established even in the absence of an exchange of money. After all, there is no fixed procedure
for conducting a buy-bust operation. The crime of illegal sale is committed as soon as the sale
transaction is consummated. The payment could precede or follow delivery of the drug sold.
On record, the NBI received confidential information that appellant was engaged in drug
dealing. NBI officers then tapped the services of the confidential informant, to enable the law
enforcers to conduct a buy-bust operation. The NBI informer facilitated the meeting of NBIs
Mapoy and the appellant. Neither the NBI nor the informer induced appellant to violate the
Dangerous Drugs Law.
Appellant was already in that illicit business, but to arrest him in the act, the NBI used the police
technique called a busy-bust operation, which has received official approval similar to an
authorized entrapment of criminals in flagrante delicto.

Cacao v People
G.R. No. 180870
January 22, 2010
Facts: On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-
ag of the Intelligence and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station received a
telephone call from an informant about a drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight
Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.

Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 JonelMangapit, went immediately to
the Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information counter of
Starlight Hotel and inquired about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.

The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was
about to deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3
Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy
knocked at the door and a woman, later identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to
enable the police officers to look inside.

PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing "shabu" while
Joseph Canlas was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing "shabu". At this juncture, PO3 Pang-
ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the drug
paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and plastic sachets.

PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing "shabu".

After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police
officer on duty while the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen
recovered from appellant and his companion which tested positive for "shabu".

RTC: Cacao is guilty. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

Issue:Whether or not the lower courts gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are
entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any
indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially
affect the disposition of the case, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to review the same. In this
case, the Court finds it imperative to review the factual findings of the trial court because of
certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on material points.
 A. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who
delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.

In this case, PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 JonelMangapit (Mangapit) both
testified that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from petitioner to the evidence
custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). However, the foregoing assertions are totally at
odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was
Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and
categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic
sachet of shabu.

Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, The Court is of the considered view that
this contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on substantial
and significant matter which could well affect the credibility of the witnesses. 

B.   The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the
same item confiscated from Cacao.

The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand,
and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic
sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly seized and confiscated
from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable aspect
pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the
most competent person to make the proper identification being the officer who confiscated the
item from Cacao, never actually identified the same.

          The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, the
Court cannot lend credence to his supposed identification, the same not being also positive,
certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this witness actually saw the shabu at
the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the
identification since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it.

          Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the
seized item. It must be noted that Balolong was never presented to testify in this case. Thus, there
is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence custodian by Balolong and
later presented in court was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to
establish the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case.

People v. Kamad
G.R. No. 174198
January 19, 2010
Facts: On October 16, 2002, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig (Taguig police) received information from an
asset that a certain Zaida was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu. The Taguig police formed a
buy-bust team. SPO2 Sanchez acted as poseur-buyer and received three (3) one hundred peso
bills for use as marked money.

After surveillance of the area, the buy-bust team and their asset proceeded at around
10:00 p.m. of October 16, 2002 to the target area. The asset introduced SPO2 Sanchez as a buyer
of shabu and the accused-appellant asked him how much he would buy. SPO2 Sanchez asked for
P300.00 worth of shabu and gave the marked money; the accused-appellant thereafter handed
him a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected to be shabu. SPO2 Sanchez lighted a
cigarette to give the pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust team to approach. SPO2 Sanchez
arrested the accused-appellant and recovered from her the P300.00 marked money. The buy-bust
team arrested Leo who was found in possession of one (1) plastic sachet also suspected to
contain shabu.

 The buy-bust team took the accused-appellant and Leo and the recovered plastic sachets
to their office for investigation. The recovered plastic sachets, marked as ES-1-161009 and ES-2-
161002, were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination; the tests
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.2[11]

The defense expectedly presented a different version of events.The accused-appellant and

Leo were frisked, but nothing was found in their possession. The police officers asked the
accused-appellant where she kept the shabu; she replied that she was not selling shabu.
Afterwards, she and Leo were taken to the police headquarters where they were again frisked and
asked the same question to which they gave the same response. The police detained Leo and the
accused-appellant for about a day and later brought them to the Prosecutors Office for inquest
without showing them any shabu.

RTC ruled finding both accused guilty. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

Issue:whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,

Article II of RA 9165 for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu.

Held:NO.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.3[17]Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust
situation requires evidence, not only that the transacted drugs actually exist, but evidence as well
that the drugs seized and examined are the same drugs presented in court. This is a condition
sine qua non for conviction as the drugs are the main subject of the illegal sale constituting the
crime and their existence and identification must be proven for the crime to exist. As we discuss

3
below, the special characteristics of prohibited drugs necessitate their strict identification by the
prosecution.

Our examination of the records shows that while the prosecution established through the
testimony of SPO2 Sanchez that the sale of the prohibited drug by the accused-appellant took
place, we find that both the RTC and the CA failed to consider the following infirmities in the
prosecutions case: (1) the serious lapses in the RA 9165 procedure committed by the buy-bust
team in handling the seized shabu; and (2) the failure of the police to comply with the chain of
custody rule in handling the seized shabu, resulting in the prosecutions failure to properly
identify the shabu offered in court as the same shabu seized from the accused-appellant on
October 16, 2002.

First Ground: Non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 under its Section 21(a) provides further
details on how RA 9165 is to be applied, and provides too for a saving mechanism in case no
strict compliance with the requirements took place. Section 21(a) states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, he failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabuwas marked although the
evidence shows that the shabuwas marked as ES-1-161009 before it was sent to a forensic
laboratory. His testimony also failed to state whether the marking of the shabu was done
immediately after its seizure (as Section 21 of RA 9165 requires) or during the investigation.
His testimony likewise failed to disclose if a physical inventory and photography of the seized
items had taken place, or if they had, whether these were undertaken in the presence of the
accused or his counsel, or a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and of
an elective official.

Second ground: The non-compliance with the chain of custody rule

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witnesses' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same. [emphasis supplied].

The SC observe that SPO2 Sanchez testimony lacks specifics on how the seized
shabuwas handled immediately after the accused-appellants arrest. Although the records show
that SPO2 Sanchez testified that he actually seized the shabuwhen he arrested the accused-
appellant, he never disclosed the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the
shabuafter its seizure, nor that he retained possession of the shabu from the place of the arrest
until they reached the police station.

 SPO2 Sanchez also failed to state the time and place as well as the identity of the
person/s who made the markings on the two (2) plastic sachets containing the recovered shabu
seized from the accused-appellant and Leo on October 16, 2002.

People vs Frondozo

G.R. No. 177164

June 30, 2009

Facts: On March 27, 2003, acting on information from a police asset about the drug activities of
Frondozo, a team was organized by Major Mario M. Dapilloza. The team proceeded to the site of
operation. Thereafter, PO1 Butay approached Frondozos house and knocked at the door several
times. When a man came out, PO1 Butay told him pakuha. The man asked, magkano? and he
replied piso lang. The man said, sandalilang then went back inside the house. Moments later, the
man returned and handed a plastic sachet to PO1 Butay. PO1 Butay examined its content and
was satisfied that the plastic sachet contained shabu. PO1 Butay then handed the man the P100
buy-bust money and put the plastic sachet of shabuinside his pocket. PO1 Butay then removed
his baseball cap as pre-arranged to signal to his teammates that the sale was already
consummated. He introduced himself to the man and stated pulisako pare and showed him his
badge. He frisked the mans body and found two arrows with sling, one fan knife (balisong) and
the P100 buy-bust money from the mans hand. PO1 Butay testified that his teammates never
went inside the house.

Together with the members of the team, PO1 Butay brought the man, who was later on
identified as Frondozo, to the police station. The specimen and the items seized from Frondozos
body were turned over to P/Insp. Richard Ang who marked the specimen RFD-01 and prepared
the request for laboratory examination.

P/Insp. Albert Arturo made a laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic sachet.
Based on the physical, chemical and chromatographic examinations he conducted, it was found
that the specimen yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.

During trial, PO1 Butay positively identified Frondozo as the man who sold him the prohibited
drug. He also identified Exhibit D-4 marked as RFD-01 as the shabuhe bought from Frondozo.
In his defense, Frondozo denied the accusations against him and claimed that he was framed-up.

RTC ruled finding both accused guilty. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

Issue: Whether or not frondozo was arrested in a valid buy-bust operation?

Held: No.

Jurisprudence clearly sets the essential elements to be established in the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, viz.:
(1) the transaction or sale took place,
(2) the corpus delictior the illicit drug was presented as evidence, and
(3) the buyer and seller were identified.

What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti.
Therefore, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt.

To establish the identity of the shabu seized from Frondozo, the procedures laid down in
Rep. Act No. 9165 should be complied with. Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody
of seized drugs. It states:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized,or his/her representative or counsel, a
 representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. [Emphasis supplied.]

In this case, the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the procedures for the
custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs as prescribed by Rep. Act No. 9165. The
arresting officers did not mark the shabuimmediately after they arrested Frondozo. Further, while
there was testimony regarding the marking of the shabuafter it was turned over to the police
investigator, no evidence was presented to prove that the marking thereof was done in the
presence of Frondozo.
The arresting officers failed to take a photographand make an inventory of the confiscated
materials in the presence of Frondozo. Likewise, there was no mention that any representative
from the media, DOJ or any elected public official had been present during the inventory or that
any of these persons had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.

People v. Partoza
G.R. No. 182418

May 8, 2009

FACTS: Appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations before the Regional RTC with
possession and sale of shabu.

PO3 JuanitoTougan (PO3 Tougan) testified for the prosecution and narrated that on 2 November
2002 at around 7:30 p.m., the police received an information from an informant that a certain Parto was
selling shabu at Sta. Barbara Subdivision, Brgy. Ampid I, San Mateo, Rizal. Parto had apparently been
under surveillance by the police for selling prohibited drugs. They immediately planned a buy-bust
operation, with PO3 Tougan acting as the poseur-buyer. Tougan received a P100.00 bill from the police
chief and placed the serial numbers of the bill on the police blotter.

PO3 Tougan, together with PO2 Pontilla and the civilian informant then proceeded to
Sta. Maria Subdivision. However, before the actual buy-bust operation, the group responded to a
commotion in the area where they arrested a certain Noel Samaniego. 4[6]Thereafter, they went to
Neptune corner Jupiter Street and spotted Parto in the tricycle terminal. The informant initially

4
approached appellant. The latter then went near the tricycle where PO3 Tougan was in and asked
him, How much[?] PO3 Tougan replied, Pisolang, which means P100.00. Upon exchange of the
money and the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance, PO3 Tougan
immediately alighted from the tricycle, grabbed Partos hand and introduced himself as a
policeman. PO3 Tougan was able to recover another plastic sachet from the hand of Parto.5

 At the police station, the two (2) plastic sachets confiscated from Parto were marked.
After marking, the police immediately prepared the request for laboratory examination.
Chemistry Report No. D-2157-02E confirmed that the two (2) plastic sachets seized from
appellant were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was driving a female passenger in
his tricycle at around 7:00 p.m. on 2 November 2002 going to Sta. Maria. Upon reaching Jupiter Street,
appellant turned left and noticed the police officers trying to arrest a person who was then causing trouble.
PO2 then Pontilla approached appellant and asked why he was driving drunk. Appellant explained that he
had been offered a drink by his friends. He was asked to alight from his tricycle, took his drivers
license and invited him to go to the police station.RTC ruled finding both accused guilty. CA affirmed
RTC’s ruling.

Appellant questioned the integrity of the evidence used against him on the grounds of failure to
mark the items seized from him immediately and failure to observe the chain of custody as required
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

Issue: Whether or not there was a failure in observing the chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165?

Held:YES.PO3 Tougandid not mark the seized drugs immediately after he arrested appellant in the
latter's presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in
the presence of appellant. There was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or
any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory
of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed.

 While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 is
not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
team,yet these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by PO3
Tougan for his failure to observe the rule.

5Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
  Furthermore, while PO3 Tougan admitted to have in his possession the shabu from the
time appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of
proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of PO3 Tougan.
PO3 Tougan mentioned a certain Inspector Manahan as the one who signed the request for
laboratory examination. He did not however relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned
over. Furthermore, the evidence of the prosecution did not reveal the identity of the person who
had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in
court. The failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody is fatal to its cause.

 All told, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

People v. Robles

G.R. No. 177220

April 24, 2009

FACTS:At around 5:00 in the afternoon of July 5, 2002, the (PO2 Besoa and PO3 MALICSE)
witnesses received a report from a confidential informant that a certain alias Bombay, later
identified to be appellant, was peddling shabu along Dimasalang Street, Barangay Baclaran,
Paraaque City. DEU Chief Wilfredo Calderon immediately constituted a buy-bust team. PO2
Besoa was designated poseur-buyer.

The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area and approached appellant and asked,
Puwede bang umiskor? (May I have a fix?). Appellant asked how much to which PO2 Besoa
replied P100. Appellant thereafter told PO2 Besoa, Akin na.(Give it to me).

 PO2 Besoa thereupon tendered a marked P100 bill to appellant who, in exchange,
handed over a transparent plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. PO2 Besoa at
once raised his right hand as a pre-arranged signal, prompting the other team members to close
in and arrest appellant. PO2 Besoa turned over the substance to SPO3 Ocfemia, and the marked
money to SPO1 Vidallon. The team also arrested Pilapil, who was then with appellant, as a
similar substance was recovered from him.

Appellant and Pilapil, were brought to the Paraaque City Police Station for investigation.
The members of the team executed a PinagsamangSinumpaangSalaysay(Joint Sworn
Statement)which additionally stated that at the time of appellants arrest, he voluntarily
surrendered two more transparent plastic sachets both containing the same white crystalline
substance.

A total of four transparent plastic sachets each containing a white crystalline substance
were thus recovered from appellant and Pilapil which, when subjected to laboratory tests, were
found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Robles claimed that at the station, they were frisked but no shabu was recovered from their person or
shown to them. Pilapils money amounting to P400 was confiscated, however.

Issue: Whether or not there was a failure in observing the chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165?

HELD: YES.

The prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of custody of the seized plastic sachet containing
shabu subject of the alleged sale. PO2 Besoa and PO3 Malicse did not adequately explain how the corpus
delicti transferred hands from the time it was supposedly confiscated from appellant to the time it was
presented in court as evidence.

PO2 Besoa testified that he turned over the sachet of shabu to SPO3 Ocfemia when appellant
was arrested. No explanation was given, however, as to how the substance reached the crime
laboratory for examination. PO2 Besoadid not mark the substance immediately after the
apprehension of appellant. While PO2 Besoa claimed that it was marked by an investigator in his
presence,he did not state at what precise point of the operation the marking took place. Both the
investigator who purportedly made the marking and SPO3 Ocfemiawere not presented in
courtto testify on what transpired before and after the substance was turned over to them.

It is expressly provided Jurisprudence that the chain of custody rule requires that testimony be
presented about everylinkinthechain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered in evidence. The testimonies of PO2 Besoa and PO3 Malicse fell short of this standard.
Moreover, they did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
thereof.

Additionally, the Court notes further that nothing on record shows compliance by the buy-bust
team with the procedural requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 91656
with respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs. There was no physical inventory
and photograph of the items allegedly confiscated from appellant. There was likewise no
explanation offered for the failure to observe the rule.

SALES v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 182296

April 7, 2009

 FACTS: On November 5, 2002, an informantreported to the chief of the DDEU that one named
Susan, who was later identified by PO1 Teresita to be petitioner, was peddling prohibited drugs
along Scout Tobias Street, Barangay South Triangle, Quezon City. The DDEU chief at once
formed a police team to conduct a buy-bust operation with PO1 Teresita as poseur buyer. PO1

6
Teresita was given a P500.00 bill to be used as buy-bust money which she marked with her
initials TBR (Exhibits A & A-1).

At past 4:00 p.m. that same day of November 5, 2002, the team, together with the
informant, proceeded to Barangay South Triangle. On reaching Scout Tobias Street at around
5:00 p.m., PO1 Teresita, together with the informant, started walking along the street as the team
members strategically deployed themselves in the vicinity.

Upon seeing petitioner standing at the side of the street, the informant approached her
and introduced PO1 Teresita as a kaibigankoi-iscoredawsya.Petitioner thereupon asked PO1
Teresita how much she would buy, to which she replied P500.00, at the same time handing to
petitioner the P500 bill. Petitioner in turn, gave PO1 Teresita a small plastic sachet.At that
instant, another person, who turned out to be Danilo D. Sanchez (Sanchez), appeared from
nowhere and told petitioner that he also wanted to score (buy). The team members rushed
towards them, and PO1 Roberto Manalo immediately searched petitioner from whom he
recovered the buy-bust money. Sanchez was searched too and a sachet was recovered from him.
The team arrested the two.

On their way back to Camp Karingal, PO1 Teresita marked the plastic sachet recovered
from petitioner with her initials TBR. She too marked the plastic sachet taken from Sanchez with
her initials.7[11] The team later turned over the buy-bust money to the desk officer, and
transmitted the sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

 In Chemistry Report No. D-1324-02 dated November 8, 2002 (Exhibit E),8[13] the
contents of the sachets were found positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
sachet taken from petitioner weighed 0.14 gram (that from Sanchez weighed 0.09 gram).

Sales claimed that the police menbarged into the house by passing through the open main door
adjacent to the library. Without any search and arrest warrant, the armed men searched the house and
arrested petitioner together with Isaguirre and Teresa.

Issue: Whether or not there was a failure in observing the chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165?

HELD: YES. The police team failed to follow the legal procedure and guidelines on her arrest and the
confiscation of the illegal drug, which omission is fatal to warrant her acquittal.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine
qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of violation of the said
Act. It is thus essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement

8
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.

The Court finds that neither was physical inventory nor photograph of the sachet and
buy-bust money taken in the presence of petitioner, or her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, as required by law, was taken. No
justification whatsoever was proffered by the apprehending team for its failure to observe the
legal safeguards.

CARINO v. PEOPL

G.R. No. 178757

March 13, 2009

FACTS:The prosecution offered the testimony of PO1 Joseph Tayaban (Tayaban) and PO1
Arnold Eugenio (Eugenio) to prove the charges against petitioners. Tayaban and Eugenio
professed that they were the ones who arrested both petitioners.

Tayaban testified that the members of OplanSita, on 20 June 2003, had started patrolling
the area of coverage as early as 9:00 oclock in the morning of that day. At around 2:00 oclock in
the afternoon, his colleague, Eugenio, spotted Carino, about a meter away from their location and
holding a plastic sachet in his hand. Right there and then, they placed Carino under arrest and
Eugenio immediately seized the plastic sachet.They asked Carino who the source of the plastic
sachet was and the latter immediately identified petitioner Andes. They approached Andes, and
she allegedly became hysterical when the policemen introduced themselves to her. It was then
that Tayaban noticed the woman inserting something inside the pocket of her 5-year old male
child. Tayaban was suspicious so he inspected the right pocket of the child and found a plastic
sachet inside it containing shabu.

Petitioners were immediately brought to the Galas Police Station. The plastic sachets
were allegedly submitted to the desk officer and then to the station investigator who in the
presence of Tayaban marked each of the specimens with the initials JT-RA and AE-RC. 9[11] The
markings purportedly represented the initials of Eugenio and Tayaban and the initials of
petitioners from whom they were seized.

Eugenio corroborated the testimony of Tayaban in its material respects. He admitted that
he was the one who grabbed Carino when he noticed that the latter was holding a plastic sachet
in his hand. He suspected the sachet to be containing shabuand he immediately told Carino of his
offense. At that point Carino allegedly dropped the plastic sachet, so he (Eugenio) picked it up
and after examining the same concluded that it indeed contained shabu.He and his companions
brought Carino to their team leader just across the street. The latter asked Carino who the source
of the shabuwas, and he was told that it was a certain woman. Some members of the team,
including Tayaban, left Araneta Avenue and went to Banawe Avenue to the place where the
woman allegedly could be found, but Eugenio was not able to catch up with them because he
received a phone message moments later that the woman had already been arrested. He instead
proceeded to the police station for the investigation.

The prosecution also submitted the results of the qualitative examination administered on
the contents of the two plastic sachets seized from petitioners. The chemistry report signed by
Engineer Leonard M. Jabonillo (Jabonillo), chemist and forensic analyst at the CPD Crime
Laboratory Office, revealed that the specimens submitted for analysis yielded positive of
methamphetamine hydrochloride content.

Carino denied the carges, he asserted that Tayaban was the source of the plastic sachet allegedly
recovered from him as he in fact saw the said officer pull the sachet out of his own pocket at the time the
arrest was taking place.He claimed FRAME-UP.

Issue: Whether or not there was a failure in observing the chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165?

HELD: YES.

Chain of custody is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction.Chain of custody is defined as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction.

Aside from that, the prosecution has not in fact reasonably explained why these same witnesses
(desk officer at the police station, investigator and the forensic chemist) were not able to testify in
court. 

9
 In the case at bar, however, the prosecution evidence is insufficient to provide that assurance, for
all the people who made contact with the sachets of shabuallegedly seized from petitioners, only Tayaban
and Eugenio were able to testify in court as to the identity of the evidence.

The members of the arresting team in this case, however, do not seem to have
complied with these guidelines. The prosecution has not even shown that they had extended
reasonable efforts to comply with the statutory requirements in handling the evidence.  From the
testimonies of Tayaban and Eugenio, it is clear that after the arrest of petitioners they
immediately seized the plastic sachets, took custody thereof and brought the same to the police
station together with petitioners. It was at the police stationand not at the place where the item
was seized from appellantwhere, according to Tayaban and Eugenio, the unnamed police
investigator had placed the markings on the specimens.  What is more telling is the admission
made by Tayaban to the effect that the markings were placed on the plastic sachet in his presence
and not in the presence of petitioners as required by law.

These flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly
recovered from petitioners, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the
same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibits before they were offered in evidence in court,
militate against the prosecutions cause because they not only cast doubt on the identity of the
corpus delictibut also tend to negate, if not totally discredit, the claim of regularity in the conduct
of official police operation advanced by the OSG. Indeed, we cannot give much weight to the
contention that the arresting officers in this case were not trained to apprehend and arrest drug
offenders, because as agents of the government in law enforcement they are reasonably
presumed to know the laws and the rules they are tasked to enforce.

All told, in view of the deviation of the apprehending officers from the mandated conduct of taking
post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case, there is no way to presume that the members
thereof had performed their duties regularly. 

People v. Garcia

G.R. No. 173480

February 25, 2009

FACTS:On February 27, 2003, at around 2:45 p.m., PO1 Samuel Garcia was with a
confidential informer and two other policemen at the back of San Roque Church,
Navotas, Metro Manila, waiting for the accused with whom the confidential informer
arranged for him (Garcia) to buy marijuana. There were prior Informations [sic] from
Camp Crame and the NPDO about the selling of marijuana xxx For this reason, Garcia
got in touch with the confidential informer whom [sic] he learned could buy marijuana
from the accused.
 
It did not take long after the arrival of Garcia and the others at the area of
operation for the accused to arrive on board a red scooter. Garcia told the accused that
he will buy P200.00 worth of marijuana, as agreed upon between the confidential
informer and the accused. The accused in turn gave Garcia the marijuana wrapped in a
yellow page of the PLDT directory. Garcia verified the contents thereof and thereafter
gave the P200.00, consisting of two P100.00 bills earlier given for him to use as buy-
bust money xxx whose serial numbers were listed in the dispatch order xxx Garcia then
gave the signal to his companions for them to approach. He also arrested the accused
whom he told of his rights and brought him to a lying-in clinic and then to the police
headquarters.
 
 
According to PO1 Garcia, after the arrest, they brought Ruiz to the DEU office for
investigation. He (PO1 Garcia) turned over the seized items to the investigator, who then placed
markings on the wrapper. The seized items were thereafter sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination; they tested positive for marijuana.

Ruiz claimed that the case was a trumped-up charge made by the police to extort money from him. In
making this claim, he admitted that he did not know PO1 Garcia and that he saw him for the first when he
was arrested.

Issue: Whether or not there was a failure in observing the chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165?

HELD: YES

The first procedural safeguard that the police failed to observe (and which both the RTC and the
CA failed to take into account) is that provided under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. This provision states:
 
1)      The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
 The records utterly fail to show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures
despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of shall in the directives of the law and its
implementing rules.

Thus, other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia and the police investigator (whose identity was not
disclosed), no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken
under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules. We observe that while
there was testimony with respect to the marking of the seized items at the police station, no mention
whatsoever was made on whether the marking had been done in the presence of Ruiz or his
representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected official had been present during this inventory, or that any of these
people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.

In addition, we also note that PO1 Garcia testified that he marked the confiscated items when he
returned to the police station after the buy-bust operation. This admission additionally shows that the
marking was not done immediately after seizure of the items, but only after a significant intervening
time had lapsed, i.e., after the buy-bust team had taken Ruiz to a lying-in clinic for a medical
examination,10[32] and from there, to the police headquarters. Significantly, Ruiz confirmed in his
testimony that the buy-bust team first took him to the San Jose Lying-in Center, before proceeding to the
police headquarters.

To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express
requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.In Sanchez, we clarified that this saving clause applies only where
the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.11
[40] We also stressed in Sanchez, that in such case, the prosecution must show that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been preserved.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. SAMUEL OBMIRANIS y ORETA,

Appellant. G.R. No. 181492. December 16, 2008

10

11
FACTS:

Policeman Jerry Velasco held a buy-bust operation against Samuel Obmiranis. When he was
arrested, Wilfredo Cinco seized the plastic sachet from him that contained shabu and marked it
with “SOO”. On trial, Velasco admitted that there was no evidence custodian designated and that
he could not remember if the seized item had been inventoried and photographed in the presence
of the accused. The laboratory results came back and were confirmed of shabu. 

In his defense, Obmiranis claims that he was arrested, while waiting for his girlfriend, by
Velasco and others the night before the said buy-bust operation.  They asked for P200,000.00
and if not he should find for the officers a large-scale drug pusher. When he failed to, he was
sent to the UN Avenue police station and was detained. Again, he was asked for money to
mitigate his crime.

The RTC found him guilty. In his petition to the Court of Appeals, they said that even though all
the essential elements of a consummated sale of dangerous drug had not been completely shown
was immaterial because the charge involved a mere attempt or offer to sell which had been duly
established by the prosecution. They also said that the chain of custody was also maintained. The
CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The Court found that the police did not follow the chain of cutody. If it was followed, every
person who held the evidence can provide testimony which was not done. The testimony of
Velasco was also unsure and proved that some important steps in a buy-operation were passed.

The prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect failed to
obliterate the hypothesis of appellant’s guiltlessness.

The Court also had their doubts whether the evidence that was found on the Obrimanis was also
the evidence presented in court or was even a real illegal drug from the first place.

The Court also reminded that the prosecution should always rely on the strength of their
evidence and not to the weakness of the defense.
Hence, petitioner was not proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was acquitted.

ELPIDIO BONDAD JR., Y BURAC v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:    

Elpidio Bondad, Jr. was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. During the trial, the prosecution witnesses averred
that Bondad was arrested pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted where he
was allegedly found to have been in possession likewise of two other sachets of white crystalline
substance, later on found to be the prohibited drug, shabu.

The prosecution witnesses admitted and confirmed that there was no physical inventory taken of
the seized drugs, neither were there photographs taken thereof, immediately after its seizure
and confiscation, contrary to the mandate of Section 21(1), R.A. 9165.
Bondad denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted and claimed that he was really arrested
while he was playing billiards. he further contested that, assuming a buy-bust operation had
really been conducted, still the evidence presented by the prosecution could not really
be admissible in evidence, as its integrity has clearly become highly questionable in the light of
the unjustified failure of the prosecution witnesses, while acting as apprehending officers, to
comply with the mandate of Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.

       The RTC found Bondad guilty of the offense charge. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower Court‘s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the object evidence are admissible against Bondad despite non-compliance with

Section 21 (1) of R.A. 9165

HELD:

No. In the present case, by the claim of one of the prosecution witnesses, he immediately marked
the seized items which were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. By his admission,
however, he did not conduct an inventory of the items seized. Worse, no photograph of the items
was taken. There was thus failure to faithfully follow the requirements of the law.

Bondad in the present case questioned early on, during the cross examination of one of the
prosecution witnesses, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and
photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, despite their awareness of
such requirements.
In fine, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the
identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged
against Bondad, his acquittal is in order.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GERALDINE MAGAT y

PADERON, Appellant.

[G.R. NO. 179939 : September 29, 2008]

FACTS:

On 7 and 8 of June 2003 and in the morning of 9 June 2003, a buy-bust team composed of
policemen conducted surveillance operations on appellant on account of a validated report from
a concerned citizen that she was engaged in selling illegal drugs.

They saw appellant standing in front of her house. PO1 Santos asked appellant "Ate, meron bang
dalawangpiso?" After looking at him, appellant said "Okay!" and then went inside her house.
When appellant came back, she asked for money from him and so PO1 Santos handed her the
two marked P100.00 bills. In turn, appellant gave the plastic sachet of shabu to him. Thereafter,
PO1 Santos executed the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head, prompting his companions
to approach them. PO1 Santos, introducing himself as a policeman, arrested appellant. He
informed appellant that she was being arrested for violation of R.A. No. 9165. The policemen
requested appellant to empty her pockets. Appellant complied; her right pocket yielded another
sachet of shabu. They got back the two marked P100.00 bills from appellant's left hand.

They brought appellant to the police station where they booked her. PO1 Santos marked the
plastic sachets containing shabu with his initials "PCS" and the letters "A" and "B" for
examination. The plastic sachets were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory Office; the
examination yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.PO1 Santos admitted during
cross-examination that although it was confirmed that appellant was selling illegal drugs he did
not secure a search warrant since their chief's instruction to them was to conduct a buy-bust
operation. He also admitted that he did not coordinate the buy-bust operation with the barangay
officials and did not verify whether appellant was a drug peddler.

Appellant denied the charges against her and testified that between 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. on 9 June
2003, while she was taking a bath, policemen PO1 Santos, Sarangaya, and Mendoza barged into
her house. Hearing the noise, she came out of the comfort room and proceeded upstairs where
she saw the policemen already searching the place. After the search, they brought her to the
Meycauayan Police Station and detained her for one day for alleged violations of the anti-drug
law. Appellant further testified that at the time the policemen arrested her, her children were
playing about three meters away from her house and that no one saw her being brought to the
police station.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 found her guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5and 11 of R.A. No. 9165. Appellant filed a
notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting her despite the prosecution's failure to establish
the identity of the prohibited drugs, which constitute the corpus delicti of the offense.

HELD:

The appeal is meritorious.

In all prosecutions for violation of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.The existence of dangerous drugs is a
condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it
being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.

In the case at bar, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. PO1
Santos admitted that he marked the two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance in
the police station. He did not mark the seized items immediately after he arrested appellant in the
latter's presence. He also did not make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated
materials in the presence of appellant. Other than the three policemen, there were no other people
who participated in the alleged buy-bust operation.There was no representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation
and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None
of the statutory safeguards were observed.

In the present case, although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic sachets
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for examination, it was not indubitably shown by
the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the seized drugs in the presence of
appellant after their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to whether the substances seized from
appellant were the same ones subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty relied upon by the courts a
quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Although the evidence for the defense is weak, the prosecution must rely on
the weight of its own evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
All told, the corpus delecti in this case is not legally extant.

the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 in Criminal Case is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Geraldine Magat y Paderon is ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE VS ORTEZA

GR No. 173051

FACTS:
A team comprised of police officers was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation at Block 9, San
Nicolas, Tarlac City on 19 November 2002 to apprehend suspected drug peddlers. The suspects
have previously been under a week-long surveillance after the police officers received reports
about their illegal activities.

The team with its back-up arrived at the place at around nine o'clock in the evening of said date.
The appointed poseur-buyer SPO1 Ramos, together with the informant, approached the two (2)
suspects LengLeng and Buboy while the back-up team positioned itself nearby. SPO1 Ramos
purchased one (1) sachet of shabu for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) from Buboy. Then, SPO1
Ramos gave the pre-arranged signal. Immediately, the rest of the team rushed to the scene and
placed the two (2) suspects under arrest. After a body search, the marked money was recovered
from Buboy and another sachet of shabu was confiscated from LengLeng. Thereafter, the
suspects were brought to Camp Macabulos where Buboy identified himself as Orteza.

As lone witness for the defense, appellant testified that on 19 November 2002 at around 5:30
p.m., he was about to enter the house when he was halted by PO2 Lagasca. Then, Lagasca
allegedly forced him to go with him. Lagasca supposedly asked appellant not to make a scene as
he would be freed later on. Subsequently, appellant was taken to Camp Macabulos. Appellant
denied selling shabu. He denied ever speaking to SPO1 Ramos, the poseur-buyer. He also denied
knowing a certain LengLeng.

After trial, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the guilt of the accused proven beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, this Court
sentences Gerardo Orteza y Orteza to [a] penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine.
The judgment of conviction was elevated to the Court for automatic review. The decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED save for a modification in the imposed penalty which is
now fixed at life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

No. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that
the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or
regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.

The Court believes that the prosecution was not able to establish with certainty all the elements
necessary for the conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu.

First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with the proper
procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending
team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure
or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement
raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been
regularly performed by the police officers.

Moreover, the testimonies of the two police officers did not include any positive face-to-face
identification in open court of appellant as the seller of shabu, an aspect which was crucial to
establish appellant's role in the alleged transaction. It is likewise unclear in the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest, which was adopted by the two police officers as their direct testimony, whether the two
had a clear and close view of the alleged sale of shabu to support the assertion that they were
eyewitnesses to it. The affidavit only stated that the back-up men "who were then placed in a
strategically [sic] position near the vicinity are watching the on going deal." [38] As such, the
testimony of the poseur-buyer, in this case Ramos, was pivotal as only he could testify on what
had really transpired during the moment of the alleged sale of shabu. His non-presentation in this
case was fatal, absent any explanation for his non-appearance and reliable eyewitness who could
testify in his place.

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant GERARDO ORTEZA y ORTEZA is ACQUITTED.

Cases of Conviction: Even if there is no compliance with the chain of custody

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODANTE DE LEON

G.R. NO. 186471, JANUARY 25, 2010

FACTS:

A confidential informant reported the illegal activities of a person named Rodante De Leon, the
accused. Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Nilo Wong formed a team for a buy-bust
operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer. A pre-operation report was prepared. P/SInsp.
Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo two (2) pieces of PhP 100 bills as buy-bust money and on
which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials NM. Two plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance were obtained from the accused. The first plastic sachet was the one he sold to the
poseur-buyer while the second one was found to be in his pocket after being frisked. After the
buy-bust operation, the accused was brought to the police station for investigation. The evidence
was subsequently turned over to the police investigator, PO1 Estrelles, who prepared a request
for its laboratory examination. Engr. Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a
qualitative examination on the specimens, which yielded positive results for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The accused was then charged with the violation of Sections 5
(sale) and 11 (possession), Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The RTC convicted the accused-appellant. The CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Accused-appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the decision of the CA. He assails the
legality of the buy-bust operation and he further contends that the police officers violated the rule
on chain of custody of the alleged confiscated items since section 21 of the Implementing Rules
& Regulations of R.A. 9165 must be followed as an exact science.
ISSUE:

WON the prosecution fail to prove the chain of custody of the alleged confiscated items from the
accused?

RULING:

No. Contrary to the assertions of appellant, Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of RA 9165 need not be followed as an exact science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not
render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is
essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs
seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case
was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that after PO2
Magcalayo seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money, accused
was immediately arrested and brought to the police station for investigation, where the sachet of
suspected shabu was marked with NM. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance, with a
letter of request for examination, was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to
determine the presence of any dangerous drug. The specimen submitted contained
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The examination was conducted by one
Engr. Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, whose stipulated
testimony clearly established the chain of custody of the specimens he received. Also, the
accused was caught in actual possession of the prohibited drugs without showing any proof that
he was duly authorized by law to possess them.

Hence, it is without a doubt that there was an unbroken chain of custody of the illicit drug
purchased from accused and that the accused is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
with moral certainty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANILO CRUZ y
CULALA, Accused-Appellant.
[G.R. NO. 185381 : December 16, 2009]

FACTS:

On June 24, 2003, at about 11 o'clock in the evening, a police informant came to the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Taguig City Police and reported that a certain Danilo Cruz alias "Boy"
was dealing in illegal drugs at his residence at 75 MLQ Street, Tambak, Wawa, Taguig, Metro
Manila. The office chief, P/SInsp. Romeo DelfinPaat, immediately formed a buy-bust team
composed of PO3 Arago, acting as poseur-buyer, PO3 Vicuña, PO2 Aguinaldo, and two other
police officers. P/SInsp. Paat gave PO3 Arago two (2) one hundred peso bills which were then
marked with the poseur-buyer's initials, "DBA," on the upper corner.

At around 11:45 in the evening, the buy-bust team and the informant set out for their operation.
The informant and PO3 Arago went to the house of alias "Boy," while their companions stayed
nearby. When alias "Boy" came out after being called, the informant introduced PO3 Arago to
him as "Mike," a friend and "eskorer." PO3 Arago then asked alias "Boy," "Pare,
meronkabadyan?" to which alias "Boy" replied, "Magkanoba?" PO3 Arago answered, "Kasang
dos lang." Alias "Boy" gave PO3 Arago a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance
in exchange for the PhP 200 marked money. Thereupon, PO3 Arago wiped his face with a white
towel as the pre-arranged signal for PO2 Aguinaldo and PO3 Vicuña to come out of hiding and
arrest "Boy."

Appellant attempted to flee but PO3 Arago held him by the arm, while PO2 Aguinaldo recovered
the marked money from him. When PO3 Arago ordered appellant to empty his pockets for any
concealed weapons, PO2 Aguinaldo retrieved two (2) more plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance. PO3 Arago inscribed his signature and the appellant's initials "DCC" on
the sachet given him by appellant, while PO2 Aguinaldo inscribed those found in appellant's
pockets as "DCC-1" and "DCC-2."

The police officers then brought appellant to the police station for investigation.

Appellant recounted that, on June 24, 2003, at around 11:00 in the evening, while inside his
house playing cara y cruz with his friends Alberto Cruz, Cesar dela Cruz, Ronaldo dela Paz, and
Antonio Dionisio, police officers barged in looking for a certain Liza, his former live-in partner.
He told the intruders that he did not know Liza's whereabouts and that only his children were in
the adjacent room.

PO3 Arago and PO2 Aguinaldo boxed the appellant in anger. PO3 Arago then searched his
house but found nothing. Afterwards, they were all brought to the police headquarters, but his
friends were released after 30 minutes. He was the only one charged with violation of Secs. 5
and 11 of RA 9165.

The two other defense witnesses corroborated the testimony of appellant: Ma. Luz Encarnacion
testified about the incident that transpired inside appellant's house on June 24, 2003, while
Ronaldo dela Paz attested to appellant's being brought to the police station.

After trial, the RTC convicted appellant DANILO CRUZ y Culala for Violation of Section 5, to
suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP
500,000) and for Violation of Section 11, is sentenced to suffer Twelve (12) years and One (1)
day, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000), without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;
On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. It ruled that all the elements of the crimes
charged were duly established by the prosecution.

ISSUE:

WON the court gravely erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses' materially
inconsistent testimonies and police officers failed to conduct prior surveillance and to observe
the proper procedure in the custody of the seized prohibited items pursuant to RA 9165.

RULING:

The appeal has no merit.

Buy-Bust Operation Was Valid

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for capturing persons who are
predisposed to commit crimes. The operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.

Appellant contends that it is unusual and improbable for a buy-bust operation to be conducted
without any prior surveillance, despite the fact that an informant had gone first to the police
station to report on his illegal activity.

We disagree.

Settled is the rule that a prior surveillance of the suspected offender is not a prerequisite for the
validity of a buy-bust operation, especially so if the buy-bust team is accompanied by the
informant, as in this case. We have held that when time is of the essence, the police may
dispense with the need for prior surveillance.

Moreover, for the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, only the following elements
are essential: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is proof
that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in evidence of the seized item, as
part of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by
the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish these elements beyond moral certainty. It
was the confidential informant who made initial contact with appellant and introduced PO3
Arago as a buyer of shabu. PO3 Arago then asked to buy PhP 200 worth of shabu with the
previously marked money he brought with him. Appellant then gave him a plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu and subsequently
presented in evidence. There was an actual exchange of the marked money and contraband.
Then, upon giving the pre-arranged signal, appellant, who knew he was selling a prohibited drug,
was arrested.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.

GRACE VENTURA y NATIVIDAD, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 184957     October 27, 2009

FACTS:

On the strength of a confidential information, a surveillance operation was conducted by

operatives of the Malolos Police Station in Malolos, Bulacan, two days before the buy-bust
operation. Results of the surveillance operation were relayed to the chief of police, who
thereafter instructed them to conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant and Danilo.
The team was composed of PO2 Sarmiento, PO1 Michael Silla, PO3 Magsakay, and a police
asset.

A briefing was conducted among the members of the buy-bust team. During said briefing, PO2
Sarmiento placed the markings "LCS," which correspond to his initials, on the buy-bust money.
The marked money consisted of three ₱100.00 bills and one ₱50.00 bill. A police asset was also
designated as poseur-buyer. Both the buy-bust operation and serial numbers of the bills to be
used as buy-bust money were recorded in the police blotter. Prior to proceeding with the
operation, the buy-bust team coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
and was assigned a control number for the operation, with its pre-operational sheet signed by
HashimMaung of PDEA.

After being briefed on the operation, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target site. While the
members of the team positioned themselves at the alley leading towards the house of accused-
appellant, the police asset went directly to the gate of Danilo and accused-appellant. The gate
was approximately ten meters away from them.

From where they were standing, the police officers saw the police asset knocking at the gate.
Thereupon, Danilo stepped out. The police asset handed the marked money to Danilo. Danilo
closed the gate and went inside the house. Moments later, Grace (accused-appellant) went out
and handed something to the police asset. Indicating the sale was consummated, the police asset
then executed his pre-arranged signal by touching his hair with his right hand. The police officers
rushed towards the gate but accused-appellant noticed them and closed the gate. PO2 Sarmiento
pushed open the gate. As PO2 Sarmiento was entering the compound, he saw a man holding a
"gulok." It turned out that the man holding the "gulok" or bolo was one of Danilo’s sons, Vergel
Ventura, who attempted to hack PO2 Sarmiento. PO2 Sarmiento informed him that he was a
police officer, but Vergel still tried to hack him with the bolo causing him to seek cover outside
the gate while parrying the attack. PO3 Magsakay drew his gun and poked it at Vergel, who ran
inside the house. PO2 Sarmiento entered the gate and arrested Danilo, while PO2 Magsakay
arrested accused-appellant. PO1 Silla arrested Vergel. After frisking Danilo, PO2 Sarmiento
recovered from him the marked money used for the buy-bust operation. The police asset handed
to PO2 Sarmiento the shabu he bought from accused-appellant. The Venturas were apprised of
their rights and informed of the offense committed. Thereafter, the suspects were brought to the
police station for further investigation.

According full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court
found Grace Ventura guilty beyond reasonable for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section
26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing her with the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of ₱500,000.00.

Via a Notice of Appeal,accused-appellant sought to appeal the RTC ruling with the Court of
Appeals.

The Court of Appeals gave more weight to the prosecution’s claim that the entrapment operation
in fact took place and denied the appeal. Concurring in the factual findings of the trial court, the
appellate court resolved the appeal in favor of the trial court.

Electing to seek a final recourse before this Court, accused-appellant filed her Notice of
Appealon 28 July 2008.

ISSUE:

WON the police officers failed to account for the chain of custody of the seized item alleged to
be shabu.

HELD:

Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim, there is no broken chain in the custody of the seized item,
found to be shabu, from the time the police asset turned it over to PO3 Magsakay, to the time it
was turned over to the investigating officer, and up to the time it was brought to the forensic
chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination.

The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered
dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, as follows:

(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165,
which implements said provision, stipulates:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: x xx Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.

Under the same proviso, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable
grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers.

Clearly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in the implementing rules is centered on the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The testimony of PO2
Sarmiento outlines the chain of custody of the confiscated item.

All documentary, testimonial, and object pieces of evidence, including the markings on the
plastic sachet containing the shabu, prove that the substance tested by the forensic chemist,
whose laboratory tests were well-documented, was the same as that taken from accused-
appellant. The foregoing evidence established and preserved the identity of the confiscated
shabu. Moreover, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.Accused-
appellant, in this case, bears the burden to make some showing that the evidence was tampered
or meddled with, to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
officers and a presumption that they properly discharged their duties.

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellant was involved in the buy-bust
operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, accused-appellant’s participation cannot be
doubted.

The Court of Appeals Decision, affirming the Decision promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in finding accused-appellant Grace Ventura y Natividad guilty
beyond reasonable, in violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165, and imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00), is hereby AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO LAZARO, JR. a.k.a
JUN LAZARO y AQUINO, Accused-Appellant.
[G.R. NO. 186418 : October 16, 2009]
  

 FACTS:

On 17 June 2004, two separate informations were filed before the RTC against appellant for
illegal sale and possession of shabu under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165.

 On 18 June 2004, an information was filed with the RTC against appellant for illegal use
of shabu under Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

On 15 June 2004, at about 12:30 p.m., an informant went to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG), Anti-Illegal Drugs Team unit (AIDT), Baguio City, and reported to
PO3 PaulinoLubos (PO3 Lubos) the drug trafficking activities of appellant in Central
Bakakeng, Baguio City. PO3 Lubos relayed the information to Police Senior Inspector Hordan T.
Pacatiw (Inspector Pacatiw), head of AIDT, who in turn, referred the matter to Senior
Superintendent Marvin V. Bolabola (Superintendent Bolabola), chief of CIDG, Baguio City, for
appropriate action. Superintendent Bolabola formed a team and planned a buy-bust operation.
The team was composed of Inspector Pacatiw who would act as the team leader; SPO1 Dennis
G. Indunan (SPO1 Indunan) as the poseur-buyer; PO3 Lubos as the seizing officer; and SPO1
Emerson A. Lingbawan (SPO1 Lingbawan) as the arresting officer. Superintendent Bolabola
handed SPO1 Indunan three One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills to be utilized as buy-bust
money. SPO1 Indunan marked the monies with DG-06-15-04. Thereafter, the team coordinated
the planned buy-bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

At around 2:30 p.m. of the same date, the team, together with the informant, went to appellants
house at 181 Km. 3, Central Bakakeng, Baguio City.Upon arriving thereat, the informant and
SPO1 Indunan saw appellant standing at the balcony of the third floor of the three-storey house.
The informant proceeded inside appellants house and talked with appellant at the balcony of the
third floor, while SPO1 Indunan stood outside the house at a distance of 10 meters. The rest of
the team positioned themselves outside appellants house at a distance of 25 meters. Later, the
informant signaled SPO1 Indunan to approach him and appellant at the balcony of the third
floor. Thereupon, the informant introduced SPO1 Indunan to appellant as user and buyer
of shabu. The informant subsequently excused himself and left SPO1 Indunan and
appellant. Appellant then asked SPO1 Indunan how much worth of shabu he would want to
buy. SPO1 Indunan answered he would like to purchase three hundred pesos (P300.00) worth
of shabu. Appellant knocked at the door of a room in the balcony and called a certain
Bong. Bong is appellants brother whose full name is Ferdinand Bong Lazaro. A man opened the
door and handed a green box to appellant. Appellant opened the green box, took a plastic sachet
from it, handed the plastic sachet to SPO1 Indunan, and demanded payment from the latter. After
examining the contents of the plastic sachet and believing that the same contained shabu, SPO1
Indunan gave the three marked one hundred peso bills to appellant. At this juncture, SPO1
Indunan removed his sunglasses and placed it in his pocket as pre-arranged signal to the other
members of the team.

The other members of the team rushed to the crime scene and identified themselves as police
officers. Appellant tried to resist arrest but he was subdued by the team. Inspector Pacatiw then
apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. Afterwards, SPO1 Indunan frisked and recovered
from appellant the buy-bust money and the green box which contained another plastic sachet
with white substance. SPO1 Indunan marked with DG-06-15-04 the plastic sachet containing
white substance sold to him by appellant, as well as the plastic sachet with white substance found
inside the green box.

Thereafter, the team discovered and seized at the third floor of the house several drug
paraphernalias. The team made a written inventory on said paraphernalias, as well as the plastic
sachet sold by appellant to SPO1 Indunan and the plastic sachet recovered in appellants
possession, in the presence of representatives from media, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the barangay. Said representatives signed the inventory document on the seized items. Inspector
Pacatiw took custody of the said seized items.

Appellant denied having sold to SPO1 Indunan one plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram
of shabu on 15 June 2004. He claimed that it was impossible for the back-up members of the
buy-bust team to have witnessed his alleged sale of shabu to SPO1 Indunan because there were
big trees beside the three-storey house which blocked the view of persons on the ground looking
up to the balcony of the third floor. He denied having received from Bong a green box during the
alleged buy-bust and averred that Jade owned the green box.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant in all of the criminal cases.  

Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
partly granting the appeal. 

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal

 ISSUE:

WON The trial court erred in disregarding the prosecutions failure to comply with the procedures
laid down in RA 9165.

HELD:  

No.
Appellant argument that the prosecution did not strictly comply with the procedures laid down in
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is of no merit as of the moment.

It should be noted that appellant raised the buy-bust teams alleged non-compliance with Section
21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too
late in the day for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria in which the very same issue was raised,
we held:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial
the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were
instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the
trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the
form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal.

Moreover, it was held in several cases that non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the present case, the integrity of the
drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of
the instant case was shown not to have been broken. 

WHEREFORE, the Decision 8 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE VS. MANUEL RESURRECCION

GR No. 186380

FACTS: 
 
According to Atty. Esmeralda, an informant went to the NBI Special Task Force office on July
13, 2000. The informant reported to SI Eduardo Villa the drug activities of a certain Manuel
Resurreccion. Atty. Esmeralda assembled and briefed a 12-member buy-bust team on the basis
of the informants report. He designated SA Vallejo as the poseur-buyer. The team headed
to Matias St. in Pasay City on board five vehicles. Atty. Esmeralda was 200 to 300 meters away
from their target when the pre-arranged signal, a radio transmission, was received. The target
turned out to be accused-appellant, whom SA Vallejo had arrested. Along with the seized shabu,
they brought accused-appellant to their office where he was subjected to printing and
photographing. 

Accused-appellant claimed that on the morning of July 13, 2000, he bought food for his invalid
friend, VilmaVivas. He proceeded to her house on foot, accompanied by his house maid,
Meliton. At her house, they handed her the food they bought. Accused-appellant and Vivas
started talking. Suddenly, three men barged in around 11 oclock in the morning. They introduced
themselves as NBI agents and manhandled accused-appellant. They dragged him out of the
house and started shouting, Shabushabushabu!  Accused-appellant was then made to lie on his
stomach, and frisked. His belongings were confiscated and he was boarded into a van along with
Meliton and three others. Inside the van, the agents asked him about a certain Nestor. He was hit
with a gun when he answered that he did not know who they were referring to. They likewise
demanded payment of PhP 300,000 for his release. When he said he did not have money, he was
brought to the NBI where he was beaten up and forced to hold a white envelope. He was also
made to place his hands over a machine. Four days later, he was taken for inquest.

 The RTC pronounced accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. It found that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements in the sale of illegal drugs. 

On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for disregarding his defense of denial. He
pointed to inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The CA, however,
affirmed the Decision of the RTC.It agreed with the trial court in holding that the inconsistencies
cited by accused-appellant were trivial and did not affect the integrity of the prosecutions
evidence as a whole. 

On September 2, 2008, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal from the appellate courts
Decision.

ISSUE: 

WON the chain of custody was not established by the prosecution by failure of the buy-bust team
to immediately mark the seized drugs as a cause to doubt the identity of the shabu allegedly
confiscated from him.

HELD: 

Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically
impair the integrity of chain of custody.

The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible.  What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
Accused-appellant broaches the view that SA Isidoros failure to mark the
confiscated shabu immediately after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as to the drugs
identity.  however, RA 9165 does not specify a time frame for immediate marking, or where said
marking should be done

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the
matter of marking of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized
upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these
activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with
the chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items
to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. 

It is clear then that the prosecution was able to provide all the facts necessary to establish
adherence to the chain of custody rule.

Moreover, the presumption of regularity works against accused-appellant. The integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that
the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant in this case has the burden to show that
the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharge
their duties.Having failed to discharge this burden, his conviction must be affirmed.

 PEOPLE VS FREDERICK RICHIE TEODORO Y DELA CRUZ

GR No. 185164

The Peoples version of the facts shows that on May 23, 2004, Police Senior Inspector Rodrigo
Flores Gadiano (PSI Gadiano), Chief of the Intelligence Unit of Mandaluyong City Police,
received information from a confidential asset that a man named Richie was conducting illegal
activities at Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Acting on the information, PSI
Gadiano instructed Police Officer 2 Robert Posadas (PO2 Posadas), PO1 Edgar Antipasado (PO1
Antipasado), and PO1 Marlon Climacosa (PO1 Climacosa) to conduct surveillance. During the
surveillance conducted from May 23-27, 2004, the group confirmed that appellant was involved
in selling illegal drugs at his home in 741 Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City.

On May 28, 2003, a team, composed of SPO1 Ronaldo de Castro (SPO1 de Castro), SPO1
Romeo Rico (SPO1 Rico), PO1 Climacosa, PO1 Antipasado, PO2 Arsenio Calilong (PO2
Calilong), PO1 Edwin Gonocruz (PO1 Gonocruz), and PO2 Posadas, was organized to conduct a
buy-bust operation at the target site. PO1 Climacosa was designated as poseur-buyer while the
remaining members of the team served as back up. At the same time, PSI Gadiano coordinated
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on the conduct of the buy-bust operation.

Two (2) marked P100.00 bills with serial numbers RF390501 and NS581977 were handed to
PO1 Climacosa.

Around 5:30 o clock in the afternoon of the same day, the team proceeded to the area.

PO1 Climacosa approached appellant who was then standing by the gate of 741 Matamis Street,
Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City and said, Pre, iskorako ng dalawangpiso pang gamit
lang. Appellant replied sandali lang. PO1 Climacosa gave appellant the two marked P100.00
bills. Appellant, in turn, handed to PO1 Climacosa a sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. PO1 Climacosa removed his cap to signal the consummation of the sale transaction to
the other team members who were positioned some 10 meters away.

Thereafter, PO1 Climacosa introduced himself and informed appellant that he was under
arrest. Appellant resisted and ran away, but he was eventually accosted by PO1 Climacosa and
the other members of the team.PO1 Antipasado then frisked appellant and found the marked
money and another sachet of white crystalline substance in appellants pocket.

Immediately, the team apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant was, thereafter,
brought to the Mandaluyong Medical Center for medical check-up. From the hospital, appellant
was turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong City Police
Station. In the said office, the confiscated sachets were marked as MC and MC-1 by PO1
Climacosa and PO1 Antipasado, respectively. The marked two (2) P100.00 bills were turned
over to the evidence custodian, while the two (2) confiscated sachets were immediately brought
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Eastern Police District (EPD) for
laboratory examination. PSI LourdelizaCejes, Forensic Chemist, found the two (2) sachets of
white crystalline substance to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu 

Denial, frame up and extortion were accused-appellants main exculpating line.  

The trial court, however, disbelieved appellants defenses and rendered a judgment of conviction.

The appellant filed an appeal before the CA, claiming that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming appellants
conviction. 

ISSUE:

WON the prosecution failed to establish the evidences chain of custody because the buy-bust
team failed to strictly comply with Section 21 of RA 9165.

 HELD:
We disagree.

Contrary to what appellant wants to portray, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs
was shown not to have been broken. After the seizure of the drugs from appellants
possession, PO1 Climacosa and PO1 Antipasado marked the two (2) plastic sachets. The plastic
sachet that was sold to PO1 Climacosa was marked MC, while the plastic sachet that was
recovered by PO1 Antipasado was marked MC-1. These plastic sachets containing a white
crystalline substance were immediately forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in EPD for
examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination
conducted on the specimens, PSI Cejes concluded that the white crystalline substance was
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. There can be no doubt
that the drugs seized from appellant were the same ones examined in the crime
laboratory.Plainly, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the
seized shabu from the time they were first discovered until they were brought for examination.

Besides, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the drug that was taken from
him in the proceedings before the RTC. In fact, he stipulated that the drugs subject matter of this
case were examined by PSI LourdelizaCejes, and the examination yielded a positive result for
shabu. We thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from appellant not
to have been compromised.

Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that non-compliance with Section 21 will not render
an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In this case, it has been shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items had been preserved. Thus, appellants claim must fail. 

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DIMISSED. The Court AFFIRMS the May 27, 2008 Decision of

the Court of Appeals.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

v. EDDIE GUM-OYEN y SACPA
[G.R. NO. 182231 : April 16, 2009]

FACTS:

On 5 February 2003, PO3 Allan Baana and SPO1 Wilfredo Montero of the Drug Enforcement
Unit, Naguilian, La Union received a report from a police asset that a certain Eddie would
deliver marijuana to Barangay Cabaritan, Naguilian, La Union. PO3 Baana and SPO1 Montero
immediately relayed this information to their station commander, Police Superintendent Rolando
Nana, who directed them to conduct a buy-bust operation together with PO3 Mendoza and PO1
Mendoza.

With the police asset acting as the poseur-buyer and P1,120.00 as buy-bust money, PO3 Baana
and SPO1 Montero proceeded to the target place. PO3 Baana and SPO1 Montero positioned
themselves at a waiting shed while the rest of the buy-bust team who followed stood by the
houses opposite the shed. The police asset waited for the arrival of the appellant by the road
close to the houses.

Around 11:30 a.m, appellant arrived at the place on board a tricycle. Carrying a blue bag, he
alighted therefrom and talked to the police asset. Then appellant put down his bag, opened it and
took out a square-shaped object wrapped in a brown-colored plastic. Appellant partially opened
it and gave it to the police asset. After smelling the object, the police asset handed the buy-bust
money to appellant. While appellant was counting the money, the buy-bust team identified
themselves as policemen, arrested him, apprised him of his rights and frisked him for dangerous
weapons.

PO3 Baana searched appellant's bag and recovered three (3) more bricks of marijuana.
Thereafter, they brought appellant to the police station and to the hospital for medical
examination.

At the police station, the buy-bust money was recovered from appellant, together with the four
(4) bricks of marijuana, and turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO1 Valentin Abenoja,
who marked the items. The police next presented appellant to the Municipal Mayor, and
photographs of them with several police officers and the seized items were taken.

In his defense, appellant maintained that he had only been instigated to commit the offenses
charged. He testified that on 12 January 2003, a certain Roger Fundanera, a former co-worker at
a construction firm in Irisan, Baguio City and a police asset, had gone to his house and asked him
to go buy marijuana from someone in San Gabriel. Roger returned a couple more times and, on
the last date, 4 February 2003, gave him P2,500.00 and a letter and instructed him to give them
to the person from whom he was going to buy marijuana. On even date, appellant left for
Sacdaan, San Gabriel.

In a Decision promulgated on 5 May 1995, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La
Union, Branch 67 found appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. Appellant, however,
was acquitted of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana.

Upon appeal the CA affirmed the RTC decision as elements of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165 being present in the case at bar, and the corpus
delicit of the said offense having been established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution,
this Court sees no convincing reason to overturn the conviction of accused-appellant.

ISSUE:

WON trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to sufficiently established the unbroken chain of custody.

HELD:

The Court sustains the verdict of conviction.

The prosecution's evidence sufficiently established the unbroken chain of custody of the seized
drugs beginning from the entrapment team, to the investigating officer, to the forensic chemist
whose laboratory tests were well-documented, up to the time there were offered in evidence. The
chain-of-custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.

The Court also finds that the arresting officers strictly complied with the guidelines prescribed by
law regarding the custody and control of the seized drugs. There was testimony regarding the
marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of appellant. Likewise there
was mention that an elected official was present during the inventory. In addition, it appears on
record that the team photographed the contraband in accordance with law. Absent any indication
that the police officers were ill-motivated in testifying against appellant, full credence should be
given to their testimonies. In sum, contrary to appellant's lone argument, the prosecution
established the corpus delicti with moral certainty.

In contrast, appellant's defense of instigation is unsubstantiated. Not only was his testimony in
this regard inconsistent, he was also unable to support his assertions with any other evidence.
Significantly, the person named Roger whom he referred to as his instigator was never presented
in court, raising questions as regards his identity and existence. As correctly quipped by the
appellate court, appellant's tale of instigation was a futile attempt to secure his acquittal.

Finally, it bears underscoring that appellant himself admitted that he was carrying marijuana at
the time of his arrest and even though he knew it was against the law to so possess it in any
amount.27 Hence, the lower courts aptly held him liable for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.