Professional Documents
Culture Documents
189.1 Umil v. Ramos - 187 SCRA 311
189.1 Umil v. Ramos - 187 SCRA 311
*
G.R. No. 81567. July 9, 1990.
*
G.R. Nos. 84581-82. July 9, 1990.
*
G.R. Nos. 84583-84. July 9, 1990.
*
G.R. No. 83162. July 9, 1990.
* EN BANC.
312
313
petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were
actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests
without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained
by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
Criminal Law; Habeas Corpus; Subversion; The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State are in the nature of continuing
crimes.—However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State
and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
Same; Same; If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order or if
such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not
be allowed.—It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered,
criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if
such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not
be allowed.
Same; Same; No compelling reason to abandon the doctrine laid down
in the case of Ilagan vs. Enrile; As the court stated in Morales Jr. vs. Enrile,
in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase
and aspect of petitioner’s detention.—We find, however, no compelling
reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of
the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed
by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan
case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be,
not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or
not the court which issued the process, judgment or order or of commitment
or
314
before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue
the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather,
as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, “in all petitions for
habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner’s detention—from the moment petitioner was taken into custody
up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition:” and
“only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.” This is exactly what
the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be
done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving
deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts
for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.
315
PER CURIAM:
These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court,
which have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues
raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at
liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by
virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their
arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in
their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have
not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending
these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous
complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when
such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7.”
“To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.”
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in
whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had
freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when
apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly
justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the
eight (8) petitions is in order.
_______________
1 63 Phil. 221.
317
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1
February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital
in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found
that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining
Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of
the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4
February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and
CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest
and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with
the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons
in Authority.” The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal,
Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was
filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and
Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12
February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February
1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato
Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had
318
been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The
petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed,
since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in
2
a criminal case who has been released on bail.
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested
while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of
the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
“From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within
the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
_______________
2 Zacarias vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-25899, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 728.
319
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of
probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest
or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of
waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
3
contingencies continues cannot be ess justified. x x x”
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against
Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for “Double Murder, etc.”
was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17
August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found
guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is
now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus,
the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held
4
in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson:
“In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact
remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on
March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to
him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the
judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if
there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he
could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil
action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire.
It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free
from error.”
_______________
3 Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472, 488-
489.
4 4 Phil. 317, 325.
320
II
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 &
2605778;
321
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to “Ka Bing & Co. from A &
Co.” dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to “ROD from VIC (Schell
datre)” dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to “Suzie” from “Vic”, dated
August 11, 1988.
322
323
III
_______________
324
325
“This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec.
7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary
investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed a
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe
that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.”
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant,
of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her
unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this
case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located
at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the
CPP-NPA. In the
326
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple,
and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession
when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were “planted”
by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to
support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or
ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said
arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has
been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not
appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for
the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, “there is absolutely
nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners
are on the ‘AFP Order of
327
6
Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.’ ” On the
other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the
petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition,
but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed
to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly
observes:
_______________
328
siple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple’s flimsy
and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for
Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to
effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who
provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had
connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the
latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque’s telephone number as written
on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra’s possession? Petitioners Roque
and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted
reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the events in
question, especially considering that at the time of petitioners’ arrest,
incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and
circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they were up
to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.”
VI
In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus
of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an
Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the
General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at
Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and
operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for
their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 23
November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363
Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister
Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire
his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was
immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of
arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and
placed him in their owner-type jeepney.
329
“Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and
operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the
government to give in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the
Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23,
8
1988.”
_______________
330
“Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila,
at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto
nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating
10
pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. ” (emphasis supplied)
VII
_______________
10 Exhibit 1.
11 Exhibit 4.
331
_______________
12 68 Phil. 415.
332
VIII
333
claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past
dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no
place under the present democratic dispensation and collides with
the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people.
Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest
and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against
them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is
filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal
information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the
protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands
as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits
lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said
doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court
and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the
petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the
Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a
mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process,
judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained
person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as
15
the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, “in all petitions for
habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner’s detention—from the moment petitioner was taken into
custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the
petition;” and “only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself
that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact
_______________
334
been satisfied.” This is exactly what the Court has done in the
petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future
cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving deprivation of
individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their
immediate scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except
that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for
petitioner’s provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
335
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 335
Umil vs. Ramos
336
1
Revised Penal Code in terms of speech and that consequently it is
important constantly to distinguish between speech which is
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of
the press and speech which may constitutionally be regarded as
violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely
because speech which the police authorities might regard as
seditious or as criminal inciting to sedition may well turn out to be
only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would
submit that we must apply the concept of “continuing offense”
narrowly for purposes of application of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Court. In my view, the very broad statement
made about “continuing crimes” in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v.
Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court below for
“double murder, etc.” and found guilty of the offense charged,
sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando Dural,
service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had
already begun.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that
the arrest of petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
_______________
337
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
1
7.
_______________
338
2
subversive organization,” and that “[s]ubversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified
3
as
it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.”
As I said, I beg to differ.
First, Rolando Dural was charged with “Double Murder with
4
Assault upon Agents of Authority.” If he had been guilty of
subversion—the offense for which he was supposedly arrested via a
warrantless arrest—subversion was the logical crime with which he
should have been charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion
on account of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible
basis for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, because as the
majority points out, “he was not arrested while in the act of shooting
[them]. . .[n]or was he arrested just after the commission of the said
5
offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident.”
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen’s) arrest is
possible in case of subversion—in the absence of any overt act that
would justify the authorities to act. “Subversion,” as the term is
known in law, means “knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts
affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of
the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of
any subversive association as defined in sections two and three
6
hereof. . .” Logically, the military could not have known that Dural,
at the time he was taken, was a member of the New People’s Army
because he was not performing any overt act that he was truly, a
6
rebel. Indeed, it had to take a “verification” before he could be
identified as allegedly a member of the underground army. Under
these circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was committing
subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he was guilty of
subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.
_______________
2 Decision, 7.
3 Supra; emphasis in the original.
4 Supra, 6.
5 Supra, 6; emphasis in the original.
6 Exec. Order No. 276, sec. 3; emphasis ours.
339
_______________
340
tence. I likewise take exception. It has been held that: “The writ may
10
be granted upon a judgment already final.”
11
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. Vindication of due
12
process is its historic office.
_______________
10 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 684;
see Castro, J., Concurring, citing Fay v. Noia, 372 US 391 (1963).
11 Supra, 683.
12 Supra, 690.
13 Decision, supra. 14.
14 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, Nos. L-35546, 35538, 35539, 35540, 35547, 35556,
35567, 35571, and 35573, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183, 247-248, citing among
other cases, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27
SCRA 835 and Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
15 Decision, supra.
341
_______________
16 Supra.
17 Supra.
342
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed
under arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be
picked upon in one’s own home and held moments later without a
warrant of arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of
a speech delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club
on November 21, 1988. He was, however, arrested the day after,
November 22, 1988. Under these circumstances, it eludes me how
an arrest without a warrant could be justified, either under paragraph
(a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with
the court, Espiritu’s detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question
is whether or not an information is an authority to hold a person in
custody. Under the Rules, an information means “an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal
18
18
and filed with the court.” It is not, however, an order to keep one
under detention.
_______________
343
_______________
344
Constitution.
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-
Padilla was handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v.
25
Enrile, a case that in my view has significantly whittled down
Garcia-Padilla’s very esse. In that case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes
Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been:
(1) informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have
27
competent and independent counsel.
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving
claims of the military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque,
Añonuevo, and Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines—and that they have supposedly confessed to be in fact
members of the outlawed organization. The question that has not
been answered is whether or not these supposed confessions are
admissible, for purposes of a warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt,
in the absence of any showing that they were apprised of their
constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the majority. I
am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the
Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused
28
to habeas corpus.
According to the majority, a “re-examination or re-appraisal . . .
29
of the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer.” In my consid-
_______________
345
30
ered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile does not rightfully belong in the
volumes of Philippine jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners,
three Davao-based lawyers, were held by virtue of a simple
information (“the petition herein has been rendered moot and
academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for
Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against
31
them” ) without any preliminary investigation (examination) having
been previously conducted (to justify the issuance of a warrant). As I
have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that
an information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation
32 33
(examination). It forms part and parcel of due process of law. I
34
find the majority’s reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, an ancient (1905)
decision, inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been
served with a warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question
that faced the Court was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid
the accused’s charges that the judge who issued it did not examine
the complainant under oath. We held that the query was academic,
because the accused had already pleaded, and the case had entered
the trial stage.
The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been
issued. I submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to
freedom by way of the writ of liberty.
xxx
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the
increasing pattern of arrests and detention in the country without the
sanction of a judicial decree. Four years ago at “EDSA”, and many
years before it, although with much fewer of us, we valiantly
challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had
_______________
30 Supra.
31 Supra, 364-365.
32 Ilagan v. Enrile, supra, 384, Teehankee, J., Dissenting.
33 Supra.
34 4 Phil. 316 (March 24, 1905).
346
——o0o——
© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.