Cities in Global Governance

Cities in Global Governance
From multilateralism to multistakeholderism?

Agustí Fernández de Losada and Marta Galceran-Vercher (Eds.)
81
Cities in Global Governance
From multilateralism to multistakeholderism?
Agustí Fernández de Losada and Marta Galceran-Vercher (Eds.)
81
© 2021 CIDOB
CIDOB edicions
Elisabets, 12
08001 Barcelona
Tel.: 933 026 495
www.cidob.org
[email protected]
Printing: Book-Print S.A.

ISBN: 978-84-92511-90-7
Legal deposit: B 2909-2021
Barcelona, February 2021

CONTENTS
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 5
ABSTRACTS 9
INTRODUCTION 13
Agustí Fernández de Losada and Marta Galceran-Vercher
From multilateralism to multi-stakeholder alliances: cities shift

from rhetoric to politics on the international stage ................................ 17
Agustí Fernández de Losada
CITIES AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 25
Global cities, world order and post-pandemic futures

Simon Curtis .......................................................................................................................................... 27
The table wobbles: cities and a faltering multilateral order

Ian Klaus ................................................................................................................................................... 37
Cities and international law: legally invisible

or rising soft-power actors?
Elif Durmuş ............................................................................................................................................. 45
EMPOWERING CITIES IN A REFORMED MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 55
The role of cities in a reformed UN: towards the institutionalisation

of the World Assembly of Local and Regional Governments
Marta Galceran-Vercher ................................................................................................................ 57
Is something better than nothing? Multi-level governance and the

European Committee of the Regions in EU policymaking
Andrea Noferini .................................................................................................................................. 65
MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM AND OTHER FORMS OF GLOBAL URBAN AGENCY 75
Towards an ecology of knowledges for global politics:

civil society and local government alliances in Habitat III
Eva Garcia-Chueca and Lorena Zárate ............................................................................... 77
What’s next? New forms of city diplomacy and emerging global

urban governance
Anna Kosovac and Daniel Pejic .............................................................................................. 87
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Simon Curtis is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics at UEA,

a Senior Fellow on Global Cities at The Chicago Council on Global
Affairs, and an Affiliated Professor in International Relations at
the Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI). Simon joined
UEA in 2009 after completing his doctorate in International Relations
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where
he held a Michael Leifer Scholarship. His latest book, Global Cities
and Global Order (Oxford University Press), won the 2018 European
Consortium for Political Research Hedley Bull Prize in International
Relations. It was also shortlisted for the 2017 British International
Studies Association Susan Strange Book Prize.
Elif Durmuş is the PhD researcher on the project Cities of Refuge

(Utrecht University) responsible for researching local governments’
engagement with human rights and migration in Turkey, Switzerland
and in the transnational field. She has a bachelor’s degree in Law
from Ankara University and an advanced master’s degree in Public
International Law (cum laude) from Leiden University. She is a found-
ing editor of the “Human Rights Here” blog of the Netherlands
Network of Human Rights Research, which seeks to bring together
human rights scholarship and societal stakeholders. Her research
interests include sociological development norms, local government
engagement in international law and human rights, the pluralisation
of international law, migration, and women’s rights.
Agustí Fernández de Losada is Senior Research Fellow and Director

of the Global Cities Programme at CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for
International Affairs). He is also vice-president of the Interarts
Foundation, founding partner at Phare - Territorios Globales and pro-
fessor of International Relations at Blanquerna, Ramon Llull University,
and at the Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI), Pompeu
Fabra University. He has worked as a Senior Expert for several United
Nations agencies, the European Commission and national and local
governments worldwide. Previous positions include: Director of
Studies and International Technical Assistance at Tornos Abogados (a
leading law firm specialised in public law and governance), Director of
the Barcelona Centre for Territorial Studies, Director of International
Relations at the Diputació de Barcelona, and General Coordinator of
the European Commission URBAL III Programme Coordination Office.
Marta Galceran-Vercher is a Lecturer in International Relations

at Pompeu Fabra University and CEI International Affairs. She also
works as Senior Consultant at anteverti, where she has led projects by
UN-Habitat, the European Union and the Inter-American Development
Bank. She is currently the Program Coordinator of the Smart City
Expo World Congress. Previously she has worked as a researcher
and project manager in research centres (CIDOB, KIgA, University of
5
•81• 2021
Barcelona), public sector organisations (Kreuzberg Museum for Urban
Development, Berlin) and local governments (Diputació de Barcelona).
She holds an MA in International Relations from the University of
Warwick (2013) and is currently finalising a PhD on City Diplomacy,
Global Governance and Sustainable Development at Pompeu Fabra
University.
Eva Garcia-Chueca is Senior Research Fellow at CIDOB’s Global

Cities Programme and holder of a PhD in Postcolonialisms and Global
Citizenship from the University of Coimbra, Portugal. She holds a
Master’s Degree in Citizenship and Human Rights: Ethics and Politics
from the University of Barcelona (2010) and a European Master’s
Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation from the European
Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (2005), undertak-
en in Italy and Denmark. She also holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Law
from the University of Barcelona (2004). Since 2011, she has been
a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies (CES), University of
Coimbra. From 2015 to 2016, she was one of the 20 experts from
around the world who took part in the HABITAT III Policy Unit on the
Right to the City and Cities for All. From 2007 to 2014, she served
as Executive Coordinator of the Committee on Social Inclusion,
Participatory Democracy and Human Rights at the global network
United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG).
Ian Klaus is Senior Fellow on Global Cities at the Chicago Council on

Global Affairs. Previously, he was Senior Adviser for Global Cities at
the US Department of State, Deputy United States Negotiator for the
United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Development
(Habitat III), and Ernest May Fellow for History and Security Studies at
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
Anna Kosovac is a Research Fellow in International Urban Politics at

the Connected Cities Lab at the University of Melbourne. Her exper-
tise is focused on City Diplomacy and decision-making within local
governance contexts, especially those related to risk. Dr Kosovac is
an elected member of the Society for Risk Analysis (ANZ) and has also
worked closely on projects with the Global Covenant of Mayors, UN
Habitat, C40, Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Metropolis to
deliver research on the importance of cities in the global arena.
Andrea Noferini is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for European

Studies of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Adjunct
Professor at the Department of Political Science of Universitat Pompeu
Fabra. He holds a PhD in Politics and the Economics of Developing
Countries from Universitá degli Studi di Firenze and a MA in Political
Science from Universitat Pompeu Fabra. His research focuses on the
study of public policies and institutional reforms in Europe and Latin
America. His studies deal with participation mechanisms for regional
and local administrations in EU policymaking, the evaluation of pub-
lic policies, territorial cooperation, cohesion policy, institutional and
administrative capacity building and decentralised cooperation.
Daniel Pejic is a Research Fellow and PhD researcher in the

Connected Cities Lab at the University of Melbourne. His research
explores the concept of city agency in global governance and sits at
CITIES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: FROM MULTILATERALISM TO MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM?

6
•81• 2021
the intersection of international relations and urban politics. Daniel’s
current research is focused on the role of cities as actors in global
migration governance and the rescaling of the politics of migration.
He has also held a number of professional research roles and leader-
ship positions, working to communicate and translate evidence into
policy for non-profit organisations, federal, state and local govern-
ments in Australia.
Lorena Zárate is a founding member of the Global Platform for

the Right to the City and part of its support team. She is the former
President of the Habitat International Coalition (2011–2019) and was
also Coordinator of the HIC-Latin America office (2003–2011). Her
academic training includes history, pedagogy and political econo-
my, and her current interests revolve around feminist, anti-racist and
decolonial theories and practices with a particular focus on the terri-
torial, urban and municipal dimensions. Born and raised in La Plata,
Argentina, she lived for several years in Mexico City and now resides
in Ottawa, Canada.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

7
•81• 2021
ABSTRACTS
From multilateralism to multi-stakeholder alliances: cities

shift from rhetoric to politics on the international stage
For decades now, cities have been trying to open up a space in the struc-
tures of global and regional governance. Yet, beyond achieving growing
recognition, their capacity for influencing traditional multilateralism is
still more symbolic than effective and does not clearly result in improved
answers and solutions offered to citizens. However, the alliances cities
have been forging with other stakeholders in the international scene,
running parallel to the structures of multilateral governance, are acquir-
ing significant visibility while also showing considerable potential for
mobilising resources and bringing about changes. Based on a twofold
analysis, global and European, this article studies the extent to which the
efforts of cities and their networks to join formal multilateralism have a
limited track record, as well as the degree to which the commitment to
creating multi-stakeholder alliances is more able to produce measurable
results although it confronts major challenges in terms of legitimacy and
accountability.
Global cities, world order and post-pandemic futures

Simon Curtis
Although the long term impact of Covid-19 on the world’s cities cannot
yet be known, what we can see is how the pandemic is interacting with
existing trends and forces that are shaping both cities and the wider
international system of which they are a part. Covid-19 will not trans-
form cities permanently on its own. Instead, its short-term effects will
interact with deep-lying structural transformative trends that are already
playing themselves out in our cities. This article examines this intersec-
tion, and suggests the pandemic also represents an opportunity for
different political actors to struggle to shape the future of cities.
The table wobbles: cities and a faltering multilateral order

Ian Klaus
Over two years in 2015–2016, United Nations member states adopted

four outcome documents that together amounted to a de facto interna-
tional development agenda. Over the last four years, these agreements
and the wider agenda they constitute have come under new pressure.
Most notably, nationalist governments have targeted the agenda as a
threat to sovereignty. Meanwhile, a number of non-governmental organ-
isations, subnational governments and national governments have noted
that the agenda is no longer sufficiently ambitious to address global
challenges. Finally, the health, social and economic effects of COVID-19
have recently rendered many of the agenda’s most visible goals more
difficult to achieve. Stakeholders have walked a narrow strategic line in
9
•81• 2021
the face of these pressures: affirming the agenda while subtly tweaking
their policy practice and rhetoric around the agreements according to
historic events.
Cities and international law: legally invisible or rising soft-

power actors?
Elif Durmuş
Traditional state-centric international law does not recognise local

government as “subjects” of international law. But this is merely
one understanding of international law, which is in itself not static.
A pluralist, multistakeholder understanding recognises the increased
engagement of local governments with international law and gover-
nance in the last decades. Meanwhile, even traditional international law
has the tools to recognise – albeit very slowly – new actors that emerge
in the field and declare them to enjoy legal personality. Legal personality
is then determined by the assessment of the de facto engagement of
the new actor in the international legal system. This means that local
governments, deliberately or not, have been taking just the right steps
by accumulating experience and demonstrating fluency and competence
in implementing, negotiating and contesting international law; and
accustoming other, more traditional actors of the international commu-
nity to their presence in the field.
The role of cities in a reformed UN: towards the institutio-

nalisation of the World Assembly of Local and Regional
Governments
Marta Galceran-Vercher
The UN marks its 75th anniversary amid growing calls for the reform
of multilateralism. The international municipalism has been advocating
for this reform since its inception. Two of the most noteworthy propos-
als are obtaining permanent observer status at the General Assembly
and institutionalising the World Assembly of Local and Regional
Governments (WALRG). Despite some progress over the last decades,
most initiatives remain more symbolic than real. Significant challenges
therefore still lie ahead. Further institutionalising the WALRG would
require rethinking its current governance scheme, especially its level of
representativity and the role played by associations of local and regional
governments.
Is something better than nothing? Multi-level governance

and the European Committee of the Regions in EU policy-
making
Andrea Noferini
In an even more uncertain world, many voices are calling for radi-
cal change in the governance models of development policies. The
European Union – like the 2030 Agenda – has recognised the need for
local and regional authorities (LRAs) to pay a greater role in defining and
implementing public policies. This paper addresses three fundamental
questions: a) when and why LRAs became central to EU policymaking;
b) how LRAs can take part in EU policymaking; and, finally, c) the extent
to which the European Committee of the Regions adequately frames
LRA representation in EU policymaking. The analysis focuses on the

10
•81• 2021
European Committee of the Regions, the youngest of the EU’s consti-
tutional organs, and a singular supranational body that allows LRAs to
participate in the formal legislative process of the EU’s multi-level political
and policy system.
Towards an ecology of knowledges for global politics: civil

society and local government alliances in Habitat III
Eva Garcia-Chueca, Lorena Zárate
The shift from traditional multilateralism to increased multi-stakeholder

governance is gaining momentum in international relations. In this sce-
nario it is necessary to ask what the implications and limits of the model
are, and also who will benefit and who will be left out. With a view to
advancing towards greater transparency and legitimacy of multi-stake-
holder governance, this article explores the possibility of constructing
it from below through horizontal dialogues (ecology of knowledges) in
which civil society and local government can take part with full guaran-
tees of recognition. To this end, it analyses the coordination experience
of the Global Platform for the Right to the City (civil society) and United
Cities and Local Governments (cities network) under the auspices of the
UN’s Habitat III summit. The paper highlights the need to have mecha-
nisms, criteria, and principles that order multi-stakeholder governance so
that not only the voice of the strongest is listened to.
What’s next? New forms of city diplomacy and emerging

global urban governance
Anna Kosovac and Daniel Pejic
Everyday urban governance is taking on increasingly global dimensions,

leading city governments to expand their alignment with international
frameworks and engagement with global processes. While these activ-
ities are often driven or coordinated by dedicated international teams
within city governments, the global dimensions of urban governance are
expanding to include policy teams across local authorities and partners
working outside government, such as academic institutions, businesses
and philanthropies. This “glocalisation” may be producing new forms
of global urban governance operating both within and outside the
traditional multilateral system. Drawing on survey data from 47 cities
from around the world and a case study on the city of Amsterdam, this
chapter explores how new forms of city diplomacy interact with evolving
conceptions of multistakeholderism and the impact this may have on the
governance of global challenges.
ABSTRACTS
11
•81• 2021
INTRODUCTION

Senior researcher and director of the Global Cities Programme,
CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs)
Part-time Lecturer in International Relations, Pompeu Fabra University
C
ities have been advocating for a seat at the global table for
decades. They are part and parcel of the international sys-
tem, yet they remain structurally powerless and virtually
invisible under international law. Global governance structures have
been designed by and for nation-states, and they leave little room for
the involvement of other stakeholders, including local governments.
Since the 1990s, some advances have been made in formalising the role
of cities in the architecture of global and regional governance, especially
within the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). Yet, for the
most part, they remain more symbolic than effective, and the system is
crying out for thorough reform.
Meanwhile, the global management of the COVID-19 pandemic and

other social, economic and ecological crises has been marred by a pro-
found lack of international cooperation, throwing the need to revamp
multilateralism into stark relief. These developments have also revealed
that if international processes and structures are to solve global prob-
lems, they need to be anchored in the multistakeholder reality of the
global policy ecosystem. Recently, “multistakeholderism” has emerged
as a seemingly more inclusive global governance framework and an
alternative to the limitations of traditional multilateralism. Bringing
together state and non-state actors with shared interests and concerns,
multistakeholderism is driven by pragmatism and the willingness to
collaborate on solutions. But, will it deliver on its promises of becom-
ing a more democratic and effective governance framework? And to
what extent does this reform context offer an opportunity for cities to
strengthen their global voice and role?
Contribution of this volume
This edited volume seeks to contribute to the policy and academic dis-
course on the reform of the multilateral system by unpacking the role
of cities and their networks in global and regional governance, spelling
out the policy implications, and making recommendations on how cit-
ies could gain greater global leverage beyond symbolism. In particular,
13
•81• 2021
it addresses the tensions and complementarity between two evolving
pathways for bringing urban interests and expertise to the global stage.
On the one hand is the long-standing ambition of the international
municipalism movement to reform the UN system. On the other is the
enhancement of new forms of global urban governance operating out-
side the traditional multilateral system, which may be depicted as an
inchoate form of multistakeholderism.
The volume opens with an article by Agustí Fernández de Losada, in

which the author critically examines the extent to which the efforts of
cities and their networks to reform multilateralism are little more than
rhetorical wrappings and may be short-sighted. Conversely, the alliances
they have been forging with other international stakeholders (i.e. philan-
thropies, the private sector, civil society) may hold greater potential to
generate an impact on the ground and transform urban localities for the
better. However, these multistakeholder alliances may face democratic
challenges as they are led by actors other than cities with greater capaci-
ty to set agendas and draw up urban transformations and solutions. This
introduction is followed by other seven contributions organised in three
parts.
Cities and the global order
The first part of the monograph sets out the opportunities and lim-
itations of cities’ political agency within the current global order and
its primary normative framework: international law. Simon Curtis
posits that global cities, as we know them today, are the product of a
historically specific form of liberal order, underpinned by a particular
configuration of geopolitical power. They are also intrinsically linked
to a distinct era of globalisation. The future of cities (and their global
political agency) will thus be formed at the intersection of the deep-lying
structural transformative trends playing out in the broader international
system in which they are embedded. The author analyses them through
three dimensions: globalisation, global governance and geopolitics.
While COVID-19 will not transform cities permanently, it will accelerate
some of the trends already in place.
However, it is not only the world order that seems to be reconfiguring

itself, but the guiding principle of global governance itself: multilat-
eralism. Ian Klaus addresses the troubling state of multilateralism by
examining how the four agreements that constitute the wider agenda
on international development, and most notably the 2030 Agenda,
have come under strain. The author shows that the most visible climate
or development goals have been rendered either significantly more
challenging to achieve or in need of reconsideration. While cities are
stepping into the breach to deliver upon the global goals (for example
their localised actions and the development of reporting mechanisms),
such multistakeholder approaches are unlikely to be able to fully fill a
gap left by the lack of ambition of important member states. And this,
Klaus argues, will have consequences for both cities and the internation-
al system in which they are seeking a seat at the table.
The law is another area of state-centricity. Indeed, Elif Durmuş notes

that as international law has traditionally been seen as an exclusively

14
•81• 2021
inter-state endeavour, it does not recognise local governments as sub-
jects. Yet, Durmuş contends, this does not reflect the developments of
world affairs today. Actorness in international law is tied to the acqui-
sition of functional legal personality, meaning holding legal rights and
duties, but also participating in law-making. Over the last three decades,
cities and their associations have been engaging with international nor-
mative frameworks, partaking in inter-governmental negotiations and
creating local-centric norms and governance mechanisms. Through these
initiatives, cities may be taking steps in the right direction to gain the
de facto recognition as global actors that, for the moment, they are still
denied de jure.
Empowering cities in a reformed multilateral sys-

tem
For cities to gain greater leverage within the global governance system,
its legal structures, institutions and norms need to be rewired. As Marta
Galceran-Vercher shows, this root and branch reform has been on the
agenda of the international municipalism since its inception. Two very
specific proposals are on the table: getting permanent observer status
before the UN General Assembly and institutionalising a mechanism
for a permanent and structured dialogue between cities and national
governments within the UN system: the World Assembly of Local and
Regional Governments (WALRG). While on paper these initiatives seem
like a remarkable step forward, their real efficacy in helping cities move
beyond mere symbolism is questioned. Significant challenges still lie
ahead, notably with regards to the WALRG’s level of representativity and
the role city networks should play in it.
To further examine the prospects and viability of a more formalised role

for cities within the UN, Andrea Noferini draws on the EU’s experience.
Specifically, the European Committee of the Regions is the world’s most
advanced governance scheme for channelling the voices of local and
regional governments (LRGs) in policymaking processes. This formal
mechanism allows LRGs to participate in the EU’s legislative process, but
it has serious weaknesses and limitations due to the heterogeneity of its
members, its consultative character and the non-binding nature of its
opinions. This raises questions not only about whether the replication
of this model at global level is feasible but whether it is desirable. A key
lesson emerges from this discussion and analysis: formal recognition
should not be equated with enhanced influence on global or regional
governance.
Multistakeholderism and other forms of global

urban agency
The third part of the monograph explores alternative pathways for cities
to engage in global politics to those currently available under intergov-
ernmental multilateralism. Eva Garcia-Chueca and Lorena Zárate
critically appraise the virtues and limits of multistakeholderism as a more
inclusive global governance framework, particularly focusing on who
benefits from this model and who loses out or is excluded. This is exam-
ined through the analysis of the involvement of the Global Platform for
INTRODUCTION
15
•81• 2021
the Right to the City and United Cities and Local Governments in the
Habitat III summit. While this landmark event provided an opportunity
for civil society and local governments to participate in the intergovern-
mental process, it also revealed important shortcomings and inequalities.
To ensure that all voices are heard, multistakeholderism should be built
from below through horizontal dialogues (ecology of knowledges) in
which all stakeholders are treated on the same footing.
Along similar lines, Anna Kosovac and Daniel Pejic explore how new
forms of city diplomacy interact with evolving conceptions of multis-
takeholderism. Drawing on survey data from 47 cities from around the
world and a case study on the city of Amsterdam, the authors show that
it is now standard practice for local authorities to engage in partnerships
with philanthropies, universities and the private sector to access resourc-
es, knowledge and expertise. These alliances may be producing new
forms of global urban governance operating both within and outside
the traditional multilateral system.

16
•81• 2021
FROM MULTILATERALISM TO MULTI-STAKEHOLDER
ALLIANCES: CITIES SHIFT FROM RHETORIC TO POLITICS ON
THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE

Senior researcher and director of the Global Cities Programme,
CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs)
I. Influencing global agendas. A matter of respon-

sibility
The commitment of city governments to influence international politi-

cal agendas is not a new phenomenon, although it has intensified with
globalisation, the growing importance of sustainable development, and
accelerating processes of urbanisation. The various municipalist plat-
forms working in the international arena are concerned, among other
matters, to advance the interests of cities and urban citizens before the
multilateral bodies.
Indeed, international agreements have an increasingly direct impact on

local realities and determine many of the policies promoted by city gov-
ernments. Having an influence in these agreements cannot and should
not be seen as an option but as part of the responsibility of local leaders.
Nevertheless, in a setting that is still greatly monopolised by the nation
states, and in which new actors with greater capacity to set the agenda
are emerging, the possibilities for cities to influence international pol-
icy making are very limited. They have managed to gain some level of
recognition and urbanisation is now widely acknowledged as a critical
global challenge. However, they have not been able to shape global
agreements in such a way as to enable the environment in which they
operate to provide better solutions for their citizens.
Starting with a brief overview of the channels available to cities for associ-
ating with multilateral bodies, in Europe and at the global level, this article
aims to ascertain the extent to which they are managing to move beyond
mere rhetoric and to shape the international political agenda. In the last
few decades cities have focused on attaining recognition and visibility at
the symbolic level. Yet, the pressing challenges they face demand that they
should move towards result-driven action in order to bring about mea-
surable improvements in the policies and solutions they are promoting in
their local communities. In its analysis of the wide range of traditional and
multistakeholder platforms available to cities for intervening in the inter-
national arena, the article draws attention to some of the challenges that
might arise in terms of relevance, legitimacy, and accountability.
17
•81• 2021
II. Cities and the EU: an institutionalised but diffuse
connection
For decades now, European cities have been trying to influence policies
pursued by the European Union (EU). Mainly through the Structural and
Cohesion Funds, but also through other financial programmes, the EU
International has been increasing its presence in the local sphere, situating itself behind
agreements have an the main urban infrastructure projects, the most advanced development
increasingly direct strategies, and the most transformative innovations. An agenda seeking to
strengthen the urban dimension of European policies has gradually been
impact on local realities
taking shape. It is constructed on the basis of intergovernmental agree-
and determine many of ments that make up the present European urban acquis, with the Leipzig
the policies promoted Charter on Sustainable European Cities1 (2007) and the Pact of Amsterdam
by city governments. (2016), through which the Urban Agenda for the EU2 is adopted, as its
most notable components.
Having an influence
in these agreements However, although some progress has been made, there is still a long
cannot and should not way to go before the EU places urban challenges at the heart of its polit-
be seen as an option ical agenda. The weight of cities is still relatively slight, especially when
compared with other actors like regions. Nevertheless, they do have
but as part of the
well-defined mechanisms for channelling their contributions. The European
responsibility of local Committee of the Regions3 (CoR) offers cities and regions an institution-
leaders. alised channel to make their voice heard. Besides this consultative body,
cities also use informal channels through which they manage a dense and
dynamic network of institutional and professional relations that give rise to
effective collaborative links.
The existence of a consultative institution that represents regions and cities

in the institutional framework of a multilateral organisation like the EU is,
without a doubt, a very significant innovation. Yet almost three decades
after it was established in 1994, the Committee has shown that its ability
to influence in the EU’s legislative processes is limited (see Noferini in this
volume). Several factors might explain this limited power, including the
non-binding nature of the reports the Committee issues, the wide range
of interests that arise when regional and local governments are brought
together in the same chamber, and the increasingly noticeable absence
of big cities. In any case, all of these factors can be explained on the basis
of one common denominator: the reluctance of national governments to
share power.
1. See https://ec.europa.eu/regio- It is undeniable that the Committee can place issues on the agenda and
nal_policy/archive/themes/urban/
leipzig_charter.pdf
that it has the legitimacy to be involved in the definition of policies present-
2. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/eu-regio- ed by the EU in certain areas that have repercussions at regional or local
nal-and-urban-development/topics/ level. But it is also true that cities are increasingly opting to channel their
cities-and-urban-development/urban-
aspirations through their own networks or by establishing direct links with
agenda-eu_en
3. See https://cor.europa.eu/en European institutions. On certain occasions, the European Commission even
4. See https://www.covenantofmayors. sidelines the Committee when establishing forums for dialogue with cities,
eu/ for example the EU Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy4 or the Policy
5. See https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/
Forum on Development5.
policy-forum-development
6. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/
recovery-plan-europe_en Access to post-COVID-19 recovery and resilience funds launched by
7. See: https://eurocities.eu/ the EU through the Next Generation EU6 package provides a very good
wp-content/uploads/2020/10/202010-
Letter-from-European-Mayors-on-
example of this. In a letter7 sent in November 2020 to the presidents
the-EU%E2%80%99s-Recovery-and- of the Parliament, the Commission, and the Council, the mayors of
Resilience-Facility.pdf some of the larger European cities demanded that 10% of the total
FROM MULTILATERALISM TO MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ALLIANCES:

18 CITIES SHIFT FROM RHETORIC TO POLITICS ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE
•81• 2021
funds should be reserved for direct management by local governments.
Beyond the importance of the initiative, what is significant here is the
fact that the mayors did not channel this demand through the European
Committee of the Regions, which has barely said a word about the mat-
ter. Using the main city networks, they established direct communication
with the EU institutions in order to be heard.
Although some
progress has been
III. From being invisible to being partners (with made, there is still a
limited powers) long way to go before
Beyond Europe, the connection of cities with global agendas began to the EU places urban
take shape with the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.8 On challenges at the heart
this occasion, the commitment of the United Nations (UN) to sustainable of its political agenda.
development and closer engagement with issues of relevance at the local
level—the environment, inequalities, poverty, housing, urban space, et
cetera—was made explicit. However, it was not until twenty years later
that the universality of global agendas in the framework of the Post-
20159 process situated cities at a different point. Indeed, in a context
of shared challenges and interdependencies it was possible to upscale
to the global negotiating tables issues of great importance for them,
regardless of their level of development.
Cities approach to global agendas has been accompanied by a most

remarkable effort to occupy a seat at the UN negotiating table. This
endeavour has taken them from total invisibility to being seen as relevant
stakeholders, joining one of the Major Groups 10that resulted from the
Earth Summit of 1992. And going one step further, they have attained
a special status allowing them to take part in deliberative processes,
although without vote, within UN Habitat, the agency specialising in
human settlements (Garcia-Chueca, 2020; Galceran-Vercher in this vol-
ume). Nevertheless, they have not managed to extend this status to the
core organs of the UN, as has been repeatedly demanded by mainstream
8. United Nations Conference on
voices of the international scene.11 Environment and Development,
3-14 June 1992. See https://www.
At this point, the commitment cities have made to operate by speak- un.org/en/conferences/environment/
ing with one voice in the framework of the multilateral system should rio1992
9. T h e P o s t - 2 0 1 5 D e v e l o p m e n t
be noted. The process of merging the main international municipalist Agenda is a process that arose
networks in 2004 had situated United Cities and Local Governments12 from Rio+20 and is the origin of
(UCLG) as the main interlocutor with the UN. But in the context of a the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
constantly expanding ecosystem of international networks of cities Development.
10. See https://www.global-taskforce.
(Fernández de Losada and Abdullah, 2019; Acuto and Rayner, 2016), org/local-authorities-major-group
the creation in 2013 of the Global Taskforce of Local and Regional 11. United Nations (UN). Strengthening
Governments, a consultative and coordination mechanism bringing of the United Nations system.
Report of the Panel of Eminent
together the main networks, placed cities and local governments in a
Persons on United Nations-Civil
scenario of greater authority and legitimacy for being listened to and Society Relations. A/58/817. See
taken into account. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/PDF/
N0437641.pdf?OpenElement . Also,
However, all these efforts have not led to a more effective capacity to
the report by the High Level Group
influence political agendas. Over the years, urban issues have gained of eminent personalities, created
relevance in international regulations, cities have been acknowledged by Kofi Annan in 2004, which pro-
and are consulted, but they are still a long way from participating in posed that the UCLG should be
recognised as an advisory body
decision-making processes. Member states have been and continue to to the Secretary General and the
be unanimous in their firm belief that local authorities and the rest of General Assembly.
accredited organisations should play an advisory, but not decision-mak- 12. See https://www.uclg.org/
AGUSTÍ FERNÁNDEZ DE LOSADA

19
•81• 2021
ing, role in any interaction with the UN (Birch, 2017). The drive to
achieve a status of greater recognition has not enabled cities to leave
the fringes of the multilateral system and acquire a more central role.
IV. Yielding more symbolic than effective influence

Cities approach to
global agendas has In fact, although cities have achieved undisputed recognition, their ability
been accompanied by a to influence traditional multilateralism is still more symbolic than effec-
tive without any clear impact in terms of improvement in the responses
most remarkable effort
and solutions that they offer to citizens. There can be no doubt that
to occupy a seat at the regulations arising from international agendas are increasingly express-
UN negotiating table. ing a clear acknowledgement of the importance of urbanising processes
(Kosovac, Acuto, and Jones, 2020). But cities are still focusing more on
“being part” and placing items on the agenda than on improving the
quality of texts that are approved at the international level by drawing on
their own priorities and realities to inform the decisions taken.
Some of the more significant achievements of cities in the international

arena in recent years clearly illustrate this reality. The inclusion of SDG 11
on sustainable cities in the framework of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development13 is fruit of an extraordinary advocacy campaign led by
a very strong multi-stakeholder alliance consisting of cities, multilat-
eral and national agencies, and transnational civil society, as well as
philanthropic and knowledge sector organisations. However, deploy-
ment of the targets around which the SDG was organised is still more
in response to the national than to the local standpoint, approaching
urban challenges in an aseptic way without including critical issues
like recognition of local autonomy, demands for improvement of local
financing systems, or multilevel organisation. SDG 11 has the virtue of
existing, of placing on the table matters that are essential for cities (as
almost all of the SGD do), but it does not include specific formula for
enabling the regulatory and institutional environments in which they
operate.
Another good example is the mention of the right to the city as a shared
ideal of the New Urban Agenda (section 11). This is an achievement
resulting from the negotiating efforts of many actors—local govern-
ment, civil society, academia—whose inclusion in the Agenda had met
with stiff resistance from the national governments. However, the text
approved in Quito does not display the concept in all its complexity—as
it is cited only once and in isolation—but presents it with a significant
lack of internal coherence. If the idea of the right to the city recognis-
es the social function of the city, this is not expressed in a text that is
clearly guided by the logic of sustainable economic growth (Fernández
de Losada and Garcia-Chueca, 2018; Garcia-Chueca and Zárate in this
volume).
The link with global agendas has also served cities to mark out political
13. See https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda positions in the national sphere. In the United States, for example, the
14. See https://unfccc.int/process-and- commitment of the main cities to the climate agenda set out in the Paris
meetings/the-paris-agreement/ Agreement14 on climate change and the migratory agenda stemming
the-paris-agreement
15. See https://www.un.org/en/conf/
from the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration15 has
migration/global-compact-for-safe- led to confrontation with the Trump administration. The paradox is that
orderly-regular-migration.shtml cities have based their opposition to the decisions of the federal govern-

•81• 2021
ment on the basis of compliance with agreements in whose design they
have barely participated.
However, in addition to responding to the agendas promoted by states

and multilateral organisms, cities have also been proactive in placing sen-
sitive issues on the international agenda. In 2018, a group that included
some of the world’s main cities spearheaded a declaration aiming at pro- Over the years,
moting the right to adequate housing in the right to the city framework. urban issues have
The manifesto “Cities for Adequate Housing. Municipalist Declaration of gained relevance
Local Governments for the Right to Housing and the Right to the City16”
in international
was backed by the commitment of the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Housing, operative support from the UCLG, and a privileged regulations, cities have
audience in its presentation at the UN High Level Political Forum in 2018. been acknowledged
Yet, despite the power of the political message they managed to convey and are consulted, but
and the relevance of the specific measures they suggested, the initiative
they are still a long
has not had any impact in terms of legislative changes at the national
level or in boosting the capacity of local governments for regulating the way from participating
very complex housing market. in decision-making
processes.
The difficulties cities are having in moving beyond the symbolic dimen-
sion and attaining concrete results from their advocacy efforts in the
international arena are also the result of the lack of binding power of
most of the institutions linked to traditional multilateralism. The system
of outcome documents17 making up the global sustainable develop-
ment agenda provides a good example of this. Their relevance is also
highly symbolic inasmuch as they offer a framework of reference for all
stakeholders, but they do not provide for processes of legislative trans-
position, sanctions, or mechanisms of accountability. At a time like the
present, when the crisis caused by COVID-19 has further exacerbated
the crisis of multilateralism, and new forms of power are emerging, the
limitations inherent to the system are becoming an important factor that
cities should take into account.
V. New spaces of power and multi-stakeholder

partnerships
Indeed, the multilateral arena is becoming increasingly extensive and
complex. The bodies linked with traditional multilateralism share spac-
es with others appearing in the domain of a new multilateralism with
emerging powers and less institutionalised forms of organisation. The
consolidation of mechanisms like the G20 and the BRIC group, plat-
forms like the World Economic Forum, and projects like the Belt and
Road Initiative promoted by China are staging the process of mutation in
which the world order is presently immersed.
Cities are not immune to this reality and, in parallel with their contin-
ued efforts to associate with or influence the UN and the European
16. See https://citiesforhousing.org/
Union, they are also approaching these new areas of power. In this
17. Including the 2030 Agenda for
regard, it should be asked whether their ability to influence this new less Sustainable Development, the New
institutionalised reality is greater than what they have shown in the tradi- Urban Agenda, the Addis Ababa
tional forums or whether, on the contrary, they are still restrained by the Action Agenda on Financing for
Development, the Paris Agreement
unchanging leverage of national governments and other stakeholders on Climate Change and the Sendai
like transnational corporations, which have gained considerable muscle Framework for Disaster Risk
with regard to the international agenda. Reduction.

21
•81• 2021
One of the platforms that best illustrates this new reality is Urban
2018 (U20), a mechanism launched in 2017 by the mayors of Buenos
Aires and Paris and convened by the C4019 and UCLG. This is a tool of
urban diplomacy bringing together mayors of the world’s main cities
with the aim of making recommendations to the G20. It operates by
means of a scheme of association with a wide range of knowledge
Cities are still focusing partners which offer advice and knowledge. As Klaus wrote (2018),
more on “being part” it stems “from a realization that cities cannot act alone to solve global
and placing items challenges like climate change and income inequality. And it reflects
the fundamental truth that nation-states cannot solve those problems
on the agenda than
without working hand-in-hand with cities”. In some sense, “the U20
on improving the is part of a larger effort to evolve the global order, including the G20,
quality of texts that to reflect the reality of power in the twenty-first century and to meet
are approved at the its challenges” (Klaus, 2018).
international level by
It is still too early to measure the effective ability cities have had for
drawing on their own influencing the G20 agenda. However, there are signs of a growing
priorities and realities interest in urban challenges. At least this is suggested by the G20 Global
to inform the decisions Smart Cities Alliance20, an initiative launched by the Japanese presiden-
cy of the G20 in 2019 with operational and financial support from the
taken.
World Economic Forum. The Alliance, which brings together the main
city networks, national governments, and a significant constellation of
academic and economic actors from around the world, aims to promote
responsible and ethical use of technologies in cities by establishing a
regulatory framework of reference with a view to fast-tracking best
practices, mitigating potential risks, and fostering greater openness and
public trust.
This is a clear indication of the interest the urban domain has awak-
ened among the most influential global economic operators like the
World Economic Forum. Similar interest has been shown by the world’s
leading philanthropic institutions, including Bloomberg Philanthropies,
the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, and Open Society, which are
supporting some of the platforms with the greatest presence in the
global urban ecosystem. Indeed, platforms like the C40, the Resilient
Cities Network21, and the Mayors Migration Council22 approach city
interests by building global multi-stakeholder alliances with key actors
in the private sector, knowledge based institutions, and national and
international agencies. These partnerships enable them to access
knowledge, innovation, and funds and increase their capacity to set
the agenda.
Although from the standpoint of differing logics, urbanising processes

are also part of the international positioning strategies of some of the
leading global powers. The Belt and Road Initiative, one of the pillars
of China’s project of global expansion, has the potential to redraw
the urban reality in many countries of the world (Curtis and Mayer,
2020). This massive effort of infrastructure investment, which is being
18. See https://www.c40knowledgehub.
introduced in practically every region of the planet poses enormous
org/s/article/Urban-20-
U20?language=en_US challenges for cities, while also conditioning their development. Beijing
19. See https://www.c40.org/ is setting out the parameters in which the initiative operates and the
20. See https://globalsmartcitiesalliance. investment priorities. However, the Chinese government is not exactly
org/?page_id=107
21. See https://resilientcitiesnetwork.org/
flexible, so cities that want to be part of the Belt and Road Initiative
22. See https://www. must accept the rules of the game. Not doing so would mean paying a
mayorsmigrationcouncil.org/ hefty price in terms of their positioning and competitiveness.

•81• 2021
It seems clear that moving forward within a multi-stakeholder scheme
would make it possible to mobilise resources and capacities that are
not within reach of platforms that operate on the basis of homogenous
affiliation, such as UCLG, Metropolis23, and ICLEI24 - Local Governments
for Sustainability. Their resources and capacities allow them to count on
highly professionalised teams to promote innovative, high-impact initia-
tives, and to acquire considerable visibility and recognition (Fernández The multi-stakeholder
de Losada and Abdullah, 2019). This capacity for impact contributes approach raises no
towards mobilising the most relevant and politically influential leaders. small number of
The notable involvement of the mayors of the world’s main cities in the
questions that require
work of C40 clearly testifies to this.
careful attention.
Nevertheless, the multi-stakeholder approach raises no small number of
questions that require careful attention. Economic dependence on philan-
thropic organisations or large private corporations—by contrast with the
independence supposedly enjoyed by fee-based traditional networks—
can give rise to considerable doubts that must be tackled. Do these
organisations effectively respond to a city-led approach? Who sets the
agenda? What priorities do they respond to? To whom are they account-
able? What mechanisms of democratic control are they subject to? The
mayors who, attracted by an undeniable capacity to deliver results, are
presently leading these multi-stakeholder platforms should address ques-
tions which, sooner or later, could undermine their legitimacy.
VI. Going beyond rhetoric to reinforce democratic

legitimacy in international action
The analysis carried out in the present text shows that cities have
achieved recognition in the international scene which nobody disputes
anymore. This may happen within the framework of traditional multilat-
eralism with a status which, varying in accordance with the institutional
context, keeps them situated on the margins of the system; or it could
be in the context of the new multilateralism, where they operate in
keeping with a multi-stakeholder scheme together with other actors,
both governmental and private, with considerable capacity for mobilising
resources and knowledge.
However, this recognition does not imply greater ability to effectively

influence the international agenda. Although cities are increasingly
able to place issues on the table, doubts remain about their capacity
to exert anything more than symbolic influence, and to transcend
rhetoric to produce substantial policy changes in these agendas
(Fernández de Losada, 2018). Such changes should respond to their
priorities and provide the solutions they need in order to enable the
institutional and regulatory environments in which they operate. Yet,
they keep coming up against resistance from national governments
in the spaces of traditional multilateralism, and the interests of other
stakeholders with a growing capacity to set the agenda within the
new multilateralism.
In times of crisis and emergency like the present, when citizens are
calling for effective solutions, cities must be able to present mea-
surable results deriving from their efforts to have an influence in 23. See https://www.metropolis.org/
international agendas. Symbolism and rhetoric have played their part 24. See https://iclei.org/

23
•81• 2021
on the way to acquiring a consolidated presence in the international
domain. This is no longer the case. Having greater knowledge of the
impacts of their international action should be turned into a demand
that legitimises it. And the same applies to advancing in a framework
of accountability that reinforces citizen commitment and democratic
control. Obtaining measurable results is crucial. But these results must
respond to the priorities and needs, interests and aspirations of cities
and their citizens. Not to those defined by other actors. To understand
it otherwise could pervert the democratic logic that must inspire the
international action of cities.
References
Acuto, M., Rayner, S. “City networks: breaking gridlocks or forging

(new) lock-ins?”, International Affairs, vol. 92, nº 5, September 2016,
pp. 1147-1166.
Birch, E. More than Window Dressing? Stakeholders and Participants in

the UN Global Agreements on Development. Penn: Current Research on
Sustainable Urban Development, 2018.
Curtis, S., Mayer, M. “Belt and Road Cities Begin to Find Their Form”.
CIDOB opinion, 01.07.2020 (online), 630 [Accessed on 12.12.2020]:
https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/2020/
belt_and_road_cities_begin_to_find_their_form
Fernández de Losada, A., Abdullah, H. Rethinking the Ecosystem of

International City Networks: Challenges and Opportunities. CIDOB
Monograph. Barcelona: CIDOB, 2019.
Fernández de Losada, A. “From Rhetoric to Politics: Can Cities Gain

Influence upon Global Agendas?” Istituto per gli studi di política inter-
nazionale (ISPI), 06.11.2018 (online) [Accessed on 05.01.2020]: https://
www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/rhetoric-politics-can-cities-gain-influ-
ence-upon-global-agendas-21555
Fernández de Losada, A., Garcia-Chueca, E. “Repensando las ciudades

globales desde el municipalismo internacional y el derecho a la ciudad”.
In Fàbregues, F., Farrés, O. (coord.). Anuario Internacional 2018. Nueva
época. Perfil de país: Francia. Barcelona: CIDOB, 2018, p. 41-49.
Garcia-Chueca, E. “Una mayor inclusión de los gobiernos locales hará

más efectiva la ONU”, in Bargués, Pol. (coord.) La ONU a los 75: repen-
sando el multilateralismo. CIDOB Report nº 6. Barcelona: CIDOB, 2020,
p. 83-92.
Klaus, I. “The Urban 20: A Contemporary Diplomatic History”.

Diplomatic Courier World in 2050’s, 02.10.2018 (online), [Accessed on
23.12.2020]: https://www.cocreate.world/articles/the-urban-20-a-con-
temporary-diplomatic-history
Kosovac, A., Acuto, M., Jones, T. L. “Acknowledging Urbanization: A

Survey of the Role of Cities in UN Frameworks”. Global Policy, vol. 11,
nº 3, February 2020, pp. 293-304.

•81• 2021
CITIES AND THE GLOBAL ORDER
• GLOBAL CITIES, WORLD ORDER AND POST-PANDEMIC

FUTURES
Simon Curtis
• THE TABLE WOBBLES: CITIES AND A FALTERING

MULTILATERAL ORDER
Ian Klaus
• CITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGALLY INVISIBLE

OR RISING SOFT-POWER ACTORS?
Elif Durmuş
25
GLOBAL CITIES, WORLD ORDER AND POST-PANDEMIC
FUTURES
Simon Curtis
Senior Lecturer in International Relations,
University of East Anglia and Senior Fellow on Global Cities
at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs
T
he long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the develop-
ment of the world’s cities is not yet known. But as with previous
outbreaks of disease throughout history, it will be felt in the ways
infrastructure and urban planners adapt to the spread of the disease. Just
as the cholera outbreaks of the 19th century accelerated moves to sewerage
systems and new sanitation infrastructure and practices in cities, so the leg-
acy of this 21st century pandemic will reshape urban form. Already we are
seeing varied responses: in some cities transportation is being remodelled
by the rapid implementation of new cycling networks; in others existing
agendas are being brought forward, such as Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo’s
“15-minute city”, where all the goods and services people need are placed
within walking distance of their homes; urban greening trends have
accelerated (e.g. Boston’s “Big Dig”); existing shifts towards surveillance
technologies and the use of big data in cities have been extended; central
business districts have emptied in response to needs to physically distance
(placing question marks over their viability in the long term); and new local
community solidarity initiatives have emerged in response to the collective
challenges the pandemic poses (Safi, 2020).
But cities were already in the throes of decades-long transformations of

a profound nature before the virus struck. Although clearly an important
shaping force on society, COVID-19 will not transform cities permanently
on its own. Instead, its short-term effects will interact with deep-lying struc-
tural transformative trends that are already playing themselves out in our
cities, and in the wider international system in which cities are embedded.
It will accelerate some of those trends and retard others. The future of cities
will be made in the intersections of these trends, and by political actors that
can successfully bend long-term trends and short-term crises towards the
realisation of their own visions.
We might see the emergence of COVID-19 and its rapid transmission

around the world as offering an inflection point: drawing together multiple
strands in politics, society, economics, ecology and technology; laying bare
previously overlooked connections and conjunctures; offering a vantage
point from which to reflect on broader historical movements and shifts. The
advent of the virus has also acted as a catalyst: accelerating some develop-
27
•81• 2021
ments in cities that were already visible before the pandemic struck, such
as the implementation of digital technologies in the creation of “smart
cities”, the emerging tensions between major cities and the states in which
they are embedded, and prompting reflection on how to make cities more
socially just and environmentally sustainable.
COVID-19 will not At the same time, cities, states and societies have all had to adapt and
transform cities change in relation to the specific challenges the virus presents. COVID-19
permanently on its has paused the frenetic onward surge of urban life and given a chance
to reflect on broad trends. But while the virus alone is not enough to fully
own. Instead, its
recast the shape and direction of cities, it may be woven through and
short-term effects entwined with these trends, with its influence making certain futures more
will interact with probable and others less so. The future of global cities, their interplay and
deep-lying structural engagement with other powerful entities like states and international
organisations and broader geo-political, geo-economic and ecological forc-
transformative trends
es already posed pressing and open questions before the pandemic hit.
that are already playing
themselves out in our In this short discussion of these major transformative trends I make
cities, and in the wider use of the concept of the “global city” to denote a historically specific
urban form: a form that may be subject to transformation. The sociol-
international system
ogist Saskia Sassen (1991) introduced this concept to the discussion
in which cities are on urban change to describe a distinctive form of city whose features,
embedded. morphology and webs of global connectivity emerged in the late-1970s
in response to the restructuring of the global economy following the
collapse of the post-World War II Bretton Woods system. Global cities
are urban forms that are intrinsically and inseparably linked to the spe-
cific era of globalisation that followed from this economic restructuring.
Global cities were a product of the regulatory environment created at
this time (with its emphasis on free market exchange, privatisation,
deregulation and financialisation) and were shaped by the global flows
of deregulated capital that it set loose. They became its material expres-
sion (in the generation of new urban forms and infrastructures) and
came to shape the development and direction of globalisation itself.
But in these origins lies a further crucial point that is often missed by
many urban theorists. The global city has been made possible by a
particular configuration of geopolitics. Global cities are the product of
a historically specific form of liberal world order, underpinned by a his-
torically specific configuration of geopolitical power (Ikenberry, 2011).
Under the hegemony of the United States, a liberal, open trading order
has been fostered over the past four decades, underwritten by US
military power in the last resort, but providing a secure and stable envi-
ronment in which cities could begin to play important roles on the world
stage, firstly as economic actors and sites of economic power and, more
recently, as political players (Curtis, 2016). It is only in this stable global
environment that cities, long stripped of their military or defensive capa-
bilities, could begin to find their niche and to evolve.
Now this environment seems to be under threat from a number of differ-

ent sources. Losing the protection it afforded is likely to have profound
consequences for the viability of “global cities” as such. The US hege-
mony that underpins the system has been perceived to be in decline for
a decade, while other powers like China have risen, shifting the locus of
economic power to the east. But the advent of the Trump administration
and its inward-looking nativist policies has further exacerbated this per-
GLOBAL CITIES, WORLD ORDER AND POST-PANDEMIC FUTURES

28
•81• 2021
ception of decline, decay and abdication of international leadership. The
rising prominence of authoritarian states on the world stage, from China
to Iran, Russia, Turkey and Brazil, lends further weight to the idea that the
liberal moment is passing, as do the increasing prevalence of right-wing
movements across the world. Threats to the future of the European Union
also push in this direction – none more so than Britain’s decision to leave.
But the most important challenge to this configuration of world order is A divide has begun
the unresolved 2008 financial crisis, which swept away not only decades to emerge between
of growth, but also the ideological legitimacy of neoliberal capitalism – the global cities and the
very form of global economic organisation from which global cities drew
heartlands of the
their lifeblood. All of these are morbid symptoms of a system under great
strain. Even before the disaster of COVID-19 was inserted into this toxic territorial nation-states
mixture, the future of global cities, if we mean the specific form of city that in which they formed.
thrived in this now decaying environment, was under threat. The pandemic
further threatens to accelerate a decline in what is an open form of global
order, offering the prospect of borders, barriers and walls of various kinds
closing down the free movement of global flows.
However, even when such existential threats are real, the very fact of the
existence of global cities – novel urban forms not seen before in the histor-
ical record – has opened up new possibilities in the international system.
Global cities have original features, new capacities and capabilities and
a new weight on the world stage that have altered the nature of world
politics and global governance and offer novel possibilities, pathways and
futures for the evolution of international society. And this is necessary,
because in a world of transnational challenges, including global pandemics,
but also the climate emergency and the crises of global capitalism, cities’
capacities to help with global challenges via their globe-spanning networks,
leadership and agenda-setting capabilities, are going to be necessary. This
is a world in which states have struggled to deal with such challenges.
That makes cities acting together on the world stage a critical governance
resource – and one that needs to be better understood and defended.
In the space of this short essay I want to examine the intersection of three
dimensions of the transformation of cities before concluding with some
thoughts on what is at stake in the future evolution of global cities in a
post-pandemic world. These dimensions are: globalisation, global gover-
nance and geopolitics.
I. Globalisation
Globalisation produced global cities. But it has become apparent in the last
decade or so that globalisation has brought many problems in its wake and
that its future is unclear. Because global cities are products of the forces
that unleashed contemporary globalisation, especially in their reliance on
deregulated markets and global capital flows, they also exhibit, in their
very morphology and form, many of the tensions and contradictions of
globalisation (Curtis, 2019a). They become strategic sites where the more
abstract forces underpinning globalism reveal themselves in concrete form.
They focus and amplify systemic tensions. We have seen this in the way
social movements protesting globalisation choose global cities as their sites
of protest and resistance – the anti-globalisation protests of the 1990s and
early 2000s, and the Occupy movements of the post-2008 financial crisis
and austerity decade, for example.
SIMON CURTIS
29
•81• 2021
They also demonstrate these tensions in their very materiality: in the co-ex-
istence of poverty and great wealth within the same neighbourhoods,
or in the sprawling slums and informal settlements of developing world
cities, such as Sao Paulo or Delhi, which nestle close by the gated commu-
nities of the super-rich (Davis, 2006; Graham, 2016). Global expressions
of the “right to the city” movement have come into being, as urban
Cities and their citizens everywhere protest against the ways the inequalities of free mar-
leadership are able to ket, finance capital-led globalisation have been materialised in cities, and
exercise a new form demand more democratic control over how urban space is allocated and
used (Harvey, 2012).
of power on the world
stage: the ability to But it is not just the left that has problems with the orientation of global-
convene networks of isation. Now, with years of austerity beginning to bite, global cities, with
various actors. their cosmopolitan and open orientation, with their diverse populations
and multiple forms of identity, culture and belonging, have started to
come into conflict with the rise of nationalist and nativist feeling brought
by globalisation’s attendant uncertainties and destabilisation of tradition.
A divide has begun to emerge between global cities and the heartlands
of the territorial nation-states in which they formed. We have seen this in
voting patterns around Brexit and the election of US President Trump: a
clear preference in metropolitan areas for remain in the case of Brexit, and
for Democrat in the case of the US election in 2016. We have seen it in the
tensions between the Trump administration and US cities over Sanctuary
Cities and the rights and protections they afford migrants. We have seen it
in disagreements over the implementation of the Paris Agreement (Trump
repudiates it, while global city mayors say they will implement it). Recently,
we have seen it in debates about law and order in liberal US cities in the
wake of the Black Lives Matter protests.
Can this divide be healed, or will it continue to drive a wedge between

global cities and the nation-states in which they are historically embed-
ded? This becomes a hugely significant question for the post-pandemic
future, because global cities have begun to exhibit many new capabil-
ities and new forms of agency and power as they have evolved over
the last four decades of globalisation. These capabilities and forms of
agency and power may be particularly significant in a future in which
many transnational problems (themselves unleashed by globalisation)
are proving beyond the capacities of states to deal with, largely because
of structural limitations built into an international system based on ter-
ritorial sovereignty. The question is: will they be fostered, or will they be
crushed by the return of the state and the rise of nativist politics?
II. Global governance
Global cities first emerged as a functional requirement of a new form of

global economy. But many powerful cities are now moving to translate
their economic power into political influence on the world stage.
As the state drew back from allocating society’s productive resourc-

es in response to the new neoliberal paradigm, these decisions were
transferred into the hands of private actors: major firms or emerging
transnational corporations who located themselves within the central
business districts of global cities such as London, New York and Hong
Kong. This spurred the natural agglomeration economies that cities have

30
•81• 2021
always fostered; kickstarting decades of astonishing growth for these
key locales. Such cities drew upon their historical advantages – and the
new regulatory environment – to draw in wealth and concentrate power.
But now these cities have begun to seek power beyond the economic
sphere. The primary mechanism for exercising new political powers has
been unexpected, perhaps, but also fully in line with the ways global cities The decline of US
have evolved economically – via globe-spanning networks, connected by hegemony has been
digital information technology infrastructures. There has been a surge in mirrored by the rise
the growth of functional political networks connecting cities around the
of Chinese power
world. Today there are between 250–300 organised associations of cities
globally – the vast majority of which have been formed in the last three and influence in
decades – covering issues such as climate, security, health, resilience and the last decade. As
many others (Acuto, 2016; Fernández de Losada, 2019). Such transnation- China exerts more
al municipal networks (TMNs) are conduits for cities to exert influence on
influence and seeks to
global agendas, development goals and international norms (including the
evolution of international law) (Blank, 2006). They offer new forms of gov- reshape the nature of
ernance that act in parallel to that pursued by traditional state diplomacy, international society,
giving cities a new presence among the constellation of global governance we should expect this
actors, helping both to shape and implement the agenda of the United
to be reflected in the
Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals, the New Urban Agenda and the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, for example. nature of urban space.
But, more than this, some of the most powerful TMNs have even begun
to develop their own agendas, regardless of the direction of states. The
C40, for example, a group of almost 100 of the world’s most powerful cit-
ies, embraced a “global green new deal” agenda in 2019, committing its
members to develop policies to achieve the Paris climate goals of limiting
global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and halving emissions
by 2030 (Curtis, 2019b). Such decisions are far from negligible: C40 mem-
bers encompass a twelfth of the world’s population, their economic power
represents a quarter of the global economy, and they are the key strategic
sites in which the climate emergency will have to be tackled.
The emergence of this kind of activity is hugely significant because it rep-

resents a new form of agency and governance capacity within international
society: a new form of diversity in a system long the preserve of state actors.
Cities and their leadership are able to exercise a new form of power on the
world stage: the ability to convene networks of various actors, including
the expertise of private firms, to amplify the voices of social movements
and to direct the capacities and abilities of those networks towards certain
governance goals. Additionally, many cities offer a form of legitimate repre-
sentative agency, with mayors having been democratically elected by sizable
populations. Such developments offer the prospect of real influence on
global governance agendas and outcomes in the years to come.
However, the question arises once more: how will states accommodate
the rise of this new form of agency? Will they embrace the novel gover-
nance capacities emerging within cities and work with cities to empower
them to help solve global governance challenges such as climate change
and health issues? This would enable international society to move
beyond the roadblocks and impasses built into its structure, where com-
petitive state sovereignty has led to the repeated failure to deal with
these challenges. Or will states seek to supress these emerging forms of
agency and city diplomatic activity? Already we see signs of this – in the
SIMON CURTIS
31
•81• 2021
clashes between US cities and the Trump administration mentioned ear-
lier and in moves by Russia to resist the encroachment of city activities
onto the territory of state sovereignty (Acuto, 2017).
III. Geopolitics
The post-pandemic
future for global cities Indeed, the pandemic has accelerated recent trends towards the return
faces two forks in of the state. States have had to step in to underwrite economies in ways
that exceed even the 2008 financial crisis, using their sovereign power
the road. The first
to keep stalled societies afloat and roll out national health responses.
is a choice between Everywhere the neoliberal illusion of the small state is beginning to be
a cosmopolitan, burned away by the harsh light of the pandemic. The return of the state
interconnected to the centre of economic decision-making joins the trends towards
populist nationalism and authoritarian states that were already gaining
internationalism and an
momentum. The international environment is quickly shifting, and the
international system of climate that made liberal globalisation and the global city possible is
renewed state control. beginning to darken. The emerging forms of multi-stakeholder global
The second is between governance described above may not be able to survive in a less hospita-
ble climate, as the liberal world order begins to decay.
an increasingly crisis-
wracked form of The decline of US hegemony has been mirrored by the rise of Chinese
capitalist city. power and influence in the last decade. As China exerts more influence
and seeks to reshape the nature of international society, we should
expect this to be reflected in the nature of urban space. Just as global
cities are a reflection of, and intrinsically connected to, US liberal hege-
mony, so the very different values China espouses will materialise in
the tight connection between geopolitics and urbanisation. Since 2013
China has been engaged in a vast project of infrastructure construction
and urban development across Afro-Eurasia, both within and beyond its
borders. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as this multi-faceted policy
is named, is nothing less than an attempt to instantiate a Chinese-led
form of globalisation. Drawing, so far, around 70 countries into its orbit
of influence, the BRI incorporates twothirds of the world’s population,
has a projected $1.5 trillion price-tag, and incorporates six land and
maritime economic corridors (Maçães, 2018). Belt and Road cities have
yet to find their form, but the early signs are that they will be shaped
by a number of trends drawn from Chinese developmental models:
emphasising the spatial form of the transnational economic corridor and
smart surveillance technologies applied to cities, as seen in Shenzhen,
Hangzhou and Shanghai within China, and beyond in the models of
Bonifacio Global City, Manila and the “smart city” of Astana (Curtis and
Mayer, 2020).
Such cities and urban corridors will likely eventually project political and
economic principles and preferences that are very different to the open,
liberal trading order in which global cities have thrived. Indeed, the cur-
rent travails of Hong Kong are emblematic of the fault lines where two
possible world orders grind against each other: the open, networked
trading city of recent decades and the emerging Belt and Road system
of tomorrow.
China’s relative success in suppressing COVID-19 – especially through

the application of smart surveillance technologies – as more open
societies in the West struggled, may mean its urban model appeals

32
•81• 2021
to developing countries seeking an alternative to the liberal model. It
should also be noted that Chinese cities are active participants in many
transnational municipal networks (Mierzeijewski, 2020). The possibility
remains that, as Chinese-inflected forms of urbanism evolve, China may
use these conduits to diffuse its own experiences, urban developmental
models and technological forms back through the networks. The eventu-
al fate of global cities, and the networks they have begun to form, may
eventually come to look quite different to the picture we have today.
IV. Post-pandemic futures
The inter-connected future of the international system and of cities is at

a crossroads. This was the case even before COVID-19; but the pandemic
has opened a window on these dynamics, even as it influences them in
various ways.
What possible futures are emerging at this juncture? They are multiple
and complex, but as a useful simplifying sketch two distinct pathways
are appearing along two contrasting political fault-lines.
The first is a choice between greater state control over cities and continued
autonomy and independence for cities and their transnational networks.
As we have seen, certain states find the devolved model cities have carved
out for themselves in world affairs hard to accept, as well as their increas-
ing economic and political weight, and may seek to rein this trend in. But,
at the same time, global cities have begun to offer a new capacity for
governing global challenges – something the world needs given states’
failures on issues such as the climate emergency. At the same time, many
global cities also have a level of democratic legitimacy that challenges the
sovereign prerogatives of states: many urban citizens are beginning to
invest their identity and loyalty in the city and its leadership. Not only do
such cities often have vast and diverse populations that fit uneasily within
the nation-state framework, they also offer a unique form of multi-scalar
local-to-global reach missing in moribund national politics today. This is
very visible in the current pandemic, where top-down statist responses
that marginalise local expertise and knowledge, such as in Britain, have
performed poorly. Perhaps a useful middle way would be a renewed part-
nership between states and cities where states recognise the capacities and
capabilities of cities and their globe-spanning networks as a resource and
collaborate to empower them to meet global challenges.
The second choice of path emerges from the increasingly strident calls
for greater social justice, equity and ecological sensitivity embodied
under the “right to the city” that oppose the defence and intensification
of the neoliberal hyper-financialised form of the global city, with its vast
wealth disparities and contrasts in life experiences. Even before the pan-
demic this contrast was increasingly on the political agenda, exacerbated
by over a decade of austerity policies and held in place by an increasingly
authoritarian form of neoliberal capitalism, augmented by trends such
as surveillance technologies and the secession of urban elites into gated
communities and fortified spaces. The pandemic has merely clarified
this picture: those with wealth and private resources have retreated into
well-connected home offices, while those without have been left to cope
as best they can.
SIMON CURTIS
33
•81• 2021
The post-pandemic future for global cities faces two forks in the road.
The first is a choice between a cosmopolitan, interconnected internation-
alism and an international system of renewed state control. The second is
between an increasingly crisis-wracked form of capitalist city and moves to
build alternative urban forms with greater balance, social justice and equity.
The pandemic will not transform cities by itself: it offers a political opportu-
nity that groups with different visions of future cities are trying to grasp.
References
Acuto, M. “Cities are gaining ground in global politics – can the UN

keep up?” The Conversation, 14 September 2017 (online). [Accessed on
19.11.2020]: https://theconversation.com/cities-are-gaining-power-in-
global-politics-can-the-un-keep-up-83668
Acuto, M. Give cities a seat at the top table. Nature 537 (7622) 611–13,
2016
Fernandez de Losada, A., “Towards a cooperative ecosystem of city

networks”, in: Fernandez de Losada and Abdullah. Rethinking the
ecosystem of international city networks, Barcelona: CIDOB, 2019
(online). [Accessed on 20.11.2020]: https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/
monografias/repensando_el_modelo_actual_de_redes_de_ciudades/
towards_a_cooperative_ecosystem_of_city_networks
Blank, Y. “The City and the World”. Columbia Journal of Transnational

Law, 44(3), 2006.
Curtis, S. Global Cities and Global Order. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2016.
Curtis, S. “Global Cities as Market Civilisation”, Global

Society, 33:4, 2019a, 437–461.
Curtis, S. Strength in numbers: 94 world cities have joined forces to cut

emissions in half by 2030. World Economic Forum. 16 October 2019b
(online). [Accessed on 19.11.2020]: https://www.weforum.org/agen-
da/2019/10/mayor-94-cities-green-new-deal-global
Curtis, S. and M. Mayer, Belt and Road cities begin to find their form.
CIDOB Opinion 630, 2020 (online). [Accessed on 20.11.2020]: https://
www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/2020/belt_
and_road_cities_begin_to_find_their_form
Davis, M. Planet of Slums. London; New York: Verso, 2006
Graham, S. Vertical: The City from Satellites to Bunkers. New York:

Verso, 2016.
Harvey, D. Rebel cities: from the right to the city to the urban revolution
New York: Verso, 2012.
Ikenberry, J. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the

American World Order. Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 2011.

34
•81• 2021
Maçães, B. Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order. London: Hurst &
Company, 2018.
Mierzeijewski, D. “The Role of Guangdong and Guangzhou’s

Subnational Diplomacy in China’s Belt and Road Initiative”. China: An
International Journal, 18(2), 2020, 99–119.
Safi, M. “Coronavirus will reshape our cities: just don’t know how yet”,
The Guardian. 22 May 2020.
Sassen, S. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1991.
SIMON CURTIS
35
•81• 2021
THE TABLE WOBBLES: CITIES AND A FALTERING MULTILA-
TERAL ORDER
Ian Klaus
Senior Fellow, Chicago Council on Global Affairs
F
or years, cities have been improving both their capacity to address
global challenges and their knowledge of the political and eco-
nomic forces that create such challenges. This effort has been
well-funded by major philanthropies, private corporations, national
governments and even cities themselves. Operating simultaneously on
a number of scales – city, nation-state, regional and global – this cam-
paign has at times appeared shambolic. It has no single leader, hub or
strategy, but is spread across a host of networks, non-governmental
organisations and stakeholder groups. Nonetheless, over the last decade
urban stakeholders have increasingly refined their messaging, goals and
diplomatic practices: mayor-driven reports now rival those of policy and
research institutions in quality; city summits advance with the pomp of
party conferences and the polite rigour of diplomatic negotiations; and
partnerships are forged between urban-stakeholder groups and well-re-
spected governments, companies and international organisations. To be
sure, this campaign has facilitated policy exchange, enabling cities to set
ambitious goals and take practical steps around climate change, eco-
nomic inequality and governance practices. While doing so, it has also
sought to elevate urban voices on global issues, to highlight urban solu-
tions to global challenges and to establish a role for urban stakeholders
in global agenda setting.
In practice, these developments have required that while always keep-

ing an eye on urban areas, transnational city-focused organisations
have also oriented their activities and policies around key international
agreements. Practitioners of city diplomacy and policy leads within
city networks are fluent in the language of multilateralism and possess
nuanced understanding of the major international agreements. They are
expert in the global and the local, as it were, as likely to know the Mayor
of Medellin as the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. This knowledge – and particularly its
transformation into practical policy steps in cities – is hard won and
speaks not only to the immense organisational effort that has gone
into elevating cities on the global stage, but also to the infrastructure
of human knowledge and capital such efforts have both produced and
depended upon.
37
•81• 2021
As part of this diverse effort at policy implementation, knowledge build-
ing and global organising, the panoply of urban stakeholders – from
elected mayors to civil society representatives – have been campaigning
for a city seat at the international table. In 2016, in advance of Habitat
III, the Global Task Force issued a political statement and ten recommen-
dations that if put into practice would form a new global governance
Cities have been model by, among other measures, raising the volume of local voices
improving both their (GTF, 2016). The “Seat at the Table” statement was supported by more
capacity to address than 500 mayors and was an especially visible moment in a campaign
that has taken on diverse shapes and platforms: cities and city networks
global challenges and
have assumed semi-formal roles translating research and findings from
their knowledge of the international organisations into urban-focused material; urbanists and
political and economic associated experts have advised the UN Secretary-General on organis-
forces that create such ing around urban issues; and networks and platforms have continued
to lobby international organisations for both more attention to urban
challenges.
issues and the reform of existing institutions to reflect the unique gov-
erning status of mayors. But sometimes a restaurant changes before
your turn on the waiting list. In other words, while scholars, commen-
tators and advocates of global urban politics have maintained a keen
focus on international organisations and the UN in particular, the covet-
ed table has been growing ever shakier before their eyes. And nowhere
is this clearer than on the global development agenda.
I. The table wobbles
Over the course of 2015–2016, UN member states adopted four agree-

ments that together amounted to an international development agenda:
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, the Addis
Ababa Action Agenda, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(and the 17 SDGs) adopted at United Nations Headquarters in New York
during High-Level Week, and the New Urban Agenda (NUA). These four
agreements, along with the Paris Agreement on climate change, consti-
tute the core of the global agenda as it existed at the beginning of 2017.
The products of hundreds of meetings, contributions from thousands of
experts and stakeholders and years of negotiations, the five agreements
include extended time horizons (Klaus and Singer, 2018). The Sendai
Framework, Addis Ababa and 2030 agendas all explicitly look forward to
2030. The NUA is meant to provide a framework for urbanisation until
the mid-2030s; and while the Paris Agreement calls for action “as soon
as possible”, it also targets goals to be achieved in “the second half of
this century.” To be sure, the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement both
include near-term reporting and assessment mechanisms and the Paris
Agreement explicitly provides a framework for signatories and the interna-
tional community to revise their ambitions and contributions upwards. But,
true to the structural nature of the challenges they are meant to address,
the temporal vision for the agenda looks out decades. In this sense, the
agenda carries a rather heavy historical load, not only in the high stakes of
the issues addressed, but in the expectation that it will maintain relevance,
efficacy and legitimacy for years.
The agenda’s long time horizon was matched by an equally ambitious

vision for enabling a diverse array of stakeholders to contribute to achiev-
ing assorted benchmarks. As Samuel Moyn and many others have pointed
out, the international order upon which the agenda rests has historically
THE TABLE WOBBLES: CITIES AND A FALTERING MULTILATERAL ORDER

38
•81• 2021
affirmed the primacy of the nation-state and its sovereignty within that
system. Take the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example. “The
Universal Declaration”, Moyn writes, “retains, rather than supersedes, the
sanctity of nationhood” (2018: 91). In addition to reflecting a reality of
geopolitics, the primacy afforded the nation reflected an historical belief
after World War II in the possible benefits of domestic intervention by the
state in rights delivery. In many ways that primacy still remains, but over While always keeping
the last 30 years, the UN has become increasingly open to, and indeed an eye on urban areas,
reliant upon, collaboration with a broad array of stakeholders. “On the transnational city-
UN side, new forms of stakeholder activism emerged after the end of the
focused organisations
Cold War,” writes Eugenie Birch (2018: 6). Indeed, the number of accred-
ited NGOs within the UN system has swelled from roughly 700 in 1990 to have also oriented
upwards of 4,500 at the end of the 2010s (Birch, 2018: 5). their activities and
policies around
This historical development was reflected in the roll out of each of the
key international
five aforementioned outcome documents, but nowhere was the mul-
tistakeholder vision more in evidence than in the 2030 Agenda and the agreements.
associated SDGs. The fractious negotiation was meant to turn to shared
action, encouraged through goals, reporting, monitoring and marketing.
When UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda in 2015, the SDGs
were rolled out with iconic and recognisable, yet easily adaptable, ico-
nography. The mustard yellow of SDG 2, bright red of SDG 4 and fresh
tangerine of SDG 11, along with all the other colours and symbols, have
been transposed onto the ubiquitous SDG lapel-pins, the shirts of New
York City school children, museum exhibits and private sector products.
As this campaign of multilateral public diplomacy spun out across the

world, experts and diplomats developed and agreed targets and indica-
tors by which to measure progress on the goals. SDG 2 has eight targets
(“universal access to safe and nutritious food”, for instance) and 13
indicators (“prevalence of undernourishment”, for instance). SDG 4 has
ten targets and 11 indicators. The brilliant colours and iconography and
the accessibility of the targets and indicators have helped ensure that the
SDGs – the product of arcane UN negotiations – have wide recognition
and appeal. “Our new development goals are ambitious”, then President
Barack Obama (2015) observed at the United Nations during the General
Assembly’s High-Level Week in September 2015, “But thanks to the
good work of many of you, they are achievable – if we work together”.
The US president spoke to an audience of heads of state and foreign
ministers in the hope that national perspectives might be reconciled in
favour of collective action to address global challenges and meet shared
goals. While the agenda was negotiated by member states, each of the
four constitutive agreements as well as the Paris Agreement highlighted
the role of local governments, civil society and the private sector in their
implementation. They were sold, as it were, and the international com-
munity bet on itself to deliver.
The “together” of which the president spoke hopefully was a big tent.
But, amid shifts in national and geopolitics and global crises such as
climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, where does this agenda
sit today? Some have exited to the right, some to the left, but while five
years later the poles of that tent remain in place, it’s no longer exact-
ly clear who remains inside. The most obvious shift in support for the
agenda has come in the form of renunciations from governments which,
playing to and encouraging nationalist revivals, have targeted the agree-
IAN KLAUS
39
•81• 2021
ments and the wider multilateral framework around everything from
climate change to trade as attacks on sovereignty. In 2017, the United
States announced its intention to leave the Paris Agreement, with the
official departure coming in October 2020. In 2018, Brazil announced it
would abandon its commitment to host COP25 the following year. Both
decisions were couched in nationalist terms: Pittsburgh over Paris, and
While scholars, all that. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, President of the 73rd Session
commentators and of the UN General Assembly observed that critics of the agenda and
advocates of global multilateralism more widely, “peddle an insular vision of nationalism to
score political points with domestic constituencies. They point to some
urban politics have
unspecified time in the past, when things were supposedly better”
maintained a keen (Garcés, 2019). Nationalist revivals need not, by definition, undermine
focus on international progress on the global agenda. Narratives that enable progress on
organisations and the climate change and development can and have been couched in nation-
alist or realist terms, as Anatol Lieven has recently argued (Lieven, 2020).
UN in particular, the
If resurgent nationalism is here to stay, such a framing will be necessary.
coveted table has been
growing ever shakier But the nationalist, often populist, often authoritarian, turn in multilateral
before their eyes. diplomacy and international organisations is just one of the developments
that has challenged the agenda’s viability. The stability of the agen-
da has come under pressure from other slightly unexpected sources:
developments in climate science, economics and social policy that have
noted the need to strengthen the agenda’s ambition and goals. The
most notable example here occurred in 2018 with the publication of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Special Report on Global
Warming of 1.5oC (SR1.5). The report detailed the dramatic differences in
outcomes in everything from biodiversity to health and poverty between a
world of 2.0°C warming over pre-industrial levels and one of 1.5°C. While
Article 2.1.(a) of the Paris Agreement is certainly consistent with SR1.5’s
finding, the international community was shocked by the differences in
impact between the two levels. This was not a departure from Paris, rath-
er an affirmation of its most ambitious goals. Nonetheless, it also means
implicitly that the higher-end numbers of the Paris Agreement are not suit-
ably ambitious to meet the climate crisis.
Layered on top of these trends, of course, is the proximate crisis

of COVID-19. In October, Aromar Revi published one of two UN
Chronicle responses to the Secretary-General’s “Policy Brief” on COVID-
19 and urbanisation. As a Co-Chair of the UN Sustainable Development
Solutions Network and Coordinating Lead Author of the Special Report
on Global Warming of 1.5oC, Revi is practiced at identifying how the
difficult is doable; but he shared some math on COVID-19’s implica-
tions for the SDGs, and the picture he revealed was not pretty. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated a 5% drop of global
GDP in 2020; local governments saw average revenue reductions
of 15–25%; and in the first months of lockdown, informal workers
– frequently urban and composing the vast majority of workers in low-
and-middle-income countries – lost as much as 60% of their earnings.
These developments, and myriad other social, economic and political
COVID-19-derived effects, have profound implications for the ability of
the global community to deliver upon the 2030 Agenda and SDGs. By
Revi’s count, at least 11 of the 17 goals suffered significant setbacks in
2020. Close your eyes and throw a dart at the SDG dartboard you no
doubt have in your pantry and you are likely to hit one of 2020s many
challenging stories: food insecurity has increased (SDG 2), access to edu-

40
•81• 2021
cation has been radically disrupted (SDG 4), and public transportation
has ground to a halt (SDG 11). Building on analysis by Robin Naidoo and
Brendan Fisher, the editorial team at Nature came to a reasonable but
nonetheless startling conclusion: “Researchers both outside and inside
the UN are questioning whether the goals are fit for the post-pandemic
age. The goals’ ambition is as important as ever, but fresh thinking is
needed on the best ways to achieve them” (Nature, 2020). Since its adoption
and rollout to much
fanfare in 2015
II. Emerging adaptations and 2016, its most
Such is the suddenly fluid if troubled state of the global development important component
agenda near the end of 2020. Since its adoption and rollout to much parts have been
fanfare in 2015 and 2016, its most important component parts have under pressure from
been under pressure from nationalist diplomats and leaders and its most
nationalist diplomats
visible goals have been rendered either significantly more difficult to
achieve or in need of reconsideration due to new research, science and and leaders and its
policy. Moving forward, these developments will have consequences for most visible goals
both stakeholders and for the international system in which they have have been rendered
sought a seat at the table. For stakeholders in particular, a number of
either significantly
different strategic responses are emerging.
more difficult to
In the last six months, a series of constructive proposals for rethinking achieve or in need of
various parts of the agenda have emerged. Such proposals, it’s worth reconsideration.
noting, need not necessarily include or imply a reduction in ambitions.
They can include – and have in certain cases, particularly concern-
ing the 1.5ºC target – a heightening of ambitions around localised
action. In their Nature article, Naidoo and Fisher argued that the High
Level Political Forum “must establish a few clear priorities, not a for-
est of targets. It should also consider which goals can be achieved in
a less-connected world with a sluggish global economy” (Naidoo and
Fisher, 2020). While recognising the interdependency of the SDGs,
Jeffrey Sachs, Guido Schmidt-Traub and co-authors also attempted to
identify key transformations needed to achieve each goal independently.
“Governments need a strategy to design and implement key interven-
tions”, they wrote in late 2019 (Sachs et al., 2020: 806). More recently,
in their extensive tracking of the responses of cities and urban areas to
COVID-19, the OECD has noted that “cities are now using the global
policy frameworks and facilitating their uptake as policy tools rather than
compliance agendas to guide the design and implementation of their
recovery strategies” (OECD, 2020: 38). The shift in language might be
lost on some, but not on the city diplomats who have worked extensive-
ly to develop reporting mechanisms – the voluntary local reviews – for
scores of cities around the world. In negotiation and practice, member
states have prioritised selected goals and agreements over others, but
hewing less closely to the agenda, using the goals as guides rather than
metrics, or choosing to prioritise a few goals is a privilege that is more
easily exercised by stakeholders, including local governments.
“Events, dear boy, events,” Harold Macmillan famously counselled when

asked what would determine his government’s direction, and it’s hard not
to note the degree to which the dual pandemics of systemic injustice and
COVID-19 have informed stakeholder policy positions and rhetoric. The
lessening of economic inequality, as opposed to the alleviation of poverty,
has never been a central or even peripheral goal of the UN (Moyn, 2018).
IAN KLAUS
41
•81• 2021
And yet, in suggesting reform of the SDGs, Naidoo, Fisher and the wider
Nature editorial team opened up a healthy discussion of the fixation on
growth. Meanwhile, the “C40 Mayors’ Agenda for a Green and Just
Recovery” puts environmental and economic justice front and centre in a
way that might not have been possible in 2015. This heightened atten-
tion to economic inequalities is coupled with continuing attention to the
But hewing less closely need to strengthen multilevel cooperation and governance practices: “As
to the agenda, using mayors” the report notes, “together with our staff and residents, we are
the goals as guides already building a green and just recovery. We call on national and regional
governments, central banks and international financial institutions to join
rather than metrics, or
us”. While not especially new, the importance of such coordination has
choosing to prioritise been brought home in cities across the world as they’ve struggled with
a few goals is a the vast majority of identified COVID-19 cases without always receiving
privilege that is more support from national governments and international organisations. Just as
the multilevel governance conversation has continued, it is likely discussion
easily exercised by
around inequality will only grow, whether it be focused around justice or
stakeholders, including emerging agendas built around the global commons.
local governments.
Finally, many close UN-watchers still see the agenda as an essential
political and policy tool, but one that cannot be delivered upon without
notable reform of governance practices. If the SDGs are at risk, so too
is the multilateral system that developed and marketed them, which
now has a leadership role in implementing and tracking them. “The
prospect of more intense and frequent future crises of global scope, like
the COVID-19 pandemic or the onset of dangerous climate change”,
Revi wrote (2020), “could lead many contemporary institutions that
are not fit-for-purpose to become irrelevant or be swept away by the
storm-tides of history”. The fix, according to Revi, and many others
working with local authorities, must be structural: “There is a strong
case for national Governments and the United Nations system to consid-
er a time-bound transition to a greater institutional voice and agency for
local and regional governments. This is just, rational and in the mutual
interest of citizens and all levels of government” (Revi, 2020). Such
voice and agency, authors like Revi and organisations like the Urban
20 noted this year, would have to be supported by a strengthening of
the financial capacity of local authorities (Birch et al., 2020). In prac-
tice, this position adopts many of the same policy prescriptions as
those advanced by the city networks and others focused on multilevel
governance and financial innovation, but with an additional rhetorical
dimension: it calls out the threat not only to cities and nation-states, but
indeed to the wider post-WWII international architecture, should such
evolution not occur.
Local authorities have taken significant steps toward delivering upon the
Paris Agreement and the SDGs, but multistakeholder approaches, resil-
ient though they are, benefit from support from national capitals and are
unlikely to be able to fully fill a gap left by the abdication of important
member states. The agreements that compose the wider agenda were
signed, after all, by nation-states and undoubtedly prioritise nation-states
as the key actors for delivering upon them. The litany of policy failures
that enabled the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the associat-
ed euro crisis have imparted a simple, enduring lesson: legitimacy, hard
enough to maintain, is even more difficult to gain. If the agenda’s legit-
imacy or relevance is lost so soon after it was conceived, who will put
their confidence in the next one or the system that backed it?

42
•81• 2021
References
Birch, E., “More than Window Dressing? Stakeholder and Participants in

the UN Global Agreements on Sustainable Development”. Penn: Current
Research on Sustainable Urban Development, February 2018.
Birch, E, Mauricio Rodas and Ian Klaus, “Financing Cities’ Recovery from
Covid-19 and Preparing for Future Shocks,” October 2020 (online).
[Accessed 3 October 2020]: https://www.urban20riyadh.org/sites/default/
files/2020-10/Financing%20Cities%27%20Recovery%20from%20Covid-
19%20and%20Preparing%20for%20Future%20Shock_22102020.pdf
C40, “C40 Mayors’ Agenda for a Green and Just Recovery,” June 2020
(online). [Accessed 15 November 2020]:
https://c40.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/#36000001Enhz/a/1Q000000kVoY/
kuR1PLHMGR2K9eEbo8aivV.xPegZVTqwt.EjX.4a.hk
Garcés, M., “The United Nations in the Age of Nationalism: Making The
UN Relevant To All: Statement by H.E. Mrs. María Fernanda Espinosa
Garcés, President of the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly,”
April 2019 (online). [Accessed 10 September 2020]: https://www.un.org/
pga/73/2019/04/16/the-united-nations-in-the-age-of-nationalism-mak-
ing-the-un-relevant-to-all/
GTF - Global Task Force, “A Seat at the Table,” October 2016 (online).
[Accessed 22 November 2020]: https://cdn.theatlantic.com/assets/media/
files/a_seat_at_the_global_table.pdf
Klaus, I and R. Singer, “The United Nations: Local Authorities in

Four Frameworks”. Penn: Current Research on Sustainable Urban
Development, February 2018.
Lieven, A., Climate Change and the Nation State: The Realist Case. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2020.
Moyn, S., The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2012.
Moyn, S., Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 2018.
Naidoo, R and B. Fisher, “Reset Sustainable Development Goals for a

pandemic world” Nature 583, 198–201 (2020).
Nature, “Time to revise the Sustainable Development Goals,” Editorial,

583, 331-332 (2020).
Obama, B. “Remarks By President Obama At Closing Session Of

Sustainable Development Goals Summit”, The White House, Office
of the Press Secretary, September 27, 2015 (online). [Accessed on
21.12.2020]: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2015/09/27/remarks-president-sustainable-development-goals
OECD, “OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19): City Policy

Responses,” July 2020 (online). [Accessed 17 November 2020]
IAN KLAUS
43
•81• 2021
http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/cities-policy-respons-
es-fd1053ff/
Revi, A., “Harnessing Urbanization to Accelerate SDG Implementation

in a Post-COVID-19 World,” UN Chronicle, October 1, 2020 (online).
[Accessed on 2 October 2020]
https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/harnessing-urbanization-acceler-
ate-sdg-implementation-post-covid-19-world
Sachs, J, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Mariana Mazzucato, Dirk Messner,

Nebojsa Nakicenovic and Johan Rockström "Six Transformations to
achieve the Sustainable Development Goals" Nature Sustainability , vol.
2, August 2019, pp. 805–814.
UNSG, “Policy Brief: COVID-19 in an Urban World,” July 2020 (online).

[Accessed 2 October 2020].
https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_policy_brief_covid_urban_
world_july_2020.pdf
Watts, M., “Climate science tells us the 1.5°C is likely to become the
most important number in human history,” (online). [Accessed 20
November 2020]
https://www.c40knowledgehub.org/s/article/Climate-science-tells-us-
that-1-5-C-is-likely-to-become-the-most-important-number-in-human-
history?language=en_US

44
•81• 2021
CITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGALLY INVISIBLE OR
RISING SOFT-POWER ACTORS?
Elif Durmuş
PhD Researcher, Utrecht University – Cities of Refuge Project
I
nternational law is seen by many practitioners, as well as by conser-
vative legal scholars, as a strictly inter-state endeavour. Symbolically
associated with the Treaty of Westphalia, this may have been true
for many centuries. But since – at the latest – the Reparations for Injuries
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice recognised the legal
personality of the United Nations as the first non-state entity, this strict
state-centricity has ceased to reflect the state of affairs. Instead, today’s
reality of global governance and its primary normative framework – inter-
national law – is messy, pluralist, multistakeholder, uses soft governance
tools rather than hard and binding law, and bridges public–private divides.
In fact, arguably, states were never monolithic, unified rational actors
conducting international law and governance, but were, in fact, when
scrutinised through a socio-legal lens, an amalgamation of influence from
elements within and without the state apparatus, such as diplomats,
networks, bureaucrats, faith organisations, political groups, other levels
of governments and more (Berman, 2007). International law worked to
reduce such influences to stricter imagined categories such as “subjects”
and “objects” for the purpose of creating a solid, dependable, as well
as binding legal framework with chances of enforcement. This “subject-
hood” or international legal personality is the primary concept in positive
international law distinguishing actors from non-actors. Now, however,
even the most positivist1 of international lawyers are confronted with the
pluralisation of actors without established legal personality engaging in
practices traditionally reserved for states. There is, additionally, a growing
preference for norms designed to govern international behaviour to be
soft, non-binding and created through multistakeholder governance pro-
1. Legal positivism refers to the stand-
cesses rather than binding treaties signed by states only. Non-state actors, point that lawyers ought to be
starting with international organisations like the United Nations, but later interested only in what law is and
also encompassing individuals, NGOs, transnational corporations and not what it should be. According to
legal positivists, what law is can be
armed groups, have been gradually accepted by international lawyers to be
determined conclusively by looking
participants and to possess legal significance in international law (Gal-Or et at whether it was issued by the
al., 2015). The pluralisation of actors and the softening of the norms creat- relevant authority. “Soft law” and
ed corresponds to a move from multilateralism – referring to an inter-state any actors excluded from official
law-making capacity should be dis-
governance system – towards multistakeholderism – referring to a system regarded as non-law and non-actors,
of norm generation and governance that involves many actors relevant to a as giving them a quasi-legal value
subject matter, which is the premise of this volume. might threaten the legal system.
45
•81• 2021
In this world, cities and their transnational city networks (TCNs) have
been engaging with increasing resonance, competence and rigour in the
governance of (and norm generation on) issues that would traditionally
be considered within the jurisdiction of the state. Our previous research
(Durmuş and Oomen, forthcoming) focussing on the field of migration
has found that this engagement of cities with matters of global gover-
“Subjecthood” or nance, including by mobilising international law, can be generally divided
international legal into two types of engagement, namely: (a) seeking a seat in traditionally
personality is the state-centric processes; and (b) creating city-centric (or local-centric, to
be more inclusive of non-urban localities) fora to engage collectively with
primary concept in
international law and global governance. The two types of engagement
positive international are complemented by cities’ engagement with international law in govern-
law distinguishing ing their own locality. For some, the question then becomes: Is any of this
actors from non-actors. city engagement relevant for international law? What are the prospects for
achieving recognition of cities’ activities and space for their engagement in
Now, however, even
formal international legal frameworks? This piece argues that international
the most positivist of law, even as it currently stands, can be observed both conservatively and
international lawyers more progressively. The progressive perspective recognises – often through
are confronted with the the support of interdisciplinary research – the de facto engagement and
even influence of local governments on international law. This piece also
pluralisation of actors
argues that even if observed through a conservative legal positivist lens,
without established the engagement of local governments with international law is likely to
legal personality be increasingly relevant to the developments in the content and practice
engaging in practices of international law. This is true regardless of whether it takes a long
time for any formal change of status to occur – if it occurs at all. If cities,
traditionally reserved
collectively, are seeking formal recognition of their role and status in inter-
for states. national law, they are on exactly the right path, both in seeking a seat at
the table in state-centric processes and in organising and convening with
their peers to engage in international law and governance matters with-
out reservations and concerns about whether or not they are “permitted”
by international law to do so (as “subjects” or holders of international
legal personality). The recognition of new players in the game, whether
by progressive or more conservative observers or by existing players, does
not come about by such permission but by a retroactive recognition of
accumulated evidence showing a new de facto reality. I will now seek to
explicate this by first reflecting on what the conservative and more plural-
ist perspectives concerning actors in international law are and how they
have changed, followed by a reflection on the current state of affairs with
regard to cities’ engagement with international law. Finally, I will sum-
marise some suggestions for practitioners representing the municipalist
movement in global governance.
I. Is international law only inter nations?
There is an understanding that international law was always organised

as a strictly inter-state global legal order – the so-called “Westphalian
system”, referring to the Treaty of Westphalia which established states
as equal and sole subjects of international law. However, even the
epitomised Treaty of Westphalia itself had city signatories.2 Further, the
independent cities forming the Hanseatic League in the 12th century
would “adopt[…] rules on trade and safe navigation routes [which] then
bound all member-cities; these rules influence[d] the development of the
2. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_ maritime law of nations” (Nijman, 2016: 11). In the centuries to come,
century/westphal.asp the modern state would establish itself as the primary and only subject
CITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGALLY INVISIBLE OR RISING SOFT-POWER ACTORS?

46
•81• 2021
of international law. Developments in technology and globalisation,
however, inevitably created a need and opportunity for more actors to
emerge, such as international organisations. The most significant step
for the recognition of so-called “non-state actors” in international law
was the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on
Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
which concerned a UN Special Rapporteur targeted by the national There are two types
government in which he was operating (International Court of Justice, of engagement by
1948). In this advisory opinion, the ICJ – through circular reasoning – cities with global
recognised that the United Nations has a functional kind of partial legal
governance: (a) seeking
personality. While not the same as the full and primary legal personality
states enjoy, this would allow the UN to fulfil the functions enshrined in a seat in traditionally
its Charter. The Court thus stated that the United Nations must have had state-centric processes;
a kind of legal personality in order to sign the agreements, undertake and (b) creating city-
the responsibilities and enjoy the rights endowed to it by states in its
centric fora to engage
creation.
collectively with global
This advisory opinion was the first legal recognition of the new, no lon- governance.
ger strictly inter-state reality of global governance. The emergence and
status of new non-state actors were thereafter analysed by international
lawyers in a similar manner. Thus, if a need arose for this actor to func-
tion in the international legal order with a degree of autonomy, a degree
of functional legal personality would emerge for this actor, which might
mean that it could hold its own rights, obligations, and/or participate
in law-making. For example, when human rights emerged as a field of
international law in which individuals held rights against states, it was
argued that individuals had acquired functional legal personality, mean-
ing they had become actors in international law (Gal-Or et al., 2015). Of
course, legal personality is not the only way an observer could determine
the extent to which an entity is an “actor” in international law, but it
remains the most established legal concept for this purpose, although
many scholars find little need for this concept at the present day.
Despite the increased attention on cities in the social sciences in the

past decades, local governments have been largely overlooked in the
legal scholarly discussions around so-called non-state actors, although
some lawyers have explored cities from other legal perspectives (Blank,
2006; Aust, 2015; Oomen and Baumgaertel, 2018; Durmuş, 2020).
This has partially to do with the fact that formal international law
does have a place for local governments, albeit not an autonomous
one. Nijman has recognised that cities in the international field have
characteristics of both sub-state actors (state organs) and non-state
actors, acting in their autonomous interest outside the direction of the
central government (Nijman, 2016). The prior understanding is easily
compatible with state-centric international law while the latter proves
problematic. According to the International Law Commission’s Articles
on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, local govern-
ments are considered “state organs” (UNGA, 2008: Art. 4), showing
their sub-state character. This means that every action or omission by
local governments that breaches an international obligation of their
respective state is attributed to the state – they have no autonomous
standing. Within this safe, established framework, the UN Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) has been engaging in the last few years with the
question of the role of local governments in promoting and protecting
human rights as state organs bound by all the international legal obliga-
ELIF DURMUŞ
47
•81• 2021
tions binding their respective states (HRC, 2015: para.1). When it comes
to law-making in international law (one of the capacities of international
legal persons), one could argue that customary international law, which
is built by accumulated state practice accompanied by a belief that the
practice constitutes law, could offer a narrow entry point for local gov-
ernments, where local governments contribute to its development as a
If cities are seeking state organ (Durmuş, 2020). Otherwise, positive international law has
formal recognition offered no place to local governments in their autonomous, non-state
of their role in capacity.
international law, they
Parallel to this pluralisation of actors, the last decades have also
are on the right path, witnessed a decline in the usage of the formal sources of interna-
both in seeking a seat tional law codified in the ICJ Statute (Art 38(1)) – treaties, customary
at the table with states international law and general principles of law – and an increased
preference for non-binding commitments and guidelines, so-called
and in organising in
“soft law”. Many fewer treaties are now concluded between states
their own fora. than in the 1990s, while non-binding norms such as the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) attract more interest, advocacy and
mobilisation from the international community. The usage of such
forms of soft law also allows the international community to circum-
vent the question of who exactly is a formal subject of international
law with the capacity to conclude treaties, and instead focus on sim-
ply reaching as wide a societal consensus as possible. The new norms
made this way are often not binding and have little (or no) justiciabil-
ity (ability to be enforced by courts). This in no way means that soft
law is ineffective, however, as international law depends on actors to
enforce it in the absence of a central enforcer. If soft law created in
multistakeholder processes with broad consensus enjoys more popu-
larity and wider mobilisation (like the SDGs) while states perpetually
turn away from binding law, the power of soft law should not be
underestimated.
Yet, the positivist vision is not the only way to see international law.
Some pluralist scholars have long recognised the power of actors and
types of norms not contemplated by “official” international law. Legal
pluralists, especially representatives of the “New” New Haven School
of International Law (Koh, 2007) have been exploring the notion of
“bottom-up international law-making” (Levit, 2007) by “norm-gener-
ating communities” (Berman, 2007) constantly proposing, negotiating
and contesting different imaginations of the law with different levels of
persuasive power and authority. Norms are created, interpreted, chal-
lenged and enforced – travelling, as they change, between different
international actors and governance levels – within a constant multi-di-
rectional process (Berman, 2007; Durmu ş , 2020). These scholars,
following the original New Haven scholars of the Cold War era, argue
that law’s power comes not only from coercion and enforcement capac-
ity, but above all from persuasion by the actors who advocate for them,
including by those within the state. Through the interactions with other
members of the international community, the advocates of a certain
norm may successfully change what other actors consider to be in
their best interests and in those of the international community. While
positive international law may remain reluctant and conservative, this
pluralist lens is very helpful in understanding how global governance
functions today.

48
•81• 2021
II. What are cities doing?
Cities and their transnational city networks have been engaging with
international law and issues of global governance with increasing
intensity for at least three decades. While local governments in this
engagement demonstrate qualities of both non-state and sub-state
actors (Nijman, 2016; Durmuş, 2020), most relevant for the purposes The International Court
of this piece is to focus on the activities of local governments that are of Justice showed in
somewhat autonomous and comparable to the engagement of non- 1948 that if a new
state actors, since these are activities that go unrecognised by, and
actor in international
challenge, formal international law. Here, our previous research in the
field of migration and human rights has shown a multiplicity of ways in law had functions
which local governments engage with international law. which required a
degree of autonomy,
and this was accepted
Engaging with international law in their own local governance
by other actors such
Firstly, local governments can engage with international law in their own as states, a degree
localities regardless of whether they are also seeking to engage in the of functional legal
global governance of these issues. Symbolic ratification of international
personality would
treaties and the adoption of international soft law instruments into local
governance are good examples for this engagement. Instances from emerge for this actor.
practice include San Francisco and other US cities symbolically ratifying
the Convention on the Elimination of All Kinds of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) while the United States has not (Davis, 2016), the city
of Graz creating a local implementation plan for the local realisation of
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the
widespread practice of referring to the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) in local law and policymaking. When the United States withdrew
from the Paris Climate Agreement, many cities pledged to continue to
comply with the international treaty, demonstrating that the “state” is
not monolithic. While this engagement certainly constitutes a contesta-
tion of what formal international law considers permissible and by which
actors, this practice alone is not considered direct engagement in global
governance by this author and thus will not be discussed extensively.
Such activity concerns the governance of the locality the local govern-
ment represents, and does not necessitate interaction, negotiation and
deliberation with other international actors. Of course, such practices
often do not stand alone. They may be linked to activities such as report-
ing progress on adopted international norms to monitoring bodies,
which include interactions with international actors and would therefore
fit within the categories below.
Participating in traditionally state-centric processes
The second type of engagement, as found in our recent research on

migration and human rights, is how cities and TCNs seek a seat at the
table in traditionally state-centric global law and governance process-
es (Durmuş and Oomen, forthcoming). Some of the most noteworthy
examples are local governments’ advocacy campaign for the inclusion of
SDG 11 on Sustainable Cities and Communities in the 2030 Agenda and
their efforts to be recognised in the Paris Climate Agreement as import-
ant actors in the fight against climate change (Art. 7(2); Art. 11(2)), as
well as in the Global Compacts for Migration and Refugees (41 referenc-
ELIF DURMUŞ
49
•81• 2021
es to local governments in total). Local governments gathered in parallel
to government representatives for the Global Compact for Migration
in Marrakech in December 2018, demonstrating their eagerness both
to take part in state-centric processes and gather amongst themselves,
even if not “permitted” to join the states. Also worth mentioning are
local governments’ efforts to secure formal recognition within the
A legal pluralist United Nations system, including but not limited to the conferences and
perspective on proceedings of UN-Habitat. Some municipalist victories in these regards
international law include the recognition of the International Union of Local Authorities
as a consultative entity before ECOSOC in 1948, the inclusion in 1992
argues that law’s
of local governments as a Major Group to be consulted in the UN espe-
power lies not only cially within the climate regime (Garcia-Chueca, 2020), the creation of
in coercion but the UN Advisory Council for Local Authorities (UNACLA) in 1999, and
persuasion, and that local governments acquiring accreditation at the United Nations to
participate in UN proceedings (unless their national governments reject
actors big and small,
to it in time) (Durmuş and Oomen, forthcoming: 7). Recently, in June
even unrecognised, 2019, the UN Human Rights Council for the first time organised a con-
can influence what sultative meeting on the role of local governments in human rights that
others consider invited TCNs such as UCLG to the Council’s headquarters in Geneva.
By the same token, cities such as New York have gone as far as report-
“good” for themselves
ing to the United Nations on their progress in implementing the Paris
and the international Climate Agreement and the SDGs locally through the Voluntary Local
community. Reviews, as if they were required to do so by the normative mechanisms
(Javorsky, 2018).
All of these activities – seeking to take part in international law-mak-

ing, seeking to have their role and responsibility with regards to norms
recognised, voluntarily reporting their compliance with internation-
al norms, seeking official accreditation, acquiring an actual body in
the United Nations system dedicated to them, establishing their role
strongly enough for United Nations organs to invite them to delibera-
tions (such as the Habitat III Conference) that involve the development
of international norms – fit squarely with the International Court of
Justice’s reasoning that an arising functional need in international law
(the creation and functioning of the UN) necessitated a recognition of
a limited kind of legal personality.. States’ jealous guarding of their
sovereignty means it would be far-fetched to expect such formal legal
recognition for sub-state actors any time soon. But it is clear that local
governments have been successfully implementing the kind of steps
that brought other non-state actors increased recognition, in order to be
recognised if not as a “non-state actor” – as international lawyers call
NGOs, international organisations and armed groups – then as “stake-
holders” in the multi-stakeholder processes of global governance.
Creating local-centric norms and governance mechanisms
Finally, local governments, seemingly fed up with the disproportion-

ately high effort required to seek inclusion in mainstream international
legal processes, also convene in their local-centric fora to discuss global
governance issues and even engage in their own norm generation to
address these issues (Durmuş and Oomen, forthcoming). They do this
within institutionalised city networks such as the European Coalition
of Cities Against Racism (ECCAR), the World Human Rights Cities
Forum (WHRCF), and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG); as

50
•81• 2021
well as in specialised processes structured around the creation of nor-
mative documents, such as the conferences leading up to the signing
of the European Charter for Safeguarding Human Rights in the City in
Saint Denis in 2000. These practices mimic states’ practices in global
governance, creating permanent international organisations as well as
convening conferences to create international treaties. Examples such
as the adoption of the Cities for Adequate Housing Declaration (2018), From a pluralist
the Global Charter-Agenda for Human Rights in the City (2012) and the perspective, cities are
launch of a Global Green New Deal by C40 (2019) in collaboration with active components
Fridays for Future are significant here. All these initiatives disregard the
of the global system
question of whether cities may engage in international law and demon-
strate innovation, initiative and brazen leadership – showing the world of norm-generating
what they think international law should look like. communities
advocating and
negotiating their
III. Analysis and suggestions for practitioners
understandings of
So, if the question is “What does international law say about all international law.
this engagement?” the answer is “That depends on how one sees Whether formal law
international law”. From a pluralist perspective, cities are very active
“sees” these processes
components of the global system of intertwined norm-generating
communities advocating and negotiating their understandings of or not, cities’ influence
international law and to diverging extents succeeding in influencing (big or small) informs
other actors in the field. From a more conservative perspective, local actors and norms in the
governments are nonetheless relevant both in their “sub-state” role
international system.
(demonstrated by UN-Habitat and the UNHRC’s interest in and increas-
ing embrace of local governments), as well as in their “non-state”
autonomous activities, including engagement with and even creation
of international norms, both by seeking to join traditional actors and
by organising among themselves. This is because, whether formal law
“sees” these processes or not, the engagement of cities does not go
unnoticed and can to diverging degrees influence other more cen-
tral actors in the international system. As an official from the UNHRC
Advisory Council stated at the closing ceremony of the WHRCF in
Gwangju in 2018, the UNHRC often bases its reports on the role of local
governments in human rights on the documents created by cities in their
networks.3 These UNHRC reports are then cited by international lawyers
exploring the role of cities in international law and the cycle of influence
continues. Local governments were also a significant actor in developing
and codifying the content of the right to housing, a formal legal right,
through the UN-Habitat conferences (Marcenko, 2019).
The final conclusion of this piece is that, whether cities have higher legal
status or official recognition in their agenda or not, they have been tak-
ing exactly the right steps to influence the development of international
law and to be included in global governance processes. A pluralist lens
reveals what legalists may not see, namely that local governments are
part and parcel of the patchwork of international law and governance,
as some of the most enthusiastic internationalist actors taking the initia-
tive and showing the motivation we now miss amongst states. If cities
seek official legal recognition, the activities they engage in, particularly
seeking inclusion in state-centric processes, are exactly the criteria rec-
ognised by the international community in determining who is an actor 3. Participant observation by the
and who is not. However, these processes are often frustrating for cities author at the WHCRF, October
and their networks and require energy that might be deemed dispro- 2018, Gwangju.
ELIF DURMUŞ
51
•81• 2021
portionate to the scant space and voice they gain from it. Therefore, in
order to continue demonstrating their full potential, fluency and com-
petence in international law and global governance, cities and TCNs
should continue investing in their own local-centric fora and their local
engagement with international law. These combined efforts are bound
to gain more and more recognition from all actors in the field, and local
governments – just like other non-state actors who now enjoy a more
established legal status – could reach the recognition, power and influ-
ence they seek and deserve.
References
Aust, H. P. “Shining Cities on the Hill? The Global City, Climate Change,
and International Law” European Journal of International Law 26(1),
2015, pp. 255–278.
Berman, P. S. “A Pluralist Approach to International Law” Yale Journal of

International Law 32(2), 2007, 301–329.
Blank, Y. ‘‘Localism in the New Global Legal Order” Harvard

International Law Journal 47, 2006, p. 263.
Davis, M. F. “Cities, Human Rights and Accountability: The United

States Experience” in: B. Oomen, M. F. Davis, M. Grigolo (eds.), Global
Urban Justice: The Rise of Human Rights Cities (pp. 23‒43). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Durmu ş , E. & Oomen, B. “Transnational City Networks and their

Contributions to Norm-Generation in International Law: The Case
of Migration” Local Government Studies, Special Issue titled ‘At the
Interplay of Subnationalization and Supranationalization: City Networks
Activism in the Governance of Immigration’, forthcoming.
Durmuş, E. “A typology of local governments’ engagement with human

rights: Legal pluralist contributions to international law and human
rights”. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 38(1), 2020, pp.
30–54.
Garcia-Chueca, E. “Further Including Local Governments in the Quest

for a More Effective UN”. CIDOB Report # 06-2020 (online). [Accessed
13.12.2020]: https://www.cidob.org/en/layout/set/print/articulos/
cidob_report/n1_6/further_including_local_governments_in_the_quest_
for_a_more_effective_un
Gal-Or, N., Ryngaert, C, Noortmann, M. (eds.) Responsibilities of the

Non-State Actor in Armed Conflict and the Market Place, 2015.
HRC, U.N. Human Rights Council, Role of Local Government in the

Promotion and Protection of Human Rights – Final Report of the Human
Rights Council Advisory Committee, UN Doc. A/HRC/30/49, 7 August 2015.
International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the

Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1 April 1948.

52
•81• 2021
Javorsky, N. “Why New York City Is Reporting Its Sustainability Progress
to the UN” Citylab, 13 July 2018 (online). [Accessed 20 December 2019]:
https://www.citylab.com/environment/2018/07/why-new-york-city-is-re-
porting-its-sustainability-progress-to-theun/564953/
Koh, H. H. “Is There a ‘New’ New Haven School of International Law?”

Yale Journal of International Law 32, 2007, p. 559.
Levit, J. K. “Bottom-up international lawmaking: reflections on the new

haven school of international law” Yale Journal of International Law 32,
2007, p. 393.
Marcenko, M. “International assemblage of security of tenure and the

interaction of local politics with the international normative process-
es” The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 51(2), 2019, pp.
151–171.
Nijman, J. “Renaissance of the City as Global Actor: The Role of Foreign

Policy and International Law Practices in the Construction of Cities as
Global Actors” in: A. Fahrmeir, G. Hellmann and M. Vec (eds.), The
Transformation of Foreign Policy: Drawing and Managing Boundaries
from Antiquity to the Present, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Oomen, B., Baumgaertel, M., “Frontier Cities: The Rise of Local

Authorities as an Opportunity for International Human Rights Law”
European Journal of International Law 29(2), 2018, p. 339.
UNGA. 2008. Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts,

adopted 8 January 2008, A/RES/62/61.
ELIF DURMUŞ
53
•81• 2021
EMPOWERING CITIES IN A
REFORMED MULTILATERAL
SYSTEM
• THE ROLE OF CITIES IN A REFORMED UN: TOWARDS

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE WORLD
ASSEMBLY OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
• IS SOMETHING BETTER THAN NOTHING? MULTI-LEVEL

GOVERNANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF
THE REGIONS IN EU POLICYMAKING
Andrea Noferini
55
THE ROLE OF CITIES IN A REFORMED UN: TOWARDS THE
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE WORLD ASSEMBLY OF
LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
Part-time Lecturer in International Relations, Pompeu Fabra University
T
he United Nations (UN) marked its 75th anniversary at a time
when the coronavirus pandemic and other global crises were
underscoring the fragility of multilateralism as the guiding
principle of global governance. The Secretary-General acknowledged
a few months ago that in the 21st century we cannot continue to
accept a dysfunctional global governance system made exclusively by
and for national governments. António Guterres proposed moving
towards “a networked multilateralism” built in collaboration with civil
society, the private sector and local governments. It would be a mul-
tilateralism based on “[s]hared values, shared responsibility, shared
sovereignty, shared progress”.1 In this context, the organisations that
make up “international municipalism” eagerly joined the UN75 global
conversation and put forward bold demands for greater recognition.
These claims and aspirations are nothing new. In fact, reforming the
multilateral system to make it more encompassing and permeable to
cities’ interest has been on the agenda of international municipal-
ism since its inception. As far back as 1920 the International Union
of Local Authorities (IULA), predecessor of United Cities and Local
Governments (UCLG), sought permanent participation in the League
of Nations (LON) (Gaspari, 2002). The demands met little success and
both the LON and its successor, the UN, ended up structuring a frag-
mented relationship with cities’ representative bodies that is similar to
its treatment of civil society.
Admittedly, there has been some progress in the past three decades
to formalise the role of local governments in global governance
structures, especially within the UN system (Garcia-Chueca, 2020).
An important milestone in this regard was the recognition in 1992
of local governments as one of the Major Groups that should be
involved in implementing global sustainability agendas. Another 1. Press conference by Secretary-
significant landmark was the second United Nations Conference on General António Guterres at the
Human Settlements (Habitat II) in 1996, which was attended by more United Nations Headquarters,
June 25 th 2020. Available online:
than 500 mayors and municipal leaders who managed to participate https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/
in the deliberations. More relevantly, during Habitat II local govern- sgsm20142.doc.htm [Accessed: 20
ments associations for the first time convened the World Assembly September 2020].
57
•81• 2021
of Cities and Local Authorities (WACLA), which served as a formal
mechanism for providing input to the Habitat II negotiations.
Since that time, UN-Habitat has become a crucial platform for

advancing the municipalist agenda, which has in turn brought about
a change in mindset towards the role of cities in formulating global
Cities' impact on agendas. Some of the most noteworthy examples are the creation
global discussions of the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (UNACLA),
remains more symbolic which has served as an advisory body to the Executive Director of
UN-Habitat since 2000, or the revision of the rules of procedure of
than real. In most
the agency’s Governing Council.
cases, they are invited
to participate as More recently, the Global Taskforce of Local and Regional
mere observers or Governments (GTF), a coordination mechanism promoted by UCLG
around which the main associations of local governments have
implementers of the
coalesced, has successfully influenced some of the most recent
major agreements but intergovernmental processes. As a result of such advocacy efforts,
have little effective the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC Climate Action Agenda rec-
involvement in ognise the need to involve cities; local governments were invited to
participate in the deliberations over the adoption of the New Urban
decision-making and
Agenda (NUA); and one of the Sustainable Development Goals
lack the capacity to (SDGs) has an unequivocally urban dimension.
influence the agenda.
But despite these arguably municipalist victories, cities’ impact on
global discussions remains more symbolic than real. In most cases,
they are invited to participate as mere observers or implementers of
the major agreements but have little effective involvement in deci-
sion-making and lack the capacity to influence the agenda. Further,
when looking at the initiatives put in place to grant them access and
participation rights, one should clearly distinguish between the UN
institution (i.e. the bureaucracy and the secretariats) – interested in
forging partnerships with non-state actors as means of implement-
ing the organisation’s mandate – and UN member states (Ruhlman,
2015). This distinction is important, because the latter have always
been reluctant to transfer any morsel of power to local authorities in
fear of eroding national sovereignty.
Hence, the main global city networks continue to call for “a seat at
the global table” (Salmerón Escobar, 2016), which would involve a
structural shift in how the UN and its members relate to local govern-
ments. Certain concrete proposals exist for remodelling the system
in this direction, such as upgrading the current consultative status
with ECOSOC to permanent observer status before the UN General
Assembly; the creation of a new agency that would give more visibil-
ity to cities and urban issues within the UN (something like UN-Cities
or UN-Urban); and the establishment of subsidiary bodies of consul-
tative nature with some UN agencies, which could be inspired by the
European Committee of the Regions. To be sure, some have more
potential than others, and the current context of UN reform could
help accelerate such changes. In order to understand them further,
the remainder of the chapter provides an overview of some of the
current mechanisms and limitations of cities’ participation within the
UN system, focusing on the institutionalisation of a World Assembly
of Local and Regional Governments (WALRG), and discusses the chal-
lenges that lie ahead.
THE ROLE OF CITIES IN A REFORMED UN: TOWARDS THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE WORLD ASSEMBLY OF
58 LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
•81• 2021
I. From consultative status with ECOSOC to per-
manent observer at the UN General Assembly
Formally, cities’ participation in the UN is articulated through local govern-

ment networks like UCLG and ICLEI, both of which have consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and act as focal points for
the whole urban constituency on a rotating basis.2 Such recognition entitles Associations of local
them to attend the events and working sessions of ECOSOC-related agen- governments have
cies and commissions, where they may make written and oral statements been calling for
and organise side events, along with basic (although surprisingly restricted)
permanent observer
privileges, such as receiving passes to access UN facilities (UN-DESA, 2018).
This access makes it possible for mayoral delegations to participate in multi- status for decades.
lateral summits such as the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC This would allow
and the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, as well as cities’ voices to be
being involved in intergovernmental negotiations such as those over the
heard in the General
2030 Agenda.
Assembly’s sessions and
Nevertheless, this has repeatedly been criticised by international municipal- resolutions.
ism as insufficient and inadequate recognition. First, because consultative
status was initially intended for NGOs and therefore does not recognise
local governments as governmental actors (or their networks as intergov-
ernmental actors, for that matter) but as civil society entities. Today, 5,725
entities currently have consultative status.3 And secondly, because this cat-
egorisation significantly restricts cities’ real capacity for political influence in
global discussions, as it does not grant them direct access to the General
Assembly, which is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative
organ of the UN. As a result, city networks are forced to negotiate par-
ticipation rights with each of the different UN agencies separately, which
may explain the proliferation of memorandums of understanding between
them.
Given these limitations, associations of local governments have been calling

for permanent observer status for decades (UCLG, 2013). This would allow
cities’ voices to be heard in the General Assembly’s sessions and resolutions,
and is therefore seen as an important step forward. Furthermore, cities and
their organisations could maintain a permanent mission at UN headquar-
ters, which would enhance their contacts with national delegations and
provide opportunities for political advocacy. Sometimes effective diplomacy
is merely a matter of being in the room where decisions are made (or as
close to it as possible). But what are the real chances of achieving such an
advanced level of recognition?
Until recently, permanent observer status was reserved for non-mem-

ber states (e.g. the Holy See and Palestine), intergovernmental 2. For further insights, see the
governance paper of the Local
organisations (e.g. the African Union or the OECD), and entities such as
Authorities Major Group, avai-
the International Committee of the Red Cross. In other words, bodies lable online. [Accessed: 20
formed and supported directly or indirectly by national governments. September 2020]: https://sustaina-
However, that changed in 2016, when the International Chamber of bledevelopment.un.org/content/
documents/7384LAMG%20gover-
Commerce joined this select club. Some saw a future opportunity for
nance%20paper%20for%20
cities in this move, and the reasoning seems clear: if the world’s largest HLPF%20Working%20Group_final.
business organisation can acquire this status, why shouldn’t local gov- pdf
ernments be entitled to similar recognition? But as it remains a route 3. For a list of entities with consultative
status, see: https://esango.un.org/
that requires the unanimous approval of all members of the assembly, civilsociety/displayConsultativeSta-
it is worth recalling that many countries still see cities’ growing global tusSearch.do?method=search&sessi
assertiveness as a threat to their national sovereignty. onCheck=false
MARTA GALCERAN-VERCHER
59
•81• 2021
II. The need to speak with a single voice
Beyond the above-mentioned limitations, efforts to establish a structural

participation mechanism for cities within the UN system have also been
hindered by the question of the representativity and accountability of
the associations claiming to speak on behalf of local governments. In
Efforts to establish a point of fact, similar considerations would apply to any other stakehold-
structural participation er constituency (i.e. women, youth, business, etc.), as highlighted by
mechanism for recent works on stakeholder democracy (Dodds, 2019) and multistake-
holderism as a new global governance practice (Raymond and DeNardis,
cities within the UN
2015; Gleckman, 2018). This is not a trivial matter, since for at least the
system have also foreseeable future, a scenario of individual cities engaging and reporting
been hindered by progress directly to the UN does not seem feasible.4
the question of the
Indeed, irrespective of the type of recognition awarded, be it consul-
representativity and
tative or permanent observer status, whenever local governments are
accountability of the given “a seat at the global table”, there is generally only one seat for
associations claiming them. That means that whatever oral intervention or written comment
to speak on behalf of is submitted to any UN meeting or intergovernmental process, it has to
be made through a single interlocutor, speaking on behalf of the whole
local governments.
constituency. Speaking with one voice is undoubtedly challenging, not
least because the ecosystem of city networks is a fragmented and highly
complex one in which the leading organisations are frequently vying for
funding, resources, members and access to political forums (Fernández
de Losada and Abdullah, 2019).
Despite this competitive environment, the larger global networks (i.e.

UCLG, ICLEI, C40) have understood that “networking with networks”
should be made an essential element of their diplomacy efforts if they
are to successfully expand their global reach and influence (Abdullah
and Garcia-Chueca, 2020). From a symbolic point of view, offering an
image of unity is of even more paramount importance. Indeed, with-
out genuine cooperation that includes the co-creation of a truly shared
global agenda for local and regional governments, city networks can
claim to speak, at best, only on behalf of their member cities, but not
in representation of the whole urban constituency. Strategy-wise, coop-
eration also serves to lend legitimacy to the agenda-setting efforts of
these associations, which explains why the Global Taskforce of Local
and Regional Governments emerged during the post-2015 international
process, when the role for local governments in sustainable develop-
ment was being discussed (including the negotiation over SDG11, the
so-called “Urban SDG”) and the stakes for the urban community were
therefore too high to fail.
4. A notable exception here is the sub-
mission of a Voluntary Local Review
(VLR) by New York City during the
2018 High Level Political Forum on III. The role of the Global Taskforce and the World
Sustainable Development (HLPF). Assembly of Local and Regional Governments
This was a truly individual initiati-
ve, as city networks were already
Just as the Earth Summit in 1992 and Habitat II in 1996 catalysed the
reporting the progress made on the
implementation of Agenda 2030 unification process that culminated in the foundation of UCLG in 2004,
by all LRGs worldwide through the the Post-2015 Development Agenda Process and Habitat III once again
SDG localisation report. Other cities, created the need for cities and their networks to coordinate joint inputs
such as Helsinki (Finland) and Bristol
(UK), are following NYC’s steps, tur-
and responses. The rationale was that cities and their networks would
ning this individual initiative into a be much more efficient in their advocacy efforts if they addressed their
collective one. messages as a unified constituency. Hence, the GTF was established in
•81• 2021
2013 and was, in turn, instrumental in relaunching the World Assembly
of Local and Regional Governments in 2016.
Operationally, the GTF was set up as the technical coordination and

consultation mechanism for the major international networks of local
governments to undertake joint advocacy work relating to global policy
processes, particularly those connected with sustainable development. Cities and their
Interestingly, this initiative was conceived following the very same networks would be
logic that brought UCLG into being some decades ago, which can be much more efficient in
summarised in the following twin aims: (1) to unify the voice of local
their advocacy efforts
and regional governments (LRGs) worldwide before the internation-
al community; and (2) to create a space from which to build LRGs’ if they addressed
joint positions and organise their advocacy strategy at the global level. their messages as a
Ultimately, it aspired to present local governments as a unified constitu- unified constituency.
ency in order to improve the chances of making the most of this single
Hence, the GTF was
seat eventually afforded to them at the global table.
established in 2013.
Yet, the GTF was not devised only as a technical mechanism, but also
as a political one. Indeed, among its functions is the authority to con-
vene the World Assembly of Local and Regional Governments, which
is presented to the international community as “the political voice”
of the urban constituency (UCLG, 2019: 23). More relevantly, the
United Nations recognises the WALRG as the formal mechanism for
following up and reviewing the implementation of the New Urban
Agenda at the local level.5 This means that, formally, whenever the
WALRG is convened, the declarations issued should be taken into
consideration as the formal input of the LRG constituency into the
implementation of the NUA.
Today the Global Taskforce is made up of 25 global and regional net-

works, including C40, ICLEI, the Global Parliament of Mayors and UCLG,
the latter being the coordinator and facilitator of this initiative. It should
be noted, however, that the level of involvement of these associations
has evolved over time. For instance, C40 was initially quite reluctant to
join this coordination mechanism, which was seen as a UCLG-dominated
space. Yet, today, collaboration between the different networks seems
to be much more robust. A clear illustration is the report on the local
implementation of SDGs that is presented annually during the High-Level
Political Forum and which despite being led by UCLG usually receives
significant input and contributions from the other networks. Another
example is the ongoing collaboration between C40 and UCLG to con-
vene the Urban 20 initiative.
IV. The challenges ahead
In sum, there has been some progress and promising initiatives have
materialised in recent years aimed at reforming the UN to make it more
inclusive towards local governments. Also, research has shown that at
least at the discursive level, the acknowledgement of cities as decisive
actors has improved in most UN frameworks (Kosovac et al., 2020). Still, 5. G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y re s o l u t i o n
there is a long way to go and the challenges ahead are significant, par- 71/256. New Urban Agenda.
Resolution adopted by the General
ticularly with regards to translating a strictly nominal and rather symbolic Assembly on 23 December 2016, A/
recognition into effective and tangible influence in global governance RES/71/256, paragraph 169, page
outputs. 29.
61
•81• 2021
To start with, prospects for obtaining permanent observer status with
the General Assembly do not look bright, despite this being one of the
core demands local authorities have once again brought to the fore
over the course of the UN75 consultations. Also, it remains to be seen
whether such status would bring any substantial change, as at the end
of the day, voting power would remain with member states. The con-
Institutionalising the solidation of the World Assembly of Local and Regional Governments
WALRG would require is surely a remarkable step forward, and its acknowledgement in the
rethinking its current New Urban Agenda should be cherished. However, the WALRG has yet
to obtain recognition by UN agencies other than UN-Habitat, let alone
governance scheme,
adquiring formal UN status before the General Assembly. Until that time
especially its level of arrives, its declarations will remain non-binding and therefore more sym-
representativity and bolic than effective. Further, institutionalising the WALRG would require
the role played by city rethinking its current governance scheme, especially its level of represen-
tativity and the role played by city networks.
networks.
As has been argued, the competing and overcrowded ecosystem of city
networks makes it hard for local governments to speak with a single
voice. Yet, it is not only a matter of having too many organisations all
claiming to be the most effective and legitimate advocate of local gov-
ernments. Instead, the issue of representativeness is profoundly rooted
in the very nature of the category of “local and regional governments”
itself. Indeed, the urban voice is not and will never be a homogeneous
one, but rather diverse and rich in nuances. The interests and challenges
of large metropolitan areas have little in common with those of small
and medium-sized cities. Aspirations to build a single shared agenda
that fits all shapes and sizes can therefore appear unworkable. Cities
and regions belong to different levels of jurisdiction, and a single assem-
bly could never hope to represent them both satisfactorily. The European
Committee of the Regions suffers from this very structural flaw. Perhaps
a bicameral system of representation could be a way forward in achiev-
ing greater levels of representativity and relevance.
Likewise, most proposals for a reformed UN attach great importance to

networks of local and regional governments and their role in orches-
trating joint positions out of a cacophony of urban voices. While their
salience as conveners and mediating agents between the local and
the global reality can hardly be disputed, other aspects should be
appraised before uncritically assuming that this is the best system of
organising the interests of local governments globally. For instance,
power dynamics that operate within these organisations are still poorly
understood. In particular, how they are governed, who sets the agenda
and – increasingly importantly – what role partners (i.e. corporates and
civil society organisations) play. This is all the more relevant as we seem
to be transitioning towards multistakeholder schemes of governance
(see Garcia-Chueca and Zárate in this volume). More research is needed
into the agency of these organisations’ secretariats and their influence
in shaping how members prioritise governance objectives and interven-
tions (Lecavalier and Gordon, 2020). This is not a minor point, as the
interests of these secretariats may not always be aligned with those of
the diverse membership they claim to represent.
Last but not least, perhaps it is time to decouple the debate on the role
of cities in global governance from the debate on how to improve their
recognition within the UN. For one thing, the number of “global tables”
•81• 2021
at which local governments must aim to exert influence has multiplied
and the UN no longer remains the sole body in charge of global gov-
ernance. This calls for city networks to diversify their efforts in order to
make cities’ voices as necessary in spaces like the G20 as they are in any
intergovernmental process sponsored by the UN. The consolidation of
the Urban 20 initiative attests to this trend. But the pathway for cities
within a system made by and for national governments may always Perhaps it is time to
be limiting and shortsighted. Local governments should not pursue decouple the debate
recognition for the sake of recognition, but ought to aspire to create on the role of cities
global impact instead. And if this cannot be attained within the system
in global governance
they strive to reform, other pathways without the UN may need to be
explored. from the debate on
how to improve their
recognition within the
References UN.
Abdullah, H. and Garcia-Chueca, E. “Cacophony or Complementarity?
The Expanding Ecosystem of City Networks Under Scrutiny”, in: Amiri, S.
and Sevin, E. (eds.) City Diplomacy: Current Trends and Future Prospects.
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.
Dodds, F. Stakeholder Democracy: Represented Democracy in a Time of

Fear. London and New York: Routledge, 2019.
Fernández de Losada, A. and Abdullah, H. (eds.). Rethinking the eco-

system of international city networks: Challenges and Opportunities.
Barcelona: CIDOB, 2019.
Garcia-Chueca, E. “Further including local governments in the quest for

a more effective UN”, in: Bargués, P. (ed.) UN @75: Rethinking multilat-
eralism. Barcelona: CIDOB, 2020.
Gaspari, O. “Cities against States? Hopes, Dreams and Shortcomings

of the European Municipal Movement, 1900–1960”, Contemporary
European History, 11(4), 2002, pp. 597–621.
Gleckman, H. Multistakeholder Governance and Democracy. A Global

Challenge. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.
Kosovac, A., Acuto, M. and Jones, T. L. “Acknowledging Urbanization:

A Survey of the Role of Cities in UN Frameworks”, Global Policy, 11(3),
2020, pp. 293–304.
Lecavalier, E. and Gordon, D. J. “Beyond networking? The Agency of

City Network Secretariats in the Realm of City Diplomacy”, in: Amiri, S.
and Sevin, E. (eds) City Diplomacy: Current Trends and Future Prospects.
Los Angeles, 2020, pp. 13–36.
Raymond, M. and DeNardis, L. “Multistakeholderism: anatomy of an

inchoate global institution”, International Theory, 7(3), 2015, pp. 572–
616.
Ruhlman, M. Who Participates in Global Governance? States, bureaucra-

cies, and NGOs in the United Nations. London and New York: Routledge,
2015.
63
•81• 2021
Salmerón Escobar, F. Un lugar en la mesa global: Los gobiernos locales
como tomadores de decisiones en la agenda mundial. Mexico City:
Proyecto AL-LAS, 2016.
UCLG. Local and Regional Governments - Partners for the Global

Agenda. Barcelona, 2013.
UCLG. UCLG Congress Durban 2019. World Council background docu-

ments. Barcelona, 2019.
UN-DESA. Working with ECOSOC: A NGOs Guide to Consultative Status.

New York: United Nations, 2018.
•81• 2021
IS SOMETHING BETTER THAN NOTHING? MULTI-LEVEL
GOVERNANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE
REGIONS IN EU POLICYMAKING
Andrea Noferini
Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
I
n a globalised, polycentric, fragmented and increasingly uncertain
world, many voices are calling for a radical change in the governance
models of development policies. New, urgent problems – COVID-19,
climate change, digitalisation, growing inequalities – invite a paradigm
shift in collective decision-making models. Increasingly, “from govern-
ment to governance” is the slogan used to express this change. On
the one hand, it underlines the inadequacy of traditional centralised
public decision-making models and, on the other, the openness of poli-
cymaking to actors who were until now largely absent from the various
national, European and international political arenas.
In this context, it seems that local and regional authorities (LRAs)1 are
gaining ground on central governments, which have always been the
centre of political power and undisputed rulers of public decisions. The
2030 Agenda recalls, for example, that localisation – the involvement of
LRAs in the implementation of the SDGs – is fundamental to achieving
its goals and that cities and territories must be able to maintain certain
autonomy to define and implement public policies on a local scale.
Although substantially dominated by inter-governmental logics, the

European Union (EU) has recognised the greater and growing interde-
pendence between its different levels of government. Recent estimates
reveal that 60% of the decisions taken by local and regional authorities
are influenced by European legislation and nearly 70% of EU legislation
is implemented by local and regional authorities (CEMR, 2016). With 1. The vocabulary is often con-
tested and the literature and
the approval of the Territorial Agenda 2020 (2011) and the Pact of
official documents give a variety
Amsterdam (2016), the EU has in fact reinvigorated the territorial and of terms, such as local and regio-
urban dimension of its public policies. nal authorities (LRAs), local and
regional governments (LRGs), sub-
national authorities (SNAs) and
In the early 1990s, thanks to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the territorial
sub-state authorities (SSAs). In
question and the urban dimension acquired relevance on the European this text reference is mainly made
agenda through the creation of the European Committee of the Regions to regional, supra-local and local
(CoR) – a voice and consultative body for territorial interests. After governments, meaning (on the
whole) representative public orga-
almost 30 years of operation, the evaluations of the CoR’s work are nisations with (some) degree of
conflicting and fluctuating. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that autonomy and control over (some)
the CoR remains the only supranational body that guarantees cities and salient policy areas.
65
•81• 2021
regions have access to – and a degree of supervisory power over – the
legislative process in such a complex political structure as the EU.
In light of this debate, the main objective of this paper is to respond

concisely to three fundamental questions: a) when and why LRAs
became central in EU policymaking; b) how – and by which means
After almost 30 – LRAs can take part in EU policymaking; and, finally, c) the extent
years of operation, to which the CoR adequately frames LRA representation in EU policy-
the evaluations of making. As its analytical framework, the paper uses the now classic
approach of multi-level governance (MLG), a combination of reflections
the CoR’s work
that first emphasised the forms of mobilisation of LRAs in European pol-
are conflicting icymaking.
and fluctuating.
Nonetheless, it is The analysis focuses on the CoR and warns that while on the one hand
its consultative nature, political fragmentation and composition con-
worth remembering
stitute major obstacles, on the other hand, the wide heterogeneity of
that the CoR remains territorial interests makes the development of coordinated and ordered
the only supranational collective action between the many and varied interests of the cities and
body that guarantees regions of Europe extremely challenging.
cities and regions
have access to – and a I. The territorial and urban dimensions of EU poli-
degree of supervisory cies in a multi-level governance context
power over – the
Historically, the traditional prudence regarding urban matters and the
legislative process in
“territorial blindness” of the EU have limited the formal rights of LRAs
such a complex political and their organisations to participate in supranational decision-making.
structure as the EU. Nevertheless, in the last decades, the role of LRAs in EU policymaking
has been increasingly recognised. A first relevant question is when and
why cities and regions became central to EU policymaking.
Scholars agree that, starting in the 1990s, the deepening of the

European process of integration and the implementation of decen-
tralisation reforms in many states encouraged the “territorial turn” of
development policies. This approach enhanced the decentralisation
of decision-making to LRAs with the aim of implementing territorially
targeted public policies more aligned with local preferences and policy
instruments. At the end of 2000s, the influential Barca Report put the
need for place-based approaches on the European agenda, stressing
the importance of regional specificities and local institutions as well
as of an endogenous model of socioeconomic development (Barca,
2009). The expansion of cohesion policy – thanks to the partnership
principle – stimulated the generation of development policies based
on the active involvement of a wide range of local and regional actors.
Territorial and urban disparities, social exclusion, industrial recovery and
the environment were some of the main concerns for which place-based
approaches were considered most appropriate.
Although place-based approaches have been criticised for their “local

bias”, they are still considered a major source of inspiration and they
have been included in the 2030 Agenda framework through the con-
cept of localisation. In the SDGs context, localising means “taking
into account sub-national contexts in the achievement of the 2030
Agenda, from the setting of goals and targets, to determining the
means of implementation and using indicators to measure and mon-
IS SOMETHING BETTER THAN NOTHING? MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE
66 OF THE REGIONS IN EU POLICYMAKING
•81• 2021
itor progress”. 2 Basically, localisation recognises local development
as an endogenous and spatially integrated phenomenon, conferring
primary responsibility for its planning, management and financing on
LRAs.
From the theoretical perspective, pioneering contributions on MLG

revealed, for the first time, that the presence of LRAs in EU policymak- Historically, the
ing was a novel phenomenon of a potentially innovative nature in the traditional prudence
context of EU policy, polity and politics (Hooghe and Marks, 1996; for regarding urban
a review, see: Piattoni, 2010). Basically, MLG revealed that LRAs were
matters and the
increasingly involved in EU affairs beyond and within member states
even in cases where the formal right to make a decision lay with national “territorial blindness”
governments or the EU legislator. More optimistic defenders of the MLG of the EU have
approach claimed that this increasing interdependency between region- limited the formal
al, local and national governments and the EU institutions could open
rights of LRAs and
the door to the establishment of a “new mode of EU governance” with
the involvement of a third tier of government alongside member states their organisations
and EU institutions. to participate in
supranational decision-
Although, formally, LRAs have not gained decision-making power over
making.
EU affairs, MLG is still important because it has contributed to insert-
ing the debate about the role of LRAs into the EU political and policy
agenda. The development of LRA external action (usually labelled paradi-
plomacy or municipal diplomacy), the proliferations of Euroregions and
Eurocities in the field of territorial cooperation, the establishment of offi-
cial delegations in Brussels and the proliferation of city networks are the
“classic” examples used to justify this greater involvement of LRAs in the
EU’s multi-level polity. There were 15 regional lobby offices in Brussels in
1988 and more than 200 in 2013 (Callanan and Tatham, 2014). In the
field of territorial cooperation, recent studies confirm the presence of
more than 300 Euroregions – a model of institutionalised cooperation
between LRAs across the EU’s internal and external borders (Durà et al.,
2018).
In sum, MLG reinforced the conceptual shift “from government to gov-

ernance” that recognised the emergence of a novel decision-making
mechanism characterised by the sharing of authority between levels
of government during the entire process from policymaking to imple-
mentation. Under this three-tiered EU polity scenario, MLG directed
scholarly attention to the means through which governments try to
achieve coordination in efforts to improve policy outcomes, legitimacy 2. Statement adopted by the Global
Taskforce of Local and Regional
and coherence. Governments at the Local and
Regional Authorities Forum at the
HLPF of June 2018.
II . The LRAs in EU policymaking 3. In this section, I will focus on the
legislative process (the upstream
phase of policymaking). For rea-
So, regions and cities have been considered a relevant tier of govern- sons of time and space, I will not
ment within the EU multi-level political system. The second question consider the downstream phase of
policymaking, i.e. the role of LRAs
regards how – and by what means – LRAs can take part in EU policy-
in the implementation of EU legis-
making.3 Basically, LRAs can influence EU policymaking in two ways: lation. This choice is justified by the
by participating in the supranational legislative arena and, domesti- fact that, while the role of LRAs as
cally, by being involved in the negotiation process of EU affairs within implementers of EU policies and
legislation is widely recognised and
the member states (in the context, for example, of cohesion policy, in analysed, much less emphasis is
intergovernmental meetings on EU affairs and in the monitoring of the usually devoted to the participation
subsidiarity principle by regional parliaments). of LRAs in the legislative process.
ANDREA NOFERINI
67
•81• 2021
In both cases, formal representation spaces are limited. When LRAs have
the opportunity to meet with their central governments to discuss EU
affairs, they usually prefer to activate their rights through the formal
member state structures rather than beyond them. In the end, most
LRAs – particularly sub-state entities – collaborate with central state
authorities rather than bypassing them (Tatham, 2008). In some cases,
Pioneering however, the weakness of formal domestic channels of representation
contributions on MLG has contributed to the development of alternative models including
revealed that the informal “going it alone” and “variable geometry” strategies aimed at
circumventing central governments’ gatekeeper positions.
presence of LRAs in EU
policymaking was a At the supranational level, legislative powers are framed within the EU’s
novel phenomenon of classical “institutional triangle”, which includes the three main institu-
a potentially innovative tions: the Commission as the agenda-setter and the two “legislative
chambers” represented by the Council and the European Council. If we
nature in the context
exclude the role of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR; see
of EU policy, polity and next paragraph), LRA access to the three institutions is constrained and
politics. usually occurs via lobby activities performed, respectively, by individual
LRAs, national associations of LRAs and international networks of LRAs
(such as the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, CEMR; the
Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions, CPMR; Eurocities; and
Metropolis, to name just a few).
Regional and local lobbying is usually welcomed by the Commission as

it lacks the expertise and resources to gather insightful local data for
initiating legislation on territorial issues at EU level. LRAs and their asso-
ciations can offer the Commission such expertise and they act in this
respect like other interest groups. LRA involvement in the initial stage
of the legislative process can reduce the risks of implementation failure,
as LRAs know what is technically feasible and politically appropriate
at the local level (Heinelt, 2017). In response to the wishes expressed
by LRAs in the consultation process for its “White Paper on European
Governance”, in 2003 the Commission established a more systematic
dialogue with European and national associations of LRAs at an early
stage of policy shaping. The goal was to introduce a more systematic
political dialogue with associations of LRAs before the formal deci-
sion-making processes got started. The “systematic dialogue” applied
exclusively to local and regional government organisations is usually
considered an example of the EU’s “new modes of governance”.
Due to its inter-governmental nature, the Council of Ministers of the EU is

unlikely to be contacted directly by associations of LRAs – especially cities.
Although access to the Council grants (some) sub-state governments a
formal and direct role in the EU legislative process, central governments
still act as “gatekeepers” and access to the Council depends in many
member states on the political will of central government (Tatham, 2008).
In this respect, contacts with representatives of individual national govern-
ments are more effective for LRAs attempting to influence negotiations at
EU level and final decisions on EU legislation.
Given the increased salience of the European Parliament (EP) in EU leg-

islative processes, MEPs are in need of greater knowledge, information
and expertise on territorial issues if they want to make their participation
valuable in the bargaining dynamics of co-decision procedures. LRAs
and their associations can provide these information assets to MEPs
•81• 2021
and allow them to increase their awareness of local political issues and
debates that would otherwise remain too distant. Since 2005, for exam-
ple, the URBAN Intergroup at the European Parliament has acted as a
cross-party, cross-committee group with a horizontal approach to dis-
cussing urban issues. By bringing together over 89 MEPs representing all
the political groups at the EP it collaborates with 143 partners from the
local, regional, national and European levels that represent the interests Whether the CoR
of Europe’s towns and cities or who work in the relevant field of urban can be considered
development. the Union’s third
representative
III . The European Committee of the Regions chamber or not is
still up for debate.
The third question regards the CoR’s role and the extent to which the Nonetheless, given
youngest of the EU’s constitutional organs can adequately frame LRA
the representative
representation in EU policymaking (Christiansen, 1996; Hönnige and
Panke, 2015; Heinelt, 2017). Established by the Maastricht Treaty in and political mandate
1992, the CoR is composed of 329 locally and regionally elected rep- of its members, to
resentatives from all member states who are organised into political consider the CoR
groups. Although LRAs and their associations can propose candidates,
a merely technical,
in almost all member states, central governments formally decide on
the list of candidates for the CoR. Candidates’ profiles therefore vary consultative assembly
depending on the relative powers LRAs possess domestically to get their would probably be to
preferred candidates approved by their national governments. underestimate its real
influence within EU
Moreover, the domestic administrative and territorial distribution of
powers in each EU member state varies and central governments find policymaking.
different ways to privilege (or inhibit) local or regional representation.
Member states with a strong regional tier of government (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) send very few representatives
from the municipal level to the CoR. Germany, for example, reserves
only five of its 24 seats on the CoR for local government representa-
tives. By contrast, all CoR members from Bulgaria, Estonia, Cyprus,
Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia are from the
municipal level because no “meso-regional” government exists in these
member states between the municipal and national levels (Heinelt and
Bertrana , 2012). As a consequence of this, representation in the CoR is
highly fragmented and – more importantly – larger and influential cities
have insufficient presence.
As the “voice” of regions and cities in the EU, the role and the func-
tioning of the CoR are laid down in articles 300 and 305–307 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Since the entry into force
of the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon – granting the CoR legal status before the
CJEU for actions for annulment under Article 263 of the TFEU – the CoR
has strengthened its position, being regarded, along with national par-
liaments, as the guardian of the principle of subsidiarity. The fact that,
until now, the CoR has never defended its own prerogatives before the
CJEU should not decrease the value of the instrument itself, as it still rep-
resents a strong deterrent to EU institutions neglecting the subsidiarity
principle in EU law making.
The CoR’s consultative role can be exercised throughout the different

stages of the EU decision-making process, including the pre-legislative
phase, the adoption of the proposal and the discussion of said pro-
ANDREA NOFERINI
69
•81• 2021
posal. Consultative functions are fulfilled in various ways, one the
most important elements being the opinions adopted at the plenary
meetings. Beside this, however, the CoR also performs many com-
plementary activities, such as specific collaborations with LRAs and
networks of LRAs and the organisation of events, conferences and
meetings in Brussels with local stakeholders. Formally, the CoR is
Considering the lack involved in the law-making process by forming mandatory, request-
of a legal basis in ed and own-initiative opinions. Consulting the CoR is mandatory for
the EU treaties and both the Council and the Commission before deciding on matters
that concern local and regional issues, such as economic, social and
the heterogeneity
territorial cohesion, education, culture, public health, trans-European
of cities and regions transport, telecommunications and energy networks. On other topics
in Europe, a single the CoR might be requested to issue an opinion if the Commission or
cohesive, shared and the Council think it is necessary. Finally, the CoR may also take the ini-
tiative and issue an opinion when regional interests are involved.
agreed model of LRA
representation at EU On average, the CoR adopts between 60 and 70 opinions per year
level is hard to imagine. (Schönlau, 2017). Although the CoR’s opinions are not binding, when
it issues own-initiative opinions EU institutions – particularly the
Commission – tend to seriously consider them. Neskhova concludes,
for example, that the European Commission acts in accordance with
the preferences of the CoR 45.5% of the time (Neskhova, 2010).
Regarding own-initiative opinions, Hönnige and Panke (2015) recog-
nise that the committee’s role improves when opinions are delivered
quickly to the members of the European Parliament and the staff of
the permanent representations. It is therefore crucial that the CoR
submit its opinion quickly, as a delayed opinion could be less influ-
ential in the decision-making processes within the two legislative
institutions.
Over its nearly 30 years of existence, the CoR, as a consultative

“supra-national body” within the EU institutional system, has nota-
bly increased its own distinctive legitimacy thanks to certain forms
of “institutional activism” that have contributed to the expansion of
its competences and influence within formal and informal EU policy-
making. Although some scholars recognise that this activism remains
merely symbolic if not complemented by changes in the EU treaties,
the CoR still remains the only official EU organisation that grants rep-
resentation to LRA interests within EU policymaking. Whether the CoR
can be considered the Union’s third representative chamber or not is
still up for debate. Nonetheless, given the representative and politi-
cal mandate of its members, to consider the CoR a merely technical,
consultative assembly would probably be to underestimate its real
influence within EU policymaking.
In the end, this ambiguity is intrinsically linked to the differential nature

of expectations that the CoR itself has always raised with respect to EU
institutions. On the one hand, the Commission’s interest in the CoR has
focused on technical expertise and feedback on EU policies with a ter-
ritorial impact. On the other hand, the European Parliament has, from
the beginning, privileged the more political nature of the CoR in the
hope of adding legitimacy to European integration and policymaking.
Clearly, the structure that was set in the Maastricht Treaty – a committee
with no formal decision-making power, and which brings together rep-
resentatives of very different kinds of LRA and with a membership to be
•81• 2021
determined essentially by national governments – represents a typical EU
compromise (Piattoni and Schönlau, 2015). Indeed, this formula was very
attractive for the supranational institutions, since it had the advantage of
adding legitimacy at the EU level without creating potential for obstruct-
ing the decision-making process.
it is hard to assess
Conclusions whether the CoR
will contribute to
Europe has many different types of LRA: there are municipalities,
inspiring a process of
provinces, counties, sub-state federated units and regions. Capital
regions and metropolitan areas cohabit with rural municipalities, institutional reform
peripheral areas and small and medium-sized towns. At the regional within the United
level, sub-state entities vary from democratically elected and economi- Nations or other
cally endowed regional governments to deconcentrated administrative
international agencies.
units with executive tasks and scarce autonomy (Hooghe et al., 2016).
Considering the lack of a legal basis in the EU treaties and the het- Nonetheless it would
erogeneity of cities and regions in Europe, a single cohesive, shared be surely unwise and
and agreed model of LRA representation at EU level is hard to imagine imprudent not to study
(Heinelt, 2017). However, spurred by the deepening of the process of
this option.
European integration and of decentralisation processes, a constant
increase of the role of LRAs in EU policymaking can be observed.
This is based on the recognition by the EU institutions that LRAs can
improve the effectiveness and the legitimacy of European public pol-
icies.
Since the CoR was established LRAs have had access to the formal are-
nas of the EU’s legislative process. The heterogeneity of its members
and the way CoR representatives are selected by member states weak-
en the potential for more incisive and cohesive action as, more often
than not, opinions are taken at the level of the minimum common
denominator. Moreover, the fact that the largest and most influential
cities are not fully represented in the CoR has increased the search for
alternative routes, particularly city networks (Fernandez de Losada,
2020). Despite its consultative character and the non-binding nature
of its opinions, the CoR has been able to position itself on highly
salient issues with territorial impact that are of interest to LRAs.
In the international system, the CoR still represents a singular body

that allows LRAs to engage in relevant institutionalised debates
and to participate in the formal legislative process of the EU’s
multi-level political and policy system. In the current crisis of mul-
tilateralism and in the era of global agendas, international actors
and central governments have begun to open decision-making are-
nas up to non-traditional actors (Galceran-Vercher, 2020). Better
endowed and forward-looking LRAs and networks of LRAs have
already explored some channels to ensure and increase their involve-
ment in the definition, implementation and monitoring of global
agendas. Honestly, it is hard to assess whether the CoR will contribute
to inspiring a process of institutional reform within the United Nations
or other international agencies. Nonetheless – and even considering
all the limitations of the functioning of the CoR – it would be surely
unwise and imprudent not to study this option. After all, there is no
more advanced mechanism in the world than the EU for channelling
the voices of LRAs in policymaking processes.
ANDREA NOFERINI
71
•81• 2021
References
Barca, F. Agenda for a reformed cohesion policy. Brussels: European

Communities, 2009.
Callanan, M. and Tatham, M. “Territorial interest representation in the

European Union: actors, objectives and strategies”. Journal of European
Public Policy, vol. 21, no 2, 2014, pp. 188–210.
CEMR, Local and Regional Governments in Europe: Structures and

Competences, Brussels, 2016.
Christiansen, T. “Second thoughts on Europe’s “third level”: the

European Union’s Committee of the Regions”. Publius: The Journal of
Federalism, vol. 26, no 1, 1996, pp. 93–116.
Durà, A., Francesco Camonita, Matteo Berzi and Andrea Noferini.,

Euroregions, Excellence and Innovation across EU borders. A Catalogue
of Good Practices, Barcelona. Kit-Book Editorial, 2018.
Fernández de Losada, A. Cities in international governance: European

lessons, Background document, Global Cities Programme, CIDOB, 2020.
Galceran-Vercher, M. Cities and global governance: reform multilateral-

ism or commit to “multistakeholderism”? Background document, Global
Cities Programme, CIDOB, 2020.
Heinelt, H. and Bertrana, X. (ed.). The second tier of local government

in Europe: Provinces, counties, departements and landkreise in compari-
son. Routledge, 2012.
Heinelt, H. The role of cities in the institutional framework of the

European Union. European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal
Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional
Affairs, Brussels, 2017.
Hönnige, C. and Panke, D. “Is anybody listening? The Committee of the

Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee and their
quest for awareness”. Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 23, no 4,
2016, pp. 624–642.
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. ““Europe with the regions”: channels of

regional representation in the European Union.” Publius: The Journal of
Federalism, vol. 26, no 1, 1996, pp. 73–92.
Hooghe, L., Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman Osterkatz,

Sara Niedzwiecki, and Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, Measuring regional
authority. Volume I: a postfunctionalist theory of governance. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016.
Neshkova, M.I. “The impact of subnational interests on supranational

regulation”. Journal of European public policy, vol. 17, no 8, 2010, pp.
1193–1211.
•81• 2021
Piattoni, S. The theory of multi-level governance: conceptual, empirical,
and normative challenges. Oxford University Press, 2010.
Piattoni, S. and Schönlau, J. (ed.). Shaping EU policy from below: EU

democracy and the committee of the regions. Edward Elgar Publishing,
2015.
Schönlau, J. “Beyond mere ‘consultation’: Expanding the European

Committee of the Regions’ role”. Journal of Contemporary European
Research, vol. 13, no 2, 2017.
Tatham, M. “Going solo: Direct regional representation in the European

Union”. Regional & Federal Studies, vol. 18, no 5, 2008, pp. 493–515.
ANDREA NOFERINI
73
•81• 2021
MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM
AND OTHER FORMS OF GLOBAL
URBAN AGENCY
• TOWARDS AN ECOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGES FOR

GLOBAL POLITICS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ALLIANCES IN HABITAT III
Eva Garcia-Chueca and Lorena Zárate
• WHAT’S NEXT? NEW FORMS OF CITY DIPLOMACY

AND EMERGING GLOBAL URBAN GOVERNANCE
Anna Kosovac and Daniel Pejic
75
TOWARDS AN ECOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGES FOR GLOBAL
POLITICS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ALLIANCES IN HABITAT III*
* The reflections presented in this

Eva Garcia-Chueca paper are the result of the authors’
Senior researcher, Global Cities Programme, CIDOB direct experience in the networks
studied, and in the preparatory pro-
Lorena Zárate cess of Habitat III. Eva Garcia-Chueca
was coordinator of the United Cities
Member of the Global Platform for the Right to the City and Local Governments (UCLG)
Committee on Social Inclusion,
Participative Democracy and Human
Rights (2007-2017) and a Habitat
III expert in the Policy Unit on the
Right to the City and Cities for All
(2015-2016). Lorena Zárate was pre-
sident of the Habitat International
Coalition (HIC) from 2011 to 2019,
I. From the crisis of multilateralism to multi- in which capacity she took part in
stakeholder governance numerous Habitat III international
meetings and preparatory gathe-
The structures of global governance have been designed by and for rings, as well as in the summit itself.
HIC is a founding member of the
nation states, giving rise to the multilateral frameworks that have been Global Platform for the Right to the
dominating international relations since the Second World War. The City (2014—).
globalisation that accelerated with the end of the Cold War has led,
inter alia, to two influential phenomena that have contributed towards
challenging the prevailing multilateralism. First, it has favoured the ap-
pearance of a multiplicity of non-traditional actors who are seeking
to have some influence in global decision-making spaces. Civil society
organisations, subnational governments, and big corporations, to give
just a few examples, are now mobilising transnationally in order to
participate in international relations and to assert their interests and
points of view. This atomisation of international dynamics has not only
eroded the nineteenth-century power of nation states, but it has also
come with thoroughgoing changes in the power relations between
them and with other stakeholders. To a great extent, this has been
caused by the predominance of neoliberalism on the global scale,
which has enabled concentration of economic power in the hands of a
few transnational corporations and financial institutions. These stake-
holders have gained more and more muscle in global governance over
the last three decades during which structural adjustment policies have
greatly affected governmental organisations.
The second phenomenon to be emphasised with regard to the impact of

globalisation in multilateral governance is the unprecedented intercon-
nection of causes and effects of contemporary problems. With such a
degree of complexity, collective answers to global challenges are neces-
sary to face issues such as energy transition or eradication of inequalities.
Without concerted action involving the long-term commitment of several
kinds of stakeholders it will be difficult to find sustainable solutions with
sufficient capacity for transformation. No strangers to this reality, nation
states are increasingly appealing to non-state stakeholders, as evidenced
by the text resulting from Habitat III, the New Urban Agenda (NUA) and,
shortly before that, the Agenda 2030 (2015).
77
•81• 2021
With these elements as a backdrop, it might be said that traditional mul-
tilateralism is in crisis, as Ian Klaus’s text in this volume also shows. Aware
of this, the United Nations (UN) has, for some years now, been discussing
how to bring about possible reforms. It even devoted its 75th anniversary
celebrations in September 2020 to promoting international debates that
would help to define a strategy for action (Bargués, 2020). In this regard,
The structures of global there are now several discussions on the need to shift from multilater-
governance have been al global governance to a model of multi-stakeholder governance that
designed by and for would make international relations more plural by recognising the voices
and roles of other actors with growing influence in international affairs.
nation states, giving
rise to the multilateral But what exactly does this mean? And, above all, what would be the
frameworks that have implications of introducing multi-stakeholder governance? It is often
been dominating argued that the multi-stakeholder factor constitutes a more inclusive
framework of global governance making it possible to circumvent the
international relations
intrinsic limitations of traditional, eminently state-centric multilateral-
since the Second World ism by facilitating the coordination of state and non-state stakeholders
War. and their joint action in tackling global challenges (Cogburn, 2006).
It is also said that it is an approach that allows a more pragmatic re-
sponse to problems because it enables collaboration between stake-
holders with different standpoints and interests in the quest for and
development of solutions.
Nonetheless, this definition brings to mind the early theoretical formu-

lations of “governance”, according to which it constituted a method of
government that allowed a deepening of democracy by means of better
dialogue with a range of stakeholders. But is governance synonymous
with democracy? If we bear in mind the fact that the historical roots of
governance coincide with processes of deregulation and privatisation that
began to appear in the United States in the mid-1980s (Estévez Araújo,
2009), the answer to this question should challenge the automatic as-
sumption that multi-stakeholder is synonymous with greater inclusion. In-
deed, it was precisely in this historical context that “governance” became
a functional model of government for neoliberalism, crucially contributing
to reducing the presence of the state and bolstering that of the market
by justifying the entry of private interest groups into institutional political
decision-making spaces. Accordingly, this considerably legitimated their
voice and politically influential action, which had previously been carried
out through less formal and more questioned channels. In practice, then,
governance was a synonym of less democracy, if democracy is under-
stood as meaning plural participation and defence of the public interest.
When applied to international relations, “multistakeholderism”, as it is

known, should raise similar misgivings. This framework could be used to
advance towards a democratic deepening of global debates, but it can
also become an indispensable ally whereby big corporations can have
direct access to governments and, above all, ensure that their influence
is seen as legitimate because it is wielded through the institutional chan-
nels established by global governance. In fact, certain recent initiatives
of the United Nations seem to be moving in the direction of reinforcing
this latter possibility. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding
between the UN and the World Economic Forum in 2019 has created
an unprecedented institutional space for political dialogue between the
UN and multinational corporations, although this is not available for any
other international actor (Gleckman, 2019).
TOWARDS AN ECOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGES FOR GLOBAL POLITICS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
78 ALLIANCES IN HABITAT III
•81• 2021
Multistakeholderism is not, therefore, a guarantee per se of greater and
better inclusion. This will depend on the stakeholders that are participat-
ing (or that can participate), in the power relations existing among them,
and also on the availability of appropriate mechanisms for incorporating
traditionally excluded voices. The key lies in mobilising different kinds of
knowledges and resources from below to the detriment of technocratic
approaches which, privileged by the rhetoric of pragmatism, ultimately It is often argued that
contribute towards depoliticising global politics and weakening a public the multi-stakeholder
sphere which—not because it is global—should then be less democratic factor constitutes
and transparent. Multi-stakeholder governance must also have mecha-
a more inclusive
nisms of responsibility, accountability, and transparency (Gleckman, 2018).
framework of global
governance making it
II. An ecology of knowledges to decolonise inter- possible to circumvent
national relations the intrinsic limitations
In keeping with these concerns, we suggest that multi-stakeholder gov- of traditional,
ernance should be interpreted from the standpoint of the “ecology of eminently state-
knowledges” (Santos, 2009) as a mechanism for endowing it with greater centric multilateralism
scope and legitimacy. From this perspective, we aim to fill one of the most
by facilitating the
important gaps in the existing literature on multi-stakeholder governance
(Scholte, 2020) which has mainly focused on carrying out descriptive anal- coordination of
ysis of how and why multi-stakeholder initiatives emerge, how they func- state and non-state
tion, and how and why they have a certain impact on policies. However, stakeholders and their
few studies consider whether the results of multi-stakeholder governance
joint action in tackling
are just. In other words, insufficient attention has been given to identify-
ing who benefits and who is left out. global challenges.
In the quest for greater legitimacy and distributive justice, it is also neces-
sary to take into consideration the fact that, generally speaking, interna-
tional relations actively reproduce hierarchical schemes of colonial origin.
This is a discipline theorised by European, American and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Australian intellectuals who have constructed a field of knowledge
that has been devoted to studying matters of interest from their own
cultural perspectives (the inter-state system, hegemonies between coun-
tries, global economic policy) while, at the same time, remaining silent
about international power structures created by themselves by way of
schemes of imperial domination that situated the territories and peoples
of colonies in a situation of inferiority and subordination (Jones, 2006).
Accordingly, international relations are rooted in the exclusion of certain
countries and groups, so it is not hard to imagine that multi-stakeholder
governance arising from this unequal environment reproduces the same
problem. However, present worldwide reflections about governance could
be an opportunity for moving towards a necessary decolonisation of inter-
national relations if inclusion on an equal footing of historically silenced
actors is guaranteed.
The ecology of knowledges can contribute towards this because it of-

fers a critical approach to these questions based on the idea that knowl-
edge entails recognition. In other words, it upholds the need to value
(recognise) the different voices existing in the world and urges horizontal
(de-hierarchised) dialogue between them so as to build bridges of mutual
understanding. This means allowing equal participation by all actors but,
above all, those who are far from centres of power and key decision-mak-
ing spaces. Global politics, dominated by state-centrist standpoints, often
EVA GARCIA CHUECA AND LORENA ZÁRATE

79
•81• 2021
bureaucratised and subject to geopolitical interests, has the chance to
become more humanised by means of processes of collective construc-
tion arising from the participation of stakeholders that are traditionally
invisible in the more traditional dynamics of international relations. How-
ever, decolonisation of international relations requires political will and
institutional efforts to channel certain voices. In this regard, ungoverned
Multistakeholderism (meaning deregulated or without clear norms to address the imbalances
is not a guarantee of power among the parties) multi-stakeholder governance will inevitably
per se of greater and be exclusionary (firstcomers will be insiders and the capacity to influence
will depend on the extent to which certain conditions are met).
better inclusion. This
will depend on the This article explores the possibilities for a bottom-up ecology of knowledges
stakeholders that are in the case of two stakeholders that should play a key role in multi-stake-
participating (or that holder governance schemes: civil society and city governments. The choice
of these actors is justified as 1) they constitute clear elements of deep root-
can participate), in the
edness in territories where global problems are manifest, and 2) they have
power relations existing connections with people on a daily basis and thus with historically silenced
among them, and groups. The article specifically seeks to respond to the question of how to
also on the availability develop strategies for collaboration among these actors so that their voices
can be more audible in the global domain with regard to which political
of appropriate
messages they convey, and which limits they find.
mechanisms for
incorporating In order to respond to this question, the article analyses the process of co-
traditionally excluded ordination which took place between a network of actors from organised
civil society, the Global Platform for the Right to the City (GPR2C)1, and a
voices.
network of cities, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG)2, within the
framework of preparing and adopting the New Urban Agenda (NUA). The
aim of studying this particular experience is to provide greater clarity as to
how multi-stakeholder governance is deployed in practice, inside and out-
side multilateral frameworks, and to describe the elements that can contrib-
ute towards reinforcing an ecology of knowledges for global policy.
III. Habitat III: a window of opportunity for

bottom-up multi-stakeholder governance?
The third UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Develop-
1. As per their own definition: “We
ment was held in 2016. Known as Habitat III, it was a continuation of
are an open, flexible, diverse net- two previous conferences on human settlements organised decades earli-
work of civil society and local er in Vancouver (1976) and Istanbul (1996). On this occasion, the United
governments organizations com- Nations General Assembly, after several years of progressive recognition
mitted to political action and social
change through the promotion,
of city governments in global governance, especially since 2000 (Gar-
defense and fulfillment of the Right cia-Chueca, 2020), urged UN-Habitat to strengthen the channels of par-
to the City at the global, regional ticipation of local governments and other stakeholders in the preparatory
and local levels, giving a particular
process of the Conference (United Nations, 2013).
voice to those people and commu-
nities affected by exclusion and
marginalization.” See: https://www. The willingness of the United Nations to engage in dialogue with actors
right2city.org other than the member states was not new. Practically since it was first
2. As per their own definition: “UCLG
created, the United Nations has facilitated the participation of civil society
is an umbrella organisation for
cities, local and regional govern- in the General Assembly by means of granting consultative status. Oth-
ments, and municipal associations er channels of communication have progressively been opened and for-
throughout the world defending malised with the establishment of the so-called Major Groups, after the
their interests internationally and
promoting democratic local self-
Earth Summit (1992) and, after 2013, recognition of other actors (such
government.” See: https://www. as philanthropic and academic entities) as part of the preparatory process
uclg.org of the 2030 Agenda.
•81• 2021
Partnerships between civil society and city governments were not new
phenomena either. They had been forming intermittently but steadily
since the first expressions of the World Social Forum (WSF), after 2000.
The “municipalist” section of the WSF was constituted over about a de-
cade by the Forum of Local Authorities for Social Inclusion and Participato-
ry Democracy (FLA), the most significant space for international dialogue
between organised civil society and local governments. The combined Global politics,
efforts that made the two spaces of WSF and FLA possible also laid dominated by state-
the foundations for the appearance of proposals that have had a long centrist standpoints,
political history in terms of international narratives calling for solidarity,
often bureaucratised
democratic participation, inclusion, and human rights. Especially nota-
ble in this regard are the World Charter for the Right to the City (2004)3 and subject to
and the Global Charter-Agenda for Human Rights in the City (2011).4 geopolitical interests,
has the chance
These precedents prepared the ground for the fact that, in 2015, two
to become more
prominent expressions of organised civil society and international mu-
nicipalism, the GPR2C and UCLG respectively (heirs of the processes humanised by means
5
of multi-stakeholder dialogue linked to the WSF and the FLA ), joined of processes of
forces with the shared aim of influencing the future urban agenda. Al- collective construction
though the United Nations environment was not new to either of the
arising from the
two platforms, gaining influence in a multilateral framework was no
easy task. Participation in the Major Groups allowed a certain amount participation of
of dialogue with the UN (a limited right to speak, as Galceran-Vercher stakeholders that
argues in this volume). But chances of having real influence were slight are traditionally
given the role of the diplomatic delegations of the member states, the
invisible in the more
only ones with the right to vote.
traditional dynamics of
In this situation UCLG and GPR2C joined forces and their partnership international relations.
not only had an impact on the outside—which is to say, reinforcing
their ability to have political influence in the process of Habitat III—but
there were also internal repercussions within their own organisations,
buttressing and nourishing some elements of their messages and pro-
posals. The right to the city was the catalyst for these synergies, both
outside and inside. In the case of the UN, it constituted a shared nar-
rative promoted by both platforms during the NUA negotiations with
a view to speaking out for the need for urban policies to be designed
to place people at the centre of political action. As for their own mem-
bership, it allowed reinforcement of certain strategic contents. For the
GPR2C, working with local governments meant expanding the impact
of its political proposals while also deepening its thinking about the 3. See https://www.right2city.org/
need to bolster local democracy and political decentralisation (or the wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
A1.1_Carta-Mundial-de-Derecho-
“rights of cities”). For UCLG, the connection with civil society brought a-la-Ciudad.pdf (in English, https://
legitimacy and underpinned the territorial and democratic approaches www.hlrn.org.in/documents/World_
that the organisation had advocated since its inception. Charter_on_the_Right_to_the_City.
htm).
4. See https://www.uclg-cisdp.org/es/
This simultaneous inside and outside situation also characterised the el-derecho-la-ciudad/carta-mundial
approach opted for in order to influence the process of defining the (in English, https://www.uclg-cisdp.
NUA, which combined 1) political influence in the working spaces and org/en/right-to-the-city/world-char-
ter-agenda).
official phases of the preparatory process of Habitat III, and 2) partic-
5. The Committee on Social Inclusion,
ipation in other urban forums and coordination with agencies of the Participatory Democracy and Human
UN system apart from UN-Habitat including, inter alia, the Office of the Rights, one of UCLG’s working
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Food and Agriculture groups, has played a key role in this
process as it functioned as the con-
Organization (FAO). The strategies inside Habitat III involved working in nection between the FLA and the
a coordinated manner to influence the different drafting phases of the UCLG, and between UCLG and the
NUA over the eighteen months prior to the summit. This included being GPR2C.

81
•81• 2021
involved in the preparation of Issue Papers, shaping the Policy Units
(by designating experts who could be spokespeople for their points
of view), and participation in regional and thematic forums. Both net-
works took part in several discussion sessions of these forums and also
joined the drafting committees of the respective final declarations.
Partnerships between Strategies outside the official process included consolidating already ex-
civil society and city isting spaces for political discussion between civil society and local gov-
governments were ernments, among them the Gwangju World Human Rights Cities Forum,
where several debates were concerned with the future NUA. These strat-
not new phenomena
egies even involved forging ad hoc alliances like the network of cities
either. They had been called “Cities for the Right to Housing and the Right to the City” whose
forming intermittently manifesto, based on specific commitments of cities regarding housing
but steadily since the and urban planning policies, detailed proposals that were relevant for
the political discussion at Habitat III.6 Meanwhile, during this period, the
first expressions of the
GPR2C and UCLG furthered the discussions they had been having prior
World Social Forum to Habitat III with several UN agencies that could be sympathetic to some
(WSF), after 2000. of their messages. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is collaboration
with the UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Adequate Housing, who
was promoting the campaign The Shift,7 in which the GPR2C and UCLG
actively participated, and also with the Office of the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights which, shortly beforehand, had undertaken the
unprecedented task of studying the role of local governments in safe-
guarding human rights.8
The synergies created inside and outside of Habitat III, and with and
outside UN-Habitat, enabled gradual reinforcement of shared messag-
es between the GPR2C and UCLG. In brief, these revolved around the
need to consolidate five issues that are fundamental for urban policies:
1) the focus on human rights; 2) the territorial approach; 3) public
sector-community collaboration through processes of co-creation and
co-production; 4) greater local autonomy, not only political but also
financial; and 5) deepening of democracy. While the first three mat-
ters filtered into the negotiations and were incorporated into the New
Urban Agenda, the last two were met with outright rejection by sev-
eral national governments and were excluded from the adopted text.
Habitat III therefore provided a window of opportunity for a certain
degree of bottom-up multi-stakeholder governance, although this was
affected by significant structural limits which we shall describe in great-
er detail below.
IV. Conditions for bottom-up multi-stakeholder

governance
What real scope exists for bottom-up multi-stakeholder governance able

to influence multilateralism? Some people argue that Habitat III was a
6. Available at https://citiesforhousing. milestone in terms of multi-stakeholder participation because of the di-
org
mensions of the process and number of actors involved (Birch, 2017). A
7. For further information see https://
www.make-the-shift.org/. quantitative look at the matter would probably yield eloquent figures:
8. F o r f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n s e e eighteen months of political discussions prior to the summit, four regional
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ conferences, seven thematic conferences, ten Policy Units consisting of a
LocalGovernment/Pages/Index.aspx.
9. All the relevant documents and
total of two hundred international experts, the involvement of forty-four
details related to this process are UN agencies, and thousands of participating organisations, platforms,
available at https://habitat3.org/ and entities.9
•81• 2021
However, a qualitative analysis cannot escape a more critical reading. Both
participation in the various working spaces and phases of discussion, and
incorporation of proposals coming from outside the domain of nation
states faced major challenges. Asymmetry in the conditions of participa-
tion (in terms of access to resources, information, capacity for political
communication, and the need for a certain degree of professionalisation,
for example) did not favour horizontal dialogue among the stakehold- Habitat III therefore
ers. The multiplicity of in-person events and preparatory documents, most provided a window
of them available only in English, made active participation difficult for of opportunity for
traditionally excluded actors without the means to cover high transport
a certain degree
and translating costs. Moreover, the richness of the preparatory process
and the inputs collectively produced over more than a year were seriously of bottom-up
undermined when the diplomatic delegations of the member states took multi-stakeholder
over the debate. governance, although
this was affected by
Hence, in the months leading up to the summit there were significant set-
backs with several key contents of the drafts that had been produced hith- significant structural
erto (including the right to the city as a common good, inclusion of the limits.
rights of LGBT+ groups, furthering of processes of decentralisation, and
strengthening of democratic institutions and processes). Another major
problem in this framework was confirmation of the fact that, in numerous
instances, private sector interests were channelled by voices coming from
governments, and that many of their demands were directly incorporated
into the final version of the document. Meanwhile, it became clear that
the dynamics of negotiations among the member states made the discus-
sions more dependent on broad geopolitical balances than on different
specific standpoints regarding urban matters. Indeed, the diplomatic rep-
resentatives participating in the name of the member states in the various
spaces of negotiation often lacked knowledge of urban and housing is-
sues, which meant that the relevance and scope of some proposals were
not properly understood (Zárate, 2017).
Consequently, participation of the GPR2C and UCLG in the process of

Habitat III was hampered by serious structural constraints resulting from
the prevailing inter-state multilateralism. In this situation, the possibility
of advancing towards an ecology of knowledges for global policy does
not look like an easy path to take. In addition to nominal recognition of
multi-stakeholder governance in the 2030 Agenda or the NUA, it is neces-
sary to introduce thoroughgoing changes into the international relations
system in order to make it viable. In other words, this means making it
possible to move from formal governance, assessed in terms of how many
participate, to substantive governance (regulated, inclusive, decolonised),
assessed in terms of who participates, how and for what purpose (with
what political goals: individual and profit-making or collective and for the
common good). Far from being secondary, these elements determine the
more or less democratic nature of multi-stakeholder governance.
Another important aspect to be borne in mind concerns the impact of

multi-stakeholder governance. Although outward impact (in terms of
influencing multilateral frameworks of governance) did not yield all the
results desired from the standpoint of organised civil society and local
government, the coordination between the GPR2C and UCLG constituted
a fundamental moment in the consolidation of a strategic partnership
between the two stakeholders. This made possible the development of
shared proposals and narratives that presently constitute the basis for

83
•81• 2021
influencing global agendas dealing with urban matters. The collabora-
tion of both platforms within the Habitat III framework was a space of
mutual learning and international visibility, which had results at several
levels: within each of the two networks, between them, and outwardly.
Hence, their convergence during this period consolidated forms of col-
laboration that were already underway, at the same time as it opened up
The dynamics of new possibilities for working together and more systematically. These are
negotiations among still operative and have turned out to be crucial in confronting the pres-
the member states ent pandemic (participation in strategic planning exercises, preparatory
processes for their own summits, collaboration in the development of
made the discussions
research, organisation, training and learning activities, and involvement
more dependent on in peer-to-peer exchanges, to mention only the most relevant). Likewise,
broad geopolitical the visibility resulting from having participated in Habitat III also resulted
balances than on in a strengthening of their political position vis-à-vis some national gov-
ernments and the UN system in general.
different specific
standpoints regarding
urban matters. V. Towards greater distributive justice in interna-
tional relations
In the context of a crisis of multilateralism, discussions about the need to

move towards a scheme of multi-stakeholder governance that would rec-
ognise the views and roles of other actors present in international relations
are gaining momentum. In response to interpretations of multi-stake-
holder governance that automatically understand it as a more inclusive
formula, this article starts out from the idea that that the multi-stakehold-
er model is not per se a guarantee of greater and better inclusion. This
will depend on the stakeholders that participate (or that can participate),
the power relations existing among them, and the existence of adequate
mechanisms for incorporating voices that are traditionally excluded.
With the aim of advancing towards models of multi-stakeholder gover-

nance with sufficient transparency and legitimacy, it is important to pay
attention to who participates (and who does not), how and for what
purpose, while establishing mechanisms, criteria and principles for or-
ganising their participation. Such regulation would offer transparency,
facilitate accountability and, if guided by principles of distributive justice,
could contribute to progress towards a bottom-up ecology of knowledg-
es which, in the last instance, would make it possible to democratise
global politics in a context of enormous worldwide challenges.
As stakeholders that are close to both territories and communities, civil

society and local government should have a major role in the processes
of multi-stakeholder governance that have been designed within multilat-
eral frameworks of governance. In turn, this dialogue in the face of mul-
tilateralism does not exhaust the possibilities for collaboration between
them because, as this article has shown, the synergies that can appear
between these actors are not only geared towards reinforcing their politi-
cal messages vis-à-vis the United Nations, but they can also feed into their
own strategies of international cooperation and global political influence
outside multilateralism.
Being both inside and outside current international relations frameworks,

while also combining local roots with a global presence, is one of the
potentials these actors have. Multi-stakeholder governance can benefit
•81• 2021
from this if the necessary principles and norms are established to permit
their participation on an equal footing and with guarantees of horizontal
dialogue. Otherwise, multi-stakeholder governance can contribute, even
unintentionally, to legitimating private interests and giving them priority
because the actors representing them have greater capacity for political
influence.
References
Bargués, P. (ed.). CIDOB Report no. 6. La ONU a los 75: Repensando el

multilateralismo. Barcelona, Septiembre 2020.
Birch, E. L. “Inclusion and Innovation: The Many Forms of Stakeholder En-

gagement in Habitat III”. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and
Research, 19 (2), 2017, pp. 45-52.
Cogburn, D.L. ‘Inclusive Internet Governance: Enhancing Multistakehold-

er Participation through Geographically Distributed Policy Collaborato-
ries’, in Kurbalija, J. and Katrandjiev, V. (eds.), Multistakeholder Diplomacy:
Challenges and Opportunities. Geneva: DiploFoundation, 2006, 45-68.
Estévez Araujo, J. A. “Que no te den gobernanza por democracia”, Mien-

tras Tanto, 108-109: 2009, pp. 33-49.
Gleckman, H. “UN signs deal with Davos that threatens democratic prin-
ciples”, 3 July, Transnational Institute, 2019. Available at: https://www.tni.
org/en/article/un-signs-deal-with-davos-that-threatens-democratic-princi-
ples.
Gleckman, H. Multistakeholder Governance and Democracy: A Global

Challenge. London: Routledge, 2018.
Jones, B. G. Decolonizing International Relations. USA: Rowman and Lit-

tlefield, 2006.
Santos, B. de Sousa; Meneses, M. P. (eds.). Epistemologias do Sul. Coím-

bra: Almedina, 2009.
Sholte, J. A. “Multistakeholderism Filling the Global Governance Gap?”

Research Overview for the Global Challenges Foundation. School of Glob-
al Studies, University of Gothenburg. April, 2020.
United Nations General Assembly . “Implementation of the Outcome of

the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) and
Strengthening of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme
(UN-Habitat).” Resolution 67/216, March 20. New York: United Nations,
2013.
Zárate, L. “¿Cuarenta años no son nada? La lucha por la inclusión del

derecho a la ciudad en la agenda global” in P. Olmedo M. y G. Endara
(eds.) Alternativas urbanas y sujetos de transformación. Quito: Frederich
Ebert Stiftung, 2016, pp. 350-396.

85
•81• 2021
WHAT’S NEXT? NEW FORMS OF CITY DIPLOMACY AND
EMERGING GLOBAL URBAN GOVERNANCE
Anna Kosovac
Research Fellow, Connected Cities Lab, University of Melbourne
Daniel Pejic
Research Fellow, Connected Cities Lab, University of Melbourne
W
itnessing city leaders participate in major multilateral fora,
such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) or the Global Forum on Migration and Development
(GFMD), has provided a convincing visual representation of their
emerging role in global governance. Narratives of city engagement
and participation in the “international system” are now also being
correlated with systematic evidence of the way multilateral processes
are being reshaped, albeit timidly, to include urban actors as critical
partners in addressing the world’s most pressing global challenges.
For example, a recent analysis of United Nations (UN) frameworks
found that 80% of documents that referred to cities had been pub-
lished since the year 2000 and, of these, 85% characterised cities as
“actors” capable of influencing the achievement of collective global
goals (Kosovac et al., 2020a). Despite these trends, without radical
reform, cities are likely to be granted only marginal and consultative
positions in multilateral institutions, akin to other non-state actors.
These positions will not be representative of the importance of city
leadership in governing global challenges in a predominately urban
world. Accordingly, the diplomatic activities of cities have focused
not only on influencing traditional multilateral actors and processes,
but on developing alternative modes of global urban agency, wheth-
er through bilateral relations, city networking, or partnerships with
other international actors such as non-government organisations,
philanthropies and research organisations. This city diplomacy has
resulted in emerging forms of formal and informal “global urban
governance”, which are operating both within and outside what is
traditionally understood as the international system. Global urban
governance recognises that urban political agency involves interac-
tions with actors at the local, national, regional and international
levels. To understand 21st century global governance and its increas-
ingly urban dimensions we first must unpack this multiscalar reality.
Global urban governance is already impacting a range of major policy

areas such as the environment, sustainable development, migration,
health and culture, to name but a few. City leaders can be effective
global governors, but they are constrained by institutional, legal and
87
•81• 2021
resource barriers, in terms of both finance and expertise). Hence,
they play to what the scholarship on modern urban governance tells
us are their key strengths – working in partnership and building coa-
litions of likeminded actors, often operating across political scales, in
order to advance the interests of their constituents (Beal and Pinson,
2014). In this way, the global agency of cities closely reflects the
Cities are likely to be principles of multistakeholder governance; however, mainstream
granted only marginal international relations has given limited consideration to how cities
and consultative fit into multistakeholder typologies (Raymond and DeNardis, 2015).
In this chapter we focus specifically on the way cities partner with
positions in multilateral
other non-state actors such as universities, philanthropies and the
institutions, akin to private sector to maximise the impact of city diplomacy and sup-
other non-state actors. port initiatives that build the capacities of global urban governance.
These positions will not Drawing on a recent survey of the diplomatic activity of 47 cities
around the world and a brief case study of Amsterdam, the chapter
be representative of
contends that if we seek to understand the governance of modern
the importance of city challenges through a multistakeholder lens, we need to focus on
leadership in governing city leaders and their interactions with academic, philanthropic and
global challenges in a business partners. Based on these trends, we also project forward to
provide some tentative predictions of how the future of global urban
predominately urban
governance may be shaped by these coalitions of actors and the
world. changes that may result from the COVID-19 pandemic.
I. Emerging trends in city diplomacy
Within urban studies and to some extent international relations, there

have been long-standing discussions on the increasing role of city
diplomacy; however, to date limited systematic empirical evidence has
underpinned these dialogues. To contribute to closing this knowledge
gap, in 2019 we conducted a global survey (together with the Chicago
Council on Global Affairs) to understand how cities structure and deliver
their international engagement programmes. A total of 49 responses
were received from 47 cities, representing a cross section of regions and
forms of local government.1 The results provide valuable context for
understanding the way cities structure their international activities both
within and outside multilateral processes and suggest some trends for
predicting future city diplomacy.
The international activities of cities tend to be run from designated inter-

national offices or departments within the government. Of the cities
that responded, 88% indicated that they have a dedicated internation-
al office within their city, with only 6% stating that they did not. This
finding reveals a clear intent from the majority of cities to position them-
selves globally in a manner that is more than ad hoc. This also helps
understand the respondents: that internationalisation occupies a formal
place within their institution is a key element in contextualising the data.
Our results indicate that private actors and philanthropies have a major
role in the way cities conduct their international engagement activities
(Figure 1): 96% of those surveyed were part of at least one city net-
1. Please note that there are more work, while around half engage regularly with philanthropies (56%) and
responses than cities because two
cities responded twice. For the full
multilateral lending agencies (48%); 40% of respondents indicated that
list of participant cities, see Kosovac they partner with multinational companies as part of their international
et al., 2020. engagement.
WHAT’S NEXT? NEW FORMS OF CITY DIPLOMACY AND EMERGING GLOBAL URBAN GOVERNANCE
88
•81• 2021
Figure 1: Findings from the survey “In the last 12 months, which of the
following organisations has your city engaged with?”
Multi-national Companies
International
Non-Governmental
Philanthropies
The global agency of
cities closely reflects
City Networks
the principles of
Multilateral Lending
Agencies multistakeholder
UN Agencies
governance;
(eg. Un Habiatat, WHO, however, mainstream
UNESCO)
international relations
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Percentage of cities that have engaged with entity has given limited
Source: Analysis of 47 cities by Connected Cities Laboratory consideration to
how cities fit into
multistakeholder
Funding constraints were identified as a key barrier to cities engaging in
typologies.
city diplomacy, with over 77% of surveyed city officials agreeing with the
statement “We would engage more in city diplomacy if we had more
funds exclusively allocated for this.”
Multistakeholder partnerships provide an opportunity to increase resourc-

ing for international city engagement by incorporating funds and in-kind
arrangements from the private sector, philanthropy and academia (leverag-
ing research grants). Private funding arrangements can be an effective way
of increasing cities’ international engagement, but they come with caveats
and the need to coordinate divergent objectives. The international aims of
businesses often align with cities’ diplomatic strategies, for example, we
have seen synergy between multinational corporations looking to promote
simplified pathways for labour migration and international advocacy from
city leaders for more open immigration policies. City leaders generally
look to support companies operating in their cities and their international
ambitions, but as city governments engage more actively in areas such as
environmental governance and climate change mitigation the goals and
standards they adopt may work against the profit motives of private sector
actors. We explore examples of these multistakeholder tensions through a
brief case study of the city diplomacy of Amsterdam.
II. The role of external stakeholders in supporting

global urban governance
Scholarship on urban governance and urban entrepreneurialism demon-

strates the multistakeholder reality that city leaders must contend with
to achieve outcomes for their constituents (Pierre, 2011). As cities
increasingly project their agency internationally in order to achieve these
outcomes, the constraints on their potential to govern only become
more pronounced. City diplomacy operates in a realm where the actors
often have limited legal and/or political legitimacy, as well as limited
resourcing. Despite this, city leaders recognise that international engage-
ment is becoming essential to addressing the urban dimensions of global
challenges such as climate change, mass migration and inequality. As a
AUTOR
89
•81• 2021
result, local authorities look to supporting agents, such as philanthro-
pies, universities and the private sector, for assistance in providing the
resourcing, knowledge and expertise they need to maximise the bene-
fits of their city diplomacy. Likewise, these organisations often look to
partner with city governments for access to data, expertise or the legal
authority/legitimacy to achieve their own urban objectives. These types
Local authorities look of partnerships are becoming essential to the semi-formalised architec-
to supporting agents, ture of global urban governance.
such as philanthropies,
universities and the
Philanthropic partnerships
private sector, for
assistance in providing Large philanthropic funders, particularly those based in the United
the resourcing, States, have had a highly visible impact on the ecosystem of transnation-
al city networking. To highlight a few well-known examples, the support
knowledge and
of the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) and Bloomberg Philanthropies
expertise they need to for the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, and The Rockefeller
maximise the benefits Foundation for 100 Resilient Cities have been essential to the develop-
of their city diplomacy. ment of the capacities and prominence these networks have exhibited
globally. The Open Society Foundations (OSF) have been a critical cata-
lyst in the emergence of cities as transnational actors in migration policy,
supporting the mayoral summits on migrants and refugees that led to
the establishment of the Mayors Migration Council (MMC). Alongside
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and United Cities
and Local Governments (UCLG), the MMC now co-steers a dedicated
“Mayors Mechanism”, which is one of the key pillars of input into the
multilateral Global Forum on Migration and Development. Naturally,
there are risks to an overreliance on philanthropic funding to underpin
the architecture of city diplomacy, as funding priorities can change. The
decision of the Rockefeller Foundation to stop funding the 100 Resilient
Cities Initiative, for example, demonstrates how even well-established
transnational networks are vulnerable to shifting philanthropic priorities.
Analysis shows that in general transnational city networks rely heavily

on multilateral organisations in partnerships that undoubtedly give some
networks access to multilateral processes (Acuto and Leffel, 2020). At the
same time, these relationships may subordinate city network activity. One
example is the World Health Organization (WHO) who, despite long-stand-
ing support for the WHO Healthy Cities Network, have been reluctant to
formalise a place for cities within their infrastructure. In this context, major
philanthropic funding for city networks can provide the capacity for them
to work independently both within and outside traditional multilateral
systems. In the case of C40 Cities and its input into IPCC processes, or to
some extent the MMC and broader discussions on migration governance,
we can see the benefit of well-resourced transnational city leadership
organisations who are able to coordinate city leaders and maximise their
collective influence on conversations both inside and outside tradition-
al multilateral systems. For example, in the case of migration, some city
leaders provided input into the development of the Global Compact for
Migration (GCM); however, they had to be invited by their respective
states. This excluded cities whose states were not involved in the negoti-
ation process, such as the United States, who withdrew from the process
in November 2017. Italy and Brazil were among the countries that did
not ultimately endorse the agreement (Brazil voted in favour in December
2018 only to withdraw in January 2019). Subsequent to these negotia-
90
•81• 2021
tions, the mayors of Los Angeles, Milan and São Paulo committed their
cities to the GCM’s goals and became founding members of the Leadership
Board of the MMC. They have leveraged their positions on the MMC Board
to become prominent global advocates for the importance of city leader-
ship in global migration governance, including promoting commitment to
the GCM, Global Compact on Refugees and city-led initiatives such as the
Marrakech Mayors Declaration and the Call to Local Action on Migration. The multistakeholder
dimensions of city
diplomacy are clearly
University partnerships
exhibited in the case
While universities have not been significant primary funders of global of Amsterdam, where
urban initiatives, city governments nevertheless work with academic city officials consider
institutions as a gateway to international knowledge and partnerships, private companies,
as well as the expertise to translate and contextualise knowledge to
universities and civil
local or regional realities. For instance, many local authorities have part-
nered with universities to support their localisation of the Sustainable society organisations
Development Goals (SDGs). The Connected Cities Lab at the University as both partners and
of Melbourne has brought together ten local authorities from across key actors in driving
Asia–Pacific to work collaboratively on local projects aligned with the
their international
SDGs. This programme includes cities from diverse contexts such as
Malaysia, India, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. These partnerships engagement.
may be critical for cities of the Global South, where local authorities
have even more limited resources to engage internationally. In Africa,
for example, the African Centre for Cities at the University of Cape Town
and the African Urban Research Initiative have been crucial in connecting
African cities with international urban initiatives.
Private sector partnerships
There is a much more limited understanding of the ways private sector

actors are shaping the ecosystem of global urban governance, although
emerging scholarship is considering this relationship in the mitigation of
climate change (see for example Gordon (2020) and Johnson (2018)).
Select examples indicate they have played an important role in catalysing
or supporting initiatives in urban resilience and sustainable development.
For instance, Arup’s decade-long partnership with C40 has produced a
range of research outputs and a codeveloped Climate Action Planning
Framework, while they have also supported 22 cities to develop resilience
strategies as part of the 100 Resilient Cities initiative. It is not uncommon
for local authorities to partner with private actors when undertaking
international economic missions to other cities or regions, and this has
formed an important part of sister city arrangements. There is undoubtedly
significant potential to increase public–private and private–civil society part-
nerships on global urban issues. In the context of COVID-19, a number of
private actors, such as IKEA and Siemens, have recently supported explicit
urban initiatives aimed at mitigating the impacts of the virus, and in the
case of Jones Lang LaSalle and the World Economic Forum have driven
discussion on the impact of COVID-19 in cities (Acuto, 2020). The private
sector provides access to funding that can greatly enhance the scope of
global urban governance. However, in these partnership models, diver-
gent objectives for investment need to be reconciled. In the case study we
present below on the collective city diplomacy of Amsterdam, we highlight
these tensions in a localised context.
AUTOR
91
•81• 2021
III. Collaborative urban governance and city
diplomacy in Amsterdam
The multistakeholder dimensions of city diplomacy are clearly exhib-

ited in the case of Amsterdam, where city officials consider private
companies, universities and civil society organisations as both partners
There are reasons to and key actors in driving their international engagement. While there
be optimistic regarding is acknowledgement that private companies can cause or exacerbate
the role of cities urban challenges on a global scale (as in the cases of Airbnb and Uber),
the City of Amsterdam also recognises the opportunities of partnering
and urban initiatives
with such companies to solve urban problems at local and global scales.
in shaping global
governance. To some Our international policy is based on our urban challenges…
extent, the COVID- Each urban challenge looks for the best partners to address
them (city official, interview with researcher, 2019).
19 crisis has solidified
the centrality of local The “best” partners as judged by the city government may include
authorities and their private companies, universities, philanthropies and other civil society
partners in addressing organisations. A strategic framework (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2012)
was adopted by the international office of Amsterdam to actively
global challenges.
invest in the development of a network of public and private partners
in the city, forming a quasi-consortium of actors to inform and guide
decision-making within local government on its activities abroad. A
key element of the strategy is convincing these partners to engage in
city-led diplomacy in order to broaden opportunities for Amsterdam
in the areas of (but not limited to) trade, tourism and economic
prosperity. Representatives from the private sector and universities
often travel with the Mayor of Amsterdam as part of the interna-
tional delegation in an effort to position Amsterdam as a global city
that effectively takes a consultative and deliberative approach in its
engagement with diverse city actors. The inclusion of these actors in
the governmental delegation provides benefits not only to the city
in its intersectoral engagement, but also “opens doors” for private
and academic groups to advance their own international objectives.
Partners on a dedicated mayoral international mission are often cho-
sen on the basis of topic or interest area, and an agreed “mission
statement” for the trip is circulated to all participants in the delega-
tion. This statement acts as a coordinating tool to minimise conflict
or misunderstandings during diplomatic engagement activities.
By establishing these partnerships, the City of Amsterdam’s interna-

tional office is able to harness state-of-the-art knowledge from the
University of Amsterdam to inform its policies and priorities, while
also offering the opportunity for alignment between the private sec-
tor and broader city goals. Partners within the private sector then
work toward addressing societal challenges within the city, providing
the local government with innovative practices that do not need to
be purely funded by the city. In this way, skills and funds can be lev-
eraged to create a wider benefit for the citizens.
This form of collaborative urban governance is directly influenced

by the “polder model”, a uniquely Dutch approach to political con-
sensus building. The Dutch word polder refers to elevated tracts of
land reclaimed from bodies of water. The polder model involves the
establishment of a joint system of decision-making in areas that are
92
•81• 2021
traditionally fragmented (polder) (Schreuder, 2001). In line with a
neoliberal approach of increasing privatisation, the polder model was
developed in the 1980s and 1990s as a way of creating a collective
group of stakeholders to deliver a unified all-of-community approach
to societal policymaking. The neoliberal drivers of this form of col-
laborative governance in many ways reflect broader trends toward
urban entrepreneurialism, although the model has been shaped by
many uniquely Dutch factors. The Dutch political system has tradi-
tionally been fractured, with a large number of political parties vying
for power, resulting in no single political party being able to achieve
a majority in parliament. This has produced a culture of coalitions
and consultative decision-making, leading our interviewee to assert:
“We are a country of people of compromises” (city official, interview,
2019). This embedding of a negotiation-based culture underpins the
way Amsterdam engages internationally, presenting a multistakehold-
er model of city diplomacy that could be pursued by other cities.
Conclusion
Given the evidence we have provided, and changes we have wit-

nessed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, what predictions can
be made about the future of city diplomacy and global urban gov-
ernance? Naturally, in the midst of the most consequential modern
global crisis much is uncertain, and we must be reserved in our fore-
casts. While global urban agency is undoubtedly increasing, there is
potential fragility in formalised transnational urban initiatives like city
networks. The challenges of COVID-19, which are impacting all areas
of global cooperation, are placing unprecedented strain on multilater-
al initiatives, which were already experiencing pre-crisis vulnerability
with global trends toward nationalism. These challenges could stall or
diminish emerging forms of global urban governance, and the urban
focus may re-localise. Certainly, in the case of major philanthropies,
the crisis has prompted some pivoting toward national priorities, such
as the OSF’s shift in 2020 of significant funding towards COVID-19
support programmes in US cities. Pre-crisis, the Ford Foundation was
also moving to focus its city and state inequality programme on US
locales. Restrictions on international travel have increased the barri-
ers for catalysing new initiatives, while also creating novel avenues
for digital engagement across regions. It remains to be seen whether
these trends will persist once the world emerges from the crisis.
In the case of universities, the pandemic and its impact on the inter-
national movement of students has placed unprecedented financial
strain on academic institutions in many countries. The budgetary
impacts of these challenges will persist for many years and have the
potential to affect investment in new globally focused initiatives and
partnerships. While universities have not been major direct funders of
global urban initiatives, their role as facilitators which connect local
governments to international knowledge and partners may also be
diminished. A similar observation could be made for private sector
actors, who are struggling through the worst economic conditions in
modern history. This will undoubtedly lead to a degree of centring on
core business to the detriment of more innovative and forward-think-
ing initiatives.
AUTOR
93
•81• 2021
Despite this, there are reasons to be optimistic regarding the role of cities
and urban initiatives in shaping global governance. To some extent, the
COVID-19 crisis has solidified the centrality of local authorities and their
partners in addressing global challenges. As highlighted by the Global
Resilient Cities Network (the next evolution of 100 Resilient Cities), cities
are on the “frontline” of COVID-19, with over 90% of cases occurring
in urban settlements (United Nations, 2020). City leaders have been
responsive and pragmatic in rising to meet the challenges of the virus
with a number of city networks quickly mobilising to share resources and
approaches to mitigating the impacts of the crisis. In some contexts, these
responses have been juxtaposed with sluggish national responses. The reli-
ance on new forms of digital connectivity, driven by the private sector, will
in some way reshape post-crisis transnational collaboration. This will hope-
fully create new opportunities for city diplomacy, which to date has been
hindered by limited travel budgets and a stigma toward city leaders who
travel too frequently. The future of global governance has perhaps never
been more uncertain, however what is certain is that the urban dimensions
of global governance have never mattered more.
References
Acuto, M. “Engaging with global urban governance in the midst of

a crisis”. Dialogues in Human Geography, 2020/07/01 2020, 10(2),
221–224.
Acuto, M. and B. Leffel “Understanding the global ecosystem of city

networks”. Urban Studies, 2020, 0042098020929261.
Beal, V. and G. Pinson. “When Mayors Go Global: International Strate-

gies, Urban Governance and Leadership”. International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research, 38(1), 2014, 302–317.
Gemeente Amsterdam. Europastrategie Amsterdam smart global hub,

2012 (online). [Accessed on 30.11.2020]: https://assets.amsterdam.nl/
publish/pages/869848/europastrategie_amsterdam_-_smart_global_hub.
pdf
Gordon, D. J. Cities on the World Stage: The Politics of Global Urban Cli-
mate Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. ISBN
9781107192331.
Johnson, C. A. The Power of Cities in Global Climate Politics: Saviours,

Supplicants or Agents of Change? London: Palgrave McMillan, 2018.
Kosovac, A., M. Acuto and T. L. Jones. “Acknowledging Urbanization:

A Survey of the Role of Cities in UN Frameworks”. Global Policy, 11(2),
2020a, 293–304.
Kosovac, A., Hartley, K., Acuto, M., Gunning, D. “Conducting City

Diplomacy: A Survey of International Engagement in 47 Cities.” Report
for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2020b.
Pierre, J. The politics of urban governance. New York: Macmillan Inter-

national Higher Education, 2011.
94
•81• 2021
Raymond, M. and L. Denardis. “Multistakeholderism: anatomy of an
inchoate global institution”. International Theory, 7(3), 2015, 572–616.
Schreuder, Y. “The Polder Model in Dutch Economic and Environmen-

tal Planning”. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 21(4), 2001,
237–245.
United Nations. Policy Brief: COVID-19 in an Urban World. New York:

2020.
AUTOR
95
•81• 2021
Cities have been advocating for a seat at the global table for decades. They are part and parcel
of the international system, yet they remain structurally powerless and virtually invisible under
international law. For local governments and their networks to gain greater leverage within the
current global and regional governance architecture, its legal structures, institutions and norms
need to be rewired. But, what principles and models underpin this reform agenda? Which specific
strategies and proposals are on the table? Are they yielding results?
In seeking answers to these questions, this volume discusses the opportunities and constraints
affecting cities’ political agency within the contemporary global order, while addressing the
tensions and complementarity between the two strategies for bringing urban concerns and
interests to the global stage. On the one hand, it examines the prospects of reforming the
current multilateral system, today in crisis. On the other, it analyses the promises and perils
of “multistakeholderism” as an alternative, seemingly more inclusive, governance framework.
Further, it delves into how city diplomacy is being reconfigured towards more innovative practices
that operate both within and outside the traditional multilateral system, encouraging urban
experimentation and new forms of public–private alliances.
This CIDOB monograph aims to contribute to the policy and academic discussion on the reform of
the multilateral system by unpacking the role of cities and their networks in global and regional
governance, spelling out the policy implications and making recommendations on how cities can
gain global leverage that extends beyond the merely symbolic.

Cities in Global Governance - Web

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Cities in Global Governance - Web

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

From multilateralism to multistakeholderism?

Printing: Book-Print S.A.

Barcelona, February 2021

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 5

Agustí Fernández de Losada and Marta Galceran-Vercher

From multilateralism to multi-stakeholder alliances: cities shift

CITIES AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 25

Global cities, world order and post-pandemic futures

The table wobbles: cities and a faltering multilateral order

Cities and international law: legally invisible

EMPOWERING CITIES IN A REFORMED MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 55

The role of cities in a reformed UN: towards the institutionalisation

Is something better than nothing? Multi-level governance and the

MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM AND OTHER FORMS OF GLOBAL URBAN AGENCY 75

Towards an ecology of knowledges for global politics:

What’s next? New forms of city diplomacy and emerging global

Simon Curtis is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics at UEA,

Elif Durmuş is the PhD researcher on the project Cities of Refuge

Agustí Fernández de Losada is Senior Research Fellow and Director

Marta Galceran-Vercher is a Lecturer in International Relations

Eva Garcia-Chueca is Senior Research Fellow at CIDOB’s Global

Ian Klaus is Senior Fellow on Global Cities at the Chicago Council on

Anna Kosovac is a Research Fellow in International Urban Politics at

Andrea Noferini is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for European

Daniel Pejic is a Research Fellow and PhD researcher in the

CITIES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: FROM MULTILATERALISM TO MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM?

Lorena Zárate is a founding member of the Global Platform for

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

From multilateralism to multi-stakeholder alliances: cities

Global cities, world order and post-pandemic futures

The table wobbles: cities and a faltering multilateral order

Over two years in 2015–2016, United Nations member states adopted

Cities and international law: legally invisible or rising soft-

Traditional state-centric international law does not recognise local

The role of cities in a reformed UN: towards the institutio-

Is something better than nothing? Multi-level governance

CITIES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: FROM MULTILATERALISM TO MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM?

Towards an ecology of knowledges for global politics: civil

The shift from traditional multilateralism to increased multi-stakeholder

What’s next? New forms of city diplomacy and emerging

Everyday urban governance is taking on increasingly global dimensions,

Agustí Fernández de Losada

Meanwhile, the global management of the COVID-19 pandemic and

Contribution of this volume

The volume opens with an article by Agustí Fernández de Losada, in

Cities and the global order

However, it is not only the world order that seems to be reconfiguring

The law is another area of state-centricity. Indeed, Elif Durmuş notes

CITIES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: FROM MULTILATERALISM TO MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM?

Empowering cities in a reformed multilateral sys-

To further examine the prospects and viability of a more formalised role

Multistakeholderism and other forms of global

CITIES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: FROM MULTILATERALISM TO MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM?

Agustí Fernández de Losada

I. Influencing global agendas. A matter of respon-

The commitment of city governments to influence international politi-

Indeed, international agreements have an increasingly direct impact on

The existence of a consultative institution that represents regions and cities

FROM MULTILATERALISM TO MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ALLIANCES:

Cities approach to global agendas has been accompanied by a most

AGUSTÍ FERNÁNDEZ DE LOSADA

IV. Yielding more symbolic than effective influence