For Report
For Report
Concept.
view of its duty to codify the laws “in accord- ance . . . with modern
trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law’’ (Exec.
Order No. 48), the Commission resolved to include a section (Sec. 2)
on ‘moral damages’ in Chapter 3, Title XVIII on “Damages” in the
Project of Civil Code.
Aside from the fact that there is a need for the claimant to sat-
isfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damages, it
is also necessary to prove its causal relation to the defendant’s act.
(Raagas vs. Traya, 22 SCRA 839 [1968]). While moral damages is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, they are recoverable if they are
the proximate cause of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
(Enervida vs. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 339; Yutuk vs. Manila Electric Co., 2
SCRA 337 [1961]).
The exception to the rule that the factual basis for moral dam-ages
must be alleged are criminal cases. Moral damages may be awarded
to the victim in criminal proceedings in such amount as the court
deems just without the need for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof. (People vs. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998; People vs.
Moreno, G.R. No. 126921, August 28, 1998; People vs. Bagayong,
G.R. No. 126518, December 2, 1998).
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code enumerate the cases
DAMAGES
Adultery or concubinage;
Illegal search;
Malicious prosecution;
In Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Villarosa, et al. (1 CAR 2s 402, 415
[1961]), Justice Capistrano explained that moral damages can be
recovered in every case of wrongful act or omission causing, as the
proximate result thereof physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injury. “In view of the fact that
the question of moral damages is a novel one in the civil law, the
Code Commission considered it advisable, for the convenience of the
bar and the bench, to mention some cases as examples of wrongful
acts where moral damages may be recovered. It was not prepared at
that time to make a complete and exclusive enumeration of all such
wrongful acts and omissions.” The Commission purposely added the
words “and analogous cases” in the opening sentence of the article in
order to avoid a possible erroneous interpretation that the enumera-
tion made therein was intended by the Commission to mean other
cases of ‘wrongful act or omission,’ causing, as the proximate result
thereof the sufferings mentioned earlier.
Justice Capistrano also noted in the said case that “the enumera-tion
does not mention any wrongful omission. This is so because, as
pointed out, the enumeration was not intended to be complete and
exclusive. The cases of wrongful acts mentioned, enumerated merely
for purposes of style, were those which the Commission could readily
give at the time of its deliberation (about two hours) on the formula-
tion of the article.” Justice Capistrano went on further to explain that
“it is obvious from a reading of the enumeration that those
mentioned are clearly cases which immediately suggest physical or
moral suffering. Thus, the delicts or crimes mentioned in Nos. (1) and
narrow the coverage of the law to the few cases mentioned in Article
2219 considering that the field of moral injury is a vast one in the civil
and criminal laws, and that the field of moral damages in American
jurisprudence is equally extensive.” (ibid., pp. 415-416).
Unfounded Suits.
It is also well settled that moral damages (and attorney’s fees under
paragraph [4] of Article 2208 of the Civil Code) cannot be assessed
against the plaintiff by the mere fact that he filed a case against the
defendant so long as the same was done in good faith. (Grapilon vs.
Mun. Council of Carigara, 2 SCRA 103 [1961]; National Rice and Corn
Corporation vs. Antonio, 2 SCRA 643 [1961]; Solis & Yarisantos vs.
Salvador, 14 SCRA 887 [1965]; Francel Realty Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 252 SCRA 156 [1996]; Mijares vs. Court of Ap-peals, 271
SCRA 558 [1997]). The rule applies even if the plaintiff’s case is
declared to be unfounded. (De la Pena vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA
456 [1994]). No damages can be charged on those who may exercise
the right to litigate in good faith even if done erroneously (“J”
Marketing Corporation v. Sia, Jr., 285 SCRA 580 [1998]).
Labor Cases.
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court upheld the rule that in the
present stage of our case law involving criminal taking of human life,
evidence must be adduced by the offended party to war-rant an
award of moral damages (See: People v. Acaya, 327 SCRA 269
[2000];People v. Pirame, 327 SCRA 552 [2000]). However, the rule
was clarified by stating that no such proof is necessary in case of
violent death. The Supreme Court explained in Carlos Arcona y
Moban v. The Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines (G.R.
No. 134784, December 9, 2002; see also People v. Cabote, G.R.
136143, November 15, 2001 and People v. Panado, 348 SCRA 679,
690-691 [2000]; People v. Cortez, 348 SCRA 663 [2000]) that “as
borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death
invariably and neces-sarily brings about emotional pain and anguish
on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer
sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life,
deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often
leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done
to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in
the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional
suffering.”
Extent of Humiliation
The husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to
live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient’s illness, knowing
any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily
lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term
goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They,
not the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the
care of the victim. The family’s moral injury and suffering in this case
is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of
P2,000,000.00 in moral dam-ages would be appropriate.’’
There are those who believe that financial standing of the of-fended
party does not affect the amount of recoverable moral damages
(Layda vs. Court of Appeals, 90 SCRA 724). The theory is that moral
sufferings of a rich person is the same as the intensity of suffering of
a poor litigant. Hence, the pain and suffering of a person who lost
DAMAGES
his limb is the same whether the victim is rich or poor. However,
Supreme Court continues to consider financial standing in a number
of cases that it decided.
The exception to said rule (where only the victim can recover)
Corporations.
NOMINAL DAMAGES.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation
arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case
where any property right has been invaded.
Stearns Lumber Co. vs. Howlett, 25 ALR 1125, 260 Mass 45, 157 NE
82).
The Supreme Court explained in Pleno vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
56505, May 9, 1988; see also People v. Singh, G.R. No. 129782, 360
SCRA 404, 408 [2001]; People v. Plazo, 350 SCRA 433 [2001]) that:
2224 of the Civil Code where it has been shown that they suffered
pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with
certainty (People v. Singh, et al., 360 SCRA 404, 408 [2001]; People v.
Plazo, 350 SCRA 433 [2001]; People v. Briones, 344 SCRA 149 [2000];
People v. De la Tongga, 336 SCRA 687 [2000]).
In Rogelio E. Ramos, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
124354, December 29, 1999), the Supreme Court sustained the
award of temperate damages to answer for the anticipated increase
in future medical expenses. The Supreme Court observed that our
present laws on actual damages cannot cover such adjustments
because our rules (on actual or compensatory damages) generally
assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a
consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that
the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take
into account those situa-tions, where the resulting injury might be
continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the
injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. The Court
concluded that temper-ate damages should be awarded to meet
pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the
nature of the case, be made with certainty. In other words,
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for.
DAMAGES
CASES:
On May 25, and 31, 1962 Araneta issued Check No. 110 for $500 and
Check No. 111 for $150, respectively, both payable to cash and drawn
against the Bank of America. These two checks were received by the
bank on June 3, 1962. The first check appeared to have come into the
hands of Rufina Saldaña, who deposited it to her account with the
First National City Bank of New York, which in turn cleared it through
the Federal Reserve Bank. The second check appeared to have been
cleared through the Wells Fargo Bank. Despite the sufficiency of
Araneta’s deposit balance to cover both checks, they were again
stamped with the notation “Account Closed” and returned to the
respective clearing banks.
In the particular case of Check No. 110, it was actually paid by the
Bank of America to the First National City Bank. Subsequently,
however, the Bank of America, claiming that the payment had been
inadvertently made, returned the check to the First National City
Bank with the request that the amount thereof be credited back to
the Bank of America. In turn, the First National City Bank wrote to the
depositor of the check, Rufina Saldaña, informing her about its return
with the notation “Account Closed” and ask-ing her consent to the
deduction of its amount from her deposit. However, before Mrs.
Saldaña’s reply could be received, the Bank of America recalled the
check from the First National City Bank and honored it.
The judgment of the trial court awarded all the items prayed for, but
P1,000.00.
Not satisfied with the decision of the appellate court, the plaintiff
filed the instant petition for review, alleging two reasons why it
should be allowed, as follows:
of Art. 2205 of the New Civil Code which up to now has not yet
received an authoritative interpretation from the Supreme Court . . .”
In his brief, however, the petitioner assigned five (5) errors commit-
ted by the appellate court, namely: (1) in concluding that the
petitioner, on the basis of the evidence, had not sufficiently proven
his claim for actual damages, where such evidence, both testimonial
and documentary, stands uncontradicted on the record; (2) in
holding that temperate damages cannot be awarded to the petitioner
without proof of actual pecuniary loss; (3) in not granting moral
damages for mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, social humiliation, etc., separate and distinct from the
damages recoverable for injury to business reputation; (4) in
reducing, without any ostensible reason, the award of exemplary
damages granted by the lower court; and (5) in reducing, without
special reason, the award of attorney’s fees by the lower court.
We consider the second and third errors, as they present the issues
raised in the petition for review and on the basis of which it was
given due course.
“In view of all the foregoing considerations we hold that the plaintiff
has not proven his claim that the two checks for $500 each were in
partial payment of two orders for jewels worth P50,000 each. He has
likewise not proven the actual damage which he claims he has
suffered. And in view of the fact that he has not proven the existence
of the supposed contract for him to buy jewels at a profit there is not
even an occasion for an award of temperate damages on this score.”
This ruling is now assailed as erroneous and without legal basis. The
petitioner maintains that in an action by a depositor against a bank
for damages resulting from the wrongful dishonor of the depositor’s
checks, temperate damages for injury to business standing or
commercial credit may be recovered even in the absence of definite
proof of direct pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, a finding — as it was
found by the Court of Appeals — that the wrongful acts of the
respondent had adversely affected his credit being suf-ficient for the
purpose. The following provisions of the Civil Code are invoked:
Also invoked by the petitioner is the case of Atlanta National Bank vs.
Davis, 96 Ga 334, 23 SE 190; 1 and the following citations in American
Jurisprudence:
“In some states what are called ‘temperate damages’ are allowed in
certain classes of cases, without proof of actual or special damages,
where the wrong done must in fact have caused actual damage to
the plaintiff, though from the nature of the case, he cannot furnish
inde-pendent, distinct proof thereof. Temperate damages are more
than nominal damages, and, rather, are such as would be a
reasonable compensation for the injury sustained . . .” (15 Am. Jur.
400)
On the other hand the respondent argues that since the petitioner
invokes Article 2205 of the Civil Code, which speaks of actual or
compensa-tory damages for injury to business standing or
commercial credit, he may not claim them as temperate damages
and thereby dispense with proof of pecuniary loss under Article 2216.
The respondent cites Article 2224, which provides that “temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty,” and contends that
the petitioner failed to show any such loss in this case.
Under the third error assigned by the petitioner in his brief, which is
the second of the two reasons relied upon in his petition for review,
he contends that moral damages should have been granted for the
injury to his business standing or commercial credit, separately from
his wounded feelings and mental anguish. It is true that under Article
2217 of the Civil Code. “Besmirched reputation” is a ground upon
which moral damages may be claimed, but the Court of Appeals did
take this element into consideration
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be
proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon,
although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may
consider the question of granting exemplary in addi-tion to the
liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
Criminal Cases.
Nevertheless, the award of exemplary damages is also justified, not only due to the presence of
aggravat-ing circumstance, but also if the circumstances show the depravity of the mind of the accused.
Hence, exemplary
damages was awarded against an accused who assaulted a pregnant woman. By sexually assaulting a
pregnant woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perver-sity and wickedness. (People vs.
Cristobal, 252 SCRA 507 [1996]). It was also imposed to deter fathers with perverse tendencies or
aberrant sexual behavior from abusing their own daughters. (People vs. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613
[1992]).