Case Digests For Constitutional Law 2 Review 2020: (List of Cases Based On Dean Joan S Largo'S Syllabus)

CASE DIGESTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEW 2020
(LIST OF CASES BASED ON DEAN JOAN S LARGO’S SYLLABUS)

INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
I. INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE The power to regulate billboards within its territorial jurisdiction has
been delegated by Congress to the City Government of Davao via
A. POLICE POWER the Davao City Charter. This direct and specific grant takes
precedence over requirements set forth in another law of general
Evasco, Jr. v. Montañez, G.R. No. 199172, [February 21, application (ITC, the National Building Code (NBC) . The city
2018] government does not need to refer to the procedures laid down in
the NBC to exercise this power.
DOCTRINE: An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police
power if: (a) it has a lawful subject such that the interests of the Even if the NBC imposes minimum requirements as to the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, construction and regulation of billboards, the city government
require its exercise; and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its may impose stricter limitations because its police power to
implementing measures must be reasonably necessary for the do so originates from its charter and not from the NBC. The
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon provisions in the subject ordinance are independent of NBC.
individuals.
The ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power
FACTS:
An ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of police power if: (a) it
The city government of Davao, through its Sangguniang has a lawful subject such that the interests of the public generally,
Panlungsod, approved an ordinance entitled “An Ordinance as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise;
Regulating the Construction, Repair, Renovation, Erection, and (b) it uses a lawful method such that its implementing
Installation and Maintenance of Outdoor Advertising Materials and measures must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
for related Purposes.” the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Pursuant to NBCDO Memorandum Circ. No. 3 issued by the Acting The Court will not be quick at invalidating an ordinance as
DPWH Secretary Ebdane, Jr., the city government suspended all unreasonable unless the rules imposed are so excessive as to be
pending applications for billboard permits. prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory.
Petitioner’s case was still pending before the RTC when the city The local legislative authority has a wide discretion to determine not
government issued another order of demolition directed against only what the interests of the public require but also what measures
Prime Advertisements & Signs on the ground that the latter’s are necessary for the protection of such interests. The Court accords
billboards had no sign permits and encroached a portion of the road high respect to the Sanggunian’s issuance because they are in the
right of way. best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
RTC declared void and unconstitutional Secs. 7, 8 and 37 of the In the same vein, Ordinance No. 092-2000 reflects the
ordinance for being contrary to the National Building Code. wisdom of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as elected
representatives of the people of Davao City. In local affairs,
CA affirmed RTC ruling is so far as it declares Sec. 7, 8 and 37 null acts of local officials must be upheld when it is clear that
and void. Sec. 45 is likewise declared null and void and reinstated these were performed squarely within the statutory
Sec. 41. authority granted to them and in the exercise of their sound
discretion.
ISSUES: WON the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
Therefore, the validity of the Ordinance including the provisions at
RULING: issue in the present petition, viz.: Sections 7, 8, 37, and 45 must be
upheld. However, the orders of demolition issued by the petitioner
Yes. City Engineer violate Sec. 45 of the ordinance since the said orders
do not observe the 60-day reglementary period granted to erring
billboard owners to correct any defect suffered by their structures
Valid Delegation of Police Power
and comply with the requirements of the ordinance.
The ordinance which regulates the construction and installation of

ERMITA MALATE HOTEL vs. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA (L-
buildings and other structures such as billboards within Davao CIty,
24693, July 31, 1967)
is an exercise of police power.
DOCTRINE: On the legislative organs of the government, whether

While police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature,
national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power,
Congress may delegate this power to local government units.
which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
Consistence between Ordinance No. 092-2000 and the NBC is
and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of
irrelevant.
due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

GUECO | IBISATE | JAVIER| KINAZO | LUMINARIAS | NAGAMORA | NIÑO | OBAOB| OLIVEROS
| OMAMALIN | RALLOS | RIEL | RUIZ | SILVERIO | VILLAESTER
1
guarantees however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it Here, there is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be morals. The Ordinance was meant to address the alarming increase
considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and
thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."
FACTS:
The Court even noted that it had invariably stamped with the seal of
The City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 regulating motel its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp
establishments. Specifically, the ordinance imposes an annual or procurer as a vagrant, provide a license tax for and regulating the
charge for motels, requires motel owners or managers to refrain maintenance or operation of public dance halls; among others. All
from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any of which are intended to protect public morals.
room or other quarter to any person or persons without filling up a
prescribed form providing basic personal information. It also B. Ordinances enjoy presumption of validity.
classifies the motels for purposes of requiring the maintenance of
minimum facilities, among others. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence
of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to
Petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association a challenged statute or ordinance.
and others, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No.
4760. It assailed the Ordinance for being unconstitutional and void, There being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
and for being unreasonable and violative of due process. They also rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
alleged that some provisions were vague, indefinite and uncertain, face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere
and constitutes invasion of the right to privacy and the guarantee better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v.
against self-incrimination. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the
On the other hand, the City of Manila, through the respondent matter thus:
Mayor, argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and
that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a “The statute here questioned deals with a
proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper subject clearly within the scope of the police power.
exercise of the police power. Respondent prayed for the dismissal We are asked to declare it void on the ground that
of the petition. the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
Lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, an appeal was process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
raised before SC. condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must
ISSUE: W/N the assailed ordinance is constitutional being a valid prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
exercise of police power. record for overthrowing the statute."
RULING: YES. No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower
court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of
A.The Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
(TOPIC) against the ordinance set aside.
A police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public C. The Ordinance does not violate due process.
morals is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. To
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police satisfy the due process requirement, official action, must not outrun
power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness.
all the great public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general Here, it would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an
welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to body considers an evil of rather serious proportion, an arbitrary and
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of

2
the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted Parties:

deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the · White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation And
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation (WLC,
measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged et al)
ordinance. · Malate Malate Tourist and Development Corporation
(MTDC)
As it stands, the attack against the validity of the challenged · City of Manila as represented by Mayor Lim (the City)
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly Facts:
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed
decision. · Petitioner challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance
No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation And Sta. Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation, vs. City of Manila Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
(G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009) Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila ,”
signed into law by City Mayor Alfredo Lim on December 3,
Doctrines: 1992. The relevant provisions are:
· THIRD PARTY STANDING. We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby the declared
three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have policy of the City Government to protect the best interest,
suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus giving him or her a "sufficiently health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the general and the youth in particular.
litigant must have a close relation to the third party ; and there
must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time
his or her own interests" [In relation to locus standi as a admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
requisite for judicial review]. similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibitedin
hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses
· For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. — Short-time admission
conform to the following substantive requirements: shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less
( (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute ; 2) than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out
must not be unfair or oppressive; of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy ; and
(6) must not be unreasonable. SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. — Any person or corporation who
shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon
· To comply with the constitutional requisite for the conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure, it (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not
must appear that: exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment
(1)The interests of the public generally, as distinguished at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a]
from those of a particular class, require an interference juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons
with private rights; in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided,
(2) The means must be reasonably necessary for the further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive offense, the business license of the guilty party shall
of private rights; automatically be cancelled.
(3) No other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work; · Dec. 15, 1992. MTDC filed a complaint for declaratory
(4) A reasonable relation must exist between the relief with prayer for a WPI and/or TRO with the RTC
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting respondent the City; prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
invaded. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by P.D. No. 259 to
Ponente: Tinga, J. admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours. DA

3
· Dec. 21, 1992. WLC, et al filed a motion to intervene be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
(MTI) and to admit attached complaint-in- the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter;
interventionon the ground that the Ordinance directly and to fix penalties for the violation of
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
and motels in Manila. The three companies are components pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both
of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.”
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.
· Petitioners’ argument:
· Dec. 23, 1992. MTI granted; RTC notified the Sol.Gen. as 1. Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
required by Rule 64, ROC; MTDC moved to withdraw as violates the right to privacy and the freedom of
plaintiff. movement;
2.It is an invalid exercise of police power; and
· Dec. 28, 1992. Motion to withdraw was granted. 3. It is an unreasonable and oppressive interference
in their business.
· Jan. 14, 1993. TRO was issued directing the City to cease
and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. · CA: reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance.
· Jan. 22, 1993. City filed an Answer: Ordinance is a (1) Held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to
legitimate exercise of Police Power. privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments
· Feb. 8, 1993. RTC issued a WPI ordering the City to desist that admit individuals for short time stays.
from the enforcement of the Ordinance. (2) The virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained through
· March 8, 1993. Sol.Gen. filed his Comment: Ordinance is a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance
constitutional is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
There is a lawful method since the establishments are
· During the pre-trial conference, WLC, et al agreed to still allowed to operate. (3) The adverse effect on the
submit the case for decision without trial as the case establishments is justified by the well-being of its
involved a purely legal question. constituents in general.
(4) As held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v.
· Oct. 20, 1993. RTC: Ordinance is null and void. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
· Petition for review on certiorari with the SC. · WLC, et al filed a petition for review on certiorari, contending
that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police
· Jan. 26, 1994. SC Resolution: the petition is one of petition power. [Same arguments in the CA proceedings]
for certiorari. Hence, the referral of the petition to the Court
of Appeals Issues:
(1)Whether or not an issued ordinance by a City may be a
· The City’s arguments before the CA: subject of judicial review.
1. Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power (2)If yes, whether or not petitioners, as third parties, have
pursuant to Section 458 (4) (iv) of the Local the legal standing to file the suit in court.
Government Code which confers on cities, among
other local government units, the power: “[To] Ruling: Yes to both issues.
regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, 1. PETITIONERS' STANDING.
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-
houses and other similar establishments, up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the
including tourist guides and transports.” Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection
rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux
2. The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the
exercise of the power of the City under Article requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal
III, Section 18 (kk) of the Revised Manila protection rights.
Charter, thus: "to enact all ordinances it may
deem necessary and proper for the sanitation Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action
the promotion of the morality, peace, good challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More
order, comfort, convenience and general welfare importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of
of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as separation of powers,sparing as it does unnecessary interference or

4
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co- had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third
equal branches of government. parties who seek access to their market or function".
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial Overbreadth Doctrine. Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not
system derived directly from the Constitution.The constitutional have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the
component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In
concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. In this overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect
jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to
presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth
petitioner's standing. In a similar vein, the US Supreme Court doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim
constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to
and redressability in Allen v. Wright. liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in
the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several
exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third The petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional
party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a
transcendental importance. "wash-rate" time frame.
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
appropriate. according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements:
THIRD PARTY STANDING. In Powers v. Ohio, the US Supreme (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of (5) must be general and consistent with public policy ; and
the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the (6) must not be unreasonable.
third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests". Herein, it is clear that the The Ordinance prohibits wash rate admissions and renting out a
business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be
Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their rooted in the police power as conferred on local government
continued viability which appears to be threatened by the units by the Local Government Code through such
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional implements as the general welfare clause.
litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the
American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be 2. POLICE POWER
construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit. Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
American jurisprudence where parties-in-interest were allowed comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room
standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.
equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and
injured by state action: its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power
has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).Physicians the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie
had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police
would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so
constitutional protections available to their patients. The years of presence in our nation's legal system, its use has rarely
Court held that: "The rights of husband and wife, pressed been denied.
here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless
those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
this kind of confidential relation to them." eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).A licensed beverage themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability
male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females achievement. Those means must align with the
under the age of 18. The Court explained that the vendors Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people . The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke

5
to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
political majorities animated by his cynicism. public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for invaded.
analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts
are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
branches of government as they exercise their political prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying
functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police
If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the
emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
political branch of government. We derive our respect and good intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any
than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug
standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their
and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day. clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is
the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
'prostitution, adultery and fornications' in Manila since they provide public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that
the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives
and thus became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill- of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may
seekers'". Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons.
consenting married or consenting single adults which is The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
constitutionally protectedwill be curtailed as well, as it was in the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights
City of Manila vs Laguio case. of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash
rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among
families are known to choose to pass the time in a motel or hotel citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that
whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.
passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the
legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed State is as old as Aristotle. The advancement of moral relativism as
any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in
spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little
or hotel as a convenient alternative. shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the
pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate accommodation of different interests.
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of
appear that: law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately
interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if
1.The interests of the public generally, as distinguished they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and
from those of a particular class, require an interference with wrong. Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral
private rights; traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions
2. The means must be reasonably necessary for the between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights; Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only
3. No other alternative for the accomplishment of the the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work; fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the
4. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not
of the measure and the means employed for its with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral

6
and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to 6. The CA reversed the decision and declared that the ordinance
make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. is void and exorbitant for failure to discuss the basis of the
Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral amount (500 pesos).
duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of
law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they ISSUES:
take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the
people to uphold the law. 1. WON CEPALCO should have exhausted administrative
remedies. – NO!
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an
indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly
2. WON the amount of the Mayor’s Fee is excessive. – NO for
absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of
lack of basis!
liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to
relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional
RULING:
conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote
morality.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Ordinance No. 7774 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. There is no need to course through the Secretary of Justice
because it was a regulatory ordinance and not tax or
revenue raising.
CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO v. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER
AND LIGHT CO. Section 187 of the Local Government Code outlines the
G.R.No. 224825, October 17, 2018 administrative procedure for questioning the constitutionality or
legality of a tax ordinance or revenue measure.
DOCTRINE:
However, the procedure found in Section 187 must be
Ordinances, like laws, enjoy a presumption of validity. However, this followed when an ordinance imposes a tax; the institution of an
presumption may be rendered naught by a clear demonstration that action in court without complying with the requirements of the
the ordinance is irreconcilable with a constitutional or legal provision will lead to the dismissal of the case on the ground of non-
provision, that it runs afoul of morality or settled public policy, that it exhaustion of administrative remedies. However, when an ordinance
prohibits trade, or that it is oppressive, discriminatory, or imposes a fee, direct recourse to the courts may be had without
unreasonable. Thus, unless invalidity or unreasonableness is prior protest before the Secretary of Justice. Simply put, fees are not
ostensibly apparent, one seeking a judicial declaration of the subject to the procedure outlined under Section 187.
invalidity of an ordinance is duty-bound to adduce evidence that is
convincingly indicative of its infirmities or defects. A cursory reading of the ordinance makes it apparent that
the purpose of the ordinance is to regulate the construction and
FACTS: maintenance of electric and telecommunications posts erected within
Cagayan de Oro City. It is clear that the ordinance in this case
1. The City of CDO enacted an ordinance imposing an annual serves a regulatory purpose and is, hence, an exercise of police
Mayor’s Permit Fee of 500 pesos on every electric or power. Nowhere in the text of the ordinance is it shown that it was
telecommunications post belonging to public utility companies enacted to raise revenue.
operating in the city.
2. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. (CEPALCO) is a public Proceeding to the question of non-exhaustion, the Court rules that
utility in the city and the owner of 17,000 poles. The ordinance ordinances that impose regulatory fees do not need to be challenged
entails that it has to pay P8,500,000. before the Secretary of Justice. Considering the foregoing, there was
3. CEPALCO filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief contending that no procedural barrier preventing CEPALCO from instituting the
the imposition, in the guise of police power was unlawful for instant petition for declaratory relief before the RTC at the first
violating the fundamental principle that fees, charges, and instance.
other impositions shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory. Substantive validity of the ordinance
4. The City of CDO argued that the alleged excessiveness should
have been raised before the Secretary of Justice because it The ordinance was presumed constitutional because of the
imposes a tax. failure of CEPALCO to prove excessiveness.
5. RTC dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. It averred that it cannot interfere with the decision- Few things are more established in this jurisdiction than
making of the government agency concerned and it is best the requisites of a valid ordinance. In order for an ordinance to be
addressed to the sound discretion of the city council of CDO. valid in substance, it
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

7
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession after complying with the
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; requirement of depositing an amount consisting of 15% of the fair
(4) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; market value of the properties.
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable. CA reversed the RTC decision, emphasized the drastic effect of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain to a landowner's right to
Equally established, however, is the presumption of private property. Hence, compliance with the rules and limitations
validity in favor of all laws, which extends to ordinances. provided under the Constitution and pertinent laws should be strictly
observed. If not, according to the CA, it behooves petitioner to
Nonetheless, the presumption, being just that, may be set justify its non-compliance with the rules and limitations. This,
aside when invalidity or unreasonableness (1) appears on the face according to the CA, petitioner failed to do (re: list of priorities in
of the ordinance; or (2) is established by proper evidence. land acquisition under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279).
If a regulatory fee produces revenue in excess of the cost The CA found the records lacking of any evidence to support
of the regulation, inspection, and licensing, it will be considered petitioner's claim that an on-site development program is the most
excessive, and hence fail the test of judicial scrutiny. practicable and advantageous for the beneficiaries, to justify the
non-applicability of the list of priorities in land acquisition under
For CEPALCO's failure to establish excessiveness, the Section 9 of R.A. No. 7279. The CA further found petitioner to have
Court rules in the negative. A judicious perusal of the record fails to failed to exhaust other modes of acquisition before it resorted to
reveal anything definitively showing the ordinance's unreasonable, expropriation in violation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 7279. The
excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory nature; hence, because it appellate court pointed out petitioner's failure to renegotiate the
enjoys the presumption of validity, the Court is constrained to offer to purchase the property before filing the expropriation case.
reverse the decision of the CA. Lastly, the CA found that the intended beneficiaries of petitioner's
socialized housing program are not "underprivileged and homeless,"
The presumption of constitutionality, in its most basic in violation of Section 8 23 of R.A. No. 7279, with some of the
sense, only means that courts, in passing upon the validity of a law, beneficiaries being professional teachers, doctors, dentists, etc.
will afford some deference to the statute and charge the party
assailing it with the burden of showing that the act is incompatible Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that petitioner failed
with the constitution. The doctrine comes into operation when a to prove that it complied with pertinent laws in the exercise of its
party comes to court praying that a law be set aside for being power of eminent domain.
unconstitutional. In effect, it places a heavy burden on the act's
assailant to prove invalidity beyond reasonable doubt; it commands Ruling: NO. The exercise of the power of eminent domain
the clearest showing of a constitutional infraction. Thus, before a drastically affects a landowner's right to private property, which is as
law may be struck down as unconstitutional, courts must be certain much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the
that there exists a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately
and not one that is speculative or argumentative. To doubt, it has connected with the rights to life and liberty." 28 Therefore, the
been said, is to sustain. exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition is granted – the ordinance is hereby Several requisites must concur before a local government unit can
declared valid and constitutional. exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit: (1) an ordinance is
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the
B. EMINENT DOMAIN power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property; (2) the power of eminent domain is
B.1 DEFINITION, NATURE AND FUNCTION; WHEN exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
EXERCISED BY LEGISLATURE/ LGU/ OTHER DELEGATES poor and the landless; (3) there is payment of just compensation , as
required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
City of Manila vs. Prieto (G.R. No. 221366, July 8, 2019) pertinent laws; and (4) a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but
Facts: In 2004 the City Council of Manila authorized the Mayor to to said offer was not accepted.
acquire certain parcels of land belonging to respondents to be used
for the City of Manila's (petitioner) Land-For-The-Landless The LGC provision also states that the exercise of such delegated
Program.Initially, petitioner attempted to acquire the subject lots by power should be pursuant to the Constitution and pertinent laws.
negotiated sale, offering the amount of P2,000.00 per square meter, R.A. No. 7279 is such pertinent law in this case as it governs the
which respondents refused to accept on the ground that their local expropriation of properties for purposes of urban land reform
respective properties are worth more than that. Thus, petitioner filed and housing. Thus, the rules and limitations set forth therein cannot
a Complaint dated September 3, 2004, before the RTC, asserting its be disregarded. Sections 9 and 10 of the said Act provide:
authority to expropriate the subject lots for its project On October 6,

8
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land . - Lands for a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly
socialized housing shall be acquired in the taken from them allegedly for public use.
following order:
To be sure, this Court is not unaware of the contemporary concept
of "public use" as explained in prevailing jurisprudence. It remains
true, however, that condemnation of private lands in an irrational or
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly
government-owned or controlled corporations and their not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the
subsidiaries; Constitution. Such act would clearly deprive a citizen of his or her
property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain; the public.
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. NGCP (G.R. No. 224936,
September 4, 2019)
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Doctrine: please proceed to the ruling portion of this digest kay
Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and medyo daghan. Heavy ang discussion related sa subtopic as
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which provided under the syllabus.
have not yet been acquired;
Facts:
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) is a private
BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and corporation engaged in the business of transmitting electric power
from generating plants of power producers to distributors. It was
(f) Privately-owned lands. granted a franchise to engage in such business by the National
govt., which included, among others, the authority to exercise
Where [on-site] development is found more practicable eminent domain over private lands.
and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities
mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local It filed an expropriation case against PNOC Alternative Fuels
government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site Corporation (PAFC) over a portion of a petrochemical industrial
development of government lands. park for the construction of a transmission line project. The park
was originally a land of public domain. Through a law, the
ownership, admin, and mgt. of such was transferred to PAFC
SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. - The modes of
(instrumentality of the State) for the purpose of developing a
acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
petrochemical industrial zone.
among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the PAFC claims that the subject property, being an industrial zone, is
Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated a land of the public domain as it is devoted to public use or
purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That purpose, i.e., the development of the petrochemical industry
expropriation shall be resorted to only when other which, it argues, is a matter of national interest. Hence, since
modes of acquisition have been exhausted: respondent NGCP is only allowed to expropriate private property,
Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to, necessarily, it has no authority to expropriate the subject
parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be property.
exempted for purposes of this Act: x x x. (Emphases
supplied) ISSUE: WON the expropriation was proper.
HELD: YES
It could be readily seen from the RTC's Order that in granting
petitioner's complaint for expropriation, it took a facile approach in Eminent Domain: Definition, Nature, and Function
its resolution of the expropriation suit. It sweepingly concluded that The power of eminent domain, which is also called the power of
the petitioner had met all the aforecited requisites. It concluded that expropriation, is the inherent right of the State to condemn
the expropriation was for a public purpose merely because it is private property for public use upon payment of just
pursuant to the city's land-for-the-landless and on-site development compensation. It has been described as "'the highest and most
programs. The above-quoted provisions are strict limitations on exact idea of property remaining in the government' that may be
the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government acquired for some public purpose through a method 'in nature of
units, especially with respect to: (1) the order of priority in acquiring a compulsory sale to the State.”
land for socialized housing; and (2) the resort to expropriation
proceedings as a means of acquiring it.35 Compliance with these The right of eminent domain is an ultimate right of the sovereign
conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty
oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be for a public purpose. The exercise of this power, whether directly
by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in

9
derogation of private rights. Hence, it is considered to be one of National Transmission Corp. VS Sps. TAGLAO (G.R. No.
the harshest proceedings known to the law. 223195, Jan. 29, 2020)
Inherent in sovereignty, it is a power which need not be granted

Doctrine: It should be borne in mind that just compensation
by any fundamental law. Hence, Article III, Sec. 9 of the 1987
should be computed based on the fair value of the property at the
Consti, which states that "private property shall not be taken for
time of its taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
public use without just compensation" is not a grant, but only a
limitation of the State's power to expropriate.
Facts: On November 24, 1995, NTC file an expropriation case
It consists of two stages: (a)the determination of the authority of against spouses Taglao, over a parcel of land covering an area of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the 5,143 sq.m. The NPC sought to acquire an easement of right of way
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the over the 3,573-sq.m. portion (subject portion) of Spouses Taglao's
suit, and (b) the determination by the court of 'the just property. RTC then granted NPC's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done of Possession over the subject portion of Spouses Taglao's property.
by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners. (2001) Commissioners of each party submitted their
recommendations for the just compensation. (NPC = P156,690.44 ;
When exercised by delegates
Sps Taglao = P12,858,000.00 / P2500 per sq. m.)
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch
of government. However, it is not exclusive to Congress, as the RTC fixed the market value of the property at P1000 per sq.m. CA
latter may delegate the exercise of the power to government affirmed the assailed ruling. NTC, aggrieved by the decision argued
agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities. that the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
In the hands of government agencies, local governments, public
utilities, and other persons and entities, the right to expropriate is
not inherent and is only a delegated power. In fact, even as to Issue: Whether RTC correctly fixed the just compensation. - NO.
municipal corporations, it has been held that they can exercise
the right of eminent domain only if some law exists conferring the Ruling: Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent
power upon them. of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.It is that
sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy,
Hence, the delegate's exercise of the right of eminent domain, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as
being merely granted by legislative fiat, is restrictively limited to price to be given and received therefor. The measure is not the
the confines of the delegating law. The scope of this delegated taker's gain, but the owner's loss.
legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the
delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict While market value may be one of the basis in the determination of
compliance with the terms of the delegating law. just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without
When the expropriation is done, not directly by the legislative considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair
branch, but by another govt agency or a municipal corp, and by market value of the property, e.g., the cost of acquisition, the
virtue of an authorizing statute which does not specify the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as
property to be taken, jurisprudence holds that the courts may the tax declarations thereon. Moreover, it should be borne in mind
look into the necessity of the taking that just compensation should be computed based on the fair value
of the property at the time of its taking or the filing of the complaint,
In this case… whichever came first.
NGCP is granted the power to exercise eminent domain over
private lands. Further, the Petrochemical Industrial Park, as an Here, the action for eminent domain was filed by the NPC on
industrial zone, is a private land, as expressly provided under the November 24, 1995. By virtue of the writ issued in favor of the NPC,
law governing such property, notwithstanding the fact that it is it took possession of the subject property on October 9, 1996. Since
owned by a State instrumentality. As such, it can be subjected to the filing of the Complaint for Eminent Domain came ahead of the
expropriation by NGCP. taking, just compensation should be based on the fair market value
of Spouses Taglao's property at the time of the filing of the NPC's
Lastly, the charter of NGCP provides that it can only expropriate Complaint on November 24, 1995.
when reasonably necessary for the construction, expansion, and
efficient maintenance and operation of the transmission system In this case, the valuation recommended by the commissioner for
and grid and the efficient operation and maintenance of the the NPC was P13.607 per sq.m. The valuation was based on the
subtransmission systems. Given that there was no allegation that market value stated on the property's Tax Declaration for December
the expropriation is unnecessary and unreasonable, SC held that 29, 1993. The commissioner for Spouses Taglao, on the other hand,
such exercise is within the limits of the delegating law. recommended a valuation of P2,500.00 per sq.m., based on the
market value of the property as of August 15, 2000.
B.2 TAKING

10
The court did not uphold the valuation of either commissioners as Section 92.Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio
they were not based on the market value of the property at the time and television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be
of the filing of NPC's complaint for eminent domain on November allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
24, 1995. Moreover, the Court ordered that the case be remanded area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
to the RTC for the proper determination of the just compensation. It purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
also set the interest rate at 12% per annum from the time of the stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio television time,
filing of the complaint on November 24, 1995. The 12% per annum free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
rate of legal interest is only applicable until June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, it shall earn Petitioners claim, among others, that such constitutes taking of
interest at the rate 6% per annum,in line with BSP Circular No. 799, property without due process of law and without just compensation,
Series of 2013. highlighting millions of pesos it lost due to providing free air time,
and the expected loss (50m plus) for incoming election.
Expounding on the Court’s ruling on RTC’s decision in arriving just
compensation:
ISSUE: WON the said provision involves “taking” within the
purview of the exercise of eminent domain
The court held that the decision of RTC in arriving at a valuation of
P1000 per sq. m., was without basis. It was not also supported by HELD: NO
any documentary evidence. Although the determination of just
compensation indeed lies within the trial court's discretion, it should Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. The valuation of courts must franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which
be based on all established rules, correct legal principles, and they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given
competent evidence. the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere
privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened
The court also disagreed with the RTC’s ruling that since the NPC with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
was not seeking to acquire the subject property, but merely intends
The claim that petitioner would be losing P52,380,000 in unrealized
to establish an easement of right of way thereon, the NPC should
revenue from advertising is based on the assumption that air time is
only pay Spouses Taglao 10% of the market value of the subject
"finished product" which, it is said, become the property of the
portion in accordance to RA 6395, as amended by PD 938. In
company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural resources
several cases, the Court struck down reliance on Section 3A of RA
after undergoing a process for their production.
6395, as amended by PD No. 938. True, an easement of a right of
way transmits no rights except the easement, and the respondents But air time is not owned by broadcast companies. As held in Red
would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the Lion Broadcasting Co.v.F .C .C ., "licenses to broadcast do not confer
acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary
of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its privilege of using them."
owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is
entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no
more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken. constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to
monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow
citizens.As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the
TELEBAP v. COMELEC (289 SCRA 337, GR No. 132922) airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they
provide air time to the COMELEC.
Doctrine: Airtime is not owned by broadcasting companies. A
license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional Other principles not closely related to the topic
right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio
A franchise is a privilege subject, among other things, to
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. As radio and
amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional
television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private
provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when
the COMELEC.
the common good so requires."
Facts: Sec 91 of BP 881 does not take over the operation of radio and
television stations but only the allocation of air time to the
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by the
broadcasting companies. The other Petitioner is GMA network. Constitution.
They challenge, among others, the validity of Sec. 92 of BP 881 Per its franchise, a duty is imposed on the GMA Network to render
which provides: "adequate public service time”. Hence, it already assumed such
responsibility.

11
After the controversy, and during the pendency of the case, there
was a resolution issued by the COMELEC, in relation to Sec. 92 Article 437 of the Civil Code provides:
which provides for payment of just compensation for the “COMELEC
Time”, but it was nullified pursuant to the principle that an admin ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its
agency cannot amend a statute. surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon
any works or make any plantations and excavations which he
The law mandates flextime, contrary to the claim that theoretically, may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject
the COMELEC can demand all the air time of such stations. SC held to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
that as to what time of the day and how much time the COMELEC reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
may procure will have to be determined by it in relation to the
overall objective of informing the public about the candidates, their Under the provision, the ownership of land extends to the surface as
qualifications and their programs of government. well as to the subsoil under it. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, this principle was applied to show that rights over lands
NAPOCOR v. Ibrahim (GR No. 183297, December 23, 2009)
are indivisible and, consequently, require a definitive and categorical
classification. In this case, respondents could have dug upon their
Facts: Respondent instituted an action against petitioner National
property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so by
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land
the authorities precisely because of the construction and existence
and damages. In the complaint, it was alleged that sometime in
of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property.
1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without
Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain
respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the
portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the
sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein
construction of the deep well.
underground tunnels, a fact not denied by NAPOCOR. The
existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in
Incidentally, petitioner should compensate the respondents. It was
July 1992 by respondents. On September 19, 1992, respondent
previously held that if the government takes property without
Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a
expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many
permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3
years, the property owner may demand payment of just
located in Saduc, Marawi City but his request was turned down
compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither
because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to
convenient nor feasible.This is in accordance with the principle that
lives and property (it was later disclosed that the refusal was
persons shall not be deprived of their property except by competent
because of the tunnels underneath the property were used for a
authority and for public use and always upon payment of just
hydroelectric project).
compensation.
On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay

B.The taking of the property should be reckoned from the
damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the
latter refused to vacate much less pay damages.
There is a "taking" in this sense when the owners are actually
deprived or dispossessed of their property, where there is a practical
In response, petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where
destruction or a material impairment of the value of their property,
the underground tunnels were constructed does not belong to
or when they are deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a
respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents
"taking" in this context when the expropriator enters private
owned the property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not
property not only for a momentary period but for more permanent
extend beyond what is necessary to enable them to obtain all the
duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in
utility and convenience that such property can normally give.
such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
Petitioner concludes that the underground tunnels 115 meters below
enjoyment thereof. Moreover, "taking" of the property for purposes
respondents’ property could not have caused damage or prejudice
of eminent domain entails that the entry into the property must be
to respondents and their claim to this effect was, therefore, purely
under warrant or color of legal authority.
conjectural and speculative.
The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent

Petitioner also avers that the property was mistakenly believed to be
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the
part of public domain.
complaint.
Issues:
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the
A. Whether petitioner is obliged to indemnify respondent.
complaint for expropriation. Hence, many ruling of this Court have
B. Whether “taking”, for purposes of computing the just
equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the
compensation, should be reckoned from 1978 or during the time
time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of
when the tunnels were constructed.
the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry
to the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the
Ruling:
time of filing of the complaint.
A.YES. PETITIONER SHOULD COMPENSATE RESPONDENT.

12
The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this Court peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to
the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. the return of the amount of just compensation received.
On this score, the Court enumerated elements of taking as the main Facts: Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No.
ingredient in the exercise of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator 88), with an area of 1,017 square meters, more or less, located in
must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the
property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the then
property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and CFI Cebu.
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
The CFI rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and
The element that the entry into the property is under warrant or ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot 88.
color of legal authority, is patently lacking. Petitioner justified its
nonpayment of the indemnity due respondents upon its mistaken However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of
belief that the property formed part of the public dominion. the old Lahug Airport was not pursued.
Petitioner’s entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA
was not made under warrant or color of legal authority, for it Director Rivera requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous
believed the property was public land covered by Proclamation No. agreement. The CAA replied that there might still be a need for the
1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of ownership Lahug Airport to be used as an emergency DC-3 airport.
sometime in 1979, the petitioner flatly refused the claim for
compensation, nakedly insisted that the property was public land President Aquino issued a Memorandum directing the
and wrongly justified its possession by alleging it had already paid transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to
"financial assistance" to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over Mactan International Airport by the end of 1990 and thereafter the
the property. Only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial closure of the Lahug Airport.
use, did the petitioner recognize private respondent’s ownership and
negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Lozada et al initiated a complaint for the recovery of
Sale with provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot 88 arguing that
correct price was then executed. Clearly, this is not the intent nor since the public purpose for the expropriation no longer exists, the
the expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a property must be returned to them.
voluntary purchase and sale. Obviously, the petitioner neglected
and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent domain. The RTC ruled in favor of Lozada et al and ordered for the
restoration of the possession and ownership of their land upon
Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover payment of the expropriation price by Lozada, et al.
possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to expropriate, did
petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
domain.
Issue: Whether or not Lozada et al may recover Lot 88 considering
To allow petitioner to use the date it constructed the tunnels as the that the Lahug Airport was not anymore used for public purpose or
date of valuation would be grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the use.
land under warrant or color of legal authority or with intent to
expropriate the same. In fact, it did not bother to notify the owners Ruling:
and wrongly assumed it had the right to dig those tunnels under Revisiting the case of Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan
their property. Secondly, the "improvements" introduced by
petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no way contributed to an increase The Court revisited the Fery ruling that the transfer to a
in the value of the land. third party of the expropriated real property, which necessarily
resulted in the abandonment of the particular public purpose for
B.3 PUBLIC USE which the property was taken, is not a ground for the recovery of
the same by its previous owner, the title of the expropriating agency
MCIAA v. LOZADA et al. (GR No. 176625, Feb. 25,2010) being one of fee simple.
Doctrine: The taking of private property, consequent to the Obviously, Fery was not decided pursuant to our now
Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific taken for public use without just compensation. It is well-settled that
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollary, if this particular the taking of private property by the Government’s power of
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that

13
it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just

compensation be paid to the property owner. These While MCIAA are obliged to reconvey Lot 88 to Lozada et
requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that. al., the latter must return to the former what they received as just
Should be complied with to enable the codemnor to keep the compensation for the expropriation of the property, plus legal
property expropriated. interest to be computed from default, which in this case runs from
the time MCIAA comply with their obligations to Lozada et al.
Prevailing Doctrine in the State’s Power in Eminent Domain
Lozada et al. must likewise pay MCIAA the necessary
With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator expenses they may have incurred in maintaining Lot 88, as well as
should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the monetary value of their services in managing it to the extent
the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file that Lozada at al. were benefited thereby.
another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private THUS, the Court ordered for the RETURN of the property –
owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the Lot 88 – to its former owners Lozada et al.
judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack
one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the B.4 JUST COMPENSATION
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MANZANO (G.R. No.
would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would 188243, January 24, 2018)
violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
Doctrine:
Author’s Note: The Fery Doctrine has been abandoned by the (Please see highlighted portions in the ruling)
Supreme Court for it will violate the property owner’s right to
justice, fairness, and equity since they were made to believe by the Facts:
concerned government agency that their property will be used for The Heirs of Pilar Manzano (respondents) were the owners of four
public purpose. parcels of agricultural land planted with rubber trees. Upon the
enactment of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
The Court now holds that the taking of private property, consequent (CARL), respondents voluntarily offered their landholdings for
to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is agrarian reform, offering it for a price of P83k per hectare.
always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the Subsequently, DAR issued Admin. Order 05-98 which provides the
specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollary, if this formula in computing just compensation for rubber lands under
particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all CARL, taking into consideration the factors laid down in Sec. 17 of
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former CARL.
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just DAR endorsed the matter of land valuation to Landbank, who gave a
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power lower counteroffer to respondents ranging from P26k to P66k,
of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required claiming that their lands were planted with more than 30-yr old
factual justification. rubber trees that were no longer productive. Respondents refused
to accept Landbank’s counteroffer. Hence, the matter of land
On the Statute of Frauds valuation was referred to the DARAB for preliminary determination
of just compensation.
In this case, the Statute of Frauds, invoked by MCIAA to bar the
claim of Lozada for the reacquisition of Lot 88, cannot apply, the After a few more disagreements on the valuation of the land
oral compromise settlement having been partially performed. By between the respondents and Landbank and DAR, a complaint for
reason of such assurance made in their favor, Lozada relied on the judicial determination and payment of just compensation was filed
same by not pursuing their appeal before the CA. Moreover, before the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Respondents
contrary to the claim of MCIAA, the fact of Lozada’s eventual argued that the just compensation should not be less the P2M for
conformity to the appraisal of Lot 88 and his seeking the correction each of the properties. Accordingly, the SAC appointed 3
of a clerical error in the judgment as to the true area of Lot 88 do commissioners to examine and ascertain the valuation of the
not conclusively establish that Lozada absolutely parted with their properties, pursuant to CARL.
property. To the Court, these acts were simply meant to cooperate
with the government, particularly because of the oral promise made Meanwhile, Landbank deposited the provisional compensation for
to them. the acquired properties. Respondents later withdrew the same.
The right of Lozada to repurchase Lot 88 may be enforced The Commissioners set the matter of land valuation for hearing.
based on a “constructive trust” constituted on the property held Respondents filed their position papers while DAR adopted
by the government in favor of the former. Landbank’s computation on the value of the land in their position
paper. After the hearing and their ocular inspection, the
Conclusion

14
commissioners gave a recommendation for the payment of just The use of the word “final” in the statute should not be
compensation which is higher than the valuation made by Landbank. construed to mean that the SAC serves as an appellate court
that must wait for the administrative agencies to finish their
The RTC substantially adopted the Commissioner’s valuation. valuation. There is no need to exhaust administrative
remedies through the PARAB before a party can go to the
Landbank filed a Petition for Review before the CA seeking the SAC for determination of just compensation. The final
reversal of the RTC Order; meanwhile, respondents filed a motion determination on the value of just compensation lies solely on the
for execution pending appeal. SAC. Any attempt to convert its original jurisdiction into an appellate
jurisdiction is contrary to the explicit provisions of the law. Thus,
While the petition was pending before the RTC, the RTC issued an aggrieved landowners can go directly to the SAC that is legally
Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal considering mandated to determine just compensation, even when no
that the ownership and possession of the properties subject of the administrative proceeding was conducted before DAR.
case were already transferred to the government. In the same
order, the RTC amended the dispositive portion by adding the 2. No. Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
payment of 6% legal interest reckoned from the date of judgment or "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
order, until fully paid. compensation." This rings true for agrarian reform cases where
private lands are taken by the State to be distributed to farmers who
RTC found Landbank liable for indirect contempt for failing to serve as beneficiaries of these lands. The amount of just
comply with the writ of execution pending appeal. CA denied compensation must be determined based on the fair market value of
Landbank’s appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. the property at the time of taking.
In the instant petition, Landbank alleges that the CA erred in In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just
accepting the commissioners’ recommendation without conducting a compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is
hearing, in directing DAR and Landbank to pay 6% legal interest, entitled is generally the market value.
and that the commissioners disregarded the applicability of CARl,
Admin Order No. 05-98, among others. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous
but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
Issue/s: compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
received therefor." The market value is not limited to the
1. WoN the RTC can simply adopt the Consolidated Commissioners’ assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market
Report in determining just compensation - YES values determined by the provincial or city appraisal
2. WoN the RTC is mandated to follow the formula prescribed under committee. However, these values may serve as factors to be
CARL - NO considered in the judicial valuation of the property.
3. WoN there may be execution pending appeal - YES
4. WoN the 6% legal Interest should be imposed - YES To determine the just compensation to be paid to the landowner,
the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the
Ruling: principal criterion. The SAC is required to consider the factors
in CARL and the formula in the administrative issuances.
1. Yes. The RTC has full discretion to make a binding decision on the This must be construed to mean that the SAC is legally
value of the properties. Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of mandated to take due consideration of these legislative and
Court, the Regional Trial Court may accept the Consolidated administrative guidelines to arrive at the amount of just
Commissioners' Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for compensation. Consideration of these guidelines, however,
further report, set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or does not mean that these are the sole bases for arriving at
accept only a part of it and reject the other parts. The final the just compensation. Thus, while Section 17 requires due
determination of the RTC sitting as SAC must be respected. The consideration of the formula prescribed by DAR, the determination
determination of just compensation is a judicial function of just compensation is still subject to the final decision of the
which cannot be curtailed by or limited by legislation, much proper court.
less by an administrative rule. Republic Act No. 6657, Section 57
gives to the Special Agrarian Courts the ”original and exclusive 3. Yes, Under Rule 39, Sec. 2(a) of the RoC, a judgment appealed
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just before the CA may still be executed by the RTC, provided there are
compensation to landowners." In CARL, Sec. 16(f): good reasons for the judgment’s execution. The respondents have
Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition and Distribution of already been deprived of their land since 1999. They were
Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of private dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits and income of their
lands, the following procedures shall be followed: properties, which were taken from them 19yrs ago without
xxx xxx xxx compensation. Thus, the denial of the execution pending appeal will
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring infringe on their constitutional right against taking of private
the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final property without compensation. Execution of the judgment or final
determination of just compensation. order pending appeal is discretionary. As an exception to the rule
that only a final judgment may be executed, it must be

15
strictly construed. Thus, execution pending appeal should - Respondent Valenzuela City formally offered the Abacan
not be granted routinely but only in extraordinary Spouses to purchase their property at P400.00 per square
circumstances. The following are the good reasons that could meter, or a total of P481,200.00. However, the Abacan
prompt the application of the exception: (1) that execution pending Spouses rejected the offer
appeal would be in consonance with justice, fairness and equity
considering that the land had long been taken by the DAR; and (2) - Valenzuela City enacted City Ordinance No. 75 which
that suspending the payment of compensation will prolong the authorized Mayor Gatchalian to initiate expropriation
agony that respondents have been suffering by reason of the proceedings over the Abacan Spouses' property for the
deprivation of their property. This Court agrees with the RTC that for construction of a public school building and appropriation of the
reasons of equity, justice and fair play, respondents should be paid project's funds.
to enable them to cope up with the loss they sustained as a result of
the taking and for their economic survival. - Mayor Gatchalian, filed before the Regional Trial Court a
Complaint for expropriation against the Abacan Spouses.
4.. Yes, the RTC correctly imposed the payment of legal interest on
the just compensation award. - Abacan Spouses filed their Answer. They averred that
Valenzuela City's offer was way below the current Bureau of
The Court has previously allowed the grant of legal interest in Internal Revenue zonal valuation.
expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment of just
compensation, deeming the same to be an effective forbearance on - Valenzuela City manifested that it issued a check worth
the part of the State. To clarify, this incremental interest is not P72,180.00 payable to the Abacan Spouses, representing
granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a around 15% of the total fair market value of the property.
penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner
due to the delay in its payment.The concept of just RTC:
compensation not only embraces the correct determination of the
amount to be paid but also payment within reasonable time from its - Authorized the issuance of a Writ of Possession in
taking. Put differently, while prompt payment of just Valenzuela City's favor.
compensation requires the immediate deposit and release
to the landowner of the provisional compensation, it does - Ruled that Valenzuela City had the right to take the
not end there. It also encompasses the payment in full of property to construct the school building. The court appointed
the just compensation as finally determined by the courts. three (3) Commissioners tasked with determining the amount
of just compensation due on Valenzuela City.
In this case, the records show that Landbank already gave
provisional compensation based on the initial valuation of the - The Board of Commissioners set the just compensation at
properties. However, while the deposits might have been sufficient P7,500.00 per square meter, or a total of P9,022,500.00.
for the purposes of immediate taking of the landholdings, it cannot
be claimed as amounts that would excuse the payment of interest - This was assailed by Valenzuela City, insisting that the just
on the unpaid balance of the compensation due. compensation must be based on the property's fair market
value per the tax declaration which was P400.00 per square
Landbank’s delay in payment makes it liable for legal interest by way
- The Regional Trial Court directed Valenzuela City to pay
of damages. Legal interest should be applied on the unpaid
the Abacan Spouses P6,000.00 per square meter, or a total of
balance of the compensation due. Therefore, the amount
P7,218,000.00, for the property
already received by respondents should be subtracted from the total
judgment, and the rate of the legal interest should be calculated
- Valenzuela City filed a MR, but it was denied in the
from that amount.
Regional Trial Court
B.4.1 HOW DETERMINED
CA:
CITY GOVERNMENT OF VALENZUELA VS SPOUSES ABACAN
- Affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
(G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018)
- Also found that the trial court not only relied on the
Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation, but also evaluated
FACTS:
the Commissioners' Report.
- Spouses Abacan are the registered owners of a 1,203-
- It also noted that Valenzuela City had purchased a 3,000-
square meter parcel of land located on G. Lazaro Street
square meter property for P5,000.00 per square meter, and
Dalandanan, Valenzuela City
that the properties in that vicinity were valued at P5,300 per
square meter by 2003.

16
Petitioner claims that CA erred because it allegedly based its “the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render
judgment on a misapprehension of facts, "speculations, surmises[,] judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it
and conjectures may recommit the same to the commissioners for further
report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint
It erred in considering only the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal new commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and
valuation and the price of the property it had purchased in 2001 as reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such
sufficient basis to determine the amount of just compensation judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to
Petitioner claimed that the property in question is not a commercial the defendant just compensation for the property so taken”
lot, but a vacant or idle residential lot. That CA disregarded this
The determination of just compensation remains a judicial
which is violative of the power bestowed upon LGU to prescribe
function to be performed by courts. Courts may substitute
zoning classifications, as held in Republic of the Philippines v. Far
their estimate of the value, as long as it is supported by
East Enterprises
the evidence on record
ISSUE: WON not the classification of a property in the tax Petitioner's assertion on the property's classification indicated in
declaration must prevail over that in the Bureau of Internal Revenue Tax Declaration, as it is allegedly in accord with the local
zonal valuation and Commissioners' Report in the determination of government's power to prescribe zoning classifications, is
the amount of just compensation. erroneous. Insisting that the trial court solely rely on this
encroaches on its judicial power to determine just
Ruling: Petition is denied for lack of merit compensation. Courts are mandated to evaluate and
consider competent evidence in determining just
State's inherent powers of eminent domain, which "enables it to compensation.
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment
of just compensation. Subject to the limitation of payment of just RTC did not solely rely on the BIR zonal valuation when it fixed
compensation. the just compensation
RTC evaluated the Commissioners' Report dated August 10, 2011.

The requisites for the local government's exercise of eminent In the said report, it is very evident that the commissioners'
domain are: recommendation of P7,500.00 per square meter was not merely
- Ordinance is enacted by the local legislative based on the zonal valuation made by the BIR. The
council authorizing the local chief executive commissioners recommended said amount after taking into
consideration the factors set forth under Section 5 of Republic Act
- Exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for No. 8974
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
“we decided to propose that the subject property be valued at
- There is payment of just compensation Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P7,500.00) per square
meter. This is a more realistic value of the subject property taking
- A valid and definite offer has been previously
into account the development in the vicinity and its neighboring
made to the owner, but said offer was not
areas. In our ocular inspection, we observed that the subject
accepted
property is indeed located in a busy and highly commercialized
Procedure on the exercise of the power under Rule 67 of ROC area. . . ."
undergoes two phases. The first phase determines the propriety
RTC likewise noted Valenzuela purchased a 3,000-
of the action. The second phase determines the compensation to
square meter property within the same vicinity as the
be paid
subject property at a value of P5,000.00 per square
In this case, both parties agreed that only the issue of just meter in August 2001. It further considered that in
compensation remains. 2003, the BIR had valued the properties in the same
zone or area at P5,300.00 per square meter.
In Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, this Court held that
where the issue is determining the amount of just Thus, although the court technically would still have the
compensation, a trial before the commissioners is power to determine the just compensation for the
indispensable. Trial with the aid of commissioners gives property its task would be relegated to simply
the parties the opportunity to present evidence on the stating the lower value of the property as
issue of just compensation. As such, it is a substantial declared either by the owner or the assessor.
right that may not be whimsically waived. However, while
Hence, the RTC had carefully studied the expropriated property
the appointment of commissioners is mandatory in
when it fixed the just compensation at P6,000.00 per square
resolving the issue of just compensation, courts are not
meter. Inasmuch as the determination of just compensation is a
bound by their findings.
judicial function, We see no plausible reason to disturb the RTC's
Rule 67, Section 8 of the ROC legal basis findings as to the valuation of the subject property
Additional discussion:

17
On petitioner's invocation of Republic of the Philippines One of the respondents also wrote a letter to Mayor
Vicente P. Eusebio calling the latter's attention to the fact that a
There, the petitioner questioned the expropriated
property in the same area, as the land subject of this case, had
properties' classification, which would be used to determine
been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square
the 100% value of the property based on the current Bureau of
meter when said property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for
Internal Revenue zonal valuation. In disposing the issue, this
conversion into a public road. Subsequently, respondents' counsel
Court rule:
sent a demand letter dated 1996 to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the
The payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to amount of P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00,
the issuance of a writ of possession differs from the as just compensation for respondents' property. In response, Mayor
payment of just compensation for the expropriated Eusebio wrote a letter informing respondents that the City of Pasig
property. While the provisional value is based on the current cannot pay them more than the amount set by the Appraisal
relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the Committee.
prevailing
Thus, respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance
The first refers to the preliminary or
and/or Damages against herein petitioners before the RTC.
provisional determination of the value of the
Respondents prayed that the property be returned to them with
property. It serves a double-purpose of pre-
payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per
payment if the property is fully expropriated,
square meter, or P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum
and of an indemnity for damages if the
from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or in the
proceedings are dismissed. It is not a final
event that said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners
determination of just compensation and may
be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of
not necessarily be equivalent to the prevailing
P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per
fair market value of the property. Of course,
square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per
it may be a factor to be considered in the
annum from the date of filing of the complaint until full payment. In
determination of just compensation.
addition, respondents prayed for payment of moral and exemplary
Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination damages, attorney's fees and costs.
of the fair market value of the property. It has been described as
"the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of Issue:
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation." Whether or not respondents are entitled to damages and interest as
part of just compensation from the taking of their property.
Hence, petitioner's invocation of Republic of the Philippines is
misplaced and does not support its cause.
Ruling:
B.4.2. DAMAGES AND INTEREST In taking respondents' property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just
HON. EUSEBIO v. LUIS et al. (GR No. 162474, Oct. 13, 2009) compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of
respondents' proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be
Doctrine: countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig
Wanton and irresponsible acts by the government in the non- should definitely be held liable for damages to respondents. Again,
payment of just compensation entitles the award of exemplary inManila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held
damages and attorneys fees to the property owner. However, this that the government agency's illegal occupation of the owner's
compensation must be, not in the form of rentals, but by way of property for a very long period of time surely resulted in pecuniary
'interest from the date that the company [or entity] exercising the loss to the owner. The Court held as follows:
right of eminent domain take possession of the condemned lands,
and the amounts granted by the court shall cease to earn interest Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate
only from the moment they are paid to the owners or deposited in compensation in the form of actual or compensatory
court damages, which in this case should be the legal interest
(6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking,
from said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is
Facts: based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as
which was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the
a municipal road. On 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed taking".
Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said
parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee of the City of The award of interest renders unwarranted the
Pasig, assessed the value of the land only at P150.00 per square grant of back rentals as extended by the courts below.
meter. Respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider In Republic v. Lara, et al., the Court ruled that the indemnity
P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land. for rentals is inconsistent with a property owner's right to be

18
paid legal interest on the value of the property, for if the to the government via Voluntary Offer to Sell applications filed with
condemnor is to pay the compensation due to the owners from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). They received
the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment of valuations of their land from DAR’s Provincial Agrarian Reform
such compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking Officer (PARO), which they then rejected as they thought they were
of the property; and, hence, there is no basis for claiming very low.
rentals from the time of actual taking. More explicitly, the Court
held in Republic v. Garcellano that: However, DAR requested Landbank to deposit part of the amount of
the valuations which AFC and HPI withdrew. Thus, their titles were
The uniform rule of this Court, however, is that this thereafter cancelled, and new ones issued in the name of the
compensation must be, not in the form of rentals, but Republic of the Philippines.
by way of 'interest from the date that the company [or
entity] exercising the right of eminent domain take
Thus, AFC and HPI filed petitions for determination of just
possession of the condemned lands, and the amounts
compensation with the DARAB, which the latter failed to act upon
granted by the court shall cease to earn interest only
for three years. They filed separate complaints to the RTC.
from the moment they are paid to the owners or
deposited in court . . . .
RTC awarded just compensation at Php 1.3B, with interest at the
xxx xxx xxx prevailing market rate computed from the taking of the properties
on 9 December 1996 until fully paid, minus the amounts petitioners
For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA occupied the initially received under the initial valuation.
subject lot without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
and without the MIAA exerting efforts to ascertain ownership LBP moved for reconsideration. RTC modified however, its ruling,
of the lot and negotiating with any of the owners of the fixing the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the
property. To our mind,these are wanton and complaint was filed until finality of decision.
irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and
corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary damages SC affirmed this RTC Decision. On MR, the SC issued a Resolution,
and attorneys fees is in order. However, while Rodriguez modifying, the Decision by deleting the 12% interest due on the
is entitled to such exemplary damages and attorney's fees, balance of the awarded just compensation, justifying the deletion by
the award granted by the courts below should be equitably finding that LBP did not delay the payment of just compensation as
reduced. We hold that Rodriguez is entitled only to it had deposited the pertinent amounts within 14 months after they
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages, and attorney's fees filed their complaints for just compensation with the RTC.
equivalent to one percent (1%) of the amount due.
Hence, this MR, with petitioners specifically arguing that the legal
Thus, the valuation of just compensation and award of
interest due is at 12% per annum, reckoned from the time of the
back rentals made by the RTC of Pasig City, are hereby SET
taking of the subject properties.
ASIDE. The City of Pasig, represented by its duly-authorized
officials, is DIRECTED to institute the appropriate expropriation
action over the subject parcel of land within fifteen (15) days from LBP on the other hand, contents that since the obligation to pay just
finality of this Decision, for the proper determination of just compensation is NOT a forbearance of money, interest should
compensation due to respondents, with interest at the legal rate of commence only after the amount due becomes ascertainable or
six (6%) percent per annum from the time of taking until full liquidated, and the 12% interest per annum should apply only to the
payment is made. liquidated amount, from the date of finality of judgment.
The City of Pasig is ORDERED to pay respondents the ISSUE: On what point should the 12% legal interest be reckoned?
amounts of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and P200,000.00 as
attorney's fees. RULING: On the balance, from the time of taking until fully paid.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC. v. LIMITATIONS OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 164195, 12
October 2010, (En Banc) Eminent domain is an inherent power of State as it is a power
necessary for the State's existence; it is a power the State cannot do
Ponente: Brion, J. without. As an inherent power, it does not need at all to be
embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is solely for
DOCTRINE: In determining the just compensation for this purposes of limiting what is otherwise an unlimited power.
exchange, however, the measure to be borne in mind is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss since what is involved is the The limitation is in the Bill of Rights, which provides under Section 9,
takeover of private property under the State's coercive power. Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads "No private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation." )
FACTS: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) provides two essential limitations to the power of eminent domain,
were registered owners of hectares of land which they offered to sell namely, that (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and

19
(2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"
property. if the property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers
the immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.
Section 9 specifies that compensation should be "just" as the
safeguard is there to ensure a balance — property is not to be taken This is the principle at the core of the present case where the
for public use at the expense of private interests; the public, through petitioners were made to wait for more than a decade after the
the State, must balance the injury that the taking of property causes taking of their property before they actually received the full amount
through compensation for what is taken, value for value. of the principal of the just compensation due them. What they
have not received to date is the income of their
THE EQUIVALENT TO BE GIVEN FOR THE PROPERTY TO BE landholdings corresponding to what they would have
TAKEN SHALL BE REAL, SUBSTANTIAL, FULL, AND AMPLE. received had no uncompensated taking of these lands been
immediately made. This income, in terms of the interest on the
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the unpaid principal, is the subject of the current litigation.
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered
taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market
the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or
be real, substantial, full and ample. the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
The owner's loss, of course, is not only his property but also its government.
income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full
compensation of its value must immediately be paid to achieve a fair Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation
exchange for the property and the potential income lost. The just is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case,
compensation is made available to the property owner so that he the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just
may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner value to be computed from the time the property is taken to
that he would have derived income from his expropriated property. the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
If full compensation is not paid for property taken, then the State with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property
must make up for the shortfall in the earning potential immediately and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to
lost due to the taking, and the absence of replacement property place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
from which income can be derived; interest on the unpaid than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional
mandate on eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness. JUST COMPENSATION DUE TO THE LANDOWNERS IS AN
EFFECTIVE FORBEARANCE ON THE PART OF THE STATE
The RTC’s award of just compensation at Php 1.3B is a finding of
fact that has subsequently been affirmed by the Court and is now As a consequence, the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum
beyond question. This valuation by the RTC is a far cry from DAR’s should be applied, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant
initial valuation, with a difference of Php 1.1B—four times the fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.
original DAR valuation. These valuations indicate how undervalued
the petitioners’ lands had been at the start, particularly at the time In the context of this case, when the LBP took the petitioners'
the petitioners’ landholdings were “taken.” landholdings without the corresponding full payment, it became
liable to the petitioners for the income the landholdings would have
While LBP initially deposited amounts at the time the lands were earned had they not immediately been taken from the petitioners.
taken, these amounts were mere PARTIAL PAYMENTS that only
amount to 5% of the Php 1.3B ACTUAL VALUE of the expropriated From this point of view, the December 19, 2007 Resolution deleting
properties. We point this aspect out to show that the initial the award of 12% interest is not only patently and legally wrong,
payments made by the LBP when the petitioners' landholdings were but is also morally unconscionable for being grossly unfair and
taken, although promptly withdrawn by the petitioners, could not by unjust.
any means be considered a fair exchange of values at the time of
taking. ON THE ISSUE OF DELAY
Thus, the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the Separately from the demandability of interest because of the failure
immediate taking of the landholdings but cannot be claimed as to fully pay for property already taken, a recurring issue in the case
amounts that would excuse the LBP from the payment of interest on is the attribution of the delay.
the unpaid balance of the compensation due.
While the petitioners were undisputedly mistaken in initially seeking
COMPENSATION TO BE JUST, MUST ALSO BE MADE recourse through the DAR, this agency itself — hence, the
WITHOUT DELAY. government — committed a graver transgression when it failed to

20
act at all on the petitioners' complaints for determination of just placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the
compensation. date of taking."
In sum, in a balancing of the attendant delay-related circumstances Neither can LBP's payment of the full compensation due before the
of this case, delay should be laid at the doorsteps of the finality of the judgment of this Court justify the reduction of the
government, not at the petitioners'. We conclude, too, that the interest due them. To rule otherwise would be to forget that the
government should not be allowed to exculpate itself from this delay petitioners had to wait twelve years from the time they gave up
and should suffer all the consequences the delay caused. their lands before the government fully paid the principal of the just
compensation due them. These were twelve years when they had
ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 12% LEGAL INTEREST no income from their landholdings because these landholdings have
immediately been taken.
The "pertinent amounts" allegedly deposited by LBP were mere
partial payments that amounted to a measly 5% of the actual value Moreover, the interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be
of the properties expropriated. They could be the basis for the inequitable and unconscionable because it resulted directly
immediate taking of the expropriated property but by no stretch of from the application of law and jurisprudence — standards
the imagination can these nominal amounts be considered that have taken into account fairness and equity in setting the
"pertinent" enough to satisfy the full requirement of just interest rates due for the use or forbearance of money.
compensation — i.e.,the full and fair equivalent of the expropriated
property, taking into account its income potential and the foregone If the LBP sees the total interest due to be immense, it only has
income lost because of the immediate taking. itself to blame, as this interest piled up because it unreasonably
acted in its valuation of the landholdings and consequently failed to
In the process, the Court determined that the legal interest should promptly pay the petitioners.
be 12% after recognizing that the just compensation due was
effectively a forbearance on the part of the government. Had the As borne by the records, the 12% interest claimed is only on the
finality of the judgment been the critical factor, then the 12% difference between the price of the expropriated lands (determined
interest should have been imposed from the time the RTC decision with finality to be P1,383,179,000.00) and the amount of
fixing just compensation became final. Instead, the 12% interest P411,769,168.32 already paid to the petitioners. The difference
was imposed from the time that the Republic commenced between these figures amounts to the remaining balance of
condemnation proceedings and "took" the property. P971,409,831.68 that was only paid on May 9, 2008.
Quite clearly, the Court imposed 12% interest based on the ruling in As above discussed, this amount should bear interest at the
Republic v. Court of Appeals that "...if property is taken for public rate of 12% per annum from the time the petitioners'
use before compensation is deposited with the court having properties were taken on December 9, 1996 up to the time
jurisdiction over the case,the final compensation must include of payment.
interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP) vs. Esther Anson
paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of Rivera, et al. (G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2010)
the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not DOCTRINE: If property is taken for public use before compensation
better than) the position he was in before the taking is deposited with the court, the final compensation must include
occurred.” interest on its just value to be computed from the time the property
is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
THE 12% INTEREST RATE AND THE CHICO-NAZARIO with the court,
DISSENT
FACTS: Respondents, Rivera et al. are co-owners of a parcel of
While Justice Chico-Nazario admitted that the petitioners were agricultural land covered by an OCT later transferred in their names.
entitled to the 12% interest, she saw it appropriate to equitably Respective TCTs were placed under the coverage of Operation Land
reduce the interest charges from P1,331,124,223.05 to Transfer in 1972 pursuant to PD 27.
P400,000,000.00. In support of this proposal, she enumerated
various cases where the Court, pursuant to Article 1229 of the Civil After DAR directed payment, LBP approved P265,494, exclusive of
Code, equitably reduced interest charges. advance payments in the form of lease rental but inclusive of 6%
increment pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 13.
While we have equitably reduced the amount of interest awarded in
numerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was Rivera instituted a civil case for the determination and payment of
essentially consensual in nature, i.e.,interest stipulated in signed just compensation before RTC claiming that the landholding was
agreements between the contracting parties. In contrast, the irrigated w/ 2 cropping seasons a year with average gross
interest involved in the present case "runs as a matter of law and production per season of 100 cavans of 50 kilos/ha; and that the
follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be

21
FMV of the property was not less than P130k/ha for the entire Where:
landholding. LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
In answer, LBP stated that the rice and corn lands under the CS = Comparable Sales
coverage of PD 27 were valued in accordance with EO 228; that the MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
administrative valuation rested solely in DAR and LBP was only the
financing arm; that funds used by LBP to pay compensation were In this case, the just compensation was computed based on EO 228.
public funds. Reiterating LBP v Soriano, “while we uphold the amount derived
from the old formula, since the application of the new formula is a
On Oct. 6, 2004, the RTC ordered LBP to pay respondents just matter of law and thus, should be made applicable, the parties are
compensation fixed at P1.3M plus interest of 12% per annum not precluded from asking for any additional amount as may be
effective Oct. 7, 2004 until fully paid. LBP filed an MR which was warranted by the new formula.”
denied. So LBP filed a petition for review to CA, which modified the
decision – just compensation (inclusive of interest as of Oct 6, 2004) As to propriety of the imposition of 12% interest on just
is fixed at P824k plus interest of 12% per annum beginning Oct. 7, compensation beginning Oct 2004 until full payment
2004 until fully paid. (Computation in full text)
VALID. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is
With an increment of 6% interest per annum compounded annually considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
beginning Oct 1972 until Oct 1994 and after which an interest of property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in
12% per annum until full payment (formula & computation in the open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
full text) competition or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the
CA pointed out that pursuant to AO 13, the rate of 6% per actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for
annum is imposed compounded annually from Oct 1972 to public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
Oct 1994 (date of effectivity of AO 13) . Beyond 1994, only the jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
simple rate is imposable until Oct. 2004 (date of judgment of RTC) interest on its just value to be computed from the time the
on the total value minus the lease rentals. Accordingly because the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually
obligation to pay was not in a written agreement that stipulated a paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of
different rate. From Oct 2004 until full payment, the simple interest the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order
of 12% per annum is imposed as by then, the amount is to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the
characterized as a forbearance of money. position he was in before the taking occurred.
ISSUES: As to liability of LBP (not related to topic)

I. Is it lawful to award 12% rate of interest per annum in According to LBP, it performs a governmental function when it
favor of respondents notwithstanding the 6% rate of disburses Agrarian Reform Fund to satisfy awards of just
interest per annum compounded annually prescribed compensation. Hence, it cannot be made to pay costs in eminent
under DAR A.O. 13, 02, and 06, "from November 1994 up domain proceedings.
to the time of actual payment”?
II. Is it lawful to adjudge LBP, performing a governmental TENABLE. LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial
function, liable for costs of suit? support in all phases of agrarian reform pursuant to RA 6657. It is
vested with the primary responsibility and authority in the valuation
RULING: YES, lawful. and compensation of covered landholdings to carry out the full
The subject parcels were acquired under PD 27 but the complaint implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program.
for just compensation was filed only in 1994, after RA 6657 (CARP)
already took effect in 1998. The role of LBP in the CARP is more than just the ministerial duty of
keeping and disbursing the Agrarian Reform Funds. It is primarily
As held in LBP v Soriano, “if just compensation is not settled prior to responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for
the passage of RA 6657, it should be computed in accordance with all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land
the said law, although the property was acquired under PD 27. The valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land
fixing of just compensation should therefore be based on the placed under the CARP. Since LBP is performing a governmental
parameters set out in RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only function in agrarian reform proceedings, it is exempt from the
suppletory effect.” payment of costs of suit.
Therefore, Sec. 17 of RA 6657 should be the principal basis of the Republic VS Dela Cruz GR No. 235883 (Notice)
computation for just compensation. As a matter of fact, the factors March 13, 2019
enumerated therein had already been translated by DAR into a basic
formula pursuant to its rule-making power in RA 6657: DOCTRINE:
“However, if full compensation is not paid, for the property taken,
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1) then the State must pay for the shortfall in the earning potential

22
immediately lost due to the taking, and the absence of replacement ● that “the swap arrangement "recognizes the fact that the
property from which income can be derived. Interest on the unpaid lot 1406-B . . . is considered expropriated in favor of the
compensation becomes due as compliance with the constitutional government" and the payment for which being Lot 434”;
mandate on eminent domain and as a basic measure of fairness.”
CA remanded the case to RTC. RTC approved the compromise
Thus, interest in eminent domain cases "runs as a matter of law and agreement.
follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be
placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the Petitioner failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate of Salud
date of taking." (EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. Jimenez because the registered owner was Progressive Realty
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 218628) Estate, Inc., not the petitioner. Upon motion, RTC annulled the
compromise agreement.
FACTS: The case does not include the facts. It only says that the
decision of CA of said case was affirmed but with modification. It RTC was directed to determine the just compensation. It ruled that
only added interest in the amount of just compensation to be paid the just compensation for Lot 1406-B should be based on the value
on the private owner of the subject land and the Supreme Court or assessment rate prevalent in 1993, the year the parties entered
penned it in this wise: into the Compromise Agreement and thereby agreed that the just
compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434. CA affirmed RTC.
“Interest in eminent domain cases "runs as a matter of law and
follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation for Lot 1406-B must
placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the be based on value of property prevailing in 1993, the year the
date of taking." parties entered into the compromise agreement, or in 1981 as
petitioner contends
For better understanding, the inclusion of interest in the payment of
just compensation, I suggest you read the case I cited about sa HELD:
doctrine kay mao ni siya ang nag discuss jud sa interest in just
compensation. Idk if naa ba siya sa assigned cases. ● The just compensation for Lot 1406-B must be based on
value of property prevailing in 1993.
B.4.3 RENTAL The Court pronounced in G.R. No. 137285 that "the compromise
agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY (NOW PHILIPPINE . . ., only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by [lot]
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY) VS. ESTATE OF SALUD payment, was rescinded."
JIMENEZ, G.R. NO. 188995. AUGUST 24, 2011
This pronouncement became the law of the case. The doctrine of
DOCTRINE: [1] When the parties signed the compromise the law of the case means that whatever is irrevocably established
agreement and the same was approved, they had in fact settled as the controlling legal rule between the same parties in the same
between themselves the question of what is just compensation and case, whether correct on general principles or not, continues to be
that both of them had intended that the defendant would be the law of the case for as long as the facts on which the legal rule
compensated on the basis of prevailing values at the time of the was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
agreement. [2] Court has imposed interest at 12% per annum in
eminent domain whenever the expropriator has not immediately The Court acknowledged that that parties understood and accepted,
delivered the just compensation. by entering into the Compromise Agreement in 1993, that the just
compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434 (or the value of Lot 434,
FACTS: which at the time of the swap in 1993 was definitely much higher
On May 15, 1981, the petitioner commenced an action for than Lot 434's value in 1981). By agreeing to a land swap in 1993 in
expropriation of three parcels of irrigated rice lands situated in the ill-fated compromise agreement, [PEZA] had impliedly agreed to
Cavite: Lot 1408; Lot 1409-B-2; and Lot 1406 [registered in the paying just compensation using the market values in 1993."
name of Salud Jimenez]. During the pendency of the case, Lot 1406
was subdivided into Lot 1406-A and Lot 1406-B. Lot 1406-A was ● P6,200.00/square meter is the correct just compensation
released from expropriation. for Lot 1406-B.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. On January 4, 1993, the petitioner

This took into due consideration the clear and convincing evidence
and Estate of Salud Jimenez entered into a compromise agreement
proving the fair valuation of properties similar and adjacent to Lot
stipulating that the petitioner agrees to withdraw the appeal;
1406-B at or near 1993. Findings of facts reached by the CA and
RTC are entitled to great respect.
● that “the Estate of Salud Jimenez would transfer Lot 1406-
B to the petitioner in exchange for "lot 434 with an area of
● Estate of Salud Jimenez entitled to Interest of 12% per
14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate
annum
of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite";

23
Compensation cannot be just to the owner in the case of property for Unlawful Detainer against Petitioner National Transmission
that is immediately taken unless there is prompt payment, Corporation [TransCo] (TransCo or TRANSCO), (a government
considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the agency, created to assume the electrical transmission functions of
loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in the National Power Corporation and is vested with the power of
addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the eminent domain subject to the requirements of the Constitution and
taking of the property until the actual payment. Court has imposed existing laws ) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao.
interest at 12% per annum in eminent domain whenever the
expropriator has not immediately delivered the just compensation. The MTC rendered a Decision Which Ordered defendant to vacate
the subject lot and remove all structures thereon, to pay plaintiff the
The petitioner, which should have known about the inefficacy of the amount of P10,350,000.00 as reasonable monthly rental computed
swapping of Lot 434 for Lot 1406- B, could even be said to have
resorted to the swapping for the purpose of delaying the payment. Petitioner [TransCo] interposed an appeal before the RTC, Branch
Thus, it was solely responsible for the delay. In fact, the Estate of 24 of Biñan, Laguna. Respondent BDC, on the other hand, 􏰀filed an
Salud Jimenez was compelled to seek the rescission of the Urgent Motion for Execution. The RTC granted Respondent BDC's
Compromise Agreement, a process that prolonged even more the Urgent Motion for Execution. A Writ of Execution Pending Appeal
delay in the payment of just compensation. In view of this, the CA's was then issued by the said court.
fixing of legal interest at only 6% per annum cannot be upheld and
must be corrected, for that rate would not ensure that compensation In the meantime, on 21 January 2010, Petitioner [TransCo] 􏰀filed a
was just in the face of the long delay in payment. Complaint for Expropriation of the parcel of land (the same property
subject of the Unlawful Detainer Case) before the RTC of Biñan,
The Court imposed 12 percent interest per annum on the unpaid Laguna.
gross value from August 23, 1993 until full amount of the just
compensation is paid. Subsequently, on 25 February 2010, Petitioner [TransCo] 􏰀filed
with RTC an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
B. 5 REMEDY OF DISPOSSESSED OWNER
Petitioner [Transco] then deposited the amount of P10,704,000.00
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, vs. BERMUDA with the Landbank of the Philippines, purportedly representing the
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (G.R. No. 214782. Apr 3, provisional value of the property sought to be expropriated.
2019) Consequently, the RTC issued an Order granting Petitioner's Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for
recovery of possession or ejectment against a public utility Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, RTC, Branch 24 dismissed Petitioner
corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has [TransCo's] appeal in the unlawful detainer case for being "moot
occupied the land belonging to the former in the interest of public and academic,"
service without prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated
purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action
Petitioner [TransCo] seasonably sought for a reconsideration of the
to compel the public utility corporation to vacate such property is
adverse ruling but the same was denied by RTC. Petitioner
unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment
[TransCo's] appeal, the record of the case was ordered remanded to
and injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as
the lower court for enforcement of the judgment regarding the
well as equitable estoppel.
rental in arrears which was not included in the computation of just
compensation.]
The proper recourse is for the ejectment court:
(1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner fi􏰀ling
Hence, the Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules before the
the proper action for recovery of just compensation and
CA. The CA in its Decision dismissed TransCo's petition and a􏰁rmed
consequential damages; or
the Orders issued by the RTC, Branch 24.
(2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to
institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and
ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing TransCo's appeal
to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed
allegedly because it has become moot and academic with the
therein; or
fi􏰀ling of the expropriation complaint involving the same property
(3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and
subject of the unlawful detainer case.
determine the just compensation and consequential
damagespursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if
TransCo’s argument: a case for recovery of possession or
the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject
ejectment suit against a public service corporation, endowed with
land.
the power of eminent domain, will not prosper as there can only
remain to the owner a right of just compensation and the RTC,
FACTS:
Branch 24, after 􏰀finding that TransCo is a public service
Respondent Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC) 􏰀filed a case
corporation with expropriation powers, should have ordered the

24
dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer for certainly BDC and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of
has no right to the remedies of ejectment or injunction, but only for the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the
the recovery of the value of the land taken, and the consequential value of the subject land.
damage, if any, especially given that the structure has been in
existence before BDC acquired the subject property Given that BDC 􏰀filed before the MTC a complaint for unlawful
detainer against TransCo, which erected and then energized a 230
RULING: KV transmission traversing the whole extent of the subject property,
the MTC should have found or taken judicial notice that TransCo is a
The Petition is meritorious. public service corporation with the power to expropriate. Upon
such 􏰀nding, the MTC, pursuant to the aforecited prevailing
Recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no jurisprudence, should have then ordered the dismissal of the
longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more unlawful detainer case without prejudice to BDC's right to recover
importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the value of the land actually taken, or ordered TransCo to institute
the obligation to continue its services to the public. The non- the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay
􏰀􏰀filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the just compensation and damages assessed therein. The MTC
the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the could not have proceeded to determine just compensation given
landowner is the right of compensation. that the value of the subject property is clearly beyond its
jurisdiction.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Mendoza, which involved an
ejectment suit against the Government for its failure to acquire Further, the award of rental in arrears by the MTC is improper
ownership of a privately-owned property that it had long used as a because BDC is only entitled to the just compensation of the subject
school site and to pay just compensation for it, the Court ruled: land and consequential damages as determined pursuant to Sections
5 and 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. While the award of rental in
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees arrears is proper in an unlawful detainer action, its award in the
voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government present case cannot be upheld since an unlawful detainer action is
for public use, he thereby waives his right to the not a sanctioned remedy in case a public service or utility
institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, like
such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio TransCo in this case, has occupied privately-owned property without
v. Luis, the failure for a long time of the owner to question 􏰀rst acquiring title thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation
the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property proceedings.
that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his
right to gain back possession.
Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either B. 6 ALLIED PROVISIONS
to evict the Republic from the land it had taken for public
use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas' right to just Sec. 17, ART. XII: In times of national emergency, when the
compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
prejudice to their 􏰀􏰀ling a proper action for recovery of over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility
such compensation. or business affected with public interest.
It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of AGAN v. PIATCO (2003 CASE)
possession or ejectment against a public utility corporation,
endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied DOCTRINE: When there is takeover pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. XII,
the land belonging to the former in the interest of public service the government is not required to compensate the private entity-
without prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase or owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership,
expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected
the public utility corporation to vacate such property is unavailing by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation
since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and for the use of the said business and its properties as the
injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of its
equitable estoppel. The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: police power and not of its power of eminent domain.
(1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner 􏰀ling the
proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential FACTS: Essentially, this is a petition to prohibit MIAA and DOTC and
damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility its Secretary from implementing the agreements executed by the
corporation to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation Philippine Government (GRP) through the DOTC and the MIAA and
proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) .
damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it PIATCO was the winning bidder of the project undertaking the
were an expropriation case and determine the just compensation development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA

25
IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law). Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and
obligate the government to pay "reasonable cost for the use of the
One of the agreements is the 1997 Concession Agreement, wherein Terminal and/or Terminal Complex." Sec. 17, Article XII
the Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times
maintain the Terminal 3 during the concession period and to collect necessitate the government to "temporarily take over or
the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
schedules as. The Agreement provided that the concession period business affected with public interest." It is the welfare and
shall be for 25 years commencing from the in-service date, and may interest of the public which is the paramount consideration
be renewed at the option of the Government for a period not in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a
exceeding 25 years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO particular business.
shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.
Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising
However, the 1997 Concession agreement contained Article V, its police power. Police power is the "most essential, insistent, and
Section 5.10 (c)1, which provides that should the development illimitable of powers." Its exercise therefore must not be
facility be seized or utilized by the GRP under permissible unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by
circumstances, the Concessionaire shall be entitled to reasonable the government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its
compensation for the duration of the temporary take over by GRP, exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable
which compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost for compensation for the reasonable use of the property pursuant to the
the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex. operation of the business contravenes the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether Article V, Section 5.10 (c) of the 1997 Concession B. 7 DISTINGUISHED FROM POLICE POWER
Agreement is valid -- NO.
PEOPLE V FAJARDO
RULING: The assailed provision is invalid.
DOCTRINE: An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use
Sec. 17, Art. XVII pertains to the right of the State in times of of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes,
national emergency, and in the exercise of its police power, to it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with taking of the property.
public interest. In the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the term
"national emergency" was defined to include threat from external While property may be regulated in the interest of the general
aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not strikes "unless it welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
is of such proportion that would paralyze government service." offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police
power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
The duration of the emergency itself is the determining factor as to property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure
how long the temporary takeover by the government would last. the aesthetic appearance of the community…
The temporary takeover by the government extends only to
the operation of the business and not to the ownership ... To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give
thereof. appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be
heard.
FACTS:
1 Section 5.10 Temporary Take-over of operations by GRP. …. The municipal council of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur
(c) In the event the development Facility or any part thereof and/or the passed an ordinance that states:
operations of Concessionaire or any part thereof, become the subject matter
of or be included in any notice, notification, or declaration concerning or
relating to acquisition, seizure or appropriation by GRP in times of war or “Section 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a
national emergency, GRP shall, by written notice to Concessionaire, building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written
immediately take over the operations of the Terminal and/or the Terminal
Complex. During such take over by GRP, the Concession Period shall be permit from the Municipal Mayor.
suspended; provided, that upon termination of war, hostilities or national
emergency, the operations shall be returned to Concessionaire, at which time, xxx
the Concession period shall commence to run again. Concessionaire shall be
entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of the temporary take
over by GRP, which compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost Section 3. xxxAny person or persons who will construct or repair a
for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex, (which is in the amount
at least equal to the debt service requirements of Concessionaire, if the
building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written
temporary take over should occur at the time when Concessionaire is still permit from the Municipal Mayor.”
servicing debts owed to project lenders), any loss or damage to the
Development Facility, and other consequential damages. If the parties cannot
agree on the reasonable compensation of Concessionaire, or on the liability of The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicted Juan F.
GRP as aforesaid, the matter shall be resolved in accordance with Section Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of the said ordinance for
10.01 [Arbitration]. Any amount determined to be payable by GRP to having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a
Concessionaire shall be offset from the amount next payable by
Concessionaire to GRP. building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

26
provision in this guideline is imposition of royalty fees. The

ISSUE: W/N the ordinance was valid imposition was to allow the CDC to increase the extent and
frequency of supervision and inspection of the volume of fuel
RULING: NO entering the CSEZ. In lieu of this, CDC charged Chevron for royalty
fees.
The ordinance is not reasonable
A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that Chevron paid under protest. It avers that there is nothing in the law
under it the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. that authorizes the CDC to impose royalty fees. Furthermore, it
The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to avers that the imposition of royalty fees amounts to a tax, which the
guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by CDC has no power to impose.
requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or
refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient Issue: WON CDC has the power to impose royalty fees?
standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus
confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or Ruling: Yes, as it was in the exercise of its police power. The
deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that determining factor in distinguishing taxation from police power is the
such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or purpose of the implemented measure. If it is primarily to raise
prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid. revenues, then it is deemed a tax; but, if the primary purpose is to
regulate, although revenue is incidentally generated, it is deemed to
Part related to topic: be an exercise of police power.
It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a
In this case, among the specific powers granted to the CDC under
permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys the view
Sec. 4 of PD 66 is the power to fix and collect the fees and charges.
of the public plaza or occupies any public property"; and in fact, the
The royalty fees imposed herein by the CDCis part of the regulatory
refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the
framework to ensure free flow or movement of petroleum fuel to
appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed building
and from the CESZ.
would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its being
seen from the public highway.
The Court also enunciated that the regulatory purpose of the
imposition of fees must relate to an occupation or activity that so
Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and
engages the public interest in health, morals, safety, and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
development as to require regulation for the protection and
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
promotion of such public interest; the imposition must also bear
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
reasonable relation to the probable expenses of regulation, taking
taking of appellants property without just compensation.
into account not only the costs of direct regulation but also its
We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the
incidental consequences as well.
beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents.
Clearly, the oil industry, to which Chevron operates, is greatly
imbued with public interest. Verily, the Court ruled that there is a
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on
reasonable relation between the royalty fees imposed and the
appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
regulations sought to be attained.
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the
view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for DRUGSTORE ASSOCIATION OF THE PH vs. NATIONAL
the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in COUNCIL ON DISABILITY AFFAIRS
character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality
must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity DOCTRINE: Police power is the power of the state to promote
to be heard. public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain is the inherent
right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been
Chevron Philippines v Bases Conversion
lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation.
Doctrine: The pivotal distinction between the power of taxation and
police power rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If
FACTS:
generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is
● RA No. 7277 otherwise known as “Magna Carta for
merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if the regulation is the
Disabled Persons” was amended by RA No. 9442. The
primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not
amending law specifically granted PWDs a 20% discount
make the imposition a tax.
on the purchase of medicine, and a tax deduction scheme
was adopted wherein covered establishments may deduct
Facts: BOD of Clark Development Corp. (CDC) issued and approved
the discount granted from gross income based on the net
the policy guidelines on the movement of petroleum fuel to and
cost of goods sold or services rendered.
from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). One pertinent

27
● Subsequently, DOH issued an administrative order (DOH ● It is a declared policy of R.A. 7277 that persons with
Administrative order No. 2009-0011) specifically stating disabilities are part of Philippine society, and thus the
that the grant of 20% discount shall be provided in the State shall give full support to the improvement of their
purchase of branded medicines and unbranded generic total well-being and their integration into the mainstream
medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines of society.
for the exclusive use of the PWDs ● They have the same rights as other people to take their
● Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application proper place in society. They should be able to live freely
of TRO before the Court of Appeals to annul and enjoin and as independently as possible, and this must be the
the implementation of: concern of everyone in the family, community and all
○ RA 7277 as amended by RA No. 9442 government and nongovernment organizations.
○ IRR of RA No. 9442 ● The PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of
○ DOH Administrative order No. 2009-0011 medicine is supported by a valid objective or purpose.
● CA rendered a decision upholding the constitutionality of ○ It has a valid subject considering that the
RA 7277 as well as the assailed administrative issuances. concept of public use is no longer confined to
● Petitioners claim that the mandated PWD discount is an the traditional notion of use by the public, but
invalid exercise of police power, and on the contrary, it is held synonymous with public interest, public
an invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.
because it fails to provide just compensation to petitioners ● As in the case of senior citizens, the discount privilege to
and other similarly situated drugstores. which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed
by the general public to which these citizens belong.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 7277 as amended by RA No. 9442 is ● The means employed in invoking the active participation
unconstitutional-- NO, it is constitutional. of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or
objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related.
RULING: ● Also, the means employed to provide a fair, just and
● Police power is the power of the state to promote public quality health care to PWDs are reasonably related to its
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that
and property. as a form of reimbursement, the discount extended to
● Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain is the inherent PWDs in the purchase of medicine can be claimed by the
right of the state (and of those entities to which the power establishments as allowable tax deductions pursuant to
has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in Section 4
to public use upon payment of just compensation. of DOF Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009
○ In the exercise of police power, property rights ● The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
of private individuals are subjected to restraints classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
and burdens in order to secure the general foundation or rational basis and is not arbitrary.
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. ● Persons with disability form a class separate and distinct
○ A legislative act based on the police power from the other citizens of the country. Indubitably, such
requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to
a lawful method. the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and
○ In more familiar words: (a) The interests of the treatment accorded to the PWDs fully satisfy the demands
public generally, as distinguished from those of equal protection. Thus, Congress may pass a law
of a particular class, should justify the providing for a different treatment to persons with
interference of the state; and (b) That means disability apart from the other citizens of the country.
employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly C. TAXATION
oppressive upon
Individuals.
● R.A. No. 9442 which amended R.A. No. 7277 grants Lung Center of the Phil vs. Quezon City, GR No. 144104,
incentives and benefits including a twenty percent (20%) June 29, 2004
discount to PWDs in the purchase of medicines; fares for
domestic air, sea and land travels including public railways DOCTRINE: If real property is used for one or more commercial
and skyways; recreation and amusement centers including purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is
theaters, food chains and restaurants. This is specifically subject to taxation. The words "dominant use" or "principal use"
stated in Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442: cannot be substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing
○ Section 4. Policies and Objectives.-- It is the violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with
objective of Republic Act No. 9442 to provide exclusively.
persons with disabilities the opportunity to
participate fully into the mainstream of society FACTS:
by granting them at least a twenty percent
(20%) discount on all basic services.

28
The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and Portions of its real property that are leased to private
non-profit entity established on January 16, 1981 by virtue of entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these
Presidential Decree No. 1823.A big space at the ground floor is are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, purposes.
and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as
their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides,
professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left thus: (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or
side of the building along Quezon Avenue is vacant and idle, while a convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and
big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and
Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes to a private exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes
enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The shall be exempt from taxation. The tax exemption under this
petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders constitutional provision covers property taxes only. Consequently,
medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside the constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of
from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual Republic Act No. 7160.
subsidies from the government.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in
Both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to
assessed for real property taxes by the City Assessor of Quezon City. prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable
The petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and
with the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. "Exclusive" is defined as
institution but it was denied. possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from
participation or enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a
ISSUE: manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively." If real
property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not
a) whether the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to
of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 taxation. The words "dominant use" or "principal use" cannot be
Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; YES and substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence
to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with
b) whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real exclusively.
property taxes- NOT ALL
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for
RULING: PARTIALLY GRANTED charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual
application of the property itself to the purposes for which the
CHARITABLE INSTITUTION charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income
from the real property that is determinative of whether the property
The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it is used for tax-exempt purposes. The petitioner failed to discharge
exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually,
whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage. directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its

character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it
derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or
confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government,
so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the ario where the CIR will decide on the protested assessment.
charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money
inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating However, these two (2) options of the taxpayer, i.e., (1) file a
the institution. petition for review before the CTA within 30 days after the
expiration of the 180-day period; or (2) to await the final decision of
Moreover, as a general principle, a charitable institution does not the CIR on the disputed assessment and appeal this final decision to
lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply the CTA within 30 days fromreceipt of it, “are mutually exclusive
because it derives income from paying patients, whether out- and resort to one bars the application of the other.”
patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the
government, so long as the money received is devoted or used Rule 4, Sec. 3(a) (2) of the 2005 CTA Rules clarifies Sec. 7(a)(2) of
altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; RA 9282 by stating that the "deemed a denial" rule is only for the
and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing "purposes of allowing the taxpayer to appeal" in case of inaction of
or operating the institution. the Commissioner and "does not necessarily constitute a formal
decision of the Commissioner. Furthermore, the taxpayer may

29
choose to wait for the final decision of the Commissioner even preliminary injunction, Respondent argued that the case must be
beyond the 180-day period, and appeal from it. appreciated in the light of RA 10001 and the pendency of House Bill
3235 which concern taxation for life and non-life insurance
In other words, the taxpayer has the option to either elevate the companies.
case to the Court of Tax Appeals if the Commissioner does not act
on his or her protest, or to wait for the Commissioner to decide on On May 2015, RTC rendered a decision enjoining the CIR from
his or her protest before he or she elevates the case to the Court of proceeding with the enforcement of Section 108 and 184 of the
Tax Appeals. NIRC against Respondent until Congress shall have enacted and
passed into law House Bill No. 3235.
ITC, Avon received the Collection Letter dated Jul. 9, 2004 on Jul.
14, 2004. Thus, it’s Petition for Review filed on August 13, 2004 was ISSUE: 1. W/N an injunctive relief is available as remedy to assail
timely filed and the assessments against it have not attained finality the collection of a tax.
yet.
2. W/N a declaratory relief is procedurally proper as a
WHEREFORE, Petition of the CIR is DENIED. The Petition of Avon remedy in this case.
Products Manufacturing, Inc. is GRANTED. The remaining deficiency
Income Tax Assessment for the taxable year of 1999, including RULING:NO FOR BOTH!
increments, is hereby declared NULL and VOID and is CANCELLED.
1. Injunctive relief is not an available remedy.
CIR vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CORP.
Section 218 of the NIRC expressly provides that;
DOCTRINE:
"[n]o court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain
The adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA for the the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge
DST deficiency for the taxable year is not an action for declaratory imposed by th[e] [NIRC]."
relief but anappeal taken in due course to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Also, pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. No. 1125, as amended, the
An action for declaratory relief is predicated on the attendance of decisions or rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
several requisites, specifically: (1) the subject matter of the among others, assessing any tax, or levying, or distraining, or selling
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written any property of taxpayers for the satisfaction of their tax liabilities
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) are immediately executory, and their enforcement is not to be
the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful suspended by any appeals thereof to the Court of Tax Appeals
and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no unless "in the opinion of the Court [of Tax Appeals] the collection by
breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between may jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the
persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for taxpayer," in which case the Court of Tax Appeals " at any stage of
judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available the proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the
through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety
bond for not more than double the amount."
FACTS:
2. Action for declaratory relief is an improper remedy.
Respondent Standard Insurance received from the BIR a Preliminary
Assessment Notice (PAN) regarding its liability arising from a An action for declaratory relief is governed by Section 1, Rule 63 of
deficiency in the payment of documentary stamp taxes (DST) for the Rules of Court. It is predicated on the attendance of several
taxable year 2011. Respondent contested the PAN through a letter requisites, specifically: (1) the subject matter of the controversy
in Feb 2014 but the CIR nonetheless sent a formal letter of demand must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
dated March 2014. executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
Although respondent requested reconsideration on April2014, it still construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents
received on Dec. 2014 a Final Decision on the Disputed Assessment in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or
(FDDA) dated Nov. 2014 declaring its liability for DST including the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
interest and compromise penalty totaling P418,830, 567.46. adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
(6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other
On Dec. 2014, Respondent sought reconsideration of the FDDA and forms of action or proceeding.
questioned the constitutionality of Section 108 and 184 of the NIRC
as violative of the constitutional limitation on taxation. It The third, fourth, fifth and sixth requisites were patently wanting.
commenced a petition for declaratory relief in the RTC with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of

30
Firstly, the third requisite was not met due to the subject of the
action (i.e. statute) having been infringed or transgressed prior to Facts:
the institution of the action. We observe in this regard that the RTC 1. GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
seemed to believe that the tax assessments issued had merely Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
created a liability against the respondent as the taxpayer, and that decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
its suit for declaratory relief was but consistent with protesting the outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC).
assessments. The RTC's belief was absolutely devoid of legal
foundation, however, simply because internal revenue taxes, being 2. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
self-assessing, required no further assessment to give rise to the bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
liability of the taxpayer. Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Secondly, the fourth and fifth requisites are also missing because Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
the apprehension of the respondent that it could be rendered for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
technically insolvent through the imposition of the iniquitous taxes than the bid of petitioner.
imposed by Section 108 and Section 184 of the NIRC, did not render
the action for declaratory relief fall within the purview of an actual 3. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the
controversy that was ripe for judicial determination. The respondent winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
was thereby engaging in speculation or conjecture, or arguing on necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent
probabilities, not actualities. Therein lay the prematurity of its GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of
action, for a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check
one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian
Lastly, the sixth requisite is wanting because there are other proper Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad…which respondent GSIS
remedies. The respondent's adequate remedy upon receipt of the refused to accept.
FDDA for the DST deficiency for taxable year 2011 was not the
action for declaratory relief but an appeal taken in due course to the 4. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel came to the Supreme Court on
Court of Tax Appeals. Instead of appealing in due course to the prohibition and mandamus. The Court issued a temporary
CTA, however, it resorted to the RTC to seek and obtain declaratory restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
relief. By choosing the wrong remedy, the respondent lost its proper consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
and true recourse. Worse, the choice of the wrong remedy rendered
the assessment for the DST deficiency for taxable year 2011 final as 5. Manila Prince Hotel invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
a consequence. As such, the petition for declaratory relief, assuming the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
its propriety as a remedy for the respondent, became mooted by the become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues
finality of the assessment. that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
certiorari and annuls the decision of the lower court. the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
6. Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since
A. Nature of Provisions
it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408, February 3,
legislation(s). Granting that this provision is self-executing,
1997
Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimonywhich only refers to lands of the public domain, waters,
Doctrine: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
Issue:Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
1987 Constitution is self-executing.
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
Ruling: Yes. Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
that:
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.

31
SECTION 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the

economic and planning agency, when the national interest PRESUMPTION—Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing
view is, as it has always been, that —
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless
to qualified Filipinos. the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
with its national goals and priorities. provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and implementing statute. (Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law,
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or 1993 ed., pp. 8-10)
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such
per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
[i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to In self-executing constitutional provisions , the legislature may still
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
ibi remedium. convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
NATURE OF PROVISIONS exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a
and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
an outline of government providing for the different departments of provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with
inalienable rights of citizens. the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But itself, fully enforceable.
a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec.
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
self-executing.Thus a constitutional provision is self- self-executing. The argument is flawed
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, The Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation
so that they can be determined by an examination and and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
construction of its terms, and there is no language paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
action. jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same

32
logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not 4. Enrico was already together with his parents when the ransom
by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to note was received by Enrico’s parents.
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions 5. Dr. Agra thought that the handwriting in the note was familiar
covering the national economy and patrimony. so he compared it with some records in the hospital. He gave
A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and the note to the police which was handed to NBI for
non-self-executing in another. examination.
6. The test showed that it had been written by Dr. Tan.
Cited cases holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely 7. Domasian and Tan were charged with the crime of kidnapping
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self- with serious illegal detention.
executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to 8. They alleged that the documents used for comparison with the
legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights: ransom note was made without a search warrant and hence,
inadmissible.
(1) Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation (197 SCRA 52, 68. 1991) speaks of ISSUE: Whether or not there was an unlawful seizure of hospital
constitutional provisions on personal dignity, the sanctity of records that were used for comparison. –NO.
family life, the vital role of the youth in nation-building,the
promotion of social justice, and the values of education; RULING:
(2)Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance (101 Phil. 1155. 1957 )
refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and (This is the only discussion in the case)
human rights and on education; and
(3) Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato (46 SCRA 540, 564. 1995) Such documents were taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI
cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,the agents or other police authorities. We held in the case of People vs.
sanctity of family life, the vital role of the youth in nation- Andre Marti, that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of
buildingand the promotion of total human liberation and private individuals, being directed only against the government and
development. its law-enforcement agencies as a limitation on official action.
The cited cases are not in point as a reading of these

DISPOSITIVE: Domasian and Dr. Tan were in conspiracy and were
provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially
adjudged guilty.
enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that
they are only principles upon which legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.
B. Against whom Enforceable
People v. Domasian
G.R. No. 95322, March 1 1993
DOCTRINE: The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of

private individuals, being directed only against the government and
its law-enforcement agencies as a limitation on official action.
FACTS:
1. Domasian kidnapped the 8 year old boy, Enrico. Enrico’s

parents were the owner of the hospital where co-accused
Dr.Tan was a resident.
2. Enrico was approached by Domasian who requested his
assistance to get the signature of his father on a medical
certificate. Enrico agreed but instead of taking Enrico to his
father, he was forcibly taken to a mini bus.
3. Domasian gave a letter for ransom addressed to Dr. Agra,
Enrico’s father. He handed it to a jeepney driver. Thereafter,
they boarded a tricycle. Enrico was crying which aroused the
suspicion of the tricycle driver. The latter immediately reported
such to the tanods. The tanods then went after Pomasian and
Enrico. Pomasian was able to escape while Enrico was left
behind.

33

Case Digests For Constitutional Law 2 Review 2020: (List of Cases Based On Dean Joan S Largo'S Syllabus)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Digests For Constitutional Law 2 Review 2020: (List of Cases Based On Dean Joan S Largo'S Syllabus)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CASE DIGESTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 REVIEW 2020

(LIST OF CASES BASED ON DEAN JOAN S LARGO’S SYLLABUS)

The ordinance which regulates the construction and installation of

DOCTRINE: On the legislative organs of the government, whether

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted Parties:

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

Inherent in sovereignty, it is a power which need not be granted

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay

The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent

A.YES. PETITIONER SHOULD COMPENSATE RESPONDENT.

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

RTC evaluated the Commissioners' Report dated August 10, 2011.

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

ISSUES: As to liability of LBP (not related to topic)

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

Petitioner appealed to the CA. On January 4, 1993, the petitioner

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

provision in this guideline is imposition of royalty fees. The

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

SECTION 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

The cited cases are not in point as a reading of these

B. Against whom Enforceable

DOCTRINE: The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of

1. Domasian kidnapped the 8 year old boy, Enrico. Enrico’s

BALIONG | BAUTISTA | CADER | CAIMBRE | DULANAS | ESTRELLA | FUEGO | GARGANERA | GUANZON |

You might also like