04. Sunville Timber Products vs. Abad, GR No.

85502, February 24, 1992

Facts:

Private Respondent filed a petition for cancellation of petitioner’s TLA for

serious violation of its conditions and of forest laws and regulations. Subsequently,
a complaint was filed for injunction with damages against the petitioner before the
RTC. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the civil case because a related case is
still pending before the DENR but it was denied by the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was

correctly applied.

Ruling:

No, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly

applied.

Paragraphs 12 and 15, Section 4, Chapter I, Title XIV of Executive Order No.
292 clearly vests DENR the power and function "to regulate the development,
disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain,"

Here, this comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the
DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming
under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.
05. Paat vs. CA, GR No. 111107, January 10, 1997

Facts:

A truck owned by private respondent was seized by the DENR because the
driver could not produce the required documents of the concealed forest products
found therein. While the administrative seizure proceeding is still pending, private
respondent filed a replevin case before the RTC to recover the said truck which was
then granted by said Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the action for replevin shall prosper, considering that said
truck is the subject matter of an administrative proceeding.

Ruling:

No, the action for replevin shall not prosper.

In National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987, it was held
that, “before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-
condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him.”

Here, the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR. Thus, they
cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of
their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.

06. Republic vs. CA and Bernabe, GR No. L-40402, March 16, 1987
Facts:

On July 6, 1965, Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public
land and was segregated from the forest zone and released as an agricultural land
for disposition under the Public Land Act. On April 26, 1967, Private respondent
filed in CFI Bataan to reopen the cadastral case to register their titles to said land
alleging that they acquire its ownership by purchase from the original owners,
whose possession is in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.

Issue:

Whether or not the lots claimed by respondents could legally be the subject of
a judicial confirmation of title under the Public Land Act.

Ruling:

No, the lots claimed could not be the subject of judicial confirmation.

In Li Seng Giap v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693 [1931], “Section 48(b) of C.A.
No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded. They are incapable of registration and their
inclusion in a title...”

Here, private respondents have not qualified for a grant under the Public
Land Act, the facts being that they could only be credited with 1 year, 9 months and
20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965,
when the land had been segregated from the forest zone and released as an
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. Consequently, neither
private respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest could have possessed the lots
for the requisite period of thirty (30) years as disposable agricultural land.

07. Lagua vs. Cusi, GR No. L-44649, April 15, 1988

Facts:

A petition for mandamus, which was originated from a complaint for

damages was filed before the Court against private respondents for closing a
logging road without authority. Private respondent moved for the dismissal of said
case contending that it is a legitimate exercise of private Respondent’s rights as a
timber licensee, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally
within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority P.D. No. 705

Issue:

Whether or not regular courts can take cognizance over the case.

Ruling:

Yes, regular courts can take cognizance over the case.

in Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of Appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110), it

was held that, “The issue in this court was whether or not the private respondents
can recover damages as a result of the dismissal of their son from the petitioner
university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an administrative nature is
to or can be done… The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages provided
in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs to the civil courts.”

Here, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based
on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was
illegal is a matter to be established by the petitioners and to be disproved by the
private respondents. This should be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is
beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine
the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of
damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

08. Republic vs. CA and Carantes, GR No. L-56984, September 30, 1987

Facts:
 Petitioner seeks to set aside the decision of CA affirming the CFI’s judgment
that private respondents have registerable title on a parcel of land for convincingly
proving that they owned and possessed said land for more that 30 years.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents have registerable title to said parcel of

land, considering that it is a forest land, hence, alienable.

Ruling:

No, private respondents have no registerable title.

In Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401, it was held that, “forest
lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property.”

Here, there is no showing of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that

the land in question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be
assumed. It calls for proof. There must first be a formal Government declaration
that the forest land has been re-classified into alienable and disposable agricultural
land which may then be acquired by private persons in accordance with the various
modes of acquiring public agricultural lands.

09. Republic vs. Naguiat, GR No. 134209, January 24, 2006

Facts:
 CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable
citing Herico vs. DAR, that “upon the completion of the requisite period of
possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private
property.” Hence, it affirmed the decision of the lower courts adjudicating the four
(4) parcels of land in favor of private respondent who claimed that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have possessed said lands for more than 30 years.

Issue:

Whether or not the lands in question are alienable and disposable.

Ruling:

No, the lands in question are not alienable and disposable.

In Republic vs. CA, 154 SCRA 476 (1987), it was held that, “Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.”

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper
government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as
alienable and disposable. Declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case
may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express
and positive act from the government.

10. Ynson vs. Sec. of Agriculture, GR No. L-36847, July 20, 1983

Facts:
 Petitioner, then followed by the Private Respondents, applied for a permit to
utilize 66 hectares of mangrove swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not
granted since it is still being considered as communal forest. When the area was
released for said purpose, the Bureau of Fisheries awarded the whole area in favor
of petitioner. However, the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered
the division of the area into three portions, one part for each of the petitioner and
the private respondents. Hence, petitioner appealed the order claiming preferential
right over the others.

Issue:

Whether or not said administrative agencies gravely abused their discretion in

interpreting and applying their own rules.

Ruling:

No, said administrative agencies did not gravely abuse their discretion.

In Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175, it was held that, “until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable, neither the Bureau of Lands
nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes,
fishpond leases, and other modes of utilization.”

Here, The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of

swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands
are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other
purposes. All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim
to have a preferential right over another.

11. International Hardwood and Veneer vs. University of the Philippines,

GR No. 521518, August 13, 1991

Facts:
 Proc. 791 segregates from the public domain parcels of land and reserved
them for use by UP. The subject land of Petitioner’s timber concession was covered
by said Proclamation. On 1964, RA 3990 was enacted fully ceding ownership over
the land described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP sought to collect forestry charges from
Petitioner and demanded that the latter subject itself to the control and supervision
of UP.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 3990 empowers UP to collect forestry charges in lieu of the

Bureau of Internal Revenue and Bureau of Forestry.

Ruling:

Yes, RA 3990 empowers UP to collect forestry charges.

Sec. 2 of RA 3990 provides that, “the reserved area stated in Proc. 791 was
"ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject
to any existing concessions, if any." Also, Sec. 3 provides that “…any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of
the Philippines.”

Here, When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in
respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and
segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute
owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession.