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TORTS - 3. FGU v. CA
TORTS - 3. FGU v. CA
CA|1
718
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VOL. 287, MARCH 23, 1998
FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents. 719
Civil Law; Damages; Quasi-Delict; Requisites to sustain a claim for damages FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
based on quasi-delict.—To sustain a claim based thereon, the following BELLOSILLO, J.:
requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the
For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-delict
plaintiff.
prosper against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its insurer for fault
Same; Same; Same; Court agrees with respondent court that petitioner failed or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle?
to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of
This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o’clock of 21 April 1987, two
defendant FILCAR.—We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to
(2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along Epifanio
prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of
de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic accident. The car
defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at
sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage
the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, with
caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that
Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR),
DahlJensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at
and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the
the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-
other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned
Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal
by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At
liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver’s
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. license.1
2 Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the
reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, so that he who is substituted dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the
succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, Civil Code which states: “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
remedies, or securities (Gerken v. Davidson Grocery Co., 57 Idaho 670, 69 P. another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
2d 122, 126). Subrogation denotes the exchange of a third person who has Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
paid a debt in the place of the creditor to whom he has paid it, so that he may between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x x”
exercise against the debtor all the rights which the creditor, if unpaid, might
have done x x x x Insurance companies, guarantors and bonding companies To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a)
generally have the right to step into the shoes of the party whom they damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
compensate and sue any party whom the compensated party could have sued (c) connection of cause and
(Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., p. _______________
1427).
720
3 Decision penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos, RTC-Br. 65, Makati
City, Records, pp. 204-205.
720 4 Decision penned by Justice Jaime M. Lantin with the concurrence of Justices
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Alicia Austria-Martinez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.; Rollo, p. 18.
FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 5 G.R. No. 57298, 7 September 1984, 132 SCRA 10.
On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the damage incurred by the plaintiff.6
trial court although based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of
of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR.4 In
the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because
other words, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action for sum of money
only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not
based on quasi-delict.
that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of
In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the strength of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to
the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo5 that the the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain
registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the
although the vehicle is leased to another. damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent
FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
TORTS – 3. FGU v. CA|3
Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasidelict provides: The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own family to prevent damage.
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated subordinates to prevent them from causing damage.7 Yet, as correctly
persons who are under their authority and live in their company. observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of
the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any
way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
an employer of the latter.
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry. We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which
provides: “In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver,
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence,
but not when the damage has been caused by the
prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
_______________ provisions of article 2180 are applicable.” Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184
is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship
between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no
cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict;
6 Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, 6 November 1990,
logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
191 SCRA 195.
_______________
722
SO ORDERED.
Note.—The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar a finding
of negligence under the principle of quasidelict. (Cipriano vs. Court of Appeals,
263 SCRA 711 [1996])
——o0o——
FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 718, G.R. No.
118889 March 23, 1998