EN BANC

[G.R. No. 219603. January 26, 2016.]

MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO , petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP
ARREZA PICHAY, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J : p

The Case
This special civil action for certiorari 1 assails the Decision dated 18
March 2015 2 and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 3 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), in HRET Case No. 13-022,
declaring respondent Philip A. Pichay (Pichay) eligible to hold and serve the
office of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Sur.
The Facts
On 16 September 2008, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R.
Nos. 161032 and 161176, entitled "Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, "
convicting Pichay by final judgment of four counts of libel. 4 In lieu of
imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for each count of libel and One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages. This Decision became final and
executory on 1 June 2009. On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages and Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) as fine for each count of libel.
On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections.
On 18 February 2013, petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-
Delgado) filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections (Comelec),
on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude. Ty-Delgado argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February
2011, the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. CAIHTE

In his Answer dated 4 March 2013, Pichay, through his counsel, alleged
that the petition for disqualification was actually a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, and it was filed out of time. He
admitted his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed
that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He argued that he did
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 not personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was
only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing
company.
On 14 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a motion to suspend the
proclamation of Pichay before the Comelec.
On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur
proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur, obtaining
a total of seventy-six thousand eight hundred seventy (76,870) votes.
On 31 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo
warranto before the HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as
Member of the House of Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by
final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and
(2) only two years have passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17
February 2011 the penalty imposed on him. In his Answer, Pichay claimed
that his conviction for the crime of libel did not make him ineligible because
ineligibility only pertained to lack of the qualifications under the Constitution.
In its Resolution dated 4 June 2013, the Comelec First Division
dismissed the petition for disqualification filed against Pichay because of
lack of jurisdiction.
On 16 July 2013, Ty-Delgado manifested her amenability to convert the
ad cautelam petition into a regular petition for quo warranto.
On 22 October 2013, the preliminary conference took place and the
parties waived the presentation of their evidence upon agreement that their
case only involved legal issues.
The HRET Decision
In a Decision dated 18 March 2015, the HRET held that it had
jurisdiction over the present quo warranto petition since it involved the
eligibility of a Member of the House of Representatives due to a
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. However,
the HRET held that there is nothing in Tulfo v. People of the Philippines which
found that Pichay directly participated in any way in writing the libelous
articles, aside from being the president of the publishing company. Thus, the
HRET concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for
libel showed that the crime did not involve moral turpitude.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: DETACa

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition (for Quo

Warranto) is DISMISSED, and respondent Philip A. Pichay is
DECLARED ELIGIBLE to hold and serve the office of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao
del Sur.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 5

In Resolution No. 15-031 dated 3 August 2015, the HRET denied Ty-
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 Delgado's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit considering that no
new matter was raised which justified the reversal or modification of the
Decision.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Ty-Delgado raises the following issues for resolution:
[I]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING RESPONDENT PICHAY'S CONVICTION OF LIBEL DID
NOT SHOW THAT MORAL TURPITUDE IS INVOLVED, WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN G.R. NO. 161032 ENTITLED "ERWIN TULFO V. PEOPLE AND
ATTY. CARLOS T. SO" AND IN G.R. NO. 161176 ENTITLED "SUSAN
CAMBRI, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL." HEITAD

[II]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE RESPONDENT PICHAY
INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED FROM HOLDING THE POSITION OF
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY REASON OF HIS
CONVICTION OF LIBEL, A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
[III]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT RESPONDENT PICHAY
FALSELY REPRESENTED IN HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY THAT HE
IS ELIGIBLE TO RUN FOR CONGRESSMAN BECAUSE HIS CONVICTION
OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE RENDERED HIM
INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED.
[IV]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT RESPONDENT PICHAY
SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE NEVER BECOME A CANDIDATE SINCE
HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IS VOID AB INITIO.
[V]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT SINCE THE PETITION FOR
QUO WARRANTO QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENT
PICHAY'S CANDIDACY, THE JURISPRUDENCE ON A "SECOND PLACER"
BEING PROCLAIMED AS WINNER SHOULD THE CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY OF A "FIRST PLACER" IS CANCELLED, SHOULD APPLY.
[VI]

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 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION BY FAILING TO DECLARE THAT PETITIONER DELGADO
WAS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE FOR MEMBER, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF SURIGAO
DEL SUR, THUS SHE MUST BE DECLARED THE RIGHTFUL WINNER IN
THE 2013 ELECTIONS AND MUST BE MADE TO ASSUME THE SAID
POSITION. 6
The Ruling of the Court
We find merit in the petition.
A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office , unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
(Emphasis supplied) ATICcS

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to

justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general. 7 Although not every criminal act involves moral
turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in
se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. 8
In Villaber v. Commission on Elections, 9 we held that violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude because a drawer who
issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on the private duties he owes
his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary
rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. In Dela Torre v.
Commission on Elections, 10 we held that the crime of fencing involves moral
turpitude because actual knowledge by the "fence" that property received is
stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful
property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very
nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. In Magno v. Commission on Elections,
11 we ruled that direct bribery involves moral turpitude, because the fact

that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits
an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for
some favors denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege
on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
In Zari v. Flores, 12 we likewise listed libel as one of the crimes
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 involving moral turpitude. The Revised Penal Code defines libel as a "public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead." 13 The law recognizes that the enjoyment
of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of
life, liberty or property. 14
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a)
the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice. 15 Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed,
and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. 16 Malice is
bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel. 17 To
determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have been
written or published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless
disregard of whether it is false or not. 18 Reckless disregard of what is false
or not means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of
the publication or possesses a high degree of awareness of its probable
falsity. 19
In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of
libel. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines , 20 the Court found Pichay liable for
publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with
reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another
libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be
considered as further evidence of malice. 21 Thus, Pichay clearly acted with
actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He
committed an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which he owes his fellow men, or society in general," and an act which is
"contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."
The dissenting opinion before the HRET even considered it "significant
that [Pichay] has raised no issue against libel being a crime involving moral
turpitude, and has taken issue only against ascribing moral turpitude to him
despite his being only the President of the publishing company." 22 Thus,
Pichay insists that, since he was only the publisher of the libelous articles
and the penalty for his conviction was reduced to payment of fine, the
circumstances of his conviction for libel did not amount to moral turpitude.
TIADCc

The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall publish,
exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a
book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof." 23
The provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to
the nature or degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime
of libel. It is basic in statutory construction that where the law does not
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 distinguish, we should not distinguish. Accordingly, we cannot distinguish
Pichay's criminal liability from the others' criminal liability only because he
was the president of the company that published the libelous articles instead
of being their author. Pichay's criminal liability was the same as that of the
others, such that he was even meted the same penalty as that imposed on
the author of the libelous articles.
The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his
participation as publisher of the libelous articles. One who furnishes the
means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its
management to servants or employees whom he selects and controls may
be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and should be held
responsible therefor, whether he was individually concerned in the
publication or not. 24
Although the participation of each felon in the crime of libel differs in
point in time and in degree, both author and publisher reneged on the
private duties they owe their fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good
morals.
Contrary to Pichay's argument, the imposition of a fine does not
determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude or not. In Villaber v.
Commission on Elections, 25 we held that a crime still involves moral
turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine.
In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines , 26 we explained that a fine was imposed
on the accused since they were first time offenders. cSEDTC

Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence. In Teves v.
Comelec, 27 we held that the five-year period of disqualification would end
only on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid
the fine he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan . In this case,
since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February
2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay
is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until
then.
Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12,
which became final on 1 June 2009, Pichay made a false material
representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy
on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification under
Section 12 is a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions
read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
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 said office ; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or
sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the
best of his knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five, days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election. (Emphases supplied)
In Fermin v. Comelec, 28 we likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a
quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with
the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate. This is also similar to a quo warranto petition
contesting the election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the
ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines filed
before the HRET. 29
Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a
certificate of candidacy is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any
of the material qualifications required for the elective office. 30 This is to be
read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. 31 In Jalosjos v. Commission on
Elections, 32 we held that if a candidate is not actually eligible because he is
barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office,
and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible
to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his
certificate of candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by
final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation
that he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material
representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office. SDAaTC

A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course

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 and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate
at all, because his certificate of candidacy is considered void ab initio and
thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. 33
In both Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 34 and Aratea v. Commission
on Elections, 35 we proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified
candidate who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the
position of Mayor. We found that since the certificate of candidacy of the
candidate with the highest number of votes was void ab initio, he was never
a candidate at all, and all his votes were considered stray votes.
Accordingly, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to
disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude. Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his
certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast for him were
considered stray votes. Thus, the qualified candidate for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who received the highest
number of valid votes shall be declared the winner. Based on the Provincial
Canvass Report, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur
in the 13 May 2013 elections who received the highest number of valid votes
is petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado. 36
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a
lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been
empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly
disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits
grave abuse of discretion. 37 AaCTcI

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE

the Decision dated 18 March 2015 and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 13-022.
Respondent Philip A. Pichay is ineligible to hold and serve the office of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur. Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado is DECLARED the
winner for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections.
Considering that the term of the present House of Representatives will end
on 30 June 2016, this Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
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 Velasco, Jr., * Peralta * and Bersamin, * JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
* No part.

1. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rollo, pp. 3-49.
2. Signed by Supreme Court Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., (took no
part for being the ponente of Tulfo v. People of the Philippines ), Diosdado
M. Peralta (dissented) and Lucas P. Bersamin (dissented), Representatives
Franklin P. Bautista, Joselito Andrew R. Mendoza, Ma. Theresa B. Bonoan,
Wilfrido Mark M. Enverga, Jerry P. Treñas, and Luzviminda C. Ilagan. Id. at
51-69.

3. Id. at 79. Notice issued by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

4. 587 Phil. 64, 99-100 (2008). The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161032 and
161176 are DISMISSED. The CA Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 25318 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be a fine
of six thousand pesos (PhP6,000) for each count of libel, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, while the award of actual damages
and exemplary damages is DELETED. The Decision dated November 17,
2000 of the RTC, Branch 112 in Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597
to 99-1600 is modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI,
REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as
defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences EACH of
the accused to pay a fine of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (PhP6,000) per count
of libel with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao,
Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay wrote and published the four (4)
defamatory articles with reckless disregard whether it was false
or not, the said articles being libelous per se, they are hereby
ordered to pay complainant Atty. Carlos T. So, jointly and severally, the
sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (PhP1,000,000) as moral damages. The
claim of actual and exemplary damages is denied for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

5. Rollo , p. 67.
6. Id. at 11-13.
7. Teves v. Commission on Elections , 604 Phil. 717 (2009); Villaber v.
Commission on Elections, 420 Phil. 930 (2001); Dela Torre v. Commission
on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144 (1996) citing Zari v. Flores , 183 Phil. 27
(1979); International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, G.R. No. 97239, 12
May 1993, 221 SCRA 760.

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 8. Id.
9. Villaber v. Commission on Elections, supra .
10. Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, supra.
11. 439 Phil. 339 (2002).

12. 183 Phil. 27 (1979).

13. THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 353.
14. Worcester v. Ocampo , 22 Phil. 42 (1912).
15. Brillante v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004).
16. Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1 (1999).

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, supra note 4.

21. Id. citing United States v. Montalvo , 29 Phil. 595 (1915).

22. Rollo , p. 76. Justice Lucas P. Bersamin penned the dissenting opinion in the
HRET and Justice Diosdado M. Peralta joined the dissent.

23. THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 360.

24. United States v. Ocampo , 18 Phil. 1 (1910).
25. Villaber v. Commission on Elections, supra note 7.
26. Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, supra note 4.

27. Teves v. Commission on Elections, supra note 7.

28. 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
29. Rule 17 of the 2011 HRET Rules provides: "RULE 17. Quo Warranto. — A
verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of
the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any registered voter of
the district concerned within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be
designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the
respondent.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph to the contrary notwithstanding, a
petition for quo warranto may be filed by any registered voter of the
district concerned against a member of the House of Representatives, on
the ground of citizenship, at any time during his tenure."

30. Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal , 706 Phil. 534 (2013);
Fermin v. Comelec, supra.
31. Fermin v. Comelec, supra .
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 32. 696 Phil. 601 (2012).
33. Id.; Aratea v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 700 (2012).
34. Supra.
35. Aratea v. Commission on Elections, supra.
36. Rollo , p. 183. The candidates for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the
13 May 2013 elections are the following: (1) Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado,
who garnered a total of 55,489 votes; (2) Victor T. Murillo, who garnered a
total of 1,777 votes; and (3) Philip A. Pichay, who garnered a total of
76,870 votes.
37. Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra.

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