3.-Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives20210424-14-1kcn06y
3.-Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives20210424-14-1kcn06y
DECISION
CARPIO, J : p
The Case
This special civil action for certiorari 1 assails the Decision dated 18
March 2015 2 and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 3 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), in HRET Case No. 13-022,
declaring respondent Philip A. Pichay (Pichay) eligible to hold and serve the
office of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Sur.
The Facts
On 16 September 2008, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R.
Nos. 161032 and 161176, entitled "Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, "
convicting Pichay by final judgment of four counts of libel. 4 In lieu of
imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for each count of libel and One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages. This Decision became final and
executory on 1 June 2009. On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages and Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) as fine for each count of libel.
On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections.
On 18 February 2013, petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-
Delgado) filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections (Comelec),
on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral
turpitude. Ty-Delgado argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February
2011, the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. CAIHTE
In his Answer dated 4 March 2013, Pichay, through his counsel, alleged
that the petition for disqualification was actually a petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, and it was filed out of time. He
admitted his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed
that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He argued that he did
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
not personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was
only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing
company.
On 14 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a motion to suspend the
proclamation of Pichay before the Comelec.
On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur
proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur, obtaining
a total of seventy-six thousand eight hundred seventy (76,870) votes.
On 31 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo
warranto before the HRET reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as
Member of the House of Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by
final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and
(2) only two years have passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17
February 2011 the penalty imposed on him. In his Answer, Pichay claimed
that his conviction for the crime of libel did not make him ineligible because
ineligibility only pertained to lack of the qualifications under the Constitution.
In its Resolution dated 4 June 2013, the Comelec First Division
dismissed the petition for disqualification filed against Pichay because of
lack of jurisdiction.
On 16 July 2013, Ty-Delgado manifested her amenability to convert the
ad cautelam petition into a regular petition for quo warranto.
On 22 October 2013, the preliminary conference took place and the
parties waived the presentation of their evidence upon agreement that their
case only involved legal issues.
The HRET Decision
In a Decision dated 18 March 2015, the HRET held that it had
jurisdiction over the present quo warranto petition since it involved the
eligibility of a Member of the House of Representatives due to a
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. However,
the HRET held that there is nothing in Tulfo v. People of the Philippines which
found that Pichay directly participated in any way in writing the libelous
articles, aside from being the president of the publishing company. Thus, the
HRET concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for
libel showed that the crime did not involve moral turpitude.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: DETACa
In Resolution No. 15-031 dated 3 August 2015, the HRET denied Ty-
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
Delgado's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit considering that no
new matter was raised which justified the reversal or modification of the
Decision.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Ty-Delgado raises the following issues for resolution:
[I]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING RESPONDENT PICHAY'S CONVICTION OF LIBEL DID
NOT SHOW THAT MORAL TURPITUDE IS INVOLVED, WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN G.R. NO. 161032 ENTITLED "ERWIN TULFO V. PEOPLE AND
ATTY. CARLOS T. SO" AND IN G.R. NO. 161176 ENTITLED "SUSAN
CAMBRI, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL." HEITAD
[II]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE RESPONDENT PICHAY
INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED FROM HOLDING THE POSITION OF
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY REASON OF HIS
CONVICTION OF LIBEL, A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
[III]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT RESPONDENT PICHAY
FALSELY REPRESENTED IN HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY THAT HE
IS ELIGIBLE TO RUN FOR CONGRESSMAN BECAUSE HIS CONVICTION
OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE RENDERED HIM
INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED.
[IV]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT RESPONDENT PICHAY
SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE NEVER BECOME A CANDIDATE SINCE
HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IS VOID AB INITIO.
[V]
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT SINCE THE PETITION FOR
QUO WARRANTO QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENT
PICHAY'S CANDIDACY, THE JURISPRUDENCE ON A "SECOND PLACER"
BEING PROCLAIMED AS WINNER SHOULD THE CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY OF A "FIRST PLACER" IS CANCELLED, SHOULD APPLY.
[VI]
that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits
an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for
some favors denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege
on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
In Zari v. Flores, 12 we likewise listed libel as one of the crimes
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
involving moral turpitude. The Revised Penal Code defines libel as a "public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead." 13 The law recognizes that the enjoyment
of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of
life, liberty or property. 14
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a)
the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice. 15 Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed,
and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. 16 Malice is
bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel. 17 To
determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have been
written or published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless
disregard of whether it is false or not. 18 Reckless disregard of what is false
or not means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of
the publication or possesses a high degree of awareness of its probable
falsity. 19
In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of
libel. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines , 20 the Court found Pichay liable for
publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with
reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another
libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be
considered as further evidence of malice. 21 Thus, Pichay clearly acted with
actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He
committed an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which he owes his fellow men, or society in general," and an act which is
"contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."
The dissenting opinion before the HRET even considered it "significant
that [Pichay] has raised no issue against libel being a crime involving moral
turpitude, and has taken issue only against ascribing moral turpitude to him
despite his being only the President of the publishing company." 22 Thus,
Pichay insists that, since he was only the publisher of the libelous articles
and the penalty for his conviction was reduced to payment of fine, the
circumstances of his conviction for libel did not amount to moral turpitude.
TIADCc
The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall publish,
exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a
book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof." 23
The provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to
the nature or degree of the participation of the persons involved in the crime
of libel. It is basic in statutory construction that where the law does not
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Accordingly, we cannot distinguish
Pichay's criminal liability from the others' criminal liability only because he
was the president of the company that published the libelous articles instead
of being their author. Pichay's criminal liability was the same as that of the
others, such that he was even meted the same penalty as that imposed on
the author of the libelous articles.
The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his
participation as publisher of the libelous articles. One who furnishes the
means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its
management to servants or employees whom he selects and controls may
be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and should be held
responsible therefor, whether he was individually concerned in the
publication or not. 24
Although the participation of each felon in the crime of libel differs in
point in time and in degree, both author and publisher reneged on the
private duties they owe their fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good
morals.
Contrary to Pichay's argument, the imposition of a fine does not
determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude or not. In Villaber v.
Commission on Elections, 25 we held that a crime still involves moral
turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine.
In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines , 26 we explained that a fine was imposed
on the accused since they were first time offenders. cSEDTC
1. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rollo, pp. 3-49.
2. Signed by Supreme Court Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., (took no
part for being the ponente of Tulfo v. People of the Philippines ), Diosdado
M. Peralta (dissented) and Lucas P. Bersamin (dissented), Representatives
Franklin P. Bautista, Joselito Andrew R. Mendoza, Ma. Theresa B. Bonoan,
Wilfrido Mark M. Enverga, Jerry P. Treñas, and Luzviminda C. Ilagan. Id. at
51-69.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, supra note 4.
30. Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal , 706 Phil. 534 (2013);
Fermin v. Comelec, supra.
31. Fermin v. Comelec, supra .
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
32. 696 Phil. 601 (2012).
33. Id.; Aratea v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 700 (2012).
34. Supra.
35. Aratea v. Commission on Elections, supra.
36. Rollo , p. 183. The candidates for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the
13 May 2013 elections are the following: (1) Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado,
who garnered a total of 55,489 votes; (2) Victor T. Murillo, who garnered a
total of 1,777 votes; and (3) Philip A. Pichay, who garnered a total of
76,870 votes.
37. Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra.