G.R. No.

141524 September 14, 2005 In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public
respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO as follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted
CABACUNGAN, Petitioners, for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the
vs. respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to
namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent. del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there
were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. 1
DECISION
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
CORONA, J.: denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court
could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for
annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already
Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on
and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998,
Salvador and Carmen. the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and
respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these
paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent
heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal,
default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs holding that it was filed eight days late. 5 This was received by
and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively. petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,
3, 1998.6 petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the
appellate court:
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the I
notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN
filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36
the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL
July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within DOCKET FEES.
the reglementary period for appeal.7
II
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT
12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED
court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL
held further: ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF
APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the AUGUST 3, 1998.
(P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with III
such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment
final and executory.8 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER
decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000. OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED
FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED
JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS
THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
 IV. shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from the notice of judgment or final order.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis
THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT supplied)
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.9
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal. judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented
part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an
law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply action.12
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the
loss of the right to appeal.10 The period to appeal is fixed by both As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998
statute and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as amended, provides: denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the
"final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. appeal on July 27, 1998.
Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal
shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of
from. x x x which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
¾ the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1,
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: 1998 order dismissing the MR?

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court
fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the
the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules
then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the
having been filed out of time. order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that
that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file
declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as cases,16 premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of
it was what ended the issues raised there. an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice
of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.14 where we again considered the order that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts
denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final must become final at some definite time fixed by law.18
order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view Rules of Court read:
that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules. Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon
the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30)
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal
15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set
notice of appeal on time? aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of 37.
judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On
the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last
petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected
motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only within the day following that in which the party appealing received
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.15 It ruled that notice of the denial of said motion.19 (emphasis supplied)
petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always
consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.
15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a
Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal21 and enhance the and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for
efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict the just and proper disposition of his cause.25
observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we
condoned late filing of notices of appeal,22 and only in very The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice. has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Municipality of Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,27 4328 and 45,29 the Court
essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling
not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist
courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to of 15 days or more.
appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
the constraint of technicalities. litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal reconsideration. 30
may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we
condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
considerations of fairness and justice. governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment
those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal
within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or
date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41,
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense Section 3.
in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
"final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was
1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.34

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso
BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC 35 since the Court of Appeals never even
hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this referred to it in its assailed decision.
case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of
rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review Appeals for further proceedings.
the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
No costs.
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise SO ORDERED.
aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to

when the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of
notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final
order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).