Final Memorial GLC Bombaypdf
Final Memorial GLC Bombaypdf
IN THE MATTER OF
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The female journalist and the non-mahabhakt lawyers, herein referred to as the
petitioners have approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Dharmasthaan through a
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of Dharmasthaan.
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE 1.
THAT PROHIBITING WOMEN OF A PARTICULAR AGE GROUP FROM
ENTERING LORD KADAMBA TEMPLE IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENSHRINED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
DHARMASTHAAN, AND THE DIRECTIVE FOR THE EXCLUSION OF
WOMEN FROM RELIGIOUS WORSHIP FOUNDED IN RELIGIOUS TEXT,
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
ISSUE 2.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
In the case of R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar1, the twin-test for determining the
validity of a classification under Article 14 were laid as:
a) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia; and
b) It must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the
impugned law.
1
R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar AIR 2014 SC 2140.
The practise of celibacy and austerity is the unique characteristic of the deity in the
Sabarimala Temple. Hindu deities have both physical/temporal and philosophical
form. The same deity is capable of having different physical and spiritual forms or
manifestations. Worship of each of these forms is unique, and not all forms are
worshipped by all persons. The form of the deity in any temple is of paramount
importance.
Therefore, it is submitted that no Fundamental right under Article 14 is violated
because Lord Kadamba is believed to be a deity of pure abstinence from all forms of
worldly pleasures and a celibate.2
Further, Article 15 of the Constitution provides for the right against discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth.
It is humbly submitted that the intention of the Constitution makers with regard to
exclusion of term “temples” from the ambit of Article 15 which corresponds to The
Draft Article 93 is pertinent to be noted.
It must be noted that the proposal to include the temples in the category of public
resort was rejected by then Constituent Assembly.
The conscious deletion of “temples” and “places of worship” from the Draft Article
9(1) has to be given due consideration.
2
Para 6 of Moot Proposition.
3
Draft Constitution of India, Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India (Manager
Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1948)
old age practice of observance of strict customs and practices while visiting the Holy
Shrine.
In Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu 4, this Hon'ble Court had discussed in detail the
significance of Agama Shastras5 which apply to the religious aspects of a Temple.
Agamas are the treatises of ceremonial law that guides how to preserve the image
from pollution, defilement or desecration. According to the Agamas, an image
becomes defiled and polluted if there is any departure or violation of any of the rules
relating to worship. Purity of character is ensured by rules which regulate the practice
of the worshippers.6
In Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir case7, this Hon'ble Court expressly held that the
State has the constitutional obligation to preserve the religious practices of all
religions. Any State action which permits the defilement or pollution of the image
would violently interfere with the religious faith and practices of the Hindu
worshipper.
Thus, young women should not offer worship in the temple so that even the slightest
deviation from celibacy and austerity observed by the deity is not caused by the
presence of such women as this custom has been in prevalence since
It must be noted that the exclusion of women in this Temple is not absolute or
universal. It is limited to a particular age group in one particular temple, with the view
to preserve the character of the deity.
In the cases of Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali and Shirur Mutt8, it
has been clearly laid down that under clauses (a) and (b) of Article 26 what is
protected is only the “essential part” of religion or, in other words, the essence of
practice practised by a religious denomination.
4
Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCR 815.
5
History of Dharmasastra Vol. II Part-II page 710
6
Mahendran
7
Sarika v. Administrator, Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee, Ujjain, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 490.
8
Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali AIR 1961 SC
1402 (1962) 1 SCR 383
In Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta
and other9, the Court laid down that “the integral or essential part of religion has to be
determined with reference to its doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background etc.
of the given religion. Essential practice means those fundamental practices upon
which the superstructure of a religion is built, without which a religion will be no
religion.
Therefore, a religious denomination enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of
deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the
religion and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in
such matters.
The expression “religious denomination” as interpreted in The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt10 was “a collection of individuals classed together under the same name: a
religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a
distinctive name”. The Court held that each of the sects or sub-sects of the Hindu
religion could be called a religious denomination, as such sects or sub-sects, had a
distinctive name.
The practises followed by this religious denomination, or sect thereof, as the case
maybe, constitute a code of conduct, which is a part of the essential spiritual
discipline related to this pilgrimage. As per the customs and usages practised in the
Sabarimala Temple, the 100-day ‘Karvatam’ is a condition precedent for undertaking
the pilgrimage to the Sabarimala Temple.
That in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan &Ors.11, it was
held that while enquiring whether the practise in question is religious in character, and
if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, the
finding of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced
before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion.
9
Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda
Avadhuta and others (2004) 12 SCC 770
10
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Math (1954) SCR 1005
11
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors
(1964) 1 SC 1638 SCR 561
The High Court in the case of S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore
Devaswom Board, Thiruvanathapuram & Ors12 recorded that a vital reason for
imposing this restriction on young women as deposed by the Thanthri of the Temple,
as well as other witnesses, was that the deity at the Sabarimala Temple was in the
form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’ which means a student who has to live in the house
of his preceptor, and studies the Vedas, living the life of utmost austerity and
discipline. The deity is in the form of a ‘Yogi’ or ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. The High
Court noted that this practise of restricting the entry of women is admitted to have
been prevalent since the past several centuries.
That, in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay 13, the Supreme Court held
that it was not open to the secular authority of state to say what essential part of
religion is and what is not. The State had no power to restrict or prohibit any religious
practice under the guise of its power to administer secular practices. That a secular
Judge is bound to accept the belief of the community, it is not for him to sit in
judgment on that belief and if the belief is genuinely and conscientiously held, it
attracts the protection of Article 25.”
In Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors 14, this Hon’ble Court
held that “Who are entitled to enter for worship; where they are entitled to stand and
worship; and, how the worship is to be conducted has to be decided as per the tenets
of that particular religion.”
In Danial Latifi & Anr v. Union of India15 and Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano
Begum16, it was held that the Supreme Court cannot supersede supreme law of the
Religion. In some religions, menstruating women are held to be impure and in some,
blood, not mere menstruation, is seen as the source of impurity.
In Acharya Maharaj Shri Narendra Prasadji’s case 17, the Constitution Bench noted
that it is a duty of this Court to strike a balance, and ensure that Fundamental Rights
of one person co-exist in harmony with the exercise of Fundamental Rights of others.
12
S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvanathapuram & Ors AIR 1993
Ker 42
13
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 282
14
Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors AIR 1958 SC 255
15
Danial Latifi & Anr vs Union of India, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 3958
16
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum,1985 S.C.R. 3 (844
17
Acharya Maharaj shri Narendra Prasadji Anand prasadji Maharaj & Ors. v. The State of Gujarat &
Ors. (1975) 1 SCC 11
Therefore, judicial review of religious practises ought not to be done in a narrow sense
as the Court cannot impose its morality or rationality with respect to the form of
worship of a deity. Doing so would negate the freedom to practise one’s religion
according to one’s faith and beliefs and it would amount to rationalising religion, faith
and beliefs, which is outside the ken of Courts.18
Therefore, in light of the arguments advanced and cases mentioned it is submitted that
the exclusionary practice, the Rules of 1967 and the Directives of 1968 is not
violative of Fundamental rights of citizens of Dharmasthaan.
It is the duty of the court to upheld the custom and practices of Mahabhakts and
recognise their Fundamental Right to profess and practice religion as provided under
Article 25 of the Constitution. In addition to this, in pursuance of the proviso of
Dharmasthaan Religious Activities Act, 1965 and Article 26 of the Constitution
ensure the freedom of the Mannath Shrine Association to manage its own affairs as a
separate religious denomination.
18
Robert L. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (U.S).
Taking into consideration the urgency of the matter and the unlawful acts of the
groups of Bandit Women which were using different means for entering the holy
shrine illegally without meeting the required criteria by taking help of encrypted
social media platforms and private forums on social media. It was essential to issue
such notification so as to ensure a system of checks and balances on the functioning
and operations of these bandit women groups.
Further, In November, 2015 a rather strange and uncanny incident happened wherein
several high-ranking officials of Unsullied and the Senior most leader of the special
force were assassinated while they were attending a closed door meeting in the town
of Shoryu. It was later discovered that infectious agents were released in the meeting
room which resulted in the death of all the senior most and important leaders.
In addition to the incident of killing of these important personalities in a closed door
meeting, few days later two persons were intercepted at a distance of 250 metres from
the gates of the Mannath shrine who were carrying hand-held rocket launchers. On
further investigation it was found that the message was broadcasted by bandit women
groups for breaking open each and every gate of the shrine by use of unlawful means
of demolition and destruction.
This act of releasing infectious agents and the fact that several weapons including the
plans to construct the biological weapons indicates the intention of these bandit
groups to indulge in the act of biological terrorism.
19
Sinha, B. K., Biological Warfare, Surindra Publications, New Delhi, 2010.
Article I of the Convention specifically provides that No Person under any
circumstances develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain biological weapons. In
the present case it is alleged that the act of the Bandit women groups which were
clearly in violation of the International Convention.
In the present case too, it is alleged that these biological weapons were used by the
bandit groups so as to pose a threat to the national security of the country and killing
the senior most leader and high-ranking officials of the Unsullied which is the sole
security and intelligence agency in Dharmasthaan.
This alleged act of usage of biological weapons to kill the important personalities is
an act of terrorism which is punishable both under the National Security Act, 1980
and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Section 15 of the UAPA, 1967 provides for the definition of terrorist act. S. 12(1)(a)
which includes the use of biological radioactive and other lethal weapons and
chemicals for causing the death of any person.
It is humbly submitted that such act of using of biological weapons and infectious
chemicals to cause the death of the leaders and officials amounts to an act of
terrorism. Therefore, issuance of Notification of 2016 in pursuance of such deadly and
hazardous is justified by the Government because ensuring the national security of the
country is of paramount importance.
Further, the arrests were made under S. 3 of the National Security Act, by the officials
of Unsullied of all the persons who were believed to have posed a threat to the
national security of the country of Dharmasthaan.
It must be noted It was only because of the important data which was intercepted and
monitored by the agency in pursuance of the Notification of 2016 that such arrests
were made.
Therefore, in light of arguments advanced and taking into consideration the acts of
terrorism of bandit women group. The Government of Dharmasthaan was justified in
passing a Notification in the year 2016 thus giving power to the Unsullied to ensure
the national security of the country and secure the sovereignty and integrity of the
nation.
It is submitted that such Notification was not in violation to the Constitution.
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of facts of the matter, arguments advanced, and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed before the Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to
hold, adjudge and declare-
1. That the exclusionary practice, the Religious Rules of 1965 and the Directive
passed in 1968 is not violative of the Constitution.
2. That the Notification of 2016 giving wide powers to the Unsullied is not violative
of the constitution and the acts of the Bandit women groups amounts to an act of
terrorism.
And/or any other relief that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interest
of Justice, Equity and Good conscience.
And in these premises the Respondent as duty bound shall forever pray.
Sd/-
Counsels on behalf of the Respondent
43. It is most reverentially submitted that the current petition is not
maintainable as Union of Indiana is a secular country and it should not
be made answerable to specific religious practices. The principle of
natural justice embodies in it the principle of audi altrem partem (right to
be heard) and the religious denominations have been denied this right in
this petition. Also, Judiciary’s power in the respect of judicial review of
religious practices is limited.
A. THAT THE PRESENT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS
NOT MAINTAINABLE
44. It is most humbly put forth that in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of
West Bengal &Ors36., the Court held that “Public interest litigation is a
weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection. This
inspection is necessary so that genuine petitioners should not be
prevented from speedy trial.
45. In Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India &Ors.37, it has been held that there must be
real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and concrete or
credible basis for maintaining a cause before Court and not merely an
adventure of knight errant borne out of wishful thinking.38
46. That, this Hon’ble Court must prevent the misuse of PIL in this case; as
the PILputs to threat the unique religious diversity and secularism of the
State. Also, equality and non- discrimination within all the religions is
sought without establishing if the followers of that particular religion
want such radical steps to be taken or not. Thus, Article 26 of the
religious denominations and sub sects has been blatantly violated
because of no representation from their parts.
47. It is most humbly submitted that in the matters concerning religion and
religious practises under our secular Constitutional set up, the Court is to
afford protection under Article 25(1) to those practises which are
regarded as “essential” or “integral” by the devotees or the religious
community itself.