Edgardo A. Gaanan, vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of The Philippines SCRA 112 (1986) G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986 Facts

EDGARDO A.
GAANAN,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SCRA 112 (1986) G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
Facts:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No.
4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an
extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that
its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the
terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on
the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to

his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his
regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request,
appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to

the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the
following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
Issues:
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate
court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation
between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or
not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep.
Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said
telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and,
therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Ruling:
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a
rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an
extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person
called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension
line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to
enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and

covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is
not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device
and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone
receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed
and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached
to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other party
or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or

arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or
the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or
record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone,

dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to
be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate

Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known
as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

Edgardo A. Gaanan, vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of The Philippines SCRA 112 (1986) G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986 Facts

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Edgardo A. Gaanan, vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of The Philippines SCRA 112 (1986) G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986 Facts

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EDGARDO A.

SCRA 112 (1986) G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to

The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone,

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate

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