USE OF PROPAGANDA IN CIVIL WAR:

THE BIAFRA EXPERIENCE.

PATRICK EDIOMI DAVIES

A Thesis in the Department of International

Relations
The London School of Economics and Political
Science

Submitted to the University of London

for the Degree o f Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D)

June 1995

1
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 USE OF PROPAGANDA IN CIVIL WAR:
THE BIAFRA EXPERIENCE.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of propaganda in the Biaffan war. Nigeria, the show
case of British colonial rule and Empire, and transfer to independence, was at the
point of disintegration in 1967. A section of the country, the Eastern region had
dared to do the unthinkable at that time, to secede. The British and Nigerian
governments were determined that it would not happen. The break away region,
which called itself Biafra was blockaded by land, air and sea, and starved of
weapons and the means o f livelihood. The only means available to it was
propaganda. In the opinion o f many commentators, Biafra employed propaganda
admirably and effectively, sustaining the war for three years, against all odds. An
investigation into the background of Biafra's successful propaganda thrust became a
very compelling urge for me. But to arrive at that point, an examination is made of
propaganda cultures that bear a family resemblance to that of Biafra. Because o f the
complete dearth of materials by media practioners, or the protagonists, or actors on
the Biafran media/propaganda scene, it has been necessary to travel to and from
Nigeria several times to interview the key participants. The issuance of
questionnaires was unsuccessful as no one had or found time to fill them in. Data
and Statistics were non existent in any cohesive form. There is still even now a
reticence by the principal actors to discuss the issues involving the war. To discuss a
familial pattern, or any other form of family migration which might support the
argument of the success o f Biafra's propaganda, three models have been examined,
ie; Hitler's/Goebbels' German propaganda, (as a watershed in modem war
propaganda, Mao Tse Tung's Chinese propaganda, and Ojukwu's Biafran
propaganda. However, other examples like the English, American, Russian, and
French civil wars and revolutions, etc; are employed in the arguments and
discussions. The thesis examines psychological warfare, the origins o f propaganda,
modem methods and concepts, the Biafran domestic and external factors; and
suggests that the exploitative propaganda tools in most civil conflicts are religion,
and/or tribal/ethnic/nationalistic tendencies. The difference is that in Biafra there
was a first - hunger and starvation became a massively useful propaganda weapon.

2
 ABBREVIATIONS.

A.G. Action Group.

BBC. British Broadcasting Corporation.
C.I.A. Central Intelligence Agency.
C.B.I. Confederation of British Industries.
C.O.R Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers State
Movement.
Dr. Doctor.
E.N.B.C./T.V Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation
and Television.
Fr. Father.
I BS. International Broadcasting Society.
MPs. Members of Parliament.
Mr. Mister.
N.B.C.T.V. Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation and
Television.
N.C.N.C. National Council of Nigeria and
Cameroun
N.N.A. Nigerian National Alliance.
N.P.C. Northern People’s Congress.
O.A.U. Organisation of African Unity.
PR. Public Relations.
P.& T. Posts and Telegraphs.
R.K.T Radio Television Kaduna.
RTE. Irish Television.
T.S. The Sunday Magazine.
U.N. United Nations.
U.P.G.A United Progressive Grand Alliance.
W.N.B.S./T.V Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service and
Television
U.A.R. United Arab Republics.
U.S.A. United States of America.

3
 CONTENTS

Page.

Abstract

Abbreviations.

Figures/Photographs appendix

Maps appenndix

Tables appendix

Acknowledgements 5.

CHAPTERS.

1.INTRODUCTION 6

2. THE OLD REGIME 32

3. MODERN METHODS AND CONCEPTS 79

4. BIAFRA: THE DOMESTIC FACTOR 119

5. BIAFRA: THE EXTERNAL FACTOR 177

6. CONCLUSION 250

Bibliography 269

Appendix 287

4
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

I thank God most sincerely for my being, for preserving me through the turmoils of
Biafra - the bombs, the air raids, the shells, the bullets, and all the other enormous
and countless difficulties. Gratefully, His Omnipresence has guided and guarded me,
and made it possible for this thesis to be written.
I am profoundly grateful to my parents for giving me life, nurturing me, giving me a
sound Christian upbringing, a good education, and until their deaths, always being
there.
My whole hearted appreciation goes out to Professor Michael Leifer, who
encouraged me, and made it possible for me to come to the London School of
Economics and Political Science for this study. It is impossible to sufficiently thank
Professor James Mayall for his gentlemanliness in 'breaking me in', his understanding
nature and patience. He has acted as counsellor, confidant, teacher, guide, and
supervisor through the upheavals o f the study and research.
I am indebted to Mr Auberon Waugh for giving me some of his books, and lending
me other books and materials. I thank the London School of Economics and
Political Science for offering me the opportunity to do this study

I acknowledge with gratitude the help and assistance given by the numerous
archives and libraries, High Commisions and Embassies, Organisations and
individuals who have helped to make this study possible. Some of them have had to
put up with incessant enquiries and demands.

Lastly, and most importantly, to my indefatigable wife, Dr Chinekwu Davies, I

extend my unlimited and absolute gratitude. She has held the reins during my
numeruos departures from home. She has exhorted me to action when the rot has
tended to set in. She, herself still bears shrapnel scars from Nigerian air raids on
Biafra. I am most grateful to my children Etebom, Unyime, and Akama for their
patience and support. Akama especially deserves optimum praise, for he was only
one year old when I started this research, and has had to cope with my several
absences from home.
I dedicate this thesis to my parents, brothers and sisters, my wife and children, for
their love, care, attention and support over the years.

Patrick Ediomi Davies.

London School of
Economics and Political
Science.
University of London.

June 1995.

5
 CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Hypothesis, and, Focus o f the Study.

It may be helpful to start this thesis by posing certain questions -

1. What is propaganda in civil war?

2. Who makes propaganda?

3. Who receives propaganda?

4. Why propaganda?

5. What is the effect ( result) o f propaganda?

6. What role did all these questions, or the answers to

them play in the Biafra Case - The Role of propaganda

in Biafra?

However, it is necessary at this stage to state that the purpose of this thesis is not

the discussion and analysis of propaganda 'per se', even though to understand the

subject and object o f the discussion, a study of propaganda is inevitable. The thrust

of the discussion is to relate propaganda experiences to civil war as generally as can

be done, and most particularly to the Biafra experience.

An immediate examination of this objective indicates the dearth of material on the

subject of propaganda in civil war, most especially on Biafra. Some work emerged

6
after the first and second world wars, generally in the context of studies covering

the wars. The cold war period also saw a few works, eg. Propaganda and

Psychological Warfare by Terence Qualters, etc. In the years between the Gulf war

of 1991 and 1995, many more books have come out dealing with propaganda in

war, foreign policy, and advertising. Some of these include Propaganda edited by

Robert Jackal, Propaganda and Empire by John M. Mackenzie, The Third Reich by

David Welch, Propaganda and Persuasion by Garth S. Jowett and Victoria

O’Donnell. Weekend in Munich by Robert S. Wistrich, Goebbels by Ralf Georg

Reuth, Age of Propaganda by Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Ireland: The

Propaganda War by Liz Curtis, Another relevant work in the context of this thesis

was Revolution in Statecraft by Andrew Scott.

These and a lot of other materials were examined in arriving at the theme and

hypothesis of this thesis. The analysis from these and other texts are discussed later

in this chapter under the 'Review o f relevant literature'. Nevertheless, there is a

difference between propaganda in foreign policy and advertising, ( which can be

conducted either in peace time or in war time), and propaganda in war.

Andrew Scott for instance believes that propaganda in foreign policy is a polite way

o f engaging in political discourse- o f achieving aims without resorting to war and its

attendant ramifications. He maintains that Athens engaged in such cultural

diplomacy extensively during the 5th century A.D.- a process described as an

'unhidden agenda'. *

Some ex-Biafra technocrats and military have written accounts of their experiences

in the war, but unfortunately none o f the media people have written anything on

either their roles or that of of the media.

Against this background, this thesis is written on the assumption that propaganda is

an important part of strategic planning in warfare, which therefore merits an

academic study in its own right. It will be argued that there is little difference

between propaganda in international wars and civil wars- except for their target

7
constituencies. Civil war is a microcosm o f global or international war, which could

be internationalised through effective propaganda. For instance, did not the First

World War begin as 'Civil War' in the Hapsburgh Empire?

In an effort to answer this and related questions, it may be helpful to organise the

discussion under the following categories:

1. Motivation.

2. Mobilisation.

3. Sustenance (Sustainability)

4. Durability.

In order to understand why these sensitivities and sensibilities act as ingredients in

propaganda or psychological warfare, it is necessary at this juncture to examine

further the questions posed at the beginning of this introduction.

1.2. Review o f Relevant Literature and Thematic Analysis.

1.2.1 (a) What is Propaganda ? (b) ... (in civil war )?

The Oxford Dictionary of current English defines PROPAGANDA as an organised

scheme (etc.) for often (tendentious) propagation of a doctrine or practice; (usually

derogatory); ideas etc. thus propagated; colloquially biased information'.

A school of thought also looks at propaganda- as psychological warfare, hence the

reference" propaganada war"- as borne out by an article in the Sunday Times of

17th February 1991, titled "Propaganda Targets Deserters".^

The word PROPAGANDA was originally an ecclesiastical latin term denoting the

function of a committee responsible for the spreading of the Roman Catholic Faith,

i.e. 'de fide propaganda'.

8
It was, according to J.H. Marshall of The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,

transfered to a political context in 1790 with reference to an obscure alleged

revolutionary organisation based in France, and was also used in the United States

as a slogan- word to refer to the pro-slavery campaign after the Mexican war in the

1850s (see H. Sperber and T.Trittschuk. American Political Terms; An Historical

Dictionary, Detroit, 1962) 4

Its use as a specifically military term is difficult to trace without a careful survey of

the relevant historical literature: the word does not appear in The Oxford Military

Dictionary o f the 19th century, but does feature in Edward S.Farrows* Dictionary of

Militaiy Terms (London, 1918).

It does not appear to have any older equivalent and seems to have been used in the

first world war, and become well established in the years leading up to the second

world war.^

Macropaedia Britannica defines PROPAGANDA^ as the more or less systematic

effort to manipulate other people's beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means o f symbols

(words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia, hairstyles, designs

on coins and postage stamps, and so forth). Deliberateness and a relatively heavy

emphasis on manipulation distinguish propaganda from casual conversation or the

free exchange o f ideas. The propagandist has a specific goal or set of goals. To

achieve these, he deliberately selects facts, arguments and displays of symbols and

presents them in ways he thinks will have the most effect. To maximise effects he

may omit pertinent facts or distort them, and he may try to divert the attention of

the reactors (the people whom he is trying to sway) from everything but his own

propaganda. Selectivity and manipulation also distinguish propaganda from

education. The educator generally tries to present various sides of an issue- the

grounds for doubting as well as the grounds for believing the statement he makes,

and the disadvantages as well as the advantages o f every conceivable course of

action. Education usually aims to induce the recipient to collect and evaluate

9
evidence for himself, and assists him in the requisite learning techniques. It must be

noted, however, that a given propagandist may look upon himself as an educator,

may believe that he is uttering the purest truth, that he is emphasising or distorting

certain aspects of the truth only to make a valid message more persuasive, and that

the courses of action that he recommends are in fact the best actions to take. By the

same token, the recipient who regards the propagandist's message as self evident

truth may think of it as educational; this often seems to be the case with "true

believers"- dogmatic reactors to dogmatic religious or social propaganda.

n
"Education for one person may be "propaganda" for another. Schlesinger makes

the point of news and information selectivity on British Television and Media in

Putting 'reality' Together, when he enunciates the principle of "inclusion -

exclusion". This involves a process o f slant, bias or parochialism in editorial news

selectivity and judgement for and on the British m edial

(b) Propaganda in Civil War

Information culled from research and archive files^ indicates that increased

communications capabilities effected by the time of the American Civil War made it

possible for each side in that conflict to conduct active propaganda, making appeals

designed to strengthen its cause and weaken the opponent. The Emancipation

Proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln in January 1863, irrespective of

its force and merit was a masterful propaganda stroke, for once the war became

characterised as a crusade against slavery, it became very difficult for any European

government to support the Confederacy ...

The abolition crusade and the pro-slavery reaction laid the psychological basis for

the war. Upon the outbreak of the conflict, press and pulpit, North and South,

further stirred the emotions of the people.

10
In the South, propagandists devoted their effort to asserting the right to secede and

to proving that the aggressive North was invading Southern territory. In the North,

the preservation of the Union, patriotism, and the crusade against slavery were the

major themes. On both sides, atrocity stories abounded often, though not always,

based on realities - largely concerned with the brutal treatment of the wounded,

military prisoners, and political dissenters. Southern efforts in propaganda lacked

coordination, but in the North the radical committee on the conduct of the war gave

official direction to the gathering and dissemination of atrocity stories that professed

to reveal rebel depravity and to show the felonious and savage nature of the

Southerners. The Sanitary Commission and the Union Leagues were the Chief

unofficial agencies in this work. Both sides attempted to influence European opinion

and President Lincoln sent journalists and ecclesiastics to England and the Continent

to create favourable sentiment. Illustrating this in "Propaganda and "Civil War,

Propaganda and undercover Activities " in Dictionary of American History ed. by

L.B.Ketz, the work also outlines a graphic thrust of both Confederate and Unionist

propaganda which are analagous to the Federal Nigerian and Biafran propaganda

during the Biafran War. Discussions and analyses will be made in this introduction

and subsequent chapters to illustrate the similarites of these, and other possible

comparisons.

1.2.2. Who makes Propaganda?

A rather obvious question with at first sight a similarly obvious answer. It is easy

enough to state that both sides to a conflict engage in propaganda in order to

mobilise and motivate their respective constituencies. It has already been shown that

'constituencies' may be defined as the "reactors". Since in motivation, propaganda

must necessarily appeal to the senses and sensibilities of the the target audience,

reactors is thereby appropriately used in this context, but this thesis will utilise

11
"constituencies" as a broad reactor’s indicator, creating the semblance of an

"audience"," viewers", "listeners"," readers", capable of objective analysis o f the

information with which they are bombarded.

They as recipients of the information, or messages are capable of making value

judgements and therefore acting on their judgements.

However, on closer inspection the question of who makes propaganda in war is not

as simple a matter as this indicates, although it maintains that "both sides to the

conflict" are involved. There are instances where one side claims that the other is

engaged in telling lies by way of propaganda whilst they themselves believe in telling

the truth even though the claimant in this example controls its own information and

its dissemination, therefore allowing it to be "economical" with the truth. For

instance according to Gerard Mansell in Let the truth be told - the Politics of

propaganda^ , Churchill and Eden maintained that Hitler fed his consistencies

with lies in the form of propaganda during the Second World War. Churchill in

contrast believed that war must be won by deeds not words.

On the contrary, Hitler’s view as he wrote in Mein Kampf. was that in war, words

are acts’. As far back as 1933, in conversation with Hermann Rauschning, Hitler had

laid stress on psychological dislocation of the enemy as a necessary preliminary

stage to military offensive just as heavy artillery bombardment in the first World

War had softened up the forward positions of the opposing army as a preliminary to

the infantry assault. "Our strategy", he said, "is to destroy the enemy from within, to

conquer him through himself. Mental confusion, contradiction of feelings,

indecision, panic - these are our weapons". ** Churchill, Eden and the then Director

General of the B.B.C, Lord Reith believed that propaganda involved lies and was

shortlived - the truth was more sustainable and therefore preferable. But, they

controlled and decided what they thought was the truth, censoring what was

disseminated to their publics.-on the principle of "inclusion-exclusion". However,

12
since this involved manipulation of information, it was propaganda, as defined

earlier.

In so far as propaganda involves the manipulation of information to achieve victory,

it may be said to consist of (a) psychological warfare (b) censorship (c) lies (d)

distortion or omission, or being economical with the truth, all designed to arouse

the emotions - sensitivities and sensibilities o f the publics targeted. Western

countries argue that autocratic and dictatorial regimes engage in propaganda. In

modem times, however, protagonists of all kinds tend to employ some or all of the

instruments listed, as bome out in the Gulf War in 1991.

For Example, the American propaganda machine, (as illustrated by the Sunday

Times article earlier referred to), ^ with the use of television, radio, leaflets, and

rumours of impending cataclysm in Iraq, may well have caused several thousands of

desertions from the Iraqi frontline. It destroyed "the enemy from within" even before

the first shots were fired. Peopaganda was again at the fore in the civil war in

Yugoslavia in the 1990s with all sides trying to capture the eyes and ears of the

world. In the Biafran case, both Nigeria and Biafra engaged in emotive propaganda.

Biafra, however managed the propaganda better than Nigeria and therefore

sustained higher propaganda results.

13
 1.2.3. Who receives propaganda?

These, as defined earlier are: the recipients, the reactors, constituencies, publics,
l 1
targets, or audience.1 J

Taking the definitive ground rules of modem propaganda earlier enunciated, ie; -

(the manipulation of information to achieve a certain objective) - it is fair to assume

that there is very little difference in intent between propaganda in international or

global war and propaganda in civil war. Both have to motivate and mobilise in the

first instance the ’’home front", before the action.

In Shakespeare’s Julius Ceasar. Mark Antony after Caesar's assassination urges the

Romans to avenge Caesar with his famous speech of "Friends, Romans,

Countrymen". After he had motivated and mobilised them, and they had rushed out

to attack Bmtus and Cassius and their men, Mark Antony proclaims "Mischief thou

art afoot. Take thou what cause thou wilt".

The most powerful war leaders have been orators who know their constituencies

and how to inspire them to action,e.g. Hitler, Churchill, Mao Tse Tung, John F.

Kennedy, Odumegwu Ojukwu, to name a handful. The publics are therefore those

to whom the message o f propaganda is addressed. They then react accordingly after

making their own value judgements. But as the message to the different targets is

essentially tailored to the needs of the propagandist, the content delivered to the

home front may be at variance with that directed at the international and foreign

publics. And it is no easy task for either side in a civil war to motivate and mobilise

the sympathy and active support of the international community, especially since the

rival messages put out by the warring factions may tend to be confused.

14
1.2.4. Why Propaganda?

The answer to this question can be found first and foremost in the definition of

propaganda already given at the beginning o f this introduction. It is important to

note that propaganda precedes the war in order to motivate and mobilise the various

constituencies at which it is directed. It intensifies during the war to sustain the

morale of the army and civilian publics and outlasts the war.

Those unfamiliar with the history o f the American war of Independence are likely to

be more familiar with the term "Boston Tea Party". Because of its appeal to the

senses, it tends to be stored in the subconscious.

Propaganda in civil war is an application of the same ground rule as in international

or global war. How ev er the domestic sector achieves the same results by clever

management of its limited scope, materials, and facilities. After all, both sides in a

civil war concentrate their efforts in justifying their reasons to the outside world,

(much more as the war progresses), rather than to the home audience. It starts from

the inside looking out The reverse is the case in international wars.

This brings one to the notion o f justification of war- the theory of the "just war".

The reason for going to war has to be justified to gain international as well as

domestic support- material, political, physical and economic- and therefore a

favourable terrain. The Russian Revolution, the Chinese Communist Long March,

The Biafran cause in the Nigerian Civil War, to name a few all bear this out. The

slogans vary, but the message tends to be similar: the liberation of the oppressed,

and the creation of an egalitarian society.

The principles enunciated during the "Enlightenment", and taken up by the French

revolutionaries are characteristic. A society "fair to all concerned" is a common

denominator to all civil war propagandists around the world in premodem, and

15
modem eras. Further propagandist themes include, the emancipation of a people

from suppresion of basic human rights- religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc. The modem

concept of prisoners of conscience is an indication of how civil struggles can arouse

international concern. Allegations o f pogrom, genocide and discrimination can also

evoke international sympathy, as in the Biafra case. There, the United Nations

together with regional international organisations such as the OAU and latterly EU

can become propaganda forums, for people to air their grievances and attract the

sentiments of a world, public. Churchill referring to the United Nations as part of

this function had said that "Jaw! Jaw!" was better than "War! War!", and that as

long as the world leaders had a piece o f paper in one hand and a pen in the other,

they would not reach out for the sword. The Gulf war of 1991 has, however belied

such a belief.

John Renshaw states, in Overseas Broadcasters Circuit, that "The radio does more

than just report the news. In moments of chaos, like the military coup in Paraguay

on the 3rd of February 1989, it can very easily change the course of events. "The

dramatic events in Paraguay illustrate one aspect of the power of the radio as a

propaganda organ. In this case, the radio was virtually used to motivate and

mobilise the populace into a state o f revolution. ^ He was discussing the role of the

media, especially radio, on the day o f that military coup in 1989, which

coincidentally was also Paraguay's Patron Saint's day.

In the case of Biafra, when the capital, Enugu, was "sacked" or "liberated",

depending on one's point of view, Biafra's existence was sustained basically by the

media, especially radio - to maintain the morale of the Biafran army and citizenry,

and to sustain the sympathy of the international community- even when the

government was relocated elsewhere in Aba, Owerri, Umuahia respectively as the

war progressed.

16
In pinpointing its target audience propagandists have to appeal to the sentiments of

that audience. Generally, the reason for propaganda preceding a war is to

demoralise the opposing army before the first shots are fired, and increasingly

nowadays soldiers and ground officers like to give press interviews regarding war

preparations, with a view to confusing or deceiving the enemy into unwise planning.

1.2.5. What is the effect of propaganda?

The data (already mentioned) culled from the research archives^ states that the

United States Consul in Paris- John Bigelow, played a key part in the propaganda

war in France. Seward, the Secretary o f State, reached a wider public with leaflets

extolling the opportunities provided by the Homestead Act, encouraging potential

immigrants or helping public meetings- with resolutions endorsing emancipation.

The adminstration's appoinments to the main diplomatic posts in Europe were made

for the usual haphazard mixture of reasons. The distinguished historian, John

Lothrop Motley, became minister in Vienna; William L. Dayton was a safe, but

undistinguished appointment as minister in Paris, but as luck and Seward would

have i t , Charles Francis Adams became minister in London. The son and grandson

of American Presidents (who had also been ministers in London) Adams had

impeccable credentials for his vital role and more than lived up to them. His

coldness and austerity may have prevented him from being a great social success or

a prominent public figure, but he scarcely put a foot wrong in all the intricate

diplomacy of the war years. He moderated athe effects of Seward's occasional

excesses, but could be stiff and unyielding when the occasion required. He contrived

to establish an effective working relationship with the foreign secretary, Earl

Russell, and coped successfully with sporadic outbursts from Palmerston. If not

much loved, he was widely respected and eventually emerged in his son's happy

17
phrase as "a kind of leader o f Her Majesty's American Opposition". He was the right

man in the right place at the right time, and did much to preserve British neutrality

and therefore preserve the American Union.

The nub of the matter as far as the United States foreign policy was concerned was

to make sure that the civil war, remained only a civil war, while it rigorously

maintained a blockade and all its implications so troublesome to neutrals anxious to

avoid a conflict on the high seas. ^

The analogy to this in the Nigerian case was the Federal blockade o f the Biafran

territory by air, land and sea while maintaining to the outside world that Nigeria was

only carrying out a "police action" to defeat rebellion and secession, and seeking to

restore and maintain the unity of Nigeria- a point that struck a welcome cord with

the British Government especially, and the American and Russian governments who

did not want to see Nigeria break up.

Biafra on the other hand used media images and symbols o f progrom, genocide,

indiscriminate bombing and strafing of civilian populations in the churches, markets,

and hospitals. This had the effect o f arousing public sympathy around the world.

Church organisations like Caritas, the World Council of Churches and other

humanitarian organisations rose to aid what they understood as the starving and

dying millions of Biafra. Auberon Waugh in his book "Biafra, Britain's Shame".

displays graphic images of Kwashiokor (bloated bellies resulting from malnutrition)

ridden children, women and men of Biafra. ^ The effects of such images and

symbols tend to endure.

The credibility of the messenger ( propagandist), the believability of the message

and the efficiency o f the mode of delivery o f the message are important ingredients

in propaganda package presentation. The language used is also germane since the

different reactors respond more effectively if the message is in a language they can

understand and imbibe.

18
One other important facet of this mesh is the tendency of protagonists to nurture a
1R
personality cult around the leader, a sort o f "objective correlative”/ as T.S. Elliot

would put it. In Biafra it was Odumegwu Ojukwu, in Russia, Lenin during the

revolution and civil war, and Stalin during the world war, in China it was Mao Tse

Tung. It is important in time of crisis for the constituency to have a personality- an

outstanding credible figure- on whom and to whom people look for inspiration and

admiration as a credible source of the message.

For Britain and for many in the British Empire, Churchill fulfilled that position

during the Second World War, being able to motivate and mobilise the public,

whether his message was true or false. The majority of Germans seem to have

believed in Hitler because he seemed to have an answer to their problems, and gave

them a sense of superiority.

It was a message they were prepared to die for. In like vein, Ojukwu was constantly

telling Biafrans through television, radio and leaflets, (amongst others) that "the

price of liberty is eternal vigilance" and so that they had to make sacrifices for their

liberation from the tyranny of the Gowon regime. The Federal Nigerian

government's own counter slogan was "to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be

done". Such propaganda tended to outlast the war. For example, some o f the songs

chanted by Biafrans as they went into battle are still occasionally sung by those who

participated in or remember the war. This phenomenon seems to be a corollary to

Bruce L. Smith's argument, in his Political Communication and Propaganda, when

he refers to trust and credibility and maintains that the message and the messenger

have to be believed, otherwise they are not effective ^

19
1.2.6. Role of propaganda in Biafra.
Nigeria now has an estimated population of one hundred and twenty million. There

are two hundred and fifty different languages. Within these two hundred and fifty

various language groups, there are at least five hundred dialectical differences.

There are two main religious groups - Christianity and Islam. Other religions exist

including traditional religions. There are two time zones between North and South-

ffom Lagos to Maidugiri, from Calabar to Kano.

The geographical cultural, political terrain is as diverse as the political and religious

terrain so described.

All this and colonial policy created a perfect setting for conflict following the

immediate post independence period. However, the events that led to the Biafran

war happened very rapidly. On the fateful morning of the coup of 15th January

1966, people in Eastern Nigeria woke to hear Effiong Etuk on the early morning

programme on ENBC/TV Enugu, announcing that there were soldiers in the studio

asking him to stop transmission of regular programmes and play only martial music.

On hearing this on his car radio, one o f the coup leaders, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna,

who having assassinated the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the

Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie Eboh, in Lagos, was supposed to ’dash' to Enugu

to assassinate Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of Eastern Nigeria, escaped into the

bush. Okpara was thus saved. Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern Nigeria, and

Chief S. L. Akintola, the self-proclaimed Premier o f Western Nigeria even though

he had been expelled by his party, the Action Group, which formed the majority in

the Western House of Assembly,were both assassinated. The country was dazed.

The media was muted by martial law, with the radio and television only playing

martial music. As a result, for a while there was no overt propaganda. But according

to Auberon Waugh, covert propaganda was instigated in northen Nigeria by civil

90
servants loyal to the assassinated Sir Ahmadu Bello Muslims and loyal northern

20
followers were forming groups and pockets of meeting groups
21 spreading secret

propaganda documents in offices, market stalls, and through the post in the North,

to the effect that the coup was Ibo instigated against the Hausa, Fulani, Muslim

groups. The message spread to its target audience and became credible.

Consequently, the Chief of Army Staff, General Aguyi Ironsi, who had taken over

the reins of the Federal Government in Lagos following the assasination of Sir

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in the January coup was himself assassinated in a

Northern led revenge coup in July 1966, along with the Governor of Western

Nigeria, Colonel Fajuyi.

Following these events, the media in the North became free to operate. The radio,

television and newspapers directed overt propaganda against the Southerners in

general and the Easterners in particular, the Ibos especially. There was counter

propaganda from the South particularly from the radio and television in Enugu. This

was overt propaganda, designed to motivate their respective constituencies.

Propaganda aroused latent tensions between the North and the South, the various

language groups and ethnic communities, galvanizing and mobilising them to war,

sustaining them through the war and helping them rehabilitate after the war. Most

commentators argue that the message and organisation of the Biafran propaganda

was better and more effective than that o f Nigeria. For example,Luke Uka Uche in

"Radio Biafra and the Nigeria Civil War: Study of War propaganda on a target

audience".^ maintains that during the Nigerian Civil War of 6th July 1967- 12th

January 1970, Radio Biafra was literally seen as the Biafran Government, per se. He

argues that even when the Biafran leadership fled the enclave before the end of the

war, people still believed in the concept o f Biafra because the Biafran Radio Station

indentification was still "This is Radio Biafra Enugu". When eventually Radio

Biafra went silent, that action formally concluded the thirty-month war. One of the

opinion leaders interviewed for his research noted that once Radio Biafra announced

the end of the war, he became convinced that the war had in fact ended. According

21
to Uka Uche, this partly demonstrates the quasi government role the mass media are

capable of playing in a crisis situation any where. For example, he claims that in July

1966, Nigeria did not have any functionally operative government for more than

three days at the time o f the second bloody military coup d'etat, as the struggle for

political leadership control raged among the military combatants. It was radio that

constantly broadcast directives and literally governed in the absence of any legally

constituted authority. When coups occured, government agencies, ministeries,

departments and parastatals were always found to be in a great disarray as a

leadership vacuum was created: nobody knew whom to be responsible to for

directives. In these situations, people panicked and the radio medium seemed to

have become their rallying point. In short during such periods, the radio medium

became a "de facto " government. People sought directives from it, Uka Uche

concludes.

This was just one facet of Biafra's propaganda package. The message was graphic

and powerful and was addressed variously to the domestic and international

constitutencies with Odumegwu Ojukwu being cultivated as the saviour o f Biafrans

from genocide and pogrom at the hands of the Federal Nigerian Government.

Nigeria on the other hand in a clear attempt to caricature Ojukwu, in order to

reduce his cultivation as Saviour, portrayed him as a bigot who was leading his

people to ruin. Western Countries use the same techniques against their opponents

eg. Hitler, Stalin, Saddam Hussein, etc, have been variously described as mad,

unstable men leading their respective countries to destruction. There was a process

of migration and mutation of this and other propaganda principles and practices to

Biafra, eg; Soon, Biafra's propagandists resorted to the caricature of Gowon. This

thesis will expand on the propaganda methods employed by both sides in this bitterly

fought war in which over one million Easterners lost their lives. It will examine how

the international society got involved and the political configuration involved with

22
Britain, the United States and Russia being on the same side, Nigeria's, while France

and some African countries supported Biafra.

1.3. Methodology and Sources of Data.

This study has adopted three research methods:

1. Qualitative archival and library research, to provide data for analysis of the

historical development of propaganda, Hitler's/Goebbel's propaganda, Mao Tse

tung's propaganda, and, the development of Nigerian political, geographical and

historical structures, which set the scene for the civil war.

2. Structured interviews with media participants and protagonists on both sides of

the divide in the Biafra war, leaders and key civil servants of Nigerian, and defunct

Biafran governments, foreign journalists, and British Council and High Commission

officials. Semi-structured interviews and discussions were also conducted with the

publics of Nigeria, and former Biafran territory, to test their reactions to the

propaganda messages they received.

3. Quantitative content analysis o f Nigerian, Biafran, and foreign media broadcasts

and materials, speeches by American, British, French, Russian and African leaders.

It was important to examine and analyse the reactions of both Nigerian and Biafran

publics to have a sense of their emotions during and after the war. Interviews and

discussions were also conducted with the key military personnel of both, particularly

the combatants at the frontline, and a qualitative analysis was carried out to

determine how they were affected by the propaganda, and how that would have

affected the conduct, and course of the war.

23
Qualitative research o f archival and library materials was done both in Nigeria and

Britain. The British locations included the British Newspaper Library at Colindale in

London, the British Library o f Political and Economic Science at the London

School of Economics and Political Science, The Library of the American Embassy in

London, the library o f the Nigerian High Commission in London, the Library of the

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, the Bromley and Mottingham Libraries, the

Imperial War Museum, the BBC Bush House Research Library and Archives, the

BBC Broadcasting House Archives, the Catholic Centre for the Study of

Communication and Culture in London, the House of Commons and House of

Lords Archives, Palace of Westminster, the Archives of Encyclopaedia Britannica,

Keesings Contemporary Archives, the Senate House Library, University of London,

the City University Library, the University of North London Library, the Rhodes

Library, University o f Oxford, the Oxford University Press Archives, and the

Tanzanian and Ghanaian High Commissions in London, the Royal African Society,

the Royal Institute o f International Affairs, the United Nations Association, the

Library of the French Embassy in London, the Confederation of British Industries

(CBI), amongst a host o f others. Archival and library materials, newspapers,

magazines, periodicals, were examined and qualitatively analysed.

The Nigerian locations included the War Museum at Umuahia, the Federal

Government Arhives in Lagos, the Government Archives at Ibadan, the Government

Archives in Kaduna, the Museum of Ancient History in Calabar, and the Archives of

the Daily Times in Lagos, and New Nigerian Newspaper in Kaduna. The Archives in

the East had been destroyed, as a result, nothing was forthcoming from there.

The only copy o f the Biafra Sun, the Biafra Newspaper, was kindly donated by

Father Michael Golden in Dublin.

24
Interviews were conducted in Britain, Nigeria, Ireland, France, Geneva, and

Portugal. It has been necessary to travel twice yearly to Nigeria throughout the

period of research to be able to get anything done. Some of the places visited in the

course of the research in Nigeria include Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, Umuahia, Aba,

Owerri, Calabar, Ete, Okon, Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Ikot Ekpene, Port Harcourt,

etc.(see map).

Several telephone call attempts to extract information and materials from the OAU

Headquarters in Ethiopia were unsuccessful. A search of Geneva to find Markpress

has also proved unsuccessful. Even the International Exchange enquiry was not

helpful. The only information obtained was that William Bemhart, the Director, had

folded up and returned to America. He, incidentally, was an American citizen.

The research has utilised extensively the knowledge gained from active participation

in propaganda activities, and broadcasting on Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra, by

the author. This has been enriched by discussions with and interviews of colleagues

in the media in Britain, Nigeria, and defunct Biafra. The interviews with Generals

Gowon and Ojukwu were immensely useful, and very enlightening, as to the

political, and propaganda objectives o f the two governments.

The thirty four volumes of Encyclopaedia Britannica, which had to be acquired for

easy access, have been useful for references and pointers to other relevant materials

and texts, for definitions, and for historical analysis, and development of theoretical

arguments.

25
 1.4. Contextual Definitions.

Familial: denotes the family resemblance between the propaganda policies and

activities of different countries.

Sensibility: is the capacity to feel physically or emotionally hurt; the tendency to be

exceptionally sensitive to messages received.

Sensitivity: portrays acute reaction to external stimuli or mental impressions; having

sensibility to, or responding emotionally to propaganda.

Motivation: signifies the stimulation of the emotions of the targeted audience by the

propagandist. Whereas sensibility may be passive, motivation activates, leading to

mobilisation.

Mobilisation: means that having been motivated, the targeted publics react by doing

the things that the propagandist demands of them.

Negative compensation: occurs when, a state makes negative public statements

about another whilst enjoying the patronage and sponsorship of that other state.

This is done to demonstrate independence of policicies and actions.

Positive compensation: occurs when a state that benefits from the patronage and

sponsorship of another makes positive public statements about that other, and also

openly gravitates towards it.

Horizontal powers: are states that are o f the same or similar status militarily and/or

economically as the propagandist.

Vertical powers: are those that are militarily and/or economically stronger, higher or

more powerful than the propagandist.

Other terms are defined within the context of the chapters and passages.

26
 1.5. Arrangement of Chapters - TWO - SIX.

CHAPTER TWO: 'The Old Regime - (Pre 1939)' aims at tracing the origin, history

and definition of propaganda (or psychological warfare). It will argue that

propaganda is as old as war itself but the "modus operandi" pre 1939 was different

because of the tools available at the time, the state of the world and international

relations, and the behaviour of war leaders within the environment so prescribed.

Was war "just or unjust"? Why was it necessary to justify war? It will examine

whether propaganda was employed or involved in the whole process of'just war'.

What lessons arose from the American Civil War and War of Independence, the

Russian Revolution, the French Revolution. What does the "Boston Tea Party", or

'Ojukwu's beard', or, 'Yabuku Wagon' mean in terms of propaganda?

CHAPTER THREE: Modem Methods and Concepts' continues with the theme

from the preceding chapter in terms of De Fide Propaganda,, and asks; what did the

Second World War bring? This chapter will examine German and Allied- British-

attitudes towards propaganda. Hitler, unprecedented in history, set up the Ministry

of Propaganda, run by Goebbels. What effect did this have on attitudes- and on the

war? What has happened since the Second World War, It will analyse the lessons

accruing from the Chinese, and other civil wars, as a basis for comparison with the

Biafra experience. Are there meeting points for the old and the new? Is there a

family resemblance in their propaganda structures?

27
CHAPTER FOUR: Biafra: The Domestic Factor.

From a combination of personal knowledge, interviewing of colleagues, archives

and other sources on the war, this chapter will attempt to relive the experience of

the media in Biafra and the effect thereof on the Biaffan war constituencies (internal

and external). It will examine through comparison with other wars- already

discussed in preceding chapters- what modes and systems were employed in Biafra

and to what effect. It will examine the lessons for Nigeria and Biafra resulting from

the war. What effect did the Biaffan slogan 'the price of liberty is eternal vigilance',

and the Nigerian slogan ' to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done' have on

the combatants.

CHAPTER FIVE: Biafra: The External Factor.

Since this thesis argues that civil war can be internationalised through effective

propaganda, here it will be explained. The chapter will look at the involvment of

Britain, U.S.A., Russia, France, The Vatican, Portugal, South Africa, Tanzania,

Zambia, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Israel and others. It will examine how much

propaganda influenced their decision to be involved (on either side) and the extent

to which it was determined by self interest.

CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion.

Drawing from all the above, a conclusion on the arguments will be extracted.

The chapter will draw on the interviews with Gowon, Ojukwu, and other

participants in the Nigerian civil war, to discover how effective and sustainable

Biaffan propaganda was. It will examine Nigeria's post civil war rehabilitation and

status, and examine the lessons learnt from the war. The future direction of Nigeria's

ethnic integration will be analysed, and conclusions will be drawn on suggestions

from the protagonists, on the cause of the war, and what they see as possible

solutions.

28
Notes on Chapter 1.

1. Andrew Scott:
NY; Duke University Press, 1994,
pp. 53-61.

2. R.E Allen: The Oxford Dictionary of Current English,

Oxford, O.U.P 1984,p.591.

3. The Sunday Tiroe s London, 17th February 1991.

The article was describing the bombardment of the
deserting Iraqi forces with radio messages and
pamphlets, by the invading United States forces
during the Gulf war in 1991. It analysed the
psychological effect this had on the course of
the war.

4. Culled from the Research Archives of the Oxford

University Press through personal research,
with the assistance of Dr. J.H. Marshall,
Assistant Editor.New Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary It is unpublished.

5. Ibid: note 4 above

Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 15th

ed. 1991 p 171

7. Ibid. p. 171

V. I. Lenin: Imperialism^
The Highest Stage of Capitalism^
Foreign Languages Press, Peking; 1964,
pp. 1-155.

John Dabom: Russia:

Revolution and Counter - Revolution.
1917- 1924.
CUP; Cambridge, 1991; pp. 4 - 130.

John M. Mackenzie: Propaganda and Empire,

The Manipulation o f British Public Opinion
1880- 1890,
Manchester University Press, Manchester,
1984; pp.3 - 11, 33 - 35, etc.

29
 8. Philip Schlesinger: Putting 'reality' Together.
London and NY; Methuen and
Co; i987, pp. 135-163.
It deals with the mechanics of news selectivity on
BritishTelevision.

John M. Mackenzie: Op. cit; pp. 172- 193.

9. Derived, through personal research, ffon the research

files and archives o f the Encyclopaedia Britannica. It is
unpublished anywhere in the form collated for this
thesis.

10. Gerald Mansell: Let the Truth be Told:

The Politics of
Propaganda, 50 years of
BBC External Broadcasting.
London, 1981, pp.4-78

11. Ibid. pp 4 - 78

Robert Jackall et al eds: Propaganda.

Macmillan, London, 1995; pp. 190-217;
260- 275.

David French: The British Way in Warfare.

1688-2000
Unwin Hyman, London, 1990; pp. 175 - 202.

Clive Hardy &

Nigel Arthur: London at War
Quoin Publishing Ltd; Huddersfield, 1989;
pp.l - 176.

Liz Curtis: IrelandJ h e

Propaganda War.
The British Media
and the Battle for Hearts and Minds.
Pluto Press, London, 1984; pp. 29 - 229.

12. Sunday Times: Op. cit. See note 3 above.

13. See earlier Deinitions.

14. John Renshaw: ’Revolutions, Phone-ins, and Rural

Development': Overseas Broadcasters
Circuit. London, BBC, 1989, p37.

30
Ben Turok ed: Witness From The Frontline.
Aggression and Resistance in
Southern Africa,
Institute for African Alternatives,
London, 1990; pp. 18 -22.

15. See no.9 o f notes above.

16. Ibid; note 9 above

17. Auberon Waugh

& S. Cronje: Biafra:
Britain's Shame.
London, Michael Joseph,
1969. ppl6,29,32 -
33,36 - 37,60 - 6

18. Culled from a lecture to the Students of the University

of Nigeria, Nsuka, Eastern Nigeria, in 1970, by
Professor Kalu Uka, of the English and Drama
Department. He is now at the University of Calabar
Cross River State. He stated that T.S. Elliot enunciated
and applied the principle of'objective correlative'
in his writings. 'Objective correlative', involves the
selection o f an object, and the building of a story
around that object. The object becomes the
skeleton, and the story forms the flesh and body.

19. Andrew Scot: op.cit p.54 - 59

20. Auberon Waugh

& S.Cronje: Op. cit. p.28.

21. Ibid: p. 28

22. Luke Uka Uche: 'Radio Biafra and The Nigerian Civil War:
Study of War Propaganda on a Target
Audience':
The Third Channel, The Journal
o f International Communication.
International Broadcasting
Society(IBS), 1987.

23. Ibid: part 2.

31
 CHAPTER TWO:

THE OLD REGIME: (PRE 1939).

2.1. Introduction.

This chapter will examine the theme that propaganda in war is as old as war itself.

In Chapter One, it was argued that propaganda has the constituents of psychological

warfare and censorship - all amounting to the manipulation of information, to inform or

disinform, in order to achieve victory against the adversary. The common denominator

that spans the ages is the justification of war-the notion of the 'just war'. It is therefore

appropriate to take a closer look at the notion; and the other constituents of propaganda

pre-1939. In doing this, and in highlighting the arguments it will be necessary to

juxtapose, compare, and analyse examples from different periods. There will be definitions

and discussions o f relevant contextual terms. Areas covered in the chapter include the just

war, psychological warfare, and censorship.

2.2. The Just War:

The medieval European concept held that a ruler, by proper declaration and with proper

motives, might employ armed force outside his normal jurisdiction to defend rights, rectify

wrongs and punish crimes. He could, that is, take up arms for a just cause (which in

practice was variously interpreted, but usually involved an appropriate response to a

wrongful act). The concept developed as early as St. Augustine in the 4th century and was

still accepted by the Dutch jurist and writer on international law Hugo Grotius in the 17th

century. Its popularity thereafter declined,1 though, in the 20th century, it enjoyed a

revival in somewhat new form with the idea that a nation might resort to armed force in

self-defence or in the execution of collective obligations toward international peace

keeping operations. From this description of the 'just war', it may be observed that the

32
notion o f ’the just war’, tended to be propaganda oriented. Because of the authority of the

rulers and war lords o f the time, the constituencies to be motivated may have differed

from what obtains in the 20th century, but the objective and the notion was the same.

There had to be an appeal to the sensibilities of the other constituencies that could affect

the course of the war vertically or horizontally.

There had to be 'justification' for going to war, and for sustaining it. The soldiers during

the period had to be mobilised, and sustained at war, to defeat the enemy -the 'evil' or

'devil'. 'Justification'^ in Christian theology was either (1) the act by which God moves a

person from the state o f sin (injustice), to the state of grace (justice); (2) the change in a

person's condition as he moves from a state of sin to a state of righteousness, or (3)

especially in Protestantism, the act of acquittal whereby God gives contrite sinners the

status of the righteous. The term, is a translation of the Greek 'dikaiosis', (Latin -

justificatio), originally a technical legal term derived from the verb "to make someone

righteous".

To justify an action requires the building up o f a credible case. The process of building up

the case involves the cultivation of an image of the enemy as evil. The message to those at

which the image is projected is, 'propaganda'. The message and the messenger have to be

credible for the constituencies - 'reactors' - to respond to the intentions of the messenger.

The 'enemy' has to be destroyed in the eyes of the constituencies to justify the taking up of

arms to obtain 'justification' in the interest of'peace' and international order. The

adversarial leader had to be caricatured to show that he was an eccentric who wanted

conquest for his own selfish ends. He had to be made to look obnoxious to the foreign and

domestic audiences. This practice establishes a trend that has spanned the ages.

The 'evil' ruler could not and would not by himself carry out actions that would 'redeem'

himself, and free his subjects from persecution. Therefore it was up to the fair and

33
righteous (the good) ruler, in the interests of humanity, to 'redeem' the 'evil' by taking up

arms against him; to correct his evil ways, move him from 'a state of sin to a state of

righteousness' and redeem his subjects from persecution. The propaganda message

during the pre-1939 period of history was mainly targeted at the 'international' community

laterally or horizontally, dependent on whether the constituency being addressed was a

major, medium or minor power. During the early modem period, the domestic

constituency did not require too much motivation because the authority of the messenger,

the ruler, was absolute. It had to be mobilised however, to wage and sustain the war. The

motivating message was for the people to serve 'the King and Country' by going to war

and making the supreme sacrifice. Posthumous decorations, however noble, were

nevertheless, propaganda messages to convince those who might hesitate, that there was

everlasting reward in making the supreme sacrifice. The evolution of sovereign states in

Europe was foreshadowed by the publication in 1625 of Hugo Grotius', "De Jure Belli ac

Pads1' (on the law of war and peace), which held that states are bound by a code of legally

binding duties and prohibitions.^

Efforts to regulate warfare grew when weapons became more destructive. The

Declaration of Paris (1856) abolished privateering. In 1863, during the American Civil

War, President Abraham Lincoln issued general orders No. 100, 'Instructions for the

Government of Armies in the Field', which were based on the Lieber code, a codification

prepared by Francis Lieber that had great subsequent influence on the first Geneva

Convention which was adopted in Switzerland in 1864, to protect those wounded in war.

Conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 codified many of the existing laws of war.

The Geneva Conventions of 1906, 1929 and 1949 expanded and refined the law of war as

applied to civilians, prisoners of war, and wounded and sick military personnel. Several

treaties banned particular weapons. For example, the Geneva Protocol on Gas Warfare

(1925) prohibited the use of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare.^

34
The issue of what constituted a just war was argued in a theological context. War was

'just’ whatever its cause if undertaken by the highest authority, an independent prince.

From the 18th century, through world war 1, each nation was deemed the sole judge of its

need to wage war.^ This was the message o f the 'age' and the authority was the

messenger. However, the League of Nations Covenant held that aggression constituted

serious international misconduct. The Kellogg-Briand Pact(1928) which condemned

recourse to war influenced the Nuremberg trials o f German war criminals after the second

world war.

To galvanise international and domestic public opinion against an adversary, it was

necessary to show that the aggressor had violated the law of war enunciated earlier and

therefore was waging an unjust war against the 'messenger' or propagandist, or against

weak, defenceless peoples. The message had to be strong, convincing and credible. The

messenger had to be authoritative, dependable and believable. The total package was

propagandist. The messenger had to be portrayed as almost a deity who was infallible,

who could invite you to, and for whom you could, die in order to serve him. His cause,

according to his message, was just and right, even though, the age recognised 'might as

right'.7

O
David French0 says that Pitt the Younger did not rush into war with revolutionary France

although his belief and his message to his domestic constituency was that the 'political

nation had not lost its dislike of continental entanglements'. The British domestic

constituency was informed that in 1789, the French revolution did not threaten Britain's

European interests. This was reinforced by the rather reassuring message that the French

were.doing what the British had done during the 'Glorious revolution'. This ' positive'

propaganda to the British constituency, reinforced by the traditional insularity and

nationalistic instincts o f the British, became a credible option of many Englishmen who, as

35
a result welcomed the consequent upheavals in France, hoping that they would have the

effect of weakening their 'rival'.

Even in this case, the message had the positive effect of calming the British public, and not

motivating and mobilising them to war against France, but it was negative as far as the

international propaganda spectrum was concerned. This was because even when the

French National Assembly declared war on Austria and Prussia in April 1792, abolished

the monarchy and established a republic, Pitt did nothing. He would not go to war to save

the French monarchy. This was a clear demonstration of the power of the French

propaganda, which as stated, at the time was in accord with the traditional view of British

national interests.

Whilst there was serious civil war in France, the intematioal community was contained

with an effective, credible, and sustaining message. This is a demonstration of how

domestically generated propaganda in civil war can have either a positive or negative

effect on the intematioal spectrum. The object, in all cases was to create a more

egalitarian society and bring justice to an unjust and cruel society.

David French says that during the American war o f independence,^ Clausewitz's message

to his audiences was that before 1793, war had been an affair for governments alone but

that during the French revolution, 'suddenly war again became the business of the people'

who threw the full weight of their nation's might into their struggles. He further states that

the break between the limited wars o f the eighteenth century and the era o f unlimited war

beginning in 1793 (and temporarily ending in 1815), was less sharp than Clausewitz

suggested. Its beginnings can be discerned during the Seven Year's war. The means which

the combatants adopted may have been limited but for at least one belligerent, Prussia, the

ends were not.

The anti-Prussian alliance tried to deprive her of more than just a province; they wished to

reduce her to the ranks o f a second-rate power. And, had he looked accross the Atlantic,

Clausewitz might have noticed that in the 1770s and 1780s, the Americans had already

36
shown how the full weight of the people might be thrown into a national war effort. The

American war of independence was unlike the wars which had been fought in Europe for

dynastic aims earlier in the eighteenth century. It was not so much a struggle for territory

as a contest for the political allegiance o f the American people. The Americans proclaimed

that they were fighting to liberate themselves from the despotism of British rule. The great

cause for which they believed they were fighting filled enough Americans with patriotic

zeal to enable the congress to mobilise the colonies' resources in a way which had not

been seen in Europe since the Thirty Year's war.

Embedded in this project were two important notions - (1) the notion of psychological

warfare, which will be discussed in detail in another section of this chapter. (2). the notion

of justification. The American war o f independence was a kind of civil war, in that

subjects of the crown in a colony were rebelling against the King and Country, and the

metropolitan authority. Nevertheless, they felt justified to take up arms to 'emancipate'

themselves from the oppressive rule o f the metropolitan authority.

Central to the age o f the 'just war' were the English civil wars. The English civil wars also

have a bearing on the two notions considered in this chapter - the 'just war' and

psychological warfare. Robert Ashton opens his book The English Civil Wars. ^ with a

speech by James 1 to the Lords and Commons o f the Parliament at White-Hall on

Wednesday the 21st of March, 1609. The speech goes:

"The State of MONARCHIE is the supreme thing

upon earth: for Kings are not onely
GOD'S lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon
GOD'S throne, but even by GOD himselfe are
called GODS".

A second quote comes from John Shelden's Table Talk:

"A King is a thing men have made for their own sakes, for quietness' sake"; and a third

relevant quote comes from 'Example for Kings: or Rule for Princes to govern b v ':

37
 "As in natural things, the head being cut off,
the rest cannot be called a body:
no more can in politick things a multitude,
or commonality, without a head be incorporate". **

Such quotes - and it would not be difficult to find others, epitomised the ritual deification

of the monarch. According to Robert Ashton, this message was so propagated that the

monarchy was regarded as a divinely ordered institution, endowed with formidable,

charismatic and supernatural powers.

One of the most spectacular manifestations of this was the power of magical healing,

which the King was reputed to possess. Ironically, James 1 himself was sceptical of these

magical powers. However, the appointment o f Saul as King by God when the Israelites

prayed to God for a King was often cited as proof o f the divine and supernatural attributes

of the monarch. Such an attitude created a feeling o f awe among the subjects of the

various Kings. Most historiographers have seen the attributes of divine Kingship as a form

of propaganda. On 30th January 1649, the English cut off the head of their King. This was

not, ofcourse, the first time that an English King had been done to death by his subjects.

What differentiated it from earlier acts of regicide, such as the murder of Edward 11 in

1327, and o f Richard 11 in 1399, was that Charles 1 was not furtively murdered in a dark

and secret place, but executed on a public scaffold in Whitehall after a trial which,

although the King denied the legality o f the court, was, it was claimed, conducted

according to due process of law. In more modem times, the execution of annointed

monarchs - the public execution of Louis XVI in Paris in 1793 and the murder of Tzar

Nicholas 11 and his family in an obscure Russian provincial town in 1918 - have been held

to symbolise the passing of an order, and the inauguration of a new one.

There can be no doubt that some, though by no means all, of that minority of

revolutionaries who were responsible for the regicide of 1649 intended that it, too, should

38
be symbolic o f the birth of a new era, and many historians have been disposed to accept

them at their word. To more than one person who lived through the events of 1649,

regicide was in itself a blasphemy. ^ Robert Ashton cites Filmer as writing in 1652 that

"even the power which God himself exercises over mankind is by right of fatherhood".

According to Ashton, James 1 argued that "just as God is the father of mankind, so 'the

stile of Pater patriae was ever and is commonly used to King'. Thus 'as the father...is

bound to care for the nourishing, education, and vertous government of his children; even

so is the King, bound to care for all his subjects".

The message was a patriachal argument directed at a constituency who were all of the

King's subjects. It was not only that the King was the source o f all authority, he was also

the keeper of all his subjects, and caretaker of all their demands, and the supplier of all

their needs and desires. Apart from Filmer, other royalists, like, John Maxwell, Thomas

Jordan, Archbishop James Usher,etc; postulated and propagated this message during the
13
17th century.-3 This propaganda message was so powerful that no one dared reveal any

anti-monarchial feelings. The people's consciences were imprisoned with and by fear. The

message contained a number of propaganda elements, such as:

(1) psychological injunction,

(2) positive compensation (see note 14),

(3) negative compensation (see note 15),

(4) justification.

A further examination of these propaganda elements aroused by the message indicate the

following -

(1) psychological injunction; this is aroused in that the conscience and emotions of the

subjects became stultified; ^

(2) positive compensation; the message acted as enduring motivation for the monarchial

and patriachal protagonists and propagandists of the time;

39
(3) negative compensation;^ this was intrinsic in the message because it had the effect of

latent, though inert motivation for emancipation on the King's subjects, even from some of

his beneficiaries, who became galvanised by anti-monarchists like Oliver Cromwell; and,

(4) justification; the question that may well be asked is, how in the face of such a powerful

and compelling message, is rebellion justified? The problem becomes more complex,

because, the monarch, as well as being the keystone of the arch o f order, was also the

source of all privilege, inequality and social distinction. Deference and privilege pervaded

the social arrangements of the 17th century to an extent which requires a real effort of the

historical imagination to appreciate.

The royalist Sir John Berkeley quoted no less a person than Oliver Cromwell as saying

that "no men could enjoy their Lives and Estates quietly without the King had his Rights".

Revolt even against a tyrant was unthinkable, for revolt simply compounded the disorder

created by the tyrannical actions which produced it. ^

Nevertheless, despite the difference in historical context, similar elements are to be found

at work in the immediate post independence period in Nigeria, when southerners felt

deprived and oppressed by the Northerners who controlled the Federal government. Crisis

and anarchy ensued in Western Nigeria. This, as will be discussed in chapter 4, led to the

first military coup of January 1966, to a counter coup in July by Northern military officers,

and to a military government again dominated by the North. The consequence was the

civil war, resulting from a series of rapid events culminating in the South - particularly the

East - accusing the North of genocide, and a pogrom on Easterners fleeing from the

North, (see chs 4&5). In a situation of this nature, the deprived, the disenfranchised, the

suppressed and oppressed, carried out covert propaganda, through the medium of secret

meetings, word of mouth, and secret documents and pamphlets, in order to co-ordinate,

motivate and mobilise their constituencies. The subsequent civil wars in England are

replicated in the Biafran case. It is almost the inevitable consequence o f absolute

40
propaganda, censorship and subjugation. The justification for going to war to rectify the

situation is usually simpler to attain, ultimately.

The justification in Biafra, as in the English civil wars, was that pleaded by rebels in all

civil war situations - the emancipation of the oppressed and suffering, and the restitution

of human dignity to the deprived. Cromwell and his men as well as Nzegwu with his

fellow coup plotters in Nigeria, Ojukwu and all other civil war leaders have applied the

same justification. The message of'FREEDOM' almost always has universal support and

usually transmits from covert to overt propaganda. The surgical way to eliminate the

domineering and overwhelming rival message, is the elimination of the source, eg. the

monarch, the oppressors, the leaders of a regime, etc. This is what Cromwell achieved in

the execution of the King, and the Nigerian coup leaders in the assassination of their heads

of government. It is the most effective form of counter propaganda. It derives from the

words of James 1 himself, quoted earlier, "the severance o f the head from the body",

rendering it non-functional.

2.3. Psychological Warfare:

The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines 'psychological' as a science of human

mind; a treatise on or system o f this; colloquially, mental chracteristics.

It defines psychological warfare as - warfare achieving aims by weakening the enemy's

17
morale.

The Britannica describes 'psychological warfare' also called 'psywar', as the use of

propaganda against an enemy, supported by such military, economic or political measures

as may be required. Such propaganda is generally intended to demoralise the enemy, to

break his will to fight or resist and sometimes to render him favourably disposed to one's
1o
position.10

41
Although often looked upon as a modem invention, psychological warfare is of ancient

origin. Cyrus the Great employed it against Babylon, Xerxes against the Greeks, and

Philip the second o f Macedon against Athens. The conquests of Genghis Khan were aided

by expertly planted rumours about large numbers of ferocious Mongol horsemen in his

army; centuries later, in the American revolution, Thomas Paine's "Common Sense” was

but one of many pamphlets used to strengthen the British-American colonists' will to fight.

With modem scientific advances in communication, such as high speed printing and radio,

together with important developments in the fields of public opinion analysis and the

prediction of mass behaviour, psychological warfare has become a more systematic

technique in strategy and tactics, and a larger ingredient in warfare as a whole. ^ This

theme is taken up more broadly in subsequent chapters of this thesis - (chs.4&5.).

The foregoing definitions lend strength to the postulate at the beginning of the chapter,

that the 'Act o f Propaganda' is as old as war itself even though the word 'Propaganda'

appears to have a relatively modem or immediate pre-modem usage. Secondly, the

dictionary definitions reflect the argument in this thesis, that is, that propaganda is

designed to appeal to the sensibilities and sensitivities o f the recipient targeted groups.

The abstract and emotive aspects of psychological warfare bring to the fore the

constituent structural elements of propaganda - the ground rules earlier defined,ie.(l)

motivation, (2) mobilisation, (3) sustainability, and (4) durability.

In the references made earlier to Robert Ashton's 'The English Civil Wars', it could clearly

be seen that the mental and psychological ability of the English to rise against the King in

civil war was stultified. The argument here is that propaganda precedes a war, intensifies

and sustains through the war, and outlasts the war. The passages from Robert Ashton are

a clear indication of propaganda preceding a war. In order to counteract such enormous

'brainwashing' of a whole people, counter propaganda is necessary. The danger is that the

42
counter propagandist may 'fall out' with the law and authority of the land. In that case,

covert propaganda is resorted to.

Brainwashing usually means intensive political indoctrination. In distinguishing between

overt and covert propaganda; the former, is that in which the propagandist and perhaps his

backers are made known to the 'reactor' - constituency; and the latter, which may include

such things as unsigned political advertisements, clandestine radio stations using false

names, and statements by editors, politicians or others, who have been secretly bribed by
90
governments, political backers or business firms.

In the case of the English civil war, and Biafra, where the authority o f the King on the one

hand, and the military on the other, was supreme, it was essential to use intense covert

propaganda by way of secret documents, meetings, word of mouth, pamphlets (etc.). The

constituencies, though these secret documents are in most cases purely psychological

instruments, are exposed to counter messages, and are therefore mentally reconstructed to

resist the status quo In the English civil war, the vindication for Parliament to go to war

against the King, was stated thus -

M.. The matter, with us, is quite and generally

mistaken,and the question altogether wrong
stated,viz, whether we should obey the King or
parliament? For the King and parliament are
not like two parallel lines, which can never
meet, not like two incompatible qualities,
which cannot be both in one subject;
not like the ARK and Dragon, whom one house will
not hold; not like God and Mammon,
which one man cannot serve:
For by siding with...the parliament,
in those things which are according to
law, we side with, and serve the King".

43
From this it is easy to perceive the difficulties of parliament in what it intended to do, and

in countering such propaganda as "...who can stretch out his hand against the Lord's

annointed and be guiltless?" - an intense psychological line put about by the royalists - a

quote from Samuel 26:9.

During the evolution o f the theory of propaganda, early commentators observed that the

archeological remains o f ancient civilizations indicate that dazzling clothing and palaces,

impressive statues and temples, magic tokens and insignia, and elaborate legal and
O')
religious arguments have been used for thousands of years, presumably to convince the

common people o f the purported greatness and supernatural powers of Kings and priests.

In ancient India, the Buddha, and in ancient China, Confucius, like Plato, in Greece,

advocated the use of truthfulness, "good" rhetoric, and "proper" forms of speech and

writing as a means of persuading men, by both precept and example, to live the good life.

Toward 400BC. in India, Kautilya, a Brahmin believed to have been chief minister to the

emperor Chandragupta Maurya, reputedly wrote the Arthasastra '(Principles of Politics), a

book of advice for rulers, that has often been compared with Plato's Republic, and

Machiavelli's much later work The Prince. Kautilya discussed, in some detail, the use of

psychological warfare, both overt and clandestine, in efforts to disrupt an enemy's army

and capture his capital. Overtly, he said, the propagandists of a King, should proclaim that

he can do magic, that God and the wisest men are on his side, and that all who support his

war aims will reap benefits. Covertly, Kautilya states, his agents should infiltrate his

enemies' and potential enemies' Kingdoms, spreading defeatism and misleading news

among their people, especially in capital cities, among leaders, and among the armed

forces. In particular, a King should employ only Brahmins, unquestionably (according to

him), the holiest and wisest o f men, as propagandists and diplomatic negotiators. These

morally irreproachable, experts should cultivate the goodwill of their King's friends, and of

friends of his friends, and should also woo the enemies of his enemies. A King should not

44
hesitate, however, to break any friendships or alliances that are later found to be

disadvantageous. Similar advice is found in Ping-fa(The Art of WarTby the Chinese

theorist Sun Tzu who wrote at about the same time. He said:
"All Warfare"is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must seem inactive;
when we are near, we must make the enemy believe
that we are far away; when far away, we must
make them believe we are near; hold out baits
to entice the enemy.
Feign disorder and crush h im ".^

In 16th century Italy, Machiavelli discussed like Kautilya and Sun-tzu, before him, the

uses of calculated piety and duplicity in peace and war. In Shakespeare's plays, Mark

Antony and the Duke o f Buckingham display the principles of propaganda and discuss

them in words and concepts that anticipate the present day behaviour of political scientists

(see Julius Ceasar Actl 11 and Richardl 11, Actl 11). They refer to such propaganda

strategems, as the seizure and monopolization of propaganda initiatives, the displacement

of guilt on to others (scapegoatism), the presentation of oneself as morally superior, and

the coordination o f propaganda with violence and bribery. It is fair to deduce from such

writings that psychological warfare and propaganda are one and the same thing or at least

integrally assimilable with one another. It follows logically, that despite the fact that the

word "propaganda" was not used in ancient times, the 'Act' existed through psychological

warfare. It is as old as war itself. Another element which has surfaced from the above

discussion is 'deception'. This will be discussed together with censorship. The other

pointer that arises from the foregoing references, is the fact that apart from being as old

as war, the elemental objective o f propaganda has not changed -(ie.) to dismember the

enemy psychologically and emotionally, in order to defeat him, whilst at the same time

emotionally motivating the propagandist's constituency to go to war to defeat the assigned

enemy. The process of deception referred to in the foregoing discussion was applied in the

45
first world war, during the second world war by Hitler, and the Allies, during the Biaffan

war by Nigeria and Biafra alike and as later seen during the Gulf war of 1991.

Propaganda transcends time. It is necessarily a vital part of strategic military planning. It

will be seen in chapters 4 & 5 how deception featured rather heavily in the Biafra war.

In cases where the propaganda status (eg. o f the Kings, in England, or the military in

Nigeria), is so immense, that counter propaganda, cannot reverse the psychological

damage already done (to the counter propagandist's objectives), then it becomes

necessary, to sever the head from the body: It becomes necessary to eliminate the

messenger, the embodiment of the message that has become so overwhelming as to

mesmerise the targeted publics.

In the English case, it was necessary to show that the King could be humiliated, and what

better way to do it than to execute him publicly. The psychological effect was electric. It

caused a reverse shock action. In the case o f Biafra, the two earlier coups of 1966 (the

first of January and the counter coup of July), were to achieve this aim. It proves that the

"untouchables”, the "deified" are after all reachable. It causes the psychological and moral

superiority of the propaganda status quo to evaporate, and in reverse, the counter

propagandist becomes the "strong one", "the dependable one", the credible messenger,

whose message ought to be taken seriously and believed.

Just as Genghis Khan used to frighten his enemies by planting rumours o f huge ferocious

Mongols in his army, in Nigeria similar stories abounded. There were stories of 'native

doctors', 'juju men' or (as the European colonialists preferred to call them, witch doctors),

leading their different warriors into battle. If one part to the conflict lost, it meant,

according to folklore, that the 'juju man' of the victors was mystically stronger.

There is a clan in Akwa Ibom State o f Nigeria called the Ukpum Ete/Okon clan. A civil

war erupted in the clan (about 100 years ago), between Ete and Okon regarding the

ascendency of the clan Kingship. Folklore has it that the leader of the Ete people was so

46
mystically powerful that he could invisibly penetrate enemy ranks. He was impervious to

bullets, arrows, matchettes, spears or any other offensive weapons. The two communities

fought several skirmishes between them over territorial borders, and over the Kingship. In

the final battle, Ete, because of the powers of its leader Obio-Akama, discarded bullets,

pellets, cartridges, and all traditionally offensive weapons, and loaded their hunting and

shot guns with sheep and goat dung. The Okon people had live bullets, pellets and

cartridges in their guns. It is claimed that none of the Ete warriors died from that battle,

whilst the Okon people were slaughtered, routed and annihilated. Since then, Okon has

not dared to attack Ete again. ^

This legend represents the epitome of psychological warfare.

It accommodates all the hypotheses postulated by this thesis. It acted to motivate,

mobilise and sustain. It also outlasted the war. In his writings on the Ete warriors, Jackson
96
Ufot, likens Obio-Akama as the English to King Arthur or King George the dragon

slayer, and equates the Ete warriors with the Knights of the round table. They were

indestructible, at least by human beings. Obio-Akama's tomb is a place of pilgrimage for

all descendants of the clan, even now. All 'bona fide' male children of the clan are taken

there for a ceremony when they are bom, because they are potential accessors to the

throne - potential Kings. It is said that Obio-Akama never really died, but lives on.

These two communities of Ete and Okon became part of colonial Eastern Nigeria and

were actively involved in the civil war. The influence o f Biaffan and Nigerian propaganda

on these communities will be discussed in chapter 4. It is clear however that psychological

warfare or propaganda has its own cultural base and constituency. The reaction of the

various cultural groups depend on the language and form of the message they receive, on

the messenger, and on the interpretation of the received message, by the various segments

or groups within a particular community. It is clear also that psychological warfare has no

territorial bounds. As a concept, it is global. It has been transmitted from primitive times

47
to modem times. If 'cowboy westerns' are anything to go by, psychological warfare was a

potent weapon in the hands of the Ameri-Indians who were fighting skirmishes for

survival against invading, occupying, and colonising 'white men'. Like the Ameri-Indians,

the wearing o f leopard skins, charms, amulets and the carrying of offensive weapons as a

sign of prowess by an African warrior still endures amongst the Zulus of South Africa

even today. That is why it was difficult to make them discard these things, no matter how

much the South African Government and the African National Congress tried, during the

period preceding the multi party elections in 1994. It is like trying to strip them of their

last (psychological) propaganda weapon - like disarming them of their manly prowess. A

community does not have to be literate, or educated to imbibe and interpret propaganda.

It is in fact possible that an overly educated community would over-analyse and delay or

obstruct the effect of propaganda messages. This is ofcourse arguable. Psychological

warfare or propaganda is described as a system o f education. The level at which this

education takes place is important. The culture o f the society is also important, and varies

as from the Chinese community, through the English community, the Indian community to
97
the African community. There have to be set goals for any propaganda message. This

thesis prefers to describe those goals as objectives. The achievement of the goals or

objectives depends on the measure o f achievement at the end of the war. It is a matter of

'finis opus coronat' (the end crowns the work).

Oral history deriving from the Ete and Okon communities, chosen as sample communities

of Eastern Nigeria also suggests that covert psychological warfare was rampant during

inter-communal and intra-communal wars. The implantation o f rumours and agents to

spread rumours within the enemy camp was a constant strategy. The issuance of

pamphlets was not possible at the time, because of the people's level of education, but the

rumours of invisible, invincible warriors, who could strike the enemy by pointing a finger

to the sun, had impacted psychologically on the morale and emotions o f the enemy.

48
Overtly, town criers (who still exist today), were used to put out certain announcements,

first thing in the morning, and last thing at night all around the propagandist's territory.

One o f the objectives of this in war time was to put out false messages to the scouts o f the

enemy - a process o f deception - discussed in detail in the next section. Here, the point to

note is that it was a clear case of information manipulation to achieve optimum

propaganda effect and mislead the enemy.

By the time o f the first world war, Christianity had arrived in Ete. With it came church

bells. The tolling of church bells in a particularly coded message acted as a motivating

morse code in the event of an attack on the community. It is not clear how this originated,

or how it was deciphered. However, some selected members o f the community were

responsible for responding to the message of the church bells by the scouts, and for rapid

mobilisation - a sort of "rapid reaction force".

At the other end of the world spectrum, in Russia, civil wars were as rife as they were in

Africa during the the old regime ie. the period up to 1939. Of great importance in this

context is the period of the Bolshevik revolution. The propaganda that preceded it, was

sustained during, and succeeded, this period, is part of the indelible history of Russia and
98
the now defunct Soviet Union. According to John Dabom it is befitting to start with

Karl Marx's motto, 'De Omnibus dubitandum' (one should doubt everything)! He states

that on International Women's Day, 8th March, 1917, the government of Tsar Nicholas 11

introduced a new round of bread and flour rationing in the capital, Petrograd. For

thousands of women, housewives and factory workers, it was the final blow. They ignored

the pleas of union leaders to remain calm. The banners carried on that day included more

than demands for bread, but also an end to the war, and the overthrow of the autocracy.

There were no casualties and the day seemed to end peacefully. However, the following

day saw a mass strike involving half the factories in Petrograd. The demands for the

overthrow of the Tsar now outstripped those for bread. It was on the third day, 10th

49
March, that the police began firing on the striking workers. By 12th March, many of the

conscript troops of the Petrograd garrison began to listen to the pleas of the

demonstrators. Some remained hesitant, others moved over to join the crowd and fire on

the police. The volhynian Regiment (among others) killed their commander and went over

to the workers. Hitherto latent, inert, civil discontent, had suddenly been motivated and

mobilised into a bread riot, culminating in a revolution. On 12th March, Russia acquired

not one, but two new governments. The Petrograd Soviet of workers deputies which had

briefly existed during the 1905 revolution was revived. On the same day and in the same

building, the Tauride Palace, the Duma ignored the Tsar's call to disperse, and hesitatingly

formed 'a Provisional Commitee'. This later became known as the provisional government.

It was the politicians from this group who requested the Tsar's abdication on 15th March.

This he did, once it became clear that he could no longer enjoy the trust of his army

generals. The February revolution was over. It was regarded as a relatively bloodless coup

since only 1,315 people were wounded or killed.

A society that thrives on revolutions, also invariably thrives on propaganda. As with the

pre civil war, English Kings, and twentieth century military dictatorships, the Tsar was the

Alpha and Omega of the Russian society before the revolution. Like all dictatorial and

autocratic regimes, the subjects were reduced to non-entities, not only through physical

domination, but also by the stories o f the Tsar's enormous unquenchable powers. The

message here was as uncompromising as that of the English Kings, and the military

government in Nigeria, because, in any case the Tsar, the King, and the military, all ruled

by physical and propagandist force. To counteract, the revolutionaries in any civil war

have to address themselves to a simple uncomplicated message, in a language that would

permeate the consciousness of the oppressed, and tap the sweet sap of the suppressed

emotions, like an African tapper, tapping the sweet sap from a palm wine tree for public

and mass drinking. In short, the message from the dictators and autocrats is total and

50
uncompromising, whilst the message from the revolutionaries should be simple and

uncomplicated. The one is based on psychological pressure, on fear and intimidation; the
9Q
other on redemption and emancipation - the common denominator in all revoltionaries.

The Russian situation witnessed carefully planned and executed covert propaganda against

the Tsar, that motivated and mobilised the mass to take the action that resulted in the

events of 8th to 12th March. It was an example of the revolutionaries understanding the

needs of their constituencies, and using those needs to design a suitable message. In that

circumstance, the message, even though propagandist, acts to motivate confidence, to

coordinate and arouse inert and latent, mutual feelings, into spontaneous conflagration.

After that, overt propaganda takes over, to sustain the actions of resistance, rebellion and

revolution. John Dabom for instance, says that the Bolsheviks had come to power

promising 'Peace, Bread and Land1, and 'All Power to the S o v ie ts '.O n peace and land,

Lenin wasted no time in drafting decrees in the first two days o f the new regime. Bread

was a more intractable problem, since that was not a matter to be settled by decree. These

were all the things that the people were deprived of under the Tsar. The revolutionaries

knew this, and responded to their demands. No one, had a clear idea as to what 'All Power

to the Soviets' meant, or how it would operate. He says that one tendency which is clear

however, is that before the signing of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in March 1918, the
-5 I
Bolsheviks passed through what is often described as their 'utopian' phase. 1 At this

point, optimism was at its height, and Lenin expressed himself time and time again on the

capacity of the ordinary masses to administer the new social order. This was given

practical force in the decree on workers' control of the factories. Political prisoners were

released, if they promised not to attack the Soviet power, and the Bolsheviks entered into

a coalition with the largest peasant party, the 'left SRS'. Revolutionary propaganda is

usually a question of 'them against us', and whoever exerts the greatest psychological

impact, motivates the constituencies to gravitate towards the exerting propagandist or

messenger. The 'floating voters' have to be swayed one way or another. John Dabom

51
again states that since the days o f Alexander 11 the opposition to the Tsar was united by

the call for a representative assembly. In the 1905 revolution, Nicholas 11 had only

managed to regain control of the country by offering a parliament or Duma. This was

immediately negated by the promulgation of the Fundamental Law of 1906, which

maintained that the Tsar remained an autocrat; in other words, the Duma would have no

real power: In the first two Dumas, the Kadets, and after them the Social Democrats tried

to contest the Tsar's power and as a result, the Dumas were dismissed. In 1917, the

February revolution was hailed by all opposition parties as the beginning o f the long

awaited 'democratic revolution'. At this point in the history of Russia, the people needed

to be propelled into a particular course of action, the revolutionaries knew this,

counteracted the Tsar's psychology of brainwashing, identified with the people, tuned their

propaganda into their frequency, and, stimulated their consciousness.

Consideration of the Russian revolution, apart from answering the questions of who

makes, and who receives propaganda, also answers the question of what is the effect of

propaganda. The effect is implicit and the result is explicit. The effect is the motivation

and mobilisation of the constituency, and the result is the event of 12th March - the

overthrow o f the Tsar, and the introduction of'democratic revolution'.

Sometimes, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary propaganda are like psychiatric

treatment for people who have been subjected to prolonged mental brainwashing. The act

is the reversal o f conscious and unconscious beliefs and views held hitherto. It was not

different in Russia, it was not different in Biafra, it is not different now. The Russian

revolution also answers the question, which hopefully is self evident - why propaganda? -

Without propaganda, the turning point would never have occured. It is propaganda that

coordinated mutual feelings of discontent, and motivated the confidence to act in unison.

This will again be treated in greater depth in the concluding chapter. Here was also an

52
example of how civil war propaganda could be internationalised. John Dabom indicates

that the Bolshevik view of the development of the revolution was intimately connected to

the war, and the future international workers revolution, which Lenin believed would issue

from it. Lenin's slogan in 1915 had been 'Turn the imperialist war into a civil war'. The

Russian working class had done just this, but, although Brest Litovsk brought peace with

Germany, it did not end the 'imperialist' war. The previous allies of Tsarist Russia (the

Entente Powers, Britain and France), aided by the United States, Japan and the newly

independent states of Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all declared war on

Bolshevik Russia. Lenin maintained that his aim was to build a 'socialist order' (a worker's

controlled state), inside Russia. He also envisaged that the international revolution would,

within a matter o f months rather than years, ensure the victory of the proletarian

revolution, first in Russia, and then around the world, against all 'imperialist' dictatorships

and governments.33 This was his message to his constituencies domestic and

international. He was therefore surprised when the German workers and socialist parties

had not risen up against the 'excesses' of the Kaiser. Nevertheless, communism and

socialism did spread from Russia around the world, particularly to under-developed and

developing countries seeking to shake off the yoke of imperialism and/or colonialism.

As in the case o f South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria (etc.), a

copiously rehearsed, well organised and carefully targeted propaganda, whilst having the

effect o f psychological warfare domestically, does also have the tendency o f either sucking

in the international community financially, morally, physically and militarily; or alienating

them, dependent on the targeted publics and the interpretations of the message received.

In either reaction, the messenger is affected negatively or positively. The effect of positive

and negative propaganda will be taken up in the next section o f this chapter.

53
In large measure, the Bolshevik revolution was an outcome of the dissatisfaction caused

by the gross mismanagement o f Russian first world war effort. This in propaganda terms

had vertical and horizontal effects, with the Russian populace demanding a change in

governance, at least to extricate the country from the war.

Also, there was a bilateral influence in propaganda activity, with the Bolsheviks wanting

to spread the 'proletarian' doctrine to the rest of the world after the overthrow of the Tsar,

and the allies of the Tsar (Britain and France), trying psychologically to influence the

Russian masses to resist the overthrow. They did this by intimidating them with the threat

of repercussions and reprisals from the weight and range of forces lined up on the side of

the Tsar, against the Russian populace. There was also Germany to deal with, which relief

only came after the treaty o f Brest Litovsk, already discussed.

However, this period saw an immense display and exploitation of psychological warfare,

covert and overt around the world. For instance, Major General J.F.C.Fuller, describes the

first world war as a 'Carnival o f d e a th '.G e n e ra l Fuller further states that fifty years

before 1914, in the American civil war, when the muzzle-loading rifle prevailed, a

participant wrote: "our infantry were tired o f charging earthworks. The ordinary enlisted

men assert that one good man behind an earthwork was equal to three good men outside

of it" - an example of a currency of propaganda during the period (showing the prowess

of the riflemen), also outlasting the war. However, General Fuller goes on to say that his

troops were motivated to battle with the belief that the 'rifle bullet was Lord of the battle'

in the first world war. The implication, the message was that the soldiers should be

motivated to go into battle without fear, because they were protected by the greater fire

power of the rifle bullet, as things had moved on since the American civil war period,

when the muzzle-loading rifle prevailed. Rather, according to General Fuller, the prevalent

belief amongst soldiers, arising out of the message to the constituencies, was that "it was

the rifle bullet, which had rendered the defence stronger than the attack (here he was

54
defending the incapacity o f the generals to win profitable battles): it begot the rifle-pit and

the trench, it sheathed the bayonet, it blunted the sword, it drove back the cannon, and it

dismounted the horseman”.

Leon Wolf states that because of this, and other similar psychological messages, which

created confidence in the combatants, they even took on bets on the war ending within

one year. When things changed, they were no longer making bets that "the war would be

over by next year". They had begun, he says, to whisper that "it might last a life time",

usually followed by the mocking: "They say the first seven years will be the worst".

Nobody sang "Tipperary" any more - that dashing inspiring tune of earlier days. It had

been replaced by "Take Me Back To Dear Old Blighty". He goes on, sardonically they

hummed to the tune o f "Auld Lang Syne"; and tunes like:

"We're here because we're here,

Because we're here, because we're here;

We're here because we're here,

or
Because we're here, because we're here".

This was a demonstration of positive psychological warfare (propaganda), turning

negative when the objective is not achieved within specified parameters.

As in the case of the Bolshevik revolution, propaganda is legitimised when the objectives

are not only just achievable, but achieved, even if the starting point was deception. When

the objectives are not achieved within certain set parameters and goals, a negative effect

results which becomes counter productive, as illustrated by the British soldiers (in the

medium term) in the first world war. This does not mean that the war was not eventually

won by Britain and the Allies; it only means that because the front soldiers, the survivors,

55
expected to see their families in a year, when victory did not soon materialise, the

opposite motivation crept in. It is essential therefore to sustain the propaganda and

intensify it during the war, in order to sustain morale. It might be necessary to alter the

message and the form of sending it, in order to achieve this. In this case the British

soldiers, having found themselves in a 'catch 22' situation, had to rouse their own morale

with the kind o f songs cited above. A constituency not only galvanises itself, but

inwardly believes in its ultimate, if protracted victory.

2.4.. Censorship.

The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines censor as an official with power to

suppress whole or parts of books, plays, films, letters, news, (etc.) on grounds of

obscenity, threat to security (etc.). (2).v.t. act as censor of; make deletions or changes in;
■57
(3). censorship n: censorial.

The Britannica defines censor, 0 plural censors, or censores, m ancient Rome; as a

magistrate whose original functions of registering citizens and their property were greatly

expanded to include supervision of senatorial rolls and moral conduct. Censors also

assessed property for taxation and contracts, penalised moral offenders by removing their

public rights, such as voting and tribe membership, and presided at the lustrum ceremonies

of purification at the close of each census. The censorship was instituted in 443BC and

discontinued in 22BC, when the emperors assumed censorial powers.

The censors, who always numbered two, were elected normally at five-year intervals in

the 'Comitia Centuriata' (one o f the assemblies in which the Roman people voted).

Plebeians became eligible in 351BC for the originally patrician office. Judgements were

56
passed only with the agreement of both incumbents, and the death or abdication of one

resulted in the retirement o f the other.

In traditional East Asia, a censor was a governmental official charged primarily with the

responsibility for scrutinizing and criticizing the conduct of officials and rulers. The office

originated in China, where under the Ch'in (221-206BC) and Han (206BC-AD220)

dynasties, the censor’s function was to criticize the emperor's acts; but as the imperial

office gained prestige, the censorate became mainly an instrument for imperial control of

the bureaucracy, investigating acts of official corruption and misgovemment for the

emperor. The censors checked important documents, supervised construction projects,

reviewed judicial proceedings, kept watch over state property, and maintained a general

lookout for cases of subversion and corruption. Although the functions o f the censorate

were maintained in the Chinese Nationalist, and to a lesser extent, the Chinese Communist

governments, the institution effectively ended in China with the overthrow of the Ch'ing

dynasty in 1911 However, a censorate apparatus was adopted by all the East and Central

Asian states that copied the Chinese bureaucratic system. In Korea, because of the

relatively weak position of the Korean King and the strength of the aristocracy, the

censorate became a highly important organ, that not only scrutinized corruption, but

criticized the policies of the monarch.

The Micropaedia Britannica^ defines censorship as the suppression or prohibition of

speech or writing that is condemned as subversive of the common good. It occurs in all

manifestations of authority to some degree, but in modem times, it has been of special

importance in its relation to government and the rule of law. In the ancient world, the

regulation of the moral, as well as the political, life of a people was considered a proper, if

not necessary role o f government.

57
In the ancient Greek communities, as in Rome, it was assumed that the character of a

people would and should be shaped by the government. Even the quite open society of

Athens had limits, as indicated by the trial and conviction of Socrates in 399BC for his

corruption of youth, and acknowledgement of unorthodox divinities.

In the Republic. Plato outlines a comprehensive system of censorship, particularly o f the

arts, as part of the development o f the best possible regime.

Such censorship was an integral part of life in ancient Israel, where opinions and actions

were routinely governed by the community. But, those in a position to know - the prophet

Nathan, for example, were expected to speak out against abuses by those in power. This

was possible because the community had been trained to share a group of moral principles

grounded in thoughtfulness. It led to the encouragement in early Christianity of private

individual testimonies of faith, bearing upon the eternal welfare of the soul.

Ancient China was perhaps the largest polity to be thoroughly trained on a vast scale. Of

great importance were the systems o f education and examination that determined one's

place in a social structure that made much of the Confucian insistence upon deference to

authority and respect for ritual. Under the Chinese system, control of information was

retained by the authorities, who also determined the contents of the authoritative texts.

In Christendom, perhaps the most dramatic form o f censorship was the Index 'Librorum

Prohibitorum', by which the Roman Catholic church for centuries policed the literature

available to its followers. Other methods used by authorities (Catholic and non-Catholic

alike), to control what people believed or thought, were the development o f creeds, such

as the Nicene Creed', and the conduct of trials, such as those of Joan of Arc (1431), and

Thomas More (1535).

The struggle against censorship in the Anglo-American world began to take its modem

form in the 17th and 18th centuries. Of special importance was John Milton's

58
Areopagitica1(1644), in which he argued against a government's right to license (or

previously restrain) publication. Milton's definition of freedom of the press, however, did

not preclude the condemnation of material after publication, a matter taken up by the 'First

Amendment o f the Constitution o f the United States of America (1787).^

The question that now arises is, what is the role o f censorship in propaganda? As has

already been illustrated, propaganda is the manipulation of information to achieve the

propagandist's objectives. Censorship, clearly involves massive manipulation of

information. It will be seen in later chapters how in modem warfare, censorship is heavily

applied in war time (civil, international or global), by dictatorial, autocratic and

democratic states alike, to disinform or misinform the enemy. In monitoring and

controlling what is disseminated from the propagandist's media and other sources, the

enemy is not only kept in the dark about what the intentions of the propagandist are, he

also receives only that information that the propagandist intends the enemy to receive. A

vital part of this type of manipulation is deception. By controlling what goes out, and

deliberately planting lies in the information available to the enemy, the possibility of

altering or determining the enemy's war stategy is effected.

In Biafra, for instance, after the fall o f Enugu, the Capital, Radio Biafra still announced

that it was broadcasting from Enugu, throwing the Nigerian front line in the Enugu sector

into confusion, whilst boosting the morale of the Biafran publics (military and civilian). In

similar vein, during the Gulf war in 1991, by keeping tight control of, and manipulating

what the press gained access to, General Norman Schwartzkopf gave the impression that

he was planning an amphibious landing on Iraq, while all the time, he was in fact planning

a land invasion. Thus censorship is a vital propaganda tool, and consequently, a major part

of strategic planning. In the Biafran case, with the sacking (or liberation according to the

Nigerian side), o f Enugu, even when the radio was broadcasting from a mobile van or

59
from a bunker, the fact that it still claimed to be broadcasting from Enugu, helped to keep

up the morale of the domestic scene and create some credibility within the international

community. In the first world war, had the British soldiers not been led to believe that

they were going to win the war in one year, it is anybody's guess what their motivation to

go to war would have been. In summary, censorship and psychological warfare involve

vital strategic manipulation of information to achieve certain set objectives. These are

essential and important propaganda tools.

In relating censorship to propaganda, it is possible to argue that different sorts of polities,

ranging from the democratic to the authoritarian, have attempted a variety of social

controls over propaganda.^ In an ideal democracy, every one would be free to make

propaganda, and free to oppose propaganda habitually through peaceful counter

propaganda. The democratic ideal assumes that, if each is free to make propaganda, the

ideas best for society will win out in the long run. This outcome would require that a

majority of the general populace be reasonably well educated, intelligent, public spirited

and patient, and that they not be greatly confused by an excess of communication. A

democratic system also presupposes that large quantities of dependable and relevant

information will be inexpensively disseminated by relatively well - financed, public -

spirited, and uncensored news gathering and educational agencies.

The extent to which any existing national society actually conforms to this model is an

open question. That the world social system does not, is self-evident.

Censorship, as a propaganda instrument in war, does not only involve the control of what

information the propagandist's media (and sources) put out to the domestic, external, and

enemy publics, it also involves the control o f what comes from the external and enemy

media into the domestic environment, which is likely to demoralise the civilian population

and the military. Censorship as an instrument of propaganda in war is an organised

exercise in damage limitation to the morale o f the propagandist's targeted audience.

60
An element o f control is required to be able to censor. Governments can censor what

emanates from the government controlled media and sources whilst rebels, or freedom

fighters, or civilian war lords (dependent on one's leanings), can censor whatever

emanates from whatever media or sources they control. The period before the first world

war saw much covert propaganda activity against the Hapsburg rule of the Balkan states.

This culminated in the assassination o f Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.

No doubt, this was a spark for overt propaganda, that transmitted from the civil, domestic

Balkan act, and sucked in the rest of the world, leading to the greatest human carnage the

world had ever witnessed - truly, a "Carnival of Death". This was an example of the effect

of propaganda and manipulation of information (covert and overt), leading to a

devastating result - a global conflagration.

Covert propaganda adopts the form o f secret or (pirate) radio stations and well organised

information dissemination sources, pamphleteering, secret meetings, oral transmittion of

subversive messages. The overthrow o f the monarch (as seen in the English civil wars), or

the dislodging o f the establishment, or occupying military authority (as in Nigeria and

Biafra), is never a task to be taken lightly. The related propaganda involves the risk of

discovery, and possible death on discovery. It has to be a well organised network. There

have to be linkages and connections to and with the external constituencies sympathetic to

the cause of the propagandist. The polity, on the other hand has to try to censor the

revolutionary propaganda of the freedom fighters or rebels. In some cases, this involves,

imprisonment, death, bombing, destruction or setting alight the radio stations and other

sources of dissemination. It also involves large scale seizure o f published material. Where

the materials have already been circulated, the authorities can issue a decree banning the

possession, reading, posting, or publication of the materials in any form - a process of

official counter propaganda. In cases where the radio stations of the revolutionaries are

clandestine, and cannot be immediately discovered, a process of'jamming' of the

61
frequency is employed. This, and pamphleteering were also largely employed during the

first world war. Nigeria similarly employed a lot of ’jamming' on Biafran radio stations.

They also air-dropped pamphlets on Biafran territory. Another method of official counter

propaganda, apart from the ones discussed above, is the publication of official counter

propaganda materials, and the use of official media to send messages. Sometimes, these

are forced down the throats of often times reluctant domestic society, and a confused

external society. This can produce a negative effect on a highly disciplined, well organised

population, who treat the official counter propaganda with disdain and scorn, and become

more resolute to press on with their cause.

An example o f how resolute a group can be is implicit in a chapter titled ’’The Bluff', in

John Glubb's Into Battle -A Soldier's Diary of the Great War.43 chronicling his experience

in the first world war. In most cases, the military constituency resorts to self motivating

songs. As the odds against survival lengthened, John Glubb's military audience was

entertained by a song that went thus -

"I want to go home! I want to go home!

I don't want to go to the trenches no more,
where the whizz - bangs and shrapnel they
whistle and roar.

Take me over the Sea,

where the Allermans cannot catch me,
Oh my! I don't want to die,
want to go home!”

According to Glubb, the song would be followed by loud cheers. He wondered whether

the Boche intelligence had received copies of the song, and reported that the morale of the

British army was cracking. That in itself, could have been a process of deception, meant to

mislead the enemy into lowering its guard. It could be described as a horizontally

transmitted military propaganda. There was also a popular song that was sung just before

battle, called, "The Galloping Major".

62
The corporal sang a parody o f this:

"Whenever we go to war,
we drive the enemy barmy,
Hi! Hi!
Never say die!
Here comes Kitchiner's Army."

The objective is implicit in the self motivating message of confidence. Any other type of

message issuing from the military source at this time to the enemy, would have been

censored, treated as treason, and resulted in the court martial of the 'traitor', unless of

course, the individual was a scout or spy for the enemy, and transmitted his message

covertly. Even then, on discovery he would be subjected to a traitor's punishment as

defined. All this is a form of military censorship, which goes on, not only in war time, but

all the time. As a constituency, therefore, the military is subjected, and subjects itself, to

perpetual censorship. This is why the military should not be in government, because when

they are, the military censorship so described, is transmitted and extended to the whole of

the civil state. There can therefore be none o f the required and necessary, fundamental

freedoms whilst the military is in power.

Annette Tapert (Despatches from the Heart - An Anthology of letters jrom the, front).

published a poem written in the trenches by Siegfried Sassoon, on 10th February 1916.^

It exhibits how the self motivation transmitted outside the immediate constituency (in this

case the military), can have the opposite, negative interpretation by even other loyal,

uninvolved constituencies (the civilian constituency). The poem is in three verses, and is

published along with letters by other soldiers in the trenches, who were constantly writing

to their loved ones, to let them know that they were still alive. The third verse of the

poem goes thus:

63
 "...And, then he thought: to - morrow night we
trudge
Up to the trenches and my boots are rotten.
Five miles o f stodgy clay and freezing sludge,
And everything but wretchedness forgotten.
To-night he's in the pink; but soon he'll die.
And still the war goes on - he do'nt know why."

The civilian population, being confronted by these messages, these apparent musings from

a soldier in the trenches, may tend to think that there was no justification for the war to

continue, because the suffering in the trenches was unbearable, and that the soldiers were

demoralised. It becomes arguable, therefore, whether even these sort of letters, and

poems, should be censored also.

However, the songs, poems, and letters are indications of propaganda outlasting the war.

The songs in themselves motivated and sustained morale during the war, but their

endurance and indelibility have lived on. Generations, who otherwise would not have

known, heard about, least of all remembered the first world war, would, through the

songs, poems, and letters, paint mental pictures of the trenches during the war, and the

people who fought in them. The effect of this is perpetual resentment for the perpetrators

of the war. Therefore, even in the post war structure, propaganda still has a vicariously

controlled motivating factor, forcing or enabling younger generations to go to war against

old enemies. This is borne out in Israel - the age old struggle over Palestine between the

Jews and Arabs; and in Yugoslavia, where the world is again witnessing almost a

replication of the events that led (with Sarajevo again as a fulcrum), to the first world war.

It is a conscious manifestation of subconscious feeling. The propaganda constituency

becomes futuristic. This may not have in fact been the intention of the authors, but it does

not obliterate the propaganda effect it creates.

I.T.V.Channel 4 shows paintings and poems o f participants in the American civil war. As

already discussed, these, together with the numerous 'cow-boy westerns' shown around

64
the world, create, and send propaganda messages of winners and losers, engendering a

dual effect on four different constituencies. First, the vanquished, particularly the Ameri-

Indians feel offended and humiliated, second, the blacks feel the objectives of their

propaganda war thrusts have not been achieved, third, the Caucasians of the victorious

North, (except a few) feel superior and elated, fourth, the Caucasians of the South,

resented defeat, and want a return to their fore father's status quo.

Ironically, in Nigeria, the Biafrans have not regrouped to continue the struggle. The

reasons for this will be elaborated on in chapter 4. But, it is evident from the foregoing

discussion that the effects of propaganda are durable, and far outlast the war (negatively

or positively).

However, as Niccolo Machiavelli^ has shown, while some propaganda may have the

effect of outlasting a war, it may not have had the same motivating effect during the war

itself. His attempts to raise an effective militia strong enough to defend Florence were

unsuccessful, except for a single defence against the M e d i c i , a n d even that collapsed

eventually. Machiavelli published extensively, to motivate the people o f Florence, his

bitterness arising from the fact that foreigners (notably France and Spain), were ruling

Italy. His principal loyalty though, was to Florence, which he hoped he could motivate,

and mobilise, and use as an example to the other city states of Italy to take pride in

themselves, and 'stand up to be counted'. He was first a republican, and second, a patriot.

He was derided by some at the time, and had a rather checkered career. Nevertheless, his

writings such as 'the Art o f War, and 'the Prince', have outlived him, and in retrospect,

have been taken seriously.

There are some arguments now on whether war has moved on from being just an 'art', to

being 'pure science'. While this may not be of concern in the context o f this thesis, it is

important to observe that some schools o f thought have noted that propaganda has

evolved from being a mere 'art', to the 'science of propaganda'.

65
In the book, there is an interesting illustration of Machiavelli's attempt to motivate

Florentines to build a good, strong militia, that would rescue the Republic, and

subsequently act to encourage all of Italy to resist domination by foreigners.

"...Wise princes, therefore have always shunned auxiliaries, and made use of their own
forces. They have preferred to lose battles with their own forces than win them with
others, in the belief that no true victory is possible with alien arms. Now I shall never
hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his conduct as an example. The duke used auxiliaries in
his invasion of the Romagna, going there at the head of French troops. With those, he
took Imola and Forli. But then, he decided that they were unsafe, and he turned to
mercenaries in the belief that less risk was involved, hiring the Orsini and the Vitelli. In
making use of these, he found them to be suspect, disloyal and dangerous; so he got rid of
them and raised his own forces. And one can easily see the difference between these
forces by considering the difference between the standing of the duke when he had only
the French, and when he relied only on his own forces. He grew in stature at each stage;
and he was held in real respect only when every one saw that he was absolute master of
his armies."

The implication here is of a lack of motivation by the targeted constituency, resulting in

the failure of the propaganda objective. It demonstrates how different segments of a

particular constituency react to the same message. The Italian citizens would have been

more motivated to fight for their 'Republics', than the mercenaries were;and they had to be

motivated, to uphold the pride o f the people. As a war strategy, this was analogous to

the problems encountered by Biafra with conscripts from the minority areas, during the

civil war.

There is of course a difference between conscripts and mercenaries, even in their

motivation to war. Sometimes, mercenaries, fighting mainly for their money, are better

trained professional soldiers, and can in certain circumstances be more reliable. Conscripts

are usually reluctant participants, virtually in some cases, dragged against their will, to

fight. There is no real commitment on their part. Several of such conscripts deserted their

posts during the Biafra war, as did the Iraqi conscripts during the Gulf war, leaving open

to the enemy large, easily penetrable flanks.

To justify his message, towards the end of'The Prince', Machiavelli writes;

66
"It is necessary, therefore, to raise such an army, in order to base our defence against the
invaders on Italian strength. Although the Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered
formidable, nonetheless there are faults in both which would enable a third kind of army
not only to hold them in battle but to be sure of conquering. The Spaniards cannot
withstand cavalry, and the Swiss have cause to fear infantry-men, who meet them in
combat with a determination to equal their own. Thus it has been found, and experience
will prove that the Spaniards cannot withstand French cavalry and the Swiss succumb to
Spanish infantry. There may have been no complete demonstration of this latter assertion,
but there was some indication of it's truth at the battle of Ravenna, where Spanish infantry
troops clashed with the German battalions, which adopt the same line of battle as the
Swiss. In the encounter, the Spaniards, making good use of their bucklers, with great
agility thrust their way between and under the German pikes, and attacked with impunity
while the Germans were defenceless. If it had not been for the cavalry which charged
them, the Spaniards would have annihilated the Germans. So, having grasped the defects
of these Swiss and Spanish infantry, you can develop a new type, capable of withstanding
cavalry and undaunted by other infantry. This will be ensured by raising new armies and
employing new formations. It is things of this kind which, when newly introduced, bring a
new prince greatness and prestige.

In order therefore that Italy, after so long a time may behold it's saviour, this opportunity
must not be let slip. And I cannot express with what love he would be welcomed in all
those provinces, which have suffered from these foreign inundations, with what thirst for
vengeance, with what resolute loyalty, with what devotion and tears. What doors would
be closed to him? What people would deny him that obedience? What envy would stand in
his way? What Italian would refuse him allegiance? This barbarous tyranny stinks in every
one's nostrils. Let your illustrious House undertake this task, therefore with the courage
and hope which belong to just enterprises, so that, under your standard, our country may
be ennobled, and under your auspices what Petrarch said may come to pass:

'Virtue 'gainst fury shall advance the fight,

And it i'th combate soone shall put to flight:
For th' old Romane valour is not dead,
Nor in the Italians brests extinguished'."

The above passage comes from the paragraph called 'Exhortation to liberate Italy from the

barbarians', and is addressed to the 'new Prince' of Ita ly .^

The purpose of reproducing this long 'ode-like' passage, is to demonstrate the fervour of

Machiavelli's love for his country, the objective of his propaganda message, and his power

of persuasion. It is surprising that he was not listened to. The last paragraphs are

particularly moving, and could motivate and mobilise most modem constituencies. It is

67
possible that he, himself, his writings, or his propaganda, were rather futuristic for the

people of Italy at the time, and so were anachronistic. Society, perhaps, was more

practical at the time, and made little room for theorising. This is also, presumably, why he

had to go into practical details o f actual war strategies to assert his point, his conviction,

and his message. It was a powerful message that he sent to the Italian publics.

Even though it may have seemed anachronistic at the time, the message has lived on after

him, and in retrospect, perhaps, if he had been listened to and taken more seriously, the

world map might have been drawn differently today. That, of course, is a matter of

conjecture. The passage also shows that no words can be lost in propaganda. The

language has to suit the environment in time and structure.

It may take one line to motivate some people; it may take lengthy passages to motivate

and mobilise others within a given space and time: it still may take several repetitions of

the same messages to motivate, mobilise and sustain some constituencies. Each case is a

matter of tactics.

Mirian Kocham (The Last Days o f Imperial Russia). ^ illustrates this when she says that

in the midst of all the upheavals o f the time in Russia, in January 1904, Russia embarked

on an irrelevant, and in the event, wholly abortive war with Japan. Viacheslav

Konstantinoviel Plehve, Minister o f the Interior, had said that "in order to hold back the

revolution, we need a small victorious war". War, on this occasion, did not constitute the

universal panacea, despite the obvious propaganda strategic intentions.

It did not bind the disunited people o f Russia together into one coherent, patriotic body.

On the contrary, it brought to the fore all the discordant forces which until then had

remained peripheral. The assassination by revolutionary groups continued. On 15th July,

1905 Plehve, himself a symbol o f the government's policy of repression, its contempt for

public opinion, anti-semitism and bureaucratic tyranny, was killed by a social

68
revolutionary's bomb. Dr. Dillon, the Daily Telegraph correspondent, happened^ to be

passing when:

"...two men on bicycles glided past, followed by a closed carriage, which I recognised as
that of the all-powerful minister. Suddenly, the ground before me quivered, a tremendous
sound as of thunder deafened me, the windows of the houses on both sides of the broad
street rattled and the glass of the panes was hurled on to the stone pavements. A dead
horse, a pool o f blood, fragments o f a carriage, and a hole in the ground were parts o f my
rapid impression. My driver was on his knees devoutly praying and saying, that the end of
the world had come. Plehve's end was received with semi-public rejoicings. I met nobody
who regretted his assassination or condemned the authors."

Most propagandists use external threat to seek to unify and galvanise domestic support in

war. This goes for civil as well as international war. Biafra, for instance accused 'the

muslim North' of wanting to exterminate 'the Christian South' of Nigeria, and called on all

Christians to unite and fight for Biafra. It will be seen later how the domestic Biafran

public, and the international, external public reacted to this type of propaganda (chs 4&5).

The cold war was sustained by both East and West on the basis of this type of propaganda

of real or imaginary external, and/or nuclear threat, even though it was obvious that the

super powers would never resort to war, least o f all nuclear war. It was sustained for

some forty years until the collapse o f the Soviet Union, leaving the West at a loss on how

to justify its continous arms build up and retention of nuclear weapons.

In a fragmented society, like Russia o f the time, Biafra/Nigeria, Iraq, this type of

propaganda is always 'risky', where absolute loyalties cannot be assured. Clearly, it failed

in the Russian case, and produced, rather a negative interpretation of, and reaction to the

intentions of the official propaganda message, from the domestic population. The

populace was motivated in the opposite direction to the objectives of the official

propaganda, leading up to the assassination of Plehve, and to a revolution.

69
In the American civil war, the situation was different. There was a polarity between the

North and the South. Apart from the usual 'spies' and 'traitors', there was loyalty on both

sides, making the propaganda objective easier to achieve. In the South, propagandists

devoted their efforts to asserting the right to secede, and to proving that the aggresive

North was invading Southern territory. In the North, the preservation of the Union,

patriotism, and the crusade against slavery were the major themes. Atrocity stories -

largely of brutal treatment of the wounded, military prisoners and political dissenters - the

usual accusations prevailed. As in the Nigeria/Biafra case, one side usually gets on top in

the propaganda war. Whilst in the American case, it was the North that succeeded; in the

Nigerian case, it was Biafra in the South. The war can some times be won and/or lost,

dependent on the effectiveness o f the propaganda of each side. The South, in the

American civil war, badly needed arms, but its propaganda organisation was dismal, and

could not mobilise the external constituency to help; Biafra started with nothing, was

blockaded on land, air and sea, (chs.4&5), but its effective propaganda motivated the

external contituency, bringing in much needed external help to enable it to sustain the war

for three years.

2.5. Conclusion.

The age of the 'just war' in Europe was also the period that saw 'might' as 'right'. It was

held that a ruler, by proper declaration, and with proper motives, might employ armed

force outside his normal jurisdiction to defend rights, rectify wrongs, and punish crimes. It

was therefore necessary for the ruler to justify the existence of these conditions. It was

also essential for him to possess the might to overwhelm the offending state. One way of

overwhelming the enemy was by psychological warfare.

70
By making the enemy feel militarily inferior, he loses the will to fight. This could be done

covertly and/or overtly. The other method employed was the prevention of the 'offending'

authority from putting accross its own arguments and defence. This was done by way of

censorship. But, this required control over the means of message transmition of the

transgressor. All this means that although the word propaganda might not have been used

militarily, the ingredients existed in psychological warfare and censorship, because modem

propaganda employs the same methods, as the next chapter illustrates.

71
 Notes of chapter 2.

1. The New Encyclopaedia

Britannica: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. Chicago, 15th ed.

1991; Vol.6;p.662,la.

Vol. 12;p.490,3a. Vol.29;p.633,2b.

2. Ibid: vol. 12; p. 490, 3a

3. Ibid: vol.29; p.633, 2b

4. Hugo Grotius: 'International Law:

Conduct o f War',

Encyclopaedia Britannica

Inc. 15th ed.

Vol.29;p.632,2a.

Vol.l7;p.333,2a.

Vol.21 p.725,2b.

5. Ibid: vol.29; p.632, 2a

6. Ibid: vol. 17; p.333, 2a

7. Ibid: vol. 21;p.725, 2b

72
8. David French: The British Way

In Warfare

1688 - 2000,

Unwin Hyman, London;

p.63.

9. Ibid: p.89.

10. Robert Ashton: The English Civil Wars:

Conservatism and

Revolution, 1603 - 1649;

2nd.ed. Weidenfeld and

Nicholson, London, 1989

pp.5,29,&85.

11. Ibid: p. 156.

12. Ibid: p. 119

13. Ibid: p.290, 291.

14. Prof. George Schwarzenberger, former Dean of the

department of law, University College, London,

explained in a lecture to the international

economic law class in 1974, that positive

compensation involves a process whereby a country

which benefits from another makes positive

public pronouncements and moves towards the latter.

73
15. Conversely, in negative compensation, whilst a country

benefits from the support of another, it nevertheless

engages in antagonistic public pronouncements

towards that other.

16. Robert Ashton; Op. cit.pp300 - 349.

17. R. E. Allen: The Oxford Dictionary of

Current English.

Oxford, O.U.P 1984.

18. The Encyclopaedia Britannica: Op.cit. Vol.9,p.764,lb.

19. Ibid: Vol.26, p.l78,la, b.

20. Ibid: p. 178, 179,2a, 2b, 2c.

21. Robert Ashton: Op.cit.p.214.

22. The Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Op. cit.'Propaedia'

Vol.4; p.488,2a.

Vol. 18; p.260,lb.

Vol.26; p. 171 la.

23. Ibid: Vol. 15; p.215,la.

74
24. Kautilya: The Encyclopaedia

Britannica, Op. cit.

Vol.6;p.768,la.

Vol.21;p. 182,2b; 190,1a.

173,1b.

25. Sun Tzu: Ibid. Vol.ll;p.389,2b.

vol. 5;p. 544,3a.

vol.21;p.718,2a.

vol.29;p.647,lb.

26. Jackson Ufot: Obio Akama: The Great

King and Warrior.

Ikot Akan Press,

Ete. 1984,

pp. 1 - 350.

27. The Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Op. cit. vol.9;p.764,la.

vol.26;p.310,2a.

28. John Dabom: Russia: Revolution and Counter Revolution.

1917 - 1942, Cambridge,

CUP; 1991,pp.l93 - 197.

75
29. Rebel leaders are usually so styled by the governments

against which the insurgence occurs. It is a kind of

caricature, to show that the leader of the movement has

no legitimacy or territory.

30. John Daborn: Op.cit. pp.219 - 273.

31. Ibid. p.313-315.

32. This is similar to the process of de-briefing.

33. John Daborn: Op.cit.pp.381 - 385.

34. Leon Wolff: 'In Flanders Fields',

Ths-1.917 Campaign;
Middlesex,Penguin Books,

1959, p.211.

35. Ibid: pp.289 - 291.

36. Ibid. pp.313 319.

37. R E . Allen: The Oxford Dictionary of

Current English.

op.cit. p. 112.

76
38 The Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Op.cit. vol.3; p.21,2a.

vol. 15; p.619,la.

39. Ibid: vol. 16; p. 114,lb. p.86,2a. p.91, 2a p. 108,lb.

40. Ibid: vol.23; p.551,lb. pl77,2a.

41. Ibid: vol.28; p.520,2a. vol.26; p. 178,la.

42. Ibid: vol.16; p.27,la. p.557,lb. vol.6; p.844,3b. vol.9;

p.781,2a.

43. John Glubb: The Bluff,

Ip ta Battle,

A Soldier's Diary of

the Great War.

London, Cassel, 1978,

p. 167.

44. Annette Tapert.ed: Despatches from the Heart.

An Antholody of letters

from.the.front,

London, Hamish Hamilton/Imperial

War Museum,1984. p.236.

77
45. Nicolo Machiavelli:

English Translation

With introduction by

George Bull: The Prince,

Middlesex, Penguin Books,

1961.

Translation, 1981.

pp.l - 50.

46. Ibid: pp. 51 - 100.

47. Ibid: pp.101 - 138.

48. Miriam Kochan The Last Days of Imperial Russia,

Weidenfeld and Nicholson,

London, 1976, p.303

49. Ibid: p. 347.

78
 CHAPTER THREE.

MODERN METHODS AND CONCEPTS.

3.1. Introduction.

The period after the First World War, leading up to the Second World War witnessed

physical and psychological developments in propaganda activity.

It was a period when the word 'propaganda’, apart from being deeply rooted and applied

in military activities, was developed and institutionalised. It has been seen how active

propaganda activities were, leading up to the First World War. It is possible to argue that

the setting up of the League o f Nations was an attempt by some major world powers to

institutionalise their propagandist manoeuvres on a global basis, in order to continue to

dominate psychologically. Indeed, the League collapsed, because of the confusing and

confused messages that emanated from it. It is also possible to argue that this was the first

attempt at the international institutionalisation of propaganda. Having learnt from that

failure, the second time round - with the United Nations - the major powers succeeded in

effecting the institutionalisation of a propaganda forum; a place where 'jaw-jaw' was better

than 'war-war'. *

The different nations o f the world applied propaganda in their dealings with each other, in

foreign policy and conflict, with greater intensity, developing and imitating whatever

precedent there was.

The First World War had a devastating effect on the world. It had destabilised and

debilitated the world's human and material resources. It had also taught governments

some lessons. It had taught them the art of massive warfare. It consequently taught them

the art of building up to war - the art o f propaganda. The world probably believed that

never again would there be another war of that nature, that would be so devastating to the

79
human race. But no one anticipated the power of propaganda that was built up,

scientifically and artfully manouvered and institutionalised within Germany. It was this

power that led to the second greatest human carnage - the Second World War.

The Ministry of Propaganda, set up by Adolf Hitler and run by Goebbels was the

culmination of marathon propaganda against the Jews, foreigners, and everything non-

German, that had consumed German society. It led to the overthrow of the legitimate

civil State, the holocaust, the aggression against the neighbours of the German State, the

declaration of war, the putsch, and the Second World War. The whole of the Hitleric

German State was borne out of propaganda, sustained on propaganda, and collapsed like

a pack of cards with the collapse of the system. It was entirely systemic.

Since Nations of the world are copycats, this lesson was not lost on other States in their

domestic, and external operations and decision making. Therefore, the birth of modern

negative and positive propaganda became feasible.

The Biafran leaders must have been deliberating on these lines when they set up the

Directorate of Propaganda during the Nigerian civil war. Also often called the Propaganda

Directorate, it was responsible for organising Biafran internal and external war

propaganda. The chapter is discussed under three headings - methods, concepts, and

derivative concepts. Derivative modem concepts mirror modem concepts. The reflection

is indicative of family resemblance - the capacity o f states to imitate. In part, the latter

might sound inevitably repetitive of the former.

There will be constant juxtaposition and interposition of the models and other examples,

in order to expose the argument.

80
3.2. Methods:

The dropping o f pamphlets behind enemy lines from overflying aircraft had already been a

feature during the first world war. The jamming of frequencies of enemy radio stations

was also used during the first world war. The oral and physical infiltration and penetration

of enemy ranks both civil and military, with negative and damaging information was

carried over to this period; it was a lesson learned from earlier warfare tactics. None of

these methods collapsed with the first world war. The propaganda lessons of the first

world war helped to improve on the utility, application, and method of propaganda.

During the period, major world powers were still shuffling for influence, power, and

atmospheric hegemony. Colonisation was rife, and so was the need to psychologically

subjugate the colonised states in the various spheres of influence with and by tested

methods,e.g;

a. Institutionalisation and other related methods.

By any standard o f examination, the cardinal example of modem propaganda in war, is the

German state of the post first world war, and immediate pre-second world war period,

which was established by the National Socialists or Nazis. Inevitably, therefore, the

propaganda of Hitler's Germany takes up most of the space in this chapter, which covers

its methods and concepts.

Hitler was a corporal in the German army during the first world war. The experience of

the war and the propaganda that accompanied it were not lost on him. The successes and

failures of Germany in that war were also not lost on him. It is difficult to decipher what

nurtured his ambitions then, but his rise to power through the economic depression of the

interwar period is significant. A school o f thought believes that the conditions and drastic

sanctions imposed on Germany after the first world war, were so impossible to maintain

and fulfil, that the resultant second world war was inevitable. Sir Edward Heath, in a

speech after the Gulf war in 1991 referred to this when he argued against the repetition of

81
 9
that kind of'mistake' by the allies, in imposing impossible and draconian conditions and

sanctions on Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Nevertheless, whether it was this or the severe world wide depression of the 1930s,

following the first world war, that was responsible for the rise of Hitler to power is

difficult to tell. What is clear is that Hitler found a combination of these factors fertile

ground to germinate his propaganda, which nourished, sprouted, sustained, and grew into

an institution - the Ministry of Propaganda. It was the first time in history that propaganda

activities had congealed into an official institution.

The process was to legitimise official and State propaganda. Radio was the chief weapon

for the German Ministry of propaganda. Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf: 'In war, words are

acts'. This lays emphasis on pronouncements made by rulers in war time, and even also in

foreign policy, and in politics in peace time. The difficulty arises when such

pronouncements are calculated to deceive and mislead. If 'words are acts', the question

arises, which or what acts are to be believed or not to be believed.

In July 1992, The British Sunday Times.^ serialised the diaries of Goebbels, Hitler's chief

propagandist in charge of the Ministry of propaganda. The diaries covered the period

leading up to Hitler's mysterious death and Goebbel's reported suicide.

As an example of propaganda in war, the German case illustrates the argument of this

thesis. The build up of the propaganda preceded the war, was sustained intensely through

the war, and as recent events in Germany have shown, lingered on long after the war, even

when the system had collapsed. According to Peter Millar (The Sunday Times, 5 July

1992 Goebbels' diaries give an insight into Nazi propaganda. They trace the moulding

of the German society from 1933 to the putsch and through the war. The diaries highlight

the 'Sudeten crisis' leading up to the Munich meeting with Neville Chamberlain, the British

Prime Minister, and the disemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Polish crisis, and the

outbreak of war in 1939; the murderous purge o f 'unreliable' Nazi Party members in the

82
1934 'night o f the long knives'; Hitler's reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour;

and the failed plot to kill Hitler in 1944'. Peter Millar maintains that the diaries reveal a

callous cynicism on the part o f the propaganda chief, notably in the passages leading to

'kristalnacht', in which Goebbels rejoices in the orgy of destruction: 'the sky is blood

red...the synagoge is burning...bravo! bravo!'

Hitler's explicit role in ordering the pogrom is spelt out as Goebbels describes in the

diaries how he gives Goebbels the first news of the demonstration against the Jews in

Berlin, and how he 'decrees' that the demonstration should go ahead: 'withdraw the police.

It is time the Jews felt the wrath of the people. That's right. I give the instruction to the

police and the party'. As a result, Goebbels' 'stosstruppen', special action brigades, were

sent out to urge the rioters to start fires.

Goebbels goes on to describe how the following day, Hitler sat in his favourite Italian

restuarant in Munich, chatting contentedly about the night o f the carnage. Hitler's tactics

were both to build up, through effective overt and covert propaganda, the emotions of the

German people to prepare to fight against a real or imagined enemy - first, internally -

within Germany, and second externally. The home front had to be so completely

consumed by this propaganda that when the time was right, mobilisation against the

enemy internally and externally was easy. He motivated the German people to hate, as

already discussed, first the Jews, second, all foreigners, third, other surrounding countries

which were neighbours of Germany, and fourth, the rest o f the world. His propaganda

brainwashed the German people, preceded, sustained the second world war, and lingered

on in the minds o f youths who are even now still prepared to think of him as their hero.

Goebbels' diaries are an incisive revelation of the psychological state of Hitler's mind, and

of the message transmitted to the German people, as the following passage reveals: 'I give

an account to the Fuhrer in the 'Osteria'. He is in agreement on everything. His opinions

83
are very radical and aggressive. The action itself has gone off perfectly. 100 dead. But no

German property damaged.'

Peter Millar maintains that the diaries also give an insight into Hitler's determination to

lead Germany into war despite the caution of some of his advisers, and, the last minute

dice-game played with Britain over the fate of Czechoslovakia in 1938, and critically in

1939. Up to the eleventh hour, with plans for the invasion of Poland formulated, the

diaries reveal that Hitler was still passing messages via an intermediary to Chamberlain.

Chamberlain, condemned for his appeasement of the Nazis was seen by Goebbels as 'an

ice-cold old English man', and a 'fox', but not one that scared Hitler: 'the Fuhrer will show

Chamberlain his map and that's it. Basta...London is immeasurably frightened of

force...the English...will undoubtedly cave in, when they come up against hard opposition'.

Peter Millar suggests that Chamberlain appears to have played a harder game than has

been appreciated, because Goebbels recounts: 'the Fuhrer gives him his memorandum. A

bitter row follows about certain points. Things go so far that at one stage Chamberlain

suddenly gets up to go; he has done his duty, there is no point in continuing and he can

wash his hands with a clean conscience'.

Goebbels spent hours reading transcripts of the tapped telephones, of the French and

British Ambassadors in Berlin as they discussed the sensational news of the Nazi-Soviet

non aggression pact. Within days, however, Hitler had decided on war, as Goebbels

related on 31st August, 1939: 'To the Reich Chancellery. Everything very quiet. The

Fuhrer has made his decision...' Even after Britain and France declared war, Goebbels

reveals that Hitler did not believe they were serious. The Nazi leader predicted

Chamberlain's resignation, but Goebbels foresaw trouble with the entry of Winston

Churchill into the Cabinet.

Hitler's carefully masterminded and orchestrated propaganda not only motivated the

German people against the 'real or imagined' enemy, it also built up a cult image around

84
him. He became a rallying point to all the German people. He was what in Ghanaian

language is described as the 'Osajefo', the saviour. This was how the Ghanaian public

described Kwame Nkrumah. Hitler, to the German’s became the ultimate messenger.

The act, however o f setting up a Ministry o f Propaganda was entirely new to the age, both

in method and concept. The concept o f this and other countries' propaganda exploits will

be discussed in the second part o f this chapter.

The reason why it is argued that the propaganda activities o f Nazi Germany represented a

watershed for the modem era is that directly or indirectly, during subsequent wars,

propaganda - internal and external was planned and executed more seriously, meaningfully

and strategically than before. As illustration of this, this chapter will examine the Chinese

and Nigerian civil wars.

The origin o f the 'Little Red Book', which became the ideology, not only of Mao's

followers during the civil war, but later also of the entire Chinese State, was for Mao, a

major propaganda success. It was highly successful in its methodical conceptualisation and

execution o f propaganda to achieve set goals.

The other core example in the context, not only o f this chapter, but o f this thesis, is the

setting up of the Directorate of Propaganda by Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. This

was a more direct imitation of the German example than even the Chinese case would

appear to be, but the goals of all three were the same. There have been numerous

examples since then of imitative actions that lend to the argument that propaganda is the

same in all wars. The scope is only limited by the constituency, and the available

technological capability of the messenger or propagandist.

The methods that seem to have pervaded the ages include:

3.2.1. The infiltration of enemy camps with debilitating rumours, as in the case of Gengis

Khan, through the American civil war, through the world wars, the Chinese civil war, and

the Biafran war.^

85
3.2.2. The dropping of propaganda leaflets behind enemy lines to confuse and demoralise

frontline combatants since the days of the French Enlightenment civil wars, the American

war o f independence and civil war, the Russian revolution, the Chinese civil war, the

Biafran war, and even latterly in the Gulf war of 1991.

3.2.3. The use of'print' media has existed since man could write. It has existed since the

days of the Pharoes, when messages were sent on tablets, through fiery war messengers,

asking the enemy to surrender or be destroyed, even before the first arrow or the first

spear was thrown. It has increased in intensity with technological developments.

The intention always is the debilitation of the enemy's morale, in order to weaken his

resolve to commit to battle. The English civil wars are no exception (as already

discussed), to all these methods. The objective of war is to annihilate the adversary. The

objective o f propaganda is to seduce, sedate, and set the enemy up for that annihilation.

The goals o f war therefore remain the same, because things which are equal to the same

thing are equal to one another.

In summary therefore, it has been stated that in setting up the Ministry o f propaganda,

Hitler institutionalised propaganda for the first time in history of warfare. This is an act

that has been later, and largely imitated, especially in civil wars. Apart from the infiltration

of enemy camps with demoralising rumours, the dropping of pamphlets behind enemy

lines, radio was regarded as the most powerful instrument by Nazi Germany, during this

period. Gerald Mansell,^ states that the German Ministry of Propaganda saw radio as its

chief instrument.Ewald Banse, Professor of Military Science at Brunswick Technical

College, wrote in 1934:

'It is essential to attack the enemy nation in its

weak spot, to undermine, crush, break down its
resistance, and convince it that it is being

86
 deceived, misled and brought to destruction by its
own government...The originally well knit fabric of
the enemy nation must be gradually disintegrated,
broken down, rotted, so that it falls to pieces like
a fungus when one treads on it in a wood'.

3.2.4. The caricaturing o f rival leaders was also another device used during this period,

which as seen before, also straddled the ages. This is a ploy that both sides of the military

divide used immensely during the second world war. The reaction of the allied publics will

be treated later in this section to determine the impact on them, and their reaction to

Hitler's messages.

3.2.5. One new method that came into operation at this stage was the use of film. Often

times, going to the cinema was such a popular leisure activity, that it attracted large

audiences. Goebbels knew this. Consequently, he commissioned film scenarios that subtly

promoted Hitler as saviour of the German people, built up animosity against the Jews, and

extolled the virtues of the Germans as the superior race. The process of building up the

protagonist is defined in this thesis as the process of 'edification'. As well as being

methods of propaganda, caricaturing and edification of leaders were also concepts. They

are discussed in full in the next section on concepts. Caricaturing is the attempt, usually by

one side, to psychologically dent the image o f the enemy leader or protagonist.

3.2.6. Counter Propaganda.

Even though Hitler's build up to the second world war propaganda was as a result of

lessons he had learned about British propaganda during the first world war, the British

public and the B.B.C were ill-prepared in many respects for the demands which the war

was to bring.

Hitler in his Mein Kampf had observed that the Germans, in the first world war, were not

defeated on the battle field, but through propaganda, mounted particularly by the British.

87
Therefore, 'In war, words are acts', was not just a notion, but the basis of Hitler's

philosophy of propaganda. This philosophy involved the conversion of ideas into ideals -

the interpretation o f words, symbols, motions, gestures - into action, a motivating force

with cataclysmic results, as seen in the second world war.

In contrast, Churchill believed that war must be won by deeds, not words. These two

conflicting philosophies formed the conceptual basis on both sides of the conflict.

However, the methods of disseminating information whether true or false, were much the

same. As in the first world war, pamphleteering was always a useful tool. It was possible

to drop pamphlets behind enemy lines directed at the enemy public. They also came in

useful for reaching out to the domestic public. Also, as in the first world war, Britain,

through the medium of the B.B.C. played a major role in informing the public at home on

what the government wanted to be regarded as true, and in encouraging the soldiers, and

all those who were involved at the front. Later in the war, the talented and resourceful

British practitioners of 'black' broadcasting, showed themselves well able to match

Goebbels in the use of deceit and fabrication. But, whilst this method was the core of Nazi

propaganda and ideology, British 'black' broadcasting, whatever its effectiveness - and it

had its undoubted success - was never more than a fringe activity. It was not as deep

rooted as it was in Germany. Censorship was a more commonly applied method by the

British war lords, Churchill and Eden. The B.B.C. under Reith, believed that though
H
telling the truth was preferable to the direct lie, the truth had to fit the occasion.

Therefore, demoralising news was censored. Those 'truths' that would help the cause of

the allied forces took priority. There was no overall strategy by the B.B.C. at the initial

stages of the war for developing foreign languages.

Nevertheless on Tuesday, 27 September, two days before the Munich Conference, the

B.B.C. was asked by the war office to provide facilities that very night, for the

88
transmission of foreign languages. These included German, Italian, and French language

versions of a broadcast to the nation, which the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was

to make at 8 p.m. that evening.

The Foreign office, which had earlier undertaken to provide speakers and translation,

found it could not. At 6 p.m. that evening, the Foreign office asked the B.B.C. if it could

provide news bulletins in those languages, as well as translate the Prime Minister’s

broadcast. A frantic search ensued. J.B. Clark of the B.B.C. tracked down a friend,

G. Walter Goetz, the German artist, who was drawing cartoons for the Daily Express, at a

cocktail party, and sent him post-haste to Broadcasting House to do the German version.

The Hon. Francis Rennell Rodd, later Lord Rennell, undertook the Italian version, having

served as an intelligence officer in Italy during the first world war, and later worked in the

Britsh Embassy in Rome. Duncan Grinnel-Milne, a B.B.C. announcer, read the French

version. The English text o f the Prime Minister's broadcast was at 8pm, reaching the

translators page by page, between 8.15 and 8.30pm, and each page was translated as it

came in, and broadcast while the remainder o f the speech was still being translated.

The first broadcasts were transmitted on all B.B.C. wavelengths and replaced normal

scheduled programmes on medium wave intended for British listeners at home. They were

also carried on short wave on all Empire Service frequencies, where, as with the home

services, they replaced advertised programmes. The Prime Minister's address in English

was reported to have made a particularly big impression in the United States, where

President Roosevelt heard it in the course o f a cabinet meeting at the White House. The

news bulletins on that day also included translations of an appeal by Mrs. Roosevelt,

which had been suppressed in Germany, and of the replies to it from France, Britain, and

Czechoslovakia. The following day 28 September, they included the text o f an appeal to

Hitler by President Roosevelt himself, and o f King George Vi's proclamation, calling up

naval reservists and marines.

89
Daily broadcasts in all three languages continued thereafter, throughout the period of the
o
Munich Crisis, though the number o f transmitters was gradually reduced.

This presumably formed the basis for the B.B.C. language services that exist to date.

It will be seen in chs. 4 and 5 how analogous to the Nigerian situation this was. The use of

radio and the translation o f broadcasts in the different ethnic languages were methods

effectively used by both Nigeria and Biafra. However, it was possible for Britain to

respond in such an overt method because it was not occupied by enemy forces. It was

similarly possible for America to do likewise.

Countries which are occupied during war cannot use such overt methods. France, Poland,

and Czechoslovakia, for example, and the other occupied territories, had to resort to more

covert means o f transmission o f their propaganda messages. This is harder work.

In essence, therefore, the setting up o f underground and sometimes mobile radio stations,

pamphleteering, the planting o f rumours, were used by both sides in the second world

war. The essence remains the same - motivation and mobilisation. The sustenance o f the

act and effect o f propaganda in all cases - overt and covert - is essential to bring about a

positive aim to the messenger. Victory is always the ultimate aim. Ironically an occupied

and beleaguered territory tends to have a greater interest in telling the truth, especially if

it is about pogrom, genocide, and other atrocities perpertrated by the occupying or

aggresssive power. This attracts sympathy to the cause of the occupied territory.

Therefore, paradoxically, the occupied territory gains more, and loses nothing, by telling

the truth. It also helps to motivate its own citizens, and fellow countrymen wherever they

are. The occupying force in this case resorts to censorship, misinformation, and

disinformation, in various cases, to protect its own position, and maintain the status quo.

90
3.3. Concept.

3.3.1. Definition.

The word 'concept', according to The Oxford Dictionary of current English means,

generalised idea or notion (eg. the concept of evolution).^

The Penguin Concise English Dictionary defines 'concept' as an abstract or general idea.10

In the analytical school of philosophy, the subject matter of philosophy is held to be the

salient features of the language in which men speak of concepts at issue. Concepts are

thus logical, not mental entities. **

A typical instance is discussed in the article on the 'concept of mind' (1949), by Gilbert

Ryle, an Oxford analyst, ^ which implies that the purpose of the author is not to

investigate matters of fact empirically (i.e. by the methods of psychology) about the mind

itself, but to investigate it's 'logical geography'. Similarly, investigation of the logical

features of discourse about pleasure or duty or remembering is concerned with the

concepts of pleasure or duty or memory. To be able to use these linguistic expressions is

to apply or possess, the concepts.

3.3.2. Concept Formation.^

This is the process of sorting specific experiences into general rules of classes. It figures

prominently in cognitive development and was a subject of great importance to the Swiss

psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980). Concept formation is a complex phenomenon

which can be distinguished for discrimination, the relatively concrete ability to respond to

differences among stimuli. Various laboratory experiments have been devised to

understand how concepts are formed. The process seems to involve two main phases: in

the first a person identifies important characteristics, and in the second identifies how the

characteristics are logically linked. Beyond simple classifications, concepts also may serve

91
as norms or models that account for the potential of some things to fluctuate in some

respects while remaining constant in others.

While experimenters and theorists generally agree about observations of conceptual

behaviour, there are wide metaphysical and epistemological differences concerning the

nature and origins of concepts, the movement between intuitive and rational thought, and

the question o f 'cognitive universals'. The stimulus - response theory of U.S. psychologist

B.F.Skinner disallows reference to mental contents, stating that learning occurs through

trial and error.

The cognitive theory of Piaget contends that learning entails an understanding of unifying

relationships and essences. The U.S. psycholinguist Noam Chomsky argues that cognitive

structures are structurally innate in human beings. Piaget argues that a child's interaction

with environmental 'universals' such as space, time, casuality, chance, number and identity

(conservation o f mass) makes possible his cognitive development.^

3.3.3. Derivative Concepts from Nazi Propaganda Methods.

In the light of part (1) of this chapter, and the foregoing definition of concept and concept

formation, it would be fair to ask: What concepts derived from Nazi, propaganda

methods? What was Goebbels' dimension within the prevalent cognitive patterns of the

German environment of that time? What 'cognitive universals' can be discerned from his

and Hitler's propaganda actions and methods?

On the morning of 22 August, 1939, Hitler held a conference with his military chiefs at his

rustic retreat on the Obersalzberg, 6,208 feet above Berchtengaden. ^ The intention was

to build on the propaganda effect and success o f the earlier capture of Austria in 1938,

and in March 1939, Czechoslovakia, against the advice o f his generals. Undaunted by the

threat by England and France to spring to the aid of Poland in the event of an attack,

Hitler announced to a gigantic, enthusiastic rally of Nazi party faithful in Berlin, in 1939:

'conquest is not only right but a duty'. ^

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It will be recalled that during the first world war, the Fuhrer had served for four years as

an infantry corporal, in the muddy trenches of France, where he had been wounded and

decorated for gallantry. Just over two decades later, without benefit of university or

military-staff training, he was Supreme commander of the German armed forces.

The lessons o f this experience had not escaped him. He was therefore determined that

never again would the Germans suffer both a propaganda and military defeat of that

nature, as he explained in his ’Mein Kampf. He was bent on first a propaganda, and

consequently a military victory. It became a matter of recognising the 'cognitive

universals', or cognitive patterns of the world at the time, and pre-empting them.

Buttressed, goaded, and reinforced by the victories over Austria and Czeckoslovakia

without a shot being fired, Hitler told his military chiefs in Berghof: 'there probably will

never again be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore of great

value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or lunatic. There is no time to lose.
17
War must come in my life time'.1

Also, to create optimum propaganda effect, he announced that he had signed a Treay of

friendship with the Soviet Union, a communist nation, and as such, a sworn archenemy.

Though it would be but a brief marriage of convenience, it enabled him to declare 'we can

now strike at the heart of Poland... as Great Britain and France will not dare to come to

Poland's rescue without the aid of Russia'. ^ He angrily lashed out at the leaders of

England, France and Poland: 'our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich. I am

only afraid, that at the last minute some "schweinhund" will produce a plan of mediation'.

There is no escaping the principle o f 'cognitive universals', ^ or cognitive patterns here.

It was the determinant, it would appear, for Hitler's every action. Hitler's demeanour

seems to have been crystallised by the concept of vendetta. His whole being and existence

had formed the concept of revenge for Germany's first world war defeat in propaganda

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war and military combat, even though, as he claimed, and as most Germans believed,

Germany was not defeated on the battle field, but by propaganda.

It can be assumed that his 'Mein Kampf was in fact a 'charter', the idealisation of his

conceptual formation, which then congealed into the creation of the Ministry of

Propaganda. As will be seen later, this institutionalisation of propaganda was to have an

effect on Biafran propaganda operations during the Nigerian civil war. This novel concept,

Germany's Ministry of propaganda, was run by someone described as a charismatic figure,

with excellent bedside manners - Goebbels.

3.3.4. Goebbels1Ministry of Propaganda.

In an article titled "Goebbels and propaganda: the psychological dimension", David

W edgewood-Benn^ argues that there was one characteristic o f Goebbels which had long

been well known, although perhaps too little highlighted. This was the incessant

preoccupation with psychological consequencies of whatever he was trying to achieve.

Goebbels is rightly remembered as unscrupulous, mendacious, as a practitioner of dirty

tricks, as a systematic repressor of dissent, and, more generally as a symbol of totalitarian

propaganda. But this still leaves out a key ingredient; the psychological dimension. For no

matter what his propaganda message at a given moment Goebbels always planned it in a

highly intelligent way, with reference to its likely impact on the feelings and prejudices of

the target audience.

The minutes of Goebbels' secret wartime conferences, one of the main channels through

which his directives were conveyed to the media, provide some particularly graphic

illustrations o f this. Thus on 13 April 1940, just four days after Germany had occupied

Denmark, Goebbels laid it down that propaganda to that country should be 'generous in

all matters which do not cost us anything', and should aim to convince the Danes that
91
'whatever is happening now is the lesser evil'.

94
This is analogous to Biafran propaganda to the minorities in Biafra to keep them within its

fold. The Federal government, on the other hand, tried to turn them into subverting

Biaffa, with its own counter propaganda. One method applied by Nigeria, was the

creation of States for minorities from areas that were still within Biafran control, which

the Nigerians then had no way of administering.

However, according to David Wedgewood-Benn, in May of 1940, when the German

armies were invading France, the Nazis set up a clandestine 'black' radio station purporting

to be run by French communists and aimed at promoting defeatism. However, at the

conference o f 30 May, a complaint was noted that its programmes were too 'doctrinaire
fyy
and dull, and Goebbels therefore asked to see the scripts. Meanwhile, on 7 July 1940,

after France's capitulation, Goebbels gave instructions that the authors of anti-British

press articles 'must not themselves get angry but must merely fan...anger, ie. they must not

lose sight o f the effect.^

In Biafra, general guidelines were given, but there was a regular daily morning conference

setting daily parameters. It thus became more a matter of self-censorship. No one

'breathed down any body's neck'. There was no pre-censorship of scripts. The punishment

for 'straying out o f course', was after the crime, ie. if there was a deviation from the

guidelines, and if that deviation acted against the interest of the Biafran war effort. As in

Goebbels' case, the Director of the Propaganda Directorate, Dr. Ifegwu Eke, would

demand to see the scripts, with his team of advisers. There were also occasional

complaints o f scripts being too doctrinaire, and therefore counter-productive.

According to David Wedgewood-Benn, a psychological strategy was no less clearly

visible in Goebbels' directives, following the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April, 1941,

which had itself followed on from a military coup in Belgrade the previous month, in

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protest against Yugoslavia joining the Avis. Goebbels' briefing on the day of the invasion

was not only carefully thought out, it had a surprisingly contemporary ring about it. In

propaganda to Yugoslavia (a term which was not to be used), the primary blame for the

war was to be pinned on the Serb generals' clique. In relation to Croatia, the official line

should begin 'quite gently at first to remind Croats of the way the Serbs had treated them'.

At the same time, clandestine stations beamed at Croatia were instructed that 'the only

limit...is the credibility of what we say. Repeat again and again, at considerable length,
94
what the Croats had to suffer at the hands of the Serbs'.

Nigeria and Biafra were strong believers in this method of "repetitive stress propaganda",

for optimum effect.

Throughout his career, Goebbels relied on far more than censorship, or even the power to

give orders to the media. He had a well developed flair for public relations, and was much

exercised with the problem of credibility. The importance of the credibility of the

messenger, and the believeability o f the message was discussed in ch. 1 o f this thesis.

Before and during the early stages of the war, he had made considerable efforts to woo

the foreign journalists in Germany (even though they increasingly became subject to

pressure and intimidation). On 14 August, 1940, he stressed 'what a useful weapon

nc
American press representatives in Germany are in the neutralisation of enemy lies'. He

complained on the same occasion about bureacracy', which had allegedly hampered visits

by foregin correspondents to German occupied France.

During the civil war in China between Mao Tse Tung's and Chiang Kai Shek's forces,
9fs
both are known to have placed a lot o f emphasis on wooing the foreign press. It is

believed that during the 'Long March' by Mao and his troops, a number of journalists

braved the elements and travelled some way with him, whilst others overcame the

difficult terrain in most cases to catch up with him during his stops.

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The cultivation o f the foreign press was as important to Biafra as it was to Nigeria, since

both had to justify their respective cause to the world. Some members o f the foreign

press, as will be seen later, became crusaders for the Biafran cause. The matter of vertical

and horizontal justification to the external constituency was discussed in the introduction,

and in ch.2 o f this thesis.

Goebbels realised that propaganda could boomerang. Therefore, on 13 March, 1943,

when the tide was already turning against Germany, Goebbels ordered restraint in

publishing cartoons o f Allied leaders which ’for the most part produce a totally different

reaction from that intended', and might actually popularise the person

attacked - the double edge of the 'concept of caricaturing'. Indeed, Goebbels, unlike some

of the other Nazi leaders, seems at all times to have warned against the possible

boomerang effect o f conducting propaganda on the assumption that Germany had already

won the war.

David Wedgewood-Benn postulates that all in all, one needs to separate two strands in

Goebbels' technique. The first - based on media control, the intimidation of dissenters and

the attempt to establish a monopoly o f information - was of course a formidable weapon

which could be described as 'coercive persuasion'. It closely resembled the Stalinist model,

although it was not so heavy-handed. This explains the past Soviet unwillingness to

publish the Goebbels' records. The second strand, which might be called 'manipulative

persuasion', was something quite distinct. It involved a careful attempt to gauge the

dispositions and prejudices of the audience, and then exploit them to serve the

propagandist's purpose. Hence the meticulous attention to Danish and Croatian

77
susceptibilities. Nor did the message consist only of lies: Nazi propaganda to

Yugoslavia had a long lasting effect in fanning undoubtedly genuine grievances. The

residual reverberations of that effect can be seen in the civil wars that led to the break up

97
of Yugoslavia, and are continuing today in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. As explained in

ch. 1„ new generations are fighting old wars, indicating the sustainability o f propaganda,

and the argument that propaganda outlasts wars.

And indeed, the most long lasting of all the Goebbels' propaganda achievements was

based on entirely truthful information. This was the revelation of the Katyn massacre of

Polish prisoners of war in Russia in 1940. It was Goebbels, in April, 1943, who first broke

the story which continued to run until April, 1990, when Moscow at last admitted Soviet

guilt.

Biafra was in a similar situation, when it reported the genocide perpetrated against the

Southerners - mostly Easterners - in Northern Nigeria before secession and the subsequent

civil war. Nigeria tried for a while to deny these claims, until it finally admitted them, and

General Gowon had to apologise. Nigeria and Biafra also applied the two concepts of

'coercive persuasion' and 'manipulative persuasion' in their approach to their different

publics - domestic and external.

So did the Chinese in 1956: Chiang Kai SheK, who had greater control of the country and

its media, used 'coercive persuasion' more than Mao Tse Tung who for logistical reasons

and lack of media control, used 'manipulative persuasion1. The use of 'coercive persuasion'

presupposes the capability, and the availability of the control facilities and means of

propaganda transmission.

Perhaps the most candid statement o f the Goebbels' propaganda philosophy was the one

minuted at his conference of 30 October, 1942. On this occasion, Goebbels emphasised

that 'it is... a mistake to conduct propaganda in such a way that it will stand up to the

critical examination o f intellectuals'. This was because 'the most primitive arguments are

the most effective and meet with the greatest agreement among the masses'. 'Intellectuals

always yield to the stronger, and this will be the ordinary man in the street'.

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David Wedgewood-Benn maintains that techniques of this kind are rather like a virus,

with a constant tendency to migrate and undergo mutations in the process. This thesis

had, in ch. 1, defined this process as that of imitations and replications, in arguing that

there is little difference in the various war propaganda. This was particularly true of the

two world wars, when each side closely studied the propaganda of its adversary. Many

Germans managed to persuade themselves that their military defeat was brought about by

the supposed skill of British propaganda, coordinated by Lord Northcliffe, the press

magnate said to have been half admired, half abhorred in Germany. Nazi propaganda was

purported to be a response to and partial imitation of British propaganda methods. David

Wedgewood-Benn states that it is not surprising that one of the main postwar experts on

Goebbels should explicitly have compared him with Northcliffe - since both in different

types of society, w ere 'unorthodox masters of mass appeal and mass manipulation1. It is, in

any case, certain that Goebbels absorbed many o f the journalistic techniques which

Northcliffe, among others, had helped to pioneer.

But what about the rev erse process - the possible influence on the Western democracies?

At least one expert on Nazi Germany, Richard Crossman, did on one occasion suggest an

indirect influence Crossman, had played a prominent part in helping to organise Anglo-

American 'black propaganda' aimed at Nazi Germany - propaganda o f a kind very similar

to that which Goebbels himself had pioneered.

3.4. Derivative Modem Concepts.

3.4.1. Definition.

What, therefore, are the consequencies of second world war propaganda?

Force and fraud have been recognised as the two cardinal virtues of war since the Chinese

conqueror Sun Tzu recorded his military theories in 550 B.C: 'Undermine the enemy first,

99
then his army will fall to you. Subvert him, attack his morale, strike at his economy,

corrupt him. Sow internal discord among his leaders, destroy him without fighting him'.

This declaration by Sun Tzu, should be juxtaposed with Hitler's declaration in *Mein

Kampf: 'in war, words are acts'. He had also in conversation with Hermann Rausching in

1939 declared: 'our strategy is to destroy the enemy from within himself. Mental
30
confusion, contradiction o f feelings, indecision, panic - these are our weapons'.

Alongside the two foregoing declarations should be placed the already cited writing by

Ewald Banse. These declarations and writings, along with Machiavelli's, unconsciously

formed the precepts for modem propaganda. All that happened afterwards was the

process of 'migration and mutation' or 'imitations and replications' of these precepts, in

the modem conduct of propaganda war generally. An examination o f the statements,

writings, and declarations from Sun Tzu in 550 B.C. through Machiavelli to Hitler,

indicate a continuity in the general concept of propaganda, varied only by developments in

communications systems. There is no anachronism in propaganda. The successful

propaganda is that which appeals to 'primitive instincts', and not to 'intellectual analysis'.

Nevertheless, the development of information systems since the first world war, and

subsequent use of these in propaganda activities has heightened and enhanced propaganda

as a strategic instmment o f war. As already discussed, the watershed for the modem era

was the second world war. During the second world war, both the Allies (particularly the

British, later the Americans), and the Germans blended these ancient precepts with

modem technology to fight a secret war o f devious machinations, as each side sought the

edge that could mean the difference between victory and defeat.

Many 'shadow warriors' on both sides were involved in what Winston Churchill called 'the

sinister touches of legerdemain'. Their principal weapons were not bullets or arms - but

intrigue, deceit, fakery, stealth, skullduggery, and periodic mayhem. No holds were
O1
barred. No scheme was too brutal or immoral. The survival of nations was at stake.

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It is therefore essential to re-emphasise the particular distinguishing features of this

watershed period, in order to extract therefrom, derivative modem concepts,eg.

(1) The concept o f institutionalisation o f propaganda.

(2) The concept of edification.

(3) The concept o f caricaturing.

(4) The concept o f the charter.

There are other peripheral concepts which are not considered in the context of this thesis.

In considering these concepts, it will be helpful to consider three models:

(1) The German Nazi model.

(2) The Mao Tse Tung, Red army, Chinese model.

(3) The Biafran model.

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3.4.2. The Concept of Institutionalisation.

The Ministry o f propaganda set up by Hitler's Germany was virtually unprecedented. It

was a departure from the tradition o f either the Ministry of Information, or the War

Office, or the Foreign Office handling the dissemination of information in war time.

The Ministry, run by Goebbels, became a power house for the coordination of Nazi

propaganda activities. By the use of radio, film, theatre, pamphlets, print media, rumours,

etc; it conjured up powerful images in the minds of the German people. It created a

multifocal dimension - one, was the way the German people saw themselves, as the

superior race; the second, was the way the Germans saw the outside world, as an inferior

race which must be conquered. It glorified war. The third dimension was, the way the rest

of the world saw Nazi Germany, as a group of people misled, heading for the destruction

of themselves, and the rest of the world. They were led by a 'mad man', who must be

stopped before it was too late. It was therefore in its concept a positive and negative

force. It conjured up different images to its different constituencies.

Whether from admiration or not, the other two models considered here learned from

Germany's experience. During the civil war in China, and the 'Long March', Mao Tse

Tung did not have the facilities within his control to set up a 'Ministry'. Nevertheless, his

manipulation o f information was very akin to the lessons learnt in the second world war.

When Chiang Kai Shek's forces encircled him and his forces in Southern China, to escape

annihilation, he set off on the long march to Northern China. In the process, he conquered

uncharted terrain, swamps, crocodiles, mountains, forests, malaria, other diseases, hostile

native warriors, and Chiag Kai Shek's forces. The images created by this super human

achievement were more than any institution would have been able to manufacture for him.

He, became, and was the institution. The Red army, however, did not regard itself as the

superior race. Rather, it regarded itself as the servant, and saviour of the Chinese people.

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Later, after Mao's success over Chiang Kai Shek, and the creation of a Communist state in

China, the Ministry of Propaganda was officially created. The process of 'migration and

mutation', had certainly extended from Germany, through China to Biafra. The Biafrans

imitated and replicated the institutionalisation of propaganda. It had an advantage over

Mao, because it already controlled the facilities, and means of propaganda transmission

right from the beginning. Its Propaganda Directorate under Dr. Ifegwu Eke, a university

don, combined fellow intellectuals, as in the case of the German Ministry, as well as Mao's

handling o f propaganda. Regular meetings every morning coordinated the daily

propaganda activities of Biafra. It replicated in principle the notion o f adapting intellectual

and modem imputs into conjuring up primitive emotions in the minds o f the Southerners

first, and the Easterners, subsequently. Unlike the Nazi and Chinese cases, however, world

public opinion was more sympathetic, even when their governments were not, as will be

seen in chs.4 and 5.

3.4.3. The Concept of Edification.

The process of edification involves the injection o f propaganda images principally into the

domestic publics, who then build up the image of the protagonist, who in turn becomes

the credible messenger. In the German case, it was Adolf Hitler, in the Chinese case, it

was Mao Tse Tung, in the Biaffan case, it was Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.

In Nazi Germany, Goebbels contrived to build such powerful images of Adolf Hitler, that

it is understood that the very mention of Hitler's name brought the soldiers to attention. It

was like flying the national flag or playing the national anthem. Hitler was kept out of the

scene as much as possible, for fear o f overexposure. Hitler, who was merely a corporal in

the German army during the first world war, was wounded in France, and later decorated.

It is assumed that he started his build up after the war, having learned the propaganda

lessons o f that war. In Goebbels, he found a man who could intensify his crusade as the

103
Fuhrer - the saviour of the German people. He capitalised on the period o f the depression

in Germany. He whipped up primitive emotions in the German people against the Jews.

He became a demigod to the Germans, and a belzeebub to non Germans, especially the

Jews in Germany. The means of transmission in the Ministry of propaganda were used

with optimum effect to bring this about.

Unlike Hitler, Mao Tse Tung was a highly educated leader. Unlike Hitler, he did not have

a Ministry o f Propaganda at the beginning o f the civil war. This was created later.

However, he had an intellectually rich committee that marched and worked with him. He

had daily early morning meetings. He mapped out both the military and propaganda

strategies at these meetings. He worked late into the night. Like Hitler, he was built up

from scratch. Like Hitler, he came from a poor background, with only propaganda to

bring about his edification to the point o f deification. He was variously described by his

followers during the civil war, and later by the Chinese people as :

(1) Mao the Romantic Revolutionary,

(1) Mao the Peasant's friend,

(3) Mao the Young Politician,

(4) Mao the Upholder of the People's Will,

(5) Mao the Creator o f the People's Communes,

(6) Mao the Supreme Commander o f the Red Guards, and later the Red Army,

(7) Mao the Statesman,

(8) Mao the M yth.^

He was accredited with driving out the Japanese from China, and with driving out the

Kuomintang, and crushing Chiang Kai Shek. The success of the long march crowned his

glory. He had learned his lessons by studying the propaganda tactics of the Germans, and

comparing them with the successes and failures o f communist propaganda under Stalin.

The one was systemic, the other was ideological. He was built up to look better than both,

104
more intelligent than both, and more humane than both. He was edified as leader o f the

communist world rather than Soviet Union's Stalin.

During the long march, Mao was asked by a foreign journalist who caught up with him:

What was the greatest gift he would give his people to make them follow him to the

death. He answered: You give them arms to defend themselves; You give them food to

eat; and you give them an unflinching belief in you as their leader, and in your leadership.

He was then asked: If any o f these were missing, what would you give them. He

answered: You give them food to eat; and you give them unalloyed belief in you as their

leader, and your leadership. He was further asked, if he had to take away from those two,

which one o f them he would retain. He answered: You give them unqualified, unflinching,

unalloyed belief in you as their leader, and in your leadership. He was quoting an earlier

Chinese sage and warrior, Sun Tzu. This, however, enunciated Mao's concept of

edification. The difference between him and Hitler, is that Hitler led from the rear, whilst

Mao led from the front. In the modem context, they both preceded Ojukwu, and Biafra.

The Biafran propaganda machine was more systemic than ideological. Unlike Hitler, but

like Mao, Ojukwu was highly educated, having graduated from Oxford before going to

Sandhurst. Like both Hitler and Mao, he was a soldier. Along with Gowon, he was

regarded as one of the best gunners in the Nigerian army.

Society had never seen him as a future leader. He was not built up from scratch. He was

bom with a 'silver spoon in his mouth'. When the coup plotters of 1966 tried to enlist his

help to overthrow the Federal government, he declined.

Even after he had been appointed Governor of Eastern Nigeria, he was not looked on as

a future leader, but just one of the Governors. His edification was therefore both contrived

and accidental. It was accidental in that he happened to be appointed to replace Hilary

Njoku as Governor of Eastern Nigeria at the time of General Ironsi's assassination in a

105
counter coup in July 1966. There were many possible leaders for the East. But, he was

there.

He was a soldier. His father was a prominent and wealthy Ibo man. He was well educated

- something very much admired by the highly educated and enterprising Easterners -

indeed by all Nigerians. There were very few highly educated people in the Nigerian army

then. The army was regarded as a profession for dropouts, and lowly educated. It was

therefore convenient for him to speak for the East, in negotiating with the Federal

government in Lagos, whose head was Yakubu Gowon, another military man, a fellow

gunner with a similar reputation. Better still, at the time, Ojukwu was a senior officer to

Gowon in the army.

That is when the connivance at edification started. The Directorate of propaganda built

him up as the instant Saviour. This rose to a crescendo at, and after the Aburi accord

under the aegis of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Ojukwu was highly intelligent, and used his

intelligence well. Like Hitler and Mao, he had a commanding personality. He became the

protagonist - the credible messenger. Television, radio, music, the theatre, were brought

to bear in the edification, as in Hitler's and Mao's cases. Music was written and made with,

and in Ojukwu's name As in Hitler's Germany, and Mao's China, his sayings were deemed

to be instructive wisdom He was also portrayed as the credible arbiter between Biafra and

the outside world - the external constituency in propaganda terms. He had tremendous

presence, and used it well in his television and radio broadcasts.

3.4.4. The Concept of Caricaturing.

This is the flip side of the coin to the concept of edification. Mostly, it is carried out by,

and with opposing or enemy propaganda. The object is to destroy the image, and puncture

the status and personality of the protagonist enemy. The belief is that if the head is cut off,

or severely dismembered morally, the body cannot function. It is in this vein, that Britain

106
and its allies tried to label Hitler as a mad man who sought world conquest. Conversely,

Hitler tried, to show that Winston Churchill by getting involved in the war, was leading

the British people to their ruin.

This state o f affairs was replicated in the Chinese civil war. Chiang Kai Shek presented

Mao Tse Tung to the outside world as the 'communist rebel', and to the domestic Chinese

public as a 'bandit chief, who was leading the people to ruin.

Again there are parallels in Biafra and Nigeria. Immediately after the declaration of the

Republic o f Biafra, Gowon used the Nigerian media to undermine Ojukwu. The message

wanted Ojukwu captured dead or alive, and brought back to Lagos. ^ Ojukwu was

described variously as a rebel, a bigot, ambitious, and leading the Eastern Nigerian people

to ruin. It was claimed that he was not interested in Biafra; that his father had sent him to

Oxford to study, so that he could return and govern Nigeria; that he was only using Biafra

as a footstool. Because Ojukwu had grown a beard when the war started, the Nigerian

media made quite a play on this. The beard was supposed to have enhanced Ojukwu's

presence and personality. Some heavy artillery pieces, which were manufactured locally in

Biafra from scrap, were now nick-named Ojukwu's beard. It was said that Ojukwu's beard

was destroying the Nigerian soldiers in their droves. The Nigerians felt that this over

enhanced Ojukwu's image, and edified Ojukwu, Therefore, every so often, propaganda

was put out from the Nigerian side that Ojukwu's beard had fallen off, as a result of a

chronic illness, and that he was no longer mentally and physically fit to lead the Biafran

people. This is analogous to Hitler and Mao being variously described as mad men,

mentally and physically unfit to lead their people.

Just as Hitler tried to counter by caricaturing Churchill, Mao countered by describing

Chiang Kai Shek as an imperialist stooge, who cared nothing about the Chinese people.

Mao accused Chiang Kai Shek of seeking self gratification only, with the help of the

107
Americans. The Biafran media, on their part, gave as much as they received, if not more.

They claimed that Gowon was uneducated; that is why he could not understand Ojukwu's

English at the Aburi accord (see ch.4). It is being held now that, for this reason, Gowon

decided to go back to school after being overthrown as Head of State - evidence o f the

sustainability o f propaganda. Gowon had his second son soon after the launching of

Apollo 12. Peter Edochie, a continuity announcer, came on the air on the voice of Biafra,

and said that Gowon was faster than Apollo 12; that he did nothing in Lagos but produce

babies; that he was unfit to govern a country as educated, as populated, as rich as

-2 C
Nigeria. Gowon was severally caricatured in the daily news talks emanating from

Radio Biafra and Voice o f Biafra - delivered by Okokon Ndem, Nwora Asika, and Paddy

Davies (myself). The anagram of his name was used: Yabuku Wagon, instead o f Yakubu

Gowon. Wagon in Nigerian 'pidgin' English is a dilapidated truck, just managing to totter

along. Yabuku means absolutely nothing. Like Chiang Kai Shek, he was accused o f being

a stooge, although in his case o f the Hausa/Fulani, even though he was from

Benue/Plateau, which had for long engaged in an uprising against Hausa/Fulani rule. He

was accused o f hanging on to power with foreign help. He was described as the 'Sho Sho

upstart'. Sho Sho is Gowon's native village.

3.4.5. The Concept o f the Charter.

The Oxford Dictionary o f Current English defines 'Charter' as a written grant of rights,

especially by Sovereign or legislature; written constitution or description of organization's

functions etc.

The Penguin Concise English Dictionary defines 'Charter' as a document granting a

privilege or recognising a right; document incorporating a borough, university or

company. 37

108
A charter is a document granting certain specific rights, powers, privileges, or functions

from the sovereign power of a state to an individual, corporation, city, or other unit of

local organization.-^ The most famous charter, fMagna Carta1('Great Charter*), was a

compact between the English King John, and his barons, specifying the King's grant of

certain liberties to the English people. Elsewhere, in medieval Europe, momachs typically

issued charters to towns, cities, guilds, merchant associations, universities, and religious

institutions; such charters guaranteed certain privileges and immunities for those

organizations, while also sometimes specifying arrangements for the conduct of their

internal affairs.

By the end of the Middle Ages, monarchs granted charters that guaranteed European

overseas trading companies monopolies of trade (and in some cases government) within a

specified foreign geographic area. A corporation that was so endowed was called a

chartered company. Virtually all o f the British colonies in North America were established

by charters; these charters granted land and certain governing rights to the colonies while

retaining certain powers to the British crown.

Modem charters are o f two kinds, corporate and municipal. A corporate charter is a grant

made by a government body giving a group of individuals the power to form a

corporation. A municipal charter is a law passed by a state government allowing the

people of a specific locality to organize themselves into a municipal corporation ie., a city.

Such a charter in effect delegates part o f the state's powers to the people for the purpose

of local self governm ent.^

In most countries, the Head of State, is the head of government, and commander in chief

of the armed forces. Therefore, their utterances are very important, in propaganda terms,

and make the headlines. It was particularly so in the three models considered here. In war

time, because power resides in the head of state and/or gvemment, who is also the

109
commander in chief, their speeches receive optimum media, political, and diplomatic

attention. This attention is heightened if the speech becomes a motivator, a charge, or a

charter.

That is why the 'Mein Kampf by Hitler, the 'Little Red Book' by Mao, and the 'Ahiara

Declaration' by Ojukwu represent charters, in the tradition of the above definitions. They

were more than just authoritative instruments; they were propaganda gun powder. They

may not have been 'Magna Carta'. But, they were a combination of thoughts, musings,

commands and grants issuing from the protagonist authority, a charge to the people they

represented - Germany, China ( the Red Guard, the Red Army, and China), and Biafra,

respectively. The three documents granted their different publics rights, privileges, and

responsibilities. They also charged them psychologically, motivating them to mobilise for

military action.

The 'Mein Kampf has already been discussed extensively.The 'Little Red Book1, Mao's

Charter, became virtually a Bible - the Mao-Chinese brand of communist ideology. A lot

of the thoughts therein became a way o f life in Mao's China.

A typical thought from the book was:

'The only group in the countryside that

has always put up the bitterest fight
is the poor peasants...

Without the poor peasants

there can be no revolution...

To reject them is to reject

the revolution'.^

110
This was Mao striking a propaganda blow at the conscience of China. He was making the

apathetic, the seemingly unaffected in China, aware of their rights to egalitarianism. He

was motivating them to action. China had to listen, and did, as he muses again:

'All the nationalities of

China have always been
unwilling to submit to the
oppression of foreign peoples
and have striven to shake it
off by acts of resistance.

They accept union only on

the basis of equality'.

The 'Ahiara Declaration', came after the unimplimented Aburi Peace Accord between

Ojukwu and Gowon, under the aegis o f Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Like the Mein

Kampf. and the 'Little Red Book', it was a charter, yet like them, also, a tremendous

propaganda ploy. It had an uncanny resemblance in form, style, and structure to the

'Arusha Declaration' (earlier by Julius Nyerere himself), and the 'Little Red Book'.

However, the significant point here is the continuity; the process of migration and

mutation, imitation and replication.

3.5. Conclusion.

German Nazi propaganda was the watershed for modem propaganda in war. The Ministry

of Propaganda, set up by Hitler and mn by Goebbels, made use of every available facet of

the media - stage, film, print, and the electronic broadcast media - to transmit its message.

It sought to brainwash the German people, and it did. Because states of the world are

copy cats, this lesson was not lost on them. A process of mutation and migration, or

imitation and replication then ensued, with family resemblances of the German propaganda

example occuring in subsequent wars o f the modem era. Therefore, the methods and

111
concepts that emanated from the Germans are reflected in the other two models applied in

this thesis - the Chinese and Biafran examples. This family reflection is described as the

T)erivative modem concepts'. Biafra, as will be seen in the next chapter, apart from

reflecting the concepts, also derived and employed some of the German methods, for

instance, in the setting up of the 'Directorate of Propaganda'.

112
Notes on Chapter 3.

1. Churchill is said to have said this, in justifying the

setting up and existence of the United Nations. He went

on to state that so long as the world leaders had a pen

in one hand and a piece of paper in the other, they would

not reach out for the sword:

Culled: 1. from a lecture at the University College, London in 1975

given by Dr. Jacobi on the law o f International organisatios.

2. from a lecture at the University o f Vienna in July

1977, given by Prof Seidel Hohen-Velden.

3. from a series of programmes on propaganda on the BBC World

Service in January 1992, produced by William Joyce. The

one in reference was transmitted on 13.1.92, at 9.15am.

2. Sir Edward Heath made the speech first in Parliament

after the Gulf War in 1991, and subsequently in

radio and television interviewsin 1991 and 1992.

Also see J.M.Kevnes 'Opposition to World War 1 Peace

terms'

Encyclopaedia Britanni.ca, Op. cit.

Vol. 21; 753:2a.

3. The .Sunday. Times London, 5th July 1992.

4. Ibid 12th July 1992.

113
5. See ch.2.
Encycopaedia Britannica: Op.cit; vols. 19:745:la;

5:180:3a; 1:129:3a;

16:106:2b; 213:2a;

25:479:2b.etc.

6. Gerald Mansell: Let Truth Be Told:

The Politics of Propaganda'

London, BBC, 1982,pp. 5 5-78

7. Ibid: pp 55 -78

8. Ibid: pp 55- 78

9. The Oxford Dictionary

of Current English: Op.cit.p.147.

10.The Penguin Concise

EngliskDiclionary;

G.N. Garmonsway, ed: London, Bloomsbury Books,

1969; pl55.

11. EncyclopaediaJBritatmica:

Op.cit; vols.3:513:3b;

13:9:2a; 18:474:2a;

114
12. Ibid: vols. 3: 513:3b
Gilbert Ryle: The Concept of Mind:

Oxford, O.U.P. 1949, p.57.

13. Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Op.cit. vols.3:514:1a;

22:897:2a; 25:608:2b.

14. Ibid: vol. 3: 514: la

15. William B. Breur: The-Sgcrel W ar with

Germany: Airlife,

Shrewsbury, 1988, pp37-50.

16. Ibid: pp 37 - 50

17. Ibid: pp40-48

18. Ibid: pp45-46

19. See above - under the definition of concept, and concept

formation.

20. David Wedgewood-Benn: 'Goebbels and propaganda:

the psychological

intension'; The World

Today: London,

115
 The Royal Institute of

International Affairs,

October 1992.

He also made a presentation on the same topic to the

General Seminar, Department of International Relations,

London School O f Economics and Political Science in

November 1992.

21. Ibid: part 1

22. Ibid: part 1

23. Ibid: part 2

24. Ibid: part 2

25. Ibid: part 2

The Sunday Times: 12th July 1992,

London, 1992.

26. Roger Howard: Ma o T se.-tung and the.

Chinese People:

George Allen and Unwin,

London, 1977, pp43-57.

27. David Wedgewood-Benn: Op.cit. parts 1 -2

116
28. Ibid: parts 1- 2

29. Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Op.cit. vols. 11:389:2c;

26:171:1a; 9:728:3b.

30. Gerald Mansell: Op.cit.

Open University: 'Propaganda': BBC2,

10.30am; Saturdays,

May 1992.

31. William B. Breur: Op.cit. pp 59 - 63

Gerald Mansell: Op.cit. pp 36 - 47

Open University: Op.cit. BBC 2, May 1992

32. Hugh Purcell: Mao J s e Tung:

Wayland; Hove England,

1977, pp 60-78.

33. Ibid: pp 60 - 78

Roger Howard: Op.cit. 50 -67

34. Radio Nigeria: Lagos, 1967.

35. Voice of Biafra: Enugu, 1968.

117
36. The Oxford Dictionary
of Current English: Op.cit. p 147

37 The Penguin Concise

English Dictionary: Op.cit. p. 155

38. Encygbpaedia^diaimka:

Op.cit. vols.3:131:2b;

15:384:1a; 12:774:3a;

20:596:1b; 29:32:1b.

39. Ibid: vol. 3: 131:2b

40. Dick Wilson: The People's Emperor:

Hutchinson, London, 1979,

pp.90-138.

Hugh Purcell: Op.cit. pp. 64 - 66

Roger Howard: Op.cit. pp 43 - 47

41. Ibid: pp. 48 - 52

118
 CHAPTER FOUR.

BIAFRA - THE DOMESTIC FACTOR.

4.1. Introduction.

This chapter being the core o f the thesis, is in two parts.

It has been divided further into appropiate sub-sections to accomodate a detailed analysis

of the domestic scene. Part A includes: Prelude, The Dawn, The Spark, The Blaze; whilst

Part B includes: The Operation of the Biaffan Media, The Biaffan Media and the Biafran

People, The Sun Set, Back to the Fold, Epilogue.

As Biaffan propaganda is the case study for this thesis, it has been necessary to segment

this chapter in this way, in order to have a clear picture of the Biafran case. The next

chapter -5 - will deal with Biafran propaganda and the external (international) factor.

Even though this thesis is not concerned with the civil war itself, nevertheless, this chapter

will examine the remote and immediate causes of the war, the war period and it's

aftermath, and consequently the propaganda sorrounding all those periods.

The chapter also examines ethnic attitudes on both sides of the divide. It will comment on

the exploitation of the different ethnic nationalities by both Nigeria and Biafra, and draw

conclusions from the fall-outs. Some material exists on the media in Nigeria, the media in

Africa, and related topics. Materials also exist on the civil war itself. Extensive research

reveals that there seems to be nothing available on the part played by the media in Biafra.

This chapter will, therefore, invariably draw heavily from interviews o f Biafran people and

propaganda Directorate colleagues. The media include ENBC/TV, Radio Biafra, Voice of

Biafra, Biafran Television, Nigerian media, politicians, and the publics on both sides of the

conflict. Some of the Biafran media staff are now working in various fields in Nigeria.

119
Information will also be gleaned from the sources noted at the end of this chapter, and

from any available sources on the civil war itself.

The chapter will relate to the principles and concepts of propaganda already enunciated,

on a comparative analysis, (as will chapter 5).

It will pose the question o f the influence of propaganda on the different players within

Biafra on the one hand, and Nigeria on the other. It will examine Nigeria’s reaction and

response.

It will discuss the influence of the media and propaganda generally on the peace process,

and the lessons thereof.

Finally, the chapter will examine what happened to Biafran media people at the end of the

war. It will show what happened to the Radio and Television stations, etc; at the end. It

will discuss the attitude of the protagonists, and their fate afterwards.

There will be an examination of the immediate post war peace and reconciliation that

ensued in Nigeria as the guns went silent. Was this unique? Was there a precedent? Or,

did Nigeria set the example for the process o f migration and mutation, imitation and

replication, in other parts of the world?

120
 PART A.

4.2. Prelude.

The scene for the civil war in Nigeria was set long before the war itself. It was set, some

would argue, almost from when Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960.

A achool of thought holds that nature itself conspired to complicate the Nigerian situation.

Nigeria is a land of great climatic, territorial and ethnic variety. * The British, at

colonisation, discovered that from the 400 mile long coast of tangled swamp and

mangrove, a belt of dense rain-forest ran inland to a depth of about a hundred and fifty

miles. This was Southern Nigeria, split into East and West by the Niger River flowing

South from its confluence with the Benue River at Lokoja (see map).

In the Western part of the South, the predominant group was the Yoruba, a people with a

long history o f powerful kingdoms. Because of the British penetration through Lagos,

Western culture first reached the Yoruba and other tribes of the West at about the same

time as it reached the peoples of the Riverine areas of the East.^ In the Eastern part of the

South lived a variety of peoples, predominant among them the Ibos, who lived on both

banks of the Niger, but mainly East o f it. Ironically, in view of their later speedy

development and progress which finally enabled them to overtake the other ethnic groups

of Nigeria in terms of European-style development, the Ibos and the other peoples of the

East were regarded as being more backward than the rest by 1900.

North of the forest line was the woodland, verging into savannah grass and prairie, and

finally to semi-desert and scrub. Along the Southern fringe of the enormous area runs the

Middle Belt, inhabited by non Hausa peoples, who at the dawn of the twentieth century,

were mainly pagan and animist in religion, but were nevertheless vassals o f the

121
Hausa/Fulani, the latter having originally come South from the Sahara in conquest,

bringing with them their Muslim religion.

All in all, Nigeria is a huge country (almost twice the size of Spain), and about four times

the size of Great Britain.

As the colonial authority, Britain made little, if any, attempt at unifying the country.

Rather, it left it largely as it found it, apart from the amalgamation of 1914, discussed later

in this chapter.

The film showing the attainment o f independence sets the scene of how things looked at

the handing over of the baton, from the British to the indigenous Nigerian government.

The speech of the Governor General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe on the film "Nigeria Attains

Independence", by the Federal Ministry o f Information, Lagos, was a plea for what looked

like a coalition of Regions to come together and work together. Yet, from the start, the

different media in the regions were fanning up tribal and ethnic differences instead of

uniting the country.

The Nigerian Constitution handed down by Lord Lugard immediately before

independence, had prior to that, created three regions - The East, The West, and The

North.^ The Mid-West was carved out of the West after independence.

The media in these regions were utterly independent of, and sometimes at variance with

each other. Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service, Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Service,

and Radio Kaduna were powerful instruments used by the respective regions to keep

Nigeria apart through the promotion of ethnic and tribal differences. The aim, ironically,

was to capture the centre, Lagos. ^

According to the Confederation of British Industry (C.B.I.)^ and United Nations

Populations office figures,^ Nigeria has a population of about 120 to 125 million. The

122
C.B.I. also forecast in the same report that by the year 2000, Nigeria would overtake the

United States o f America in population growth.

Nigeria has two hundred and fifty different languages. Within these two hundred and fifty

different language groups, there are at least five hundred dialectical differences.

Barely three years after independence, in 1963, there was a census in Nigeria. The result

of this head count has never been accepted. Since then, there have been three other

censuses in Nigeria, in 1977, 1988, and 1991, all of which have been disputed by the
Q
different ethnic groups. Even the census o f 1953 -54, organised by Britain, and held

under their auspices, was rejected. However, after the 1963 census, the media in the West

and the East o f the country accused the Federal government of distorting the census

figures in favour of the North, in order to attract more amenities to the North. Radio

Kaduna responded aggressively in its numerous news talks.

This set a tumultuous scene in Nigeria. Such overt propaganda was inciting and

confrontational. Yet, at the time, many assumed that it was no more than adversarial

politics of the kind practised in Westminster. Nigeria was after all regarded by the British

as a colonial show piece and trail blazer.^ Yet’ several elements of propaganda, as

enunciated earlier, can be discerned even at this early stage in the discussion of

Nigerian/Biafran experience, eg;

4.2.1 Overt propaganda:

The media activities were a clear indication of overt propaganda. There were no punches

pulled. All was given to maintain the loyalty of particular niches and constituencies. ^

More was even given to capture the interest of the 'wavering souls' in the opposing camps.

The language was abrasive propaganda, the mode of transmission was clearly overt.

123
He had been in Biafra during the early days - the exodus and the declaration of

independence. He was recalled by the BBC, but returned to Biafra independently, because

he was moved by what he saw in his earlier visit.

Biafra's early propaganda thrust were three fold - pogrom and genocide, religious war

fare, and oil and economic war. (see ch. 4). All three relatively impacted on the world

stage, but, as has been seen, despite strong words, did not motivate any external

mobilisation in aid of Biafra. But, famine - and the pictures of Kwashiorkor children,

women and men achieved what religion, genocide and pogrom, and oil, did not.

Famine has struck countless communities throughout history, but the impact had always

been local and gone largely unnoticed in the rest of the world. In this case, the isolation

was swept aside because the media was made to take interest - an excellent case of

manipulative persuasion.

The Biafran famine was caused directly by the civil war. It was a clear and unambigous

case o f politics provoking a famine.

Father Mike Doheny, an Irish Holy Ghost Father, who had lived as a missionary in

Eastern Nigeria from 1945 to 1959, recalls:

We'd never seen hunger, never.

There was no shortage of food.
People lived very simply,
there was a lot of disease
but no starvation as such,
and when we saw it for the first time,
when we saw Kwashiorkor,
it really shocked us to our foundations.
We weren't prepared for it
and we could'nt understand it for a long time'.^

Kwashiorkor, a protein-deficiency disease principally affecting children, had arisen

because of the blockade o f Biafra on land sea and air by Nigeria. Previously, Eastern

Nigeria had been self sufficient in fruits and carbohydrates, while importing salt from

182
4.2.2 Covert propaganda:

A lot of covert propaganda also ensued. For instance, when civil servants in the North, in

a series o f meetings, plotted the removal from the region of civil servants and workers of

the South, particularly those of Eastern origin,* * they planted rumours within the

Northen populace to the effect that the Eastern civil servants were there, not to help the

North, but to take the jobs of the Northerners and keep them under perpetual
1o
domination. This inflamed latent, inert ethnic differences, leading to the first Kano

(Sabongeri) riots of the 1950s. Such covert propaganda, was of course economical with

the truth. It failed to mention that Northern apathy towards modernisation, in part because

of its Islamic culture, meant that the work place and the civil service could not be filled by

the British alone. Thus a few of such available posts - clerks, junior executives,

accountants, switchboard operators, engineers, train drivers, waterworks superintendents,

bank tellers, factory and shop staff, post office workers, and the like - were filled by

Yorubas: most were filled by the more enterprising Easterners. By 1966, there were an

estimated 1,3000,000 Easterners, mostly Ibos, in the Northern Region, and about another

500,000 had taken up jobs and residence in the West. The bulk of the market stalls in the

major commercial centres of Kano arid Kaduna were owned by Easterners.

It is against these communities that the covert propaganda was directed. The similarity to

Germany's experience between the wars is inescapable. Hitler's overt and covert

propaganda against the Jews led ultimately, in Hitler's case to the holocaust; and in the

Nigerian case, the propaganda against the Easterners led to the Kano riots of the 1950s

and early 1960s, and the subsequent genocide and pogrom against the Easterners in the

North. It was partly because of this, and partly because of their resilience and industry,

that the Ibos described themselves as the Jews o f Nigeria. The Ibos argued that the Jews

124
were persecuted in Nazi Germany for their resilience and industry, similarly, they were

persecuted in Nigeria for the same reasons.

It would be entirely fair therefore to extract a process of migration and mutation, imitation

and replication even here, (except for the gas chambers).

4.2.3. Propaganda preceding the war:

It is clear from the preceding that even though at this stage, ^ civil war was not

contemplated by any one in the country, a lot o f propaganda preceded the war. It was the

trigger. It enkindled fears in the minds of the ordinary people of the North, who otherwise

would have lived peacefully with the Easterners, and infact had lived peacefully with them

over the years. It was propaganda that inflamed the inert and latent feelings of jealousies,

envy and hatred that propaganda itself had implanted. In propaganda terms, it appealed to

the sensitivities and sensibilities o f the Northern populace. It was a case o f manipulative

persuation. It was this build up, this preceding propaganda that caused the spark.

4.3 The Dawn:

The scene thus set characterised the pattern of political philosophy and thought in Nigeria.

It decided the events that followed. However, it is important to point out that it was not

always the East and the West against the North.

During the ensuing elections in 1959, into the Federal House of Representatives, and

subsequent to the elections, the Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Service was transmitting

messages to the Eastern Regional people different from the pre-census era. The simple

reason was that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had resigned his appointment as Premier of

Eastern Nigeria to contest the Federal House elections in 1959, in order to become

125
Governor General, had gone into coalition with the leader of the Northern Regional party,

Sir Ahmadu Bello.

The alliance thus formed between the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), and the

National Council o f Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), therefore altered and

reshaped the attitudes of the media in the North and in the East. They both accused Chief

Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group (A.G.), and Premier of Western Region,

of tribalism.

The Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service was by far the best broadcasting system in the

country at the time, and fought back with aspersions on the other two parties and their

leaders. It extolled Chief Awolowo as the Saviour of the Yoruba people, and the only

possible saviour of Nigeria. It promoted him as the best person to govern Nigeria.

This was the new trend in the political set up. the coalition of the NPC-NCNC won the

elections to the Federal House o f Representatives, after the 1959 Federal House elections.

The NPC held the North with 148 seats, the NCNC held the East and a proportion of the

West (mostly those non-Yoruba parts which were later carved out as Mid-West State),

gaining 89 seats, and the Action Group (AG), took most of the Yoruba speaking West,

but gained only 75 seats ^

However, because of the powerful and penetrating transmission o f the Western Nigeria

Broadcasting Service, combined with the vigorous and flambuoyant campaigns o f Chief

Obafemi Awolowo, the Action Group penetrated and captured constituencies in the North

(particularly in the Middle Belt area), and the East, (amongst the minorities agitating for

Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers' State - COR State). ^ Chief Awolowo campaigned with

helicopters, traversing, and spraying the country with political propaganda pamphlets; and

launching and floating air-borne propaganda balloons, edifying and extolling Chief

Awolowo and the Action Group. The Action Group, nevertheless, was in opposition at

the Federal level. ^

126
It can thus be argued, that the propaganda element of caricaturing was applied here; the

caricaturing o f Awolowo by the media in the East and North. By contrast, Ahmadu Bello

and Azikiwe were edified, along with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, of NPC and the

Federal Prime Minister (whom Ahmadu Bello described as his 'lieutenant'), as the leaders

who had the interest o f the country at heart. Awolowo was caricatured as a tribal, ethnic,

sectional leader o f the Yoruba tribe. ^

The Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service, for its part, caricatured Nnamdi Azikiwe as an

opportunistic Ibo leader. It claimed that Zik, as he was popularly and favourably known,

was only interested in 'ZDC', because all he wanted was to be Governor General, and later,

President. WNBS described Ahmadu Bello as not in fact wanting the unity of Nigeria, but

as a conniving Fulani tribal leader who was interested only in spreading Islam to the

Southernmost part, and indeed all parts o f the country. ^ While WNBS described

Abubakar as a stooge o f Ahmadu Bello’^ C h ie f Awolowo was described as a pillar of

strength, and a paragon of intelligence.

Apart from these different propaganda statements from the media and press from the

regions, the utterances from the different leaders, Awo, (as he was popularly and

favourably called), Zik, and the Sardauna (as Ahmadu Bello was popularly known, being

also the Sardauna o f Sokoto), buttressed what emanated from the media and press.

Witnessed here therefore were the propaganda elements of edification, caricaturing,

brainwashing, coersive, and manipulative persuation. Nigeria was an epitomy of the

principles of migration and mutation, imitation and replication. No holds were barred.

Ethnic, religious, and political differences were abundantly exploited.

4.4. The Spark:

127
A curious vista therefore emerged. Whilst the West and the East accused the North of

distorting census figures for its benefit, Zik and the Sardauna were in coalition; in a

marriage of convenience. Sir Ahmadu Bello (NPC), however, remained Premier of the

Northern Region; Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC), was Federal Prime Minister; the

Rt. Honourable, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC) was Governor General, and later

President, and a-political. Chief Obafemi Awolowo (AG) was Federal leader of

opposition.

As if to complicate matters further, another twist was introduced to the political and

propaganda horizon o f the time. Zik, having been promoted from Acting Governor

General, to Governor General, to President, became a-political surrendering his leadership

of the NCNC. Ahmadu Bello declared that the Ibos were never friends of the Northerners,

nor of any one else, and broke off the alliance between the NPC and the N C N C .^

Then a systematic accusation of tribalism was instigated on Radio Television Kaduna

(RKT) against the East. The Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation and Television

(ENBC/TV) responded in like manner against the North and the Federal government. The

Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service and Television (WNBS/TV), sided with

ENBC/TV, reinforcing its own on-going propaganda against, what it called, the 'bigoted'

leaders of the North, with Ahmadu Bello at the head.

By this time, another dimension was introduced to reinforce media activity. Eighty percent

of the newspapers in Lagos were at the time owned by people from the mainly Western

region, and had country wide circulation. The Northen regional newspapers circulated

principally in the North and, because of the low percentage of literacy in English in the

region, some were published in Hausa. The papers from the East were calculatedly, kept

out of circulation in Lagos by the mainly Western regional mafia-like media based in

128
 Lagos, the Federal capital, the centre o f activity, and seat of the Federal government. This,

clearly was censorship. The aim was to make it impossible for the Biafran message to be

transmitted, domestically or externally, because the external sector could have picked up

the message in Lagos.

4.4.1. The Media and the Advent o f Broadcasting:

It is essential at this stage to understand, the strength of the media in Nigeria.

Broadcasting arrived in Nigeria in 1931 in the form of a relay service of the British Empire

Service from Daventry, England, to L a g o s . O n e year later, the Lagos station

experimented with rediffusion service. The Nigerian Posts and Telegraphs Department

(P&T), was authorised to devise a plan for programme distribution to subscribers in

Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, operating in conjunction with the Empire Broadcasting Service.

The first rediffusion service started in 1936, distributing programmes originating from the

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), in London, as part of its overseas service.

Between 1940 and 1950, rediffusion spread to Ibadan, Abeokuta, Ijebu Ode, Port

Harcourt, Calabar, Enugu, Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Zaria, and was installed in most offices to

supply regular news and musical programmes during working hours. It was also installed

in the official residences of civil servants. Some private homes were later allowed to

subscribe.

The Nigerian Broadcasting Service began formally on 1st April, 1951 with some limited

to produce programmes catering for the interests of the audience in Nigeria, but with a

colonial bias. Relay of news, current affairs, and other programmes still emanated from

London.

129

i
The NBS later became the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation on 23rd August, 1954,

following a bill in Parliament creating an instrument for the establishment of the

Corporation. At self government, the Corporation devolved branches o f the Corporation

to the three regional headquarters, Ibadan in 1952, Enugu in 1954, and Kaduna in 1956;

the Midwest, carved out o f the West after independence, got its own station in 1962.

Television broadcasting began in Nigeria on 31st October, 1959, one year before

independence. It was, as it turned out, the advent of television in Africa. The first station

(in Africa), was thus established in Ibadan by the then government o f the Western region

of Nigeria, and its jingle said so: "First in Africa". It was called the Western Nigeria

Television (WNTV). It became an essential arm of the Western Nigeria Ministry of

Information, and therefore o f government.

In October 1960, the Eastern Nigeria Television was established in Enugu (ENTV). Not

to be outdone by Ibadan, its jingle said it was "Second to None". Again, it was a

parastatal of the Eastern Nigeria Ministry o f Information. This was also the year and the

month Nigeria became independent. Two years lapsed before Radio Television Kaduna

(RKT) was established, in 1962. It too was an arm of the Northern Nigeria Ministry of

Information. Ironically, later that year, 1962, the Federal government at the centre, Lagos,

rather belatedly established its own Television station, the Nigerian Television Service

(NTS), Lagos. It should have led the way. This service, which was confined to the Federal

Capital, Lagos, was set up and operated under a management agreement with an

American Network, NBC-International, on a purely technical cooperation contractual

basis. It was not long however before it was brought into the fold of the already existent

Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), at the termination of the management contract

with the American Network.

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Before independence, the only independent media were the print (as was the case in many

African countries). The most prominent amongst these was the West African Pilot, Such

indigenous, privately owned papers were set up by people who had been abroad and

studied there making contact with the West Indians and Black Americans whose struggle

for the emancipation o f the black man gave rise to Pan Africanism.

As can be seen, at the time, the tradition was for state and federal governments to set up,

be responsible for, cater for, and subvent the electronic media. (This has now been altered

by a decree in 1992). The result was a propaganda war between regions that were

opposed to or at variance with the federal government, and the federal government itself,

or between regions of opposing or different political complexions. The North - South

dichotomy was at the core of these exchanges - culturally and politically.

4.4.2. Historical (socio-political) terrain:

Nigeria is regarded as the 'Giant of Africa', because of it's population, size, economic

potential, and complex language spread. During its early colonial heritage, it was ruled as

two different entities - the North, with experimental headquarters at Zungeru, and the

South, with headquarters in Calabar. Zungeru is, incidentally, within the same

geographical location of the new federal capital territory, Abuja. In 1914, Lord Lugard

brought about the amalgamation of the North and South in a fragile union.

There were differences in language, religion and culture between the two entities. The

British however created this marriage o f convenience to be able to administer the territory

better through a single process of indirect rule. But, according to Frederick Forsyth this

sort of arrangement had its own disadvantages which overweighed whatever apparent

advantages it had: "Indirect rule maintained the federal structures, confirmed the

repression by the priviledged Emirs and their appointees, prolonged the inability o f the

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North to graduate into the modem world, and stultified future efforts to introduce
99
parliamentary democracy".

However, all the British were interested in was the enhancement of their trade in raw

materials to feed the industries at home. Luke Uka Uche states that contemporary

evidence suggests that the European traders were anything but civilising agents: "Many of

them had adopted legal trade only as a last resort when the original slave trading

occupation had grown too hazardous. Brutal and disreputable as many of them were, they

often suffered greatly from the precariousness o f their position at the mercy of

unpredictable coastal rulers". Samir Amin, Cedric Robinson, Michel Beaud, Chinweizu

also adopt this theme and argument in their discussion of colonialism, and the spread of
9 -5
capitalism - Chinweizu more forcefully than others.

The history of Nigeria and the background to the conflict are longer and more

complicated than described here. However, this brief background is meant to assist in the

understanding of the beginnings of the process of factionisation, fractionalisation, and

dissent - the dawn of disenchantment leading to the spark and blaze.

Official media during the pre-independence period was used by the colonial authorities to

establish trade and cultural development, suitable for colonial peoples. The private press

took on the duty of fighting the colonialists to bring about the emancipation of the

territory from colonial rule. Printing was relatively cheaper and circulation was easier.

Pamphleteering could also be carried out covertly. Ironically, nationalism was first

promoted by non-Nigerians. Consequently, the enlightened, educated, indigenous, African

graduates returning from abroad, who owned the private press, regarded it as a duty to

fight colonialism. They included Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah and Tubman. Uka

Uche suggests that the road to nationalism was paved by freed slaves from the West

Indies and the United States o f America. People like Blyden, Garvey, and Dubois, etc;

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sought the cultural emancipation of the 'negro'. Their concern was on Africa as a whole,

rather than the seemingly artificial units drawn up by the European colonial powers.

In the 1920s, Herbert Macauley emerged as the Father of Nigerian nationalism, and, with

his Lagos "Daily News'' started unleashing nationalist attacks against the British.

He was later joined by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who had just returned from studying in the

United States of America. In the 1930s, the West African Pilot was formed. When the

British turned on the heat against the nationalist papers, Nnamdi Azikiwe fled to Accra,

Ghana, from where he continued to operate.

From this, it can be seen that whilst the print media was involved in emancipation, the

electronic media was used (mostly radio at this time), to establish British culture and

enhance British rule The early educated people in Nigeria were trained as teachers, who

would subsequently impart their often limited knowledge to the rest of the country - a

feature identified also in other colonial countries.

Those who were able to proceed to study law, medicine, and engineering, were sponsored

either by their communities, or their hard working families. These of course were few.

People were taught to think British, buy British, wear British, and adore the British,

particularly in the South o f Nigeria. The North remained largely intact, because of its

feudal, hierachical, and largely muslim structure and culture.

The economy was geared towards the enhancement of British trade, and the development

of the "Mother Country". Early broadcasters were trained either in London by the BBC,

or by BBC trainers sent to Nigeria to organise training courses.

Graham Mytton observes that the history o f the mass media is longer and more complex

along the West Coast of Africa: "The press in English speaking West Africa grew up in a

nationalist tradition. Newspapers were the mouthpieces of emerging campaigning

nationalist politicians".^ This is perhaps because printing was cheaper and newspapers

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could be smuggled undetected to fellow compatriots fighting against colonialism, - a

lesson in covert propaganda that was later adopted even before the war. One writer has

made the observation that to study either nationalism or the press in British West Africa is

to study 'the other'!. This is very true o f conptemporary civilian politics in Nigeria, where

the mass media occupy a central place. However, the British used the radio to establish
?c
their influence. This was because radio had a wider coverage, was received at all levels-

literate and illiterate - and transmission was easier. It was therefore an effective
0(\
instrument of overt propaganda transmission. The newspapers, as indicated, were

nationalistic. Television missed all that. The British had set about abolishing indegenous

cultural societies, institutions, and traditions, describing them as fetish, heathen, and anti-

Christian, particularly in the South.

Briefly therefore, whilst the South was being christianised and largely educated, the North

remained largely uneducated and muslim.

The north was regarded as predominantly muslim at the time and therefore not susceptible

to this intrusion. Also the British were anxious not to upset the Emirs and their feudal

system, because it was a convenient instrument for indirect rule. This in itself created a

cultural imbalance, which transmitted to the educational structure of the amalgamated

halves. Television when it arrived one year prior to independence, rather than enhancing

political and cultural unity, was employed to exacerbate the North-South dichotomy.

Thus, television, arrived at the peak o f national intra-party political activity in Nigeria. The

various political factions in the country used it to exploit all the existing ethnic, religious,

language and dialectical diversities in the country, to foster their respective aim to succeed

to, and capture the centre, Lagos.

It became more a propaganda tool set between region and region, party and party, and in

certain cases, between the central Federal government and the regions.

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Being audio-visual and instant - the potential force of television was brought to bear on

the propaganda war.

Dr. Michael Okpara had become Premier of Eastern Region and leader of the N.C.N.C.

Chief S. L. Akintola became Premier of the Western Region, but not leader of the Action

Group. An interesting vista opened up at this time. The WNBS/TV accused Chief

Akintola of sabotaging Chief Awolowo in support of Sir Ahmadu Bello. Chief Akintola

was dismissed from the Action Group, and removed from office by the Governor of

Western Nigeria. The Action Group, which held the regional parliamentary majority

accused him of maladminstration. He refused to go and broke into the Premier's office to

occupy it. The Action group had appointed Chief Adegbenro as the Premier o f Western

Region to replace Chief Akintola. He formed a new goverment, whereupon a fight broke

out on the floor of the Western House o f Assembly. This was the spark that ignited the

riot in Western Nigeria. The media in the East and the West warned the Federal

Government of the impending crisis. The Federal Government, the media in Lagos, except

the newspapers acquiesced. So did all the media in the North. Akintola appealed to the

Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, without going through the Western

Regional Governor. The Prime Minister acting in collusion with the leader of the NPC and

Premier of Northern Nigeria, overuled the Western Regional Governor and upheld

Akintola's appeal.

Even though in May 1963. the Privy Council in London ruled that Akintola's dismissal by

the Governor was valid, the Prime Minister, the Northern Premier and Akintola refused to

accept it, and stuck to their guns. By now Akintola had formed his own party and allied

with the NPC to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA).

Dr. Michael Okpara now leader of the NCNC in the East went into alliance with Chief

Awolowo's Action Group to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).

Awolowo accused of plotting to overthrow the Federal Government, was tried, found

135
guilty, and imprisoned, along with Chief Anthony Enahoro, who had been his Minister of

Information in Western Nigeria.

UPGA boycotted the 1964 General Elections. The President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and the

National Chairman of the NCNC, Dr. G. C. Mbanugo advised against a boycott in "the

interest of the unity of the country", counselling that the boycott would have "no

constitutional effect". Dr. Michael Okpara, now joint leader of UPGA with Chief

Adegbenro, insisted that it would have "a political effect". The NNA, with Abubakar as

Prime Minister were inevitably returned to power at the Federal House without any

representatives from UPGA.

There was intense media and propaganda activity. Despite Akintola, the media in the West

was still loyal to Awolowo (who was at this time in jail), to Adegbenro and to UPGA.

The media in the East backed the Western media in its orchestrations against Akintola, the

Federal and Northern Nigerian Governments. The media in the North was vehement in its

retaliatory and counter propaganda. The Federal media was split. The electronic media

controlled by the Federal Government supported the Federal Government. So did the

Federal government owned newspapers like the Daily Times, the Morning Post etc. The

independent newspapers and magazines were still strongly in support o f Awolowo,

accusing the Federal Government of accumulating "trumped up charges" against

Awolowo, whom they claimed was innocent.

It was the signal for a complete breakdown o f law and order, even if it could truly be said

to have existed before. Rioting broke out across the length and breadth o f the Western

Region. Murder, looting, arson, mayhem were rife. On the roads, gangs of rural thugs set

up road blocks, by cutting down trees, and stopping motorists to demand their political

affiliations. The wrong answer brought robbery and death. Within a few weeks, estimated

deaths were between 1,000 and 2,000.

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In face of the turmoil, Balewa, who had been so quick to declare a state of emergency in

1962 because of an uproar in the Western House of Assembly, remained quiescent. In

vain, the media, student bodies with propaganda leaflets, several bodies and personalities

across the country, appealed to him, to declare a state of emergency, dissolve the Akintola

government, and order fresh elections. He declared he had "no powers."

The mighty Federation of Nigeria was crumbling into ruin before the eyes of foreign

observers, who had only a few years before heralded Nigeria as the great hope of
77
Africa Yet to the outside world hardly a word of this penetrated. Indeed anxious to

keep up appearances, Balewa’s government invited a Commonwealth Prime Ministers

conference to meet in Lagos on the first week o f January 1966, to discuss the question of

restoring law and order in rebellious Rhodesia.

Mr. Harold Wilson was pleased to attend. While Commonwealth Premiers shook hands

and beamed at each other on the apron of Ikeja international airport, a few miles away

Nigerians were dying in scores, as the army moved in on the UPGA supporters. ° The

army could not restore order either, and at the insistence of the General Officer

Commanding, Major-General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguyi Ironsi, the troops were

withdrawn.

The majority o f the ordinary infantry-men at that time serving in the Federal army were

drawn from the Middle Belt, that is, the minority tribes of the North. These troops,

particularly the Tivs who formed the highest percentage among them, could not be used

to quell the Tiv riots still raging in Northern Nigeria, for they would probably not have

turned their guns on their kith and kin. Thus most of the army units available outside

Tivland were heavily salted with Tivs.

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For the same reason that they could not be used in Tiv-land, they were not much use in

the West either. Their sympathies lay not with the Akintola regime, for was not Akintola

the ally and vassal o f the Sardauna o f Sokoto, persecutor of their own homeland? They

tended to sympathise more with the rioters, being in themselves in much the same positon

vis-a-vis the Sardauna/Akintola power group.

By the second of January 1966, it had become clear that something had to give.

Subsequent portrayal by the Gowon military regime of what followed as an all-Ibo affair

fails to take into account the inevitability of either a ’'demarche’' from the army, or

complete anarchy.

On the night of the 14th of January 1966, in the North, the West and the Federal Capital

of Lagos, a group o f young officers struck. Within a few hours, the Sardauna o f Sokoto,

Akintola, and Balewa were dead. Also dead was Chief Okotie Eboh, Balewa's friend,

most loyal lieutenant and Federal Minister of Finance, and with them the Federal Republic

of Nigeria. It was a bloody ’Coup d'etat’. The leader of the coup was Major Chukwuma

Nzeogwu, an Ibo from the Mid-West state of Nigeria.

If the twists and turns o f the Nigerian media and propaganda scene sound complicated, it

is because it is complicated. John Wilkinson, retired Director of Corporate Affairs at the

BBC, current Patron o f the One World Broadcasting Trust in London, remarked recently

that within the Nigerian Media Scene "there is never a dull moment". The responses, the

twists and turns are in reaction to the twists and turns of the political spectrum.

One of the questions that arose in the course of this research was how the propaganda

activity could be so intense without the necessary facilities, compared for instance to the

situations in Mozambique and Angola. Clearly the situations are different. Unlike most

other African and indeed developing countries, Nigeria was immensely facilitated by way

of media provision, as has been seen. It learned its lesson well from the British. It had the

138
men and material to initiate and sustain its propaganda activities. The different political

factions employed both covert and overt propaganda methods in their attempt to destroy

their opponents.

The media and propaganda objectives followed the usual cognitive patterns:

(1) to motivate their supporters

(2) to mobilise their support and spur them into

action, physically and psychologically, and,

(3) to sustain their actions, in order that the

protagonists could continue to ride high.

Covert activities were carried out by way of rumours, secret clan, ethnic and supporter's

meetings. It involved the injection of derogatory information against the opponents.

Whilst being caricatured, the opponents countered by extolling the factional leaders in

order to edify them.

At the risk o f constant repetition, it has to be noted, however, that the idea of civil war in

Nigeria was never contemplated, not even at the trial of Awolowo. So the difference here,

at least at this stage, was the presence o f positive propaganda for factional and ethnic

subjugation, like the ones carried out by Northern Nigeria. For instance, in 1947,

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared to a British Official: "We do not want, Sir, our

Southern neigbours to interfere in our development....I should like to make it clear to you

that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the Northern people would continue

their uninterupted conquest to the sea". This brought accusations from the South, in a

negative form o f propaganda, that the Muslims of the North want to "dip the Koran in the

Sea".

In May 1953, a delegation from the Action Group (AG) was due to visit Kano, the largest

city in the North. Intense fomentation of public opinion against the visit was undertaken

139
by Mallam Inua Wada, Kano Branch Secretary of the Northen People's Congress (NPC).

In a speech two days before their unscheduled arrival, Wada told a meeting of section

heads of the native adminstration: "Having abused us in the South, these very Southerners

have decided to come over to the North to abuse us... we have, therefore organised about

a thousand men ready in the city to meet force with force..." The Action Groups's visit
O 1
was cancelled, but on the 11th of May, a series of massacres began. Failing to find

Yorubas, Hausas set about the Easterners with what the official report compiled by a

British Civil servant termed "a universally unexpected degree o f violence". In his

autobiography, Sir Ahmadu Bello recalls that "Here in Kano, as things fell out, the

fighting took place between the Hausas ... and the Ibos: the Yorubas were oddly enough

out of it."

The official report was a conscientious effort. The rapporteur condemned Wada's speech

as "very ill-advised and provocative". O f the conservative estimates of 52 killed and 245

wounded, he comments that: "it is still a possibility that more were killed than have been

recorded, in view of conflicting statements by ambulance men and lorry drivers (who

carted away the living and the dead)". O f the whole affair, he observed that "no amount of

provocation, short term or long term can, in any sense justify their (Hausas) behaviour".

But perhaps his most notable utterance was in the conclusion: "The seeds of the trouble

which broke out in Kano on 16th May 1953 have their cunterpart still in the ground. It

could happen again, and only a realisation and acceptance of the underlying causes can

remove the danger of recurrence." There was no realisation nor any attempt at one.

And it did happen again!

Whilst this type of propaganda was positive in terms of the North, it was negative for the

South and especially for the Easterners who suffered the ultimate negative effect. What

happened in the North in 1953 was replicated, as will be seen later in this chapter, in

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1966/67. It was, to use a contemporary term, "ethnic cleansing", o f the kind that occured

in Bosnia in the 1990s.

To counteract, the Southern leaders and media indicated that they always knew that the

intention of the North was not to unify the country but to conquer the South and "dip the

Koran in the Sea." They said that they would never stand for that; that the Northerners

were filthy illitrates who were unfit to rule the educated progressive and dynamic South.

They accused Sir Ahumadu Bello o f being a religiuos bigot and Abubakar of being his

stooge, and unqualified to rule the country.

Even though there was no deliberate and systematic build up to the war, the propaganda

exchanges, the caricaturing, the edification were almost similar to the other two models

discussed in this thesis - Germany and China. The difference of course is that there were

no strikingly outstanding personalities like Adolf Hitler and Mao Tse Tung, except that Sir

Ahumadu Bello, in the eyes of the South fitted the description o f Hitler and Stalin in his

treatment o f the Southerners, and his acquiescence at the massacre of the Southerners.

Frederick Forsyth and Auberon Waugh argue that some may even say he tacitly

encouraged and motivated his people to it, as his autobiography seems to suggest. It is

clear also that during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference on Rhodesia in

Lagos, the Federal Government applied two propaganda techniques:

(1) Censorship

(2) Manipulative persuasion.

(1). Censorship: Since they were in control o f the electronic media in Lagos, the seat of

the conference, they dictated whatever was transmitted overtly.

141
(2). Manupilative Persuasion: In so doing, they hid the truth from the other Heads of

State and Government, who by their very presence, may have even lent credence to the

acts of the Abubakar Government. The Federal Government's organisation of the

conference was a manipulation to divert attention from the tumult within the country. It is

also entirely possible that through the process o f censorship, an element of "coercive

persuasion" was applied domestically whilst the outside world was being manipulated.

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4.5 THE BLAZE.

The events that led to the Biafra war happened very rapidly.

On the fateful morning, people in Eastern Nigeria woke up to hear Efiong Etuk on the

early morning programme on ENBC/TV, announcing that there were soldiers in the studio

asking him to stop transmission o f regular programmes and play only martial music.

On hearing this on his car radio, one of the leaders of the coup, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, who

was on his way to Enugu to take command and assasinate Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of

Eastern Nigeria, abandoned his vehicle along with his lieutenants, escaped, and went into

hiding. Okpara was thus saved. That morning also, The President of Cyprus, Archbishop

Makarios, who had been officially visiting Eastern Nigeria, was being seen off by Dr.

Michael Okpara and Sir Francis Akanu Ibiam, the Governor of Eastern Nigeria. When the

army having waited for Emmanuel Ifeajuna in vain, finally seized the airport in Enugu and

confronted Okpara, he refused to enter the jeep that he was ordered into. Both

Archbishop Makarios and Sir Akanu Ibiam virtually bundled him into the vehicle. This,

some commentators maintain, helped save him from being shot on the spot. It is claimed

that Archbishop Mkcarios's experience in coup plotting may have helped here. Sir

Ahmadu Bello of the North was killed by the coup leader, Major Chukuma Nzeogu,

accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant Hassan Usman Katsina, a Hausa/Fulani muslim

officer.

Chief S.L. Akintola, self declared Premier of the West and ally of Sir Ahumadu Bello was

assasinated. The Prime Minister Sir Abubakar was killed. Chief Okotie Eboh, who, even

though he was from the Midwest, and o f the NCNC, was close to Sir Abubakar, and so

was killed.

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The country was dazed. No information came from the media who were playing only

martial music. The newspapers could not publish. There was total confusion. Then it

emerged that the Chief of Defence Staff and General officer commanding, Major-General

Aguyi Ironsi, had taken over in Lagos and invited the leaders of the coup to surrender to

him. When it became apparent that only leaders o f the NPC and allies had been

assassinated, while the leaders o f the Action Group and NCNC were spared, Radio

Television Kaduna came out with vigorous news talks against what was now in their own

estimation, a Southern (East and West combined) organised coup against the Northern

leaders and their allies. The Northern papers which came back into circulation, carried

inflammatory editorials and messages in Hausa and English. These papers circulated in the

army. The coup was blamed on the Ibos. There, therefore followed some disturbances in

the North. In May 1966, a riot broke out where the southerners, and particularly the Ibos

at Sabongeri market in Kano, were massacred again. There was a record with the tune

"ewu ne be akwa", which had been released many years before. The literal translation is

"the goat is crying". The Ibos have a tradition of playing loud music in their stalls to

attract customers. This record had been on the charts for a while, but on this particular

occasion, their Northern counterparts claimed that it was a mockery on the Northeners.

The Northern traders covertly met, passed the word round, motivated and mobilised their

forces and struck.

There followed an urgent meeting o f the Eastern House of Assembly where the Speaker

called on the Federal leader Major-General Aguyi Ironsi to take action to stop the killings.

Nothing happened. Rather Ironsi stated that he wanted to form a unitary government

which would bring peace and harmony to the country. To please the North, since he was

an Ibo, he appointed two of his immediate aides from the Northern officers1ranks.

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While Major-General Ironsi was on an official visit to Western Nigeria, the Northern

officers carried out a counter coup in July 1966, where General Aguyi Ironsi was

assassinated. Killed with him was his host, Governor of the Western Region, Colonel

Fajuyi. For a while there was no effective government in Nigeria. The media were hungry

for news, and the public was looking to the media to inform, guide and direct. The media,

as John Renfeld stated, in such confused and chaotic situations, assumes a very important

instrument. Luke Uka Uche also follows this theme, as will be seen later in this chapter.

He and John Renfeld argue that the media fills the vaccuum in these circumstances and

becomes a sort of'de facto' government.

Meanwhile, there was widespread masssacre of Easterners in Northern Nigeria. The

propaganda from the Northern media had penetrated the army.

The ENBC/TV accused Northern Nigeria of "genocide and progrom" on the Easterners.

The rest of the media in the East joined in. Pictures of the exodus from the North and tales

and scenes o f the genocide on radio and television, filled the Easterners with revulsion

and anger. While Radio Kaduna wanted the Ibos out of the North, the ENBC/TV wanted

them to return to the East and help build up the region. There was mass exodus from the

North to the East.

Lt. Colonel Chukwuma Odumegwu Ojukwu who had been appointed Military Governor

of Eastern Region came on Radio and Television and made constant announcements,

threatening retaliatory action if Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who had succeeded Major-

General Ironsi, did not apprehend and punish the perpetrators o f the genocide, and

recompense the Easterners.

The Easterners were accused by the media in the North and Lagos (at this time the

Federal Government was fighting back) o f playing up the scope and effect of the

145
massacres. However, Mr. Schwarz, an independent journalist and an independent eye

witness, refers to them as "a pogrom of genocidal proportions". Nor were they directed

solely against the Ibos. The word Ibo is a singular generic term in the North - actually the

Hausa word is Nyamiri', which is derogatory as well as descriptive - for all Easterners

regardless o f ethnic group. Thus not only the Ibos suffered, though they were undoubtedly

in the majority. Efiks, Ibibios, Ogojas, and Ijaws were also singled out for butchery. As

they came home and told their tales, a wave o f rage swept across the East, mingled also

with despair and disillusion. There was hardly a village or town, family or compound in

the Region that did not take into its fold one o f the refugees and listen to what he had to

say. Thousands of the refugees were marred for life, either mentally or physically, by what

they had gone through. Almost every one o f them was penniless, for the Easterner

traditionally invested his money in his business or in property, and few could bring away

more than a small suitcase when they fled .

There is no better propaganda coup than the images and actual sights of the exodus of the

suffering, the maimed, the homeless, the penniless. For Ojukwu, this was an important

motivating force for all Easterners, and he publicly demanded the creation of a new

constitution creating a confederation, where Easterners could be accomodated in a

peaceful Nigeria. The federal media carried a rejection of this demand by Yakubu Gowon.

Moreover Ojukwu had come into possession of a draft document by the Federal

Government creating more states (about fourteen). There were several meetings in Lagos

in an attempt to resolve the consitutional impasse.

In early September 1966, a number o f Northern troops from Ibadan, capital of the West,

raided Benin City in the Midwest, and snatched from prison a number of officers in

detention for their part in the January coup. The Northerners among the detainees were

146
released in the North, whilst the Easterners were murdered. And, although Gowon had

promised that those responsible would be punished, this did not happen.

Firstly, Gowon's dismissal of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference on 30th November,

on the grounds that the Eastern delegates had not attended it since the original

adjournment on 3rd October, was seen by the media in the East as dictatorial. The Eastern

media claimed that the delegation from the East could not travel to Lagos because they

were afraid for their lives. There then followed a bald announcement, a public admission

by Gowon, as carried by the Federal media, that a new constitution would be drafted

based on between ten and fourteen States. In the same broadcast on 30th November,

Gowon stressed for the first time ever, that he would be inclined "to use force if

circumstances compel". Naturally, the Eastern media saw this as provocative.

On the question of repatriation of troops, which had been considered at one of the

constitutional conferences, Gowon explained that he had only meant that Easterners

should be repatriated to the East, and Northerners in the East should return to the North.

Although the Western ’leaders of thought conference' had unanimously agreed with the

firm stand taken by the East on the repatriation from the West as well, Gowon said he had

to keep Northerners there, as there were no Yoruba troops. At this, Colonel Robert

Adebayo, Governor of the West, and a Yoruba, protested. But, the main question was the

form of Nigeria, and o f its army, in the immediate future.

Here, Ojukwu argued:

"As long as this situation exists, men from Eastern Nigeria would find it
utterly impossible to stay in the same barracks, feed in the same mess, fight from the same
trenches as men in the army from the Northern Nigeria...For these basic reasons the
separation o f forces, the separation o f population is, in all sincerity essential, in order to
avoid further friction and further killing."

Hassan Usman Katsina of the North and David Ejoor of the Midwest agreed.

147
Gowon was asked by the leaders o f the East, and by the media, to apologise for the crimes

against the Easterners, punish the culprits and recompense the Easterners. There were 'no

regrets' by Gowon, despite an earlier promise. According to the Biafran media, Gowon

had promised, during one o f the meetings of the Council of State, to recompense the

affected Easterners, and to publicly apologise to them. The media and propaganda war

intensified.

Apart from Adebayo's protest, the Western media sided with the East. Awolowo

announced that if the East broke away from Nigeria, the West would follow suit, creating

an Oduduwa Republic. Chief Awolowo and his retinue visited Ojukwu in cabinet in

Enugu, and confirmed this by way o f an understanding. Ojukwu's hand and that of the

Assembly in the East were thus strengthened. This turned out to be a propaganda ploy by
** C

Awolowo. When he got back to Lagos, there was a stalemate.

Ojukwu declared to a joumalist:,fI cannot wait indefinitely for Lagos, so I have to make

other arrangements".^

Then came the 'Aburi Accord1. Aburi was Nigeria's last chance before the putsch. There

was, country wide, increasing popular pressure that the regional military Governors

should meet to sort out the problems, a view strongly shared by Colonel Ojukwu. But

since there was nowhere within Nigeria he felt he could go in personal safety, it was

agreed to hold the meeting at Aburi, Ghana, under the auspices of General Ankrah of

Ghana, and Julius Nyerere o f Tanzania.

It was there in ex-President Nkrumah's luxurious country seat in the hills above Accra that

the Supreme Council of Nigeria met on 4th and 5th January, 1967. Present were:

Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, the four Regional Military Governors, - Colonel

Robert Adebayo (successor to the assassinated Colonel Fajuyi), and Lieutenant Colonels

Katsina, Ojukwu and Ejoor. Four others from Nigeria were also on the Council,

148
representing the Navy, Lagos Territory, and two from the Federal Police. But the real

talks hinged on the five Colonels.

The deliberations returned to the central issues of the Constitution and separation of

forces. Also discussed and agreed were the matters of compensation for the fleeing

Easterners from the North. Since the problem of refugees and abandoned property stuck

out like a sore finger, there was an agreement to set up a commission to handle these.

Again Gowon promised to express public regret about what had happened - (see appendix

for details o f the Aburi Accord)

Within a few days of Gowon's return to Lagos, the Aburi agreement began to die on the

vine. Federal civil servants, led by the permanent secretaries, met in Lagos and resolved to

advise Gowon that it was not in the interest of Nigeria to honour the Aburi Accord - (see
-> o
appendix).

It is obvious from the foregoing that several elements of propaganda were present and

employed. Personalities were edified and caricatured to suit the propaganda objectives of

their different constituencies. Because the different interest groups had control of the

means of transmission, overt propaganda was widely employed. Covert propaganda was

applied, through secret meetings, word o f mouth, and pamphleteering. Ethnicity/tribalism

was exploited. Sensibilties were evoked, and the reactors were motivated and mobilised.

The principles of migration and mutation, imitation and replication are easily discemable.

Nigeria had virtually become a propaganda theatre. Media activity was at it’s peak.

The collapse of the agreement was a further provocation. Predictably, the media in the

East screamed. Rather, within ten days, the Federal Government published a book called

Nigeria 1966', which gave the Federal, ie; Northern, version of everything that had

happened since the January coup. At the time it caused a furore in the East. When

149
Ojukwu protested over the phone that it had been agreed not to publish any more official

versions, Gowon told him that there had been a leak. Later, Ojukwu learned that far from

being a leak, the booklet had appeared simultaneously in London, New York, and several

other capitals with all the usual publishers' ballyhoo, including cocktail parties at the High

Commissions and Embassies. When Ojukwu protested again on the phone, Gowon put the

phone down on him. The conversations were recorded by Ojukwu and broadcast on the

media in the East.

Ojukwu had to protect himself against the wrath of the people in the East, who at this

time demanded separation against his wishes; he preferred confederation. Therefore, after

transmitting these conversations on the Eastern media, he also transmitted the Aburi

deliberations, which he had secretly and unknown to the other participants, recorded. So,

whilst Gowon attempted to seize the propaganda initiative with the world-wide,

simultaneous, publication of the book Nigeria 1966', Ojukwu's counter propaganda thrust

was a deadly blow aimed at the heart. It found its targeted point.

To modify the effect of this, on 26th February, 1967, Gowon called a press conference in

Lagos, in which to put his own views and interpretation of the Aburi Accord. At the press

conference, he presented the minutes and final agreements at Aburi. He also juxtaposed

these with the texts of the minutes o f the Federal civil servants in Lagos, (see both

appendices) This was his way of criticising the Aburi Accord.

It also turned out to be a further propaganda coup for Ojukwu. Gowon was furious that

Ojukwu had secretly recorded the Aburi deliberations, and broadcast the recordings. The

broadcast tapes portrayed Gowon as unreliable, and unserious, while Ojukwu's

intelligence superseded all the others present.

150
The media in the East claimed that Ojukwu "went to Oxford and Sandhurst while Gowon

only went to Sandhurst; as a result, Ojukwu's Oxford English was too difficult for Gowon

to comprehend". Ojukwu was edified. Gowon was caricatured. Gowon accused Ojukwu

of betrayal and arrogance.

"On Aburi We Stand", became the slogan on all the media in the East. It became such a

propaganda punch line, that it acted as a negotiating ploy and euphemism everywhere one

went in the East.

Ojukwu refused to attend further meetings of the Supreme Military Council until the

Aburi agreements had been implemented, partly because the meeting scheduled was in a

Benin City liberally sprinkled with Northern soldiers, partly because he knew he could go

no further. In a broadcast at the end of February, he said: "If the Aburi agreements are not

fully implemented by 31st March, I shall have no alternative but to feel free to take

whatever measures may be necessary to give effect in this Region to those agreements".

On that day the departure of Eastern Nigeria was fully expected. Journalists arriving in

Enugu for a press conference already had their headlines mapped out. Instead, still playing

for the last chance o f staying inside 'One Nigeria', Colonel Ojukwu told them that he was

issuing a Revenue Edict appropriating all Federal Revenue collected in the East as a

means of paying for the rehabilitation program m e.^ The decree did not affect oil

revenues, as these were collected in Lagos. The reporters were stunned; they had

expected brimstone, and were being confronted with a fiscal programme. Mildly, Ojukwu

told them the East would only pull out o f Nigeria if she were attacked or blockaded. This

was a clear instance o f manipulative persuasion. By blowing hot and cold, he was

attempting to attract the sympathy of the journalists, and the admiration of the domestic

constituency, all o f which edified him more.

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The Federal Government replied with Decree Eight, a document that appeared at first

glance to implement the major points o f the constitutional agreement o f Aburi; if not the

fiscal arrangements. Decree Eight, like Aburi, vested the legislative and executive powers

in the Supreme Military Council, and decisions on vital matters could only be taken with

the agreement of all the Military Governors. Within their own regions, the Governors

were to have virtual autonomy.

It looked good, and was hailed as such by the media in Lagos and the West. The Eastern

media cautiosly welcomed it as a climb down, and change of heart by Gowon, although it

went no further than what had been agreed at Aburi four months earlier. That was until

the small print was read again and more carefully. Then it could be seen that the 'extras' on

the small print virtually nullified the main paragraphs.

One of the extra clauses was to the effect that the Regional Governors could not exercise

their powers "so as to impede or prejudice the authority of the Federation, or endager the

continuance of the Federal Government". Although it looked harmless, it was presumably

up to the Federal Government, ie; Gowon, to decide precisely what would "impede or

prejudice the authority..." Another section enabled the Federal Government to take over

the authority o f a Regional Government which was "endangering the continuance of the

Federal Government", the criterion being again left in Lagos.

Most menacing of all to Eastern eyes was a paragraph, under which, a state of emergency

could be declared in any region with the agreement of only three Military Governors.^

As the declaration of a state of emergency usually implies sending in troops, and as the

other three Military Governors were either Northern or governed regions occupied by

Northern troops, Colonel Ojukwu saw this as being specifically anti- Eastern. He rejected

the decree in a broadcast on Eastern Nigeria media.

152
The mounting unpopularity o f the Gowon regime now grew elsewhere in the South. In the

West there had been growing resentment over the failure to repatriate the Northern

troops, a measure that Aburi had restated, and Chief Awolowo led the revolt. His

following had traditionally been among the proletarian and radical elements in the West,

and these were the people who resented most the occupation of the Northern soldiers. At

a meeting of the Western ’leaders o f thought' in Ibadan in late April, 1967, he resigned as

the Western delegate to the impending Ad Hoc Conference, stating in his letter: "It is my

considered view that whilst some o f the demands of the East are excessive, within the

context of a Nigerian Union, most o f such demands are not only well founded, but are

designed for smooth and healthy association among the various national units of

Nigeria” 42

Chief Awolowo had just returned from a visit to Ojukwu in Enugu, to witness for himself

the depth of feeling in the East. According to Ojukwu, in a press conference following the

visit, Awolowo had asked if the East would pull out, and the reply had been that it would

not until and unless it was absolutely offered no other alternative.

After seeing the situation for himself, Awolowo sympathised with the sufferings of the

Eastern people, and asked that if the East was going to pull out, he be allowed twenty

four hours forewarning, and he would do the same for the West. This, he was promised.

Later, he got his forewarning, but by that time, he had been swayed round by other

attractions, and failed to fulfil his intent. Frederick Forsyth maintains that from the point

of view of the Yorubas, this was regrettable, for if Awolowo had stuck to his guns, the

Federal government, unable to face two simultaneous disaffections, would have been

forced to fulfil the Aburi agreements to the letter.^

As the deadlock continued, the media acted as snipers for their respective governments.

One precaution Ojukwu did feel obliged to take, nevertheless, was to import some arms.

153
The departure of the Enugu garrison with all its weaponry, and arrival back home of the

Eastern troops without any, had left the East defenceless. Moreover, Ojukwu had come

into possession of a document from an Ibo diplomat in Rome showing that a Northern

army Major, Sule Apollo was in Italy buying large quantities of a rm s.^

Gowon was emboldened by pronouncements from the Northern media, conveying their

support for his actions, including the creation o f more States in Nigeria (a major turn

around for the North for propaganda reasons). Early in May 1967, Gowon imposed a

partial blockade on the East. It extended to postal and postal order services, but also

affected telephones, cables, telex machines, and other forms of communication, all of

which were routed through Lagos. The effect was to leave the East cut off from the

outside, the more so as Nigeria Airways flights were also banned.

In Enugu, Ojukwu remarked to Reuters: "I think we are now rolling downhill. It will take

a great deal to halt the momentum. We are very close, very, very close".

There was one last peace move. A group calling itself the National Conciliation

Committee, headed by the new Federal Chief Justice, Sir Adetokumbo Ademola, a

Yoruba, and including Chief Awolowo, visited Ojukwu on 7th May. They listened to his

views, accepted all his demands, and called on the Federal Government to implement

them. These demands included little more than the implementation of the August 9th,

1966 agreement to post the troops back to their regions of origin, and to call off the

economic sanctions News broadcasts and commentaries from both the Nigerian and

Biafran media at the time confirmed this.

On 20th May, 1967, Gowon accepted all the recommendations. He announced the lifting

of the ban on Nigerian Airways flights, along with other sanctions. But, the Director of

the Airways privately admitted that he had had no orders to resume flights. As for the

troops, Colonel Katsina flew from Kaduna to Ibadan to inform the troops that they were

154
to be moved - but only to the town o f Ilorin, about a stone's throw over the border

between West and North, and lying on the main road to Lagos.

All this, in propaganda terms, was a catalogue of lies and deception, a process of

disinformation, in order to keep the other side guessing, and destabilised.

Ojukwu, by the time, had dissolved the House of Assembly, and set up a Consultative

Assembly with 335 members, o f people from all ethnic groups in the East, and from all

walks of life. They met on 26th May (with the clamour for sepration ringing in their ears),

and gave him a unanimous mandate, at the end of a noisy session, to pull the East out of

what was now, according to the Eastern media, "the defunct Federation of Nigeria", 'at an

early practicable date', by declaring the Eastern Region:

"A FREE SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE BY THE NAME AND

TITLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA".

Gowon activated his plans the next day. He declared a state of emergency, and

simultaneously published a decree, abolishing the existing regions, and dividing Nigeria

into twelve new States. It was clearly a propaganda ploy, meant to be provocative,

directed at the heart of the Eastern demands; but it was also an appeal to the sensibilities

of the minorities of the East. There had been no consultation, which was contrary to the

constitution, even though despite the mandate granted him by the East, Ojukwu had not in

fact, seceded. It contravened the spirit o f Aburi. It contravened the provision that all the

Regions would participate fully in any determination of the country's structural adjustment

in the form of association. More important was the division of the East into three States -

Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers States, thus satisfying the yearnings of the Calabar, Ogoja, and

Rivers'(COR) State Movement, which comprised the non-Ibo politicians of the East who,

for long, had agitated for a separate State, carved out of the Eastern Region.

155
Also, Port Harcourt, the industrial city of the East, was removed by Gowon's

arrangement, and made capital of Rivers State. The Rivers and Cross Rivers States were

the oil producing areas of the region, and the country. The action was described by the

media in the East as "an open challenge to secede". In the same broadcast on the Federal

media, Gowon announced the reimposition o f the blockade, the abrogation of Decree

Eight, earlier mentioned, and accorded himself full powers " for the short period necessary

to carry out the measures which are now urgently required".

Clearly, there was no way the Federal Government could administer the new States it had

created within Eastern Nigeria, because the government o f the soon to be declared

Republic of Biaffa, had territorial and military control.

In the small hours of 30th May, 1967, diplomats were called to the State House, Enugu,

soon to be renamed Biaffa Lodge, to hear Colonel Ojukwu read the Declaration of

Independence:

"Fellow Countrymen and women, you the

people of Eastern Nigeria:
Conscious o f the Supreme authority of
Almighty God over all Mankind; of
your duty to yourselves and posterity;
Aware that you can no longer be
protected in your lives and in your
property by any government based
outside Eastern Nigeria.
Believing that you, are bom free and
have certain inalienable rights which
can be best presented by yourselves;
Unwilling to be unfree partners in
any association of a political or economic
nature;
Rejecting the authority of any person
or persons other than the Military Government
of Eastern Nigeria to make
any imposition of whatever kind of
nature upon you;

156
 Determined to disolve all political and
other ties between you and the former
Federal Republic o f Nigeria;
Prepared to enter into such association,
treaty or alliance with any sovereign
State within the former Federal Republic
of Nigeria and elsewhere on such terms
and conditions as best to subserve
your common good;
Affirming your trust and confidence in
me;
Having mandated me to proclaim on your
behalf and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria
be a Sovereign Independent Republic,

NOW THEREFORE I, LIEUTENANT COLONEL

CHUKWUEMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU,
MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN NIGERIA
BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY, AND PURSUANT TO
THE PRICIPLES RECITED ABOVE,
DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIM
THAT THE TERRITORY AND REGION
KNOWN AS AND CALLED EASTERN NIGERIA
TOGETHER WITH HER CONTINENTAL SHELF
AND TERRITORIAL WATERS
SHALL HENCEFORTH BE
AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE
OF THE NAME AND TITLE OF
"THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA ."4 6

The die was thus cast.

What Radio Nigeria and Television in Lagos chose to describe as 'police action' started,

to 'bring Eastern Nigeria back to the fold'. The slogan on Radio Nigeria and Television

was 'to keep Nigeria one, is a task that must be done'.

Within a few months of the declaration o f independence, a remarkable array of forces had

ranged themselves to crush the new co untry.^ Gowon launched the Federal army behind

the slogan above. Phrases like 'One Nigeria', 'to preserve the territorial integrity of

Nigeria', and 'crush the revolt' were constant features on the Nigerian media.

157
The counter slogan on what was now 'Radio Biafra and Television', was 'the price of

liberty is eternal vigilance'.

The media in Lagos announced that the army had been instructed to enter the Eastern

Nigerian territory to regain the territory in a police action. They were also expected 'to

capture Ojukwu dead or alive, and bring him back to Lagos'.

Seeing that war was imminent, both sides went forward with feverish preparations, the

Biaffans to defend themselves, the Nigerians to bring about a quick finish to what they

regarded as a "childishly easy task".

The first shells were fired over Biafra's northern border at dawn on 6 th July, 1967.

Full scale war broke out.

158
 CHAPTER FOUR, PARTB.

4.6. The Operation o f the Biafran Media.

The Radio was by far the most powerful instrument in the Biafran war.

By 1967 there were two television stations in Biafra - Channel 6 in Enugu and Channel 4

in Aba. However, it was the Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation in Enugu which

reached out to all parts of the region and beyond. There were also repeater stations in all

the provincial headquarters of the Region. Apart from local newspapers in Aba, Calabar,

Onitsha, with circulation only in the provinces, the main newspaper was owned and

controlled by the Biafran government with a regional circulation. This was called the

Biaffa Sun. (see appendix.) In addition there were the numerous government propaganda

leaflets. It is necessary to emphasise that even though the people of Calabar, Ogoja, and

Rivers Provinces were killed along with the Ibos in the North, they did not want to be part

o f Biaffa. That meant that the whole of the Eastern Region did not speak with one voice.

Consequently propaganda was directed from Lagos at the people in the three dissenting

areas to sabotage Biafra. Conversely there was a vast amount of propaganda from the

Biafran media to keep them in the Biafran fold.

Since at this time, Biafra had military control of the area, the Biafran media prevailed. To

further consolidate this hold, listening to Radio Nigeria and reading Nigerian newspapers

was made illegal and treated as sabotage. It is not clear whether the Biafran government

ever caught and punished anybody under this law, but there were indications that some

people who were caught were mobbed to death by angry crowds or summarily shot by

soldiers, though clearly not at the command or with the Knowledge of superior officers of

the Biafran government.

159
At the beginning o f the war, Radio Nigeria Enugu, which was an offshoot of the Federal

Radio Nigeria was taken over by the Biafran government. All the broadcast systems were

brought under one umbrella for effective control. The Ministiy o f Information was

converted into The Propaganda Directorate headed by Dr. Ifegwu Eke, a university

lecturer. The air and sea blockade mounted by the Federal Nigerian Government against

Biaffa meant that it became difficult, indeed almost impossible, to import and export from

the Biafran territory. Biafra then established the Voice of Biafra to reach out to the rest of

the world, to come to her aid.

Propaganda dictated the pace of the war. Territories were gained and lost on radio.

Newspapers could hardly be produced for lack of paper, and spare parts. The Radio

subsisted on a repair culture. Sometimes Biafra existed only on radio. Even when the

capital Enugu fell to the Nigerian soldiers, the station built underground in Umuahia in a

bunker was still announcing the retention of Enugu. The stations were boosted. People

were encouraged to produce more radio from scrap. People were encouraged to buy and

carry radios. Bushes and forests became radio stations and palm and cotton wool trees

their antennae.

4.7 The Biafran Media and The Biafran People.

The operation and activities of the Biafran media are a clear demonstration of the

modalities o f successful propaganda postulated by this thesis, namely

(1) Motivation

(2) Mobilisation

(3) Sustainability (Sustenance)

(3) Durability.

160
It will be expedient therefore to examine these themes in turn;

4.7.1 Motivation.

Prior to the civil war, the Biafran media was used as an instrument to build up unity,

confidence and morale of the Biafran people. Pictures of Easterners being massacred in

Kano and different parts of the North were repeatedly shown on what was then the

Eastern Nigeria Television, and in the region's newspapers. This angered all parts of the

East, not just the Ibos. Most families o f the East were affected either directly or indirectly

by the massacres. People were returning to the East from the North by all available means

- bicycles, trucks, planes, trains, some even lay on top of trains. The Eastern Television

stations, Channels 6 & 4, and the newspapers were full of the images. Even the Western

Nigeria television and newspapers at this stage carried the pictures. The radios ran

interviews with the streams of people pouring into the East. The images o f the exodus

were roundly condemned by Easterners.

The resettlement of the refugees, or "returnees" (as they were called in the East), affected

evrybody's life in the region. The radio was not left out o f this. Together with Television

and Print, it carried out several interviews with the "returnees", broadcasting them to all

nooks and crannies of the region.

As has been seen, the media played a major role in caricaturing Gowon's inadequacies,

whilst edifying Ojukwu's virtues at the peace conferences leading up to the declaration of

Biafra.

4.7.2 Mobilisation.

In this case, there was a very fine line between motivation and mobilisation. The one

flowed into the other.

It should be stressed that the most important things that the media did, either as Eastern

Nigeria media or the Biafran media, were:

161
(1) The conveying of the Declaration of Secession and (Independence).

(2) The annoucement o f the Ahiara Declaration

(3) The annoucement of the cessation of military activities, and surrender speech by

General Philip Efiong, Biafran Deputy Head of State, and an Ibibio.

These were cardinal landmarks which stand out amongst the other activities of the

secessionist State media.

The declaration o f secession and of the Republic of Biafra, was both a motivator and

mobiliser for the people of Eastern Nigeria. It was a momentous occasion for friends and

enemies of Biafra, within and beyond the territory. It was exhilarating for some, and

ominous for the others. It was onerous. People were expectant and reflective; they Knew

the die was cast.

A hurriedly assembled "Biafran Army" was enveloped by a sense of awe - for what was to

come. The 'Ahiara Declaration* which resulted, both from the failure of the 'Aburi Accord'

and the Declaration o f Independence, was regarded, as already stated, as a 'Charter' for

Biafra and Biafrans. It was both a motivator and mobiliser, and from this point of view,

can be compared, with 'Mein Kampf, and the Little Red Book', as well as more

immediately, Nyerere's 'Arusha Declaration1on which it was modelled. Ojukwu admired

Nyerere, who in turn had great respect for Mao.

The paradox was that Nyerere was a socialist, whilst Ojukwu was a capitalist. The Arusha

Declaration for its part was modelled on Mao's Little Red Book .The Biafran media

repeated pronouncements and announcements of the Ahiara Declaration several times

over, to motivate and mobilise. There were passages for all strata of society. It became a

'bible', a way o f life and conduct, for Biafran Servicemen, Civil Servants, Businessmen and

Civilians. Passages were treated as wise sayings.

162
4.7.3. Sustainability (Sustenance).
The Biafran media commissioned, drama, and sketches in praise of Biafra, and edification

of Ojukwu. Nigeria on the other hand was portrayed in a predictably bad light, and

Gowon was caricatured. Peter Edochie's story about Gowon's production of children,

earlier told, was one example, the story o f the coconut tree another, of the sort of either

subtle or abrasive propaganda that went on. To reiterate, the story of the coconut tree

went thus; three people went in search o f coconut. They all gathered at the trunk of the

coconut tree. The first, a Hausa-Fulani, sat down and said'Allah will provide', the second,

a Yoruba looked up watching for the coconut to fall for him to pick, the third, an Ibo,

climbed up and plucked the coconut.

The fiercest battles of the war were fought at Ikot Ekpene, Aba-Azumini-Ekpat Akwa,

especially at Ogbor Hill; and at Port Harcourt, Abagana, and Umuahia-Uzuakoli. The

Biafran commanders at these battle fronts were extolled by the media for their prowess,

intelligence, and bravery. In this way, the war was sustained. The media created and

enkindled confidence in the Biafran people. It gave them hope that they were being

sufficiently defended, and protected from annihilation. Some of the commanders, like

Colonel Archibong of the Ikot Ekpene front, Colonel Achuzia, Port Harcourt front,

Colonel Ananaba, Adazi front, were extolled as possessing mystical powers, which could

not be penetrated by enemy forces. It was claimed that Colonel Archibong was impervious

to enemy bullets. According to Biafran propaganda, he was indestructible. This was

analogous to claims made during the Ukpum Ete/Okon battles, demonstrating the

continuity o f propaganda.

Even when Colonel Archibong was finally killed, and given a military burial in Lagos by

Gowon, the Biafran people did not believe it; just as they did not believe that Aguiyi

Ironsi could be successfully assassinated. These sort of beliefs were not restricted to

Biafra. The Northerners had believed that Ahmadu Bello was above human destruction.

163
Songs like "Ojukwu Nyem Egbe", "Military Police", "Biafra Win The War", and several

others, were constantly repeated on the Bifran media. Song writers, musicians, band

leaders, like Miki Nzewi, Nwokolobia Agu, Ojukwu (no relation), and performing groups,

wrote and performed numerous songs and sketches on the media, and at the war fronts, to

sustain the war effort. Several drama sketches were written, and directed by prominent

figures, amongst whom were John Ekwere, Cyprian Ekwensi, Ralph Opara, Okokon

Ndem, Kalu Uka, Ezenta Eze, Mazi Ukonu Ukonu.

When Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe escaped to Nigeria, and announced that he was happy to

return to his fatherland; the Biafran media announced that Zik had left his "motherland",

for his "fatherland". This was the Biafran way o f saying that Zik was running with the hare

and hunting with the hounds; that he was a deserter, who could not be trusted not to

abandon ship in heavy storm. Zik, incidentally wrote the Biafran National Anthem, before

he escaped from Biafra.(see appendix). The National Anthem itself, like the Biafran

currency, (see appendix) and Biafran stamps, were land marks in the sustenance of the

war effort. They were reflections of Biafran images, aims and objectives, struggles,

motivations, purposes, ambitions and successes. The Anthem, ensign, currency, stamps,

coat of arms and crest, were all designed to encompass all of the Biafran peoples, their

cultures, and their aims, and not only the Ibos'.

The announcement of the secession o f hostilities, and military activities, and surrender

speech was the last performance of the Biafran media. General Philip Efiong, an Ibibio,

Deputy Biafran Head o f State, undertook the awesome, but onerous task. Ojukwu had

fled to exile the week before surrender. After the speech, all activities of the Biafran media

were brought to a halt. The media ceased to exist.

Everything went dead.

164
4.7.4. Durability.
As a test of the durability of Biafran propaganda, this thesis has fallen back on two studies

- (1) A study conducted in the course o f research for this thesis on the Ukpum Ete/Okon

Clan discussed earlier; and (2) A study conducted by Luke Uka Uche in some urban areas
48
of Nigeria, and rural Ibo communities.

These two studies, it should be noted, are relatively recent. Luke Uka Uche's study was

done in 1987, while the one for this thesis was done in 1992. The Ukpum Ete/Okon

community was discussed in chapter 1. They are a community in the South East of

Nigeria. They were a part of Eastern Nigeria, then of Biafra; ’liberated' by Colonel

Adekunle's Nigerian commandos in 1968, they became a part of the South Eastern State

created by Gowon. Latterly, they have become a part of Akwa Ibom State, carved out of

South Eastern State by General Ibrahim Babangida.

They, are therefore a strategically suitable group for study. They form part of the Ibibio

language group. There were newstalks in Efik/Ibibio, who are the fourth largest language

group in Nigeria; and were the second largest language group in Biaffa.

General Philip Efiong, as already stated, is an Ibibio. He was Deputy Head of State in

Biaffa. Mr. N.U.Akpan, who was Secretary to the Government of Biaffa, is an Ibibio. The

Director General of Biaffan Broadcasting Services, Chief John Dickson Ekwere, is an

Ibibio. Ukpum Ete/Okon, therefore, possessing all the ingredients of being within the

Biafran territory initially, captured in 1968 by Colonel Adekunle's Nigerian commandos,

had the benefit of both propaganda thrusts - Nigeria's and Biafra's. Also, being within the

COR State demand territory, Nigeria and Biafra wooed it. A lot of the newstalk were

directed at such areas from the Biafran media. However, the study revealed that even

though they were opposed to Biafra, and actually helped the Nigerian soldiers, they

missed Radio Biafra after it ceased to exist. They still, even now, reflect on, repeat and

chant, the 'one liner' songs and propaganda that emanated from Radio Biafra. The Biafran

165
media, according to them, made compelling listening, and the propaganda therefrom was

indelible.

Luke Uka Uche's study involved Aba, Abayi, Amaoji, and Ihie, in the heart of Ibo land in

Eastern Nigeria - as a sample of rural village opinion. He chose Benin City in the Midwest

o f Nigeria, and Lagos at the centre, for a sample of Nigerian and urban opinion. The study

revealed that Biafran propaganda was more convincing than Nigerian propaganda even in

Federal communities like Lagos and Benin. The Ibo communities still chant the songs,

repeat the stories, and keep the symbols of the war period.

Research for this thesis has also discovered that some buildings in Ibo land that were

riddled with bullets have been left untouched as a memento for posterity. The Ibos cannot

forget the motivating influence of the Biafran media.

According to Uka Uche, one Ibo leader interviewed observed: "Radio Biafra was a

constant reminder o f how Igbos were slaughtered up North. It reminded me that we had

always been cheated..."

One o f the propaganda 'one liners' that the Ibibio people still remember arose from a

newstalk in Ibibio directed at them by Okon Atakpo from Radio Biafra . One of the lines

was a deep rooted Ibibio idiom which had a double edged meaning: "Nsasak asok asak,

ete atat adan", meaning "the robin is roasting, but the onlookers claim it is shedding oil".

4.8 The Sun Set.

The involement of the major powers in the Biafra/Nigeria conflict may have been as a

result of oil, politics or Biafran and Nigerian propaganda, but it was the only occasion

since the second world war that Britain, the U.S.A. and Russia were on one side. France

however supported and aided Biafra.

Under the aegis of the O. A.U. the African countries tried several times and by various

means and through several personalities to intervene. One such attempt was the 'Aburi

166
Accord' which was instigated by President Julius Nyerere and the Ghanaian Head of State,

(see ch. 5)

The international involvement meant that the United Nations urged the O. A.U. to

mediate. Biafra tried unsuccessfully to be admitted into the United Nations. The other

angle adopted by Biaffa in its propaganda war was religion. It accused the Mostly Muslim

North' of seeking to annihilate the 'Christian East'. This attracted sympathy from the

World Council of Churches and the Vatican, and large supplies from Caritas.(see ch. 5)

Ironically, the instrument for propagating the Biafran cause was also used by one of its

foremost soldiers to sabotage Biafra. Emmanuel Ifeajuna, one of the leaders of the 1966

coup had joined Biafra along with Chukwuma Nzeogu. Ifeajuna had his own ambition.

He wanted to take back Lagos and become Head of State. He then played both ends

against themselves. He made a secret pact with the Nigerian army to hand Biafra back to

Nigeria, his main aim being to use the opportunity as a footstool to recapture Lagos. He

then put out certain messages on Radio Biafra which at the time he claimed were coded

messages to the Biafran forces at the war front. But, in fact he was sending veiled

messages to the Nigerian forces to come and take Enugu. The message read "The apple is

ripe and must be eaten. Go to the lake and catch the fish. Andrew Lilian will cooperate".

He was found out, but too late, Enugu had fallen. He was shot. No doubt this started

some back lash against the Onitsha people, homeland of Ifeajuna. The Biafran scene was

tumultous. There were suspicions, accusations and distrust even amongst media people.

There were struggles for power, and sycophancy and ethnic differences between Ibos and

non-Ibos were rife.

Internal strife neither helped the propaganda network nor the Biafran war. Nevertheless

there were a number o f prominent non-Ibo broadcasters who were very efficient in

Biafra. The perpetual news talks against Nigeria were given by Okokon Ndem, an Efik,

Paddy Davies, an Ibibio, and Nwora Asika, an Ibo. John Ekwere, an Ibibio, was Director

General for the co-ordinated Biafran broadcasting services. The O. A.U. forces stepped in.

167
The Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra went silent and into hiding. Even when the Nigerian

army regained the territory, they did not discover the stations.

4.9 Back To The Fold.

Just before the end, a fourth station was set up. Tests were being run.

It was called "The Fourth Dimension". This was to carry a very powerful transmitter, and

to be beamed to Europe and the Americas. Whatever effect this would have had on the

war is a matter for conjecture.

However, Radio Biaffa was taken back to Enugu and incorporated into Radio Nigeria,

Enugu since it had a short wave transmitter. The Voice o f Biaffa was secretly carted away

to Calabar by the Engineer-in-charge, who came ffom Calabar, David Andrew Bassey, to

be used at Calabar Television Stations at Enugu and Aba were incorporated into the

Nigerian Television, and the Radio Stations were all taken over by the New State

Governments or the Federal Government.

The process of reabsorbtion signified the magnanimity of the then Head of State, General

Yakubu Gowon Despite all the insults on him personally, emanating ffom the Voice of

Biaffa and Radio Biafra, during the war, he welcomed everybody back and rehabilitated

them. It would be interesting to see where else such bitter wars have been fought, and

there have not been any official recriminations at the end.

Some of the Biaffan broadcasters have since risen to positions of authority within the

Nigerian fold.

168
4.10. Epilogue.

Somehow, none of the active participants in Biafra's propaganda effort has written

about their experiences. This thesis may turn out to be the first such account. It

incorporates the views and reactions of prominent participants and colleagues, some of

whom include; Cyprian Ekwensi, John Ekwere, Chinua Achebe, Kalu Uka, Sam

Nwaneri, Sebastian Ofiirum, Eno Irukwu, OkokonNdem, Kevin Ejiofor, David

Andrew-Bassey, Gloria Fiofori, Kalu Nsi, Ifegwu Eke.

Part of the reason for the lack of exposition of Biafran propaganda, is that at the end

of the war, the word Biafra became a "dirty word" in Nigeria, even to the ex-Biafrans.

The ex-Biafrans were more concerned with rehabilitation and reconstruction. And, the

Nigerians were frightened, lest another propaganda war would start, and another civil

war. The Federal Nigerian Government of General Yakubu Gowon was anxious to

bury the hatchet and speed up rehabilitation and reconstruction. Some books have

eventually emerged but mainly on the civil war itself, not on the media.

One observation from these reflections is worth comment; the African attitude towards

reconciliations. Unlike other parts o f the world - the Middle East, the Americas, Asia

and Europe - where repercusions still reverberate over crimes that were committed at

war decades ago, Africans, as demonstrated in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and

South Africa, reconcile, accommodate, bury the hatchet, and forget.

Hopefully, this will happen in future in Mozambique, Angola, Liberia,etc. There are no

widespread postwar recriminations. This does not happen elsewhere in the world.

Perhaps, since the reconciliation example migrated from Nigeria to Zimbabwe,

Namibia, and South Africa, the African mutation formula may, in due course be

imitated and replicated around the world.

169
Notes on Chapter 4.

1. Frederick Forsyth: The Biafra Story:

The Making of an African Legend.

Severn House, London, 1983, pp.37-61.

2. Ibid: pp 78 -90

3. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe: Nigeria Attains Independence':

a text of the speech by the first

indigenous Governor General of

Nigeria at the attainment of

independence on October 1st, 1960;

Film, Federal Ministry of

Information Archives,

Lagos, Nigeria, 1960.

4. Auberon Waugh

& Suzanne Cronje: Biafra Britain's Shame.

London, Michael Joseph, 1969,

pp.103-107.

Frederick Forsyth: Op. cit. pp. 60 -67

170
5. Michael Mok: BiafraJoumal
N.Y. Time Life, 1969, pp. 14-19

6 . Confederation of

British Industries,

London: These figures, and information were

extracted ffom the C.B.I. demographic

office. It was a result of worldwide

economic and related population survey

commissioned by the C.B.I. in 1985.

7. United Nations,

New York: The figures were produced by a United

Nations Report;

Courtesy o f the U.N. Population Bureau.

8 . Nigerian High

Commission, London: Ministry o f Information Leaflet,

Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos,

obtained by courtesy of

the High Commission.

9. Frederick Forsyth: Op. cit. pp. 50 - 60

Notes 6,7,8 & 9, were juxtaposed

and married to produce the paragraph.

10. Auberon Waugh: Op. cit. pp.33-35.

171
 Frederick Forsyth: Op. cit.pp.81-89.

11. Ibid: pp. 82 - 88

12. Ibid: pp. 83 - 87

13 Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe: The Biafra War,

Dyfed, Wales, Edwin Mellen, 1990.

pp.40-69.

14. Frederick Forsyth: Op cit. pp. 19-37

15 Ibid: pp. 20 - 36

16 Ibid: pp. 21 - 35

17. Patrick Davies: The Role of Television in Nigeria

(unpublished), Dissertation,

M. A. Sociology and Social Policy,

University of North London, 1990.

18. Luke Uka Uche: Mass Media People And Politics In

Nigeria,

Concept, New Delhi, 1989. pp.74-85.

19. Ibid: pp. 50 - 60.

172
20. Frederick Forsyth: Op cit. pp.81-84

21. Luke Uka Uche: Op cit. pp. 89-97.

Ibid : 'Imperialism Revisited',

The Media Education Journal,

No.6, 1987 Falkirk, Scotland.

22. Frederick Forsyth: Op cit. pp. 113-117.

23. Chinweizu "The West and the Rest of Us"-

extracted from a lecture to M. A.

Sociology Students at the

University of North London 1991.

Luke Uka Uche: Op cit. pp.97-101.

24. Graham Mytton: Mass Communication in Africa,

Edward Arnold, London, 1983. pp. 118-123.

25. See Chapter 5..

26. Ibid: ch. 5

27. Frederick Forsyth: Op cit. pp. 1.00-118.

28. Ibid: pp. 101 - 117

173
29. Ibid: pp. 102 - 106

30. See Chapter 5.

31. Frederick Forsyth: Op cit. pp. 153-182

32. Ibid: pp. 154-181

33. Ibid: pp. 155 - 180

Auberon Waugh

& Suzanne Cronje. Op.cit. pp.23-36

34. Leaders o f Thought Conference: Frederick Forsyth, p89,

Op cit:

Auberon Waugh

& Suzanne Cronje: Op cit. pp. 19-20

35. Voice of Biafra, (YOB) : 1967.

Frederick Forsyth: Op cit. pp. 71-73.

36. West Africa Magazine, London, 24 -12-66.

37. Hilary M. Njoku: A Tragedy Without Heroes.

(Brigadier Rtd.) Enugu, Fourth Dimension, 1987.

pp. 52-71 & Appendix 5, p. 191.

174
 Nigerian War Museum, Umuahia, Nigeria; Aburi Accord

Documents.

38. Hilary Njoku: Op cit: Meeting of Permanent

Secretaries.

Appendix 6, p. 196.

Frederick Forsyth: Op cit. pp.42-45.

39. Ibid: pp. 43 - 44

40. Ibid: Edicts and Decrees.

& Appendix 6. p. 199.

41. Ibid: p. 199

42. Western Nigeria Leaders o f Thought Conference Documents,

Archives, Ibadan

43. Frederick Forsvth Op cit.

44. Ibid: p. 62

45. Ibid: p. 63

46. War Museum Archives, Umuahia, Nigeria.

175
47. Frederick Forsyth: Op cit. pp.73-86.

48. Luke Uka Uche: 'Radio Biafra and The Nigerian Civil War':

''Study of War Propaganda on a Target

Audience,'' The Third Channel.

International Broadcasting Society, 1987.

176
 CHAPTER FIVE

BIAFRA: THE EXTERNAL FACTOR.

Introduction

This chapter, which is in three parts, examines the international factor in Biaffan

propaganda under the following headings:

Part A: Biaffa's external propaganda;

Part B: Biafra and Africa; Biaffa and Britain; and

Part C: Biaffa and the World.

With the establishment of the Voice o f Biafra, which reached out to surrounding African

countries, sympathy began to emerge from some African countries. The countries included

parts of the Camerouns, despite the attempt by the Camerounian leader to stop it, Gabon,

Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Zaire.

Outside Africa, Israel, France, Portugal, South Africa and Haiti, were sympathetic. By

accusing Nigeria o f continued genocide and instituting pogroms, Biafra also attracted

some non-governmental sympathy from the people of Great Britain and the United States.

The voice of Biafra expressed the appreciation o f the Biaffan people for the support.

The media - Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra - accused Nigeria of waging the war to steal

the abundant mineral wealth of Biafra. They called it an 'oil war', because Biafra was the

main source of crude oil in Nigeria. In 1967, in the early part of the war, Biaffan soldiers

177
successfully captured and incorporated the Midwest, the other oil producing area. But, the

Nigerian army took back the region.

The people o f Biafra were asked through mounting propaganda to starve Nigeria of crude

oil, fuel, and by-products. The sale or export of these products was punishable by death.

Despite this, the black market flourished, and traders amassed vast amounts of Biafran

money.

A broadcast from the Voice of Biafra in December 1967, accused the British Prime

Minister, Harold Wilson, of supporting Nigeria, and ignoring the cross party consensus in

the British Parliament against his policy. According to the Voice of Biaffa, he advised the

Nigerian government to get the United States and the Soviet Union on her side quickly.

The Biaffan government, however, claimed that even though Britain officially supported

the Nigerian government, it indirectly and unofficially sympathised with Biafra. There

appears to be no official source for this piece of information which seems to have

emanated either from Biafran government sources, or the propaganda directorate. But, the

'rumour' spread like wild fire in Biafra boosting morale. Whether this was propaganda or

not, is difficult to determine, but Auberon Waugh maintained that Sir David Hunt, who

was British High Commissioner in Nigeria at the time, tacitly worked in favour of the

Nigerian government, and also convinced the British government to do the same. *

This chapter will examine these themes in greater depth, and analyse the effectiveness of

Biafran propaganda in attracting or repelling sympathies from the different participating

external constituencies it addressed.

It will be seen that while the British government appeared to 'encourage the activities of

the Nigerian government, British journalists were active on both sides of the divide, for

example, Colin Legum, then Africa and Commonwealth correspondent of the Observer.

and Frederick Forsyth, then of the B.B.C. were involved with feeding the world with

information, the former from Nigeria, the latter from Biafra. Others, like Angus

178
McDermid and Auberon Waugh also became deeply involved at different times in the

propaganda war.

179
 PART A

5.1. External Propaganda:

Mode, Method, Execution and Effect.

This part analyses the mode of transmission of Biafran propaganda to the outside world,

and the method used to execute the spread. It examines the effect this had on the policies

of the recipients.

5.1.1. Mode

The mode was entirely 'manipulative persuasion' by both Nigeria and Biaffa, but more so

by Biaffa, whose propaganda was better organised and more efficient. The means of

control of the external forces was non existent, and so it was difficult to gauge the mood,

reception and reaction of the external constituency. Therefore the methods discussed in

the next section had to be employed.

Dr. Ifegwu Eke, when interviewed for this thesis, explained that Biafra had also carefully

studied the propaganda results and responses in the other models - China and Germany,

etc. and learned both from their mistakes and successes, and decided what to adapt and

tailor to suit it's own particular propaganda goals. From this, it is fair to argue that a

process of migration and mutation had occured. The Biaffans had gestated the ideas thus

imbibed, imitated and replicated them, with adaptations to suit their particular messages

and recipient audiences. The external audiences responded, and reacted variously to the

messages received. Their reactions and responses varied depending on their interpretations

of Biafran mterial. Their respective motivations were to variously mobilise humanitarian

help, and arms.

180
No doubt, censorship as a mode o f propaganda was also heavily applied. Each side only

issued statements, and released messages and information favourable to it. Two typical

examples demonstrate this clearly:

(1) During the upheaval in Western Nigeria, the Commonwealth Prime Minister's

Conference was being held in Lagos. Yet, the Federal Government controlled,

manipulated and stifled the information that reached the Heads of State and Government,

even at such a close proximity; such as the the riots, the killings, the burning and looting

that went on. The propagation o f a 'police action', whilst waging all out war, is a further

example.

(2) The best illustration of such a control by Biaffa was the continous announcement that

Radio Biaffa and Voice of Biaffa were both still broadcasting ffom Enugu, long after

Enugu had been sacked. In fact, Radio Biafra had moved three times, first to Owerri, then

to Umuahia, then to a bunker, and finally to Obodo Ukwu near Orlu, where it survived in

the forest till the war ended.

Voice of Biafra had also moved three or more times, finally situating in Eke Ututu near

the Biafran airport at Uli, until the end o f the war.

Throughout all this movement, the stations were housed in mobile portakabins - an act of

considerable engineering ingenuity, considering the propaganda achievement over a period

of three years.

5.1.2. Method.

In 1968, the first puzzling signs o f famine began to emerge from Biafra - images of famine

that were to reveal the true scale of the so called 'small bush war', and transform it into a

major front page story in the West. The journalist responsible for the transformation was

Frederick Forsyth.

181
He had been in Biafra during the early days - the exodus and the declaration of

independence. He was recalled by the BBC, but returned to Biafra independently, because

he was moved by what he saw in his earlier visit.

Biafra's early propaganda thrust were three fold - pogrom and genocide, religious war

fare, and oil and economic war.(see ch.4). All three relatively impacted on the world

stage, but, as has been seen, despite strong words, did not motivate any external

mobilisation in aid of Biafra. But, famine - and the pictures of Kwashiorkor children,

women and men achieved what religion, genocide and pogrom, and oil, did not.

Famine has struck countless communities throughout history, but the impact had always

been local and gone largely unnoticed in the rest of the world. In this case, the isolation

was swept aside because the media was made to take interest - an excellent case of

manipulative persuasion.

The Biafran famine was caused directly by the civil war. It was a clear and unambigous

case of politics provoking a famine.

Father Mike Doheny. an Irish Holy Ghost Father, who had lived as a missionary in

Eastern Nigeria from 1945 to 1959, recalls:

’We'd never seen hunger, never.

There was no shortage of food.
People lived very simply,
there was a lot of disease
but no starvation as such,
and when we saw it for the first time,
when we saw Kwashiorkor,
it really shocked us to our foundations.
We weren't prepared for it
and we could'nt understand it for a long time'.4

Kwashiorkor, a protein-deficiency disease principally affecting children, had arisen

because of the blockade of Biaffa on land sea and air by Nigeria. Previously, Eastern

Nigeria had been self sufficient in fruits and carbohydrates, while importing salt from

182
Niger, and meat from Northern Nigeria. It imported stock fish - dried cod - from

Scandinavia.

With the economic and military blockade, everything stopped coming. Biafra accused

Nigeria of seeking to starve Biafran citizens into submission, and of using starvation as a

weapon of war. Biafra had no hard currency to exchange for goods and materials because

it could no longer export. Insurance cover was denied to all shipping lines venturing

beyond Lagos port - apart from the threat of being boarded and searched.

The area was described by Nigeria as a war zone, while claiming that it was only carrying

out a police action 'to keep Nigeria one'.

Biafra launched two schemes called Back to Land', and 'Operation Feed the Nation'. It

propagated the planting of all sorts of crops, an increase in the production of chicken and

egg, extensive fish farming, salt production from sea water etc. But, as the war

progressed, these measures became inadequate for the needs o f both the military and

civilian populations. Gradually, Biafra began to lose even the farming territories to the

invading Nigerian army. As the rural areas fell, refugees flocked to the centre of Biafra,

exacerbating the famine.

Thus, by May 1968, starvation was almost at its peak. Biafran propaganda on the issue of

starvation also heightened, whilst Lagos was determined to play it down.

It censored every information emanating from Biafra. The two hundred Christian

Missionary groups in Biafra were the first to react to this aspect of Biafra's message, and

responded immediately. They were to play a key role in attracting the world's attention to

the ever increasing volumes of Biafra's starving children especially, and women and men

generally.

Earlier, it was seen that Eastern Nigeria unlike the North and West had totally accepted

Christianity. This was to have its rewards. As a result of this acceptance, various

denominations had built churches, hospitals and schools. As town after town fell, the

missionaries who ran these institutions could not carry on with their normal daily

183
activities. They therefore turned their energies into helping the refugees and the starving.

They risked their lives in most cases, to take food into remote villages to reach those who

had been cut off and inaccessible to the refugee centres. Some of them even became

involved in buying or hiring ships and planes to bring in vital supplies via Lisbon and Sao

Tome.

Father Doheny explains:

Suddenly we realised that

we were all in the same boat
with our people getting hammered.
The children were starving
and I realised for the first time
the meaning of Paul's phrase:
"You are my children
whom I have begotten in the Lord".
I had once taken that
as a pious kind of statement,
but now I realised that it was a fact.
I was feeling:
"Here are children I have baptised,
and here they are starving.
They are mine, may be in a very true sense.
Even though it's not a natural child,
it's a spiritual child, a reality".
And that's what drove us.
And here were all these missionaries
finding the same thing,
their children were starving,
and so to help them they had to come together.
And they came together
not by talking but by doing.
They started Joint Church Aid - JCA,
which combined all their resources at Sao Tome.
They hired planes and pilots
to fly them in overnight to Biafra'.^

Unlike the journalists who flocked into Biafra when news of the famine broke, the

missionaries had lived in the area for a long time. They knew their whereabouts.^ They

184
also knew the advantage and power of the media - and they used it. The missionary

infrastructure was good and strong, and their local knowledge was useful to the media.

The media knew this and utilised it. The relationship became, unconsciously, a quid pro

quo. Therefore, what started as propaganda, repeated often enough, materialised in fact,

into a truism. Father Mike Doheny's brother, Father Kevin Doheny was as prominent

amongst the missionaries as his brother. He had resided and worked in Eastern Nigeria

since 1954. He was particularly outspoken and journalists often sought him out precisely
n
because he refused to mince his words. He was quoted in the Daily Sketch of 22nd June
o
1968 as saying: 'I came here to these people and will stay here until I am killed'. He

brought many stories of the bombing of undefended villages and the like to the attention

of Frederick Forsyth and the journalists. Father Kevin Doheny recalls one occasion in

1969 when Mike Nicholson o f ITN came out to Biafra:

Because o f anti-British feeling,

he wasn't allowed to take any photographs
or any films.
I asked the Ministry o f Information
if he could stay with me,
and they said yes.
He stayed with me in a hoouse in Umuahia.
We were there when
the Iliyushin jets came right over our heads,
strafing the church and the Priest's house.
Mike had his camera just at the right time
in the right place,
because the Catholic Church was
overlooking the town
so he got marvellous film
of the whole of the bombing episode'.^

Father Mike Doheny had been in the habit o f shooting films since the 1960s purely as a

hobby, but the war brought a new dimension to his favourite past time. Television became

an outlet. Demand for films from Biafra had grown. The dangers and expense of sending a

crew to the front were enormous, so the stations developed an appetite for anything that

185
came out - any footage at all, they even abandoned their normal reluctance to use super-8

film. ^ As it happened, Father Mike Doheny was at the scene when Owerri was

recaptured from Nigeria by Biafra in April 1969. He recalls:

'I had taken shots of Owerri

and the unfinished Cathedral
and the Bishop’s house with bullet holes
and strafing marks on the walls.
By this time
I'd got to know a lot of these media guys;
you’d meet them out there and they’d say:
"Give us a buzz when you're next in London".
They'd want to hear the latest news.
So this time when I got to London,
one of them asked if I had any film.
He had a look at it
and asked if he could use i t .
I said yes, on condition that I was in no way
identified as the person who made it.
It was a very delicate diplomatic situation
at that time.
That night, it appeared on News At Ten
which was OK,
as they didn't identify me.
But the following night
RTE (Irish Television) showed it,
saying who I was,
without so much as a 'by your leave'. * *

5.1.3. Execution.

Two wars were fought in Nigeria. The first was the military, which eventually the Federal
19
side won. The second was conducted in the media, and there is no boubt that the
1^
Biafrans won that one hands down. The Easterners had dominated the Nigerian media

and they were fully conscious o f the need for publicity to attract outside support.

Angus McDermid cites a British diplomat, who had once been a professional public

relations practitioner, as saying rather grudgingly, that in his opinion the Biafrans had

mounted 'the most successful public relations campaign of all time'. ^ They hired a

186
Geneva- based PR Manager, Markpress, which also held the Chrysler account, to promote

their cause. Markpress bombarded British MPs, newspaper editors, radio and television

correspondents, businessmen and academics with over 700 press releases and other

material during the war. ^ The Catholic Church also played an important world wide role

in the propaganda war.

Since most Easterners were Catholic, it was natural for the Church to sympathise with

them, and idividuals like Fr Mike, Fr W.J.Dowling, Fr Michael Golden, Fr O'Marley, Fr

Owen Reid spared no effort to publicise the Biafran cause as widely as possible. In the

case of Fr W.J. Dowling, who had once been Parish Priest in Essene, Opobo, Pricipal o f

Holy Family College, Abak, St Patrick's College Calabar, and Regina Coeli College

Essene, devoted his life to the Biafran cause. Like Fr Mike, he had baptised so many

children, and seen so many of them through school, that he could not stand idly by and

watch them die. When the Nigerian soldiers entered the South East, he was captured, sent

to Lagos, deported, and banned from Nigeria. He has ofcourse since returned as Parish

Priest in Abakaliki near Enugu. Fr. Michael Golden was sent to Northern Nigeria, where

he contracted polio, and became paralysed from the waist down. He was flown back to

Dublin, but still manages even now, despite his disability, to pay regular visits to Nigeria.

Fr. O'Marley went to Rome to work in the Research Department of the Vatican, while

Owen Reid returned to Northern Ireland.

In France, the combination of Catholicism and President De Gaulle's desire to weaken

Nigeria, meant that the Biafrans got every support short of 'de jure' recognition.

In America, Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Sub-committee on

Refugees tried to tilt official policy towards Biafra. (see part 3 of this ch.)

In Ireland, Holland and Germany, there was also significant support for Biafra.

The missionaries often talked of the conflict in terms of a 'Holy War' between Christianity

and Islam. This was an over-simplification, which ignored the Christian belt in the largely

Muslim North of Nigeria, and the fact that the predominantly Christian West supported

187
the Federal side. But it is true that strong support for Federal Nigeria came from the oil-

rich Arab countries, while Egyptian pilots flew Russian-built Ilyushin jets for the

Nigrerians after Britain declined to do so, thus serving to enhance the notion of a Holy

War.16

When it came to television, the Biafrans were far more adept than the Nigerians. As Colin

Legum of the Observer explains:

'The Biafrans stole a march

by flying in everybody who wanted to come
and taking them up and showing them everything.
Thus much of the filming on television,
which is what upset the Federals,
was on the Biafran side,
showing the devastation caused,
first by the air bombing
and then later by the famine.
So in that sense the reporting became one-sided
because the Federals refused to let the
17
cameras in,
or placed great obstacles m the way'1

In time the Nigerians handled the media abysmally. They were defensive, secretive and

very formal. They were reluctant to supply even the most basic information to the 20 or so

foriegn journalists normally based in Lagos and they made it almost impossible for them to

get to the front. No army casualty lists were ever supplied.

Angus McDermid's recollection is that 'you had to go round squeezing out news'. The

Federal side had nothing to rival Markpress. He goes on:

'The journalists relied heavily on

what were laughingly called
"diplomatic sources".
We did the rounds of the embassies.
We tried to get stuff out of the Ministry of Defence,
but there were very few regular press conferences,
and the idea of daily press handouts was laughable.

188
 Scraps of Information came from the generals
who went out with the army
and would give you a briefing
when they got back.
The government itself was very reluctant
to say anything.
You might get an individual soldier
telling you something.
It was extremely difficult and unsatisfactory;
in fact it was an affront
to our sense of professionalism'. ^

For McDermid, it was of all reporting jobs the most difficult to get anything absolute:

'I used to amuse myself in the long nights

by thinking about a situation
and making a coefficient o f reliability.
Something that I gave ten points to,
I had seen happen myself.
Then gradually I worked down to the things like
"who told me about this;
what would his reason be for telling me?
Have two people seen this?"
and so on until you got down to about three,
w hich was the rumour stage.
It was a most weird task to report the war,
and Markpress were no help;
they were sending out
disastrously incorrect stuff. ^

Forsyth agrees with this assessment of Markpress bulletins. He 'very quickly came to

regard them as being as foolish and as exaggerated and propagandist as the Federal

bulletins'. But he was given far greater freedom than McDermid. According to Paul

Harrison and Robin Palmer, in News Out o f Africa, when Forsyth returned as a freelance

to Biafra, Ojukwu gave him accommodation, the loan o f a Volkswagen Beetle and petrol

vouchers, access to the one telex and freedom to travel where he liked, saying: 'If you

want to get your head blown off, get your head blown off, but don't blame me!'

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The problems o f lack of information on the Federal side and deliberate misinformation on

both sides were further compounded by the fact that it was virtually impossible for

journalists to cover both sides of the war. Once a journalist had gone to Biafra, he/she was

automatically barred from Nigeria. Winston Churchill, then a special correspodent for The

Times, did go to both sides, to Nigeria first and then to Biafra - but he would not have

been allowed back into Nigeria again.

Eventually the Federals did give a small contract to a London PR firm, Galitzine Chant

Russell, but that did not change things very much because they continued to be very

secretive and their army continued to behave 'pretty badly', according to Colin Legum.

The Nigerians constantly complained that they were getting a bad Western press, and the

issue soured Nigerian-British relations long after the end of the war, but they remained

chronically incapable of remedying the situation. In fact the Western press was very much

divided on the issue.

It is interesting to note that Forsyth, who was pro-Biafran, and Legum, who was pro-

Federal, both considered themselves to be in a minority. Because Legum had written so

movingly about the atrocities committed against the Easterners in the North in 1966, he

was regarded as pro-Biafran. In fact, he supported the Federal side, believing secession to

be 'a nonsense which wouldn't work'.

5.1.4

The Effect.

For Biafra, the great media breakthrough came in the summer of 1968, almost by

accident. Forsyth recalls that as with the missionaries, it took time for the full implications

o f the famine to hit the journalists. The first photographs, taken by the Daily Express's

David Cairns were dismissed by his editor as mere Oxfam posters of no news value or

interest whatever to the British people. In June 1968 a party of five journalists went out to

Biafra at the invitation o f Markpress. It included Michael Leapman of the Sun as

190
Commonwealth Correspondent, this paper having replaced the Daily Herald in 1964. He

went to Biafra with a photographer, Ronald Burton.

As far as Leapman was concerned, it was a war assignment. But, he recalls a visit to a

hospital in Biafra with Alan Hart of the ITN, at the invitation o f Fr Kevin:

’It was the pictures

that really made that first story,
some marvellous pictures
of kids in great distress.
And talking to the Doctor, who said:
"This one here is going to die tomorrow".
It was very moving stuff.
I'd never done much
of the heart-throbbing, sob-story stuff before;
I'd been mainly in diplomatic reporting.
I wrote down what he said
and reported it back.
And the Sun ran it as a series
over about three days and sent me back
about a week later!
It was at that time
that I think the Biafrans realised that
if they wanted to get the sympathy of the world,
they could actually exploit this.
And they did.
They then took people around.
But it wasn't their initial intention.
They did that when they realised
what the reponse was to that story,
compared to the very limited response
to the other stories
that had been written ! '^

Leapman's first story appeared on the morning of 12th June, while Hart's ITN coverage

went out that evening. Leapman's article was entitled 'The Land of No Hope' - a phrase

which The Sun was to make great play with. The front page carried a picture of a child

dying of hunger in a nurse's arms.

191
On page two there was an article headed Why British arms count' about arms supplies to

Nigeria, and a picture o f Biafran soldiers with a case of British made ammunition captured

from the Nigerians.

Page three carried a picture of a child in Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Umuahia, with a

caption Boy suffering from malnutrition hides under a cot during an air raid'.

This was later used in an appeal run by The Times, headed, 'We can't sit and wait for a

million people to die'.

Leapman's main report said that several thousand children had already died; that hundreds

of thousands would starve to death that summer, and by August more than a million might

be dead. The problem was exacerbated by the massive influx of refugees into an ever-

diminishing area and by the Ngerian blockade. The hospital was receiving 2,500

malnutrition cases every week. Biafra needed 200 tons of protein daily, but was getting

only 20 tons weekly. This report coincided with an emergency Commons debate on arms

supplies to Nigeria, and copies o f the Sun were sent to every MP. The next day a Sun

editorial called for a massive international rescue operation and for more vigour by the

British government.

A similar story appeared in the Sun's rival, the Daily Sketch on 17th June. Its front page

carried a picture o f a starving child and proclaimed 'Scandal of Biafra: the Sketch says the

children need milk - Britain sends bullets'. The Sketch had decided to send out half a ton

of full cream dried milk, enough to keep 200 children alive for just two weeks. It appealed

for more. On 22nd June Brian Dixon, who had followed in Leapman's footsteps, filed a

report in the Sketch under a heading TVlilk - not murder'. He described Biafra as 'today's

Belsen', and said he had seen 200 children dying that day, that those he had spoken to

would probably not be alive by the time his report was read, and that nearly 3 million

children were thought to be near death:

'The grey hair on their heads

192
 is the sign that there is no hope.
The sign that they have a few days to live.
They sit like decrepit old men.
Their bones are covered with only
tightly stretched skin,
their eyes bulge and they look around them
as if they know they are doomed'.^*

The impact of the ITN and newspaper reports was instant. Forsyth remarks:

'Quite suddenly, bingo, we'd touched a nerve.

Nobody in this country at that time
had ever seen children looking like that.
The last time the Brits had seen anything like that
must have been the Belsen pictures.
Even in Vietnam they didn't starve.
Those first few pictures did it.
There was suddenly a tidal wave
o f applications from Fleet Street
to the little office the Biafrans maintained
in London for space on a plane, for access.
And then it all started.
What they wrote
shook the conscience of the world...
Only after those pictures appeared
did the Fleet Street editors
override the advice they were getting
from the Commonwealth Office.
Only at that point did they say:
''Bugger you, we are going to investigate
And the guys they sent down
weren't African experts,
they were hard-nosed reporters,
who went out with no prior conceptions
or emotional baggage.
They were just down there to report a story.
And report it they did. With cameras.
Then came the television
and then came the foreigners.
The war itself would never have
set the Thames on fire,
but the pictures of starving children
put Biaffa on to the front page
o f every British newspaper

193
 and from there to newspapers all over the world.
People who couldn't fathom
the political complexities of the war
could easily grasp the wrong
in a picture of a child dying of starvation'.^

After this, Biafra became a beehive of world journalists. The world was brimming over

with the Biafran story.

Charity organisations across the globe fell over themselves to get into the act of relief

shipments to Biafra, all to the chagrin o f Nigeria.

Predictably therefore, public opinion and government policies around the world reacted

variously to the massive media coverage, as discussed in the remaining parts of this

chapter.

194
 PART 2

5.2. Biafra and Africa.

It is necessary to state at the start that, there was a big difference between the propaganda

messages sent out from Biafra to Africa, and those sent to the rest of the world. This is

because where Africa was concerned, at least initially, Biafra had a problem convincing

the other countries, especially within the O. A.U, that if successful, its secssion would not

create a domino effect across the continent.

It was therefore more difficult to get African sympathy for Biafra. Conversly, the African

countries' fear of a secessionist domino effect was the very same sentiment that Nigeria

played on to counteract the Biafran argument. In a speech welcoming the O. A.U

Consultative Committee on Nigeria in 1967, General Gowon stated

'The O. A.U has rightly seen our problems as a purely domestic affair, and in accordance

with the O.A.U resolutions, your mission is not here to mediate.

The O.A.U, as it was formed in 1963, represented a compromise between two groups.

Professor Emmanuel Wallerstein, has defined these as the progressive core which saw

unity as a movement, 'a key rallying point' with the aim of transforming Africa, and a

periphery which regarded unity as 'an alliance among the gorvening groups to share in the

immediately available portion of the pie allocated to their countries in the existing world

m arket'.^

This division corresponded roughly to the radical 'Casablanca' and moderate 'Monrovia'

groups, named after the venues o f two conferences that had been held in 1961.

The main difference between the two was their attitude towards events in the Congo; the

Casablanca States supporting the Lumumbist elements and the Monrovia group

attempting 'to consolidate the defeat of the Lumumbist elements in the Congo by creating

195
a Pan-African structure that would build very firmly on the principle of non interference in

the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Non interference had thus been consecrated in the O.A.U Charter as a principle on the

insistence of those who feared subversion and were deeply concerned about internal

security. In return, a commitment to help liberation movements in Southern Africa and in

other African territories still under foreign domination was also incorporated into the

Charter.

When President Tshombe of the Congo began systematically to recruit South African and

other white mercenaries to deal with the Lumumbist revolutionaries, backed by strong

material assistance from the United States and other Western powers, the O. A.U called an

extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers. This established an ad hoc ten member

commission charged with restoring normal relations between the Congo and some of its

neighbours, and with helping and encouraging the efforts of the Congolese government 'in

the restoration of national reconciliation'.^

In effect, this meant that the OAU had asserted that national reconciliation within a

member state was its legitimate concern - an important principle three years later when the

organisation had to deal with the Nigerian crisis.

This African debate on the Congo was to be highly relevant to the issues involved in the

Biaffan secession It was inevitable that Biaffa should be compared with Katanga, and

Ojukwu with Tshombe Nigerian emissaries at international meetings, particularly at the

OAU and the United Nations invariably made this point, forgetting perhaps that Nigeria -

one of the key protagonists of the Monrovia group - had not been among those which had

supported Lumumba, or protested at the Stanleyville rescue operation. President Mobutu

of Zaire was not at first among those who took the view that Katanga was comparable to

Biaffa, since the secession of Katanga had been brought about by foreign financial
77
interests, while the secession of Biaffa was the result of internal forces against Nigeria.

196
The same view was held from the start by President Nyerere of Tanzania, In 1969, he

expanded it in an analysis of the Nigerian crisis. Outlining the similarities between the two

cases, he acknowledged that Katanga was part o f a United Congo - similarly Biaffa was

part of a United Nigeria.

Both decided to secede, and in both cases the centre objected and war broke out. Katanga

had vast copper resources; the former colonial power was very interested in this vast

amount of wealth, and these economic interests were threatened by Lumumba at the

centre. Similarly Biaffa had vital oil resources. The former colonial power was vitally

interested in this vast amount of oil, and these interests were threatened in the conflict -

but in this case the threat came ffom the secessionists. In the case of the Congo, Belgium

joined the side supported by the copper companies - Katanga. In the case of Nigeria,
90
Britain was on the same side as the oil companes - the centre.

Nyerere further argued:

'Let those who love

the superficial similarities of secession
have the courage and honesty to accept
this unpleasant fact also.
In Katanga, Belgium
and the copper companies were on one side;
in Nigeria, Britain
and the oil companies are on one side.
This is the one constant
and crucial factor in both cases
around which everything else
can be variable
In both cases, the former colonial power
and the vested economic interests
are on one side.
Tshombe was a stooge
of the copper interests:
they filled his coffers
with their vast financial resources.
Ojukwu is not a stooge of these interests.
They refuse to pay him a penny
ffom the wealth they derive

197
 from Biafran oil...
Only great simplicity -
or extreme naievity
could lend anyone to accept that
Britain is defending the unity of Nigeria,
or African unity in general.
She is defending
her own economic interests...
Who is Biafra's Tshombe?
Who in Biafra represents
the copper companies?
Africa appealed to the United Nations
to support Patrice Lumumba;
why are we not appealing
to the United Nations
to support General Gowon,
who on this analogy
would be Nigeria’s Lumumba?
Perhaps the true answer is
that it is not necessary;
he already has strong support.
But why is it not necessary?
Because the Ibos are simply
fighting for their own survival
and therefore have no strong supporter.
That is their strength and weakness:
it is the major difference between
Katanga and Biafra.
In the one case,
foreign economic interest was on the side
of the secessionists,
and that made them very strong;
in the other case
foreign economic interest
is on the side of the Federalists,
and makes them too very strong.
They can even quote the O.A.U Charter
on non-interference in the internal affairs
of a member State'. 29

This statement is of particular importance as Julius Nyerere was later to spearhead the

campaign for recognition of Biafra by African States, an unprecedented act, in

198
contradiction of the O.A.U. Charter. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia held a similar

view as Nyerere. He too was to later recognise Biafra, along with Ivory Coast and Gabon.

Even though Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah was regarded as the protagonist of the

radical - Casablanca group, by 1967 Nyerere's Tanzania, had emerged as one of the

radical front runners. He had an ally in Kenneth Kaunda who shared his views on

international affairs.

Nevertheless, the other 'radicals' 30 were firmly opposed to Biafra's secession. Most of

those in this category were Muslim States;in thier case the Biafran religious propaganda

had a negative - indeed an opposite - effect on them.

Thus President Boumediene attacked countries and relief agencies aiding Biafra in a tirade

which described them as imperialist stooges in a conspiracy against Nigeria 'whose unity

we are all proud of. Similar views were expressed by Guinea, Egypt, Mali, Somalia and

the Sudan - all countries which voted with the 'progressives' on African issues.

Their difference with Nyerere on the Nigerian question became particularly marked in that

they found themselves in the same group as Malawi and the Malagasy Republic, two of

the most conservative African countries, which were as fully behind Lagos as the North
oI
African radicals.

In 1968, the President of the Malagasy Republic condemned Tanzanian recognition of

Biafra as 'not an honest act vis-a-vis a brother state in the O.A.U...what would the

Tanzanian leaders do if a part of their country seceded?' He warned against 'imperialist

traps' and said; 'There is oil in Biafra and this smells of o il'.^ For Dr. Banda, 'non­

intervention in Nigeria's domestic affairs meant that he would support anything Gowon

chose to do in Nigeria on the understanding that Gowon would refrain from interfering in

what Dr. Banda considered to be Malawi's internal affairs. The fact that Presidents

Nyerere and Kaunda whom he had long accused o f fostering subversion in Malawi, had

recognised Biafra may also have influenced him. South Africa reacted to Tanzania's

199
recognition by predicting that this action would split the O. A.U, and suggesting that

Chinese Communist influence would invade West Africa.

There was ofcourse an element of double standards by Algeria who on the one hand

supported the Eritrean Liberation Movement, whilst decrying Biaffan secession. For

instance, the Algerian government kept Biaffan representatives out of Algeria during the

1968 summit o f the O.A.U, while allowing the Eritrean Liberation Movement, which had

opened offices in Algiers a few months earlier, to lobby among the African delegations

attending the summit. The reasons were purely religious.

Thus, the reception of and reaction to Biaffan and Nigerian propaganda, by Affican

governments were varied and complex, as will be seen later in this chapter.

There certainly is a link between Islam and politics on the African continent, and in some

cases with government and governance.^

The Islamic, and, feudal structures of Northern Nigeria had emerged relatively unscathed

from the effects of colonialism. Eastern Nigeria, the area that became Biafra, was not

penetrated, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, by Islam. The all conquering Fulanis, who

spread Islam to West Africa, were obstructed in the South by the dense rain forest and

Tsetse fly.

Western Nigeria was partly converted because o f the proximity to the North, and partly

because of Yoruba trade with Arabic Kingdoms north of the Sahara.

The East remained firmly and predominantly Christian, preventing Islam from ’dipping the

Koran in the sea', as Biafra claimed in its euphemistic propaganda during the war.

Within hours o f declaring independence, Radio Biafra announced that Ghana, Togo,

Gambia, Ethiopia and Israel had recognised Biafra, with more recognitions being

expected. This was denied by the countries concerned. The inclusion or anticipation of

recognition by Israel merely acted in a negative propaganda fashion, in that it stiffened the

opposition of the Islamic Affican countries to Biaffan independence. There was caution

200
and concern in the various African countries. Mostly all the African countries wanted

mediation and reconciliation to occur.

Nevertheless, mediation offers were principally initiated from West African countries. For

instance, Dahomey, one of Nigeria’s closest neighbours, fearing an eruption of the war,

sent a mission headed by its Foreign Minister, Dr. Zinsou, which was turned back at the
or
border by the Nigerian government. The Gowon Government was nervous about any

form of mediation which looked like an interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria.

This was because Ojukwu had used the Voice o f Biafra and Radio Biafra to call on the

African countries to mediate.

Any mediation attempt therefore appeared to Gowon to be an attempt to respond to and

side with Ojukwu. The Federal government was opposed to this in principle because

intervention by Heads o f State might have been regarded as a form of recognition for

Biafra: it implied that Gowon and Ojukwu were being approached as equals, and

Ojukwu’s refusal to accept the authority of Lagos was ofcourse the basic issue. The main

comfort for Lagos at this stage came from outside Africa - significantly - from the ruler of

Kuwait, who sent a message of goodwill, and solidarity to Gowon, stating that he

regarded the Nigerian crisis as a purely internal m a t t e r . T h e Nigerian government then

reinforced it's propaganda message that it was merely carrying out a police action in the

East to restore law and order, and secure Nigerian unity. It claimed that it was not a

religious war at all as propagated by Biafra, even though Lagos enjoyed the total support

o f the Islamic countries.

On 29th June, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Nigeria's Foreign Minister left Lagos with a message

from Gowon to President Mobutu of Zaire. Simultaneously, Radio Nigeria, drew a

parallel between Biafra and Katanga, ignoring Nyerere's earlier argument to the contrary.

Mobutu had already offerd to mediate: he had also pointed out that contrary to what

'some politicians' had claimed, Biaffa's secession could not be compared to that of

Katanga.

201
The war broke out while Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were meeting

to prevent it, and all they could do was to issue a communique which appealed for an

immediate end to fighting. But it was too late. Nyerere commented that only South Africa

and Rhodesia could rejoice over Nigeria's war, and repeated his call for a ceasefire. He

also criticised Britain's 'shameless involvement', while other African countries called for

'African action' to stop the w a r .^

'African action' meant intervention by the O. A.U and the employment o f the mediation

offices of the O.A.U. The summit meeting of the O.A.U was scheduled that year to be

held in Zaire. The chorus of African action found favour with Biafra. The Biaffan media

incorporated this in its propaganda thrust, and Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra carried

the statement that 'The problem must be solved by Africans, if the O. A.U is to justify its

existence.

In anticipation o f the summit, media and diplomatic activities became frantic on both

sides. The Nigerian media claimed that Biafra acquired arms from Czechoslovakia which

were paid for in U.S. dollars. It blamed the C.I.A. for not preventing it. It announced that

Communist Chinese guerrillas were fighting alongside the Biafrans against Nigeria. All

this was an attempt to consolidate the support of the West for Nigeria, which it already

enjoyed. Russia, for that matter, also supported Nigeria. Radio Nigeria further warned

Ghanain media against supporting Biafra, threatening that disintegration was contagious,

waving 'the sword of an Ashanti' revolt over Ghana's head. The Biaffan propaganda

machine countered, accusing Nigeria of recruiting ex-SS mercemaries in Bonn, and

repeatedly warning Affican countries of the 'new Anglo-Soviet imperialist threat to

Africa'. Close to the conference, the Nigerian media raised vehement objections to the

O. A.U. discussing the war without approval from Lagos. It maintained that Cameroun,

Congo-Brazaville, the Central Affican Republic, Niger and Gabon had expressed

202
'enthusiastic support' for the Nigerian stand. It, claimed that these countries had also

promised not to raise the issue at the sum m it.^

When it became clear that there was heavy African pressure, particularly from Ghana,

Liberia and Zaire itself, for a discussion of the Nigerian crisis, the Nigerian government

indicated that in the event of a negotiated settlement, it would not accept Ojukwu as

spokesman for Biafra. The media in Lagos demanded that the Biaffans could either

surrender 'and seek honourable peace under a new leadership or they could fight "to total

destruction" under Ojukwu'. The crisis was not in the official agenda of the summit, but

it was discussed. On the 14th of September, the conference set up a mediation

committee,^® with Emperor Haile Selasie as chairman. Avoiding the use o f the word

'mediate', the conference resolved '...to send a consultative mission of six Heads of State

to the Head o f the Federal government of Nigeria to assure him o f the Assembly's desire

for the territorial integrity, unity and peace o f Nigeria'.^

The mission was also, according to the official communique, to 'explore the possibilities of

placing the services of the Assembly at the disposal of the Federal government'.

The communique expressed concern at the 'tragic and serious situation in Nigeria'. The

Assembly thus achieved a dual purpose of respect for the internal affairs of a member state

whilst reiterating its 1964 precedent when it appointed an ad hoc commission to help the
49
Congolese government in the restoration of national reconciliation. Apart from Haile

Selasie, other members of the mission were Presidents Mobutu of Zaire, Hamani Diori of

Niger, Ahidjo o f Cameroun, Tubman o f Liberia and General Ankrah o f Ghana. Since

Nigeria was acclaimed to be the economic and military regional super power, the

countries immediately bordering her were severely affected economically by the war.

These included the Cameroun, Niger, Dahomey, Chad and Sau Tome - particularly

Fernando Po.

203
The ’frontline States' - the countries bordering South Africa and Rhodesia, resisting white

rule and domination - were also affected. This was because Nigeria contributed large

funds to the liberation struggle. The total liberation of Africa from colonialism and foreign

domination was the core o f Nigeria's foreign policy.

In the Cameroun, the situation was more complicated. President Ahidjo, a Northern Fulani

who was actually bom in Northern Nigeria clearly sympathised with Lagos. However, he

bore Nigeria a political grudge: the Northern Cameroun - a trust territory had been joined

to Nigeria, after a United Nations plebiscite in 1962, but Cameroun had refused to accept

the decision, holding an annual day of mourning to commemorate the sad event. Besides,

West Cameroun, which had once been administered together with Eastern Nigeria but

which had chosen to join East Cameroun on independence, subsequently found she was

not very happy in this predominantly Francophone union and the nostalgia for the pre-

independence day generated a wave o f sympathy with Biafra accross the border. It was a

sentiment which Ahidjo as a wise politician could not ignore

Popular opinion in most West African counteries particularly Ghana, and Liberia was

sympathetic to Biafra. Their leaders however were restrained by the non-interference

clause in the O. A.U. Charter. Emperor Haile Selasie and the Zairen President seemed to

find themselves in this same situation.^

Biafra hailed the O. A.U. mediation committee, describing it as 'a move to mediate in the

war'. Ojukwu stated on the Biaffan media that the O.A.U. had recognised 'the

international nature o f the conflict', by setting up the committee.

This antagonised the Nigerian government which sought to prevent the visit of the

committee to L a g o s.^ The Biaffan media accused Nigeria of applying delay tactics to

obstruct the committee. The Nigerian media denied this. In the interim, they announced

that Biafra had lost Enugu, its capital, prompting an announcement in London by the

Nigerian High Commissioner that the war was 'fast coming to an e n d '.^

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The Biafran media vigorously denied these claims, and Biafra stiffened its military

resistance. The committee finally met in Lagos on the 22nd of November. President

Tubman of Liberia, and Mobutu of Zaire were absent.

Gowon's welcome address to the committee stated: 'Your Mission is not here to

m ediate'.^ He repeated the same statement to the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson,

when he visited Lagos in March 1 9 6 9 .^ In both instances, Gowon raised the spectre of

contagious infection o f seperatism in Africa, if Biafra were allowed to succeed. To the

relief of Nigeria and the wrath of Biafra, the Committee agreed with Gowon. The war of

arms and words thus continued for three years, belying the so called 'police actio n '^ that

Nigeria had claimed it was carrying out.

The African countries got weary and impatient - the supporters of Lagos with Biafra, and

the supporters o f Biafra with Nigeria. In April 1968, President Nyerere of Tanzania

recognised Biafra.

In explanation, he stated:

"Unity by conquest is impossible...

even if military might could force
the acceptance of a particular authority,
the purpose of unity
would have been destroyed.
The general consent
of all the people involved
is the only basis
on which unity in Africa
can be maintained or extended.
The Biafrans might be wrong
in their belief
that they had been rejected by
a Nigeria whose government had been unable
or unwilling to protect them
from persecutions and pogroms;
if so , they would have to be persuaded
that they were wrong,
but they will not be convinced
by being shot.

205
 Nobody had talked more about the need
for African unity
than the leaders of Tanzania,
but it seemed to us that by refusing
to recognise the existence of Biafra
we were tacitly supporting a war
against the people of Eastern Nigeria -
and a war conducted in the name of unity.
We could not continue doing this
any longer" so

The Nigerian media labelled Nyerere a puppet - a charge that did not stick. The Biaffan

media acclaimed him an African statesman, maintaining that Tanzania had nothing to gain

except undiluted principle. Susequently, in barely five weeks - between April and May of

that year, three more recognitions o f Biafra followed. These were by Zambia, Gabon and

Ivory Coast.

While the war of arms and words was raging, there were several attempts by at mediation,

intervention and settlement, by both individuals and institutions.. One of these following

immmediately on the four rapid recognitions of Biafra was by the Commonwealth

Secretariat in London. It initiated the setting up of peace negotiations, with Kampala as

the venue. The process went through preliminary and substantive stages, but failed

because o f the intransigence of both sides to the conflict.

On the 15th of July, after the failure of the Kampala peace talks, the O. A.U. Consultative

Committee was invited to reassemble in Niamey. Five of the six members o f the

committee attended. Mobutu again was absent. Chief Obafemi Awolowo led the Nigerian

delegation, but General Gowon joined the meeting the folloing day, 16th July 1968, and

declared himself only as an 'observer'. He warned, in his self declared observer status

speech, that if the 'rebels persist in their contemptous attitude to the conference table, the

Federal government will have no choice but to take over the remainig rebel-held areas...In

military terms, the rebellion is virtually supressed already'.^ Ojukwu was invited to

attend.

206
The meeting proposed a ten-mile-wide demilitarised zone patrolled by neutral

international troops to allow relief supplies to pass to Biaffan refugees. Gowon is said to

have rejected this, and his comments and attitude seemed to confer that he would not

have been able to guarantee the actions of his soldiers at the fronts. Niamey radio

broadcast the main points of the resolution and the rejection. It also announced that

Ghana and the Camerouns offered their services for the transportation of relief materials;

and offered shipping facilities. Gowon left for Lagos within two days.

The Biaffan delegation headed by Ojukwu arrived on the 19th. He flew in on Houphet

Boigny's private jet. The delegation included Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, former Governor

General and President of Nigeria, Dr. Michael Okpara, former Premier of Eastern Nigeria,

Sir Louis Mbanefo, former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and Chief Justice of Biaffa, and Dr.

Eni Njoku, former Vice Chancellor o f the University of Lagos.

At the end o f the meeting between Ojukwu and the committee a communique was issued.

There appeared to be two versions. According to Niamey radio,:

The O. A.U. Consultative Committe on Nigeria announces with great satisfaction the

folloing decisions: (1) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu

have agreed to meet immediately in Niamey under the chairmanship of President Hamani

Diori in order to begin preliminary talks as a speedy resumption of Nigerian peace

negotiations; (2) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have

agreed to resume as soon as possible peace negotiations in Addis Ababa under the

auspices o f the O.A.U. Consultative Committee on Nigeria'. ^

207
The version broadcast by the Nigerian media was different from that of Niamey radio.

Radio Nigeria announced that the Committee had called on both parties to resume peace

talks as soon as possible, '...with the objective o f preserving Nigeria's territorial integrity

and guaranteeing the security of all its inhabitants'. It further claimed that the committee

indicated that 'it will be in contact with the Federal Military Government, and Ojukwu or

his representatives may at any time contact any member of the committee'.

The Lagos broadcast included two other items that were absent in the Niamey radio

broadcast. These concerned relief, appealing to both sides to undertake various measures

to alleviate suffering among war victims. ^

The next round o f peace talks opened at Addis Ababa on the 15th of August. The

Consultative Committee failed to turn up. Gowon did not appear. The O.A.U. Secretariat

was left to cope unsuccessfully. The Biafran delegation which was without Ojukwu stayed

on for a while,on his instructions, Ojukwu had been earlier blamed earlier for breaking off

the Kampala peace talks, because they did not go the Biafran way. He therefore told the

Biafran delegation to 'stay there even if it takes a thousand years'

Subsequently, Diallo Telli, then Scecretary General of the O.A.U, said in an interview

with 1.6 Figaro' ''We must ask ourselves if we should not reconsider the principle of unity

at any price, which has been for Africans the main stay of our policy'. ' His annual report

to the O.A.U. that year, 1969 also called for a redefinition of the idea of non-interference

in the internal affairs of member states. After this, every subsequent attempt at mediation

by the O. A.U. failed. The only condition Lagos accepted from the O.A.U. was the

allowing of the O. A.U.troops to observe the surrender by Biafra. Even this was done out

of pressure from the United Nations Secretariat.^

208
5.3. Biafra and Britain.
The initial lack o f African support for Biafra was one of the arguments employed by the

British Government to justify it's active support for the Nigerian Government. The British

Government argued that an international embargo against Nigeria would be received with

'deep hostility by most African States'.

Mr. Michael Stewart, the British Foreign Secretary, applied the domino theory to the

African situation - arguing that secession in one part of Africa would generate the

disintegration o f the African Continent into tribal States. The Johnson and Nixon

administrations employed the same arguments in America,1^ because American policy

towards Africa was heavily weighted towards the British view. They believed that Britain,

as the former colonial power, knew the area better. On the other hand, Biafra claimed that

the British Government had encouraged Nigeria to blockade Biafra by land, sea and air -

thus depriving the Biafran people o f the means of self defence, with the aim of starving the

Biafran people into submission and surrender. British policy in Lagos had always been

solidly in favour o f anything which looked like being able to hold the Nigerian Federation

together.

Nigeria was Britain's proudest colonial achievement, the home of thousands of British

subjects, easily the most populous country in Africa, and potentially the most prosperous.

Britain already had some five hundred million pounds invested in the Federation, and the

field for afuture exploitation - especially the oil deposits in the East and the Midwest - was

almost limitless. Oil was a particularly sensitive commodity because both Nigeria and

Biafra used the oil arguments in their propaganda war. Biafra accused Nigeria of wanting

to capture Biafra because of oil reserves. Nigeria accused Biafra of appropriating

unwilling minority areas, eg; Calabar and Rivers Provinces into Biafra because of their oil

deposits.

Nothing which threatened radically to alter the unity of Nigeria was acceptable to Britain.

Auberon Waugh maintained that it was British influence which prevented General Gowon

209
from honouring the 'Aburi A ccord'.^ This was hotly denied in Whitehall, but according

to Waugh, there is evidence to suggest that it was Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, the then

High Commissioner in Lagos who dissuaded General Gowon from announcing the break­

up o f the Federation in his broadcast o f 1st August 1966. The evidence is credited to

Professor Eni Njoku, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos in an

interview with Susan Cronje. It is stated that Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce related the

incident to Professor Njoku and Sir Louis Mbanefo, former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and

later Chief Justice of Biafra. As seen above, the two were also later members of Biafran

peace delegations. The conversation is said to have taken place in Sir Louis Mbanefo's

residence in Enugu when the British High Commissioner paid a farewell visit before

leaving Nigeria early in 1967.^

The assumption by the British Government initially was that this was a storm in a tea cup

which would soon blow over.

It was the repudiation of the Aburi Accord which made war inevitable.^ This action of

the Gowon regime cornered Ojukwu, leaving him with very few choices, and the Biafran

people with their backs to the wall. There was a pervasive sense of insecurity in Biafra.

However, the British government clung to its 'storm in a tea cup' theory, seeing the crisis

as the type of tribal warfare that plagued Africa, and would blow over as in other ex­

colonial African countries: it pointed to similar pressures in other countries and urged

(quite rightly in many cases) that tribal fragmentation of this nature did nothing but harm

to the economic prospects of the people involved; it also pointed to the tribal diversity of

Nigeria itself, and argued, that disintegration along tribal lines would not be conducive to

the general good, and should therefore be discouraged; finally, it argued that if ever one

such tribal pressure were to prevail, in what were admittedly exceptional circumstances,

then it inescapably followed that every single other such tribal pressure would be similarly

successful.^

210
It is worth noting that at the inception of the war, all the information at the disposal of the

British Cabinet - if not the Foreign and Commomnwealth office - suggested that the war

would be over in a matter of weeks; at which point it seemed that there was no need for

the British government to do anything but express public regret, for domestic
f% 7
consumption, that such a 'police action, 7 as claimed by Nigerian propaganda, should

have been necessary.

On the basis of available information, to have withheld arms supplies and to have

repudiated existing arms contracts would certainly be interpreted as hostile to the

recognised government in Lagos, and would also have been singularly pointless, since it

could only have prolonged the hostilities while Nigeria sought arms from other sources.

Indeed, so effective had been the British High Commission in persuading Whitehall that

the war would be over in a matter of weeks, that the cabinet allowed itself the moral

luxury of refusing to sell General Gowon any military aircraft, on the grounds that that

would not be needed and would only add to the mess.

As a result, Chief Anthony Enahoro, the Federal Commissioner for Labour and

Information, was sent to Moscow where he successfully negotiated an agreement to

receive both Mig fighters and Ilyushin bombers, and the arms race began in earnest. This

episode also provided the British Foreign office with a further justification for the

Commonwealth Office's policy - namely the spectre of Russian presence in West Africa. It

was this 'Russian threat' argument which later converted Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Chief

opposition spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the government's

policy.

Exactly how the British Cabinet came to be so misinformed is a matter of permisible

speculation. Until the third month of the war, there was a British Deputy High

Commissioner in Enugu, the Biafran Capital. He was in a position to inform the British

government on the extent of Biafra's preparadness for the war and also on the extent of

her will to resist. All the evidence suggests that the Deputy High Commissioner, Mr.

211
James Parker, did, in fact, fulfil his duty in this respect until the time of his departure after

the fall o f Enugu. Unfortunately, from Biaffa's point of view, all Parker's intelligence had

to go through the British High Commissioner in Lagos. The new High Commissioner, Sir

David Hunt ( who succeeded Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce in November 1966) turned out

to be a very good friend of Nigeria, and a man whose assessment of the military situation

was strickingly different from Parker's. Presumably, the papers will be available in 1999,

under the thirty year rule, and then it will be known in what form Parker's information

reached London, unless placed under a special embargo. What is absolutely certain is that

it was Sir David Hunt's assessment which prevailed.

It is clear that, like Churchill, Eden, and Reith, during the second world war, who used

censorhip effectively to stifle Hitler's propaganda thrust into Britain, Wilson and Gowon

believed that censorship was the most effective propaganda weapon to use against the

Biafrans. Conversely, like Hitler and Goebbels , Ojukwu believed in massive propaganda

bombardment o f the enemy constituencies.

However, it is fair to say, even at the risk of repetition that at the time that Biafra seceded

on 30th May 1967, official British actions were muted and ambivalent. In the House of

Commons, the Secretary o f State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Herbert Bowden, said

only that there was some association between the British representative in Enugu and the

authorities there, 'but at this stage there can be no recognition of the Eastern Region by

ourselves, nor has any other country recognised it'.^* Lord Watson, Parliamentary

Secretary, Board of Trade, is quoted as stating in June 1967: W e have been watching

carefully - indeed anxiously - what has been happening in Nigeria, and we have done so

for many reasons...We have a vast trade with Nigeria...There are ofcourse, the relatively

newly discovered oil deposits which are being exploited now with such enormous
79
success...' ^

212
The British Government's ambivalence and preoccupation was understandable. Apart from

the traditional fears o f being cut off fron its sources of oil, the closure of the Suez Canal

threatened to affect Britain's desperate attempts to achieve a balance o f payments surplus.

Mr. Harold Wilson subsequently recalled that 'in the spring o f 1967 we were almost within

sight o f balancing our overseas trade and payments when the Middle East war and the

closure of the Suez Canal inflicted great damage on us - a major factor in forcing
n'>
devaluation upon us later in the year'. On the 6th of June 1967, Egypt blocked the Suez

Canal, and the following day, George Brown, then Foreign Secretary, said that urgent

steps were being taken to readjust the pattern of oil supplies to Britain. By the end of

June, Britain began to feel the oil shortage.

The loss resulting from the Middle East situation as a whole was about £ 10 million a

month from July to September, and double that level for the rest of the y e a r.^

With these points in view, it is not surprising therefore that oil featured prominently in the

propaganda war between Biafra and Nigeria. It is possible that if Parker's reports had

reached London in the form they were sent, Britain may have sided with Biafra, and the

course and outcome o f the war would have been completely different. This is only a

matter of conjecture. It will also remain a matter of conjecture which factors weighed

more with the decision makers in the British cabinet - oil reserves and wealth; the British

economy; the unity of Nigeria; or the contagious, infectious disintergration o f Africa.

Suffice it to say that Biafra maintained in its propaganda that Britain erred on the side o f

oil reserves, and selfishness. If that is true, then the unity o f Nigeria and Africa were

secondary in the circumstances that Britain found itself economically after the closure of

the Suez Canal by Egypt.

It has to be said, that public support for secession is very rare, and was particularly non

existent during the cold war. In fact, up to 1971, after the Biafran war, secession might

have been regarded as futile. The fact that Biafra attracted public sympathy at all, was the

success of its propaganda.

213
The Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London in January 1969, was the first

since the meeting presided over by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in Lagos. It seemed to

many Africans to have belonged to a previous age. In any event, the Conference kept the

Nigerian crisis carefully in the background.

Sierra Leone's Prime Minister Siaka Stevens, tried to persuade the Commonwealth

countries to launch a new peace initiative through Emperor Haile Selassie or the Liberian

Prime Minister William Tubman, but Nigeria's Head of Delegation, Chief Awolowo,

headed this off, stressing the OAU's exclusive right to act as mediator. Officially, the

Federal position remained rock-hard. Awolowo maintained 'bluntly, one side or the other

has to give in. You could say we're both fighting for the soul o f Nigeria'. However, he did

see Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, Biafra's two Commonwealth backers, privately, and

explained the Federal Government's uncompromising attitude in more detail and in less

abrasive language.

At the end o f March 1969, Harold Wilson, Britain's Prime Minister, arrived in Lagos. He

had offered to come the preceding Christmas to try to arrange a temporary truce, but the

Federal government had made plain their opposition.

This time, the mediating motive, officially denied by both Lagos and Whitehall, was

ascribed to a fact finding trip.

It was the watershed o f British policy towards the Nigerian civil war. It became clear then,

if there were ever any doubts, that officially, Britain was not only firmly behind Nigeria

but intended to maintain this support. The presence of a British Prime Minister in Lagos,

and the fact that he visited Federal occupied parts of Biafra, where he made speeches

declaring Britain's support for 'One Nigeria', constituted the final imprimatur of the policy

of the British governm ent.^

Even though it criticised the visit, the Biaffan propaganda Directorate was rather cautious

about the way it handled critcisms of the British. Biafra had always maintained that the

Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was acting against the will of the British people, members

214
of his party, and of parliament. There was still hope in Biafra that they could win Britain

over, as the war progressed. All they had to do was to 'hang in there', until Nigerian
77
credibility waned, and the outside world asked more questions. Rather, Biafra directed

it's propaganda at Gowon, calling him a puppet. They claimed that he could not take

decisioins on his own, that was why he had to invite 'his Lord and master' to come and
70
show him what to do.

With some justification, Biafra maintained, as it had done all along, that the British public

was behind her, because the World Council o f Churches and other charity organisations

were raising aid, collecting clothes, food, milk, etc for Biafra. Voices were raised against

the reports o f genocide that were appearing on British television. As a result of the part

played by organisations like Save the Children, in helping Biaffan children, and Caritas, in

flying provisions into Biafra, these organisations along with the Red Cross were banned

from Nigeria. Save the Children has still not reopened its offices in Nigeria.

Chief (Dr.) K.O.Mbadiwe, Ambassador plenipotentiary, Joseph Wayas, and many other

Biafrans were despatched to Britain via Gabon and the Camerouns to raise 'public

awareness', and to raise funds for Biafra.

To illustrate the nature of the public debate in Britain, it may be helpful at this point to

reproduce a sample of quotations from public speeches:

1. 'The Ibos quite unknowingly

appeared to take the position of
the Irish in the former United Kingdom;
they had never formed part of the Roman Empire
and never come under the Law.
The result was that they would never conform.
The Ibo had never come up against the Fulani
and their administrative genius...
they lapped up education...
they filled important
professional and technical posts
all over the North...'

215
 - Sir Rex Niven, 01
former colonial official in Northern Nigeria.

2. W e are neutral to both sides,

but there is clearly a
recognised government in Nigeria'.
- Lord Shepherd, 25th January, 1968.8^

3. Neutrality would mean supporting a rebellion'.

- George Thompson, 21st May 1968.8-*

4. Neutrality was not a possible option

for Her Majesty's government'.
- George Thompson, 27th August 1968.8^

5. 'I do not believe in neutrality'.

- Lord Shepherd, 27th August 1968.8^

6. Britain was probably the only country

in the world that could not,
in fact or in honour, be neutral about this'.
- Michael Stewart, 30th June 1969.8^

7. What we have pressed for

is a ceasefire on the basis of
recognition o f the Federal system in Nigeria,
with adequate safeguards for the very fine people
who live in the Biafran area'.
- Harold Wilson, October 1968.8^

8. W e at least used our influence

with the Nigerian government
together with others
to persuade them to invite observers
into the areas concerned
to provide some...guarantee that
there was no genocide...
This was totally successful and the

216
 reports showed that there was no genocide'.
- Harold Wilson, April 1971.88

9. 'The Nigerian Airforce

does not have the capacity of
interdicting the rebel airfield complex at Uli'.
- Colonel Scott, on
British Defence Adviser, December 1967.

10. 'So that I can take pleasure in the prospect

of greater industrialisation in Nigeria;
not merely because we are pleased by
the prosperity of our friends but also because
I look forward to an industialised Nigeria
as an increasingly better customer
for those sophisticated and expensive goods
by whose export Britain now lives.
Long live a modem, enterprising, prosperous
and industialised Nigeria'.
- Sir David Hunt, British High Commissioner
in Nigeria, November 1967.

Such was the range of arguments, and the varying degrees of neutrality exhibited by the

authorities in Britain towards the Nigerian conflict.

Nevertheless, in November 1969, a Biaffan government statement which aroused much

speculation declared 'Biafra's only interest in wanting Sovereignty is that it provides

security for it's 14 million people. It then went on to describe 'the ever recurring incidence

o f massacres suffered by the people of the former Eastern Region living outside their own

areas in 1945, 1955 and 1966'.^ It continued: 'The only logical remedy, as Biafrans see

it, is their seperate existence. However, since our attachment to sovereignty is functional

and not sentimental, Biafra will be prepared to accept, at the suggestion of no matter

whom, any alternative arrangement that can guarantee a non-recurrence of the massacres

of the last twenty five years'.

217
This was, hailed in London and elsewhere as a sign of a more flexible Biaffan attitude,

until a further statement issued a couple of days later announced that Biaffa's basic
09
attitude remained unchanged. The Biaffans were then accused of inconsistency.

Earlier, in June 1968, when the British government was under heavy pressure over its

arms supply to Lagos, it spelled out certain conditions under which it would, consider 'and

more than reconsider' it's policy towards Nigeria.

In the words of Mr. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary:

'if we make the supposition

that it were the intention
of the Federal government
not merely to preserve the unity o f Nigeria
but, to proceed without mercy
either with the slaughter
or the starvation of the people
or if we were to make
the supposition that it were the intention
o f the Federal government
to take advantage of a
military situation in order to throw aside
with contempt any terms
of reasonable resettlement,
then the arguments which justified
the policy we have so far pursued
would fall, and we would have to
reconsider, and more than reconsider,
go
the action we have so far taken'.

A few days after these words were spoken, it became obvious not only that Biaffan

civilians were starving, but that General Gowon had given the order for 'the final push'

into the Biaffan heartland.^

The critics of Mr. Harold Wilson's policy considered that Gowon's 'final push' fulfilled the

second of the conditions enunciated above by Mr. Michael Stewart, and angry MPs

demanded a vote.

218
According to the procedure this could only be taken if the final speaker, Mr. Whitlock,

ended the speech before the set time limit. But despite repeated appeals and points of

order from backbenchers of all parties he refused to do this. The end o f his speech was

drowned in cries of'shame', and 'sit down', joined by shouts of'murderer' and 'liar' from

the public gallery until a few of the spectators were ejected.

Thus by applying a process of fillibustering the British government under Harold Wilson

actually succeded in obliterating any demands for areview of it's policy, which they had no

intention o f changing in any case. In the final explosion and pandemonium Mr. Wilson and

his colleagues hurriedly moved out of the chamber, followed by a torrent of abuse. ^

The Labour Party Conference in Blackpool was approaching, and in preparation for the

event, 'Peace News', the Pacifist Weekly, circulated a pro-forma statement which was

signed by many prominent Labour Members of both Houses o f Parliament. In part the

declaration read:

'On the Nigerian - Biafran issue

the government has withheld
the truth and concealed vital information.
It has pursued it's course willy-nilly,
outside the "democratic process".
There has been every effort - successful at that -
to curb and stifle legislative debate,
and popular indignation
has been brazenly disregarded.
We are now confronted not
only with an entrenched problem of foreign policy
- how to halt the suffering
of the peoples of Nigeria and Biafra -
but also with what is perhaps
the most serious domestic
problem o f our times:
What kind of democracy are we going to
have in this country?'

219
 Q7
The signatories included such leading members of the 'Tribune Group as Stan Ome,

Stan Newens, Frank Allaun and Eric Heffer, and Labour Peers like Lord Gifford and Lord

Soper. The statement was presented to Mr. Michael Stewart on three seperate occasions

by delegations led by Frank Allaun. At last on 24th December 1968, well after the

Blackpool conference, Mr. Maurice Foley, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

replied to it. In a letter to Frank Allaun he stated:

'Our position is certainly not an inflexible one.

While we have always taken the view that
the future welfare of Nigeria depends
to a substantial degree on the country's
ability to maintain it's unity,
the nature of a settlement
has to be decided by the people themselves.
It is flexibility on the part of belligerents
that is required to end this war'.

The only possible compromise - a loose association between Nigeria and Biafra entailing

close cooperation between equal partners on a voluntary basis - was unacceptable to

Nigeria and did not receive British official support. Biafra would have had to concede it's

formal sovereignty; Nigeria would have had to relinguish it's claim to political authority

over Biafra. Ojukwu had offered an internationally supervised referendum in 'disputed

areas' - those inhabited by the minority groups in the East and, perhaps, the Ibo parts of

the Mid-West. This was refused by the Federal government. If'flexibility' meant anything,

it meant a compromise on those lines. ^

The news o f the final push and the consequent uproar and furore was so awkward for the

British government that it tried to deny that the campaign was in full swing.

But since the evidence that it was taking place was irrefutable, the Foreign Office renewed

it's efforts to persuade Lagos to invite 'impartial'^ international observers who could

certify the good behaviour of Federal troops and, above all, produce 'evidence' that

220
Biaffa's charges of genocide were false. Gowon subsequently spoke o f the great

reluctance with which he had invited the foreign observers. ^

The Nigerian government announcement about the establishment of an International

Observer Team came two days after the stormy August 1968 debate in the British

Parliament.

A Federal Nigerian government spokesman said that the United Nations, the Organisation

o f Afrcan Unity, Britain, Canada, Sweden and Poland had been invited to send one

member each. The Nigerian government subsequently relented sufficiently to allow each

o f these observers one or two deputies, but it refused to enlarge the team, despite pressure

from the governments which had sent representatives. ^ A spokesman for the

Commonwealth Office said that the British government was willing in principle to take

part in the scheme, provided that the other parties agreed to it. He stressed that 'this

should not be taken to mean that the British government is aware that an offensive is

taking place, or is, in fact, imminent'. ^ Nobody else was in any doubt that it was well

under way. The Times of the same day carried a long report by its own correspondent,

datelined 'near Aba, Nigeria, August 29th' under the prominent headline NIGERIAN

TROOPS CLOSE IN ON IBO HEARTLAND'. ^ While declaring itself ready to send a

representative, the British government stated that there was no intention to seek Biafran

reactions to the invitation of observers.

The continued Biafran resistance, despite the fact that Gowon had forecast victory inside

four weeks was put down in London to large quantities of French arms which were said to

be supplied nightly to the Biafran troops; these shipments had 'prolonged the misery and

the agony', according to Mr. Harold Wilson. The British government rejected

suggestions that British bullets' might have similar effects.

At the end of September, Lord Shepherd was despatched to Lagos on an undisclosed,

unidentified mission, because even though the Foreign Office maintained that he was there

221
to discuss peace and relief, Lagos seemed surprised at his visit. They seemed not to have

expected him. After that Mr. Maurice Foley arrived in Lagos on a trip that achieved very

little, if anything.

In defence of Gowon against Biafra's accusations of perpertrating genocide on the Biafran

people, Lord Hunt, who had been sent to Lagos in 1968 to solve the relief problem, came

back 'convinced from my personal meeting with him General Gowon is a man of high

ideals, of deep sincerity and real humanity.

Perhaps the most appropriate way to round off this section is to recall the words of

Professor H.G.Hanbury:

'If the government had waited

to consider the merits of the quarrel
before taking sides, with the stronger party,
other powers would doubtless have done the same,
though Britain has, through it's policies,
been reduced to second- class status
among nations, yet surely,
in a matter concerning the Commonwealth,
her lead would have been followed.
But it chose to place expediency before right,
it can only be the realisation
that it has long ceased to represent
the people whom it presumes to rule,
that preserves Biafrans,
with their innate sence of justice,
from unreservedly condemning
the entire Bitish Nation.
Four nations there are,
which have reversed their priorities,
and placed right above expediency,
in recognising Biafra
as a Sovereign State.
These are Tanzania, Gabon,
Ivory Coast and Zambia,
who have set a splendid example of fair dealing
to the rest of the world.
Though the "federal government",
in senseless resentment and spite,

222
 at once broke off relations with them,
it must be sensible
of the spirit o f indignation and conpassion
which will, it is hoped
pervade the rest of Africa, and the world,
before it is too late.
Mr. Wilson should read the moving statement
by M.Houphouet Boigny,
probably the most revered figure
in Africa today,
who pointed out that the war
which Nigeria launched on
Biafra has, in ten months,
accounted for more deaths than
has the Vietnam war in three years.
It's perusal might, even
at the eleventh hour, induce him:
(1) to follow the excellent example of
Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Netherlands,
and abandon his evil policy
of supplying Lagos with arms;
(ii) to make it clear
to the "federal government"
that, in the event of their victory,
which may God forbid,
he will not hasten to clasp their hands,
red with the blood
of women and little children, but that any form
of overseas aid will be withheld,
until the rights and dignity of such
Ibos as are left alive
will be inviolably safeguarded'.*^

It is important to stress that Biafran propaganda was not carried out only on the media.

Biafra invested heavily in foreign emissaries to spread the news, convince the people, raise

funds, and lobby members of foreign National Assemblies. It engaged numerous friends,

intellectuals, and sympathisers in foreign countries, to help disseminate it's message, and

propagagate it's case. In this way, it circumvented the censorship and embargo placed on

it. This was another demonstration o f Biafra's aptitude at counter propaganda.

223
Implantation o f information, censorship, counter propaganda, all demonstrate elements of

migration and mutation, imigration and replication.

224
 PART C

5.4. BIAFRA AND THE WORLD.

5.4.1 Haiti.

The best way to kick off this section, is with the last, and only non-African diplomatic

recognition that Biafra received. It was the least expected and the most bizzare.

On 22nd March 1969, the Republic o f Haiti recognised Biafra, and even senior Biaffan

government officials in Umuahia could not take it seriously, dissolving into laughter when

Ojukwu read out the cable from 'Papa Doc' Duvalier, who signed himself'President for
107
Life'. The circumstances surrounding this move are obscure, but it seems to have

sprung from a fit o f pique against the British - Graham Greene's highly critical novel about

Haiti, 'The Comedians' had just been made into a film - and the fact that nobody

apparently had solicited 'Papa Doc's' opinion or assistance in world affairs before.

The recognition was considered as a quirk by some Biafra watchers and commentators.

One of the reasons suggested for the recognition was that one o f Papa Doc's old school
108
friends, Dr. Ikejiani, happened to be an Ibo, and one of Ojukwu's emissaries. The

significance of the recognition nevertheless was that it was the first outside the African

continent; it was neither overtly or covertly solicited, and it acted to swell the number of

recognitions for Biafra.

5.4.2. South Africa.

Towards the end of 1967. Nigeria accused South Africa of helping Biafra. The accusation

followed a court hearing in Cape Town, where it was alleged, that an outlawed African

Nationalist movement had it's headquarters in Lagos. ^

The Nigerian Federal government in its denial of this claim, countered that it 'was an

obvious attempt by the South African government to justify its active support for the

225
rebels in Nigeria'. Both sides accused each other - Nigeria and Biafra - from time to time,

of having South Africans among their respective mercenaries, and in both cases the

accusations were justified. In 1967, while Lagos was claiming active South African

support for Biafra, the Nigerians themselvews employed South Africans, Britons and

Egyptians as pilots to bomb and strafe Biafran targets. One of the reporters covering

the war from Lagos, Norman Kirkman, claims that: 'A Nigerian Air Force DC-3 with

2501bs bombs taxied slowly past me to the runway. A South African at the controls

grinned and gave me a thumbs-up sign as he began another bombing mission. The

appearance of South Africans among the mercenaries has caused some surprise in view of

apartheid. But they were recruited on a strictly commercial basis to train Nigerians. They

have been flying because air operations were necessary before training was complete'. ^

There were similar reports from other correspondents.

While there was no concrete or substantial evidence of South African involvement on

either side, Biafra's Portuguese connections aroused speculations of South African

support for Biafra. Nigeria's disintegration would have been a welcome bonus for the

whites in Pretoria; already the bloody conflict in itself was employed to support South

Africa's contention that Black Africa was unstable, and not sufficiently mature to govern

itself. By helping Biafra to continue the resistance, Pretoria might well have wished to

buttress it's argument and perpertuate the conflict.

5.4.3 France.

M. Joel Le Theule, the French Secretary of State for Information made the first official

pronouncements about Biafra on 31st July 1968. He said: 'The Biafrans had demonstrated

their will to assert themselves as a people, and the war had to be settled by appropiate
113
international procedures on the basis of the right of peoples to self determination'. As

was to be expected, this was received with absolute exhilaration by Biafra.

226
Peace talks in Addis Ababa were about to start, under the auspices of the OAU. Nigeria

ascribed Biafran ’obstinacy* at the peace talks to encouragement from France.

Before the official statement of July 1968, Biafra had made no attempts to deny Nigerian

and British accusations that France backed Biafra. Ivory Coast Radio had indicated the

number of times that President Houphet Boigny had to meet with President De Gaulle

before announcing his recognition o f Biafra. Gabon, according to Nigerian propaganda,

was also said to have been encouraged by France to recognise Biafra.

Nigerian propaganda was quite sure that France was bringing pressure to bear on the

Francophone African countries - particularly the West African ones to support Biafra.

On his way to France before the recognition of Biafra, Houphet Boigny had stopped off in

Tunisia. After a meeting Habib Bourguiba, the two Heads of State issued a communique

condemning the 'reckless, unnecessary pogrom and genocide that was taking place in

Nigeria'. They called for a ceasefire. ^

As earlier stated, the British Prime Minister, had also ascribed Biafran intransigence and

obstinacy to the large number of Frecnh arms in Biafra. On 9th September, 1968, the day

the Addis Ababa conference broke down, President De Gaulle declared in a press

conference that he was not sure:

'that the concept of Federation'

which replaces in certain places
that of colonisation,
is always a very good one,
or very practical, especially in Africa...
even before the present tragedy of Biafra
took place, one could ask oneself
if Nigeria would live in view of the upheavals
it was going through...
In this affair, France has assisted
and is assisting Biafra
to the limit of her possibilities.
She has not taken the step...
of recognition of the Biafran Republic,
because she thinks that the development

227
 of Africa is above all a matter
for Africans.
Already, there are, some African States of
the West and o f the East
which have recognised Biafra.
Others will also perhaps recognise it.
This means that for France the decision
which has not been taken cannot be
excluded in the future.
Moreover, one can imagine the Federation...
transforming itself into some sort o f Union
which could reconcile the right of Biafra
to decide it's own fate and the links
which would remain between it and
the whole o f Nigeria'. *^

This was a rather ominous statement and Biafra's hopes were raised high after it.

According to the Voice of Biafra, starvation, had reached it's peak, but Gowon's 'final

push' was in full swing.

Even though Biafra was short o f supplies and equipment, the aims of the 'final push' were

not achieved; the annihilation o f Biafra in one final fell swoop failed at this time. Gowon

attributed the failure to a let down by Nigeria's arms suppliers, whilst on the other hand,

'French arms were pouring into Biafra'. ^ Ojukwu, countering this, maintained in an

address to the Biafran Consultative Assembly on 26th September 1968, that 'the increased

international acceptance of Biafra's right to self determination, and it's improved supply

position, had boosted Biafra's capability and resolve'. Press reports in Britain talked of

massive airlifts of arms from France to Biafra via Libreville in Gabon.

The reports were denied by the French Foreign Office in Paris, maintaining only that relief

materials were being airlifted to Biafra through Libreville. The statement from the French

Foreign Office pointed out that the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Michel Debre had

proclaimed an embargo on arms to both sides earlier in the year, and that this remained the

official position. ^ This did not satisfy the British Press. A headline in the Observer read:

BIAFRA SHOCK: FRANCE STEPS UP AID TO THE REBELS.118

228
France would have been happy to see the dislocation of Nigeria. It was envious of

Nigeria’s Anglophone credentials, because o f its potential wealth, size, population and

strength vis- a- vis the Francophone African countries.

During the civil war, Nigeria had accused France of being interested in the oil deposits in

the areas in conflict.

However, De Gaulle had stopped short of full recognition of Biafra. Of this, Ojukwu

remarked to Phillipe Decraene o f Le Monde:

'The attitude of the French Government

towards us is encouraging.
But our enemies have been so impressed
by the moral aid given to us by France
that they have savagely stepped up
their military operations against Biafra.
What we need now is for this moral aid
to be matched by military
and diplomatic measures.
My feeling is that France is now in
a position to grant us recognition.
A move of this sort
would have a dramatic effect on Nigeria,
it would force Gowon at long last
to sit at the conference table...
Where it would have a really decisive effect
is on the French-speaking African countries

But, De Gaulle did not go the extra mile and recognise Biafra. Two diametrically opposed

reasons have been offered for this, both authoritative.

Both agree that President Houphet Boigny's intercession had helped to bring the French

Government out into the open in supporting Biafra's aspirations. But, acording to Fracois

Debre, the French Foreign Minister under De Gaulle, Houphet Boigny himself advised
12 i
against full recognition, saying that the matter was an African affair. This view was

supported by other sources in the French Foreign Office. Susan George, a journalist and

writer on Biafra, states that she discovered this in an interview with Pricess Elizabeth Du

Croy, a leading figure in the French - Biafra lobby, who said after the war, that she had

229
been told about Houphet Boigny's advise by 'highly placed figures' - like the Quay

d'Orsay.*^
On the other hand, Ralph Uwechue, the Biafran Representative in Paris, who was

involved in all the relevant diplomatic exchanges until he left the Biafran Service at the

end of 1968, maintained that Houphet Boigny tried to persuade De Gaulle to extend
1
recognition, but failed. In his owm book, Uwechue explains that 'French officials made

no secret o f their intention to keep clear of the struggle, which they regarded essentially as

an African affair'. ^ 4

Whatever the truth is, France kept Biafra suspended in a diplomatic limbo . After Biafra's

surrender in January 1970, a Biafran official complained o f France: 'I wish they had never
1 O f
opened their mouth. They did not really help us much, and it only annoyed the British'.

5.4.4 United States of America.

The initial reaction from the United States was that the civil war in Nigeria was an 'African

Affair'. Washington was more inclined to tow the same line as its ally, Britain, which was

also the former metropolitan colonial power.

This combination of Britain, America and later the Soviet Union tilted the scales heavily

agaist Biafra, in favour of Nigeria. It is not clear that America was intially aware of this,

nor whether it intended it to happen. Nevertheless, it looked to the OAU to solve the

problem, despite the fact that the organisation had proved itself inadequate to do so. It

was clear, or should have been that every attempt by the OAU to mediate had been

rebuffed by Nigeria.

However, despite this apparent apathy, Auberon Waugh and Susan Cronje maintained that

the most blatant and significant pre-war intervention occured at the end of July 1966, after

the second coup, when the US Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Elbert G.Mathews, and the

British High Commissioner, Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, persuaded Lt,Col. Yakubu

Gowon at the last minute to strike out of his speech the actual words announcing the

230
dissolution of the Federation. Had the various parts of Nigeria been allowed to drift apart

- a natural development after the political nightmare of the previous two years - a looser

association might have been formed, which would probably have prevented any large scale
19 ft
military conflict.

Dr. Eni Njoku, the former Vice Chancellor of the University o f Lagos is said to have told

Susan Cronje that Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce related the incident to himself and Sir

Louis Mbanefo, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and later former Chief Justice of

Biafra. The conversation is said to have taken place in Sir Louis' residence in Enugu when

the British High Commissioner paid a fairwell visit before leaving Nigeria early in
I 0*7
1967. i ^ /The restatement of this point, which was made ealier, is important because of its

importance.

Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, the American Ambassador, intervened again after the Aburi

meeting - which w ould have given the regions a certain amount of autonomy - by assuring

Gowon of American support in his refusal to implement the essential conditons of the

agreement. The Eastern Region, on the other hand, was told in no uncertain terms that the

United States w ould not stand behind it, if it refused to cooperate with the policies which

came out of Lagos, and which were in direct contradiction with what had been agreed at

Aburi. 128

The apparent initial apathy appears to have been a smoke screen therefore to camouflage

America's real intentions. As in the case of Britain, the reports from the American Consul

in Enugu, were at variance with those of the Ambassador in Lagos. The difference
199
between them was regarded in the State Department as a 'personality conflict'.

An American Senator, Eugene McCarthy maintained that in preventing the dissolution of

the Federation, and in giving the policies of Lagos full support while opposing those in
1
Enugu, the United States and Britain actively interfered in Nigerian affairs. He

disputed the claim by the United States that diplomatic recognition of Biafra would

constitute intervention into purely African affairs.

231
Senator McCarthy stated: 'Non-recognition is also intervention. There are faults of

ommission as well as commission. The United States has already intervened repeatedly in

the area: first by propping up General Gowon when he assumed power; later by backing

him when Nigeria abrogated the Aburi agreement; and also by exerting pressure on a

number of African nations not to recognise Biafra'.

A similar account of American interference in Nigeria during 1966-67 was given in a

171
Republican Party publication, the Ripon Forum. 1 The Ripon Society Incorporated is a

Republican Research and Policy Organisation. The editor states: 'In publishing this

magazine, the Ripon Society seeks to provide a forum for fresh ideas, well researched

proposals and for a free spirit of criticism, innovation, and idependent thinking within the

Republican Party'. ^

The official American account maintained a discreet silence concerning the second coup,

and events in Lagos during July 1966. Mr. Joseph Palmer, Assistant Secretary for African

Affairs until May 1969, in a statement made before the sub-committee on Africa of the

Senate Committee of Foreign Relations on September 11th 1 9 6 8 ,^ suggested that the

cause of the July coup was revenge because the new government, 'led by General Ironsi,

(an Ibo), was not strong enough to punish the leaders of the original coup, despite strong

demands to that effect from the North'. He conceded: 'After the second coup, in the

period before secession, the US government urged both sides to negotiate their

differences. When negotiations broke down we counseled against secession through our

Consul in Enugu, and Ambassador Mathews flew to that city to try to dissuade Colonel

Ojukwu from this course'. Susan Cronje stated that she was at State House in Enugu at

the beginning of April 1967 when a stormy interview took place. Both men emerged from

the conference room looking angry, but at that stage Lt. Col. Ojukwu was by no means

set on secession. In fact he had just appealed for African mediation in the hope of avoiding

the disintegration of the Federation. The argument with Mr. Mathews arose out of an

232
American attempt to persuade the Biafran government to accept the authority of Gowon,
IOC
which it did not recognise.

On his return to Lagos, Mathews issued a more specific and terse statement. In a letter he

sent to the Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce a few days after the outbreak of

war early in July 1967, he stated:

The facts are simple.

My government recognises
the Federal Military Government
as the government of Nigeria.
We have repeatedly made known
our complete support
for the political integrity of Nigeria.
Many times we have expressed our hopes
that Nigeria would continue to remain
a united country.
This is not only an official view,
but one that is also felt
by American businessmen
engaged in the rapidly growing trade
between our two countries...
Despite the uncertainties of the
past eighteen months,
there have been notable expressions of
continued confidence in Nigeria's future
by investors from the United States.
The expansion of your own organisation
and the formation of counterparts like it
in the United States
indicate the continuing importance
of our mutual economic activities
Following the military coup of January 1966,
and through all subsequent difficulties,
the United States has consistently
expressed it's hopes that Nigerians
would resolve their differences
and maintain the cohesion
of the country.
Both alone, and together with other governments,
the United States has urged Nigerian leaders
to seek a solution that would insure

233
 a stable future.
Repeatedly, we have stated that Nigeria,
as an independent country,
should solve it's own problems.
We regard these as internal matters
for the Nigerian people themselves.
As a consequence of this policy
we have not during the current crises
supplied arms anywhere in Nigeria.
It is our deepest desire
that the present hostilities
may be brought to a steady end
and that Nigeria would resume
uninterruptedly her dynamic development1.

Nevertheless, the decision not to supply arms to Nigeria was received in stony silence by

Lagos. On the other side, the Biafran media remained sceptical of American intentions.

It believed that the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk had stated that Nigeria was 'the

primary responsibility of Great Britain'. ^ The West Africa Magazine also held the same

view. The Voice of Biafra claimed that Joseph Palmer, who was a former Ambassador to

Nigeria, had engineered the policy o f America allowing Britain to be the arms supplier to

Nigeria. According to the Biafran media, he was committed to 'One Nigeria', as the

showcase o f Western democracy in Africa, just as was Britain. All indications are that

there was closer cooperation on policy between America and Britain than was apparent.

When, for instance, Britain announced that airlifting of food for Biafra was inadequate,
1 TO
and wanted Biafra to accept a land corridor, America concurred.

But, for some Americans this attitude was inadequate. Senator Eugene McCarthy called

on President Johnson in July 1968 to ask the United Nations for a mandatory airlift of

food to Biafra, and to persuade Britain to stop arms shipments to Nigeria. He said that

America should be prepared to back a division of Nigeria according to self-determination,

and he accused the Johnson administration of passivity and inaction. His rival for the

Democratic Party nomination, Vice President Hubert Humphreys called for the Red Cross
13Q
to 'take prompt and risk taking initiatives'^

234
The matter o f Biafran starvation became a subject of American internal politics. On 9th

September 1968, Presidential candidate Mr. Richard M. Nixon issued the following

statement:

The terrible tragedy of the people of Biafra

has now assumed catastrophic dimensions.
Starvation is daily claiming the lives of
an estimated six thousand Ibo tribesmen,
most o f them children.
If adequate food is not delivered
to the people in the immediate future,
hundreds of thousands of human beings
will die of hunger.
Until now efforts to relieve the Biafran people
have been thwarted by the desire
of the central government o f Nigeria
to pursue total and unconditional victory
and by the fear o f the Ibo people that
surrender means wholesale atrocities
and genocide.
But genocide is what is taking place right now -
and starvation is the grim reaper.
This is not the time to stand on ceremony
or to "go through channels",
or to observe the diplomatic niceties.
The destruction o f an entire people
is an immoral objective,
even in the most moral of wars.
It can never be justified;
it can never be condoned.
Voluntary organisations such as the Red Cross,
the World Council of Churches and Caritas
have rushed thousands of tons of foods
to the vicinity of the stricken region.
Much of the food remains nearby
while these children starve to death.
The time has long passed
for the wringing o f hands
about what is going on.
Whilst America is not the world’s policeman,
let us at least act as the world's conscience
in this matter of life and death for millions.
The President of the United States

235
 is a man charged with responsibilities
and concern all over the world,
but I urge President Johnson
to give to this crisis
all the time and attention and imagination
and energy he can muster.
Every friend o f humanity should be asked
to step forward to call an end
to this slaughter of innocents in West Africa.
America is not without
enormous material wealth and power and ability.
There is no better cause
in which we might invest that power
than in staying alive
the lives o f innocent men and women
and children who otherwise are doomed' ^

Richard Nixon was elected President in November 1968, and proceeded to setup an

emergency task force on Biafra under the Secretary of State, Mr. Nicholas de

B.Katzenbach at the end o f the month of his election.

The new move was seen both as an effort to give the Biafran crisis a higher priority in

government policy-making, and to force a sweeping review of US policies.

A key source in Washington was quoted as saying: 'The time is fast approaching when the

United States can no longer stand by and hope for a purely African solution to this

problem'. ^

But in a statement in December, ^ Mr. Katzenbach said that 'a solution to the conflict

must be pre-eminently Nigerian and African'. In the same breath he said that the British

'who have traditionally trained and supplied Nigeria with arms have continued to do so:...

I do not really see how they could have made any other choice. Their position is clearly

different from others who have been interlopers or Johnies-come-lately in the Nigerian

arms picture.If they had stopped their sales they would, in fact, be helping to support the

disemberment of a fellow Commonwealth country with which they have had a special

relationship since it's independence'.

236
This was after the OAU's fifth attempt to deal with the conflict had failed. At about the

same time, Mr. Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian Foreign Minister, criticised the OAU for

having washed its hands of the affair: 'the only advise the African States had given was for

Biafra to lay down its arms'. ^

It would appear therefore that despite Nixon's pre-election strong words, and the

immediate subsequent setting up of the task force, America was at a cross roads on policy

on Biafra. It was split between loyalty to Britain, revulsion at the atrocities in Biafra, and

bringing pressure to bear on African States and the OAU to find a peaceful solution.

Again, therefore, just as in the case o f France, America did not formulate a definite and

credible policy until the war ended. However, it can be argued that Biafra's use of

starvation as a propaganda weapon immensely affected United States's foreign policy and

public opinion towards the conflict.

5.4.5. The Soviet Union.

Sam Ikoku, a leading Nigerian socialist politician stated: 'The Federal Government's

decision to purchase arms from the USSR and obtain military aid from the UAR knocked

the bottom out of the Anglo-American diplomacy over arms supplies...

The Soviet attitude towards the plight of Eastern Nigeria before secession was a mixture

of sympathy and understanding as testified by Russian journalists visiting Nigeria.

Amongst these was Yevgeny Korshunov, who, while in Nigeria in 1967 met Herbert

Unegbu, editor of the West African Pilot, and Paul Nwokedi, President of the Nigeria-

Soviet Friendship Society. The two briefed him on the pogroms on Easterners in 1966 in

Northern Nigeria and the subsequent exodus of Easterners from the North.

Korshunov was 'disturbed by the passion and resolution expressed' by, people he knew to

be 'supporters of African unity in the face of imperialist intrigues'. But he was impressed

by the way the refugees were being integrated.

237
He wrote:

Today the whole o f Eastern Nigeria has turned into a building site... they are cutting

down the jungle and cultivating new land...they are receiving from the government on

easy terms hundreds o f thousands of chick incubators and are raising poultry... frankly,

one's heart rejoices when one sees this bubbling life...'

In admiration of Ojukwu, he recalled how, previously, the government had blocked the

spread of socialist ideas in the East. He described How 'Ojukwu has publicly declared

at a meeting of trade union workers that, for Africa, he saw just one path for

development - the socialist one...'

Ojukwu, he said, did not tire of repeating that 'in the present circumstances there is but

one way towards the preservation o f the unity of Nigeria - the creation o f a

confederation instead of the existing federation. He continues in this search with great

stubbomess, and with all the force at his command. He tries to secure the support of

the West and Mid-West against the North. And without result'.

Korshunov concluded that there was chauvinism in the East, but that 'not all the

Easterners whom I happened to meet were completely gripped by the wave of

nationalism. Some tried to look to the future, asking themselves whether the East

would not lose more than it would gain by "defecting". Those who thought like this

took the view that "Nigeria is one country, and that the successful solution of the

problem lies not in a greater or lesser autonomy for her regions, but in a uniting of all

progressive forces on a basis o f wholly national interests in the struggle for a better life

for the working masses in all regions and all nationalities in Nigeria'.

This article, which appeared soon after Biafra's declaration of independence was in

concurrence with Radio Moscow which in November 1966 announced: 'It must be

clear that an end to tribal hostility will not solve the Nigerian crisis, as the Western

Press has been suggesting, but only the coming together of progressive

nationalists'. ^

238
Pravda simultaneously declared that 'only the firmness of the military government in

rising above tribal interests and the consolidation of all truly democratic forces can

help Nigeria'. ^

The first overtly official statement on the war, came by way of a letter from the Prime

Minister, Mr. Alexei Kosygin, in 1967, to General Gowon on the war. It was released

in Lagos on 17th October, and in Moscow on 1st November 1967. It read:

'The Soviet people fully understand the desire

o f the Nigerian Federal government
to preserve the unity and territorial integrity
of the Nigerian State and to prevent the country
from being disembered.
The Soviet Union has tried to help African States
in every way in their noble desire to strengthen
their political and economic independence'. ^

Despite this ambivalence, Biafra had made early overtures to the Soviet Union by

sending George Krubo, as Biafra's emissary to Moscow. According to the Voice of

Boafra, he was well received on arrival. ^ Apart from being Biafra's representative in

the Soviet Union, he was also to negotiate the sale of arms by Moscow to Biafra. The

tragedy was that for reasons that are not immediately clear, George Krubo defected to

the Nigerian cause while in Russia, and chose to negotiate the purchase o f arms for

Nigeria instead.

Predictably, therefore, even though the Soviet authorities could not really explain how

they came to support Nigeria, and be on the same side as the great enemies - Britain

and America, to the Biafrans, it was obvious. For them, it was easy to guess how and

why - to their chagrin.

They felt betrayed. *^ *

239
 5.5. Conclusion.
The watershed for Biafran propaganda was the discovery that starvation was a

powerful, and exploitable propaganda weapon. Having used genocide, pogrom,

religious and ethnic extermination, economic and political domination and subjugation,

with limited successes, starvation struck a chord with the world’s conscience. Biafra

without weapons could not win a military war. It had one telex link to the outside

world, and made this available to foreign journalists who sympathised with it's cause.

It employed the services of a Geneva based public relations organisation, Markpress,

and literarily 'invaded the West' with it's propaganda, drawing on the world's sympathy

to attract unprecedented massive aid, and some might say, sustenance. Even though

starvation and kwashiorkor were real, it was the conversion and manipulation of these

images for a propaganda purpose, that demonstrated Biafra's dexterity at manipulative

persuasion. The international publics were motivated by the images and messages that

came out of Biafra.

Britain, which regarded Nigeria as the show piece of African colonies, did not want

the disintegration of the country. The British government believed that the war would

blow over in a few weeks. It did not. It lasted three years and, according to Auberon

Waugh, cost one million Eastern Nigerian lives. Whilst Vietnam was America's

television war of the 1960s, Biafra was Europe's. Until Biafra, civil wars in Africa

were largely unreported in the West.

The recognition of Biafra by five countries was unprecedented at least on the African

continent. The use of hunger and starvation as a propaganda weapon was a 'first'.

Nigerias attempt to censor information emanating from Biafra failed woefully. Nigeria

may have won the military war, but it never matched Biafran propaganda.

240
 Notes on Chapter 5.

1. Auberon Waugh
& Suzanne Cronje: Op. cit; p.51.
Frederick Forsyth: Op. cit; p.96.

2. Ibid.

3. Radio Biafra and Voice o f Biafra: December 1967.

Dr. Ifegwu Eke explained in a discussion in December,
1967 that the policy section of the Propaganda Directorate
would study both systems, and adapt what was was useful
in the circumstances of Biafra 'to add to what Biafra already knew and had'.
This was carried on both media.

4. Interview with Cyprian Ekwensi,

Director of Information, Biafra;
and Dr. Ifegwu Eke,
Director, Propaganda Directorate, Biafra:
August 1993.

5. Paul Harrison
Robin Palmer: News out of Africa
'Biafra to Band Aid', London,
Hilary Shipmam, 1986. p. 19.

6 - 22. Ibid: pp.20 - 39.

23. Suzanne Cronje: The World And Nigeria

The Diplomatic History of
the Biafran War 1967-70.
London, Sidgwick and Jackson,
1972, p.281.
West Arica: London, 2nd December, 1967.

24. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.281.

Emmanuel Wallerstein: Africa, The Politics of Unity.
London, Pall Mall Press,
17th June 1967. pp. 84-87

241
41. West Africa: 23 rd September 1967.

42. S. Cronje: Op.cit. p.290.

43. Ibid: pp.291, 292.

44. Voice of Biafra: 1967.

45. Ibid.
Radio Biafra: 1967.

46. West Africa: 14th October 1967.

47. Ibid: 2nd December 1967.

48. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.293.

49. Radio Nigeria: 1967.

NBC/TV:

50. President Nyerere: The. Observer,

London, 28th April 1968.

51. West Africa: 27th July 1968.

52. Ibid: 27th July 1968

53. BBC: ME/2825/ii,

Niamey Radio, 18th July 1968

54. Ibid: ME/2827/ii,

Ibid, 19th July 1968.

55. Ibid: ME/2829/B1

Lagos Radio, 19th July 1968.

56. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.305.

57. Financial Times: London, 30th August 1968.

West Africa: September 1968.

58. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.306

59. Harold Wilson: Commons Official Report,

243
 9th December 1969.

60. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.281.

61. Voice of Biafra: December 1967.

62. Auberon Waugh

& S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.49

63. See ch. 2.

64. A. Waugh
& S. Cronje: Op. cit. pp.49 & 78.

65. Ibid: p.49.

66. Ibid: p.51.

67. Ibid: p.53.

68. Ibid: p. 53

69. Ibid: p.54.

70. Ibid: p.54

71. Commons Official Report: London, 6 th June 1967.

72. Lords Official Report: London, 20th June 1967.

73. Harold Wilson: The Labour Government 1964-1970.

Weidenfeld, Michael Joseph, 1971,
p.84.
S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.23.

74. Commons Official Report: 27th February 1968.

75. John de St Jorre: The Nigerian Civil War.

Hodder & Stoughton,
London, 1978, p.292.

76. Ibid: p.293.

77. Interview with Dr. Ifegwu Eke. Lugust 1993.

244
78. Voice of Biafra: 1969.

79. Discussion with Her Royal Highness, Princess Anne,

The Princess Royal; and with Nicholas Hinton,
Director o f Save the Children. Interview with Fr. W. J.Dowling.
one of the Catholic priests who was thrown out of Nigeria
when Nigeria captured the South East.
June, July & August, 1992.

80. Interview with Chief (Dr.) K.O.Mbadiwe. April, 1987.

81. Sir Rex Niven: The War of Nigerian Unity,

Evans, London, 1970, p.62.
S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.l.

82. Lords Official Report: 25th January 1968.

83. Commons Official Report: 21st May 1968.

84. Ibid: 27th August 1968.

S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.58.

85. Lords Official Report: 27th August 1968.

8 6 . Commons Official Report: 30th June 1969.

87. Ibid: 17th October 1968.

8 8 . Ibid: 21st April 1971,

in a parliamentary
exchange on East Pakistan.

S. Cronje: Op. cit. pp.38, 66 , & 80.

89. Colonel Robert Scott,

Defence Adviser to
the British High
Commission in Lagos: Appreciation of the Nigerian
Conflict,
Lagos, 13th December 1969.
S. Cronje: Op. cit. p. 131.

245
90. Speech by Sir David Hunt
on the occasion o f the formal opening of
the engineering building
of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria,
Northern Nigeria,
24th November 1967.
Quoted in the Nigerian Review.
January, 1968.

91. The Times: London, 4th November 1969.

92. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.70.

93. Commons Official Report: 12th June 11968.

94. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.81.

95. Ibid: p.77

96. Ibid: p. 77

97. Named after the Left Wing Labour Weekly, Trbune.

98. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.79.

99. Harold Wilson’s visit to Lagos,

with his entourage was described by
Nigerian propaganda as 'Independent Observers'.

100. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.81.

101. Ibid

102 Financial Times 30th August 1968.

103. The Times: 30th August 1968.

104. Commons Official Report: 3rd December 1968.

105. Lords..Qffitial Report: 27th August 1968.

S. Cronje: Op. cit. pp. 94, 112 & 128.

106. Prof. H.G.Hanbury,QC.DCL: Biafra, a challenge to the

conscience of Britain

246
 Britain-Biafra Association,
London, 1968, p. 19.

107. John de St Jorre: Op. cit. p.293.

108. S. Cronje: Op. cit. pp.300 & 377.

109. West.Afiica: 11th November 1967.

110 . S. Cronje: Op. cit. p. 187.

111. Daily Telegraph: London, 19th October 1967.

1 12. S. Cronje: Op. cit.p. 188.

113. Ibid: p. 194.

114. Voice o f Biafra: 1968.

115. Keesing Contemporary Archives:

S. Cronje: Op. cit. p. 195.

116. Ibid: p. 193.

117. Ibid: p.195.

118. The Observer: London, 27th October, 1968.

119. The First Secretay to the French Embassy in London,

and Ex-student of the LSE. stated this
at the African Seminar, for MA. students in
international relations, held at the LSE in 1991.
He was replying to a question on Biafra and Nigeria.

120 Le Monde Weekly Selection: 28th May 1969.

121. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.203.

122. Ibid: p.366.

123. Ibid: p.205.

124. Ralph Uwechue: Reflections, on the Nigerian Civil War,

Paris, Jeune Afrique, 1971,
Revised Ed. p.32.

247
125. Interview with Prof. Kalu Uka,
Biafran Representative to Canada.
August, 1993.

126. Auberon Waugh

& Suzanne Cronje: Op. cit. p.65.

127. Ibid: p.78.

128. Ibid: p.6 6 .

129. Ibid: p. 66

130. Statement of 16th May 1967,

Auberon Waugh
& Suzanne Cronje: Op. cit. p.6 6 .

131. Ripon Forum: February 1969: 'Biafra and the

Bureaucrats by Les Auspitz.

132. Auberon Waugh

& Suzanne Cronje: Op. cit. p.28.

133. U.S. Department o f State Bulletin:

Vol.LlXNo.1512,
Oct. 7th 1968
S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.67.

134. Auberon Waugh

& Suzanne Cronje: Op. cit. p.67.

135. Ibid: p.78.

136. Daily Times: Lagos, 27th July 1967.

137. West Africa: 29th July 1967.

138. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p. 93

139. West Africa: 10th August 1968.

140. Auberon Waugh

& Suzanne Cronje: Op. cit. p.70.

248
141. International Herald Tribune: 20th November 1968.

142. Address given at

Brown University, Providence, R.I. (Department of
State Bulletin
Vol.LIX, No. 1539 23rd December 1968)
Auberon Waugh
& Suzanne Cronje: Op. cit. p. 70.

143. West Africa: 28th September 1968.

144. S. Cronje: Op. cit. p.252.

145. Za Rubezhom: No.24, 9 - 15 June 1967.

146. Radio Moscow: 18th November 1966,

quoted in Mizam,
July/August 1967.

147. Pray da: Ibid

148. Daily Times: Lagos, 17th October 1967.

Soviet News: Moscow, 7th November 1967.

149. Interview with Okokon Ndem,

Head of Programmes;
Sebastian Ofurum,
Producer;
and John Ekwere,
Director General:
Biafra Broadcasting Services.
August & September, 1993.

150. Voice of Biafra: 1967.

151. Ibid: December 1967.

Radio Biafra: December 1967,
Interview with Cyprian Ekwensi.

249
 CHAPTER SIX.

CONCLUSION.

Certainly, in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, two wars were fought - the bush war, and

the propaganda war. There is little doubt that whilst Nigeria won the former, Biafra won

the latter. In order to examine this view, it was essential to discuss the following

prevailing questions:

1. What is propaganda.

2.Who makes propaganda.

3. What is the objective o f propaganda.

4. What is the Biafra experience.

1 . Propaganda was defined as the manipulation of information to achieve certain

objectives. Even though there are studies being undertaken into various aspects of

propaganda, eg. propaganda in foreign policy, and in advertising, the particular concern

here was with propaganda in war, and in civil war especially. In relating this theme to the

discussion, three models have been studied. These have been - Germany under Hitler and

Goebbels; China under MaoTse Tung; and Biafra, the main case study. The word

'propaganda' does not appear to have come into military usage till the latter part of the

19th century or the early part of the 20th century. The 'act' nevertheless existed. It was

variously described as psychological warfare, or psyche war-(in the case of the American

war of independence). A juxtaposition o f Sun Tzu in China in 550 BC. with Hitler's

utterances in Mein Kampf. and Ojukwus speeches and broadcasts, demonstrate an

apparent continuum from the ancient to the modem - ie. from psychological warfare to

propaganda, (see chs. 2-5.) The word 'propaganda' seems to have ecclesiastical origins,

deriving from the Roman Catholic Church. It was used to describe the activity of

propagating the faith. It is argued that in terms of this definition, there is very little

250
difference between propaganda in world, international, or civil wars, except in the

constituencies addressed, and the facilities available. The language, message, culture and

design are adapted in each case to suit the prevailing set of circumstances.

2. In war situations, and in civil wars especially, the question of 'who makes propaganda'

is always difficult. this is because, no one side to a conflict ever admits to being engaged

in propaganda activities. The reason for this is that each side to conflict accuses the other

of lying, and o f leading its constituencies astray. Propaganda activities therefore tend to be

treated as lies and deceit. This was amply demonstrated in the second world war, (ch.3.),

when Eden and Churchill maintained that they did not want to engage in propaganda

activities, because that meant telling lies to the British people. However, they and the

BBC applied strict censorship to what was broadcast. This brings up the question of

'censorship' in the realms o f propaganda. The Encyclopaedia Britannica (ch.2.) clearly puts

censorship within the definition of propaganda. Furthermore, going by the earlier

definition of propaganda as being the 'manipulation of information', then, it is fair to argue

that censorship is within the definition, and therefore an aspect of propaganda. It follows

therefore that whatever the arguments, accusations and denials, both side to a conflict

make propaganda.

3. The objective of propaganda, according to Sun Tzu, (ch.2), and Hitler, (ch.3), is to

disable the enemy psychologically before the first bullets are fired in battle. The aim is to

create an inferiority complex in the enemy, to make him turn and run. It is also necessary,

through this process, to caricature the leader or protagonist of the enemy, and cause a loss

of confidence within the rank and file of the enemy publics - military and civilian.

Conversely, a process of edification o f the leader of the propagandist is pursued. The

examples of Mao Tse tung, Hitler, and Ojukwu are demonstrations of this (ch.2,3,4.) The

objective demands total, unquestioning and unalloyed loyalty from its targeted audiences.

251
However, this depends on whether the propagandist is applying what David Wedgewood-

Benn describes as; coercive persuasion, or manipulative persuasion’, (ch3). Coercive

persuasion, as in the case of the Soviet Union, involves total control o f propaganda

facilities, while manipulative persuasion does not. Nevertheless, in a war situation, the two

are usually applied, dependent on whether the propagandist is adressing the domestic or

the external audience. It is easier to use coercive persuasion on the domestic audience as

in the case o f Mao Tse Tung, Hitler and Ojukwu,(ch.3&4), while manipulative persuasion

is applied to external targets. An effective propaganda precedes, intensifies during, and

outlasts the war. The intention is to motivate, mobilise and sustain the varied

constituencies. The important things are the credibility of the messenger, and the

belieavability of the message. Therefore, there is a tendency to 'brainwash', particularly the

domestic audience. Total submission becomes essential. Goebbels believed that

propaganda was not meant for the intellectual, but for those who could not question the

essence o f the massages with which they were bombarded . (ch.3). The audience is not

expected to have time to think and question. If they did, then the objective had failed.

4. In the case of Biafra, a process o f migration and mutation,(ch.3), seems to have

occurred; ie the authorities adapted certain aspects of the German and Chinese examples,

and tailored them to their particular circumstances. Despite this, the peculiarly African

nature of the conflict affected the resolution of the conflict, as will be seen in the

discussion under the following headings:

1 RECONCILIATION.

2 THE EFFECT.

3 THE LESSONS.

These segments are so interactive, that in some cases, they may overlap, in a rather

complementary form to and with each other.

252
6.1. Reconciliation.

"In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God"... 1

"And God said, let there be light: and there was light...

And God called the light Day, and the Darkness He called Night. And the evening and the

morning were the first day.

And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide into

waters from the waters...

And God called the firmament Heaven..."^

Such sentences demonstrate the power of the word. At a party for newly qualified

Doctors at St. Thomas' Hospital London, one o f the graduates, a self confessed religious

sceptic remarked that the Bible was a propaganda document, and that the immaculate

conception was a 'con' Another graduant countered that if that were true, then the

propaganda and the ’con' were immensely powerful and durable. The Bible itself is replete

with the word - spoken, written, uttered, and in so many other forms and symbols that it is

unique. The acceptance and belief in them is an act of faith. This unquestioning faith is

what the Catholics describe as 'The Mistery O f Religion. The followers of this faith,

acceptance and belief, are the faithful. Modem Christians or followers of any religion are

sometimes accused of being brainwashed. Propaganda, and the targets of propaganda -

the followers create an analogy to the faithful - are sometimes accused of being

brainwashed. The Bible itself exploited the symbolic power of words, to convert, to

admonish, to restrain, to keep within the fold of believers; eg; as in the 'The Lord's Prayer',

'The Beatitudes', the casting of the devil into the herd of swines, 'The Ten

Commandments', 'The Baptism', the turning of wine into water, the parables and other

numerous miracles, etc. The only thing modem Christians have inherited from the fathers

of Christianity are the words and symbols. It is total, unquestioning and absolute loyalty

that keeps them attached to their faith. It is easier, perhaps to be an agnostic, or an atheist,

than to believe in the unknown, unseen, and some might say, a void. The scriptures,

253
creeds, prayers and images are all different forms and symbols of the of the word, and the

'mistery of religion', according to the Roman Catholic Church, is in the total acceptance of

the faith without investigation and questioning; it is an act of absolute faith. The Pope to

the Roman Catholics is infallible. The followers of the Church have accepted this from

time immemorial. As a result, his utterances are tantamount to decrees. The moment

followers begin to question the papal decrees, they are questioning the structure and

culture of the Church. Afterall, propaganda is a catholic church derivative, demonstrating

the analogy in the demand for absolute faith and loyalty, whether the propaganda is

temporal or spiritual. Those who question and investigate are potential sceptics who may

'fall by the way side'. That is why in Biafra, support had to be unquestioningly strong,

even for the followers to imagine or envisage the success of the secession, against the

odds. That is why, when the end came, some Easterners, particularly Ibos were

completely devastated. There was uncertainty about what was going to be everybody's

fate. Emeka Obinwa and Willy R. Murray-Bruce, both Biafran airforce pilots decided at

the eleventh hour that they had to marry immediately, 'and produce children to leave

something behind'.’* Many broadcasters did the same.^ As a result, a lot of the surviving

young women came out of the war pregnant. Many of the marriages have survived, some

have not. The children - 'products of the war', may or may not ever be told the reasons for

their being brought into the world. However, the end of the war came like a flash of

tropical lightning, momentarily illuminating a half - remembered landscape, and

reimposing itself on the consciousness of a world which had already pigeonholed the

conflict, along with Vietnam and the Middle East, as insoluble. It took everyone by

surprise, including the victorious Nigerian armies as they raced across great tracts of

Biafran territory long denied them. The initial reaction was one of disbelief; the cry of

'victory' had been heard too often in the past to retain much credibility. Then, outside

Nigeria there was an emotional outburst of unprecedented proportions as the whole world

- or so it seemed - expressed the direct fears for the fate of the Biafrans, and frantically

254
tried to rush relief and other supplies in, only to have the door slammed firmly in it's face

by an angry and xenophobic Federal Nigerian Government. The first news that something

serious was happening appeared in the Paris evening papers on Saturday, 10th January

1970. French relief workers, evacuated from Biafra to Gabon, carried tales of a Federal

breakthrough in the Southern sector: Owerri and even Uli appeared to be threatened. In

answer to journalist's questions, Markpress and Biafran officials abroad could only say

that they were having 'communication problems with Biafra', but that they had however

been in touch by telex with Biafra earlier, and confirmed that Uli - the airport was still

safe. The next morning, in the London Sunday Times] Richard Hall, the last foreign

journalist to leave Biafra, opened his dramatic account with the terse sentence, 'Biafra is

dying'. Four days later, after two and a half years o f anguished but heroic existence, the

Republic of Biafra, 'Land of the Rising Sun', was dead.*’

After the Biafran media, principally the radio stations at this time, had performed their last

duties of transmitting the secession of violence, it also went dead.^ But despite the fact

that oral form of propaganda had silenced itself, the other symbols remained - the posters,

the images, domestic and external would not be easily erased. Nevertheless, Owerri which

was the heartland of Biafra and it's last stronghold witnessed a mass retreat of Biafran

soldiers. Many of them were still armed, some were not. Quite a number of them had

buried their arms on hearing of the cessation of violence on the radio, and simply fled. The

media governed their lives and actions till the last moment. They ran, they walked, they

jogged tiredly and helplessly, looking for relatives, friends, family, homes, whatever they

could find, whatever remained of people, of houses. Some, described as 'artillery', who

were the heavy gunners during the war were still shell shocked, and virtually visually

stupefied, and unaware of either themselves or their environment. Mingled amongst them,

and sometimes following closely behind, were armed Nigerian soldiers, not in combat

readiness, but with their guns slung over their shoulders. With the Nigerian soldiers were

others in bluish uniforms who the Easterners learned were peace and surrender monitoring

255
troops from the OAU - the only ones the Nigerian government was at last willing to

tolerate and accommodate. The Federal government had always maintained that it would

allow a monitoring team only to oversee Biafra's surrender. These were the memories and

images that would not go away. The others that have not gone away are the bullet ridden

houses, some of which have been preserved as they are, for posterity, the numerous war-

maimed-tumed-beggars, the bunkers of the Radio Biafra, the songs, the poems, the

currency, the stamps, the insignia and coat of arms, the National Anthem of Biafra.

Radio Nigeria, the Nigerian Television, and Nigerian print media re-took the initiative.

Pronouncements were made about the team to travel to the Biafran heartland, led by

General Olufemi Obasanjo, to pick up General Effiong and his officials to Lagos for the

surrender ceremony. Time and dates were announced. Everything went like clockwork. It

is important to note that none of the Biafran stations were ever captured by the Nigerian

soldiers, nor was Uli, the Biafran airport, ever captured. Gowon painstakingly ensured

that the press, domestic and international, was heavily represented at the surrender

ceremony in Lagos. It was extensively covered. The greatest, and the most enduring sight

was seeing Gowon, Effiong, and members of both teams, all embracing each other - in a
n
truly African tradition - thus setting up an unprecedented reconciliation process.

6.2. The Effect.

On 28th April 1968, William Norris wrote in the Sunday Times:

'I have seen things in Biafra this week which no man should have to see Sights
to scorch the mind and sicken the conscience. I have seen children roasted
alive, young girls torn in two by shrapnel, pregnant women eviscerated, and
old men blown to fragments. I have seen these things, and I have seen their
cause: high flying Russian Illyusian jets operated by Federal Nigeria, dropping
their bombs on civilian centres throughout Biafra'.

A commentator on the Biafran war, Arthur Nwankwo wrote in a book published in 1969,

in the thick of the war:

256
 The extended family, that resilient traditional umbrella in whose
comfortable and protecting shade the Biafran always finds a welcome
place in times o f need is useless today. The umbrella itself has been
tom to pieces by the invading Nigerian forces. Makeshift refugee
camps are set up in every available space (which is rare).
After my first visit to a camp I couldn’t sleep for two days... It was
terrible enough to live from hand to mouth, not sure of the next meal;
to think of such things as electric lights, gas, stoves, fans, air
conditioners, milk, ice cream, cake, beer, tinned food, soft drinks and
anything that savoured o f twentieth century civilisation (except, of
course, guns, bombs and modem instruments of destmction) is to think
o f luxuries of far remote times'.

He continues:

M y first visit to the refugee camp was not planned. I ran across an old
school mate whom I hadn't seen for years. He was an administrative
officer -in-charge o f one of the camps. He invited me for a weekend
and I went. The camp was in what used to be an elementary school
compound. (Education is also a thing of the past world in embattled
Biafra). My friend graduated from a Nigerian University and shared a
room with a co-worker also a graduate of the same University. The
first thing my host did was to take me round the camp. It was a
nightmarish affair. The refugees clustered in groups (family groups,
probably) and gazed listlessly at us as we passed. O f course they
were human skeletons. There were hundreds of children, with swollen
tummies and legs, large skully heads, withered chests, pleated and
sallow skins, yellowish hairs, flattened buttocks and sunken pale eyes'.^

The reason for reproducing this in full is to elicit the full effect of the war, despite the

positive propaganda on both sides o f the divide. It gives credence to the adage that 'when

the elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers'. There were two wars - the military, and the

propaganda. As already stated, Nigeria won the one, and Biafra the other, but both were

fought intensely. But, it is necessary to stop and think of the effect both their wars had on

the civilian population of Nigeria and Biafra. Arthur Nwankwo was an Ibo, from Biafra,

who was studying in the United States. After several attempts to reach home during the

war, he finally succeeded, travelling through Lisbon, South Africa, and on to Biafra, in a

manner that has never been sufficiently explained. However, if his writing, reproduced

257
above, is juxtaposed with that o f William Norris, also reproduced above, there is no doubt

about the physical effect o f the war on the Biafran population. The two writings are self

explanatory. They paint a picture and summarise a tiny portion o f an essay on the total

mental and physical suffering o f the Biafran population. Yet, Biafran propaganda had kept

them going. It kept them believing in Biafra. If, at the time in 1969, any of those people in

the refugee camps were tempted to flee to Nigeria, they would have spumed the idea.

They were conditioned by a process of both coercive and manipulative persuasion to think

that way. They were scared o f the unknown. What they knew was what they had and saw

in front of them. The alternative, they were made to believe, was worse than death. And

indeed they did believe it.

Air raids, for instance had the effect (after so many of them) o f bringing out propaganda

songs from the affected areas. These songs were either orchestrated, planted, taught,

and/or started off by members o f *60??'. This was an elite group trained in the manner of

the British 'SAS'. They never wore uniforms. Their task to was defend Biafra with their

lives, if necessary. They mingled with the domestic crowds, and rooted out 'suspected

saboteurs'. They crossed enemy lines and carried out kamikaze type assignments. Within

the Biafran population, 'BOFF was given different interpretations. Some people thought it

meant Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters, others believed it was Biafran Offensive

Forces. Every indication is that the former is more accurate. As 'BOFF' was more or less

elusive, secretive, and elitist, it was difficult to discover what it meant, what it was, and

what it did. One typical song that most of the population were taught, including children -

and which would echo round the camps immediately after air raids went thus:

'We are Biaffans

Fighting for survival,
By the name of Jesus
We shall conquer.
They may bomb us
Killing all our children,

258
 But by the name o f Jesus
We shall conquer'.

It was one o f many. The other regular one in that sort of circumstance was; 'Anyi ge nwe

mmeli', meaning, 'we shall overcome'. This was also sung soon after heavy shelling by the

Nigerian forces. The Biafran media also made a point of incorporating these songs,

poems and wise sayings into their different broadcasts, programmes, and write-ups. The

effect of each air raid intensified the belief o f the people that their survival lay in resisting

to the bitter end. Biafra had learned, as Goebbels had taught in Germany, to turn disasters

into drama, poetry, and music - thus affecting people's psychological leanings, beliefs, and

loyalties. The strength of this loyalty lay in maintaining the propaganda momentum,

without giving the mass populace time and space to think or question the rationale or

effect of the 'brainwashing'. The policy section o f the propaganda directorate worked

round the clock, studying other examples in particular circumstances, producing reactions

and response, advising, commissioning songs, drama, dance, and all sorts of diversions

and entertainment. Punch lines and one liners were constantly produced to catch the ear or

eye, and therefore the sentiments of the populace, Biafran musicians like Nwokolobia

Agu, Miki Nzewi, and Sam Ojukwu were kept very busy writing, composing, producing

and entertaining. Dramatists like John Ekwere, Okokon Ndem, Ralph Opara, Ezenta Eze,

and Paddy Davies were kept very busy writing, producing and acting. So were the poets,

the numerous University dons who had flocked back to Biafra from different parts of the

country. There was an abundance of artistic input. On the other hand, the Nigerian

populace was perplexed at the resilience of Biaffans. They lived more in fear of Biaffa's

success. When during the initial stages o f the war, the Biaffans bombed Lagos, the

teaming capital o f Nigeria emptied within minutes, with people in flowing robes scuttling

in all sorts of transport back to their villages. Biaffa, however could not keep this up

because of the inadequacy of its air force. Ironically therefore, Nigerians were more

frightened, than they need have been. Biafra and Biafran success, sometimes virtually

259
existed only on radio. So, despite the fact that the bulk of Nigeria was relatively

untouched by the physical and military war, they were grossly affected psychologically by

the propaganda war. Conversely, to quote Arthur Nwankwo again;

'The psychological effect o f this war on the total Biafran population has been
most profound, though this is hardly recognised. The knowledge that one
stands a very good chance of being dead the next minute is a rather exacting
strain. One moment you are chatting with a neighbour, a friend or a brother.
The next moment a bomber swoops into the town, there is an explosion and he
is dead. It could have been you. And there is no knowing that it won't be your
turn next. When a bomber arrives, my younger brother always says, "say your
last prayer, which may not be your last". He does it jovially; but how profound
it is !'10

Propaganda or not, the fact is that this avidly describes the true situation in Biafra. This is

clearly an element of positive propaganda, demonstrating that the underdog need not lie.

3.The Lessons.

In the course o f this research, certain important questions have arisen, which fall

into the context of this section. These included:

(1.) How was it that the Biafran war, received greater publicity and world attention than

other civil wars, that were raging at the time, and had gone on for longer periods than the

Biafran war?

(2.) What were the lessons for Africa?

3.) What were the lessons for Nigeria?

The answers to these questions provide the backdrop for this section: (1). The answer to

the first question is all embracing. It involves the attitude of States and International

Institutions at a particular time in history. It involves their reactions to secession and

disintegration,, to rebellion and threats to the modem State. The effect o f propaganda on

these is implicit. Propaganda helped to shape public opinion in the respective external

constituencies that had to deal or react to the warring parties, therefore affecting the

course of their foreign policies towards them. If the examples of Britain, America, France,

260
and the Soviet Union, ^ are re-examined, it may be discovered that even though Britain,

for instance, had stood firm behind Nigeria at the official and governmental level, public

opinion was behind Biafra. This is not only because Biafran propaganda said so, but also

because of the uproar that arose out of the debates in Parliament on the crisis. It is also

borne out of the multifarious humanitarian activities that emanated from Britain in support

of Biafra. As time went on, the Biafran attitude was almost exactly like that of the

Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s - keep holding on, and keep repeating your propaganda

often enough, and the tide turns in your favour. Most Biaffans still believe even now that

the weight of public opinion would have swayed the British Government attitude towards

Biafra, if the war had not ended when it did. This will never be proven.

10
As argued earlier, the case o f America was slightly different. The Biafran media

believed that the American public had been convinced of Biaffa's right to self

determination. ^ The attitude o f Biafran propaganda operators was a bit fuzzy at first.

Generally, they maintained an attitude o f not antagonising the external publics, even when

they felt that they were being hard done by. Rather, they made a point of caricaturing

Gowon and his leadership before the world. It was more or less a matter of positive

propaganda in putting across the Biafran cause, and negative propaganda in attempting to

destroy the reasons put forward by Nigeria for attacking Biafra. The watershed for Britain

and America however came with the pictures of starving Biafran children, women and

men on media around the world. ^ Richard Nixon's pre-election statements condemning

the genocide, discussed in chapter 5, put Lyndon Johnson's government in difficulty.

Hitherto, America was minded to go along with British policy towards Nigeria, as Britain

was the former colonial master. The election of Nixon as President, and his instant

reaction of setting up the emergency task force for Biafra met with a lot of praise and

jubilation on the Biafran media. Nigeria, not surprisingly thought this was an unnecessary

261
interference in Nigeria's internal affairs. Biafra even ventured to think that America might

recognise Biafra.

It is impossible to say whether any propaganda affected the Soviet Union in it's attitude to

the crisis. It is fair to argue, as demonstrated earlier, ^ that the Soviets were mainly

interested in arms sales. It would appear that if Colonel Krubo, whom the Biaffans sent as

Ambassador to Moscow had not defected to the Nigerian side, the Soviets would have

backed Biafra. This is a matter o f conjecture. Also, it is worth noting that utterances from

the Soviet authorities and media were not supportive of rebellion, disintegration,

secession, or separation. They were mindful at the time of their own tribal and ethnic

problems. The unique lesson and consequence of all this was that the Biafran war became

the first time since the second world war that America, initially, Britain, and the Soviet

Union were more or less on the same side. The case of France seems a little more

complicated. It was the only major country that supported Biafra, all be it covertly at first.

Earlier arguments have demonstrated that France was affected by the potential of Nigeria

on the African continent - it being an Anglophone colossus. It has also been shown that it

was swayed by the attitude towards Biafra o f the Francophone African countries,

particularly the Ivory Coast and Gabon. It may be fair to argue therefore that

complementarity, Biafran propaganda, 'via' the same route of Francophone African

countries, affected French actions and decisions. Since Ivory Coast in particular was

persuaded to recognise Biafra, and held a sway of respected opinion with the Gaullist

Government, it seems likely that the French were also persuaded by this means.

Apart from contributing a member o f the observer team to Nigeria, and U. Thant

attending the OAU meetings, on the Nigerian civil war as an observer, the UN was very

much on the periphery of the conflict. The Secretariat did however, eventually, ask the

OAU to try to settle the conflict.

This was at a time in history when non-interference in the domestic affairs o f a member

State was sacrosanct. Nigeria sent a delegation to the General Assembly to make sure that

262
this was upheld. Biafra attempted to join, and was never allowed to see day light. Any

attempts, in any case would have been blocked by Britain. It was only after Nixon's

assumption o f office, that he threatened to raise the matter of genocide at the security

council. ^ Biafra hailed this. Nigeria reacted angrily. All this meant that Biafran problems

were acted out on the world stage, and on the world media. This brought the matter to the

fore of world opinion, but somehow in the act, overshadowing the other preceding and

existing domestic conflicts around the world. It was a clear lesson of the success o f a well

organised propaganda. It can also be said that since about eighty percent of the world

media is controlled by the English speaking media, the coverage in Britain and America

given to the conflict, had an immense bearing on this aspect of the propaganda outcome

o f events.

2. The success of organised propaganda transmitted to the reaction of African countries

and the OAU. The OAU in its Charter maintains the sanctity o f States. It upholds very

strictly the non-interference principle in the domestic affairs o f member States. It has

reason to.

The very nature of the African Continent is that of a continent consisting of States with

multifarious ethnic backgrounds, religions, language, and dialectical diversities, with all

the attendant problems. Therefore, member States were careful not to 'upset the apple

cart'.

All this created a problem for Biafran propaganda. If it played the ethnic card, the States

would shy away more from supporting it for fear of awakening internal problems at home

- fear of the domino effect. If it played the religious card, then it stood the chance of
17
alienating Muslim States, particularly those of North Africa, as has been seen. So,

Biafra tried them all, before it struck on the note of hunger, and starving children, women,

and the elderly. The card of pogrom, and genocide was always there as the safety net

when there was a lull, for Biafra to dip into. This thrust into the starvation, pogrom, and

genocide propaganda emboldened the so called 'radical' States 18 like Tanzania, Zambia,

263
Gabon, and the Ivory Coast, to press ahead and recognise Biafra, to the chagrin of

Nigeria. Again, this was a first - an unprecedented step - the recognition of a secessionist

entity. Comparisons of the Biafran situation with the Katanga situation were made by the

Muslim North African States, which were dismissed by Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania,

and Kaunda o f Zambia. This further demonstrated the power of Biafran propaganda. It

showed that with properly organised propaganda, most things were possible in war.

Nigeria was content to sit back and play the non-interference card - a rather negative

propaganda ploy, in short, propaganda of omission.

3. In the Nigerian context, the lessons were numerous. Whether the Nigerian people have

learned from them or not is another matter. Two cardinal points deserve mention. These

are; the problem o f ethnicity and tribalism; and the matter of the effective use of the media

to achieve optimum results. Biafra created many 'firsts', amongst which were:

( 1) the first secessionist territory to be recognised internationally, during a civil war. ^

Certainly, on the African continent, this fact is undisputable. Elsewhere, research has not

revealed any evidence to the contrary. Buchheit, for instance, describes Biafra as a

'precedent' in the study of secession in international law. But does not answer this

particular point either way.

(2 ) the first entity to institutionalise propaganda in a civil war situation, by creating the

Directorate o f Propaganda: and the second in the world to set it up at all since Hitler's

Germany in the second world w a r.^

(3) the first ever situation where starvation became the all conquering propaganda

weapon. 211

(4) the first crisis since the second world war that initially at least, the United States, the

Soviet Union, and Britain supported the same side.

All these were not only lessons for Nigeria, Africa, but also for the world. These and

other matters already discussed all happened because of effective manipulation of

information. It was a question of the messenger discovering what was most suited to its

264
target audience, and directing the message appropriately. It was the utmost effective use

o f both coercive and manipulative persuasion. Biafran intellectuals who made up the

Propaganda Directorate had studied carefully the propaganda tactics o f Hitler, Goebbels,

and Mao Tse tu n g .^ They had also studied the effect of'psyche war', the exploits of the
91
French 'Enlightenment', modified, modernised, and converted them to suit their own

situations - their needs and commitments. It is therefore right to argue that here, a process
94
o f migration and mutation, imitation and replication had ensued.
95
Nigeria was slow to catch up, and never really did catch up. Ojukwu stated this in an

interview in 1993. He was however more interested in talking about Nigeria at present, as

he was one o f the Presidential aspirants at the time. He nevertheless indicated that present

events in Nigeria have vindicated 'the stand we have always maintained', that it is suicidal

for any one group in Nigeria to dream of subjugating the others. He said the East had its

share of conflict, and was not prepared to assist any one else to resolve their problems. He

said: 'it is now our turn to sit and watch by the side lines. He maintained that those asking

for civil war in Nigeria now, are doing so because they have had no experience of civil

wars, and so don't understand the repercussions. He paid glowing tribute to all those who

were involved with Biafran propaganda, 'for giving their all to keep us going'. But,

according to him, all that is in the past. 'We did what we were called upon to do, and

now, we must move on, look forward'. He warned Nigerians against calling for civil war,

and maintained that he was better placed than any Nigerian to understand that. He blamed

the press in Lagos for always wanting to fan up trouble.

The symbols are still there - the songs, the poems, the scars.

The Biafra experience, coming at the time that it did, was a clear, and undoubted

demonstration to Nigeria, Africa, the World, that ethnicity remained an immanent

96
potentially explosive, and exploitative propaganda weapon, and still remains the

greatest threat to the modem state. General Gowon stated this in April 1993, in a

discussion. He said that his main aim has always been to keep Nigeria united without

265
mentioning any particular ethnic groups, he maintained that the reason for dividing up the

country was to satisfy the yearnings of the minorities and eliminate conflict. But,

according to him, this does not appear to have 'cured the cancer'. Almost in the same vein

as Ojukwu, he warned against 'those who want to mislead the Nigerian youth of today to

start trouble'.

He said: don't be misled, don't be deceived. And, as if in echo, he repeated exactly what

Ojukjwu had said a few months earlier, that Nigeria was mightier than any one man. He

remained very hopeful where Nigeria was concerned. He said 'it would be to your credit

for your supervisors to know you have interviewed me'. He stated: my motto has always

been - to keep Nigeria one, is a task that must be done'.

266
Notes on Chapter 6
1. The Gospel according to St. John' Ch.l, Vrs.l, The Holy Bible.

2. 'Genesis Ch. 1', The Holy Bible.

3. Interview with Fit. Lt. Willy R. Murray-Bruce, Biafran Airforce Pilot. London, 1992.

4. Interviews with Kevin Ejiofor, Kalu Nsi, Sebastine Ofurum, Eno Irukwu, Biafran

Broadcasters, and Dr. (Mrs) Eke - wife of Dr. Ifegwu Eke, Director of the Propaganda

Directorate. Enugu, September, 1993.

5.John de St. Jorre - The Nigerian Civil War.

London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1972;

pp.391,392.

6 . See Ch.4..

7. Ibid: ch. 4

8 . The Sunday Times London, 28th April 1968, William Norris.

9. Arthur A. Nwankwo The Making of a Nation

Samuel U. Ifejika Biafra - 'Mv People Suffer'.

London, C. Hurst and Company,

1969; pp.273,281.

10. Ibid: p. 273

11. See Ch. 5 ..

12. Ibid: ch. 5

13. Voice of Biafra, December 1969.

14. See Ch. 5..

15. Ibid: ch. 5

16. Voice o f Biafra, December 1969. Voice of Nigeria, December 1969.

Also See Ch. 5..

17. See Ch. 5.

18. Ibid: ch. 5

267
19. See Ch.4..

20. See Ch.4..

2 1 . See Chs. 4 & 5.

2 2 . See Ch. 3.

23. See Ch. 2 .

24. See Ch. 3.

25. Interview with Gen. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.

Nnewi, M arch-April, 1993;

Enugu, February - March 1995

26. Interview with Gen. Yakubu Gowon.

London, April, 1993;

Jos, February - March 1995

268
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Azikiwe, Nnamdi.
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Hallam, Roger.
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Grotius, Hugo.
'Intematinal Law: Conduct o f War',
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The United Nations.
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The Civil War and Nigerian Unity.
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The Economic Consequences of The Peace (1919).
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'Psychological Warfare'.
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The Nigeria-Biafra Crisis.
Dar-es-Salam, The Government Printer, 1967.

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'Propaganda'
London, BBC2, 10.30am, Saturdays, May 1992.

Renshaw, John.
'Revolutios, Phone-ins, and Rural Development'.
Overseas Broadcaster's Circuit, London, BBC; 1989.

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Scott, Colonel Robert.
Appreciation of the Nigerian Conflict.
Lagos, 13th December, 1969

Schwarzenberger, George.
'postive Compensation and Negative Compensation'.
London, The University College, 1974.

Tzu, Sun.
'psychological Warfare'.
Chicago, Encyclopaedia Inc. 15th.ed. 1991.
Vol.ll,p.389,2b. Vol.5,p.544,3a. Vol.21,p.718,2a.
Vol.29,p.647,lb.

Uche, Luke Uka.

'Imperialism Revisited'.
The Media Education Journal.'
Falkirk Scotland, 1987.

Uche, Luke Uka.

'Radio Biaffa and The Nigerian Civil War:
Study of War Propaganda on a Target Audience'.
The Third ChannelTThe Journal of International
Communication,
International Broadcasting Society(IBS), 1987.

Uka, Kalu.
'On T.S.Elliot:
The Principle of Objective Correlative'.
Nsuka, The University of Nigeria, 1970.

Keynes, J.M.
'The Economic Consequencies of the Peace - 1919.
Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 1991.
Vol.21,p.753,ld,2a.
Vol.6p.824,le,2a.

Wedgewood-Benn, David.
'Goebbels and Propaganda:
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278
4. THESES, DISSERTATIONS, AND UNPUBLISHED WORKS.

Davies, Patrick.
The Role of Television in Nigeria.
M.A. Dissertation, 1990.

01ayiwola,R.O.
Political Communications in Nigeria.
PHD. Thesis, 1991

279
5. PERIODICALS, JOURNALS, MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS AND REPORTS.

Africa.

The Biafra Journal

Biafra Sun.

Daily Express.

Commons Official Report.

DailyJLelggcaph.

Daily Times o f Nigeria.

Eastern States Express.

Financial Times.

Index on Censorship.

International Herald Tribune.

International Socialist Review.

The Guardian.

The jQumaLofin temationaLCommumcatipn,

LeJdonde

Lords Official Report.

The Media Education Journal.

Midweeks

The Morning Post.

Ms.London,

The New Nigerian.

The News.

280
The Nigerian Tribune.

I he_Qbs.ery.ei:>

Overseas Broadcaster's Circuit.

Pravda.

The Punch.

Ripon Forum.

Soviet News.

The Sunday Times.

The Sunday MagazmeXTSM).

Tell Magazine.

The, limes

The Tribune.

U S. Department of State Bulletin

West .Africa Magazine.

The West African Pilot.

The World Today.

Za Rubezhom.

281
6. BROADCASTING ORGANISATIONS.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

The Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation Television

(NBC/TV).

Niamey Radio.

Radio Biafra.

Radio Moscow.

Radio Nigeria

The Voice o f America.

The Voice o f Biafra

282
PERSONS INTERVIEWED.

Nwokolobia Agu.

Pal Akalonu.

Obot Akabio.

Chief N.U. Akpan.

His Excellency Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji.

Okon Atakpo.

Rt. Hon. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The Owelle Of Onitsha.

David Andrew-Bassey.

Chief Edwin Davies.

Dr. Chinekwu Davies.

Rev. Fr. Doheny.

Rev. Fr. Dowling.

Obi Eboh.

Peter Edochie.

General Philip Effiong.

Kevin Ejiofor.

Dr. Ifegwu Eke.

Efiom Ekpe.

Moses Ekpo.

Chief S.H.U. Ekpo.

U.J. Ekpo.

283
Cyprian Ekwensi.

John Ekwere.

Brigadier General U J. Esuene.

Gloria Fiofori.

Frederick Forsyth.

Rev. Fr. Golden.

General Yakubu Gowon.

Sir. Edward Heath.

Sir. David Hunt.

Dr. Francis Akanu Ibiam.

Mfon Inam.

Eno Irukwu.

Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe.

Chief (Dr.) G.C. Mbanugo, The Ogene of Obosi..

Ft. Lt. Willy R. Murray-Bruce.

Ikenna Ndaguba.

Okokon Ndem.

Kalu Nsi.

President Sam Nujoma.

Sam Nwaneri.

Miki Nzewi.

Egbuna Obidike.

284
Sebastian Ofurum.

Ft.Lt. Oga Oga.

General Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.

Sam Ojukwu.

Elias Ohuabunwa.

Prof. Onwumechili.

Gold Oruh.

Dr. Luke Uka Uche.

Chief A. A. Udoete.

Sir Udo Udoma.

Jackson Ufot.

Chief William Ufot.

Prof. Kalu Uka.

Ukonu Ukonu.

Ukpum Ete Community.

Ukpum Okon Community.

Auberon Waugh.

285
8. MISCELLANEOUS SOURCES.

Dr.J.M.Marshall,
Assistant Editor,
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.

Discussed with Her Royal Highness,

The Princess Royal.

Research and Field Trips to Nigeria.

Archives, Libraries, Embassies, High Commissions,

and Museums in the United Kingdom.

Archives, Libraries, Museums in Nigeria.

Research and Interview trips to, Portugal, Geneva,

France, and Ireland.

Radio and Television

Seminars and Conferences.

Personal involvement, and experience

of the operation of Biafran Propaganda.

286
APPENDIX

287
 ii i u i . n m
JANUARY 1966 l CHAt
Sokoro
Kol'Sina
HAUSA Casr.ua

H adejia
K A N U R I

M o id u O u ri
Kano
H AJ U5 A 2. N D FULANI Pofiskum
Azare Boma

Gwoza
•‘ A R A B \
AND
BU5ANA jr. NORTHER REGION KANURI
Biu
aduna
onl-odora Bauch i
Combe Mubi y

KAMIBERAWA
MARGl t
Koiomo KaFancho N um o n
M inna
# Ponkshin
NUPE
C WAR I BIROM
KEDEL
wombo Shendam mgo
AMA
LoFia .C o n y e y
llorm N a s o ro w a

Yv O R U B A IGBIRA

w u k ari
oyo O shogbo BASAKOMO
o K u rd
W ESTER flesho •.^cj0.EKiri .okene
Ibodon
Gbcto _BOI5SO
R E G IO N Akure*'"' ^ wo j tf Oft#kfo*
' . Jr idah
( I lo ro i c „ rtAuchi /Cigala /
hooom u
lebu-Otie ED0 gt! "^sukko
Ubioja■ ^ (
Abudu **' | BO nugu IYALLA «
Logos - — Benin
Awko AbokolikiTT
V M ID -W IF S ^s^ ^ •Ikom
/ i Avk. i l/Oni
r ^k e.o k
ri :
o n r r ^
i ° k ,3wl
: / r su e a s t e rn \ /
M om rc
BIGHT OF BENIN rerokpc O z o ro M m U R E G I O N
R a ilw a y s
R oads
muoh,^ f In le rn a fio n a l B o u n d a ries
/ O w e r r i^ / I EFI K ^ '
Regional B o u n d a rie s
/E k g e ru z # in > .
T r ib e s
Domodi Ahoodb* ’ AbaVi7Bi6t^yy°
AboK* \ %J /
K^plobar M a jo r E l-h n ic B o u n d a r i e s
■>Ooa PorV H a rc o u rf
THE BIAFRAN NATIONAL ANTHEM
Land o f ike Rising Sim

Land of the rising sun, we love and cherish,

Beloved homeland of our brave heroes;
We must defend our lives or we shall perish,
We shall protect our hearths from all our foes;
But if the price is death for all we hold dear,
Then let us die without a shred of fear.

Kail to Biafra, consecrated nation,

Oh fatherland, this be our solemn pledge:
Defending thee shall be a dedication,
Spilling our blood we’ll count a privilege;
The waving standard which emboldens the free
Snail always be our Sag of liberty.

We snail emerge triumphant from this ordeal,

And through the crucible unscathed we’ll pass;
When we are poiscu the wounds of battle to heal,
We shall remember those who died in mass;
Then shall our trumpets peal the glorious song
Of victory we scored o’er might and wrong.

Oh God, protect us from me hidden pitfall,

Guide ail our movements lest we go astray;
Give us the strength to heed the humanist call:
‘To give and not to count the cost*, each day;
Bless those who rule to serve with resoluteness,
To make this clime a land of righteousness.
N n a m d i AZZKIW2

289

f iir js U
 A P P E N D IX

ABURI ACCORD

1. In order to follow clearly the immediate political development preceding the civil
war, it is necessary to understand the salient points agreed to at the Aburi meeting
by the Nigerian Military leaders. The meeting lasted for two days -4th and 5th
January 1967. Here, with courtesy, the summary of conclusions reached on the
various subjects considered at the meeting is reproduced.
O p en in g :
2. The Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council, Lt-General J.A. Ankrah
declaring the meeting open, welcomed the visitors to Ghana and expressed delight
that Ghana had been agreed upon by the Nigerian Military leaders as the venue for
this crucial meeting. He considered the whole matter to be the domestic affairs of
Nigeria and as such, he refrained from dwelling on any specific points. The
General, however, expressed the belief that the Nigerian problems were not such
that cannot be easily resolved through patience, understanding and mutual respect.
Throughout history, he said, there has been no failure of military statesmen and the
eyes of the whole world were on the Nigerian Army. He advised that soldiers arc
purely statesmen and not politicians and the Nigerian Military leaders owe it as a
responsibility to the 56 million people of Nigeria to successfully carry through
their task of nation-buiiding. Concluding, the General urged the Nigerian leaders to
bury their differences, forget the past and discuss their matter frankly but patiently.
3. Lt-Coi. Gowon invited the Nigerian leaders to say a "joint thank you" to their
host, and all said thank you in unison in response to Lt-General Ankrah’s address.
At this point the General vacated the Conference table.
Im portation o f Arms & R esolution R enouncing the U se of Force:
4. Lt-Col. Ojukwu spoke next. He said that the Agenda was acceptable to him subject
to the comments he had made on some of the items. Lt-Col. Ojukwu said that no
useful purpose would be served by using the meeting as a cover for arms build-up
and accused the Federal Military Government of having engaged in large scale arms
deals by sending Major Apolo to negotiate for arms abroad. He alleged that the
Federal Military Government recently paid £ lm for some arms bought from Italy
and now stored up in Kaduna. Lt-Col. Ojukwu was reminded by the Military
Governor, North and other members that the East was included in an arms build-up
and that the plane carrying arms which recently crashed on the Carmeroons border
was destined for Enugu. Lt-Col. Ojukwu denied both allegations. Concluding his
remarks on arms build-up, Lt-Col. Ojukwu proposed that if the meeting was to
make any progress, all the members must at the outset adopt a resolution to
renounce the use of force in the settlement o f the Nigerin dispute.
5. Lt-Col. Gowon explained that as a former Chief of Staff, Army he was aware of the
deficiency in the country’s arms and ammunition which needed replacement. Since
the Defence Industries Corporation could not produce these, the only choice was to
order from overseas and order was accordingly placed to the tunc of £3/4m. He said
to the best of his knowledge, the actual amount that had been paid out was only
£80,000 for which he signed a cheque on behalf o f the General Officer
Commanding The £80m about which so much noise has been made was nothing but
a typographical error in the Customs in recording the payment of £80,000. As to
why these arms were sent up to the North, Lt-Col. Gowon referred to lack of
storage facilites in Lagos and reminded his Military Colleagues of the number of
times arms and ammunition had been dumped in the sea. This was why, he said, it
became necessary to use the better storage facilities in Kaduna. The arms and
 A Tragedy Without Heroes
ammunition had not been distributed because they arrived only two weeks
previously and have not yet been taken on charge. After exhaustive discussion to
which all members contributed and during which Lt-Col. Ejoor pointed out that it
would be necessary to determine what arms and ammunition had arrived and what
each unit of the Army had before any further distribution would take place, the
Supreme Military Council unanimously adopted a Declaration proposed by Lt-Col.
Ojukwu, that all members:
(a) renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis;
(b) Reaffirm their faith in discussions and negotiation as the only peaceful way of
resolving the Nigerian crisis; and
(c) agree to exchange information on the quantity o f arms and ammunition
available in each unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated
stores, and to share out such arms equitably to the various Commands;
(d) agree that there should be no more importation of arms and ammunition until
normalcy was restored.
R eorganisation of the Army:
6. The Supreme Military Council, having acknowledged the fact that the series of
disturbances since January 15, 1966, have caused disunity in the Army resulting in
lack o f discipline and loss of public confidence, turned their attention to the
question o f how best the Army should be re-organised in order to restore that
discipline and confidence. There was a lengthy discussion of the subject and when
the arguments became involved members retired into secret session. On their return
they announced that agreement had been reached by them on the re-organisation,
administration and control of the army on the following lines:-
(a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be
known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal
Military Government.
(b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from
the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.
(c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the
charge of Area Commanders.
(d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive
posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme
Military Council.
(e) During the period o f the Military Government, Military Governors will have
control over Area Commands for internal security.
(f) Creation of a Lagos Garison including Ikeja Barracks.
7. In connection with the re-organisation of the Army, the Council discussed the
distribution o f Military Personnel with particular reference to the present
recruitment drive. The view was held that general recruitment throughout the
country in the present situation would cause great imbalance in the distribution of
soldiers. After a lengthy discussion of the subject, the Council agreed to set up a
Military Committee, on which each Region will be represented, to prepare
statistics which will show:
(a) Present strength of the Nigerian Army;
(b) Deficiency in each sector of each unit;
(c) The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;
(d) Additional requirement for the country and each Area Command.
The Committee is to meet and report to Council within two weeks from the date of
receipt of instructions.
8. The Council agreed that pending completion of the exercise in paragraph 7 further
recruitment of soldiers should cease.
9. In respect of the organisation of the Nigerian Army, implementation of the
agreement reached on August 9, 1966, it was agreed after a lengthy discussion,

291
 that ii was necessary for the agreement reached on August 9th by the delegates of
the Regional Governments to be fully implemented. In particular, it was accepted
in principle that army personnel of Northern origin would return to the North from
the West. It was therefore fell that a crash programme of recruitment and training,
the details of which would be further examined after the Committee to look into the
strength and distribution of army personnel had reported, would be necessary to
constitute indigenous army personnel in the West to a majority there quickly.

N on-R ecognition by the East of L t-C ol. Gowon

As Suprem e Com m ander:
10. The question of the non-recognition by the East of Lt-Col. Gowon as Supreme
Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government was also exhaustively
discussed. Lt-Col. Ojukwu based his objection on the fact, inter alia, that no one
can properly assume the position o f Supreme Commander uniil the whereabout of
the former Supreme Commander, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, was known. He
therefore asked that the country be informed o f the whereabout o f the Major-
General and added that in his view, it was impossible, in the present circumstances,
for any one person to assume any effective central command of the Nigerian Army.
Lt-Col. Ejoor enunciated four principles to guide the meeting in formulating an
answer to the question of who should be Supreme Commander. These were the:
(a) Problem of effective leadership;
(b) Crisis of confidence in the Army;
(c) Disruption in the present chain o f Command;
(d) Inability o f any soldier to serve effectively in any unit anywhere in the

Lt-Col. Gowon replied that he was quite prepared to make an announcement on the
matter and regretted that a formal announcement had been delayed for so long but
the delay was originally intended to allow lime for tempers to cool down. He
reminded his colleagues that they already had the information in confidence. After
further discussion and following the insistence by Lt-Col. Ojukwu that Lt-Col.
Gowon should inform members o f what happened to the former Supreme
Commander, members retired into secret session and subsequently returned to
continue with the meeting after having reached agreement among themselves.
11. At this point, the meeting adjourned until Thursday Sth January.
The Pow ers of the F ederal M ilitary G overnm ent,
V is-A -V is the R egion al G overn m ents:
12. When the meeting resumed on Sth January, it proceeded to consider the form of
Government best suited to Nigeria in view of what the country has experienced in
the past year (1966). Members agreed that the legislative and executive authority
of the Federal Military Government should remair. in the Supreme Military Council
to which any decision affecting the whole country shall be referred for
determination provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the
matter requiring determination must be referred to Military Governors for their
comment and concurrence. Specifically, the Council agreed that appointments to
senior ranks in the Police, Diplomatic and Consular Services as w ell as
appointments to superscale posts in the Federal Civil Service and the equivalent
posts in Statutory Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military
Council. The Regional members felt that all the Decrees or positions o f Decrees
passed since 15th January. 1966 and which detracted from the previous powers and
positions of Regional Governments should be repealed if mutual confidence is to
be restored.
After this issue had been discussed at some length the Council took the following
decisions:-

292
- '■ — if — a— —

ft ' /M- 7Vj(jKu - A M

 A Tragedy Withoul Heroes
The Council decided that:
(i) On the reorganisation of the Army:
(a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman
to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the ,
Federal Military Government. *
(b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation
from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff. (
(c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under
the charge of Area Commanders.
(d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top
executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the
Supreme Military Council.
(e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will
have control over Area Commands for internal security.
(0 Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks.
(ii) On appointment to certain posts:
The following appointment must be approved by the Supreme Military
Council:-
(a) Diplomatic and Consular posts.
(b) Senior Posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.
(c) Super-scale Federal Civil service and Federal Corporation posts.
(iii) On the functioning of the Supreme Military Council: Any decision affecting
the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military council. Where
a meeting is not possible such a matter must be referred to Military Governors
for comment and concurrence.
(iv) That all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on the 14th
of January and list out all the Decrees and provisions of Decrees- concerned so
that they may be repealed no; later than 21st January if possible.
(v) That for at least the next six months, there should be purely a Military
Government, having nothing to do whatever with politicians.
Soldiers Involved In Disturbances on
15th January, 1966 und Thereafter:
13. Members expressed views about the future of those who have been detained in
connection with all the disturbances since 15th January, 1966 and agreed that the
fate of soldiers in detention should be determined not later than end of January,
1967.

Ad Hoc C onstitutional C onference:

14. The Council next considered the question of the resumption of the Ad Hoc
Constitutional Committee and the acceptance of that Committee's recommendations of
September, 1966. After some exchange of views, it was agreed that the Ad Hoc
Committee should resume silting as soon as practical to begin from where they left off,
and drat the question of accepting the unanimous recommendations of September, 1966
be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Milita^r Council.
The Problem s of Displaced Persons:
15. The Council considered exhaustively the problems of displaced persons, with
particular reference to their rehabilitation, employment and property. The view was
expressed and generally accepted that the Federal Government ought to take the
lead in establishing a National Body which will be responsible for raising and
making appeal for funds. Lt-Col. Ojukwu made the point, which was accepted by
Lt-Cwi. Kalsina, that in the present situation, the interminingling of Easterners and

293

0:
 A p p e n d ix

Northerners was not feasible. After each Military Governor had discussed these
problems as they affected his area, the Council agreed.
(a) On rehabilitation, the Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting
within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each Region should
send three representatives to the meeting.
(b) On employment and recovery of porpcrty, that civil servants and Corporation
staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should
continue to be paid their full salaries until 31st March, 1967 provided they
have not got alternative employment, and that the Military Governors of the
East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners)
to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by
displaced persons. Lt-Col. Ejoor disclosed that the employment situation in
his Region was so actule that he had no alternative but to ask non-Mid-
Westemers working in the private sector in his Region to quit and make room
for Mid-Westerners repatriated from elsewhere. Lt-Col. Ojukwu staled that he
fully appreciated the problem faced by both the Military Governor, West, and
the Military Governor, Mid-West, in this matter and that if in the last resort,
cither of them had to send the Easterners concerned back to the East, he would
understand, much as the action would further complicate the resettlement
problem in the East. He .assured the Council that his order that non-Easterriers
should leave the Eastern Region would be kept under constant review with a
view to its being lifted as soon as practicable.
16. On the question of future meetings of the Supreme Military Council, members
agreed that future meetings will be neid in Nigeria at a venue to be mutually agreed.
17. On the question of Government information media, the Council agreed that all
Government information media should be restrained from making inflammatory
statements and causing embarrassment to various Governments in the Federation.
18. There were other matters not on the Agenda which were also considered among
which were the form of Government for Nigeria (reported in paragraph 12 above)
and the disruption of the country’s economy by the lack of movement of rail and
road transport which the Regional Governors agreed to look into.
19. The meeting began and ended in a most cordial atmosphere and members
unanimously issued a second and final Communique.
20. In his closing remarks the Chi arm an of the Ghana National Liberation Council
expressed his pleasure at the successful outcome of the meeting and commenced the
decisions taken to the Nigerian leaders for their implementation. Lt-Col. Gowon on
behalf of his colleagues thanked the Ghanaian leader for the excellent part he had
played in helping to resolve the issues. The successful outcome of the meeting was
then toasted with champagne and the Nigerians took leave of the Ghanaians.
21. The proceedings o f the meeting were reported verbatim for each Regional
Government and the Federal Government by their respective official reporters and
tape-recorded versions were distributed to etch Government.

294
 6
,AGOS JUNTA Refugee V\
Told To F
A ll refugee civil ser­
vants and corporation
rese
regi<

IS A
staff, w hether already re­ thirt
settled or not, have been have
requested by the Biafra conn
Republic Rehabilitation. Th
Commission to register fore
their nam es with the com ­ servs
m ission as refugees. staff
G o w o n Accused Administrators
In a statem ent in Enugu
yesterday, the commission
disclosed that of the 30,000
not t
w ith
refug
Declare Assets
Of Treason The te x t of the code of
conduct subscribed to by
refugee civil servants and
corporation staff already
rent
whicl
The Eastern Nigeria Government said the new ly appointed Biafra
yesterday that the so-called creation of more Provincial Administrators
states by the chief rebel in Lagos, Lt. Col* appointed on Monday by
Yakubu Gowon and the declaration of a state the M ilitary
Lt. Col.
Governor,
Odumegwu
C0 NGRATUU
of emergency in the country cannot apply to Ojukwu has been publish­
the East. The Board, ^ ^ a o p m e n
ed.
The Government state­ Under the code of con­ of the BIAFRA v*A
m ent w ent on: “ A stunned Dishonesty duct approved by the M ili­ CORPORATIOh tc
country and her friends tary Governor, the Adm i­ Lt. Col. Chukw O di
have heard with amaze* nistrators declared all their *
nient the ominous and disa­ Tt is manifestly clear assets showing their landed Miiita.ry Goverm Den
strous announcem ent of that Gowon does not even property with the value at of BTAFRA am >ver
know the politi<;afc-geogra- the tim e of their assump­
Gowon proclaiming him­ plty of hastenLf.d^eri;-: Congratulations c ssfu
se lf the dictator of Nige­ tion of ollice, amount of
ria, io what am ounts to and therefore . Tamioj ex­ money they have in the great, progressive and industi
pect an\one to" lake *.him bank, investm ents in any Federation of Nigeria into t
one-man coup d’etat. seriously .
By this act, Gowon has undertaking and value and of peace and abundance unde
"Besiues, Gowon knows income from any other
made May 27, 1967. that lie cannot enforce any
the darkest date in the sources.
oi his decrees in the hast. The Administrators also Long live the R epublic c
history of freedom and res­ “The whole exercise is
pect for human feelings in solemnly swore on oath and
therefore dishonest, co­ bound them selves not to
this couuti*). wardly and farcical be­
Gowon. has unc-ivnioni- accept, gifts, decorations,
cause it servrs as a cloak gratuities, pensions, salary
ously dism issed the Supre­ Ior a permanent subjuga­
me M ilitary Council, con­ or title from any foreign
tion oi the W est.by . the government nor w ill
tem ptuously brushed as'cJe
VACANC
the m ost senior m ijitaiy
officer
country h\
available in the
proclaiming-
him self the Commander.
North; for it is'clear'th at
ih« declaration of the so-
C(iHed state of emergency
is directed principally
A kpo P
An indigenous
pany for the manufacture
com­
they accept gifts, loans
or other perquisites from
anv person or source
with a v iew to influencing
i
in-Chiel of the Armed
aj;ainst the occupied areas
of nail and wire was their decisions or actions
# Vacancies exist in a progre
of tin- South, nanii'i.'.
1 o n e s and Head oi a I c-
cieral G overnm ent that is
i-agos and Western Nige­
ria.
Protest opened recently at Port
in regard to their public
duties.
| young men and girls with the
now to consist of himsell -W e in the hast knew Akpo co m m u n ity in Marcourt. Picture shov - The Adm inistrators a l s o
hounH ~*
& and office work. Annlv in owi
a lo n e . •ala D iv isio n . A «ka
tie Mas I 'a m S ii e u ' Iio n i ioI,*.
u r Ntajid. T h e
IT««# - ..............*
p eop le of
- - 4•
 campaigns
to Oould You For
Only 3d
A

Vol. XIV No. 2,132 ENU(

mmmmm

mmmm

Odumegwu Ojukwu, Mijitar

N ig c m . by virtue of the anth
principles, recited above, do
that the territory and region I
crn N igeria together with h
territorial w aters shall hone?
sovereign state o f the name an
of BIAFRA '.
AND I DO DECLARE TH,
LT. COL. ODUMEGWU OJUKWU <0 aJ1 political ties betwee
ftfctkms the historic declaration — _ public of Nigeria are hoi
(»i) all subsisting contractu:
Eastern Nigeria became the independent by the Government of
Nigeria or by any perso
and sovereign State of Biafra early this morn­ or governm ent acting or
ing following a proclamation by Lt. Col. son. authority, organisat
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military on its behalf, with any
ganisation operating, or
Governor of the new nation- thing, w ithin the Uepub
The Governor's declaration, announcing the pulling forth be deem ed to be e:
out of what used to be called the Eastern Region from tary Governor of ihe Ref
.the Nigerian Federation, was made eorlv ibis morning behalf of eh?> Gov»mme
a* a coiourfu' ceirmuuy at S t a v e X n u g u - >• , » < p«l»>br .>f ,j t,„
With the Military Governor were his Advises*; Sir suojcct to this Declarer:
Francis Ibiam, senior m ilitary personnel, the Chief parties according to the
Justice, Sir Louis Mbanefo. the Catholic and Anglican (iii) all subsisting internatk
Bishops of Enu&u, members of the diplomatic corps and tions made on behalf of
high Government officials. Governm ent of the Fee
The declaration was later cheered by thousands of shall be honoured and rt
people who ran out into the streets shouting ‘‘Hail th* (iv) Eastern N igeria’s due 3
REPUBLIC of BIAFRA." tein ad on al debts and ot
The declaration reads: the Governm ent of th * ;
Fellow countrymen and women. You, the people of ria on behalf of the Fed:
1.astern Nigeria: honoured and respected
* CONSCIOUS of the supreme authority of A lm ightv (v) steps w ill be taken to
Cr>d over all mankind, of your d u ty ‘to yourselves question of Eastern X
and postentv: assets of the Federation
* AW ARE that you can no longer be protected in properties of the citize
your lives and in your property by any govern­ the F ederation of Niger
ment based outside Eastern Nigeria; (v i) the rights, privileges, t
* BELIEVING that vou are born free and have cer­ sonnel of the Public Ser
ium inalienable rights which can best be preserved and the Pol ice now serv:
bv yourselves: the R epublic of Biafra
* UNWILLING to be unfree partners in anv asso- (v;i) w e hall keep the dcor'i
^ o r r r ? - , a political or economic nature; and would welcom e, anv
. tne authority of any person or per­ ‘n the form er Federate
sons other than the Military Government of East- other parts of Africa de
u:Ti ^ ;gerla t0 make any imposition of whatever us for the purposes o f n
Kinj or naiure upon you; organisation and for the
mic ties;
* rDp^ kE? M INED to ° issolve a11 political and other
(vii.i) w e shall protect the 1
Vf N ig e r i? 11 y° U the forraer Federal Republic
foreigners residing in B;
* A°v,enter int0 s“ch association, treatv hand o f friendship to if
296 our sovereignty, and sh;
form e?F ed eral in our internal affairs; '
U i) we shall faithfully adhe
Organisation o f African
* a.nd “ n.Edence in ME: I \ I N1+ations1r« Organisation.
,
 Every Sunday

ENUGU, Tuesday, May 30, 1967 Three Pence

Odumegwu Ojukwu, M ilitary Governor lo f Eastern

Nigeria, by virtue of the authority, and pursuant t<*-the
principles, recited above, do hereby solem nly proclaim
that the territory and region known as and called East­ AN EDITORIAL
ern N igeria together with her continental shelf and
territorial waters shall henceforth be an Independent
sovereign state of fche name and title of “The REPUBLIC

UMEGWU OJUKWU
of BIAFRA’’.
AND I DO DECLARE THAT —
(i) all political ties betw een Us and the Federal'Re-
W E SALUTE BIAFRA
; historic declaration public of Nigeria are hereby totally dissojyel:
(«i) all subsisting contractual obligations entered into NEW NATIO N cam e into being precedented pogrom have shown neither
ia became the independent by the Government of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria or by any person, authority, orgahiiation
A today. By the grace of God and the remorse nor regret, and hove in fact
e of Biafra early this morn- or governm ent acting on its behalf, w ithjm j per­ will of the progressive people of th ese conducted them selves m ost arrogantly
proclamation by Lt. Col. son. authority, organisation or govem m eft acting parts, it is the Republic of Biafra. A and contem ptuously, leaving no one in
umegwu Ojukwu, Military on its behalf, with any person, authorly or or­ any doubt th a t given another opport­
ganisation operating, or relating to anv ifatter of free, independent and sovereign S tate,
ew nation* thing, within the Republic of Biafra, shffl hence­ it covers the whole of the area until unity they would gladly repeat the per­
claration. announcing the pulling forth be deemed to be entered into with pie Mili­ yesterday known as Eastern N igeria. formance.
e called the Eastern Region from tary Governor of the Republic of Biafia f(f and on
>11. was made enrly this jnprning behalf of the Government and people cf *V , T h p re w as n o J o v b li ; ib slr
f •; piibfiir-.rf BIVi's.' the* C o n c e iv e d tin freedom and in sp ire d b v \
■v at Slave'.Hou6t, irhugu. >• . ♦ He o f a. pec p ie t o ;ih e iJinr o f I’k enem y The .
 4 BIAFRA SUN Tuesdt

BIRTH OF REPUB
Following- is text of the Proclama­ lican

OF BIAFRA
geriai
tion made by the Governor, Lt. Col. fu lly
Odumegwu Ojukwu declaring the for­ advic
On
mer Eastern Nigeria the REPUBLIC first
of BIAFRA: bly a:
m itte
It is right and just that we of this genera­ E ldei
tion of E astern Nigeria, should record for the in its own way. Complete ed by Northerners. They people of Eastern Nigeria the Military Leaders repre
disorder followed. Yet, the w ere killed in the North, to solve the crisis, and of agreed at Aburi on what admii
benefit of posterity, som e of the reasons for the bad faith with w hich the Permanent Secretaries
Federal Government do­ in Western Nigeria, in and <
the momentous decision w e have taken at this m inated by the North Lagos; some Eastern soldi­ these attem pts have been correctly interpreted as sumrr
crucial tim e in the history of our people. fiddled. ers in detention at Benin received. confederation, he unila­ relati
With the issue and even w ere forcibly removed On A ugust 9, 1966, re­ terally rejected the agree, befori
The M ilitary Government of Eastern N i­ presentatives of the Mili­ m ent to which he had vo­ was a
refused to recognise what from prison by Northern
geria has, in a series of publications, traced the the whole world had known soldiers and murdered. tary Governors m eeting luntarily subscribed. When
evils and injustices of the Nigerian political namely, that Nigeria was At the tim e of the inci­ in Lagos made decision in May 1967, all the South­ foil
on the brink of disaster. dent, m illions of Eastern for restoring peace and ern Military Governor- 1
association through the decades, stating also Nigerians resided outside for clearing the w ay for
the case and standpoint of E astern Nigeria in Only the Armed Forces constitutional talks, nota­ and the Leaders of Though
rem ained politically un­ the Eastland persons from bly the decision that of their Regions spoke ot
the recent crisis. com m itted and non-parti­ other parts of the country troops be all repatriated in favour of confederatioi
Throughout the period of san. Some of their officers lived in this Region. While to their region of origin. he dismissed the Suprem
Nigeria’s precarious exist­
East’s Stand and men revolted against Eastern Nigerians who as­ These decesions w ere not Military Council and prc
oo
C\
ence as a single political the injustices which were sembled at (Northern air­ fu lly im plem ented. claimed himsef the Diet? c*
entity Eastern Nigerians perpetrated before their ports, railway stations and On Septem ber 12, the tor of Nigeria — an ac
have always believed in which it purported to gua­ very eyes and attempted motor parks were set upon
rantee for the citizens. Ad Hoc Constitutional which, to say the least, j
fundam ental human rights to overthrow the Federal by Northern ^ poldiers and
and principles as they are Thus were sown, by design
Government and Regional chine civilians armed w ith ma­ Cotiference consisting of treasonable. kwt
accepted and enjoyed in or by default, the sees of guns, rifles, daggers delegates representing all Following the pogrom of lie
factionalism and hate, of Government. dea
civilized com m unities Im­ In desperation, the M i­ and poisoned j arrows, the the Governments of the 1966, some tw o million
struggle for power at the w hi
pelled by their belief in
centre, and of the worst nisters of the Federal G o ­ Army and the Police in
the East were specifically
Federation m et in Lagos, Eastern Nigerians have re­
ger:
these rights and principles vernment handed over po- instructed to shoot at sight and for three weeks turned from other regions,
and in their common citi­ types of political chicanery 196
w-er to the Armed Forces any sought to discover a form refugees in their own coun­ 2
zenship with other N ige­ and abuse of power. Eastern Nigerian of association best suited try. Money w as needed
under the supreme Com­ found molesting non-East- gra\
rians after Amalgamation, One of two situations mand of Major-General erners living in the Re­ to Nigeria having regard to care for them — not to
Eastern Nigerians employ­ was bound to result from sur\
J. T U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. gion. to the prevailing circum­ give them mere relief, but Rep
ed their ideas and skills, that arrangem ent: eitner stances and their causes, to rehabilitate them and, in
their resourcefulness and perpetual nomination of The M ilitary administra­ her<
dynamism in the develop­ tion under Major-General and future possibilities. time, restore their outraged pow
m ent of areas of Nigeria
the rest of the country by
the North, not by consent, Aguiyi-Ironsi made the Non-Easterners This conference was uni­ feelings. The Lagos Go­ take
outside the East. but by force anti fraud, or first real attempt to unite laterally dismissed by vernment was urged to that
the country and its peo­ Bv early October, the Lieutenant Colonel Go- give the Eastern Nigeria to p
Eastern Nigerians open­ a dissolution of the federat­ sight of mutilated refu­
ed up avenues of trade and ing bond. National inde­ ples. The Northerners saw won, the Head of the Government its share of of £
industry throughout the pendence was followed by in his elForts the possibili­ gees, orhpaned children, Lagos Government. the statutory revenues. Lt. the
ty of losing their control widowed mothers and de­ Col. Gowon refused to do o f it
country: overlooked the successive crises each lead­ I t h a d ' c-com e t h e n im ­
neglect of their homeland ing to n e a r d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the alFuirs of the coun- capitated corpses of E a s t ­ p o s s i b le f o r t h e S u p r e m e so in the hope that the 3
So w h ile its le a d e r s ern N ig e r ia n s arrvin i
in th e d isp o sitio n o f n a tio n -
 IRTH OF BIAFRA REPUBLIC
trativne.division in Eastern prised w ithin such area Observing that, even N igeia. *' TATIVES OF ALL GO­ ral Government;
— Continue*
REPU1
Nigeria -and ofher sectors the w ishes of each such though the decision to ap­ LA STLY , we assure VERNMENTS CAN MEET “And w hereas the m ay e:
of the ooa&wumity w ere grouping m ust be point the Ad Hoc Cons­ Y our E xcellency that no WITHOUT FURTHER object of governm ent is m en t
summoned- ®he delegates separately ascertained titutional C onference w as Eastern N igerian, whether DELAY TO PLAN FOR the good o f the governed ign un
to the Ad Hoc C onstitu­ and respected. a unanimous agreem ent of liv in g inside or outside SMOOTH IMPLEMENTA­ and the w ill of the people remair
tional 0otQ<fere«oe glaced (d) The population, area the G overnm ents of the this R egion has the man­ TION OF THE POLITI­ its ultim ate sanction, in anj
a full report "before them, and econom ic resources Federation, yet, the ad­ date or support of the CAL AND ADMINISTRA­ NOW, therefore, in con- desiroi
and fey a resolution dated of any new state which journm ent w as m ade w ith ­ people o f this Region to TIVE PROGRAMME sideration of these and w ith i
October 7, MSS, the Con- it is proposed to create out consultation w ith or speak for or represent ADOPTED BY ALL YOUR other of facts and injus- o f run
sulWiJ*e A ssem bly and m ust be reasonably consent by the Eastern N i­ them U N LESS appointed COLLEAGUES OF THE tices, w e, the Chiefs, servici
the A d ^ so ry Qppunifctee com m ensurate to the geria Government; w ith th e recom m endation SUPREME MILITARY Elders and R epresentatives and ft
of U&iefs ap d Eiders ad­ enorm ous functions Having also noted that and approval o f Your Ex­ COUNCIL X “MOST IM­ of all the T w enty Pro- m ent
vised as fnllfews: which th e states w ill the m any acts of bad faith cellen cy acting on behalf MEDIATE” vinces of Eastern Nigeria, .(d )
“1. Rlafies on record its be expected to perform on the part of the G ow on of Eastern Nigeria. On the evening of
assembled in this joint that tl
deep gratitude to the under th e new consti­ Governm ent and its inabi­ D ated 23rd Novem ber, L Saturday, May 27th, 1967 M eeting of the A dvisory BIAF1
Eastern Nige*ia D elega­ tution al arrangements lity to fu lfil prom ises or the joint session of the
1966. * enlarged Consultative A s­ Comm ittee of Chiefs and a nier
tion to the constitutional envisaged for Nigeria. im plem ent agreem ents un­ (A. IR O A U j ** sembly and th e Advisory Elders and the Consults- m onw
conference in Lagas for 7. In view of the fact anim ously reached; C jbL tt-IK M A N tiv e Assem bly, at Enusu th e
the tfflig^mt and faithful that the desire on the part Finding now that there Committee of Chiefs and
JEAST.fc.RiN ... m G E R iA ,, Elders, after fu ll delibera- this 27th day of May 1967, Africa
way in w hich, under con­ of the m inority groups for is a plot hatched up by i A i iOiN A S- ; t toiis, passed a resolution do hereby solem nly. Unite<
ditions of severe strain, self-determ ination is the certain civ il servants and
tension a^d fear th ey car­ m otive force behind the other officials w ith the ac­
SfcMbi^iG the text of which is as (a) MANDATE His sation
Excellency, Lt. CoL Chu- (e)
ried out the m andate demand for the creation tiv e involvem ent of Lt. Since th a t date, m atters follows: “We, the Chiefs, Elders kwuem eka Odumegwu th e ac
ghien tp ffaem by the of m ore states, and since Col. Yakubu Gowon to im- had pecom e worse; sanc­ and
Consuitasive A ssem bly and in the context of present- Representatives of Ojukwu, M ilitary Gover- O
cit confidence of the peo- tions nad oeen imposed on Eastern N igeria gathered nor of Eastern Nigeria h
tlje and Eiders of day N igeria m inorities pose a constitution and iia stern N igeria, warlike at this Joint M eeting of
Eastern,IsSgoria are defined by reference certain other m easures on preparations m aae against the Advisory Comm ittee to declare at th e earliest
2. ENDORSES the stand to tribe, AFFIRMS its be­ Nigeria; practicable date Eastern
ner; per isolation was of Chiefs and Elders and Nigeria a free, sovere­ 1
of the Eastern D elegation lief that th e best hope for R e-affirm ing the im pli- com plete. M en ana women the Consultative Assembly
at the Dagos eoostrttttional a satisfactory solution to of Eastern Nigeria in H is in tn e R egion, incensed by dd. solem nly declare as ig n .;,and independent p
cdnfeceneje. the problem s of Nigeria Excellency, Lt. Col. Odu- tn e treatm en t m eted out follows: state ,,by the name and persoi
3. URGES that as an lies in the recognition and m egwu Ojukwu and as­ to them by an unrepentant title of the REPUBLIC busim
interipi measure, a begin­ preservation of the se­ i “Whereas we have been OF BIAFRA. natioi
suring him of the solidari­ Lagos an a tne North, call­ id the vanguard of the
ning be m ade to im ple­ parate identity of the ty of Eastern Nigeria and (b) RESOLVE that tory.
m ent those aspects of the various tribal or linguistic ed tor th e declaration of national m ovem ent for the the n ew Republic of (g)
their support and admira­ Eastern N igeria as a so­ building of a strong,
recom m endations as relate groupings and their right tion for the w a y he has Biafra shall have the unqu:
to the Awned Forces at to develop each along its vereign independent state. united and prosperous N i­
handled the present crisis in these circumstances, geria where no man w ill fu ll and absolute powers th e 1
least to th e extent of re­ own lin e and at its own facing Nigeria; of a sovereign state, and of Ef
turning the®? to their pace; accordingly RECOM­ the joint m eeting of the be oppressed and have
A lso assuring His E xcel­ Consultative A ssem bly and devoted our efforts, shall ^establish com- Col.
Regions of' Origin and vest- MENDS that the creation lency of the admiration of m erce, le v y war, con- Odun
in g jh e eperafSonai control of states throughout Nige­ th e A dvisory Com m ittee talents and resources to
the people of Eastern N ige­ of Chiefs and Elders was this end; elude peace, enter into assur
of the co*tfigents ria should be on the basis ria in the M ilitary G overn­ diplom atic relations, and serv e
in tike x^ pective Military of tribal or linguistic reconvened for a clear “Whereas w e cherish
ment of Eastern N igeria carry out, as of right, w ay
Go*<seEJ?or-s. groupings or mutual con­ and their desire for its statem ent on the future certain inalienable human
4. RE-AEF1RMS its sent betw een the linguis­ course of action. A fter an rights and state onega­ other sovereign respon- hand]
continued administration
acceptance of the Report tic groupings. u n t i l it. has achieved its appraisal of th e develop­ tions such as the right to sibilities. th e c
ot tne comnwutee on the Jtfm y j’.nd *mu3xjiV
m ent in Nigerian crisis of happiness; the right to f o ' SVXECT th a t th e SO 2
objective o f creating a new
attern of aonstitution for Resolutions
g astern N igeria within the
Federation of Migaria and
the add&iooal suggestions
8. --D VISES that, until
the agreem ents reached
society in Eastern Nigeria;
W E D O H E R E B Y R E­
SO LV E that our M ilitary
past and present had been acquire, possess and de­
presented to the joint ses­ fend property; the provi­
sion, a telegram just re­ sion of security; and the Biafra Festiv
proposed by the Graham- by the personal repre­ Governor be advised as ceived from the Lagos Go­ establishm ent of good and
follows: vernm ent was read. The
Dougius constitutional
com m ittee rajsarding the
sentatives of the Military
Governors on A ueust 8
U.
/1 ) T o take any measure
.nncirlorc o r>r.rnnriatp
full text is as follows:-
just governm ent based on
the consent of the govern-
Match Fix
 if tlie b lam e vviii not be to take immSarat'e action "
.led s11i«--- ours. Gouou will bear the in order to avert further T O U g U l iv u iiu , i . O . u u .v
.it ion ol lull responsibility while trouble. Y O U I H L L A O U L
vs been we, for our part, will do The petition recalled Phone 2886.
*nia!s on
standing.
amDiuon
our duly,
"There are twu im-
portant asides which one
that in Septem ber 1963,
the. then civilian Govern­
m ent of the East, ap-.
THANKS I
—

S T O C K IST S o r
; always must make- The first and pointed a high-powered The Biafra Republic Youth League has | Machine T ools, Ruston Engines and Gene-
n 0 1 the rather pathetic one is that com m ission headed by Mr
!i: lie had after purporting to create Ju stice J. C. Phil-Ebosie, : congratulated the 20 newly appointed Provin­ k rating Set, Pumps, Hand Tools, Welding
o do this two new statese in the to inquire into the bloody cial Administrators and called upon them to | Equipm ent, F lat Sc V ee Belts, Hoses. Pipes
everyone East he has im posed full riots which broke out justify the confidence reposed in them by doing ►j Sc Pipe Fittings, R opes, Electrical Acces-
mid h a v e diplomaic, political and between Akpo apd Achina
economic sanctions against com m unities over a pro­ their duties according to the code of conduct k sories, Drawing Office Equipment Cotton
to have £ astern Nigeria including tracted land dispute. set for them. | Waste. R ags, Polishing Cloth. Bolts Sc
s in the even his new states. A s. a result of the re­ In a statem ent in Enugu | N uts, Brass, Copper Sheets, etc- etc.
.“t. he has " The second is that in com m endation of the y esterd a y ,. th e A dm inis­
Commission, the people* trator of the League, Mr
Iheanacho Also
intact by his broadcast Gowon stat-
provinces ed as follows: of A china who were held Commended ilr u n c h e s
largely responsible for. S. K. Udensi, thanked the Okpara Avenue 18 Owerri Road,
ed by Lt "Faced with this final
ian Kut- choice between action to th e . disturbances were- ■’M ilitary Governor for the P. O. Box 709 P. O. Box 782
n of the save Nigeria and acquies- fined a total sum of . appointments and assured F. O. Ihenacho cm th e ap­ & Phone 2780
£11,826: 8s: 9d. him that the n ew adm inis­ Phone 21540
of States. e n c e I have assumed
the Mid- the power of Commander- trators who are m em bers pointm ent. | Enugu. Port Harcourt.
of th e League w ill prove
in-Chief of the Armed
‘ purports Forces and Head of the
ree states Federal Military Govern-
Jailed 12 that no better
could have been made.
O ther m em bers of the
choice L eague so appointed are
Mr S. O. Mgbada; Mr P. K. YOUR WAY TO SSF 2 SUCCESS SYNDIC A
st-C'entral m ent for a short period
the pre- necessary to carry out ail
ion minus the necessary m easures
Years H e assured th e M ilitary Ndem; and Mr D. N jiribe-
Governor of th e League’s ako.
continued loyalty and sup­
Chidiegwu Iheukwumere port in his task o f ,'build­ In a statem ent yester­
BOX 261, ABA
Relax A w hile W ith SSF 2
MAGIC FIGURE PUZZLE NO. 19 §
and the now urgently required.” Choose any number 1 — 50, NO FRACTIC <*5
“At least Gowon has 24, wa yesterday at the day, th e N sukka Federa­
Enugu Chief Magistrate ing a neW nation and pro- ted U nion congratulated ONCE SO that
ivers Fro- been able to adm it public- tectin g its people and in­ M r F rancis O nyeke on his
1 Nigeria. ly that up to now there Court sentenced to 12 £2,000 To be Won each:
oja Povin- has been no Commander- years’ im prisonment w ith terests with a ll their appointm ent as A dm inis­ W inning Points, 24, Vertical — 48
of the 20 in-Chief because none was hard labour having been m ight and power. trator o f N sukka and also 23, 22, 21 & 20. Horizontal — 48
tern Nige- appointed follow ing Aburi; found guilty of stealing The League has per­ thanked Lt. Col, Odume­ 4 pts awarded to Diagonal — 48
the sum of £4, property you already 16 CLOSING DATE
ich cover and that there has been sonally congratulated its gw u Ojukw u for th e ap­
as. no Federal Military Go- of Sunday John. E xecutive P reside d , Mr. pointm ent. First entry is 2 /- 2nd June, 1967
the other vernm ent since July last additional is 1 /- Result 3rd June,
g minority year because no Head each 1967
ENTRY PAYMENT:
inang, De- existed,
obo, Uyo
e included
»d bast-
“This is exactly w hat
the Military Governor of
the East has been saying.
Biafra Collects £119,500
A total o f £119,526 The bulletin said that the period and £7,933 10s
A s a result of difficulties in present Postal Order*
system , entry payment should be (a) Payment in ADVANCE
by unit of 5 /- 1 0 /- or £1 Currency N otes ReceiDt is issued
It follow's then that ail and “ADVANCE PAYMENT ACCOUNT” opened and
w as co llected as ren ts on during the quarter under 6d was paid as rents on operated in your name. A ll you do is to stake, Quote your
so-called actions hitherto taken in S ta te L ands in th e Repub* review £117,928 was rea­ private governm ent quar­ A /C No. and despatch Form for correction. When the
comprising the name of a non-exist- lie o f B iafra b y th e M in is­ lised from Stamp D uties, ters- money is finishing, if you like, you can make a further
Degema. ent Federal M ilitary Go- try o f L ands and Survey I’remium, Survey, D eeds It added that a further advance payment. Your BALANCE is refunded with
Harcourt vernment have been d u rin g th e q u a rter whiefi and Temporary Occupa­ sum of £57,410 was
s transfer- fraudulent. Every right pleasure, any time you ORDER.
en d ed on March 31, this tion Licence fees- spent on developm ent of (b ) OPEN POSTAL ORDERS if available.
ie. Bonnv thinking N igerian w ill y ear. T h is w as con tain ed In It further stated that state lands and Town ATTEMPTS over 100 entries workable Mora entries more
Joiniv and condemn Gowon’s present a quarterly b u lletin of the Biafran M ilitary Planning, w hile £480: 8 /-, chances of winning ALWAYS ENCLOSE SELF-ADDRESS­
v Divisions action in subverting all the the M inistry for March Governm ent paid the w as paid out as refund ED STAMPED LONG ENVELOPE for your result Best of
led East- laws and constitution of 1967, ju st published hi sum of £64,118. 9/- on o f rents to Voluntary luck. GOWON BLOCKADES ARE NON-SENSE.
Nigeria as treasonable.” Enugu acquisition of land during Agencies.

Printed and Published by the Biafra Information Servi ce Corporation, Works Road. Enugu — E ditor, Gab Idi go, 2 Park Way, Enugu. 3 0 /5/67.
 s E ast- such ports as Caiaoar. ana— K a d u n a / L a g o s r e g i m e . ~v
Bonny, they knew nothing ble the ready absorption in ic u u c u
of the hinterland, until the The people of Eastern 1966 of two million dis­ weaving respectively.
i "Wan- startling discovery in 1830 Nigeria patient to the last placed Biafrans from other At the village level, life Biafra has three airport3 ,
At'riea" that the Niger entered the mandated the Military parts of Nigeria. is at its sim p lest Strict
none of them of interna­
.uggests Bight triggered off their
interest in the hinterland.
Governor with absolute
powers to declare Eastern
checks are maintained
against the forces that
Natural tional standard as a re­
Rortu- The discovery proved
Nigeria the Democratic
Republic of Biafra- Rich Cultural tend to undermine che­ Resources sult of the discriminatory
alfras. a bojth an invitation and a rished values and long- policy of the Federal Go­
gave to
in the
challenge to them to pene­ One year after the May Heritage established traditions. There are also the va­
rious traditional religious vernm ent of the former
trate the interior. 29, 1966 pogrom against Republic of Nigeria against
Easterners, the Governor Biafra has a tropical Social life in the towns and social festivals held
clim ate tempered down in follows th e pattern in all the year round what w as then known as
ink lt is beecroft implemented the mandate.
the Eastern parts by Oban other A frican tow ns and throughout th e country Eastern Nigeria.
ish from The independent Repub­
the Por- Appointed lic of Biafra lies east of
and Obudu Hills and in
the northern areas by the
is
degree
characterised by a
of detribalisation
which are characterised
by so much colour and The Republic of Biafra
ilt of an the River N iger and south Nsukka scarplands. and sophistication. pageantry. has a port of international
lerstand- On June 30, 1849, Bee­ of the Benue valley be­
croft was officially appoint­ Biafra has a rich cu l­ repute — Pori; Ilarcourt.
nous or tween 4° — 7° North and C atering establishm ents The Republic of Biafra
ia which ed Her Britannic Majesty's tural heritage that finds is blessed with almost Bonny Bar, the Republic’s
Consul for the Bights of o i° — 94° East and ranging from ultra mo­
a large covers an area of 29,484 deep expression in our unlimited natural and oil loading base was re­
Benin and Biafra with traditional religious arts d em hotels to non­ mineral resources. Biafra
j in tlit? square miles. cen tly dredged to enable
imeroons headquarters at Fernand'* and crafts, music and descript 'pubs’ are a fea­ produced 70 per cent of
Po. ture o f the country. Re­ it take ocean going vessels.
the capi* the export produce of
i of that He had powers to regu­
Realistic dances, literature
architecture. ..
and
creational f a c i l i ­ the now former Republic 1962 marked a turning
late trade between the t i e s abound even in the of Nigeria. point in the industrial life
ports of Benin, Brass, New
Solution This rich culture suf­ rem otest areas. of the Republic of
and Old Calabar, Bonny. fered a period o f de­ Cocoa and rubber were
Act The physical features cline as a result of the Tourism is a young recently introduced to Prior to this da
Bimbia and the Cam eioons industry in the young
and above all, to stop the comprise a Scarpland that activities and misguided diversify the economy of industries in
runs in a north-south enthusiasm of the early Republic o f Biafra, but the young Republic. w ere financed i o
n ot the slave trade along the ports direction from south of one that bristles ' w ith
.he coast- of Biafra. missionaries and their foreign capital. ***
the Benue to the valley of converts. prospects of success. The Biafra’s crude oil pro­
; formerly the Niger; an Eastern establishm ent of Hotel duction now stands at Government
11 Nigeria
Immediately after the
Berlin Conference in 1885, Highland made up of the Ironically e n o u g h , Presidential gave a boost 364,000 barrels a day or tion in industrial establish­
initi-eight- Oban and Obudu Hills; a other classes of Euro­ to tourism in the Repub­ 65 per cent of the total
as simply Britain declared the N iger m ents w as minimal be­
D elta area the Oil R ivers plain — the Cross River peans wrere at the same lic. amount of crude petro-
la Gulf, of Plain; a coastal Lowland: cause. of. 'tsL rj?;
;ish act. Protectorate. vxs1 sssrsec pewsvs sxsrs'a;sssssvjsv* sw ssy ssv ?sst2^ S’&.'sw ssk sss:
and a delta — the Niger w ith th e provision of the
‘bight’ has Palm oil trade in the Delta — of which Mary & % basic services such as com­
lenis while Bight of Biafra was in the
hands of private merchants.
Kingsley wrote: the “great
swamp region of the Bight
The Republic of Biafra is today one of the | munications, education,
tened form The same was true of trade of Biafra is the greatest in health and water supply
;se Biafara. along the N iger until 1886, the world, and • . . in its | best industrialised countries of Africa. — all of which, however,
in name the year the Royal N iger immensity and gloom it paved th e w ay for indus­
ably dated Company took it over. The has grandeur equal to t § trialisation.
*i following Company’s monopoly end­ that of the Himalayas.” This remarkable achievement derives from |
Paris, Bri-
le dominant
West Coast
he next 10U
ed in 1900.
In 1893, the British Go­
vernment extended the Oil
It has a wonderful sys­
tem of natural canalisa­
tion which connects all the
i the Government’s prudent i n d u s t r i a l policy f The Republic of Biafra
is today one of the best in­
dustrialised countries of
Africa.
»ult of her Rivers Protectorate to the
hinterland and christened
branches of the
Niger by means of deep
lower
iwhich allows for the attraction of foreign in- | This remarkable achive-
it the N iger Coast Protec­ creeks m ent derives from the
I exploration
ace H enry of
torate.
With a population of I vestment c a p i t a l , encourages the establish-1 governm ent’s prudent in­
In 1900, the Niger Coast over 14,000,000, and an dustrial policy which al­
not allow ed
ini Protectorate was proclaim­
ed the Protectorate of
average density of 480
persons per square mile,
1 ment of industries by p r i v a t e indigenous or | low s for the attraction of
foreign investm ent capital,
Southern Nigeria. In 1914. Biafra has one of the encourages the establish­
Ite r h is d e a t h
lin g o f P o r tu - the Northern and Southern highest population densi­ 1 foreign concerns, and allows for government | m ent of industries by pri
vate indigenous or foreign
D m to rin ra tes w e re a m a lg a - t i e s i n A f r i c a . She has ♦'our $ 53
a narticination in industrial projects. | concerns, and allows for
governm ent p«vt;- wition
^ in industrial projects.
 Tuesday, May 30, 1957 BIAF r a SUN

AND I
lu 1922, a Legislative
Council was established
for the whole country, al­
though the Governor-
General in Lagos conti­
Cor
nued to legislate for the
North by Proclamation. leum
In 1939, the Protecto­ former
rate of Southern Nigeria
was split into the Eastern
and W estern Provinces ’h er
with Enugu as the capital •cess
of the Eastern Provinces. for
In 1954, Eastern Nigeria ext
achieved full regional ican
status follow ing the re- Biafr
gionalisation of the coun­
try. In 1957, she attained voir of
internal self-government. in asso<
fields a
Independence for N ige­ This is
The Bight of Biafra has variously ria cam e in 19K0 and three
years later, she became a supply
been described as ‘an arm of the Gulf Republic. But right from estabJis
1954, she w as pl.vjued by Port H
of Guinea’, ‘an inlet of the Atlantic tribal and religious differ­
ences, and by the poll l i t a I
Ocean on the West Coast of Africa’, am bition of the North to De
rule the rest of the coun­
and ‘the innermost bay of the Gulf of try for ever, and their use
of force to achieve this
political end The
Guinea’. t deposits
In January 190(5, an
According to ‘T ra v els in West Africa” by Army coup which aimed birth tc
at curing N igeria’s ills ritory
T. J. Hutchinson published in 1858, it extends took place and was widely quality
acclaimed
from Cape Formosa (which an admiralty map Cross
Later in the year a The Ibos and Ijaws have tim e surreptitiously cart­ A net-work of Progress hence
placed in about 1858 between the Nun and Sen- series of brutal attacks on their kith and kin i living ing away our best works Hotels and other catering
innocent Eastern A lg e ­ in the Mid-West and West of art w hich now adorn oi tiie I
establishm ents provide
g ana o u t l e t s o f t h e N ig e r ) in lat. 4° 21 N ., long'. rians in other parts ot' the ern Regions of Nigeria the museums and art added incentive. bar Cei
o n t r y s h o c k e d t h e w o rld resp ectiv ely .
 sons other u i a n ...
eip Nigeria to make any impositiOn~Ui------------------
kind or nature upon vuu; mic ties:-------------------- --------- -------------------
* DETERM INED to dissolve all political and other (v»ii) w e shall p rotect the lives and property ot~a7T~
ties between you and the former Federal R epublic foreigners residing in Biafra; we shall extend the
if Nigeria: of o progressive people wno
hand o f friendship to those nations who respect d e c la r a r io n «i s
* PR EPA RED to enter into such association, treatv our sovereignty, and shall repel any interference tending with the forces of reaction and
or alliance with any sovereign state w ithin the in our internal affairs; As we strik
former Federal R epublic of Nigeria and elsew here Cxi) we shall faithfully adhere to th e charter of th e despotic feudalism . T h at man is
on such terms ana conditions as best to subsei-ve must be consci
O rganisation o f A frican Unity and of the United L ieutenant C olonel Chukwuemeka
your common good: N ations Organisation. duties and ot
* AFFIRM ING vour trust and confidence in ME: (x) it is our intention to rem ain a member of th e Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Head of the new tim e th e pec
* H AVING mandated M E to proclaim on your b e­ Comm onwealth of N ations in our right as a
half, and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a sovereign, independent nation. State of the Republic of Biafra. realising whal
sovereign independent Republic, Long live th e R EPU BLIC O F BIAFRA* th ese years -
Now therefore I, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka And m ay God protect A L L who live in H ERD W hile rejoicing a t our new lease of erotic societ
life, we should not forget both the con­ man will be
ditions th a t com pelled and inspired the
We are happy com ing into being o f the Republic of W e have
Biafra and th e com pelling im plications nationhood,
of this glorious phenom ena in our h is­
to announcethat tory a s a people. This th e people of
of deadweic
elem en ts,
Biafra must do in order to m ake a suc­
as from today, cess o f th e venture, cherish freedom, which ca lls
and defend their independence and forebearan
the €Nigerian sovereignty.

2 a POLITICAL MAP Of
REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA
Outlook9 has
W e in th e new Republic as well
progressives in th e
(
foreign countrii <
w est o f Biafra and in th e foreign, en
been re~christe~ my country north o f th e new State •
Biafra, are aware o f the tragic events
sin ce May 1966. T he mad dogs of
ned €Biafra Sun9 feudalism and reaction were unleashed.
30,000 of our people murdered and two
- EDITOR m illions more had to fle e th e North.
i an » Up till now the perpetrators of this un- LONG I

tournam ent la st Saturt

throughout the coun­ gates to th e Ad Hoc Con­ M ilitary Leaders and th e ESSEN TIA L CENTRAL vernm ent” to im plem ent night w hen th e y w o n
try. stitutional Conference, and reconvening of th e A d G O VERNM ENTS FUNC­ these and other A gree­ return first round me
(b) The creation of states our confidence in them , Hoc C onstitutional C on­ TIO N S X PROGRAM M E m ents notw ithstan din g th e in Chicago b y on e goa
must take place sim ul­ and having noted w ith ference under conditions W ILL EN SU R E FAIR fact that they w ere freely
regret the indefinite ad­ and voluntarily, entered nil.
taneously th*o»ghout of adequate security satis­ P L A Y AND JUSTICE In the first le g In Ha
the country. journm ent of the m eeting factory to Y our E x cel­ FOR ALL .SECTIONS OF into; _ , ton, tha tw o coun
(c) The creation of any of the Ad Hoc Constitu­ T H E CO U N TR Y X "Wher*M the Federa­ played a goalless d
new state must be tional Conference by Lt. lency. tion of Nigeria ha* for­
(9) T o ensure that only TH E REF OR E I Last Saturday night**
based upon the consent Colonel Yakubu Gowon men and w om en of integri­ EARNESTLY APPEAL TO feited any claim to our
of the people of th e for alleged inability to allegiance by th ese acts I was scored by right
ty and m erit are appointed YOU TO CO-OPERATE TO ■ Rubba D aniels.
a r e a wHifeh is to b e tn- agree upon the ven u e of and b y th e economic,
i n liv e p r o p o s e d th e m e e t in g as w e ll as to public offices in the R e­ ARREST FURHER DRIFT political and diplomatic Bermuda w ill p lay
gion and that a code of fNTO • t'TON’ crnala in th e n e x t s
to h im . becau se
c o n d u c t for public officers X ON THE P ACTC 0,7 THE sanctions im posed against
f ''r Rastern FOREGO^G REPRCSEN- ua by the so-called Fede* - (AFPX
 GOWON HATES YOU!

„Bim
T%OOUt

* ' it*;

m rm
Vf:';’: * ''

He loves nobody
Gouon sp a n s nobody -

He destroys edl

CM/SW (A b ove left)

‘G o w o n points the w a y ’ : O goja, a
‘m in ority’ area o f Biafra, liberated by
Federal N igerian troops during the first

'eb^H/ow; m onth o f the war.

(A b ove right)
Biafran poster depicting gonocidal fate o f
the Ibos i f they surrendered to —or were
overrun b y — the Federal troops.

C—N
A popular poster in Federal N igeria during
the war: O ju k w u ’s head under the boot
o f unity.

304
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 BIAFRA 5 IN K IN G . OCTOBER I960

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 BIAFRA ON THE OFFENSIVE AGAIN
JUNE 1969

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100%
90
801—
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60
50
40
30
20
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communication;
TV.

Fig. 1. The most consistently used media for information during the entire dura­
tion of the Nigerian Civil War among the Urban Opinion Leaders (N —30)

100 %
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

Newspaper: Radio; interpersonal TV.

com m unication:

Fig. II. The most consistently used media for inform ation during the entire d u ra­
tion of the Nigerian Civil W ar am ong the Rural O pinion Leaders (N —20).
“\ j M