Professional Documents
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Competition Law in India
Competition Law in India
Research
Competition Law
in India
December 2020
December 2020
About NDA
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Acknowledgements
Pratibha Jain
[email protected]
Simone Reis
[email protected]
Payel Chatterjee
[email protected]
Vinay Shukla
[email protected]
Prashant Prakhar
[email protected]
Krithika Ramesh
[email protected]
Atikant Kaur
[email protected]
Mohak Kapoor
[email protected]
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION 01
2. ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS 02
3. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE 06
I. Introduction 10
II. CCI Inquiry Process 10
III. Before DG Investigation 10
IV. DG Investigation 10
V. Post DG Investigation 11
VI. Special Investigative Tools 13
VII. Leniency 13
VIII. Leniency available for cartels only 13
VIII. Leniency process before the CCI 13
IX. Dawn raids 14
X. Applicable cases 14
XI. Appeal process 14
XII. Appealable orders 14
XIII. Procedure before the NCLAT 15
XIV. Supreme Court 15
XV. Writ jurisdiction 15
I. Introduction 21
II. High scrutiny sectors 21
III. General take-aways for high scrutiny sectors 21
IV. High level risk mitigation strategies for market leaders 23
V. Determining compliance requirement 23
VI. Arrangements with distributors and dealers 23
VII. Dual role of regulator and participant 24
VIII. High level risk mitigation strategies for dealing with rivals 24
IX. Direct contact with competitors 25
X. Indirect contact with competitors 25
XI. Observations and recommendations 25
ANNEXURE A 26
ANNEXURE B-1 38
ANNEXURE B-2 42
Orders Passed under Section 26 (2) of the Act by the Commission Dismissing the Case 42
ANNEXURE B-3 58
ANNEXURE B-4 61
1. Introduction
A vibrant and effective competition law framework in view of the economic development of the country, for
is essential for the growth of any economy. It the establishment of a Commission to prevent practices
helps in regulating a fair market, devoid of any having adverse effect on competition, to promote and
anti-competitive practices that cause harm to the sustain competition in markets, to protect the interests of
customers as well as the businesses. Competition law consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by
is an essential tool to maintain balance in the markets other participants in markets, in India...’
by ensuring that a few prominent players do not single
The Act provides for prohibitions and regulates (A)
handedly run the show, rather the market operates in
anticompetitive agreements (u/s 3 of the Act) (B)
a manner wherein the practices do not lead to barriers
abuse of dominant position (u/s 4 of the Act) (C)
of entry for small businesses or lead to unfair burden
combinations (u/s 5 & 6 of the Act). The Act established
being put on businesses compelling them to indulge
the Competition Commission of India (“CCI” /
in unfair practices, to rise against the competition.
“Commission”) and erstwhile Competition Appellate
In India, the competition law framework, has Tribunal (“COMPAT”) (which has now been merged
emerged from being governed by the erstwhile with the National Companies Law Appellate Tribunal
Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practice Act, (“NCLAT” both referred to together as “Tribunal”),
1969 (“MRTP”) to the current Competition Act, to be the primary authorities vested with the
2002 (the “Act”). The MRTP Act, was framed on the responsibility and powers to implement the provisions
basis of socialistic ideas and philosophies, which is of the Act, to curb restrictive trade practices and ensure
an essential element of the Directive Principles of consumer welfare.
State Policy (“DSP”). The primary object of MRTP
This report examines the development of the
was to curb and restrict formation of monopolies
competition law framework in India. The report is
in the market. It was considered that any such
divided into different chapters, each highlighting
concentration of power in a free market in the
the issues and the legal framework under different
hands of a few, will hamper the economic growth
aspects of competition law. The developments
and interests of the consumers and thus, must be
that have been pronounced and effectuated by the
restricted. However, MRTP did not envisage effective
commission and the tribunal, in regulating the
measures against the public sector companies and
market practices have been examined for the purpose
was unfairly more restrictive to the private sector.
of presenting an inclusive overview of the practice
Further, terms such as collusion, abuse of dominance,
in India. This report is divided into chapters (I) Anti-
price fixing and bid rigging, were not defined, which
Competitive Agreements, under Section 3 of the Act,
lead to the MRTP becoming ineffective to tackle
and examines provisions restricting such practices
the evolving challenges in the Indian market post
along with the latest developments by the Courts; (II)
reforms in 1991.
Abuse of Dominance, under Section 4 of the Act, and
Therefore, the Competition Act, 2002 (“Act”) was examines factors considered to establish dominance
introduced to cover the inadequacies of MRTP and and misuse of such power to create anti-competitive
to serve as an effective legislation to promote fair environment in the market; (III) Procedure for
trade practices in the Indian market. The objective investigation under the Act; (IV) Merger Control (V)
of the Act can be further gathered from its preamble Risk Mitigation.
which states as follows ‘An act to provide, keeping
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2. Anti-Competitive Agreements
Section 3 of the Act states that any agreement which the former is aimed at horizontal agreement2 and
causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse later at vertical agreements.3 Horizontal agreements
effect on competition (“AAEC”) in India is deemed, relating to activities referred to under Section 3 (3) of
anti-competitive. Section 3 (1) of the Competition Act the Act are presumed to have an AAEC within India.
prohibits any agreement with respect to “production, The Supreme Court of India in Sodhi Transport Co. v.
supply, distribution, storage, and acquisition or control State of U.P.4 has interpreted ‘shall be presumed’ as a
of goods or services which causes or is likely to cause presumption and not evidence itself, but merely indicative
an appreciable adverse effect on competition within on whom burden of proof lies.
India”. Although the Act does not define AAEC and
Section 3(3) of the Act provides that agreements or a
nor is there any thumb rule to determine when
‘practice carried’ on by enterprises or persons (including
an agreement causes or is likely to cause AAEC,
cartels) engaged in trade of identical or similar products
Section 19 (3) of the Act specifies certain factors for
are presumed to have AAEC in India if they: -
determining AAEC under Section 3:
i. creation of barriers to new entrants in the market; § Directly or indirectly fix purchase or sale prices;
ii. driving existing competitors out of the market; § Limit or control production, supply, markets,
technical development, investments or provision
iii. foreclosure of competition by hindering entry of services;
into the market;
§ Result in sharing markets or sources of production
iv. accrual of benefits to consumers; or provision of services;
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submitted to HPCL by many of the bidders on the same efficiency in terms of production, supply, distribution,
day. The fact that there was common understanding storage, acquisition or control of goods or services.
between the parties was further supported by the fact Thus, there has to be a direct nexus between cost/
that the bids submitted had been uploaded by common quality efficiencies and benefits to the consumers
agents from the same IP address and the parties were must at least compensate consumers for any actual or
regularly in contact through emails and meetings or likely negative impact caused by the agreement.
common/related management. The parties were also
Section 3(4) of the Act provides that any agreement
unable to satisfy the CCI with respect to the reasons
among enterprises or persons at different stages or
provided by them for withdrawal and the reasons
levels of the production chain in different markets, in
provided were vague and generic such as unavoidable
respect of production, supply, distribution, storage,
circumstances. The CCI established the existence
sale or price of, or trade in goods or provision
of cartels by way of conduct of two meetings and
of services, including (a) tie-in arrangement; (b)
telephonic conversation, wherein price revision along
exclusive supply agreement; (c) exclusive distribution
with minimum percentage of price increase to be
agreement; (d) refusal to deal; (e) resale price
quoted were discussed. The CCI also held that once an
maintenance, shall be an agreement in contravention
agreement of the types specified under Section 3 (3) of
of Section 3(1) if such agreement causes or is likely
the Act is established, the same is presumed to have an
to cause AAEC in India. As can be seen, these
AAEC within India.6
agreements are not deemed anti-competitive. Only
In Nagrik Chetna Manch v Fortified Securities Solutions & if they cause or are likely to cause an AAEC in India
Ors7, the CCI rejected the contention that the parties will these agreements be in violation of section 3(1)
that indulged in bid rigging are not competitors as they of the Act. Vertical agreements relating to activities
are engaged in different trades and are, therefore, not referred under Section 3(4) of the Act on the other
covered by the provision of Section 3(3) of the Act and hand have to be analyzed in accordance with the rule
more specifically excluded by the language ‘identical of reason9 analysis under the Act. In essence, these
or similar trade of goods or provision of services.’ CCI held arrangements are anti-competitive only if they cause
that if the parties were allowed to escape the grasp of or are likely to cause an AAEC in India.
the Act by considering them as not competitors on
For instance, the agreements between manufacturers/
the pretext that they are actually engaged in varied
distributors and e-commerce players can be looked
businesses, it may defeat the very purpose of the
into under Section 3 (4) read with Section 3(1) of the
provisions of Section 3(3) (d) of the Act. In the same
Act as the online platforms may also have a role to
case, the CCI found all six bidders of a tender guilty
play in influencing prices of products listed on their
of bid rigging and in accordance with Competition
websites.10 Interestingly, the CCI in Meru Travel
Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2009
Solutions Pvt. Ltd. V Ani Technologies and Uber India
(‘Leniency Regulations’) permitted leniency for four
and Ors11, analyzing the scope of term ‘agreement’,
of the bidders, with highest percentage of reduction
noted that no written or oral agreement has been
of penalty being 50%. We have also come across other
placed on record and incentives given by Ola and
cases where CCI has allowed 100% leniency in the
Uber to their drivers and prospective drivers cannot
matter of cartelization involving price co-ordination in
be covered under the definition of agreement. It
the entire distribution chain, limiting and controlling of
further stated that such incentive models do not
production and supply as well as allocation of markets.8
constitute anti-competitive agreements.
The only exception to this per-se rule is in the nature
of joint venture arrangements which increase 9. Rule of reason approach is adopted by the adjudicating
authorities, to determine the pro-competitive features arising
out of a restrictive business practice, against the anti-competitive
features caused by such practice. By way of such comparison, the
6. Case No 5 of 2017, decided on 5.6.2020 adjudicating authority determines whether to allow the practice
7. Case No. 5 of 2015 decided on 1.5.2018 or prohibit it.
8. Suo Moto Case In Re: Cartelisation in respect of zinc carbon dry 10. Case No 61 of 2014, decided on 15.1.2019
cell batteries market in India 11. Case 25-28 of 2017, decided on 20.6.2018
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In M/s Jasper lnfotech Private Limited (Snapdeal) v.M/s Act when Commission comes to the conclusion that
Kaff Appliances (India) Pvt. Ltd.,12 the CCI held that there is a contravention of Section 3 of the Act.
display of products at prices less than that determined
by the dealers/distributors, hinders their ability to
compete and is thus a violation of Section 3(4)(e)
I. Examination at the stage
read with 3(1) of the Act. Similarly, imposition of of Section 26 (1)
restrictions on the dealers to deal with competing
brands in the market and thereby restricting the
According to Section 26 (1) of the Act “…if the
inter-brand competition too is a breach of Section 3(4)
Commission is of the opinion that there exists a prima
with section 3(1) of the Act.13 However, as decided
facie case….”, the DG shall be directed to investigate
in XYZ vs. M/s Penna Cements, M/s India Cements
the matter. Although ‘prima facie’ has not been
M/s Bharathi Cements M/s Dalmia (Bharat) Cements
defined, it is a settled principle of law16 that a prima
etc.14 the mere allegation of increasing the prices
facie analysis is restricted to an examination of
of a product would not make the transaction anti-
material on record without conducting a detailed
competitive.
analysis of material, examination of evidence or
detailed examination of merits of the contentions.
The Act does recognize that protectionist measures
with respect to rights granted under intellectual
As a quasi-judicial body, the Commission is bound
property laws need to be taken by the holder
by certain constitutional principles and is bound to
thereof in the course of activities and entering into
disclose reasons for its rulings17 and consequently,
agreements and arrangements. Consequently, the
the opinion expressed by the Commission under
Act specifically states that the contours of anti-
Section 26 (1) of the Act, should not take into account
competitive restraints will not apply with respect
merits of the contentions, should be based on a
to those horizontal and vertical agreements which
preliminary review of material on record and finally,
impose reasonable conditions to protect or restrain
the order passed, should have reasons.
infringement of, the rights granted under intellectual
property laws. For instance, in the case of Shri Ashok For instance, such an analysis was carried out by the
Kumar Sharma v. Agni Devices Pvt. Ltd,15 it was Commission in M/s. Magnus Graphics v. M/s. Nilpeter
held that a mere restriction on the use of trademark India Pvt. Ltd.18, where, based on a preliminary review
would not be in violation of Sections 3 or 4 of the of the provisions of the agreement and a preliminary
Competition Act, 2002. examination of the effect of such clauses in terms
of Section 3 of the Act, the Commission concluded
The Commission examines agreements and its
a prima facie case and directed further investigation.
effects in two stages. First, when an order is passed
Similarly, in M/s. Financial Software and System
under Section 26 (1) of the Act directing Directorate
Private Limited v. M/s. ACI Worldwide Solutions Private
General for Competition (“DG”) to conduct further
Limited &Ors.19, based on a preliminary review of
investigation and a prima facie view is taken about
the clauses of the relevant agreement and its impact
the agreement and its possible effects. Second, when
in terms of Section 3 of the Act, the Commission
an order is ultimately passed after DG submits its
directed the DG to investigate further.
report and comments are taken from all parties. The
Commission may pass an order under Section 26 (6)
of the Act closing the case depending on facts and
evidence or pass an order under Section 27 of the
16. Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Limited & Anr. 2005 7
SCC 234 and Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai
12. Case No. 61 of 2014 decided on 29.12.2014 Patel & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 726.
13. Case No. 81 of 2014, St. Antony’s Cars Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Hyundai Motor 17. Seimens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Limited v. Union of
India Ltd.decided on 20.11.2014. India & Anr. (1976) 2 SCC 981.
14. Ref. Case No. 7 of 2014 decided on 19.11.2014 18. Case No. 65 of 2013, Order dated 12.12.2013.
15. Case No. 12 of 2015 decided on 07.05.2015. 19. Case No. 52 of 2013, Order dated 4.9.2013.
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II. Examination at the Fox Star Studios, M/s NBC Universal Media Distribution
Services Pvt. Ltd. etc.21 (“K Sera Sera Case”) it was
stage of passing an held that if no prima facie case could be established
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3. Abuse of Dominance
Section 4 of the Act is the operative provision of the market having due regard to all or any of the
Act dealing with the abuse of dominant position. following factors30:
This provision is broadly fashioned on the European
i. regulatory trade barriers;
Union prohibition on abuse of dominance contained
in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
ii. local specification requirements;
European Union (TEFU).
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that could have been achieved through superior cost of entry, marketing entry barriers, technical
economic performance, innovation or pure accident entry barriers, economies of scale, high cost of
but only its abuse.32 substitutable goods or service for consumers;
Therefore, the primary concern in such cases, is not ix. countervailing buying power;
regarding the popularity or market capitalization of
x. market structure and size of market;
the enterprise, rather the concern is limited to the
abuse, if any. The CCI has upheld the same position,
xi. social obligations and social costs;
while analyzing such issues. In the case of Harshita
Chawla v. WhatsApp and Facebook Inc33., CCI examined xii. relative advantage, by way of the contribution to
complaints made against the two companies, for the economic development, by the enter¬prise
leveraging their dominance in the instant messaging enjoying a dominant position having or
application market. However, the CCI rejected the likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on
contentions raised for any violations under section competition;
4(2)(d) of the Act and held that mere existence of an
xiii. any other factor which the Commission may con-
application does not ensure usage. The CCI noted that,
sider relevant for the inquiry.
the fact that Whatsapp is a major player in the relevant
market cannot be taken as abuse of dominance,
Dominance per se is not bad. It is only when there is
without any coercive actions. The fact that full
an abuse of the dominant position that Section 4 of
discretion lied in the hands of the consumer, in terms
the Act is invoked.35 Thus, once the dominance of an
of usage, mere provision of service by a popular entity,
enterprise in the relevant market is determined the
cannot be deemed as abuse of its dominance.
CCI has to establish the abuse of its dominance by an
enterprise. Section 4 (2) sets out a list of activities that
The Act sets out following factors which the CCI
shall be deemed abuse of dominant position.
takes into account to establish the dominant position
of an enterprise34:
i. anti-competitive practices of imposing unfair or
discriminatory trading conditions or prices or
i. market share of the enterprise;
predatory prices,
ii. size and resources of the enterprise;
ii. limiting the supply of goods or services, or a
iii. size and importance of the competitors; market or technical or scientific development,
denying market access,
iv. economic power of the enterprise including
commercial advantages over competitors; iii. imposing supplementary obligations having no
connection with the subject of the contract, or
v. vertical integration of the enterprises or sale or
service network of such enterprises; iv. using dominance in one market to enter into or
protect another relevant market.
vi. dependence of consumers on the enterprise;
The list of abuses provided in the Act is meant to be
vii. monopoly or dominant position whether
exhaustive, and not merely illustra¬tive. This broadly
acquired as a result of any statute or by virtue of
follows the categories of abuse identified under
being a Government company or a public sector
Article 102 of TEFU. The Act also exempts certain
undertaking or otherwise;
unfair or discriminatory conditions in purchase
or sale or predatory pricing of goods or service
viii. entry barriers including barriers such as
from being considered an abuse when such trading
regulatory barriers, financial risk, high capital
conditions are adopted to meet competition.
32. Section 19 (7) of the Act.
33. Case 15 of 2020, Harshita Chawla v. Whatsapp Inc. & Facebook
Inc.,, decided on 18.08.2020 35. Case No. 07 of 2015,Shri Brajesh Asthana, Proprietor M/s Arpita
34. Section 19 (4) of the Act. Engineering vs. Uflex Limited decided on 23.04.2015.
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II. Examination at the Similarly, in the case of Google Inc.42, the Commission
relied on the DG Report submitted after calling for
stage of Section 26 (2) an investigation as per section 26(1); wherein it was
41. Case No.14 of 2015, Ravinder Pal Singh vs. BPTP Limited & Others,
decided on 24.04.2015 42. Case 07 & 30 of 2012, decided on 08.02.2018.
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II. CCI Inquiry Process our section dealing with appeals below. The CCI also
has the power to pass a temporary injunction while the
DG investigation is pending.48
This section lays down the basic structure of the
inquiry before the CCI. The section attempts to
provide a pithy substance of the CCI process before
IV. DG Investigation
the DG investigation, during and after the DG
investigation.
a. Once an investigation order is passed, the
complaint and any other filings made by
III. Before DG Investigation the parties are sent to the DG case team
assigned on the matter. The DG case team
prepares an investigation report containing
Any person can file a complaint before CCI.43 The CCI
its recommendation on contravention by the
may also suo moto inquire into matters on its own.44
opposite party.
Once a complaint is filed, the CCI considers whether
to send the matter to the DG for investigation. At this
b. The DG’s mandate is prescribed by the CCI’s
stage, the complaint is typically confidential, and
investigation order and investigation on matters
the Commissioners seek recommendations from the
falling beyond the CCI investigation order are
antitrust case team assigned to the matter. Inputs from
considered ultra vires.49 Typically, the CCI gives
the economics division are also sought in complex cases
the DG 60 days to complete the investigation. It
involving novel markets, such as the hi-tech sector.
is ordinary practice for the DG to seek additional
time. Over the past few years, we have witnessed
The CCI may opt to call the complainant or the
that investigation reports in simple cases take
opposite party for a preliminary conference before
around two years to complete.
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d. While it is the DG’s discretion to accede to i. Post the presentation, the CCI considers
an extension request, the office typically the Report and decides whether further
grants a series of short extensions in case the investigation is needed on any aspects. If the
information collection is expected to be onerous. CCI deems the DG Report to be complete, it
Subject to fulfilling the filing formalities circulates a non-confidential version (i.e., with
prescribed under the Act, the parties can confidential information redacted) of the DG
request the DG to maintain confidentiality over Report to the informant and opposite parties.
portions of the information they submit.
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50. CCI booklet on leniency available here: https://www.cci.gov.in/ 53. CCI Annual Report 2018-2019 available here: https://
sites/default/files/advocacy_booklet_document/Leniency.pdf www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/annual%20reports/
ENGANNUALREPORTCCI.pdf
51. CCI booklet on leniency available here: https://www.cci.gov.in/
sites/default/files/advocacy_booklet_document/Leniency.pdf 54. Regulation 3 of the Leniency Regulations.
52. CCI Annual Report 2018-2019 available here: https://www.cci.gov.in/ 55. Regulation 6 of the Leniency Regulations.
sites/default/files/annual%20reports/ENGANNUALREPORTCCI.pdf 56. Regulation 6 of the Leniency Regulations.
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IX. Dawn raids to CCI orders listed under Section 53A of the Act lie
before the NCLAT.
Thus far the DG has conducted dawn raids in both In cases where there is more than one DG Report
abuse of dominance and cartel cases – JCB abuse (i.e., one recommending contravention and other
of dominance investigation, beer and dry cells exonerating the parties), the appellate tribunal has
battery cartel cases.59 Interestingly, the DG has also read into Section 53A of the Act to categorize the CCI
conducted a dawn raid in the dry cells’ battery cartel order either under Section 27 or 26(6) (depending on
case just three days after the leniency application was whether the CCI agreed with the DG’s contravention or
filed with the CCI.60 non-contravention recommendation) of the Act.63 The
Competition Law Amendment Bill, 2020 includes these
types of order under the revised Section 53A of the Act.
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XIII. Procedure before the on record, the NCLAT allots a date for final hearings.
Following from the final hearing, the NCLAT posts
NCLAT the date for announcing the judgment on the matter
on its cause list. The certified copy of the order is
An aggrieved party has 60 days from the date of usually available within three business days of the
the receipt of the certified copy of the CCI order to judgment being announced in open court.
challenge it before the NCLAT. In case the CCI order
imposes a structural or behavioral remedy on the
party that requires compliance before the limitation
XIV. Supreme Court
period, the parties can either file an application before
As reflected in the procedural chart, the orders of
the CCI requesting an extension of time or obtain a
the NCLAT can be appealed to the SC within 60
stay order from the NCLAT.
days of communication of the NCLAT order.64 On
To obtain a stay order, the appeal along with the stay demonstration of sufficient cause, the SC can toll the
application must be filed with the NCLAT. Typically, limitation period of 60 days. Similar to the NCLAT,
a matter is listed for admission within three working the SC can grant interim relief. Once service and
days of filing the appeal. If there are defects in the pleadings are completed, the matter is posted for final
appeal, the NCLAT registry usually allows the party hearing. Proceedings before the SC are open to the
to cure defects within seven business days of receiving press and public. Confidential filings can be made
the notice listing the defects in the appeal. after obtaining a protective order from the court.
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xi. Acquisition of shares, control, voting rights enterprises operating in the oil and gas sectors
or assets by a purchaser approved by the CCI looking to combine with their partially or wholly
pursuant to and in accordance with its order owned subsidiaries70, were also exempted from
under section 31 of the Competition Act. the application of such regulation for a period of 5
years (from August 10, 2017), 10 years (from August
Note that ‘control’ could be de facto, de jure and material
30, 2017), and 5 years (from November 27, 2017)
influence. The Act defines it to include controlling the
respectively.
affairs or management by (i) one or more enterprises,
either jointly or singly, over another enterprise or
group; or (ii) one or more groups, either jointly or VII. Process considerations
singly, over another group or enterprise.66 Based on past
precedent, CCI has considered affirmative rights such as The section below provides an overview of the
right to approve business plan, commencement of new substantive and procedural formalities that parties
business line, closing of existing business line, approval need to account for prior to making a CCI notification.
of budget and appointment of key managerial persons
as being exemplary of control conferring rights.67 The
CCI in the past has also considered negative control
VIII. Phase I and Phase II
(by virtue of ability to block special resolutions Inquiries
of a company) or operational control (by virtue of
commercial cooperation agreements with or without
The CCI must issue a prima facie opinion on whether
involving equity) as control conferring.
the combination causes AAEC in the relevant market
in India within 30 working days from the date the
VI. Other MCA exemptions the CCI believes that the combination may cause
AAEC in India, it issues a notice under Section 29 of
the Competition Act asking the parties why a phase
Additionally, (i) regional rural banks68, (ii)
II inquiry shouldn’t commence in relation to the
nationalized banks69, and (iii) central public sector
combination. The parties may address CCI’s concerns
66. Explanation to Section 5 of the Competition Act. through structural or behavioural remedies. If the CCI
67. Century Tokyo/Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd C-2012/09/78 is not satisfied with the parties’ response or remedies,
available here: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/
faq/C-2012-09-78.pdf; Bandhan Bank/Caladium Investment it may initiate a phase II review.
C-2015/05/278 available here: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/de-
fault/files/C-2015-05-278.pdf.
68. http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/notification/
Notificiation%20-%2010.08.2017.pdf
69. http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/notification/Notifica- 70. https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/notification/Notifica-
tion%2030.08.2017.pdf tion-22.112017.pdf
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Once phase II is initiated, the CCI may ask the DG To avail of the benefit of the Green Channel route, the
to investigate and submit a report in respect of the qualifying criteria is that the parties to the combination,
combination. Parties subjected to phase II inquiries their group entities and each of their, direct or indirect
are also obligated to publish the Form IV. The CCI investee entities (even an investment of a single share
also publishes the Form IV on its website and may in a company shall make such company an investee
invite public objections to the combination. The entity) should: (i) not produce/provide similar or
CCI may seek the parties’ comments on the public identical or substitutable product or service or; (ii) not
comments. Following from this, the CCI can (i) engage in any activity relating to production, supply,
unconditionally approve the combination, (ii) distribution, storage, sale and service or trade in
conditionally approve the combination or (iii) product or service which are at different stage or level
disallow the combination. of production chain or; (iii) not engage in any activity
relating to production, supply distribution, storage, sale
and service or trade in product or service which are
IX. Form I v. Form II complementary to each other.
Form I is the shorter one of the two CCI statutory This analysis will also have to be undertaken
notice prescribed for combinations. Under Form I, while considering all plausible alternative market
parties are required to share corporate information definitions. The acquirer would also be required
and market facing information including overlaps and to make a positive declaration confirming that the
market size and shares of the parties. In addition to combination falls under the Green Channel (meaning
the corporate and market facing information, Form II there are no overlaps at any level as discussed above).
requires parties to disclose additional information like If it is found that either such declaration or any other
estimates of concentration levels, regulatory overview statement made by it in the Form I is found to be
of the businesses conducted by the parties, imports incorrect then the Form I and deemed approval of the
and exports etc. The parties to a combination may opt Commission shall both be void ab initio. The parties
to file the notification in Form II if combined shares of will have an opportunity to be heard though before
the parties exceed 15% (horizontally) or 25% (vertical the commission renders the approval void ab initio.
markets). In case the overlaps between the parties fall
below 15% (horizontally) or 25% (vertical markets),
they may file a notification in Form I.
XI. Pre-filing Consultation
The CCI offers informal and verbal pre-filing
X. Green Channel consultation to parties.71 The consultations are
designed to help parties identify the type of form
In furtherance of the Government of India’s ease and necessary information required to complete
of doing business initiatives, the CCI introduced a valid notification. The process provides efficient
certain important amendments to its Combination merger review. It is also an early channel to identify
Regulations on August 13, 2019 (‘2019 Amendment competition concerns with the case team and
Regulations’) with effect from August 15, 2019. preempting their concerns in the follow-on notice.
The 2019 Amendment Regulations provide for a
Green Channel route whereby parties that meet
the criteria described below need not wait for the
XII. Post CCI Notification
approval of the Commission to consummate a
The section below provides a high-level overview of
notifiable transaction. Once the acknowledgment
the CCI merger filing time frame.
of a Form I filed under this Green Channel route
has been received by the parties, the transaction
will be deemed approved and parties will be able to
consummate the transaction immediately. 71. CCI’s pre-filing consultation guidelines are available here: https://
www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/cci_pdf/PFCguidancenote.pdf
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72. https://www.livemint.com/Companies/
lDJIVG5Tr5WgBgw2fG2gWN/Compat-dismisses-Jitendra-
Bhargava-plea-against-JetEtihad-d.html
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Companies are expected to be responsible to ensure during dawn raids, who would be the point of contact,
that the most basic compliance programs cover the what to speak and how much to speak could help
following areas78: develop an effective response strategy.
a. An active risk management process for The response strategy should lay down the names of
systematic review of existing agreements and the company lawyer and external competition lawyer
market practices to ensure that the company is who should be contacted in case of a dawn raid.
compliant with the provisions of the Act; Employees should be categorically told to cooperate
with the government officials and instructed not to
b. Periodic compliance training for employees and
destroy any documents. Employees should also be
senior management;
instructed to not leak the news of the dawn raid to
persons other than the ones mentioned in the contact
c. Regularly review and update the competition
list. In this respect, an internal training could be
compliance efforts;
conducted for employees to cover these areas.
d. Promote a culture of competition compliance
within the company;
C. Litigation Hold Policy
e. Ensure that the employees receive the message
In investigations, the CCI assigns great weight to
of competition compliance from senior
internal documentation within the company. In our
management.
experience, an objectively determined litigation hold
policy would go a long way in effectively defending
In addition to the above, it may be good to have
any potential claims before the CCI though the
special training sessions for employees on a
practice has not evolved in India. Absence of a written
regular basis that are part of the commerce team or
record unequivocally stating the reasons for non-
responsible for conducting the company’s business in
participation in a yearly tender by a company has
the ordinary course.
been inferred adversely to presume an agreement not
to participate in the tender.80 During an investigation,
B. Dawn Raid the CCI can ask for dated documents (sometimes
documents that are decades old). However, an
The CCI and the DG office can get a warrant to conduct
objectively determined hold policy would be helpful
a raid the company. The DG has exercised this option
to explain to the CCI that dated documents are not
in abuse of dominance as well as cartel cases. For
retained as a matter of company policy. At the same
instance, the DG has conducted dawn raids in an abuse
time, in high scrutiny sectors, the hold policy would
of dominance investigation involving a real estate
allow the company to preserve documents relevant to
company, beer manufacturers accused of a cartel and
any potential investigation. Depending on the needs
batteries manufacturers alleged to be in a cartel.79
of the company, the competition law counsel would
Typically, the DG office comes to the local office of be able to advice on whether to implement a silent
the company under investigation unannounced. The hold or non-silent hold and duration of the same.
dawn raid may last a day or several days, during which
the officials from the DG office conduct interviews
D. Press strategy
and seize evidence. Conducting mock dawn raids with
employees or organizing a session on how to behave Press strategy encompasses all the representations
made on behalf of the company publicly. In the
78. CCI compliance manual available at: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/ past the CCI has treated statements describing a
default/files/manual_compliance/manual_booklet.pdf
79. Boost to Dawn Raids in India – Supreme Court Rules Power
to Search Includes Seizure as well - Kluwer Competition Law
Blog, , http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw. 80. Biomed v. GlaxoSmitheKline & Another Case No. 26 of
com/2019/02/27/boost-to-dawn-raids-in-india-supreme-court- 2013 available here: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/
rules-power-to-search-includes-seizure-as-well/ (last visited Sep files/262013_0.pdf Note that this decision was ultimately set
16, 2020). aside by the COMPAT and SC.
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83. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) available at:
81. DGCOM Buyers & Owners Association, Chennai v. DLF Limited https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/2/
Case No, 29 of 2012, available at: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/ 84. COMPAT upholds CCI order in DLF Belaire Owners Association
default/files/292012GG.pdf Case, Juris Law Corp (May, 2014) available here: https://
82. Proceedings against Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and indiacorplaw.in/2014/05/guest-post-compat-upholds-cci-order-in.
ReNew Power Limited under Chapter VI of the Competition html; Vishal Gupta v. Google Case Nos. 6 & 46 of 2014 available
Act, 2002 available at: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/ at: https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/C.%20Nos.%20
Notice_order_document/OrderPublicVersion.pdf 06%20%26%2046%20of%202014.pdf
23
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d. Insert clauses obligating parties to record in § Be transparent and objective about the criteria
writing episodes that result in termination for access to the platform and the basis of which
of the arrangement. The CCI initiated an access is provided. For instance, in All India Online
investigation against Hero Motorcycle based Traders Association v. Flipkart, the CCI while
on inter alia alleged unfair termination in the issuing closure order in favor of Flipkart based it’s
complaint by one of its dealers.85 decision inter alia on the fact that the ecommerce
platform devised the arrangement of its search
e. Avoid discriminating between customers,
results on an objective criterion.89
suppliers or dealers. Although the COMPAT
has observed in Schott Glass v. CCI that different § In Matrimony.com v. Google90, the CCI found that
conditions of dealing can be implemented based users using a search engine could be confused
on objective conditions such as offering volume between verticals offered by the search engine and
discounts.86 third parties. In this regard, the CCI implied that
consumers being misled to believe that they were
f. In contracts and public documents, avoid using
using a third party’s vertical service could result
words like ‘big’, ‘dominant’ with respect to the
in harm to competition. In this respect, adding
company. In the cases investigated against the
conspicuous disclosures so that consumers know
real estate company, DLF, the CCI considered
if they are dealing with third-party products or the
the company’s own positioning to the world to
products affiliated to the platform provider may
infer dominance87
help alleviate competition concerns associated
with transparency of the product and its design.
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IX. Direct contact with itself act as a hub. For instance, in case of a bid for
pharmaceutical goods, the consumer calling the
competitors bids shares information on the bid prices being
contemplated by rivals with a competing bidder. In
Limit contacts with competitors. When this is not such cases, it is important to preserve documentation
possible, reach out to external competition law counsel that demonstrates that regardless of the information
to devise a custom-made rule book for employees who inadvertently accessed, the company made
are required to be in contact with rivals. independent business decisions.
a. Identify teams/employees who regularly In the digital economy, many companies use
interact with competitors and consumers. Make softwares for automating their pricing and inventory
sure that they receive competition compliance allocation process. The CCI in its investigations
training sessions are assigned a contact person against airlines and radio cab service providers has
to report any concerns. examined the possibility of algorithmic collusion
through use of a common software.93 CCI concerns
b. High level rule book for information exchange
may be preempted in such cases by:
with competitors should as a matter of policy
recommend recording even innocuous contacts. a. Reducing manual intervention and devising
clearly recorded criteria for cases fit for manual
c. Send senior level employees to trade association
intervention.
meetings. In case a rival solicits other
participants to form a cartel, the senior level b. In case a third-party software is being used,
employee should conspicuously withdraw any ensure that company’s proprietary and non-
participation and leave the meeting. public data is not being used for making
predictions for third parties.
d. Do not exchange any business sensitive
information with competitors. Business
sensitive information include future pricing XI. Observations and rec-
plans, inventory allocation, future business
plans.
ommendations
The above high-level strategies are based on
X. Indirect contact with our reading of a collection of CCI decisions and
93. Airlines under CCI scanner for alleged fixing of airfares, Mint
(Nov, 2018) available at: https://www.livemint.com/Industry/
grAMdTMl8pvq7XVvWQcepN/Airlines-under-CCI-scanner-
for-alleged-fixing-of-airfares.html; Meru Travel Solutions v. ANI
Technologies Case No. 25-28 of 2017 available at: https://www.cci.
gov.in/sites/default/files/25%20-%2028%20of%202017.pdf
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© Nishith Desai Associates 2020
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Annexure A
KAFF Appliances (India) CCI began its analysis by examining the applicability
of Section 3(4)(e) on online market platforms. It stated
Pvt. Ltd. (Kaff) [Case No. that within the technology driven market, the market
platform provides important value addition services
61 of 2014] like warehousing, which assists consumers in sorting
and buying products. Thus, within a modern online
The Informant Snapdeal is an ecommerce platform.
market, these platforms form a part of the vertical
The opposite party KAFF was a brand dealing in kitchen
chain. In addition, the CCI noted that the mere fact
appliances and sold its goods, both online and offline.
that Jasper Infotech was not the purchaser of goods
The Informant sold KAFF’s goods at a discounted price,
was not enough to dismiss resale price maintenance
aggrieved by which KAFF issued a caution notice to
allegations. Having due regard to changing structures
Snapdeal, to not sell their goods below the minimum
in digital markets, the CCI stated that online market
operating price. In turn, Snapdeal filed an information
platforms provide sourcing and grievance redressal
alleging violation of Section 3(4)(e) of the Act and the
opportunities to consumers, which would indicate
CCI directed the DG to investigate the matter.
that they form part of the value chain even though
they did not have literal ‘ownership’ of the goods.
The DG defined the two relevant markets as the
Furthermore, online platforms also have the ability
‘market for chimneys’ and ‘market for hobs’ in India,
to impose price restrictions on products listed on
noting that the competitive nature of the markets
their websites. Thus, the CCI, having due regard to its
implied that KAFF did not possess sufficient market
own past jurisprudence and international judgments
power to cause an AAEC. With respect to allegations
held that online market platforms, and as a corollary,
concerning resale price maintenance, DG’s
agreements between manufacturers/distributors and
investigation determined that the variable nature
e-commerce players can be examined under Section
of incentives earned by dealers led to a different net
3(4) read with Section 3(1) of the Act. Thus, the DG’s
landing price, enabling each dealer to offer different
observations in this regard were not agreed with.
prices for the same product. Competition amongst
distributors was even stiffer since they were exclusive
The CCI then went on to examine the tenability of
to KAFF. Thus, the DG concluded that it was not ideal
the resale price maintenance allegations. Within
for either the company or its dealers to consistently
the relevant markets identified by the DG, the CCI
sell products at a particular price. With regard to
examined the evidence presented to them and found
the caution notice, the DG noted that it was served
that the dealers were not required to adhere to a
because KAFF had legitimate apprehensions that
minimum price. Discounts offered online where also
counterfeit products were being sold by unverified
funded by the retailers themselves. Thus, as against
dealers listed on the Snapdeal website. It was further
the dealers, the CCI concluded that there was no
noted that this amounted to protection of goodwill,
imposition of a resale price maintenance agreement.
which was a valid business concern. Importantly,
Specifically, with respect to KAFF’s conduct with
the DG also noted that since Jasper Infotech is only a
Jasper Infotech, the CCI accepted its business
market platform that does not perform any material
justifications for issuance of the caution notice and
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Competition Law in India
Legal Notice. It was held that each manufacturer on the Boards of both the companies orchestrates
has a right to choose the most efficient distribution consolidation and is an anti-competitive agreement
channel, and interference in this regard is warranted under Section 3. The CCI dismissed the petitions
only if it leads to anti-competitive effects. In addition, filed by the Meru on the following grounds: (i) there
there was no evidence to indicate AAEC through the weren’t any written/oral agreements with the drivers,
KAFF’s conduct, as available reports indicated that and the driver voluntarily chose the model which
the sale of chimneys and hobs via Snapdeal had only he thought was fit, thereby not coming within the
increased in the past two years, despite issuance of the purview of anti-competitive agreements. (ii) There is
caution notice. Thus, the CCI dismissed allegations no concept of collective dominance under the scheme
of resale price maintenance as against the dealers and of the Act as Section 4 only envisages unilateral
Jasper Infotech and held in favour of KAFF. dominance, and (iii) Informant failed to prove any
dominant position of the Opposite Parties in the
relevant market. With respect to the Informant’s
II. Meru Travel Solution Pvt. submission alleging an abuse of dominance due to
Ltd. v. ANI Technologies common institutional ownership, the CCI found that
while an overlapping ownership interest may hamper
and Ors. [Case No. 25 competition in the market, the underlying economic
of 2017] theories had not been tested to reveal any such anti-
competitive effects. Thus, it was incorrect to assume
that mere existence of common ownership would
The Informant, Meru Cabs, is engaged in the business
amount to an abuse of dominance. The CCI thus held
of radio taxi service since 2007 and caters to many
that no prima facie case was made out against the
cities all over India. ANI and Uber, the opposite
opposite parties.
parties, were also in the business of radio taxis and
provided their services under the name of “Ola”
and “Uber” respectively. Meru approached the CCI
III. In Re: Alleged
alleging violations of Section 3 and 4 of the Act,
as Opposite Parties were abusing their dominant cartelisation in supply of
position and provided lucrative models to their
drivers, due to collective dominance enjoyed in the
LPG Cylinders procured
relevant market and alleged advantages arising from through tenders by
common ownership. It was argued that Uber and
Ola had created an extremely attractive incentive
Hindustan Petroleum
scheme with an intention to lock-in drivers into their Corporation Ltd. (HPCL)
network, which would ultimately create visible entry
barriers and lead to foreclosure of competition in the
The case was taken up by the CCI on the basis of
market. This was alleged to be violative of Section 3(4)
an anonymous complaint. The case involved an
read with Section 3(1) of the Act.
investigation by the DG into two tenders floated by
Hindustan Petroleum (HPCL) for the procurement
The Informants stated that these anti-competitive
of cylinders and whether the actions of the bidders
terms were found in the ‘Minimum Business
were in contravention with Section 3(1) and 3(3)
Guarantee’ scheme agreements that were entered
(d) of the Act. In the first tender, it was alleged that
into with the drivers. With respect to allegations
the orders placed were at prices substantially higher
concerning collective dominance and common
than the procurement price of other oil companies
ownership, Meru argued that the presence of cross-
with the same vendors during the same period. With
shareholding common institutional investors was
respect to the second tender, it was alleged that during
strengthening the combined market position of
evaluation of the bids submitted by vendors, many
Uber and Ola in the market. Lastly, it was argued
of them withdrew their applications citing similar
that the presence of SoftBank’s influence and control
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or incomplete reasons for withdrawals. Interestingly, cartelization amongst industrial and automotive
these withdrawals were submitted at a similar time. bearings supplier companies to claim an increase in
price from their original equipment manufacturers
The DG, in his report, observed that the tender prices
(“OEMs”). The CCI directed the DG to investigate. The
submitted by the vendors were identical and the
DG discovered that the representatives of four of the
withdrawal by the vendors in case of the second
companies in question, i.e. NEI, Schaeffler, Tata and
tender was either without a reason or had identical
SKF met and shared confidential information that
reasons. The vendors admitted that they shared
enabled them to decide upon the percentage increase
information with each other and even used the same
in steel price that each of them would represent to their
IP address for withdrawal of their bids. Thus, the DG
OEMs to claim a price increase from them. Thus, DG
concluded that there was a contravention of Section
concluded that there was a contravention of Section
3(3)(d) read with Section 3(1) of the Act.
3(3)(a) read with 3(1) of the Act.
[Case No. 5 of 2017] under Section 46 of the Act read with Regulation 5
of the Lesser Penalty Regulations. The DG further
concluded in its report that the opposite parties were
This case was taken up suo moto by the CCI pursuant
involved in collusive bid rigging and that evidence
to a leniency application filed by Schaeffler under
available was sufficient to indicate a meeting of the
Section 46 of the Act, disclosing the existence of a cartel.
minds in this regard.
The allegations made were with respect to alleged
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CCI first had to examine whether Section 3(3) of the information against MakeMyTrip India Pvt. Ltd.
Act was applicable when certain opposite parties were (MMT), Ibibo Group Private Limited (GoIbibo)
not engaged in similar or identical trade or provision and Oravel Stays Private Limited (OYO) alleging
of goods and services. It was held that it is the business individual and collective abuse of dominance. It was
activity of the parties that they are actually bidding and also alleged that the opposite parties had entered
based on which the allegation is made, that is relevant into anti-competitive agreements with practices
for the purpose of the applicability of Section 3(3) such as predatory pricing, charging of exorbitant
(d) of the Act. Thus, other business activities that the commissions from hotels and providing illegal and
parties ‘were’ or ‘are’ engaged in will not be relevant. unlicensed bed and breakfast misrepresentation on
Examining procedural issues, the CCI then rejected their platforms since December 2012. In addition,
the argument that the DG had violated confidentiality FHRAI argued that the CCI’s act of allowing
by disclosing the contents of statements before they the merger of MMT and GoIbibo in 2017 had
were labelled as ‘non-confidential’. The CCI created a strengthened their dominant position in the market.
distinction between evidence given under the Lesser For MMT, the relevant market was delineated as the
Penalty Regulations and statements made before the “market for intermediation services for booking of
DG for an investigation. It was held that confidential hotels in India” and for OYO, it was the “market for
treatment granted under Lesser Penalty Regulations franchising services for budget hotels in India.” Thus,
does not extend to evidence obtained or collected by under Section 26(1), the CCI was asked to determine
the DG, even if such an evidence is obtained from a whether a prima facie case exists to direct the DG to
Lesser Penalty Applicant. investigate the aforesaid allegations.
With respect to the merits, the CCI held that the The CCI first rejected the arguments concerning
conduct shall be considered in violation of Section collective dominance as being outside the framework
3(3)(d) read with Section 3(1) of the Act because there of Section 4 of the Act. Within the respective
was evidence indicating collusive bid rigging by the delineated relevant markets, MMT was found to
parties. The criteria for complete engagement in be dominant because the presence of other players
producing identical goods and services did not apply. like PayTM, HappyEasyGo, Thomas Cook was
Allegations against Pune Municipal Corporation were insignificant. However, OYO was not found to be
rejected since mere failure to exercise due diligence dominant in the delineated relevant market due to
to detect collusion on the portal did not amount to presence of other large competitors.
contravention of substantive provisions of the Act.
The CCI held that Across Platform Parity Agreements
Whilst examining the Lesser Penalty Application, the
(APPAs), similar to most-favoured-nation clauses,
CCI granted reductions ranging from 25-50% to the
have the effect of imposing narrow and wide
applicants and their office bearers, while 2 applicants
restrictions on sellers, for they may be barred from
and 1 office bearer were not granted any reductions.
providing better prices or conditions on their
own website or other websites. In case the entity
VI. Federation of Hotel & imposing restrictions is dominant, it may amount
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Provided upon request only
its competitors Treebo and FabHotels from the be a significant (not dominant) player in the ‘market
MMT platform. It was also held that the DG should for franchising services for budget hotels in India’.
additionally investigate allegations concerning the Thus, the CCI held that it would rely on investigations
charge of unfair commissions and fake bookings on that were already being undertaken in the said case.
the MMT platform are necessary. Importantly, since When examining the allegations concerning price
this is a Section 26(1) order, the outcome of the DG’s parity, the CCI observed that MMT imposed an
investigation and final order are still pending. arbitrary exclusivity condition on Treebo through the
‘Exclusivity Agreement’ entered into between MMT
and Treebo, which was in contravention of provisions
VII. Rubtub Solutions Pvt. of Section 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(c) of the Act. It was noted
Ltd v. MakeMyTrip that although such agreements may result in removal
of the incentive for platforms to compete on the
India Pvt. Ltd. (MMT) commission they charge to hoteliers, these allegations
were similar to the previous case and hence there
Rubtub Solutions Pvt. Ltd., operating under the brand
was no need for a further investigation or presence
name of Treebo Hotels, (“Treebo”) filed a complaint
of allegations were made out. It was also observed
against MakeMyTrip India Pvt. Ltd. (“MMT”) and
that OYO abused its dominant position by entering
Oravel Stays Private Limited (“OYO”). alleging that
into an anti-competitive vertical arrangement with
MMT abused its dominant position in the relevant
MMT. CCI held that imposing restrictive conditions
market for online intermediation services for booking
on Treebo, along with OYO and MMT’s deal would
hotels in India. Treebo was previously listing its
tantamount to ‘refusal to deal’ and prima facie violates
budget hotels on MMT’s platform, amongst other
Section 3(4) read with Section 3(1) of the Act. Thus,
platforms, in addition to availing intermediation
CCI directed the DG to investigate the allegations in
services provided by MMT. However, upon
this case. However, since this is a Section 26(1) order,
acquisition of Go-Ibibo, MMT proposed to make
the outcome of the DG’s investigation and final order
a significant investment in Treebo, in exchange
is still pending.
for Treebo listing its hotels exclusively on MMT’s
platform. Treebo refused this offer, as a result of
which all Treebo properties were allegedly removed VIII. Samir Agarwal
from MMT’s platform for 6 months. Thereafter, MMT
decided to relist Treebo on its platform subject to
vs Competition
Treebo entering into an allegedly unfair ‘Exclusivity Commission of India
Agreement’ and ‘Chain Agreement’ with MMT.
Subsequently, these agreements were unilaterally The appeal was filed in the Tribunal by Samir
terminated by MMT, and it was alleged that this Agarwal (the informant) against CCI decision in Samir
was as a result of OYO’s agreement with MMT. Thus, Agrawal v. ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The appeal
under Section 26(1), the CCI was asked to determine was filed on the ground that CCI had erroneously
whether a prima facie case exists to direct the DG to concluded on the genuineness and legality of the
investigate the aforesaid allegations. pricing model of cab aggregators. In the proceedings
before the CCI, the appellant had argued that the
Two separate relevant markets were delineated
cab aggregators and drivers of app-based setups like
for MMT and OYO respectively, relying on prima
Ola and Uber were acting as a hub-and-spoke cartel,
facie observations of the CCI in a previous case with
where the prices were being determined by the cab
similar allegations [Federation of Hotel and Restaurant
aggregators (hub) and accepted by the drivers (spokes)
Association of India v. MakeMyTrip India Pvt. Ltd.].
through algorithms. The CCI held that the use of such
MMT was found to be prima facie dominant in the
algorithms do not amount to collusion, because there
relevant ‘market for online intermediation services for
is an absence of an agreement amongst all drivers to
booking of hotels in India’, while OYO was found to
coordinate prices.
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The Tribunal observed that cab aggregators provided and attract attention. Through this model, Facebook
radio taxi services on demand. The consumers are thus monetise their user data, generates revenue, and
required to download the app to avail the services drives out healthy competition from the market.
of the cab aggregators. There is also no exchange of
CCI delineated the relevant market to be the ‘market
information amongst the drivers and Ola under its
for Over-The-Top (OTT) messaging apps through
business model. The taxi drivers connected with
smartphones in India.’ Whilst doing so, the CCI noted
Ola platform have no inter se connectivity and
that WhatsApp and Facebook provided different
lack the possibility of sharing information with
services and hence could not be consolidated into the
regard to the commuters and the earnings they
‘market for user attention.’ With respect to dominance,
make out of the rides provided. This excludes the
it was observed that WhatsApp’s ‘dominant position’
probability of collusion inter se the drivers through
in the market needs to be ascertained taking into
the platform. The Tribunal thus held that Uber
consideration the idea that Facebook and WhatsApp
provided a technology service to its driver partners
are group entities having the network effect advantage.
and riders through the Uber App and assisted them
The CCI was noted that merely being dominant in the
in finding a potential ride and recommended a fare
market was not a violation of the Act unless an abuse
for the same. Even with regard to fare, though the
was proved. Thus, although WhatsApp was a dominant
app recommended a fare, the driver partners were at
player in the OTT messaging apps sector market, it had
a liberty to negotiate a lower fare. The NCLAT also
not contravened Section 4 of the Act. Finally, when
observed that the case for abuse of dominance was
examining allegations of “bundling”, the CCI observed
not made out in this case, as no cab aggregator held
that tying and bundling could not occur as users were
a dominant position in the relevant market. The
provided a choice to use the WhatsApp pay feature,
Tribunal dismissed the appeal, as it did not find any
and the decision to use the UPI payment app is purely
legal infirmity in the impugned order.
voluntary and choice based for the user. Infact, since
WhatsApp pay is still being tested to be launched across
IX. Harshita Chawla v. India, it is still early to conclude that dominance has
WhatsApp & Facebook been leveraged by either of the group entities. The CCI
nevertheless adopted a pragmatic approach to hold
that it would open the case subsequently in case new
The Informant, Advocate Harshita Chawla filed
evidence in this regard was found.
an information, against WhatsApp and Facebook,
the owner of WhatsApp. This was done owing to
conduct concerning the launch of a Beta version X. Uber India Systems
of WhatsApp Pay – a UPI payment service. The
petition alleged violation of Section 4 of the Act, as
Pvt. Ltd. v. Competition
the Informant argued that WhatsApp and Facebook Commission of India
abused their dominant position in the relevant
market by pre-installing the same with all WhatsApp The complaint was filed before CCI against Uber
users, equivalent to bundling under Section 4(2)(a) India alleging predatory pricing. However, CCI
(i) of the Act. In addition to this, it was argued this questioned the very credibility of the reports relying
pre-installation amounted to leverage of dominance upon which the Informant had approached the
under Section 4(2)(e) of the Act, as it was using its CCI. The said case was then referred to the erstwhile
dominance in the market for instant messaging apps Tribunal, which directed the DG to investigate in
to promote its payment system. Concerns related the matter as the information in the above reports
to data security of the personal information were differed from each other. The said order was
also raised before the CCI. It was argued that usage challenged before the Supreme Court by Uber India
of personal data through WhatsApp, Facebook can leading to the present decision.
customise advertisements and suit user situations
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barriers for competitors. Thus, it was argued even here meant that there was no significant horizontal
that there was a clear contravention of Section 4. overlap/vertical relationship between parties to the
combination. Therefore, the CCI approved the said
The DG investigated the issue and delineated the two
combination under Section 31(1) of the Act.
relevant markets as market for ‘online general web
search services’ and ‘online search advertising’ in
India. It was found that Google was dominant in both XV. Century Tokyo
these markets. The DG confirmed allegations with
respect to search bias through the display of Google’s
Leasing Corporation:
own services at prominent ranks in the search pages. Combination
Cumulatively, the DG concluded that Google was
in violation of Sections 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(b)(ii), 4(2)(c) Registration No.
and Section 4(2)(e) of the Act. The CCI affirmed the C-2012/09/78
findings of the DG and held that Google guilty of
abuse of dominance in the online general search and
Century Tokyo Leasing Corporation filed an
online advertising search market, by undertaking
application under Section 6(2) of the Act, for
a search bias that promoted its own products. CCI
acquisition of joint control in the leasing division of
held that there were instances where Google was
Tata Capital Financial Services Limited, pursuant to
the default search engine for browsers like Safari
the execution of a Business Partnership Agreement
& Mozilla Firefox, whereon other websites were
between the parties.
prevented from implementing search technologies
that were similar to Google. The CCI penalised Google The CCI noted that the proposed combination is
to the tune of Rs. 135.86 crores and ordered them to covered under Section 5(a) of the Act, as Century
cease and desist from any such activities in the future. Tokyo would have the ability to make decisions
about strategic affairs of the Leasing Division, which
effectively leads to a situation of joint control over
XIV. Caladium Investment assets and operations of Tata’s leasing business.
Pte. Ltd.: Combination Furthermore, since Century Tokyo had no business
operations in India, the business operations of both
Registration No. the companies are not competing with or related with
33
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was argued that the end result of this would be an level through a “Discount Control Mechanism”
absence of choice for consumers in the market. and a penalty punishment mechanism upon non-
compliance of the discount scheme.
After examining these contentions, the Tribunal
dismissed the appeal saying the appellant does not
have “locus standi” to file the plea as the Appellant XVIII. KM Chakrapani
was not “any person aggrieved” for the purposes of
Section 53B. Merely being an ex-Executive Director of
v. Competition
Air India did not, in any way indicate that there is any Commission of India,
personal grievance to the Appellant.
Competition Appeal
XVII. Fx Enterprise (AT) No. 51 of 2018
Solutions Private The appeal before NCLAT arose out of a common
Limited and Another v. order of the CCI holding that there was no proof that
the Kerala Cement Dealers Association (KCDA) had
Hyundai Motor India violated Section 3(3) read with Section 3(1) of the Act.
In the proceedings before the CCI, it was argued that
Private Limited 2017 KCDA had unilaterally terminated the dealership
SCC OnLine CCI 26 agreement with the Informant without due reason.
The DG’s initial investigation revealed that KCDA had
undertaken such conduct. However, the CCI found
Fx Enterprise Solutions India Private Limited
some irregularities in the investigation and re-directed
and St. Anthony’s Cars Private Limited filed an
the DG to undertake an investigation. The new report
information against Hyundai Motors India Limited
reached a different conclusion and held that the
(“HMIL”) alleging contravention of Section 3(4) (e)
Informant’s allegations were untrue and KCDA’s
read with section 3(1) of the Act. It was alleged that
conduct was in line with prevalent market conditions.
Hyundai had restricted the Informants from dealing
This was appealed before NCLAT, on grounds that CCI
in products of competing brands. In addition, it
was not justified to redirect the DG to conduct another
fixed the maximum retail price and the maximum
investigation, and maintainability of the appeal.
discount which could be offered by the dealers
The argument with respect to maintainability was
through its Discount Control Mechanism within the
rejected by NCLAT as it found that the CCI was only in
distributorship agreement. Furthermore, Hyundai
partial agreement with the recommendations of DG.
tied the purchase of popular cars to the sale of high-
Orders of such nature, where the CCI was in partial
end unwanted cars, which was a restrictive trade
agreement of the findings of the DG, are appealable
practice denying market access to distributors with
under Sections 53A and 53B of the Act.
other brand car products.
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35
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these disclosures were material and the Commission Department of Commerce. The question before
imposed a penalty of Rs. 50 lakhs on Canada Pension. NCLAT was whether the Appellant had engaged in
discriminatory practices during the allotment of spaces
to private organisers. It was alleged that ITPO had been
XXI. Vishal Gupta v. Google, maintaining a time-gap of 15 days between two “third
Case Nos. 6 & 46 of party events”; whereas in case of ITPO’s own organized
events, the time gap restriction was 90 days before and
2014 45 days after the event in case of ITPO events.
The Informant owned a garment group of companies The CCI found that imposition of different time
and approached Google India to create an AdWords periods was an unfair and discriminatory practice in
account to qualify for the display of services under violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act and imposed
Google’s ‘remote technology support’ plan. However, a penalty of Rs. 6.75 crores at the rate of 2% average
his account was removed by Google under its ‘User turnover for the preceding three years. In Appeal,
Safety Policy’, citing security concerns. The Informant NCLAT reversed the decision of the CCI. It stated
alleged that the bidding process for Google AdWords that an enterprise cannot be compelled to part
account lacks transparency, and the ambiguity of its with its own assets for the benefit of others, when
‘User Safety Policy’ is indicative of abuse of dominance it is detrimental to its own interest, provided it can
by Google. Furthermore, Google had launched its own produce an objective justification for such refusal. In
competing remote tech support operation, which was the instant case, NCLAT accepted the Appellant’s
unfair, and denied market access to the Informant and objective justification that the time-gap policy was
other such service providers. to ensure that no confusing signals are provided for
similar exhibitions and events.
The CCI held that Google had not indulged in any anti-
competitive practices or abused its dominant position
in the market. With respect to closure of the AdWords XXIII. All India Online
account, CCI found that Google had followed a fair
and legitimate procedure which was accessible to
Vendors Association
all, and the Informant had acted in clear violation of v. Flipkart, Case No.
its policies. Furthermore, the bidding procedure was
transparent insofar as Google provided sufficient 20 of 2018
data to advertisers on the performance of their
The All India Online Vendors Association, the
advertisements. Lastly, with respect to unfair terms, it
Informant, was a group of more than 2000 sellers
was found that since the Informant had voluntarily
selling on ecommerce marketplaces such as Flipkart,
agreed to the lucid terms and conditions imposed by
Amazon, Snapdeal etc. It alleged that Flipkart was
Google, it was incorrect to argue that these terms were
engaging in providing preferential treatment to
unfair simply because he was prejudiced by them later.
certain sellers, amounting to an abuse of dominant
The Informant appealed the CCI decision and the
position by denying market access under Section 4
matter is currently pending before NCLAT.
(2) (a) of the Act. It was also stated that Flipkart had
devised a strategy to acquire goods from smaller
XXII. India Trade Promotion sellers, sell the same immediately to WS Retail
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Competition Law in India
abuse of dominance could not arise. It also noted Grasim Industries Limited [“GIL”] and Kanoria
that neither was Flipkart imposing any restraints Chemicals and Industries Limited [“KCIL”]. The DG’s
on resellers to sell products on its platform, nor was consolidated report revealed that for both tenders,
it imposing any conditions that were different from ABCIL, GIL and GACL acted in a collusive manner to
standard practice in the market. Furthermore, the artificially jack up the bid prices, forcing Delhi Jal Board
structural link with WS Retail existed only until 2012 to divide the tender quantity. No contravention was
and was later discontinued. found to be established against KCIL.
Grasim & Others because they were part of the same group. The CCI’s
reasoning was based on the fact that though GIL and
Case Nos. 3 & 4 of ABCIL had common shareholders, employees etc,
they participated in the tender as separate entities.
2013 Evidence indicating that the parties had acted in
concert, with an intention for bid rigging, was also
The Informant and Tenderer, the Delhi Jal Board
found. Thus, the CCI imposed a penalty of INR 6.27
alleged that the Opposite parties had rigged two bids
crores for this violation of Section 3(3)(d) read with
for procurement of poly aluminium chloride and liquid
Section 3(1) of the Act on GACL, GIL and ABCIL. The
chlorine respectively. The four opposite parties named
CCI agreed with the DG’s conclusion that the fourth
were Aditya Birla Chemicals (India) Limited [“ABCIL”],
party, KCIL, was not in contravention of provisions of
Gujarat Alkalies and Chemicals Limited [“GACL”],
the Act and was thus exonerated.
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Annexure B-1
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Annexure B-2
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Annexure B-3
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Annexure B-4
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Indian Foundation of
Transport Research Violation of section 3,
61/2012 All India Motor
& Training vs Sh. Transport/ Automotive cease activities and
16/02/2015 Transport Congress
Bal Malkait Singh, penalty was imposed
President and Ors.
Violation of section
M/s Atos Worldline
4, Order to cease
56/2012 India Pvt. Ltd. vs M/s Information Electronic Payment
and desist from such
10/04/2015 Verifone India Sales Technology Services Technologies
activities and penalty
Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
was imposed
M/s Three D
Electronic Ticketing Violation of section 4,
13/2013 Integrated Solutions
Video Broadcasting Machines cease activities and
10/04/2015 Ltd. vs M/s VeriFone
Manufacturer penalty was imposed
India Sales Pvt. Ltd.
Mr. Pankaj Aggarwal
(13/2010), Mr.
Violation of section
Sachin Aggarwal
13 & 21/2010 & 4 and no financial
(21/2010) & Mr. Anil
55/2012 Private Individual Real Estate penalty was imposed
Kumar (55/2012) vs
12/05/2015 but cease and desist
DLF Gurgaon Home
orders were passed.
Developers Private
Limited
Violation of Section
M/s Bio-Med Private
26/2013 3(3)(d) read with
Limited vs Union of Medical Pharmaceutical
04/06/2015 Section 3(1) and
India & others
penalty was imposed.
Kerala Cine Exhibitors
Association vs Kerala Violation of Section
45/2012
Film Exhibitors Cinema Owner Cinema 3 and penalty was
23/06/2015
Federation and imposed.
Others
Violation of sections
In Re: Shri Shamsher
3(4)(b), 3(4)(c), 3(4)
03/2011 Kataria vs Honda
Private Individual Automobile (d), 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(c)
27/07/2015 Siel Cars India Ltd. &
and 4(2)(e). Penalty
Others.
was imposed.
Kannada Grahakara
Koota Shri Ganesh Violation of section
58/2012 Chetan vs Karnataka Trade Associations for 3(1) read with section
Private Individuals
27/07/2015 Film Chamber of films and TV 3(3)(b) and penalty
Commerce (KFCC) & was imposed.
Others.
In Re:M/s. Crown Violation of section
16/2014 Theatre vs Kerala Film 3(1) read with section
Theatre Film
08/09/2015 Exhibitors Federation 3(3)(b) and penalty
(KFEF) was imposed.
Shri Ghanshyam Das Sale of ayurvedic Violation of section
68/2013
Vij Vs. M/s Bajaj Corp. Private Individual products and 3(1) read with section
12/10/2015
Ltd. & Others medicines 3(3)(b) & (c)
Express Industry
Violation of Section
30/2013 Council of India Vs. Express Industry
Aviation 3(1) read with Section
17/11/2015 Jet Airways (India) Ltd. Council of India
3(3)
& Others.
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Mr. P. K. Krishnan
Proprietor, Vinayaka
Pharma vs Mr. Paul Violation of Section
28/2014
Madavana, Divisional Pharmaceutical Pharmaceutical 3 and 4. Penalty was
01/12/2015
Sales Manager, M/s imposed
Alkem Laboratories
Limited. & Others
M/s Maruti &
Company Vs Violation of Section
71/2013
Karnataka Chemists Private Individual Medicine and Drugs 3 and 4. Penalty was
28/07/2016
& Druggists imposed
Association & Others
Builders Association
29 of 2010 of India vs Cement
Builders Association Cement Penalty was imposed
31/08/2016 Manufacturers'
Association & Ors.
Shri Ashutosh
Bhardwaj Vs M/s.
01/2014 and
DLF Limited & Others, Violation of Section 4.
93/2015 Private Individual Real Estate
M/s. Shri Lalit Babu & Penalty was imposed
04/01/2017
Ors.Vs DLF Limited &
Others
Director, Supplies & Violation of Section
Ref. Case No. 05 of
Disposals, Haryana 3(3)(d) read with
2013 Central Agency Cement
vs Shree Cement Section 3(1). Penalty
19/01/2017
Limited & Ors. was imposed
The Belgaum District
C-175/09/ Chemists and Violation of Section
DGIR/27/28-MRTP Druggists Association Chemists and Drugs Pharmaceutical 3(1) read with Section
02/03/2017 Vs. Abbott India Ltd. & 3(3)
Others
(03/2012)
Maharashtra State
Power Generation
Company Ltd.
Vs. Mahanadi
Coalfields Ltd. &
other, (11/2012)
Maharashtra State Violation of Section
03, 11 and 59/2012
Power Generation Power Generation Coal 4(2)(a)(i). Penalty
24/03/2017
Company Ltd. Vs. imposed.
Western Coalfields
Ltd. & other,
(59/2012) Gujarat
State Electricity
Corporation Limited
Vs. South Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. & other
Shri T. G. Vinayakumar
(also known
98/2014 as Vinayan) Vs. Violation of Section 3.
Private Individual Film
24/03/2017 Association of Penalty was imposed.
Malayalam Movie
Artists & others.
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Vedanta Bio
Sciences, Vadodara Violation of section 3
c-87/2009/DGIR
Vs. Chemists and Bio Sciences Pharmaceutical and 4. No penalty was
15/01/2019
Druggists Association imposed.
of Baroda
Madhya Pradesh
Chemists and
Distributors
64/2014 Federation (MPCDF) Violation of Section 3.
Pharmaceutical Pharmaceutical
03/06/2019 Vs. Madhya Pradesh Penalty was imposed
Chemists and
Druggist Association
(MPCDA) & Others
Mr. Nadie Jauhri Violation of Section
61/2015 Vs. Jalgaon District 3(3)(b) read with
Private Individual Pharmaceutical
20/06/2019 Medicine Dealers Section 3(1). Penalty
Association (JDMDA) was imposed.
Nagrik Chetna Violation of Section
12/2017 Manch Vs. SAAR IT 3(3)(d) read with
Private Individual Multiple Industries
02/08/2019 Resources Private Section 3(1). Penalty
Limited & Others. was imposed.
Naveen Kataria Vs. Violation of Section
99/2014
Jaiprakash Associates Private Individual Real Estate 4(2)(a)(i). Penalty was
09/08/2019
Limited imposed.
Shri Suprabhat
Roy, Proprietor, M/s
Suman Distributors
Vs. Shri Saiful
Islam Biswas,
District Secretary
of Murshidabad
District Committee
of Bengal Chemists
and Druggists
Association & Others,
Shri Sankar Saha,
Branch Secretary,
36/2015, 31/2016
Pharmaceuticals
& 58/2016 Private Individual Medicine Violation of Section 3.
Traders Welfare
12/03/2020
Association of Bengal
Vs. Shri Hitesh Mehta,
Depot Manager of
Alkem Laboratories
Limited & Others,
Shri Joy Deb Das,
Proprietor, M/s Maa
Tara Medical Agency
Vs. Shri Rajeev
Mishra, authorised
signatory of Macleods
Pharmaceuticals Ltd
& Ors
XYZ Vs. Association Violation of Sections
62/2016 of Man Made Fibre 4(2)(a)(ii), 4(2)(d) read
Fibre Fibre
16/03/2020 Industry of India & with 4(1). Penalty was
Others imposed.
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Ref.Case
No.03/2016 (Chief
Materials Manager,
South Eastern Railway
v/s Hindustan
Composites Ltd. &
ors.), Ref. Case No.
05/2016 (Controller
of Stores, Central
Railways v/s BIC Auto
Pvt. Ltd. & ors.), Ref.
Ref. Case No.
Case No. 01/2018 Violation of Section 3
03/2016, 05/2016,
(Chief Materials (3) (a), 3 (3) (c) and
01/2018, 04/2018 Railway Multiple Industries
Manager, Eastern 3 (3) (d) read with
& 08/2018
Railways v/s BIC Auto Section 3 (1).
10/07/2020
Pvt. Ltd. & ors.),Ref
Case No.04/2018
(Chief Materials
Manager – I, North
Western Railways v/s
BIC Auto Pvt. Ltd. &
ors.) and Ref. Case
No.08/2018 (Chief
Materials Manager –
Sales v/s Rane Brake
Lining Ltd. & anr.)
68
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The following research papers and much more are available on our Knowledge Site: www.nishithdesai.com
Case Study
June 2020
May 2020
Cross-Border
Insolvency
Construction Disputes Digital Health Introduction to
in India in India Cross-Border
Legal, Regulatory and Tax Insolvency
Overview
April 2020
April 2020
April 2020
NDA Insights
TITLE TYPE DATE
Delhi Tribunal: Hitachi Singapore’s Liaison Office in India is a Permanent Tax November 2019
Establishment, Scope of Exclusion Under Singapore Treaty Restrictive
CBDT issues clarification around availment of additional depreciation Tax October 2019
and MAT credit for companies availing lower rate of tax
Bombay High Court quashes 197 order rejecting Mauritius tax treaty benefits Tax May 2019
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Research @ NDA
Research is the DNA of NDA. In early 1980s, our firm emerged from an extensive, and then pioneering, research
by Nishith M. Desai on the taxation of cross-border transactions. The research book written by him provided the
foundation for our international tax practice. Since then, we have relied upon research to be the cornerstone of our
practice development. Today, research is fully ingrained in the firm’s culture.
Our dedication to research has been instrumental in creating thought leadership in various areas of law and pub-
lic policy. Through research, we develop intellectual capital and leverage it actively for both our clients and the
development of our associates. We use research to discover new thinking, approaches, skills and reflections on ju-
risprudence, and ultimately deliver superior value to our clients. Over time, we have embedded a culture and built
processes of learning through research that give us a robust edge in providing best quality advices and services to
our clients, to our fraternity and to the community at large.
Every member of the firm is required to participate in research activities. The seeds of research are typically sown
in hour-long continuing education sessions conducted every day as the first thing in the morning. Free interac-
tions in these sessions help associates identify new legal, regulatory, technological and business trends that require
intellectual investigation from the legal and tax perspectives. Then, one or few associates take up an emerging
trend or issue under the guidance of seniors and put it through our “Anticipate-Prepare-Deliver” research model.
As the first step, they would conduct a capsule research, which involves a quick analysis of readily available
secondary data. Often such basic research provides valuable insights and creates broader understanding of the
issue for the involved associates, who in turn would disseminate it to other associates through tacit and explicit
knowledge exchange processes. For us, knowledge sharing is as important an attribute as knowledge acquisition.
When the issue requires further investigation, we develop an extensive research paper. Often we collect our own
primary data when we feel the issue demands going deep to the root or when we find gaps in secondary data. In
some cases, we have even taken up multi-year research projects to investigate every aspect of the topic and build
unparallel mastery. Our TMT practice, IP practice, Pharma & Healthcare/Med-Tech and Medical Device, practice
and energy sector practice have emerged from such projects. Research in essence graduates to Knowledge, and
finally to Intellectual Property.
Over the years, we have produced some outstanding research papers, articles, webinars and talks. Almost on daily
basis, we analyze and offer our perspective on latest legal developments through our regular “Hotlines”, which go
out to our clients and fraternity. These Hotlines provide immediate awareness and quick reference, and have been
eagerly received. We also provide expanded commentary on issues through detailed articles for publication in
newspapers and periodicals for dissemination to wider audience. Our Lab Reports dissect and analyze a published,
distinctive legal transaction using multiple lenses and offer various perspectives, including some even overlooked
by the executors of the transaction. We regularly write extensive research articles and disseminate them through
our website. Our research has also contributed to public policy discourse, helped state and central governments in
drafting statutes, and provided regulators with much needed comparative research for rule making. Our discours-
es on Taxation of eCommerce, Arbitration, and Direct Tax Code have been widely acknowledged. Although we
invest heavily in terms of time and expenses in our research activities, we are happy to provide unlimited access to
our research to our clients and the community for greater good.
As we continue to grow through our research-based approach, we now have established an exclusive four-acre,
state-of-the-art research center, just a 45-minute ferry ride from Mumbai but in the middle of verdant hills of reclu-
sive Alibaug-Raigadh district. Imaginarium AliGunjan is a platform for creative thinking; an apolitical eco-sys-
tem that connects multi-disciplinary threads of ideas, innovation and imagination. Designed to inspire ‘blue sky’
thinking, research, exploration and synthesis, reflections and communication, it aims to bring in wholeness – that
leads to answers to the biggest challenges of our time and beyond. It seeks to be a bridge that connects the futuris-
tic advancements of diverse disciplines. It offers a space, both virtually and literally, for integration and synthesis
of knowhow and innovation from various streams and serves as a dais to internationally renowned professionals
to share their expertise and experience with our associates and select clients.
We would love to hear your suggestions on our research reports. Please feel free to contact us at
[email protected]
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