No.

20-303

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
JOSE LUIS VAELLO-MADERO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
ABBY C. WRIGHT
LAURA E. MYRON
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
[email protected]
(202) 514-2217
 QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Congress violated the equal-protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security
Income—a program that provides benefits to needy
aged, blind, and disabled individuals—in the 50 States
and the District of Columbia, but not extending it to
Puerto Rico.

(I)
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 1
Statement:
A. Legal background ............................................................ 2
B. Factual background and proceedings below ................ 6
Summary of argument ................................................................. 9
Argument..................................................................................... 11
A. The court of appeals erred in holding that
Congress’s decision not to extend the SSI program
to Puerto Rico lacks a rational basis ............................ 13
1. A court owes Congress substantial deference
when it assesses a law under the rational-basis
test ............................................................................ 13
2. Puerto Rico’s unique tax status and resulting
fiscal autonomy provide a rational basis for the
decision not to extend the SSI program to its
residents ................................................................... 15
3. The interest in advancing self-government and
longstanding practice reinforce the rationality
of Congress’s decision not to extend the SSI
program to Puerto Rico .......................................... 22
4. Congress also had rational grounds to treat
Puerto Rico differently than the Northern
Mariana Islands ....................................................... 27
B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential
treatment of Territories warrants heightened
scrutiny ........................................................................... 28
1. The constitutional text establishes that
Congress may treat a Territory differently
than the States if it has a rational basis to do so ... 28

(III)
 IV

Table of Contents—Continued:    Page

2. Congress’s power to treat Territories

differently than the States draws additional
support from its broader authority to draw
rational geographic distinctions ............................ 30
3. Equal-protection doctrine confirms that
Congress may treat a Territory differently
than the States if it has a rational basis to
do so .......................................................................... 34
C. The doctrine of stare decisis supports retaining
Torres and Rosario........................................................ 36
Conclusion ................................................................................... 41
Appendix — Statutory provisions ........................................... 1a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) .................................. 36
American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) .................................................. 30
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673
(2012) .............................................................................. 18, 39
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) ................................ 12
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) ................................... 21
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) .......................... passim
Chappell Chemical & Fertilizer Co. v. Sulphur
Mines Co. No. 3, 172 U.S. 474 (1899) ................................ 33
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985)........................................................ 34, 35
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne,
575 U.S. 542 (2015).............................................................. 37
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel,
830 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1015 (1988)............................................................ 38
 V

Cases—Continued: Page
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) ..................................... 28
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) ................................... 32
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) .......... 14, 21, 40
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.,
346 U.S. 100 (1953).............................................................. 32
Examining Board of Engineers, Architects &
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) ...... 2, 12
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307 (1993).................................................. 13, 14, 40
Financial Oversight & Management Board for
Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC,
140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) ..................................25, 29, 30, 32, 39
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) ........................... 14
Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of
Improvement of Paving District No. 16,
274 U.S. 387 (1927).............................................................. 33
Friend v. Reno, 172 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1163 (2000) ..................................... 38
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) ................ 36
Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905).......................... 33
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)............................ 37
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) ........ 33
Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) ...................... passim
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887) ................................ 33
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981)................................. 32
Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) ........................ 37
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) .......................... 14
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,
487 U.S. 450 (1988).............................................................. 33
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) ................................... 36
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973).............................................................. 18
 VI

Cases—Continued: Page
Lyng v. International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) ............................................ 18
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) ............................ 18
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) ................................... 25
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ...................... 33
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880) ........................... 32, 33
Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990) ....................... 36
North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) .................................. 33
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory,
431 U.S. 471 (1977).............................................................. 18
Ohio ex rel Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park
District, 281 U.S. 74 (1930) ................................................ 33
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) ............................... 33
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ........................................ 34
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,
478 U.S. 328 (1986).............................................................. 35
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) ......................................................... 36
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933) ............. 35
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863
(2016) ......................................................... 2, 10, 23, 28, 30, 35
Quiban v. Veterans Administration, 928 F.2d 1154
(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 918 (1994) .... 29, 38
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) ......... 33
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) .......................... 14
Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2001) ..................... 38
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954) ........................ 33
San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) ....................................... 23, 33
Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) .......................... 37
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) ..................... 19, 34
 VII

Cases—Continued: Page
Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining
Co., 338 U.S. 604 (1950) ...................................................... 31
Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 320 (2018) ................... 38
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) .........17
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) ........ 39
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) ............................... 31
Talon v. Brown, 999 F.2d 514 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028 (1993) ..................................... 38
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) ............................ 39
United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ...... 32
United States v. Montijo-Maysonet, 974 F.3d 34
(1st Cir. 2020), petition for cert. pending,
No. 20-8072 (filed May 15, 2021) ....................................... 38
United States v. Pollard, 326 F.3d 397 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 932 (2003) ....................................... 38
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)................... 25
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166 (1980).............................................................. 25
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) ................................... 25
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955).............................................................. 27
Constitution, treaty, and statutes:
U.S. Const.:
Art. I:
§ 2, Cl. 1 ...................................................................... 29
§ 8 ............................................................................... 29
Cl. 1........................................................................ 30
Taxing Clause ................................................... 30
Cl. 4........................................................................ 31
Bankruptcy Clause .......................................... 30
 VIII

Constitution, treaty, and statutes—Continued: Page

Naturalization Clause ...................................... 31
§ 9, Cl. 6 ...................................................................... 31
Port Preference Clause ....................................... 31
Art. II:
§ 1:
Cl. 3........................................................................ 29
Cl. 4........................................................................ 31
Presidential Vote Clause ................................. 31
§ 2, Cl. 2 (Appointments Clause).............................. 29
Art. III .............................................................................. 30
Art. IV .................................................................. 10, 28, 30
§ 3:
Cl. 1........................................................................ 29
Cl. 2.................................................................... 6, 29
Territory Clause .............................. 5, 10, 28, 36
Amend. V ............................................................ 5, 7, 11, 12
Double Jeopardy Clause ........................................... 30
Due Process Clause .......................................... passim
Amend. XIV ..................................................................... 32
§ 1 (Equal Protection Clause) ...........10, 30, 31, 32, 33
Amend. XVII, Cl. 1.......................................................... 29
Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, Art. IX,
30 Stat. 1759 (proclaimed Apr. 11, 1899) ............................ 2
Act of July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327 ................................ 2
Act of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241,
90 Stat. 263 (48 U.S.C. 1801 note) ....................................... 3
90 Stat. 268 (§ 502(a)(1)) ................................................. 27
48 U.S.C. 1801 .............................................................. 3, 3a
Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 ............................................ 2
Organic Act of Puerto Rico, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 953
et seq. ...................................................................................... 2
 IX

Statutes—Continued: Page
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 .................................... 26
Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620
(42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.):
§ 1101(a), 49 Stat. 647 ..................................................... 25
42 U.S.C. 401 .................................................................... 20
42 U.S.C. 402(a) ............................................................... 20
42 U.S.C. 404(b)(1) ............................................................ 7
42 U.S.C. 410(h)-(i) .......................................................... 20
42 U.S.C. 426(a) ............................................................... 20
42 U.S.C. 502 .................................................................... 26
42 U.S.C. 503 .................................................................... 20
42 U.S.C. 801(a)(2)........................................................... 26
42 U.S.C. 1301(a)(1) ................................................... 20, 26
42 U.S.C. 1308(f )-(g)........................................................ 26
42 U.S.C. 1381 .................................................................... 4
42 U.S.C. 1381 note ........................................................... 4
42 U.S.C. 1381a ............................................................ 4, 1a
42 U.S.C. 1382 .................................................................... 3
42 U.S.C. 1382 note ..................................................... 4, 3a
42 U.S.C. 1382(f )(1) ..................................................... 3, 1a
42 U.S.C. 1382c ............................................................ 3, 2a
42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(1)(B)(i) ................................................ 3
42 U.S.C. 1382c(e) ............................................................. 3
42 U.S.C. 1383 .................................................................... 3
42 U.S.C. 1383 note ........................................................... 4
42 U.S.C. 1383(b)(1)(A) ..................................................... 7
42 U.S.C. 1384 note ........................................................... 4
42 U.S.C. 1385 note ........................................................... 4
42 U.S.C. 1395i ................................................................. 20
42 U.S.C. 1395w-114(a) ................................................... 26
 X

Statutes—Continued: Page
42 U.S.C. 1396d(b) ........................................................... 26
42 U.S.C. 1760(f ).............................................................. 26
Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No.
81-734, 64 Stat.:
§ 104(a), 64 Stat. 498 ....................................................... 26
§ 107, 64 Stat. 517 ............................................................ 26
Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-603, Tit. III, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465-1478 ........................... 3
Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. 1100 et seq. .............................. 31
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. 1201 et seq. .......................................................... 32
Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. 511 et seq. ...................... 32
7 U.S.C. 2012(r) ...................................................................... 26
26 U.S.C. 32 ............................................................................ 26
26 U.S.C. 36B ......................................................................... 26
26 U.S.C. 881-882 ................................................................... 16
26 U.S.C. 933 .................................................................... 16, 20
26 U.S.C. 2209 ........................................................................ 16
26 U.S.C. 3121(e) ................................................................... 20
26 U.S.C. 3306( j) .................................................................... 20
26 U.S.C. 4081-4084 ............................................................... 16
26 U.S.C. 4181-4182 ............................................................... 16
26 U.S.C. 4251-4254 ............................................................... 16
26 U.S.C. 4261-4263 ............................................................... 16
26 U.S.C. 4375-4377 ............................................................... 16
26 U.S.C. 4401-4424 ............................................................... 17
26 U.S.C. 5001-5690 ............................................................... 17
26 U.S.C. 5701-5763 ............................................................... 17
26 U.S.C. 7652(a) ................................................................... 17
26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(4)-(5) ......................................................... 16
26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9)-(10) ....................................................... 16
 XI

Statutes—Continued: Page
48 U.S.C. 1-2241 ..................................................................... 35
Ch. 4, 48 U.S.C. 731 et seq..................................................... 35
48 U.S.C. 731-916............................................................. 36
48 U.S.C. 734 .............................................................. 15, 17
48 U.S.C. 739-740............................................................. 17
Puerto Rico Internal Revenue Code:
§ 1021.01(a)....................................................................... 17
§ 1022.01(b) ...................................................................... 17
§ 1022.02(b)(2) .................................................................. 17

Miscellaneous:
House Committee on Ways and Means, 115th Cong.,
2d Sess., Green Book: Background Material and
Data on the Programs within the Jurisdiction of
the Committee on Ways and Means (2018) ............... 20, 26
79 Cong. Rec. 6902 (1935) ..................................................... 15
96 Cong. Rec. 8891 (1950) ..................................................... 15
118 Cong. Rec. 33,991 (1972) ................................................ 15
122 Cong. Rec. 6244 (1976) ................................................... 24
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Report of the Undersecretary’s Advisory Group on
Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands (1976) ....... 24
H.R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ............... 15
Letter from R.L. Doughton, Chairman, House
Committee on Ways and Means, to William Green,
President, American Federation of Labor
(Apr. 19, 1935), in 79 Cong. Rec. 6902 (1935) .................. 25
Steven Maguire, Congressional Research Service,
R41028, The Rum Excise Tax Cover-Over:
Legislative History and Current Issues
(Sept. 20, 2012) .................................................................... 17
 XII

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page
Press Release, U.S. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Biden Statement on Puerto Rico (June 7, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2021/06/07/statement-by-
president-joseph-r-biden-jr-on-puerto-rico/ .................... 40
Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to the
Secretary of War, Re: The Political Status of
Porto Rico, in Civil Government for Porto Rico:
Hearings on S. 4604 before the Senate Committee
on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914) ..................................................................... 35
Memorandum from Michael Stephens, Supervisory
Actuary, Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Secu-
rity Administration, to Steve Goss, Chief Actuary,
Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security Admin-
istration, Estimated Change in Federal SSI
Program Cost for Potential Extension of SSI
Eligibility to Residents of Certain U.S. Territories
- INFORMATION (June 11, 2020), https://www.
ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/SSIEligExt_20200611.pdf ........ 18
S. Rep. No. 1310, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)..................... 15
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 109th
Cong., 2d Sess., JCX-24-06, An Overview of the
Special Tax Rules Related to Puerto Rico and an
Analysis of the Tax and Economic Policy Implica-
tions of Recent Legislative Options (Joint Comm.
Print 2006) ..................................................................... 15, 16
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-14-31, Puerto
Rico: Information on How Statehood Would
Potentially Affect Selected Federal Programs and
Revenue Sources (Mar. 2014) .......................... 15, 16, 20, 21
U.S. Social Security Administration, SSI Monthly
Statistics, April 2021 (released May 2021) ........................ 3
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 20-303
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
JOSE LUIS VAELLO-MADERO

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-37a)
is reported at 956 F.3d 12. The opinion and order of the
district court (Pet. App. 38a-49a) is reported at 356
F. Supp. 3d 208. An additional opinion and order of the
district court (Pet. App. 50a-60a) is reported at 313
F. Supp. 3d 370.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
April 10, 2020. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
granted on March 1, 2021. The jurisdiction of this Court
rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Relevant statutory provisions are reprinted in an ap-
pendix to this brief. App., infra, 1a-4a.

(1)
 2

STATEMENT
A. Legal Background
1. “Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United
States that has no parallel in our history.” Examining
Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 596 (1976). The island became a
territory of the United States in 1898, as a result of the
Spanish-American War. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,
136 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2016). The treaty that ended the
conflict and ceded the island to the United States pro-
vided that Congress would determine the “political sta-
tus” of the island’s inhabitants. Treaty of Paris, Dec.
10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, Art. IX, 30 Stat. 1759 (proclaimed
Apr. 11, 1899). “In the ensuing hundred-plus years, the
United States and Puerto Rico have forged a unique po-
litical relationship, built on the island’s evolution into a
constitutional democracy exercising local self-rule.”
Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868. That relationship,
founded on mutual respect, has benefited both the peo-
ple of Puerto Rico and the United States. Id. at 1874.
In 1900, Congress established a civilian government
for Puerto Rico and granted it significant autonomy
over internal affairs. See Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat.
77; Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1868. In 1917, Congress
granted the island’s inhabitants U.S. citizenship. See
Organic Act of Puerto Rico, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 953.
Then, in 1952, Congress approved a constitution framed
and ratified by the Puerto Rican people. Act of July 3,
1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327. Before ratification, Congress
removed a provision recognizing various social welfare
rights, including “entitlements to food, housing, medical
care, and employment,” and prohibited any future
amendment that would restore that provision. Sanchez
Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1869.
 3

2. This case concerns Puerto Rico residents’ eligibil-

ity for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a program
administered by the Social Security Administration
that provides monthly cash payments to aged, blind,
and disabled individuals who lack the financial means to
support themselves. See Social Security Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, Tit. III, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465-
1478. To qualify for SSI benefits, a person must be
blind, disabled, or at least 65 years old; must have in-
come and assets that fall below specified limits; and
must satisfy certain other criteria. 42 U.S.C. 1382,
1382c, 1383. Nearly eight million individuals receive
SSI payments each month, and the average monthly
federal benefit is around $585. See Social Security Ad-
ministration, SSI Monthly Statistics, April 2021, Tbl. 2
(released May 2021).
When Congress created SSI in 1972, it made the pro-
gram available in the 50 States and the District of Co-
lumbia, but not in Puerto Rico or other Territories.
Congress provided, subject to exceptions not at issue
here, that a person must be “a resident of the United
States” to qualify for SSI, 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(1)(B)(i),
and that a person who stays “outside the United States”
for the entirety of a month may not receive SSI benefits
for that month, 42 U.S.C. 1382(f )(1). Congress defined
the term “ ‘United States’ ” for purposes of those provi-
sions to mean “the 50 States and the District of Colum-
bia.” 42 U.S.C. 1382c(e).
In 1976, Congress extended SSI to the Northern
Mariana Islands, fulfilling a commitment made by the
United States in the covenant to establish the Islands
as a Commonwealth. See 48 U.S.C. 1801; Act of Mar.
24, 1976 (Covenant), Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (48
U.S.C. 1801 note). But Congress has not similarly ex-
tended SSI to Puerto Rico or other Territories.
 4

Congress instead provides federal assistance to

needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals in Puerto
Rico through a different program: Aid to the Aged,
Blind, and Disabled (AABD). Pet. App. 32a. AABD
originally operated in the States and District of Colum-
bia, as well as Puerto Rico. Id. at 32a. In 1972, Con-
gress replaced AABD with SSI in the States and Dis-
trict of Columbia while leaving it in place in Puerto Rico.
Ibid. AABD provides more local control, but less fed-
eral funding, than SSI. Under SSI, the federal govern-
ment sets eligibility criteria, determines the amount of
the federal benefits, and pays the full amount of those
benefits and the associated administrative costs.
42 U.S.C. 1381, 1381a. Under AABD, by contrast, the
government of Puerto Rico sets its own income and as-
set limits and determines its own benefit amounts, while
the federal government covers 75% of the benefits and
50% of the administrative costs, subject to a statutory
cap on total expenditures. 42 U.S.C. 1381 note, 1382
note, 1383 note, 1384 note, 1385 note. The income limits
and benefit levels that the government of Puerto Rico
has set for AABD are lower than those that the federal
government has set for SSI. Pet. App. 32a-33a & n.27.
AABD thus covers fewer people and provides a lower
level of benefits than SSI would if it were available in
Puerto Rico. Id. at 32a-33a.
3. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per cu-
riam), this Court, on direct appeal, summarily reversed
a district court’s decision holding that Congress’s deci-
sion not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico vio-
lated the Constitution. Id. at 2-3, 5. In particular, the
Court rejected the contention that the statutory scheme
“unconstitutionally burdened the right of interstate
travel” of individuals who “mov[ed] to Puerto Rico”
from the mainland United States and “lost the benefits
 5

to which they were entitled while residing in the United

States.” Id. at 2-4. The Court explained that it “ha[d]
never held that the constitutional right to travel em-
braces any such doctrine.” Id. at 4. The Court instead
concluded that, “[s]o long as its judgments are rational,
and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to tackle the
problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a
constitutional straitjacket.” Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
The Court observed that “[a]t least three reasons have
been advanced to explain the exclusion of persons in
Puerto Rico from the SSI program”: (1) “because of the
unique tax status of Puerto Rico, its residents do not
contribute to the public treasury”; (2) “the cost of in-
cluding Puerto Rico would be extremely great”; and (3)
“inclusion in the SSI program might seriously disrupt
the Puerto Rican economy.” Id. at 5 n.7.
The Court in Torres noted that the complaint in one
of the cases before it had also relied on the equal-
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment in challenging Congress’s decision
not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico. 435 U.S.
at 3 n.4. The Court observed that the district court in
that case “apparently acknowledged that Congress has
the power to treat Puerto Rico differently, and that
every federal program does not have to be extended to
it.” Ibid.
Two years later, in Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651
(1980) (per curiam), this Court summarily reversed a
district court’s decision holding that another federal
benefits program, Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren, denied equal protection by providing a lower level
of reimbursement for Puerto Rico than for the States
and the District of Columbia. The Court explained that,
under the Territory Clause of the Constitution, U.S.
Const. Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2, Congress “may treat Puerto
 6

Rico differently from States so long as there is a ra-

tional basis for its actions.” Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652.
The Court noted that, in Torres, it had “concluded that
a similar statutory classification was rationally
grounded on three factors: Puerto Rican residents do
not contribute to the federal treasury; the cost of treat-
ing Puerto Rico as a State under the statute would be
high; and greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Ri-
can economy.” Id. at 652. The Court observed that the
“same considerations” supported the different treat-
ment of Puerto Rico under the Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children program, and it “s[aw] no reason to
depart from [its] conclusion in Torres that they suf-
fice[d] to form a rational basis for the challenged statu-
tory classification.” Ibid.
B. Factual Background And Proceedings Below
1. Respondent Jose Luis Vaello Madero is a United
States citizen who suffers from “severe health prob-
lems.” Pet. App. 3a. Respondent lived in New York
from 1985 to 2013, and he started receiving SSI pay-
ments there in 2012. Ibid.
Respondent moved from New York to Puerto Rico in
July 2013 and, as a result, lost his eligibility to receive
SSI benefits. Pet. App. 3a-4a. But respondent failed to
notify the Social Security Administration of his move,
and the agency continued to make SSI payments to him
through his bank account in New York for several more
years. Id. at 3a-4a, 39a. The agency eventually became
aware of respondent’s change of residence in 2016, and
it informed him that it was discontinuing his SSI bene-
fits with retroactive effect. Id. at 3a-4a.
2. Congress has directed the Social Security Admin-
istration to seek “proper adjustment or recovery” when
it “finds that more * * * than the correct amount of
 7

benefits has been paid.” 42 U.S.C. 1383(b)(1)(A). The

agency may waive recoupment when the beneficiary “is
without fault” and recoupment would “defeat the pur-
pose of [the statute] or would be against equity and good
conscience,” 42 U.S.C. 404(b)(1), but respondent has not
applied for such a waiver here. The government sued
respondent in August 2017 in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico, seeking restitu-
tion of $28,081 in SSI benefits that it had incorrectly
paid him from August 2013 to August 2016. Pet. App.
4a, 40a. Respondent filed an answer in which he chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Congress’s exclusion of
Puerto Rico from SSI. Id. at 5a.
The district court granted respondent’s motion for
summary judgment, denied the government’s cross-
motion for summary judgment, and held that Con-
gress’s decision not to extend the SSI program to
Puerto Rico violates the equal-protection component of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pet.
App. 38a-49a. The court suggested that Congress may
have excluded Puerto Rico in order to harm citizens “of
Hispanic origin,” but found it unnecessary to consider
that theory further because it believed that the exclu-
sion of Puerto Rico failed “rational basis scrutiny.” Id.
at 45a-46a. The court concluded that “the principal pur-
pose of the statute is to impose inequality,” and it re-
jected the government’s contentions that the statute re-
flected valid distinctions between Puerto Rico and the
States. Id. at 46a (brackets and citation omitted). In a
footnote, the court dismissed this Court’s precedents in
Torres and Rosario, explaining that it could not “simply
bind itself ” to those decisions and “ignore important
subsequent developments in the constitutional land-
scape.” Id. at 47a n.7.
 8

3. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1a-37a.

The court of appeals first rejected the government’s
contention that this Court’s decisions in Torres and Ro-
sario controlled the outcome of this case. Pet. App. 8a-
19a. The court stated that neither Torres nor Rosario
considered whether the SSI program’s exclusion of res-
idents of Puerto Rico denied equal protection, because
Torres involved the right to travel rather than equal
protection, and Rosario involved Aid to Families with
Dependent Children rather than SSI. Pet. App. 14a.
The court further emphasized that Torres and Rosario
were “[s]ummary dispositions.” Id. at 15a.
The court of appeals also found unpersuasive the
government’s argument that, even apart from Torres
and Rosario, Congress had rational grounds for exclud-
ing Puerto Rico from the SSI program. Pet. App. 19a-
37a. The court rejected the government’s argument
that the exclusion of Puerto Rico from the program
could be justified by Puerto Rico’s “unique tax status”
—in particular, by the fact “that residents of Puerto
Rico do not, as a general matter, pay federal income
taxes.” Id. at 20a (citations omitted). The court found
income taxes to be irrelevant to the SSI program be-
cause “any individual eligible for SSI benefits almost by
definition earns too little to be paying federal income
taxes.” Id. at 27a. The court also rejected the govern-
ment’s argument that “the cost of including Puerto Rico
residents in the SSI program is a rational basis for their
exclusion,” concluding that “cost alone does not support
differentiating individuals.” Id. at 29a, 31a. Finally, the
court stated that the government had not relied on
Torres’s and Rosario’s economic-disruption rationale
for Congress’s decision not to extend the SSI program
to Puerto Rico, and the court in any event rejected that
rationale as “dubious.” Id. at 18a.
 9

The court of appeals also relied upon the United

States’ agreement, as part of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands’ covenant to enter into a political union with the
United States, to make SSI available in that Territory.
Pet. App. 34a. The court concluded that Congress’s de-
cision to extend SSI to the Northern Mariana Islands
“undercuts” the rationales for Puerto Rico’s exclusion
from the program. Ibid.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The court of appeals held that Congress’s decision
not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico lacks a
rational basis and therefore is unconstitutional. The
court’s decision is incorrect.
This Court’s decisions in Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S.
1 (1978) (per curiam), and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651 (1980) (per curiam), establish that Puerto Rico’s
unique tax status provides a rational basis for excluding
it from programs such as SSI. Residents of Puerto Rico
are generally exempt from most federal taxes, including
the income tax, excise taxes, and estate and gift taxes.
Congress could rationally conclude that a jurisdiction
that makes a reduced contribution to the general fed-
eral treasury should receive a reduced share of the ben-
efits funded by the general treasury. And that consid-
eration carries additional force since including Puerto
Rico in the program would cost the federal government
around two billion dollars each year.
The exemptions from federal taxes also enable
Puerto Rico to levy higher territorial taxes and use the
revenues from those taxes to support its own expendi-
tures to promote the general welfare of its residents.
For example, Puerto Rico could decide whether to
spend its tax revenues to furnish additional aid to needy
 10

aged, blind, or disabled residents. Congress could ra-

tionally conclude that the Commonwealth’s legislature
is best positioned to assess local conditions in Puerto
Rico and address the circumstances of its neediest aged,
blind, and disabled residents. That arrangement, under
which Puerto Rico exercises a significant measure of fis-
cal autonomy, is consistent with Puerto Rico’s “distinc-
tive, indeed exceptional, status as a self-governing
Commonwealth.” Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S.
Ct. 1863, 1874 (2016).
2. Respondent argues that Congress’s decision not
to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico is subject to
and fails heightened scrutiny. That, too, is incorrect.
This Court correctly recognized in Rosario that Con-
gress may treat a Territory differently than the States
if it has a rational basis to do so. Article IV vests Con-
gress with plenary power to govern the Territories, and
numerous clauses of the Constitution treat Territories
differently than States. Further, the Court has long
held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
do not require geographic equality and that a legisla-
ture may treat one geographic area differently than an-
other if its actions are supported by a rational basis.
In addition, under this Court’s precedents, a classifi-
cation is suspect and thus subject to heightened scru-
tiny only when it is so rarely relevant to legitimate gov-
ernmental interests that its use can be presumed to re-
flect prejudice. The differential treatment of Puerto
Rico and other Territories does not raise those con-
cerns. Congress, consistent with the constitutional de-
sign and pursuant to its plenary power under the Terri-
tory Clause, has long treated Territories differently
than the States in numerous ways. In addressing the
myriad aspects of territorial governance, Congress
 11

must make policy judgments, both overarching and in-

terstitial, that could not properly be subject to judicial
second-guessing under heightened scrutiny.
3. For the reasons just discussed, Torres and Ro-
sario correctly held that Congress did not violate the
Constitution by treating Puerto Rico differently than
the States for purposes of the SSI program and Aid to
Families with Dependent Children. But beyond their
merits as an original matter, those decisions warrant re-
spect under the doctrine of stare decisis. Torres and
Rosario recognized and approved Congress’s
longstanding practice in treating Territories differently
in various ways, and they have generated significant re-
liance in the four decades since they were decided. Con-
gress has relied on the principles underlying those de-
cisions in maintaining or enacting numerous laws that
treat Puerto Rico differently than the States, and the
lower courts have relied on those decisions in upholding
those laws.
On the other side of the ledger, respondent has of-
fered no special justification for overruling those deci-
sions. Respondent’s circumstances forcefully illustrate
the case for enhancing aid to needy individuals in
Puerto Rico, and the President has announced that, as
a matter of policy, the Administration supports extend-
ing SSI benefits to Puerto Rico residents. But the
proper mechanism to effectuate such a change in social
welfare policy is action by Congress—not a ruling by
this Court overruling its precedents and invalidating an
Act of Congress under rational-basis review.
ARGUMENT
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides that no person shall be “deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
 12

Const. Amend. V. The Clause prohibits the federal gov-

ernment from denying a person the equal protection of
the laws. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954). The guarantees of due process and equal pro-
tection apply fully in Puerto Rico. See Examining
Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-601 (1976).
This Court’s decisions in Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S.
1 (1978) (per curiam), and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651 (1980) (per curiam), establish that Congress’s deci-
sion not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico com-
plies with the equal-protection component of the Due
Process Clause. In Torres, the Court summarily re-
versed a district court’s decision holding that the una-
vailability of SSI benefits in Puerto Rico violated the
right to travel of persons who moved from the continent
(where they would be eligible for benefits) to the island
(where they would not). 435 U.S. at 4-5. The Court ex-
plained that Congress’s decision not to extend the SSI
program to Puerto Rico rested on a rational basis given,
among other things, “the unique tax status of Puerto
Rico.” Id. at 5 n.7. In Rosario, the Court summarily
reversed a district court’s decision holding that Puerto
Rico’s differential treatment under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program denied residents of
Puerto Rico the equal protection of the laws. 446 U.S.
at 651-652. The Court explained that Congress “may
treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as
there is a rational basis for its actions.” Ibid. It ob-
served that it had held in Torres that “a similar statu-
tory classification was rationally grounded,” and it con-
cluded that the differential treatment of Puerto Rico
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children was ra-
tional for the same reasons. Id. at 652. Taken together,
 13

Torres and Rosario resolve this case. Rosario estab-

lishes that respondent’s challenge triggers rational-
basis review, and Torres and Rosario together establish
that Congress’s decision not to extend the SSI program
to Puerto Rico satisfies that standard.
The court of appeals recognized that the statute at
issue here is subject to rational-basis review, but held
that the statute fails that test. See Pet. App. 8a-37a.
Respondent, for his part, argues (Br. in Opp. 18) that
the statute should instead be subject to heightened
scrutiny. Each argument is mistaken, and neither can
justify overruling this Court’s decisions in Torres and
Rosario.
A. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Holding That Congress’s
Decision Not To Extend The SSI Program To Puerto
Rico Lacks A Rational Basis
The court of appeals recognized that it was “beyond
question” that “precedent require[d] [it] to apply ra-
tional basis review to the claim before [it].” Pet. App.
9a. The court held, however, that Congress’s decision
not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico failed that
test. Id. at 19a-37a. That was error. Both Torres and
Rosario make clear that Congress had rational grounds
for declining to extend the SSI program to residents of
Puerto Rico.
1. A court owes Congress substantial deference when it
assesses a law under the rational-basis test
A law satisfies the rational-basis test “if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Under
that test, the challenged classification begins with “a
strong presumption of validity,” and its challengers
 14

bear the burden of negating “ ‘every conceivable basis

which might support it.’ ” Id. at 314-315 (citation omit-
ted). It does not matter whether the articulated reason
“actually motivated” Congress; as long as there are
“ ‘plausible reasons’ ” for the legislation, the “ ‘inquiry is
at an end.’ ” Id. at 313-315 (citation omitted). Nor does
it matter whether Congress has produced a legislative
record in support of the classification; a classification
may instead rest on “rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data.” Id. at 315.
Under the rational-basis test, the legislature enjoys
especially broad latitude in the area of “social welfare.”
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Ben-
efits programs raise “intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems.” Id. at 487. The power to
resolve those problems belongs to Congress and state
and territorial legislatures, not to federal courts. As the
Court has recognized, “the Constitution does not em-
power this Court to second-guess [legislative bodies]
charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of poten-
tial recipients.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 546-547 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
611 (1960).
This Court should likewise accord Congress latitude
when reviewing laws concerning the Territories. In de-
ciding which federal laws and programs to extend to a
Territory, Congress may consider factors such as what
kind of relationship the Territory has with the United
States, how much fiscal and other governmental auton-
omy it exercises, how close its economic and political
ties to the United States should be, what its economic
and social conditions are, and whether the Territory
may move toward statehood or independence over time.
 15

Courts have neither the constitutional authority nor the

institutional competence to review Congress’s weighing
of those intensely political considerations.
2. Puerto Rico’s unique tax status and resulting fiscal
autonomy provide a rational basis for the decision
not to extend the SSI program to its residents
In Torres and Rosario, this Court found that Puerto
Rico’s tax status justified its exclusion from the SSI
program. See Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652; Torres, 435 U.S.
at 5 n.7. Members of Congress, too, have cited Puerto
Rico’s tax status in explaining why they have voted to
treat it differently in federal benefits programs. See,
e.g., S. Rep. No. 1310, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978); 118
Cong. Rec. 33,991 (1972) (statement of Sen. Long); 96
Cong. Rec. 8891 (1950) (statement of Sen. George); H.R.
Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1949) (1949
House Report); 79 Cong. Rec. 6902 (1935) (statement of
Rep. Santiago Iglesias inserting into the Congressional
Record correspondence of Rep. Doughton). That ra-
tionale satisfies the rational-basis test.
a. As this Court observed in Torres, Congress has
long accorded Puerto Rico a “unique tax status.”
Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7. Under federal law, “internal
revenue laws” do not extend to Puerto Rico, except
when Congress provides otherwise. 48 U.S.C. 734.
Congress sometimes does provide otherwise, but even
when doing so it often treats Puerto Rico differently
than the States and other Territories. See U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office, GAO-14-315, Puerto Rico:
Information on How Statehood Would Potentially Af-
fect Selected Federal Programs and Revenue Sources
100-109 (Mar. 2014) (GAO Report); Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., JCX-24-
06, An Overview of the Special Tax Rules Related to
 16

Puerto Rico and an Analysis of the Tax and Economic

Policy Implications of Recent Legislative Options 2-3
(Joint Comm. 2006) (Joint Committee Report).
The upshot of those laws is that residents of Puerto
Rico are exempt from a broad range of federal taxes.
For example:
• Individual income tax. Residents of Puerto Rico
generally owe no federal income tax on income
from sources in Puerto Rico. 26 U.S.C. 933. That
exemption saves residents of the island an esti-
mated $2 billion a year. GAO Report 101.
• Corporate income tax. The Internal Revenue
Code treats corporations incorporated in Puerto
Rico as foreign rather than domestic entities.
26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(4)-(5) and (9)-(10). As a result,
such corporations usually owe federal income tax
only on income connected with the mainland
United States, not on income connected with
Puerto Rico or other parts of the world. 26 U.S.C.
881-882.
• Estate and gift tax. Certain residents of Puerto
Rico owe no federal estate or gift taxes on prop-
erty in Puerto Rico. See 26 U.S.C. 2209.
• Excise taxes. Congress has declined to extend
most federal excise taxes to Puerto Rico. See
Joint Committee Report 19. For example, Puerto
Rico generally is not subject to federal excise
taxes on motor fuel, 26 U.S.C. 4081-4084; fire-
arms, 26 U.S.C. 4181-4182; telephone lines, 26
U.S.C. 4251-4254; aviation, 26 U.S.C. 4261-4263;
health insurance, 26 U.S.C. 4375-4377, wagering,
26 U.S.C. 4401-4424; alcohol, 26 U.S.C. 5001-5690;
or tobacco, 26 U.S.C. 5701-5763.
 17

In practical terms, Puerto Rico’s tax status means

that much of the revenue that would have flowed into
the federal treasury can flow into the territorial treas-
ury instead. That is so because Puerto Rico can replace
the inapplicable federal taxes with its own territorial
taxes. For example, Puerto Rico has taken advantage
of its exemption from federal income tax by imposing a
territorial individual income tax of up to 33% for the
highest bracket—well above the typical rate in the
States. Puerto Rico Internal Revenue Code § 1021.01(a).
Puerto Rico has likewise taken advantage of its exemp-
tion from the federal corporate tax by imposing a terri-
torial corporate tax of up to 37.5%—again, well above
the typical rate in the States. Id. § 1022.01(b),
1022.02(b)(2).
In addition, Congress has made some federal taxes
applicable in Puerto Rico but has channeled the pro-
ceeds to the territorial rather than the federal treasury.
For example, federal excise taxes apply to some articles
made in Puerto Rico, but the federal treasury must
cover over the proceeds to the territorial treasury.
26 U.S.C. 7652(a), 48 U.S.C. 734. Federal customs du-
ties likewise apply in Puerto Rico, but the federal treas-
ury again must cover over the proceeds to the territorial
treasury. 48 U.S.C. 739-740. Puerto Rico receives hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in covered-over revenues
each year. See Steven Maguire, Congressional Re-
search Service, R41028, The Rum Excise Tax Cover-
Over: Legislative History and Current Issues (Sept.
20, 2012).
b. Puerto Rico’s tax status provides a rational basis
for Congress’s decision not to extend the SSI program
to the island’s inhabitants. Congress could rationally
conclude that a jurisdiction that makes a reduced con-
 18

tribution to the federal treasury should receive a re-

duced share of the benefits funded by that treasury.
Congress has a legitimate interest in maintaining a bal-
anced fiscal relationship with the Territories. The Con-
stitution does not require Congress to grant the Terri-
tories the full fiscal benefits that it has chosen to accord
the States even though they do not bear the full fiscal
burdens.
Indeed, this Court has recognized that the govern-
ment has a legitimate interest in “saving money” and
“protecting the fiscal integrity of government pro-
grams.” Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 373
(1988). The Court has often relied on that interest in
upholding classifications under rational-basis review.
See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673,
682 (2012) (“administrative costs”); Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 493
(1977) (“protection of the fiscal integrity of the fund”);
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356, 365 (1973) (“fiscal reasons”); Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83, 90 (1940) (“difficulties and expenses”).
In Torres, this Court noted that the cost of including
Puerto Rico in the SSI program would be “extremely
great—an estimated $300 million per year.” 435 U.S. at
5 n.7. According to an estimate made by actuaries at
the Social Security Administration, that cost now would
be between $1.8 billion and $2.5 billion per year over the
next ten years, and approximately $23 billion over the
next decade as a whole. See Memorandum from Mi-
chael Stephens, Supervisory Actuary, Office of the
Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration, to Steve
Goss, Chief Actuary, Office of the Chief Actuary, Social
Security Administration, Estimated Change in Federal
SSI Program Cost for Potential Extension of SSI Eli-
 19

gibility to Residents of Certain U.S. Territories – IN-

FORMATION 2 (June 11, 2020). Those figures under-
score the rationality of Congress’s decision not to ex-
tend the SSI program to Puerto Rico while according
the island preferential tax treatment.
That consideration carries additional weight because
Congress has separately addressed these issues
through the AABD program and has facilitated a
stream of revenue for the Commonwealth by exempting
its residents from most federal taxes. Congress could
rationally conclude that, since much of the tax revenue
that would normally go to the federal treasury goes to
the territorial treasury instead, the territorial treasury
should correspondingly shoulder some of the burden of
funding various benefits programs in Puerto Rico. This
Court has held that classifications in federal benefits
programs may properly rest on a judgment that “States
should * * * have the primary responsibility” for a
given class of people and that Congress “legitimately
may assume that the States would, or should,” meet the
needs of those individuals. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. 221, 237-238 (1981). Congress likewise could ra-
tionally conclude that, given Puerto Rico’s special tax
status under federal law, the Commonwealth, with fed-
eral assistance through the AABD program, should
bear primary responsibility for providing benefits to
needy aged, blind, and disabled residents.
c. Puerto Rico’s tax status provides a rational basis
for its exclusion from the SSI program even though, as
the court of appeals observed, residents of Puerto Rico
make some contributions to the federal treasury. Pet.
App. 20a-23a. In particular, employees, employers, and
self-employed individuals in Puerto Rico are subject to
Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes (also known
 20

as FICA taxes or payroll taxes), as well as unemploy-

ment taxes. See Pet. App. 22a-23a; 26 U.S.C. 3121(e),
3306( j). Those taxes fund specific programs. FICA
taxes go to trust funds dedicated to Social Security and
Medicare, and employees and self-employed individuals
who pay those taxes generally receive personal entitle-
ments to benefits under those programs. See 42 U.S.C.
401, 402(a), 426(a), 1395i. Unemployment taxes, in turn,
fund unemployment benefits. See 42 U.S.C. 503. Each
of those programs is available in Puerto Rico. See 42
U.S.C. 410(h)-(i), 1301(a)(1); House Committee on Ways
and Means, 115th Cong., 2d Sess., Green Book: Back-
ground Material and Data on the Programs within the
Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means
App. A (2018). Congress could rationally conclude that
residents of Puerto Rico should participate in specific
programs that they help fund (such as Social Security,
Medicare, and unemployment benefits), but not in pro-
grams that they generally do not help fund (such as
SSI).
Some Puerto Rico residents do pay some federal in-
come taxes. See Pet. App. 22a-23a. For instance, fed-
eral employees in Puerto Rico owe federal income tax
on their federal salaries, and other residents of Puerto
Rico owe federal income tax on income earned outside
Puerto Rico. 26 U.S.C. 933. But one source estimates
that, in 2010, the federal government collected only
about $20 million as a result of such payments—
compared to the more than $2 billion it would have col-
lected if Puerto Rico had been a State. GAO Report
101. 1

1
The court of appeals stated that residents of Puerto Rico pay
more than $4 billion a year to the federal treasury, but that figure
includes the employment taxes discussed above. See Pet. App. 21a.
 21

Those limited federal income-tax payments do not

render irrational the denial of SSI benefits in Puerto
Rico. The rational-basis test allows “rough accommo-
dations”; it does not demand “mathematical nicety.”
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted). Con-
gress may rely on the general rule that federal taxes do
not apply in Puerto Rico, even though some residents of
Puerto Rico do pay some federal taxes in some circum-
stances. Further, just as some residents of Puerto Rico
pay some taxes to the federal treasury, so too residents
of Puerto Rico receive some benefits funded by the fed-
eral treasury. For example, residents of Puerto Rico
receive benefits under Medicaid, the Children’s Health
Insurance Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, the Head Start Program, the National School
Lunch Program, the Federal Direct Student Loan Pro-
gram, the Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Pro-
gram, the Public Housing Operating Fund, and the
Public Housing Capital Fund, among others—although
even under those programs, Congress does not always
treat Puerto Rico identically to the States. See GAO
Report 15-21. Congress could rationally conclude, how-
ever, that because residents of Puerto Rico do not pay
the full range of taxes paid by residents of the States,
they should not receive the full range of benefits avail-
able in the States.
d. Congress’s decision not to extend SSI benefits to
Puerto Rico is not undermined by the fact that, as the
court of appeals noted, individuals who receive SSI ben-
efits “almost by definition earn too little to be paying
federal income taxes.” Pet. App. 27a. The rational-
basis test allows a legislature to rely on general catego-
ries; the legislature need not make “case-by-case,” “in-
dividualized” judgments. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47,
52 (1977). In determining spending policy for Puerto
 22

Rico, therefore, Congress may rationally choose to con-

centrate on the tax status of the Commonwealth and its
population as a whole. Congress need not consider the
tax status of particular individuals such as respondent.
In addition, residents of Puerto Rico benefit from the
Commonwealth’s tax status even if they earn too little
money to owe federal income tax if that tax applied in
Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico’s tax status frees those indi-
viduals from the burden of other federal taxes that ap-
ply regardless of income level, such as excise taxes on
motor fuel and telephone lines. See p. 16, supra. Those
individuals also benefit from living in a jurisdiction that
retains its own tax revenues, because the territorial
government can use that money to fund various govern-
mental services. See pp. 17, 19, supra. Even from the
perspective of individuals such as respondent, then,
Puerto Rico’s distinctive status under federal tax law
provides a rational basis for its exclusion from the SSI
program.
3. The interest in advancing self-government and
longstanding practice reinforce the rationality of
Congress’s decision not to extend the SSI program to
Puerto Rico
Two additional considerations confirm that Congress
acted rationally in deciding not to extend the SSI pro-
gram to Puerto Rico while instead contributing to the
provision of benefits under AABD, which vests more
control in the Commonwealth to determine social wel-
fare policy.
First, Congress could rationally conclude that these
arrangements promote Puerto Rico’s ability to govern
itself. Puerto Rico’s status as a Commonwealth affords
it a great degree of autonomy and self-determination.
In particular, the Commonwealth functions as a largely
 23

autonomous fiscal unit: it imposes its own taxes in lieu

of inapplicable federal taxes, receives the covered-over
proceeds of some federal taxes that do apply there, and
decides for itself how to spend the revenue it receives.
As relevant here, Puerto Rico could use the money to
increase benefit levels in the AABD program, the coop-
erative territorial-federal benefits program that applies
in Puerto Rico instead of SSI. See p. 19, supra. AABD
provides more local control than SSI: the federal gov-
ernment sets both the standard of need and the amount
of federal benefits under SSI, but the government of
Puerto Rico sets the standard of need and the amount
of benefits under AABD. Puerto Rico also could decide
to use the money to fund a territorial supplement out-
side the AABD program. Or it could spend the money
on something else. Leaving those choices to the Com-
monwealth is a rational means of respecting and ad-
vancing “local self-rule” and “self-governance” on the
island. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863,
1868 (2016).
Congress could also rationally conclude that Puerto
Rico should have this autonomy because the territorial
government is best positioned to tailor its laws and pro-
grams to reflect “local conditions.” San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41
(1973) (citation omitted). Economic and other condi-
tions in Puerto Rico differ from those in the States, and
Congress could properly conclude that those differ-
ences counsel caution in extending taxing and spending
policies applicable in the States to Puerto Rico. By the
same token, Congress could properly conclude that
Puerto Rico should instead make its own taxing and
spending decisions in certain areas, in keeping with its
“distinctive, indeed exceptional, status as a self-govern-
ing Commonwealth.” Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1874.
 24

In that way, the Commonwealth’s legislature can make

its own judgments about how best to promote the gen-
eral welfare in light of local conditions, including decid-
ing for itself how much money is called for to aid needy
aged, blind, and disabled people in the Commonwealth.
See p. 19, supra; 122 Cong. Rec. 6244 (1976) (statement
of Sen. Long) (observing that such local control permits
the adoption of “locally developed plans” that are “tai-
lored” to Puerto Rico’s distinct circumstances). 2
To be sure, the increased local control comes at a
price. The federal government pays 100% of the federal
benefits and related administrative costs under SSI, but
only 75% of the benefits and 50% of the administrative
costs under AABD. See p. 4, supra. In addition, be-
cause aid to Puerto Rico under AABD is subject to a
statutory cap, total federal expenditures under AABD
are lower than they would be under SSI. See p. 4, su-
pra. But the Constitution leaves Congress with broad
discretion to use different programs to address similar

2
In Torres and Rosario, this Court stated without further elabo-
ration that including Puerto Rico in the SSI program “might seri-
ously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.” Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7;
see Rosario, 446 U.S. at 652. Although the court of appeals found
that the government had not relied on an economic-disruption ra-
tionale below, Pet. App. 16a, 18a, the government briefly argued in
the petition for a writ of certiorari (at 13-14) that extending SSI ben-
efits to Puerto Rico might discourage people from working. That
proposition, however, has been disputed as an empirical matter. See
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report of the Un-
dersecretary’s Advisory Group on Puerto Rico, Guam and the Vir-
gin Islands 22 (1976). Following the change in Administration, the
United States has concluded that economic conditions in Puerto
Rico are more appropriately considered as a further justification for
Congress’s decision to respect Puerto Rico’s fiscal autonomy and to
leave it to the Commonwealth’s legislature to determine the appro-
priate level of benefits for its aged, blind, and disabled residents.
 25

issues among different categories. For example, Con-

gress may create different retirement programs for dif-
ferent classes of railroad employees. See United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-
179 (1980). Or it may use different disability systems
for different parts of the Civil Service. See Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 103-112 (1979). Under the Due
Process Clause, the task of weighing the advantages of
increased local control against the disadvantages of re-
duced federal funding belongs to Congress, not the fed-
eral courts.
Second, this Court has explained that congressional
practice carries significant weight in constitutional in-
terpretation. See Financial Oversight & Management
Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC,
140 S. Ct. 1649, 1659 (2020). While “[d]iscriminations of
an unusual character” can raise serious equal-protection
concerns, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768
(2013) (citations omitted), “routine” classifications usu-
ally present no constitutional problems, Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976).
The congressional practice of treating Territories
differently in federal benefits programs is as old as fed-
eral benefits programs themselves. When Congress es-
tablished Social Security in 1935, it extended the pro-
gram to the States, the District of Columbia, and the
then-Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, but not to
Puerto Rico or the other Territories. See Social Secu-
rity Act, ch. 531, § 1101(a), 49 Stat. 647. “This was done
because Puerto Rico ha[d] its own tax law and d[id] not
pay any taxes into the Treasury of the United States.”
Letter from R.L. Doughton, Chairman, House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, to William Green, President,
American Federation of Labor (Apr. 19, 1935), in 79
Cong. Rec. at 6902 (1935) (statement of Rep. Santiago
 26

Iglesias). Congress later extended Social Security ben-

efits (and corresponding Social Security taxes) to
Puerto Rico in 1950. See Social Security Act Amend-
ments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, §§ 104(a), 107, 64
Stat. 498, 517.
Differential treatment of Territories in federal ben-
efits programs remains commonplace today. Federal
unemployment compensation, for example, is available
in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, but not
American Samoa, Guam, or the Northern Mariana Is-
lands. See 42 U.S.C. 502, 1301(a)(1); Green Book App.
Tbl. A-2. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram is available in Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
but not American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Is-
lands, or Puerto Rico. 7 U.S.C. 2012(r); Green Book
App. Tbl. A-2. Temporary Assistance for Needy Fami-
lies is available in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Vir-
gin Islands, but not the Northern Mariana Islands (with
American Samoa eligible but not participating). 42
U.S.C. 602, 1301(a)(1); Green Book App. Tbl. A-2. Many
other benefits programs extend to Puerto Rico, but ap-
ply differently than in the States. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
801(a)(2) (Coronavirus Relief Fund); 42 U.S.C. 1308(f )-
(g), 1396d(b) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. 1395w-114(a) (Med-
icare); 42 U.S.C. 1760(f ) (School Lunch Program). And
because most provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
do not extend to Puerto Rico, refundable tax credits
provided by the Code, which could be thought of as a
form of benefits, generally do not extend there either.
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 32 (earned income tax credit); 26
U.S.C. 36B (tax credits under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119). The prevalence of such classifications confirms
that Congress did not lack a rational basis in declining
to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico in light of its
 27

tax status and instead providing benefits under AABD,

which provides the Commonwealth with more local con-
trol.
4. Congress also had rational grounds to treat Puerto
Rico differently than the Northern Mariana Islands
In holding that Congress violated the Constitution in
declining to extend SSI benefits to Puerto Rico, the
court of appeals found it significant that Congress in-
cluded the Northern Mariana Islands in the SSI pro-
gram. Pet. App. 34a-37a. But Congress had rational
grounds for differentiating between the two Territories.
The Northern Mariana Islands, previously part of the
United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
became a commonwealth pursuant to a negotiated cov-
enant with the United States. See pp. 3-4, supra. In
the covenant, the United States committed, among
other things, to extend “Title XVI of the Social Security
Act” (which establishes the SSI program) to the Is-
lands. Covenant, 90 Stat. 268 (§ 502(a)(1)). The United
States has never made a similar negotiated commitment
to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico. That differ-
ence provides a rational basis for extending the SSI pro-
gram to the Northern Mariana Islands but not Puerto
Rico.
In all events, under the rational-basis test, Congress
need not solve a social or economic problem in one fell
swoop. Congress “may take one step at a time”; it may
“select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,
neglecting the others.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Congress’s
decision to extend the SSI program to the Northern
Mariana Islands thus does not require it to extend the
program to other Territories.
 28

The nature of the United States’ relationship with

the Territories reinforces the foregoing arguments.
Although this Court has often emphasized the constitu-
tional equality of the States, see, e.g., Sanchez Valle, 136
S. Ct. at 1822 n.4; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 556
(1911), it has never adopted an equal-footing doctrine
for the Territories. It has instead recognized that Con-
gress may “develop innovative approaches” to address
each Territory’s distinctive needs. Sanchez Valle, 136
S. Ct. at 1876. It also has observed that Puerto Rico’s
relationship to the United States is “unique” and “ ‘has
no parallel in our history.’ ” Id. at 1868, 1876 (citation
omitted). Against that backdrop, it is not irrational for
Congress to extend different federal benefits to differ-
ent Territories.
B. Respondent Errs In Arguing That The Differential
Treatment Of Territories Warrants Heightened
Scrutiny
Respondent also argues (Br. in Opp. 12-24) that Con-
gress’s decision not to extend the SSI program to
Puerto Rico is subject to and fails heightened scrutiny.
That argument is mistaken. As this Court correctly
held in Rosario, Congress “may treat Puerto Rico dif-
ferently from States so long as there is a rational basis
for its actions.” 446 U.S. at 651-652.
1. The constitutional text establishes that Congress
may treat a Territory differently than the States if it
has a rational basis to do so
The Constitution’s text makes plain that Congress
enjoys broad latitude to treat Territories differently
than the States. Most obviously, the Territory Clause
of Article IV empowers Congress to “make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
 29

other Property belonging to the United States.” Art.

IV, § 3, Cl. 2. This Court has described the territory
power as “absolute and undisputed” and “full and com-
plete.” Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1666 (citations omitted).
The very existence of the Territory Clause establishes
that Congress may enact different laws for the Territo-
ries than for the States. As the D.C. Circuit observed
in an opinion by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, sub-
jecting limitations directed at a Territory to heightened
scrutiny “would be inconsistent with Congress’s large
powers” in this field. Quiban v. Veterans Administra-
tion, 928 F.2d 1154, 1160 (1991) (brackets, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 918 (1994).
That conclusion draws additional force from the Ad-
mission Clause, which provides that “[n]ew States may
be admitted by the Congress into this Union.” U.S.
Const. Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Admis-
sion Clause commits to Congress the responsibility to
decide when to admit a Territory into the Union and
thereby provide it with the benefits associated with
statehood. Interpreting the equal-protection guarantee
to require Congress to accord Territories the same
treatment as States would upset that textual allocation
of responsibility.
In addition, multiple provisions of the Constitution
distinguish Territories from States. For example,
States but not Territories elect Representatives, Sena-
tors, and presidential electors. See U.S. Const. Art. I,
§ 2, Cl. 1; Art. II, § 1, Cl. 3; Amend. XVII, Cl. 1. Con-
gress exercises plenary power in the Territories, but
only enumerated powers in the States. See Art. I, § 8;
Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2. The Appointments Clause does not
limit the manner of appointing territorial officers. See
 30

Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at 1658-1659. Article III judges en-

joy life tenure, but Congress may limit the tenure of Ar-
ticle IV judges. See American Insurance Co. v. 356
Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). And
States qualify as separate sovereigns for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, but Territories do not.
See Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1873. The Due Process
Clause does not condemn a distinction that other con-
stitutional provisions treat as legitimate.
2. Congress’s power to treat Territories differently than
the States draws additional support from its broader
authority to draw rational geographic distinctions
Congress’s power to treat Territories differently
than States draws reinforcement from a separate con-
stitutional principle: the equal-protection component of
the Due Process Clause allows Congress to treat one
geographic area differently than another if Congress
has a rational basis to do so.
a. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no
State may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV, § 1. That text suggests that the Equal Protection
Clause—and, by extension, the equal-protection compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause—concerns unequal
treatment of classes of persons, not unequal treatment
of regions. The text provides no foothold for applying
heightened scrutiny to purely geographic distinctions.
When the Framers wanted to limit Congress’s power
to draw geographic distinctions, they knew how to say
so. For example, the Taxing Clause requires “Duties,
Imposts and Excises” to “be uniform throughout the
United States.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1. The Nat-
uralization and Bankruptcy Clauses empower Congress
 31

to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uni-

form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States.” Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4. The Port Prefer-
ence Clause provides that “[n]o Preference shall be
given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to
the Ports of one State over those of another.” Art. I,
§ 9, Cl. 6. And the Presidential Vote Clause empowers
Congress to fix “the Day on which [the electors] shall
give their Votes; which Day shall be the same through-
out the United States.” Art. II, § 1, Cl. 4. The Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, by contrast, pri-
marily concern personal distinctions, such as those
based on race, national origin, and sex.
b. This Court’s precedents under the Due Process
Clause reflect that understanding. In Secretary of Ag-
riculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604
(1950), for example, the Court rejected a due-process
challenge to the Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.,
which imposed different sugar quotas in Puerto Rico
than in the mainland United States. 338 U.S. at 619.
The Court explained that Congress may legislate “with
due regard for the varying and fluctuating interests of
different regions.” Id. at 616. It noted that “Congress
might well have thought” that different market condi-
tions in Puerto Rico justified different quotas, and it re-
fused to “sit in judgment on the validity or the signifi-
cance of those views.” Id. at 618-619.
Likewise, in Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977),
this Court applied the rational-basis test to a law that
treated the District of Columbia differently than the
rest of the United States. Id. at 379 n.12. As the D.C.
Circuit later explained in an opinion by then-Judge
Scalia, Swain represented “a considered rejection of
[the] assertion that provisions uniquely applicable to
the District demand a higher degree of scrutiny.”
 32

United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 136 (1984) (en

banc). Swain is highly pertinent here because the
“analogy” between the District and a Territory “is an
apt one.” District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson
Co., 346 U.S. 100, 105 (1953); see, e.g., Aurelius, 140 S.
Ct. at 1658-1661, 1663-1665 (relying on the analogy be-
tween the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico).
Similarly, in Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939), the
Court upheld the Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. 511
et seq., which permitted different tobacco regulations in
different regions of the country. 306 U.S. at 13-14. The
Court rejected the contention that “mere lack of uni-
formity” violated the Due Process Clause, explaining
that Congress may “choose the * * * places to which
its regulation shall apply” and that such choices gener-
ally raise questions “of wisdom and not of power.” Id.
at 14.
So too, in Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), the
Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 1201 et seq., which imposed
different mining regulations in different regions of the
country. 452 U.S. at 330-333. The Court stated that an
equal-protection challenge to a federal law “cannot rest
solely on a statute’s lack of uniform geographic impact.”
Id. at 332.
c. This Court’s precedents on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment point in the same
direction. In Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880), lit-
tle more than a decade after the Amendment’s ratifica-
tion, the Court rejected an equal-protection challenge
to Missouri’s creation of different court systems for dif-
ferent parts of the State. Id. at 29-33. The Court ob-
served that the Equal Protection Clause “has respect to
persons and classes of persons,” not to areas. Id. at 31.
It explained that the Clause “means that no person or
 33

class of persons shall be denied the same protection of

the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and under like circum-
stances.” Ibid. (emphasis added). And it stated that,
“[i]f every person residing or being in [a] portion of the
State should be accorded the equal protection of the
laws prevailing there, he could not justly complain of a
violation.” Ibid.
In the years since Lewis, this Court has clarified that
geographic classifications are subject to rational-basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44. But the Court has otherwise
adhered to the general rule that, in the absence of irra-
tionality, “territorial uniformity is not a constitutional
requisite,” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427
(1961); that “[a] State, of course, has a wide discretion
in deciding whether laws shall operate statewide or
shall operate only in certain counties,” Griffin v.
County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); and that
the Clause “does not prohibit legislation merely be-
cause it is special, or limited in its application to a par-
ticular geographical or political subdivision,” Kadrmas
v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988)
(citation omitted). The cases applying that principle are
legion. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283-
285 (1986); North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 338-339
(1976); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551 (1954);
Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dis-
trict, 281 U.S. 74, 81 (1930); Fort Smith Light & Trac-
tion Co. v. Board of Improvement of Paving District
No. 16, 274 U.S. 387, 391 (1927); Reinman v. City of Lit-
tle Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 177 (1915); Gardner v. Michigan,
199 U.S. 325, 333-334 (1905); Chappell Chemical & Fer-
tilizer Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co. (No. 3), 172 U.S. 474,
475 (1899); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72 (1887).
 34

3. Equal-protection doctrine confirms that Congress

may treat a Territory differently than the States if it
has a rational basis to do so
This Court’s equal-protection doctrine likewise
shows that Congress may treat a Territory differently
than the States when it is rational to do so. The Court’s
modern equal-protection jurisprudence reflects a “gen-
eral rule” that “legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the stat-
ute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The Court has applied heightened
scrutiny only when (1) the classification proceeds along
suspect lines or (2) the classification affects the equal
exercise of a fundamental right. Ibid. The latter
ground for heightened scrutiny is not at issue here, as
this Court has held that a person’s interest in receiving
social welfare benefits is not a fundamental right that
triggers heightened scrutiny. See Wilson, 450 U.S. at
230-234.
In deciding whether a classification is “suspect,” this
Court has focused on whether the classification “is valid
as a general matter.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. “Clas-
sifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to
any proper legislative goal” and thus are presumed to
“reflect deep-seated prejudice.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 n.14 (1982). For example, because race is “so
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate
state interest,” the Court has presumed that racial clas-
sifications reflect “prejudice and antipathy”—a pre-
sumption that the government may overcome only by
satisfying strict scrutiny. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
Similarly, because sex “generally provides no sensible
 35

ground for differential treatment,” the Court has pre-

sumed that sex-based classifications “reflect outmoded
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women”—
a presumption that the government may overcome only
by satisfying intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 440-441. Age
classifications, by contrast, warrant only rational-basis
review, because age is often “relevant to interests the
State has authority to implement.” Id. at 441.
Residence in a Territory is not a suspect classifica-
tion under those principles. “History suggests a great
diversity of relationship between a central government
and dependent territory. The present day shows a
great variety in actual operation.” Memorandum from
Felix Frankfurter to the Secretary of War, Re: The Po-
litical Status of Porto Rico, in Civil Government for
Porto Rico: Hearings on S. 4604 before the Senate Com-
mittee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1914).
Puerto Rico illustrates those points well. “Puerto
Rico boasts ‘a relationship to the United States that has
no parallel in our history.’ ” Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at
1876 (citation omitted). The island enjoys a unique de-
gree of autonomy. See id. at 1876-1877. It has a “unique
* * * legal history.” Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 339 n.6 (1986). It has a
unique system of law, based on Spanish civil law rather
than English common law. See Puerto Rico v. Russell
& Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933). And, as noted, it also
has a “unique tax status.” Torres, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7.
Given those differences, Congress has often treated
Territories differently than States and one Territory
differently than another. In fact, a whole Title of the
U.S. Code, Title 48, is devoted to laws applicable only to
the Territories. See 48 U.S.C. 1-2241. A whole chapter
of that Title, Chapter 4, is devoted to laws applicable
 36

only to Puerto Rico. See 48 U.S.C. 731-916. Laws out-

side Title 48, too, routinely apply differently in the Ter-
ritories than in other parts of the United States. See,
e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 495 n.4 (2015) (Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act); Puerto Rico
v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938,
1942 (2016) (Bankruptcy Code); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez,
495 U.S. 182, 187 (1990) (civil-rights laws); Torres, 435
U.S. at 5 n.7 (Internal Revenue Code). No sound basis
exists to subject all of these laws to exacting judicial re-
view.
C. The Doctrine Of Stare Decisis Supports Retaining
Torres And Rosario
As discussed above, this Court held in Rosario that
Congress may treat Puerto Rico differently than the
States if it has a rational basis to do so, and held in
Torres and Rosario that Congress had rational grounds
for excluding Puerto Rico from programs such as SSI.
For the reasons explained in this brief, those holdings
were correct given the text of the Territory Clause, the
broader constitutional context, long historical practice,
and the Court’s equal-protection doctrine. But beyond
those decisions’ merits as an original matter, they de-
serve respect under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court should
begin with a strong presumption in favor of following
precedent. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
1960, 1969 (2019). A party that seeks to overcome that
presumption bears the burden of providing a special
justification—a compelling reason to overrule the deci-
sion, over and above garden-variety disagreement with
its outcome. See, e.g., Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994,
1003 (2020).
 37

Under this Court’s precedent on precedent, those

principles apply to summary reversals. Although the
Court has often noted that unexplained summary affir-
mances carry diminished precedential value, see, e.g.,
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542,
559-560 (2015), it has treated reasoned summary rever-
sals as binding precedents, see, e.g., Gonzales v.
Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185 (2006) (per curiam). It also
has consulted the usual stare decisis factors in deciding
whether to overrule earlier summary reversals. See,
e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251-253 (1998).
That makes sense. A summary reversal, unlike a sum-
mary affirmance, is usually accompanied by an opinion,
and “[w]hen an opinion issues for the Court, it is not
only the result but also those portions of the opinion
necessary to that result by which [the Court is] bound.”
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67
(1996). Further, the Court usually reserves summary
reversal for cases where “the law is settled and stable”
and “the decision below is clearly in error.” Schweiker
v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (per curiam) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Those circumstances count in fa-
vor of according stare decisis effect to Torres and Ro-
sario.
Indeed, Torres and Rosario have an especially
strong claim to stare decisis effect. They were decided
against the backdrop of and reflect Congress’s long-
standing practice of enacting different laws for Puerto
Rico and other Territories as compared to laws applica-
ble in the States. And the precedents have generated
significant reliance in the four decades since they were
decided. Congress, for example, has relied on those
precedents and the principles they reflect in maintain-
ing and refining the United States’ distinct relationship
 38

with the Territories, including with respect to what fed-

eral benefits they should receive and what federal taxes
they should pay in return.
The federal courts, too, have relied on Torres and
Rosario. The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by then-Judge
Ginsburg, described Rosario as “pathmarking” as to
both “the appropriate standard of review” (i.e., rational
basis) and “the merits” (i.e., the sufficiency of rationales
such as tax status). Quiban, 928 F.2d at 1161. Many
courts of appeals have relied on Torres and Rosario in
upholding differential treatment of the Territories.
See, e.g., United States v. Montijo-Maysonet, 974 F.3d
34, 45 (1st Cir. 2020), petition for cert. pending, No. 20-
8072 (filed May 15, 2021); Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d
118, 124 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Pollard, 326
F.3d 397, 409 n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 932
(2003); Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 390-391
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 320 (2018); Friend v.
Reno, 172 F.3d 638, 645-646 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1163 (2000); Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day
Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 385 & n.71 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988); Talon v.
Brown, 999 F.2d 514, 516-517 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1028 (1993).
Overruling Torres and Rosario also could call into
question laws that treat Territories more favorably
than the States—for instance, the laws exempting
Puerto Rico from most federal taxes. This Court has
generally applied the equal-protection guarantee in a
symmetrical way, using the same standard of scrutiny
regardless of whether the challenged law is designed to
benefit or burden a particular group. For instance, the
Court has applied heightened scrutiny to classifications
based on gender, whether the classifications favor men
 39

or women. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct.

1678, 1689-1690 (2017). Overruling Torres and Rosario
thus could jeopardize the many laws that provide bene-
fits to Territories that are not available in the States.
On the other side of the ledger, respondent has of-
fered no special justification for overruling Torres and
Rosario. Neither case was “gravely wrong the day it
was decided,” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423
(2018); to the contrary, the decisions comport with the
Constitution’s text and structure, longstanding congres-
sional practice, and the Court’s broader equal-protection
doctrine. Nor have the decisions’ foundations eroded
because of later legal or factual developments; instead,
later cases have reaffirmed the breadth of Congress’s
authority over Territories, see Aurelius, 140 S. Ct. at
1658-1659, and the deference owed to legislatures under
rational-basis review, see Armour, 566 U.S. at 680-681.
Nor have the precedents proved unworkable. The ra-
tional-basis standard they set out is straightforward to
apply and properly leaves to Congress—rather than to
the courts under heightened scrutiny—the superin-
tendence of the many aspects of the federal govern-
ment’s relationship with the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico. This case thus features none of the traditional jus-
tifications for overruling precedent, much less one sig-
nificant enough to outweigh the considerable reliance
interests on the other side of the scale.
* * * * *
Respondent’s circumstances forcefully illustrate the
case for enhancing aid to needy individuals in Puerto
Rico, either by extending the SSI program or by in-
creasing benefits through increased federal and Com-
monwealth contributions under the AABD program.
 40

Respondent observes (Br. in Opp. 1) that he is “indi-

gent” and “disabled,” and he argues that it is “unjust”
to cut off his SSI benefits simply because he has moved
to Puerto Rico “to be closer to family.” He also notes
(ibid.) that Congress’s decision not to extend the SSI
program to Puerto Rico harms “some of the nation’s
poorest disabled Americans.” The President has an-
nounced that, as a matter of policy, the Administration
supports extending SSI benefits to Puerto Rico resi-
dents. Press Release, U.S. President Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on
Puerto Rico (June 7, 2021).
Under the Constitution, however, the proper mecha-
nism for effectuating that change is action by Congress
—not a suit asking this Court to overrule its prior cases
and declare a duly enacted statute unconstitutional un-
der rational-basis review. It is to Congress that the
Constitution has entrusted the power to govern Terri-
tories and to spend money for the general welfare. Con-
gress may not, of course, deny anyone the equal protec-
tion of the laws, but that guarantee does not authorize
courts to “judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legis-
lative choices,” Beach, 508 U.S. at 313, or to decide
whether “a more just and humane system could * * *
be devised,” Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487. Congress is
fully empowered to extend SSI to Puerto Rico in light
of the concerns respondent identifies, but its decision
not to do so does not violate the Constitution under this
Court’s precedents.
 41

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Acting Solicitor General
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
ABBY C. WRIGHT
LAURA E. MYRON
Attorneys
JUNE 2021
 APPENDIX

1. 42 U.S.C. 1381a provides:

Basic entitlement to benefits
Every aged, blind, or disabled individual who is de-
termined under part A of this subchapter to be eligible
on the basis of his income and resources shall, in accord-
ance with and subject to the provisions of this subchap-
ter, be paid benefits by the Commissioner of Social Se-
curity.

2. 42 U.S.C. 1382(f)(1) provides:

Eligibility for benefits
(f ) Individuals outside United States; determination of
status
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub-
chapter, no individual (other than a child described in
section 1382c(a)(1)(B)(ii) of this title) shall be considered
an eligible individual for purposes of this subchapter for
any month during all of which such individual is outside
the United States (and no person shall be considered the
eligible spouse of an individual for purposes of this sub-
chapter with respect to any month during all of which
such person is outside the United States). For purposes
of the preceding sentence, after an individual has been
outside the United States for any period of 30 consecu-
tive days, he shall be treated as remaining outside the
United States until he has been in the United States for
a period of 30 consecutive days.

(1a)
 2a

3. 42 U.S.C. 1382c provides in pertinent part:

Definitions
(a)(1) For purposes of this subchapter, the term
“aged, blind, or disabled individual” means an individual
who—
(A) is 65 years of age or older, is blind (as deter-
mined under paragraph (2)), or is disabled (as deter-
mined under paragraph (3)), and
(B)(i) is a resident of the United States, and is
either (I) a citizen or (II) an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence or otherwise permanently
residing in the United States under color of law (in-
cluding any alien who is lawfully present in the
United States as a result of the application of the pro-
visions of section 1182(d)(5) of title 8), or
(ii) is a child who is a citizen of the United
States, and who is living with a parent of the child
who is a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States assigned to permanent duty ashore outside
the United States.

* * * * *
(e) For purposes of this subchapter, the term
“United States”, when used in a geographical sense,
means the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

* * * * *
 3a

4. 48 U.S.C. 1801 provides:

Approval of Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands
The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the
United States of America, the text of which is as follows,
is hereby approved.

5. 48 U.S.C. 1801 note provides in pertinent part:

* * * * *
“SECTION 502. (a) The following laws of the
United States in existence on the effective date of this
Section and subsequent amendments to such laws will
apply to the Northern Mariana Islands, except as other-
wise provided in this Covenant:
“(1) those laws which provide federal services
and financial assistance programs and the federal
banking laws as they apply to Guam; Section 228 of
Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act as it
applies to the several States; the Public Health Ser-
vice Act as it applies to the Virgin Islands; and the
Micronesian Claims Act as it applies to the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands;
“(2) those laws not described in paragraph (1)
which are applicable to Guam and which are of gen-
eral application to the several States as they are ap-
plicable to the several States; and
“(3) those laws not described in paragraph (1) or
(2) which are applicable to the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, but not their subsequent amendments
 4a

unless specifically made applicable to the Northern

Mariana Islands, as they apply to the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands until termination of the Trus-
teeship Agreement, and will thereafter be inapplica-
ble.
“(b) The laws of the United States regarding coastal
shipments and the conditions of employment, including
the wages and hours of employees, will apply to the ac-
tivities of the United States Government and its contrac-
tors in the Northern Mariana Islands.

* * * * *