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SUBJECT: Constitutional Law 1

TOPIC: Limitations to Appointment Power


TITLE: Matibag v. Benipayo
CITATION: G.R. No. 149036, 03 December 2002

FACTS:
This is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the decision of
respondent COA affirming the notices of Mandaue City Auditor which
diminished the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner
judges of RTC and MTC.
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving
monthly allowances of P1260 each through the yearly appropriation
ordinance enacted by the SAngguniang Panlungsod. In 1991, Mandaue
City increased the amount to P1500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget Management (DBM)
issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provides:
“at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities, and P700.00 in
municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions:”
Acting on the said DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
notices of disallowances to herein petitioners. Beginning October 1994,
the additional montly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced
to P1,000.00 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they
received in excess from April to September 1994.
Thus, petitioners filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest.
However, it was treated as a motion for reconsideration and was
endorsed to the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. 7. In
turn, the COA Regional Office referred the said motion to their Head
Office with recommendation that the same should be denied.
Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners filed the
instant petition. They argued, among others, that LBC 55 is void for
infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform
amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional
allowances to judges stationed therein.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not LBC 55 of the DBM is void foregoing beyond the
supervisory powers of the President and for not having been published.
2. Whether or not the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City
of Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges
contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress.

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court declared LBC 55 to be null and void.
Although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government
units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of
control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President.
Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. . . .
In Pimentel vs. Aguirre, we defined the supervisory power of the
President and distinguished it from the power of control exercised by
Congress. Thus:
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v.
Silvosa, i[5] the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision
over local government officials with that of his power of control over
executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that
the two terms — supervision and control — differed in meaning and
extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:
". . . In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter."
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities
of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers
over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her
alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her
alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on
local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it
violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the
executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations.
LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a
local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities
and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law
that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of
additional allowances "when the finances of the city government allow."
The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to
the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor
the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of
additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city
government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a city
government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and
expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant allowances of more than
P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can
afford it.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par.
(a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision
over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not
correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the
prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in
violation of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera.

2. The Court disagreed.


Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to
spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no evidence
submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city
government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented
were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit,
the surplus and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no
data or figures were presented to show that Mandaue City deducted the
subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because Mandaue
City's locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its
expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of
petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the city's own
revenues.
Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a
disapproval of Mandaue City's appropriation ordinances, in accordance
with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of RA 7160

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