58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

*
G.R. Nos. 120898-99. May 14, 1998.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO

BAUTISTA, accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Witnesses; Ordinarily, delay by a witness in divulging

what he or she knows about the commission of a crime, such as the identity
of the offender, is not by itself a setback to the evidentiary value of such a
witness’ testimony.—The rule is ordinarily to the effect that delay by a
witness in divulging what he or she knows about the commission of a crime,
such as the identity of the offender, is not by itself a setback to the
evidentiary value of such a witness’ testimony. The courts, however, have
been quick to deny evidentiary weight where such delay is not sufficiently
justified by any acceptable explanation.

Same; Same; Failure to reveal what one had witnessed about a crime
for a number of days, or weeks, or even a number of months, is allowable.
But, that will not hold true where the delay had unreasonably stretched all
too far out into a year and four months, especially in the absence of any
compelling or rational basis for such self-imposed and lengthy silence.—For
instance, well-founded fear of reprisal, or the unpredictable manner by
which individuals react when confronted by a gruesome event as to place
the viewer in a state of shock for sometime, have been considered as
permissible situations resulting in delay. Invariably, however, even under the
foregoing circumstances the delay must not be undue in point of time. Thus,
failure to reveal what one had witnessed about a crime for a number of days,
or weeks, or even a number of months, is allowable. But, that will not hold
true where, as in the case now being reviewed, the delay had unreasonably
stretched all too far out into a year and four months, especially in the
absence of any compelling or rational basis for such self-imposed and
lengthy silence.

Same; Same; The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime is to

reveal it to the authorities, unless, of course, he is the author thereof.—In
similar situations, the pronouncements of this Court have laid down
guidelines applying foursquare to the instant case. The holding in People vs.
Cunanan, et al. was emphatic that—The

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
 59

VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 59

People vs. Bautista

natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime is to reveal it to the

authorities, unless, of course, he is the author thereof. It defies credulity that
not one or two but five such witnesses made no effort to expose Cunanan if
they really knew that he was the author thereof. This stultified silence casts
grave doubts as to their veracity.

Same; Alibi; While the defense of alibi must stand searching scrutiny, it
acquires commensurate strength where no proper and positive identification
has been made.—The prosecution belittles appellant’s supposed alibi since it
is easy of fabrication and is always viewed with suspicion. However, the
prosecution’s own evidence which supposedly identifies appellant as the
malefactor falls far short of the requisite quantum of evidence, as earlier
explained, not to speak of the absence of any firearm presented in court nor
satisfactory evidence of appellant’s possession thereof. While the defense of
alibi must stand searching scrutiny, it acquires commensurate strength
where no proper and positive identification has been made. The identity of
the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
After all, as a paramount element for conviction, the prosecution’s evidence
must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the defense.

Same; Same; Strictly speaking, an accused is not deemed to have

resorted to alibi where he steadfastly denied being at the scene of the crime
but candidly admitted that he could not remember or did not know whether
at the time of the killing he was then in his tobacco field elsewhere since he
did not even know about the crime in question; It is of general knowledge
that in rural areas where farmers live a humdrum working existence, and
where the quotidian routine of every day life is just like the last, one cannot
expect them or even their families to keep diaries or records which would
enable them to honestly state where they were on particular dates, unless
there was an important reason therefor.—Strictly speaking, however, when
viewed from another angle with a little more perception, it does not appear
that appellant really resorted to alibi. As conventionally understood, this
exculpation is invoked by an accused who represents, often with proffered
corroboration, that at the time the offense was committed he was elsewhere
at a specific place, hence he could not have participated therein. In the
instant case, the peculiarity is that appellant steadfastly denied being at the
scene of the crime but candidly admitted that he could not remember or did
not know whether at

60
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

the time of the killing he was then in his tobacco field in Barangay
Macayog, San Jacinto since he did not even know about the crime in
question. Withal, he could remember the dates of other events where he
personally participated, such as when he was arrested, when he was detained
in San Fabian, and when he was brought to Lingayen. It is of general
knowledge that in rural areas where farmers live a humdrum working
existence, and where the quotidian routine of every day is just like the last,
one cannot expect them or even their families to keep diaries or records
which would enable them to honestly state where they were on particular
dates, unless there was an important reason therefor. Thus, it appeals more
to common sense and realistic truth that the innocent answer of appellant
reflects more honesty than that of one who could easily fix his definite
whereabouts just to subserve his defense of alibi. The latter practice is much
a matter of judicial experience and repudiation.

Same; Motive; If the evidence of identification is unclear, then the

jurisprudential doctrine is that proof of motive is a paramount necessity.—It
is also noteworthy that no motive was ever attributed to appellant as to why
he should kill the deceased or shoot the other victims since the evidence
shows beyond cavil that he did not even know any of them personally or
had any previous association or dealings with them. The rule is that proof of
motive is unnecessary to impute a crime to the accused if the evidence
concerning his identification is convincing. A converso, if the evidence of
identification is unclear, then the jurisprudential doctrine is that proof of
motive is a paramount necessity.

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,

Pangasinan, Br. 48.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Nuelino B. Ranchez for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

In a joint decision, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, of Urdaneta,

Pangasinan rendered two verdicts of conviction in Criminal Cases
Nos. U-8191 and U-8192, finding accused-

61

VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 61

People vs. Bautista

appellant Alfonso Bautista, alias “Poldo,” guilty of the charge of

illegal possession of firearm and ammunition and of the complex
crime of murder with frustrated murder and attempted murder,
respectively. Appellant insists in this present appellate review that
the trial court should not have granted affirmative weight to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ferdinand Datario and Rolando
Nagsagaray as the bases for his conviction, considering that, inter
alia, after they allegedly caught a glimpse of appellant at the scene
of the crime, they broke their silence about his supposed
participation only after more than sixteen months and under dubious
circumstances.
The initiatory criminal information in Criminal Case No. U-8191
was lodged on June 13, 1994 with 1
Branch 48 of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, while that in Criminal Case No. U-
8192, dated June 16, 1994, was assigned to Branch 49 of said court.
On motion of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, these cases2
were subsequently consolidated and assigned to Branch 48 for trial.
Appellant was indicted for the commission of the aforestated crimes,
as follows:

Criminal Case No. U-8191

That on or about the 18th day of May, 1992, at Barangay Dilan,

municipality of Pozorrubio, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
control and custody one (1) long firearm of unknown caliber or make,
without authority of law, and which he used in shooting Barangay Captain
3
Eduardo Datario, Bernabe Bayona and Cinderella Estrella.

_______________

1 Original Record, Criminal Case No. U-8191, 2.

2 Ibid., Criminal Case No. U-8192, 77-78.
3 Ibid., Criminal Case No. U-8191, 2.

62

62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

Criminal Case No. U-8192

That on or about the 18th day of May, 1992, at Barangay Dilan,

municipality of Pozorrubio, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, attack and sho(o)t on(e) Eduardo Datario hitting the latter’s face
with the bullet exiting through his neck, which wound caused his death, and
further hitting the ear of Bernabe Bayona and the bullet exiting through his
mouth, which wound would have caused the death of said Bernabe Bayona
had it not been for the timely medical assistance rendered to him, and the
bullet finally hitting (the) right leg of Cinderella Estrella, (through) which
wound accused commenced the commission of the crime of Murder directly
by overt act but did not produce it by reason of some cause other than his
spontaneous resistance, all to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
4
deceased and the two other victims (Corrections supplied).

At the arraignment of appellant on November 10, 1994 wherein he

was duly assisted by counsel, negative pleas to the charges5
were
entered for him pursuant to his indication in open court. Pre-trial
having been waived by appellant, trial proceeded thereafter with the
presentation of several prosecution witnesses, particularly the
alleged eyewitnesses Ferdinand Datario and Rolando Nagsagaray on
whose testimonies the court below principally anchored its judgment
of conviction. On the other hand, appellant himself appeared in his
defense, and one Norma Reyes, a neighbor, partly corroborated his
assertions.
Professedly convinced by the evidence for the prosecution, the
trial court found appellant guilty as charged and imposed on him the
penalty of life imprisonment, with costs, in Criminal Case No. U-
8191. In Criminal Case No. U-8192, appellant was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and

_______________

4 Ibid., Criminal Case No. U-8192, 1.

5 Ibid., id., 85.

63

VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 63

People vs. Bautista

to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00,6 actual damages in the sum of

P20,000.00, and the prescribed costs. 7
According to the evidence of the prosecution, Eduardo Datario,
Barangay Captain of Dilan in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, was fatally
shot by an assassin on the night of May 18, 1992 at around ten
o’clock. At the time of the treacherous assault, the victim was
watching the sideshows of their barangay fiesta which were being
held within the school campus of the Dilan Elementary School.
Ferdinand Datario, younger brother of the deceased, recounted that
when he arrived and took his place beside his brother at the school
premises, the latter was with Rolando Nagsagaray, Bernabe Bayona
and Cinderella Estrella, among others, watching a sideshow game.
Shortly thereafter, a gun report caused the people around to
scamper in different directions. In the few seconds prior to the
ensuing melee, the deceased slumped to the ground with a gunshot
wound in the area of his chin which proved to be lethal. Bernabe
Bayona and Cinderella Estrella, who were beside the victim, were
likewise hit apparently by the same bullet in succession, but they
fortunately survived. Bayona sustained only a wound on the left ear
followed by a grazing wound on his left upper lip, and the bullet
thereafter lodged in the left thigh of Estrella.
The same prosecution eyewitness recalled that as soon as the lone
gun shot rang out, he instinctively turned toward its source, and it
was at that point that he saw the assailant, at an approximate
distance of ten meters, holding a long firearm aimed towards their
group. That assailant, according to this witness, was herein appellant
who was then on the other side of a concrete fence which was more
than five feet high. The witness then turned his attention to his
brother and with the help of other8 persons, they brought him to a
hospital where the victim expired. Rolando Nagsagaray, the other
key prose-

_______________

6 Rollo, 38-39; per decision dated May 23, 1995 by Presiding Judge Alicia B.
Gonzales-Decano.
7 TSN, December 8, 1994, 6-11; December 12, 1994, 2-9.
8 Ibid., id., 7-10.

64

64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

cution eyewitness, testified along the same lines. He likewise

claimed to have seen appellant standing 9 at the other side of the
concrete fence and holding a long firearm. Both of them admittedly
did not call the attention of the people around them or those near the
fence to the fact of the presence of appellant, either for his
identification or apprehension.
Appellant, a farm helper and resident of Lipit, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, vehemently denied any involvement in the shooting
incident. He asserted in court that he never knew personally the
victims and, although he himself could not specifically recall where
he was at the time of the killing on May 18, 1992, his neighbor,
Norma Reyes, testified that he was then at their house as a guest at
the birthday celebration of her husband. Appellant also recalled that
when he was arrested in September, 1993 in San Fabian,
Pangasinan, reportedly in connection with another case, he was
actually waiting for one Francisco Periamil at the latter’s house to
collect payment for his tobacco produce. However, Periamil instead
arrived with two law enforcers who promptly arrested appellant. He
was then brought to Lingayen, Pangasinan where he was detained
and it was there where he was tortured and forced to admit
participation in some unsolved killings, one of which was the
10
murder of Eduardo Datario. It was also at the time of his arrest that
the two prosecution eyewitnesses, Ferdinand Datario and Rolando
Nagsagaray, came out into the open to announce
11
what they allegedly
witnessed on the night of May 18, 1992.
Appellant faults the trial court for its unwarranted acceptance of
the version of the prosecution. He argues that the very long delay,
which took all of sixteen months, on the part of Ferdinand Datario
and Rolando Nagsagaray in reporting to the authorities what they
allegedly saw has definitely placed the stamp of doubt, if not
incredibility, on their testimonies.

_______________

9 Ibid., December 8, 1994, 11-12.

10 Ibid., February 28, 1995, 2-15.
11 Original Record, Criminal Case No. U-8192, 12-15; Exhibits D, D-1, E and E-1.

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VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 65

People vs. Bautista

On top of that, there are inherent improbabilities and inconsistencies

in their declarations in court and which, according to appellant, are
factors obviously corrosive of the prosecution’s cause. With the facts
in this hypothesis, the Court is inclined to agree. For, while it is true
that the matter of assigning values and weight to the testimonies of
witnesses is at best the province of the trial court, it is equally the
province of appellate courts to disregard factual findings of the
former where certain facts of substance have been plainly
12
overlooked and misappreciated by the said lower courts.
In the case at bar, the aforesaid two eyewitnesses both averred
that they feared for their lives, hence they kept silent for sixteen
months. It was only after appellant had been apprehended and had
allegedly owned up to the killing of the victim that they decided to
speak and execute sworn affidavits on the matter. The trouble with
their posturing is that they had all the opportunity to pinpoint
appellant as the malefactor without having to necessarily place their
lives, or of those of their families, in danger. Thus, as pointedly
noted by the defense, both these witnesses could very well have
revealed what they supposedly knew to the town mayor who took a
hand in the investigation of the case, or any of the police
investigators or the other barangay officials, some of whom in fact
were their personal friends, but they did not. An anonymous tip to
these authorities would also have been a convenient and effective
course of action.
Witness these admissions in the testimony of Ferdinand Datario:

Q When was the first time that you reveal(ed) the identity of the
accused Alfonso Bautista to the authorities or did you reveal to
anybody the identity of the person who shot your brother
Eduardo Dat(a)rio?
A Only to my father, sir.

_______________

12 People vs. Vallador, et al., G.R. No. 116071, June 20, 1996, 257 SCRA 515;
People vs. Malazarte, G.R. No. 108179, September 6, 1996, 261 SCRA 482.
 66

66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

Q And when did you tell your father that it was Alfonso Bautista
      who shot your brother Eduardo Datario?
A On the fourth day after the incident, sir.
COURT
Q Why did you not tell your father immediately that Alfonso
Bautista shot your brother?
A Because my father might get shock(ed), Ma’am.
Q Why did you not reveal immediately that Alfonso Bautista was
the one who shot your brother?
A We were afraid because Alfonso Bautista usually roams around,
Ma’am.
Q When did the police go to your house?
A Before we brought home my brother, it was the 19th of May,
the day after my brother died, Ma’am.
  xxx
Q When the policeman went to your house on May 19, 1992, you
have not seen Alfonso Bautista yet and yet you did not tell the
police that Alfonso Bautista was the one who shot your
brother?
A Yes, Ma’am.
Q Why?
13
A We were afraid to tell, Ma’am.
  xxx
Q You never made any attempt to report what you saw who killed
your brother on May 18, 1992?
A No, sir.
Q Now, do you know the Mayor of Pozorrubio at that time in
1992?
A Yes, sir.
Q Considering the fact that you are a barangay captain’s brother
you are very close to him, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q In spite of that, you never attempt(ed) even to whisper to him
what you allegedly saw on May 18, 1992?
A No, sir.

_______________
 13 TSN, December 12, 1994, 11-12.

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VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 67

People vs. Bautista

Q Now, at that time, 1992, do you personally know any policeman

      in the municipality of Pozorrubio?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who were they, could you please inform us?
A Investigator Balelo, Pat. Fernandez, sir.
Q You were very close to these policemen, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in spite of that you never attempted even to whisper to
them that it was Alfonso Bautista alias Poldo who allegedly
shot your brother?
A I did not, sir.
  xxx
Q Who called you at the police headquarters at Lingayen,
Pangasinan?
A SPO1 Jaime Fernandez went to our house, sir.
  xxx
Q Now, what did SPO1 Jaime Fernandez tell you when he went to
your house and convinced you to give your sworn statement?
A He told us to go to the police headquarters, sir.
Q Did you ask him why they were calling you at the
headquarters?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what was his reason?
A He told us that the one who shot the barangay captain was
already arrested, sir.
  xxx
Q And what did you do when SPO1 Fernandez told you that
Alfonso Bautista admitted that he was the one who allegedly
killed your brother?
A That is why we filed a case on behalf of my deceased brother,
sir.
Q So that was the only evidence you relied on when you filed this
complaint only in 1993?
14
A Yes, sir. (Italics and corrections in parentheses ours).

_______________
 14 Ibid., id., 20-25.

68

68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

The veritable cock-and-bull account of witness Rolando Nagsagaray,

which was obviously patterned after and to corroborate that of
Ferdinand Datario, was even worse. Thus:

Q At the time the gunwielder shot Eduardo Datario, you al ready

      knew him?
A Yes, Ma’am.
Q So, what is the name?
A Alfonso Bautista, Ma’am.
  xxx
Q Now, at what time did you go home after delivering the late
Barangay Captain Datario at the Sacred Heart Hospital?
A 1:00 o’clock in the morning because he died at 1:00 o’clock,
sir.
Q Were you alone when you went home at that time?
A There were two (2) of us, sir.
Q Who is your companion?
A Reynaldo Datario, the brother of Eduardo Datario, Ma’am.
Q You never informed Reynaldo Datario of what you allegedly
saw that night?
A No, sir.
COURT
Q Why did you not inform Reynaldo Datario about what you
saw?
A Because I was then afraid, Ma’am.
Q Reynaldo Datario is the brother of Eduardo?
A Yes, Ma’am.
Q Now, could you please inform this Honorable Court what was
the physical condition or situation of Reynaldo Da-tario when
you went home.
A He cried, sir.
Q And am I right to say while he was crying he was crying for
justice for his brother at that time?
A Yes, sir.

69
 VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 69
People vs. Bautista

Q And in spite of that you never informed him of what you saw
      that night?
A No, sir.
  xxx
Q You do not know any barangay official at that time?
A Napoleon Sales, sir.
  xxx
Q How far is the house of Napoleon Sales to your house?
A Around 100 meters, sir.
Q Did you inform Napoleon Sales what you saw at that particular
night?
A No, sir.
Q Do you know of any policeman stationed at Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you please tell us the name of that policeman?
A Balelo, sir.
  xxx
Q You are very close to him, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q on that particular night? In spite of that, you never informed
him of what you saw
A No, Ma’am.
Q Who is the incumbent Mayor at that time in Pozorrubio?
A Manuel Venezuela, sir.
Q You know him very well, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in spite of that, you never informed him, whispered to
him, of what you know that night?
A No, sir.
  xxx
Q Do you have any parent?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were living with them that particular time.
A Yes, sir.

70
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Bautista

Q And did you ever tell them of what you allegedly saw on that
particular night?
15
A No, sir.

Ferdinand Datario even saw appellant passing near their house

during the victim’s wake but he never bothered to sound the alarm,
so to speak. This is an inconceivable reaction on his part,
considering that there was at that time sufficient manpower in the
persons of fourteen male relatives and friends then in attendance
who could have physically overpowered appellant and placed him in
16
the custody of the law. More perplexing is the fact that while the
witness is an aggrieved consanguineous brother of the victim, yet he
inexplicably remained tight-lipped over his avowed knowledge of
the identity of his own brother’s killer. His behavior is certainly
unnatural for one who had just lost a sibling under the circumstances
in this case, despite the opportunities under which he could have
relayed what he now alleges to have known all along and which, if
true, could secure retributive justice for his brother.
The rule is ordinarily to the effect that delay by a witness in
divulging what he or she knows about the commission of a crime,
such as the identity of the offender, is not by itself a setback to the
17
evidentiary value of such a witness’ testimony. The courts,
however, have been quick to deny evidentiary weight where such
delay is not sufficiently justified by any acceptable explanation.
For instance, well-founded fear of reprisal, or the unpredictable
manner by which individuals react when confronted by a gruesome
event as to place the viewer in a state of shock for sometime, have
been considered as permissible situations

_______________

15 TSN, December 28, 1994, 12-15.

16 Ibid., id., 29.
17 People vs. Alcantara, et al., G.R. Nos. 112858-59, March 6, 1996, 254 SCRA
384; People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 118824, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 411.

71

VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 71

People vs. Bautista

18
resulting in delay. Invariably, however, even under the foregoing
circumstances the delay must not be undue in point of time. Thus,
failure to reveal what one had witnessed about a crime for a number
of days, or weeks, or even a number of months, is allowable. But,
that will not hold true where, as in the case now being reviewed, the
delay had unreasonably stretched all too far out into a year and four
months, especially in the absence of any compelling or rational basis
for such self-imposed and lengthy silence.
In similar situations, the pronouncements of this Court have laid
down guidelines applying foursquare
19
to the instant case. The holding
in People vs. Cunanan, et al. was emphatic that—

The natural reaction of one who witnesses a crime is to reveal it to the

authorities, unless, of course, he is the author thereof. It defies credulity that
not one or two but five such witnesses made no effort to expose Cunanan if
they really knew that he was the author thereof. This stultified silence casts
grave doubts as to their veracity.
In the end, we have here a specific case where evidence of identification
is thoroughly unreliable. Reason: No valid explanation was given why the
People’s witnesses did not report the identity of appellant Cunanan to the
authorities during a long period of time.
20
Thereafter, People vs. Cruz reiterated that ruling and trenchantly
stressed as follows:

_______________

18 People vs. Reoveros, G.R. No. 115987, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 628;
People vs. Navales, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 112977, January 23, 1997; People vs. Padao,
G.R. No. 104400, January 28, 1997.
19 G.R. No. L-17599, April 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 769. It was in this case that
Sanchez, J. made this observation, now often quoted in criminal adjudications: “This
calls to our mind what Alfonso El Sabio was reputed to have said a long time ago:
‘Mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente.’
”
20 G.R. No. 60098, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 156.

72

72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

2. It took forty-two (42) days after the incident for Modesto Alipio to come
out and give his sworn statement, Exhibit “B,” to the Philippine
Constabulary narrating therein what he saw on that occasion. x x x Failure
on the part of Alipio to report to the authorities immediately—a very
essential detail in the solution of the crime—engenders a suspicion that he
was not altogether candid and truthful in his testimony. At any rate, the long
delay, which is not caused by threat, intimidation or coercion by herein
appellant or anybody for that matter, in reporting the matter to the
authorities—the mayor, barangay captain, police or the Philippine
Constabulary, by one who himself was once an army man has rendered the
evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant’s guilty
connection to the requisite of moral certainty. x x x.
21
More recently, People vs. Gonzales, et al. gave another instructive
illustration, to wit:
Additionally, Huntoria’s credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the
fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months
since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily
the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime
he had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his
credibility, here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria’s coming out engenders
doubt on his veracity. If the silence of an alleged eyewitness for several
weeks renders his credibility doubtful, the more it should be for one who
was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria’s long delay in revealing what
he allegedly witnessed has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame
excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed.
There is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. x
x x.

Even then, by themselves, the testimonies of these two prosecution

witnesses are replete with material inconsistencies and incongruities.
Thus, to cite just a few, Ferdinand Datario narrated that he in fact
divulged to his father, Ber-

_______________

21 G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1996, 183 SCRA 309, citing People vs. Delavin,
G.R. Nos. 73762-63, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 257; People vs. Tulagan, et al.,
G.R. No. 68620, July 22, 1986, 143 SCRA 107.

73

VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 73

People vs. Bautista

nardino Datario,
22
the identity of his brother’s assailant four days after
the incident. He claims that he deferred that revelation in order not
to shock his father, but he does not explain why the death of the
victim would not shock his father, but the identity of the killer
would. Contrarily, Bernardino Datario, declared that he came to
know about appellant’s participation in the crime from Ferdinand on
the very same night that Eduardo was killed but that he (the father), 23
likewise opted for silence allegedly on account of fear at that time.
Rolando Nagsagaray, on his part, asserted in court that after
shooting the deceased, appellant then merely walked away from the
24
concrete fence with rifle in hand. Now, said witness could not have
spoken the truth since the height of the fence was about a foot more
than appellant’s admitted height, hence the witness could25 not have
really seen appellant walking away from the crime scene. Besides,
it sounds somewhat absurd that if appellant had to quickly duck
behind the fence immediately after firing the single shot in order to
avoid recognition, he would then nonchalantly walk away although
there were many people on both sides of the fence who would
recognize him. His bringing a rifle would also naturally attract
attention.
Ferdinand Datario also admitted, and this is not disputed by the
parties, that between the concrete fence and the place where their
group was then watching the sideshow, there were people milling
around and structures erected for other sideshows, which
26
collectively obstructed his view. Although the other prosecution
eyewitness, Rolando Nagsagaray, hedged on the effect of such
obstructions to their vantage location, there are considerations
hereafter explained showing the correctness of Ferdinand Datario’s
testimony. Actually,

_______________

22 TSN, December 12, 1994, 11.

23 Original Record, Criminal Case No. U-8192, 11.
24 TSN, December 8, 1994, 12.
25 Ibid., id., 18; Exhibit W.
26 Ibid., December 12, 1994, 25-26.

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74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

the prosecution does not seriously question the existence of those

structures being used by the other sideshows.
There is likewise in Nagsagaray’s version an evident taint of
falsity. If he is to be believed, within the swift span of a few seconds
after hearing the gun report, he first glanced at his watch and thus
recalled that it was 10:30 in the evening when it happened; that in
the process he also saw the victims Eduardo Datario, Bernabe
Bayona and Cinderella Estrella fall one after the other; that, at the
same time, he observed the frightened crowd running away in
different directions, although he could not name any of them; and,
on top of all these, he still managed to further27obtain an excellent
view of appellant behind the concrete fence. This exaggerated
narration of the facts simultaneously taking place is certainly beyond
human experience. No person could have had the capacity to see all
these events taking place during those fleeting seconds, considering
the rapidity of their occurrence as this witness himself represents.
There are also a number of unexplained or inexplicable facts that
enshroud the testimonies of these witnesses in uncertainty and
doubt. As ordered by the lower court, an ocular inspection of the
premises was conducted by its branch clerk of court, designated as
commissioner therefor, and the salient findings are as follows:

1. The height of the fence is 1.7 meters and the distance

between the fence and the center of the basketball court is
12 meters.
2. The distance between the center of the basketball court and
the place where the victim fell down is 18 meters.
3. Between the basketball court and the fence are two full-
grown acacia trees and one star-apple tree very close to the
 fence. Immediately 28behind the fence is a house with two
mango trees nearby.

_______________

27 Ibid., December 28, 1994, 6-7, 10-11.

28 Original Record, Criminal Case No. U-8191, 136.

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VOL. 290, MAY 14, 1998 75

People vs. Bautista

What these physical features of the crime scene reveal is that,

although the place was illuminated for the “barangay feria,” the
presence of the big trees naturally cast shadows on wide portions
thereof, especially along parts of the concrete fence. There was no
specification made by the two alleged eyewitnesses of the particular
portion of the fence where they supposedly saw appellant, except by
way of a vague general direction in relation to their own variant
positions, such as, to the left or right of some of them. It cannot,
therefore, be said that appellant was so clearly exposed as to be
easily visible to the so-called eyewitnesses.
At the29trial, it was ascertained that appellant was 5 feet 4 inches
in height, obviously lower than the height of the fence. Yet, witness
Nagsagaray described appellant’s presence at the fence 30
in various
positions, such as “holding the gun at breast level,” 31 or “putting
down the gun” and then “walking towards the east,” despite the
fact that he was obscured by the shadows and the view was blocked
by the fence. An attempt was made to show that appellant must have
been standing on top of a water container behind the fence so he
could aim his gun above it, but the records are barren of competent
evidence showing whether those containers were really there that
night, or who placed them there, and on which portion along the
fence they were located. In fine, we are presented with a situational
problem created by a surmise founded upon a conjecture.
The prosecution belittles appellant’s supposed alibi since it is
easy of fabrication and is always viewed with suspicion. However,
the prosecution’s own evidence which supposedly identifies
appellant as the malefactor falls far short of the requisite quantum of
evidence, as earlier explained, not to speak of the absence of any
firearm presented in court nor satisfactory evidence of appellant’s
possession thereof. While the defense of alibi must stand searching
scrutiny, it acquires

________________

29 TSN, December 12, 1994, 8, 20.

30 Ibid., December 8, 1994, 9.
31 Ibid., id., 11-12.
 76

76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Bautista

commensurate strength
32
where no proper and positive identification
has been made. The identity of the offender,
33
like the crime itself,
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. After all, as a paramount
element for conviction, the prosecution’s evidence must stand on its
own merits
34
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.
Strictly speaking, however, when viewed from another angle
with a little more perception, it does not appear that appellant really
resorted to alibi. As conventionally understood, this exculpation is
invoked by an accused who represents, often with proffered
corroboration, that at the time the offense was committed he was
elsewhere at a specific place, hence he could not have participated
therein. In the instant case, the peculiarity is that appellant
steadfastly denied being at the scene of the crime but candidly
admitted that he could not remember or did not know whether at the
time of the killing he was then in his tobacco field in Barangay
Macayog,35San Jacinto since he did not even know about the crime in
question. Withal, he could remember the dates of other events
where he personally participated, such as when he was arrested,
when he was detained in San Fabian, and when he was brought to
Lingayen.
It is of general knowledge that in rural areas where farmers live a
humdrum working existence, and where the quotidian routine of
every day is just like the last, one cannot expect them or even their
families to keep diaries or records which would enable them to
honestly state where they were on particular dates, unless there was
an important reason therefor. Thus, it appeals more to common sense
and realistic truth that the innocent answer of appellant reflects more
honesty than that of one who could easily fix his definite

_______________

32 People vs. Ola, G.R. No. L-47147, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 1.
33 People vs. Clores, et al., G.R. No. 61408, October 12, 1983, 125 SCRA 67.
34 People vs. Obar, Jr., G.R. No. 105688, February 7, 1996, 253 SCRA 288.
35 TSN, February 28, 1995, 8.

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People vs. Bautista

whereabouts just to subserve his defense of alibi. The latter practice

is much a matter of judicial experience and repudiation.
 It is also noteworthy that no motive was ever attributed to
appellant as to why he should kill the deceased or shoot the other
victims since the evidence shows beyond cavil that he did not even
know any of them personally or had any previous association or
dealings with them. The rule is that proof of motive is unnecessary
to impute a crime to the accused if the evidence concerning his
identification is convincing. A converso, if the evidence of
identification is unclear, then the jurisprudential
36
doctrine is that
proof of motive is a paramount necessity.
At the trial, the witnesses from the Philippine National Police
harped on the fact that, after his arrest for another alleged crime,
herein appellant was linked to a number of long unsolved killings in
the region, including the present case. This was an unfair
proposition, such that the defense was forced to rejoin that appellant
was actually being made a scapegoat in order to camouflage official
incompetence by going through the motions of wiping clean the
slate of unsolved crimes through the expedient of indicting appellant
for all of them. A sober note is interjected by the Solicitor General
who points out that those other cases should not be taken up here for
being immaterial. Indeed, entangling those other charges with the
one at bar would37run afoul of the second branch of the rule of res
inter alios acta since, even taken altogether, they could not
constitute an exception thereto.
ACCORDINGLY, on reasonable doubt irresistibly created by the
foregoing premises, the consolidated judgments of the court a quo in
Criminal Cases Nos. U-8191 and U-8192 are

_______________

36 People vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 114681, July 18, 1995, 246 SCRA 673.
37 Section 34, Rule 130, which provides that evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same
or a similar thing at another time.

78

78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Capras, Jr.

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Alfonso

Bautista is hereby ACQUITTED of the present charges against him
and, unless otherwise detained for some other lawful cause, his
release from confinement is consequently directed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

     Melo, Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Judgments reversed and set aside, accused-appellant acquitted.

Notes.—When the prosecution’s cause is weak, an accused’s

alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating his
criminal liability, and his alibi should be considered for there are
 times where an accused has no other possible defense but alibi, as
that could really be the truth. (People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67
[1994])
Delay in the filing of a criminal complaint does not necessarily
impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily
explained. (People vs. Quitoriano, 266 SCRA 373 [1997])

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