Professional Documents
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t2 30 People vs. Estrada and Sandiganbayan.
t2 30 People vs. Estrada and Sandiganbayan.
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms.
Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February 2000),
they saw movant use the name Jose Velarde;
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001
as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the
prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be
revealed without following proper procedures; and
1. The Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating
to what is described in the Information.
2. the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved Estradas commission of the offense.
3. The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of
anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a
legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed
depositors to hide their true identities.
Issue: WON there was insufficiency of evidence presented & if the Ursua Ruling holds value in
this case
Held: The Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the
sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliunde. This is far different
from the present demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the
prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecutions evidence was
sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the
Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case
in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave abuse of
discretion. That there is no error of law is strengthened by our consideration of the
Sandiganbayan ruling on the application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues in its
petition that Estradas case is different from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent
Estrada used and intended to continually use the alias Jose Velarde in addition to the name
Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a single transaction;
and (3) the use of the alias Jose Velarde was designed to cause and did cause confusion and fraud
in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent. The
People also argues that the evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No.
142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estradas use of the alias
was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed positions, we shall now
examine within the Ursua framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the
demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it
presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly on the matter of
publicity and habituality in the use of an alias.
FACTS:
An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among
other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was likewise filed. The Amended
Information reads: “…to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure and his true
identity as the President, represents himself as JOSE VELARDE in several transactions and use
and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his
baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was not public despite the
presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000 (YES, not
public)
2. Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was allowable under banking
rules, despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142; (YES, allowable when the
act was committed)
3. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage
of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias Jose Velarde by
respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000; (Not limitative [procedural question])
4. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its
earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its
application to the instant case. (NO)
HELD:
Ursua definition of an alias: a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. There must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the
alias) in addition to his real name, and there must be habituality. The repeated use of an alias
within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or
use.
Following the doctrine of stare decisis, we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime
punished under CA No. 142 may be committed.
The court found no merit in the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred when it resurrected the
application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling. First, the cited
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order. Second, in the earlier motion to quash,
the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the
sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliened.
The court found no merit on the argument of the People that the Sandiganbayan abused its
discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information to Estrada's use of the alias Jose
Velarde on February 4, 2000, considering that there were other transactions covered by the
phrase prior to or subsequent thereto.
The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or
information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense.
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were
all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these
transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or
after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said on or about February
4, 2000 to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or
subsequent thereto would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the on
or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or subsequent thereto phrase
cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the
two phrases and the THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of
course, the reading would have been very different (and would have been clearly in accord with
the Peoples present interpretation) had the Information simply used AND instead of OR to
separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and
occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People,
the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this
reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him; the multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims would result in
surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single
day mentioned in the Information.
The issues of publicity, and the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160
The rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not apply
to violations of CA No. 142. The use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly,
or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known, in other words, the
intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
The enactment of R.A. No. 9160 clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts
or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or
by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively
recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment
and use of ex post facto laws.