Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Middle Range Theory and The Study of Organizations Middle Range Theory and The Study of Organizations
Middle Range Theory and The Study of Organizations Middle Range Theory and The Study of Organizations
Edited by:
CRAIG C. PINDER
LARRY F. MOORE
The University of British Columbia
Late one afternoon in the fall of 1976, we were sipping Sanka and speculating
on the possible directions towards which research and theory in organizational
science might lead. One of us had just re-read Walter Nord's Marxist critique of
Human Resource Management, and the discussion evolved into an enumeration
of the many articles that had appeared in the recent literature attacking the
discipline, its mission, and its methods. In no time the list was long enough to
suggest that a number of scholars, both young and established, were dissatisfied
with the rate of progress begin made in the accumulation of knowledge about
organizations. The critics we identified were located at many different schools,
and they were associated with diverse research traditions and biases. The causes
they identified as underlying the problems they cited varied, as did the solutions
they offered. We decided to pursue these polemics with a view to seeking com-
monalities among them, hoping that if there were any dominant common
themes, it might be possible to anticipate the directions the field could take.
Our reading and thinking led us to the conclusion that many of the issues
being raised by the critics of the discipline could be seen as disagreements over
some implicit (or ignored) metaphysical and epistemological assumptions about
organizations. We hypothesized that much of the controversy resulted from a
lack of consensus regarding what organizations are and how knowledge about
them can be developed.
In an attempt to clarify our own perception of the situation, we wrote two
vii
viii PREFACE
papers summarizing our understanding of the problem and outlining our pro-
posal for its resolution. (Both of these papers appear in this volume.) The essence
of our analysis is that, while research and theory have been, in many ways,
dominated by the systems metaphor, different observers see, record, and write
about different things when they study organizations. We believe that reliance on
single, overarching images and paradigms in organizational science is premature
at present, and probably dysfunctional. We agree with Karl Weick's 1974 sug-
gestion that scholars should entertain theories of the middle range when con-
sidering organizations, and we suspect that organizational science may never
achieve a situation in which one paradigm truly dominates and serves well.
To explore these issues, we called a conference to which we invited those
people whose attacks on the field seemed most fundamental and whose solutions
seemed most promising. We also invited one or two people who have reputations
for fostering creative exchange at conferences. For the most part, the invited
participants were requested to serve as discussants and panelists. Original papers
on the theme of middle range theories of organizational science were solicited in
journals and professional newsletters, and in two mass mailings of fliers to all
members of the Academy of Management. In response to our calls for papers, we
received forty-three submissions. From these we selected seventeen papers, to be
presented at the conference, held August 1-3,1978, at the University of British
Columbia in Vancouver. This book reports the proceedings of the conference.
All of the papers submitted were reviewed anonymously by at least two re-
viewers at other universities, as well as by ourselves. Most papers received three
or four reviews in total. Manuscripts submitted by our own University of British
Columbia colleagues were subjected to the same scrutiny given to outside papers.
The selected papers sorted themselves neatly into the five major topic areas
found in this volume.
Larry Moore wrote the first draft of the paper we had planned to use to open
the conference. By coincidence, Gary Johns (of Concordia University) submitted
a manuscript that touched on many of the themes we had planned to address.
Johns' paper was too good to ignore, so we incorporated it into our own and
asked him to help set the stage accordingly. He graciously consented to do so.
One of the papers in this book, "The Resurrection of Taxonomy to Aid the
Development of Middle Range Theories of Organizational Behavior," was not
actually presented at the conference. As indicated earlier, however, it was
written about the time the conference was being organized, and has subse-
quently been published in the Administrative Science Quarterly (March 1979).
We are grateful to Cornell University for permission to include it in this volume.
We have chosen to include it here because it is germane to the theme of the
conference and relates closely to the papers presented by John Bigelow and
Bill McKelvey.
PREFACE ix
Enterprises such as this conference may originate with two people over a cup
of decaffeinated coffee, but such enterprises require the devotion and assis-
tance of a large number of organizations and people. We wish to acknowledge
those who made the conference a success. Funding was provided by the Canada
Council (now the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada),
The Leon and Thea Koerner Foundation, The Province of British Columbia, Im-
perial Oil Co. Ltd., McGraw-Hill Ryerson Co. Ltd., West Publishing Company,
and the Office of the President and the Faculty of Commerce and Business
Administration of The University of British Columbia. These sponsors provided
the necessary financial support to make the conference possible. We are es-
pecially grateful to Deans Peter Lusztig and Stanley Hamilton and President
Douglas Kenny of the University of British Columbia for their support.
Our manuscript review panel did a superb job. We are grateful to Mary-
Elizabeth Beres (Temple), Richard Daft (Queen's), Craig Lundberg (Oregon
State), Vance Mitchell (British Columbia), Donald Nightingale (Queen's),
Rodney Schneck (Alberta), and Barry Straw (Northwestern) for the time and
energy they spent helping to select the best papers from those submitted.
Considerable credit for the smooth organization of the conference itself goes
to Joan Harrison, who anticipated, dealt with, and subsequently told us about
countless problems (some of which we ourselves created) and considerations, in
a sensitive and efficient style that made us look as though we knew all along
what was happening. She made the conference fun and intellectually viable by
cheerfully mastering the myriad details that can interfere and spoil things.
Finally, we are grateful to our colleagues in the Industrial Relations Manage-
ment Division of the University of British Columbia Faculty of Commerce and
Business Administration, and to our wives (to whom the book is dedicated) for
the constant support and encouragement they provided us.
The book is organized in a structure parallel to that used at the conference.
In each section, three or four papers are presented, followed by the remarks of
one of the discussants and then the rejoinders of those authors who elected to
prepare rebuttals after the conference. At the end of the book are the remarks
of Les Roos, Gerald Salancik, and Karl Weick, who had been asked to provide
integrative summary statements based on all they had heard at the conference,
both on and off the record.
The order of editorship was determined by a toss of a coin. We are equally
responsible for the conference as well as the contents of this volume.
Craig C. Pinder
Larry F. Moore
Vancouver, B.C.
February 1979
CONTENTS
Preface xi
xi
xii CONTENTS
This conference was called for the purpose of exploring the meaning of Merton's
(l968) concept of middle range theory, and for examining the relevance of the
concept for the scientific study of organizations and organizational behavior
(O.B.). This paper will attempt to set the stage for our deliberations by providing
a brief interpretation of the history of theoretical development in O.B., and by
highlighting the five major themes of the conference.
The distinguished sociologist Robert Merton (1968) has suggested that middle
range theories of social phenomena lie somewhere between casually generated
working hypotheses and grandiose attempts to explain all social behavior with a
given systematic set of assumptions. But middle range theories are not derived
from the grand theories, and they are more than summary statements of ob-
served relationships (empirical generalizations). As such, middle range theories
should provide for the efficient generation, consolidation, and evaluation of
empirical evidence and be liable to modification, refutation, and replacement.
More specifically, Merton (l968) indicates that such theories have the following
three major characteristics:
1. They do not attempt to deal with all social phenomena; rather, they are
each concerned with one or a few phenomena.
2 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Given the delimited subject matter of middle range theories, it follows that the
problems encountered and the methods used in generating data may be unique
to the particular theory in question. Using Stinchcombe's (1968) terminology,
middle range theory should consist of theoretical statements from which empiri-
cal statements can be logically deduced and tested by observations.
A brief historical summary of the development of O.B. helps explain the current
interest in middle range theorizing. Risking oversimplification, it can be argued
that our field has witnessed three historical phases:
Obviously, these stages do not represent distinct and independent eras, and it is
unlikely that their existence can be validated merely by counting the books and
journal pages devoted to each emphasis over the time period cited. Rather, each
stage represents an implicit orientation in the literature of a given period, and
each stage can be viewed as a partial reaction to the previous stages. Let us now
examine each period a little more closely.
1. They contained an implicit view of the basic nature of people, which can
be traced to certain other grand theories in philosophy and psychology.
Individual differences were downplayed.
2. They suggested that human energies can be directed toward organiza-
tional purposes by the application of universal principles.
3. They were stated at a level of abstraction such that it was logically impos-
sible to deduce hypotheses amenable to disproof.
The period from around 1940 to the early 1960s can reasonably accurately be
described as a period of research without much theory. During this time span
the empirical groundwork of the discipline we now call organizational behavior
was laid, with its emphasis upon individual and interpersonal behavior in an
organizational context. As Landsberger (1967) points out, researchers were so
4 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
scriptive and lacked external validity. Much of the work of this nature was
stimulated by the human relations movement. As observed by Whyte (1965):
The survey researchers have been concerned with measuring attitudes and
perceptions and with relating these both to the demographic characteristics
of their informants and to "hard criterion variables" such as productivity,
absenteeism and turnover. They have not generally been concerned with re-
lating attitudes and perceptions, on the one hand, or hard criterion variables,
on the other, to the social processes in which their informants are involved
(p. 308).
By the 1960s there were two almost separate approaches to the study of organi-
zation, corresponding closely to developments in the two major parent disci-
plines: psychology and sociology.
6 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
The Individual Behavior Approach. On the psychological side, there were signs
of increasing disenchantment, both with the universally prescriptive but empiri-
cally unsupportable theory of the principles era and with the simplistic and
disjointed attempts at empirical generalization characterizing the 1950s (Strauss,
1970). For example, serious doubts were cast about the universality of Mc-
Gregor's Theory Y assumptions; Herzberg et al., (1960) challenged the prevailing
assumptions about job satisfaction, pay, and performance; and Vroom's (1959,
1964) literature review and research demonstrated the importance of moderating
variables in the relationship between leadership style and job attitudes.
Prompted by the large-scale infusion of methodological rigor in O.B. by young
researchers possessing the academic training of psychology, and the wider avail-
ability of more sophisticated and easy to use computer programs, the search was
on for more complete, if complex, explanations of individual behavior in the
work setting. As a result of the research generated, a host of multivariate models
dealing with aspects of motivation (porter and Lawler, 1968), leadership (Fiedler,
1967), job design (Hackman and Oldham, 1975), and most other individual vari-
ables of interest to the field have been developed.
The Contingency Way of Thinking. Growing out of both the individual behav-
ior and the complex organization branches of research, one can see a rejection of
the search for grand theory in favor of theory building on more modest dimen-
sions. Students of individual behavior have developed several so-calJed contin-
gency theories, e.g., Vroom and Yetton's (1973) work on decision making, the
Fiedler (1967) theory of leadership, and the Hackman-Oldham (1975) theory of
job characteristics. Each involves a fairly specific organizational process (e.g.,
decision making, leadership, motivation) or the relationship between a limited
set of specific, distinctive variables (e.g., leadership and performance, job charac-
teristics, and employee responses). Each of these examples has generated testable
hypotheses and has encouraged systematic data collection. At the complex
organization level several studies have been designed to reveal or to test situation-
dependent or contingent relationships. For example, Woodward (1965) demon-
strated contingent relationships between technological, structural, and managerial
TOWARD MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 7
variables and performance, while Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Rage and
Aiken (1967) found several organization variables to be contingent on environ-
ment. Contingency models now pervade management textbooks, supplanting the
universalistic models of the past.
In spite of the recent popularity of contingency theorizing in organizations
and management, a number of serious problems still plague our field and are
curtailing its advancement.
We previously mentioned that the past ten years have been characterized by a
large influx to faculties of administrative studies by researchers already trained
in foundation disciplines such as SOciology and psychology. As pointed out
recently by Lundberg (1976) and Bass (1974), this shift in composition of
scholars interested in O.B. problems has resulted in more emphasis being placed
on methodological rigor at the hypothesis testing stage than was previously the
case. We have become preoccupied with measurement precision, with the cre-
ation and internal validation of new instruments, and with trying out newly
available analytical models in the context of tight, formal designs based on hy-
potheses carefully derived from previous studies of a similar nature. White
(1978) provides an excellent illustration of such preoccupation in his review of
the investigations of individual difference moderators of the job characteristic-
employee response relationship. The danger in such research lies in the tendency
to extend intellectual exploration mainly along avenues that have previously
received attention-that is, by extending existing hypotheses and relying on
previously accepted assumptions. This approach, carried to the extreme, can
result in theory construction which, systematic though it may be, is narrowly
based and not capable of rendering accurate explanations and predictions of
reality. What must be sought is an approach to theory building that ensures
adequate emphasis on creative idea and hypothesis generation.
The recent use of limited range theories in specifying the operation of moderator
variables has led to an understandable increase in the interest devoted to contin-
8 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
gent relationships. This may be a good thing. However, the search for moderators
has not been accompanied by equally careful consideration of the outcomes or
dependent variables specified by the theories. This issue transcends the tradi-
tional criterion problem. It also extends beyond the obvious recommendation
that researchers predict and then demonstrate that variables account for more
criterion variance as moderators than as simple predictors (Zedeck, 1971). In
an incisive critique of the utility of systems theory as a guide for organizational
research, Weick (1974) has pointed out that the existence of simple direct causal
relationships may be obscured by inadequate attention to effects or outcomes.
By the same token, gross summary criterion measures may artifactually indicate
the operation of moderators. For example, if a particular measure is a reliable
indicator of voluntary absenteeism for males but not for females, sex may serve
as an apparent moderator of the relationship between job satisfaction and ab-
sence, when it is actually better conceived as a predictor of different types of
absence. Devoting attention to moderator variables at the expense of outcome
variables could lead to an inability to accomplish important linkages between
emerging theories as they develop.
A related problem, but not necessarily traceable to a concern with moder-
ators, is the failure of limited range theorists to specify how conceptually distinct
criteria are impacted by the process delineated in their theories. For instance,
there has been an implicit tendency to equate absence, turnover, satisfaction,
and performance as equally predictable effects, or to ignore certain outcomes
in the specification of a given theory. In reviewing the research on task design,
Pierce and Dunham (1976) have stated that investigators ... "have generally not
attempted to differentiate conceptually or empirically the role of the dependent
variables in associations with task design ... these conceptually distinct responses
should be treated as such (p. 94)." Thus, it is unclear whether researchers' con-
clusions that task characteristics predict affective responses better than they pre-
dict behavior indicates a theoretically relevant phenomenon of a problem of
measurement and design. In a similar vein, as originally proposed by Vroom
(1964), expectancy theory was designed to account for intra-individual decisions
both to participate in organizations and to produce in them. While it seems pos-
sible that an ongoing, continuous decision process (whether or not to work hard)
might differ from a one-shot, discontinuous decision (to join or to quit), such
concern with the nature of the dependent variable is not evident in the theory.
Thus, it would be difficult to decide whether differential success in predicting
production-related variables versus organizational entry or turnover would re-
flect upon the theory itself or the measurement properties of the criteria. To sug-
gest that this issue represents a simple empirical question is to revert to empirical
generalization and to forsake the guidance that should be provided by theory.
TOWARD MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 9
The knowledge we have gained about organizational phenomena over the past
fifteen years has been far from commensurate with the energy expended. During
that time the incremental gain in knowledge about how organizations should be
structured and designed, how leaders should lead and motivate people, how jobs
should be designed, and how organizations should be evaluated in terms of effec-
tiveness, has been modest. Our sophisticated correlational designs typically pro-
duce omega squares around .10, leaving large amounts of variance unexplained
(cf. Dewar and Hage, 1978; White, 1978). What accounts for the inability to
explain the rest of the variance? Perhaps faulty measurement, poor sample selec-
tion, poor theory, or poor hypothesis construction, or maybe a combination of
these aspects are deficient - we rarely find out.
A second area of disappointment lies in the poor record of replication that
seems to characterize O. B. Far too much of the research conducted in our field
simply is not replicated at all, causing us to rely quite heavily on the theoretical
relationships established in one study or a set of closely related studies using a
common research design. Where replication has been attempted using other
methods (as in the case of the Herzberg and Fiedler models), the results have
proved inconsistent and have resulted in great confusion. One wonders just how
great this confusion might be if systematic replications of most of our other
major theoretical constructs were undertaken. Furthermore, we are tempted to
speCUlate with White (1978) that the real situation is probably worse than indi-
cated because studies reporting null results tend not to be published in the
journals.
This section will identify five issue areas that seemed to materialize as the con-
ference committee examined the entire group of papers selected as a result of
the multiple-blind review process. Under each issue area, a few overview com-
ments will be made about the related papers and their orientations. Obviously,
much of the intellecuta1 richness of a conference grows out of the comments of
the discussants and the subsequent scholarly interchange that takes place. The
comments of each discussant follow the papers in each section, and the edited
transcription of the final contemplative panel session will be included as a sepa-
rate section in the proceedings.
TOWARD MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 11
For Bobko, middle range theories arise because of different sets of assumptions
and unique sets of imagery about what constitutes the field of O.B., resulting
in a need for multiple explanations. Further, he believes there may be at least
as many ways of structuring middle range theories as there are theories, and
calls for humor and creativity as we strive to comprehend alternative, simul-
taneous images.
12 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Pinder and Moore concur that multiple imagery is inevitable in the study of
organizations, basing their arguments on two different philosophical perspec-
tives: Realism and Phenomenalism. They also expect emerging middle range
theories to compete with one another and/or to be melded together as com-
munalities between theories are identified, but predict that general theory will
not be justified for some time to come.
The process of integration of theories is the subject of Schuler's paper. He
discusses how clusters of organizational phenomena might be recognized and
defined so as to suggest trans-middle range theories, which can in turn act as
integrators for other new or existing middle range theories.
The paper by Sekaran, Martin, Trafton, and Osborn tackles the problem of
clustering phenomena for theory building by illustrating that nomothetical nets
can be constructed using higher order factor analysis. Their empirical approach is
one that recognizes both the measurement of concepts and patterns of relation-
ships, and represents a step beyond the purely philosophical perspective regard-
ing the "how" of middle range theorizing.
The next series of papers either provides examples of what the authors perceive
to be middle range theories in operation or discusses some aspect of middle range
theorizing using a specific theory as a case-in·point illustration. Beres and Price
use role theory to focus on the scope and limits of middle range theory. They
also offer an interesting set of guidelines for developing middle range theory.
Miner elucidates his concept of middle range theory by presenting four lim·
ited domain theories of the processes by which organizations induce human
effort and create energy. Slusher and Roering use catastrophe models of social
interaction to illustrate their notion of middle range theory and to show how
linkages can be built between theories-again, a recurrent concern.
Muchinsky and Morrow explore the potential merit of using a middle range
approach to study organizational effectiveness. Their analysis indicates that
problems of global theoretical orientation, construct validity, and inductive ver-
sus deductive approaches to organizational effectiveness might be mitigated by
the construction of middle range theories.
Finally, Feldman reviews the nature and meaning of middle range theory,
then weighs the merits of middle range theorizing drawing on his own study of
socialization in organizations for illustrative material.
Let's hear it for the systems model! Cooper and Wolf believe that recent discon-
tent with the state of theory development in O.B., which has led some scholars
to call for a change in paradigms, should be more appropriately viewed as a need
for further elaboration on the core of our existing paradigm (which they argue is
the system paradigm). Their view is that there may be no need for new para-
digms if we would strive for more careful and precise language in theory building
and if we would clearly specify the domain of organization theory and its in-
tended set of applications. An elaborate defense of system theory is presented to
demonstrate its applicability as the major theoretical paradigm for organizational
study and to call for more efforts to carefully elaborate this paradigm.
Finally, in keeping with the spirit of the conference, Frost and Hayes propose
14 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
a middle ground for middle range theory. Their paper argues for a dual approach
to the study of organizational phenomena. It is suggested that if the focal con-
cern of research is the content (substance perceived and created by participants),
then a middle range approach is appropriate. If, however, the focus is on the
process of organizing (the mechanics and associated behaviors through which or-
ganization takes place), then a general theory approach may be the best strategy.
The paper includes speculation on some potential constructs in a general theory
of organizing.
In conclusion, the diversity of thought expressed in the conference papers
promises to be highly conducive to the sort of cross-fertilization necessary to
enable us to understand better the potential role of middle range theorizing in
advancing the state of knowledge about organizations. We invite you to read on!
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Bass, B.M. The substance and the shadow. American Psychologist, 1974 29,
870-886.
Behling, O. Some problems in the philosophy of science of organizations. Acad-
emy of Management Review, 1978,3, 193-201.
Blau, P.M. The dynamics of bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1955.
Blau, P.M.; Heydebrand, W.; and Stauffer, R. The structure of small bureaucra-
cies. American Sociological Review, 1966,31, 179-191.
Blau, P.M., and Schoenherr, R.A. The Structure of Organizations. New York:
Basic Books, 1971.
Brayfield, A. H., and Crockett, W. H. Employee attitudes and employee responses.
Psychological Bulletin, 1955,52,396-424.
Dewar, R., and Hage, J. Size, technology, complexity, and structural differentia-
tion: Toward a theoretical synthesis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1978,
111-136.
Fayol, H. Industrial and General Administration. New York: Pitman, 1916.
Fiedler, F. A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness. New York: McGraw-Hill,
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Gibb, C.A. Leadership. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology
(Vol. 2). Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954.
Gouldner, A.W. Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1954.
Hackman, J.R., and Oldham, G.R. Development of the job diagnostic survey.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 1975,60, 159-170.
TOWARD MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 15
Taylor, F.W. Tf.e Principles of Scientific Management. New York: Harper, 1911.
Thompson, J.D. Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
Turner, A.N., and Lawrence, P. Industrial Jobs and the Worker. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1965.
Viteles, M.S. Motivation and Morale in Industry. New York: Norton, 1953.
Vroom, V. Some personality determinants of the effects of participation. Jour-
nal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 1959,59,322-327.
- - . Work and Motivation. New York: Wiley, 1964.
Vroom, V., and Yetton, P. W. Leadership and Decision Making. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973.
Weber, M. Theory of Social and Economic Organization, tr. and ed. by A.M.
Henderson and T. Parsons. Oxford University Press, 1947.
Weick, K.E. Middle range theories of social systems. Behavioral Science, 1974,
19,357-367.
White, J.K. Individual differences and the job quality-worker response relation-
ship. Academy of Management Review, 1978,3, 263-280.
Whyte, W.F. A field in search of a focus. Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
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Woodward, J. Industrial Organization. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Zedeck, S. Problems with the use of moderator variables. Psychological Bulletin,
1971,76,295-310.
I WHAT IS MIDDLE
RANGE THEORY?
2 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY
AND THE STRATEGIES OF
THEORY CONSTRUCTION
Allen C. Bluedorn, The Pennsylvania
State University; and Roger Evered,
University of Illinois
I am not one of those who hold that there is a scientific method as such. The
scientific method, as far as it is method, is nothing more than doing one's
damnedest with one's mind, no holds barred. -P.W. Bridgman (1950, p. 351)
In 1949 Robert Merton published the first edition of Social Theory and Social
Structure (STSS). This volume crystallized a theory construction imperative for
the social sciences: a strategy of building theories of the middle range (Merton,
1949, pp. 5-11). Although Merton (1967, 1968, pp. 56-58) would later trace
the call for middle range theories (MRTs) to such eminent philosophers as Plato,
Francis Bacon, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Mannheim, contemporary concern
about the middle range imperative is due almost entirely to Merton's discussion
in the three editions of STSS (1949,1957, and 1968V
Despite the discussion of MRT by many distinguished scholars, several ques-
tions about it still inhibit theorists who attempt to adopt the middle range
strategy. Two of these questions will be examined in the following analysis. First,
what is a middle range theory? Second, what role in the larger theory construc-
tion enterprise are MRTs intended to play? After these two questions have been
discussed, the final portion of this paper will examine the importance of socio-
logical and psychological factors on the choice of theory construction strategies
by individual theorists.
19
20 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Merton has provided the most comprehensive defmition of MRT in his editions
of STSS. In the most recent edition (Merton, 1968), the following definition of
MRT is provided.
Throughout ... theories of the middle range: theories that lie between [italics
ours] the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance
during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop
a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social be-
havior, social organization and social change (Merton, 1968, p. 39).
Merton also indicates that the MRT concept does not involve the distinction
between the "nomothetic and idiothetic [idiographic]" (1968, p. 44), nor does
it refer to either an empirical generalization or a derivation from a single all-
embracing theory of social systems (1968, p. 41V Aside from some examples of
MRTs from the physical, biological, and social sciences, few additional clues to
the meaning ofMRT are provided by Merton. 3
Through his definition and examples, Merton has implicitly defined a contin-
uum along the dimension of theoretical scope. Scope is the quality of a theory
that refers to how many of the basic problems in a discipline are handled by the
same theory (Hage, 1972, p. 178). The more problems handled by a given theory,
the greater its scope.
Empirical generalizations are located at the small-scope end of the continuum,
and general or grand theories are located at the large-scope end. MRTs are lo-
cated in the area between the two extremes. Because Merton has not specified
the location of MRTs with greater precision, any theory with greater scope than
an empirical generalization, but of less scope than the most general theory
in the field, would qualify as an MRT. Merton, however, has failed to discuss this
point explicitly and, therefore, a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding
has resulted.
The source of the confusion and misunderstanding is the way Merton defmed
MRT. His intentional definition is inadequate and readers are forced to rely
upon the extentional meaning he provides. The extentional meaning of a term is
composed of the specific entities to which the term applies (Copi, 1967,
pp. 107-108). In the case of MRT, the extentional meaning has been partially
given in the examples Merton provided. A complete extentional definition for
MRT could be an infmite set of referents, and, in any case, would be an ex-
tremely inefficient and tedious way to define the concept.
A more efficient approach is to defme MRT intentionally. The intentional
meaning of a concept is the list of characteristics, qualities, attributes, and so on,
which qualify an entity as a member of the class to which the term or concept
MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STRATEGIES OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 21
refers (Copi, 1967, pp. 107-108). Merton left the work on MRT's intentional
meaning incomplete, and it is this failing that is primarily responsible for the
confusion over its meaning.
If Merton's definition of MRT reproduced in this analysis is examined, very
few intrinsic qualities or attributes can be found. The major attribute, and even
this is not explicitly stated in the defmition, is that middle rangeness is a relative
concept; that MRTs lie on a continuum somewhere between a single empirical
generalization and a theory of infmite scope. Merton is reasonably clear in dis-
tinguishing an MRT from an empirical generalization, because his definition of
an empirical generalization is precise enough to differentiate the two (Merton,
1968,p.41).
Confusion has resulted from problems involving the other end of the contin-
uum; problems that arise in attempts to distinguish between MRTs and general
theories. Put another way, how middling must a theory be to be an MRT? Un-
like the case with empirical generalizations, there are no absolute standards at
the large-scope end of the continuum. The general theory end will be occupied
by the theory with the greatest scope in the discipline. Any other theory with
greater scope than an empirical generalization is an MRT. The relative nature
of the middle range versus general theory classification is highlighted by the
possibility of future theory construction producing a theory of greater scope
than any that may have existed at some prior time. The creation of the theory
of greater scope will transform the theory that previously had the greatest scope
into an MRT. And so forth ad infinitum.4
Unfortunately, much of the discussion of MRT has proceeded as if that desig-
nation were an absolute quality rather than a relative property. This, in turn,
has resulted in many of the wrong questions being asked. For example, a com-
mon quandary for investigators attempting to classify a given theory as middle
range or not is the existence of two or more theories of clearly lesser scope than
some other theory. The problem arises when it becomes obvious that the theories
under examination also differ in scope. But if middle rangeness were an absolute
quality, only one of the theories could possibly be an MRT. This conundrum re-
sults from considering middle rangeness as an absolute property of a theory. By
recognizing the relative nature of the middle range concept, the solution to the
dilemma is straightforward: Both theories are MRTs.
The basic reason so much concern has been given to MRTs over the last three
decades is the belief that not only will MRTs successfully explain delimited sets
of phenomena, but they will also serve as the raw materials for the construction
22 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
of more general theories. It is this belief which serves as one of the major justifi-
cations of the middle range imperative.
Sociological theory, if it is to advance significantly, must proceed on these
interconnected planes: (1) by developing special theories [MRTs] from which
to derive hypotheses that can be empirically investigated and (2) by evolving,
not suddenly revealing a progressively more general conceptual scheme that is
adequate to consolidate groups of special theories [MRTs] .... theory which,
instead of proceeding from the head of one man, gradually consolidates
theories of the middle range, so that these become special cases of more gen-
eral formulations (Merton, 1968, p. 51).
MRT construction is justified as a means to the ends of creating theories of
ever-increasing scope. This imperative can be stated as a proposition (which is
implicit in Merton's discuSSions): The optimal method of generating acceptable
(criteria of acceptability will be discussed later) theories of relatively large scope
is to: (1) generate MRTs and (2) synthesize the MRTs into theories of larger
scope. This proposition will be examined in two W\lYS. First, it will be compared
with possible alternative strategies. Second, the development of several success-
ful theories of relatively large scope will be examined to determine whether or
not they were produced in the manner directed by the middle range imperative.
Many of the great systems of sociological theory of the nineteenth century (e.g.,
Spencer's and Marx's) are theories with the degree of scope Merton had in mind
as general theories. These theories were produced by single individuals without
following Merton's middle range imperative. Instead, they were produced by a
single individual based on empirical data, some generalizations, and insight. Mer-
ton was critical of these theories and described them as "all-inclusive specula-
tions," possessing "scientific sterility," and being "general orientations toward
data, suggesting types of variables which need somehow to be taken into account,
rather than clear, verifiable statements of relationships between specific vari-
ables" {Merton, 1949, pp. 9_10).5
What the grand theories lack is the necessary conceptual and propositional
integration to produce testable hypotheses that would ground them in the em-
pirical world. Merton felt that these shortcomings could be overcome if the
initial scope of a theory was restricted. Merton's thesis is that premature at-
tempts to initially construct theories of large scope directly from empirical data
will produce systems of theory lacking both empirical grounding and conceptual-
propositional integration.
2 i
I
I
E
REFINEMENT JJ
X
I
P 12
L
iI
I I
C REFINEMENT
I
T
N
E
6
S
S
11
__ .......
- -... 00
00
LOW HIGH
SCOPE
tv
W . of
Figure 11.. The Strategies Construction
0 f Theory Construct ion
24 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
The absence of these characteristics is what Dumont and Wilson (1967, pp.
988-989) have called the explicitness of a theory. They have constructed an
explicitness continuum ranging from a low end (implicit theories), through a
moderate range (theory sketches), to a high end (explicit theories). At the high
end, concepts are tightly (often mathematically) integrated, and measurement
and testing procedures are tightly linked to the theory as well. Merton's criti-
cisms of the large scope (grand, general) theories amount to criticisms of their
explicitness. It follows from his prescription that theories of great initial scope
will be less explicit than theories of lesser initial scope.
If the previously discussed scope continuum is combined with Dumont and
Wilson's explicitness continuum (1967, p. 989), the diagram in Figure I is pro-
duced. Twelve possible theory construction strategies are depicted within the
axes. Although there are actually an infmite number of strategies, the 12 strat-
egies, depicted in Figure 1 can be thought of as the core strategies. The remain-
ing infinity of possibilities represents differences in degree rather than kind.
Merton's analysis of MRTs and his imperative to use them to construct more
general theories involve strategies 5, 6, 7, and 9. The remaining strategies, in-
cluding the possible compound strategies, were either not discussed by Merton
or were rejected by him. The individual strategies are described in Table 1.
The proposition concerning the optimal technique for developing relatively gen-
eral theories is completely undocumented by Merton. He fails to cite even a
single specific example from the physical, biological, or social sciences of the
type of synthetic process he prescribes. His reference to Darwin's theory of coral
atoll formation (Merton, 1968, p. 40) as an example of an MRT is particularly
insightful on this point. It reveals that Merton did not consider Darwin's theory
of organic evolution to be an example of an MRT. He probably regarded it as a
theory equivalent in scope to the work of Spencer, Marx, and so forth. Other-
wise, why pick the relatively obscure coral atoll theory rather than the famous
evolutionary theory for use as an example?
If Darwin's theory of evolution is of greater scope than Merton envisioned
for MRTs, three disconfirmations of the middle range imperative are revealed.
The first two disconfirmations involve the independent development of the
theory of evolution by Darwin and Wallace. Neither man produced the evolu-
tionary theory by synthesizing theories of lesser scope (MRTs). Instead, both
developed the theory from an examination of the data. In fact, Wallace dis-
covered the principle of natural selection while he was experiencing an attack of
fever (Eiseley, 1961, p. 291). Since both Darwin and Wallace independently de-
veloped the theory of evolution by techniques different from Merton's prescrip-
tion, they represent two disconfirmations of Merton's middle range imperative.
Examining the history of the evolutionary theory leads to a third disconfir-
mation of the middle range imperative. One of the few great theoretical syntheses
in the history of science is the modem synthetic theory of evolution (Dobzhan-
sky, 1970, pp. 1-29; Huxley, 1942; Mayr, 1970, pp. 1-9). The synthetic theory
combines Darwinian evolutionary theory with the theory of genetics. But since
Merton did not consider Darwin's theory of evolution an example of an MRT,
its synthesis with genetics cannot be regarded as an example of the application
of the middle range imperative. 6
The development of genetics reveals four additional disconfirmations. Mendel
originally discovered the laws of inheritance in the 1850s and 1860s working
with empirical data, not MRTs (Asimov, 1972a, p. 367). In 1900, three biolo-
gists (De Vries, Corens, and von Tschermak) independ~nt1y rediscovered the laws
of inheritance and discovered Mendel's original papers (Asimov, 1972b, p. 585).
And none of the three synthesized MRTs to produce their results.
26 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Alternative 2. Theorizing as a Bridge. Kurt Lewin (1951, pp. 77-80) once de-
scribed the scientific process as a bridging or tension-spanning process, a process
spanning the distance between observed facts on the one side and abstract
thought on the other. The observed facts create a need (tension) in the researcher
to provide an explanation, a theory. The more unexplained facts the researcher
can hold, the greater the need (tension) for explanation, and the broader the
tension-spanning of the resulting theory will be.
Empirical generalizations are low-tension spanning theories, while grand
abstractions are high-tension spanning theories. Thus, the scope of a theory, in
Lewin's formulation, is a function of the researcher's capacity to manage the
intellectual tension between unexplained observations and theory.
NOTES
1. The first post-World War II call for MRTs was made by T.H. Marshall in 1946 (1963,
pp. 21-22). This call was then tentatively amplified by Merton (1948) before he stated his
position on the middle range imperative in the three editions of STSS. Recently, Walton
(1972) and Weick (1974) have also argued for the middle range imperative.
2. EXamples of empirical generalizations can be found in Berelson and Steiner (1964)
who have provided 1,045 examples in their codification of findings on human behavior.
The "proverbs of administration" (Simon, 1976, pp. 20-44) would be likely candidates for
empirical generalization status from organization theory. All-embracing theories would be
the works of Marx, Spencer, Parsons, etc. (Merton, 1968, pp. 43, 46).
3. Examples Merton (1968, p. 61) cited, which are familiar to organizational theorists,
include the following: Se1znick (1949), Gouldner (1954), Blau (1963), Lipset, Trow, and
Coleman (1956), Crozier (1964), and Katz and Kahn (1966). Merton (1968, p. 61) con-
sidered the work of March and Simon (1958) too general to qualify as an MRT.
30 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
4. It is also possible that the transformation process could operate in the opposite direc-
tion. If a general theory was disconfumed a sufficient number of times-perhaps often
enough to produce the crisis Kuhn (1970) describes as leading to revolutionary science-it
might be abandoned, and some MRT might ascend to the position of most general theory.
5. Some theorists have expressed the opinion that providing general orientations and sug-
gesting which variables are important is, in fact, the major task of social theory. See Blumer's
(I954, pp. 7-10) discussion of "sensitizing concepts" for a statement of this view.
6. Dobzhansky (1970, p. 25) attributes the modern synthesis to the work of Fisher
(1930), Haldane (1932), Tshetverikov (1961), and Wright (1931).
REFERENCES
Haldane, J.B.S. The Causes of Evolution. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co.,
1932.
Huxley, J. Evolution, the Modern Synthesis. New York and London: Harper &
Brothers, 1942.
Jung, C.G. C. G. Jung: Collected Works, Vol 6, Psychological Types. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975.
Katz, D., and Kahn, R.L. The Social Psychology of Organizations. New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1966.
Kuhn, T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1970.
Lewin, Kurt. Comment concerning psychological forces and energies, and the
structure of the psyche. Organization and Pathology of Thought (David
Rapaport, ed.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.
Lipset, S.M.; Trow, M.; and Coleman, J. Union Democracy. New York: The Free
Press, 1956.
Mannheim, K. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World,
1965.
March, J.G., and Simon, H.A. Organizations. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1958.
Marshall, T.H. Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays. London: Heine-
mann, 1963.
Mayr, E. Population, Species, and Evolution. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1970.
Merton, R.K. Science, technology and society in Seventeenth Century England
(in Osiris: Studies on the History and Philosophy of Science, and on the
History of Learning and Culture, G. Sarton, ed.). Bruges, Belgium: St.
Catherine Press, 1938.
- - . Discussion. American Sociological Review, 1948,13, 164-168.
- - . Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949.
- - . Social Theory and Social Structure (revised and enlarged ed.). Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1957.
- - . On Theoretical Sociology. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- - . Social Theory and Social Structure (enlarged ed.). New York: The Free
Press, 1968.
Nisbet, R. Sociology as an Art Form. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Selznick, P. TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1949.
Simmel, G. The Sociology of Georg Simmel (translated by Kurt H. Wolff). New
York: The Free Press, 1950.
Simon, H.A. Administrative Behavior (3rd ed.). New York: The Free Press,
1976.
Timasheff, N.S., and Theodorson, G.A. Sociological Theory: Its Nature and
Growth (4th ed.). New York: Random House, 1976.
32 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
References to middle range theories, middle range theorizing, and middle range
concepts are increasingly common in organizational research. The growing fre-
quency of their use may indicate the onset of a new trend, perhaps even a new
strategy of inquiry for organizational research. The middle range conceptualiza-
tion, however, like most research tools, has limitations as well as advantages.
These potentially offsetting factors require critical evaluation before the middle
range notion can be further endorsed. The purpose of this paper is to provide
such an overview of the middle range approach, rendering particular attention to
the nature and meaning of middle range notions for understanding organizations
and organizational behavior. In addition, we will offer some pragmatic sugges-
tions for conducting research consonant with the middle range orientation.
The middle range designation is used to refer to two different, yet related
ideas. The first is the notion of a middle range theory. A middle range theory,
according to Merton (1967), consists of a set of assumptions from which specific
hypotheses are logically derived and subsequently confirmed by empirical in-
vestigation. More generally, a middle range theory has corne to be regarded as a
limited set of interrelated propositions aimed at an intermediary level of expla-
nation of a given phenomenon. Such theories are said to be of the middle rather
than ordinary or highly abstract range because the concepts embodied in the
33
34 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
While Merton (1949; 1967) is often credited with the development of the middle
range notion, he clearly notes that he is not the originator of the idea. The
writings of Plato, Bacon, J.S. Mill, and T.H. Marshall all advocate middle axioms,
middle principles, limited theories, and stepping stones in the middle distance.
Beyond this, many contemporary social scientists have endorsed the policy: for
example, Rossi, Riesman, Zetterberg, and Weick (see Merton, 1967, pp. 56-62).
Common middle range theories evident in current research include dissonance
theory, theories of collective behavior, reference group theory, and in the orga-
nizational sphere, theories of oligarchy, bureaucracy and contingency. The
middle range concept is thus neither a new idea nor an innovative strategy for
scientific inquiry. It has experienced a sufficient tenure for evaluation in terms
of relative advantages and disadvantages.
Numerous advantages can be cited for theories of the middle range and mid-
dle range theorizing. The primary benefits of this approach, according to Merton
MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 35
(1967), are: (1) its ability to transcend pure description and single empirical
observations; (2) its ability to draw upon divergent units of analysis, perspectives
and even disciplines in order to formulate new theory; (3) its recognition that
basic knowledge must be obtained before complex theoretical questions can be
answered; and (4) its flexibility in that it allows researchers to seek generalizabil-
ity without totally endorsing the belief that a single, unified social science is
achievable. Other advantages to the middle range orientation include that it is a
strategy that legitimates desires to solve practical problems while engaging in
basic research (Le., it seeks to produce generalizations while remaining empiri-
cally grounded) and, because it rests on the integration of theories constructed
by various researchers, it manifests a built-in form of replication. A fmal advan-
tage rests on Weick's (1974) observation that too many theories are not falsi-
fiable. Middle range theories are valuable because, when properly tested, they
permit empirical confirmation or rejection.
Limitations of the middle range orientation have also been observed. These dis-
advantages can be summarized as: (1) the charge that the emphasis on testable
propositions is merely a ruse for a positivistic conception of science; (2) the fact
that errors in the initial theories or set of assumptions from which a middle
range theory is derived are undetectable; (3) the charge that middle range think-
ing promotes fragmentation and an overemphasis on unrelated, specialized
theories; and (4) the charge that the pursuit of middle range theories stimulates
only low levels of ambition and generally atheoretical research (Bierstedt, 1960).
The first disadvantage is associated with those scholars who contend that
empirical confirmation and logic can be supplanted by other techniques of
knowing (e.g., experiential, phenomenological approaches). This critique reflects
a philosophy of science issue that applies to more than just middle range theo-
rizing and is, accordingly, beyond the scope of this essay. It is, however, a
legitimate criticism of the approach. The second disadvantage stems from a
common failure among theorists and researchers to identify and explicate all of
the assumptions underlying the derived hypotheses formulating a middle range
theory. These assumptions, along with restrictions associated with testing a mid-
dle range theory in a particular research setting, can be labelled as auxiliary
theory (Blalock, 1968). Middle range theories, in comparison to more grandiose
theories, require more auxiliary theory in order to reduce the number of poten-
tially relevant variables to a manageable set and to permit empirical evaluation
of the derived hypotheses. The greater the number of assumptions necessary for
36 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
bringing closure to an explanatory system (Le., a theory), the greater the likeli-
hood that some implicit assumptions will be overlooked and that some erroneous
assumptions will unknowingly be accepted.
The charge of fragmentation is perhaps the most serious criticism that can'be
directed against the middle range orientation. Many researchers neglect the con-
solidation component of the middle range approach and thus never seek to go
beyond explanations connected with a limited range of observations. Such
tunnel visioning tactics produce areas of inquiry marked by disparate, sometimes
inconsistent, specialized theories. In addition, such fragmentation can extend
to the point where differential aspects of the same or closely related phenomena
are explained by distinct, unrelated theories. For example, the relationship
between job satisfaction and job behavior has alternately been explained by
attitude-behavior theories, theories of need satisfaction (Alderfer, 1969), and
instrumentality theory (Lawler and Porter, 1967). Ideally, these middle range
theories should ultimately be synthesized into a more general macroscopic the-
ory. The final disadvantage that has been observed concerns the potentially athe-
oretical nature of middle range research. Some regard endorsement of the middle
range approach as "sickly, pale, and singularly unambitious" (Merton, 1967,
p. 63). It is apparent that the degree of scope appropriate to a middle range
theory is a matter of opinion and probably contingent on the extent to which
the specific research problem subsumed within the theory has received empirical
consideration in the past.
In summarizing the last three disadvantages, one common problem can be
identified. The fundamental limitation of the middle range perspective is its
susceptibility to misuse. When the construction of middle range theories be-
comes an end in itself, rather than a means to an end, the ultimate purpose of
the strategy is destroyed and the disadvantages cited above become operational.
Organizational researchers can readily understand this problem as a higher-order
example of goal displacement. In short, the common disadvantages of the middle
range orientation are not endemic to the approach but become evident in the
hands of some researchers.
Finally, the evaluation of the middle range orientation is sometimes prede-
termined by one's stance in regard to other issues. For example, there are
various opinions concerning how science (and organizational research) can best
be advanced. Many argue that science making is facilitated by researchers build-
ing and refming each other's work over time. Viewing science as such a cumula-
tive process engenders norms of cooperation among researchers. Theories and
theorizing of the middle range, with their emphasis on gradual development
through periodic consolidation, are highly consistent with this outlook. Others,
however, feel that genuine scientific advancements occur most often through
the concentrated work of a single individual or through serendipitous fmdings.
MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 37
In addition, there are those (e.g., Popper, 1959) who believe that science is best
promoted under conditions of competition rather than cooperation. Researchers
who maintain these attitudes toward science fmd little utility in middle range
approaches. Merging theories that are discrepant in some respects may be con-
ceived as compromising, or as a strategy more likely to reduce the probability
of uncovering more useful theory.
In the remainder of this paper some of the less commonly recognized impli-
cations of the middle range approach are discussed. These issues are perhaps
more important for the overall assessment of middle range theory as they im-
pede the implementation of the middle range approach.
Researchers who are confronted with a very complex idea often feel they cannot
adequately capture the essence of their idea in a single concept. The idea, which
is sometimes identified as a construct rather than a concept in order to under-
score its complexity, is judged to be multidimensional (Le., a notion that must
be broken down into other less abstract concepts before it can be operation-
alized). Researchers who cannot incorporate all the dimensions of highly com-
plex constructs into their work, may simply state that they will only deal with
a restricted domain of these constructs. Hage (1972) views the formulation of
such an assumption as a way to build middle range theories, and terms the pro-
cess concept explication. He illustrates this technique of moving to a lower level
of abstraction by discussing how a researcher who is interested in the relation-
ship between bureaucracy and organizational efficiency might proceed. Bureau-
cracy, as a construct, can be defined as the extent to which an organization is
characterized by a rational-legal authority structure. Hage suggests that this
complex construct involves four subsidiary notions: (a) the degree of hierarchy
or centralization, (b) the number of rules or formalization, (c) the number of
formal offices or complexity, and (d) the level of technical competence charac-
terizing the organization. By explicating bureaucracy in this manner, one can
construct propositions linking dimensions of bureaucracy and efficiency at a less
abstract 'level (e.g., the greater the level of centralization, the greater the organi-
zational efficiency). While Hage's example pertains only to the bureaucratic con-
struct, a similar procedure could be Simultaneously followed for efficiency.
Shifting from a more abstract to a less abstract level is a useful assumption to
make in situations where a middle range theory is desired for at least two rea-
sons. First, the lower informative value of the derived propositions increases the
likelihood that the propositions will be empirically supported (Zetterberg,
1966). This occurs because the propositions must only hold true for a smaller
theoretical domain. A second advantage is an increase in confidence in the valid-
ity of the fmdings attributable to higher epistemic correlations between the
explicated notions and their measures (Kaplan, 1964). The offsetting disadvan-
tage of subscription to this and the two forthcoming assumptions is the reduced
generalizability of the resultant theory. Should the level of abstraction become
too low, our ability to extend the fmdings beyond the narrowly defmed con-
cepts in the theory would be markedly reduced. In the worst of situations we
would have as many middle range theories as we have objects of investigation.
mount to assuming that the theory must only be confirmed in a limited sample
of units. Organizational researchers frequently use this device in that they build
theories intended to describe limited categories of organizations (e.g., nonprofit
organizations, utilitarian organizations, etc.). Assuming that one's theory is ap-
plicable only to certain units of analysis, reduces the level of coverage required
by the propositions and thus is a means for building middle range theories (Hage,
1972).
The ultimate utility of this technique, however, rests on the outcome of ef-
forts to consolidate middle range theories devised under this assumption. In the
study of organizations, this point is especially problematic. Those attempting to
integrate middle range theories formulated via this assumption are working with
theories generated under an intratypical sampling frame. Intratypical sampling
is a sampling strategy where only one type of organization is used in the analysis
(Kimberly, 1976). The rationale behind intratypical sampling is that theories
supported in one organizational sample will be replicated in other types of orga-
nizations, reconfirmed, and thereby achieve greater generalizability. To this
point, middle range theorizing and intratypical sampling logic are quite com-
patible. The problem emerges when one attempts to discern when a sufficient
number of organizations has been sampled and used to test the theory. As
many have observed (e.g., Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Hall, Haas, and Johnson,
1967), no one has been able to delineate the universe of organizations. Accord-
ingly, there is no ready formula for ascertaining when a random sample of
organizations has been acquired.
The existence of this problem should not be interpreted as a lack of endorse-
ment for this assumption as a way of building middle range theories. The alter-
native of intertypical sampling (i.e., selection of a heterogeneous sample of
organizations) has also encountered criticism (Kimberly, 1976). But it is impor-
tant to recognize that the issue of what constitutes a universe of organizations
will have to be resolved before middle range theories of organizational types can
be consolidated into a singular theory of organizations.
guided chemists' search for new elements by indicating which logical possibilities
had not received empirical confmnation. The middle range approach to organiza-
tional inquiry may similarly be able to guide researchers to areas of investigation
that have a strong potential for theoretical advancement.
Finally, it must be recognized that the recombination of middle range theories
is a creative act contingent on a researcher's own unique analytical abilities. Any
process of induction, including the synthesis of theories, requires a selection of
elements for recombination that cannot readily be replaced with cookbook-type
guidelines. Even though we would contend that the ability to intuit similarities
and resolve discrepancies is a skill that can be developed through concerted
application, those who feel that the talent has escaped them are not without re-
course. Scholars who maintain a highly theoretical orientation are continually
offering suggestions for others to empirically explore. Schein (1975), for exam-
ple, has proposed a linkage between "Theory Y" and the contingency view of
organizations. He argues that both (middle range) theories recognize that a broad
range in individuals and organizations exists and that one must evaluate the total
situation (Le., the environment, technology, aspirations of individual workers)
before implementing a managerial or organizational plan. This analytical link
could provide the impetus for a more general contingency theory of organiza-
tional behavior.
SUMMARY
The middle range strategy, with its dual emphasis on theoretical generalizability
and empirical confirmation is a reasonable approach for organizational re-
searchers to follow. The advantages noted speak for themselves while the limita-
tions reviewed serve as reminders to implement the strategy carefully. It seems
particularly appropriate and a reasonable compromise for organizational scholars
who have traditionally expressed a preference for abstract theory or empirical
research. We feel that research on certain organizational topics (e.g., effective-
ness, climate) has stagnated somewhat because of a failure to move to an inter-
mediary level represented by middle range theory. Perhaps this strategy with its
broader outlook and ability to discern inconsistencies, can extricate these topics
from the myriad of contradictory fmdings that characterizes them. We hope the
suggestions for building middle range theory developed in this paper will be use-
ful in these endeavors. We also hope that once these theories are acquired,
organizational researchers will not stop their efforts but will seriously pursue the
goal of consolidation. To leave middle range theories as disjoint, specialized
theories is to defeat the ultimate purpose of the strategy and to eradicate its
MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 43
REFERENCES
45
46 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
overlaps the previous one, as well as the first on the list. The lat-
ter overlap suggests the difficulty of categorizing these character-
istics unambiguously.
II.A. Conceptual, relational characteristics
6. Generality 1: "How many of the basic problems in the discipline
or specialty are handled by the same theory" (Hage, 1972,
p. 178). While this criterion is somewhat similar to no. 2, above,
it is stated in a manner that seems to imply derivation from, or
reference to, grand theory, rather than derivation from, or refer-
ence to, data.
7. GeneralitY2: Ratio of derived to primitive terms in the theory.
"The higher the ratio of derived to primitive terms, the wider the
scope of the theory ... (or its) generality" (Hage, 1972, pp.178-
179).
[LB. Conceptual, qualitative characteristics
8. The clarity and precision of theoretical terms, postulates, axioms,
and operationalizing rules (Abel, 1970, p. 220). Merton made this
point indirectly, contrasting MRTs with supposed theories which
are, rather, "general orientations," lacking "clearly formulated,
verifiable statements of relationships between specified variables"
(Merton, 1968, p. 52).
9. GeneralitY3: Abstractness. MRTs contain analytical concepts more
general than empirical generalizations (Abel, 1970, p. 220; Dubin,
1969, pp.141-144;Merton, 1968, p. 41), but from which testable
hypotheses, or empirical generalizations, may be derived directly
(Merton, 1968, pp. 41, 68). Kaplan (1964, p. 301) called this ab-
stractness, the length of the reduction chain from theoretical
terms to observable ones.
10. Development from data, rather than from grand or total theories.
Merton emphasized this quite strongly: MRTs "have not been
logically derived from a single all-embracing theory of social sys-
tems, though once developed they may be consistent with one"
(1968, p. 41), or more than one (p. 43). The point was reinforced
by arguing that grand theory in physics developed by integrating
MRTs. Finally, he insisted, theoretical progress can only be made
by developing MRTs and then, by combining them, "evolving,
not suddenly revealing, a progressively more general conceptual
scheme that is adequate to consolidate groups of special theories"
(1968, p. 51). Despite the vigor with which Merton made this
assertion, others blandly ignored it. Dubin, for instance, stated
CHARACTERISTICS OF MIDDLE RANGE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES 49
"In which direction the model building goes probably does not
make any difference" (1969, p. 143).
Merton lists several other characteristics of MRTs that are not included in the
above list, on the grounds that they do not distinguish MRTs from other types
of theory. For instance, while MRTs are used to guide empirical research (Mer-
ton, 1968, p. 39), so are general theories and even empirical laws. Similarly,
consistency with more than one general theory (Merton, 1968, p. 43) is a char-
acteristic shared with empirical laws.
Merton's defmition has the advantage of simplicity, but the disadvantage of
vagueness. It is not entirely clear whether the various supplements to that
definition have clarified matters, although each offers a variety of specificity.
While the ten characteristics do seem to be related to one another, they are
by no means reducible to a single characteristic, or even to a much smaller set.
Thus, while we might reasonably expect the number of types of units of analy-
sis to be related to the number of empirical generalizations, it is not the only
determinant of the number of empirical generalizations. The terminological
confusion involved, extending even to inconsistencies between different chap-
ters of Kaplan, obscures the issue but does not affect the substance. All of
these characteristics seem at least potentially important.
Furthermore, there does not seem to be any obvious principle by which
one of these characteristics may be preferred to another for the purpose of
establishing a working definition of an MRT. Nor is it immediately obvious
how these ten characteristics might be combined to yield a single index of
middle rangedness. Merton asserted that the search for total systems of socio-
logical theory is "premature and apocalyptic ... (we) are not ready" (1968,
p. 45), and that in sociology, as presumably in related disciplines, pursuit of
MRTs will be more productive (p. 51). This may be taken to be an hypothesis,
testable using unobtrusive indicators of scientific productivity in the manner
of other hypotheses in the history and sociology of science. However, it will be
extraordinarily difficult to make such a test without having an operational defi-
nition, or a single index, of middle rangedness. Perhaps such an index can be
developed during the discussions of this conference.
process, several of the least redundant characteristics have been chosen. In each
case, information theory in general, and the Weick theory in particular, will be
compared with a theory that is clearly a general theory, systems theory as
represented by Miller (1971) and Katz and Kahn (1966), and also with a clearly
middle range theory, so labelled by Merton (1968, p. 64), cognitive dissonance
theory (Festinger, 1957). A listing of the applicable characteristics and evalua-
tions of relevant theories follows.
LA.l. Number of empirical laws. Miller listed 36 hypotheses, which had the
form, and, he suggested briefly, the support, to be considered empiri-
cal laws. Of these, 24 related more or less directly to information.
Festinger's data chapters listed something over a dozen empirical laws
that were explicitly explained by dissonance theory. Weick listed
about a half dozen such empirical generalizations in a somewhat less
explicit way, but also listed numerous theoretical propositions ex-
plained by his version of information theory, some of which may be
considered stand-ins for empirical laws. Thus, with respect to this
characteristic, information theory appears middle range by compari-
son with general systems theory, and approximately equivalent in
range to dissonance theory. A comparison on variety (characteristic
2) produces similar results.
LB.3. Number of units of analysis. Information theory is clearly more
middling than systems theory on this characteristic; Miller listed 19
subsystems of which nine are informational, whereas Katz and Kahn
listed 5 subsystems of which one (the managerial) is primarily con-
cerned with information. Weick and Festinger, on the other hand,
seem quite comparable on this characteristic. Weick's theory involves
about ten units, such as individuals, rules, behaviors, and so on. Fes-
tinger's theory involves about eight units, including cognitive ele-
ments, individuals, behaviors, and so forth. Thus Weick's theory is
clearly middle range on this basis. A comparison on number of prop-
erties (characteristic 4) produces similar results.
ILA.6. Generality 1: basic problems. The difficulty with applying this crite-
rion of middle rangedness is to define the basic problems of the dis-
cipline, since presumably different general orientations to a field may
identify different sets. However, it is possible to compare systems
and information approaches in Katz and Kahn; their latter chapters
were given over to seven "genotypic categories of phenomena" (1966,
p. 453), of which only one is informational. It is possible to compare
the seven components of organization theory discussed in Weick's
third chapter with the five major areas of theory and data discussed
by Festinger's later chapters, although the latter seem somehow a bit
CHARACTERISTICS OF MIDDLE RANGE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES 53
these organizations were new written arrangements, which were equivocal both
in the sense of being made of unknown notes, and of being related in unknown
ways to the jazz idiom, standards of musical quality, and the bands' favored
styles of playing. Since each musician received only one-twentieth of the music
written down, this was very clearly a case of generating an enacted environment;
the tune had to be played at least once before it could be known as a whole. Fol-
lowing this initial playing, the first selection process was invoked; the arrange-
ment might be rejected if it was either very high in equivocality (chaotic or
senseless) or very low (banal) (Meyer, 1957). If the arrangement was retained,
it was repeatedly cycled through the organizational processes, removing the
unfamiliarity of the notes, and later the more subtle equivocality involved in
interpretive questions, until the number was considered ready for public per-
formance, which was the principal dependent variable.
Four hypotheses were derived from the foregoing analysis, which could be
tested given the assumption that the new arrangements comprising the input to
the orchestras were of approximately equal equivocality, so that outcome dif-
ferences would reflect primarily variations in organizational processing.
Hypothesis 4. The more the discussion time devoted to the arrangement, the
more likely it is to be perfected for performance. If equivocality is relatively
high, and few rules are invoked, many behaviors will be activated, including both
playing and discussion. This should be especially true when interpretive, aes-
thetic issues come to the fore.
Further details of the research methodology, the data analysis, and the results
of this study have been reported elsewhere (Gilfillan, 1978). These will be men-
tioned below only as they bear on the question of the status of the Weick theory
as a middle range theory.
theory contained several suggestions that the organization as whole is the pri-
mary equivocality-reducer. This organismic assumption is shared with many
other systems approaches, and has been frequently criticized (e.g., Dahrendorf,
1958, p. 125).
One result of this orientation in the theory was the generation of Hypotheses
3 and 2b, that individual or sectional playing would interfere with organizational
processing. These hypotheses were by no means counter-intuitive; both the
leader and other orchestra members often expressed annoyance at ad-hoc play-
ing and at rehearsing single sections. However, the data were disconfirming.
Some of the work that needs to be done to get any organizational product out
is individual or group work. Individual players must master difficult passages,
sections must adjust their loudness, and these processes, though they contribute
to the fmal goal, go on essentially independent of other parts of the organiza-
tion. A revised theoretical model, including individual and group equivocality-
reducing processes, was the result of these considerations.
These problems appear to derive from the fact that the theory was largely
deduced from a general framework, rather than built up, as suggested by charac-
teristic 10, from empirical generalizations. A theory deduced from another
general framework (e.g., Dahrendorfs) might well correct for these problems,
but at the risk of missing other aspects. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely
that a midrange theory built up from empirical laws could manage to slight the
contributions of individuals and groups to organizations.
The orientation of the theory was reflected in other ways, as well. First, the
research simply assumed the existence of a common organizational goal of
making new arrangements ready, rather than researching the goals, implicit and
explicit, held by the organization's members, shared or not. Second, an arrange-
ment consists of 20 individual parts, each with its own level of equivocality. This
fact was not operationalized in the research design, nor explicitly assumed (as
equivalence of arrangements was). Clearly, however, any thorough informational
approach would have to include an attack on the problem on a part-by-part basis.
the original choice was made on the basis of other considerations. This theo-
retical problem might also have been a serious empirical problem, had the
initial assumption led to the collection of data relevant only to the original
operationalization.
Other difficulties with operationalization also related to the problem of
abstractness. For example, the operationalization of the idea of multiple inter-
locked processing behaviors in terms of playing and talk (Hypothesis 4) was
clearly a rather coarse classification; however, it was not clear how to distinguish
finer categories of behaviors for this purpose. Similarly, some central aspects of
the theory remain unoperationalized, including the separation into three process
stages, and the notion of assembly rules. Making assembly rules observable
would involve gathering data on how the leader chooses, during each pause,
the sections of the band and the parts of the arrangement to be played next,
how the various members decide upon various twists of interpretation, and so
on. These may be very difficult to observe, and in fact may be largely unver-
balizable, expressible only by playing or singing. In general, operationalization
in this study depended to a very great extent upon detailed knowledge of music
and orchestras, and even with that knowledge often went astray. While all
operationalization requires knowledge of the concrete research situation, the
knowledge required may have been greater, and the outcome less reliable,
in this case than in the case of the usual MRT. Thus, the high level of abstract-
ness, or of generalitY3, of the Weick theory, caused difficulties both formal and
operational.
CONCLUSION
While the Weick theory has the majority of the ten characteristics of an MRT,
it does not have three. While one might be inclined to adopt a majority decision
rule, and to classify it as a theory of the middle range, the foregoing analysis
indicates that this would be a mistake. With the appropriate reservation, that
this analysis has been based on a single theory and a single research study, it is
clear that the characteristics listed are not merely formal, that they do have
substantial impact on the testability of a theory. Further, since problems of
abstractness, clarity, and top-down derivation seem to produce somewhat dif-
ferent difficulties, my previous impression that they are each important, and are
not synonymous or reducible to a single characteristic, is also supported. To
qualify as a middle range theory, then, a theory must meet a substantial number
of criteria, not just one or two. Not every limited theory is a theory of the
middle range; it seems possible, though this analysis has not demonstrated it
conclusively, that the conceptual, and especially the qualitative characteristics
(type II.B.) are somewhat more important than the others.
CHARACTERISTICS OF MIDDLE RANGE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES 59
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
Each of the three papers in this section of the book makes important contribu·
tions to our understanding of middle range theory. Gilfillan has made a valiant
attempt to make the concept of middle range theory operational by laying down
ten criteria that distinguish middle range theories from empirical generaliza·
tions on the one hand and from grand theories on the other hand. Morrow and
Muchinsky have argued that the ultimate goal of scientific inquiry is to develop
general theories, and that the use of middle range theories (MRTs) can play an
important role in this process through the gradual consolidation of MRTs into
theories of increasing generality. Bluedorn and Evered, in contrast to Gilfillan,
have rejected the notion of middle range theory as a well·defined absolute con·
cept and have suggested instead that middle rangedness is a relative concept and
that what is at issue is not the use of MRTs but the employment of a middle
range strategy for theory construction. Furthermore, they argue that the middle
range strategy is only one of several possible strategies, and that we in organiza-
*1 would like to express thanks to Patricia Templin and Roger Evered for helpful con-
versations during the preparation of this paper, and to Patricia Hollahan for assistance in
copy editing the final version of the manuscript.
61
62 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
tional behavior should avoid anointing the middle range strategy as the best and
only acceptable way of conducting scientific inquiry. Taken together these
contributions resolve certain problems, but they also expose certain conflicts
and gaps in our understanding of how to conduct inquiry into organizational
phenomena.
I should like to organize my own comments around: (a) one of the conflicts
among the three papers, (b) one gap not closed by any of the papers, and (c)
my own proposed formulation of the role that MRTs can play in organiza-
tional research. The conflict concerns whether middle range theory exists as a
well-defmed concept, or whether what exists instead is a middle range strategy.
The gap arises from an inadequate discussion of what "progress" or "advance-
ment" means in scientific inquiry. My proposed formulation is called the circle
of inquiry and attempts both to resolve the conflict and to fill the gap men-
tioned above.
Throughout my preparation of these comments, my posture has been future-
oriented: What can we say and do here that will help to make organizational
research more fruitful in the future? I have resisted the temptation to spend time
trying to determine what Robert Merton really intended by the concept of mid-
dle range theory. Merton represents only one of organizational behavior's parent
disciplines, with his own set of biases, problems, and concerns. It is time for us
in organizational behavior (O.B.) to solve our own problems, rather than import-
ing prefabricated solutions. This commitment to authenticity-to be authors of
our own scripts-obligates us to examine in depth the nature of our subject mat-
ter and our relationship to it. Let us be "phenomeno-Iogical" in the literal sense
of the word, rooting our logic in the nature of our phenomena, not borrowing
a logic from some other domain.
Before getting on with the heart of my comments, let me share with you my
two greatest fears about the outcome of this examination of middle range theory.
One fear is that we will take middle range theory too seriously; the other is that
we will fail to take it seriously enough. We will have taken middle range theory
too seriously if we outlaw any approach to inquiry that is not a middle range
theory approach. We will not have taken it seriously enough if we change only
our language but not our habits of inquiry, merely relabelling all of what we
have been doing as middle range theory. Our purpose in this endeavor ought to
be to develop an optional strategy, middle range theory, for organizational re-
search, not to argue that it is the only acceptable strategy.
Our field has a pernicious habit of reifying what we study. We tend to treat
organizations as if they were objective things or entities with persistent and
COMMENTARY ON GILFILLAN, MORROW-MUCHINSKY 63
hand, they recognize explicitly the process of consolidating MRTs into grand
theories and so see MRTs in the context of inquiry as a whole, and they do seem
to recognize that MRT is more a process of theorizing than a well-defined entity.
Indeed, they use the phrase "middle range theorizing" in their paper, and place
considerable emphasis on the consolidation process. And in private correspon-
dence, Professor Morrow has indicated that they see MRT as one of only several
strategies of inquiry. So perhaps I am just overreacting to the fact that Bluedom
and Evered laid out a more systematic array of theory construction strategies
than did Morrow and Muchinsky.
To conclude this section, my judgment is that we should reject the notion
that middle range theories exist in some independent objective sense. Gilftllan
has provided a valuable service in trying to create measurable properties of MRTs
and in demonstrating that particular strategy is not a fruitful one. In my judg-
ment, no more of our resources should be invested in such efforts. Instead, let
us choose as one of the slogans of this investigation: "Middle range strategy, not
middle range theory."
All three papers address the question of whether using MRTs will result in more
progress for scientific advancement. But none of them explicitly discusses alter-
native meanings of "progress."
I have inferred from Morrow and Muchinsky's paper that the ultimate goal of
scientific inquiry is the development of general theories, a goal shared by Merton
himself. Furthermore, Morrow and Muchinsky consider whether progress takes
place through the gradual consolidation of MRTs into more general theories.
Bluedom and Evered seem to be saying that theory construction is the aim of
scientific activity. Gilfillan is less explicit as to his defmition of progress. From
his example of Weick's theory, we might conclude that progress is the testing of
scientific theories. Taken together these defmitions of progress constitute a
limited definition of what we might take as the indices of scientific progress. If
we are to assert that the middle range strategy of inquiry, or some other strat-
egy, will permit us to make more progress, then we had better have a clearer idea
of what is meant by progress, and should address the issue frontally.
Let me begin the task by listing some possible indices of progress, and permit
me to make clear at the outset that my defmition of progress includes all of
these; the problem is not to choose which one really is the best single indicator
of progress. (In the next section, I propose a model of inquiry in which these
phases of progress are integrated.) I propose the following eight indices of
scientific progress.
66 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
This list of indices of scientific progress is more nearly complete than those cri-
teria considered in the three papers. Some might argue that we have omitted
certain purely instrumental indices such as the development of more reliable
measurement procedures, and I would agree that these indices are indeed purely
instrumental. The eight criteria I have listed have the status of goals of inquiry,
whereas the development of better measurement procedures is merely a means
to those goals. I do not yet wish to refer to them as individual goals, because
they take on meaning as goals only in the context of each other.
Before going further, I should like to discuss one very special issue about
progress that surfaced in the Morrow-Muchinsky paper. Their treatment of con-
solidation as a gradual process smuggles into the analysis an assumption of
scientific progress that is directly counter to Kuhn's (1970) theory of scientific
revolutions. Nowhere in the Morrow-Muchinsky analysis is there any room for a
radical shift in the underlying root metaphor from which the theories derive. In
a private communication, Professor Morrow said that she and Muchinsky con-
sidered the Kuhnian model but chose not to discuss it. She observed that the
middle range orientation is probably consistent with what Kuhn called the
"normal science" phase in which the reigning paradigm is not questioned. If
correct, this observation would mean that adopting a middle range strategy
exclusively would preclude the most fundamental and important forms of scien-
tific progress - the creation of new paradigms of inquiry. Morrow argued privately
that consolidating MRTs can highlight anomalies and thus help to precipitate
paradigmatic revolutions. But I am more convinced by her prior argument that
adopting the middle range strategy would facilitate progress within a normal
science mode, but would foreclose more revolutionary forms of progress. One
wonders whether Merton's methodological orientation toward middle range
strategy was not a reflection of his own substantive orientation toward func-
tionalism and gradualism.
In this section, I attempt to place the middle range strategy of theorizing within
a broader context of scientific inquiry. In their paper, Bluedorn and Evered
present MRT as a strategy of theory construction, and thus, in their Figure 1, all
of the arrows of development run from left to right, from the empirical end
toward the theoretical end of the scope continuum. (What is seen as strategy
68 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
numbers 7 and 9 in their model appears to be what Morrow and Muchinsky term
consolidation.) Is there some way in which we can build upon and extend the
Bluedorn-Evered model to defme the ends of inquiry so that it includes theory
construction and other forms of scientific inquiry as well? (I wish to acknowl-
edge that Bluedorn-Evered did not assert that the aim of inquiry was limited to
theory construction; they were simply silent on the issue.) Theory is not only a
summary of empirical facts. It is also a guide to further inquiry; it tells us what
to look for and what to ignore. And it is a framework for interpreting the mean-
ing of empirical facts. These are my indices I and II in the list of indices of
scientific progress from the preceding section. Within the context of the
Bluedorn-Evered model, this suggests that arrows should also be running from
right to left, connecting theory back to the factual level of empirical generaliza-
tions. While the present version of the Bluedorn-Evered model suggests a uni-
directional movement toward more precise and broader scope theory, my
extension of their model suggests a circle of inquiry, flowing back and forth
between the presuppositions of theory and the observations of fact. (My circle
of inquiry derives from the concept of a "hermeneutical circle" as described by
Heidegger (1962) in Being and Time or Habermas (1971) in Knowledge and
Human Interests.) The circle is shown graphically in Figure 1, which follows.
The Roman numerals I, II, Ill, and IV correspond to the first four indices of
progress described in the preceding section. At this stage, no distinction is made
between MRTs and theories of higher levels of abstraction. Inquiry within this
model is the joint action of theorizing and empirical investigation. Emphasis
is placed on both processes working together, round and round, not in a linear
movement toward ever grander theory, but in a mutual process of using maps
(theories) to explore new territory (collect new facts), and improving maps in
accord with the results of exploration. The circle of inquiry suggests that we
are both explorers and map-makers working together.
Where does the middle range strategy fit into this scheme? It suggests that
the leap from facts to grand theories is usually too large to take in a single
bound and that interposing middle range theories as stepping stones between
facts and grand theories makes that transition more nearly feasible. But it also
suggests that grand theories are frequently too vague to serve as guides for select-
II: Interpretation
I
FACTS
I: Selection
I
THEORIES
I IV: Shaping
III: Verification
t
Figure 1. The Circle of Inquiry.
COMMENTARY ON GILFILLAN, MORROW-MUCHINSKY 69
ing facts to observe and interpret because grand theories are too far removed
from concrete situations. Using MRTs provides a way of continuing to root
empirical inquiry in general theory while still providing a close link to concrete
events. Stepping stones are helpful for travelling in both directions. Not only
should we, according to this version of the middle range strategy, attempt to
consolidate those stepping stones into grand theories (my index V), but we
should also concretize grand theories down into generalizations more directly
useful for selection and interpretation of empirical facts (my index VI).
This expanded version of the circle of inquiry is depicted in Figure 2, which
follows.
Indices I through VI are represented in Figure 2 as transitions between fact,
middle range theories, and grand theories. It is more difficult to represent indices
VII and VIII on the circle of inquiry. Both have to do, in a sense, with the
empirical analog of grand theorizing; both represent intense probing, one practi-
cal, one descriptive, into some specific empirical setting. They might be de-
scribed as "grand empiricizing."
This line of thinking suggests that we should carry the parallel between facts
and theories a step further. Suppose we make an analytical distinction between
middle range facts and grand facts. By grand facts I mean intensive, contextually-
sensitive case descriptions of concrete situations - what Geertz (1973) calls
"thick descriptions." And let us define middle range facts as factual descriptions
in which the empirical context of those facts is not fully specified. Then placing
middle range facts into context and thereby creating grand facts is what I have
labelled index VIII in my list of indices of scientific progress. Index VII, devel-
oping a capacity for problem solving, can then be seen as using an understanding
of the factual context to shape and give meaning to specific factual descriptions
of the middle range. These ideas are summarized graphically in the third ver-
sion of the circle of inquiry in Figure 3.
MIDDLE
TH~;IEES~
~I: Concretization
Interpretation
GRAND
FACTS THEORIES
~:
Verification
Shaping Consolidation
MIDDLE
RANGE
THEORIES
Figure 2. The Circle of Inquiry, Expanded.
70 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
In the above discussion, the word "circle" was used to suggest repetitive, inter-
locked processes. But there is another use of the word "circle" that suggests
"active intellectual group," as in Vienna Circle. This reminds us that science is
a social process, a point touched on by Morrow and Muchinsky in their discus-
sion of cooperative and competitive elements in science. More broadly, it sug-
gests that we might profitably be more aware of the organization of scientific
inquiry, the division of labor into empiricists, grand theorizers, and middle range
theorizers, the ways of coordinating their efforts, and the pathologies of inquiry
that can result when we do not. Hopefully, this book will help to reinforce the
social interpretation of "circle" as well as its procedural one, and serve to inte-
grate empiricism, grand theorizing and other strategies of inquiry, not to define
them as subordinate to a new orthodoxy of middle range theory.
COMMENTARY ON GILFILLAN, MORROW-MUCHINSKY 71
REFERENCES
Pondy has found much to criticize in my paper. I find that in some cases, I agree
with him because he has mistaken or misinterpreted my points, in other cases,
that I must disagree on quite substantial grounds, and in still others, that his
criticisms are merely careless errors. I have attempted to group my responses to
nearly a score of issues in his commentary according to general themes: reifica-
tion, goals and progress in science, and so forth.
Are the Ten Defining Characteristics Mine? In several places, Pondy stated that
I laid down, proposed, created, and in some sense was responsible for the ten
characteristics that may be components of a defmition of middle range theory.
In fact, that section of my paper was thick with references to Rage, Dubin,
Gibbs, Kaplan, and other major figures of the theory-building literature. I re-
viewed and synthesized that literature, and then attempted to evaluate those
characteristics. I cannot honestly claim any of the characteristics as mine by
invention. My conclusion might possibly suggest that the qualitative characteris-
tics are mine by adoption, but it is phrased very tentatively, and I would prefer
72
METAPHORS, THEORIES, AND THE PROCESSES OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 73
to defer that adoption until I have had much more opportunity to evaluate
them further.
Is MRT Well Defined? Pondy has charged that, in contrast to Bluedorn and
Evered, I considered the concept of middle range theory (MRT) to be well de-
fined. In fact, I pointed out in my paper that the defining characteristics overlap
each other, that the terminology used is inconsistent and unclear, that there are
differences among the writers on theory, that some of the characteristics pro-
posed by Merton do not distinguish MRT from other theory, and that Merton's
basic definition of MRT "has the advantage of simplicity, but the disadvantage
of vagueness." Pondy can not have read this section very carefully.
A number of Pondy's specific criticisms and comments fall under this general
heading. His basic position was that organizations are "socially constructed
realities, collections of processes that do the work of organizing," and I fmd
it impossible to disagree with that. Unfortunately, however, he went further
by attempting to "stamp out nouns" (Weick, 1974, p. 358; Bateson, 1972,
p. 334), to deny that organizations (and MRTs) are "objective things or en-
tities with persistent and measurable properties." In passing, I think it appro-
priate to note that processes have persistent and measurable properties too, such
as rate, but that is not the issue. The question is, does a process viewpoint ex-
clude an entitive, or structural, viewpoint?
It is reasonable to regard an automobile as largely a process from one form of
iron oxide, hematite, or iron ore, to another, rust, and indeed it is an unfortu-
nately fast process. Nevertheless, for practical and legal purposes, it is useful
and necessary to consider it as a structure. The process description is an accurate
but only a partial description, and a description useful only for some purposes. I
don't buy the car for its oxidizing potential. Similarly, a chair is a socially con-
structed reality, and may also be differently constructed as a substitute ladder, a
collection of pieces of wood, a defense against lions, a collection of molecules,
or an area of space thinly populated with elementary particles. The point is that
it is wrong to assert that the object in questions is only one of its many possible
aspects.
With regard to social entities such as organizations, the best and last word on
this subject has probably been that of Donald T. Campbell (1958), whose main
point was that entitivity is a matter of degree, of the extent to which social
objects have such characteristics as similarity, common fate, and so on, and
therefore, of the extent to which they are perceived as a unit. The continuing
existence and success of macro organizational behavior (0. B.) is a testament to
the usefulness of thinking about organizations as objects, with structures.
Are Theories Entities? Pondy clearly disagrees with me, and as I recall his
spoken comments in Vancouver, he went even further in asserting that what is
important is the theorizing, not the theory. Theorizing, a process aspect of
science, is very interesting and very important; it is studied by philosophers of
science (under such headings as logic and as the discovery problem) and by psy-
chologists (creativity, problem solving) among others. Nevertheless, it is a means
to an end, and the end is knowledge, intersubjective, reliable, precise, systematic
knowledge, for which read theory. The fact that theories evolve over time, or
that they appear somewhat different to different observers, no more affects the
entitivity of theories than it does that of cars, chairs, or organizations.
METAPHORS, THEORIES, AND THE PROCESSES OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 75
Has MRT Been Reified? Pondy asked the question "Does the concept of mid-
dle range theory make any sense at all?" and suggested that the answer is "no."
As I recall his spoken comments, that "no" was "unambiguous." He suggested
that, in the place of senseless, reified MRT, we think about middle range the-
orizing. Yet even Pondy has been unable to act upon these assertions. Late in
his comments may be found a discussion in which the words "middle range
theories" and "grand theories" are used quite concretely, and indeed, are com-
pared to other quite concrete entities, such as maps and stepping stones. He
can't have it both ways.
What Is Progress? Pondy listed eight indices of scientific progress, with which I
suspect not only I, but virtually everyone else could agree. I would add at least
one more, the development of new research methods and instruments. Surely
the invention of the telescope or the microscope, the cyclotron or the electron
microscope, the l.Q. test or the Skinner box, were not merely "purely instru-
mental" as Pondy states, but were in addition, great advances in applied science,
and generated whole new fields of study in many cases.
These nine indices of scientific progress can be ordered in at least three ways.
First, the preferences of the individual scientist will determine a personal ranking
in importance, the methodologist preferring to search for new methods, the
practitioner to search for new applications, and so forth. Second, they may be
flow-charted, in the manner of Pondy's circle, indicating how each relates to the
others. Third, and most important, however, they can be organized as means
and ends.
Pondy argued that all eight ( or nine) indices of progress are equivalent in
being ends, or goals. Further, his analysis suggests that the development of gen-
eral theory is not a meaningful definition of progress. I disagree, as I suspect
most scientists would. I think the development of general theory is a goal at a
higher level than the others; the others are contributory to and/or derivative
from it. Virtually any source that discusses the goals of science states these in
one of two ways: as description, explanation, and prediction, or as the produc-
tion of knowledge of a certain type. Obviously, the most adequate description,
explanation, and prediction are provided by the most general theory. The knowl-
edge which is the objective is usually qualified as follows (an example chosen
from the book nearest to hand): "The quest for scientific knowledge is therefore
regulated by certain standards or criteria (or) ... ideals to be approximated, but
perhaps never fully attained. The most important of these ... are: (1) Intersub-
jective testability ... (2) Reliability, or a sufficient degree of confirmation ...
(3) Definiteness and precision ... (4) Coherence or systematic structure ... (5)
Comprehensiveness or scope of knowledge" (Feigl, 1949). In combination, these
also constitute a reasonable definition of general theory.
METAPHORS, THEORIES, AND THE PROCESSES OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 77
In summary, then, while all of the indices are desirable goals in themselves,
and contribute to scientific progress, all the others are also means to the ultimate
goal, general theory, as defined above.
Solving Our Own Problems. Near the beginning of his comments, Pondy called
for those of " ... us in O.B. to solve our own problems, rather than importing
prefabricated solutions." I have difficulty knowing whether he really meant
it, given his later utilization of Heidegger (a philosopher) and Habermas (a
Frankfurt-school sociologist). But let us suppose he was serious about this
"authenticity": will such a strategy contribute to the advancement of O.B.?
I suggest that, while O.B. has both substantive and methodological problems,
which are to some extent unique, the field is not and cannot be separated from
the other behavioral and social disciplines. As Weick has argued, organization
behavior is behavior that happens to take place in organizations (1969, pp. 25-
27). Organizational behavior is, has been, and must remain at the intersection
of the related diSciplines. There are political and organizational forces that tend
to artificially separate related fields, but for the sake of scientific adequacy, it is
important to avoid "the ethnocentrism of disciplines" (Campbell, 1969).
Are They the Same? There is a good deal of ambiguity among writers on theory
as to what constitutes a general theory. Merton provided a good example: his
chapter began with the observation that "the word theory threatens to become
meaningless because of the diversity of its referents, "from minor working hypo-
theses, through comprehensive but vague and unordered speculations, to axiom-
atic systems of thought" (1968, p. 39). In the following paragraph he proposed
to restrict the use of the word to "logically interconnected sets of propositions
from which empirical uniformities can be derived." Yet, a page later, he referred
to the "seminal ideas" or metaphors from which several natural-science theories
78 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
/I Idiographic.
Ethnographic.
or "Thick"
Descriptions
X VIb
Empirical
/1""\
la, II
Generalizations ..
Middle VIa
Range ...- - - - - - - - - - -
(not "mi ddl e ~ Theory
Research
Methods
Figure 1. An Outline of the Content and the Processes of Scientific Inquiry: The Circle
of Inquiry, Revised.
79
80 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
have labelled the connections between theory and paradigms as "assuring" pro-
cesses, to indicate that, while root metaphors may not be verified in the ordinary
sense, the existence of congruent MRTs and general theories, as well as facts,
at least increases our belief or faith in the metaphor. The former is a formal
scientific process, reasonably well understood; the latter is akin to argument
from example; we know less about how to do it usefully in a scientific context.
from facts (as a result of tinkering), from MRTs (engineering), even from root
metaphors (insight or inspiration; vide Archimedes' bathtub, or Kohler's apes,
1925). Finally, neither Pondy's circle nor my own figure possesses a necessary
third dimension, to indicate in graphic form that what's involved is not horizon-
tal tail-chasing, but rather an upward spiral.
ANALYSIS OF A THEORY
presumably includes not only behavioral science, but everything else as well. I
freely confess that I feel inadequate to such a task. However, if I understand
the intention of Zen training correctly, it is to train the novice without actually
telling him anything, for he can only experience what is important, not be
taught it. This suggests that an attempt by me or anyone else to express the
wholeness will be fruitless, that "all is incomprehensible" (Humphreys, 1968,
p. 14; Bobko, 1979), and that each person will necessarily have a different sense
of that wholeness, independently arrived at. Thus, in Zen terms, what Pondy
suggested would be futile. Furthermore, while the kind of Zen thinking which
Bobko recommended may be a way to knowledge, it is certainly not a way to
scientific knowledge, since intersubjectivity is one of the key characteristics of
scientific knowledge.
Thus, Pondy seems to have recommended that I do one of two things, one
of which is superfluous, the other of which is both philosophically futile and
scientifically "non-sense" (Bobko, 1979). Under the circumstances, I think my
preference to other activities is reasonable.
Is Weick's Theory "Useless"? Although I suspect that Pondy did not believe
it, I do in fact agree with him that Weick's theory is not useless. My paper dis-
cussed some aspects of its usefulness. I also agree with him that "work remains
to be done to link up Weick's insights with empirical procedures"; a major
section of my paper was devoted to precisely this issue. While I do not fully
agree that "the terms in Weick's theory can not be operationalized directly",
I did describe a number of difficulties that I encountered when I tried to "spec-
if[y them] in some concrete empirical context." This criticism seems to be
based on a misreading of my paper.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The real issue here is, how best to deal with theories that are on the upper part
of the range continuum, as I have argued Weick's is, and with paradigms or root
metaphors generally. I suspect that other such theories have difficulties similar
to the ones described in my paper. For example, a recent review of a book by
four British Marxists indicated that they found one of the mainstays of Marxist
theory, the labor theory of value, to be unrelated to the market price of goods,
useless for economic analysis, and "an obstacle to understanding how a capitalist
economy works" (Hindess, 1978, p. 80). Since Marxism is so widely known and
intensely studied and debated, it is remarkable that such a weakness took more
than a century to surface. However, one explanation of the delay may be the
kind of difficulties I had with Weick's theory, preventing the sort of testing that
would have rapidly revealed the flaw.
METAPHORS, THEORIES, AND THE PROCESSES OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 83
Thus, to return to my Figure 1, I have argued that there are important dif-
ferences between grand theory and paradigms, and between empirical generaliza-
tions and thick descriptions. We understand much better how to deal with the
first and third of these than the other two, for instance, how to relate each to
middle range theory in a productive way. I have not argued that paradigms and
thick descriptions are therefore useless, for I do not believe that. Rather, I have
argued that we should attempt to understand them better, and to understand
the processes by which they are linked to each other, to theory, and to empirical
generalizations. There is some indication that these processes are not the same as
the processes which link grand and midrange theory to empirical generalizations.
There are three implications of this analysis for future work in O.B. If we can
learn to tell the one from the other, we can, first, deal with theories and em·
pirical generalizations appropriately, using well-developed modes of thought.
Second, we can avoid applying those modes of thought inappropriately to
paradigms and thick descriptions. Finally, we can also proceed to develop appro-
priate modes of thought for dealing with the latter.
REFERENCES
Kuhn, T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1970.
Lewis, o. Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1951.
- - . Tepozthin restudied: A critique of the folk-urban conceptualization of
social change. Rural Sociology, 1953,18, 121-136.
Mack, R.W. Ego, energy, and the education of a sociologist. In I.L. Horowitz
(Ed.), Sociological Self-Images: A Collective Portrait. Beverly Hills, Sage,
1969.
Masterman, M. The nature or a paradigm. In I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Eds.),
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1970.
Merton, R.K. On sociological theories of the middle range. In Merton, R.K.,
Social Theory and Social Structure. (1968 enlarged ed.) New York: Free
Press, 1968.
Platt, J.R. Strong inference. Science, 1964,146, 347-352.
Pondy, L.R. Commentary on Gilfillan, Morrow-Muchinsky, and Bluedorn-
Evered: The circle of inquiry. In Pinder and Moore, op. cit.
Redfield, R. Tepoztlan: A Mexican Village. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1930.
- - . The Folk Culture of Yucatan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.
Snizek, W.E. An empirical assessment of "Sociology: A multiple paradigm
science". The American Sociologist. 1976,11, 217-219.
Weick, K.E. The Social Psychology of Organizing. Reading: Addison-Wesley,
1969.
- - . Middle range theories of social systems. Behavioral Science, 1974, 19,
357-367.
- - . Remarks during the contemplative panel session, August 3. In Pinder and
Moore, op. cit.
IIWHY AND HOW
DOES MIDDLE RANGE
THEORY DEVELOP?
7
THE INEVITABILITY
OF MULTIPLE PARADIGMS
AND THE RESULTANT
NEED FOR MIDDLE
RANGE ANALYSIS
IN ORGANIZATION THEORY
Craig C. Pinder and Larry F. Moore, *
University of British Columbia
It has become fashionable in recent years for scholars to criticize "the state of
the art" in the study of organizations. A content analysis of many of these
criticisms and alleged problems reveals discontent about fundamental issues such
as the directions the field has taken or is taking, and about how research and
theorizing are being conducted. Controversy of such a basic nature and the
frequency of its appearance suggests to us that there is considerable disappoint-
ment and frustration on the part of many students of the field and a widespread
suspicion that the rate of progress in our learning about organizations is incom-
mensurate with the effort being expended.
The nature and incidence of this controversy seems similar to that which
Kuhn (1970) suggests occurs before the fall of a dominant paradigm and the
emergence of a new one. However, it will be argued in this paper that the high
incidence of controversy in our field in recent years reflects the simultaneous
existence of many images (or paradigms) about the subject matter studied, and
that this diversity of imagery and the controversy it generates are inevitable.
Two alternative philosophical positions will be adopted and it will be argued
*Tbe authors thank Peter J. Frost and an anonymous journal reviewer for comments
on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
87
88 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
within the bounds of each perspective that organizational behavior and organiza-
tion theory (O.B./O. T.) may never see the emergence of a single over arching
paradigm of the sort Kuhn (1970) describes in the context of other sciences,
certainly not in the foreseeable future.
Before our analysis proceeds, however, a few comments regarding the nature
of the paradigms are in order.
Most scientists are familiar with the work of Kuhn (1970) on the revolutionary
nature of scientific development. Although he provided an important, if not
seminal (Masterman, 1970) understanding of the role of paradigms, there have
been a number of recent criticisms of the lack of clarity of Kuhn's paradigm
concept, since most of his discussions of the concept deal with what paradigms
do rather than what they are. Pursuant to this, Ritzer (1975) has elaborated on
Kuhn's definition. Since Ritzer's concept of paradigm is central to the analysis
that follows, we will examine it closely before proceeding.
For Ritzer, a paradigm is " ... a fundamental image of the subject matter
within a science ...." It is the "broadest unit of consensus within a science"
that serves to differentiate one community of scholars from all others.
There are two particular aspects of Ritzer's concept of paradigm that are of
special importance to our arguments. The first (and one that is also reflected
in the work of Masterman, 1970) is the notion that a scientific discipline can
simultaneously have several competing paradigms, each of which identifies a
scientific "subcommunity." Accordingly, for example, Ritzer has identified
three separate subcommunities, or paradigms, in contemporary sociology.
Pondy and Boje (1975) have subsequently explored the status of these three
in the context of organization theory. The three paradigms are referred to as the
social factist, the social behaviorist and the social definitionist points of view.
The second facet of Ritzer's concept that has relevance for our analysis is
his view that a paradigm consists of four basic components: (1) an "image"
of the phenomena and subject matter that are the focus of the discipline; (2)
an "exemplar", which he defmes as a seminal piece of work that articulates
and reports the essence of the image to scientists in that particular field; (3)
theories; and (4) research methods and instruments. But for Ritzer, the essence
of a paradigm consists primarily of the imagery created in the minds of scien-
tists by the substance of the phenomena being studied. Therefore, to say that a
discipline is a multiple paradigm science implies that different scientists within
the field hold different images about the essential nature of the phenomena
they study.
MIDDLE RANGE ANALYSIS IN ORGANIZATION THEORY 89
1. the vast real differences between organizations at any given point in time
2. the changing nature of organizations and their contexts
3. the reactive nature of the social scientific process of studying social
organizations
progression in history from feudalism, through the industrial revolution and into
modem times, as charted by writers such as Bendix (1956) reveals that the
fundamental form and nature of human organization has undergone considerable
change. Further, it seems that organizations (and their environments) of the
present day are typically different from those found at the tum of the century
when the formal study of organizations began (Maccoby 1976). Moreover,
futurologists such as Bennis (1969), Toffler (1970), and Scott (1974) have pre-
dicted further drastic changes in organizations and their contexts in the future.
Now, as social, economic, and political environments change, organizations
change with them, or die. But these adaptive organizational responses do not
occur suddenly or all at once. At a given point in time it seems reasonable to
expect to find many organizations in a population that feature vestiges of
process and structure suitable for the past but which gradually change to be
adaptive in the future. Simultaneously, an observer will note many new (or even
old) organizations that bear the structural and process styles suited to their
present environmental circumstances. Still other organizations may feature
managerial and structural styles that are inappropriate for any set of circum-
stances. Not only do prototypical organizations of given environmental eras
differ as a function of their respective circumstances, but individual organiza-
tions at a given point in time reveal complex differences. In addition, these same
individual organizations themselves may be in the process of changing over time
to adapt to their changing environments. The faster the rate of change of proto-
typical or particular organizations in a population, the sooner well-established
imagery becomes outmoded and dysfunctional. Research guided by paradigms
based on outmoded imagery will naturally yield disappointing results and give
rise to the type of fundamental controversy mentioned earlier.
In short, it can be argued that O.B./O.T. presently features multiple para-
digms because different observers of organizations understandably see vast dif-
ferences between the (real) organizations they observe. These divergent images
give rise to divergent theoretical and applied ideas about organizations and
generate controversy and polemics among adherents of the different paradigms.
Examples of these differences and the controversies they have generated are
plentiful in the recent literature. Concerning the most appropriate imagery
for the field, consider Georgiou's (1973) attack on the goal paradigm and his
suggested substitution of an "organizations-as-marketplaces" image in its place.
Or consider the proposition by Cohen et al. (1972) and March and Olsen (1976)
MIDDLE RANGE ANALYSIS IN ORGANIZATION THEORY 91
that organizations are "garbage cans," as opposed to the rational systems most
previous thinking implicitly assumed. There is Barnard's (1938) view of orga-
nizations as social systems; Tushman's (1977) image of organizations as political
systems; and the notion of organizations as "loosely-coupled" systems (Glass-
man 1973; Weick, 1976). Consider, in fact, the recurrent attack on the systems
metaphor itself as a general framework for studying organizations (cf. Burack,
1975; Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972; Melcher, 1975; Milburn et al., 1975; Pondy
and Mitroff, 1978; Thayer, 1972; Weick, 1974a; Zaleznik, 1967). Each of these
authors either adopts or rejects an image of what constitutes organizations, and
again, most of them seem to adopt a realist perspective.
Notice that Nord's (1974) Marxist critique of the field attacks what we take
as given and what we view as manipulatable in understanding and changing
organizations. Recall Dunnette's (1966) observation pertaining to our susceptibil-
ity to fads and fashions and Naylor's (1971) perspective on how scholars should
be trained for the field. These sets of observations and the controversies they gen-
erated reflect assumptions about the nature of the field: what it is and how it
should be viewed. Reflect on the intermittent complaints about the necessity for
considering the sociological facets of organizations (cf. Perrow, 1970, 1972;
Pfeffer, 1976) and consider the ageless debate about the nature of the individual
human being and how it has been updated by contemporary organizational
psychologists such as Scott (1974), Deci (1974) and Locke (1977). Each of
these debates, suggestions, and comments reflects, in our view, the vast diversity
among their authors in the images they hold about the nature of organizations
and organizational behavior. Finally (although not exhausting the list of possible
examples), consider Bittner's (1965) views of organization as sources of rules for
conduct, stylistic unity, and corroborative reference.
In addition, consider some of the recent controversy regarding methodology.
Weick's (1974b) suggestion that we study "absurd organizatioTls," "micro-
organizations" and "everyday events" reflects an image of organization, as does
Piehl's (1974) admonition that we think in and look for nonlinear relationships.
Sayles' (1975) argument that we return to anthropological methods, and the
recurrent cry for the simultaneous consideration of variables from several levels
of analysis (cf. Fredericksen et aI., 1972; de Wolff and Shimmin, 1976) all re-
flect implicit imagery about the nature of organizations. The "organizational
realities" perspective of Frost et al. (1978) and the isolation of alleged "blind-
spots" by Frost (1977) and Weick (1977a) similarly reflect a belief about what
imagery is most appropriate. RimIer's (1976) allegation that the field is pre-
occupied with mathematics, psychology, and "trivia" also reflects an image of
what the field consists of and how it should be studied.
We could continue this list, but hopefully our point is made: Different
scholars are looking at organizations and are seeing different things; different
92 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Whether this state of confusion reflects what Kuhn (1970) would call a pre-
paradigm situation or what Masterman (1970) and Ritzer (1975) would call a
multiple paradigm condition is hard to determine, but perhaps that issue, in
itself, is not important. What seems important to us is the proposition that while
there is considerable variety underlying the chaos and while this variety could be
beneficial if attempts were periodically made to reduce the incommensurability
among the images we hold, we are not aware of many attempts to do so. It may
be that the field is far too young for us to reasonably expect the emergence of a
single hegemonic image, or overarching paradigm.
Or fmally, it may be that the diversity of imagery and considerable contro-
versy we are witnessing attest to the futility of embracing a realist's view of
the world, and that a philosophical stance such as Subjective Idealism or Phe-
nomenalism is more justified. We turn now to that possibility.
There is at least one other major reason why our literature reflects the simul-
taneous existence of so many paradigms (images) of organizations. The reason
has been suggested by the writings of Weick (1969, 1977b) and requires, to be
understood, the rejection of the assumptions of Realism (as described earlier)
and the adoption of a different epistemology. The alternative viewpoint has its
roots in the thinking of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mach, and Schutz. Broadly
classified, these thinkers come from the tradition of Subjective Idealism or
Phenomenalism. Very briefly (and with a fear of unfairly typecasting Weick
or oversimplifying his perspective), Phenomenalism " ... is the doctrine that all
statements about material objects can be completely analyzed into statements
about sense-data (Whiteley, 1974, p. 712)." It " ... involves the thesis that
anything we know about material things may be expressed in statements re-
ferring solely to appearances (Chisholm, 1968, p. 83). " When Weick remarks
that organizations, organizational boundaries, and organizational environments
cannot be known but are simply what actors enact them to be, because they
exist only in the heads of the actors themselves, he sounds amazingly like
Berkeley and the physicist Mach who both believed that there is no physical
world behind the appearances and sensory stimulation we attribute to entities
that we think of as occupying space in the universe. Writes Mach:
Different ideas can express themselves with the same exactness in the domain
accessible to observation. The facts must hence be carefully distinguished
from the intellectual constructs the formation of which they suggested. The
latter-concepts-must be consistent with observation, and must in addition
94 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
be logically in accord with one another. Now these two requirements can be
fulfilled in more than one manner ... (Bradley, 1971, p. 83).
The important point for the present discussion is not the correct classification
of Weickian O.B. The important point is that from this general epistemology, as
from the realist view considered earlier, multiple paradigms of organizations are
inevitable. In fact, it may even follow that we can expect as many images and
paradigms of organizations and their contexts as we have observers of them.
Complicated by the practical problems of registering without interference the
mental maps and images actors hold (again, the issue of reactivity), organization
theorizing with a social defmitionist or phenomenalist viewpoint, in the limit,
would be chaotic from a scientific perspective. While ethnomethodologists claim
that organization theorizing by realists is fraudulant, adherents to the scientific
norms of replication, cross-validation and precision can claim that assumptions
from the social factist and social behaviorist schools (following Ritzer, 1975)
are necessary if chaos is not to prevail.
Pondy and Boje (1976) have reviewed the problems of managing a multiple
paradigm science. They conclude that a multiparadigm situation can be useful
for learning from the triangulation possible from competing perspectives. They
also discuss, somewhat optimistically, how efforts might be conducted to recon-
cile interparadigmatic differences to make the science more manageable. like
Pondy and Boje, we recognize the utility of multiple paradigms (although our
reasons for doing so are somewhat different), but unlike them, we do not
share their apparent optimism that reconciliation can take place. We predict
that the multiplicity of images that will abound in the heads of factists or
definitionists, (or realists or phenomenalists) will make the resolution to a single
paradigm hopeless.
The first obvious implication is that we simply accept the notion (for the time
being at least) of many different ways for viewing organizations and that pro-
ponents of the various images could be all somewhat correct. That is, it may be
that we should accept several simultaneous images as being more or less appro-
priate for any given set of organizations. Thus, for example, we might reason
that some (or all) organizations are more or less, and at varying points in time,
political systems, economic marketplaces, garbage cans, flypaper, cooperative
systems, and so forth. In fact, we may even consider system as a variable rather
than a fixed quantity and consider the possibility that some organizations are
more like systems than others.
We would not denigrate efforts to find bridges and to reduce the diversity of
paradigms in the field, but we would urge the vast majority of students in the
field who believe they are engaged in normal science not to set their expecta-
tions for general science too high, and would warn them to continue to expect
flak from adherents of (many) competing paradigms.
At the same time, however, we might suggest that journal editors require
polemics representing particular paradigms, as they attack the work of others
in different paradigms, to recognize and make explicit the differences of imagery
they hold, as a way of attempting the processes of "transpection" described by
Maruyama (1974). (Transpection involves seeing the world from the point of
view of alternative paradigms.) In other words, the price of admission into a
journal for the sake of polemizing would become the painful requirement that
the prospective critic articulate his or her underlying imagery as well as correctly
represent the assumed imagery of the author he or she seeks to assail. Then,
following the assault, the critic would be required to address the issue of whether
anything new has been learned about either of the two paradigms involved or
96 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
how they are similar or related. Otherwise, controversy such as we have wit-
nessed in recent years will continue to be only vacuous and destructive.
Hopefully, ideas generated in this book will provide some impetus to the
acceptance of multiple paradigms and will offer further insight into the process
of middle range theory development and its possibilities for understanding
organizations.
NOTES
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100 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
DEFINITIONS
A disenchantment with global theories derived from open systems models has
led researchers to consider the efficacy of more specific, middle range theories
(see Pinder, 1977, for a review of this movement). According to a recent call
for papers, middle range theories are dermed as:
. . . [theories) that would attempt to predict and explain only a subset of
all organizational phenomena. As such, each midrange theory might make dif-
ferent sets of assumptions about organizations, consider different parameters
to be important and lead to distinctly different prescriptions for practice.
Each midrange theory may be based on a unique set of imagery of what con-
stitutes organizational behavior and require entirely different research strat-
egies and tactics (University of British Columbia announcement, 1977).
*1 am indebted to Peter Dachler for his help in the preparation of this manuscript. His
willingness to always not be distraught by my constant interruptions, listen to my ideas,
and provide helpful suggestions was imperative in keeping my infmities unbounded. 1 also
wish to thank Willard Larkin and Ken Smith for their time, helpful comments, and qualita-
tive knowledge.
101
102 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
The existence of multiple paradigms in the social sciences can be readily docu-
mented. For example, Ritzer (1975) has indicated that sociology is a multiple
paradigm science. According to Ritzer, a paradigm is an image of a subject matter
that defmes what and how that subject should be studied. Thus, a paradigm/
image is a consensual unit of analysis that is clearly normative.
In psychology, Sampson (1977) contends that social psychologists have
emphasized research under the thesis of "self-contained individualism." This
thesis represents the belief that "syntheses of opposing or desirable characteris-
tics are located within the person rather than within an interdependent col-
lectivity" (p. 767). This image of a synthesis has dominated research in social
psychology as if self-contained individualism were a fundamental psychological
principle, which it is not. By example, (e.g., androgyny), Sampson indicates
that syntheses among persons provide alternative, and perhaps more desirable,
MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 103
EXEMPLARS
John Steinbeck
In The Log from the Sea o[Cortez Steinbeck (1941/1962, pp. 131-151) con-
siders two modes of thought-teleological and nonteleological. For Steinbeck,
teleological thought represents the search for causes and answers to the question,
"Why is X so?" He also notes that "conflicts may arise between any two or more
of the 'answers' brought forth by ... teleologies" (p. 143). Thus, Steinbeck may
be interpreted as struggling with the problem of conflicting, multiply-imaged
explanations. To resolve this problem, Steinbeck appeals to the need for a new
non teleological explanation in the form "X is so because it's so." Taken literally,
this formulation could be dismissed as naive description. However, for Stein-
beck, this nonteleological statement results from an awareness of a multiplicity
of explanations. The statement "X is so because it's so" subsumes causal (teleo-
logical) explanations, as well as descriptive statements, "since they [teleological
answers] are part of the picture even if only restrictedly true" (p. 144). The
non teleological statement allows for all possible modes of explanation, as well
as for multiple images within each mode. To know a thing includes all percep-
tions, causal and acausal, and their interrelationships:
The truest reason for anything's being so is that it is. This is actually and
truly a reason, more valid and clearer than all the other separate reasons,
or than any group of them short of the whole. Anything less than the whole
forms part of the picture only .... A thing may be so "because" of a thou-
sand and one reasons of greater or lesser importance .... The integration
MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 105
of these many reasons which are in the nature of relations rather than reasons
is that he [man] is. (pp. 148-149).
Thus, Steinbeck accepts the existence of multiple images. His integrative,
non teleological statement subsumes all multiple images as a buzzing and alive
set of apparent conflicts, all nonconflicting by the fact that they each reflect
an aspect of what is. Knowledge then becomes the set of relations between our
multiple reasons (images) and the actual phenomenon of study. We now turn to
factor analysis in order to pictorially depict the nature of this nonteleological,
conflict-free thought.
Factor Analysis
The input for a factor analysis program is generally a correlation (or covariance)
matrix. The matrix is then transformed, mathematically and statistically, in
order to uncover underlying structures in the data and to test hypotheses about
such structures. The technical development of this technique led Cronbach
(1957) to state "Factor analysis is rapidly being perfected into a rigorous
method of clarifying multivariate relationships" (p. 675). Current researchers,
however, are becoming increaSingly aware that factor analytic results are a func-
tion of subjective decision rules regarding the nature of the data to be collected
for analysis, the number of factors, ope rationalizations of simple structure, types
of rotations, and assumed factor intercorrelations (cf. Francis, 1974). Thus, with
the same data, different researchers may produce differing structures, just as dif-
fering images of organizations may lead to differing middle range theories. As
Rozeboom (1966) says of factor analysis, "Aren't we just going in circles? Well,
yes-in a way we are, but sometimes the view from one point on a circle is more
interesting than from another" (p. 213). Thus, our multiple images are views
from differing points on the circumference of the circle. We are now ready for
the epistemological jump necessary for discovering the essence, indeed, the
center of the organizational phenomena that we study. That is, we are now
ready to take the Zen leap to ...
Points on the circumference of a circle, instead of merely looking to the self-
same centre, are at the centre all the time. This means, of course, that the
circle folds up, as it were, into the Void of the Unmanifest (Humphreys,
1968, p. 113).
Thus, just as with Steinbeck, the multiple images can not be conflicting at all,
for they are all aspects of the same center of the circle. The previous quote by
Humphreys concerns the Zen wholeness of multiple approaches. We now turn
to the underlying philosophy of that wholeness.
106 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Zen
The Zen developmental process consists of three stages. The first stage, nonsense,
implies a world view that is unidimensional, naive, descriptive, and bounded by
Marxian (Groucho) humor. The second stage, logic, as typified by Western civili-
zation, is replete with dualistic notions (e.g., good/bad, logical/illogical, active/
passive) and emphasizes the rational search for an understanding of behavioral
phenomena. like Steinbeck, multiplicity of images provides the impetus for
a new mode of explanation. That is, we must comprehend that the part (middle
range images) is greater than the whole since the ''whole is complete, which is
finite; the part is unfinished, and that is infinite" (Humphreys, 1968, pp. 109-
110). The number of multiple Zen images is infmite. The second developmental
stage, logic, is incapable of subsuming such a multiplicity of images. In fact, in
Zen philosophy, the fmal function of the intellect is that it "enables us to com-
prehend at last that all is incomprehensible" (Humphreys, p. 14). This compre-
hension, and the need to encompass the logical conflicts of our middle range
theories, leads to the third Zen stage of nonsense (or super-sense). Here, like
Steinbeck, there is no tension between opposing images since "things are what
they seem to be and that is that" (p. 85) and there is "oneness of cause and
effect." The state of mind called satori is an awareness of such wholeness and
the simultaneity of conflict and harmony. At the third stage, one is willing to
experience all phenomena and to believe in an intuition that is beyond descrip-
tion and logic. For Zen, "the intellect may argue and debate; it may learn and
teach a vast amount about almost anything; it can never know. Zen is a matter
of experience" (Humphreys, pp. 13-14). At this third stage, knowledge is not
measurable, for it is experienced in its wholeness and totality of images at an
intuitive, qualitative level.
It is suggested here that Campbell's (1974) notion of "qualitative knowing"
is congruent with the above Zen experiential mode of knowing. This is apparent
in types of data discussed by Campbell (e.g., remembered experiences of partici-
pants, recorded participant experience, participant and nonparticipant observa-
tion, and the experience interview). For Campbell, "qualitative, common-sense
knowing of wholes and patterns provides the enveloping context necessary for
the interpretation of particular quantitative data" (p. 11, italics added). Thus,
the wholeness of our research is couched in qualitative, experiential knowing.
We now tum to a fmal exemplar, which suggests a state of mind necessary for
the encompassment of multiplicities.
Herman Hesse
"Artifacts"
To reiterate, the notion of middle range theory has utility in that it leads to a
heightened awareness that multiple images of organizations coexist. These
multiple images are based upon differing normative assumptions (stipulations)
underlying the research (Israel, 1972; Ritzer, 1975; Sampson, 1977) which,
108 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
in turn, are a function of traits of the individual researcher, values of the current
culture, or criteria imposed by the organization that requests the study. The
nature of these normative assumptions suggests that it may prove useful to
consider the effect of: (1) organizational and cultural demand characteristics
on theory formulation as well as (2) personality traits and expectancies of
the researcher.
In their review of laboratory experimentation, Fromkin and Streufert (1977)
consider demand characteristics, experimenter expectancy, and experimenter
personality under the rubric of "artifacts" and note that such notions are also
applicable to field research settings. It is likely that both normative cultural
assumptions and images of working man set forth by organizations operate as
demand characteristics in the theory development process. Differences in de-
mand characteristics will lead researchers to differing images of individuals,
organizations, or their interrelationships. For additional support of this point,
consider Sherwood and Nataupsky's (1968) rmding that theoretical conclusions
based on empirical data are related to demographic variables of the individual
researcher. It is therefore suggested that a researcher's expectancies about
empirical outcomes are affected by both demand characteristics of the situation
and by researcher personality profiles. Such exp ;tancies affect the type of
questions asked, the modes of data collection, and the interpretation of empiri-
cal results-leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy about the "truth" of the original
normative assumptions. Rather than dismiss the above processes as "artifactual,"
it is suggested that the effects of demand characteristics and personality variables
on theory development provide, in themselves, phenomena that are deserving
of study.
All exemplars clearly suggest that we accept the existence of multiple images and
the resultant sets of apparent contradictions. However, these contradictions are
apparent only at the rational, quantitative level of thought. The acceptance of
contradictions (by Steinbeck and Zen philosophy) as necessary reflections of a
greater All implies that "contradictions" are no longer contradictory, for they
are all reflections of the same universe of human behavior. That is, the circum-
ference of the circle is at the center. How are we to accept these maddening
notions? Hesse and Zen philosophy state very clearly: laughter and humor. That
is, humor becomes a capacity (perhaps a loving capacity) to laugh at/with our-
selves and the simultaneity of multiple images. The humor is of harmonious, not
nihilistic, origins. In this marmer, we now become aware of the normative nature
of our assumptions, their effect on the development of theory, and their multi-
MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 109
plicity. For von Neuman (1958) the beauty of the brain, unlike the computer,
is exactly this capacity to cope and function in "noisy," sometimes, chaotic,
environments. Only through this humor within ourselves can we effectively dare
to leap among the points of the Zen circle.
Such realizations are important for a creative, investigative science. All exem-
plars have suggested research approaches that are considered to be preconditions
for creativity: i.e., humor, acceptance of multiplicity, novel viewpoints (from
the circle), tolerance for ambiguity, and divergence (cf. Barron, 1969; Gowan,
Demos, and Torrance, 1967). Thus, if we accept the implications of multiple
fundamental assumptions, organizational research may become a truly cre-
ative endeavor.
Causality
Steinbeck suggests that causal (teleological) explanation is neither the sole nor
the major mode of explanation of organizational phenomena. Indeed, both Zen
philosophy and Rozeboom's comment on factor analysis depicted the circularity
of explanation. In general linear model theory, recent attention to the notion of
circularity has led to the analysis of structural equations that consider feedback
loops, changes in parameters, and circularity of behavioral processes (Heise,
1975; Hanushek and Jackson, 1977). Finally, it may be fruitful to accept the
extreme notion of synchronicity (Jung, 1955/1973) and assume that since space
and time are relative, many theoretical explanations are necessarily acausal.
Quality
quantitative and rational techniques does not avoid the existence of multiple
imagery. That is, the "objective" multivariate techniques, such as factor analysis,
yield results that are a function of subjective, value-laden decisions (such as the
choice of "objective" rotation schemes in factor analysis).
If multiple images are created from multiple value structures (individual,
organizational, or cultural), research results are comprehensible only in the
light of their respective value bases. Perhaps each journal article should contain
a statement, by the author(s), indicating reasons (both personal and otherwise)
for choosing the particular research questions, criteria, and modes of analysis.
Additionally, authors might include personal growth experiences as a result of
the research inquiry, by indicating how this growth affected implementation of
the study and interpretation of the data (Smith, 1978). In this way, social
science knowledge becomes a process of the interplay between value structures
and the collection of research data.
REFERENCES
Barron, F. Creative Person and Creative Process. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, Inc., 1969.
Blyth, R.H. Zen in English Literature and Oriental Classics. San Francisco:
Heian International Pub. Co., 1942.
Campbell, D. T. Qualitative Knowing in Action Research. Paper presented at the
meeting of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, September,
1974.
Cronbach, L.J. The two disciplines of scientific psychology. American Psychol-
ogist, 1957,12,671-684.
Francis, 1. Factor analysis: Fact or fabrication. Mathematical Chronicle. 1974,
3,9-44.
Fromkin, H.L., and Streufert, S. Laboratory experimentation. In M.D. Dunnette
(Ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Chicago: Rand
McNally Publishing Co., 1976.
Gowan, J.C.; Demos, G.D.; and Torrance, E.P. (Eds.). Creativity: Its Educa-
tional Implications. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967.
Hannan, M. T. Problems of aggregation. In H.M. Blalock (Ed.), Causal Models in
the Social Sciences. New York: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971.
Hanushek, E.A., and Jackson, J.E. Statistical Methods for Social Scientists. New
York: Academic Press, 1977.
Heise, D.R. Causal Analysis. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975.
Hesse, H. Steppenwolf. (B. Creighton, trans.) New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, Inc., 1963. (Originally published, 1929.)
Humphreys, C. Zen Buddhism. New York: MacMillan Co., 1968.
Israel, J. Stipulations and construction in the social sciences. In J. Israel and
H. Tajfel (Eds.), The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment.
New York: Academic Press, 1972.
Jung, C.G. [Synchronicity] (R.F.C. Hull, trans.). Princeton, New Jersey: Prince-
ton University Press, 1973. (Originally published, 1955.)
112 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION
113
114 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
range theories, and also to search for middle range theory(ies) to integrate those
middle range theories. Middle range theories that integrate other middle range
theories are called trans-middle range.
Before advancing an example of a trans-middle range theory, let's look at
middle range theory, including reasons for and properties of middle range theory
in the study of organizations and organizational behavior. It is argued that some
organizational phenomenon are currently described by middle range theories but
that these middle range theories are unconnected and unintegrated.
1. How can middle range and trans-middle range theories be developed and
used for advancing the understanding of and defining the total area of
organizational behavior and theory? As seen from the discussion of mid-
dle range theories such as the Path-Goal Theory of leadership the question
arises, "Can the boundaries of any inquiry be naturally determined or
must they be arbitrary?" The analysis of leadership, for example, could
be regarded as an area of inquiry in political science and the use of role
perceptions as an artifact of sociology. The total area of organizational
behavior and theory has, of course, drawn extensively from these other
grand areas mentioned. Although organizational behavior and theory has
developed some uniqueness from these areas, it continues to take advan-
tage of aspects of those areas which serve its own uses, help reconcile
inconsistencies, and/or explain more variance in the phenomena currently
within the purview of organizational behavior and theory. Thus our major
area of inquiry (Le., organizational behavior and theory) in essence is also
a cluster-though perhaps grand-within the universe of epistemology,
seeking other grand clusters, which may have common theoretical and
empirical threads, with which to integrate (Driggers, 1977). For the
moment, any specific middle range theory of organizational phenomenon
122 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
case with role theory. Schuler (1978) integrated a middle range theory of
task design, a middle range theory ofleader behavior, and a middle range
theory of organizational structure by a middle range theory of role per-
ceptions, which then became a trans-middle range theory. The same clus-
ters of phenomenon could have been integrated with another middle
range theory and also with other theories of middle range for task, leader
behavior, and structure.
For example, Silverman (1971) and Collins (1975) have attempted to
integrate two unique clusters of phenomenon in sociology: conflict and
action. Each attempt is based upon a different middle range theory of
conflict and action and, therefore, has a different framework for the de-
velopment of the trans-middle range theory. Silverman and Collins' the-
ories show the feasibility and perhaps necessity for several theories,
perhaps even conflicting theories, within each cluster or across clusters
of phenomenon (Benson, 1977).
Thus, the determination of the best middle range theory or best trans-middle
range theory may be difficult, although not impossible. This determination of
the best middle range theory and the best trans-middle range theory, for exam-
ple, could be made within the framework or rule of Theoretic Blockage ex-
plained by Driggers (1977). What is important, however, is that regardless of
the middle range theories used, they must be examined both theoretically and
empirically within themselves and across other clusters seeking an integrating
cluster. Determination of the middle range theory for a cluster depends upon its
ability to explain the phenomenon and/or resolve inconsistencies, but also it
depends upon the efficiency with which it can be integrated with other clusters
or be an integrator for them. Thus, utilization of middle range theory as dis-
cussed here, by recognizing the differing degrees of coupling among variables,
their theoretical linkages and construct similarity, transcends specific approaches
(e.g., structural functionalism) and becomes trans-theoretic in orientation
(Spinner, 1973). It is, therefore, suggested here that generation of efficient
middle range and trans-middle range theories is the best hope for increased under-
standing and advancement of knowledge of the total organizational phenomena.
CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the importance of middle range theory within the con-
text of increasing our understanding of organizational phenomena. Grand
theory and narrow range theory appear to be inefficient or incapable to advance
understanding. The middle range theories, of which there are now several in
124 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
NOTES
I. Although singular, the term phenomenon will be used when referring to one, two or
more single clusters of variables, or larger clusters. The term phenomena will be reserved for
reference to the total set of clusters that describe organizational behavior and theory. Thus,
leader behavior and task design are two clusters of variables and are referred to as two phe-
nomenon within the total set of clusters referred to as the total organizational phenomena.
2. The remaining discussion uses employee responses as the dependent variable for
which maximizing variance is desired. Ouster identification is usually made on the basis of
construct and empirical similarity and theoretical relationships of the independent modera-
tor, and intervening variables.
3. Clusters would ideally be identified fIrst by analysis of the theoretical linkages and
construct similarity of the current universe of variables in organizational theory and be-
havior. This identification process is similar to that used in the development of construct
validity for any scale or test. The second step in cluster identification is the determination
of empirical similarity or the degree of coupling. Since the degree of coupling refers, in part,
to intensity and direction of the relationship between variables, the determination of the
degree of coupling can be done by examining the correlation matrix of the variables iden-
tified by construct similarity.
MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES 125
REFERENCES
Bennis, W.G.; Benne, K.D.; and Chin, R. The Planning of Change: Readings in
the Applied Behavioral Sciences. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
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Benson, J. K. Innovation and crisis in organizational analysis. The Sociological
Quarterly, 1977,18, 3-16.
Coilins, R. Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science. New York:
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Driggers, P.F. Theoretical blockage: A strategy for the development of organiza-
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126 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
127
128 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Also, strict adherence to the analytical method may entice researchers into de-
veloping single causal models where there is reciprocal causation and premature
closure (Dubin, 1975). Recurring patterns not originally identified within the
domain of the researcher's discipline are rarely considered or discussed. An ex-
ample of this is the relationship between leader behavior and employee satisfac-
tion. Recent studies indicate that leadership may only be important in some
types of units in some types of organizations. Yet, typologies of organizations
are not normally found in the psychological literature that forms the base for
most leadership research (Kerr, 1976; Hunt, Osborn, and Schriesheim, 1978).
To encourage middle range theory development, a compromise between, and
a meeting ground of, the analytical and systems methods must be found. Specifi-
cally, as Weick (1974) denotes, this development process would be limited to
patterns of relationships that can be confirmed within limited ranges of data,
would represent consolidation of segregated hypotheses, and would be available
for consolidation with other middle range theories.
What is needed is a view that recognizes both the measurement of concepts
and patterns of relationships. The notion of a nomothetical net incorporates
this view. A nomothetical net is simply a system of relationships among con-
structs. If, however, a single pattern continues to emerge across subjects and set-
tings (organizations), then one begins to think of validated nets that can be
subjected to more rigorous analytical testing procedures. Following Marx and
Hillix (1973) and Windelband (1921), analyses leading to validated nets help
isolate general laws (nomothetical relationships). In contrast, most organiza-
tional research has been idiographic in character. That is, there has been a search
for explaining maximum variance across particular events or individuals.
If the notion of a nomothetical net is combined with higher order factor
analysis, there is a simultaneous search for both concepts and patterns of rela-
tionships across concepts. Normally in organizational analysis, factor analysis
is most often used to identify patterns of covariation across items on a ques-
tionnaire to derive concepts (Gorsuch, 1974; Neter and Wasserman, 1974).
However, a higher order factor analysis can be used to examine relationships
among patterns, particularly where the initial identification of the constructs
allows them to be intercorrelated. Rather than factoring correlations among
items, higher order factor analysis factors correlations among constructs to
delineate patterns of covariation. The patterns of covariation across concepts
appear to be the statistical analog of a nomothetical net. Only when a particular
pattern keeps recurring across subjects and organizations, does one begin to
think of a validated net.
While mapping nomothetical nets using higher order factor analysis may be
the approach, the most critical question that still remains is, "What body of
constructs should be selected for analysis?" In our opinion the work system
NOMOTHETICAL NETS AND HIGHER ORDER FACTOR ANALYSIS 129
design literature abounds with lists of dimensions, which should yield constructs
and which should lend themselves to the middle range theory development pro-
posed by Weick. Our particular selection was guided by researchers attempting
to integrate individual-psychological views with organizational-sociological views.
Specifically, we were interested in twenty-five dimensions that attempted to
tap employee perceptions of the organization, job characteristics, and selected
psychological dimensions researched by those interested in this aspect of orga-
nizational analysis. We have used the term dimension since there is some ques-
tion as to whether the dimensions listed by the researcher are constructs. While
many claim they are, there is mixed evidence for most of the measures.
Our previous discussion leads to two research questions. First, "Do employees
perceive the twenty-five dimensions in the same way as evolved by previous
researchers so that they can be labelled as concepts?" Second, "What are the
relationships among the concepts identified? Do they conform to existing
theoretical notions such that we may begin to see the emergence of a validated
nomothetical net?" If so, then the work system design theory building process
may be advanced beyond the basic analytical perspective into the realm of a
middle range theory.
To summarize, our conceptual approach to develop a middle range perspec-
tive of the work system design literature is the nomothetical net. The analytical
tool to develop the net is higher order factor analysis. This exploratory study
should be a prelude to developing a middle range theory of work systems design.
We expect that future research with other employees in different organizational
settings would identify similar and associated nomothetical nets. If, however,
different types of nomothetical nets are mapped, these differences would be
equally important information contributing to the development of a middle
range theory of work systems design.
METHOD
Sample
130
NOMOTHETICAL NETS AND HIGHER ORDER FACTOR ANALYSIS 131
Measures
The twenty-five dimensions (comprising 99 items) used in this study were drawn
from a comprehensive review of the organizational behavior literature and per-
tain to the domains of the organization, the job, work-related attitudes, selected
psychological dimensions and work-related satisfaction. Table 1 provides these
dimensions and their origin. All instruments were reported to have adequate
reliability and validity for exploratory research.
Data Analysis
All 99 items were first factor analyzed using Rao's canonical model with squared
multiple correlations as initial communality estimates. A scree test of the eigen-
values indicated twelve Significant factors. Various oblique factor rotations were
made to arrive at simple structure to detect the constructs empirically identified
in this sample (Gorsuch, 1974). Next, higher order factor analysis was performed
on the correlations among the twelve factors using Rao's canonical model with
squared multiple correlations as an initial communality estimate. The scree test
was used to determine the number of factors to retain. Several orthogonal and
oblique rotations were applied to approach simple structure. This was done to
trace the nomothetical net.
The first research question was whether respondents saw the concepts as the
researchers did. The 99 items in the questionnaire should have loaded on 25
different factors. Instead, the scree test of the eigenvalues indicated only twelve
factors. Forty-one percent of the total variance was explained by these twelve
factors. While some of these factors correspond closely to the originally devel-
oped instruments, others seem to be apparently a conglomeration of several.
Using the most interpretable oblique rotation (Delta = -3) and incorporating all
items with factor loadings of .30 and above with no cross-loadings on the other
factors (a total of 53 items), twelve factors were found. The twelve factors and
example items and Cronbach alpha for each, are presented in Table 2.
In the initial factor anlaysis of all 99 items, Factor I (eigenvalue = 15.44)
represented "Satisfaction with Growth." All three items from the Hackman and
w
w Table 2. Example Items and Cronbach Alpha of the 12 Constructs Evolved from Factor Analysis of 99 Items.
N
--
Factor Number Cronbach
Number Construct Example Items of a
Satisfaction with Growth To what extent you are satisfied with: 7 .89
1. amount of personal growth and
development you get in doing the
job?
2. amount of challenge in the job?
II Satisfaction with Pay and To what extent you are satisfied with: 3 .79
Job Security 1. amount of job security you have?
2. amount of pay and fringe benefits
you receive?
III Job Involvement The most important things that happen 5 .70
to me involve my work.
I live, eat, and breathe my job.
IV Supervisory Behavior My supervisor is warm and friendly. 7 .75
The supervisor helps subordinates
with their personal problems
V Informality at the Work I get a lot of chances to make friends. 4 .60
Place I have the freedom to talk to people
during working hours.
VI Job Complexity My job requires the use of all the 7 .76
knowledge and skills I have.
The job requires me to use a number
of complex or high level skills.
VII Self-Esteem from the Job How do you see yourself in your work? 4 .73
Successful - - - - - - Unsuccessful
Important - - - - - - Unimportant
VIII Sense of Competence My job offers me a chance to test 3 .73
myself and my abilities.
Mastering this job meant a lot to me.
IX Satisfaction With Work- Satisfaction with: 3 .60
Related Interactions 1. people I talk to and work with.
2. the chance to get to know other
people on the job.
X Organizational Climate You get a lot of support and encourage- S
5 .70
ment for trying something new in this
organization.
Red-tape is kept to a minimum in this
organization.
XI Motivation to Work I invariably start the next assignment 3 .69
the moment the previous one is done.
I really want to work hard most of
the time.
XII Work Interdependencies To do my job well, I have to work 2 .51
closely with others.
w
w
w
--
134 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Oldham's (1974) instrument and four items from Pelz and Andrews (1966)
denoting satisfaction with learning new skills and advancing on the job loaded on
this factor. Factor II, "Pay-Security Satisfaction," was comprised of four Hack-
man and Oldham items with two items tapping satisfaction with pay and the
other two, tapping satisfaction with job security. The two separate satisfactions
collapsed into one factor and is reminiscent of the satisfaction of "Existence
Needs." Factor III, "Job Involvement," was essentially the short version of
Lodahl and Kejner's (1965) job involvement scale. Factor IV, "Supervisory
Behavior," consisted of seven leadership items from the Michigan Organizational
Assessment Package (1975). Factor V, "Informality," was composed of two
items from Litwin and Stringer's instrument of structure and the "freedom
to talk" item from the Michigan Organizational Assessment Package. Factor VI,
"Job Complexity," did not appear to be rooted in anyone particular instru-
ment. The seven items that loaded on this factor dealt with job descriptions, and
the loadings suggested that simple versus complex were the two ends of this con-
tinuum. Factor VII, "Self-Esteem," was the self-esteem index from the Michigan
Organizational Assessment Package. Factor VIII, "Sense of Competence," had
three of the five items used as a measure from the Wagner and Morse (1975)
instrument and the "personal satisfaction from job" item from the Hackman and
Oldham Intrinsic Motivation to Work item. Factor IX, "Satisfaction with Work
Interactions," contained Hackman and Oldham's "Satisfaction with Social
Interactions" items. Factor X, "Organizational Climate," consisted of five items
from the Litwin and Stringer measures, while Factor XI, "Motivation to Work,"
was the Landy and Guion (1970) motivation measure. The last factor, Factor
XII, "Work Interdependence," contained two items from Hackman and Old-
ham's "Dealing with Others" measure.
Overall, it appears that respondents identified some of the dimensions as
delineated by researchers. Yet, they also saw configurations of items that are
hard to describe. These results may reflect poor instrumentation. However, they
also may reflect the perceptions of employees as they see themselves, their orga-
nizations, and their jobs.
The second research question concerned the presence of a nomothetical net.
Using the higher order factor analysis, the twelve concepts were collapsed into
four higher order factors as determined by the scree test. Fifty-two percent of
the common variance was explained by these four factors. The eigenvalues and
percentage of variance explained are presented in Table 3. The factor loadings on
the four higher order factors are in Table 4.
There are two important components of the outcome of the higher order fac-
tor analysis. One, the interpretation of the higher order factors themselves, and
two, the examination of the correlation among the higher order factors.
NOMOTHETICAL NETS AND HIGHER ORDER FACTOR ANALYSIS 135
The first higher order factor consisted primarily of the original Factor V and was
thus labelled "Informality" -denoting a "loose" structure. The second higher
order factor consisted of the Job Complexity factor (originally Factor VI) and
the Pay and Security Satisfaction factor (originally Factor II) and was thus
labelled "Job." The emergence of this higher order factor suggests a close asso-
ciation between the characteristics of the job and the satisfaction that goes along
with job pay and job security. These two satisfactions seem to have their roots in
the job itself. The loadings on the third higher order factor indicate the inclusion
of the original Factors III and XI, representing the job involvement and motiva-
tion to work factors, respectively, and was thus labelled "Work Commitment."
The fourth higher order factor includes the original Factors I, IV, VII, VIII, IX,
and X, denoting growth satisfaction, supervisory behavior, self esteem, sense of
competence, satisfaction with work interactions, and organizational climate.
This complex factor appears indicative of the attributions regarding: (1) self as
the actor in the organization, (2) the superior as the actor, (3) the supportiveness
of the organization, and (4) the work interactions. Thus, this factor was labelled
"Organizational Support."
The last of the original twelve factors -work interdependency -did not get
caught in the nomothetical net. Possible explanations might include poor mea-
surement or its being a part of another network.
Overall, the factor structure of the higher order factor analysis suggested that
some of the original factors tend to get integrated into consistent wholes or
gestalts. These gestalts seem to represent partially consistent groupings of per-
ceptions that appear to have a common base. This is also evident from the nature
of the clusterings of variables in the higher order factors.
A most interesting aspect of the results of the higher order factor analysis is the
relationship among the factors. The nomothetical net as captured by the higher
order factor analysis and the correlation among the different pockets in the net
is depicted in Figure 1.
Informality, Job, and the Work Commitment factors are very weakly corre-
lated with each other. Only the Organizational Support factor has a modest
correlation with the Informality factor. Each of the higher order factors appears
to be differentiated from the others by employees. This is evidenced by the
relatively low correlations among the factors. The employees appear to integrate
the pieces, or groups of pieces, even though all the pieces do not fit together into
one gestalt.
NOMOTHETICAL NETS AND HIGHER ORDER FACTOR ANALYSIS 137
FIGURE 1
THE PERCEPTUAL NOMOTHETICAL NET
INFORMALITY
Informality
(1.01 )
ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT
Satisfaction-Growth (-.35)
2 Sel f Esteem ( .61)
JOB Sense of Competence (.35)
Supervisory Behavior ( .37)
Job Complexity (.91) .13 Satisfaction with Work
Satisfaction-Pay and Interactions (.58)
Security (-.30) Organizational Climate (.41 )
.01
WORK
COMMITMENT
Job Involvement (.30)
Motivation to Work (.92)
Figures in parentheses indicate higher order factor loadings, while the correlations among the
"constructs" are indicated on the connecting lines.
to remember, however, that for this factor job difficulty (complexity) combined
with pay and security satisfaction.
From a systems perspective, analysis of the pattern of correlational associa-
tions among the four higher order factors should reveal higher interrelationships.
Since this is not the case, the system's theorists might recommend that a holistic
approach has not been followed in the work systems design literature. Addi-
tional nets are entirely feasible if a larger range of variables is included. Perhaps
the work system design researcher might incorporate the potential importance of
nonpsychological factors such as physical location, state of the economy, and
the type of product produced by the organization as part of their future research.
While some might argue that all that has been done is a Fishbein type of simu-
lation of numerous organizational variables, the mapping of nomothetical nets
does facilitate integration of knowledge over and above piecemeal analytical and
predictive studies and is faster and more reliable. Mapping the perceptual do-
mains of respondents during pilot study phases would seem to be a useful strat-
egy for refming theoretical models before launching into full-fledged research
endeavors. We suspect that several nomothetical nets could be mapped into an
organization's work system. Thus, researchers might expand their research into
numerous nomothetical nets encompassing limited but interdisciplinary ranges
of data and hypotheses. This is a step beyond the fragmented, disciplinary
boundaries of the pure analytical perspective and yet, not encompassing the
holistic universe of the systems perspective. Ukewise, the higher order factor
analysis represents a useful tool of analysis for middle range theory develop-
ment. This tool begins to help the investigator to understand how constructs are
integrated to form nomothetical nets.
This paper has departed substantially from current studies by examining con-
structs in terms of the nomothetical net of the respondent instead of analyzing
data to fit a priori theoretical models of the investigator. This study suggests that
the search to identify nomothetical nets may be a fruitful middle range field of
endeavor in our attempts at understanding what goes on in organizations. Add-
ing more constructs and mapping the nets in different organizations may be
useful in explaining higher levels of variance and also in understanding the inves-
tigated systems. Perhaps this is what Merton (1957) and Weick (1974) had in
mind when they called forth the category of theories of the middle range!
REFERENCES
All of the papers under consideration 1 advocate middle range theory in some
form. I will attempt first to explicate the conceptions of middle range theory
that are developed in the papers. This will involve an exploration of the am-
biguities and differences of view in the several statements. Then, I will tum
to an assessment of middle range theory and its possibilities.
140
ON THE POTENTIALITIES OF MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 141
I will examine next some tasks that would be important in a program of middle
range theory building, as seen in the papers at hand. Both Schuler and the
Sekaran group are constructing middle range theory. Both papers take middle
range theory to be something more than empirical generalizations, and both face
the problem of how to put pieces of theory together. They confront two closely
connected tasks.
First, there is the task of achieving conceptual comparability between a series
of distinct inquiries. This problem arises because much organization theorizing
is in the form of narrow-gauged empirical generalizations. To construct middle
range theory is to build up from such empirical generalizations to more general
statements. This requires finding a common conceptual framework. (Note that
Schuler uses the term "trans-middle range theory" to refer to such integrative
formulations.)
Second, empirical division points must be found that separate clusters of
variables closely connected to each other and that are differentiated from other
clusters. Theories of the middle range presumably would isolate those units of
organizational behavior which hang together empirically and which have a degree
of autonomy from other units. If such units cannot be identified, then the
claims for middle range theory quickly evaporate.
142 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
The authors use quite different strategies for dealing with these tasks. Schuler
uses a strategy of theoretical reduction, that is, rmding sets of theoretical argu-
ments and reducing two or more sets to the terms of a third. Such a reduction
involves abstracting general concepts from specific concepts and constructing
an encompassing framework of propositions based upon and accounting for the
several sets of empirical generalizations. Specific concepts and generalizations
are converted to instances of a more general theoretical scheme. Thus, for
Schuler the first step in building middle range theory is conceptual rather
than empirical.
Sekaran et al., by contrast, rely upon a strategy of empirical observation and
testing. They use factor analysis of indicators used in previous research on re-
lated problems to search for "nomothetical nets." Their strategy is basically
empirical. The ultimate answer is to see how the several measures correlate and
then to correct conceptualizations. They even assume that a scientific mapping
of the social world should correspond closely to the cognitive maps of organiza-
tional participants.
A serious problem with the Sekaran paper is that it rests upon the assumption
of the existence of an unambiguous empirical reference point, which can even-
tually make sense of our conceptual and explanatory efforts and resolve differ-
ences between the proponents of different constructs, theories, and paradigms.
The paper exemplifies a form of what Pinder and Moore call the realist position.
The exploration of the problem by Pinder and Moore and by Bobko should be
sufficient to show how problematic the position is.
In addition, the Sekaran paper involves an important conceptual step prior
to the factor analysis, which is not sufficiently articulated. The authors choose
a population of indicators on the basis of the assumption that comparability
should exist across certain categories of research. This involves establishing a
claim of comparability across different groups or scientific communities. The
authors offer us no guidelines for including some such groups and excluding
others. The usefulness of their proposed approach depends upon explicating
this step. This is a point that Bobko also makes about factor analysis; and deal-
ing with the problem would open a whole range of issues regarding scientific
paradigms, which Bobko and Pinder and Moore take up but which the Sekaran
group leave implicit in their paper.
Schuler does not escape this difficulty either. He encounters it at the point of
selecting clusters for inclusion in a theoretical reduction. That is, both the
Sekaran and Schuler papers encounter a basic difficulty in dividing the social
world into sets of variables or clusters that form the starting point for analysis.
In both papers the clusters are formed in a very conventional way. That is, they
rely upon conventionally defined clusters of variables corresponding to estab-
lished areas of research such as leadership or job design. What are these clusters?
ON THE POTENTIALITIES OF MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 143
How are they bounded? Are the boundaries social? Do they represent theoretical
traditions? Do they represent common tasks of organization theorizing, practi-
cal, or applied tasks of administrations? One would need to ask these questions
very early in the game; but neither paper pays sufficient attention to them.
The problem of dissensus on such issues is the focus of the papers by Pinder
and Moore and by Bobko.
and Moore and by Bobko. Both papers favor diversity of approach; both en-
courage middle range theory; both advocate tolerance for differences; and both
discourage the formulation of general theory. There is even a tendency, espe-
cially in Pinder and Moore, to condemn cross-paradigm debate and to declare a
moratorium on fundamental questions in the interest of encouraging a variety
of middle range developments.
There are basic differences between Bobko and the other authors on what
should come from the pursuit of middle range theory. Pinder and Moore, for
example, envision a gradual building up of linkages between separately devel-
oped strands of theory. Eventually it may be possible to construct general the-
ory by bringing together enough separate strands of middle range theory. Pinder
and Moore even suggest, in their explication of the realist argument, that we may
be able to construct a theory of organizational variation that would tell us why
organizational realities change and vary and thus by implication tell us why we
have theoretical diversity. For this purpose they resort to a brief statement of
population-ecology theory (Le., that diversity and change result from coping
with different and changing environments). Pinder and Moore seem to envision
putting the field together again in the sense of constructing a series of empiri-
cally verifiable statements about organizations that would be widely affirmed
and that would mediate the remaining differences.
For Bobko, by contrast, the implications are largely contemplative. He is con-
cerned not with the state of the field but with a state of mind. He would have
us learn from several exemplars-Steinbeck, factor analysis, Zen-to value diver-
sity, to adjust to it with humor, to be creative and reflexive, to contemplate with
love our multilectic, anarchistic field. This state of mind would have an uncer-
tain bearing on the state of the field. There is no indication of what a loving
acceptance of diversity would contribute to our capacity to construct an inte-
grated set of statements about organizations that could stand the scrutiny of
other scholars. In fact, it might lead us to accept diversity where it should be
challenged with techniques such as theoretical reduction (Schuler'S strategy) or
factor analysis (as in Sekaran).
Bobko's argument should not be dismissed lightly. In fact, it is a very en-
couraging sign. It might contribute to the formulation of a theory of knowledge
production specific to the organizations field. Such a theory would account for
the shape of the field by reference to the interests, relevance structures, social
positions, and so on, of theory groups. The result might be a sociology of orga-
nization science that could make empirically verifiable statements about the
production of organization theories. This would take us beyond the contempla-
tion advocated by Bobko and beyond the mere recognition of the importance
of standpoints, which is the endpoint of Pinder and Moore's explication of the
idealist position. It might also be linked to a theory of the production of
ON THE POTENTIALITIES OF MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 145
Next I will outline some reservations about the proposals for theories of the
middle range in the papers at hand. To begin, however, I must record that I find
the interest in middle range theory a welcome development since it represents
a departure from the dominance of rational model and systems theorizing in the
organizations field. This said, I tum to a few critical remarks.
First, all four of the papers overestimate the diversity in the field. This over-
estimate occurs because of superficial readings of the field and the failure to
look for its deep structures. The problem is clearest in Pinder and Moore's
slippery usage of the concept of paradigm. If we look at surface differences in
the names of concepts and theories, the field appears to be enormously diverse.
Such differences, however, probably should not be termed paradigmatic. To
identify a paradigm requires looking for underlying assumptions, commitments,
or images that run through a series of works without necessarily being stated.
146 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
NOTE
1. The papers included are those by Bobko; Pinder and Moore; Sekaran, Martin, Trafton,
and Osborn; and Schuler.
ON THE POTENTIALITIES OF MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 147
REFERENCES
Benson raised several crucial issues regarding the application of middle range
theory in organizational behavior and theory, which address statements I made
in my paper "Middle Range Theories: Clusters of Clusters of Organizational
Phenomenon." I wish to comment on the points he raised and further clarify my
position regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of middle range
theory in the study of organization.
I think that Merton provided a useful thrust to explore and explain organiza-
tional phenomena with his popularization of middle range theory. Benson points
out, however, that for Merton middle range theory was used to describe "the
whole of substantive fields like political sociology .... " For Merton the field of
organization would be described by a middle range theory. Thus, the reference
to Merton in the application of middle range theory is most appropriate only at
the conceptual level. His intent was not to use middle range theory within sub-
stantive fields; however, ours is. Therefore, we leave Merton at the gate of the
field of organization. What we do inside is up to us.
Benson points out that two important issues in the use of middle range
theory in organization are differentiation and integration. That is, how can we
divide the field of organization into parts and then how can the parts be com-
bined? Benson suggests that there are many ways each of these issues can be
148
REPLY TO BENSON'S COMMENTS 149
addressed. Benson indicates that "the puzzle (field) is extemely complex because
of the large number of possible clusters (ways to divide the field)," and thus the
prospect is for many middle range theories of minimal support. I agree with
Benson and suggest that there be competing middle range theories for the same
clusters. The identification of these clusters in the field of organization (i.e., the
differentiation) should be done both conceptually and empirically. My illustra-
tion of where we could start used three clusters: task design, leadership and
roles. My purpose in using these three was not to maintain the status quo in the
investigation of organization but to provide an illustration of middle range
theory development. I appreciate Benson's concern for divergent approaches to
organization understanding and suggest that middle range theory is an excellent
vehicle to accommodate both divergent and more conventional approaches.
The issue of integration of clusters or parts of the field of organization is
important. It is not until this integration occurs that I recognize middle range
theory use and development. Each cluster or part before integration is best
described by narrow range theory. Thus, the focus of middle range theory is
delimited at one end. At the other end, when all the clusters or parts in the field
are encompassed in one theory it is called grand theory. Between the extremes,
lie middle range theories. There are many middle range theories. Further-
more, when I use the term middle range theory, I refer to the integration of
only two clusters and when there is an integration of more than two clusters
I use the term trans-middle range theory. Again, there are many trans-middle
range theories.
I see the use of middle range and trans-middle range theories as spurs to the
development of our understanding of organization. I see lively debates and com-
petition among researchers for their middle range theories or trans-middle range
theories. The winners will be difficult, if not impossible, to identify. Indeed,
winning implies criteria to judge. What criteria can we use to judge the best
middle range theory or best trans-middle range theory? First of all, the competi-
tion needs to be based on the entries theorizing about the same clusters-or does
it? Who's to say that a middle range theory using task design and employee
growth-need strength is better than a middle range theory using roles and em-
ployee growth-need strength? How could these two theories be compared?
The competition in the field of organization should be directed toward seeing
which researcher can incorporate the most clusters in a single theoretical scheme
most efficiently. The concern for which issues or clusters are covered will be in
the hands of the researchers, not determined by the use of the middle range
theory. Thus, "micro" and "macro" issues may be addressed in the use of
middle range theory. Which issues are addressed more frequently will, in part,
reflect the concerns of the researchers. The concerns of the researchers, in turn,
may reflect their ability to empirically test their middle range or trans-middle
range theories.
150 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
A final concern here for middle range theory and trans-middle range theory
is what are their (our) purposes? Are the purposes to reconcile apparent diver-
sity, to increase predictability, to improve practicality and applicability, to
improve conditions for employees in organizations, or to identify and accept real
diversity? I would suggest all of these are legitimate purposes. I think that real
divergencies in the field must be identified, but this requires more than the use
of middle range theorizing to approach the study of organization. It perhaps
takes researchers such as Benson, with divergent ideas and conceptualizations
using middle range theory, to identify these real divergencies.
This identification of purposes also suggests the great number of middle range
and trans-middle range theories that are possible. For example, if we want to
increase predictability, several theories can be constructed; each would have dif-
ferent criteria for which they are trying to increase predictability (e.g., employee
satisfaction, performance, group cohesion, etc.).
Thus, the suggested use of middle range theory for the study of organization
incorporates recognition of numerous clusters of phenomena within the field of
organization, the numerous ways of incorporating those clusters into larger
groupings, the real divergencies that may exist among the clusters, and the vital-
ity from the competition among researchers in conceptualizing and testing their
middle range or trans-middle range theories.
A final caveat. This push for the use of middle range theory by no means
implies that we should ignore grand range theorizing nor the development of
narrow range theories. Grand range theorizing may provide vision or may con-
ceptualize a guide for assemblying middle range theories, and narrow range
theories are the important stepping stones for the construction of middle
range theories.
13 ZEN AND SCIENCE
A Reply to Benson
Philip Bobko,
University of Maryland
For the most part, I think Professor Benson has captured the spirit of the four
articles that he has reviewed. In particular, I believe he responsibly articulates
my multilectic approach to social scientific knowing. However, I would like to
indicate a few subtle misinterpretations-due, I believe, to Benson's unwilling-
ness to accept the Zen paradigm in toto. Secondly, I would like to expand on
the possibility of an integration/coupling of our organizational research en-
deavors. Finally, I reiterate my conclusions and heartily support Benson's con-
clusions regarding the epistemological nature of social science.
In the Zen paradigm, there is no tension between opposing images. The clear
implication is a negation of the necessity for dualistic notions and singular
dimensions with bipolar opposites as endpoints. Unfortunately, Benson's analy-
sis of my paper maps his Western, dialectical (Benson, 1977) schema onto a
structure that has a circular geometric metaphor. For example, Benson mis-
takenly classifies my position as subjective idealist "in contrast" to the realist
position of Pinder and Moore. However, the multilectic view of my paper
151
152 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
accepts both positions as possibly fruitful starting points for inquiry, that is,
as points on a circle and not as opposing endpoints in a thesis-antithesis para-
digm. As a second example, consider Benson's statement that I am "concerned
not with the state of the field, but with a state of mind." Again, field and mind
are not opposing, or even separate, entities. It is the processual interplay of field
and mind which creates the organizational totality of interest. (Otherwise, one
could envision a "mindless state of the field" -much to the delight of critics of
organizational theorizing!)
Additionally, negation of the necessity of bipolarity implies a negation of the
necessity for evaluation. Thus, I do not "advocate middle range theory" (as
Benson suggests). Rather, I simply note the existence of multiple imagery in
organizational theorizing and the importance of that awareness for creative,
investigatory social science. Similarly, I am not dissatisfied with open systems
theory (as Benson suggests). I just note that open systems theory may be
considered as a type of middle-range theory and, as such, is subject to the con-
siderations and implications of my multilectic approach.
SCIENCE
Benson suggests that one implication of my position is the need for a sociology
of organizational theorizing that would go "beyond the contemplation advo-
cated by Bobko." I heartily agree with the need for such a sociology and, in
ZEN AND SCIENCE 153
fact, indicated the further need for both a sociology and psychology of organiza-
tional theorizing in my section on artifacts (thus disagreeing with Benson's use
of the term contemplation).
Finally, it would seem crucial to accept Benson's interpretation of Bernstein
(1977). That is, a multilectic inquiry "does not imply a rejection of science but
a new understanding of science." Etymologically, the word science is derived
from the Latin word scire, meaning "to know." Thus, science is the totality of
knowing, and not just one aspect of knowledge bounded, for example, by
quantitative or positivistic thought. In this original defmition, science is not
wedded to the choice of an endpoint on a particular epistemological dimension.
Rather, it is the union of all choices on the Zen circle (or sphere, or hyper-
sphere). It is this union and enhancement of our knowledges through multiple
imagery that provides a new understanding of science.
NOTE
1. However, techniques such as factor analysis may give a false sense of precision. For
example, assume the Sekaran et al. measurement paradigm to be true. In their study, an
initial factor analysis captured 41% of the variance. Their higher order factor analysis cap-
tured 52% of the 41%-for a total of .41 X .52 =.21, or 21% of the variance in the original
sample. Also, the sample size in their study was N = 1123. A conservative estimate of the
number of parameters estimated in their study is p = 99 + 12 = III (i.e., 99 initial variables
and 12 factors in the higher order factor analysis). Using the Stein formula (see Darlington,
1968) to estimate shrinkage of the explained variance in a new sample with R2 = .21,
N = 1123, and p = 111 gives a shrunken R2 of less than .02. Thus, the Sekaran et al. factor
structure would probably explain less than 2% of the total system variance in a cross-
validation sample -hardly a figure of practical significance!
REFERENCES
Pinder, C., and Moore, L. The inevitability of multiple paradigms and the resul-
tant need for middle range analysis in organization theory. In C. Pinder and
L. Moore (Eds.), Middle Range Theory and the Study of Organizations. Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1979.
Sekaran, U.; Martin, T.; Trafton; R., and Osborn, R. Nomothetical nets and
higher order factor analysis in middle range theory development. In C. Pinder
and L. Moore (Eds.), Middle Range Theory and the Study of Organizations.
Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.
IIIGENERAL
FRAMEWORKS
FOR MIDDLE RANGE
THEORIZING
14 EVOLUTION AND MIDDLE
RANGE THEORIES
Toward a Matrix
of Organizational Modes
John D. Bigelow, Oregon State University
to be able to organize the classes around one or more dominant modes along
a given attribute dimension, with each class encompassing the modal organiza-
tions and a few on either side of the mode (p. 521).
In developing organizational classifications, to what extent can we rely on the
existence of such modes? An alternative possibility is that organizations exist in
every configuration, and a continuum of intermediate types can be identified for
every pair of classifications. Such a possibility is implied in Wilson's (1975) con-
cept of "ecological release." Noting that there exists an extraordinary variety of
cultural forms, Wilson asks:
How can such variation in social structure persist? The explanation may be
lack of competition from other species, resulting in what biologists call eco-
logical release. During the past ten thousand years or longer, man as a whole
has been so successful in dominating his environment that almost any kind of
culture can succeed for a while ... (p. 550).
Of course, the existence of modes is a question addressable by empirical
investigation, as McKelvey later indicates. However, before investing the consid-
erable time and energy that such an investigation would undoubtedly require, it
seems worthwhile to first attempt to come to terms with the question theoreti-
cally. Even modest success in such an attempt may prove worthwhile by focusing
subsequent research into areas of high potential payoff.
Recently, the author has been working with a theoretical perspective that
addresses this question (Bigelow, 1977). He began with a concern similar to
Pinder and Moore's: that organizational theories lack relevance for organizational
practice. His view is that inattention to the diachronic dimension of organiza-
tions is a major obstacle to application of many current theories of organizations.
His response has been to develop an evolutionary perspective of organizations,
which has a greater potential for application.
The two views presented above are somewhat different from one another, and
each points to a somewhat different response to the problem. By the same token,
the two have potential for cross-fertilization, which can lead to mutual enrich-
ment. The multiple paradigm model can provide a perspective in which evolu-
tionary contributions can be located and understood. Conversely, evolutionary
concepts can help clarify what is meant by a multiple paradigm model, and how
this might be developed.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of an evolutionary
perspective for the multiple paradigm model. A shortcoming seen in many cur-
rent theories of organizations will first be discussed, which led the author to
move to an evolutionary perspective. Some specific aspects of evolutionary
theory that are pertinent to middle range theorizing are then presented. Follow-
ing this, attention is turned to implications of this perspective for the multiple
paradigm model and middle range theories.
EVOLUTION AND MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES 159
The first point to be made is that social evolution, rather than biological evolu-
tion, is the central focus. While a number of authors have considered effects of
biological evolution on social and organizational systems (e.g., Adrian, 1970;
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970; Maclay and Knipe, 1972; Trivers, 1972; Wilson, 1975),
these effects are essentially static in the time frames of most organizational
theorists. Social evolutionary processes, on the other hand, are likely to be in
a more rapid state of change, and the process is more relevant to organizational
theorists and practitioners.
A second point is that the organization is seen as existing in an environment
to which it must adapt-reactively and/or proactively-in order to survive. This
view is consistent with contingency and open system perspectives of organiza-
tions (e.g., Thompson, 1967). It is important to note that "adaptation" is not
necessarily a reactive process, but can be proactive as well: that is, an orga-
nization may adapt by acting on and changing its environment, as well as by
changing itself to fit its environment. It should also be noted that in some in-
stances an organization's survival is not necessarily independent of societal sur-
vival at some higher level. For example, a poorly operating school system may
not be allowed to fail (as might a poorly operating private enterprise) apart from
the governmental system that supports it. In such instances, the higher level
system is an appropriate unit of evolutionary analysis.
A third point is that organizational practices are seen as a principal means of
adaptation. While evolutionary theory shows that at least three other kinds of
entities may be evolving in organizations (Le., knowledge systems, kinds of peo-
ple included, and physical artifacts of the organization), organizational practices
appear to be the central means of adaptation. Other kinds of evolution are
pertinent to organizational adaptation, but tend to follow, rather than lead,
organizational practices (cf. Weick, 1969).
EVOLUTION AND MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES 161
training). Through these mechanisms, organizations seek out, identify, and retain
organizational practices adaptive to their current situation.
In this section, an evolutionary perspective of organizations has been briefly
overviewed. We see that this is a dynamic and diachronic view, in which orga-
nizations develop mechanisms that regulate the process of variation, selection,
and retention, and thereby adapt to their situation. Let us now consider what
implications this perspective has for middle range theories.
Recall that earlier a question was raised about a preliminary assumption of mid-
dle range theorizing, that organizations will fall into some number of relatively
discrete categories. It is now possible to address this question, using an evolu-
tionary perspective.
Initially, this perspective would appear to be discouraging to the possibility of
organizational categories. EvolUtionary theory ties organizational form to envi-
ronment by an adaptive process, and the lack of environmental categories might
be interpreted as implying the same for organizations. Moreover, the popular
usage of evolution is synonymous with slow and continuous change, which
would not appear to produce the categorical breaks required in middle range
theorizing.
Recently, however, it has been shown that evolutionary models can in fact
include the possibility of rapid changes occurring as a consequence of evolution-
ary process. Waddington (1975), drawing on the work of the topologist Rene
Thorn, proposes a "catastrophe theory of evolution," in which rapid evolution-
ary changes are brought about by the movement of evolving systems from one
evolutionary "canal" to another. Since this model is based on topological theory,
it is as applicable to organizational change as it is to biological change. 1
The possibility of rapid change and discontinuities arising from evolutionary
processes has an important implication for middle range theorizing: These
changes can serve to demark organizational forms into a discrete set of categories
or adaptive modes, each of which (or subsets of which) may be an appropriate
topic for a middle range theory.
In this view, what kinds of discontinuities might we expect to see in organiza-
tions? The literature on organizational change indicates at least three factors that
may lead to discontinuity: organizational niche, the impact of culture, and
chronological stages within single organizations. Each is discussed as follows:
1. Organizational niche. McKelvey makes the interesting observation that
biologists, unlike organization and management researchers, don't need contin-
gency theories, since biological speciation provides a clear classification system
EVOLUTION AND MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES 163
carry out in their society. Different societies, however, may distribute functions
to organizations in different ways. If so, two organizations in two different
cultures could have similar niches, but adapt to them in ways characteristic of
their particular culture. For example, during the 1800s in Ethiopia, the functions
of both government and defense were carried out by a single mobile organiza-
tional unit. Other societies at that time (and presently) distinguished government
and defense into two different organizational units. The way production is car-
ried out in free enterprise and socialistic societies is another example of how the
same function may be carried out in different ways in different societies.
This is an area in which more research is needed. Presently, greater attention
has been given to means by which Western organizations can be transplanted to
other cultures, than to ways by which Western technologies can be uniquely
incorporated by them. Schumacher's (1972) treatise on Buddhist economics is
a needed step in this direction.
3. Organizational stages. There is considerable evidence that organizational
change over time is not necessarily continuous. As Starbuck (1971) states:
The basic proposition advanced is that change in organizational structure is
occasionally punctuated by abrupt, major transformations which sharply
distinguish one period of organizational history from another (p. 275).
A number of scholars have considered discontinuous changes of this type. For
example, Greiner (1972) distinguishes five distinct phases in organizational
growth. Strauss (1974) distinguishes the stages of organizational "youth" and
"adolescence" as organizations grow. Clark (1972) sees organizational life as
characterized by "sagas," each with its own "understanding of a unique ac-
complishment based on historical exploits." In each case, relatively smooth
underlying changes were adapted to by a succession of one or more discrete
adaptive modes.
These successive stages of organizations serve as another possible point of
demarcation for middle range theories. It may be, for example, that a theory
of "young" organizations should be distinguished from a theory of "adoles-
cent" organizations.
The possibility that organizations may transform from one adaptive mode to
another raises a critical issue for middle level theoreticians: when can an organi-
zation be relied on to dependably exhibit a particular adaptive mode, and thus
be an appropriate topic of the corresponding theory? Clearly, if a middle-level
theory is to be applied, there should be some assurance that the organization will
continue to exemplify that theory, at least in the near future.
This issue suggests a possible way of looking at evolutionary theory in a mid-
dle range theory context. It should first be noted that the evolutionary theory
presented here is itself a middle range theory. While some authors, such as
EVOLUTION AND MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES 165
~
ID Ir-------~~------_+--------~--------~
~
.c
~
....uU Mode Mode Mode Mode
Z
.-t·
3. Stages
NOTE
1. The author and Lynne Markus (Case Western Reserve University, Department of
Organizational Behavior) go into detail on this topic in a forthcoming paper. For more on
catastrophe theory, see Woodcock (1978) and Zeeman (1978).
REFERENCES
Adrian, C. Ethology and bureaucracy. Paper read at the Eighth World Congress
of the International Political Science Association, held at Munich, 1970.
Bajema, C.J. Transmission of information about the environment in the human
species: A cybernetic view of genetic and cultural evolution. Social Biology,
1972, 19(3).
Bigelow, J. Evolution in Organization. Dissertation, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity, Cleveland, 1977.
Burke, W. W. Organization development in transition. Journal of Applied Be-
havioral Science, 1976, 12( 1),23-43.
Campbell, D. T. Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. In
H.R. Barringer, G.T. Blankston, and R.W. Mack (Eds.), Social Change in
Developing Areas. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1965.
168 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
Dl. Fonn: the appearance, condition, and nature of an organization and its
subunits as well as the configuration, interrelationship, and manner of
coordinating its subunits (McKelvey, 1978a).
It is important to note that the inquiry will focus on the creation of a form,
which is embodied in the several members of an organizational specie or group-
ing, not on the life or death of a particular organization as a legal entity. A
specific definition of an organizational specie appears later in the paper.
1. Essentialism. All objects are treated as totally analyzable entities that may
be defmed in terms of a fundamental reality or essence giving rise to prop-
erties that are inevitable consequences of the essential definition. Whether
taking biological organisms or organizations, essentialists attempt to trace
all observable attributes back to a few essential characteristics. All exist-
ing typologies of organizations, such as those by Etzioni (1961), Blau and
Scott (1962), Parsons (1956), Katz and Kahn (1966), Perrow (1967), and
Thompson (1967), among others, are based on the identification of a few
essential attributes.
2. Empiricism. This view holds that there are naturally occurring groupings
of objects and that if investigators carry out enough empirical studies, the
groupings will eventually be discovered. They do not posit theories about
how or why the groupings occur. Instead, they form groupings strictly on
the basis of similarity. Some examples of this approach to organizational
classification, using numerical taxonomic methods, are studies by Haas et
al. (1966), Pugh et al. (1968, 1969), Goronzy (1969), and Pinto and
Pinder (1972). Methodological comments are given by McKelvey (1975)
and Warriner (1977a).
3. Evolutionism Adherents of this theory not only try to classify the ob-
jects in question but also attempt to explain their origin and subsequent
differences by looking to natural selection processes which result in the
survival of some forms but not others. Environmental variation, selection
processes that create species, and retention mechanisms that preserve
species once they are created, are the main elements of evolutionary
theory. The result is not only a classification of presently existing entities
but also a development of lineages tracing the entities' descent from com-
mon ancestors. The best example of such a theory is the biological classi-
fication scheme now in wide use. The evolutionary approach has not been
used in classifying organizations. But a recent development is a paper by
McKelvey (1978b) that discussed the evolution of organizational forms in
ancient Mesopotamia.
Theories Principles
Essentialism Reductive
Evolutionalism Rational
Holistic
Empiricism An tiprinciple
Primitive
progressed beyond that, the only principle that has been left out of existing the-
ories of classification is holism. Though it, in the form of systems theory, has
been on the rise in organization theory, it has not yet led to a paradigm that
has fostered theoretical propositions and subsequent empirical inquiry on a
wide scale. 1
Since organizations, like biological organisms, are not totally analyzable
entities, organizational systematicists probably ought to dismiss essentialism and
its implicit reductive principle as their biological counterparts have already done.
Though there may not be as many different kinds f organizations as there are
biological organisms, organizations may be more complex in that more taxo-
nomic characters may be needed to adequately describe their total behavior
As Burns (1967), Hall et al. (1967), and McKelvey (1978a) have noted, the
simple essentialist typologies have proved inadequate in face of the richness of
total organizational behavior, leading to their rejection by researchers needing a
workable classification for use in identifying meaningful subpopulations of
organizations for empirical study.
In biology, systematicists have tended to adhere either to evolutionism (Mayr,
1969) or to empiricism (Sneath and Sokal, 1973), with each largely rejecting the
opposing theory. McKelvey (1978a) has argued for an approach combining both.
Thus evolutionary theory would be used a priori to suggest possible classes
which are then tested out by the more objective, broader based, numerical tax-
onomic methods. As noted before, without a solid a priori theory the empirical
methods run into difficulties. And without empirical testing there is no check on
biased interpretations of evolutionary development due to poor and occasionally
unavailable historical data. In short, each theory benefits the other.
Following the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) this view came to be la-
belled "contingency theory." Over the years there has developed strong em-
pirical support for the central ideas that organizational technology and structure
are contingent on the kind of environment prevailing (Woodward, 1958; Burns
and Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Udy, 1964; Duncan, 1971; Negandi and
Reiman, 1972; Child and Mansfield, 1972; Galbraith, 1973; Khandwalla, 1974;
Lorsch and Morse, 1974; and Child, 1974, 1975; among others).
The theoretical and empirical work in support of this approach has recently been
exhaustively reviewed by Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) and Pfeffer (1977), so need
not be discussed here.
Without entering into a lengthy discussion, let it be noted that the natural
selection model does not require acceptance of a view of environmental deter-
minism in which managers are denied choice, as is implied by Hannen and
Freeman (1977). Instead, the environment may be seen as a set of objective con-
straints, which managers may or may not correctly discern or enact (using
Weick's (1969) term) and chose to respond to. Thus managers are never denied
the option of not adapting to the prevailing environment. The fact that a man-
ager chooses not to respond or does so poorly does not undermine the long-run
viability of the form of an organizational population or specie best suited for
its niche 2 anymore than the choice of a rabbit to jump in front of a truck under-
mines the long-run viability of its specie.
ORGANIZATIONAL SPECIATION 175
The constraints imposed by natural selection theory stem directly from the
three essential processes: variation, selection, and retention. Taking a cue from
the way in which the biological specie concept (Mayr, 1969) handles these con-
straints, an organizational specie concept probably should have analogs to:
The biological specie concept is not perfect in its handling of all possibilities
of biological speciation, though it does handle the mainstream of sexually re-
producing organisms. Ross (I974) concluded that rather than argue whether or
not the main specie concept handled all situations, it would be preferable to have
additional specie concepts to handle special situations. Such will undoubtedly be
the case for organizational specie concepts as well.
Following Monod (1971), Hannan and Freeman (1977) argue for identification
of an organizational blueprint analogous to the genetic code of biological species.
Such a blueprint would "consist of rules and procedures for obtaining and acting
upon inputs in order to produce an organizational product or response" (Hannan
and Freeman, 1977: 935). After the contingency theorists in general and Perrow
(1967) in particular, the view taken here is that what will shortly be defined as
an organization's core technology constitutes the relevant body of knowledge,
skills, rules, and procedures for obtaining and converting inputs into outputs.
Defmitions of key concepts are collected in this section along with brief ex-
amples. An explanation of how the concepts combine to form a viable organiza-
tional specie concept is given in the following section.
ORGANIZATIONAL SPECIATION 177
The specie concept is based on two key concepts drawn from biological tax-
onomy, polythetic groups and the intercommunicating gene pool. Biologists
have long since given up on the idea of forming a classification around mono-
thetic groups-the phenomena are too varied to allow this. Instead, they have
found the notion of polythetic grouping fully satisfactory. Since organizations
are also highly varied, it is suggested that organizational systematicists will want
to adopt the polythetic group concept. 3
Though there is always risk in adopting analogs from another science, it will
be argued that the tech-pool concept solves similar conceptual problems in
dealing with organizational stability and adaptation. As outlined in the follow-
ing section, the concept of the intercommunicating tech-pool solves a number
of problems related to conceptualizing and explaining how organizational
species remain stable across generations in the short term and adapt in the long
term. Furthermore, it will be argued that technological elements, via manager
and employee choices, intercommunicate and combine very much like genes do
to form the technological base of individual organizations.
In thinking about technology it is important to distinguish between the sub-
set of technical and managerial elements used by managers in a particular organi-
zation and the broader pool of technological elements from which they are drawn.
This pool, containing all known elements of a technology, is defined as the tech-
pool. Thus, the tech-pool of founding consists of all skill and knowledge ele-
ments pertinent to operating the technical and managerial aspects of a foundry
organization. A particular foundry would not have within its grasp all elements
of the broad tech-pool, though each foundry would have many elements of the
tech-pool. And, each element of the tech-pool would be present in many foun-
dries. Thus, the members of an organizational specie comprise a poly the tic group
sharing many elements of their tech-pool. The relation between the tech-pool
and the organizations that are its members is depicted in Figure 1.
178 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Technical Elements
abcdefghijklmn
Alpha
~ abcdefgh k n abcdef hijk
___________n ~ Beta
~-----"-----....
Figure 1. Relation between Tech-Pool and Organizations that are Members. In this example
the tech-pool comprises 14 technological elements (real organizations have vastly greater
numbers of elements). Each member has a subset of the elements, none of which are quite
the same, though overlap is considerable. The number of elements held by a member may
vary; in this case, Gamma has one more element than Alpha or Beta. The tech-pool is shown
to be intercommunicating with its members. The elements within a member are held tempo-
rarily by its employees, with no employee holding all elements.
DS: Core technology: the knowledge and skills used in the primary task
workplace and the direct management of that workplace.
D6: Primary task: comprises the set of activities that bear directly on the
conversion inputs into those outputs critical to an organization's
survival (Miller and Rice, 1967):
(a) there is only one primary task per specie;
(b) it is possible for an organization as a legal entity to have several
primary tasks (a conglomerate, for example);
(c) peripheral service or staff units in larger organizations are not ele-
ments of the primary task; however, they may be seen as having
their own primary tasks.
D7: Workplace management task: comprises the set of activities that bear
directly on carrying out boundary transactions between the workplace
unit and other organizational subunits or entities comprising the organi-
zation's niche.
Space precludes full development of the pros and cons of the primary task con-
cept. In most organizations it is the production, marketing, or fmancing func-
tion, singly or in combination. Thus, the primary task of a foundry is pouring
molten metal into molds; the primary task in an elementary school is education,
not serving hot lunches. In BIC Pens, Ltd_ the primary task is marketing. In
ORGANIZATIONAL SPECIATION 179
To be viable, the core technology specie concept, coupled with the tech-pool
concept, should include generational, ecological, and isolating mechanisms.
organization's choice (via its employees) to use a certain unique subset of the
tech-pool.
As does its biological counterpart, the tech-pool also offers a way of concep-
tualizing short-term stability and long-term evolutionary change. The short-term
stability of an organizational specie obtains because all members of the specie
draw from the same tech-pool of successful, and therefore highly probable, com-
binations of technological elements. Organizations tend to keep on using ele-
ments that are effective. They reward employees for learning the elements of the
tech-pool that work. They hire from other members of the specie employees
who are known to have mastered needed technological elements. As long as
there are individual and organizational rewards for mastering the elements of the
tech-pool, the tendency will be toward stable combinations of elements closely
reflecting, but not identical to the composition of the tech-pool.
Long-term evolutionary change in the form of incessant, usually small changes
(they mayor may not be improvements) is also covered by the tech-pool specie
concept. During the course of doing his or her job an employee may discover a
new way of doing something. This is a variation. If it is successful it probably
will be spread around the organization (though there are numerous case studies
showing that certain kinds of incentive systems mitigate against this, at least in
the short term-strike another note for stability) and eventually to other organi-
zations making up the specie. It is also possible that a new employee, though
being taught by an old master about to retire or leave, brings in a new way or
soon discovers one. This is a variation that eventually, if successful, may be
passed on into the tech-pool. Another possibility is that a new employee fails
to learn from the truly skilled old master and so the organization loses part of
its grasp on the tech-pool. This variation, if it happens often enough, may lead
to the failure of the organization or it may lead to the discovery of other suc-
cessful variations that replace the old elements and eventually take their place in
the tech-pool.
keeping one tech-pool from merging with another over fairly long periods of
time. Organizations, for example aerospace companies, tend to hire employees
who know certain parts of the "aerospace tech-pool." They tend not to hire
miners, nurses, teachers, or airline pilots, and so forth, who have knowledge of
technological elements from different tech-pools. In this way, the aerospace
companies remain isolated from other tech-pools. Even though an organization
might hire a member from a totally different tech-pool (such as a business school
hiring a business person as dean) the "strange" member knows only a small
portion of the tech-pool from which he or she came.4 Since the tech-pool is
typically widely diffused among many people it is very difficult, if not im-
possible, for an organization to quickly change from one tech-pool to another
simply by hiring people. Organizations also tend to try to retain people who
they see are valuable tech-pool holders. Often the elements of a tech-pool are
held by artisans; learning a craft takes a long apprenticeship or an on-the-job
training program - these increase the difficulty of an organization quickly
picking up a different tech-pool. Many tech-pools are held by professional
people such as professors, engineers, and scientists. Because the training is
long and often difficult, the job of learning even a part of the tech-pool of an
organization such as an aerospace company is very difficult. Furthermore,
employees holding part of a tech-pool tend to mix with other people holding
part of the same tech-pool- they attend the same professional conferences
and so forth. Warriner (1977b) noted that accreditation agencies, federal regu-
latory agencies, professional associations, and the like, also acted as isolating
mechanisms.
One of the advantages of drawing heavily on the biological specie concept
as a metaphor is that the various mechanisms it entails also work to satisfy the
conditions imposed by an ideal classification model. The isolating mechanisms
work to assure homogeneity within classes and sharp demarcations between
them. The tech-pool notion, which interrelates with the generational and eco-
logical mechanisms is the device that allows the core-technology concept to
handle the problem of short-term stability and long-term evolutionary change.
In conclusion, it seems reasonable to go forward with the view that the core
technology concept is a viable specie concept. Preliminary acceptance of this
concept does not preclude the development of alternative specie concepts, how-
ever. It is far too soon to assume that the core technology concept, or any other
soon to be presented, will be the concept gaining eventual broad acceptance.
CONCLUSION
NOTES
REFERENCES
Since the publication of Katz and Kahn's The Social Psychology of Organizations
(1966) and Thompson's Organizations in Action (1967), the open systems
model has dominated the thinking of scholars interested in organization theory.
Although a number of authors, such as Scott (1961), had discussed the systems
view of organizations before 1966, Katz and Kahn's book was the first major
exemplar of the systems model, and the one probably most often cited since
then in connection with the systems paradigm. For Katz and Kahn, the stated
purpose of applying the systems model to organizations was to facilitate the
integration of so-called "macro" and "micro" concepts, thereby fostering some
commonality of terms and concepts. Further, they hoped that the systems
model would escape a commonly alleged fault of earlier approaches to the study
187
188 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
theory, are in sympathy with the sentiments of critics such as Weick (1974),
who favor a shift away from the search for general theory toward the develop-
ment of "theories of the middle range" (Merton, 1968).
In contrast to general theories that purport to apply to all organizations,
theories of the middle range attempt to predict and explain only a subset of all
organizational phenomena. As such, each midrange theory makes different sets
of assumptions about organizations, considers different parameters to be impor-
tant, and leads to entirely different prescriptions for practice from other mid-
range theories. In fact, using Ritzer's (1975) paradigm concepts, each midrange
theory may be based on a unique set of images of what constitutes organiza-
tional behavior and on unique research strategies and tactics.
There are at least three ways to develop middle range theories. One approach
is to develop more or less specific theories to deal with each particular phe-
nomenon of interest (e.g., communication). This approach has been underway
for a number of years, as is apparent from even a cursory view of the tables of
contents of textbooks in the field.
A second approach is to limit the sample frame of analysis by sorting indi-
viduals, groups, or organizations into categories for subsequent analysis. This
strategy of forming typologies or taxonomies l of organizations has also been
attempted a number of times in the past. A third strategy is to combine the first
two, developing limited range theories concerned with particular phenomena in
the context of limited classes of organizations.
An examination of early attempts to form typologies or taxonomies of orga-
nizations reveals that they have had several things in common. First, as noted by
McKelvey (1975), most of them were based on only one or two parameters (cf.
Etzioni, 1961; Blau and Scott, 1962; Woodward, 1965; Becker and Gordon,
1966; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Van Riper, 1966; Perrow, 1967; Thompson, 1967).
Second, they have tended to group entire organizations into categories on the
basis of interorganizational similarities and differences in terms of parameters
that are seen as characterizing whole organizations. For example, technology,
size, beneficiary served, and primary basis of authority and compliance have
been treated as organization-wide characteristics. Consequently, organizations
have been sorted so as to maximize differences between categories and to mini-
mize differences within categories on these dimensions. This strategy has char-
acterized much of the so-called "comparative organizations" approach (cf. Udy,
1965; Heydebrand, 1973). Third, previous schemes have focused on parameters
that vary across organizations at given points in time, but that have been assumed
to be constant over time. Use of these parameters reflects a strong structuralist
bias and has tended to preclude the possibility that a given whole organization
may belong to a particular class at one point in time but belong to another class
at some later point. Finally, estimates of central tendency, such as means or
190 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
those of Burns (1967), and Hall, Haas, and Johnson (1967) have suggested that
simple sub grouping schemes based on economical (rather than multidimensional)
models, tend to leave out a great deal, making it hard to sort organizations into
groups reliably, and consequently providing the researcher with little predictive
or explanatory assistance. Organizations are complex phenomena, and, as such,
it seems only reasonable that meaningful and useful subgrouping schemes incor-
porate commensurate levels of complexity (Weick, 1969). Therefore, the first
guideline we propose is that multiple parameters be employed to attempt to
capture the multidimensionality of organizational similarities and differences.
There are at least three ways in which internal differences can be operationalized
for use in a taxonomic effort, each of which could be useful for capturing the
sort of intracluster richness we expect from the subgrouping process:
194 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Depending upon the parameters in question and possibly upon the size of the
organizations to be grouped, anyone or any combination of these variance mea-
sures could serve in a profIle for clustering organizations.
The first tactic forces an aggregation or averaging of data at the subunit level
for subsequent interunit comparisons. An example of the first approach might
use technology as a clustering variable. For the sake of the illustration, we use
Thompson's (l967) typology of technologies. Organizations would be sorted
into clusters on the basis of similar intra organizational patterns of subsystem
technologies. Thus, one cluster might be constituted primarily of organiza-
tions featuring a particular blend of long-linked and mediating subunit tech-
nologies, while a second cluster features a particular blend of intensive and
mediating styles.
Notice that in some situations, this approach could result in the same sort of
richness-masking of which we have accused earlier taxonomic schemes. For ex-
ample, if it were applied to some potential clustering parameters, such as em-
ployee age, the "average" figures used to represent each subunit would mask the
richness that might be observed as a consequence of intrasubunit differences in
age. Consequently, this tactic for operationalizing the variance concept is prob-
ably most suited, as in the example above, for use with subunit characteristics
that apply almost universally to the members of a particular subunit but that
vary among the subunits of any particular organization. However, it would not
be necessary that only nominal level variables be operationalized in this fashion.
The second tactic for operationalizing intraorganizational differences avoids
the aggregation or combination of individual data into subunit scores, as in the
case described above. Instead, subunit boundaries would be disregarded, so that
variance measures on the parameter(s) used would be based upon total, system-
wide differences around the overall mean (or other measure of central tendency)
for the organization. This tactic would probably be most useful for operation-
alizing variance measures on individual-level dimensions that are equally relevant
to all parts of the organization, regardless of subunit. For instance, organization-
wide variation in seniority or salary might be operationalized in this fashion.
This second approach might be especially useful in subgrouping small, relatively
undifferentiated organizations.
The third tactic makes use of average variances. That is, organizations would
THE RESURRECTION OF TAXONOMY 195
be grouped on the basis of their similarities with regard to the average amount
of variability they have within their respective subgroups on the parameter(s)
in question. This tactic might be employed to ope rationalize the variance con-
cept when intrasubunit variability in terms of a clustering parameter could be
expected to be a source of interesting outcomes. For example, the amount of
intragroup adherence to official rules or informal norms is a potentially inter-
esting parameter that, if used to form homogeneous clusters of organizations,
might facilitate some revealing analyses of intersubunit phenomena, such as
intergroup conflict. The richness would most easily follow if organizations were
grouped according to similarities of the average degree of variance in compliance
to these norms. For example, a cluster of organizations might be formed so
that they all featured a similar average level of subunit compliance to official
rules, such as a very high degree of compliance within most of their respective
subsystems.
In short, there at least three ways to operationalize a general strategy of
grouping organizations on the basis of similar internal differences. The particu-
lar tactic used would vary from one parameter to another, and all three tactics
might be employed on different parameters to yield the variability measures
that would serve as the basis of a particular organizational taxonomy.
Theory for Theory for Theory for Theory for Theory for Theory for Theory for
Organization 1 OrganizatIOn 2 Organization 3 Organization 4 Organization 5 Organization 6 Organization 7
Figure 1. Gradual Ascension to General Theory through the Integration of Progressively More Abstract Bodies of Midrange Theories
......
\0
-...J
198 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
scriptive and normative theories developed, would also be different from those
employed in the context of other clusters of organizations. Our expectation is
that models of organizational behavior might fare somewhat better within sub-
groups, simply because so much of the usual "error variance" will have been
controlled by the grouping process. Moreover, the rich insights for theory con-
struction that would ensue would be attributable to the fact that the groups were
formed on the basis of common internal variation and common processes, as
opposed to common internal similarities in terms of modal, static characteristics
Eventually, it might be possible to develop higher order theories based on a
more complete understanding of the organizational relationships within groups,
and the detection of similarities of phenomena and relationships across groups.
In the end, general theory might be possible, but, if so, its emergence would
be based on the valid synthesis of bodies of lower order, midrange theories,
which reveal meaningful similarities and which provide a good understanding of
the organizational phenomena within their respective domains. As such interclus-
ter similarities emerge and prove reliable, the total number of paradigms in the
field may also be reduced. 3 This long range process is illustrated in the Figure.
Thus far, our discussion has begged the question of specifically which parameters
should be used for sorting organizations into groups, as well as the more general
question of what criteria might be employed for making this selection. Here lies
the major challenge for organization theorists who wish to pursue the taxonomic
approach to theory development.
unit might appear to fit more than one category based on only a few dimensions,
the use of additional parameters assists in a decision as to which category is
most appropriate.
Further, Hempel believed that the parameters used should lend themselves
to valid and meaningful generalizations and thereby facilitate prediction for new
cases that can later be sorted into one class or another on the basis of their de-
grees of similarity with each of the previously formed classes.
Finally, Hempel noted that concepts such as "average" and "typical" ignore
problems of dispersion and interunit differences. Therefore, statistical methods
that reflect averages as well as the representativeness of the averages should be
used. Much more emphasis, however, needs to be placed on dispersion and pro-
cess than was proposed by Hempel. McKelvey (1975) has recently provided
some specific suggestions for the empirical development of taxonomies of orga-
nizations. His guidelines follow closely a general strategy for careful statistical
inference, employing random sampling procedures for the selection of organiza-
tions and parameters to be studied, as well as of observers to provide data on the
sub grouping dimensions.
While we agree with most of McKelvey's suggestions, we take issue with two
of his points. The first concerns the problem of the role played by prior sub-
grouping schemes and parameters. One of McKelvey's directives is to avoid as
much as possible being influenced by previous approaches. Herein lies a major
problem. Whether a taxonomist opts for an empirical approach or one explicitly
guided by a specie concept, it is difficult, if not impossible, to completely avoid
the influence of extant theory when selecting sub grouping parameters. The
empiricist tends to rely on obvious phenotypic characteristics, but exactly which
dimensions appear obvious to him will be heavily influenced by his theoretical
training and predispositions. Taxonomizing with the deliberate use of a specie
concept, of course, also entails a strong influence by extant theory and research.
The influence of previous thinking is virtually impossible to avoid.
Moreover, there tends to be a tautolOgical relationship between prevailing
theory and scientific classification systems. Theories attempt to explain how and
why given classes of phenomena occur; they also simultaneously serve to delin-
eate boundaries between those phenomena that belong to a class and those that
do not. Kuhn's (1970) recounting of how Dalton reconciled a number of anom-
alies in the behavior of what were previously thought to be chemical compounds
is an example. Essentially, the problem was that a number of presumed "com-
pounds" did not combine according to the prevailing law of fixed proportions.
Two French chemists, Proust and Berthollet, each marshalled considerable
evidence to debate the point of whether or not all chemical reactions occurred in
fixed proportions. Proust claimed they did; Berthollet argued that many chemi-
cal reactions did not result in fixed proportions. The two chemists talked past
202 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
each other until Dalton provided a taxonomic resolution. Basically, all that
Dalton did was to designate those reactions that occur in fixed proportion as
"chemical"; those that do not were arbitrarily considered to be something other
than chemical. The point is that prevailing theories and paradigms delimit the
variety of bases or parameters that might be used to form categories of phe-
nomena. Dalton managed to avoid the tyranny of the prevailing paradigm which
held that forces of mutual affinity were responsible for the formation of com-
pounds largely because he was not trained as a chemist.
In the context of organizational taxonomizing, the difficulty of avoiding
extant theory is apparent. Most of us who want to attempt to develop a taxon-
omy have been educated within the confines of one or two prevailing paradigms.
Consequently, considerable difficulty is encountered in preventing a self-
perpetuating cycle wherein, for example, systems concepts are operationalized,
organizations are measured and sorted, and pseudo-systems theories ultimately
emerge within categories. Systems theorists would be quite comfortable with
this outcome because of their belief in the Ubiquity and inevitablility of systems.
Others who are less committed to the systems model, however, while they may
feel that the familiar systems imagery will lead to the same sort of theorizing as
before, may fmd that middle range theorizing within organizational categories is
easier than before because within each class certain systems-oriented qualities
will be predominant, while others are less pronounced. The systems paradigm
(or any other paradigm) need not necessarily prevent useful midrange theory
construction within classes of organizations. To the extent that not all organiza-
tions feature fully all of the characteristics of general systems, differences among
groups and homogeneity within groups in terms of "systemness" of constituent
organizations should facilitate the emergence of midrange theories, each of
which is more useful than any single theory based on a general, overarching
image pertaining to all organizations in the universe.
The second point of McKelvey's with which we take issue is his view that the
parameters used in sub grouping should receive equal weights. We caution that
the real weight of a parameter in a subgrouping scheme will, in part, be deter-
mined by the degree of variability that measures of that parameter detect in the
sample to be subgrouped. A parameter with apparent double weighting, as deter-
mined by some coefficient, will, in effect, have no bearing on the final determi-
nation of categories (i.e. will have zero weight) if the "scores" of all of the units
on that measure are equal, or nearly equal. Further, to the extent that parameters
covary in the population, their use in the subgrouping analysis will, in a sense,
result in unequal weights for any underlying construct that causes the empirical
parameters to covary. This is not necessarily bad if the actual weighting arrange-
ment reflects the conceptual basis for subgrouping intended by the researcher.
An issue that was not explicitly raised by either Hempel or McKelvey pertains
THE RESURRECTION OF TAXONOMY 203
NOTES
1. Following the distinction made by Pugh et al. (1969b), we use the term "typology" to
refer to a priori classification schemes, such as those developed by Etzioni (1961), Blau and
Scott (1962), and others (see Cap low , 1964 for a review of anum ber of much earlier typol-
ogies), and the term "taxonomy" to refer to empirically derived, multivariate classificatory
schemes. For descriptive purposes, many of the early subgrouping schemes served well. For
the sake of theory advancement, however, most have been of limited value, because of their
failure to provide explanatory or predictive power.
2. In the guidelines that follow, it is crucial to recognize two important points, First, our
THE RESURRECTION OF TAXONOMY 207
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Thayer, F. General system(s) theory: The promise that could not be kept.
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Vroom, V., and Yetton, P. Leadership and Decision Making. Pittsburgh: Uni-
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17 FUNCTIONALISM AS A BASE
FOR MIDRANGE THEORY
IN ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR/THEORY
Orlando Behling, The Ohio State University
The term junction has different meanings in common conversation, the literature
of traditional management, and in sociology and anthropology. Thus, unfortu-
212
FUNCTIONALISM AS A BASE FOR MIDRANGE THEORY 213
nately, it is necessary to nail down what we do not mean by the term before
we can meaningfully defme it. Function as used in this paper refers to none of
the everyday uses of the term: (1) a ceremonial social gathering, (2) the activities
of a "political functionary," or (3) a mathematical relationship of one variable
to one or more others in the sense of depending upon. Nor do we use the term
to designate activities of managers, as did traditional management writers:
At the opposite extreme, though certainly closer to the modal use of the term,
stands Hempel:
Part of the definitional problem stems from the fact that functionalism is as
much a state of mind as a single unified technique, making it difficult to capture
its essence in a few phrases or sentences. Nevertheless, we believe that two key
characteristics define this approach, which was and is widely applied in the bio-
logical sciences and which also has been extensively used in anthropology, psy-
chology, and sociology to lead Merton (1949) and Martindale (1960) to label it
214 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Uses of Functionalism
engine will continue to operate without it, or auxiliary, in the sense that its
operation would be unchanged were the structure removed or inoperable. Simi-
larly, one can now identify functional equivalents. A fuel injection system, for
example, neither looks like a carburetor-that is, static descriptions of the two
have little in common-nor does it operate in the same fashion as a carburetor;
that is, dynamic descriptions of the two also vary. Yet they are equivalent in
the sense that they perform the same function for the engine. Such knowledge
not only allows for the potential replacement of one with the other, but also
both demands and provides greater insights into the engine, the superordinate
system, of which the structure, the carburetor, is a part.
Second, functionalism can aid in explaining as well as describing organiza·
tional phenomena. A good place to begin an understanding of how functionalism
does this is with a framework developed by MacIver (1973) who identifies six
methods of explaining social phenomena. Three of these: the Why of Obliga-
tion, the Why of Inference, and the Why of Social Conjecture are not directly
relevant to the thrust of this paper. The remaining three: the Why of Invariant
Order, the Why of Organic Function, and the Why of Objective, Motivation, or
Design, however, are directly relevant. They are, in order: the dominant force in
the development of midrange theory in Organizational Behavior/Theory and
thus functionalism's most important competitor; functionalism itself; and, be·
cause it is often confused with functionalism, a major source of problems in the
project considered here.
The Why of Invariant Order involves what is normally considered "cause and
effect." Evered points out:
A "cause" is generally thought of as that factor or agent which produces
(and thus accounts for and may even be responsible for) some thing or other
occurrence. . . . With pure causal determinism, S 1 invariably and necessarily
follows from the action of the causative agent C, occurring in a situation of
the kind, So and the transformation (C + So) -+ SI is described by a law
(1976: 263).
Thus, the phenomenon to be understood is seen as stemming from some "cause"
in a lawful, objectively observable manner. The relationship can be specified at
a conceptual level and is invariant in the sense of always occurring, given iden-
tical cause and situation. Finally, the cause precedes the effect in time, except in
a few cases where cause and effect occur at the same instant. Evered points out
the importance of the Why of Invariant Order in science:
The traditional causal model of explanation is by far the most prominent of
all modes of scientific explanation and has historically speaking, formed the
core of the scientific method .... Since the beginning of modern science, the
term "cause" has been restricted to (this) notion. The pure causalist position
216 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Advantages of Functionalism
In this section we consider five key problems that hamper the application of
functionalism to Organizational Behavior/Theory. They are: (1) the confusion
of function with purpose, (2) the teleological reversal, (3) the confusion of
sufficiency and necessity, (4) the assumption of universal functionality, and (5)
the assumption of closely linked systems.
MacIver's (1973) Why of Objective, Motivation and Design provides the basis
for a discussion of the first of these problems. He defines "objective" as " ... the
foreseen and intended end-result of any act or series of acts" (MacIver, 1973:
16), while "motivation" designates the emotions, needs or other subjective
conditions leading to behavior; for example, "I did it because I was angry," and
"design" refers to conformity to an accepted pattern as in the case of giving
gifts on birthdays-it is customary to do so. The difference between such ex-
218 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
bers . . . participants vary in the amount of time and effort they devote to
different domains; involvement varies from one time to another.... These
properties of organized anarchy have been identified often in studies of
organizations. They are characteristic of any organization in part-part of
the time (1972: I).
These authors are certainly not alone. Ashby (1960) in his concept of "poorly
joined" systems and Weick (1969, 1974) in his concept of "loosely coupled"
systems and Cyert and March (1959) with their idea of ambiguous goals also
question the assumption of organic unit for many organizations.
Thus far, we have demonstrated that functional analysis may yield new
insights into organizational phenomena, but that five problems may hamper
its use in Organizational Behavior/Theory disciplines. If we restate those prob-
lems as constraints, we defme the limits of a modest but useful functional
approach to understanding organizations:
These constraints reduce the scope (and fun) of functional analysis, but they
also minimize the chances of falling into pitfalls that have plagued its application
in other social and behavioral disciplines.
functional analysis. Other authors (Evan, 1970; House, 1971; Miner, 1975; Kerr,
1977) appear to be moving in the direction of functionally based theories of
leadership without clearly recognizing them for what they are. The following
paragraphs outline a crude functional analysis ofleadership built on these works
to illustrate the potential of functional approaches and the processes through
which they may be developed.
Functional explanations begin not with the structure of interest-in this case,
leadership - but rather with the superordinate system of which it is a part. Thus,
a functional analysis of leadership begins by looking at work groups and inquiring
about the functions requisite for their survival in current form or for task ac-
complishment. For this analysis we borrow a list that is both simple and widely
accepted. Building on Homans' (1950) discussion of the internal and external
systems of groups, Bales (1953, 1958); Thibaut and Kelley (1959); Katz and
Kahn (1966) and Lord (1977) identify task functions:
The group must operate effectively upon (its) environment in order to pro-
vide adequate rewards to its members. Thus a family must have adequate
financial income or sufficient provision of food and materials from its land;
a baseball team must have financial and moral support from its fans. Hence
one general problem that confronts this generalized type of group is that of
controlling its social and physical environments so that they yield high out-
comes for its members ...the adequacy of performance of task functions
determines how much usable power the group has (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959,
pp.274-275).
In work groups embedded in larger organizations the task function is half of an
exchange relationship between the work group and the parent organization. The
organization defmes the contribution the group is to make in terms of schedules,
quotas, objectives, and the like. Management information, output reporting,
performance evaluation, and accounting systems test the group's contribution
to the parent organization.
The same writers also identify maintenance functions concerned with reward-
ing work group members to assure their participation and performance:
Even if usable power is relatively high, various circumstances may intervene
to make group survival problematic in the absence of special measures to
insure it. First, the scheme for allocating rewards within the group may be
such as to place some members perilously close to (the standard they use in
deciding whether to remain in or leave the group). Second, in task activities
as in any activities, costs are involved, and these generally are incurred before
rewards are forthcoming. Moreover, certain members may incur unusually
heavy costs. And, finally, in many task activities the rewards are fed back to
the group only after considerable time delay .... We refer to these activities
by which each member maintains his position (above the standard used in
FUNCTIONALISM AS A BASE FOR MIDRANGE THEORY 221
5. Task Control-Task direction is provided by the job itself. Miner cites the
pacing of an assembly line or the crush of customers around a sales clerk
as examples.
Kerr (1976) identifies eleven structures in the subordinates, the task, and the
organization which may substitute for the conventional task leadership that sup-
plements Miner's list. Further, Kerr lists four structures that may substitute for
maintenance leadership, fulfilling the maintenance functions:
NOTE
1. Functional analysts unfortunately use the term "structure" not in reference to com-
munications channels, work flows, authority and responsibility relationships and the like, as
it is commonly used in Organizational Behavior/Theory, but to refer to any observable
aspect or pattern in a system under study.
REFERENCES
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224 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
The lesson of early organizational theory is now painfully clear to both re-
searchers and practitioners. Bluntly, our general theories collapsed as we dis-
covered that they applied only in limited circumstances. Since the theories were
intended to be broad in scope, they were necessarily abandoned, with interest
turning toward more promising new possibilities. The wreckage of the grand
motivational, leadership, and job design theories from the first half of this cen-
tury provides obvious examples of this process. The overall shift from engineer-
ing, through human relations, to the present organic (organizational behavior)
approach to our field is evidence of the same phenomenon.
One result of the failure of general theories has been a reaction against
the use of any theory. Many researchers are now compiling atheoretic studies,
which merely compare the results obtained under different sets of conditions.
Thus, for instance, we have learned that personnel managers discriminate in
hiring certain groups under some conditions-but until recently there has been
little effort to develop a theoretical explanation for this observation (Larwood
and Wood, 1977).
The atheoretic approach is most useful to researchers making preliminary
surveys or gathering data for use in solving immediate and limited problems.
Although it is initially productive, atheoretic research is an inefficient long-term
225
226 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
the extent that the exchange concepts are accepted, these concepts suggest limits
for some middle range theories, referee conflicting predictions between them,
and suggest new lines of future research.
EXCHANGE THEORY
Stripped to its most basic form, exchange theory suggests that the behavior of
an individual in a social context is interdetermined with the perceived behavior
of at least one other participant (Chadwick-Jones, 1976; Ekeh, 1975). That is,
any individual's behavior is "exchanged" with that of others, with the nature of
the exchange following predictable rules based on the perceptions of the partici-
pants. Although the exchange rules are assumed to follow consensual norms,
until recently no detailed testable rationale explained either why this process
should occur or how such a concept of exchange might be applied. Perhaps in
consequence of this frustrating lack of defmition, the more general theory has
been cannibalized by less ambitious middle range theories. For example, limited
theories of power (Blau, 1964) and distributive justice (Homans, 1961, 1974)
have employed restricted notions of the exchange process, which proved useful
in examining certain political and economic behaviors. The absence of explicit
exchange guidelines has unfortunately allowed these limited theories to be
applied well beyond the phenomena for which they were designed (Chadwick-
Jones, 1976). The resulting failure to confirm their generalizability has been
incorrectly interpreted as a failure of both the middle range theories and the
underlying exchange notion (cf. Goodman and Friedman, 1971; Lawler, 1971).
It is easy to understand why a mathematically explicit derivative, such as
equity theory (in which individuals are assumed motivated to ensure payoffs
proportional to their relative contributions-see Adams, 1965; Walster, Ber-
scheid, and Walster, 1973; Walster, 1975), would be accepted and tested in
place of its more general and vague parent. Do we have an alternative? It seems
likely that recent developmental research has finally provided an acceptable
rationale as to why exchanges develop and how they work (cf. Larwood, 1979;
Lerner, 1977). Rather than replacing viable middle range theories with an un-
tested theory of exchange, the latter is now coming to be seen as a mechanism
that might be used to sort between other limited theories (cf. Chadwick-Jones,
1976; Cook, 1975; Deutsch, 1975). The dimensions of this emerging theory are
briefly sketched below.
OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW
What is the major thrust of exchange theory from the point of view of organiza-
tional behavior? As may be seen from the items listed above, the theory is
strangely undistinguished-theorists have examined these elements in one form
or another for over half a century. The manner in which the parts are brought
together is new, however. It seems reasonable to expect that the new combina-
tion will provide different and perhaps more useful insights (cf. Weick, 1977).
Taken as a whole, the theory suggests that prospective and new members of
an organization are highly motivated to learn the prevailing system of organiza-
tional norms (concerning pay, roles, growth, output, ethics, etc.) because each
norm implies an exchange in which something is given up while something else
is gained. The particular set of organizational norms is not specified by exchange
theory; nonetheless, it must be such (or appear to be such) as to attract the type
of personnel who will sustain the system. Individuals discovering a set of norms
too distant from those they had previously seen as justified would predictably
refuse the enterprise's employment offer, or would quickly leave for other
opportunities. They would of course feel that the system was subjectively unfair
or incomprehensible, that is, threatening to their sense of justice.
Individuals who stay are more often those who feel comfortable with the sys-
tem, those who can accommodate or can alter minor points of unfairness, those
who change their perceptions toward agreement with the system of norms, or
those who have no choice. Those voluntarily staying with the organization do so
presumably because they see this as their best (most efficacious) option-and
because they see the option itself as relatively acceptable. Thus, the theory pre-
dicts that they behave according to the prevailing norms and begin to build a
stake in the organization's continuance. The norms, of course, need not neces-
sarily work toward management's advantage; they definitely will not work to the
individual's disadvantage (as perceived by the individual) for any length of time.
230 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
After a period, the individuals in any given position may actively resist change
because of its potential for disrupting the system that they have come to accept
as fair. Personnel who have experienced considerable mobility are obviously
exceptions, since they may see mobility itself as the norm.
Employees who are staying with the organization involuntarily (perhaps
locked in by a poor job market or the possibility of blacklisting) are unpredict-
able from a management viewpoint. Seeing themselves as temporary and the sys-
tem as unfair to them, they have little reason to invest themselves in the position
to any greater extent than necessary to keep their job. Thus, these individuals
would predictably slacken their performance below the norm unless monitored
in some manner. Some might engage in unethical practices in efforts to restore
justice as they perceive it (sabotage is justified, for example, if one is forced to
work rapidly for low pay).
To some extent, an organization can alter the norms by replacing the existing
personnel with others who are unaware of the previous norms. Nonetheless,
social expectations also influence the norms anticipated by incoming personnel.
As well, the individual differences greatly influence the manner in which an
employee perceives or operates in the enterprise. Consequently, some individuals
will need more rapid reinforcement because they come from social strata in
which little long-term planning was possible; other persons may see themselves as
managers and resist norms they feel do not make management possible for them.
In short, an effective fit between individual and job requires that the individual
view the exchange norms as just from his or her point of view; the question of
what is just must be resolved on an individual basis.
APPLICATIONS
In the preceding section, the nature of the specific exchange norms that might
be considered by exchange theory was left open. Several different middle-level
theories already examine normative types of organizational relationships. To the
extent that exchange theory is useful in orchestrating those theories, we would
expect to find that the exchange concepts are consistent with the major predic-
tions the middle-level theories make ... but that some of those theories will be
extended somewhat, while others may be limited.
The exchange formulation above can readily retain equity theory as the norm in
many economic relationships: People undeniably do exchange pay in proportion
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXCHANGE THEORY 231
Role Theory
Role theorists have tended to view roles as flXed consensual behavior patterns
that individuals carry across situations, or more recently, which individuals
exhibit in particular situations, such as in the work environment (Katz and
Kahn, 1978; Sarbin and Allen, 1968). Exchange theory does not disturb the
bulk of role theory research, but it does offer a reinterpretation that may be of
particular use in understanding role change and role conflict phenomena. The
exchange perspective suggests that role behaviors are manifestations of the social
contract-behavior modalities, which the individual exchanges in return for the
rewards expected from others. This is in agreement with research indicating that
232 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
the individual's expectations determine the role to be played, and that the role
will be performed only so long as the conditions making it appear subjectively
efficacious continue (cf. Graen, 1976; Larwood and Wood, 1977).
Role conflict can readily be interpreted as a situation potentially upsetting
the individual's return on the social contract; such situations can understandably
arouse anxieties and will be preferentially avoided by most persons (Kahn, Wolfe,
Quinn, Snoek, and Rosenthal, 1964). In dealing with unavoidable role conflict
(situations suggesting the use of two mutually exclusive roles), the individual
may be predicted to behave in the manner considered most efficacious. While
either role may (depending on the situation) seem justifiable, some alternatives
may seem threatening and unpredictable when viewed by other parties to the
exchange. Thus, the individual chooses a path that seems both fair and reason-
ably free of the negative sanctions of others, and which potentially leads to the
outcomes for which the role relationship was originally entered. Role change is
similarly accomplished when another role appears more efficacious in the time
frame adopted by the role player-or when no role is sufficiently worthwhile
to warrant continuing social investment and delay of gratification.
From the organizational viewpoint, this theoretical change is substantial. Role
theory (as modified here) now says that the presence of different personnel in
the same room with an employee may result in the employee's use of quite dif-
ferent objective roles (Larwood, O'Carroll, and Logan, 1977; Larwood, Zalkind,
and Legault, 1975). The role differences come about because of the differences
in expectations the audience is believed to have; a different set of role behaviors
may be produced to meet the demands of each new exchange situation. While
the pattern of changes is predictable, the best predictions will require that we
examine the perceptions of the role player.
Leadership
pears to take the exchange model an additional step: Role relationships are
defined between leaders and subordinates. While some subordinates are members
of the leader's ingroup, others might more appropriately be considered members
of the outgroup. Ingroup members perform different types of behaviors for the
leader and are accorded different advantages from outgroup members. Thus, for
instance, in the Dansereau et al. study, the ingroup members performed more
challenging assignments and indicated a higher satisfaction with the relationship,
while the outgroup members withdrew from the leader and developed a high
turnover rate.
Although the exchange theory developed in this paper agrees with the vertical
dyad linkage model, the theory also has several ideas to add to the model. For
instance, the concepts of efficacy and fairness might be applied directly to pre-
dict who is most satisfied with or likely to drop from the subordinate group. The
nature of the work environment might be expected to affect the group's perfor-
mance in a complex manner by providing cues to some group members that their
personal or social contracts are at risk, causing them to react so as to restore the
contracts. In this manner, the vertical dyad linkage model might be usefully ex-
tended to include a wider cross-section of leadership phenomena.
Ethics
CONCLUSIONS
theories linking middle range concepts to one another, the success of such a
theory remains to be determined. The present theory asserts that its four com-
ponent concepts underlie many social interactions. As more information is
discovered concerning those concepts, it seems reasonable to expect that ex-
change theory itself will change shape somewhat. While the changes may bring
the theory more closely into agreement with some middle range theories, the
possibility also exists that a corrected exchange theory will become too spe-
cialized to serve as an integrative network for others. In that event other such
middle-level "theories about theories" will be needed. In the meantime, ex-
change theory does seem to provide a fertile perspective for the examination of
both organizations and theories about organizations.
REFERENCES
Larwood, L., O'Carroll, M., and Logan, J. Sex role as a mediator of achievement
in task performance. Sex Roles, 1977,3, 109-114.
Larwood, L., and Wood, M.M. Women in Management. Lexington, Mass.: Lex-
ington Books, 1977.
Larwood, L., Zalkind, D., and Legault, J. The bank job: A field study of sexually
discriminatory performance on a neutral role task. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 1975,5,68-74.
Lawler, E.E. Pay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View. NY:
McGraw-Hill, 1971.
Lerner, M.J. Observer's evaluation of a victim: Justice, guilt, and veridical per-
ception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971,20, 127-135.
- - . The justice motive: Some hypotheses as to its origins and forms. Journal of
Personality, 1977,45, 1-52.
Lerner, M.J., Miller, D.T., and Holmes, J.G. Deserving and the emergence of
forms of justice. In L. Berkowitz and E. Walster (Eds.), Advances in Experi-
mental Social Psychology, Vol. 9. NY: Academic Press, 1976.
Leventhal, G. S. The distribution of rewards and resources in groups and organi-
zations. In L. Berkowitz and E. Walster (Eds.), Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, Vol. 9, NY: Academic Press, 1976.
Mischel, W. Processes in delay of gratification. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 7, NY: Academic Press, 1973.
Pfeffer, J. Power and resource allocation in organizations. In B.M. Staw and
G.R. Salancik (Eds.), New Directions in Organizational Behavior. Chicago: St.
Clair Press, 1977.
Reis, H. T., and Gruzen, J. On mediating equity, equality, and self-interest: The
role of self-presentation in social exchange. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 1976,12,487-503.
Roy, D. Quota restriction and goldbricking in a machine shop. American Journal
of Sociology, 1952,57,427-442.
Sarbin, T.R., and Allen, V.L. Role theory. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Eds.)
Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 1, Second edition. Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1968.
Stogdill, R.M. Handbook of Leadership. NY: Free Press, 1974.
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., and Walster, G. W. New directions in equity research.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973,25, 151-176.
Walster, G.W. The Walster et al. (1973) equity formula: A correction. Represen-
tative Research in Social Psychology, 1975,6,63-64.
Weick, K.E. Enactment processes in organizations. In B.M. Staw and G.R. Salan-
cik (Eds.), New Directions in Organizational Behavior. Chicago: St. Clair
Press, 1977.
Wilson, E.O. Sociobiology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.
19 A STEP OUT FROM THE MIDDLE
Thoughts Stimulated by Papers
of McKelvey, Bigelow, Behling,
and Larwood
Walter Nord,
Washington University
I will make two types of comments. First, I will summarize my thoughts as they
relate to the four individual papers. Then, I want to focus on some ideas that
these papers stimulated about middle range theory and organizational behavior
more generally.
Both sets of comments rest on several assumptions or biases. First, I share
Moscovici's (1972) preference for " ... any theory to absence of theory. (47)."
Second, I am persuaded by Washburn's (1978) view that " ... a theory is only
a license for research (407)." Third, I believe that theories, almost independent
of their ultimate success in coming to terms with reality, motivate research as
well as guide research and observation. Thus, I will take an eclectic position and
maintain that all of the orientations presented can have considerable benefit for
advancing organizational behavior. However, as will become apparent, I do tend
to see exchange theory as the more useful of the basic approaches advocated,
although this preference is undoubtedly a function of the fact that I am more
familiar with this approach than I am with the others. Having confessed my
initial biases, I will examine the papers.
239
240 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
MCKELVEY'S PAPER
The organizational speciation and the general ecological approach were relatively
new territory to me. Consequently, I found McKelvey's paper extremely instruc-
tive in laying out some of the basic concepts and terminology. While I was
bothered about the general applicability of this approach, some of this concern
was eased by Bigelow's view that we treat evolutionary theory itself as a middle
range theory that is differentially applicable; (i.e., it will be more useful in some
situations than in others). Still, it remains to be seen how widely the species
notion is useful as an analogue for organizational processes.
Focusing specifically on McKelvey's paper, I would like him to elaborate on
two interrelated points, both of which have to do with the species analogue for
organizational types. The first point is methodological. The development of
good taxonomies is most feasible where: (a) it is possible to make repeated ob-
servations on the relevant objects, (b) the observations can be made in ways that
appear to have little effect on the basic characteristics being measured, and (c)
the observations can be repeated relatively independently of environmental con·
ditions. Consequently, it is possible to pick these objects up, to look at them
from all angles, to create them, to take them apart, to subject them to all types
of tests, and to measure them in relatively precise physical terms. To the degree
that concepts and theories are a function of the measurement and observation
techniques possible, it would seem that the evolution of taxonomies is much
better suited for inquiry in research niches such as those which exist in biology
than those in which the study of organizations must occur.
Undoubtedly, there are at least a few aspects of organization that are sus-
ceptible to such analysis. McKelvey makes a good case for its value for dealing
with technology. I suspect that structure is another leading candidate. How
many others are possible? How many are necessary for this perspective to be
worthwhile? Adequate answers to these question will be easier to arrive at when
the paradigm has been applied more widely. Consequently, I think McKelvey'S
position that his efforts should be viewed as beginning discussion on this topic is
the appropriate one. For the time being, the burden of proof is on the advocates
of the position and I suspect this burden will motivate some valuable research.
The second set of points I'd like McKelvey to address is more conceptual.
First, are social organizations as closely coupled with their environments as
biological ones? If not, what are the implications for the organization speciation
concept? Second, there are a number of characteristics of organizations and their
environments that are apt to be quite different from the comparable set of factors
for biological organisms. For example, how useful is the organization speciation
concept in very abundant environments? What changes in the model must be
made to deal with systems having the ability to create their own niches? Also, how
A STEP OUT FROM THE MIDDLE 241
BIGELOW'S PAPER
stimulated me to think about what other concepts we might borrow from the
more "hard" sciences. Although I am generally bothered by the widespread
practice of mindless borrowing of models from other diSCiplines, I will offer one
other candidate-subatomic physics (See Capra, 1975). In many ways the images
that subatomic physicists hold of type of processes, changes, indeterminancies,
and relationships of subatomic "particles" to the field in which they exist, seem
to be very analogous to the ways organizations behave-perhaps more so than
the more static concept of species. This type of thinking seems to be consistent
with some of Bobko's points.
BEHLING'S PAPER
The pros and cons of functional analysis have been widely discussed in sociology,
and I have little to add to the controversy except to stress that many of the
criticisms of functionalism attack aspects that are not necessarily a part of func-
tionalism but rather the way functional analysis is used.
Behling's perspective, which views functionalism as a state of mind as op-
posed to a unified technique, seems to be the most fruitful use of the model.
Throughout the paper he uses the model in this way and avoids the fruitless de-
bates triggered by more absolutistic views. Moreover, in much the same way as
Bigelow observed about evolutionary theory, Behling suggests that functionalism
may be more useful in some situations and for some purposes than for others.
However, this still leaves some important questions unanswered: In how many
situations is functional analysis useful? For what purposes is it useful?
With respect to the breadth of use for organizational analysis, Behling writes
"functional analysis can be applied only to systems where functional unity can
be demonstrated." He acknowledges that this, along with the other constraints,
restricts the scope of functional analysis. Given the work of the scholars such as
March, Weick, Cyert, and others, that Behling cites, the functional unity require-
ment seems to be a serious restriction. If organizations are in fact viewed as
political coalitions, loosely coupled systems, and so on, does functional analysis
help us very much?
Second, to the degree that organizations are composed of a variety of at least
partially conflicting interests, the notion of arguing for functional analysis based
on the merits to the managers who control the system seems to me to be prob-
lematic both practically and ideologically. On a pragmatic level, every particular
structure or action may be functional for a number of different interests and
may be functional for some and dysfunctional for the others. While for some
purposes it is useful to look at the functions and dysfunctions from only one set
of interests, such analysis may underemphasize important organizational pro-
A STEP OUT FROM THE MIDDLE 243
cesses. For example, when organizations are observed through a functional lens
that emphasizes the interests of those in charge, expressions of conflicting inter-
ests, and "deviant" acts (e.g., theft and industrial strife) are likely to be viewed
as dysfunctional and "bad." As a result, analysis that leads to an understanding
of their functions for a number of other interests is apt to be rare.
Of course, functional analysis can be used to examine all the different inter-
ests that are served or restrained by particular actions. However, usually such
analysis is called conflict theory rather than functional theory. Moreover, it is
difficult to apply when the number of competing interests is large.
Two final points about Behling's paper. First, I think it is important to recog-
nize that in sociology, functionalism has frequently been attacked for its con-
servative bias. While I want to stress the fact that a conservative bias is not
inevitably a part of functionalism, it tends to operate that way. I think Behling's
emphasis on the value of this approach, because we are interested in the concerns
of those who are in charge of organizations, demonstrates this tendency and runs
the risk of viewing actions that challenge the existing order as illegitimate. For
example, consider Behling's statement that "Functionality per se cannot be used
to justify the existence of structures." Logically this is correct, but de facto it is
incorrect-the functional point of view is used in this very way. Finally, I hope
Behling will elaborate more fully on how functional theory will aid in the appli-
cation of behavioral science analysis. I agree that the concepts of manifest and
latent consequences and of functions and dysfunctions can be extremely prac-
tical. These, however, have been in our textbooks and training programs for
years. What other insights can we expect practitioners to get from functional
analysis?
LARWOOO'S PAPER
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Having dealt with the papers one by one, I would like to mention several general
feelings I had about middle range theory and organizational behavior as I was
reading these papers.
First, there seemed to be a tendency for this particular set of papers, and I
expect other papers born in the traditions these papers stem from, to be written
from the perspective of the managerial elite. As such, they have many manifest
and latent eufunctions. However, they may sacrifice our understanding of pro-
cesses that conflict-oriented approaches or approaches written from different
ideological or interest perspectives would reveal.
Secondly, although most of the writers were interested in bridging the gap
between theory and practice, I got the clear impression that theory was more
important than practice. It seemed as if all authors were assuming that a theory
integrating the various middle range theories in an intellectually satisfying way
would be a practical theory. The assumption that there is a close coupling
between the intellectual merits of a theory and its utilization in managerial
practice seems to me to be dubious. I suggest that we need to study the utiliza-
tion of knowledge if we are really serious about bridging the theory-practice gap.
None of the papers really dealt with this issue.
Further, there seemed to be an implicit assumption that the models derived
from other social or biological sciences are the most useful ways to integrate
various middle range theories. However, I think it is important to stress that
the theories of scientists are only one way of "punctuating reality" (Weick,
1977). The problems experienced by various interest groups in a social system
are another way of punctuating reality. Particularly if utilization is the major
point of interest, I would offer that the study of a variety of problems as they are
experienced by members of social systems may be more valuable for integrating
various middle range theories than are additional layers of abstractions laid on
by intellectuals. In this regard, I find C. Wright Mills' (1959) attack on both
grand theory and abstract empiricism very relevant. One strategy for being
246 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
REFERENCES
Nord raises several important points regarding "Functionalism as a Basis for Mid-
range Theory in Organizational Behavior/Theory," four of which clearly deserve
some sort of response. He holds that:
247
248 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Nord and 1 agree on the necessity of functional unity as a precondition for func-
tional analysis, as anyone who fully understands functionalism must, since it is
a requirement practically by defmition. What we disagree on is the likelihood
that this requirement reduces the class of organizations and phenomena subject
to functional analysis to a null set. Nord cites the works of Cyert and March
(1959) and Weick (1969), critical of the traditional view of organizations as ex-
tensions of the wills of single owner-managers in support of his position, but
ignores the increasingly sophisticated work on "technology" (e.g., Aldrich 1972)
which argues that organizations vary markedly in the degree of interdependence
of their components and this interdependence is crucial in understanding their
operation. The functional unity of a particular organization must remain an em-
piric question and with it the usefulness of functional analysis as a tool for
exploring it.
Functionalism can and has been misued to justify the status quo in the face of
demands for change, as Nord indicates. Clearly, this is a risk that must be kept in
A REJOINDER TO NORD 249
The potential benefits of functional analysis are obvious. If we accept the as-
sumption that it is useful to think of some organizations, some times as entities
established to accomplish particular ends, functional analysis has the major
advantage of yielding results in which, unlike conventional invariant order
explanations, prescription is readily apparent; few intellectual leaps are required
to move from research to practice. It also has the potential advantage of focusing
scholarly attention on issues of practical as well as academic significance.
Unquestionably, however, the crude demonstration of the usefulness of
functional analysis that concluded my paper is adequate to demonstrate its
potential only in a very limited fashion. It can be hoped, however, that this
paper will stimulate additional attempts to test its usefulness.
REFERENCES
It is always pleasant to find one's self in agreement with one's critic. Professor
Nord's very perceptive examination of my paper has pointed to certain short-
comings-in the paper, but not in the theory of exchange developed there.
Limitations of space confined my consideration to only a few of the many
applications of exchange theory. As Professor Nord suggests, these were primarily
cases of the "fair exchange" -situations in which the parties to the exchange ob-
tain what they expect and agree is fair. Fair exchanges characterize ongoing
voluntary relationships; in contrast, any failure to obtain what one expects
might force a reconsideration by at least one of the participants.
Situations involving unjust, unfair, unpredictable, or unevenly perceived ex-
changes have been extensively elaborated in Larwood (1979) and will not be
detailed here. As suggested, however, the uneven or unjust exchange is of con-
siderable social importance. For example, an employee is generally engaged in a
fair exchange with the employer. However, if the individual's pay is unex-
pectedly cut or if the employee does not obtain the recognition expected, he or
she is plunged into the uneven exchange. The desire for justice may motivate a
number of activities, probably beginning with employer-employee negotiations
or resignation if alternative employment is readily available.
If negotiations fail and the employee is locked into the organization, other
250
SOME OTHER PARTS OF EXCHANGE THEORY 251
alternatives come into play. These have the effects of returning the employee to
the original position and/or denying the employer the fruits of the uneven ex-
change. In this manner, honest, hard-working, and well-meaning employees can
readily justify strikes, slowdowns, sabotage, theft, or unearned overtime. After
all, they deserve increased benefits, and the employer is not paying for what she
or he is getting. Moreover, if such safety valves are unavailable, one could predict
the growth of a dissatisfied group of workers who might be willing to engage in
major social change.
In this sense, an unjust or uneven exchange is unstable-one or more of the
parties will seek adjustment until all participants agree that the relationship
apparently achieved has become fair. Of course, exchange partners may perceive
the same relatonship differently, may attach different values to their resources,
or may covertly obtain a fair (to themselves) exchange in a manner unrecognized
by others. Thus, the determination of what is uneven rests on the participants;
outside observers can ask, but they cannot-at least at this point in development
of the theory -assert accurately what the terms are of any exchange and whether
that exchange is fair or unfair (Larwood, Kavanagh, and Levine, 1978; Larwood,
Levine, Shaw, and Hurwitz, 1979).
Professor Nord suggests that the reliance on exchange norms is unnecessarily
restrictive. Although not made explicit in the earlier paper, the term "norm" is
intended to be used in a broad sense. While society-wide norms exist for many
types of exchanges, adjustment in those norms is readily made. Since, as above,
individuals differ from one another in the particular resources they have to offer,
in those they value, or in their experiences and perceptions, one person may be
more willing than another to engage in an exchange based on consensual norms.
Any exchange that is intended to be fair with the less willing individual must
then be based on modified standards acceptable to both parties. The modifica-
tions become a part of the new norm for this exchange-they must now be met
for an ongoing relationship to take place.
Given the obvious potential complexity of multiparty exchanges involving
qualitatively different resources (communication, roles, pay, etc.), does ex-
change theory offer much utility of analysis? A fair exchange under such con-
ditions is an interlocked matrix, which cannot be completely comprehended by
reference only to a dyad or to one or two varieties of resource. Nonetheless, it
is easily possible for certain elements to be eliminated from usual consideration.
For example, certain resource inputs are more important to most persons in
specific sets of circumstances (Larwood, Levine, Shaw, and Hurwitz, 1979).
Similarly, people tend to interact with certain individuals more often and more
intensely than with others (see for instance, social comparison theory). Finally,
the particular nature of the exchange often depends on the situation (Larwood
and Blackmore, 1977; Larwood, Kavanagh, and Levine, 1978). As a consequence,
252 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
the matrix problem can be decomposed fairly readily into a set of approxima-
tions; presumably, as we learn more about the mechanism of exchange theory,
we will become more adept at selecting the most valuable approximations.
How does all of this differ from expectancy theory? The exchange conceptu-
alization emphasizes the links between self-interest and justice which must be
obtained before the individual can successfully operate in society (Larwood,
1979). When, for instance, the personal contract fails to develop adequately, the
individual is incapable of entering exchanges requiring long-term planning.
Further, exchange theory emphasizes an interpersonal normative process as
opposed to the individual self-interest model of expectancy theory. Of course,
expectancy theory can be modified to take into account many of the same
aspects as exchange theory; when modified, expectancy theory becomes a con-
venient vehicle by which we may operationalize Bandura's (1977) concept of
self-efficacy in the exchange process.
Nonetheless, expectancy theory is merely one potential middle range com-
ponent of exchange theory. Researchers who prefer Maslow's hierarchy, for
example, could as readily define self-efficacious behavior as that which fulfills
successively higher motivational levels; they can interpret injustice as any threat
to that fulfillment. The selection of expectancy theory as a middle range theory
encompassed by exchange theory was based on the evident empirical power of
expectancy theory rather than on any unique fit. Exchange theory is compatible
with a number of other motivational concepts, but does not stand or fall with
any of them.
Finally, Professor Nord's comments that we must bridge the gaps between
theory and use, and between the managerial elite and the managed are vitally
important. Some exchange research is already available to indicate how em-
ployees, as opposed to employers, feel about the exchanges in which they are
engaged (Larwood and Blackmore, 1977), or to determine at a micro level what
the important inputs and outputs seem to be (Larwood, Kavanagh, and Levine,
1978; Larwood, Levine, Shaw, and Hurwitz, 1979). So far, the principles do
seem to hold up.
While laboratory and organizational survey studies have in the past contrib-
uted most to the advancement of psychological and organizational theory, case
studies have been largely ignored. Exchange theory would seem to have wide
social implications, however, and case study may be the most rapid way to test
and expand this form of analysis. As examples, the California property tax re-
volt can be studied as the social result of a perceived failure in the expected
exchange; European worker occupations of plant sites may be interpreted as
the workers' failure to authorize the use of managerial power in an exchange;
the bloodless invasion of the Spanish Sahara by Morocco may have succeeded
because of a breakdown in the military role exchange for which the Spanish
SOME OTHER PARTS OF EXCHANGE THEORY 253
troops were prepared. In the absence of closer scrutiny, these suggestions are
rather wild speculations. The conclusion, still, is that a great deal of research of
every kind is needed before exchange theory can be accepted as a reliable and
predictive tool in broad organizational and social analysis.
REFERENCES
The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of middle range organization
theory, to identify some of its major strengths and limitations, and to suggest
some guidelines for middle range theorizing. Role theory will be used as an illus·
tration throughout the discussion. This area of theory has been identified as
middle range by Merton (1968) and is likely to receive increased attention
through the new edition (1978)" of Katz and Kahn's The Social Psychology of
Organizations.
The concept of middle range theory was introduced by Merton (1949) as a
way of developing a better understanding of social processes. He suggested that
grand theories, which attempt to explain all phenomena, are often so abstract
as to offer little insight into specific situations. On the other hand, ungeneralized
knowledge of specific phenomena is not transferable. Hence, Merton suggested
that middle range theory be constructed from empirical data to develop gen-
eralizations that would be applicable to specific aspects or categories of sit-
uations. Thus, middle range theories would offer explanations of limited types
of social phenomena.
Since organizations are a specialized form of social unit, a general theory of
organizations would be, from Merton's perspective, a middle range social theory.
It appears then, that in proposing the development of middle range organization
257
258 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
theory, yet another step is being added in a sequence of abstraction from specific
data to grand social theory. From this perspective, a middle range theory of
organizations would be a set of related generalizations that: (a) link a limited set
of organizational variables, or (b) describe a limited set of organizational pro-
cesses, or (c) explain characteristics of special types of organizations.
Adding a step to a sequence of abstractions describing social processes is not
as straightforward as it may at first seem. Because organizations are one of a
variety of social aggregations (Blau and Scott, 1962; Weber, 1968), some of the
processes that occur within them also occur in other contexts. If a set of general-
izations addresses phenomena shared by organizations and other aggregates, then
the generalizations are both middle range theories of organizations and middle
range theories of more general social processes. Only theories that address pro-
cesses shaped by the differentiating characteristics of organizations can be exclu-
sively middle range organization theories. Since, at the present time, there is
disagreement about the distinguishing properties of organizations (Georgiou,
1973) and there is no generally accepted way to identify organizational bound-
aries, any sets of generalizations that refer to limited elements of organizations
or limited types of organizations will be considered here as middle range orga-
nization theories, whether or not the generalizations apply elsewhere.
An absence of a commonly agreed upon concept of organizations creates a
second problem in the identification of middle range organization theories. A
subset of phenomena can be identified only in relation to the whole set. Because
of disagreement on what constitutes "the organization," one theorist's middle
range theory may be another's organization theory. Resolution of this issue is
outside the scope of this discussion. For the purposes of proceeding, however,
the organization is considered here as consisting of Leavitt's (1965) set of com-
ponents, that is, people, structure, technology and task, augmented by the open
systems element of relations with the task environment (Thompson, 1967). In
this context, a general theory of organization would have to account for all the
relations in all types of organizations among all the organizationally significant
properties of people, structure, technology, task, and environmental relations.
Any theory that only accounts for some of these relations, or the relations in
special types of organizations, is a middle range theory of organization.
Two effects follow from the nature of middle range theory. First, identifying
the range of a theory focuses attention on the scope and limits of a set of gen-
eralizations. Second, advocating middle range theorizing gives legitimacy to the
study of partial aspects of the complex organization phenomenon. The remainder
of this paper addresses some of the implications of middle range theorizing in
terms of these effects.
MIDDLE RANGE ORGANIZATION THEORIZING 259
Hall (1972) has emphasized the need for a typology to give conceptual order to
the vast amount of organizationally relevant research already in existence. By
requiring the establishment of the scope of general theory in order to identify
less than general theory, middle range theorizing contributes to the development
of such a classification system. The range set for general theory provides the
dimensions for characterizing theories. Comparing a theory with these dimen-
sions indicates its range and, at the same time, its limits, making it possible to
identify a theory as middle range.
The process of classifying theories can be illustrated by using the general
frame of reference proposed earlier to describe the scope and limits of role
theory. First, a summary of role theory is in order.
Although identified as an area of theory by Merton (1968), Biddle and
Thomas (1966) in their book entitled Role Theory indicated that there is no
one grand "role theory." They state further that, "A close examination of that
which is regarded as 'role theory' indicates that its statements appear in essen-
tially three forms: (a) as single hypotheses, (b) as sets of logically unrelated
hypotheses on the same topic, and (c) as sets of logically as well as topically
related hypotheses" (p. 14). Only the last of these would qualify as a middle
range theory.
Katz and Kahn (1966) offer one such set of generalizations concerning roles
in their theory of organizations. As they view it, the role concept is a set of
logically and topically related generalizations attempting to explain human inter-
action in an organizational setting. The Katz and Kahn model of role is related
to that of Gross, Mason, and McEachern (1958) in that it focuses on the expecta-
tions held for the behavior of the focal person. It is largely a social-psychological
concept even though the impacts of the organization, as well as individual dif-
ferences, are included as influences in the basic role episode, which is largely an
interpersonal phenomenon. The Katz and Kahn role episode was derived from the
earlier work of Kahn, et aI., (1964) entitled Organizational Stress (See Figure 1).
The role episode begins with the role senders holding expectations for the
focal person. These expectations are influenced by the focal person's previous
performance and by organizational factors such as structure, technology, rewards
and punishments, and politics. The role senders convert their expectations into
influence attempts, such as shouted demands or a pat on the back, and com-
municate them to the focal person. These influence attempts are perceived by
the focal persons, and, distorted as they may be, are interpreted in view of his/her
perception of all the other expectations held by his/her role set. The focal per-
tv
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o
Attributes of
the person
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,
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/ " "-"-\
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Role Senders I Focal Person
son then responds or copes in accordance with his/her own expectations and
perception of the role senders' expectations.
The model shows that the focal person's performance affects the role senders'
expectations for the focal person, renewing the episode. Furthermore, certain of
the focal person's reactions to, or feelings about the role sendings such as ten-
sion, may affect his/her personality. Certain other reactions, such as loss of
respect for role senders, may affect the interpersonal relations between the focal
person and his/her role senders. The focal person's personality and interpersonal
relations between role senders and focal person may, in turn, affect the expecta-
tions and influence attempts of the role senders and may also affect the percep-
tions and reactions of the focal person. This model of the role episode will be
used for the remainder of the discussion to illustrate the process of middle
range theorizing.
As indicated earlier, identifying the range of an organization theory involves
comparing its scope with the range of general organization theory. The latter,
according to the enlarged Leavitt framework, would include all organizationally
relevant relations within and among organization members, structure, technol-
ogy, task, and environmental relations for all types of organizations. In relation
to this general range, we can see that the role episode is concerned with a limited
number of variables. It is largely social-psychological in nature focusing on the
interaction between role senders and focal persons. The fact that environmental
factors may impact on the relationship is recognized, but the nature of the influ-
ence is not specified by the model. Socio-technical aspects of organizations are
largely ignored, making the model more applicable for the study of organizations
characterized by significant amounts of human interaction. By the same token,
the influence of individual differences is recognized, but not explained in the
model. Thus, the effects of personality and social environment [e.g., urban ver-
sus rural environment (Blood and Hulin, 1967)] are not addressed. Finally, the
potential effects of task properties, such as degree of ambiguity, on role sending
and receiving are never specifically treated. In summary, the role model can be
seen mainly to address relationships between organization members, a scope that
makes it middle range in comparison with the previously described general range.
In order to make such a comparison, however, the general range must be speci-
fied. Thus, attention to midrange theorizing increases the need to agree upon a
typology identifying the scope of general organization theory.
A second contribution of middle range theorizing is in the area of theory
development. By focusing attention on the scope and limits of theory, this ap-
proach provides for a clearer targeting of research. The scope of the theory
translates into criteria for research design decisions in the areas of sample selec-
tion and data collection. Identified limits indicate areas where controls need to
262 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
within the theory. Other theories, that focus on the particular variable or pro-
cess, can be linked to the midrange theory according to the relationship specified
at the limits, thus, extending the range of explanation. In this sense, the mid-
dle range approach contributes to the development of a general theory of
organizations.
Through a recognition of the overlap between social processes within and
outside organizations, middle range theorizing can contribute to an under-
standing of the social nature of organizations. Theories that apply across the
boundaries indicate the extent to which organizations reflect general social
properties. Whereas, theories applying only within organizations indicate the
distinctive properties of this specialized form of collective activity. By focusing
on the basic interpersonal relationship between two individuals, the role model
can be used in studying any form of social collectivity. For example, relation-
ships between family members are as amenable to study using the role episode
as is the relationship between a superior and his/her subordinate. As such, "role
theory" is not only a middle range theory of organizations but also a middle
range theory of general social structures (Merton, 1968).
Middle range theorizing makes a fifth contribution in the area of contin-
gency theory development. The typological framework used to identify a theory
as middle range can also be used as a frame of reference for cataloging research.
Examination of such a research survey would show the areas in which research is
lacking. In helping to identify these areas, middle range theorizing would focus
attention on the gaps where research is needed and, thereby, provide a guide
for continuing research efforts.
As indicated earlier, significant research in the role literature is related to
single hypotheses or logically unconnected sets of hypotheses. If this research
were organized in terms of a common frame of reference, potential linkages
could be identified-expanding the scope of a logically coherent role theory. At
the same time, gaps needing further study would be highlighted.
A final contribution of middle range theorizing is in the area of theory appli-
cation. One of the major uses of organization theory is in the design and manage-
ment of organizations. From a contingency perspective, however, all theory is
not applicable to all situations. Relevance depends on a fit between the subject
of the theory and conditions in the organization. By focusing on the scope and
limits of theory, middle range theorizing helps to define the range of applicability
of a theory. Attention to this range can help to counteract the bandwagon
tendency to adopt practices simply because they have become popularly known
as successful. In the case of role theory, the discussion so far indicates that role
theory research would be most applicable in organizations characterized by high
levels of person to person interaction and where behavior is minimally con-
strained by technology and structure.
264 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
One of the most serious limitations of middle range theorizing follows from
legitimizing studies of partial sets of variables or a subset of organizational
processes. If, as systems theorists suggest (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Thompson,
1967), the processes in organizations are interdependent, then results from
studying any partial set of relationships are of questionable meaning. There is
always the possibility that fmdings are actually the consequence of variables or
processes outside the scope of the middle range theory. Where excluded factors
have a major effect, a middle range set of generalizations would give a distorted
interpretation of the organization phenomena.
As indicated earlier, group level processes could provide alternative explana-
tions to the outcomes ascribed to role theory. likewise, the technological aspects
of the "Organizational Factors" may directly explain behavior without the
necessity of examining the interpersonal relations. If these and similar possibil.
ities are never examined, we cannot be sure that the explanation offered by role
theory accurately represents organizational realities.
Limiting the scope of research also creates a problem when middle range
theory focuses on special types of organizations, such as manufacturing firms or
volunteer organizations. In such a case, independently pursued studies are likely
to focus on different generalizations and to ope rationalize variables in incom·
patible ways. As a result, findings relating to different types of organizations will
not be comparable, making it difficult to develop a general theory of organiza·
tions. In the case of role theory, most of the differences between organizations
have been masked by the fact that specific roles, either in a single organization or
in several comparable organizations were studied. In many instances the roles
studied were unique to a particular type of organization (e.g., nurses, professors,
MIDDLE RANGE ORGANIZATION THEORIZING 265
Following the first two of these guidelines would counteract the tendency to
develop inconsistent terminology and would increase the comparability of sepa-
rate studies. The latter two guidelines promote the identification of significant
research issues and encourage studies in those areas, thereby emphasizing the
theory building contributions of the midrange approach.
In selecting areas of study, researchers should:
guidelines would increase the likelihood that meaningful, rather than spurious,
generalizations would be developed.
During the research design phase:
The first two design guidelines parallel the selection guidelines in promoting
studies that generate meaningful results within the domain of Significant mid-
range theory. They also reflect the contribution which this approach can make
to the operational rigor of research. Encouraging researchers to use current
terminology, rather than invent labels, supports typological development and
clarifies the relationships between a new research effort and other middle range
theoretical or empirical studies.
When proposing new conceptualizations, theorists should:
1. identify clearly (in relation to the typology) the scope and limits of the
generalization;
2. defme the scope of the theory so that it includes a reasonably self-
contained set of relationships;
3. indicate whether the phenomenon is limited to organizations or is shared
with other forms of social activity.
2. determine whether or not adequate measures are available for all the vari-
ables relevant to the phenomena;
3. determine whether potentially significant extraneous influences are
controlled;
4. describe the data using commonly accepted terminology that is relevant
to the phenomena.
If the above conditions cannot be met, any generalizations are very likely to be
distorted explanations, leading to spurious midrange theories and distracting
attention from significant areas of study. Failure to use relevant existing vocabu·
lary may generate seemingly unique theories that differ only semantically. Where
these guidelines are met, on the other hand, meaningful generalizations will have
the support of rigorous empirical descriptions.
Research fmdings should be applied only when the following are true:
These fmal guidelines should alert research users to the possibility of spurious
findings and the need to test comparability between the research setting and
their situation. In this latter respect, these guidelines institutionalize the contri-
butions of midrange theorizing to the applied use of research.
The preceding guidelines and their relationships to the contributions and
limitations of middle range organization theorizing are summarized in Table 1.
The guidelines are grouped according to the phases of the research activity to
which they are most relevant, and the contributions operationalized and limita-
tions addressed by following each of the guidelines are indicated by X's in the
table.
The establishment of a clearinghouse for organization theory and research
is the fmal recommendation that follows from this analysis of middle range
theorizing. The most severe limitations of the midrange approach include: dupli-
cation of effort, proliferation of terminology, and the pursuit of spurious or
insignificant research. On the other hand, identification of theories as middle
range places an emphasis on the total range of organization theory and legiti-
mizes the development of a general theory through the accumulation of studies
of partial aspects of organizations. A clearing house would provide a mechanism
for coordinating independent effort so that common terms could be used, sig-
MIDDLE RANGE ORGANIZATION THEORIZING 269
nificant areas of research could be identified and pursued, and studies could be
designed to build on one another.
The development of a clearinghouse for research concerning middle range
organization theorizing is not without its problems. The first, and major obstacle
to overcome is the determination of an appropriate taxonomy of relevant orga-
nizational research issues into which research of a middle range nature can be
classified. Without such a taxonomy, the research results that already exist and
the results of new research cannot be analyzed to determine what has been done
and what needs to be done. The massive job of scanning organizationally rele-
vant research will be facilitated by a good taxonomy. This scanning must be
done if there is going to be any organized effort directed toward the develop-
ment of organization theory.
Once the initial tasks of developing a taxonomy and categorizing research
fmdings using the taxonomy are completed, or at least under way, the next
major task will be to gain the acceptance of researchers in the many disciplines
of the taxonomy and what it implies. If researchers are not willing to begin to
use common terminology; share data, ideas, and research methods; to, in fact,
realize that they are using middle range theories, then the task of the clearing-
house could prove impossible to accomplish.
To handle the problems and move the cause of middle range organization
theorizing forward will require a Significant effort. This conference is a very
useful first step in that it is focusing attention on middle range theorizing. Hope-
fully, some consensus about appropriate typologies for categorizing research
will evolve from the conference, but whether this occurs or not, a significant
input of time and effort will be required to develop a successful clearinghouse.
Some of the time and effort might be directed toward the following projects:
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X xx
2. Catalogue Theory X X X
X X
3. Design Cumulative Studies X X X X
X
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1. Assess Significance X X X
X
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mize Internal Variability
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X X
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REFERENCES
Biddle, B.J., and Thomas, E.J. (Eds.). Role Theory: Concepts and Research.
New York: Wiley, 1966.
Blau, P.M., and Scott, W.R. Formal Organizations. San Francisco: Chandler,
1962.
Blood, M.R., and Hulin, C.L. Alienation, environmental characteristics, and
worker responses. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1967,51, 284-90.
Georgiou, P. The goal paradigm and notes toward a counter paradigm. Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly, 1973,18,291-310.
Gross, N., Mason, W. S., and McEachern, A. W. Explorations in Role Analysis.
New York: Wiley, 1958.
Hall, R.H. Organizations: Structure and Process. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1972.
Kahn, R.L., et al. Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity.
New York: Wiley, 1964.
Katz, D., and Kahn, R. L. The Social Psychology of Organizations. New York:
Wiley, 1966.
Leavitt, H. Applied organizational change in industry: structural, technological
and humanistic approaches. In J. G. March (Ed.), Handbook of Organizations.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.
Merton, R.K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1949.
--. Social Theory and Social Structure (enlarged edition). New York: Free
Press, 1968.
Neiman, L.S., and Hughes, J.W. The problem of the concept of role-A resurvey
of the literature. Social Forces, 1951,30, 141-49.
Thompson, J.D. Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
Weber, M. Economy and Society (Vol. 1). New York: Bedminster Press, 1968.
23OF LIMITED DOMAIN THEORIES
ORGANIZATIONAL ENERGY
John B. Miner, Georgia State University
The title of this paper contains two basic elements-the concepts of limited
domain theory and of organizational energy. The first of these draws upon
Dubin's (1969) terminology and refers to theories that have a number of
boundary-determining criteria. Whether the theories to be presented are truly
theories of the middle range in the sense Merton (1949) intended is an open
question, but they are not grand theories; the boundaries within which they are
expected to prove valid are sharply delimited. It is because the defmition of
middle range theory is somewhat imprecise that the limited domain concept is
applied here. When exactly does a theory move from a narrow range into the
middle of the spectrum? If one is not sure about this matter of classification, the
limited domain terminology with its requirement of precise boundary limits, has
considerable appeal.
The second concept in the title, that of organizational energy, assumes that
organization structures are essentially static and that some source of energy is
required to make them dynamic, in pursuit of goals. This energy derives from
the human input to the organization and takes the form of motivated effort or
force. The energy is aroused and charmeled toward goal accomplishment by
certain kinds of role prescriptions, which may be either formally stated or infor-
mally operative, depending on the predilections of the particular organization.
273
274 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
The hierarchic theory was first formally set forth in Miner (1965), although a
certain amount of research on the theory was conducted prior to that time. It
has generally been labelled managerial role-motivation theory. The domain of
the theory follows the boundaries of the ideal bureaucracy as described by
Weber (1947); it is assumed that the organization is large enough so that for-
malized, written communication is necessary, not merely face-to-face interaction
(Stinchcombe, 1974). In such an organization the key group is management,
especially top management. Management induces contributions from lower
members through the manipulation of positive and negative sanctions, and the
energy thus generated is channeled toward goal attainment through the establish-
ment of some type of role prescriptions, as specified in written job descriptions
to take one example.
But where does management obtain its energy? To some extent, of course,
through the manipulation of sanctions at yet higher levels of management. How-
ever, there is a limit to this process. The theory of hierarchic inducement systems
states that there are at least six general types of managerial role prescriptions
operating in the hierarchic context, each of which in tum must engage a particu-
lar intrinsic motivational constellation if managerial behavior appropriate to the
effective operation of this particular inducement approach is to occur. These
role prescriptions and the patterns of motivation (not necessarily a unitary
motive) they engage are as follows:
1. Role. The positive relations with authority figure role. Motivational Base.
A favorable attitude toward people in authority positions generally. Ex-
planation. In a hierarchic system there must be communication and inter-
action upward with superiors and favorable attitudes facilitate this.
2. Role. The competitive role. Motivational Base. A desire to compete. Ex-
planation. In a hierarchic system, rewards such as promotion to the highest
levels and the largest salaries are differentially distributed and relatively
LIMITED DOMAIN THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ENERGY 275
fessionals (Hall, 1967; Harrison, 1974; Sorenson and Sorenson, 1974). The role
prescriptions and their motivational bases are as follows:
a desire not merely for social interaction, but for acceptance and a sense
of belongingness in the group, becomes necessary.
3. Role. The positive relations with peers role. Motivational Base. A favor-
able attitude toward peers and coworkers generally. Explanation. Just as
in hierarchic systems favorable attitudes upward are required to facilitate
hierarchic communication, in a group system favorable attitudes toward
group members, or potential group members, are also required. These
positive attitudes should take such forms as belief in others, trust, con-
sideration, and mutual respect.
4. Role. The cooperative role. Motivational Base. A desire to work with
others in a cooperative or collaborative fashion. Explanation. In a group
system, competition among members can disrupt communications and
lead to withholding of needed information -even to group disintegration.
As a result, members must eschew competition in favor of cooperative,
collaborative relations and gain satisfaction from doing so.
S. Role. The democratic process role. Motivational Base. A desire to partici-
pate in democratic group processes. Explanation. In a group system the
major method of getting things done is some variant of the power equal-
ized, democratic process including open expression of ideas and views,
and the use of democratic procedures such as the vote to reach decisions.
For these processes to function effectively members must be favorably dis-
posed toward them and desire to contribute to their effective operation.
A task inducement approach is built into many business jobs, in each instance
modeled after the entrepreneurial case, which in fact specifies the boundary-
determining criteria of the theory. Examples are the profit center manager, the
corporate venture manager, straight commission sales representatives, and manu-
facturers' representatives. Much job enrichment utilizes a similar pattern (Ford,
1969; Herzberg, 1976). In all of these instances, achievement motivation theory
appears to provide valuable insights into the dynamics of work behavior (Mc-
Clelland and Winter, 1969).
McClelland (1961, 1962) specifies certain characteristics of situations that are
preferred by and tend to elicit achievement striving from individuals with a
strong achievement need. These characteristics may be viewed as providing a
minimum set of role prescriptions necessary for the operation of a task induce-
ment system. These role prescriptions and the motivations engaged (presumably
components of the overall need achievement variable) are as follows:
THEORETICAL QUESTIONS
There are eight basic questions that limited domain theories of the type set forth
in this paper should be expected to answer (Miner, 1977). In a number of in-
stances these questions may be formulated as theoretical hypotheses, and thus
they may be used in testing the underlying theories.
The theory-based measures should predict job performance levels within the
domain of their appropriate theories, that is, in the theoretically specified
organizational or work context. Relationships would be expected to be con·
siderably stronger if purified measures of motivational force were used as criteria,
but the theories do anticipate that the motivational patterns will explain sizable
amounts of performance variance. Furthermore, extrapolating from current per·
formance, career success should also be predictable.
In terms of the four theories the research hypotheses may be stated as follows:
The problem of the availability of high levels of the different types of motiva-
tion in a population at a given point in time is an important one, and one which
the theories should help to solve. However, this question adds an historical
dimension to the theories, which has not really been considered to this point,
except as related to the training and development question. It seems logical that
LIMITED DOMAIN THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ENERGY 283
families should develop strong motives in children just as training does in adults
(Turner, 1970). The more difficult problem is to determine how parents come to
change or permit a change in motivational patterns so that major shifts in the
concentration of motives in a society of the kind we know do occur (McClelland,
1961 ; Miner, 1977) come about.
On this point the theories must remain silent at the present time. It seems
highly likely that those societies which have perpetuated certain patterns-hier-
archic, professional, group, and/or task-over considerable periods may in a
relatively short time go neutral, and fail to enforce existing values. But it is by
no means clear why this occurs, and why a particular other motive pattern then
takes on a predominant role. It is simply premature to extend the theories in
these directions at present.
To the extent pure tests within a domain are possible, it should follow that the
hypotheses set forth under the preceding questions will hold within the appro-
priate domain, but not outside it. The four inducement-system-based motiva-
tional patterns are not, however, assumed to show any necessary relationships
with each other; they are not pure factors. Thus, both positive and negative
correlations are expected depending on circumstances, although large correla-
tions would not be anticipated. Since many organizational forms are based on
more than one type of inducement system, positive correlations between the
appropriate motive sets can be anticipated as a result of selective recruitment in
such instances.
As this theoretical rubric has expanded from one domain to another-from the
hierarchic to the professional, and now to the group and task-it would appear
to take on many of the characteristics of a contingency theory and in fact it has
been proposed as an alternative to existing contingency theories, which utilize
environmental characteristics as the key contingency variables (Miner, 1978a,
1978c). However, the theoretical variables themselves have been generated
separately and are posited as being theoretically distinct and independent. There
is no statement as to the normative superiority of one theoretical framework
over another. As far as the theories are concerned, and existing knowledge as
well, one theory can produce as effective an organization as another provided
the motivational base is congruent with the role prescriptions. However, to ac-
complish this equality of effectiveness large organizations utilizing professional,
group, or task inducement systems will have to separate into small, reasonably
autonomous units at whatever point under variable structuring a change in in-
ducement approach among these three alternatives occurs.
In essence, then, we are dealing to this point with four distinct limited domain
theories of organizational energy inducement. The "our may also be considered
to be theories of organizational control, using that term in the broad sense it has
recently assumed (Lawler and Rhode, 1976). In fact, the first statements of the
theories utilized the term control (Miner, 1975). However, the ambiguities of
that term (Newman, 1975) make it unattractive for theoretical purposes, and its
use has been abandoned in subsequent writing.
Although it is appropriate and useful to state the four theories as independent
entities, it is also realistic to recognize that these domains may on occasion over-
lap within the confines of a specific organization. In particular, professional,
group, or task elements may appear in primarily hierarchic organizations. How
does one deal with such overlapping domain contexts?
To the extent two or more inducement systems are superimposed in an orga·
nizational unit or an organization as a whole, there is a high probability of role
conflict. Given that the role sets are independent of each other, multiple oppor-
tunities will exist for individuals to be pulled two ways at once when more than
one set is operating. For most people this means reduced levels of effectiveness
and intrinsic job satisfaction (Szilagyi, Sims and Keller, 1976). It seems entirely
possible, for example, that the negative effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic
motivation noted by Deci (1975) are a consequence of conflicts between hier-
archic and task inducement systems.
However, the introduction of variable structuring in an organization will
inevitably create certain positions in which inducement systems interface (Miner,
1974). This is true, for instance, of profit center general managers in a corpora-
LIMITED DOMAIN THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ENERGY 285
tion, deans in a university, the first level of hierarchic supervision where socio-
technical work groups have been organized, and so on_ In these specific positions
role conflict is inevitable. It need not be debilitating for performance, however,
if the individual staffing the position is one of those relatively rare people who
possesses strong motivational patterns along both dimensions represented by the
inducement systems interfacing in the position. Because such motive combina-
tions are not expected to occur frequently, given the assumed low level of corre-
lation among the underlying variables, staffing interface positions is a difficult
matter and failures occur frequently. Yet, if the appropriate people can be
found, a high degree of resistance to the particular kind of role conflict present
is hypothesized.
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Collings, O.F., Moore, D.G., and Unwalla, D.B. The Enterprising Man. East
Lansing, Mich.: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Michigan State
University, 1964.
Deci, E. L. Intrinsic Motivation. New York: Plenum, 1975.
Dubin, R. Theory Building. New York: Free Press, 1969.
Etzioni, A. Modern Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
Ford, R.N. Motivation Through the Work Itself. New York: American Manage-
ment Association, 1969.
French, W.L., and Bell, C.H. Organization Development. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Golembiewski, R. T. Renewing Organizations: The Laboratory Approach to
Planned Change. Itasca, 111.: F. E. Peacock, 1972.
Gou1dner, A. W. Cosmos and locals: Toward an analysis of latent social roles. Ad-
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Hall, R.H. Some organizational considerations in the professional-organizational
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Harrison, F. The management of scientists: Determinants of perceived role per-
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Herbst, P.G. Alternatives to Hierarchies. Leiden, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff,
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Herzberg, F. The Managerial Choice: To be Efficient and to be Human. Home-
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Kerr, S. Substitutes for leadership: Some implications for organizational design.
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Lawler, E.E., and Rhode, LG. Information and Control in Organizations. Pacific
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286 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Likert, R., and Likert, J.G. New ways ofManaging Conflict. New York: McGraw-
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24 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
MODES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION
E. Allen Slusher and Kenneth J. Roering,
University of Missouri-Columbia
287
288 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Boulding (1970, p. 9), applying a general systems perspective, notes that there
are three basic genotypes in social systems that define the role relationships be-
tween two parties. The first genotype is a threat relationship, which " ... origi-
nates when one person says to another, 'You do something that I want ... or I
will do something that you do not want.' If the threatened person submits, we
get a threat-submission system ...." Second is an exchange relationship, which
" ... develops when somebody says to somebody else, 'You do something that I
want and I'll do something that you want.'" Third is an integrative relationship,
which " ... takes form when somebody says to somebody else, 'You do some-
thing because of what you are and what I am.'" Walton and McKersie (1965),
focusing on the narrower issue of social negotiations, offer an analytical frame-
work complementary to Boulding's social system genotypes. They identify three
interunit subprocesses:
greater detail than do either Boulding or Walton and McKersie the issue of inter-
action modes. Bonoma sees social episodes involving power, conflict, coopera-
tion, and trust as falling into three categories: unilateral, mixed, and bilateral
power systems. The unilateral and mixed power systems are differentiated by
relative power. In the unilateral system there is a strong party and a weak party.
Mixed power systems imply a greater balance (although not necessarily equality)
of power between the parties. Although unilaterial and mixed systems are con-
ceived as being qualitatively different, the greatest contrast occurs when the
unilateral and mixed systems are compared with the bilateral power system. As
Bonoma notes "There is a third class of social episode implicating conflict
constructs, one in which the interactants share a unit bonding or belongingness;
it is different in kind and degree from the other two." Bonoma strongly
advocates the position that the relationship between the same theoretical
constructs will differ across the three types of social episodes. This suggests the
need for three middle range theories each aimed at explaining the relationship
among constructs for a given category. If a general theory were to be developed,
it must include modifiers for application to a given social context.
There is great similarity in the theoretical views of Bonoma, Boulding, and
Walton and McKersie. We wish to synthesize their view in a framework applicable
to the dyadic interactions common to much of organizational life. We defme
three modes of social interaction: dominance, exchange, and commitment. The
differences between these modes are summarized in Table 1.
When considering the modes of social interaction, one should not assume that
the characteristic theoretical constructs apply exclusively to a single mode. For
example, conflict might develop in a commitment interaction over scarce re-
sources. However, we do believe that the most probable source of conflict in
the committed mode will be differences in perspectives on individual and unit
welfare or the nature of joint policies. The interaction modes should be viewed
as describing general tendencies or highly probable behaviors rather than discrete
categories.
The question of exclusivity-nonexclusivity in assigning characteristic
theoretical constructs to the interaction modes is related to another fundamental
question. Does an interaction mode describe all interactions between two
parties, a subset of all interactions, or only a single interaction? We are not
referring here to interactions that represent mere repetition over time, but to
interactions that differ in some characteristic attribute (e.g., issue, importance,
duration, etc.). If a mode applies to only one interaction, then our typology can
only be applied in an issue or transaction specific sense. It might thus be
necessary to categorize three different interactions between the same two parties
as instances of dominance, exchange, and commitment. This approach not
only presents practical research difficulties, but ignores the strong influence of
N
\0
o
Table 1. Three Modes of Social
Socia I Interaction.
Modes
Theoretical Constructs Dominance Exchange Commitment
basic social relationships. At the other extreme, applying the same modal anal-
ysis to all interactions between the same two parties may lead to erroneous
conclusions in special instances. Here it is conceived that a given interaction
mode applies to most, but not all interactions, between two parties.
We have argued strongly in this section that social interaction theory and
research should recognize different interaction modes between parties. More-
over, we have offered a threefold typology for distinguishing between inter-
action modes. This analysis suggests that research will proceed most effectively
when an appropriate middle range theory is applied to a given interaction mode.
A middle range theory for the dominance mode can be constructed from various
bases in psychology, sociology, or political science. For the exchange mode an
appropriate middle range theory can be derived from the classic work in social
exchange theory by Gouldner (1960), Homans (1961), Thibaut and Kelley
(1959), and Blau (1964). The problem is more acute for the commitment mode
where social science theories are less developed and more diffuse. However, the
work on the psychology of commitment by Kiesler and his colleagues should be
a useful point of departure (Kiesler, 1971).
Although we believe that research will be more productive when greater
emphasis is placed on identifying the mode of social interaction and then select-
ing a middle range theory, there is another fundamental issue that should be
addressed. In dynamic social systems two types of change may occur. A given
middle range theory, to the extent it involves process, deals with the first type of
change-that which occurs within a given interaction mode. An understanding of
this intramode change is intrinsically useful and also complementary to under-
standing the second type of change-that which leads to a shift from one inter-
action mode to another. Such intermode change represents a fundamental
restructuring of the parties' interaction with consequent influences on behavior
and outcomes. Unfortunately, little attention has been given to intermode
change despite its potential importance. In the remainder of this paper we will
analyze intermode change from the perspective of a new development in mathe-
matical theory.
end, commitment at the other end, and exchange in the middle. Such a con-
tinuum would suggest three features of the relationship between the interaction
modes. First, on the extreme ends of the continuum and in the center we could
note the distinctive attributes that separate the three modes. That is, we can
rather easily distinguish between some areas along the continuum with respect to
the characteristic attributes discussed earlier. Second, when we move to the left
(or right) of center, but not to the end, on our continuum, it becomes difficult
to say whether dominance or exchange (exchange or commitment) exists. There
is some smooth transition between modes in which we might presume that some
attributes are declining, others increasing, and some mixture exists. Third, the
dominance and commitment modes are inaccessible without moving through the
exchange mode. If two parties are in a dominance interaction and if the nature
of that interaction were to change, it must move to an exchange relationship.
Similarly, change from commitment implies movement to an exchange interac-
tion. Thus, the assumption of a continuum from dominance to commitment
leads to testable propositions. Particularly interesting are the propositions tha~:
(a) smooth transitions occur between modes of social interaction, and (b) transi-
tions must occur from dominance to exchange to commitment or the reverse.
Although these are plausible propositions, we wish to examine a different, and
perhaps more descriptive, conceptualization.
Rene Thom, a French mathematician, has recently applied typology to
develop a mathematics applicable to discontinuous events, which has been
labelled catastrophe theory. This innovation has particular relevance to the be-
havioral sciences where differential calculus is inadequate for describing the
sudden breaks in behavior that are often observed in social interaction. At this
point, the mathematics may be less important than the conceptual view offered
by catastrophe theory. In the future, when important behavioral problems have
been conceptualized as catastrophes, then a powerful mathematics will become
available for their solution. Here we will apply a graphical analysis to show how
movements between modes of social interaction can be conceived as catastrophes.
More important, we will also show how provocative hypotheses can be derived
from the catastrophe theory conceptualization. The theoretical work by Bould-
ing, Walton and McKersie, and Bonoma suggests that the catastrophe model is
appropriate for explaining movements between interaction modes. Recall that in
each of the three typologies two categories were closely related, while the third
differed in kind rather than degree. With respect to our composite typology,
dominance and exchange are similar in their focus on an individual party in
interaction with another party. In contrast, commitment interactions center on
the inseparable dyadic unit. Thus, if the interaction mode were to change from
either dominance or exchange to commitment, we would expect a major break
or "catastrophic" change in the basic nature of the interaction.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MODES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 293
B
conun'itment
Conununity
Let us return to our earlier example, but with a different scenario. Suppose
that soon after acquiring Canton Products, the top management at Atlanta
Industries had taken a more active stance. Birmingham and Canton are directed
by Atlanta to work closely together in developing a new product (Le., a super-
ordinate goal is provided). Atlanta supplies monetary resources, extensive staff
support, and top management time. The coordination between Birmingham and
Canton is closely monitored. In short, the high level of competitive motivation
between Birmingham and Canton is taken as given and efforts are directed
toward increasing cooperative attitudes. Finally, Atlanta management is satisfied
that they have built a "real team."
The relationship between Birmingham and Canton moves from point A to
point B in Figure 2 by a different path than in the previous example (compare
with Figure 1). Initially, movement would occur toward the fold along path AC.
Such movement might represent some change in community, but would still fall
within the dominance region. However, what happens at point C is very different
community
.;
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298
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MODES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 299
Research Implications
We have discussed the basic features of the catastrophe model: sudden breaks,
bimodality, hysteresis, and divergence. It will now be helpful to examine the
model as a whole and its implications for understanding social interaction. The
major purpose in presenting the catastrophe model is to derme the relation-
ship between the dominance, exchange, and commitment modes. In order
to truly derme this relationship, it is necessary to consider the dynamics of social
interaction.
Dominance, exchange, and commitment were modeled as three areas on the
behavior surface of a catastrophe model. Within a given area the slope of the
behavior surface is relatively flat. This suggests that movements within a partic-
ular interaction mode involve only small changes in community. That is, the
notion of an interaction mode implies a stable interaction pattern or equilibrium
between the parties. When we refer to an equilibrium, we also imply there is
some pull or attraction between the two parties that binds the interaction to a
familiar pattern. The same basic attractor may operate in different contexts;
for example, a magnetic attractor in three different physical systems. However,
in social interactions we believe that three different simple attractors exist, one
for each interaction mode. In the dominance mode, it is the high power party
that uses his or her power to establish and enforce the prescribed interaction
pattern. For exchange, the interaction pattern is determined through many past
exchanges of valued factors. Interactions in a commitment relationship are
circumscribed by a network of norms, beliefs, and values. The attractor in
dominance is power, in exchange it is reinforcement, and in commitment the
attractor is cohesiveness. As we discussed earlier, understanding and predicting
social interaction within a given context requires selecting and applying an
appropriate theoretical model. The power, reinforcement, and cohesiveness
300 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
attractors are the social glue in the influence model, social exchange model, and
commitment model, respectively.
Once a given interaction mode (dominance, exchange, or commitment) is
accepted by the parties, the attractor (power, reinforcement, or cohesiveness)
acts to maintain stability within the mode. However, stability can be over-
come and the parties may enter a new relationship. Such change from a stable
equilibrium can only occur when new forces enter the situation. The effects of
such forces are summarized by changes in the underlying control parameters,
cooperation and competition. Later we will consider why and how changes in
cooperation and competition occur, but for now we will assume that enough
change has taken place so that two attractor forces are affecting the interaction.
In an area where the two attractors are nearly equal in their pull, subtle changes
in either direction may dictate movement back to the old mode or change to a
new interaction mode. Unlike objects in a physical system, the parties do not
simply passively react to attractors. Rather, the parties sense the pull toward a
new interaction mode and react to this pull.
We will call the areas where the pull between attractors is nearly equal conflict
zones. In these conflict zones the parties recognize that a basic change in their
interaction is eminent. We can distinguish two forms of conflict: outcome con-
flict and relationship conflict. Outcome conflict is the conflict that ensues
within a given interaction mode. This usually involves differences in preferences
for outcomes where the outcome itself will have no effect or only marginal
effect on the nature of the future interaction mode. That is, the basic interaction
mode endures unchanged by some momentary conflict. Relationship conflict
develops when the parties are in the conflict zone. Here, conflict results not
from different preferences over outcomes but from different desires concern-
ing the basic social relationship that should exist and how that relationship
should be defined. Outcome conflict and relationship conflict are not
independent, since continued outcome conflict may result in change in the
underlying control parameters ultimately leading to a conflict zone. However,
the immediate effects of outcome conflict are neither as serious nor as pervasive
as those for relationship conflict. When outcome conflict breaks out, the attrac-
tor force acts to pull the relationship back into stable equilibrium. Moreover,
the parties have vital interests at stake in the present relationship and anticipa-
tions of how their interests will be met in a new relationship. Thus, because the
equilibrium is weak and the issues vital, we would expect any relationship con-
flicts to be more violent than the more typical outcome conflicts. Because the
parties can foresee the strong possibility of serious relationship conflict occurring
as the conflict zone is entered, we would expect more intensive bargaining
between the parties. Successful bargaining will move the relationship to a new
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MODES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 301
interaction mode or back into the previous equilibrium. The failure of bargaining
will lead to an overt relationship conflict between the parties.
The conflict zones occur on the behavior surface near areas of transition
between social contexts. Thus, there is a conflict zone on: (1) the lower surface
between exchange and dominance, (2) the lower surface near the fold curve
marking the break between exchange and commitment, (3) on the lower surface
near the fold curve marking the break between dominance and commitment, (4)
on the upper surface from commitment to exchange, and (5) on the upper
surface from commitment to dominance. These five conflict zones can be
distinguished by the degree to which community behavior would shift should a
transition through the zone to a new social context occur. This difference
suggests that the intensity of bargaining behavior will vary with the magnitude of
the shift in community behavior. That is, we would expect bargaining would be
more intense and the probability of relationship conflict higher as the difference
between the current and anticipated interaction situation increases. With respect
to the five conflict zones noted above, bargaining intensity and relationship
conflict potential are greatest in the dominance-commitment and commitment-
dominance zones, moderate in the exchange-commitment and commitment-
exchange zones, and low in the dominance-exchange zone.
SUMMARY
regions where the attractor forces for two interaction modes are nearly
equal (Le., in the conflict zones).
7. Bargaining intensity varies directly with the anticipated levels of change in
community.
REFERENCES
Blau, P.M. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1964.
Bonoma, T. V. Conflict, cooperation and trust in three power systems. Behavioral
Science, 1976,21,499-514.
Boulding, K.E. Economics as a Science. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Com-
pany, 1970.
Denzin, N.K. The Research Act. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970.
Gouldner, A. The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American
Sociological Review, 1960,25, 161-179.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MODES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 303
Homans, G.c. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1961.
Kiesler, C. A. The Psychology of Commitment. New York: Academic Press, 1971.
Thibaut, J.W., and Kelley, H.H. The Social Psychology of Groups. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1959.
Thorn, R. Structural Stability and Morphogenesis (translated by D.H. Fowler).
W.A. Benjamin, Inc., Reading, Massachusetts, 1975.
Walton, E., and McKersie, R.B. A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.
Weick, K.E. Middle range theories of social systems. Behavioral Science, 1974,
19, 357-367.
Zeeman, E.C. Catastrophe theory. Scientific American, 1976, (April), 65-83.
25
THE APPLICABILITY
OF MIDDLE RANGE THEORIES
TO THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS
Paul M. Muchinsky and Paula C. Morrow,
Iowa State University
Middle range theorizing has been proposed as an efficient means by which sets of
hypotheses can be integrated and synthesized into submolar theory, such that
the hypotheses are grounded in empirical confirmation while lending themselves
to a higher·order theoretical abstraction. This approach can be construed as an
epistomological strategy of moderation or middle ground, on a continuum of
abstraction above organized descriptive data but beneath comprehensive theories
that attempt to explain large-scale social phenomena. According to Merton
(1967), middle range theories consist of limited sets of assumptions from which
specific hypotheses are logically derived and confirmed by empirical investiga-
tion. Advocates of middle range theories (Merton, 1967; Weick, 1974) have
outlined three particular characteristics of these theories that are of special con·
cern to this paper. First, middle range theory involves abstractions, but these
abstractions are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in proposi-
tions that permit empirical testing. Secondly, a given theory of the middle range
having a measure of empirical confirmation can often be subsumed under com-
prehensive theories, which are themselves discrepant in certain respects. Thirdly,
an effective strategy of scientific inquiry is to develop theories of the middle
range and consolidate them periodically_ The focus of this paper is on the
applicability of middle range theorizing to the construct of organizational
304
THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 305
effectiveness, a construct that has met with limited success when conceptualized
via traditional modes of analysis, and accordingly may be more profitably
studied through the use of middle range theories.
The feasibility of applying middle range theories to the construct of organiza-
tional effectiveness will be examined in part by focusing upon the three cited
characteristics of middle range theories and the potential they have for reducing
some of the empirical and theoretical ambiguities associated with organizational
effectiveness research. The format of this paper consists essentially of two parts:
a review of three pronounced problems in organizational effectiveness research,
and an examination of how middle range theories might alleviate some of
these problems.
As Steers (1975) has discussed, there are numerous conceptual problems with
the construct of organizational effectiveness. These problems range from a lack
of convergence among theorists as to what the construct of organizational ef-
fectiveness should entail, to data that offer weak empirical confirmation of the
construct. While a complete review of all the problems currently plaguing orga-
nizational effectiveness researchers is beyond the scope of this paper, three
substantive problems will be presented to which the concept of middle range
theories may offer some answers. More detailed discourses on the problems asso-
ciated with organizational effectiveness research are presented in Spray (1976)
and Goodman and Pennings (1977).
ture under one theoretical umbrella, that is, by their nature some organizations
just don't readily fit into one theoretical framework.
While the universalistic framework seems to be a popular one, other types of
theories have also been proposed to explain organizational effectiveness. Con-
ceptualizing organizational effectiveness as a series of goals has been advocated
by Hall (l972), Price (1972), and others. Alternately, Yuchtman and Seashore
(1967) have pursued the study of organizational effectiveness via the system
resource approach. Some investigators (Molnar and Rogers, 1976) have empiri-
cally compared the two approaches, although Hannan and Freeman (1977) have
described the problems in trying to make across-study comparisons. Puzzlements
exist even within theoretical frameworks, as a lack of consensus within an orga-
nization as to what the goals of the organization are or should be (Dubin, 1976).
When the empirical data do not support the propositions of a theory, one can
attribute the lack of confirmation to poor theory or poor measures of the con-
cepts under investigation. In most cases the question of the quality of the mea-
sures can be resolved through traditional psychometric criteria (e.g., statistical
reliability and validity). The question of poor theory is a tougher issue to re-
solve, as there are many determinants of theory quality (Marx and Hillix, 1963).
It does seem likely, however, that in the area of organizational effectiveness,
theories may not be so much an issue of "poor" as they are "inappropriate"
given the stage of development in organizational effectiveness research. Many of
the more universalistic theories may be trying to accomplish too much, given the
relatively uncertain state of organizational effectiveness research. More modest
degrees of theorizing may culminate in greater degrees of success in explaining
the construct of organizational effectiveness, if for no other reason than the
theoretical domain will be less heterogeneous. The current state of the art on
organizational effectiveness (e.g., Spray, 1976; Goodman and Pennings, 1977)
illustrates the lack of agreement among scholars as to what is meant by "orga-
nizational effectiveness," how it should be studied, and even whether the concept
is a useful one or not (pfeffer, 1977). Given this situation it seems reasonable for
scholars to retrench from the molar and grandiose theories of organizational
effectiveness (that have not met with much professional favor) to less ambitious
theories reflecting in part our current limited comprehension of the topic.
empirical data (with little or no abstractions) and the overriding theoretical per-
spective (at a very high level of abstraction). The middle range theory would be
"close" enough to the data to deter the problems of increased measurement
error that occur when attempting to traverse great distance between theory and
data. Thus, a major advantage of the inductive approach would be retained. Per-
haps research would show that one middle range theory would not be sufficient
to explain organizational effectiveness, thus necessitating the use of multiple
middle range theories to explain the construct. These multiple middle range
theories would then become the conceptual target of a larger, more general
theory of organizational effectiveness. Thus, the deductive approach would work
down to the content of the middle range theories, which was derived via the
inductive approach. It appears that working through a middle range theory per-
spective might be a most efficient way to study the construct of organizational
effectiveness, a construct that has not met with much success when studied via
one singular perspective (inductive or deductive).
This paper has focused upon three particular issues currently facing researchers
in the area of organizational effectiveness. Many other additional types of prob-
lems are also present as has been documented by Steers (1975), Hall and Clark
(1977), and Goodman and Pennings (1977). The remainder of this paper will be
devoted to exploring how middle range theories might alleviate some of these
problems, particularly in regard to the three characteristics of middle range
theories cited earlier in the paper.
Because the problems associated with organizational effectiveness are inter-
twined, it is difficult to address them separately. This is especially true with the
issues of reduced theoretical range and construct validity, as a decrement in the
scope of a theory would in all likelihood produce a decrement in the diversity of
variables used to demonstrate its construct validity. This dependency among
problems notwithstanding, a reasonable place to begin would be to abandon the
goal of developing the (general) theory of organizational effectiveness. Research
has shown that this objective has to date not been met with any great degree of
success. An alternative strategy, therefore, would be to develop a series or set
of theories that address a subset of the content matter of a general theory. We
are therefore proposing that the (general) theory of organizational effectiveness
be supplanted with a number of middle range theories. The number and type of
middle range theories would depend upon the manner in which scholars wished
to partition the construct of effectiveness.
This might be accomplished by one of two ways. One way would be to seg-
3lO MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
ment the scope of the theory's content, as developing a (middle range) theory
of organizational effectiveness that addresses effectiveness only in the short run,
or effectiveness as judged by one constituency (e.g., employees). Such an ap-
proach would serve to reduce the complexity of the construct by temporarily
excusing the scholar from the need to embrace both short- and long-run per-
spectives, multiple constituencies, and so on. After logically sound and em-
pirically supported middle range theories (i.e., theories of reduced scope) are
acquired, the scholar's next task is to reunite the segmented middle range
theories into a higher-order theory of broader scope. This approach to generating
larger-scale theories is fundamentally different from one where a scholar reduces
the scope or range of a construct under investigation without the intent of
studying the other elements or units comprising the construct, and without the
intent of integrating the segmented bodies of knowledge into a broader theo-
retical framework.
A second middle range approach to the study of organizational effectiveness
would be to selectively group the elements of analysis (i.e., organizations) into
homogenous categories. For example, separate middle range theories could be
devoted to private versus public sector organizations, production versus service
oriented organizations, and so forth. Greater refmement could be attained by
limiting the types of organizations embraced by a theory as hospital, prison,
school, and military organizations. It would again be the researcher's objective
to first empirically support each theory within organizational types, and then
seek to consolidate and integrate the findings across organizational types, striv-
ing for generalizability and cross-validity. It would seem that the range of vari-
ables needed for inclusion in the nomological net of construct validity would be
far less via these approaches than for a general theory of effectiveness. If the
focus of a given middle range theory is, for example, nonprofit hospitals, vari-
ables dealing with financial gain can be discarded as being inappropriate to the
theory, as well as variables that are irrelevant to a service-oriented organization.
Certain variables would seemingly be relevant for all types of organizations as
stability (or survival) and employee satisfaction. These types of variables might
serve as "marker" variables, measures that can be used for comparison of orga-
nizations that span the focus of different middle range theories. However, our
initial concern should be the development of relatively clean and tight theories
of effectiveness that possess a high degree of internal clarity and conciseness.
The best path to this goal would seem to be one of limiting or narrowing our
focus of investigation, going from developing the general theory of effectiveness
(applicable to all organizations) down to the middle range theory aimed at ex-
plaining effectiveness in just a certain type of organization, or effectiveness at
one point in time. It seems the construct validity waters have been muddied by
incorporating variables that simply "must" be considered because of their
THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 311
The three characteristics of middle range theories presented earlier in this paper
can be used to assess the potential applicability of middle range theories to the
study of organizational effectiveness. The first characteristic involves the use of
abstractions that are close enough to observed data to permit empirical testing.
This characteristic seemingly could be met without much difficulty, because the
levels of abstraction are not that distant from the observed data. In contrast,
there is considerable distance between the abstract concepts in a general theory
and the data. For example, in a middle range theory of effectiveness a theoreti-
cal abstraction might be employee stability, as operationalized by rates of turn-
over. However, a more general theory might be forced to use a higher level of
abstraction to account for the phenomena under investigation, such as negen-
trophy (Katz and Kahn, 1966), i.e., the capacity of a system to resist death
and disorganization. Thus, because middle range theories do not attempt to
explain large-scale phenomena, they are permitted to develop concepts at lower
levels of abstraction. Additionally, if one adopts an inductive approach, the
theoretical abstractions emerge directly out of the observed data and are thus
literally borne out of empirical verification. Such a system seems most desirable
in an area of research that has spawned a multitude of (primarily untested)
theoretical abstractions. It would thus appear that the first property of middle
range theories (Le., empirically testable abstractions) would be a reasonable
starting point for giving some systematic direction to the study of organiza-
tional effectiveness (Goodman and Pennings, 1977).
The second property of middle range theories that was presented involves
subsuming empirically confirmed middle range theories under general theories,
which are themselves discrepant in certain respects. Two such general theories
of effectiveness are the goal-centered and the natural systems models (Ghorpade,
1971). The general goal-centered model assumes that organizations have a set of
312 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
goals to pursue. Assuming that the goals can be identified, it should be possible
to plan the best organizational strategies for attaining them. With this frame-
work, therefore, the way to assess organizational effectiveness would be to
develop criterion measures to assess how well the goals are being achieved
(Campbell, 1977). The natural systems approach rejects the notion of specific
goal attainment and rather focuses upon maintaining the organization through
time. Organizational effectiveness as assessed by this approach partially entails
studying whether the organization's resources are being distributed over a variety
of coping (adaptation) mechanisms. It would seem that a middle range theory of
organizational effectiveness that operationalizes effectiveness in part in terms of
participative decision making or shared control would have something to offer
each of these two general theories, that is, goal-centered and natural systems.
Adopting the goal-centered approach, it could be argued that shared control
is a strategy for goal attainment, and those organizations (or types of organiza-
tions) that invoke shared control are more effective than those that don't (on
the basis that participative decision making is instrumental for attaining other
goals of the organization, as increased job satisfaction, decreased absenteeism,
etc.). If one adopts the natural systems perspective, it could be argued that
shared control is a necessary coping mechanism to ensure the viability of the
organization. Those organizations or types of organizations that share control
will survive longer than those that don't. While the example of shared control is
but one of many possible examples, it does seem that empirically verified middle
range theories may be encompassed by larger general theories, which themselves
are discrepant or adopt initially incompatible theoretical perspectives.
The third characteristic of middle range theories is that they should periodi-
cally be consolidated. This appears to be a most appealing property, especially
with regard to the study of organizational effectiveness. To be sure, researchers
are not interested in nor would they be satisfied with a multitude of middle range
theories of effectiveness, one theory for nonprofit hospitals, one for voluntary
organizations, one for prisons, and so on. Eventually, we would like to collapse
across theories, consolidating them into larger theoretical units. However, given
the problems that have occurred in attempting to verify global or general theories
of organizational effectiveness, the consolidation of many middle range theories
is probably a long-range goal. Given our current limited knowledge of organiza-
tional effectiveness, the development of a series of empirically strong middle
range theories of effectiveness seems to be (at least at this point in time) a chal-
lenging goal in itself. The eventual consolidation of middle range theories may
be accomplished over the time dimension (short run versus long run), type of
organization (product versus service, public sector versus private sector, etc.),
and perhaps over constituencies (employees versus customers). It also seems
likely that we will reach a point in time when we cannot consolidate all of the
THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 313
theories into one general theory due to irreconcilable differences among orga-
nizations. To attempt a complete consolidation may serve to reduce the explana-
tory power and conceptual accuracy of the theories. While Bierstedt (1960) has
referred to the implementation of middle range theories as an "anemic ambi-
tion," the feelings of epistomological anemia may be offset by the increased
empirical verification that such midrange theories provide.
In conclusion, the applicability of middle range theories to the study of
organizational effectiveness seems to hold considerable promise. The observed
problems of global theoretical orientations, construct validity, and inductive
versus deductive approaches to organizational effectiveness appear to be miti-
gated by the construction of middle range theories. Midrange theories seem
particularly attractive as theoretical building blocks because they provide the
opportunity for grounded empirical verification of abstraction, which in turn
can be consolidated into larger theoretical frameworks. As Merton (1967)
stated, middle range theories specify the limits of our ignorance. Given the
current state of the art of organizational effectiveness research, middle range
theories seem to accord us the means by which we can increase our under-
standing of this vexing construct.
REFERENCES
Throughout the paper, illustrative examples are taken from the author's
"A Contingency Theory of Socialization" (Feldman, 1976a). In that research, a
middle range theory of individual socialization into organizations is presented
and tested. The model: (a) identifies three distinct stages of socialization, (b)
specifies the activities engaged in by an individual at each stage, and (c) specifies
the personal and organizational contingencies that control an individual's move-
ment through the stages. Interview and questionnaire data collected from 118
hospital employees-nurses, nurse's aides, radiology technologists, tradesmen,
and accounting clerks - were used to develop, refine, and test the model. The dif-
ferences between the socialization experiences of professional, paraprofessional,
and nonprofessional workers are identified and explained as well.
The term "middle range theory" is best known from Merton's Social Theory
and Social Structure: "theories that lie between the minor but necessary work-
ing hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day to day research and the all-
inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the
observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization, and social change"
(1968, p. 39). While Merton does not give a comprehensive list of criteria on
ON RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIALIZATION 317
Phenomena. Middle range theories generally examine fewer variables and fewer
relationships between variables than overarching theories. Their focus is often on
one process in organizations - the variables that initiate, sustain, and cessate
some behavior-or on a small subset of organizational variables. In contrast,
more overarching theories try to provide frameworks in which many processes
and many variables can be understood. Rather than fOCUSing on several levels of
analysis-individual, group, organization, and environment-most middle range
theories focus on a problem that cuts across only one or two of these levels.
The type of phenomena that middle range theories try to explain may also be
different from those considered by overarching theories. A middle range theory
may examine a phenomenon that cuts across previously identified phenomena,
318 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
or it may set forth propositions that subsume previously stated middle range
theories. In "A Contingency Theory of Socialization" (Feldman, 1976a), for
example, socialization is the phenomenon under investigation; it cuts across pre-
viously identified phenomena in the selection, training, orientation, and role
development literature, and integrates some existing theories in those areas.
Concepts. At least in the first type of middle range theory that Merton discusses
-the more exploratory research from which empirically testable hypotheses can
be derived-the most important way in which the concepts used in middle range
theories differ from concepts in more comprehensive theories is their precision.
Concepts may be more global in nature, or aggregates of several facets of a vari-
able. For example, in "A Contingency Theory of Socialization," the concept
"congruence" is defined globally as "the extent to which the organization's
resources and individual needs and skills are mutually satisfying." The concept
"realism" is defined as "the extent to which individuals have a full and accurate
picture of what life in the organization is really like" -realistic expectations
about the job itself, the work group, and the organization are combined (Feld-
man, 1976a). Secondly, the reliability and validity of these operational defmi-
tions may be lower. At least in the initial formulation of the theory, there may
not be similar questionnaire items or interview schedules from previous research
which could be used in data collection. As a result, there may be enough conver-
gent and discriminant validity to establish the existence of the concepts but not
very high interrater or test-retest reliability.
As such theories get subsumed under more comprehensive middle range the-
ories, concepts become much more meticulously specified. Overlapping domains
of concepts should become less problematic as both further theory articulation
and data collection occur. Too, the psychometric quality of the instrumentation
should increase with larger, more complete data sets and validation studies.
stages are predicted, but not the specific bivariate relationships between each
two variables in the study. Often, the initial test of the theory is cross-sectional
rather than longitudinal; the theory is often developed correlationally rather
than experimentally.
Secondly, the middle range theories often inadequately test for feedback, or
two-way, influence processes. For example, in the area of leadership research,
much of the early research-much of it middle range theory-concentrated on
the impact of leader behavior on subordinate behavior (e.g., Halpin and Winer,
1957; Fleishman, Harris, and Burtt, 1955), and did so through correlational
data. It has only been more recently (Lowin and Craig, 1968; Farris and Lim,
1969) that the mutual influence processes in leader-member relations became
investigated and done so through more experimental methodologies. Similarly,
in the socialization literature, much theoretical work has been on the impact of
"socialization agents" on new group members (Caplow, 1964); it has only been
more recently (Van Maanen, 1975; Feldman, 1976a) that more emphasis has
been put on the two-way direction of the influence process during socialization.
The comprehensive, overarching theories are often more conscientious about
acknowledging potential feedback causal processes.
At the minimum, middle range theories must establish associations of some
magnitude and consistency to establish solid covariance. The size of the associa-
tions must be large enough and the circumstances under which the associations
will occur must be identifiable enough to encourage further investigation. In the
evolution of larger-scale middle range theories, even more attention should be
given to the question of causation. There should be greater scrutiny of potential
feedback influence; there should be greater concern with research designs where
the independent causal variable either occurs first or changes prior to the depen-
dent variable (Labovitz and Hagedorn, 1971) and/or where two-way influence
processes can be teased out.
Methodology and Empirical Analysis. Middle range theories often are tested
with a research methodology rigorous enough to establish the plausibility of the
theory but not rigorous enough, at least in the early stages of theory formula-
tion, to reject the null hypothesis (if one exists). The size of the sample may be
too small. The variety of settings in which the theory is initially tested may be
too limited, (e.g., there may be only one organization, one type of organization,
or one employee classification in the study). As mentioned above, the refine-
ment and measurement of concepts may not be adequate, or the research design
of the initial theory tests may be suboptimal.
Two issues dealing with empirical analysis are of particular concern to the
midrange theorist. The first is the amount of variance in the phenomenon under
investigation that the theory will explain. The lower reliability and validity of
320 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
the concept measurements are one constraint on the amount of variance ac-
counted for. Also, because by definition middle range theories do not consider
all the variables that might possibly influence the phenomenon, they may
account for less variance in the phenomenon than might be expected with more
comprehensive theories.
Secondly, middle range theory testing often must use less powerful statistics
and tools of data analysis because of the lower formality of the relational state-
ments and the imperfections of the research methodology. Ideally, the contin-
gency theory of socialization should have been tested longitudinally through
path analysis; because of the cross-sectional data, it is tested with partial corre-
lations (Blalock, 1964).
1. Simplicity. The better theory uses the fewest number of variables and
hypotheses to explain a set of phenomena; a good theory should not need
a set of ad hoc hypotheses.
2. Prediction and control. A theory is considered important to the extent
that it can accurately predict the occurrence of a phenomenon or allows
the researcher or practitioner to control the phenomenon in actual
situations.
3. Precision of supporting evidence. The better theory has more reliable
and valid data to its support, and has evidence of its explanatory power
in a variety of situations.
The set of criteria on which to judge the utility of midrange theories, while it
might include the criteria listed above, could also include some different -and
perhaps less rigorous-criteria as well. Additional criteria on which to judge the
utility of middle range theories would include:
potheses and theories currently accepted that have any bearing on it. The
new theory should either be consistent with an already present nomologi-
cal network or cogently explain the differences in its predictions (Hem-
pel,1966).
3. Testability-in-principle. While middle range theories may not have been
tested in the most appropriate manner-or, in fact might be completely
"logical" or "nonempirical" in nature -no middle range theory can be
significantly proposed unless it is amenable to objective empirical test
(Hempel, 1966), at least in principle (e.g., the technology to test the
theory may not currently be available).
4. Theoretical understanding. A middle range theory must increase our un-
derstanding of a phenomenon in some Significant way. It should either
offer a systematically unified account of diverse phenomena, or specify
the conditions under which previously formulated empirical laws hold
true, or predict and explain phenomena that were not known about be-
fore the theory was formulated (Hempel, 1966).
The next issue concerns identifying the types of research that are most called for
to further elaborate, articulate, and refme midrange theories of organization
behavior. The two traditionally suggested studies for further research are:
I. Crucial tests and key experiments. If two rival theories concerning the
same phenomenon have so far stood up equally well in empirical tests,
322 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
then a decision between the two may be reached if a certain set of test
conditions can be established so that their two hypotheses yield mutually
exclusive outcomes (Hempel, 1966).
2. Confirmation by "new" test implications. When a theory is formulated,
it is generally done to explain certain already observable phenomena. It
is highly desirable for a theory to be confirmed also by "new" evidence
-by facts that were not known or not taken into account when the hy·
pothesis was formulated (Hempel, 1966).
Just as the criteria on which to judge the utility of middle range theories may
be different from those used to evaluate more global theories, so, too, are the
types of research that must follow the initial theory articulation and data collec-
tion. Some additional types of follow-up research that midrange theories might
demand are:
sophisticated statistics to isolate both the main effects and the more sub-
tle patterns of the results. In the research on socialization, the appropriate
test of the socialization model calls for path analysis: the existence of
causal relationships can be more firmly established (or disputed); the dif-
ferences between socialization experiences in different job categories can
be more fully understood; alternative models of the socialization process
can be compared and contrasted.
CONCLUSIONS
In weighing the merits of middle range theories, two key considerations emerge.
The first is the current "state of the art" of organization behavior as a social
science endeavor. The second, and perhaps the more important issue, is how
facilitative a collective or consensus approach to research would be in extending
our knowledge in the field.
The field of organization behavior is both interdisciplinary and young. Orga-
nization behavior is an amalgamation of theoretical perspectives from other
fields. As researchers and practitioners, all of us do not share the same profes-
sional association; many of us do not value the same methodologies; some of us
disagree on what phenomena should be the focus of study; a few of us even dis-
agree on basic defmitions.
Our progress in the field is a much more interactive process of theory formu-
lation, data collection, theory refmement, and methodological improvement
than the pure deductive scientist would be comfortable with. Our hypotheses
contain theoretical terms whose instances have not as yet been observed. "The
operations and measurements that a scientist undertakes in the laboratory,"
writes Kuhn, "are not 'the given' of experiment but rather 'the collected with
difficulty.' They are not what the scientist sees -at least not before his research
is well advanced and his attention focused" (1962, p. 126). We can not pursue a
truly inductivist path either, for we can not enumerate all the instances of occur-
rence of a phenomenon under investigation and lack criteria for determining
how many instances could or should be studied to guarantee representativeness
(Feldman, 1972).
The field of organization behavior is clearly beyond the "craft" stage, where
shared theory is only adequate to establish the plaUSibility of the diScipline and
to provide a rationale for the various craft rules that govern practices, and where
individual failures are uninformative and do not reflect on the competence of
the prognosticator in the eyes of coprofessionals (Kuhn, 1962). On the other
hand, neither the state of our theorizing nor the state of our methodology sug·
gests the utility of a comprehensive theory to guide research. Given the diversity
324 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
of our assumptions about individuals, groups, and organizations and the diversity
of the phenomena under investigation, the field of organization behavior may
progress faster from the growth of middle range theories bottom-up than from
the pursuit of a more global theory top-down.
The second issue is that of how important consensus among scientists about
assumptions, methodologies, and theories is in increasing the body of knowledge
in a field. Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), sees research
as "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes
supplied by professional education. Research could not proceed without such
boxes, whatever the element of arbitrariness in their historic origins, and occa-
sionally in their subsequent development .... Observation and experience can
and must drastically restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there
would be no science" (pp. 3-5, emphasis added).
Certainly, perceptually and sociologically, organization behavior scholars
must have some shared references on which to base their communications with
each other. However, collectivism can exist in scientific communities in a dif·
ferent, and perhaps a more appropriate, sense than Kuhn means (Feldman,
1972). As Joseph Agassi writes in The Journal of the History of Philosophy,
collectivism can operate, not in the sense that everyone belongs to the same
paradigm, but in that everyone agrees on what is Significant enough to deserve
critical attention (1966, pp. 351-354). Given the origins and the age of the
field, that is probably the most we can hope for in the near future. Middle
range theories might move us faster and more efficiently to that collectivism.
REFERENCES
The papers presented here are intended as "examples of middle range theory" of
organizations and organizational behavior. Quite different approaches were
taken in the development of the various papers, yet a discussant must search for
common dimensions on which to compare the papers. Common dimensions that
appeared in my analysis of the papers relate to issues and topics that were the
subject of earlier sessions. Repeated examination of certain of these issues is
inevitable and, at this stage, probably desirable. The dimensions that appeared
common to all five papers are outlined below as questions and provide the
framework for my comparison and evaluation of the different papers. Certain
authors addressed these questions explicitly, other authors addressed them only
inferentially. My inferences based upon these papers are open to challenge and
I'm confident the authors will exercise this right to challenge. Each of the papers
represents a condensation of some larger body of thought, and my inferences
about that larger body of thought based upon the condensed papers may well
be faulty.
the selection and development of topics for submission to the conference; cer-
tain of the papers in this session also address the question explicitly_Merton 's
characterization of middle range theories as lying somewhere between "minor
working hypotheses" and a "master conceptual scheme" is accepted by all of
the authors as a general defmition of middle range theory. Minor working hy-
potheses are relatively easy to identify as one boundary, but, as noted by Beres
and Price, the other boundary of a master conceptual scheme is not as
easy to identify.
What constitutes a master conceptual scheme for one class of phenomena
may constitute a middle range theory for another, broader class of phenomena.
A theory of employment determination at the level of the firm appears middle
range relative to a theory of the firm, which also appears middle range to a
theory of capitalism. It would appear that the concept of middle range theory
varies with the class of phenomena of concern. It struck me that most of the
theories with which I am familiar are middle range theories, whether intended
as such or not. Further, it appears that middle range theory cannot be defined
without specification of the phenomena that are the subject of the theories,
and that characterization of middle range theories of organizations and organiza-
tional behavior might better focus upon definition of the intended domains of
these constructs than upon the concept of middle range. We probably ought to
distinguish between middle range theory and middle range phenomena, two
independent concepts, and then seek to identify what might be classed as middle
range phenomena of organizational behavior.
The papers by Feldman and by Beres and Price explicitly address the question
"What is middle range theory?", develop definitions of middle range theory, and
provide examples from what they would term middle range theories to illustrate
their points. The paper by Muchinsky and Morrow answers the question inferen-
tially as they discuss middle range theorizing relative to the concept of organiza-
tional effectiveness. The papers by Miner and by Slusher and Roering answer the
question only indirectly as they present what they consider to be specific middle
range theories.
Feldman, Beres and Price, and, less directly, Muchinsky and Morrow, indicate
that middle range theory can be characterized as follows:
While these characteristics may apply to certain middle range theories, it is not
apparent that they need be exclusionary in nature. The economic theory of the
firm, for example, might be cited as an example of middle range theory in eco-
nomics. From one standpoint, this theory does present a conceptual scheme
comprehensive of allocational decisions within the firm, yet it is not sufficiently
comprehensive to explain market phenomena; in short, it addresses middle range
phenomena of economics. The constructs employed in this theory while less
abstract than the construct of general equilibrium, often are relatively abstract
and not easily induced from experience; many students would assert that the
construct of marginal revenue product is quite difficult to induce from observa-
tion. The domain within which the theory is restricted is indicated quite clearly
in the assumptions upon which the theory is based, assumptions of rationality,
competition and profit maximizing behavior, yet this domain limitation in no
way suggests limitation to small sample or case study research. Also, the theory
of the firm analyzes the structure of equilibrium conditions rather than the
process through which equilibrium is achieved. Finally, although the theory of
the firm probably was induced in part from experiential observations, it is today
stated as a deductive theory in which propositions are derived from a specific
set of assumptions. The characteristics of middle range theory inferred from
these papers may thus appear descriptive of present-day theorizing about orga-
nizational behavior, but they are not necessary or defmitional characteristics of
middle range theory.
The papers by Miner and by Slusher and Roering present intended examples
of middle range theories, examples that can be analyzed in terms of middle range
theory characteristics specified in the other papers. Miner's presentation of
middle range theory illustrates certain of these characteristics. The concepts
specified in the paper, for example, appear to have been induced from observa-
tion of organizational roles rather than deduced from a comprehensive concep-
tual scheme of organizational energy. The domain of variables considered
also is relatively restricted, focusing upon organizational role characteristics and
inferred rewarding or reinforcing aspects of these roles; other influences of
motivation and energization are excluded from consideration. Relational hy-
potheses are not stated explicitly in the paper and can only be inferred from the
discussion. The example from Miner is more easily characterized as an elabora-
tion of constructs of middle range phenomena presumed relevant to motivation
and performance in organizational roles than as a theory of motivational pro-
cesses. The theory in which these constructs are applied may be developed else-
where in Miner's writing, but it is not stated explicitly in this condensed version.
The paper by Slusher and Roering illustrates relatively fewer of the character-
istics of middle range theory cited earlier. This paper presents a relatively ab-
stract model developed in topographical mathematics as it might apply to a
EXAMPLES OF MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 329
would appear to vary with the theory in which it is employed. Thus, profit is
an appropriate attribute of the construct of organizational effectiveness in the
economic theory of the firm, and job satisfaction might be an appropriate attri-
bute in a theory of organizational commitment. Partitioning of the domain for
elaboration of the construct of organizational effectiveness might thus be based
upon the specific theory in which the construct is employed. I find it difficult to
elaborate a construct in the absence of a tentative theory, model, or purpose to
provide motivation for the construct. Muchinsky and Morrow appear to be
examining the desirability of formulating a general construct of organizational
effectiveness without considering the generality of the model or theory in which
the construct is to be employed. Perhaps definition of the construct ought to be
abandoned until necessary in development of a specific model or theory of
organizations and organizational behavior.
The papers by Feldman and by Beres and Price do not state explicitly but
rather imply that the value of middle range theorizing lies in its usefulness as a
strategy toward achieving general theory, that general theory is more likely to
emerge from well conceived and validated middle range theories than from
deduction from global propositions. Middle range theorizing is justified as a
strategy, not an end, of scholarship; general theory appears as the end sought.
While middle range theorizing may be a very fruitful strategy for the develop-
ment of knowledge about organizations, particularly at the current stage of
scholarship, I doubt whether the authors would argue that it is the only appro-
priate strategy, although they imply it is the predominant strategy. Improved
understanding of organizations and organizational behavior is most likely to
develop if each interested scholar applies the craft at which he or she is most
skilled, not by forcing all to apply a single craft.
The paper by Miner suggests that general theory may require additional
specification and elaboration for application in relatively specific domains, and
that these elaborations can be viewed as middle range theories just as eyert
and March's behavioral theory of the firm elaborates the economic theory of the
firm for more accurate prediction of specific decisions. One might infer from
Miner's discussion that a general proposition to the effect that individual perfor-
mance is a function of task characteristics perceived as reinforcing by the indi-
vidual underlies development of his theory, a general proposition consistent with
various theories of motivation and performance. Miner elaborates this general
proposition through specification of constructs of organizational roles and by
reinforcing role characteristics. Miner seeks elaboration of constructs from gen-
eral theory for more precise prediction within limited domains. He thus appears
to suggest that middle range theory can be derived from general theory and that
the value of middle range theory is to provide more specific and precise predic-
tion within limited domains, a rationale for middle range theorizing counter to
EXAMPLES OF MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 331
that offered by Feldman and by Beres and Price who appear to seek general
theory from middle range theory. Miner's paper does not provide any explicit
motivation for development of the theory presented and the specific constructs
elaborated in the theory. One can only infer Miner would argue that the specific
construct elaborations he proposes ought to be more predictive of individual
performance in organizational roles than other motivation and reward variables
such as contingency compensation, need achievement, or performance goals. He
proposes construct dimensions more specific than the general constructs of role
and reinforcement, but he does not include in this paper the motivation for
elaboration of these more specific dimensions.
Both rationales for middle range theorizing inferred from these papers appear
reasonable, the development of middle range theory as an advance over ad hoc
hypotheses and the development of middle range theory as elaboration of gen-
eral theory for more accurate prediction within limited domains. The search for
middle range theory as an advance over ad hoc hypothesizing is easily rationalized
as a process in the development of general theory, an accepted end of scientific
endeavor. The development of middle range theory as an elaboration of general
theory differs both in rationale and form. The rationale depends upon recog-
nized imprecision of predictions from general theory and the value of improved
prediction within limited domains. The rationale for theorizing about coalitional
decisions in resource allocation, for example, depends upon the degree of error
observed in predictions about resource allocation decisions derived from the
theory of the firm. Middle range theory developed as limited domain elabora-
tions of general theory also differs in form from middle range theory developed
from ad hoc hypotheses; it is concerned more with construct specification than
with the identification of relationships as illustrated in comparison of the papers
by Miner and Feldman.
The paper by Slusher and Roering considers what might be classed as middle
range phenomena, modes of interaction between organizational units, and ap-
plies a general model in analysis of those phenomena. The model applied is not
a theory. The model is quite abstract and general, specifying relationships but
lacking constructs with substantive content. They attempt to use the model in
developing a theory of middle range phenomena, and illustrate the development
of theory of middle range phenomena, not the development of middle range
theory. This paper demonstrates quite clearly that theory of middle range phe-
nomena need not be approached as the development of middle range theory
from a base of single order hypotheses.
ber of reactions to the papers and to issues raised by this conference, which are
not particularly germane to the questions posed earlier. Note that there are three
aspects of this question, one relating to middle range, another to theory, and a
third relating to subjects of the papers.
Certainly all of the papers relate to something that might be termed middle
range, some more than others. This is not surprising since Beres and Price ob-
serve that what is middle range depends upon one's view of general. Most theories
are middle range in the sense that a domain more general than that addressed by
the theory can always be postulated.
Whether or not these papers present theories as such is debatable depending
upon one's terminology and approach to the philosophy of science. Certain
differences among the papers can be noted, however, without engaging in such a
debate. The paper by Muchinsky and Morrow, for example, is a discussion of
theorizing and does not present a theory of organizational effectiveness; they
urge a particular approach to development of such a theory. The papers by
Feldman and by Beres and Price do not explicitly present theories; rather, they
discuss middle range theorizing and present illustrations from middle range
theories. Citations in these papers presumably refer readers to more complete
statements of the theories. It appears from the papers that Feldman refers to
an explicit statement of a theory, whereas Beres and Price refer to constructs
in role literature that might be integrated into a theory, a theory that is not
yet explicit. Miner's paper presents a framework for construct elaboration but
does not explicate a theory. Theory, viewed as a set of constructs defined with
linkages among themselves and with rules of correspondence to the observable
world, is more comprehensive than the discussion in the paper and, presumably,
is more explicit in works cited in the paper. The paper appears to present an
elaboration of a construct of reward through specification of role characteristics
as relevant attributes of the construct, a construct that presumably achieves rele-
vance through incorporation in some theory of performance. The paper by
Slusher and Roering is at a preliminary stage of theory development. They pro-
pose a general model lacking substantive content and causal relationships for
application in analysis of specific organizational phenomena. It remains to
specify constructs within the framework of this model and to develop causal
explanations of the predicted relationships. Application of the catastrophe
model in developing a theory of modes of interaction between organizations
provides a helpful discipline to this theory development. Theory development
using a general model as framework for the theory appears to be contrary to the
order implied by Merton, an alternative and probably fruitful approach to
theory development.
Having distinguished between middle range theory and theory of middle
range phenomena earlier, let me note that the former was the subject of most
EXAMPLES OF MIDDLE RANGE THEORY 333
of these papers. Only the paper by Slusher and Roering and, to a lesser degree,
the paper by Muchinsky and Morrow focus upon what might be termed middle
range phenomena of organization behavior. Organization behavior, viewed as
middle range between concepts of individual behavior in organizations and be-
havior of social systems, suggests theory development with the concept of orga-
nization as the unit of analysis. Most of these papers address middle range
theorizing about individual behavior in organizations rather than theory develop-
ment about the behavior of organizations as middle range phenomena. It is by
no means apparent that the development of theory of behavior of organizations
will proceed best if approached as aggregation of or abstraction from theories
about individual behavior in organizations. In fact, examples from other sciences
suggest that variables and models appropriate for analysis at one level do not
easily aggregate for analysis at another level. New models and variables appro-
priate to that level are required.
Finally, I commend the authors of these papers. Examination of their papers
has helped me to understand better the need for theory development at the level
of organizational analysis. The analysis stimulated by these papers also suggests
to me that theory development for organizations as middle range phenomena
might well proceed independently of micro theories of individual behavior in
organizations and macro theories of the behavior of social systems. I propose the
topic "theories of organizations as middle range phenomena" as the natural sub-
ject for a second annual conference at the University of British Columbia.
28DOMAIN
A RATIONALE FOR THE LIMITED
APPROACH TO THE STUDY
OF MOTIVATION
John B. Miner, Georgia State University
Further elaborations of this strategy have been set forth in other publications:
An alternative approach would be to shift the research emphasis away from
the specific needs and motives of most content theories to the motivational
requirements of tasks and to informal and formal job role requirements. Thus
the major concern would be with the sum total of motivational inputs needed
to satisfy job requirements .... If this approach can be extended further to
cover a whole network of key jobs in varying organizational contexts, the
possibility exists that a base for meaningful organizational change can be de-
veloped long before the total complexity of specific human motives is under-
stood. What may well emerge is a highly parsimonious but comprehensive
theory which takes job requirements rather than human motives as its starting
point (Miner and Dachler, 1973, p. 397).
The main virtue of limited domain theories is that they simplify the theo-
retical task to a point where it is amenable to precise conceptualization and
intensive research investigation. Key variables delimiting the domain, which
may later be expanded into true contingency variables, can be clearly iden-
tified. Over time as various domains are explored the matrix of possible do-
mains is gradually filled in, until a comprehensive contingency theory emerges.
Ideally the domains explored initially will be those where the prospect of
establishing valid theories is greatest and where the most important practical
contribution can be made. One definition of the latter would be a domain in
which the greatest number of organizations fall for the longest periods of
time (Steiner and Miner, 1977, p. 313).
bypassed; as knowledge develops they may well be filled in later, but for many
current purposes they are not needed.
Whether the result of this strategy as presented in my paper constitutes a true
theory is a legitimate matter for speculation. Certainly it serves in the role of a
theory. The situation is much like that with regard to goal setting theory (Locke,
1975). My own view, elaborated elsewhere, is that such efforts are best treated
as theories, with full acknowledgement that they are markedly, and often inten-
tionally, incomplete (Miner, 1980).
REFERENCES
There is considerable agreement that the open systems model has dominated
thinking and research in the field of organization theory over the last decade.
Recently, however, there has been a call for a paradigm change in organization
theory and proponents of such a change have referred to the possibility of a
paradigmatic revolution in the near future (Scott, 1974). The growing discontent
with the state of organizational theory has been largely responsible for the
renewed interest in middle range theorizing (pinder and Moore, 1977; Weick,
1974). However, the reasons for such discontent have not been subject to
unambiguous interpretation.
This paper will focus upon the attributes of a systems methodology! and will
indicate that recent contributions, which have seemingly called for something
new, have pleaded for little more than the exploitation of systemic notions in
the science of organization. Much of the recent concern with a systems orienta-
tion will be shown to have arisen largely because of our own failure to adequately
exploit the implications of a systems methodology in organizational behavior.
In this paper we explore the potentialities of systems thinking in the science
of organizations. In the next section we will consider the idea of a revolution in
the study of organizational behavior and will clarify the Kuhnian notion of a
revolutionary change. The applicability of the revolutionary metaphor to the
339
340 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
work, it is clear that he did not carefully distinguish between theories and para-
digms in his description of the stages of the revolutionary process.
Ritzer (1975), drawing upon the ideas developed by Kuhn, suggests that
a paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It
serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how
they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the
answer obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a
science and serves to differentiate one scientific community from another
(Ritzer, 1975, p. 157).
The paradigm change, according to Kuhn, is unlikely to be completed quickly
and the new paradigm will only be accepted if it is able to resolve some out-
standing and generally recognizable problems that cannot be met in some other
way. Furthermore, a paradigm change will only be successful if the new para-
digm is at least potentially able to preserve a large part of the concrete problem-
solving ability that has accrued to science through its predecessors.
Recently, Sneed (1971) and subsequently Stegmuller (1976) and Mattessich
(1978) have provided a formalization of Kuhn's theory of paradigm revolution,
which provides a framework within which recent developments in organizational
theory can be constructively viewed. It is argued that a theory consists of a
fairly stable core and, in addition, a set of intended applications. Thus, a theory
can be represented by the following equation:
T= f(K,l)
where: T= theory
K = the core of a theory
I = the set of intended applications
Sneed and Stegmtiller specify the core elements in some detail. They indicate
that the core consists of a set of models (m), possible models (mp), and possible
partial models (mpp). Within the core there are also constraints (c) and a number
of variables (v). Thus, the core of the theory can be described functionally as:
K = gem, mp, mpp, c, v)
and hence, a theory may be functionally described as follows:
T = f(m, mp, mpp, c, v, l)
According to Sneed and Stegmtiller, normal science (the process of accumula-
tion) consists of the elaboration of the core. Core elaboration takes place as
more variables and constraints are added and as model development ensues.
Hence, partial models and partial partial models may be added to the core
342 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
dimension. In a Kuhnian sense, revolution occurs only when the core can no
longer be extended and is overthrown. However, theory development can pro-
ceed by altering the models, the constraints, the variables, or the set of intended
applications of the theory. In the ensuing analysis it will be demonstrated that
calls for a paradigm change in organizational theory are merely calls for core
elaboration-no paradigm upheaval is involved.
Nevertheless, while calls for a paradigm change in organizational behavior
may be misplaced, the recent concern about the usefulness of the systems para-
digm has been important. First, it has drawn attention to the need to defme just
what the core of organizational theory actually is. In so doing, it has placed
demands on the researcher to specify the nature and extent of the variables and
constraints underlying the core construct. In organizational behavior science
careful elaboration and specification of the core elements seems to have been
lacking. We have spoken loosely of organizations as systems without defining the
parameters implicit in such an observation. A fundamental concern of this
paper is a call for a more careful and precise specific language in organizational
behavior science.
Second, dispute over the usefulness of the systems paradigm has fulfilled the
function of drawing attention to the need to specify the set of intended appli-
cations of organization theory. A theory relates to a specific domain of reality:
organization theory does not seem to have clearly specified its domain.
Associated with, but nevertheless distinct from, the need to specify the in-
tended applications of organization theory has been a need to specify the basis
on which we may judge the success of the science of organization. To argue that
the open systems approach has been unsuccessful necessarily presupposes criteria
of success. It is not clear that discontent amongst scientists is, of itself, evidence
of the failure of systems thinking in organization theory. The discontent may be
a result of the current organization of science that encourages artificial disputes
and "innovation." In a system where promotion and recognition seem to be
related to novelty and theory "development" (rather than elaboration or rep-
lication of tests of the theory) the existence of disputes and "innovation" is
hardly surprising.
Popper (1959) proposes a set of criteria for the evaluation of science:
scientific theories are universal statements ... theories are nets cast to catch
what we call the 'world': to rationalize, to explain and to master it (p. 59).
The science of organization is also concerned with the explanation, predic-
tion, and mastery of organizational behavior. 2 As a positive science, explanation
and prediction may be sufficient. But, if organization theory is intended to
enable the effective management of organizations (i.e., to act as a normative or
THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR 343
The advantages of the systems approach have been emphasized in the literature
on organization theory (most notably by Katz and Kahn, 1966 and Thompson,
1967). Even a brief review of the literature in organization behavior or theory
indicates the pervasiveness of the systems paradigm. For example, Pondy and
Mitroff (1978) indicate that thirty-five percent of the articles in a recent one-
year period in Administrative Science Quarterly refer to Thompson's work. Yet,
although lip service has been paid to the concepts of systems thinking, it does
not seem that they have been carefully utilized or developed in organizational
theorizing. In this section we will briefly indicate the basic features of any sys-
tem and illustrate that systems thinking has not been fully utilized in organiza-
tion theory. We show that while many of the current interests in organization
theory are entirely consistent with systems thinking, the use of the systems
approach has not been rigorously applied in the study of organizations. The sys-
tems paradigm has not been fully exploited.
Boulding (1956) has provided us with a useful elaboration of a general systems
theory. He identifies nine levels of analysis. In his hierarchy each level of analysis
contains a111evels below it and adds a new dimension that was not included in
the lower levels. Accordingly, the higher the level, the greater the complexity
and generality of the analysis. Pondy and Mitroff (1978, p. 12), using Boulding's
classification of systems, suggest that "our formal models and data collection
344 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
efforts are rooted at levels 1 and 2." These lowest levels are concerned with
structural attributes of systems, whereas the level of social organization must be
analyzed at a higher level of complexity.
This criticism can be leveled at Thompson's rather engineering-oriented view
of organizations (see the critiques by Silverman, 1971 and Pondy and Mitroff,
1978) yet Thompson's definition of an organization as an open system indicates
the major concepts we wish to emphasize and develop:
The complex organization is a set of interdependent parts which together
make up the whole because each contributes something and receives some-
thing from the whole, which in turn is interdependent with the larger environ-
ment. Survival of the system is taken to be the goal, and the parts and their
relationships presumably are determined through evolutionary processes
(Thompson, 1967).
In short, Thompson draws attention to the basic features of a system: struc-
ture, environment and function (or purpose).
Structure
Environment
Function
One aspect of systems that does not seem to have deeply permeated into orga-
nization theory is the notion of function or purpose. Beer (1964) and Churchman
(1968) both emphasize their concern for function. To paraphrase Churchman
only slightly "the way to describe an organization is first by thinking about what
it is for, about its function, and not the list of items that make up its structure"
(Churchman, 1968, p. 13). Purposive behavior, or teleology, is fundamental to
systems thinking-a system must be defined in terms of its purpose. This pur-
pose cannot be identified by asking the components of the system for their
view, but rather by considering the environment or metasystem and hence,
specifying the reasons why the environment sustains a system. Organization
theory has clearly been concerned with objectives, but little emphasis has been
placed on environmental demands (see Dill, 1958; Thompson and McEwen,
1958). Instead of asking what an organization is, systems thinking focuses on
what an organization does (Ashby, 1956).
The focus on the function of an organization in systems thinking does indeed
form the basis of Katz and Kahn's (1966) classification of organization. More
recently, Carroll and Tosi (1977) similarly use function as a way of identifying
subsystems within an organization -viz production, adaptive, boundary spanning,
maintenance, and managerial subsystems. Yet, the discussion of function has
little influence on the majority of the chapters of these two books. Issues of con-
flict, change, decision making, and policy are discussed without a functionalist
perspective. Perhaps this is because the authors acknowledge the criticisms of
Parsonian functionalism-its overemphasis on stability and maintenance of the
status quo. "Organization theory has been a theory of order" (pondy and
Mitroff,1978).
Thompson in his above cited definition of a complex organization emphasizes
corrective devices, but a more general notion of function in systems thinking
embraces change: "As a fundamental principle, it can be stated that a condition
for the maintenance of a viable adaptive system may be a change in its particular
structure. Both stability and change are a function of the same set of variables,
which must include both the internal state of the system and the state of its
348 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
significant environment, along with the nature of the interchange between the
two" (Buckley, 1968, p. 510). It is important to indicate the feedback loops in
any "correction" device, and to indicate the time horizon of the loop. Disequi-
librium in a system may indeed occur at one point in time; systems analysis
suggests that organizations will attempt to move over time to a stable state. The
fact that organizations fail indicates that stability is not "natural" in organiza-
tions; organization theory should specify the mechanisms of adaptation.
These examples hopefully indicate the superficial treatment of systems in
organizational theorizing. We have not been exhaustive in our discussion (e.g.,
Pondy and Mitroff, 1978 place great emphasis on language in systems analysis),
yet this section has indicated both the richness of the paradigm and its ability to
raise a set of questions about any organizational analysis. Elaboration of the
paradigm is still necessary in the application of system thinking to organiza-
tional theorizing.3
Organization theorists, while they have seen themselves as working within a
systems framework, do not seem to have carefully utilized or applied that
framework. Our call is for careful elaboration of the systems paradigm, the core
of organization theory. So our concern to place many of the insights from the
science of organization into a systems frameworl is not merely a need by the
faithful to see the world through the eyes of a favored paradigm. As Pioggi
states, "A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing" (1965). Instead, systems
thinking offers the science of organization a useful way of seeing that empha-
sizes multiple relationships, coherence, and purpose. Multiple relationships are
emphasized in the interdependencies of structural components in producing
an organizational outcome. Coherence is emphasized by the similarities of con-
cern within science in general and the insight offered to any particular science
by other sciences. Coherence is also recognized in the set of questions asked of
a theory or a test thereof; what is the structure, environment, and purpose of the
organization that is the object of theory or investigation? Indeed, has the re-
search identified the systemic features? And fmally, systems thinking emphasizes
purpose. What is the purpose of the theory and by what set of criteria might it
be regarded as important or significant? Any system is a subset of a metasystem,
and it is the metasystem that provides the metaphysical justification for the
science and its theories.
In the preceding sections of this analysis the potentiality of systems thinking has
been alluded to and the usefulness of a systems methodology for organizational
behavior science has been described. We now illustrate further the richness of the
THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR 349
systems approach and at the same time provide a concrete illustration of the
Sneed-StegmUller formalization of the nature of theory by considering the appli-
cation of taxonomic developments in organizational behavior science.
In this section of our analysis we will show that middle range theorizing is
consistent with a systems methodology and need not imply the abandoment of
our search for a general theory. Indeed, failure to have a general theory that can
be used for the purpose of guiding the development of middle range theories
may lead to a morphological nightmare whence no prescriptions about organiza-
tions will be realizable.
McKelvey (1977) has carefully drawn a distinction between organizational
taxonomy and organizational typology and his distinction will be adhered to in
this analysis. Taxonomy is used to refer to the theory and method of classifica-
tion, while typology is used to refer to classification schema that are founded on
heuristic criteria. Taxonomic developments are neither new in the area of orga-
nizational behavior nor for that matter to science in general.
Taxonomic developments in organizational behavior have been advanced by
Etzioni (1961), Blau and Scott (1962), Thompson (1967) and others. More
recently, McKelvey (1975, 1977) and Pinder and Moore (1978) have called for a
reexamination of taxonomizing as a means by which theory development in
organizational behavior could be advanced. In particular, it has been argued that
taxonomy development may provide a mechanism by which middle range
theories can be formulated (Pinder and Moore, 1978).
However, taxonomies in the area of organizational behavior science can be
created on a multitude of dimensions since in organizational theory there exists
no commonly held view of what the basic unit of organizational structure is, and
hence the many variables and relationships with which organizational theory is
concerned lack integration (Miller, 1972, pp. 7-14). Clearly, for theory develop-
ment to proceed efficiently a meta-theory is needed to guide taxonomic formu-
lation. Failure to proceed in such a way can only lead to confusion. The need
for a general meta-theory to guide taxonomizing was well argued two hundred
and fifty years ago by Linnaeus (1737):
All the real knowledge which we possess, depends on methods by which we
distinguish the similar from the dissimilar ... The more numerous the objects
which employ our attention the more difficult it becomes to form such a
method and the more necessary.
For we must not join in the same genus the horse and the swine, tho' both
species had one hoof'd nor separate in different genera the goat, the reindeer
and the elk, tho' they differ in the form of their horns. We ought therefore by
attentive and diligent observation to determine the limits of the genera, since
they cannot be determined a priori. This is the great work, the important
labour, for should the genera be confused, all would be confusion.
350 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Recent discontent in the literature has led some to call for a paradigm change in
organization behavior science. It has been our intent to illustrate that such calls
are misplaced at the current time. Calls for a paradigm change are nothing more
than calls for the exploration of the core of our existing paradigm. If calls for a
paradigm change are taken seriously, we may well discard the accumulative gains
we have reaped to date. Further, since a paradigmatic change is revolutionary
and painful, its occurrence at a time when the core of our existing paradigm has
THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR 351
not been fully elaborated may lead to turmoil and confusion as students in the
area do not know where to turn.
Certainly, the development and elaboration of systems thinking within orga-
nizational behavior has not been easy. Further elaboration of the constructs
in terms of the set of intended applications, the set of models, variables, and
constraints may at this stage seem a forbiddingly complex task. Yet this gives
us little excuse for not confronting this task.
We can conclude no better than by considering and acting upon the following
observation:
The concepts presented ... were not selected to be admired. Rather, they are
meant to be used in connection with the stubborn phenomenon of human be-
havior in organizations . . . They provide some answers but more guidance as
to what questions it might be well to ask next to gain the understanding that
is necessary for the effective resolution of particular situations. When they do
not provide such understanding, the serious student of phenomena in orga-
nization will do well not to cast these concepts aside quickly. Rather, he may
still find them useful to throw into relief the aspects of the situation he fails
to understand. Then new questions for inquiring may suggest themselves to
him. For chance still favors the prepared mind." (Lombard's foreword to
Seiler, 1967, p. viii).
NOTES
1. In this paper we use the terms systems "methodology," "thinking," and "analy-
sis" synonymously. We prefer to avoid using the term "theory" since this suggests
that the approach we adopt is refutable. Instead, we regard the systems' approach as an
insightful way of viewing the world.
2. Some readers may be disturbed by the notion of "mastery" -alternatively influence,
control, or management. Yet, in an instrumental or applied science (such as organization
theory) we would argue that understanding is required so that it may be used-hopefully
to improve the "performance" (measured across all dimensions of behavior) of organizations.
3. Notice that Pondy and Mitroff's critique (1978) of open system models works within
a general systems framework and that their "sketch of possible futures" is a call for analysis
consistent with Boulding's higher levels of systems analysis.
REFERENCES
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Boulding, K. General systems theory - The skeleton of science. Management
Science, 1956, vol. 2, 197-208.
Buckley, W. Society as a complex adaptive system. In W. Buckley (Ed.), Modern
Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist. Chicago: Aldine, 1968.
Carroll, S., and Tosi, H. Organizational Behavior. Chicago: St. Clair Press, 1977.
Child, J. Organizational structure, environment and performance: The role of
strategic choice. Sociology, January 1972, vol. 6, no. 1, 1-22.
Churchman, C.W. The Systems Approach. New York: Dell Publishing, 1968.
Dill, W.R. Environment as an influence on managerial autonomy. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 1958, vol. 2,409-443.
Emery, F. Systems Thinking. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1969.
Emery, F., and Trist, E. The causal texture of organizational environments.
Human Relations, 1965, vol. 18,21-32.
Etzioni, A. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. New York: Free
Press, 1961.
Hedberg, B., Nystrom, P., and Starbuck, W. Camping on seesaws: Prescriptions
for a self-designing organization. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1976,
vol. 21,41-65.
Hempel, C. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: Free Press, 1965.
Katz, D., and Kahn, R. The Social Psychology of Organizations. New York:
Wiley, 1966.
Klir, G., and Valach, M. Cybernetic Modelling. London: Iliffe Books, 1967.
Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd enlarged edition). Chi-
cago : University of Chicago Press, 1970.
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McKelvey, W. Guidelines for the empirical classification of organizations. Ad-
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Mattessich, R. Instrumental Reasoning and Systems Methodology. Dordrecht:
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR 353
Debate on the relative usefulness of general theory versus middle range theories
of organization has taken place in recent years (e.g. Melcher, 1975; Pinder and
Moore, 1977, Weick, 1974). The intent of this paper is to argue for a dual ap-
proach to studying and understanding organization, involving the development
of partial, middle range theories to describe and explain the content of organiza-
tion, and the development of general theory to capture the essence of the pro-
cess of organizing. We use the concept of middle range in this paper to refer to
discrete, confirmed theory that " ... applies to limited ranges of data, consoli-
dates segregated hypotheses and is itself available for consolidation with other
theories" (Weick, 1974, p. 357). By general theory we mean that the elements
of such a theory (the constructs and relationships between them) are not bound
by particular settings, but represent a deductive approach based on phenomena
that are assumed to be universal in application.
We begin with an outline of our assumptions about organization, follow with
a discussion of the content-process distinction referred to above, and then pre-
sent our arguments for a middle range theory approach to organization content
and a general theory approach to the organizing process. We conclude the paper
with speculations on some likely constructs of a general theory of organizing.
354
HAVING ONE'S CAKE AND EATING IT TOO 355
Throughout 1963 and early 1964 Ramsbottom pressed for further computeriza-
tion of the business. When the issue of replacing the outdated SE 100 arose, he
argued that the new machine should be used to do both the work the SE 100
was doing and the work of one of the clothing administrative offices. It was his
insistence on the latter point that finally lost him the support of the directors
and allowed Jim Kenny to move back into formal control of the 0 & M
department.
Ramsbottom's explanation of his lack of success was as follows:
... The directors weren't too keen on having computers in the administrative offices.
This was the main side of the business where feelings were strongest and where the
most entrenched systems were to be found. To me it was a prolific area for computeriza-
tion, but in the minds of the entrenched this was the heart and soul of the business ...
saw a Victor representative and proceeded to change the name on the report to recom-
mend Victor while leaving the main body of the report untouched.
We feel that the case illustrates the essence of our arguments about inter-
locked behavior and the organizing process. Interlocking appears as a variable,
sometimes loose, sometimes tight; behaviors are evidenced that represent at-
tempts to remove equivocality/uncertainty by individual action as well as
through behaviors aimed at negotiating and resisting negotiation of an organiza-
tional order. The dimensions of routineness and consensus are clearly reflected
in these behaviors, as are differences in causal maps of individuals and coalitions
participating in the process. The content and process of this organization de-
cision are illustrated in Table 1.
HAVING ONE'S CAKE AND EATING IT TOO 365
A. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTENT
Common Organizational Images of Participants: Replacing an outdated
computer SE 100 will improve flow of information and the decision
making of managers
Competing Images of Participants:
1. Ramsbottom:
• Applying a new computer to the administrative offices is an efficient
use of computer and must be pushed
• Top management resists this move because of its entrenched views
• I prefer a BDC or a Victor Computer
• Top management rejected NTL for technical reasons
2. Top Management:
• Keep the new computer in existing areas and out of our domain
• Search best handled by delegation to next level of managers
3. Staff Managers (coalition):
• Ifwe try to push computer into administrative offices we are threat-
ening the power of gp-so don't tamper
· We don't want NTL, we will choose between BDC and Newton
• Ramsbottom doesn't count
4. DeVille (Sales Manager Newton);
• I want Michael's organization to buy our computer
• Experienced sales representatives and personal touch will influence
the outcome
B. ORGANIZING PROCESS
The setting: an organization deciding to replace a computer.
Removal of equivocality (what computer shall it be?) via negotiated
reality which involved interlocking behavior characterized by both
degrees of routineness, and of consensus.
Interlocking Behaviors Involved:
• Ramsbottom (low degree of interlocking)
• Turner, Kenny, Parkin (high degree of interlocking)
• Kenny with directors (moderate degree of interlocking)
• Sanderson (sales representative) with Turner (high degree of inter-
locking)
Behaviors as:
I. Routine • Completing a report recommending BCD
II. Nonroutine Telephoning MD to voice misgiving
Allocating sales representative to spend a week
with manager
Ill. Consensus • Discussion with sales people
IV. Nonconsensus Changing report to suit personal preferences
Excluding key person from meetings
366 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
CONCLUDING REMARKS
REFERENCES
There is a common thread between the two papers I am to discuss. Both papers
argue that there is a need for general theory despite the legitimate calls for mid-
dle range theory. However, since the arguments take rather different forms and
comprise differing proportions of the total length of the papers, I will discuss the
papers separately. Both papers are thought provoking and contain many valid
points. In my remarks I have tended to focus on points that were important
issues but not as well developed as one might like.
A Paradigm Shift?
It would seem that one person's paradigm shift is another person's pebble polish-
ing. Like the watched pot that never boils, it is possible that a paradigm shift
happens only when scientists aren't looking, meaning that they are spending
their time in discovery rather than in idle chatter. I fear the time when one will
369
370 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
One of the many instructive points of the Cooper and Wolf paper is their bring-
ing to our attention the absence of criteria for deciding what is good and bad
organization science. However, in passing I should note that I thought the authors
pulled their punch by not attempting to list or discuss possible criteria. Hempel
(1965) suggested two goals for science: (1) to satisfy curiosity; and (2) to help
the human race gain leverage on its environment. The authors cite Popper (1959)
as proposing scientific theories are "to rationalize, to explain, and to master." I
was struck by the footnote in which the authors more or less were apologizing
for their inclusion of the word "mastery." It made me realize that there are good
and bad words in organizational behavior. Some bad words are: manipulation,
direction, control, determinism, and behaviorism. Some good words are: free-
dom, choice, growth, and needs. Don't get me wrong; I think it is good that we
now recognize and value choicefulness among organizational members. But I am
not convinced we are yet willing to give full recognition to the constraints im-
posed by the external environments of individuals and organizations. The issue
is one of Individual Purposefulness versus Environmental Determinism. This
372 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
issue recently has been taken up by Salancik and Pfeffer (1977; 1978) in the
micro-organization behavior context.
To identify criteria one has to buy into a paradigm. Within the rational-
causal subparadigm which I prefer, some possible criteria are:
How well does the science describe and explain niche attributes, evolution,
and development?
How well does it explain organizational behavior in terms of niche attributes?
How useful is it to practitioners?
How great is the incidence of practical improvements emanating from scien-
tific theory and fmdings?
How successful is it in terms of Schwab's (1960) four criteria of a good
theory (i.e., interconnectivity, adequacy, feasibility, and continUity)?
The authors argue that: (a) meta-theory is necessary to guide taxonomic formu-
lation through the tangle of the many attributes presently seen to characterize
organizations, and (b) systems thinking can provide a unifying conceptual frame-
work. As stated, the authors are correct but not very helpful.
What kind of meta-theory? Presumably one rooted in holism. In my paper
presented at this conference (McKelvey, 1978a) I noted that holism is the only
principle of enquiry not heretofore used in biological or organizational taxon-
omy. For a variety of reasons I argue for an evolutionary theory rooted in the
rational principle of enquiry. The causal complexity of holism has, as I have
previously noted, prevented it from success elsewhere in organization science.
I see little reason why that would not be true for taxonomic inquiry, too. The
numerical taxonomists (Sneath and Sokal, 1973) have argued that no a priori
theory is necessary. In light of these arguments the authors' bland call for meta-
theory doesn't wash. I would like to see the authors carry forward explicit
arguments for holism in taxonomy.
In the search for taxonomic characters, systems theory seems to provide an
overall, very broad framework. But, taking the view that systems theory is to
organizations what water is to fish, meaning an all-pervasive medium in which to
exist and through which to view the world, successful search for taxonomic
characters now calls for much more precision than possible with systems con-
cepts as presently developed. Of course, if systems theory is further explicated
into a fmer set of elements, as the authors call for, it may be of more obvious
help to taxonomists.
How Particularistic?
I am confused as to just what kind of middle range theory the authors advocate
for handling organizational content. They take great pains to state that cause
maps vary by individual. Presumably, one could think the authors were arguing
for a separate theory for each organizational member-an impractical idea, I am
sure they would agree. Probably they are arguing for theory compartmentalized
by kinds of negotiated cause maps. But they cite data showing there could be
more than one map per organization. This means, since they don't say otherwise,
DISCUSSION OF THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN ORGANIZATION BEHAVIOR 375
that they anticipate more than one theory per organization. How many theories
for a large organization like General Motors, Inc.? How many for the United
States?
I don't see much scientific payoff (i.e., good science) from a super-particu-
laristic middle range theory. While the goal of satisfying curiosity (and perhaps
getting things published and beating the university reward system) is met by
super-particularistic theory (I suspect this has already happened in leadership
and motivation theory, which is to say it is great for the professors and useless
to students and managers), such theory may offer little aid in helping people gain
leverage on their environment. What possible good is it to anyone for some scien-
tist to spend his or her time and somebody else's money studying a situation
and developing theory that is not expected to be generalizable to even one other
setting? And yet that is what the authors, and many other people at this confer-
ence, would appear to want us to do! There are some exceptions. I could see the
tremendous importance of a study of former President Nixon's cause map and
the negotiated cause map of the Watergate crew because of the power position
they were in and the great national attention. But what scientific use is there for
a similar study of the CEO of Amalgamated Pea Co. or Boy Scout Troop N?
Enough already!
Of course the reason Merton (I957) picked middle range theory in the first
place was to steer a course between the useless super-abstractions of Parsonian
general theory and the super-particularism of mindless empiricism -subjective
or objective data about some fly-by-night social grouping. He knew that scien-
tific payoff was the product of generalizability times precision. Too parsimoni-
ous a compartmentalization lowers precision and one too complex lowers
generalizability. My personal solution to this problem should be obvious-
better classification!
I think the paper is aptly titled, but it is the authors having their cake and eating
it, not organization science. Given the arguments made in support of individual
and negotiated cause maps and consequently very particularistic middle range
theory, I do not see how the authors could have it the other way around and
conclude that such particularism did not also apply to the process of organizing.
Why do the authors, " ... perceive the mechanisms of organizing to be content
free in that they are likely to occur regardless of the characteristics of organiza-
tional members of (sic, it should be or, I think) the particular situation." Why
don't cause maps affect how organizing takes place? I am confused by the fact
that at one point the authors say that organizing is independent of content
376 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
particularities and yet earlier in their paper they say, in using the figure-ground
analogy, that content gives substance to organizing process? Given that most
theories are hierarchical, with very abstract general statements at the top and
substantive particularistic statements at the bottom, it seems to me that the
authors have chosen to focus on the bottom of the hierarchy in dealing with
content but stayed at the top of the hierarchy when dealing with process. Why
not the other way around? If it doesn't work the other way around, I would
like to see some argument to that effect. Otherwise, what's good for the goose
is good for the gander!
The authors (following Weick, 1969) focus on uncertainty or equivocality
reduction. Surely there is more to organizing than that. What happened to other
constraints imposed by the external environment (the objective constraints the
authors choose to ignore) such as threat or hostility, heterogeneity, dynamism,
or what Khandwalla (1977) termed restrictiveness? And there are probably more.
(One of my pet peeves is that the contingency theorists and others have tended
to treat environments as having one attribute dimension, certainty-uncertainty,
assuming that everything else is absorbed into that. Khandwalla's study shows
that is not true.
It is possible that there are individual, collective (Le., socially constructed),
and objective organizational (management layers and horizontal buffers, etc.)
uncertainty reduction approaches, and further, that some of these are subjective
and some objective. I suspect that theory about organizing process needs to
be elaborated along these dimensions, whether or not it ends up being general
or particularistic.
In conclusion, I feel this paper is instructive in pointing our attention to
how best to handle theories about content and process, but I feel some further
elaboration is necessary and some areas of confusion and inconsistency need to
be cleared up. I also feel that, in organizational behavior at least, the bandwagon
toward subjectivity is about to leave the station. The scientific implications of
this can of worms need to be given more thought than I see happening to date.
At this point, I see little real payoff in the more extreme renditions. If this paper
gets us to discuss some of these problems, we will be well served indeed.
REFERENCES
McKelvey's comment on our paper uses cliches similar to those we used in our
title, including ganders and geese, bandwagons leaving stations, cans of worms,
and so on. In responding to McKelvey's remarks, we will resist as much as possi-
ble continuing in the same vein, but if he's the gander and we're the geese,
then-or should that be the other way around?
There appears to be a single "antisubjectivism" thread running through his
comments, despite an avowal of neutrality. Thus, McKelvey questions the sub-
jectivist premise as his first point and then uses that in an attempt to build an
anti particularism argument in almost a reductio ad absurdum style.
However, we would argue that the citation from which he builds his argu-
ments is the basis for his undoing. We repeat it here: Early in the paper we say,
"Consequently, there is no such thing as the organization in a concrete social
entity sense, but rather there are coexisting and frequently competing images of
what the substance of organization is at any point in time." McKelvey has
jumped on the first phrase, skipped over the qualifier, and leaped to the re-
mainder of that sentence. But, the qualifier employed here is critical to interpre-
tation of what we were trying to argue. By arguing that organizations are not
concrete social entities, it is meant that social and behavioral interactions and
relationships as the essence of organization are not observable in the sense that
379
380 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
one can actually touch them. Thus, the examples of observed reality given by
McKelvey as analogies (plane and car wrecks) suffer badly. It is the social inter-
action aspect of organization to which we were referring, and perhaps because
we did not make the point clearly enough in the paper, McKelvey has been led
to some inferences we believe are not valid.
For example, such concepts as long-linked assembly lines and organization
charts, which McKelvey refers to as objective elements or organization, are not
social interactions but are touchable, physical things. Such "objects" neverthe-
less are concepts or labels given to phenomena observed, and in the context of
understanding organizations we are left with a "so what" feeling. Why they are
important seems to be the relevant question. There undoubtedly is organization
that can be studied in assembly-line settings, and organization charts and rank
hierarchies may become pertinent to understanding organization as and when
they exist as meaningful concepts in the cause maps of organizational partici-
pants, or at least in the maps of those studying organization. We see little point
in pursuing an understanding of organization as if there were such a thing as the
organization, or as if organization were some objective reality. Consequently,
we reaffirm our assertion in the paper that the path to an understanding of
organization lies in exploring the sense which individuals and coalitions give
to organization (including concepts which McKelvey suggested comprise the
organization) and in the behaviors and interactions that characterize the orga-
nizing process.
With respect to the antiparticularism arguments advanced by McKelvey, we
are not sure whether he is joking or serious in his comments about studying
negotiated cause maps of Boy Scout Troops or hinting at large numbers of maps
for General Motors. He is using the reductio ad absurdum again, and perhaps
the reason for that is that we failed to make clear in our paper what the limits
and intents of our argument were. Let us try to explain once again what we are
getting at.
The argument advanced was that, as individual perceptions of organization
vary, then for organizational action, individuals would need to negotiate com-
mon grounds of beliefs and actions, so forming coalitions. Such competing
coalitions would then seek common grounds for getting things done through a
process of negotiation. We attempted to argue that this negotiating process is a
general phenomenon of organizing and might even follow similar patterns, irre-
spective of the particular groups and individuals involved. We conjectured
that such individuals and groups would behave in ways that are classifiable as
to the degree of routineness and of consensus or agreement involved in these
negotiations.
We argued that the elements or stuff of the cause maps are individual percep-
tions of the particular organization setting -and, the individual's position within
that setting. This we referred to as the content of organization. Thus, we would
A PIECE OF CAKE 381
expect individuals to make differential sense (and thus draw different cause-
effect linkages) about such things as the technology, environment, formal proce-
dures, and so on, dependent upon their perceptions. Again, take the assembly-line
example of McKelvey: Perceptions of the tasks, speed, and so on would differ,
we would argue, between workers and managers in an assembly-line setting. The
former see it as a pain in the butt, controlling their working lives; the latter, as
an efficient means of producing marketable products. (The organizing process
reflects in part the interactions of groups or coalitions attempting to negotiate
shared cause maps.)
Our argument about content, then, is simply that given differential percep-
tions, if you wish to study content, then it can only be studied in a somewhat
particularistic fashion: To generalize via sweeping questionnaire studies across
different organization settings and treat the data as comparable seems to beg the
question of whether or not they are comparable in the first place. Thus, the
argument was made for a midrange approach: Site-by-site study of content to
determine what, if any, the similarities are in sense-making perceptions of the
individuals and groups or coalitions involved. This is what we understand mid-
range theorizing to be about.
On the other hand, as we indicated before, we attempt to make the argument
that if it is the ongoing, dynamic process of organizing that is of concern and
interest, then the types of behaviors involved as people attempt to negotiate
the removal of equivocality (i.e., negotiate the common grounds or cause maps)
are generalizable. Thus an explicit, broad approach across settings is appropriate,
as groups engaging in such processes are studied.
One other potentially misleading aspect of our paper has caused McKelvey to
infer that organizing is just equivocality reduction. That was not our intent.
Rather, we chose to focus on this aspect of the organizing process as a way of
building from Weick's work and illustrating the argument of a general approach
to the process. There may well be a number of other significant aspects to it-
that is, significant in terms of generalizability across negotiating environments;
we simply focused on one as a way to explore and illustrate the argument.
A final point we think worth making is to quote from McKelvey'S comments
on the Cooper and Wolfe paper (Theory Development in Organization Behavior).
It seems to us that he is after all agreeing with our essential argument. Midway
through his remarks, he says, "Goals and purposes are best seen as temporary
enactments that come and go in individual members of a specie during the long-
term competitive struggle of a specie for resources in its interdependent ecologi-
cal network." He seems hoist by his own petard.
Finally, we could not resist the temptation to pursue our cake analogy one
more time and decided to call our response "A Piece of Cake" rather than just
"Marie Antoinette."
VI CONTEMPLATIVE
PANEL DISCUSSION
33 EXPLORING BIG FIERCE
THEORIES
Leslie L. Roos, Jr., University of Manitoba
I came up with a tentative title for these comments: "Exploring Big Fierce
Theories." I plan to relate some of the notions about evolutionary theory that
emerged during the conference both to others' concerns and to my own, which
in Lou Pondy's terms are closer to "exploring" rather than to "map mapping."
I have adapted to my own needs a set of phrases in Cooper and Wolfs paper.
"Everyone else in the room may well be guilty of theorizing by analogy," but
I "sensitively apply insights from all branches of science to the study of organi-
zational behavior." That statement stuck in my mind.
I ftrst wanted to discuss some ofthe factors aiding the construction of better
theory. I was very impressed with the fact that, when Darwin and Wallace
thought up their evolutionary theory, they were in rather strange places. Wallace
was out in the jungle and Darwin was cruising along on the Beagle. Although he
did his best-known writing at home, Darwin's voyages at least served as his
inspiration. Colinvaux's (1978) very readable survey of modern ecology cites
example after example of theoretical advance inspired by work in an unusual
environment.
This suggests some advantages of data-rich environments. We must ask, "What
are the characteristics of an interesting environment?" Much good organizational
work seems to have come about through studying environments that were either
385
386 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
very tough for the organization or very easy. Let's look at an organization oper-
ating in a very rich environment and see the fun that its members have, not
holding conferences certainly, but spending money, enjoying fringes, and so on.
A great deal more about the workings of organizational slack could be learned
by such studies. Similarly, growth situations or crisis situations can be fruitful
for investigation.
If we're interested in history or tradition or evolution, the organizational
fields are in a data-poor situation. We have some of Chandler's (1962, 1977)
studies, and Hall's (1976) longitudinal study of the death of the Saturday Even-
ing Post, but such case studies with an explicitly theoretical orientation are
comparatively few. Studying the birth of a new organization, as was done by
Sproull, Weiner, and Wolf (1978), can provide significant insights. As Bigelow
has noted, a chronological stage within a single organization may be an impor-
tant factor.
Things outside our normal personal or professional experiences may aid
theory building. Clearly, super novae and black holes have stimulated astron-
omers to rethink certain aspects of their science. Weick has pioneered in the
use of insights garnered from unconventional organizations-from Apollo
Skylabs (Weick, 1977) to jazz orchestras (Bougon, Weick, and Binkhorst, 1977).
Better theories might result from concentrating our efforts in such situations;
much interesting research in the natural sciences has been stimulated by unusual
experiences.
How might some of the developments in evolutionary theory stimulate or-
ganizational research? Biologists are now studying the many ways in which the
highlighting of certain characteristics can act to minimize competition by help-
ing to establish different ecological niches for each species. For example, Colin-
vaux notes that, when different bird species are geographically separated, the
intra-species variation may be considerable. Many individuals belonging to dif-
ferent bird species of the same genus may look quite similar when they are far
apart geographically. This is true for two species of nuthatches-one in Greece
and Asia Minor, the other in central Asia. The range of the two species overlaps
in Iran, but in this zone of overlap the species can be easily distinguished by
their markings. Colinvaux reports a number of studies emphasizing that certain
behavioral or physical characteristics of a species become clear in an environ-
ment that would otherwise be highly competitive.
Some hypotheses for organizational research are suggested, even though
defining niches and identifying species is difficult for both biologists and or-
ganization theorists. McKelvey makes a laudable first effort at organizational
taxonomy. If different species of organizations might look or act differently in
order to avoid head-on competition, this has implications for organizational
strategy. Successful companies tend to have the dominant market share in one
EXPLORING BIG FIERCE THEORIES 387
or more fields (Buzzell, Gale, and Sultan, 1975). If the market share is being
equally divided among four or five firms, anyone company finds it more dif-
ficult to be terribly successful (Hamermesh, Anderson, and Harris, 1978). Thus,
evolutionary theory may be helpful beyond taxonomy in suggesting some
dynamic propositions to help us understand the way public and private organi-
zations behave.
We might also build theory by looking at unoccupied niches; such niches may
occur because of a natural or manmade catastrophe. In fact, the biologists have
actually run some experiments here. Colinvaux cites research by the "Maine
Gunners," scientists hired to go into the woods to study a caterpillar pest, the
spruce budworm. Because spruce warblers raise their broods almost entirely
on budworms, the Maine Gunners wanted to determine the extent to which
the birds were restraining the pests. They chose two stretches of forest to have
one experimental and one control area. They decided to count, then remove, all
the birds in the experimental area. When they started shooting, it became neces-
sary to kill almost twice as many birds as were originally nesting in the selected
area. Under normal conditions a surplus floating population of nonbreeding
birds was unable to get niches and territories.
Analogs in the organizational world include such dramatic, catastrophic
events as complete defeats in war. For example, theory-relevant longitudinal
case studies of the reemergence of German and Japanese industry after World
War II would be most useful. Can we identify particular species of organizations
able to take advantage of the situation? Which kinds of organizations are partic-
ularly adaptive for this unoccupied niche situation?
Questions of specialization are relevant here. Within biology specialization
exists in such ways as one-to-one relationships between predator and prey
species. What happens when the environment changes such that the prey is no
longer there? The predator'S niche is altered markedly. The biological question
is: Which species can handle this and change their source of food? Which species
can't? Can we unravel how and why? Organizational parallels are clear. Firms,
such as defense contractors, may get so specialized that when the environment
changes, they don't know what to do. Some organizations can deal with this flux
in the environment, some can not. Bigelow has noted how military organizations
exist in one of two niches-peacetime or wartime. Interesting organizational
research on specialization and adaptation could be done.
Another evolutionary theme concerns how animal species handle problems
of variation, succession, and reproduction. A long lead time is needed to produce
a great white shark or a tiger. In the same way the kind of high technology nec-
essary to develop a large, new computer leads to a long incubation period. Other
biological strategies to facilitate reproduction are based on numbers and wide
dispersal, as gardeners fighting dandelions well know. Perhaps a better under-
388 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
the averages, in both up and down markets, is very hard. Students of fmance
(Sharpe, 1978) say there is a great deal of information in the system; the market
is nearly efficient.
One of the relevant research questions is, "Are there any organizations that
manage money, are there any people, who are doing better than the others? Can
they articulate the reasons why they are superior?" Some are doing worse, but
doing better seems to be very difficult. If a few organizations do do better, we
should be studying these. If you can find them, you can make some money
yourself. Moreover, the study of such organizations should be tremendously
stimulating for the development of better organizational theory. The policy
relevance and academic interest in understanding excellence should be clear.
The same parallel with other variables, a few different concepts, exists in
what one might call "the dilemma of modern education" -education theory.
Coleman et al. (1966) and Jencks (1972) suggest that, within the "normal"
range of variables related to resource allocation and controlling for recruit-
ment, differences among schools are associated with only small differences
in student outcomes. Although more recent research (Wiley, 1976) has for-
warded such promising new variables as "quantity of schooling," additional
work must be done to establish a more optimistic approach.
One question to be asked is: "Can we identify those who consistently do
better or who consistently do poorer?" In a data-rich environment these de-
viant cases can be spotted more easily than would be possible without exten-
sive, well-organized data. Some progress has been made in developing and
applying techniques for isolating such cases (Klitgaard and Hall, 1977).
We might focus on the specific factors, both subjective and objective, which
might influence why a given organization is more or less effective. Often, leader-
ship is going to be critical; saying this is not terribly useful theoretically. How-
ever, other factors in the organizational environment undoubtedly interact with
the leaders' abilities and would permit more interesting formulations. Thus,
Sowell's (l976) research on excellence in black schools highlighted community
characteristics that supported the academic efforts of successful principals.
Often, we will be able to elaborate on particular aspects of the process, on
some dynamics of resource allocation that make a given firm more successful.
Perhaps the organization has particular strategies for getting resources from
the environment; some of the resource acquisition devices used by public sector
organizations are particularly interesting. Such research might help on the pro-
cess side, moving beyond mere taxonomy. This would ask: ''What are the
characteristics of effective organizations in different environments? What is
generalizable and what is not?"
In clOSing, I would like to tell about something that links to evolutionary
theory. Not only did I enjoy reading this in Colinvaux, but the theme relates to
390 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
REFERENCES
*Support for this work was provided in part by the National Science Foundation through
Grant BNS 75-09864.
392
MIDDLE RANGE THEMES IN ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIZING 393
doesn't always have it, and when it does have it, we don't know why it does.
There's another preparation made from a cold vaccine that is taken internally,
like a pill. 1 think it was forty percent of a group of people who reported a
great improvement after taking this, but forty percent of another group who
were given pills containing nothing at all also reported great improvement.
One reason we are beginning to think a cold isn't caused by a germ is that a
cold, unlike most infectious diseases, seems to develop no immunity. You
can have one cold on top of another, as you know. We're up a tree, as 1
said before.'
'This business of the common cold not being caused by a germ at all sort
of strikes at the foundations of American civilization, doesn't it?'
'Don't get me wrong,' the doctor said. 'The no-germ theory hasn't been
proved, any more than the germ theory. The thing is we just don't know.
There's a great deal to be said for the germ theory, although it seems right
now that there is more to be said for the no-germ theory. And anyway, influ-
enza is a contagious disease definitely caused by a germ, so the precautions
people usually take to keep from giving other people their colds are just as
well. The funny thing about influenza is that the turbinates don't seem to be
particularly affected by it. You don't get the same acute sniffling or stuffed-
up feeling with influenza that you do with the common, grippy cold, yet with
influenza you are a whole lot sicker than you are with a common cold.'
'I guess 1 ought to get out of here tomorrow,' 1 said.
'No reason why you shouldn't,' he said. 'You've had no fever for two days
and there doesn't seem to be any serious bronchial infection. You'll cough a
little for a day or two, and then you ought to be O.K.' The doctor sneezed
suddenly.
'I hope 1 haven't given you my cold,' 1 said.
'Y ou may have,' he said. 'If there are common cold germs, 1 have doubtless
picked some of them up from you. On the other hand, it is probably just the
turbinates seeing ghosts. Of course, a piece of dust or something may have got
up my nose just then and made me sneeze, the sneeze being a reflex action
designed by nature to clear the nose of any irritating substance. But this re-
flex action isn't absolutely dependable either, any more than the turbinates
are. 1 suspect that what happened just now was that the turbinates, for some
reason known only to themselves, got excited and worked up an overabun-
dant amount of moisture; this moisture, trickling through my nose, fooled
my sensory nervous system into thinking that there was some irritating sub-
stance in there and caused me to sneeze. Sneezing, incidentally, isn't such a
good method of ridding the nose of an irritating substance because sneezing
itself irritates the nose.'
'And perhaps causes or contributes to an inflammation of the mucous mem-
brane of the upper respiratory tract?'
'Exactly,' he said (St. Clair McKelway, in Siu, 1968, pp. 198-200).
Understanding of the common cold takes some unusual twists in this excerpt
394 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
and these twists mirror themes of the middle range in organizational theory. At
the very end of the explanation, the possibility arises that sneezing causes colds
rather than colds cause sneezing. Thus, the direction of causal arrows in the com-
mon cold is elusive just as it is in common organizations. People become dog-
matic about the direction of causation and about the abundance of unilateral
causation, at their own peril. Middle range theory can serve as corrective that
redirects causal arrows, adds causal arrows where none were thought to exist,
and questions the presence of arrows presumed to exist.
A supposedly robust theory of the common cold, the germ theory, plays to
very mixed reviews in this excerpt. It both looks as if germs are the cause of the
common cold and as if they're not. Similarly, most theories in organizational
research such as resource dependence look at times as if they're major themes
and at other times as if they're not.
Much of the agonized theorizing about colds and their origin may boil down
to something like a random origin to the process. Just as is true with organiza-
tions, full-blown colds may develop from inconsequential beginnings. The modest
scope of middle range theories may be temporary and hold only for the initial
stages of a process. Given a modest phenomenon the components of which are
tied together in a deviation amplifying causal loop, the result of several cyclings
through this circuit may produce a dominant phenomenon that encompasses the
field and drives out other possibilities.
The germ theory directs much of the physician's seeing as a patient is ex-
amined, and the same holds true for organizational theory. Believing is seeing
and the belief that the world is made up of middle range phenomena that are
loosely coupled to one another can produce the measurements and observations
that support the existence of such a world.
The large variety of possible causes for the common cold that are described
in the preceding incident bears a close resemblance to the large variety of possible
causes for outcomes such as organizational effectiveness. It is the very abun-
dance of these variables and the possibility that in various combinations they are
crucial, that generates middle range theories that highlight subsets of them.
Theorizing about the common cold has a decidedly piecemeal and contradic-
tory quality. It's not much different with organizations. The value of this con-
ference has been that it provides a pretext for us to reflect on both the content
and the form of our arguing. The papers provide a splendid opportunity to re-
examine how we feel about theorizing and about the content of the theories.
The papers as a set provide considerable new information and do much of
Merton's homework for him. I have no doubt that we know more about middle
range theories and some of the traps in that concept now than was true at the
beginning of this conference.
In these remarks I want to suggest a variety of images that can be used to
MIDDLE RANGE THEMES IN ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIZING 395
think through the implications of middle range theory. My intentions here are
several. As much as possible I want to link the topic of middle range theory with
other themes that have been present in organizational theory for some time. I
want to suggest a set of images that do not simply duplicate those already avail-
able in the papers in this volume.
During this conference Lou Pondy invited us to sort ourselves into explorers and
map makers. Various other people have suggested that the participants at this
conference sort themselves into idealists and realists, essentialists and evolution-
ists, and those who think teleologically and those who think nonteleologically.
At first, it may seem surprising that issues of labelling and identification should
surface at a conference that supposedly is about as innocuous a topic as middle
range theory. Considering, however, that the topic of middle range theory is
ambiguous, then you would expect that people would try to develop a social
definition of reality and in doing so, would seek out similar others. In answer
to the question, what's going on here, potential idealists spot and talk to other
potential idealists, and the same holds true for the realists. As a consequence,
novel definitions develop as to what this conference "really" is about.
That's innocent enough as long as the labels aren't taken too seriously. Gonos
(1977), for example, argues that what looks like an idealist perspective in fact
isn't. McKelvey argues that people are either essentialists or evolutionists, but
doesn't leave room for the possibility that both perspectives can be accomodated
in a single formulation. It can be asserted, for example, that interlocked be-
haviors are a fundamental unit of analysis out of which all organizing grows,
and that these essences change over time. It could be argued that loosely coupled
interlockings are going to survive for a longer period of time than tightly coupled
interlockings, because loosely coupled interlockings can adapt to a greater vari-
ety of circumstances. Similarly, you could argue that the prototypic action in
organizations is enactment but make the further assertion that some forms of
enactment survive longer than other ones.
When Pondy asks us to sort ourselves into explorers or map makers, he for-
gets that man is that animal who draws lines that he then stumbles over. Pondy
is interested in circles of inquiry. When forcing people into either explorers or
map makers he momentarily loses sight of the fact that most people are both.
Exploration affects map making, but the maps in the hands of an individual
affect subsequent exploring, a circle of inquiry that has been described recently
396 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
by Neisser (1976). Furthermore, it's not obvious that exploring and map making
exhaust the possibilities. There are map readers, people who invent the idea of a
map, people who create what explorers explore, there are people who discover
they are explorers a posteriori, and in short, the dichotomy loses much of the
richness that is preserved in several of the other distinctions raised by Pondy.
/ Structure
~
Task
· 1 / Technology
"- People (Actors)
Each narrow specialty is a fish scale. It is the continuous texture of narrow spe-
cialties overlapping with other narrow specialties that produces comprehensive
398 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
understanding and fills the gaps between the somewhat arbitrary clusters of
specialties that now are thought to comprise disciplines.
A novel, narrow, deep specialty such as is associated with a fish scale seems to
be virtually an ideal approximation of the kind of image implied by middle range
theories. The emphasis on novel, narrow, and deep specialties that lie adjacent to
other unique combinations suggests the potential benefits that can accrue when
people actively pursue middle range theories. The trick seems to be that people
ensure that there is modest redundancy among the topics addressed by these
theories. The greater the redundancy, the greater the likelihood that we simply
duplicate the arbitrary clusters and nonsensical gaps in understanding now asso-
ciated with social science.
People worry that intentional pursuit of fish scales heightens the fragmenta-
tion of inquiry rather than helping to reduce it. The futility of this worry lies
in the fact that fish scales produce collective comprehensiveness. It will never
be the case that any single individual will represent and encompass a field. In-
stead, it is the combination of variable ignorance and knowledge among scholars
that collectively comprises what is known about an area. The understanding is
collective and the full scope of the understanding is found only by quizzing all
of the components.
Ironically, fields in social science fragment in the interest of unity. Increased
fragmentation fills gaps and links specialties that previously had been uncon-
nected. It is this fIlling of gaps that promises to unify a field even as the immedi-
ate activity involves fragmentation. Middle range theories, as they have been
described in the preceding papers, hold some promise for fragmenting the field
in the way that will induce fish-scale unity.
Warren Thorngate (1976) has argued that it is impossible for a scientific explana-
tion to be simultaneously general, accurate, and simple. Any explanation that
meets two of these criteria will violate the third. I have found it useful to exam-
ine the nuances of this assertion by representing its three components in terms
of three positions on a clock face with General represented at twelve o'clock,
Accurate at four o'clock, and Simple at eight o'clock. An explanation that
is simultaneously general and accurate (it would fall at the two o'clock position)
is as far from simplicity as it is possible to get. In accomplishing generality
and accuracy in an explanation an investigator has paid the price of simplicity
and runs the risk that his or her work will be criticized as impenetrable, inac-
cessible, and obscure. Other tradeoffs represented by strategies of inquiry
at six o'clock or at ten o'clock create similar patterns of assets and liabilities.
General
12
Simple Accurate
With the aid of this representation we can describe middle range theory in
two different ways. First, it can be argued that any movement of an explanation
away from twelve o'clock is a movement toward middle range theory. Any
explanation that falls at six o'clock, a combination of simplicity and accuracy, is
the empirical generalization referred to by Evered and Bluedorn. Viewed in this
way, middle range theories will be criticized either because they are excessively
complex (the investigator has moved away from the twelve o'clock position in a
clockwise direction) or because they are inaccurate as explanations of specific
problems (an indictment that is produced by counterclockwise movement away
from twelve o'clock). A tacit prescription implied by this is that the investigator
who moves away from twelve o'clock simultaneously toward both four and eight
o'clock is in a stronger position than an investigator who moves in only one of
the two directions. It might also be argued that an investigator who moves com-
pletely around the clockface will have produced a more valuable contribution to
the field than a person who covers a smaller portion of the clockface.
If we modify thee two-dimensional character of the clockface and make
it three-dimensional, we can see a second way to pose the issue of middle
range theory.
Grand Theory
Empirical
Generalizations
399
400 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
Quality of Propositions
Scope of Theory Falsifiable Not-falsifiable
Phenomena that occur on a modest scale can have massive consequences if their
components are tied together by means of deviation amplifying causal loops.
MIDDLE RANGE THEMES IN ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIZING 403
The importance of this point is that the phenomena addressed by middle range
theory are not necessarily phenomena of middling importance. In fact, I'd argue
that middle range phenomena and deviation amplifying feedback loops may be
all you need to produce many of the major phenomena that we worry about.
Any chance event such as a small crack in a rock that gathers water or a far-
mer who builds his home on a homogeneous agricultural plain can become
amplified into a tree that grows out of a rock or people congregating around the
original farmer to form a city. It is the process that generates the complex out-
come, not the placement of the initial crack or the initial settlement (Maruyama,
1963). With sufficient cycling, small deviations can be amplified either into
complex homogeneous events or into a virtual disappearance of the relevant
elements. It all depends on the initial kick that triggers the deviation amplify-
ing process.
Consider the simple deviation amplifying loop shown in the following figure.
self-evaluation
self-evaluation
-!
coping ability - depression
We now see that coping ability is tied negatively to self-evaluation, which says
that the greater my coping ability the lower is my self-evaluation. I may like to
see myself as someone who is unable to cope with the world and who needs to
be taken care of. In such a world, characterized by an odd number of negative
signs, the variables associated with depression now constitute a deviation coun-
teracting loop. There is no chance whatsoever that a phenomenon tied together
in this manner will dominate the world.
Suppose again that my coping ability goes up for some reason. This decreases
my self-evaluation, which increases depression, which decreases coping ability,
which now increases my self-evaluation, which now decreases my self-evaluation
again. With an odd number of negative signs self-evaluation fluctuates around a
central value as do depression and coping ability. There is no chance that from
these small beginnings a massive depression or a massive manic condition will
emerge. Instead, the changes are controlled.
Middle range theorizing is not without problems and several of these are evident
in the preceding papers. I want to focus briefly on three issues that supplement
those raised in preceding papers; disconfumed assumptions, playfulness, and
auxiliary theories.
Davis (1971) has argued that theories that violate weakly held assumptions
are typically perceived as interesting. A tacit quality of middle range theories
is that they are often eclectic and often affirm rather than violate assumptions.
That being the case, theories that affirm assumptions are likely to be regarded
MIDDLE RANGE THEMES IN ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIZING 405
iary theory becomes the middle range theory and the middle range theory now
merely supplements. Finally, if middle range theory works only if there is
auxiliary theory, then this could mean that middle range theorizing is middle
range only in name. If one combines both the middle and auxiliary theory then
what one is really talking about is yet another grand theory. Thus, it may turn
out to be the case that theorizing does not partake of quite as many gradations
as we have presumed during this conference.
CONCLUSION
These papers have provided a superb pretext for all of us to reflect on our
theorizing skills and the place of theory in our work. The spirit in which we
should ponder the advice implicit in these papers is captured by George Romans:
Naturally I believe that what I have said here is true. But the most important
advice I can give contemporary sociologists has nothing to do with the valid-
ity of my arguments. It is this: you do not have to believe anything about
theory or methodology that is told you pretentiously and sanctimoniously
by other sociologists-including myself. So much guff has gotten mixed with
truth that, if you cannot tell which is which, you had better reject it all. It
will only get in your way. No one will go far wrong theoretically who remains
in close touch with and seeks to understand a body of concrete phenomena
(1964, pp. 975-976).
REFERENCES
Lou Pondy said that he wanted me to speak last because he wanted the con-
ference to end on a cynical note. However, after listening to Karl, I don't think
I can reach the expected pitch, but I can summarize some of the content of the
conference: Briefly, we went through pebbles and popes and circles and now
clocks; without straining imagination, it would seem that our conference was on
the rock of the Middle Ages.
Beyond that, I'd like not to talk about the contents of the papers. You can
read them. They've been discussed already. I agree with Karl Weick that they
were extremely well summarized by the discussants.
Instead I'd like to discuss the social process of the conference.
During the conference, I've been curious about two things: the enormous
interest in middle range theories and the disparaging things people said about
them. From these, I'm trying to figure out why a smart fellow like Robert
Merton would say a really stupid thing like: Go ye into the world and grow
theories of the middle kind and gather them altogether into a grand theory?
The very first paper by Bluedorn and Evered, I think accurately suggested
why Merton's charge was not the way science gets done or the way grand images
of the world are developed. It is just cognitively very difficult to take several dis-
parate and independently created ideas and unify them into one grand idea.
408
SCIENCE AS A SOCIAL REALITY 409
What more likely happens is a third independent idea develops that balances
or contains the prior two.
So the question is: Why would Merton suggest middle range theory develop-
ment as a model for science? And one answer to the question may be he was
being foolhardly and didn't use his sense. But that is not likely and doesn't
make sense from what else we know about Merton's work. This answer also
doesn't answer another question, which is, why would so many people orient
and rally around Merton's notion? That is, why would all of the people who
have read Merton and have spoken his truths from their mouths also suggest
middle levels for science?
I think the answer is that Merton, rather than being foolish, really was a
cagey capitalist. What he was doing was solving the problem that he started with,
which was to stimulate scientists to be more productive. And like any grand old
man or woman of any discipline or any enterprise, Merton was in the business of
creating a myth. As a figurehead for science, he was inventing myths for scien-
tists to orient around.
The myth Merton created was that of a very orderly process for the doing of
science. You take comprehensible sets of observed phonomena, and you develop
a limited set of ideas that account for those sets of data. And then you take
these bits and pieces of limited ideas and put them together into a grand theory.
But, in order for the grand theory to be comprehensible, the scientist must begin
with small segments of the world's phenomena, because they can be compre-
hended. For science to proceed with such order gives scientists a very good sense
of what to do and how to do it. It gives them direction. This myth is like the one
used in the organization of Ph.D. training. Nobody really knows how to train a
Ph.D., but what mentors do know is how to organize the process in an orderly
and knowledgeable manner. This is done by saying there are certain stages a
Ph.D. candidate must go through. By this device, both the professors-the
trainers or masters-and the students know what to do at anyone point in time.
The procedures inform each about what to do. No one is confused.
Thus, we have this neat myth about Ph.D. education that allows us all to be-
have and engage in the business of training brilliance. And I think that was what
Merton really was doing in developing his myth about science proceedings in
stages from middle ranges to grand theory. The problem he was addressing, de-
ducible from his own words, was no less than the problem of shaping brilliance.
The object of Merton's myth, however, was not Ph.D. education but science
and the motivation of scientists to be productive. At the time Merton began his
writings there were a lot of grand theorists, about whom Merton perhaps didn't
think kindly because they were writing elaborate and weighty statements about
the nature of the social world. The theories were grand because they were large;
they required large books to present them, and large words to capture their
410 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
essence. And like most large things, they awed people and frightened people.
They were difficult to comprehend. They were obtuse, that is, they did not
shed much insight into the nature of the workings of the world or the workings
of society even though they were glowing and grand and exciting. They excited
poeple, but when you got down to brass tacks, nobody could figure out what
the hell was going on.
At the time Merton wrote, there were people like Talcott·Parsons unraveling
the conceptual mess of social systems and making sense of it. And maybe grand
theories made sense to such people. But the rest of science's poor working stiffs
may not have been able to figure it out. And at this time of the history of the
world, the production of Ph.D.'s, and the production of scholars itself was an
expanding phenomenon. The problem then, became: How to motivate such
large numbers of less grand scholars to do science.
It wouldn't make sense to have everybody sit around and write grand theories
because most of us are going to be incompetent on a pure probability basis. Most
of us are not going to be able to do that, and so the rest of us need something
that we can do and which, in fact, will get us on to the business of doing science.
So Merton hit upon the notion of working on a little piece of the puzzle at a
time; which essentially is what is meant by middle range theorizing. What Merton
meant by doing a science in a middle range was to take limited sets of phenom·
ena, understand those, and develop ideas about them. He said little more than
that. And I think his idea was a brilliant solution to the problem of motivating
the growing numbers of everyday scholars because, indeed, it gives them a sense
of what they can do. By presenting science as a middle range activity, Merton
suggested that everyone, the middling and the grand, can participate in this busi·
ness of science because everyone can do something. One of the things that was
pointed out about the nature of middle range theory during this conference was
that the middle ranges all the way from some endpoint called dust·bowl em·
piricism to some endpoint at the grandest of the grand. Scholars of all types
could fit somewhere along this mythical continuum.
One could fit somewhere at a level one can comprehend. Merton's myth
allowed you to practice your art or your science or the art which is your science.
You did not have to sit idly by awing the grand theories of a Parson or a Marx.
Well, I think that this is the value of middle range theory. As evidence I can
point to an observation about this conference. The conference organizers put
this rather ambiguous stimulus level "middle range theory" on the title of a flyer
calling for papers, and amazingly, forty-one papers came flying back. The label
attracted and inspired some eighty people. Being able to attract eighty people
from a field that has maybe only five hundred at maximum, even counting the
fringes, is doing a hell of a lot. Truly, the myth Merton created motivates.
In addition to the intellectual attraction of this flypaper, I'm also amazed
SCIENCE AS A SOCIAL REALITY 411
about the social process thereby created. A paper call is a kind of stimulus to
which people respond on their own volition; and everyone does so relatively
independent of everyone else. Nobody knows who else is submitting ideas, or
what ideas are submitted. So what you end up with is a fairly random mix of
flies. In this case, the concept "middle range theory" is a very neat label. It's
like "loose coupling." You can attach anything you want to it and sort of have
a sentence to say. And thus would I offer this conjecture as the middle range
theory of the coarsely coupled ideas presented here.
I said I wasn't going to be cynical. And so to continue: People came with
ideas that were of immediate concern to them. Some people came with the idea
that truth could be found in traditional lore. Other people came with the very
new idea of applying topological theory to interpersonal relationships. It was
an idea randomly caught by the flypaper of the conference. But, it is also a very
interesting idea and should be pursued. The conference is a success for catching
such flies.
But what amazes one is not only that so many different theoretical and em-
pirical projects came in through this process, but also that such diverse people
came here to discuss their ideas and to hear each other's thoughts. The result is
essentially a mingling of strange ideas. And mixing has its hazards. You, as par-
ticipants, expose to yourself and to others the reality that there are a hell of a
lot of ideas in social science. Everyone is so different. There were the idealists,
the realists, the map makers; the map breakers; the sags and the gases. There was
diversity and confusion.
I think on the first day of the conference, I observed a bit of testiness in the
meeting. People were a bit anxious. That was very understandable. People were
aware that other people around them behaved slightly differently. Some were
amazed or distressed. Others were looking for compatriots who shared ideas.
There was a lot of social communication. Extraordinary affmities were developing.
For instance, at one point, Bobko used this word ''multilectic.'' Now, there
aren't as many as a thousand people in the world who would use a word like
''multilectic.'' Yet he blasts the room with this word, and it turns out on a pure
chance basis there's another person in the room who understood. Ann Huffs
eyes lit up. And while there may be alternative interpretations of this reaction,
I happen to know that Huff had also used this word "multilectic" in a paper she
wrote. An affinity was found. I later learned that this affmity went beyond lit
eyes. Professor Huff gave to Professor Bobko her paper with its strange "multi-
lectic" words.
So in the end, this flypaper conference, despite its random attractions, makes
sense. It makes sense because people learn that there are others like them, de-
spite their differences and their other ways of looking at things. The differences
are slightly frightening, slightly confusing. But in the end, they are sorted out.
412 MIDDLE RANGE THEORY AND THE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONS
We are forced, flies that we are, to come together randomly and stuck by the
propriety of attending, we learn that there are others in this community, with
whom we can talk, with whom we can feel comfortable, and indeed, in the
future, with whom we will work and collaborate. From such as this may come
grand theories eventually.
This, in short, is why I think Merton was brilliant. His was the clever strategy
that all organizations use to get people to work their noses off for nothing. They
create a myth that gives purpose to work. Merton invented "middle range"
mythologies to get scientists to work at their emerging craft. And his idea that
middle range theories will become integrated into grand theories, I think is an
inherently necessary part of the overall purpose I'm reading into Merton. He has
created a myth that works. He glorified the middle range with a nirvana. It sells
better. If anybody is selling you soap and they say to you that, here is a bar of
soap, it's a little different from other bars of soap, but then stops at that point,
it wouldn't sell very well. When you sell soap, you've got to say it's the best
soap in town and leads to the cleanest skin.
And when you sell science, you do so with the notion that it will lead to
truth and to grand theory. It feeds on an implicit assumption which we accept,
which is that we all want to end up to a grand understanding of the world, a
grand theory. Of course, some of us don't want to do that. Some of just like to
flick pebbles around, like me.
But Merton addresses the series scholars. To them he offers grand theory as
an end. And, in saying this, he's saying that we all know what we're doing, that
in fact, this science, is a serious business. He is saying that we are getting some-
where. And by suggesting middle range theories as a model of science, he gives
us a specific task to do to get to our goal.
And in this way, Merton has given us something important. Everybody needs
to have a sense that what they are doing is important. And thus Merton's ques-
tionable notions make sense, in the same way that gatherings of this nature do.
Both are exactly what they should be. But because we participate in them, we
shall walk away feeling: "Bejeezes, I really know what it's all about." It's a bit of
a mess, but it's getting us somewhere. Where? Nobody really knows, but some-
where nonetheless. One thing we do know is that, if ain't nobody doing anything
to figure out how this world works, we ain't gonna ever figure it out.
In the process, however, we need to accept our distress about diversity.
There's a paradox that I will call "the pondeviant paradox," after Louis Pondy
because he exemplified it to some degree at this conference.
If you observed him carefully during this conference, you would have noticed
the loud excited tones he used to describe the diversity in paradigms, the many
ways of doing things. Even the circle image is characteristic. The idea that he
would stand anywhere and still have somewhere else to be is pure pondeviant. It
SCIENCE AS A SOCIAL REALITY 413