Abhi Hu

Abhi<Jharmakosa-Bha~ya
of VASUBANI>HU.
Volume I
Abhidharmakosa-Bha~ya
of VASUBANDHU
The Treasury of the Abhidharma
and its (Auto) commentary
Translated into French by

LOUIS DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN
Annotated English Translation byi

GELONG LODRO SANGPO
With a New Introduction by

BHIKKHU KL DHAMMAJOTI
Volume I
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First Edition: Delhi, 2012
TranslatedfromL' Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu
First edition 1823-1931, Paris, Paul Geuthner
Second edition 1971, Bruxelles, Institute Belga des Hautes Etudes Chinoises
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Dedicated
To my Esteemed
Teachers
Volume I
• Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosa-bhii~ya

by Bhikk.hu KL Dhammajoti
• Preface to the 1971 edition of "L 'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu"
by Etienne Lamotte
• Bibliographical Addendum
by Hubert Durt
• Preface
by Louis de La Vallee Poussin
• Introduction
by Louis de La Vallee Poussin
• Remarks of the Translator
• · Abbreviations
• Outline of Chapter One
• Chapter One: Exposition of the Elements (Dhiitunirdesa)
• Endnotes to Chapter One
• Outline of Chapter Two
• Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdesa)
• Endnotes to Chapter Two
Summary and Discussion
of the Abhidharmakosa-bha~ya
by
Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti
A. Abhidharma as primarily a soteriology ................................................................................ 1

B. The predecessors of the Abhidharmakosa-bha!fya as a manual ........................................... 2
C. The organizational structure of the Abhidharmakosa-bha!fya .............................................. 6
D. The affiliation of the Abhidharmakosa-bha!fya .................................................................... 9
E. Summaries and discussion on the chapters ........................................................................ 10
EA. Chapter one: Dhatu-nirdesa ...................................................................................... 10
EB. Chapter two: lndriya-nirdesa .................................................................................... 15
EBA. On the indriya-s ............................................................................................. 16
EBB. One the co-nascence of material atoms ......................................................... 17
EBC. On the citta-caitta-s ........................................................................................ 17
EBD. On the disjoined conditionings ...................................................................... 19
EBE. On causes, con~itions and fruits .. :................................................................. 21
EC. Chapter three: Loka-nirdesa ..................................................................................... 23
ECA. Constitution of the physical universe and its inhabitants .............................. 24
ECB. Formation and dissolution· of the universe .................................................... 25
ECC. · Conditioned co-arising ..................................................................... :............ 25
ED. Chapter four: Karma-nirdesa .................................................................................... 28
EE. Chapter five: Anusaya-nirdesa .................................................................................. 34
EF. Chapter six: Margapudgala-nirdesa ......................................................................... 40
EG. Chapter seven: Jfi.ana-nirdesa .................................................................................. 46
EH. Chapter eight: Samapatti-nirdesa ............................................................................. 51
EI. Chapter nine: *Pudgalavada-prati!jedha .................................................................. 56
F. Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 61
A. Abhidharma as primarily a soteriology

The term "abhidhamza", as it occurs in the sutra-s, means either "pertaining to
(/about) the Doctrine", or the "excellent Doctrine". It is important co realize that
although the northern Abhidharma tradition preserves _the meaning of "abhi-" as
"facing" (abhimukha), hence, also "pertaining", the signification of the two compo-
nents (abhi + dhamza) is profoundly different from that in the sutra-s. In the devel-
oped Abhidharma system represented by the period of the Abhidharma treatises,
firstly, "abhi-" in the sense of abhimukha signifies direct reali~ation (abhisamaya)
into the true nature of dhamza-s. This is the meaning of the definition that, "abhi-
dhanna is outflow-free (aniisrava) or pure prajfiii", 1 where both abhidharma and
2 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabha:jya
prajna are defined as "investigation/discernment of dharma-s" (dharma-pravicaya).

Secondly, "dharma" here does not mean "Doctrine", but refers either to the ultimate
reals, each having a unique intrinsic nature (svabhava) and being uniquely experi-
enced as an intrinsic characteristic (svalak:ja-tJa), or to Nirva1Ja as the Dharma par
excellence. 2 (Also cf. Section EA). In the MVS, the Sarvastivada master Buddha-
palita explains the signification of "abhi-" thus:
''.abhi-" is a prefix signifying "abhimukha" (lU{:\fl.). This dharma is called
abhidharma because it induces all skillful dharma-s-the factors conducing
to Enlightenment (bodhi-pak~a-dharma)-to manifest directly. 3
The signification of "abhisamaya" is in fact explicitly shown in one of the Abhi-

dharmikas' definitions:
It is called abhidharma because it can directly realize the dharma-s. 4
This spiritual significance (as opposed to a mere intellectual one) is also succinctly
brought out by SaII1ghabhadra:
Now, why is it that only the outflow-free prajftii alone is called abhi-
dharma? Because, when the characteristics of dharma-s have been directly
realized (l'Jirffl; abhi-sam--fi) through it, one will no longer be deluded
[therein]. 5
It is true that in the coutse of development of the Abhidharmika exegetical meth-

odology, there unavoidably ·came to be some distinctive elements of what might be
called "scholasticism". But in view of the above consideration, I, for one, am very
disinclined to adopt "scholasticism" as a formal rendering of "Abhidharma". Perhaps
the term is best left in its Sanskrit form.
B. The predecessors of the Abhidharmakosa-bha~ya as a manual

1. Like many other Buddhist schools, the Sarvastivada came to be a fully estab-
lished school through a gradual process, and it is hardly possible to pinpoint an
exact date of its founding or a particular person as its founder. This is especially
so since the Sarvastivada is a broad lineage embracing, besides the Abhidharmika
masters, various masters and communities, some of whom-such as the early
Dar~tantikas-are basically anti-Abhidharmika. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Abhi-
dharmikas, constituting the mainstream Sarvastivadins as they do, came to uphold
the Jiianaprasthana (ca. 150 B.C.) as the supreme authority on Abhidharma doc-
trines, its author Katyayaniputra came to be generally regarded by tradition as the
school's effective founder. Eventually the orthodox Sarvastivaqins based in Kasmira
composed the Abhidharma-mahavibha:ja, a gigantic commentary (translated by Xuan
BHIKKHU KL DHAMMAJOTI 3
Zang into 200 fascicles) on the Jfianaprasthiina, with the. purpose of defining the
Sarvii.stivii.da orthodoxy and purging all other views not compatible with those
expressed by Kii.tyii.yaniputra. Subsequent to this, these Kasmirian masters assumed
the position of orthodox Sarviistivadins and, conforming to the collectively sanc-
tioned views arrived at in this commentary, came to be known as the Vaibhii.~ikas.
The Mahiivibha~a. now extant only in Chinese, was undoubtedly a great achievement
to be proud of, representing the collective wisdom through a process of continuous
effort of devoted study, careful analysis and articulation on the part of these
.Abhidharmikas. Traditional accounts speak of it as being guarded as a great treasure,
not to be transmitted outside the Kasmirian orthodoxy.
2. Be that as it may, it is certain that the text in due course came to be widely
known by the other Sarvii.stivii.dins outside Kasmira, including the so-called
"western" (Pii.scii.ttya) or "outside" (Bii.hyaka/Bii.hyii.bhidharmika) masters. These
latter masters, based mainly in the Gandhii.ra region, while also respecting the
Jnanaprasthiina, did not submit themselves to the dictation of the authority of this
text or its huge commentary. In fact, many of them seemed to be much more
influenced by Vasumitra's Prakarm;ia-pada, another canonical Abhidharma text of
the school. In respect of doctrinal exposition, one of major influences of the
Prakara,;ia on these western masters was the tendency towards succinctness and
organization - a tendency especially discernible in the exposition of its Pafica-
vastuka chapter which streamlines for the first time the classification of the totality of
dharma-s into the five categories of riipa, citta, caitasika, viprayukta-sarriskara and
asarriskrta:
3. The Mahavibha~ii, in contrast, encyclopedic as it is, in respect of organiza-

tion leaves much to be desired as a text for a systematic comprehension of the
Sarvii.stiviida doctrines. This partly results from its structure being dictated by that of
the Jfianaprasthiina, which is little organized, and partly owing to the compilers'
style of branching off too frequently from one topic to another in discussing a given
doctrinal position. This fact, coupled with a reaction on the part of some masters-
mainly Gandhiira based-to its excessive adherence to the Jfianaprasthana ortho-
doxy, led to the subsequent compilation of various Abhidharma manuals exhibiting
the tendency towards succinctness and systematic organization.
i. The first of these appeared shortly after the Mahiivibha~a. entitled the *Amrta-
rasa-sastra it'.aJ~~ (T no. 1553), a·small treatise (two fascicles in Chinese tr.) by
Gho~aka6 who evidently consulted and often synthesized the views in the Jfiana-
f) prasthana, Prakara,;ia-pada as well as Mahavibhii~a. The influence from the
4 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhii:jya
Prakara,:za-piida is particularly visible in the chapter on the sa1?1,skiira-s which

Gho~aka divides into sa1?1,prayukta- (the caitasika-s) and viprayukta-sa1?1,skiira-s
(comprising fifteen dharma-s, just as the Paiicavastuka chapter of the Prakara,:za-
piida does. Gho~aka also follows the Paiicavastu.ka in enumerating four non-defined
roots (avyakrta-miila) and tenjiiiina-s.7 The Amrta-rasa, though having the merit of
succinctness and a distinctive emphasis on praxis, suffers from a lack of breadth and
depth in terms of doctrinal elucidation.
ii. The next manual in this direction of development was DharmasrI's Abhidharma-
hrdaya ~ l!l: 1t-~ (T no. 1550), around the latter part of the third century C.E. 8 This
was basically a revision and enlargement (four fascicles in Chinese tr.) of the Amrta-
rasa. Its main contribution was the innovation of the style of expounding Abhi-
dharma doctrines in verses, followed by prose elaboration. The verses very effec-
tively summarize the doctrines and greatly facilitate their memorization. In terms of
organization, it also shows a further improvement: it underscores the Abhidharma
emphasis on the investigation. of the intrinsic and common characteristics of
dharma~s by making the "exposition on dhatu-s" the very first chapter. This is
immediately followed by the second chapter .on the "sa1?1,skii:ra-s" (fi£)--ex-
pounding the dynamic inter-relationship among the dharma-s-replacing chapters
six, seven and eight of the Amrta-rasa. In this way, the first two chapters fully
accomplish the task of a general exposition on what the ultimate reals are and their
dynamic functions. The remaining chapters are then devoted to the individual
expositions on the specific cause-effect relations of these reals from different
perspectives. Such an organization came to be consistently adopted by the later
manuals, including the Abhidharmakosa and its bhi'i:jya. A significant doctrinal
dissention from the Kasmirian orthodoxy in this text concerns the non-information
(avijiiapti) karma: it teaches that the non-information is unreal, speaking of it as a
seed that arises in the doer's IJ.lind (whose serial continuity fluctuates in moral
nature: sometimes skillful, sometimes unskillful and sometimes neutral) when it has
been projected by a strong information karma. 9 It also asserts that "mental karma is
exclusively of the nature of non-information karma, since the cetani'i continues
subtly as a series without manifesting itself'. 10 Both assertions are contrary to the
Jiianaprasthana-Mahavibhii:jii orthodoxy.
iii. The Abhidharma-hrdaya sets the style of exposition and the structural trend for
the subsequent Abhidharma manuals, and appears to have been very influential.
Various commentaries,1 1 extant now only in Chinese, came to be written on it, some
with the intent of aligning more with the Jiiiinaprasthiina-Mahiivibhii:jii orthodoxy,
while others dissent to varying degrees. One, by Upasanta, entitled ~ l!.i: 1t-~,
BHIKKHU KL DHAMMAJOTJ 5
apparently the same title as *Abhidharmahrdaya, or forl!~,t'~~ (T no. 1551),

probably *Abhidharmahrdaya-bhii~ya in its original Sanskrit, was translated in 555-
561 C.E. This text adds two stanzas to those of the Abhidharmahrdaya, modifies
some of its stanzas and revises its expositions with an attempt to restore them to the
Jfitinaprasthiina-Mahiivibhii~a orthodoxy.
iv. The *Abhidharmahrdaya-vytikhya (or *Misra-abhidharmahrdaya lltllHtl:,t'~,

T no. 1552), composed around 350 C.E. by Dharmatrata, another Gandhara master,
follows Upasanta's commentary in this direction. Many scholars have long con-
sidered it.as a direct reference of Vasubandhu when he composed the Abhidharma-
kosa. 12 This text contains 596 stanzas, twice as many as the Abhidharmahrdaya, and
in this way is better suited for more extensive doctri9al exposition. It also added a
chapter on "discernment/investigation (:t. J6 ). But while aligning his views with
those in the Mahti-vibha~a. the author often retains some variant Vaibha~ika views.
Besides following Upasanta in rectifying Dharmasrl's non-orthodox exposition, he
also shows some attempt at more precise definitions. For instance, Dharmasrl defines
''with-outflow" (stisrava) thus:
The noble ones define "with-outflow" as that which generates defilement. 13
Upasanta follows this, though slightly modifying DharmasrI's stanza and offering a
little elaboration:
The noble ones define "with-outflow" as that wherein defilement is gener-
ated.14
Dharmatrata's definition, on the other hand, is more articulate:

The noble ones define "with-outflow" as that wherein defilement is intensi-
.fied.15
Towards the end of the chapter on "discernment", he states that he finds it necessary
to modify DharmasrI's ,stanza and e~planation, not out of arrogance or a desire
to become famous, but in the hope· that his exposition would contribute to the
propagation of the doctrinal legacy (of the ancient masters). Taking the definition on
"with-outflow" as an example, he explains:
For instance, he (DharmasrI) states that "the noble ones define 'with-
outflow' as that which generates defilement". [But] cessation (nirodha) and
the path (miirga) too generate defilem\:nt; yet they are not with-outflow.
This is because they are adverse (~~11'; *apak~a) to the increase (/intensifi-
cation) of the defilement. A defilement that takes an outflow-free object
(aniisrava-iilambanal_i klesal_i) diminishes rather than intensifies .... Hence,
I say "is intensified". 16
6 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabha~ya
v .. FQllowing the style of Dharmatrata, Vasubandhu (ca. fourth_ century C.E.),

another Gandhiirian, composed the Abhidharma-kosa in verse. He skillfully .sum-
marizes the Vaibha~ika doctrines, occasionally inserting the word "kila" where
he dissents from the Vaibha~ika orthodoxy. In his own prose commentary, the
Abhidhannakosa-bha~ya, he reviews the Vaibha~ika tenets, often criticizing them
from the Sautriintika perspective. Vasubandhu's brilliant critique of the Vaibhii~ika
doctrines was answered by the equally brilliant Sarµghabhadra, his contemporary and
a staunch Vaibhii~ika, in the *Nyayanusara which is now extant only in Xuan Zang's
translation. Other more concis~ manuals followed, such as Skandhila's Abhi-
dharmiivatiira (extant in both Tibetan and Chinese translations) which aims at
expounding the totality oft.he S~rviistiviida doctrines in a scheme of eight categories
(padartha)-five aggregates (skandha) and the three unconditioned (asarµskrta)-
whiie steering clear of sectarian disputations.
c. The organizational structure of the Abhidhar,,.akosa-bhii~ya

1. Vasubandhu's Abhidhannakosa-bha~ya may ·be considered the culmination
in the western-based development of Abhidharma manuals, influenced by the
Prakara,:ia-piida's tendency towards succinctness and systematic exposition. In fact,
like many western masters, he appears to respect the Prakara,:ia as much as the
Jnanaprasthiina.
The structural similarity between the AKB and the ARV should be clear from the
following table of comparison:
AKB AHV
1. Dhtitu-nirdesa Jr- J1r --~: iJii(*Dhiitu-nird_e_sa_)_ _ _ _~
2. Indriya-nirdesa Jii
3. Loka-nirdesa ili: MJ'p
*~··········••····•·•··········•·······•·•··········
-··-----
2. 1i Ji, (*Sarriskiira-nirdesa)
]
_4_._K._a_r_m_a_-n_i_rd_e_sa_-J!t._~_'l,_____t····· 3. -J/t. J1r (*Kar~a-nirdesa) f.i
5. Anusaya-nirdesa Jlit Pl?. JI, 4. 1t JI, (*Anusaya-nirdesa) 1
,,
""""'"~"·-""~'"·""~... , ~ - - ~ . - - - ~ ~ - - . - -·· .• "~·~-~", 11
6. Miirgapudgala-nirdesa JtM Ji, 5. Jt¥ J'p (*Miirgapudgala-nirdesa) i
7. Jfiiina-nirdesa 9/,\' Ji, ·
!!--------···•-••························································N·····
6:.......
9/,\' Ji, (* Jfiii~~~~i;d~ia)
-----
I
\¾
8. Samiipatti-nirdesa JtJi, 7. JtJ!, (*Samiipatti-nirdesa) jl
---------~-----,.,. •...
8. 1~ ~ !.ll. Ji, (*Sutra-nirdesa) I
m------------········•·······l--- ----;$
------~,,,,..,,,.,=,,.,,,_,,. a· ~--w"
9.
-~ ·•••••••••••••-••••
#Jh (*K~udraka/prakfr,:iaka) •
10. ~JI, (*Viniscaya)
....---·------· ······1i: (*Siimkathya/"';;~§~~=k~ih~L: iJli
BHJKKHU KL DHAMMAJOTI 7
It can be seen that Vasubandhu deleted the last four chapters of the ARV, of which
eight, nine and eleven were inherited from the Abhidharmahrdaya. Since these four
chapters do not contain specifically representative doctrines under their titles,
Vasubandhu deleted them, though incorporated some of their content into his chap-
ters. On the other hand, he added the loka-nirdesa (chapter three) which then
provides a proper venue for the Abhidharma exposition of cosmological doctrines;
various discussions pertaining thereto are found scattered in different places of the
ARV. Chapter two of the ARV is renamed as "indriya-nirdesa"-perhaps also not a
very suitable choice of title-because this chapter in his AKB begins by discus-
sing the twenty-two indriya-s. Pu Guang 17 justifies Vasubandhu's deviation from
Dharmatrii.ta here: "indriya" decisively signifies "function". On the other hand, the
term "sa,µskiira" (as in the ARV), while denoting constructive activity or condi-
tioning (il1t:), also signifies procession or te~poral flow (:ililit; sam--fkram); the
signification of function/activity is thus not decisive. 18
As we have remarked above, the AKB inherited the scheme of exposition, set by the
Abhidharma-hrdaya: the first two chapters expound generally the ultimate reals as
well as their mutual interactions; the remaining chapters deal separately. with the
specific aspects of their cause-effect relationship. In the first chapter of the AKB,
Vasubandhu retains the title "dhiitu-nirdesa", subsuming all dharma-s into two
fundamental species: with-outflow and outflow-free; these are correlated to the four
Noble Truths. 19
A ninth chapter ,on Atmaviida-prati~edha is appended to the eight chapters of the
AKB. In style, it is distinctively different from the previous chapters in being purely
in prose, without the karikii-s. At the end of chapter eight, Vasubandhu already says
that he has finished expounding the Abhidharma doctrines. It is to be noted in this
connection that Sarpghabhadra's *Nyiiyiinusiira also ends with cqapter eight on
samiipatii and does not say a word on the ninth chapter; Nevertheless, Vasubandhu
must have had this· chapter in mind when composing the AKB, as he refers to it
within this text. 20
2. Pu Guang, takes all this into consideration in explaining the overall structure
of the AKB. He firstly points out that all Indian treatises have as their aim the
elucidation of the Buddha's teachings of the three insignia: (i) "All conditionings are
impermanent" (sarve sa,µskiirii 'nityati); (ii) "all dharma-s are without a self' (sarve
dharmii'niitmiinal:i); (iii) "Nirvii~a is quiescent" (nirvii~a,µ siintam). Some texts eluci-
date one; other, another. The AKB, he says, aims at elucidating no-self-ness, because
by doing so, the no-self-ness of all dhanna-s, whether conditioned or unconditioned,
is demonstrated. 21 He then gives the outline structure of the whole text thus:
This treatise has a total of nine chapters, elucidating [the teaching] in the
siitra-s that "all dharma-s are without a self". The first eight chapters
expound [as their proper concern]22 the dharma-s as [non-self] entities ($)
.... The last chapter expounds [as its proper concern] the principle (:fl) of
no-self-ness ....
Among the first eight chapters, the first two expound generally the with-
outflow and outflow-free; the last six expound separately [the specific
aspects of] the with-outflow and outflow-free ....
In the general exposition, the dhatu-nirdesa elucidates [as its proper con-
cern] the essential natures of the dharma-s; the indriya-nirdesa elucidates
[as its proper concern] the functions/efficacies of the dharma-s . ... The
essential natures constitute the bases, hence the dhiitu-s are first expounded,
The efficacies arise with the essential natures as support-bases, hence the
indriya-s are next expounded.
Among the six chapters of separate expositions, the first three elucidate [as
C. their proper concern] the with-outflow dharma-s; the last three elucidate [as
their proper concern] the outflow-free dharma-s ... .
Among the separate expositions of the with-outflow dharma-s, there are
three chapters-loka, karma and anusaya-which elucidate the sequence of
the fruits,. the causes and the conditions (pratyaya): The loka-nirde§a [as its
proper concern] elucidates the with-outflow fruits; they are expounded first
because their characteristics ate gross and are easy to be disgusted with ....
The karma-nirdesa · [as its proper concern] elucidates the causes of the
retributions; the fruits necessarily arise from the causes and their powers
must be dominant, hence they are expounded next. ... The anusaya-nirdesa
elucidates [as its proper concern] the conditions for the karma-s. The
karma-s by themselves cannot effectuate fruition, and must rely on the
conditions; and in the production of the fruits, the anusaya-s are relatively
inferior [as a contributing factor], hence they are elucidated last.
Among the separate expositions of the outflow-free dharma-s, there are
three chapters-miirga-pudgala, jfiiina and samiipatti-which elucidate the
sequence of the fruits, the causes and the conditions: The miirga-pudgala-
nirdesa [as its proper concern] elucidates the outflow-free fruits; they are
elucidated first because their characteristics are manifest and easy to be
delighted in. The jftiina-nirdesa elucidates [as its proper concern] the causes
for the realization of the fruits. The fruits necessarily depend on their
causes, which are strong [as a contributory factor] to the realization of the
fruits, hence they are elucidated next. The samiipatti-nirdesa elucidates the
conditions for the jfiiina-s. The jftiina-s by themselves alone cannot [lead to]
the realization of the fruits, they must rely on the samiipatti-s as conditions;
and the samqpatti-s are comparatively inferior [as a contributory factor] to
the fruits, hence they are elucidated last. 23
BHIKKHV KL DHAMMAJOTI 9
Pu Guang's description of the organizational structure of the AKB can b.e summa-
rized by the following chart:
CHAPTER ELUCIDATION
Dhatu Essential nature of dharma-s With-outflow
Jndriya Functions of dharma-s & outflow-free:
Causes for the realization of expositions on

the fruits outflow~free . ·.
Conditions for the ·nana-s
'Atmavlida- Principle of non-self-ness
prati~edha
n. The affiliation of the Abhidharmakosa-bha~ya

1. Besides its culminating. achievement in streamlining the overall structure of
the whole exposition, Vasubandhu' s AKB is also unmatched by any of the preced-
ing manuals in respect to its comprehensiveness, incorporating all the important
Vaibhii~ika doctrines since the Vibhii~a, to its excellent .skill in definition and elu-
cidation, and to its ability to clarify the difficult points involved in doctrinal
disputations. Added to thes~ is its great value as a brilliant critique and insightful re-
evaluation of all the fundamental Sarviistiviida doctrines developed up to its time.
Since its appearance, it had been used in India as a standard textbook for the
understanding of not only the Abhidharma doctrines but fundamental Buddhist
doctrines in general. Pu Guang tells us that in India, it was hailed as the "Book of
Intelligence" (:iiw o/l ~): ·
[This treatise] gathers the essential teachings of the six "feet[-treatises]"
without leaving out anything. Although the master, when discussing the
Sarvastivada doctrines, at times rectifies them from the perspective of the
Sautrantikas, he [in fact] affiliates himself with whatever accords with truth
and harbors no sectarian bias. Accordingly, the ninety-six heretical schools
without exception enjoy studying this text, and all the eighteen [Hinayana]
sects equally delight in it as an esoteric treatise (~·:!Ii!-) .... Hence, students
in India.hail it as the "Book oflntelligence".24
10 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhii~a
In China, Japan and the Far-East, too, the AKB has generally been highly treasured
as a textbook of fundamental importance for Buddhist studies. In Japan, there is a
popular saying: "Eight years of the Kosa and three years of the Vijfiaptimiitra [-for
the mastery of Buddhist philosophy]".
2. Vasubandhu states that he, in the main, follows the Kasmirian Vaibha~ikas in
expounding the Sarviistiviidin doctrines. However, in many places, he is explicitly
oriented towards the doctrinal standpoints of the Sautriintikas, together with whom
he repudiates even the fundamental Sarviistivada tenet of the tri-temporal existence
of dharma-s. In his exposition on karma (including the doctrine of the avijfiapti),
the process of spiritual transformation (iisraya-parivrtti) and no-self-ness, etc., he is
seen to clearly favor the Sautriintika theory of bfja. To this extent, he could be
labeled as a Sautrantika. But in many cases, he also advocates the Sarvastivada-
Vaibha~ika positions: notably, the doctrine of simultaneous causality (sahabha-
hetu), the citta-caitta doctrines in general (here he generally refrains from siding
with the Sautriintikas), and the system of spiritual praxis and its stages of progress.
Moreover; he never in a sectarian manner rejects the doctrines of the Abhidharma
texts-his composition of the AKB is a clear point in case. At the end of chapter
eight, he states:
This abhidharma proclaimed by us is for the most part established
according to the principles of the Kasmirian Vaibhii~ikas (ka§mfra-
vaibhii~ikii,:iiif[I, nfti-siddhalJ). Whatever herein has been badly grasped by us
is our fault. But then, with regard to the principle of the True Doctrine, the
Buddha and the sons of the Buddha alone are the authority (pramii,:ia). 25
On the whole, therefore, concerning Vasubandhu's affiliation, the description by the

Chinese commentators seems most appropriate: he affiliates himself with whatever
accords with truth ( 1V, :tl~~ *, -~~*).The following is expressed by Fa Bao, a
student of Xuan Zang:
The stanzas in this treatise are composed mostly in accordance with the
Vibhii~a. In the prose, [the author] affiliates with whatever excels in
truthfulness, and is not partial to any particular school. Nevertheless, within
[the prose commentary], he mostly takes the Sautriintika doctrines as the
correct ones. 26
E. Summaries and discussion on the chapters

EA. Chapter one: Dhatu-nirdesa
As we saw above, the title of this chapter is inherited from the Abhidharma-hrdaya,
and this first chapter has as its main purpose the exposition on the entities qua
ultimate reals. Although this chapter also investigates these reals underthe scheme of
the skandha-s and iiyatana-s, the term "dhiitu" is chosen because it has a similar
signification as "dharma" when understood in the sense of an ultimate real source.
Thus, the Great Elements (mahii-bhuta) are also called dhiitu-s with the definition:
"they are dhiitu-s because they sustain their intrinsic characteristics and the derived
rupa-s". 27 While the part concerning their sustaining the derived matter is to be
expected, the first part of the definition-"silstain intrinsic characteristics"-is
most instructive. It is the same definition as. that for "dharma": "It is dharma
because it sustains its intrinsic characteristic."28 Moreover, when explaining "dhiitu"
in "loka-dhij,tu", etc. (chapter three), Vasubandhu again gives the gloss: "svalak~a,:,,a-
dhiira,:iiid dhiitul:z''. 29 We may further note that in fact the Vaibhii~ikas-as repre-
sented.by Sazµghabhadra-take "dharmatii" ("nature of dharma") as a synonym for
"dhiitu".?£> In this connection, we should also note that in his *Nyiiyiinusiira,
Saqighabhadra names this chapter as "The Fundamental Entities" (1.10, & ; *draVJ.'a-
nirdesa) which confirms that "dhiitu" in the title of this chapter of the AKB is indeed
intended to signify the ultimate or fundamental reals.
This chapter offers definitions of the central concepts of Abhidharma, and discusses
its most fundamental topics; some in outline, some in considerable detail.
1. Firstly, "abhidharma" is stated to be the outflow-free prajfiii. In fact, both "abhi-

dharma" and "prajnii" are glossed as "discernment/investigation of dharma-s." In
a broader sense, abhidharma can be said to comprise all the five outflow-free
skandha-s that constitute its "retinue" (anucara). This is· abhidharma in the highest
sense (piiramiirthika). In the conventional sense, the term further connotes all that
serves as the means for the acquisition of this outflow-free prajna: the with-outflow
prajna derived from listening, from reflection and from cultivation, or innately
acquired, as well as the Abhidharma texts.
"Abhidharma" is also etymologically defined as "face to face (abhimukha)_ with the
dharma-s". A "dharma" is- a unique, ultimate real entity "which sustains its intrinsic
characteristic (svalaka~a,:ia-dhara,:iad dharmal:,.). This "dharma" is also said to refer
to Nirvii,:ia, the "dharma qua the absolute entity (paramartha-dharma)". These
explanations taken together mean that Abhidharma in the true sense is that which
directly realizes the true nature of all dharma-s and hence also that which leads to the
realization of Nirva,:ia.
2. The definitional identification of "abhidharma" with "prajfi,ii," spells out the·

central importance of the latter as both the means and the ultimate aim of abhi-
12 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabha!jya
dhanna investigation. This is more explicitly shown in the definition of prajna in the
Abhidhannadfpa-prabhavrtti31 and Skandhila's Abhidhannavatara:
Understanding (prajiiii) is the discernment of dharma-s. It is the exami-

nation (upalak/far.za), as the case may be, of the following eight kinds of
dharma-s: inclusion (sarµgraha), conjunction (sarµprayoga), endowment
(samanviigama), causes (hetu), conditions (sarµgraha), effects (phala),
intrinsic characteristic (svalak/far.za), common characteristic (siimiinya-
lak/fai:ta).32
The eight items enumerated constitute the fundamental topics as well as methodo-
logical devices of the A.bhidharmikas.
"Intrinsic characteristic" and "common characteristic" constitute the core concern
of dhanna-pravicaya. "Conjunction" studies the dynamic relationship between the
simultaneously existing mental factors.
"Inclusion" is an important device for determining the nature of dharma-s in terms of
their intrinsic natures:
For instance, the visual faculty is subsumed under the matter-aggregate, by

the visual abode (cak~ur-iiyatana) and the visual element (cak/fur-dhiitu),
and the truths of unsatisfactoriness and origin. This is because they consti-
tute its intrinsic nature. It is not [subsumed under] the other aggregates, etc.,
for it is. distinct in rtatnre from them. 33
Every dhanna is both a cause/condition for other dharma-s and is_ also caused/
·conditioned ~y other dhanna-s; the study of causality ("causes", "conditions" and
"effects") is therefore of fundamental importance.
Last, "endowment"-a modality of acquisition (prapti)-is a special topic, also of
fundamentaJ importance to the Sarvastivada system (cf also Section EB).
3. Vasubandhu gives us the Vaibha~ika view that the Abhidharma was taught by
the Buddha himself for the purpose of emancipation from sarrisara. But he also
indicates his disgreement with the marker word "kila" ("it is said ... "). Yasomitra
comments that Vasubandhu intends, here to convey the Sautrantika stance that
"Abhidharma" refers to the teachings· in certain types of satra-s such as the
Arthaviniscaya, etc. 34
4. The totality of dhanna-s is subsumed as those that are with-outflow ("impure")

and those that are outflow-free ("pure"). "Outflow" is a synonym for defilement; but
it has the important signification of that which retains one (asayati) in sarrisara. A
with-outflow (sasrava) dhanna is that which conduces to or is favorable for the
BHIKKHU KLDHAMMAJOTI 13
growth or intensification of a defilement. Even a skillful act, such as giving, however

sincere, may be with-outflow unless done through spiritual insight, because it may
retain us in some form of saqisaric existence. This category comprises all the
conditioned (sarriskrta) dharma-s of the truths of unsatisfactoriness (dul:zkha) and its
origin (samudaya).
The truth of the path (marga) and the three types of unconditioned (asarriskrta)
dhanna-s-Space (akasa), cessation through deliberation (pratisarrikhya-nirod,ha)
and cessation independent of deliberation (apratisarrikhya-nirodha)--are-0utflow-
free ·(anasrava) because they do not conduce to the growth of a defilement. An
outflow-free skillful act, such as the practice of an aspect of the noble eightfold path,
leads one further and further away from sarrisara.
Space has non-obstruction (anavara~za) as its intrinsic nature. Pratisarrikhya-nirodha
is a cessation-a real entity-arisen through an effort of discrimination. Aprati-
sarrikhya-nirodha is a cessation acquired without specific effort, but owing to the
mere deficiency in the conditions for a dharma's arising; this too is a real entity (not
a mere absence of conditions) efficacious in absolutely preventing the re-arising of
the ceased dharma.
5. The conditioned dharma-s are etymologically defined as those "compounded by

an assemblage of conditions" (samety sarribhuya pratyayail:z krta iti sarriskrtal:z). They
are explained as comprising the five skandha-s:
i. Matter (rupa), defined as that which is resistant and subject to deterioration,
comprising the four Great Elements _(mahabhuta) and the derived matter (upadaya-
rupa). A special type of matter called the non-information (avijiiapti) matter is
briefly ~xplained as that which is projected by a physical or vocal karma. Although
of the nature of rupa, it is invisible and non-resistant; once projected, it continues
_serially even when the doer's thought is of a different moral nature than that when it
was projected, and even when no mental activity occurs in him. (Avijiiapti is
discussed in detail in chapter four.)
n. Sensation (vgdana) is of three species, pleasurable, unpleasurable and neutral.
iii. Ideation (sarrijiia) is that which grasps a sign: "male", "female", "green", "yel-
low", etc.
iv. Conditionings (sarriskara) comprise all conditioned dharma-s other than matter,
sensation, ideation and consciousness .. They include both the conjoined (sarripra-
yukta) and the disjoined (viprayukta) conditionings (cf. Section EB).
v. Consciousness (vijiiana) is defined as the cognition of its specific object-domain
as a whole (vi~ayarri vi~ayarri prati vijiiaptir upalabdhir vijiiana-skandhal:z).
14 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhiifya
6. We thus see that this chapter discusses all the five fundamental categories of
dharma: (i) riipa, (ii) citta, (iii) caitasika, (iv) viprayukta-saTflskiira, (v) asaTflskrta;
though ii-iv are only briefly mentioned. This five-category classification of
dharma-s, originally innovated in Vasumitra's Prakarar,a-piida, served as the
standard Sarvastivadin classification throughout the ages.
7. The six internal faculties (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and
mental) and the six corresponding objects are also subsumed wnder the scheme of the
"twelve abodes/entrances" (iiyatana). All dharma-s are also subsumable under the
scheme of the "eighteen elements" (dhiitu).
"Skandha" is glossed as. '.'heap"; "iiyatana" as "gate of entry (iiya-dviira) of thoughts
and thought-concomitants; "dhiitu" as "clan" (gotra), in the sense of "mine" (iikara),
like iron-mine, gold-mine, etc. - the source-origin. Whereas the Vaibha~ikas take
all these three categories as existent, the Sautrlintikas would only accept the dhiitu-s
as existent. Vasubandhu himself accepts the iiyatana-s and the dhiitu-s as existent.
8. The dharma-s-the eighteen elements-are further investigated from various

doctrinal perspectives. Pu Guang counts a total of twenty-two perspectives in this
chapter: (1) visible (sa-nidarsana), invisible (anidarsana); (2) resistant (sa-pratigha),
non-resistant (apratigha) (3) skillful (kusala), unskillful (akusala), non-defined
(avyakrta); (4) ·connected with/pertaining to (pratisaTflyukta) sensuality sphere, to
fine-materiality sphere, to non-materiality sphere; (5) with-outflow, outflow-free;
(6) with-reasoning (savitarka), with-investigation (saviciira); (7) with cognitive
object (sa-iilambana), without cognitive object (aniilambana); (8) appropriated
(uplitta), non-appropriated (anutpiitta); (9) Great Elements (bhuta), derived from
Great Elements (bhautika); 00) accumulated (sa'!lcita), non-accumulated (asaTflcita);
(11) that which cuts ·(chinatti), that which is cut (chidyate); (12) that which bums
(diihaka), that which is burnt (dahyate); (13) that which weighs (tulayati), that which
can be weighed (tulya); (14) the five species: retribution-born (vipiikaja), accumula-
tive (aupacayika), emanational (naif:ifyandika), yoked with a real entity (dravya-
yukta), momentary (~ar,ika); (15) acquisition (priipti/pratilambha), endowment
(samanviigama); (16) external, internal; (17) participative/active (sabhiiga), non-par-
ticipative/facsimile (tat-sabhiiga); (18) abandonable through seeing/vision (darsana-
heya), abandonabk_through cultivation (bhiivanii-heya), not to be abandoned
(ahey~); (19) view (dmi), not view; (20) consciousness (vijfiiina), object of con-
sciousness (/the cognized; vijfieya - i.e., what elements are cognized by which con-
sciousness); (21) permanent, impermanent; (22) faculties (indriya), non-faculties. 35
Such an investigation from the various perspectives col)stitutes a fundamental
methodology of dharma-pravicaya.
Bmia(HU KL DHAMMAJOTI 15
i. In discussing how many of the dhatu-s are views (dr~ti), how many are not
views, a controversy arises as to "what sees". The Vaibha~ikas maintain that it is the
visual faculty that sees; the Vijiianavlida, consciousness. The Sautrlintikas finally
appear on the scene and ridicule the disputants as trying to chew empty space:
Conditioned by the eye and rapa-s, visual consciousness arises. Therein,
what sees and what is seen? It is devoid of any operation; it is mere-dharma
qua cause and effect... .36
ii. ·in the final discussion on how many dhiitu-s are faculties (indriya), how many
are not, twenty-two faculties are enumerated: 1-5. the five sensory faculties;
6. mental; 7. male; 8. female; 9. vital; 10. pleasure (sukha-); 11. displeasure (dul}kha-);
12. joyousness (saumanasya-); 13. distress (daurmanasya-); 14. even-mindedness
(upek~ii-); 15. faith; 16. vigor; 17. mindfulness; 18. equipoise (samiidhi-); 19. under-
standing (prajiiii-); 20. "I shall know what has not been known" (anlijiilitam-
iijiiiisylimi-); 21. full-knowledge (iijiiii-); 22. possessing full-knowledge (lijiilitiivi-).
EB. Chapter two: Indriya-nirdesa

We saw that Vasubandhu changed the title of the second chapter of AHV from
"sa1!1,sklira", and Pu Guang, observing that this chapter is intended to expound the
dynamic activities vis-a-vis the ultimate reals, argues that "indriya" is a more
appropriate title because it more decisively signifies "function/activity" (Section C).
We may note here that Vasubandhu does gloss "indriya" as "dominance" (iidhipatya;
see below), a term also used to define the "condition of dominance" (adhipati-
pratyaya) and the "efficient cause"· (kiira,:ia-hetu), both signifying a cause/condition
exercising a force of dominance over the arising of other dharma-s. On the other
hand, this title may also simply be due to the fact that this chapter picks up from the
enumeration of the indriya-s at the end of chapter one, and they are the first topic of
discussion here. Nevertheless, it is possible that in choosing "indriya", Vasubandhu
has actually simultaneously taken all these into consideration.
Probably not finding the title entirely satisfactory, Sarµghabhadra changes it to
"Distinctive Varieties" (!:.Stl JEi; *Prabheda-nirdesa), which he perhaps thinks better
indicates the varieties of modes that the ultimate reals can function in mutual
interaction. Pu Guang, however, defends Vasubandhu's choice, and shows his
preference for it over "Conditionings" and "Distinctive Varieties". 37
This chapter comprises the following major sections: (a) on the twenty-two indriya-s;
(b) on the co-nascence of material atoms, (c) on the citta-caitta-s, (d) on the con-
ditionings disjoined from thought; (e) on causes, conditions and effects.
16 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya
EBA. On the indriya-s

The chapter begins with the grammarian definition of the term "indriya": "The root
idi is in the sense of 'supreme dominion' (idi paramaisvarye). The indriya-s are so
called because they exercise power (indantfti indriyti,:ii)." It then states t~at indriya
means "dominance" (adhipatya). 38 E.g., the eye is an indriya since it exercises a
dominant function in the arising of visual consciousness and its conjoined thought-
concomitants, etc.
The la~t three outflow-free indriya-s are, in nature, spiritual insight at progressively
higher levels of spiritual attainment and, in terms of intrinsic nature, they are, in each
case, constituted by nine faculties: manas, sukha, saumanasya, upek~ti, sraddhti,
vrrya, smrti, samtidhi and prajiiti. The first of these three, called the faculty of "I shall
know what has not been .known" exercises dominance with regard to the cessation of
the defilements abandonable through insight (darsana-heya). The second, the
faculty of "full knowledge", exercises dominance with regard to the cessation of
the defilements abandonable through cultivation (bhavanti-heya). The third, the
faculty of "possessing full knowledge" exercises dominance with regard to the state
of bliss in the present and constitutes the path of liberation in the acquisition of the
fruit of arhat-hood . .
The definition of "indriya" in terms of "dominance" serves the purpose of a unifying
concept for the twenty-two indriya-s whose members have occurred in different.
contexts in the sutra-s (and stistra s) with different emphases. But this leads to the
0
question as to why these twenty-two alone are considered indriya s when many other
0
dharma-s too exercise a dominant influence in the arising or functioning of other

dharma~s. Vasubandhu presents the Vaibhii~ika explanation on the essential charac-
teristics of the. indriya-s: They firstly (1-6) refer to the six faculties of consciousness,
visual to mental, which constitute the sixfold support-basis of thought (citta-iisraya),
that is, the six internal iiyatana-s which are the fundamental constituents (maula,ri
sattva-drayam) of a sentient being. They furthermore refer to what differentiates
this six-fold basis as being male and female (7-8), to what sustains it for a period
of duration (9), to what causes its pollution (sa,riklesa) (10-14), to what serves as
requisites for its purification (vyavadtina) (15-19), and to what accomplishes its
purification (20-22).
Vasubandhu does not raise any objection to these Sjlrviistiviida-Vaibhii~ika ex-
planations, and in fact refutes the claim by some, namely, that the defining char-
acteristic of "dominance" results in having to admit that the hands, feet, etc., too, are
"indriya-s" .39
EBB. On lhe co-nascence of material atoms

In the Buddhist system, nothing can arise by itself. In the Abhidharma analysis, this
means that whenever a dharma arises, it necessarily does so with a number of co-
nascent dharma-s. In the case of material dharma-s, the A.bhidharmikas combine-
apparently not so perfectly-the doctrine of the Great Elements with the relatively
later theory of atoms (paramii,:,,u) coming from outside of Buddhism (probably from
the Vaise~ika). At least by the time of the MVS, they had articulated their own
version of the atomic theory to a large extent. Sometime after this, they came to
stipulate that in the sensuality sphere a minimum of eight substances-constituting
the subtlest. aggregate, "aggregate-atom" (sarrtghiita-paramii,:,,u')--are necessarily co-
nascent. This theory is clearly proposed herein this chapter, mentioning the "octad
molecule" as comprising the four Great Elements plus visible, odor, taste and touch.
This is the case where no sound is produced and no sense faculty is involved. Where
sound is generated, one has a nonad molecule; so also is the case of the bodily
faculty, comprising the basic eight plus an atom of the bodily faculty. Where another
·faculty such as the eye is involved, the minimum is ten: the basic eight, plus an atom
of the bodily faculty plus an atom of the eye. It should be noted that prior to the
AKB, the Abhidharma-hrdaya, in its second chapter, has already mentioned this
doctrine:
In a rupa which is not a faculty, there are eight types of atom.
Question: To the atoms of which sphere do these refer?
Answer: They refer to [where there is] odor; odor exists in the sensuality
sphere. 40
EBc. On the citta-caitta-s

1. Vasubandhu expounds in great detail the Vaibha~ika teachings on thoughts and
thought-concomitants, and generally without repudiating them. For instance, he
straightforwardly describes the Vaibha~ika doctrine on citta, manas and vijfiiina
being one and the same object (ekartha), even though having different significa-
tions, and then he proceeds to present, in a matter of fact manner, the Vaibha~ika
doctrine of the five-fold equality of two mental factors that are said to be in
conjunction (sa,p,prayoga): same time, same support-basis, same cognitive object,
same mode of activity (iikiira), same singularity of substance (dravya; i.e., one
thought is conjoined with only one species of sensation, etc.). Here there is not the
slightest indication of his objection to the doctrine.
Contrary to the Sarvastivada-Vaibha~ika model of simultaneous arising of mental
factors, the Dar~tantika-Sautrantikas maintain that they arise sequentially.
18 Summary and Discussion ofthe_Abhidharmakosabha~ya
2. Vasubandhu first states that there are five classes (mahabhiimika, etc.) of
thought-concomitants; but in the end, he speaks of certain dharma-s that cannot be
fitted into any of the five. Thus he effectively proposes six classes, comprising
forty-six dharma-s. This is clearly an improvement on the basis of the classification
in the MYS, which enumerates fifty-eight dharma-s subsumed under seven classes,
with some items being repe~ted in several of these classes. 41 Significantly here, he
does not seem to have been influenced by the classification in the Prakara,:ia-pada
which does not explicitly group the caitta-s under specific classes.
Among Vasubandhu's six classes, the "indeterminate thought-concomitants"class
(aniyata-dharma) is most likely his innovation. Concerning this group of dharma-s,
he comments: "There are also other [caitta-s than those of the preceding five
classes], that are indeterminate [in respect of their scope of occurrence, moral nature,
etc.]: reasoning (vitarka), investigation (vicara), regret (kaukrtya); sleep (middha),
etc."42 The last word, "etc.", led to some controversies among later commentators,
such as Yasomitra, Sthiramati and the Xuan Zang tradition, as to what exactly these
other indeterminate dharma-s should be.
3. At the start of the enumeration of the ten universal (mahabhiimika) dharma-s,

Vasubandhu inserts the usual "kila" ("it is said") to indicate some reservation on his
own part. Nevertheless, he proceeds to define each of them without complaint. At the
end of these definitions, he simply states:
The differences among the citta-caitta-s are indeed subtle. This is difficult
to discern even with regard to a serial flow (praviiha) of them, how much
more so with regard to. them [when co-existing] in each given moment. ... 43
No doubt, subsequently, he does cite the Sautrantika questioning some of the

thought-concomitants: e.g., how can two factors contradictory in nature, equanimity
(upek~a) and mental application (manaskara), co-exist in a single thought? But we
can observe that in such cases, Vasubandhu seems to do little more than record the
arguments, without taking any side. Likewise, Vasubandhu records the Sautrantikas'
view that vitarka and vicara are nothing more than the grossness and subtleness,
respectively, of thought. In contrast, the Vaibha~ikas assert that the two are distinct,
real entities which are the causes, respectively, for the grossness and subtleness.
Saiµghabhadra 44 refutes the Sautrantika arguments, but nowhere puts any blame
on Vasubandhu (as he often does in other contexts). It is, therefore, likely that
Vasubandhu generally accepts the citta-caitta doctrines of the Vaibha~ikas-most
importantly the doctrine of their simultaneous arising-1:mt in the case of some
individual caitta-s, as regards their definitions and natures, he intends to subject them
to a. reassessment from the Sautrantika perspective.
His alignment with the Abhidharmika position is also discemiqle on the question of
the existence or otherwise of a citta in the cessation meditation (nirodha-samiipatti).
He prefers the view of the ancient masters (purviiciirya) that the body and thought
are mutually seeds to each other, rather than the Sautrantika view of a subtle citta
still remaining in the meditation. This is because, from the Abhidharmika standpoint,
it is not possible to have a citta without any caitta, or to have contact (sparsa)
without sensation and ideation. 45
EBD. On.the disjoined conditionings

1. The "conditionings disjoined from thought" is an important doctrinal innova-
tion of the Sarvastivada. They refer to forces in the universe that are neither mental
nor physical, but nonetheless can operate on dharma-s of both domains. Unlike
in the case of the citta-caitta-s, Vasubandhu is seen here to clearly side with the
Sautrantikas in their repudiation of these disjoined forces--one by one-as real
entities. This seems to be an inheritance from the position of the Sarvastivadin
Diir~µintikas in the MYS.
2. We may consider the example of the disjoined conditioning called "acqui-

sition" (priipti) which, in many ways, is of fundamental importance for the
Sarvastiviida system. It is considered the sine qua non for relating a dharma-
which, in the Sarvastiviida system has always been existing in its intrinsic nature-to
a given sentient being. He is bound by a defilement thanks to this force which links
the defilement to him; he is liberated from the bondage when the serial continuity
linking this defilement to him fro~ moment to moment is severed. Acquisition is
equally a sine qua non for the distinction between an ordinary worldling (prthagjana)
and an. iirya (a Buddhist saint). The former, even when he generates a skillful
· thought, still remains a worldling on account of his still having the acquisitions of
craving, etc. A trainee (saik~a), such as a stream entrant (srota-iipanna), remains an
iirya even when certain defilements arise in him, on account of the continuous
existence of the acquisitions of the iirya-dharma-s within him. In fact, it is possible
for a sentient being in the conditioned domain to attain Nirvii.,_ia, an unconditioned,
precisely by virtue of the arising of the acquisition of Nirvii.,_,a.
In the AKB, Vasubandhu presents the Sautrantika view that "acquisition" is nothing
more than a notion (prajfiapti) for a being's possession of a dharma. The distinction
between a worldling and an lirya is explained in terms of the Sautrantika theory
of seeds: the former still possesses the seeds of defilements; the latter, does not.
In this connection Vasubandhu also introduces the important Sautrantika conception
of the "transformation of the basis" (iisraya-parivrtti, iisraya-pariivrtti): When a
20 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabha(iya
practitioner, through spiritual practice, is transformed into an arya, his whql.e

personal being or basis (asraya) undergoes a transformation - a new basis free
from any seed of defilement (abfjfbhiita) replaces the old one. (See also Section
EBE.3).
Vasubandhu presents the arguments from both sides, the Vaibha~ikas and the
Sautrantikas, but clearly gives more space for the latter's arguments. At the very end,
he presents, as the final statement, the Sautriintika argument and conclusion that both
acquisition as well as non-acquisition (apriipti, asamanviigama), a force opposite in
nature and function to acquisition, are not real entities. Immediately after this,
Vasubandhu sums up:
However, the Vaibha~ikas consider both of them to be definitely real
entities. Why? "Because this is our established tenet" (siddhanta). 46
This is obviously a sarcastic remark meant to ridicule the Vaibha~ikas: it is meant

to imply that the Vaibhii~ikas can offer no more counter-arguments; all they can
respond is that the two dharma-s must be real because their school holds that they
are real. Xuan Zang's version here shows Vasubandhu's ridicule even more inter-
estingly:
The Vaibha~ikas assert that both are distinct real entities. Both alternative·
.positions (lit: "both paths") are proper assertions. Why? Because [one] does
not contradict logical reasoning, [the other] is our tenet. 47
3. Another important controversy concerns the two disjoined conditionings called

"cessation meditation" (nirodha-samiipatti) and "ideationless meditation" (asaf(tjfii-
samapatti). For the Vaibha~ikas, they are in each case a real entity capable of
preventing the arising of mental activities. When they are induced to arise, the
meditator e_nters into a meditative state completely devoid of thought and thought-
concomitants. The question arises as to how, after a long period of interruption, the
meditator's thought comes to re-arise.
The Vaibha~ikas' answer that it re-arises in dependence on the previous "thought of
entry into the meditative attainment" (samiipatti-citta), which, though having become
past, is capable of serving as the equal-immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya)
for the re-arising thought.
Vasumitra explains that there is still a subtle thought in this meditative attainment so
that the re-arising poses no problem. But this is rejected by Gho~aka who points out
that given the existence of any consciousness (= citta), there would necessarily be
contact (sparsa) on account of which there would be sensation and ideation.
Vasubandhu rejects these two dharma-s as real existents. He favors the explanation
by the "ancient masters" (purvikarya) that the body and thought are mutually seed to
each other (anyonya-bfjaka), so that; when the meditator emerges from the medita-
tion, his thought arises from his body. Saqighabhadra alleges that Vasubandhu aligns
with this view: In fact, in this connection, he further alleges that Vasubandhu actually
seems to align with "some masters" who hold that several consciousnesses arise
simultaneously within a single body. For, "if it is held that consciousness arises
simply in dependence on the body possessing the faculties (sendriya-kaya), without
having to depend on the causal conditions pertaining to its own species (*svajatfya),
what, for him, prevents the simultaneous arising of consciousnesses of all object-
domains in all stages?"48
EBE. On causes, conditions and fruits

1. Both the theories of the four conditions (pratyaya) and the six causes are ]?re-
sented. The former-comprising (i) condition qua cause (hetu-pratyaya), (ii) condi-
tion qua object (alambana-), (iii) equal-immediate condition (samanantara-),
(iv) condition of dominance (adhipati-)-was an earlier theory of causality attributed
to the Buddha. The latter, i.e., the six causes-comprising (i) efficient cause (kara,:ia-
hetu), (ii) homogeneous cause (sabhaga-), (iii) universal cause (sarvatraga-), (iv) co-
existent cause (sahabha-), (v) conjoined cause (sal!lprayuktaka-), (vi) retribution
(/maturation) cause (vipaka-)-was innovated by Katyaniputra for the first time in
his Ji-ianaprasthana.
2. Of the six causes, the co-existent cause-of which the conjoined cause is a
subset-is the most important. Vasubandhu describes it thus:
The co-existent [causes] are those that. are reciprocally effects .... For
example: the four Great Elements-are co-existent [causes] mutually among
themselves; so also, thought and the dharma-s that are thought-accom-
paniments (cittiinuvarttin); .... [The case of the co-existent cause] is like
the staying in position of three sticks through their mutual strength/support
- this establishes the causal relationship (hetuphalabhiiva) of the co-
existents. 49
Co-nascence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for two or more dharma-s
to be co-existent causes. Saqighabhadra does not give any suggestion that Vasu-
bandhu is opposed to this doctrine;. he only criticizes that the scope of this cause,
as specified by Vasubandhu ("reciprocally effects ... "), is not broad enough. Saqigha-
bhadra articulates that this causal category obtains in only three cases:
22 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhli~ya
[i] amon:g those that share the same effect; or [ii] that are reciprocally
effects; or [iii] where by the force of this, that dharma can arise. Such co-
nascent [dharma-s] have a cause-effect relationship, [i.e., are co-existent
causes]. 50
For the Sarviistiviidins, the fact of direct perception (pratyak~a) cannot be established
without the type of simultaneous causality represented by the co-existent cause. This
is because, given that a sensory faculty and its object last for only one single moment
(a doctrine commonly accepted by all Abhidharma schools with the exception of the
Siitpmitiya, etc.), if the corresponding consciousness (qua effect) were to arise in the
second moment (as claimed by the Sautriintikas and others), it would not have an
existent object. If direct perception cannot be established, then inferential knowledge
too would be impossible - and this would result in the absolute impossibility of any
knowledge of the external world!
More importantly, the co-existent cause serves as the only valid paradigm of causa-
tion. In general, if A causes B, both A and B must be existent at the same time (an
utter void or a non-existent cannot be causally efficacious) - although they may
belong to different time periods with respect to their own temporal frame of
reference. That is: A may be past or present or future, and B may also be past or
present or future - but they must co-exist, although not necessarily be co-nascent.
To borr.ow Dharmatriita's terminology, they are both existent, but not necessarily of
the same "mode of existence" (bhliva). Where A and B are necessarily co-nasce11t,
. i.e., both existing at the same present moment, it reduces to the category known
as the co-existent cause.
In fact, according to the Sarviistiviida conception of the tri-temporal existence of
dharma-s, all dharma-s in their essential nature have always been existent; it is
only a m~tter of inducing their arising through causes and conditions. This is the
fundamental principle underlining the Sarviistiviida doctrine of causality. Past and
future dharma-s are also endowed with efficacies including that of actually giving an
effect, although it is only a present dharma that has "activity" (kliritra; cf. Section
EE) - the efficacy of establishing the specific causal relationship with the dharma to
be produced as its effect.
3. The five fruits are: (i) disconnection fruit (visarp,yoga-phala), (ii) virile fruit
(puru~aklira-), (iii) fruit of dominance (adhipati-), (iv) emanational fruit (ni~yanda-),
(v) retribution fruit (viplika-). They are correlated to the conditions and causes as
follows:
4 CONDITIONS 6CAUSES 5 EFFECTS

sqhabhii-hetu
sarµprayuktaka-hetu
} puru~akiira-phala
hetu-pratyaya • sabhiiga-hetu
sarvatraga-hetu
} ni~yanda-phala
vipiika-hetu vipiika-phala
samanantara-pratyaya
iilambana-pratyaya
adhipati-pratyaya - - kiira,:ia-hetu adhipati-phala
visarµyoga-phala
(not a fruit of any of the 6 causes)
The unconditioned dharma-s, being transcendent to space and time, are neither
causally produced nor do they operate as causes. However, they can serve as
•
"condition qua object" (alambana.-pratyaya) inasmuch as they can be apprehended as
cognitive objects. The Sarviistiviida Abhidharmikas would also concede that in some
special sense and in conformity to worldly parlance, it is permissible to speak of the
unconditioned dharma-s as "efficient carnies" inasmuch as they do not hinder the
arising of other dharma-s. Although not causally produced, the cessation through
deliberation may also be expediently spoken of as a "disconnection-fruit" inasmuch
as it is acquired (pra--fiip) through the efficacy of the noble path - even though it is
not directly produced by it. 51
In this discussion, the Sautriintikas declare that all the three types of unconditioned
proposed by the Sarviistivadins are not real entities. But they do not assert that
unconditioned things do not exist. Thus, Nirviil},a is certainly a true spiritual
attainment - albeit not an ontological entity. They explain this in terms of the
doctrine cif transformation of the basis (see above, Section EBD.2):
Nirviil}a is said to have been attained as a result of the obtaining-by virtue

of the counteragent--of a basis which is absolutely opposed to the genera-·
tion of defilements and rebirth. 52
Ee. Chapter three: Loka-nirdesa

This chapter deals with cosmological doctrines: the universe as the fruition of with-
outflow53 karma, its constitqtion (sentient and non-sentient), and the processes in-
volved in its formation and dissolution. It also expounds the causal principles
governing conditioned existence: conditioned co-arising (pratftya-samutpiida).
24 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabha¥Ya
ECA. Constitution of the physical universe and its inhabitants

1. The universe comprises the three spheres of existence: (1) Sensuality sphere
(kiima-dhatu) characterized by sensual attachment- i.e., for food, sex, sleep, etc.
(2) Above the sensuality sphere is the fine-materiality sphere where the types of
gross and unclean matter pertaining to the sensuality sphere are absent; it is
characterized by subtle and fine materiality. (3) The non-materiality sphere is non-
spatialized, as no materiality exists therein. Beings reborn there possess no physical
bodies.
The sensuality sphere is inhabited by five types of beings: gods, humans, hell beings
(naraka), ghosts (preta; often rendered as "hungry ghosts") and animals. They are
born in four modes: from a womb, from eggs, from moisture, and apparitionally born
(upapiiduka). The two upper spheres are inhabited by gods of various types whose
karma-s of meditative praxis are retributed therein; they are all apparitionally born.
2. A question arises: In a material sphere, thought exists/operates (pra--fvrt) with

the physical body as its support. How does thought in the non-materiality sphere
exist/operate? The Vaibha~ika.s hold that it exists or operates with the two disjoined
forces, group-homogeneity (nikiiya-sabhiiga) and vital principle (jfvitendriya) as
support. The latter two,~ tum, exist through mutual support. Vasubandhu raises
several objections and states that thought and thought-concomitants exist through
mutual support. He then cites the Sautrantika explanation with which he ostensibly
· seeks to align himself: A thought in the non-materiality sphere does not have a
support outside the mental series. In a material sphere, there is greed for matter,
hence the thought will be reborn with matter and is necessarily dependent on matter.
But a thought in the non-materiality sphere is freed from the greed for matter, hence
it will be reborn without matter and will exist independent of matter. 54
3. The whole of saqisaric existence is characterized by greed (riiga). The greed of

beings in the sensuality sphere who have not been detached (vfta-riiga) from this
sphere (i.e. from the dharma-s pertaining to this sphere) is called "sensual greed"
(kama-riiga). The same applies to the greed pertaining to the fine-materiality-sphere
as "materiality greed" (rapa-riiga), and to greed pertaining to the non-materiality
sphere as "non-materiality greed" (arapya-riiga). Or rather, sensual greed is greed in
the stage (bhiimi) of non-equipoise (asamahita); fine-materiality greed is greed in the
stag~s of the four meditations (dhyiina); non-materiality greed is greed in the stages
of the four non-materiality meditative attainments (samiipatti). Those dharma-s with
regard to which the sensual or fine-materiality or non-materiality greed adhere and
grow (anuserate) are said to be, respectively, "connected with (i.e.,. pertaining to) the
sensuality sphere" (kamadhatu-pratisal'J'lyukta), "connected with the fine-materiality

sphere" (rupadhatu-pratisal'J'lyukta) and "connected with the non~materiality-sphere"
(arapyadhatu-pratisal'J'lyukta).
ECB. Formation anddissolu-Uon-of the universe

1. The whole physical universe is called the "receptacle-world" (bhajana-loka), in
contradistinction to the "world of sentient beings" (sattva-loka). The physical ·
universe. is centered around Mount Sumeru, At the beginning of the period_ of
formation of the world systein, on account of the force of dominance (adhipatya) of
sentient beings' karma, wind comes to arise in the empty space. This wind gradually
increases in intensity, forming a great Wind Disc supported by space. The force of
karma further gives rise to storms pouring onto the Wind Disc to form the Water
Disc. Again by the force of karma, violent wind is generated striking this water so
that its upper part coagulates as the Gold Disc. On this Gold Disc, further storms
arise to result in huge billows .which push some parts of it to form mountains, i,tnd
other parts, oceans. In this way, the universe with Mount Sumeru as the center-
comprising nine mountains, with eight oceans in between them--comes to be
formed.
2. The whole process from the formation of the universe to its destruction involves
four stages: (i) period of formation (vivarta), (ii) period of duration (vivarta-sthayin),
(iii) period of involution (sal'J'lvarta), (iv) period of being emptied (sal'J'lvarta-sthayin).
Each of these takes twenty small kalpa-s (antarakalpa), which together constitute
one intermediate kalpa; thus, the .whole process takes· eighty intermediate kalpa-s,
which together constitute a great kalpa (mahakalpa). A small kalpa is the time taken
when the human lifespan decreases from 80,000 years to ten years, or that when
human lifespan increases from ten years to 80,000 years.
Ecc. CondiHoned co-arising

1. Vasubandhu's exposition of the twelve-limbed conditioned co-arising is essen-
tially based on explanations in the Sarviistiviida canonical Abhidharma texts and the
MVS. The distribution of the twelve limbs over three lives has been taught in the
Jnanaprasthana. 55 In fact, such an explanation is already discernible in the Dharma-
skandha in its exposition of "conditioned by consciousness is name-and-form", and
on "conditioned by being (bhava) is birth": It states that "consciousness" here refers
to the last thought of the gandharva and it relinks at birth; 56 "being" is "karma-being"
on account of which one will be reborn according to the karma incurred in the
present existence. 57 ·
An interesting _point to note in Vasubandhu's discussion on the individual limbs

is that he does not particularly favor the Sautrantikas; occasionally, he even seems
to side with the Vaibha~ikas or at least gives them the last say. For instance,
on ignorance (avidyii), he joins the Vaibha~ikas in establishing that it is a distinct
force, not just a mere absence of knowledge (vidyii) as argued by the Dar~tantika-
Sautrantikas. On contact (sparsa), he does not side with any party, but finishes off
the dispute-and this, without any of the type of the sarcasm that we noted in. the
controversies on the disjoined forces- by stating the Vaibha~ika view that it is a real
entity. Likewise, in the dispute on the simultaneity of consciousness, contact, sensa-
tion, etc.
2. In the MVS, a question is posed: In the twelve-limbed exposition,' there is no

mention of the cause of ignorance or the effect of old-age-and-death. Does this not
lead to the consequence that either there should be thirteen or fourteen limbs, or that
ignorance and old-age-and-death are unconditioned? Among the explanations offered
by the MVS compilers, by way of clearing away this difficulty, we find the doctrines
of "defilement-karma-suffering" and of "defilement-karma-object-base".58 The
AKB poses the same question, albeit in a somewhat different form, and as a
response, Vasubandhu expounds the doctrine of "defilement-:..karma-object-base"
and asserts that this is the principl~ established for the existence-limbs (e~a nayo
vyavasthito bhaviingiiniim). This triad is elaborated as follows:
Defilement => defilement

craving => clinging.
Defilement => karma
clinging => being; ignorance => conditionings.
Karma=> object-base
conditionings => consciousness; being => birth.
Object-base=> object-base
consciousness=> name-and-form; name-and-form=> 6-fold abode;
6-fold abode=> contact; contact=> sensation; birth=> old-age-and-death.
Object-base => defilement
sensation=> craving.59
The above elaboration is meant to indicate that, since ignorance and. old-age-and-
death are of the nature of being defilement and object-base, respectively; (a) igno-
rance is the effect of either a defilement or an object-base, and (b) old-age-and-death
is the cause for an object-base or a defilement.
This is further explained thus: When the effects (= object-base) of the future are
compared to the effects of the present, we have:
ft-•0,-;;1-;;....,a,1:1,...,__..~,;;,;;..,::,,;.,i..,.x-,.._,;;,,1u....,u._,_,....,...;,.,,;:1n•;;-,:H,4f""'"-"'"' ~c_,>_,,c,,.,.,...,..,.,.,.• .,,~~,,,..,._,.,,-.,,-,.....,.>cc",_•--••""""'jl-.>,:ou•'"·'-";..;;,;;.w..,,.:..t•::•.t!':<*,,,,_;;.,_•:~
t birth ~ consciousness;
old-age-and-death ~ name-and-form, six-fold abode, contact and sensation.
Since craving is conditioned by sensation, it is to be understood that ignorance

(comparable to craving) is conditioned by old-age-and-death (comparable to sensa-
tion).
Moreover, name-and-form (one of the four object-bases comparable to old-age-and-
death) conditions the six-fold base which conditions contact which conditions
sensation. Thus, it is shown that old-age-and-death as object-base is a cause.
Accordingly, ignorance is the effect of old-age-and-death qua object-base and defile-
ment.
In this way, according to the Sarviistivada, the Buddha intends his teaching of the
twelve-limbed conditioned co-arising to represent sentient existence as being like a
revolving wheel, without an absolute beginning, but capable of coming to an end:
The first limb, ignorance, is the effect of defilement and object-base, and the final an
limb, old-age-and-death, is the cause of defilement and an object-base. The two are
causally related, the resulting cyclic existence coming to an end only when ignorance
is absolutely eradicated.
Vasubandhu concludes that the enumeration of the twelve limbs in the sutra is
complete. Its sole intention is to clear the doubt of those deluded with regard to
the sarp.saric process (pravrtti-sarrimutfha): how the present existence results from
the previous existence, and how the next existence will proceed from the present
existence.
3. Vasubandhu also explains the Vaibha~ika theory of the fourfold conditioned co-
arising:
1. "Momentary" (k:ja~ika). All the twelve limbs are embraced within a single ·
moment. E.g.: The craving generated in killing is conjoined with con-
28 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabha:;ya
sciousness, volition, ignorance, contact, sensation, the enwrapment which

is clinging, the information karma which is name-and-form and the six
ayatana-s, the bodily and vocal karma-s which are being (bhava). The very
arising of all these dharma-s is birth; their maturing is old-age; their
perishing is death. 60
ii. "Prolonged" (prakar:;ika). When the process of karmic retribution is seen
as extending over several existences, the perspective is described as "pro-
longed".
iii. "Connective" (saf!!bandhika). "[This] refers to the fact that cause and effect,
of a homogeneous or heterogeneous nature, arise in an immediate cause-
effect connection. As it is said in the Siltra, "With ignorance as cause, greed
is generated; with wisdom (vidya) as cause, no greed is generated. Again, it
is said in the Siitra: "Immediately from the skillful, a defiled [or] non-
defined (kli:;favyakrta) is generated, or conversely."61
iv. "Pertaining to stage" (avasthika). The twelve limbs comprise twelve distinc-
tive stages. At the stage of each limb, all the five aggregates are present;
but that particular limb is prominent and representative at that stage. E.g., in
a given stage, if ignorance is prominent, then the five aggregates of that
stage are collectiv~ly called "ignorance". 62
Vasubandhu states, with his usual marker of skepticism, "kila", that the Vaibh~ikas
take the "pertaining to stage" perspective as the intended perspective in the Buddha's
own exposition.
The Siitra expounds conditioned co-arising as pertaining to sentient existence,
whereas the Prakara'IJ,a-pada states that the doctrine applies to all conditioned
dharma-s. This difference, Vasubandhu states, is due to the fact that whereas
the sutra exposition is intentional (abhiprayika), the abhidharma is definitive
(lak:;a'IJ,ika). 63
ED. Chapter four: Karma-nirdesa

In chapter three, it was mentioned that the whole universe comes to assume its shape
and appearanc_e as a result of the dominance of the karma of sentient beings. Indeed,
the Sarviistiviida view--essentially in agreement with those of all Buddhists-is
that the whole universe, with all its planets, mountains and oceans, etc., is the result,
i.e., the fruit of dominance, of the collective karma of the totality of beings inhabiting
therein. 64 It begins with the winds endowed with special power born of this collective
karma. 65 The exhaustion of this collective karma brings about the dissolution of
the universe through three great calamities: of fire, water and wind. 66 The fact that
the kanna-s of beings in this world are mixed-some good, some bad-accounts
for the existence of beautiful' and pleasant external things such as fragrant flowers,
etc., on the one hand, and human bodies with all their impurities, on the other. In
the case of the gods (deva), their exclusively skillful kanna-s result in the equal
beauty of both their internal bodies and external objects of enjoyment. 67 Chapter four
begins by stating that all the variegatedness of the sentient world and the receptacle
world is on account of sentient beings' karma-s, not the intelligent design of a creator
God.
1. i. Karma.is broadly twofold: volition (~etana) and that which is generated after
the volitional act (cetayitva). The former is mental kanna. The latter is bodily and
vocal, and hence matter in nature, and is divisible as information (vijftapti) and non-
information (avijftapti-karma). The following chart shows this classification:
bodily karma
cetayitvii-karma
vocal karma
Information kanna is so called because it is an action that informs others of the

doer's mental state. A bodily karma has as its intrinsic ·nature the configuration-
matter (saf!1.sthana-rilpa) in the doer's body at the final moment of accomplishment
of a serial bodily action (e.g., killing). For a vocal karma, it is the sound matter at the
final moment of an utterance.
At the final moment of an information bodily or vocal action, the karmic efficacy
is serially continued as an invisible force. Since this does not inform others of the
doer's mental state, it is called non-information karma. Its intrinsic nature is matter
since it is projected by an information karma that is matter in nature. Skandhila's
definition below shows the set of simultaneous causal factors in dependence on
which it is projected:
Projected from a specific [set of] information karma, thought and [tetrad of]
Great Elements, there arises [in the doer] a continuous series of skillful or
unskillful matter, which is non-cumulative and which persists in the states
of [sleep, wakefulness,] distracted (vik~ipta) thought, non-distracted thought
or "unconsciousness" (acittaka). It is the cause for the establishing of the

bhik~u, etc. 68
Firstly, the above definition shows that it is non-cumulative, unlike the ordinary
matter which is resistant. Secondly, its generation is dependent on a thought - i.e.,
one that is conjoined and conditioned by the volition involved in the action. Thus,
although the information and non-information karma-s are considered as matter and
not the volition itself, the thought/volition is nonetheless their sine ·qua non. From
this perspective-notwithstanding their distinction of the cetayitva karma from the
cetana karma-the Sarvastivadins, like other Buddhists, equally uphold the primacy
of the karmic role of volition: all three types of karma are originated (samutthita) by
volition.
The information or nonsinformation matter comes to acquire a particular moral
nature and content on account of the thought/volition which- constitutes its
origination-cause (samutthana-hetu): it is skillful or unskillful through origination
(samutthanena). This is also how the disjoined conditionings come to be morally
definable. 69 The notion of the origination-cause for bodily and vocal karma-sand
the disjoined conditionings was already present in the early canonical texts.70 It
came to be articulated in the MVS as being twofold: origination qua cause (hetu-
samutthii.na) and simultaneous origination ((tat)k~a,:ia-samutthana), explained as
the initial propellant (pravartaka) and the subsequent propellant (anuvartaka),
respectively. 71 Yasubandhu explains likewise, comparing the first origination
cause to the hand that propels the rolling of a wheel and the second to the floor
that sustains its motion from moment to moment. The MYS also mentions several
views on whether the five sensory consciousnesses can serve as both types of
cause. The compilers comment that they cannot serve as origination qua cause;
only mental consciousness can serve as both. 72 Vasubandhu explains in the same
manner. 73 •
ii. Karma is also classifiable as (a) experiencible in this existence (dr:fta-dharma-

vedanfya), (b) experiencible in the next existence (upapadya-vedanfya), (c) expe-
riencible in an existence after the next (aparaparyaya-vedanfya). These three types
belong to the category of "determinate karma". To these is added a category of
(d) "indeterminate karma" (aniyata-vedanfya) - i.e., that which,may not actually be
retributed.
Xuan Zang's translation here seems to suggest that Vasubandhu endorses the above
classification of fourfold karma: "This explanation is good". 74 In the MYS, this
fourfold karma is ascribed to "some [Sarvastivada] masters". 75 "[The first three
types] cannot be transformed. Those karma-s whose retribution are indeterminate can
be transformed. It is precisely for the sake of transforming this fourth type of karma
that one observes the precepts and vigorously practises the spiritual life (brahma-
carya ), making the aspiration: 'May I be able to transform this karma by virtue of
this' ."76
iii. The notion of indeterminate karma is an interesting one, and subject to different
interpretations. Some other Sarvastivada masters 77 arrive at five types of karma by
subdividing it as (a) those determinate as regards retribution and (b) those indetermi-
nate as regards retribution.
iv. Yet other masters arrive at eight types of karma: each of the four (dr~{a-dharma-
... aniyata-vedanfya) is divisible as being determinate or indeterminate in regard to
retribution. These masters give a fourfold alternative (catuJ:iko(i) 78 as in the AKB:
(a) determinate in regard to the period of retribution, but indeterminate in regard to
retribution; (b) conversely; (c) determinate in regard to both period and retribution;
(d) indeterminate in both respects. But it is interesting that Vasubandhu, likewise
Sarpghabhadra,79 ascribes this eightfold classification to the Diir~tiintikas, and
Yasomitra here states that "the Diir~tiintikas are the Sautriintikas";80 whereas the
MVS ascribes it to "some other [Sarviistiviida] masters". 81 fu fact the compilers do
not at all criticize any of these different classifications. We may note that Vasu-
bandhu's expositions on these and the subsequent topics-i.e., "Is there a case where
one generates all three types of karma (dr~{a-dharma- ... aparaparyiiya-) at once",
"How many types can project nikiiya-sabhiiga", etc.-also follow the sequence of
exposition in the MVS. 82
2. Among other things, the notion of indeterminate karma shows that the Buddhist
doctrine of karma is not one of absolute determination, fu this context, the
Diir~tiintikas in the MVS are the most radical here .. For them, ail ~rma-s-including
the fivefold gravest evil (iinantarya: patricide, etc.)--can be trans(ormed. Thus, a
dr~{adharma-vedanfya karma, for instance, is not necessarily retributed in the present
existence. 83
3. Another noteworthy point repeatedly emphasized by the MVS compilers in this

discussion is that "all skillful or unskillful karma-s must depend on a serial continuity
or go beyond a serial continuity before they come to be retributed." 84 "There is
definitely no karma that can be retributed/matured in the very same moment of it
being done or in the immediately next ~oment". 85 This emphasis, coupled with the
acknowledgement of the indeterminateness of certain karmic retributions, must
imply that, in the process of maturation in the serial continuity, the status of the
efficacy of a karma is subject to continuous adjustment. And the latter presupposes a
32 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmako{abhaJya
serially continuous karmic force which is always present in the serial continuity of
the doer. Indeed, the Vaibha~ikas teach that a karma done (krta), but not accumulated
(upacita), is not necessarily retributed. Sarµghabhadra explains in what sense a
karma is not necessarily retributed:
... [By indeterminate karma-s, the siitra refers to] karma-s that are not
necessarily experienced. If one can vigorously cultivate the precepts
pertaining to the body, the thought (citta) and understanding (prajfiii), these
karma-s ought to be experienced in the human world. [However,] as a result
of not cultivating the precepts pertaining to the body, the thought and
understanding, one falls into naraka through these karma-s . ...
Alternatively, the meaning [is] thus: There are karma-s that are, although
done, not accumulated. If they a,e allowed to follow their own course, they
would be retributed in the present life. If, [however,] one subsequently
further commits karma-s that are retributable in the hells, nourishing the
karma and causing it to be accumulated, one will proceed to experience it in
the hells .... 86
4. The avijiiapti doctrine is a major doctrine innovated by the Sarvastivadins. It

is true that given their tenet of the tritemporal existence of the dharma-s, a past
karma, though having assumed the past mode, is still causally efficacious and thus
capable of yielding fruit. Accordingly, the Sarvastivadins should have no difficulty in
accounting for the preservation of the efficacy from a past karma. However, in the
MVS, we see them considering certain situations that call for a more fine-tuned
mechanism. For instance, when a person sends an emissary to murder another, at
the time when the victim is actually killed, the informative karma of the instigator
is no more. Besides, this informative karma-vocal in nature-cannot be one that
constitutes the principal act of killing. It is, in fact, only part of the preparation for
the killing., There arises in him at this time, however, a non-information karma of
killing. It is this invisible karmic force at this present moment that causally effects
the transgression of a murderer. 87 Another consideration: Given that a physical or
vocal karma is momentary, if there were no non-information karma, there would
be no legitimate establishment of the differences among those abiding in restraint
(sa,rtvara), non-restraint (asa,rivara) and neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint (naiva-
sa,rtvara-na-asa,rtvara).88 Restraint refers to the ordination vows taken by a bhikJu,
etc; non-restraint, to the commitment of a butcher or hunter to kill for his whole life,
etc; neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint refers to all willful understandings outside the
former two contexts. This notion of the avijiiapti qua restraint in fact came to be
greatly emphasized in the Sarvastivada development.
BHIKXHU KL DHAMMAJOTI 33
Vasubandhu also presents both the above considerations of the Sarvastivada. He

in fact enumerates eight reasons proposed by the Vaibha~ikas for establishing the
avijiiapti doctrine. The Sautrantikas, who maintain that all karma is volition, vehe-
mently reject this doctrine _and repudiate all the eight reasons. 89 Instead, they
enunciate the doctrine of the seed (bfja) and explain the process of the preservation
of karmic efficacy culminating in the retribution fruit as a "distinctive transformation0
of the serial continuity" (sa,rztati-pari"!Jii"fa-vi~esa): The volition is like the seed. The
karmic efficacy projected from it undergoes a process of transformation in the serial
continuity of the citta-caitta-s. At the culminating point of the karmic maturation,
when the required conditions obtain, a corresponding fruit is generated.
In the Sautrantika refutation of the avijiiapti doctrine, we once again come across
their doctrine of the "transformation of the basis" (see sections El:3!).2, EDE.3). The
Vaibha~ikas argue that if there were no avjiiapti, when an iirya enters into samiidhi,
he would not have "proper speech", "proper activity" and "proper livelihood" -
these three being incompatible with samiidhi. That even in this state he does possess
them is. because they exist as avijiiapti. The Sautrantikas, however, explain that,
when the iirya enters into the path (miirga-samiipanna), he obtains an intention
(iisaya) and a basis (iisraya) of such a kind that he is enabled to generate these three
factors on coming out of the meditation. 90 Yasomitra comments that the basis here
refers to the transformation of the basis. 91
In another context, Vasubandhu enumerates five fields of merit relating to which the
karma is retributed in the present existence. Among them, two are: (1) the person
who emerges from the path of vision and (2) the person who emerges from the path
of cultivation - i.e., who has just acquired the arhat-phala. In both cases, there is
said to be the obtaining of the transformation of the basis and a new (pratyagra),
pure (nirmala, suddha) serial continuity. 92
5. From the above discussion, we can discern how the avijiiapti doctrine serves
as a fine-tuning mechanism in the Saryastivadin karma theory. The avijiiapti, being
continuously present in the serial continuity of the doer, renders it possible for
him to continuously modify its status - e.g., in the case of an evil karma, he can
do so through such subsequent (pr~tha) actions as repentance, etc. It is taught
that the avijiiapti serial flow will terminate owing to several conditions. One is
when the karma is retributed; another, when the doer dies. In the latter case, the
karmic force which has come to acquire a particular final status, though having
become past, will nonetheless still be causally efficacious and give_ a fruit in some
future time.
34 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabha;jya
In this process of karmic maturation as taught by the Sarvastivada, involving the

avijfiapti, we can see some of the important features of the Sautrantika seed theory,
i.e., (i) continuation from the originating volition; (ii) a serial continuity whose
karmic status is continuously updated; (iii) a process of transformation. To be
sure, the seed theory differs importantly from the avijfiapti theory, particularly since
the former is a complete theory of karma, and it works on the principle of perfum-
ing (viisanii). But it seems possible that the historically earlier avijfiapti theory
· had provided at least some raw doctrinal ingredients to the seed· theory of the
Dar~tantika-Sautrantikas who, after all, had come from the broad Sarvastivada
tradition. In this connection, we may also note Sarµghabhadra's claim that it is in
fact the Sarvastivada-rather than the Sautrantika-doctrine of karma that can be
said to accord with the causal principle of the sequential growth of a plant from its
seed. 93
6. Vasubandhu94 clearly favors the Sautrantika stance and endorses their seed
theory. He states:
There is not any hatred [on our part in rejecting the avijiiapti doctrine]. But
to say that through a bodily undertaking following a thought, there arises
in the instigator, at the accomplishment of the action, a distinct dharma
separate from the two (thought and body) - such an assertion does not
give delight. On the other hand, delight arises in the assertion that the
accomplishment of the action, brought about when the undertaking is
completed, is the transformation of the serial continuity-caused by that
[undertaking]-which arises in this very person (the instigator). This is a1so
because the arising of the fruit in the future occurs from the citta-caitta
serial continuity .95
EE. Chapter f~ve: Anusaya-nirdesa

Our sarµsaric existence is the result of karma, and karma comes into operation on
account of defilements (klesa). Hence, after chapters three and four, this fifth chapter
is devoted to defilements. Anusaya, which we may render as proclivity, is one
of the major synonyms for defilements. Besides "defilement" and "proclivity", the
AKB enumerates the following synonymous terms: fetter (sarriyojana), bondage
(bandhana), envelopment (paryavasthiina), outflow (iisrava), flood (ogha), yoke
0
(yoga), clinging (upiidiina) and corporeal tie (kiiya-grantha).

Vasubandhu's choice of "anusaya" as the chapter title is probably influenced by the
fact that, since the Abhidharmahrdaya, the chapter on defilements had been regularly
entitled "anusaya". 96 He begins the chapter by stating that the proclivities are the root
of existence (bhavasya miilam); without them, karma-s are incapable of effectuating

existences.97
1. Six fundamental proclivities are enumerated; but they can be further divided into
seven or ten, as shown in the following chart:
6 fundamental kinds ,7 kinds (in the siitra) 10 kinds (in the Jfianaprasthii.na)
1. greed (raga) 1. sensual greed (kiimariiga) 1. greed
2. existence-greed (bhavariiga)
2. hostility (Jiratigha) 3. hostility 2. hostility
3. ignorance (avidyii) 4. ignorance 3. ignorance
4. conceit (miina) 5. conceit 4. conceit
5. doubt (vicikitsii) 6. doubt 5. doubt
6. view (dr~!i) 7. view 6. Self-view (satkiiya-dr~!i)
7. extreme-grasping view (antagriiha-
dml)
8. false view (mithya-dmi)
9. attachment to view (dr~!i-pariimarsa)
10. irrational attachment to religious
vows and observances (sfla-vrata-
pariimarsa)
Sensual greed is greed with regard to the sensuality sphere. Existence-greed is greed
for the subtler forms of existence in the fine-materiality and non-materiality spheres.
When view is subdivided into the fivefold views, we havt;! a total of ten proclivities
as given in the Jfianaprasthana.
Besides the fundamental defilements, the AKB also enumerates a total of nineteen
secondary defilements: non-diligence (pramdda), slackness (kauffdya), faithlessness
(a§raddhya), torpor (styana), restlessness (auddhatya), immodesty (dhrfkya), shame-
lessness (anapatrapya), anger (krodha), enmity (upanaha), dissimulation (sdfhya),
jealousy (fr~ya), depravity (pradasa), concealment (mrak~a), avarice (matsarya),
deceptiveness (maya), pride (mada), harmfulness (vihirµsa), remorse (kaukrtya) and
drowsiness (middha). The last two are grouped with the indeterminate dharma-s (cf
Section EB); the rest comprises the defiled dharma-s.
2. Vasubandhu, following the Prakarm:ia-pada, gives four meanings of "anusaya":
i. a~u: meaning "fine", "subtle": A pseudo-etymological interpretation of the

prefix anu - stressing the difficulty in detecting the arising of the defile-
ments which are subtle in nature.
ii. anu + ..fbandh ("bind"): They "bind along with" (anu-..fbandh)_, i.e., they
proceed together with the psycho-physical series (saYfllati). "It is extremely
difficult to be separated from them .... According to some, this means that
their prapti-s always follow along." 98
+
iii. anu + .fgam or anu .fsaj: Vasubandhu explains in the sense of anu + .fsaj:
"They adhere through adhesion of their prapti-s". 99 Sa:rµghabhadra: from
beginningless time, one is followed along by the prapti-s arising in one's
serial continuity. 100
iv. anu + .fsr: They grow or become intensified in accord with (anu-.fst): They
become nouris~ed by (a) the objects they take (alambanato 'nuserate) and
(b) the thought concomitants with which they are conjoined (sa,rtpra-
yogato'nuserate),101 Sa:rµghabhadra explains that the first way (a) is like the
case of an enemy seeking a weak point; the second way (b) is like the case of
a heated ball that heats up the water. Like a foster mother who causes the
growth of an infant, both the object taken and the conjoined mental
dharma-s cause the series of the defilement to grow and accumulate. 102
Out of the four senses given above, the MVS gives only three, i.e., without that of
anu-.fgam. It attributes the explanation in terms of the four senses to the foreign
masters. 103
3. Vasubandhu describes the controversy concerning the nature of the proclivities.

For the Sautrantikas, a proclivity is a seed-i.e., dormant efficacy-from which
a corresponding defilement manifests given the right conditions. Since the seed
is a mere concept, it is neither conjoined with (saYflprayukta) nor disjoined from
(viprayukta) thought; when manifested, the defilement is called an enwrapment. For
the Vaibha~ikas, proclivity and enwrapment are both synonyms for defilement; there
is no contrast of a dormant proclivity as opposed to a manifested enwrapment. A
proclivity is therefore conjoined with thought and is an existent entity. Vasubandhu
explicitly endorses the Sautrantika view. 104
In the MVS, the Vibhajyavadins' view is similar to the Sautrantikas', except that
they consider the proclivity as being conjoined with and the enwrapment as being
disjoined from thought. 105 However, we know that some early Dar~tantika masters,
like Asvagho~a, already proposed some form of a seed 1:heory and contrasted the
proclivity with the enwrapment in a similar manner. 106
4. Those defilements of the nature of a cognitive error are abandonable through

insight (darsana-(pra)heya) into the four truths. A defilement whose cognitive object
(iilambana) is abandonable through insight into a particular truth. (e:g., unsatisfac-

toriness) is one abandonable through that truth. 107 This definition follows from the
consideration that when an insight into a particular truth arises with regard to a given
object, then the particular defilement which is a cognitive error with regard to that
same object, with respect to that particular truth, has ceased.
The other defilements, of a more obstinate nature and not-or not entirely-of the
nature of cognitive error, are to be abandoned through cultivation (bhiivani'i-(pra)-
heya), i.e., through a process of repeated practice.
The doctrine of the abandonment of defilements is correlated with the Sarviistiviidin
cosmological view: To transcend sarp.siiric existence, one must progressively aban-
don the defilements pertaining to the three spheres. A total of eighty-eight forms of
the ten fundamental kinds of defilements are to be abandoned through insight -
thirty-two pertaining to the sensuality sphere; twenty-eight each, pertaining to the
two upper spheres. Ten forms are to be abandoned through cultivation: four per-
taining to the sensuality sphere; three each, pertaining to the two upper spheres. (Cf
Section EF for more details.)
5. The central Sarviistiviida doctrine of the tritemporal existence of dharma-s

(sarvi'istivada, sarvi'istitva) is di.scussed in this chapter. It is significant that both the
beginning and end of .this lengthy discussion are marked by the same spiritual
concern: the validity of the process of bondage and emancipation. This section first
givenhe statement of its purpose as being the investigation into the kind of object-
base (vastu) to which a person is bound by a past, present or future proclivity. The
question is soon raised as to whether the so-called "past" and "future" (dharma-s)
exist. Towards the end of the debate, the Vaibhii~ikas ask: If the past and the future
are non-e:x;istent, how does one come to be yoked to a particular defilement? Indeed,
how is the fact of liberation from bondage possible? This suggests that the
Sarviistivada doctrine of tritemporal existence most probably originated in the
context of such a fundamental spiritual concern.
i. As in the MVS, the four major versions of the theory are presented here, all
purporting to explain how-given that all dharma-s are always existent-their
temporal distinction can nonetheless be accounted for: (a) Dharmatrata's theory of
"change in the mode of being" (bhava-anyathika); (b) Gho~aka's "change in
characteristic" (lak~m:ia-anyathika); (c) Vasumitra's "change in state" (avastha-
anyathika); (d) Buddhadeva's "change in [temporal] relativity" (anyatha-anyathika).
All of them state that when conditioning forces (= dharma-s) operate in time,
there is no change in their intrinsic natures. Dharmatrata ~ays ·that only their modes
of being-future, present and past modes-change. Gho~aka says that only their
38 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhii:jya
temporal characteristics change. Vasumitra says that only their temporal states/
positions change. Buddhadheva says that they are "future", "present" or "past"
relative to that which precedes or that which succeeds.
Vasubandhu, following the MVS, states that Vasumitra's theory is considered the
best, as it explains temporal differences in terms of activity (kiiritra), without con-
fusion: when a dharma has not yet extrcised its activity, it is "future"; when the
activity is being exercised, it is "present"; when it has exercised it, it is "past".
Dharmatrata's theory is rejected as being similar to the Sarp.khya theory of pari,:iiima.
The other two are also rejected for reason of confusion. Sarp.ghabhadra, however,
defends Dharmatrata's theory as being in keeping with the Vaibha~ika system. He
himself in fact often uses it along with Vasumitra's and finds it indispensible for
demonstrating the Vaibha~ika doctrines. (See below.)
ii. The Sautrantikas raise various objections to this theory of trit<c:mporal existence
of dharma-s. Concerning the explanation in terms of activity, they ask: "What is
the activity of a present facsimile (tat-sabhiiga) visual faculty?" A facsimile eye is
one similar to an active present eye; but unlike the latter, it does not see (e.g., the
eyes of a blind person). The Vaibha~ikas answer that such an eye has the activity of
"grasping a fruit" (phala-parigraha) and "giving a fruit" (phala-diina); the former
referring to a dharma's causally determining its corresponding fruit to be gener-
ated in the future, the latter, its actually yielding its fruit subsequently. But the
Sautrantikas then point out that since a past dharma can have the activity of giving a
fruit, it would have to be semi-present!
Moreover, if a dharma's intrinsic nature is always existent, what prevents it from
exercising its activity at all times? Various other objections are raised by the
Sautrantikas, and finally the Vaibha~ikas have to state that the activity is not different
from the dharma. But this only invites further objections. For instance, if the two are
identical, then the activity, like the dharma, must also be always existent- how then
can one speak of it as being past or future?
iii. In Sarp.ghabhadra's response, he articulates as follows:

a. When the Vaibha~ikas assert that all dharma-s-future, present and past-
are (;!xistent, an existent is defined as "that which can serve as an object-
domain to generate a cognition (buddhi)". These existents may be either
absolute or relative (based on the absolute reals). Absolute rton-existents
(atyanta-abhiiva) are, for example, a horse's horns, etc.
b. The past and future dharma-s are not relative reals conceptualized upon the
present dharma-s as real entities. They are real entities in themselves. But
they do not exist in the same manner as the present dharma-s; the modes of
existence of the tritemporal dharma-s are different. 108 (See below.)
c. "Activity" does not refer to any generic efficacy, such as an eye's efficacy
for vision. It refers very specifically to the efficacy of "grasping a fruit", but
not "giving a fruit". Thus, the chai:ge of "semi-presentness" does not apply.
This activity, also called "projecting a fruit" (phala-ak~epa), is the efficacy
of a present dharma to project its own arising (its own fruit) in the im-
mediately following moment. A present facsimile eye does not have the
efficacy of seeing; but it too necessarily has this activity. Since this activity
is unique to a present dharma, it uniquely distinguishes it from a past or a
future dharma. 109
d. A dharma's activity is neither identical with nor different from the dharma
itself. It is momentary and is generated only when an assemblage of con-
ditions obtains. The same is true for a dharma's mode of being. 110
iv. Back to the AKB, the Sautrantikas go on to ridicule the Vaibha~ika position with
the following stanza:
The intrinsic nature (svabhava) exists always,

but the mode of being (bhiiva) is not conceded as permanent,
nor is the mode of being [conceded as] different from the intrinsic nature.
- This is clearly an act of the Almighty (fsvar.t1) [who can state .as he
likes]. 111 ·
This ridicule alludes to the apparent contradiction-as jn Dharmatrata's theory on

sarvastivada-that a dharma's bhava changes, but not its sva-bhava. Saqighabhadra
retorts:
.The intrinsic nature of a dharma remains always; its mode of being (bhiiva)
changes: When a conditioned dharma traverses in time, it gives rise to its
activity (kiiritra) in accordance with conditions, without abandoning its
intrinsic nature; immediately after this, the activity produced ceases. Hence
it is said that the svabhiiva exists always and yet it is not permanent, since
its bhiiva changes.
The A.bhidharmikas are entitled to ridicule thus: [The Sautriintikas] ac-
knowledge tritemporal existence and yet deny the reality of the past and the
future. Such an assertion is wonderful! While asserting that the past is what
has existed and the future is what will exist, they are only talking about the
existence of the present in different words (from different perspectives);
this has nothing to do with the past and the future. 112
Towards the final part of the debate in the AKB, Vasubandhu comments that the
Vaibhli~ika exposition of "all-exist" is not a proper one within the Dispensation (na
siisane sadhur bhavati). A proper assertion of "all-exist" should be in the manner of
the siitra statement that "all" refers to the twelve ayatana-s. Nothing exists outside
these twelve ayatana-s. Or rather: "past" means what has been; "future", what will
be. He then makes the following concluding remark, put into the Vaibhli~ikas'
mouth:
The Vaibhii~ikas assert: "The past and the future definitely exist". What
cannot be comprehended must therein be thus understood by one who is
self-respecting. 113
The nature of dharma is indeed profound.
It is not necessarily capable of being proved through logical reasoning. 114
On this, Sarp.ghabhadra sternly protests:
I here must say that you have yourself stealthily fabricated the assertions
which you deceivingly label as "Vaibhii~ika". The genuine Vaibhii~ikas
would never utter such words.
Moreover, they would not, like him, arbitrarily claim that the past and
the future exist truly in the manner as the present, for the tritemporal
[dharma-s] whic;h exist as real entities have distinctive modes of being
(bhiiva). It is clear that he intends to bring about a disaster to the noble
teachings, cunningly fabricating false words to vilify those who expound
properly. But how can our tenets be harmed by such fabricated vilifying
words? ... It appears that he has not studied the true Vaibhii~ika [teach-
ings] .... 115
In fact, throughout the very lengthy debate in the Ny, Sarp.ghabhadra exposes
Vasubandhu, on every count, as framing all the arguments we have mentioned above
as being "Sautrantika". At the end, Sarp.ghabhadra states that he has confronted the
Kosakara squarely on the issue of tritemporal existence, questioning and repudiating
all his assertions and claims which have been worded to the best of Vasubandhu's
ability. In this process, he has also briefly repudiated Srllata's views.11 6
EF. Chapter six: Margapudgala-nirdesa

Xuan Zang gives the title of this chapter as "The Chapter on the Noble Sages" or
"The Chapter on the Sages and the Noble Ones" ( ~~ .% ). 117 Pu Guang comments
that this chapter comes after the previous three which expound the with-outflow.
This, together with the next two, expounds the outflow-free. As for the sequence, this
exposition on the outflow-free fruits comes first, since the fruits are relatively more
conspicuous; chapter seven· expounds their causes; chapter eight, their conditions. 118
1. Since the whole scheme of spiritual praxis in the Abhidharma is centered around
the doctrinal framework of the four noble truths, the chapter begins with an examina-
tion of these truths: their meaning, nature, order of exposition, etc. In this context,
there are a couple of controversial points.
One point concerns the nature of the truth of origin (samudaya). The Sarvastivadin~
think that the five upiidiina-skandha-s comprise both unsatisfactoriness (duftkha) and
its origin (samudaya): the former is the skandha-s in their effect aspect; the latter, in
their cause aspect. The Sautrantikas-such as Srilata 119-aqd others maintain that,
as taught in the sutra, craving (tr,niii) alone is the origin of unsatisfactoriness.
Vasubandhu provides the Vaibha~ikas with much greater space for their defense,
which includes the statement-uncontested by Vasubandhu-that the sutra explana-
tion is intentional (abhipriiyika) whereas the Abhidharma explanation is definitiv~.
Another point concerns the pleasurable sensation (sukhii vedanii). The Sautrantikas
and others argue that there is no pleasurable sensation. Vasubandhu endorses the
Vaibha~ika position that there is, praising it as being a reasonable one. 120
2. The next discussion concerns the path of spiritual progress. The essential com-
ponents of the Sarvastivada path structure are: (i) th~ stage of preliminary practices;
(ii) the stage or path of preparatory efforts (prayoga-miirga); (iii) the stage or path
of vision/insight into the truths (darsana-miirga); (iv) the stage or path of repeated
practice or cultivation (bhiivanii-miirga); (v) the stage or path of the non-trainee
(asaik~a-miirga).
i. Although there seems to be no specific appellation in the Sarvastivada texts for
the first stage, it may well be called the "stage of requisites" (saf!!bhara)-as in the
Y ogacara-since they obviously serve as requisites for the prayqga-miirga. In the
MVS, for instance, the preliminary practices at the stage of an ordinary worldling-
the bodhisattva and a universiil monarch (cakravartin)-are often emphasized as the
"requisites of mer~ts and knowledge" (*pw:iya-jiiiina-saf(lbhiira). 121 The Ny also
speaks of the preliminary practices as "requisites" to be readied/accumulated before
one embarks on meditation practices such as the mindfulness of breathing and the
contemplation on the loathsome. 122 The AKB prescribes these preliminaries as the
observance of precepts and development of the threefold understanding (srutamayf-,
cintiimayf, bhiivaniimayf-prajiiii). For success of meditation, one must withdraw
from non-conducive conditions and evil companions, and practice contentment that
enables one to abide in the four "noble lineages" (iiryavaf(lsa): cont~ntment with
(i) clothing, (ii) food, (iii) bed and seat, and (iv) delight in the abandonment of defile-
ments and spiritual cultivation.
ii. This stage comprises two sub-stages: (a) The part conducing to liberation
(mok.ra-bhagfya) which essentially comprises the twofold meditative praxis of
tranquillity (samatha) and insight (vipafyana); the former refers mainly to mind-
fulness of breathing (anapana-smrti) and the meditation on the impure/loathsome
(asubha), the latter, to the fourfold abiding of mindfulness (smrt)!-upasthana). It
should be noted that although samatha and vipasyana form two distinctive types of
praxis, the Sarvastivada also stresses their complementarity. The following passage
in the Saligftiparyaya is a good illustration:
What is samatha? The skillful one-pointedness of mind.
What is vipasyanii? The discernment ... operation of understanding (prajfia-
ciira)-conjoined with samatha-with regard to a dharma ... . As the
Bhagavat has said:
There is no dhyiina for one without prajfiii; and no prajfiii for one
without dhyiina. Only he who has dhyana and prajfiii can realize
123
Nirvii,:ia.
"There is no dhyana for one without prajna": - If one has such a prajfiii,
then one has attained a corresponding category of dhyana. If one does not
have such a prajfiii, then one has not attained such a dhyiina.
"No prajfiii for one without dhyiina": - If one has prajfiii which is born of
dhyiina and has dhyana as its origination, this category of prajna 124 is
projected by dhyiina. If one has such a category of dhyiina, then there can
be the attainment of such a category of prajnii. If one does not have such a
dhyiina, then one cannot attain such a prajfia ... .125
(b) The part conducing to penetration (nirvedha-bhagfya) or decisive insight (into

the four truths). This consists of repeated contemplation, by means of the mun-
dane (with-outflow) understanding, on ·the four truths, resulting in the tangible
attainments-albeit still with-outflow-of warmth (u~magata, ii~man), summits
(miirdhan), receptivities (k~anti) and supreme worldly dharma-s (laukika-agra-
dharma). These four are also called skillful roots because they constitute the
foundation for the arising of the outflow-free prajfta.
The above stages already suffice to show that the Abhidharma tradition is fundamen-
tally concerned with spiritual praxis. Abhidharma studies, no doubt, are given their
due place. They are indispensable as a preparation for the development of true spiri-
tual insight:
At the stage of preparatory effort, one may either mostly cultivate the
requisite (sarµbhiira) of samatha or mostly cultivate the requisite of

vipasyanii. One who mostly cultivates the requisite of samatha is one who,
at the stage of preparatory effort, always delights in solitude and quietness,
fears disturbance and sees the faults of socialization; he always stays within
his hermitage. When he enters into the noble path, he is called the samatha-
type of practitioner. One who mostly cultivates the requisite of vipasyanii is
one who, at the stage of preparatory effort, always delights in studying and
reflecting on the tripitaka. He repeatedly examines the specific and general
characteristics of all dharma-s. When he enters into the noble path, he is
called the vipasyanii-type of practitioner. 126
iii. Immediately after the single moment of the thought and thought-concomitants
collectively known as the "supreme worldly dharma-s", the practitioner sails into the
path of vision. He enters into a sixteen-moment process of true spiritual (as opposed
to intellectual) insight into the four truths, known as "direct realization" (abhi-
samaya), and emerges as an arya.
This doctrine of abhisamaya---,--which, as we have seen above, defines the very
nature of abhidharma itself-is of central importance. No matter how much an
ordinary worldling has struggled and succeeded in intellectual understanding
and apandoning defilements, he cannot become spiritually transformed into an
arya without going through the process of abhisamaya in which he progres-
sively acquires insight into the four truths. For each truth, the insight first arises.
pertaining to the sensuality sphere, and next, pertaining to the two upper spheres
together. The former insight is called "dharma-knowledge" because he acquires,
for the very first time in his sa:qisaric faring, this outflow-free understanding of
the nature of dharma-s from the perspective of that particular truth. That pertaining
to the two upper spheres. is called "subsequent knowledge" since it arises, in a
similar manner, subsequent to the dharma-knowledge - though nonetheless also
a direct perception (cf Section EG). 127 When each truth is so directly realized, a
corresponding number of defilements are abandoned. For the abandoning of each
defilement, two moments are necessarily involved: The first, called the "unhin-
dered path" (anantarya-marga), is when the defilement is actua~ly being aban-
doned; the second, called "liberation path" (vimukti-marga), is when the cessation
(nirodha) of the defilement arises. The former is also called the moment of
receptivity (k~anti); the latter, the moment of knowledge. In all, a total of eighty-
eight darsana-heya defilements are abandoned through this process: twenty-eight
u~der duJ:ikha, nineteen under samudaya, nineteen under nirodha and twenty-two
under marga.
All the abOYe essential features of the abhisamaya doctrine. are already discernible in
the Prakara,:ia-pada 128 and the Jfi,a,naprasthana; 129 but it is perhaps in the MVS that
the doctrine becomes systematically articulated for the first time. 130 It may also be
mentioned here that the Sarviistivada masters concede that, although abhisamaya in
the true sense is an outflow-free insight, some conventional knowledges that are
capable of clear discernment-such as that with which the bodhisattva, before his
enlightenment, discerned truly that conditioned by birth~ there was old-age-and-
death-can also qualify as abhisamaya. 131
In contrast to the Sarvastivadins who maintain that the direct realization irito
the truths is a gradual process, other schools-such as the Mahasruµghika, 132 the
Mahisasaka, the Dharmaguptaka, 133 the Vibhajyaviidins 134 in general (including the
Theravada) and certain Dar~tantika-Sautriintikas 135-hold it to be an abrupt one.
SrTiiita teaches an eight-moment abhisamaya process:
... next he generates the dul;ikha-dharmajfiiina; this is called the first thought
(moment) of stream-entry. At that very time he is able to abruptly abandon
the three fetters, for he is able to absolutely abandon their old pursuant
e~ements (*purii,:za-ariudhiitu). From this time onwards, he generates the
dul;ikha-anvayjfiiina, etc. Thus there are definitely eight thoughts in the
abhisamaya. 136
The eight moments are thus: 1. duJ:tkha-dharmajfiiina (which abruptly eliminates

three fetters); 2. duJ:tkha:anvayajiiiina; 3. samudaya-dhannajiiiina; 4. samudaya-
anvayajfiiina; 5. nirodha-dharmajfiiina; 6. nirodha-anvayajiiiina; 7. miirga-dharma-
jiiiina; 8. miirga-anvayajiiiina.
'It is noteworthy that Vasubandhu does not follow this Dar~tantika-Sautriintika
doctrine but prefers to stick to the Vaibha~ika exposition. This is most likely in
consideration of the fact that in respect of praxis, the Sarviistivada has had a long
tradition of tested experiences to which no novel doctrine of any individual master
can compare. 137 Saqighabhadra in fact remarks that Srilata has here arbitrarily pro-
posed his doctrine in contradiction with the truth regarding abhisamaya established
by the tradition of hundreds of thousands of yogiiciira-s on the basis of genuine direct
perception. 138
iv. The path of vision lasts fifteen moments of the abhisamaya process during which
time the practitioner is a candidate (pratipannaka)-he is on his way-for the fruit of
stream-entry (srotaiipatti-phala). At the sixteenth moment, he has acquired the fruit
of stream-entry and emerges to embark on the next stage, the path of cultivation,
which can last as long as seven births. At this stage, he repeatedly contemplates on
the four ttuths on the basis of the spiritual insight he has gained at the preceding
stage. He must work further on the affective aspects of the four defilements: greed,
hostility, ignorance and conceit, which, in respect to the three upheres, yield a total of
BHIJ,(KHU KL DHAMMAJOTI 45
ten species. In this process, he progressively attains the higher fruits of a once-
returner (sakrdagamin), non-returner (anagamin) and arhat.
An important notion of the bhavana-marga is that it can be either mundane (laukika)
or supramundane (lokottara). Through the former, an ordinary worldling can also
abandon defilements; but such abandonments can truly take effect only when the
practitioner enters- into the abhisamaya process. The principle here is that once a
defilement is abandoned-even if it is through a mundane path-it does not need
to be abandoned again. But the acquisition of disjunction (visarµyoga-propti) can
take place repeatedly. This means that following the arising of a superior path
(vise~a-marga), a superior acquisition of disjunction from the defilement arises.13 9 It
is only with an outflow-free path--outflow-free knowledge as counteragent-that
the acquisition which arises comes to be of sufficient strength to ensure absolute
abandonrnent of the defilement.
The above description of the sequential attainment of fruits applies to the case of one
who begins without having yet abandoned any defilement - he is an ordinary
worldling "who is fully bound" (sakala-bandhana). For one who has beforehand
abandoned some defilements through the mundane bhavana-marga, he may emerge
from the abhisamaya process either as a once-returner or a non-returner, depending
on the amount of defilements he has previously abandoned. But this mundane
bhavana-marga is incapable of abandoning the defilements pertaining to the stage
(bhami) of the sphere of neither-ideation-nor-nonideation (naiva-sarµjfia-nasarµjfia-
ayatana).
v. The final (ninth) unhindered path which absolutely eliminates all remaining
defilements is called the diamond-like samadhi. At this- point, the arya is called a
non-trainee (asaik~a), in contrast to those who acquire the preceding fruits who are
called trainee (saik~a) since they still need further training for the final fruit of arhat-
hood. The final liberation path that follows is called the "exhaustion-knowledge"
(k~aya-jfiona), a canonical term which occurs together with the "knowledge of non-
arising" (anutpada-jfiona) in the siitra description at the time of the attainment of
arhat-hood.
In the Sarviistiviida scheme of the process of liberation, the arising of the knowledge
of non-arising signifies the attainment of the highest, non-retrogressive (apariha,:ia-
dharman) grade of arhat-hood - also called a "lion-circumstantially liberated"
(asamaya-vimukta) arhat. Such a practitioner has started off as a "doctrine-pursuer"
(dharmanusarin). Accordingly, this knowledge does not follow the moment of the
exhaustion-knowledge in the case of those arhat-s who are susceptible to retrogres-
46 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabha!jya
sion (pariha'l}a-dharman), also called those who are "circumstantially liberated"

(samaya-vimukta), who have started off as "faith-pursuers" (sraddhanusarin).
There are a total of six types or grades of arhat-s: pariha'l}a'-dharman, cetana-
dharman, anurak!fa'l}a-dharman, sthita-akampya-dharman, prativedhana-dharman
and akopya-dharman ("of the nature of being unshakable"). Only the last is non-
retrogressive; but a retrogressive type can be elevated· to be non-retrogressive
through the process of "elevation/sublimation of the faculties" (indriya-uttapana,
indriya-sarricara). Some schools-like the Mahasarµghika, 140 and the Vibhajya-
vadins 141 in general-hold that an arhat cannot retrogress. Vasubandhu also endorses
the Sautrantikas who hold a similar view .142
The arya-pudgala-s are divisible into seven types: 1. sraddhanusarin; 2. dharma-

anusiirin; 3. sraddha-vimukta; 4. dr!f!i-priipta; 5. kaya-sak~in; 6. prajfia-vimukta;
7. ubhayatobhaga-vimukta.
(3) and (4) started as (1) and (2) respectively, and become so called after emerging
from the darsana-marga.
(5) The "body-witness", who has realized through his body the cessation meditative
attainment (nirodha-samapatti).
(6) The "understanding-liberated", who is one liberated from the defilement-hin-
drance (klesa-avara'l}a) through understanding alone. He has not been able to enter
into the cessation meditation (nirodha-samapatti).
(7) The "doubly liberated", who is one who, besides being liberated from the
defilement-hindrance, is also liberated from the vimok!ja-avara'!Ja. He is liberated
from all hindrances to meditative attainments. 143 According to Sarµghabhadra, the
intrinsic nature of this·vimok!fa-avara'l}a is the non-defiled nescience (akli!ffa-ajfiana)
which is still capable of manifestation in the arhat. 144
Ea. Chapter seven: Jfiiina-nirdesa

This chapter discusses (1) the intrinsic nature and functions of the different types of
knowledge, (2) their classification, (3) their modes of activities (akara) and (4) their
excellent qualities (gu'l}a). The flow of this chapter from the last is described at the
beginning of Sarµghabhadra's commentary thus:
In this way, the iirya-pudgala-s have been designated on the basis of the
differences in the paths. In [discussing] these paths, it has been mentioned
that proper view and proper knowledge are called the non-trainee factors
(asaik1a-aliga). We should therefore now consider wheth~r, in designating
the two separate factors of view and knowledges, there are prajfiii-s that are
views but not knowledges, and prajiia-s that are knowledges and not
views .... 145
l. Prajfiii is one of the most important terms in the Abhidharma. For the Sarviisti-
viida, it can be of different moral species and operate in different modes for
which various names are given. For this reason, we generally render it generically
as "understanding". This chapter mainly distinguishes its modes of operation as
(i) receptivity (k~anti), (ii) knowledge (jfiiina) and (iii) view (dr~!i).
i. · "Receptivity" is the stage of understanding that precedes knowledge proper. It is
judgmental in nature (sa"f!ltfrm:iatmaka) and is receptive to a fact even though it has
not been fully ascertained. But it is not a decisive understanding, for it arises together
with the acquisition (priipti) of the doubt that it is to abandon, i.e., so long as it has
not abandoned the doubt, its understanding is non-decisive. It is the seeing (darsana)
of a fact for the first time.
ii. "Knowledge" is an understanding that is decisive or definite (niscita), free from
doubt; the process of judgmental investigation has come to cease. It is also said to be
that which repeatedly discerns the object-domains, and it is from this perspective that
all the with-outflow prajfiii-s can be subsumed as knowledges,1 46 since they have
been discerning their object-domains repeatedly from beginningless time. As for the
outflow-free understandings, those that repeatedly discern are called knowledges; but
the outflow-free receptivities with regard to the four noble truths are not called
knowledges on account of their not having made any repeated discemment. 147 The
"exhaustion-knowledge" and the "knowledge of non-arising" are knowledges, but
not views, because they arise after-the ceasing of judgme,ital investigation.
iii. "View" is also judgmental in nature. This is also part of Vasumitra's definition
of "view, which requires judgment and investigation". 148 Elsewhere in the MVS, four
characteristics of view are mentioned: seeing, being judgmental, firm attachlllent,
and penetrating into the cognitive objects. 149 Among the with-outflow prajfiii-s, six
are also views (besides being knowledges): the five defiled views comprising Self-
view (satkiiya-dr~!i), etc., and the mundane proper view (laukikf samyag-dr~!i);
2. Vasubandhu enumerates ten knowledges. This. classification comes from the

Prakara,:ia-piida; the Jfii1naprasthana 150 enumerates eight. But Vasubandhu probably
simply follows the ten-fold classification known since the Amrta-rasa. These ten,
with their different modes of activity (iikiira), are as follows:
(i) Dhanna-knowledge. It operates with the sixteen iikara-s of the four truths
pertaining to the sensuality sphere (four. for each truth). The sixteen iikiira-s are:
(a) truth of unsatisfactoriness - impermanent, unsatisfactory, empty, non-self;
48 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmako§abha~ya
(b) truth of origin - cause (hetu), origin (samudaya), generation (prabhava), condi-
tion (pratyaya); (c) truth of cessation - cessation (nirodha), quiescent (santa),
excellent (prar_ifta), exit (ni!Jsarar_ia); (d) truth of the path - path (marga), propriety
(nyaya), practice (pratipat), transcendent (nairyar_iika).
(ii) Subsequent knowledge. It operates with the sixteen akara-s of the four truths
pertaining to the two upper spheres.
Sa:qighabhadra objects to the view-probably shared by Vasubandhu 151-that this
subsequent knowledge is an inferential knowledge. Firstly, the sutra-s speak of it as
being a case of truly knowing the noble truths; true knowledge cannot be inferential.
Moreover, if it were so, it would mean that an tirya can have no knowledge _which
takes cessation as object, since cessation is not an entity directly seen. Here he of-
fers an important explanation on the Sarvastivada doctrine of direct perception
(pratyak~a) which is said to be threefold: (a) faculty-based (*indriytisrita-pratyak~a)
- direct grasping of the external object-domain by a sensory faculty; (b) direct
perception of experience (*anubhava-pratyak~a) - when sensation, ideation, etc.,
are coming into the present; (c) direct perception of comprehension (*buddhi-
pratyak~a) - the realization of a dharma's intrinsic or common characteristic
accordingly as the case may be. "Herein, if we say from the perspectives of
(a) and (b) that the object-domain of anvaya-jfWna is not an entity directly seen,
then there also ought not to be the dharma-jfWna of cessation, since cessation is not
the domain of (a) and (b). If we consider from the perspective of (c), we should not
say that the cognitive object of anvayajfiana is the object-domain of an inferential
knowledge. Thus, all properly derived (*yoga-vihita) ascertainment (viniscaya) of the
reals are knowledge of direct perception (pratyak~a-Jfiana); the anvayajfiana being
so, should pertain to direct perception". 152
(iii) Conv~ntional knowledge (saY(lvrti-Jfiana). This takes all dharma-s as cognitive
objects. At the stages of warmth, summits and receptivities (see Section EF), it
operates with the sixteen akara-s of the four truths; at the stage of the upper grade of
receptivity and the supreme worldly dharma-s, it operates with the akara-s of the
truth of unsatisfactoriness alone; in the practice of jamatha and vipasyana, it has the
intrinsic and common characteristics of dharma-s as its akara-s.
(iv)--(vii) Knowledge of unsatisfactoriness, knowledge of origin, knowledge of
cessation, knowledge of the path. Each has the four akii.ra-s of the particular truth
concerned.
(viii) Knowledge of others' thoughts (paracitta-Jfiana). This can be both outflow-free
and with-outflow. In the former case, it is subsumed under \he truth of the path, and
thus operates with the four akara-s of the path. In the latter case, its akara-s relate to
BHJKKffU KL DHAMMAJOTI 49
the intrinsic characteristics of the citta-caitta-s-but only one entity at a time-that it

cognizes.
(ix)-(x) Exhaustion-knowledge and knowledge of non-arising. Each of them operates
with fourteen iikiira-s - i.e., the sixteen minus siinya and aniitman. According to
the Kasmirian masters: They are realized in an arhat's contemplation and are thus
outflow-free; but when he emerges from the contemplation, two conventional
knowledges qua "subsequently obtained knowledges" (pr~!halabdha-jiiiina) follow
consecutively, through which he knows: "dul:,,kha has been known by me ... " and
"dul:,,kha has been known by me, and is no longer to be known ... " 153 - such thoughts
of "me", which then become possible, exclude the siinya and aniitman iikiira-s.
Of these knowledges, the conventional knowledge is with-outflow. The knowledge of

others' thoughts are both with-outflow and outflow-free. The rest are all outflow-
free. Although liberation must ultimately depend on the outflow-free knowledges,
the conventional knowledges--derived from listening (srutamayi), from reflection
(cintii-mayf; note that this already involves meditative praxis), from cultivation
(bhiivanii-mayi) and from birth (upapatti-priitilambhikii; i.e., innate)-are also em-
phasized in the Abhidharma, and in this emphasis, abhidharmic investigation (of
intrinsic and common characteristics) is once again given its due place:
Question: What kinds of conventional knowledge are also called "knowl-

edge qua complete knowledge" (jiiiina-parijiiii)?
Answer: Excepting the conventional knowledges which are conjoined with
resolve (adhimok~a), the other [conventional knowledges] derived from
listening, reflection and cultivation which are exceedingly clear can also
be called "direct realization" (abhisamaya; see Section EF.2.b.iii and note
125) as well as "knowledges qua complete knowledge". Those derived
from listening examine the eighteen elements with regard to their intrin-
sic characteristics and common characteristics, etc. Those derived from
reflection comprise the mindfulness of breathing and the fourfold abiding
of mindfulness, etc. Those derived from cultivation comprise warmth,
summits, receptivities and the supreme worldly dharma-s, etc. These as
well as the outflow-free knowledges are called knowledges qua complete
knowledge .... 154
Innate understanding is that which studies, recites and thoroughly propa-
gates the twelve-division teachings of the tripitaka. On the basis of this, the
understanding derived from listening comes into being. On the basis of this,
the understanding derived from reflection comes into being. On the basis of
this, the understanding derived from cultivation comes into being; this
eradicates defilements and realizes Nirvii,:ia. It is like the case that the
sprout is generated on the basis of the seed; the stem, on the sprout; the
branches, leaves, flower_s and fruits successively, on the stem. 155
3. For the Vaibhii~ikas, akara refers to prajfia. Vasubandhu, however, endorses the
Sautriintika view that it is a mode of apprehending cognitive objects (alambana-
graha,:za-praktira) by the citta-caitta-s. 156 Sa111ghabhadra rebukes him:
Here, the Siitrakiira leans towards the tenet of others .... It must be con-
sidered what is meant by the "object-grasping-mode". If it refers to the
different modes/species (prakiira) of the form of the object, then the notion
that all [citta-caitta-s] can assume the image-form (M~ 1!) [of the object]
cannot be established at all, for an object has various forms, skillful,
permanent, etc. Or rather, the riipa-dharma-s are to be subsumed under
iikiira, since riipa-dharma-s can also assume the images of the forms of
others. If it refers to the ability to grasp the distinctive characteristic of
the object, then iikiira ought not to be possible for the five· [sensory]
consciousnesses, since they are not capable of grasping the specific charac-
teristic of the object - since only a discriminative (sa-vikalpaka) con-
sciousness is capable of grasping the specific characteristic of the object [in
the form:] "it is blue, not green", etc. However, this is not what is conceded
[by his definition]. Hence [his definition] is logically invalid. 157
4. In the section on the excellent qualities (gu,:za) of the knowledges, there is

much' buddhological discussion. These include: (i) qualities unique to the Buddha
- his eighteen unique qualities (ave,:zika-dharma), i.e., his ten powers, fourfold
self-confidence (vaisaradya), threefold abiding in mindfulness, great compassion;
(ii) qualities also shared by other trainees - e.g., non-disputation (ara,:za): the ability
to prevent others' defilements from arising with respect to them; (iii) qualities also
shared by the srtivaka-s or the ordinary worldlings - e.g., the supernormal knowl-
edges (a~hijfia).
On the Buddha's ten powers, the AKB states that the Buddha's knowledges-such as
knowing the possible and the impossible (sthiina-asthiina), etc.-are called powers
because they know all objects without any hindrance. This results from the fact that
he alone has abandoned all outflows together with all their traces (va.sanii). In this
connection, the story is told of Sariputra's refusal to a seeker for ordination because
of Siiriputra's inability to see the seeds of liberation phmted by this seeker in the
remote past. This same example occurs in the Vy 158 to illustrate that an arhat still has
the non-defiled type of nescience (akli~{a-ajfiiina).
The Buddha's threefold accomplishment (saf!lpad)-of cause (hetu), result (phala)
and benefit (upakara)--is also discussed. Under the accomplishment of result, the
aspect of the accomplishment in respect to abandoning (prahii,:za-saf!lpad) is said
to be fourfold: (a) he has abandoned all defilements; (b) he has abandoned them
absolutely (atyanta-prahib:,,a); (c) he has abandoned them along with their traces;
(d) he has abandoned all hindrances to meditative attainment. 159 This last aspect
refers to the abandoning of the non-defiled nescience. Saiµghabhadra explains that an
arhat still has to overcome the hindrance to the complete mastery of meditative
attainment on account of the fact that his non-defiled nescience can still manifest
(sam-ud-a--fcar) in him. 160 (See also, Section EF). This is fully abandoned and
rendered incapable of manifestation only in the case of a Buddha - and this is
why his wisdom surpasses those of the pratyekabuddha-s and the sravaka-s.
EH. Chapter eight: Samapatti-nirdesa

1. This chapter expounds the meditative attainments as the ~ausal conditions form-
ing the basis for the generation of knowledges, particularly the outflow-free
knowledges which effectuate emancipation. At the outset, it states that meditations
(dhyana) are twofold: (i) as rebirth (upapatti) states; i.e., as states of birth effectuated
by the karma of meditative praxis; (this aspect has been dealt with in chapter three);
{ii) as meditative attainment, samapatti.
The experiences in these two aspects are not quite the same. For instance, for the
dhyana-s qua meditations:
• in the first dhyana, there are vitarka, vicara, prfti, sukha and samadhi;
• in the second, prfti, sukha, samadhi and adhyatma-sa1Jlprasada;
• in the third, sukha, samadhi, sa1J1skaropek!fa, smrti, sa'f!'lprajfiana;
• in the fourth, samadhi, neutral sensation, upek:ja-parisuddhi, smrti-pari-
suddhi.
But the sensations (vedana) for the dhyana-s qua existences are listed as follows:
• in the first, there are sukha-vedana associated with visual, auditory and
bodily consciousnesses, saumanasya associated with mental conscious-
ness and upek!fa associated with visual, auditory, bodily and mental con-
sciousnesses;
• in the second, saumanasya and upek:ja associated with the mind;
• in the third, sukha and upek:ja associated with the mind;
• in the fourth, only upek:ja vedana. 161
2. The term samapatti, literally meaning "even attainment" (Xuan Zang's rendering
of ~ .¥. conveys this sense), i_s one of the key terms referring to meditation. It can
refer to any of the dhyana-s, the four arupya-s and the two non-conscious meditative
attainments (acittaka samiipatti). The verb from sam-ii--fpad is used technically to

mean "enter into meditation". It is often used synonymously with samiidhi. For some
early masters like Bhadanta Dharmatrata, the two terms in fact mean the same in the
context of meditation - but he is also aware that samiipatti has a broader connota-
tion outside the context of meditation. 162
Samiipatti-s may be Sllperior or inferior in accordance with the gotra (the particular
type of iirya; sharp-faculty, weak-faculty, retrogressive, non-retrogressive, etc.) and
prajiia of the meditators: the sravaka-s and pratyekabuddha-s cannot know even the
names of the Buddha's samapatti-s; those of Sariputra cannot be known by other
sriivaka-s; and so on; when attaining parinirvii1J,a, the Buddha entered into the
samiipatti of "immovable radiance", 163 whereas Sariputra entered into the sirriha-
vifrmbhita-samapatti and Maudgalyayana entered into the gandhahasti-vifrmbha-
samiipatti; etc. 164
3. Another term generally connoting "meditation" is samiidhi: "holding (-fdhii)

evenly", "equipoise". It is one of the ten universal thought-concomitants (mahii-
bhamika-dharma) of the Sarvastivada system, defined very simply by Vasubandhu as
"one-pointedness of thought" (cittasyaikagrata) in chapter two. The MVS explains it
thus:
It sustains (a-.fdhii) various types of skillful citta-caitta-s making them
continue evenly as a series; hence called samadhi . ... It is samadhi because
it holds evenly ... , it holds various excellent even dharma-s. 165
Various opinions distinguishing between samadhi and samapatti are given in the
MVS: (i) the former is of a single entity (dravya), the latter comprises the five
skandha-s; (ii) the former, momentary, the latter, in a serial continuity; (iii) all
samiidhi-s are samiipatti-s, but some samiipatti-s are not samiidhi-s; (iv) some
samadhi-~ are not samapatti-s - viz, the samadhi conjoined with a non-concentrated
(asamahita) thought. 166
4. The English word "meditation" is perhaps best reserved for dhyiina. 167 Vasu-
bandhu brings out the important point of the Vaibha~ika system that it involves
equally the aspects of concentration and contemplation - or samatha and vipasyanii:
[Dhyana] is that through which they meditate (dhyayanty aneneti); this

means "they understand truly" (prajananti), because one who is concen-
trated understands truly (i.e., there is necessarily an element of insight in a
concentrated mind; see Section EG). This root (.fdhyai) is in the sense of
reflection (cintana) which, according to the accepted t~net of the school
(Sarviistiviida), refers to prajiia.
If so, it amounts to that all samiidhi is dhyiina.

No. The name ["dhyiina"] is given to a samiidhi endowed with excellences
(prakar~a) ... . But what [samiidhi] is endowed with excellences?
T_hat samiidhi which is endowed with the dhyana-factors. For, being bound
by the pair of samatha and vipasyani'i (samatha-vipasyanabhyiiJ!l yuga-
naddhal:i), it is called an "abode of happiness in the present life" (dr~{a-
dharma-vihiira) or the path of ease (sukha pratipad) [for liberation]: with it,
[the practitioners] meditate at ease. 168
For this reason, while all the nine meditative attainments can be called samapatti,
only the first four meditative attainments are called dhyana. This agrees with the
explanations in the MVS:
Only when both senses are fulfilled can it be called a dhyana - [the sense
of] abandoning fetters and of proper seeing (sam-anu--fpas'). The sensu-
ality-sphere samadhi-s, although capable of pr~per seeing, cannot abandon
the fetters; the non-material-sphere samadhi-s, although capable of aban-
doning fetters, cannot see properly. Hence, [both] are not dhyana . ...
Further, the non-material-sphere samadhi-s have quiescence, but no con-
templation; -the sensuality-sphere samadhi-s have contemplation, but no
quiescence. The rupa samadhi-s have both, hence they are called quiescent
contemplation (dhyana): 169 quiescent in the sense of being concentrated
(samiihita); contemplation in the sense of insight (vidarsana/vipasyanii). 170
5. The nine meditative attainments are: (i) the four dhyana-s pertaining to the
rupadhatu, (ii) the four arupya attainments-akasanantya-ayatana, _vijfiananantya-
ayatana, aki'!lcanya-ayatana, naiva-sa'!l}fia-nasa'!l}fia~ayatana-and (iii) the cessa-
tion meditative attainment (nirodha-samapatti). These a'.re called the "nine sequential
meditative attainments" (rtava-anupurva-samapatti), because they have to be mas-
tered in sequence. But once mastered, they can be entered into in any order. Of
these, on the whole, it is the four dhyana-s that Vasubandhu discusses_ in greatest
detail. Indeed, the four dhyana-s constitute the fundamental emphasis on Buddhist
meditation praxis. Proper equipoise (samyak-samadhi) is defined in terms of the
dhyana-s, 171 and they are the meditation praxis praised by the Buddha himst;lf. 172 As
the bodhisattva, the Buddha was said to have been instructed in and gained 'mastery
over the attainment of the aki'!lcanya-ayatana and naiva-sa'!l}fia-nasa'!l}fia-ayatana;
but he did not find them efficacious in bringing about enlightenment. The MVS in
fact states that all buddha-s, more numerous than the sands of river Ganga, without
exception, relied on the fourth dhyana to attain supreme perfect enlightenment. 173 In
attaining parinirva,:,,a too, the Buddha-and for that matter the great disciples like
Sliriputra and Maudgalyliyana-passed away after emerging from the fourth dhyana.
I
The dhyana-s are emphasized as the "predominant thought-concomitant" (adhi-
caitasika), as the "abode of happiness in the present life" (dr~fadharma-vihara) and

as the "path of ease" (sukha pratipad) (see above) in which a more and more subtle
form of comfort and bliss (prasrabdhi; "lightness", "pliability", "fitness") is expe-
rienced:
There is no samiidhi like the four fundamental dhyiina-s which, possessing
great power and being highly efficacious, can accomplish great things. For
this reason, they alone are called the adhi-caitasika. Moreover, in tfie four
dhyiina-s there are immeasurable kinds of excellent qualities of the adhi-
caitasika ... . Moreover, on the basis of the four dhyiina-s, the yogiiciira-s
experience the caitasika bliss through immeasurable ways. . .. Furthermore
the four dhyiina-s are included as "paths of bliss/ease", hence they alone are
called the adhi-caitasika. 174
6. Other forms of meditative praxis discussed in this chapter include (i) the three-
fold samadhi and (ii) the threefold-threefold samadhi, (iii) the eight liberations
(vimok~a), (iv) the eight spheres of conquest (abhibhv-ayatana) and (v) the ten
pervasive spheres (krtsna-ayatana), etc.
1. The threefold samadhi is (a) emptiness-samadhi (sanyata-samadhi), so called
because it contemplates the sanya and anatman akara-s of the truth of unsatisfactori-
ness, conducing to the realization of the emptiness of the self and of what pertains
to the self; (b) characteristicless-samadhi (animitta-samadhi), so called because it
takes as its cognitive object Nirva,:ia, which is free from the ten characteristics of the
five sensory objects, male, female and the three characteristics of the conditioned;
(c) aspirationless-samadhi, so called because, contemplating the dufikha and anitya
akara-s of dufikha-satya and the four akara-.s of the truth of origin, it comes to aspire
for no dharma at all. These three may be with-outflow and outflow-free, and the
latter are also called gateways of liberation (vimok~a-mukha) as they are efficacious ·
in leading to Nirva,:ia - thus spelling out their importance as methods of meditative
praxis.
ii. The threefold-threefold samadhi-s are emptiness-emptiness-samad/u, charac-
teristicless-characteristicless-samadhi, aspirationless-aspirationless-samadhi; each
takes its respective threefold samadhi as object. E.g., an arhat first contemplates,
by means o.f his outflow-free knowledge, the emptiness and no-self-ness of all
dharma-s, generating the emptiness-samadhi. He further contemplates, by means of
the with-outflow knowledge, the preceding knowledge of emptiness as being empty,
generating dispassion towards it; this is emptiness-emptiness-samadhi. Sarµgha-
bhadra explains thus:
This is like the case of using a stick to turn around the corpse that is .being
burned; when the corpse has become extinct, the stick too must be burned.
Likewise, having burned the defilements by means of the emptiness [-
samiidhi], one further generates the emptiness-emptiness-samiidlii in order
to generate dispassion toward the preceding emptiness. 175
iii. The eight liberations (vimok~a) are: (1) "possessing matter, he sees [external]
matter"; (2) "internally without the ideation of matter, he sees matter externally";
(3) "having realized through the body and fully attained the beautiful liberation
(subha-vimok~a), he abides therein"; (4) - (7) "the four liriipya samlipatti-s; (8) the
nirodha-samlipatti. These liberations, cultivated sequentially, are for the purpose of
rendering defilements more distant and gaining mastery over the samlipatti-s - with
these liberations the practitioner can bring about qualities like non-disputation
(ara,:ili; see Section EG), etc., and psychic power for such activities as prolonging
and shortening the life-span. 176
iv. As for the spheres of conquest (abhibhv-liyatana), the first two are the same as
the first liberation; the next two· are the same as the second liberation; the next four
are the same as the third liberation. However, there is a difference: In cultivating the
liberations, one is only able to "turn one.'s back" on the defilements - i.e., one is
only "liberated". Subsequently, in cultivating these "spheres of conquests", one is
able to also conquer the cognitive object: one can view the object in any manner that
one delights in, without any defilement being provoked by it. ·
v. The eight liberations conduce to the eight spheres of conquest which in turn
conduce to the ten pervasive spheres (krtsna-liyatana). The latter are: earth, water,
fire, wind (four Great Elements), blue, yellow, red, white (four primary colours),
liklisa-linantya-liyatana and vijiiana-linantya-liyatana (first two ariipya meditative
attainments). These ten are so called "because their cognitive objects pervade
extensively and their resolve (adhimukti) is boundless". 177 The MYS elaborates as
follows:
The first eight pervasive spheres pertain to the fine-materiality spheres, the
last two pertain to the non-materiality sphere .... This is because, the
"beautiful liberation" is in the fourth dhyiina. FrC>m this [the practitioner]
can enter into the last four spheres of conquest; from these last four spheres
of conquest he can further enter into the first eight pervasive spheres.
Herein, the liberation can only apprehend generically the mark of the
beautiful, it cannot distinguish blue, yellow, red and white; although the last
four spheres of conquest can distinguish blue, yellow, red and white, they
cannot exercise the mode of understanding (iikiira) of being boundless. The
first four pervasive spheres not only distinguish blue, yellow, red and white;
they can also. exercise the mode of understanding of being boundless. That
is: [the practitioner] contemplates on blue, etc., being each boundless, and
further reflects: "What are the support-bases (ti.fraya) of green-, -etc?"
Having known that they have the Great Elements as support-basis, he next
contemplates earth, etc., being in each case boundless. He further reflects:
"On account of what does this cognized riipa become extensive?" Having
known that it is on account of space, he next generates the tiktisa-tinantya-
tiyatana. He further reflects: "What is the support basis of thi:; cognizing
awareness (buddhi)?" Having known that it has the extensive consciousness
as support-basis, he next generates the vijiitina-tinantya-tiyatana. This con-
sciousness qua support-basis being without another support-basis, the
[stages] further up are not designated as pervasive spheres. 178
7. At the end of the chapter, Vasubandhu states that he has completed his ex-
position of the Abhidharma doctrines in this text, basing himself mostly on the
established tenets of the Kasmirian Vaibha~ikas (praye,:ia hi kasmfravaibhii:jikii,:tii1Jl
nftyiidisiddha .. . ). He adds: "Whatever, herein, has been wrongly grasped by us is our
fault."
m. Chapter nine: *Pudgalavlida-prati~edha

Unlike the previous eight chapters, this chapter does not contain any stanzas (not
counting the couple of verses quoted within the whole prose text). Samghabhadra's
commentary ends with 'Chapter eight at the end of which, as we saw, Vasubandhu
states that he has completed his exposition of the AKB. It is therefore clear that this
chapter forms an appendix to the AKB.
As to its title, we may first note that Vasubandhu refers to this chapter twice, once as
pudgalaviida-prati:jedha 119 ("refutation of the pudgala") and another time as ii,tma-
viida-prati:jedha180 ("refutation of the iitman"). On the first, Yasomitra comments: .
"pudgalaviide pudgala-prati~edha-prakaral).e"; 181 on the second: "ii.tmaviida-prati-
~edha iti sastravasane vatsiputriya-mata-prati~edhe". 182 It thus appears that the title
must have been either pudgalaviida-prati~edha or iitmaviida-prati:jedha, and, as
Yasomitra suggests, it is mainly for the refutation of the Vatsiputriya doctrine of the
pudgala. However, the doctrines of the Saqikhyas, Vaise~ikas and the Grammarians
(vaiyiikara,:ia)-in this regard-are also refuted.
1. Vasubandhu begins the chapter by stating that outside the Buddhist teaching
there can be no liberation. This is because those outside of Buddhism differ from the
Buddhists in being deeply attached to the view of the iitman (iitmadr:Jfi-nivi:jta). They
falsely conceptualize the iitman as a real entity (dravya-antara) distinct from the
skandha-s, and all defilements are generated through the power of this clinging to-the
iitman.
2. Succinctly speaking, the previous eight chapters constitute a doctrine of the

dharma-s demonstrating the truth of no-self-ness (cf. Pu Guang's explanation in
Section C). This is the common concern of all the Abhidharma traditions other than
the Pudgalavadins, such as the Vatsiputrlya and its off-shoots. The following dis-
cussion in the introductory chapter of the Jfiiinaprasthiina illustrates this:
Question: How is the merit (iinusaf!1sa) of this treatise to be characterized?
Answer: It accords with liberation, eradicates bondages and conforms to
emptiness and non-self-ness. It elucidates the truth of no-self-ness, repu-
diates the pudgala, ... turns away from pollution (saf!lklesa) and tends
towards purification, . . . establishes all the true doctrines of the Buddha-
dharma.183
But, after the eight chapters, the most pressing problems still remain to be explained.
Since Buddhism denies th~ iitman and the Abhidharma teaches the doctrine of
momentariness, how is morll responsibility to be established? What is the agei;it of
action and the recipient ofin action? On this, Vasubandhu finds the need, in the
chapter on karma, to refer {h~ readers to our chapter (see first reference, p. 56,
bottom}. Again, in the context of discussing the process of karmic retribution- i.e.,
how a subsequent result can be derived from a previous karma which lasted for only
a single moment-Vasubandhu denies the need and validity to resort to the theory
of tri-temporal existence of dharma-s. He briefly mentions the Sautrantika doctrine
that the result coIDes from a distipctive state of the serial continuity of thought
(citfasa'!ltiina-vise~a), but again finds the need to refer the readers to our chapter
for detai_ls (see second reference, page 56, bottom). We can therefore see that the
purpose of this chapter nine is mainly to establish in detail the Sautrantika doctrine
of karma in terms of bfja and sa'!ltati-parh:ziima-vise~a, without sarviistitva and
pudgalaviida. In other words, while the previous chapters have shown the working of
dharmaviida-from the perspectives of both the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika-it
remains for Vasubandhu to refute pudgalaviida and to establish in detail how the
validity of karmic "agency", moral responsibility, "agent" of sa'!lsiira and the fact of
memory can all be satisfactorily explained in terms of the Sautrantika model. He
probably feels that without such an exposition the preceding accounts on the opera-
tions of the dharma-s, however detailed, would not be convincing enough for the
practitioners.
These are in fact the very concerns of the Vatsiputrlyas and the Atmavadins. The
Vatsiputrlyas ask: "If in that case the pudgala does not exist, who is it that goes
around in sa'!lsii.ra? For, it is not possible that sa'!lsii.ra itself goes around in
sa'!lsii.ra". 184 And, "If in that case the ii.tman does not exist in any way whatsoever,·
how does memory or recognition of a long experienced object occur in the thoughts
58 Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhii:fya
which are momentary?" 185 Similarly, the Vaise1?ikas ask: "There being no iitman,
who is the agent(/doer) of karma-s? Who comes to be the experiencer (bhoktr) of the
fruits?" 186
4. The Vatsiputriyas
,
branched off quite early from theI
Sarvastivada,
.
which is said
to have occurred during the third century after the Buddha's maha-parinirvii,:ia.
Devasarman's Vijiiana-kiiya already contains a detailed disputation between the
Sarvastivadins--called the Sunyatavadins in that context-and the Pudgalavadins.
The following is an example of its denial of the pudgala as a real entity:
There are six consciousnesses: visual ... mental consciousness. Conditioned

by the eye and visible forms, visual consciousness arises. This visual
consciousness can only cognize the visibles, not the pudgala. This pudgala
is not cognizable by visual conscigusness; only the visibles are cogniza-
ble by visual consciousness. Thus, this visual consciousness is not the
pudgala . ...
Further, conditioned by the eye and visible forms, visual consciousness
arises. From the coming together of the three, there is contact. Conditioned
by contact there is sensation. This sensation generated by visual contact ·can
only sense the visibles, hot the pudgala. This pudgala is not sensed by the
sensation generated by visual contact; only the visibles are sensed by the
sensation generated by visual contact. Thus, this sensation generated by
visual contact is not a sensation generated by the pudgala . ...
Hence, the pudgala does not exist. As with visual consciousness, the same
is true for the cases of auditory, olfactory, gustatory, bodily and mental
consciousnesses. 187
5.. In the present chapter, Vasubandhu expounds the Vatsiputriyas' conception of

the pudgala as being ineffable in respe~t to its nature. They teach a distinctive
doctrine of the five categories of dharma: (i) the futµre; (ii) the present; (iii) the past;
(iv) the unconditioned; (v) the ineffable, tci which the pudgala belongs. It can only be
stated that this pudgala is in a necessary relation to the five skandha-s, being neither
identical with nor different from the latter. However, it should be noted that for the
Vatsiputriyas, the pudgala is a designation (prajiiapti) based on the skandha-s,
though cognizable by the six consciousnesses.
Vasubandhu presses the Vatsiputriyas to be precise: ls the pudgala existent as a real
entity or non-existent? If it is an existent, it should be known through either direct
perception or inference - but this is not the case. If it is a non-existent and a mere
concept, then it does not differ from our notion of the pudgala. But the Vatsiputriyas
complain that their doctrine is misunderstood; the pudgala is ineffable as to its being
identical with or different from the skandha-s. It is a dynamic reality designated
on the presently existing appropriated skandha-s. Nevertheless, ontologically it is

neither purely a non-existent nor, for that matter, an existent entity:
It indeed does not exist as a real entity (dravya) or as a [mere] concept [in
the manner that you are suggesting] .... The pudgala is designated on the
basis of the internal appropriated skandha-s existing at the present. 188
That the Vatsiputriyas explain the pudgala as a designation on the basis of the
skandha-s is also confirmed by their other texts, such as the *Tridharmaka-siistra
(.=.;t/:i~1jli") 189 and the *Siif[lmitfya-siistra. For instance, the *Tridharmaka defines the
"nescience (ajiiiina) of the ineffable" (::f~J;Jt::f ;i;u)-i.e., the non-understanding
concerning the ineffable pudgala-as the nescience with regard to the following
threefold designation:
i. designation of the appropriated (~:/jJEg)!:; *upiitta-prajiiapti): 190 "Sentient
beings, having appropriated (upiitta) the skandha-s, dhiitu-s and iiyatan_a-s,
come to (falsely) consi_der [the sentient being] (= the pudgala) as being
identical with or different from [the appropriated skandha-s, dhiitu-s and
iiyatana-s ]"; 191
ii. designation of the past: It is an expression based on the past skandha-s,
dhiitu-s and iiyatana-s, such as: "In the past, I was named Govinda";
iii. designation of the ceased: This refers to the_ designation of the skandha-s,
etc., that have ceased-i.e., designation of the non-appropriated (*anu-
piidatta) skandha-s, etc.-such as: "The Bhagavat enters into parinirvii~a."
In other words, the ineffable pudgala is designated froin the above three perspec-
tives. This threefold designation of the pudgala is said to counteract, respectively,
the three false views: non~existence, annihilation, existence/eternalism. 192 Thus, it
becomes clear that: (a) the pudgala is to be designated on the basis of the skandha-s,
etc; (b) that the pudgala-the sentient being mentioned in (i)--must not be
understood as being identical with or different from the skandha-s, etc.; (c) the
notion bf the pudgala must also steer clear from the false views of existence, non-
existence, eternality, annihilation. To that extent, it is different from the Brahmanical
notion of the iitman, on the one hand, and a mere concept of the Sarvastivadins,
Sautrantikas and others, on the other.
6. Vasubandhu also refutes the doctrine of "a certain heretic" (ekfyas tfrthikal:,.) 193-
identified by both Yasomitra194 and Pu Guang 195 as the Vaise~ika-that conscious-
ness necessarily arises from the iitman. It claims that the observed variation in the
c-6nsciousness arising in the different moments and the lack of a fixed order of
arising is due to the conjunction (saf[lyoga) of the iitman with the manas.
Vasubandhu argues that a conjunction necessarily occurs at a particular localized

spot, which implies that the two things in conjunction are localized. Moreover, the
Vaise~ikas define conjunction as "a meeting-together preceded by a non-meeting-
together" (apraptipiirvika praptilJ sm11yogaf:i). Now, manas possesses activity and
moves; when it does so, the atman which meets with it must also move. All this
contradicts the claim of an omnipresent, non-limited, non-moving atman.
In response to the Vaise~ika question as to how, in the absence of the atman, a
past kanna which has perished can subsequently generate an effect, Vasubandhu
expounds the distinctive Sautrantika theory of saf!llati-pari,:iama-vise~a:
Just as it is said [in the world], "a fruit arises from the seed". But it does not
arise from the perished seed nor does it arise immediately. How then? It
[arises] from the distinctive [culminating moment] in the serial trans-
formation (sa1J1,tati-paririiima-vise.ya) of that [seed]: from the final stage of
the flower, generated successively from the sprout to the stem to the leaves,
etc. But as for that which is generated from the flower, why is it said to be
the fruit of the seed? Because the efficacy [for generating the fruit] existing
in lhe flower was induced by it through a succession from it. ... It is thus
that the fruit is said to arise from the karma. And it is not the case that it
arises from the karma that has perished, nor [does it arise] immediately
[after the karma] . ... It is from the distinctive [culminating moment] in the
serial transformation of that [karma]. 196
7. Some [like the Grammarians 197 ] claim (yo 'py aha) 198 that the atman exists,
~ince a state of existence (bhava) depends on an existent agent (bha:vitr), just as
Devadatta's walking depends on Devadatta qua the agent of walking (gantr).
Likewise, consciousness-and for that matter any action-depends on an agent of
cognition (vijfiatr).
V asubandhu replies that if by such an "agent" is meant a real atman, its existence
remains to be proved (and in fact it has already been disproved). If it is a person in
the conventional usage of the term (vyavahara-puru~a), it refers simply to a name
given to a serial continuity of conditionings (saf!lskara). As to the siitra statement
.that consciousness cognizes (vijfianaf!l vijanati), Vasubandhu explains that in the
cognitive process consciousness in fact does nothing (it is not a true, independent
agent):
It does nothing. Nevertheless, just as an effect, though doing nothing

whatsoever, is said to correspond (anuvidhfyate) to the cause on account of
its acquiring its existence (iitma-labha) resembling (sadr~yena) [the cause];
likewise, consciousness, though doing nothing whatsoever, is said to be
conscious [of the object] on account of its acquiring its existence resem-
bling [the object]. Now, what is its resemblance? The fact of having the
BHIKKHV KL DHAMMAJOTJ 61
form or aspect (iikiira) of that [object] (tadiikiiratii). For this very reason,
although it is arisen through the sense faculty as well, it is said to cognize
the object-domain, not the sense faculty. Or rather, the statement "con-
sciousness cognizes" is also faultless from this perspective: because of the
fact of the serial continuity of consciousness being the cause for the
consciousness [that arises in each moment with regard to the object-
domain] (because, in the serial continuity of consciousness, the preceding
moment of consciousness is the cause for the succeeding one). 199
8. The religiosity of this great scholar monk, Vasubandhu, shows up unmistakably

in various places in the AKB. In this chapter too, on several occasions, he stresses
that the true nature of things concerning the operation of consciousness and the
process of karma are truly profound, fully comprehensive by the Buddha alone.
F. Abbreviations
AKB = Pradhan, P. (ed.), 2nd edition. Abhidharmakosabhii~yam of Vasubandhu. (1975,
Patna).
AHV = *Abhidharmahrdaya-vyiikhyii (/Misra-abhidharmahrdaya). # jl,J Ile. t:,..:..,~. T28,
no. 1552.
MVS = Abhidharma-mahiivibhii~ii r,J Ile. :l!~ JC Ile.~ jj,~. T29, no. 1545.
Study = Yin Shun, wr;--1:}]*~~ :i.~:f:~ij)-/frli .z:.~'ir. (A Study of the Siistras and
.Aciiryas of the Sarviistiviida and Other Schools). (1968, Taipei).
Ny = *Nyiiyiinusiira. T29, no. 1562.
Vy = Wogihara, U (ed.), Sph!Jfiirthii Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii. (1936, 1971, 1989,
Tokyo).
Endnotes
Cf AKB, 2: prajiitimalii siinucariibhidharma/:t I tatra prajiiii dharma-pravicaya/:t (= abhi-

dharma) I
AKB,2.
MVS, 4b22-25.
MVS, 4a15-16.
Ny, T29, 329b. See. also the third meaning of abhidharma according to the Abhi-
dharmikas in MVS, 4a15-16.
La Vallee Poussin takes him to be the same Gho~aka mentioned frequently in the MVS
(see LVP's Introduction). Yin Shun, however, points out that they cannot be the same
person since their views differ, and the Amrta-rasa was compiled after the MVS (Study,
486).
See Study, 479 ff.
Some scholars, including La Vallee Poussin (see his Introduction), misinterpreted Dao
An's preface to the older translation of the Mahiivibhii:fii (T no. 1546) to suggest that the
Abhidharmahrdaya was composed before the Mahiivibhii:fti. So, also, Erich Frauwallner,
Studies in the Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems.
English tr. by Sophie Francis Kidd (1995), 152. Yin Shun (Study, 472-74), however,
shows convincingly that the Chinese narration in this preface in fact indicates that the
Abhidharmahrdaya post-dated the Mahiivibhii:jii.
T28, 812c3-4.
10
T28, 812c6-7.
11
But as Yin Shun (Study, 511 f) remarks, the Abhidharmahrdaya does p.ot have any real
commentary properly so called; partly because its content is too concise, and partly on
account of its tendency to deviate from the orthodox doctrinal positions. Accordingly, the
"commentators" felt it necessary to revise and supplement its content.
12
For e.g., see Hirakawa, A., et. al., (1973), Index to the Abhidharmakosabhii:jya, Part One,
p.XXX.
13
T28, 809b10: *IJ:. jH.~ ·ti\/, ¾M j\jt;f.r~.
14
T28, 834bl4: *~&~~•t~, ¾.M.\lt;f.r~.
15
T28, 871a15: *J-ihiHJH&l, ¾M.wt;f.r~.
16
T28, 963c8-13.
17 Pu Guang, a close pupil of Xuan Zang, is an important commentator on the Abhi-
dharmakosabhii:jya. For twenty years, from the very inception (645 C.E.) of the Transla-
tion Bureau established with Xuan Zang as the head until Xuan Zang's death in 664 C.E.,
Pu Guang followed and learned the AKB and other texts froin the teacher. In fact, most of
Xuan Zang's translations were written down in Chinese by him. Pu Guang wrote the
Notes on th~ Abhidharmakosabhii:jya (111-¾t'HE., T no. 1821) which is a record of the
explanations on the text he received from Xuan Zang during the translation process.
18
T41, no. 1821, 55c.
19
AKB,3.
Endnotes to Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhii$ya 63
20
Cf AKB, 300: ... ity atmaviidaprati:jedhe sarµpravedayi[fyiimal:z I
21
T41,no. 1821, lb12-24.
22
This phrase in square brackets (likewise below) paraphrases Pu Guang's qualification:
"Although [this chapter] also elucidates the principle, this is so stated from the point of
view that this is mostly the case or that [the elucidation of the principle] is not its proper
concern."
23
T41,no. 1821, lcl0-2a19.
24
T41, lal5-22.
25
AKB,460.
26
T41,no. 1822,458a29-b2.
27
AKB, 8: ete catviirafr svalak:fa1:iopiidiiyarupadhiira1J,iid dhiitavas catviiri mahiibhiitiinfty
ucyante I
28
AKB, 2: svalak(fa1J,a-dhii~a1J,iid dharmal:z I
29
AKB, 112.
30
Cf. Ny, 747b.
31
Jaini, op. cit., 70: dhil:z prajiiii dharmasarµgrahiidy-upalak:far:ia-svabhiivii I
32
See Dhitmmajoti, KL (2008), Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine, 83.
33
AKB, 12.
34
Vy, 11.
35
T41, 34b6--44cl 1.
36
AKB, 31: nirvyiipiirarµ hfdarµ dharmamiitra1J1 hetuphalamiitra1J1 ca 1- For a detailed
account and discussion of this controversy, see Dhammajoti, KL (2007). Abhidharma
Doctrines and Controversies on Perception. 3rd ed. Hong Kong, 51-91.
37
T41, 55c24-56al.
38
AKB,38.
39
Vasubandhu also presents the explanation of some other Sarviistivii.din masters; likewise,
he does not show any objection (cf AKB, 40). Sarµghabhadra also refutes such a claim
(Ny, 397a-b).
40
T28, 811bll-13.
41
MYS, 220a-b.
42
AKB,57.
43
AKB,54.
44
Ny, 394a-<:.
45
See Study, 680. - Also ibid., 681: "On questions pertaining to the citta-caitta-s,
Vasubandhu, the author of the Abhidharmakosabhii:jya, is very prudent and discreet; it is
more correct to say that Vasubandhu respects the Abhidharma tradition, rather than that
he approves of the Sautriintikas."
46
AKB,64.
64 Endnotes to Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti's Summary
47
T29, no. 1558, 22c.
48
Ny, 403c24-404a9: #.!i.~llt, ~I ~'ffir: wlltr Jt,(.,, M~A:ltr.l.... ~::f ... 1i, 1Rir.A Jt,
~»u.-n .... *ffl, 1&i(.,'1/t1iiJ\1ii~? «wt, Jl~-#{*{lJJ'~; l;l.*{lJJ':~-1\J, /l ... J.Ht-'f-#{.
1-J*llt~? ~--\JJa½, --J;JJ:1Jt.1J!.a½~#<.- ... *:$1(.::f{sl'IHP-El~, {sl'*fl}iJ', -~~,t;
«--lJJ~, --lJJ:tJt•.~~A~~::f1J!.m ~**•· ~~~~=:$1(.*f•. -}iJ'1Jl.~-
4-til1::~, 1~ e, j;if_, #z \!Jtil~ if, {/X:/q'{t:$1(..
49
Cf AKB, 83-85.
50
Ny,419c.
51
Cf AKB, 91.
52
AKB,93.
53
In chapter one, AKB, 5, "the world" (loka) and "existence" (bhava) are given as two
among the various synonyms for the v.rith-outflow dharma-s.
54
AKB, 112.
55
T26, 921b.
56
T26, 507b-c.
57
T26, 512c.
58
MVS, 121c24-122b17..
59
AKB, 134f
60
MVS, 118c; AKB, 133.
61
Ny,.494b.
62
Cf AKB, 133: yady angam angal'[I pafica skandhii/:t kil'[I kiira,:iam avidyiidfn eva dharmiin
kfrttayati sma I ... avidyiipradhiiniim avasthiim avidyiil'[I jagiida sal'[lskiirapradhiiniil'[I
sal'[lskiiriin yiivaj jariimara,:iam ity ado$a/:t I
63
AKB, 133.
Vasubandhu, in showing the difference, gives here: "tathii iivasthika/:1 k$a,:tikab
priikar$ika/:I siil'[lbandhika/:t sattviikhyo'sattviikhyas ceti bheda/:t". That is, he conveys the
sense that both the satra exposition and the abhidharma exposition involve the fourfold
perspective (iivasthika, etc.). Since he is skeptical about the Vaibha~ika view that the
Buddha's exposition is intended to be iivasthika, it seems very probable that Vasubandhu
here is giving his own view when he says that the sutra is intentional whereas the
abhidharma is definitive. This, then, is yet another indication that Vasubandhu cannot be
straightforwardly assigned to be a Sautrantika.
64
MVS, 41b, 106c, 692c.
65
AKB, 157 f, 189: sattviiniil'[I karmaja/:t prabhiiva-visi$(O viiyitr bfjam 1- Cf.MYS, 691b;
0
Ny, 216b.
66
MVS, 690aff.
67
AKB, 192.
68
See Dhammajoti, KL (2008), Entrance Into the Supreme Do_.ctrine (2nd edn), 76, 214.
Hong Kong.
Endnotes to Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya 65
69
AKB,202.
70
E.g., Dharmaskandha, T26, 503cll-13: "Hostility, and the vedanii, sarµ,jiiii, sarµ,skiira-s
conjoined with it, as well as the bodily and vocal karma-s and disjoined conditionings
originated (sam-utthita) [by it], are collectively called the hostility-element (pratigha-
dhiitu)."
71
MYS, 610a.
72
MYS, 610a.
73
AKB,205.
74
T29, 82a4: ~~~~- It may be possible that Vasubandhu is here merely stating the
Sarvastivada-Vaibhli~ika stance - since he does not refute the other alternative explana-
tions in this context. Cf AKB, 230: niyatam eva tu dr:ftadharmadi-vedanfyam aniyatam
cathurtham iti var~ayanti. But, oLcourse, neither does it particularly advocate the
Dlir~tlintika-Sautrlintika explanations.
75
MYS, 593b.
76
MYS, 593b23.
77
MYS, 593b28: 1j{_ 1'r *- tili (*apare punar ahuft, *anye iiciiryiift punar iihul:t).
78
MYS, 593c6-15.
Ny, 570c27-28.
80
Vy, 392: diir:jfiintikiiJ:t sautriintikii/:t I
81
The Dlir~tantikas in the MYS were also Sarvastivada masters so that the two ascriptions
need not be contradictory. However, it is also to be observed that in this very same con-
text, the MYS introduces the specific Dlir~tantika theory that all karma is transformable.
82
MYS, 592a-594a.
83
MYS, 593b9-16.
84
E.g., MYS, 592a26-27: ~%-~:lJ:1#*m#.t 1'X.l,Um~. :;ir;'t-~.
85 MYS, 592bl-2: !:ildJ1ar:l, 1IU1J}}~:J!. J!lj JltR),!c~lj}}~~~-
86
Ny, 569c.
87
Cf MYS, 635a, 636c; AKB, 196,238.
88
MYS, 634c24-26.
89
AKB, 196ff.
90
AKB, 198.
91
Vy, 357: iisraya iisraya-paravrttiJ:t j
92 AKB, 232. Saxµghabhadra (Ny, 572a) does not object here to the mention of the trans-
formed basis, but he himself avoids using that term in his exaplanation.
93
Ny, 535b.
94 Xuan Zang gives here: "But both this [theory of sarµ,tati-pari~iima-vise:ja] and that
[theory of the avijfiapti] are difficult to understand.... [We] do not have hatred therein
.... " This understanding is supported in the Vy, 357: tathaivi'isarµ,jfii'iyami'ina iti
66 Endnotes to Bhikkhu KL_Dhammajoti's Summary
yathaivavijfiaptir duravabodha I tathaiva sal!}tati-pariI]-funa-vise~o 'piti I ... tatprayoga-

nimittaQ sa1J1tati-pari,:za~o bhavatfti bhavati parito~o '.smakam iti vakya-se~aQ 1- Pu Guang
(T41, 208b16-20) also conveys the same understanding.
95
AKB, 198: na khalu kascit pradve~al} I kirµtu cittlinvaya-kliyaprayoge,:za kriylipari-
samliptau tlibhylirµ prthagbhutarµ dharmlintara,_n prayojayitur utpadyata iti notpadyate
parito~ -1· yatkrtaprayoga-sarµbhutli tu kriyliparisamliptis tasyaiva tannimittal} sarµtati-
pari,:zlimo bhavatfti bhavati parito~al,l I cittacaitta-sarµtlinlic ca liyatylirµ phalotpattel} I
96
"1lt£"; 1Jt being the older rendering for anusaya. The Amrta-rasa has "fit-it", which is
also likely to have been a rendering for anusaya.
97
AKB, 255.
98
Ny, 641c.
99
AKB, 308.
100
Ny, 641c.
101
AKB, 308; Ny, 641c.
102
Ny, 641c.
103
MVS, 257a-b.
104
AKB, 278: evarµ tu slidhu yathli sautrtintikliniim I
105
MVS, 313a.
106
See Dhammajoti, KL (2007), Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception,
14-18. Hong Kong.
107
AKB, 280: ye yaddarsanaheyiilambaniis te taddarsanaheyii avasi~tii bhlivaniiheylil} I
108
For points (i) and (ii), see Ny, 621cl0-22, etc.
109
Ny, 409c.
110
Ny, 633a-b, especially, a28-b2.
111
AKB,298.
112
Ny, 633c24-634al.
113 I follow here Honjo's emendation given in Odani Nobuchiyo and Honjo Yoshihumi (2007)
11!-¾~ }ff :;\ll!- '1iff jE - llit ij~ Ji,
(Kyoto), 144, note 46: yan na ... tatrlitmakiimenaivarµ ...
114
AKB, 301.
115
Ny, 634c22-635al.
116
Ny, 635a2-4.
117 Paramartha's rendering,"¾ }jlj M:i~)ltA Ji,", corresponds well with the Sanskrit.
m T41, 332c7-ll.
119
Ny, 659cl-5.
120 AKB, 330: asty evety iibhidharmikiil} I e~a eva nyiiyal} I, Vasubandhu's endorsement here
is also confirmed by Yasomitra (Vy, 518).
121
MVS, 1591:K:, 363c.
122
Ny, 670c28-671a.
123
T26, 375b. Cf Dhammapada, 372. Udv XXXI, 25.
124
Jt here seems to be an error for ;t.
125
T26, 375b--c.
126
MVS, 148a23-29.
127
Ny, 735c. See also infra, Section EG.
128
E.g., T26, 719c 14-27: eighty-eight darsana-heya, ten bhiivanii-heya. T26, 694al 4-17:
duJ:ikha-dharmajfiiina-k~iinti, duJ:ikha-anvayajfiiina-k~iinti, etc. T26, 712c3-5: "There are
six [kinds of] dharma-s: duJ:ikhadarsana-heya, samudayadarsana-heya, nirodhadarsana-
l)eya, miirgadarsana-heya, bhiivanii-heya, aheya."
129
E.g., T26, 918a27-b9: "In entering into samyaktva, one first directly realizes the duJ:ikha
pertaining to the sensuality sphere as duJ:ikha, then directly realizes, collectively, the
duJ:ikha pertaining to the riipa- and iiriipya-dhiitu as duJ:ikha ... ". T26, 940a13-18:
"duJ:ikha-dharmajfiiina-k~iinti, ... samudaya-dharma-jfiiina, du/:ikha-anvayajfiiina-k~iinti,
. . . miirgadharma-jfiiina, miirga-anvayajfiiina-k~iinti, .... " T26, 957b26-c 1: "What is
duJ:ikha-jfiiina? That which, with regard to the conditionings, operates with the iikiira-s of
duJ:ikha, anitya, siinya, aniitman . ... What is miirga-jfiiina? That which, with regard to the
counteracting path of the conditionings, operates with the iikiira-s of miirga, nyiiya,
pratipat, nairyii,:,,ika. T26, 930c20-22: "Among the ninety-eight anusaya-s, twenty-eight
are duJ:ikhadarsana-heya, nineteen are samudayadarsana-heya, nineteen are nirodha-
darsana-heya, twenty-two are miirgadarsana-heya, ten are bhiivanii-heya."
130 In any case, it is unlike the claim by Erich Frauwallner and others that the abhisamaya
doctrine was innovated in Dharmasri's Abhidharmahrdaya. See Erich Frauwallner, op.
cit., 153 ff.
131
MVS, 175a25-b2. See Nidiina-smriyutta, 10.
132
T49, 15c; but also cf T49, 16a. Also according to Pu Guang, T41, 351c.
133
Vy, 542.
134
MVS, 533a.
135
Cf *CatuJ:isatya-siistra IZYi'//i~, T32, 378a, 379a.
136
Ny, 684b21-24.
137
See also, Study, 567 f
138
Ny, 684a24-26.
139
See AKB, 321:
sarve~arri hi klesiinarri
sakrt k~ayal).
yasya yaJ:i prahii,:,,a-miirgas tenaiva tasya k~ayaJ:i I
visarp.yoga-liibhas te~iirp. punal). punal). I
140
T49, 15c; T41, 375a.
141
MVS, 312b.
142
AKB, 375.
68 Endnotes to Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti's Summary
143
Vy, 650: sarva-samiidhi-samiipatty-iivara1Ja-prahii1Jam ity ubhayato-bhaga-vimukte):l I
144
Ny, 724b.
145
Ny, 735a25-28.
146
AKB, 391.
147
See MVS, 547c6--10.
148
MVS, 490c-491a.
149
MVS, 744a18-20.
150
T26, 957b19.
151
Vasubandhu explains this as tad-anvayiit (AKB, 350), and Yasomitra (Vy, 542) says this
means: "it has [the dharmajiiiina] for its cause": taddhetukatviid ity arthaJ:i. See also infra,
summary on chapter six.
152
Ny, 736c7-17.
153
AKB,394.
154
MVS, 175b2-8
155
MVS, 217b12-16.
156
AKB, 401: evalJl tu yuktalJl syiit ... I. Yasomitra (Vy, 629) comments: evalJl tu yuktalJl syiid
iti sautriintika-matam I
157
Ny, 741b. In brief: "The term akiira is a synonym of prajiiii. The term iikiirayati is a
synonym for the grasping of an object (vi~aya-grahal}a); this word iikiirayati· does. not
exc)usively denote prajiiii. The term iikiiryate applies to all dharma-s." (loc. cit.)
158
Vy,5.
159
AKB,416.
/
160
Ny, 724b.
161
AKB, 437 f, 442.
162
Including dvaya-dvqya-samiipatti referring to sexual copulation, MVS, 539a.
163
::f. t)J a,IJ, *aninjyii prabhii (?). This must be the same as the "immovable quiescent
samiidni" :ft}J~ff-Jt, MVS, 1024a2.
164
MVS, 82lb19-cl.
165
MVS, 539a.
166
MVS, 821c.
167
Not "absorption", "ecstasy", "trance", etc.
168
AKB, 433.
169
Xuan Zang's tr. of dhyiina as ff-~ ("quiescence-contemplation") reflects these two
senses.
170
MVS, 412a.
171
Majjhima, iiL252.
172
Gopaka-moggalliina-sutta, Majjhima, iii.13 f
173
MVS, 881b.
174
MVS, 417c-418a.
175
Ny, 766c15-17.
176 Ny, 773b--c.
177
MVS, 727a23-24.
178
MVS, 440b24-c9.
179
AKB, 243.
180
AKB, 300.
181
Vy, 405.
182
Vy, 476.
183
T26,4c12-17.
184
AKB, 471.
185
AKB, 472.
186
AKB, 476.
187
T26, 545b24-cl8. MVS, 596b3-7, cites this.
188
AKB, 461: naiva hi dravyato 'sti napi prajfiaptita/:t.l ... adhyatmikan upattan varttamanan
skandhiin upiidaya pudgalal:t prajfiapyate [
189
Yin Shun, Study, 458 f, shows that this is a ViitsTputriya text, and its riotion of the j1: ~ tJt
(*upatta-prajfiapti), etc., represents this doctrine.
190
That j1: here translates upatta is suggested by the following eiaboration: ~ 9' ~ ,t: ~
*1t~, ·*
.j'\!..A ::.;ft I§ '.Jt 1t j1:. :f ~ ,f: ~ ,t(.Jli:llHt a ~ t1' :f ~ ,t, ,l ~ ~u :f ~: "Herein,
appropriated(~) refers to being appropriated by oneself or by others. The non-appropri-
ated is such as vegetation, the wall, etc. Among them, that appropriated by others and that
which is not appropriated is to be known as 'non-appropriated' (anupatta)".
191
T25,no.1506,24b2-3: ~~UJt,t: )Rg,_e_,jl:~.j'\!..A, it-2Hffe.
192
T25, 24b5-8.
193
AKB, 475.
194
Vy, 715.
195
T4, 449a26-27.
196
AKB, 477.
197
Vy, 712. But according to Pu Guang, T41, 448a26-27, this is the Siiqikhya.
198
AKB, 473.
199
AKB, 473.
Preface to the 1971 edition of
"L 'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu"
by Etienne Lamotte
The Abhidharmakosa or The Treasury of Scholasticism is an exposition of Buddhist

scholasticism as the Vaibha~ika_ school of Kasmir taught it at the beginning of our
era. The work was composed by the Indian master Vasubandhu some time around
the fifth century. It consists of two parts:
1. the Karikiis, "memorial verses", where the author impartially sets forth the
orthodox system of the school;
2. the Bhii~ya, "commentary" in prose, inserted between each verse, where the
same author explains the Kiirikiis almost word for word, states and criticizes
the opinions of other Buddhist schools and finally gives his own personal
opinion which often departs from the Vaibha~ika interpretation.
From its publication onward, the Abhidharmakosa was very successful, not only
in India but in all of the Far East, where it is universally co_nsidered to be \he
indispensable basis for all Buddhist studies. It was the object of many translations
into Chinese, Tibetan, and Uigur and gave its name to the Kiu-cho school, which saw
the light of day in China at the end of the sixth century, and to the Kusha school,
officially recognized in Japan in 793. Even in our times, the Abhidharmakosa is
taught in all the great Japanese universities.
In the West, the importance of this work was recogni_zed towards the middle of the
nineteenth century. Eugene Burnouf comments that its author, Vasubandhu, was
rightly held to be the "Sage similar to a second Buddha". Nevertheless, western
Indologists hesitated for a long time to undert.rke the study of a text the technical
nature of which presented insurmountable difficulties for them. Moreover, the
original Indian text being lost, the work could be approached only by means of the
Chinese and Tibetan translations.
Louis de La Vallee Poussin, who towered masterfully over the .major Buddhist
languages-Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan-dedicated the last half of his life to
a French translation of the Abhidharmakosa, the anastatic reproduction of which will
be found here. The work, which was published between 1923 and 1931, consists of
six volumes:
• Vol. I (chapters 1 and 2)
• Vol. II (chapter 3)
• Vol. ID (chapter 4)
• Vol. IV (chapters 5 and 6)
• Vol. V (chapters 7, 8 and 9)
• Vol. VI (intro.duction, index, and .addenda)
72 Preface
The French version relies on the following sources:

1. The original Sanskrit text of the Karikiis for the first three chapters and the
beginning of the fourth chapter.
2. The two Chinese translations of the Karikas and the Bha~ya made by
Paramartha between 563 and 567 (Taisho edition; no. 1559) and by Hiuan-
tsang between 651 and 654 (Taisho edition, no. 1558), respectively.
3. A Tibetan translation of the Karikas and the Bha~ya made at the beginning
of the ninth century by Jinamitra and Dpal-brtsegs.
4. The Sphufartha Abhidharmakosavyakhya, Exegesis of Clear Meaning of the
Abhidharmakosa. This refers to an exegetical treatise in Sanskrit composed
in the seventh century ~y the Indian master Yasomitra. It is a treasure-mine
of precious information, but in no way does it constitute an uninterrupted
commentary: "By ~tself it is a Very inefficient tool for the study of the
Abhidhannakosa." Louis de La Vallee Poussin knew it from copies of the
manusoript, but the work was published later in 1933-1936 by Unrai
Wogihara (Publishing Association of Abhidharmakosavyakhya, Tokyo).
It was in this way, using in~irect sources, that the Belgian scholar undertook the
study of an intrinsically difficult text. Actually, Vasubandhu-the author of the
Abhidharmakosa-<!alled upon Indian and Buddhist concepts familiar to him, but
which are and remain foreign to the western world's way of thinking. These ideas are
expressed in technical terms with very precise meaning that, however, have no exact
equivalents in the western philosophical vocabulary.
In order to make this text understandable without thereby misrepresenting the Indian
mind, Louis de La Vallee Poussin had recourse to a skillful stratagem. Although
French in terms of syntax, his translation is Indian in terms of vocabulary, in the
sense that the technical terms are retained in their original Sanskrit form. Discon-
certing as this may be for the uninitiate.d reader, this method proves to be the one
most valuable to the specialists, for it alone, in its specificity and its subtleties, allows
one to grasp the Buddhist mind. 1
Some have wished to see in it an easy method, but this criticism has no basis. Indeed,
as soon as a new technical term comes up in the exposition, Louis de La Vallee
Poussin proposes a French equivalent, an equivalent that, although it does not
exhaust the Indian notion in its comprehension and its extension, gives at the very
least a close idea of it. This being done, the Belgian scholar subsequently keeps the
Indian original term. More than anyone else, he has contributed to establishing the
Lodro Sangpo (LS): To also accommodate the "uninitiated reader", in most cases I will
translate the Sanskrit technical terms but also maintain them in brackets.
:ETIENNE LAMOTTE 73
French vocabulary of Buddhist philosophy and, with the exception of slight modi-
fications, this is the vocabulary that the majority of translators are now using.
In his Abhidharmakosa, Vasubandhu continually appeals to the canonical and post-
canonical scriptures, namely, the doctrinal teachings of the Buddha, codes of re-
ligious discipline, scholastic manuals, collections of stories and legends, great trea-
tises of philosophy, in short, a literature stretching. over almost ten centuries. But
according to the custom of the times, Vasubandhu refers to these sources without
giving precise references. In the many notes added onto his translation, Louis de
La Vallee Poussin has succeeded in identifying almost all. This precision in
information somehow doubles the value of Vasubandhu's work and makes the
French translation of the Abhidharmakosa the most instructive book of early
Buddhism (Small Vehicle).
While Louis de La Vallee Poussin was working in this way on what was to be the
great work of his life, he held as irremediably lost the Sanskrit text of the Abhi-
dharmakosa. But in 1935, three years before the death of the Belgian scholar, Ra.hula
Saqikrtyayana discovered the text in question in the Tibetan monastery of Ngor. As
far as I know, this refers to a manuscript in NagarI characters dating from the twelfth
to thirteenth centuries approximately. Louis de La Vallee Poussin had no awareness
of this sensational discovery that certainly would have filled him with joy. The
second World War and the troubles it brought about. slowed the publication of the
manu~cript until recently. The Text of the Abhidharmakosakarika of Vasubandhu was
published by V.V. Gokhale in the Journal of the Bombay Branch, Royal Asiatic
Society, XXII, 1946, pp. 73-102; the complete text of lhe Abhidharmakosa (Karikas
and Bhti!jya) was published by P. Pradhan in the Jayaswal Research Institute of
Patna, 1967.
I was not surprised to notice that the French translation of Louis de La Vallee
Poussin, based mainly on the Chinese version of Hiuan-tsang, adhered literally to the
original Indian text. The honor of such an exceptional success must be given both to
the Chinese master of the seventh century and the Belgian master of the twentieth
century who, on different accounts but with the same talent, labored hard to render
Vasubandhu's mind faithfully.
I will go even further. By its conciseness and abstractness, an Indian philosophical
text demands from its reader an effort of sustained attention and, in order to be
understood in all its nuances, must be reread several times. The inconvenience, if
there pe any inconvenience, disappears in the French version as well as in the
Chinese translation, which, by their analytical nature, can be more directly assimi-
lated.
74 Preface
This is why the Abhidharmakoia of Vasubandhu and its French translation by Louis
de La Vallee Poussin are today inseparably united for the greatest benefit to Buddhist
studies.
But now it is more than thirty years that the French translation has been out of print
and if we do not wish to lose one. of the finest jewels of Belgian Sinology, its new
edition is needed most urgently.
Desirous of paying a last tribute to the memory of Louis de La Vallee Poussin who at
one time was its finest collaborator, the Institut Beige des Hautes Etudes Chinoises
has been very happy to take on this task. Our gratitude is especially addressed to his
distinguished president, M. Henri Lavachery who, by this happy initiative, adds a
new kind deed to the innumerable services he had rendered to science as professor in
the Universite Libre of Brussels, chief conservator of the Musees Royaux d' Art et
d'Histoire, permanent secretary of the Academie Royale de Belgique and general
.· secretary of the Union Academique Internationale.
With a dedication both efficient and discreet, MM. Hubert Durt and Marcel Van
Velthem, librarians at the Institut, have successfully carried out the multiple pro-
cedures involved in the realization of the project.
The relatives of M. Louis de La Vallee Poussin have enthusiastically welcomed the
initiative of the Institut and authorized, completely free of charge, the reproduction
of this work. This gesture of rnre elegance is within the lineage of the illustrious
scholar who devoted his entire life to science.
Bibliographical Addendum
by Hubert Durt
Here we will note only the editions of texts and works relative to the Abhidharma-
kosa that have been published subsequent to. the first publication of the present work
(1923-1931).
SANSKRIT:
V.V. Gokhale, "The Text of the Abhidharmakosakiirikii of Vasubandhu". Journal of
the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, N.S., Vol. 22, 1946, pp. 73-102.
P. Pradhan, Abhidharmakosabha~ya of Vasubandhu. 2d ed. Tibetan Sanskrit Works
Series 8. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.
Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Abhidharmakosa & Bha~ya of Acharya Vasubandhu with
Sphutartha Commentary of Acarya Yasomitra, P,art I (I and II Kosastha11:a),
critically edited, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1970.
Unrai Wogihara, Sphutartha Abhidharmakosavyakhya, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1933-1936.
Anastatic reproduction, Tokyo, 1971.
TIBETAN:
Otani University, The Tibetan Tripifaka, Peking edition, vol. 115 (no. 5590) to
vol. 119 (no. 5597). Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo, 1962.
CHINESE:
J. Takakusu, K. Watanabe, The Tripifaka in Chinese, vol. 29 (no. 1558-1563). The
Taisho Issai-kyo kanko kwai, Tokyo, 1926.
Otani University, Index to the Taisho Tripitaka, no. 16, Bidon-bu III (vol. 29).
Research Association for the Terminology of the Taisho Tripitaka, Tokyo,
1962.
S. and I. Funahashi, Kanda Abidatsuma Kusharon Sakuin, Kyoto, 1956. (This index
is based on the Chinese version used by Louis de La Vallee Poussin; Kyokuga
Saeki, Kando Kusharon, 30 vols., Kyoto, 1887).
Preface
by
Louis de La Vallee Poussin
1. By the kind generosity of Sylvain Levi, this sixth and last volume of the Kosa is
enriched by the text of the karikiis of the first three chapters according to a Nepalese
manuscript of the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries. For the karikiis of the other
chapters, fragments of which appear in the Vyakhya or which can be safely restored,
see the notes to the translation. The Tibetan text of the karikas of the third chapter
are mentioned in Cosmologie bouddhique.
2. Fout indexes have been created:
i. a general index;
ii. gathas or karikiis cited in the text or in the notes;
iii. the first words of_the citations of siitras or sastras;
iv. names, scholars, sects, books, Siitras, Abhidharma.
The words Meru, Jambudvipa, Trayastrirµsas, etc., are placed in the general index. 2
3. The Additions and Corrections 3 contain the notes that I marked haphazardly in
my working copy. I have not undertaken either the accumulation of a complete
documentation, clearly impossible, or a conscientious revision of the translation.
4. Th~ Introduction does not contain everything that I wanted to put in it.
a. It lacks the summary of the doctrines of the Kosa. The recent study by Rene
Grousset, Analyse de l'Abhidharmakosasastra, 4 can favorably substitute for what
I might have written. Besides, I had started to examine various problems of general
interest which the Kosa clarifies: Nirviiflla (1925), Morale bouddhique (1927),
Dogme et philosophie du Bouddhisme (1930). I plan a Chemin de Nirva~a (Kosa,
Royal names and the huge numbers in the third chapter, which are cited in the Index of
Cosmologie bouddhique, have been omitted. The Vyiikhyii has not been studied systematically.
LS: Since I have incorporated most of the additions and corrections into the footnotes of
the translation, they have not been translated separately.
In Philosophies indiennes (1931), i, pp. 153-99 [LS: See Electronic Appendix]. In the
same work, vol. ii, pp. 10--130 and 404-14, there is an analysis of the large treatises and the
important questions of the V,:_ijfiiinaviida. - Sometimes biased, but evidence of a serious attempt
at interpretation, see the works of Stcherbatski and Rosenberg, cited below in the Introduction,
~' ~Vii.
Preface 77
chap. v-viii) and a Histoire de l'Abhidharma (Siitras; Kosa; Siddhi) which will
explain what the Sarvastivada added to the early Abhidhamma. 5
The materials gathered together for the study of some points, either important or
difficult, make up a very considerable amount. They are in the course of publication
under the title Documents d'Abhidhanna. The first part, on the Asarµskrtas (accord-
ing to the Vibhi'i~a and Sarµghabhadra), is published in the Bulletin de !'Ecole
Franraise d'Extreme-Orient. It will be followed by notes on the authenticity of the
Scriptures and the sacred nature of the Abhidharma; the doctrine of the refuges and
the purity of the body of the perfected being (arhat); the controversy on time, the
moment andthe atom; the two, the four and the three truths; the possessions (prapti)
and the traces (vasana); the Dar~tantikas-Sautra9tikas; the Yogasutras and the
Abhidharma.
b. One will find here [in my Introduction], along with the bibliography of the Kosa,
only the beginnings of a study on Vasubandhu's sources 6 :
A. Annotated edition of the comments that appear in the foreword to
Cosmologie bouddhique (1913): the place of the Abhidharma in the old
literature of Buddhism, the place of the Kosa in the Abhidharma literature;
pp. vi-xvi
B. Bibliography of the Kosa and its commentaries, European sources, Sanskrit
sources, etc.; pp. xvii-xxiii
C. The question of the date of Vasubandhu; pp. xxv-xxviii
D. The seven canonical treatises of the Abhidharma; pp. xxix-xlii
The historic relationships of orthodox or Brahmanic philosophy and Buddhist philosophy

are not clear. But it is easy to see (1) that the Sarvastivadin theory of the homogenous
character (sabhagatii), if not merged with the Vaise~ika theory, resembles it greatly (AKB
ii, F 198); (2) that the thesis of the word manifested by the voice has a Mimaiµsa air; (3) that
Dharmatrata's explanation of all exists has similarities to the Saiµkhya (v, F 53).
I think I have shown that the Yogasiltras depend upon the Sarvastivada (Ac. de Belgique, Nov.
1922: 520-26); but who would claim that Buddhist Yoga has not been influenced by Brah-
-manic Yoga? (See the note on Nirval).a in Melanges Raymonde Linossier, 1931).
AKB iv, F 189, cites the Saundarananda of Asvagho~a, which the Vyiikhyii, in tum, cites
several times. Asvagho~a•s poem should be mentioned among the works that depend closely
on the Abhidharma. The spiritual progress of Nanda, for example, is described with technical
precision. - Verse xiii, 44 (which is reminiscent of Sumarigalavilasinf, i, 12) is Nagarjunian by
changing the last piida: bhutadarsf vimucyate; see Index of karikas
78 LOUIS DE LAV ALLEE POUSSIN
E. Some masters of the Vibha~a; pp. xliii-li

F. Some schools of the Vibha~a; pp. lii-lix
G. · The Abhidharma of Sariputra; pp. lx-lxii
H. The three editions of the Abhidharmastira; pp. lxiii-lxv
The study of the Vibha~a, facilitated particularly by the references of Saeki Kiokuga
(ed. of the Kosa), and the study of the old Abhidharma treatises show clearly all that
Vasubandhu owes to the Sarvastivadin sources: Vasubandhu speaks the truth when
he says that this book is an explanation of the doctrines of the Vaibha~ikas of
Kasmir; the Kosa is, by definition, a judicious and well-ordered analysis of the
Vibha~a. But the Kosa, as we know, is also the refutation of several essential doc-
trines of the Vibha~li. Vasubandhu, who the orthodox Vaibha~ika Sarµghabhadra
calls "the Sautrantika", sets the view of the Sautrantikas or his own views against the
views of the Sarvastivadin--=-Vaibha~ikas: here we have very little information on the
sources that he uses; he makes use of data foreign to and undoubtedly later than the
Vibha~ti, the Dar~tantikas-Bhadanta-Dharmatrata cited by the Vibha~a. We will see
more clearly when we have read Sa~ghabhadra who gathers information on SrTiata,
who must be one ofthe Sautrantika sources ofVasubandhu. 7
My task is to offer to my colleagues the information-such as it is and. in all its
simplicity-that I have available. The Kosa and the Abhidharma remind one of the
definition the poet gave of the boar, animal propter convivia natum ("an animal
created for conviviality"). Concerted and numerous efforts are required to sort out, if
not the theories-too free of metaphysics, more complicated than profound-then at
least the history of the theories and books.
Another authority of Vasubandhu is the Vasumitra who is the author of the Pariprcchii-
0
slistra; see Index s.v. Sautriintika. I have not found any information on the Netrfpadaslistra,
ii, 205.
Introduction
by
Louis de La Vallee Poussin
A. The three baskets (pitaka) & the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya ................................................. 80

AA. The two baskets of the Vinaya and Dharma & the first Matrkas ............................. 80
AB. The Pali school & the third basket of the Abhidhamma ........................................... 81
AC. The school of the Sarvii.stivii.dins and Vaibhii.~ikas & the Jniinaprasthiina and
its six feet, and the Vibhii~ii ...................................................................................... 83
AD. The school of the Sautrii.ntikas .& the Abhidharmakosa and Bhii~ya ........................ 85
ADA. The importance of the Abhidharmakosa and its Bhii~ya for the study
of canonical philosophy and scholasticism ................................................... 86
ADB. Why the study of the Abhidharmakosa and its Bhii~ya was deferred
for so long ...................................................................................................... 89
B. Bibliography of the Kosa .....................................................................................................91 \
C. The question of the date of Vasubandhu. - Vasubandhu-the-Ancient.. ............................. 97
CA. Bibliography related to the date of Vasubandhu ...................................... :............... 97
CB. The dating of V asubandhu in dependence on the date of Asailga and
the question of the historicity of Maitreyanii.tha ....................................................... 98
CC. Difficulties regarding the biography of Vasubandhu, the expression
piirviiciirya, etc ......................................................................................................... 99
CD. Vasubandhu-the-Ancient ........................................................................................ 100
D. The seven canonical treatises of the Abhidharma ............................................................ 102
DA. Jniinaprasthiina ....................................................................................................... 102
DB. Prakara1Ja of Vasumitra ......................................................................................... 106
gg: ~i:~;:~ta::iiz~·::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::: !~i

DE. Prajniiptisiistra ........................................................................................,................ 111
DF. Dhiitukiiya ..................................................................... ,......................................... 115
DO. Sa,rig'itiparyiiya ....................................................... ;............................................... 116
E. Some masters of the Vibhii~ii ...................................................................... :.................... 118
EA. Vasumitra ................................................................................................................ 119
EB. Gho~aka and the Abhidharmiimrtasiistra .... ,........................................................... 121
EC. Buddhadeva ....................................... ,..................................................................... 123
ED. Dharmatrii.ta ............................................................................................................ 124
EE. Bhadanta, Dharmatrii.ta ........................................................................................... 125
F. Some schools of the Vibhii~ii ............................................................................................ 130
FA. Diir~tii.ntikas and Sautrii.ntikas ................................................................................. 130
FB. Vibhajyaviidins ...... ,................................................................................................ 134
FC. Yogiiciiras ................................................................................................................ 138
G. The Sii.riputriibhidharma ................................................................................................... 140
GA. Dharmadhiitu .................................................. ,........................................................ 141
GB. Nirodhasatya ............................. :............................................................................. 141
H. TheAbhidharmasiira ........................................................................................................ 143
HA. Obstructions, AKB iv, F 201-12; Vibhii~ii, 115, p. 599 ......................................... 146
HB. Non-informative action (avijiiapti), AKB iv, F 4, 14 ............................................. 147
80 Introduction
A. THE THREE BASKETS (PITAKA) & THE ABHIDHARMAKOSA-

BHA.$YA8
AA. The two baskets of the Vinaya and Dharma & the first Matrkiis
The oldest literature of Buddhism is divided into two parts or baskets:
1. Vinaya: the rule and procedures of monastic discipline, history of and com-
mentary on the discipline;
2. Dharma: 9 since then called Sutra, the collection of discourses that explain
the Dharma, that is to say, all that directly or indirectly concerns the path of
salvation: to some extent the moral law, incapable though it may be of
definitively releasing from unsatisfactoriness; but above all the Eightfold
Noble Path, the methods of contemplation and of meditation that lead
to the definitive release from unsatisfactoriness, i.e., to nirva,:ia: this is
the essential thing, for the sole flavor of the True Doctrine is the flavor of·
release.
The Siitra or Dharma cannot be practiced exclusively. Greed (lobha) and hatred
(dve~a) are combated effectively only by destroying delusion (moha); the most
humble moral law implies right view (samyagdr~ti), right view concerning life
after death and ripening of action. All the more so, the elimination of defilements
and their most subtle traces, indispensable for the liberation from the cycle of
transmigrations, implies penetrating insight into the nature of phenomena, into
their accidental and transient characteristics. The siitras always contained, one
may believe, much psychology or ontology. 10 When catechesis, {i.e., oral in-
struction by the method of question and answer,} developed, <vii> numerous
"discourses of the Buddha" that are enumerations, endowed with glosses, of
[This first section, pp. vi-xvi, formed originally the main section of the Foreword to
"Cosmologie bouddhique",] printed 1913, published 1919, Memoires in-4° de l'Academie
royale de Belgique (Luzac, London), which contains the reconstruction of the verses (karikii)
of the third chapter of the Kosa, the Tibetan kiirikiis, the version of the Bhii~ya, the text of the
Vyiikhyii: in the appendix, the summary of the Lokaprajfiiipti and of the Kiirm;aprajfiiipti.
Lodro Sangpo (LS): Besides a few additions and corrections that were added by L VP in square
brackets, the Foreword is reproduced nearly unchanged.
Cullavagga; XI, 1, 8. - [For a more exact exposition, J. Przyluski, Concile de Riijagrha,
pp. 341, 345, 349.]
10
Oldenberg, Buddha ... , 6th ed. p. 202; transl. Foucher, 2nd ed. J:>· 177. - [Psychology, yes;
but ontology is doubtful.]
LOUIS DE LAV ALLEE POUSSIN 81
technical terms were edited. This is what an old tradition calls miitrkiis or indices. 11
The Anguttara11 and the Dfgha 33-34, where the categories are classified accord-
ing to the incre~sing number of terms, have conserved for us an early type of
this literature. rone of the most notable miitrkiis is the Sa1J1,gftisuttanta. The Pali
canon considers it a siitra, which it places in the Dfgha. Under the name of
Sa1J1,gftiparyaya, this matrka ranks among the seven canonical Abhidharmas of the
Sarvastivada.] 13
AB. The Pali school & the third basket of the Abhidhamma
A very famous school, perhaps the first to constitute the standardized baskets
of Vinaya and of Siitra, the Pali school, was also the first to compile a third
basket. Whereas the first catechisms had been incorporated into the Siitra, to the
new and more systematic catechisms the name of Abhidharma was given, a term
that designated a special manner of expounding the Dharma, and their authenticity
was asserted, if not historically at least doctrinally, by grouping them in one
basket on an equal footing with the baskets of Vinaya and Siitra. <viii> [For a
discussion concerning the authenticity of the Abhidhammapifaka, see, for example,
Atthasiilinr, p. 35.]
11
M. Kern (Manual, p. 3) thinks that in the Divya, i.e., a Sarvii.stivii.din work where we find
the expressions sutrasya vinayasya miitrkiiyiih: "the monks ask about the Siitra, the Vinaya, the
Mii.tfkii." (p. 18, 15), and siitra,ri miitrkii ca, equivalent to iigama-catu~fayam (p. 333, 7), the
term miitrfkii is used "as synonymous with abhidharma". It cannot, however, refer to the
Abhidharmas of the Sarviistivii.dins of which we shall speak below on p. x, which are treatises;
it fits the Abhidhammas a little less poorly, without being satisfactory. Does it designate lists
"omitting all the explanations and other details" (Childers, 243), tables of contents which
belong to the Agama (Scripture) and are not specifically Abhidharma? The Sautrii.ntikas, who
deny the existence of a basket of the Abhidharm~ as distinct from Siitra, certainly had indices,
just like the Sarvastivii.dins of the period (previous to the Abhidharmas) to which we date the
expressions of the Divya. - Does it designate the expositions, in the manner of the siitras, as
those that constitute the miitikiis of the Vibhaliga? In this book, whatever is peculiar to the
Abhidharma is often a type of commentary in the form of glosses.
12 See the article of Rhys Davids in Hastings' Encyclopedia.
13 [Development of the Abhidharma, Dogme et philosophie, p. 123; J. Przyluski, Concile,
third chapter and 179, 353, Aroka, 322, Funerailles, 49; Levi, Seize Arhats, 20, 39.]
82 Introduction
Mrs. Rhys Davids says:

Let it, then, be clearly understood that our present knowledge of such
philosophy as is revealed in the Buddhist Pali canon would be practically
undiminished if the whole of the Abhidhamma pitaka were non-existent. ...
The burden, then, of Abhidhamma is not any positive contribution to the
philosophy of early Buddhism, but analytic and logical and methodological
elaboration of what is already given .... The chief methods of that [Abhi-
dhamma] training were:
first, the definition and determination of all names or terms entering
into the Buddhist scheme of culture;
secondly, the enunciation of all doctrines, theoretical and practical,
as formulas, with co-ordination of all such as were logically inter-
related; and
finally, practice in reducing all possible heterodox positions to an
absurdity .... 14
Nevertheless, as an example will make clear, the word Abhidharma took on a higher
scope: the ban on drinking intoxicating liquor is a precept of the Vinaya; but to
examine whether the transgression of drinking intoxicating liquor is a transgression
by nature or a transgression of disobedience is to create a pure theory about the
Vinaya; it is to refine the Vinaya, this is called the Abhivinaya. In the same way, the
Abhidharma does not remain foreign to scientific and philosophical research; it
embraces questions the relationships of which with the Dharma proper are rather
loose. This tendency is very pronounced in the most recent of the Pali treatises of the
Abhidharma, the Kathiivatthu (Points of Controversy), which tradition dates back to
the council of AsokaY This is a book on heresies [or controversial issues] that lays
down the [diverse] positions very clearly in regards to a mass of purely speculative
issues: the long work of exegesis of which the Siitra has been the object may be
noticed here.
14
In Hastings' Encyclopedia, I, 19f. [LS: This is not a direct translation from the French.
I have repll\Ced it with the original English text.] - Winternitz, Geschichte, 134. - Scholastic
0
definitions o'f the Abhidharma: Atthasiilinf, 48-50 and following; Satriilal'fl,kiira, XI, 3.
15
Traditio'µ knows, however, that the author of the Kathavatthu foresaw and refuted in
advance the future heresies; see Atthakathii, pp. 6-7. - The remark is by Minayef and the
observations of H. Oldenberg (Buddh. Studien, pp. 633, 676) do not prove that the Kathiivatthu
has not been amplified in the course of time.
The Pali Abhidharmas do not belong to the early patrimony common to all the
sects-which does not mean that they are Singhalese! Whereas any surveys made in
the purely Indian Buddhist canonical literature show us Vinayas and Siitras depen-
dent on Pali literature or closely related to that literature, nothing there indicates the
presence of replicas of Pali Abhidhamn:ias in them. 16 <ix>
Moreover, according to the tradition itself, the Kathiivatthu belongs solely to a
certain philosophical school, the Vibhajjavadins, those who distinguish. 17 To the old
question discussed in the satras: "Does everything exist?", 18 these philosophers
answered by distinguishing (vibhajya):
The present and the past that has not yet given forth its effect, exist; the
future and the past that has given forth its effect, do not exist. 19
Ac. The school of the Sarvastivadins and Vaibha~ikas & the Jfianapra-
sthana and its six feet, and the Vibha~a
Opposed to this school-presumably from early times-was the school of All exists,
sarviistiviida, Sarvastivadins, Sabbatthiviidins. This school, which also was a sect
endowed with a special Vinaya and its own canon, and which was sanskritized, 20 also
16
[LVP: This is not correct. The Sarrigftiparyliya is just the Sarrigftisuttanta. The second part
of the Dhlitukliya has close relations with the Dhlitukathliprakara,:ta. A careful study will show
other points of contact and it may be seen that the Sarviistiviidins have simply enriched the
early material of the Abhidhamma by their inventions (theory of the viprayuktas, i.e., the for-
mations dissociated from thought, of the mahlibhiitas, i.e., the generally permeating mental
t
factors, etc.).]
17
The account of Buddhaghosa, Kathlivatthu-Atthakathli, p. 6, is valid at least in that the
Vibhajjaviidins are the orthodox.
18
This is one of the aspects of the problem of kiriyavlida.
LS: PTS: kiriyavlida: promulgating the (view of a) consequence of action, believing in merit
and demerit, usually combined with kammavada.
19 This definition of the two[?] schools is borrowed from the Abhidharmakosa, v. 25; see
Kathlivatthu, I, 8 (which does not entirely confirm our interpretation). ["La controverse du
temps et du pudgala dans le Vijfiiinakiiya", Etudes Asiatiques, 1925.]
20
[LVP: Geography of the Sariivastiviidin sect, J. Przyluski, Afoka.J
I know that the sinologists, notably Takakusu, are not sure about the language in which the
first of the Abhidharmas of the Sarviistiviidins, the Jnlinaprasthlina, was written:
84 Introduction
looked closely into the Dharma. <x> Besides the casuists, 21 i.e., the Vinayadharas,
this school had philosophers, i.e., the .Abhidharmikas. [Its Devasarman, follower of
the existence of past-future, opposed Mo-lien or Moggaliputta.] Long labor, on
which we have little information, 22 led to the redaction of numerous works, among
which are the seven books of the Abhidharma, Treatises (sastra) or Works (pra-
kara,:,,a): the Jfianaprasthana and its six feet (pada), i.e., Dhannaskandha, etc. [see
below].
In what language, however, the original text was composed we have no means of
ascertaining. All we can say is that the text brought by Saipghadeva and Dhamma-
piya [Dharmapriya] from Ka~mira [A.D. 383] seems to have been in. a dialect akin to
Pali, whereas the text used by Hsiian-tsang [A.D. 657], as in other cases, seems to
have been in Sanskrit. But this supposition rests solely on the phonetic value of
Chinese ideographs employed in these translations, and is not corroborated by any
other evidence .... It seems to me more than probable thatthe Jiilinaprasthlina at
least was written in some dialect: one thinks naturally of the dialect of Ka~mira, but
we really have no certainty that the Jiilinaprasthlina was not composed in Kosala
(JPTS, 1905, pp. 84, 86).
We possess a fragmentary quotation of the Sarviistivadin Priitimok~a which proves that the old
forms, Pali or dialect, remained in use: "In the Po~adha ceremony, when the Vinayadhara asks:
'Are you pure?' (bhik~upo~adhe hi kacci ttha parisuddhli iti vinayadhare,:zlinusriivite), if any
Bhik~u does not confess his transgression ... " (Abhidharmakosavylikhyli ad IV, 75; compare
the introduction of the Piitimokkha and the remarks of Rhys Davids, Dialogues, II, p. 257).
[See L. Finot, "Priitimok~asiitra des Sarvastivadins", JA, 1913, 2, pp. 477-79.]
But we possess a fragment of the Jiilinaprasthlina, cited in the Abhidharmakosavylikhyli
(ad i, 46): katamad buddhavacanaf!1 tathligatasya yli vlig vacanaf!l vyavahliro gfr niruktir
vlikpatho vliggho~o vlikkarma vligvijiiaptiJ.i II buddhavacanaf!1 kusalaf!l vaktavyam athlivya-
krtaf!l vaktavyam I sylit ku§alarµ sylid avylikrtam II katarat kusalam I kusalacittasya tathligatasya
vlicaf!1 bhli~amli,:zasya yli [vlig]vijiiaptil,t 11 katarad avylikrtam I ... piirvavat II punas tatraiva-
anantaram uktam I buddhavacanarµ ka e~a dharmal,t I niimakiiyapadakliyavyaiijana-kiiyiinlirµ
ylinupiirvavacanli anupiirvasthlipanli anupiirvasamliyoga iti I
21
LS: Webster Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary (Second Edition): Casuist: one who studies
and resolves questions of right and wrong in conduct.
22
[LVP: The invention of the possessions (prlipti); the group homogeneity (sabhligatli); the
existence of past and future factors; the different types of cause; the cessation not due to
deliberation (apratisdf!lkhylinirodha); not to speak of the stages conducive to penetration
(nirvedhabhligfya), etc.]
l LOUIS DE LAV ALLEE POUSSIN 85
There were philosophers who held themselves to this first layer of scholarly
literature. 23 But the speculative work continued and, toward the end of the first
century of our era (Council of Ka1!i~ka), 24 a commentary was written on the Jiiiina-
prasthiina, the Vibhii~ii, 25 a collective work that gave its name to all the scholars who
adopted it. The Vaibha~ikas are the philosophers who claim to adhere to the Vibhii~ii
(Watters, i, 276). The center of the school appears to be Kasmir, although there were
Sarvastivadins outside of Kasmir-Bahirdesakas, i.e., scholars of a foreign country,
Pascattyas, i.e., Westerners [relative to Kasmir], Aparantakas, i.e., scholars of the
western border-and Kasmirians who are not Vaibha~ikas. <xi>
AD. The school of the Sautrantikas & the Abhidharmakosa and Bha~ya
The Sarvastivadins and the Vaibha~ikas think that the Abhidharmas are the words
of the Buddha. But there were scholars who did not recognize the authenticity of
these books. When it was brought to the attention of these scholars that ther~ is
no "Abhidharma basket" outside the Abhidharmas of the Sarvastivadins and that
everyone knows that the word of the Buddha involves "three baskets", they answer
that the Buddha taught the Abhidharma in the Siitra itself-which is quite accurate;
they recognize only the authority of the Siitra, and they take on the name of
Sautriintikas. 26
But one should not be !llistaken about their attitude. Although formally oppqsed to
some of the theses of the Vibhii~ii and of the Vaibh'a~ikas, and although, for their
part: they had a fairly modernistic speculation and perhaps buddhology, they do' hot
combat systematically their adversaries, who were, without doubt, their predecessors.
Of the system of the Vaibha~ikas they assert everything of which they have no
formal reason to deny.
23
The Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii speaks of Abhidharmikas who read only the Abhidharma
with its six feet (~atpiidiibhidharmamiitrapii(hinas), which could mean: who do not read the
Vibha~ii. - These are Sarviistivadins; but not all Sarviistivadins are adherents of the Vibhii~ii
(Vaibha~ikas). We know, for example, that there are four ways of understanding All exists,
those of the Sarviistivadins (1) Dharmatriita, (2) Gho~aka, (3) Vasumitra and (4) Buddhadeva:
the Vaibha~ikas of Kasmir condemn the first, the second and the fourth; they condemn the first
for the serious reason that it merges with the heresy of the SiiJTlkhyas.
24
[LVP: Better, "after the reign of Kani~ka", lnde sous les Mauryas ... , p. 328).
,25
LS: EIP.VIl.511-68.
26
[See this Introduction, Diir~tiintikas, and Index, Sautrlintikas.]
86 Introduction
[To speak more cautiously:] this at least is the attitude of our author, Vasubandhu.27
His work, the Abhidharmakosa, a collection of about 600 verses, is portrayed as "an
exposition of the Abhidharma as the Vaibhli~ikas of Kasmir teach it". This does not
mean that Vasubandhu is a Vaibhii~ika; he is not a Sarvlistiviidin; he has evident
sympathies for the Sautrlintikas; he utilizes the opinions of the "ancient masters", i.e.,
the "Yoglicliras, headed by Asali.ga."-but without a doubt, in his opinion, the system
of the Vaibhli~ikas is in fact indispensable: the Vaibhii~ikas are the School. Nowhere
else is there a body of doctrine as coordinated and as complete as theirs. <xii>
However they sometimes make mistakes, and on important points. Therefore Vasu-
bandhu supplements his collection of technical verses, an impartial exposition of the
Vaibhli~ika system, with his prose commentary, the Abhidhannakosabhii~ya, where
his personal opinion, his objections, the opinion of different schools or of different
scholars are set out on the occasion of numerous theses defended by the School. 28 We
know that he was himself, in his turn, combated and refuted by the orthodox
Vaibhii~ikas.
But it matters little to us whether he was always right! The essential point, for,· us as
for the scholars who followed after him, _is that his book and his Bha~ya are truly a
treasury (kosa).
ADA. The importance of the Abhidharmakosa and its Bha~ya for the
study of canonical philosophy and scholasticism
From the point of view of dogmatics, the Abhidhannakosa, with the Bha~ya, is
perhaps the most instructive book of the old Buddhism (Small Vehicle). I think that it
is destined to render a great service in the study of canonical philosophy and the
study of actual scholasticism.
It would not be accurate to say that we do not know the philosophy of canonical
Buddhism: we know the essentials, the principles, and the broad outline, and many
details. (On the other hand,) the history of this philosophy, of its origins, of its birth,
of its developments, is less clear, even though one could think that Buddhism, like
27 [LVP: I remove here the rather long note where the bibliography regarding the dating of
Vasubandhu was summarized, and where the texts establishing the existence of an "older
Vasubandhu" (see below pp. xxvii.f.) were gathered together.]
28
All the opinions, or almost all the opinions, marked in the Kosa or in the Bhii~ya by the
adverb kila ("indeed", "so said", "so reported", [Tib.] grags so), are erroneous opinions of the
Vaibhii~ikas. The true translation is: "The School says, wrongly, that ... ".
LOUIS DE LAVALLEE POUSSIN 87
the Buddha himself, from its birth took many steps and these in all directions. But it
is fair to say of [Buddhism] and encouraging to repeat that, although the history of
the canonical philosophy has not been done, the picture that scholars such as Rhys
Davids and Oldenberg have provided of this philosophy either remains definitive or
calls for only slight alterations. We may think, nevertheless, that we do not know
any part of [this philosophy] thoroughly, because we know very imperfectly the
scholasticism that certainly enriched it, <xiii> that perhaps deformed it, but that
certainly derived from it; (the scholasticism) that, moreover, should be, by its
methods and its tendencies, very similar to the original speculation from which the
canonical philosophy itself emerged. This philosophy is made up of the old layers of
a speculation that continues within the actual scholasticism, both in Pali and in
Sanskrit.
The awareness of a gap in our knowledge becomes very strong when we read, better,
when we attempt to read the old works such as the Dhammasariga,;i or _the
Kathavatthu; when we seek to determine the meaning of the satras themselves, word
by word (avayavartha), with some rigor. How many terms there are the exact sig-
nificance of which escapes us! It is easy and often correct to observe (1) that these
terms originally did not have a precise meaning; (2) that the general orientation of
Buddhist thought alone deserves to interest us; (3) that-though not knowing that
which is exactly the four meditations (dhyii.na) and the foµr formless meditative
attainments (qrupyasamapatti), initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicara),
form (rupa), the fruits (phala), and the candidates of the fruit (pratipannaka)-we
l
nevertheless have a sufficient idea of the g;oal and the methods of Buddhist
saintliness; (4) that the candidates of the fruit should be concerned with the details
of the Eightfold Noble Path, but not the western.historians. - Some think that
scholasticism is not interesting; that throughout Buddhist history it remained for-
eign to the actual religion, as it was in fact to the original doctrine. This is wrong:
"If one thinks thus, no, for this is in contradiction with the SUtra!" (iti cen na
sutravirodhatal:i). Buddhism is born complicated and verbose; the scholastic classi-
fications are often pre-Buddhist; it is our good fortune to be able to exaniine them
closely, in sources older than Buddhaghosa; and the Abhidhannakosa bestows on us
this fortune to the extent that we have the courage to be worthy of it.
The example is set by the Buddhists themselves.
The Abhidharmakosa has had a great plane of existence: "This work ... had an
enormous influence. From the time of its appearance, it was indispensable for all,
friends and adversaries, we are told; and there is reason to believe this, for the same
fortune followed it everywhere, first in China with Paramartha, Hsiian-tsang and his
88 Introduction
disciples, <xiv> then in Japan, where today specialized Buddhist studies still begin
with the Kosasastra." 29
The author asserts that we will find in his book an accurate summary of the doctrine
of the Vaibha~ikas; but however close his dependence on the ancient masters of the
Abhidharma may be, we think that he says it better than what they had said. When
the Kosa had appeared, the old works-of the Sarvastivadins, Abhidharmas, and
Vibha~ii doubtlessly lost part of their practi_c:al interest: for while the Chinese
translated them, the Lotsavas did not consider it relevant to put them into Tibetan,
with the sole exception of the Prajfiapti.'30 And this is undoubtedly so because the
Abhidharmakosa, in accordance with the wish of Vasubandhu, constituted a veritable
comprehensive survey, embraced all problems-ontology, psychology, cosmology,
discipline and the doctrine of action, theory of the fruits, mysticism, and arhathood-
and treated them with sobriety and in clear language, with every method of which
the Indians are capable. Ever since Vasubandhu, the Buddhists of the North-to
whatever school they belong, whether they adhere to the Great Vehicle or not-learn
the basic elements of Buddhism from the Kosa. - All schools, in fact, agree about
.
a great number of fundamental data, the same as are accepted by Pali orthodoxy,
the same, we may add,;as are often subjacent to the siitras themselves. These data,
which the Vaibha~ikas had elucidated, were nowhere as wisely presented as in the
Abhidharmakosa. This sufficiently explains the reputation of the author and the
popularity of the book.
While Vasubandhu is an excellent teacher of Buddhism, of Buddhism without
epithet of sect or of school, he also renders precious service by initiating us into
the systems of these schools. He constructs. before us the spacious edifice of the
dogmatic Vaibha~ikas; <xv> he shows its gaps; he explains what the Sautrantikas
say, what the Vaibha~ika answer, and what he himself thinks. Like many phi-
losophical treatises, and like the best of them, the Abhidharmakosa is a circumstantial
work, written sub specie aetemitatis ["under the forms of eternity"]. We find in it
29
N. Peri. "'A. propos de la date de Vasubandhu", Bulletin de /'Ecole Fran9aise d'Extreme-
Orient (BEFEO), 1911, p. 374. - The Tibetan Siddhiintas also take great advantage of the
Kosa. - Note that it was translated into Chinese only in 563; the Tibetan version, of Jinamitra
and Sn1cuiarak~ita, at the time of Ral-pa-can (816-38).
30
The Prajfiiipti does not exist in extenso in Chinese (Journal of the Pali Text Society
[JPTS], 1905, p. 77). - This is the treatise the first two parts of which are analysed in the
Appendix of Cosmologie bouddhique.
many proper names, many allusions to contemporary debates. 31 This is not a boring
book.
We find in it also a great number of quotations elsewhere shortened. In that way, the
Kosa is a precious testimony for the study of the oldt_st literature, 32 Its quotations add
to the numerous fragments of the Sanskrit canon which the sands of Turkestan have
given us or which we discover under the modernistic prose of the Divyavadana
and of the siitras of the Great Vehicle. [The quotations] most often revolve around
texts of a doctrinal nature and enlighten us as to the dogmatic, if not the historical,
relationships of the canon.
ADB. Why the study of the Abhidharmakosa and its Bha~ya was·
deferred for so long
The importance of the Kosa was long ago recognized by the European scholars, and
first of all by Burnouf. Let us look into why the study of it was deferred for so long.
The work of Vasubandhu consists of two distinct parts:
the Abhidharmakosa, the Karika, a collection of about 600 verses, and
the [auto]commentary or Bha(fya.
The Sanskrit verses and Bha:fya [were not available to scholars until 1946 and
1967].33
And of the vast exegetical literature that fills eight volumes of the Tibetan canon, the
Nepalese scribes have preserved for us only _a single document, the commentary on
the Bha:fya by Yasomitra, the Abhidharmakosavyakhya, which is called Sphutartha,
"of clear meaning".
This commentary of Yasomitra is not a complete commentary; it quotes on occasion
the verses of Vasubandhu; it elucidates a given passage of the Bha:jya, indicating it
by the first words of the passage in question, following the custom of commentators:
"The subject itself', says Burnouf, "is difficult to follow here because of the form
of the commentary, which considers each word of the text separately, develops it or
31
The Vyakhya, the commentary on the Bha:jya by Yasomitra, adds many details.
32
It is from this point of view that M. Oldenberg recommends the study of the Abhidharma-
kosa, "Buddhistische StU:dien", Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenliindischen Gesellschaft
(ZDMG), LII, p. 644 (1898).
33
LS: See above Etienne Lamotte's comments on this topic in his "Preface to the New
Edition of the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu".
90 Introduction
submerges it in a gloss which is usually very extended. It is only very rarely possible
to distinguish the text from these comments in the midst of which it is found." 34 Let
us add that Yasomitra passes over in silence anything that appears to him easy or
without interest, and introduces the reader abruptly into the discussions of which the
data and the positions are not pointed out. In the first chapter, he explains just about
every word of the text. Elsewhere he aims at only the points with respect to which he l
has something important to say.
The commentary of Yasomitra is thus, as Bumouf said, "an inexhaustible mine of
precious teachings" (Introduction, p. 447); we read thousands of interesting things
in it; but it is, by itself, a very ineffective instrument for the study of the Abhi-
dharmakosa.
This is why this work has been neglected for such a long time. Or rather, why,
although it attracted the attention of several researchers, no-one has yet put his hand
to the work. The knowledge of Sanskrit is not enough; one must join with it the
knowledge of Tibetan or Chinese, for [until 1946 and 1967]35 it is solely in the
Tibetan and Chinese versions that the book of Vasubandhu, Ka.rikii and Bha~ya, was
available in full. <xvii>
34
LS: In Wogihara's edition, "the original text" is now italicized.
35
LS: See note.35.
B. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE KOSA 36

1. Burnouf, Introduction, 34, 46, 447 ("the importance of the AKB"), 563;
Wassiliew, Buddhismus, 77, 78, 108, 130,220; S. Levi, La science des religions et
les religions de l'Inde (Ecole des Hautes-Etudes, programme 1892); Hasting's
Encyclopaedia, i, 20 (1908); Minayef, Recherches et Materiaux, 1887, trans. 1894.
J. Takakusu, "On the Abhidharma Literature", JPTS, 1905.
Noel Peri, "Apropos de la date de Vasubandhu", BEFEO, 1911.
La Vallee Poussin, Cosmologie bouddhique, Troisieme chapitre de l'Abhidharma-
kosa, karikii, bhii~ya et vyiikhyii, avec [une introduction et] une analyse de la Loka-
prajiiiipti et de la Kiira,:iaprajiiiipti de Maudgalyiiyana, 1914-19; Paul Demieville,
review of the Kosa i-ii, BEFEO, 1924, p. 463; 0. Rosenberg, Probleme der
buddhistischen Philosophie, 1924, translation of the work published in Russian in
1918 (the appendix contains a bulky bibliography of Abhidharma literature, Chinese
sources and Japanese sources); Th. Stcherbatsky: (a) The Central Conception of
Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma", 1923 (the first appendix is
a translation of Kosa v, F 48-65; the second is a table of seventy-five dharmas
enriched by substantial notes); (b) an English translation of the Pudgalaprati-
~edhaprakara,:ia, or ninth chapter of the Kosa, Acad. of Petrograd, 1918.
Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, Calcutta, 1912, chap. iii, "Sarvasti-
vadins". - Bibliography of contemporary Japanese memoirs in Peri, Demieville,
Rosenberg, and in particular in Funabashi Suisai, Kusha tetsugaku, Tokyo, 1906.
2. Kosa and commentaries, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese sources:
i. Abhidhannakosavyiikhyii, Bibliotheca Buddhica, Sphufiirthii Abhidharma-
kosavyiikhyii, the work of Yasomitra, first Kosasthiina, edited by Prof.
S. Levi and Prof. Stcherbatsky, 1st fasc., Petrograd, 1918; 2nd fasc. by
Wogihara, Stcherbatsky and Obermiller, (part of the 2nd chapter), Lenin-
grad, 1931. <xviii>
Text of the third chapter, kiirikiis and vyiikhyii, in Bouddhisme, Cosmologie ...
by Louis de La Vallee Poussin [with the collaboration of Dr. P. Cordier],
Brussels, 1914-1919.
n. Tibetan translation of the Abhidharmakosakiirikiib and of the Abhidharma-
kosabhii~ya of Vasubandhu, ed. by Th. I. Stcherbatsky, 1st fasc. 1917,
2nd fasc. 1930.
36
LS: See also the bibliography at the end of the translation.
92 Introduction
3. Tibetan sources, Palmyr Cordier, Catalogue du fonds tibetain de la Bibliotheque

Nationale, third part, Paris 1914, pp. 394 and 499.
i. Abhidharmakosakiirikii and Bhii~ya of Vasubandhu, Mdo 63, fols. 1-27, and
fol. 28 - Mdo, 64, fol. 109.
ii. Siitriinuriipii niima abhidharmakosavrttil;i of Vinitabhadra, 64, fols. 109-304.
iii. Sphufiirthii niima abhidharmakosavyiikhya of Yasomitra, 65 and 66. This is
the commentary preserved in Sanskrit.
iv. Lak~a,:iiinusiiri,:if nama abhidharmakosaffka of Pun:iavardhana, student of
Sthiramati, master of Jinamitra and of Sflendrabodhi, 67 and 68.
v. Upayikii nama abhidharmakosajrka of Samathadeva, 69 and 70, fols. 1-144.
vi. Marmapradfpo nama abhidharmakosavrttil;i of Digniiga, 70, fols. 144-286.
vii. Lak~a,:ianusari,:if nama abhidharmakosaffka, abridged recension of the
Brha{tikii, (see above iv,) 70, fols. 286-315.
viii. Sarasamuccayo nama abhidharmiivatiiraffkii, anonymous, 70, fols. 315-93.
ix. Abhidhdrmavatiiraptakara,:ia, anonymous, 70, fols. 393-417.
x. Tattviirtho niima abhidharmakosabhii~yaffkii of Sthiramati, 129 and 130.
4. Abhidharmakosasiistra,, of V asubandhu, translated by Paramiirtha, 564-67,
Nanjio 1269, Taisho 1559, vol. 29, pp. 161-309; trans. by Hsiian-tsang, 651-54,
Nanjio 1267, Taisho 1558, vol. 29, pp. 1-160. <xix>
The references in our translation are to the edition of Saeki Kiokuga, Ky6to 1891,
Kanda Abidatsumakusharon, the pages of which correspond to those of the Ming
edition, a remarkable work that notably contains, besides the interline~r notes of
the editor, copious extracts of (1) the two great Chinese commentaries, (2) the
Vibh~ii, (3) the commentary of Saqighabhadra, (4) the work of K'uei-chi on the
Thirty Verses.
5. Among the Chinese commentaries on the Kosa: 37
i. Shen-t'ai, the author of a Shu, [i.e., the Chu-she lun shu, originally in twenty
Chinese volumes, today only volumes 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 17 are extant;
Manji Zoku-zokyo I.83.3-4]. 38
ii. P'u-kuang, the author of a-Chi [i.e., the thirty-volume Chu-she lun Chi;
TD 41, number 1821], which quotes Shen-t'ai, edited by Saeki Kiokuga.
iii. Fa-pao, the author of a Shu [i.e., ChU-she lun Shu; TD 41, number 1822],
which quotes Shen-t'ai and P'u-kuang, edited by Saeki Kiokuga.
37
According to P. Demieville, BEF]iO, 1924, p. 463.
38
LS: The comments in the following square brackets are by Pruden.
Two other disciples of Hstian-tsang, Huai-su and K'uei-chi; have written

commentaries on the Kosa which are lost.
P'u-kuang has also written a small treatise on the doctrine of the Kosa.
iv. Yuan-hui, with a preface dated befort: 727 by Chia-ts'eng, has written a
Shu, [i.e., the Chu-she tun sung Shu, preserved in TD volume 421, number
1823], on the kiirikiis of the Kosa, a Shu that was "commented upon several
times in China and widely used in Japan; it is from this inte11_!1ediary that
the Mahayanists generally draw their knowledge of the Kosa. But from the
point of view of Indology, it does not offer the same interest as the three
preceding commentaries."
Hstian-tsang dictated his version of Sarµghabhadra to Yuan-yu. There exist frag-
ments of a commentary attributed to him.
6. Gul).amati and the Lak~m;anusiira.
Gul).amati is known through his commentary on [Vasubandhu's] Vyakhyayukti;
several fragments of this commentary are quoted in the Chos- 'byung of Bu-ston,
translated by Obermiller, 1931.
Gm,1amati is mentioned f~J times by Y asomitra in the Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii.
i. Introductory verses: Gul).amati has commented on the Kosa, as has also
Vasumitra; Y asomitra follows this commentary when it is good.
ii. GuQ.amati and his disciple Vasumitra say that the word namas is constructed
with the fourth case. But when the word namas is not independent, we have
the accusative. <xx> This is why this master (Vasubandhu), in the Vyakhyii-
yukti; says: "Bowing to the Muni with my head ... " (Kosa; Vya., i, p. 7).
iii. Gul).amati asserts that the Kosa teaches wrongly: "Conditioned phenomena,
with the exception of the path, are in a relationship with the fluxes (siisrava),
(AKB i, F 6)", for all factors (dharma), without exception, can be taken as
object by the fluxes (iisrava) (Vya.; i, p. 13).
iv. Concerning the continuity of the mental stream, "thr master Gul).amati, with
his disciple the master Vasumitra, being fortd of the doctrine of his own
group (nikiiya), instead of confining himself to explaining the Kosa, refutes
it" (AKB iii, F 34, note).
N. Peri (Date, 41) reminds us that Burnoufhas pointed out, based on Yasomitra, the
commentary of Gul).amati. He adds: "An author very rarely quoted. His Lak~a,:,,a-
anusarasiistra (Nanjio 1280 = Taisho 1641) belongs to the Canon where it is classed
among the Hinayanist works. He summarizes there the ideas of the Kosa, then sets
'--
out his own particular ideas on a few issues. The Hsi-yil-chi, after having cited him
l
94 Introduction
amongst the celebrated monks of Nalanda, k. 9, tells us that he left the monastery in
which he lived in order to establish ValabhI, k. 11."
The Nanjio 1280, Taisho 1641, is only au extract of the treatise of Gm:iamati, the
chapter which examines the sixteen aspects of th!;! truths (AKB vii, F 30-39):
Are we dealing here with sixteen real entities or sixteen names? The masters
of the Vibha~ii say that sixteen names are established because there are
sixteen real entities. But the satra-upadesa-masters say that there are sixteen
names, but only seven real entities, four real entities for the first truth, one
real entity for each of the three others. Originally, the Buddha promulgated
the Upadesasiitra. After the death of the Buddha, Ananda, Katyayana, etc.,
read/recited what they had heard. In order to explain the meaning of the
siitra, as disciples [do], they composed a siistra explaining the siitra, which
is thus called siitra-upadesa. From what is found in [this] upade§a, the
Vibha~a then extracted an upadesa [exposition]; since it originates only
indirectly [from the Sutra], it is not called siitra-upadesa.
Gm:iamati continues as in AKB vii, F 31: "According to the first exegesis, im-
permanent (anitya) because of arising in dependence on conditions (pratyaya-
adhrnatvat)." And he comments: "Conditioned phenomena, without power, do not
arise by themselves ... ".
The first book ends: "The thesis of Vasubandhu is similar to what the siitra-upadesa-
masters meant."
The second begins: "The author says: I will express now the explanation of what
I believe. <xxi> Impermanent (anitya), because of having arising, having destruction.
Conditioned entities, having arising and destruction, are not_permanent. Birth is
existence ....
The treatise touches on. various philosophical issues, absence of self (iitman), etc.
In it we find very interesting notes, for example (Taisho, 168b9): "In the Small
Vehicle, hungry ghosts (preta) are superior to animals; in the Great Vehicle, the
opposite. In fact, hungry ghosts are enveloped in flames .... "
It is curious that the title of Gm:iamati's work, literally Liik~aranusiirasiistra, is
exactly the same as the book attributed to Piin;iavardhana in the Tanjur. - We
have Gul).amati, the master of Sthiramati, and Piifl).avardhana, the student of Sthira-
mati. 39
39 As for Gul).amati, consult H. Ui, Studies in Indian Philosophy, fifth vol., pp. 136-40.
7. Sthiramati, a student of Gm:iamati, defended the Kosa against Sarµghabhadra.

"His commentary on the Kosa is mentioned on several occasions by Shen-t'ai,
P'u-kuang and Fa-pao in their works on the same text. The precise manner in which
they quote it, in which they comment on it and discuss the opinions, makes us think
that Hslian-tsang must have brought it back to China and perhaps they as well were
able to read it" (N. Peri, Date, 41). Sthiramati, the author of Tsa-chi, is one of the
great scholars of the Vijiiaptimatrata.
There is (Taisho 1561) a small treatise of Sthiramati (transcription and translation)
entitled Kosatattvarthaffka or Abhidharmakosasastratattvarthaffka, which is doubt-
less an extract of the voluminous work of the same name and by the same author
preserved in Tibetan, Cordier, 499.
We notice, at the beginning, the commentary on the seven points indicated in the
introductory verse of the Kosa.
On the knowledge of the Buddha, superior to that of the noble ones, the author
quotes the KalpanamatJ.r;l.itikii. verse40 (Huber, Satralarp,kii.ra), AKB i, F 2 and vii,
F 72; and reminds us of Maudgalyayana's ignorance of the place of rebirth of his
mother, AKB i, F 2.
In order to demonstrate the thesis of the Kosa that the faculty of faith (sraddha-
indriyp) can be impure, ii, F 119, the author quotes at length the siitra on the request
of"Brahma to the Buddha (setting in motion the wheel [of the teachings]), a satra
briefly pointed out by Vasubandhu. <xxii>
The work ends with comments on the duration of life: The verse says: "Among the
Kurus, life is always 1,000 years; half of this in the West and the, East; in this
[i.e., our] continent, it is not determined: at the end, ten years; at the beginning,
incalculable" (AKB iii, F 171-72).
There are indeed in this world sentient beings who have meritorious actions to
spare and who wish: "May I have a long life!", without wishing precisely: "May I
live 100 years, ninety years, eighty years!" Or else, venerable persons, parents and
friends, say: "May you live a long time!" without saying precisely how much time.
That one makes similar wishes is because the actions committed by humans of this
continent are associated with thoughts of desire.
The Siitra says: "Know, bhik~us, that the life-span was 8,000 years long under
Vipasyin, 20,000 years under Kasyapa; the life-span is now 100 years; few exceed
40
LS: mok~abfjam aha,µ hy asya susak~mam upalak~aye I dhiitupii~ii1Javivare nilfnam iva
kiiiicanam II
f
96 Introduction
this, many stay less than that." If the duration of life is not determined, why does the
Fortunate One (Bhagavat) express himself in this way? ... - The treatise concludes
with the well-known verse: sucfn;iabrahmacarye 'smin ... (AKB vi, F 269).
8-. Sarµghabhadra has written two works.
The first, the title, of which is transcribed in Chinese as Abhidhannanyayanusara-
sastra-or perhaps be~ter Nyayanusaro nama Abhidharmasastram-is a commentary
which reproduces, without modifications, the karikas of the Abhidhannakosa. But
this commentary criticizes those karikas which set out the Vaibhli~ika doctrine by
marking them with the word kila, which signifies the School says; it refutes the
Bha~ya, the auto-commentary of Vasubandhu, when it presents views opposite to
those of the Vaibhli~ikas, corrects it when it attributes to the Vaibhli~ikas views that
are not theirs.
The title of the second treatise is not completely transcribed: Abhidhannasamaya-
hsien-sastra or Abhidhannasamaya-kuang-sastra. J. Takakusu proposes Abhidharma-
samayapradfpikiisastra, which is not bad; however pradfpa, lamp, is always '(Ch.) teng,
and we have for (Ch.) hsien the equivalents of prakasa and dyotana.
This is an extract of the Nyayanusara, from which all controversy is excluded
and which is thus a simple exposition of the system (samaya) of the Abhidharma.
It differs from the Nyayanusara by the presence of a fairly long introduction, in
seven verses and prose, and as well by the manner in which it treats the karikas of
Vasubandhu: these karikas are either removed (ii. 2-3) or corrected (i. 11, 14) when
they express false doctrines or when they cast suspicion on the true doctrines by
adding the word kila. 41 <xxiii>
Sarµghabhadra innovates, and K'uei-chi distinguishes the old and the new
Sarvlistivlidins: Siddhi, 45: theory of atoms (in relation to the cognitive object
condition, [iilambanapratyaya]); Siddhi, 65: the characteristics (lak~a,:ia) of the
conditfrmed; Siddhi, 71: the factor dissociated from thought (viprayukta) called
(Ch.) ho-ho (sal'flketa, samavaya, etc.); Siddhi, 147: sensation (vedana): (vi~aya-
vedana; svabhava-vedana); Siddhi, 311: divergent Sarvlistivadins on resolve (adhi-
mok~a). <xxiv>
41
Missing in the two treatises of Sayµghabhadra, the iiryii qtfoted in Vyiikhyii, i, 31, who is
the critic of AKB i, k. 11.
In the two treatises of Sayµghabhadra, the first chapter is called miilavastunirdesa, the second
visetjanirdesa, the third pratftyasamutpiidanirdesa. And of course, the Pudgalapratitjedhapra-
karalJa, the annex of the Kosa, is ignored.
c. THE QUESTION OF THE DATE OF VASUBANDHU. -

VASUBANDHU-THE-ANCIENT
Here we will not undertake the bibliography of Vasubandhu. 42
But his treatise, Pratftyasamutpiidavyiikhyii, Cordier, iii, 365, requires the attention
of the reader of the Kosa. G. Tucci has published fragments of this work (Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland [IRAS], 1930, pp. 611-23)
where the twelve members of the chain are explained in detail, with numerous
quqtations from scriptures.
G. Tucci intends to publish the Trisvabhiivakiirikii4 3 and parts of the commentary of
the Madhyiintavibhiiga.
With regard to the "definition of direct perception by Vasubandhu" (viisubandhava
pratyak~alak~a,:ia), known through the Tiitparyaffkii, 99, and the Viidavidhi attributed
to Vasubandhu, see the articles by G. Tucci (IRAS, 1929, p. 473); A.B. Keith
(Ind. Hist. Quarterly, 1928, pp. 221-27); R. Iyengar (Ind. Hist. Quarterly, 1929,
pp. 81-86); Stcherbatsky, Logic, ii, 161, 382; G. Tucci, Maitreya[niitha] et Asaliga,
70-71; and finally Pramii,:iasamuccaya, chap. i, by R. Iyengar, pp. 31-35. It seems
that Dignaga denies the authorship to Vasubandhu despite the common opinion, and
J
I the ffka quotes the AKB ii, kiirikii 64, which contradicts the aforesaid definition of
direct perception (pratyak~a).
There are also numerous passages of the Vyiikhyiiyukti in the Chos- 'byung of Bu-ston
(see above p. xix).
CA. Bibliography related to the date ofVasubandhu

• Wassiliew, Buddhismus, 235 (1860): life ofVasubandhu.
• Kern, Geschiedenis, trans. Huet, ii, 450.
• S. Levi, Journal Asiatique (JA), 1890, 2, 252; Theatre indien, 1890, i, 165;
ii, 35; "Date de Candragomin", BEFEO, 1903, p. 47; Siitriilarrikiira, trans-
lation, preface, 1911, pp. 2-3.
• Buhler, Alter der indischen Kunst-Poesie, 1890, p. 79.
• J. Takakusu, "Life ofVasubandhu", T'oung-pao, 1904; "A Study of Para-
martha's Life of Vasu-bandhu and the Date of Vasu-bandhu", IRAS, 1905;
"Sarµkhyakarika", BEFEO, 1904.
42 LS: On the question of which works can reasonably be attributed to Vasubandhu the
Kosakiira, see section 5, ii, a in my Remarks by' the Translator.
43 He has been preceded by Susumu Yamaguchi [September 1931].
t
98 Introduction
Wogihara, Asaflga's Bodhisattvabhami, 14, Strasbourg thesis, Leipzig, 1908.

" Noel, Peri, "Apropos de la date de Vasubandhu", BEFEO, 1911, pp. 339-92.
<xxv>
• Pathak, Bhandraka, Indian Antiquary, 1911-12 (V. Smith, History, 3rd ed.,
328; 4 th ed., 346).
• B. Shiiwo, Dr. Takakusu and Mr. Peri on the date of Vasubandhu (270-350),
· Tetsugaku Zasshi, Nov.-Dec. 1912.
• Wintemitz, Geschichte, ii, 256 (1913); iii, 694 (1922).
• H. Ui, "On the author of the Malliiyiinasiitriilarrzkiira", Zeitschrift fur
Indologie und Iranistik (ZII), vi, 1928, pp. 216-25.
A group of articles, several of which are summaries of papers written in Japanese, in
Melanges Lanman (Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman), 1929:
• J. Takakusu, Date of Vasubandhu, the Great Buddhist Philosopher.
" T. Kimura, Date ofVasubandhu Seen from the Abhidharmakosa.
• G. Ono, Date ofVasubandhu Seen from the History of Buddhist Philosophy.
• H. Ui, Maitreya as a Historical Personage.
In addition, information on the opinions of B. Shiiwo, S. Funabashi, E. Mayeda,
S. Mochizuki.
cB. The dating of Vasubandhu in dependence on the date of Asariga and the
question of the historicity of Maitreyanatha
"H.P. Sastrl pointed out the historicity of Maitreyanatha from the colophon of
Abhisamayiilarµkiirakiirikii, which is a commentary, from the Yogacara point of
view, on Pancavirµsatisiihasrikii-prajiiii-piiramitii-siUra by Maitreyanatha" (Kimura,
Origin of Mahayana Buddhism, Calcutta, 1927, p. 170).
The date of Vasubandhu is linked to that of Asanga, his brother. 44 Now, parts of
the Yogasiistra, the work of Asanga, were translated into Chinese in 413-21 and in
431. - However, the opinion is widespread among Japanese scholars that the works
attributed to Asanga, written under the inspiration of the future Buddha Maitreya,
were in reality works of a Master Maitreya, a teacher (iiciirya), "a historical
personage". This thesis allows us to remove from Asanga one collection of books of
which we tho~ght him to have been the devout editor, and to place him, with his
44
LS: On the issue of the alternative hypotheses of one or two Yasubandhus, his life time,
his relationship to Asailga, the problems of the information available on the relevant Gupta
dynastic history, see section 5, ii, bin my Remarks by the Translator.
brother Vasubandhu, back into the middle or the end of fhe fifth century, or-wl:jy
a
not?---'into 'the sixth century. "If a scholar named Mai trey be found to be the author
of those works hitherto attributed to Asariga, then the date of the latter ought to be
shifted later, at least by one generation, if not more. The ground for an earlier date
for Vasubandhu should give way altogether" (Takakµsu, Melanges Lanman, 85).
<xxvi>
H. Ui, in the Philosophical Journal of the Imperial University Tokyo, n° 411, 1921 (or,
1922?), has put forward the arguments, developed/ since then in his Studies of Indian
Philosophy, i, 359, summarized in Melanges Lanman.
[But these arguments] appear weak to me and, I really think, to be nonexistent (Note
bouddhique xvi: Maitreya et Asanga, Ac. royale de Belgique, January 1930). I do not
think that they gain any strength from the observations of G. Tucci ("On some
aspects of the doctrines of Maitreya[natha] and Asanga", Calcutta Lectures, 1930).
The tradition of the Vij:iiaptimatrata school establishes, as G. Tucci observes, the
succession Maitreyanatha-Asanga-Vasubandhu; but Maitreyanatha is not a name of
a man: "Who has Maitreya as protector"; niitha is synonymous with buddha or, more
exactly, with bhagavat (lord). 45 The commentary of the Abhisamayiila1J1,kiira (p. 73 of
Tucci's edition) gives to Maitreya the title of bhagavat in a passage where it explains
how "Asaiiga, in spite of his scriptural erudition and his insight (labdhiidhigamo 'pi,
AKB viii, F 220), did not understand the Prajfiiipiiramitii and was in despair. Then
the Bhagavat Maitreya explained the Prajfiiipiiramitii for the sake of [Asariga] (tam
uddisya) and composed the treatise that is called Abhisamayiilmµkiirakiirikii." It is
with the name Maitreyanatha that Santideva designates the noble one who, in the
Gm:uJavyuha, explains the virtues of the thought of Bodbito the wanderer Sudhana
(Bodhicaryiivattira, i, 14; Rajendralal Mitra, Buddhist Nep_alese Literature, 92). If the
school holds the treatises of Asariga as sacred, as iiryii desanii [instructions of a noble
one], it is because the Bhagavat Maitreya revealed them. That the Tibetan-Chinese
tradition varies in its attributions, naming as author sometimes a revealing deity,
sometimes an inspired master, does not present any difficulty.
e:c. Difficulties regarding the biography ofVasubandhu, the expression

parvacarya, etc.
The biography of Vasubandhu (Pll.ramartha) is not without difficulties. - The Kosa
gave rise to criticism by Sm:pghabhadra who, in the bulky Nyiiyiinusara, notes the
45
See AKB i, F 1. - Obermiller, in the preface of the translation of the Uttaratantra (Asia
Major, 1931), dismisses the thesis of H. Ui.
100 Introduction
innumerable heresies of Sautrantika flavor that mar the work of Vasubandhu.

<xxvii> We are told that Vasubandhu refused to accept a debate: "I am now already
old. You may do as you please" (Version of Takakusu). But it is also ascertained that
Vasubandhu was then converted to the Mahayana by his brother Asanga, considered
cutting out his tongue in order to punish it for not confessing the Mahayana sooner
and, better advised, wrote numerous treatises wherein the doctrine of the Mahayana
is learnedly elaborated.
Yasomitra, the commentator on the Kosa, says that tre expression parvacarya
(i.e., ancient masters) of the Kosa refers to "Asanga, etc." (asaligaprabhrtayaf:t;
WOG.281.27f.). N. Peri thought that Yasomitra means to refer to the school of the
Piirvacaryas by their most illustrious name, and does not say that Asanga is indeed
ancient (parva) in relation to Vasubandhu (Cosmologie bouddhique, footnote on p. ix).
The Kosa was translated [into Chinese] only in 563, whereas the work of Dharma-
trata, an imperfect draft of the Kosa, was translated in 397-418, 426-31, 433-42.
J. Takakusu observes: "If the Kosa had existed, why would so many translators
linger over the book of Dharmatrata?" (Melanges Lanman). And it is difficult to
reply pertinently to this question. 46
But it seems almost impossible to believe that Paramartha, the biographer of
Vasubandhu, the first translator of the Kosa, arriving in China in 548, is in error
when he makes the author of the Kosa the contemporary and brother of Asanga. It
is a hopeless hypothesis to identify the brother and the convert of Asanga with
Vasubandhu-the-Ancient.
en. Vasubandhu-the-Ancient
We must accept the existence and "abhidharmic" activity of an ancient Vasubandhu.
The problem which I had tackled in the _Foreword to Cosmologie bouddhique (see
above p. xi, [as well as the footnote on p. viii in Cosmologie bouddhique: "We have
to distinguish Vasubandhu, the author of the Kosa, from Vasubandhu-the-Ancient
who likewise worked in the field of Abhidharma. "]) has been taken up by Taiken
Kimura, "Examen lumineux de I' Abhidharma" (table in Eastern Buddhist, iii, p. 85),
fifth part: "Sur les sources du Kosa": we will see a summary of his conclusion
in Melanges Lanman. <xxviii> Since then has appeared Note bouddhique xvii:
46
Maybe because the work of Dharmatrata has Jong since enjoyed a great reputation; maybe
because, in the eyes of the Sarvastivadins, the Kosa was, with good reason, regarded as hereti-
cal and tendentious.
Vasubandhu l'ancien, Acad. de Belgique; and a note by Paul Pelliot in JA, (July
1931).
Yasomitra-in three places: AKB i, F 26, iii, F 70 and iv, F 7-recognizes a
"Sthavira Vasubandhu, a master of Manoratha",47 an "ancient master Vasubandhu"
(vrddhiicarya-vasubandhu), as a master who was refuted by Vasubandhu, i.e., the
author of the Kosa and disciple of Manoratha according to Hstian-tsang. P'u-kuang
(Kimura, Melanges Lanman, 91) confirms Yasomitra, and refers to the master in
question under the name "ancient Vasubandhu, a dissident Sarviistiviidin Master".
On the other hand, the gloss of the initial five verses of Dharmatriita' s treatise
[SAH.2J,the new edition of the Abhidharmasara of DharmasrI, 48 attributes an edition
of the same book in 6;000 verses to Vasubandhu. These verses and this gloss are not
very clear. Kimura has studied them {Melanges Lcmman); I have amended his
interpretation (Note bouddhique xvii); Paul Pelliot, finally, draws from it what can be
drawn from it. <xxix>
47 Quoted iii. 152, on the explanation of the word neighboring hell (utsada).
48
See below.
\
102 Introduction
D. THE SEVEN CANONICAL TREATISES OF THE ABHIDHARMA

The Sarviistiviidins recognize the authority of seven Abhidharma treatises, "the word
of the Buddha". Among the Sarviistiviidins, there are the A.bhidhiirmikas "who read
only the Abhidharma with its six feet", 49 who are distinct from the Vaibha~ikas "who
read the Abhidharma".
The Abhidharma with its six feet50 is the great treatise of Kiityiiyaniputra-entitled
Jfilinaprasthiina, of which the Vibhli~ii is the long commentary-and the six treatises,
the order and authorship of which vary somewhat according to the sources. To
follow the order of the Abhidharmakosavylikhya:
l. Prakaraf}apiida of Vasumitra;
2. Vijfiiinakiiya of Devasarman;
3. Dhar_maskandha of Siiriputra (or ofMaudgalyiiyana, Chinese sources);
4. Prajfiiiptisiistra of Maudgalyiiyana;
5. Dhlitukliya of Piir9-a (or of Vasumitra, Chinese sources);
6. SmJ1gftiparyitya ofMahiikau~thila (or of Siiriputra, Chinese sources).
We should note that the Tibetans name the Dhannaskandha first and the Jfiana-
prasthiina only as sixth: "TJ:ie Tibetans seem to regard the Dhannaskandha as the
most important of all." This is also the opinion of Chin-mai (664 A.D.), the author of
the Chinese colophon (Takakusu, 75, 115).
J. Takakusu, in "On the Abhidharma Literature" (JPTS, 1905), collects a number of
details on these seven books, which Burnouf was the first to name; he gives a table
of the chapters of each of them. The comments that follow are ,an addition to this
fine work.
DA. Jfianaprasthiina51
1. According to Hslian-tsang, Kiityayaniputra composed this slistra in the monas-
tery of Tiimasavana, 300 years after the Nirvii.9-a (fourth century). 52 <xxx>
49
~a!piidiibhidharmamiitrapiithinas, a good reading of AKB v, F 45 (note).
50
Account of the council in Ta-chih-tu-lun. Przyluski, Concile de Riijagrha, p. 72.
51
Translated in 383 by Gotama Sarp.ghadeva of Kasmir, and by Hsiian-tsang.
LS: See SBS.221-29; EIP.VII.108-10; 417-49.

52
Watters, i. 294; S. Levi, Catalogue geographique des Yak~as, 55; J. Przyluski, A9oka, 263.
However, the Vibh<i!f<i, 5, p. 21 at the end, commenting on the Jnanaprasthana, 1,

p. 918, says: "When the Bhadanta composed the Jniinaprasthana, he was residing in
the East, and this is why he quotes the five rivers [i.e., Ganga, Yamuna, Sarayii,
AciravatI, MahI] known in the East as examples." (AKB iii, F 147)
2. We know through the quotations of Yasomitra that the chapters are called
skandhaka (indriyaskandhaka, samiidhiskandhaka) and that the work he uses is com-
posed in Sanskrit.
However, the first translation has as its title Sastra of eight chien-tu; in
Paramiirtha, Sastra of eight ch 'ien-tu; we might think of khm:u/.a, but Paramiirtha
explains that ch 'ien-tu is equivalent to ka-lan-ta, which is obviously grantha.
S. Levi thought that (Ch.) ch'ien-tu is the Prakrit gantho. - J. Takakusu concludes:
ts
"All we can say that the text brought by Sarµghadeva seems to have been in a
dialect akin to ~ali .... But this supposition rests solely on the phonetic value of
Chinese ideographs."53
3. The Jniinaprasthana, a very poorly composed work, begins with the study of the
worldly supreme factors (laukikiigradharma). 54
"What are the worldly supreme factors? (1) The thought and thought-concomitants
that are immediately followed by entry into
.
/
the assurance .of the eventual attainment
of enlightenment (samyaktvanyiima) (see AKB vi, F 180). (2) There are those who
say to this: "The five (praxis-oriented) faculties (indriya: faith, etc.) that are immedi-
ately followed by entry into the assurance of the eventual attainment of enlighten-
ment-are what are called the worldly supreme factors." The text continues: "Why are
these thought and thought-concomitants so called ... ?"
53
On the language in which the Jiiiinaprasthana was written, Takakusu, pp. 82, 84, 86. -
See above p. ix.
LS: Hirakawa (IA.XXIX) states that the Jiiiinaprasthiina "consists of eight chapters, and the
Mahiivibhii1a, which is the commentary on the liiiinaprasthiina, also consists of eight chapters
and forty-four vargas as follows:
1. K1udrakagrantha (8 vargas); 2. Anusayagrantha (4 vargas); 3. Jfiiinagrantha (5 vargas);
4. Karmagrantha (5 '\Jargas); 5. Mahiibhiitagrantha (4 vargas); 6. Indriyagrantha (7 vargas);
7. Samiidhigrantha (5 vargas); 8. Dmigrantha (6 vargas)."
54
On the laukikiigradharmas, AKB vi, F 167, and "Paraya1,1a quoted in the Jfiiinaprasthiina",
Melanges Linossier (where we see that the Jiiiinaprasthiina sets out the problem of the stages
conducive to penetration [nirvedhabhiigfya] very poorly).
104 Introduction
The Vibhii~a. 2, p. 7c,55 reproduces the two definitions from the Jfianaprasthana, and
explains: "Who are the people who say that the worldly supreme factors are the fj.ve
(praxis-oriented) faculties? - The ancient Abhidhiirmikas. - Why do they express
themselves in this way? - In order to refute another school: they do not mean
that the worldly supreme factors consist solely of the five (praxis-oriented) faculties.
But the Vibhajyavadins maintain that the five (praxis-oriented) faculties are solely
pure (aniisrava) (see AKB ii, F 118) .... To refute this doctrine, the ancient
Abhidhiinnikas say that the worldly supreme factors consist of the five (praxis-
oriented) faculties. <xxxi> Now, these factors (dharma) occur in an ordinary
worldling (prthagjana): thus :t is established that the five (praxis-oriented) faculties
can be impure."
The significance of this commentary is that it distinguishes (1) Katyayaniputra and
the Jiianaprasthana from (2) the "ancient Abhidhiirmikas".
4. One of the last verses of the last chapter is the verse (sloka) on the meaning of
which, according io Vasumitta (Sectes, Masuda, p. 57), the Vatsiputnyas disagreed
with each other: hence the separation of the four schools, Dharmottariyas, etc.
5. But, if the Jfiiinaprasthana is the work of Katyaniputra, how can the Sarvasti-
vadins consider this treatise to be the word of the Buddha?
The Vibha~a answers this question. 56
Question: - Who has composed this Treatise [that is, the Jiianaprasthiina]?
Answer: - The Buddha Bhagavat. For the nature of the factors (dharma)
to be known is very profound and very subtle: apart from the Buddha
Bhagavat, who could know it and expound it?
[Question:] - If that is so, who, in this Treatise, asks the questions, and who
answers?
[Answer:] - There are several opinions:
1. the Sthavira Sariputra asks the questions and the Fortunate One
(bhagavat) answers;
2. the 500 arhats ask the questions and the Fortunate One answers;
3. the gods ask the questions and the Fortunate One answers;
4. miraculously manifested (nim1ita) bhik~us ask the questions and the
Fortunate One answers: it is the law (dharmata; [Ch.] fa-erh) of the
ss Same text, Small Vibha~ii, p. Sb, toward the end.

56
Compare AKB i, F 5-6, and Documents d'Abhidharma; Vibhii~li, 46, P: 236b.
II LOUIS DE LAV ALLEE POUSSIN 105
Buddhas that they should expound to the world the .nature of the
factors to be known. But if there is no questioner? In that case
the Fortunate One creates bhik~us with a proper countenance and
appearance, agreeable to be seen, shaven-headed, dressed in robes;
he causes these beings to ask the qu,estions and he answers ....
Question: - If that is so, why does tradition attribute the composition of the
Treatise to the Arya Katyayan1putra?.
Answer: - Because this Arya has written and published this treatise in such a
1
way that it became widespread; this is why it is said to be by him. But the
Treatise has been spoken by the Fortunate One. However, according to
another opinion, this Treatise is the work of the Arya Katyayan1putra.
Question: - Did we not say above that no one, with the exception of the
Buddha, is capable of knowing and expounding the nature of the factors?
How is the Arya able to compose this Treatise?
Answer: - Because the Arya also possesses a subtle, profound, ardent,
skilful intelligence; knows well the particular inherent and common
characteristics of the factors; penetrates the meaning of the texts from
beginning to end (piirviiparakoti); <xxxii> knows the three baskets well; has
abandoned the stains of the three realms (dhiitu); is in possession of the three
clear knowledges (vidyii; AKB vii, F 108); is endowed with the six super-
knowledges (abhijiiii) and the eight liberations (vimok~a); has obtained the
unhindered knowledges (pratisaJ?7,vid); has obtained the cognition resulting
from a resolve (prm:iidhijiiana); in past times, has .practiced the religious life
under 500 Buddhas of the past; has developed the resolution:. "In the future,
after the Nirva1:m of Sakyamuni, I shall compose the Abhidharma." This is
why it is said that this Treatise is his work. - In the multitude of disciples of
all the Tathagata-Samyaksarpbuddhas, it is the law (dharmatii) that there are
two great masters (siistriiciirya) who uphold (dhiitar; AKB viii, F 219) the
True Doctrine (Saddharma): just like Arya Sariputra in the lifetime of the
Tathagata and Arya Katyayan1putra after his Nirvai;ia. - Therefore, this
Arya, through the power of his vow, has seen that which is of use to the
Dharma and has composed this Treatise.
Question: - If that is so, how can you say that it is the Buddha who speaks
the Abhidharma?
Answer: - The Fortunate One, when he was in this world, explained and
expounded the Abhidharma in different places by means of various
theoretical presentations (lit. vada-patha). Either after the Nirvai;ia or when
106 Introduction
the Fortunate One was still in this world, the Arya-disciples, by means of
cognition resulting from a resolve (pra,:iidhijnana), compiled and collected
[these presentations], arranging them into sections. Therefore after the
departure of the Fortunate One, Katyayaniputra also, by means of cogni-
tion resulting from a resolve (pra,:iidhijnana), compiled, collected and com-
posed the Jnanaprasthana. Amongst the theoretical presentations of the
Fortunate One, Katyayaniputra set up the gates of a book ('vakyadvara); he
worked out verse-summaries, he composed various chapters to which he
gave the name Skandhaka. He collected various presentations drawing from
disparate subjects and from them composed (1) the Miscellaneous-
Skandhaka, [i.e., SafJlkTrnaka-skandhaka]. The presentation relating to
(2) the fetters (safJlyojana), (3) cognitions (jnana), (4) actions (karman),
(5) fundamental material elements (mahabhuta), (6) faculties (indriya),
(7) concentrations (samadhi) and (8) views (dr~!i) constituted the SafJl-
yojanaskandhaka, etc. - Likewise, all the Udanagathas have been spoken
by the Buddha: the Buddha Bhagavat spoke them, in various places, in
response to various persons, according to the circumstances. After the
Buddha left the world, the Bhadanta Dharmatrata, who knew [the Udana-
•
gathas] from tradition, compiled and collected them and gave the name
varga [to the groups]. He collected the gathas relating to impermanence and
composed the anityavarga, and so forth from them.
I:he Abhidharma is originally the word of the Buddha; it is also a compila-
tion of the Arya Katyayaniputra.
Whether the Buddha spoke [the Abhidharma] or whether the disciple spoke
it does not contradict the Dharmata, for all the Buddhas want the bhik~us
to uphold [the Abhidharma]. Thus this Arya-whether he knows the Abhi-
dharma from tradition or whether he sees and examines it thanks to the
cognition resulting from a resolve~has composed this Treatise in order that
the True Doctrine remain for a long time in the world ....
DB. Prakara1Ja of Vasumitra 57

It is also called Prakara,:iagrantha or Prakara,:iapadasastra. An important work
which is not very systematic (for many things have been amassed in the chapter of
The Thousand Questions) but frequently quoted in the Kosa (for example, i, F 12, 15;
ii, F 200, 251, 269 ... ). <xxxiii>
57
LS: See SAL.32-36; SBS.212-21; EIP.VII.106-8; 375-79.
LOUIS DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN 107
[The Prakara~a] differs from the classical Vaibha~ikavada on one important issue:
it ignores the unwholesome permeating mental factors (akusalamahiibhumika;
iii, F 105). Sometimes it expresses itself in terms that must be interpreted rather
heavily to make them fit (ii, F 229, 259; iii, F 14, 128). It differs from the liiiina-
prasthiina, v, F 28.
Ignorance of the unwholesome permeating mental factors (akusalamahiibhumika)
category seems to prove that the Prakara~a is earli'er than the Jiiiinaprasthana.
However, the authors of the Vibha~a (45, p. 231c) are uncertain:
Why does this treatise (that is to say, the Jiiiinaprasthiina) say prthag-
janatva and not prthagjanadharma, whereas the Prakara~apiida says
prthagjanadharma and not prthagjanatva? . . . This treatise having said
prthagjanatva, the Prakara~apada does not repeat it; ~his treatise not having
said prthagjanadharma, the Prakara~apada says pfthagjanadharma. This
indicates that the latter was composed after this one. There are pe~ple
who say: That treatise ·having said prthagjanadharma, this treatise does
not repeat it ... ; this indicates that that treatise was composed before this
one.
The Prakara~a does not enumerate the faculties (indriya) in the same order as
the Siitra, the Jiiiinaprasthiina, the early Pali scholasticism, AKB i, F 101.
DC. Vijnanakaya 58
This is a work that the Chinese sources (quoted in Takakusu) date 100 years aftei- the
Nirva9a; it is attributed to Devasarman or to lha-skyid (Devak~eina?). About the
author, who has the title of Arhat in Hslian-tsang, see Wassiliew in Taranatha, 296,
Hiouen-thsang [= Hslian-tsang], Vie, 123, Watters,i, 373.
The significance of this book, not very great from the doctrinal point of view, is
noteworthy from the point of view of history. The first chapter, Maudgalyiiyana-
skandhaka, and the second chapter, Pudgalaskandhaka, relate to the two great
controversies, the existence of past and future [factors] and the existence of the
person (pudgala), [respectively]. 59 <xxxiv>
58
LS: See SAL.28-31; SBS.197-205; EIP.VII.104-6; 367-74.
59
"La Controverse du Temps and du Pudgala dans le Vijfianakaya", in Etudes Asiatiques,
1925, I, pp. 343-76; Inde sous les Mauryas, 1930, p. 138; Note bouddhique ii: Le Vijnanakiiya
et le Kathavatthu, Ac. Belgique, Nov. 1922, pp. 516-20.
108 Introduction
[First chapter:] - Devasarman refutes the doctrine of Mu-lien or Maudgalyayana

who denies the existence of past and future [factors], just as Tissa Moggaliputta in
the Pali ecclesiastical history denied it.
We have here, from the Sarvastivadin point of view, the controversy which gave
rise to the council of Asoka. [On the other hand,] according to the legend that
Buddhaghosa has caused to be believed in Ceylon and in London, the king
ascertained that the Buddha was a follower of those who distinguish (vibhajya-
viidin)-that is to say, probably, did not accept as a whole the existence of all
(sarviistiviida); then [the king] gave to Tissa Moggaliputta, that is to say, I think, our
Mu-lien, the responsibility of presiding over a council where only the opponents of
past and future [factors] were admitted. 60
[Second chapter:] - There is no close relationship between the Maudgalyiiyana-
skandhaka and the work of Tissa (Katthiivatthu, i, 6 and following). This is not
surprising since the two books represent opposing doctrines and present their own
side as prevailing over their opponent.
On the contrary, the Pudgalaskandhaka presents close analogies with the Kathii-
vatthu, i, 1, even down to the°identity of phrases.
Devasarman has two scholars speaking, the follower of the person (pudgala-
viidin),61 who admits a vital principle or living being, a kind of soul or self
(pudgala), and the follower of emptiness (sunyatiiviidin), i.e., the negator of the
self (iitman), the orthodox Buddhist who does not recognize a permanent prin-
ciple.
The fourth volume of the Japanese translation of the Abhidharma just reached me (September
1931). It contains the Vijfiiinakiiya. The translator, B. Watanabe, in a short preface, deals with
the philosophical significance of the book, its compilation, and its relationship to the Abhi-
dhammas.
60
We must clarify the comments of Barth (ii, 355): to tell the truth, the editors of the
Dfpavaf!lsa are alone in knowing a Tissa Moggaliputta "who must have presided over the
council of Asoka and composed the Kathiivatthu." But the Sarviistiviidin tradition knows a
Mu-lien to whom it attributes-in the controversy of the past and future [factors]-the posi-
tion that the Dfpavarrisa assigns to Tissa. There is certainly much legend in the Singhalese
hagiography.
61
The enigmatic Gopiila of Hsiian-tsang? - Our sources agree in attributing the doctrine of
the pudgala to the Sammitiyas, to the Viitsiputriyas. See Madhyamakavrtti, pp. 275-76.
1. The thesis of the pudgalavadin is formulated in terms that are partly identical to
those which the puggalavadin of the Kathavatthu 62 uses. <xxxv>
2. The arguments are partly the same:
i. Argument taken from the passage from one plane of existence to another
(compare Kathavatthu, i, 1, 158-61).
ii. Argument taken from the passage from one stage of nobleness to another
(i, 1, 221).
iii. Connections between the doer of the action and the "eater of the fruit"
(i, 1,200).
iv. Is unsatisfactoriness caused by oneself or caused by another? (i, 1,212)
v. The pudgala is not perceived by any of the six consciousnesses; the
consciousnesses arise from well-known causes, without intervention from.
the pudgala (Kathavatthu, passim).
3. The method of argumentation is the same in the Sanskrit source as in the Pali
source. The negator of the pudgala puts the follower of the pudgala into contra-
diction with the Siitra, i.e., into contt:adiction with [the pudgalaviidin] himself-for
the follower of the pudgala recognizes that the Buddha has indeed said all that he
said.
The Pudgalavadin says: - There is a self (iitman), a sentient being
(sattva), a living being (jfva), a being who is born (jantu), a being who is
nourished (po~a), an individual (puru~a), a person (pudgala). 63 Because
there is a person (pudgala), he performs actions that must bear an agree-
able (sukhavedanfya), disagn;eable, or neither disagreeable nor agreeable
fruit.
The Siinyatavadin asks him: - Yes or no, is it the same person who does the
action and experiences the sensation?
The Pudgalavadin answers: - No.
62
Kathiivatthu: saccika!{haparama!{hena puggalo upalabbhati. - The Sanskrit phrase is not
reconstructed with certainty. We have tattviirthataJ:i (satyiirthataJ:i?) paramiirthataJ:i pudgala
upalabhyate siiksfkriyate saf!lpratividyate (?) saf!lvidyate. - Devasarman's version, more
developed than that of Tissa, appears more modern.
63
The Sanskrit sources are fond of the expression puru$apudgala. For example, the Sanskrit
edition of Majjhima, iii, 239 (chadhiituro ayam puriso) has $acjdhiitur ayaf!l puru$apudgalaJ:i. -
See Madhyamakavrtti, pp. 129, 180, etc.
110 Introduction
[Reply:] - Recognize the contradiction into which you fall! 64 <xxxvi> If

there is a self, a person (pudgala), and if, because there is a person
(pudgala), he performs actions and experiences the just retribution of them,
then one must say that it is the same yerson who does the action and who
experiences the sensation: thus your answer is illogical. If you now deny that
it would be the same person who does the action and experiences the sen-
sation, then one cannot say that there is a self, a living being and so oh. To
say that is illogical.
If the Pudgalavadin answers: - "It is the same person who does the action
and who experiences the sensation", one must ask him: Yes or no, is what
the Fortunate One says in the Siitra well-said, well-defined, well-declared,
namely: "Brahmin, to say that it is the same person who does the action and
who experiences the sensation is to fall into the extreme view of perma-
nence"65?
The Pudgalaviidin answers: - Yes, that is well said.
[Reply:] - Recognize the contradiction into which you fall ....
The relationship of the Pali treatises and the Sanskrit Abhidharma is close. The
comparison of the Prakara,:ta and the Dhatukiiya with the Dhammasaliga,:ii, like that
of the _vijfianakiiya with the Kathiivatthu, supplies numerous testimonies of the unity
of scholasticism. The controversy of the pudgala is, without a doubt, one of the
controversies (kathavatthu), one of the oldest subjects of discussion. Expounded, in
Pali or in Sanskrit, according to the same principles, with often the same arguments
and striking coincidences in phraseology-clearer in Devasarman, older, it seems to
me, in Tissa-it cannot fail to throw light to some extent on the history of the most
64
The expression that I translate: "Recognize the contradiction into which you fall", (Ch.) ju
t'ing tuo Ju, corresponds to a Sanskrit original ajanfhi nigraham. Tuo ju is indeed translated
by nigraha sthana in a vocabulary (Tetsugaku daijisho, Tokyo 1912) examined in detail by
Rosenberg ("Introduction to the study of Buddhism", i, Vocabulary, Tokyo, 1916). - We have
therefore the exact equivalent here of the phrase ajiiniihi niggaham of the Kathiivatthu and of
Milinda.
65
The doctrine of the Fortunate One is a path between two extremes. It avoids the extreme
theory of permanence, by saying that he who eats the fruit of action is not the same person
who has committed the action (sa karoti so' nubhavati?): it avoids the theory of annihilation by
denying that he who eats the fruit is a person other than the one who has committed the action.
- Compare Sal!lyutta, ii, p. 23.
serious conflict that had troubled ancient Buddhism. We may be surprised that the
Pudgalavadin of Devasarman does not cite the Siitra on the Bearer of the Burden
(Bhiirahiirasiitra), the siitra that is one of the principal authorities of Vasubandhu's
Pudgalavadin, AKB ix.
As for the Kathiivatthu, it is not ill-advised to think that this book is made up of bits
and pieces. Certain parts are old, other parts are suspect. <xxxvii>
DD. Dharmaskandha66
J. Takakusu wonders whether the compilation having this name is the work of
Sariputra (Yasomitra) or Maudgalyayana (Chinese title). This is a somewhat futile
concern.
It is a collection of siitras, promulgated in Jetavana, addressed to bhik~us, preceded
by two verses: "Homage to the Buddha .... The Abhidharma is like the ocean, the
great mountain, the great earth, the great sky. I will try to expound in brief the
treasures of the Dharma found therein."
The author indeed comments most often on the siitra that he quotes by citing other
siitras: "Among these four, what is stealing? -The Fortunate One says .... "
Without a doubt, the author is a scholarly man and well-informed about the most
subtle doctrines of the Sarvastivada: "The Fortunate One, in Jetavana, says to the
bhik(ius: There are four noble fruits of religious praxis (.friima1:iyaphala). What are
the four? The fruit of the stream-enterer (.frotaiipanna) ... . What is the fruit of the
stream-enterer? It is twofold, conditioned (saf!lskrta) and unconditioned (asaf!lskrta).
Conditioned, namely, the acquisition of the fruit and that which is acquired by this
acquisition, the morality of those in training (saik(ia), ... all the factors (dharma) of
those in training. Unconditioned, namely, the cutting off of the three fetters ... "
(comp. AKB vi, F 242, 297).
DE. Prajiiiiptisastra67
a. The Tibetan Prajiiiiptisiistra:
The Tibetan Prajiiiiptisiistra is made up of three parts: (1) lokaprajiiiipti (world);
(2) kiira-r:iaprajiiiipti (reasons); (3) karmaprajiiiipti (action).
The first two are described and analyzed in Cosmologie bouddhique, pp. 295-350.
66
LS: See SAL.15-21; SBS.181-89; EIP.vii.103; 179-87.
67
LS: See SBS.189-96; EIP.VII.104; 217.
112 Introduction
The third is of the same style. The text [of this part] is divided into chapters preceded
by a summary. Here is the beginning:
Summary: (1) intentional (action); (2) intention; (3) past; (4) wholesome;
(5) object; (6) realm of desire; (7) verse; (8) summary of actions.
1. Thus have I heard. The Fortunate One resided in Jetavana in the park of
AniithapiQ.9ada; he said to the bhik~us: "I teach the retribution of intentional
action, action done and assumed, retribution in this life ... ". Thus spoke 'the
Fortunate One. <xxxviii>
2. There are two actions: the action of intention (cetanii-karman), the
action subsequent to intention (cetayitvii-karman). What is the first? It
says: cetana, abhisaY(lcetana, cintana, cetayitatva, cittabhisaY(lskara, miinasa
karman, that is called action of intention ... .
3. The action of intention is past, future, present. What is past action
of intention? That which is jata, utpanna, abhinirvrtta, .. . abhyatfta, k~f,:ia,
niruddha, vipari,:iata, atftasaYflgrhrta, atftiidhvasaYflgrhrta ... .
4. Action of intention is wholesome, unwholesome, non-defined ....
5. Is the object of good intention wholesome ... ?
6. The action of intention is of the three realms (dhatu). What is that of th~
realm of desire (kiima)?
7. A verse in honor of the Buddha who teaches the different types of
action.
8. One action, all actions being action (literally: ekahetuna karma,:taY(l
saY(lgrahaJ:i karmeti). Two actions: intention and action subsequent to inten-
tion. Three actions: bodily, vocal, mental. Four actions: of Kama, of Riipa,
of Ariipya, not belonging to the realms (dhiitu). Five actions: (i-ii) the
defined and non-defined actions that are abandoned by the path of insight;
(iii-iv) the defined and non-defined actions that are abandoned by the path
of cultivation; (v) that action which is not to be abandoned (aheya) ... . And
so on up to: Twelv:.e [actions].
Almosf all the theories expounded in AKB iv are treated, with long quotations from
the siitras.
Several details are worth mentioning. For example: "False speech arising from
delusion (moha) (AKB iv, F 148). Asked by the hunter whether he has seen the
gazelle, he thinks: 'It is not appropriate for the hunter to kill the gazelle', and. he
answers that he has not seen it (compare the story of K~iintivadin, Chavannes, Cinq
cents contes, i, 161). Asked by the king's army whether he has seen the group of
bandits .... Asked by the group of bandits whether he has seen the king's army .... "
And above all, this case of frivolous speech that arises from greed (lobha): "Or else,
through the attachment to the examination of the word of the Buddha."
Chapter xi is interesting from another point of view. After the definition of death
through the exhaustion of life (iiyus) or of merit (pw:iya), the story of the naked
ascetic Kii.syapa (SaY(tyutta, ii, 19-22) is quoted with long expositions:
Shortly after he had left the Fortunate One, he was killed by a cow. At the
time of his death, his faculties became very clear; the color of his face
became very pure; the color of his skin became very brilliant.
It should also be noted that Kii.syapa was welcomed as a lay practitioner (upiisaka):
Master, I go forth to the Fortunate One, Master, I go forth to the Sugata.
Master, I take refuge in the Fortunate One, I take refuge in the Dharma and
in the Sarp.gha. May the Fortunate One recognize me (dhiiretu) as a 'lay
practitioner having renounced killing ... " (compare SaY(tyutta, ii, 22 arid
Dfgha, i, 178). <xxxix>
Then: "The acquisition of karman is of four types. They are enumerated as in

SaY(tgftiparyiiya." - Three paragraphs on giving follow: "Four givings: it happens that
the giver is pure and the recipient impure ... and so on as in Sa'!tgftiparyiiya. Eight
givings: the giving to those near (iisadya; AKB-iv, F 239), and so on as in
SaY(tgftiparyiiya. Eight givings: it happens that the person with little faith gives little,
to immoral people, for a short period of time .... "
b. The Chinese Prajfiaptisiistra:
The Chinese Prajfiiiptisastra is incomplete. The edition of the first part merely gives
the title: ''In the great Abhidharmasastra, the first part is called Lokaprajfiiipti", and a
gloss says that the Indian original is missing. The title of the second part immediately
follows: Kiira"f},aprajfiiipti.
The text continues as follows: "In the siistra, the question is posed: For what reason
does the Cakravartin have the royal treasure (ratna) of the queen ... ?" Comparing this
with the Tibetan Kiira"f_laprajfiiipti, we see that the Chinese text omits the first chapter
on the characteristics (lak(fa"f_l,a) of the Bodhisattva; in the second chapter, it omits the
enumeration of the royal treasures and the essays on the wheel (cakra), the elephant
(hasti), the horse (asva) and the jewel (ma"f_l,i).
The third chapter, in Chinese as well as in Tibetan, is composed of verses on the
Buddha, a king like the Cakravartin, and the jewels of the Buddha: the Dharma is a
wheel; the bases of supernormal power (rddhipiida) are an elephant. The Tibetan
114 Introduction
tells us that these verses are the Sailagathas. This concerns a recension which departs
from the Suttanipata where the single verse 554 has two quarter-verses (pada)
corresponding to the Tibetan: "Saila, I am a king, a sublime king of the Dharma; in
the circle (ma1:uj,ala) of the earth, I set in motion the wheel of Dharma; like a
Cakravartin king, consider th.e Tathagata as merciful, full of pity, a Muni useful to
the world."
The Chinese text has fourteen chapters; the last, dealing with meteorological issues
(rain, etc.), corresponds closely, as do the others, to the Tibetan text. The latter has
four supplementary chapters: the four planes of existence (gati), the five modes of
birth (yoni), to which mode of birth the sentient beings of the various planes of
existence belong, etc. It is likely that Vasubandhu had this chapter in front of him,
when he includes, like the Tibetan Prajfi.apti, the story of the pretf who eats ten
children every day, the stories of Saila, KapotamalinI, etc. (AKB iii, F 28-29;
Vibha~a, 120). <xl>
J. Takakusu has ingeniously assumed that the Lokaprajnapti--omitted either by
mistake or on purpose in the Chinese Prajftaptisastra of which it should be the first
gate-occurs in fact in the sastra Nanjio 1297, Taisho 1644, entitled Li-shih: "Nanjio
translated Loka-sthiti(?)-abhidharmasastra. But li signifies constructing, establishing
and is practically equivalent to shi-she or prajfiapti." Thus J. Takakusu translates
Lokaprajnapty-abhidharmasastra. ·
We may note that the sastra 1297, Taisho 1644, shows the characteristics of a siitra.
In some editions the title is preceded by "spoken by the Buddha".
The text begins: "As the Buddha Bhagavat and Arhat spoke, thus have I heard.
The Buddha resided in Sravasfi, in the monastery of the upiisikii Mrgaramatar
Visakha, with many· bhik~us, all perfected beings (arhat) ... with the exception of
Ananda. Then the earth shook. And Pu11,1a Maitrayai:iiputra asked .... " The chapters
begin usually: "Then the Buddha spoke", "The Buddha spoke to bhik~u Puri:ia",
"The Buddha spoke to the bhik~us", and end: "This is what the Buddha spoke; thus
have I heard."
The table of the chapters, established by J. Takakusu, shows that, although [the
siistra 1297] deals with the [same] subject as that with which the Tibetan Loka-
prajiiiipti deals, the former has nothing to do with this Lokaprajiiiipti. In the
latter, there is nothing that corresponds to the 1297 chapter on the yak~as and notably
to the conversation of Satagira and Hemavata (the verses of the .Hemavatasutta of
the Suttanipiita, Uragavagga, Taisho, p. 177). The Lokaprajnapti has only a brief
summary on the heavenly gardens, on which the Nanjio 1297 has long expositions.
But in both works there is the battle of the gods (sura) and the demi-gods (asura), the
movements of the sun and moon, the durations of life, the hells, the three small and
the three great calamities. The order, however, differs.
Sometimes the titles of the chapters of 1297 do not give an exact idea of the contents
of the book.
For example, in the first chapter, we have (1) the two causes of earthquakes
(movement of the wind, water; magical powers of the noble ones who "consider
the earth as small, the water as large"). - (2) After two verses on earthquakes,
the Buddha then says to Piill_la: "There a~e winds called Vairambhas ... " (AKB
vi, F 155). On this circle (mm:u;lala) of wind, there is the water and the earth, the
thickness and width of which are determined as in the Kosa (iii, F 138). - The
Buddha explains the great hell called Black Darkness which is between the universes
(which is not mentioned in the Kosa), and the ten cold hells (AKB iii, F 150, n. 2) ....
<xli> A little later, Ananda shows his admiration for the Buddha and his power.
Udayin reprimands him and is, in tum, reprimanded by the Master. This is a
recension of the famous Suttanta (Ariguttara, i, 278) which differs from the Pali by
the prophecy: "Aquatic beings are many, terrestrial beings are few .... The cir-
cumstantially liberated (samayavimukta; AKB vi, F 251) Arhats are many, the
non-circumstantially liberated (asamayavimukta) Arhats are few, are difficult to
meet in this world: and I declare that Ananda will become a non-circumstantially
liberated Arhat."
DF. Dhatuktiya68
1. At the beginning, we find here the enumeration and definition of the factors
(dhanna) of the Sarvastivadins: ten generally permeating ment.al factors (mahii-
bhiimika); ten afflicted permeating mental factors (klesamahabhiimika), ten mental
factors of defilement of restricted scope (parfttaklesa), five defilements (klesa), five
afflicted views (dr~fi), five factors (dharma) ... .
The wholesome permeating mental factors (kusalamahiibhiimika) are missing, as are
the unwholesome permeating mentai' factors (akusalamahiibhiimika).
The five defilements make up an unfamiliar list: kiimariiga, riipariiga, iiriipyariiga,
pratigha, and vicikitsii.
More interesting is the list of five factors: initial inquiry (vitarka), investigation
(viciira), consciousness (vijfiiina; meaning the six consciousnesses, i.e., visual, etc.),
non-modesty (iihrikya) and shamelessness (anapatriipy_a).
68
LS: See SAL.21-28; SBS.206-12; EIP.VII.104; 345-58.
116 Introduction
We may believe that this book is from the old Sarvastivada.

2. The second part deals with association (sarriprayoga), inclusion (sarrigraha).
"With how many of the six faculties of sensation (vedanendriya: pleasure, etc.) is the
sensation (vedana) that belongs to the generally permeating mental factors associ-
ated? With how many is it not associated? ... and so on up to: With how many of the
faculties of sensation is the affection arisen through mental contact associated? With
how many is it not associated?"
"In what is that which is associated with sensation included (sarrigrhfta)? - In the
thought and thought-concomitants, eight elements (dhatu), two sense-spheres
(ayatana), three aggregates (skandha). - What is it that is left out? - Sensation
(vedana), form (riipa), the unconditioned factors (asarriskrta), the formations dissoci-
ated from thought (viprayuktasarriskara), i.e., eleven elements, .... "
This is exactly the kind of questions that the Dhiitukathiipakara1Ja examines:
sukhindriyam ... kehici sarripayuttarri kathfhi vippayuttam ... ? These are the same
questions: vedaniikkhandena ye dhamma sarripayutta te dhamma katfhi khandhehi
katfhayataneJ:ii katfhi dhatiihi sarrigahfta? te dhamma tfhi khandhehi dvfhayatanehi
a!{hahi dhatiihi sarrigahfta (Section xii). <xiii>
3. We can therefore affirm the close relationship of the Dhiitukiiya and the
Dhatukathapakara1Ja. The first, in its second part, is merely a Sarvastivadin recen-
sion (theory of the generally permeating mental factors, of the formations dissociated
from thought ... ) of an old book of academic exercises on the factors.
na. Saf!lgftiparyaya69
The Sarrigrtiparyiiya is a recension of the Sarrigftisuttanta which is part of the
Dfghanikaya.
Same nidand: the Buddha at Pava; the death of the Nirgrantha; Sariputra invites the
monks to chant the Dharma and the Vinaya together so that, after the NirvaQ.a of the
Tathiigata, his sons would not quarrel. Then follow the chapters on the single factors
(dharma), the pairs of factors, ... the decades of factors. Finally, the eulogy of
Sariputra: sadhu sadhu, by the Fortunate One: "You have well collected and recited
with the bhik:fuS the Ekottaradharmaparyaya taught by the Tathiigata ... ".
The close relationship of the Pali and of the Sanskrit does not exclude some variants.
Thus among the octads, the Abhidharma omits the eight false factors (mithyatva; the
69
LS: See SAL.14-15; SBS.177~81; EIP.VII.102-3; 203-16.
first of the Pali list) and adds the eight liberations (vimok:ja; omitted in the Pali list,
but which appear in the Dasa-uttara). The order differs also. On the one hand,
marganga, pudgala, dana, kausfdyavastu, arabhyavastu, pwJyotpatti, par:jad, loka-
dharma, vimok:ja, abhibhvayatana, on the other hand, micchatta, sammatta, puggala,
kusftavatthu, arabbhavatthu, dana, danuppatti, parisii, lokadhamma, abhibhayatana.
Notice that pw;iyotpatti is better than diinuppatti. 70
Yasomitra and Bu-ston attribute the Sal'{lgftiparyaya to Mahakau~thila; the Chinese
sources name Sariputra. Is it possible that in one recension, that known by
Yasomitra, Mahakau~thila was given the role that the Pali and Chinese texts assign to
Sariputra?
J. Takakusu says that the Sal'{lgftiparyaya, in books 15 and 18, quotes the Dharma-
skandhasastra. I have not come across these quotations. The Prajftaptisastra refers
the reader to the Sal'[lgftiparyaya. <xliii>
70 The edition of the Dfrgha has only four octads: vimok:ja, abhibha, lokadharma and
samyag-mlirga (which recalls the Pali samattas).
118 Introduction
E. SOME MASTERS OF THE VIBHA.$A.

The Vibhti~ti frequently quotes the opinions of masters and of various schools, often
divergent opinions. This presentation is often followed by the opinion of P'ing or of
the P'ing-chia: "The P'ing-chia says that the first opinion is good." Elsewhere the
commentators simply state: "there is no p'ing-chia" (AKB iii, F 49, 61, 124; Siddhi,
552, 690). 71
A good specimen of the methods of the Vibha~a: "whether there is a pure under-
standing (prajflti) outside of the sixteen aspects or modes of activity (tiktira)" (AKB
vii, F 27-30; Vibhi'i~i'i, 102, p. 529): "If yes, why does the Vijni'inaki'iya not say
this ... ? ffno, why do the Prakara,:,,a and the SaY(lgftiparyaya, and this very treatise of
the Vibhi'i~ti, say that ... ? And how does one explain such a sutra? - It should be said
that there is no pure understanding outside of the sixteen aspects or modes of
activity. - In this case, one understands the Vijfli'inaki'iya, but how does one explain
the Prakarm:ia ... ? - ... There are five reasons that justify this text .... "
Among the masters of the Vibhti~ti, we find:
Parsva-frequently 9uoted-who, with several anonymous authors, com-
ments on the Brahmajala, Vibhti~ti, 98, p. 508 (note also Vibh., 175, p. 881,
on the Suddhavasikas; Vibh., 177, p. 889, on the number of characteristics
[lak~a,:,,a]);
Piin;iasa, Kosa iii, F 74; Vibh., 23, p. 118b;
Samadatta (?), iii, F 49; Vibh., 118c;
Saqighavasu, Vibh., 19, p. 97a; 106, p. 547a; 142, p. 732a (only six faculties
[indriya] in the absolute sense: the vitality faculty [jfvita] and the group
of five, i.e., eye, etc., because these six are the root of a sentient being
(sattvamula; AKB ii, F 111);
and, in the same passage:
Kusavarman, who admits only one faculty, the mental faculty (manas), a
doctrine which leans toward the Vijflanavtida.
71
[LVP, iii, F 61: One should, it seems to me-without having the Vibha~a at hand-
understand by (Ch.) p'ing-chia the group of philosophers who edited the Vibhii~ii and formu-
lated a critical judgment on the opinons of various masters. Saeki notes that, on such and such
a point, the Vibhii~ii is content with enumerating opinions: "There is no p 'ing-chia", it says. -
In regard to other points, four p'ing-chia.]
EA. Vasumitra 72
i. Vasumitra is one of the great masters of the Vibhii~ii, one of the leaders of the
Sarvastivadin school. His theory on the existence of all is, Vasubandhu says, pre-
ferable to that of the three other masters, Dharmatrata, Gho~aka and Buddhadeva
(AKB v, F 52).
One searches in vain in the two Abhidharmas (within the collection of the seven
treatises) attributed to V asumitra, i.e., the Prakara,:iapiida and the Dhiitukiiya, for an
allusion to this theory. Taranatha says, moreover, that the author of the Prakara,:ia
has nothing to do with the Vasumitra of the Vibhii~a (p. 68).
2. The Aryavasumitrabodhisattva gives his name to the treatise Nanjio 1289
[*.Aryavasumitrabodhisattvasaligftisiistra, Taisho 1549]. According to the preface,
this would be the Vasumitra who, after Maitreya, <xliv> will be the Sirrihatathagata,
the Vasumitra to whom the fathers refused entrance into the Council because he was
not a perfected being (arhat), and who later became the president of the Councjl
(Hiuan-tsang, Watters, i, 271). Watters does not claim that he is the great master of
the Vibhii~ii; in fact, the thirteenth chapter of 1289, entitled Sarviisti-kha,:i<J,a, does not
contain any reference to Bhadanta Vasumitra's system of difference of state
(avasthiinyathatva). This is all that I will venture to say about this very intricate
chapter.
The theory of the time periods is found in the second book (p. 780, 2), where the
following text is discussed: "The past and the future are impermanent, all the
more so, the present." Why does the Fortunate One say: "all the more so, the
present"? Six explanations follow (among which the fifth: "In days of old the
length of life was 80,000 years; it will again become 80,000 years"); then: "The
Bhadanta says: The present appears for a short period of time; the past and the
future do not reside permanently but come and go in turn. That is what is in
accord with the siitra."
The paragraph devoted to ignorance (avidyii; p. 722) does not express the opin-
ion of the author. It is only: "It is said", notably the opinion of the Mahlsasakas. Is
it the non-cognition (ajfiiina), the five hindrances (nfvara,:ia), incorrect mental appli-
cation (ayonisomanaskiira), mistaken view (viparyiisa), etc? (See AKB iii, F 88). It
72
On the various Vasumitras, see Watters, i. 274-75; Masuda's Preface to Vasumitra's
treatise on the origins and doctrine of early Indian Buddhist schools, Asia Major, ii, p. 7;
Tii.ranii.tha, 174.
120 Introduction
seems, from the silence of S. Kiokuga, the editor of the Kosa, that the Vibha~a
does not deal with this point.
The problem of intoxicating liquor is dealt with in 8, p. 786; AKB iv, F 83; Vibha~a.
124, p. 645.
The discussion on acquisition (labha) and cultivation (bhavana) (AKB vii, F 63), in
which Vasumitra takes part (according to the Vyakhya), should reier to Nanjio 1289,
for Vasumitra is not named in Vibha~a. 107, p. 554b.
The same comment applies to the erroneous opinion of Vasumitra on the loss 6f the
stages conducive to penetration (nirvedhabhagfya ), AKB vi, F 171.
The verse (sloka) on the eight undetermined (aniyata) mental factors (AKB ii, F 165)
is not in Nanjio 1289.
For the discussion: "Does it happen that the factor (dharma) which is the causal
condition (hetupratyaya) of a factor, is not the causal condition of this factor?", see
Nanjio 1289, 9, at the beginning, compare the Jfianaprasthana in AKB ii, F 258.
Regarding the survival beyond the kalpa, p. 782, 2; manodal}<j,a, schism, p. 785,
classical doctrines.
3. Vasubandhu (ii, F 212) quotes the Pariprccha, the work of a Vasumitra who
is other than the Vasumitra of the Vibh~a, 73 and_ who also wrote a Paficavastuka
(Vyakhya). <xiv>
The Pariprccha teaches a doctrine which is clearly Sautriintika (that the attainment of
cessation [nirodhasamapatti] is accompanied by a subtle thought). Also, K'uei-chi
(Siddhi, 211) says that this Vasumitra is a divergent Sautriintika master.
As for the Paficavas_tuka,74 we possess a commentary, the Paficavastukavibha~a,
attributable to Dharmatrata (Nanjio 1283, Taisho 1555). - The five vastus are the
vastus explained in AKB ii, F 286-87 ( vastu in the sense of a specific entity
[svabhavavastu], vastu in the sense of cognitive object of consciousness [alambana-
vastu], ... ).
73
Who (Vibhii~ii, p. 152a) declares that any thought-thought-concomitant (citta-caitta) dis-
appears in the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti)?
74
Maybe Taisho 1556, anonymous: Sarviistiviidasamaya-paficavastuka, notable for its enu-
meration of the_ formations dissociated from thought (viprayukta), 997c): priipti, asarµjfiisam-
lipatti, nirodhasamiipatti, iisarµjfiika, jfvitendriya, sabhiigatii, desapriipti (?), iiyatanapriipti,
jiiti, jarii, sthiti, anityatii, niima-piida-vyafijanakiiyas.
This work does not seem to contain Sautrantika opinions; 75 it is divided into three
chapters: Riipavibhiiga (material form), Cittavibhiiga (thought), and Caittavibhiiga
(thought-concomitants).
Vasubandhu takes from it the demonstration of the "vision by two eyes" by means of
the argument of perceiving two moons (AKB i, F 86; Pancavastukavibhii:fii, end of
first book, p. 991c).
He probably also takes from it the theory (i, F 71): the five consciousnesses (vijniina)
are of retribution (vipiikaja) and of equal outflow (nai:fyandika), and that the sixth is
also of a moment (k:fm:zika) (Pancavastuka, p. 933c).
The demonstration of the existence of the agreeable (sukha; AKB vi, F 127) is very
similar to the demonstration established in the Pancavastuka[vibha:fii],76 p. 994c.
As for the treatise of the sects, (Sarvastivadin thesis, 28), K'uei-chi indicates the
opinion of the Paficavastuka (Tokyo, 24, 1, 25a8) on the nature of the particular
inherent characteristic (svalak:fm:za) that is the object of the consciousnesses (vijniina;
AKB i, F 19). <xlvi>
EB. Gho~aka and the Abhidharmiimrtasastra

A Tho-gar or Tukhara who, after the Council and th~ death of Kani~ka, was invited
with Vasumitra by a ruler of the country of Asmaparanta, located to the west of
Kasmir and close to Tukhara (Taranatha, 61); he was the patron of a theory that all
exists, which was not good; he is frequently,quoted in the Vibha:fii; he was also the
author oftheAbhidharmamrtasiistra (Nanjio 1278, Taisho 1553).77
75
It quotes the Abhidharma-acaryas. It admits the generally permeating mental factors
(mahiibhamika, p. 994b3,) and also the non-informative (avijiiapti, p. 992c), which it explains,
along with the restraints (saf!!vara), in exactly the same way as the Kosa. - But the phrase:
"There are two gates to the deathless (amrta), the meditation on the repulsive and the regula-
tion of the breath", is worth noting, p. 989b.
76
LS: LVP hasPaficavastuka, but Kritzer comments (RCYA.131) that "La Vallee Poussin
seems to have made a slip in referring to it as the Paiicavastuka when it is, in fact, Dharma-
trata 's commentary, the Pancavastukavibhii~ii, but he gives the correct Taisho reference:
T. 1555: 994c6-995b28".
77
LS: Dessein (SBS.278) comments that Fukuhara, Frauwallner, Mochizuki, Lin and Kritzer
agree with this attribution; he himself, however, and Dhammajoti disagree with it. Dhamma-
joti states (SA.IV.107f.):
122 Introduction
This treatise is a small, truly ambrosial book, very readable (in spite of the early date
of its translation: 220--65 A.D.), very complete (for example, chap. vi, the doctrine of
the primary characteristics [lak~arJ,a] and secondary characteristics [anulak~arJ,a],
AKB ii, F 222), but brief: where, nevertheless, we find some well-chosen details (for
example, the enumeration of the fields of merit: father, mother, an old person, a sick
person ... ).
The list of the formations dissociated from thought (viprayukta, p. 970) is similar to
that of the PrakararJ,a (AKB ii, F 178): prapti, jati, sthiti, anityata, asa,pjnisamapatti,
nirodhasamapatti, asa,pjni-ayatana, nanadesaprapti (?), vastuprtipti (?), ayatana-
prtipti (?), the three kayas, prthagjanatva.
The Kosa (ii, F 212f.) reproduces the essentials of a discussion between Gho~aka and
the Sautriintika Vasumitra, the -author of the Pariprcchli (see above p. xliv), on the
The Jfianaprasthiina-sastra (JPS) and the Mahiivibha~a-sastra (MYS), magnificent

as they are, lack sufficient unity and systematization as a whole .... Such a state of
affairs eventually brought about a significant reaction from some of the more pro-
gressive doctors of the Sarvastivada, and this led to a new line of development. These
doctors deviated to varying degrees from the Kiismirian orthodoxy-known after the
MYS as the Vaibhii~ika-and began to compose manuals aimed at being concise,
lucid and systematic.
The earliest of such manuals that we possess in Chinese is the Abhidharmamrta-
rasa-siistra (AmRS) by a certain Gho~aka, which effectively serves as an intro-
duction to the JPS and MYS. Its Chinese translation comprises 16 short chapters in
two fascicles. There is clear evidence that while AmRS derives its material from the
JPS, MYS, AbhidharmaprakararJ,a-sastra (PrS) and other sources, it is basically
inclined toward PrS and the Gandhiira school. As Bhadanta Gho~aka, one of
the "four great Sarvastiviida A.bhidharmikas", was pre-MYS, the author of the AmRS
must be a different Ghoeyaka whose date is probably not far from the completion of
theMVS.
Likewise, Van den Broeck, in his Foreword to his La saveur de l'immortel (A-p'i-t'an Kan Lu
Wei Lun). La version chinoise de l'Amrtarasa de Gho~aka, states (p. 21; transl.: Migme
Chodron):
It' seems logical to conclude that the Amrta should be the work of another Gho~aka,
since not only the. theses of the Bhadanta Gho~aka are not mentioned in it, but also
the text contradicts them in certain cases and, lastly, seems to belong to a later period
than that of the Bhadanta cited in the Vibht'i~a.
existence of thought in the attainment of cessation (nirodhq,samapatti). - The

Vibhii~ii, it seems; ignores the author of the Pariprcchii.
Among the opinions of Gho~aka, indicated in the Vibhii~ii and found in the Kosa, the
most notable is that "visible forms are seen by understanding (prajna) associated
with the visual consciousness", an opinion that departs from orthodoxy (Vibhii~ii, 13,
beginning; AKB i, F 83).
Elsewhere Gho~aka is very orthodox, 78 or else his divergences, which are minimal,
indicate a progress, for example, AKB vi, F 167, 170, 301. -The references iv, F 26,
174 and v, F 112 deserve to be examined.
Vibhii~ii, 77, p. 397b, is interesting: <xlvii>
Gho~aka says: The five aggregates (skandha) that belong to one's own
stream, to the stream of another, that belong to sentient beings and that, do
not belong to sentient beings, are unsatisfactoriness and the truth of unsat-
isfactoriness. At the direct realization (abhisamaya), the meditators see only
th~t the five aggregates of their own stream are unsatisfactoriness; they do
not see that the [aggregates of] others are unsatisfactoriness. Why? Because
unsatisfactoriness is understood under the aspect of torment: yet, the aggre-
gates of the stream of another. .. do not torment one's own stream.
Ee. Buddhadeva
S. Levi wonders (JA, 1896, 2, p. 450, compare Barnett, IRAS, 1913, p. 945) whether
the Buddhadeva of the Vibhii~ii should be identified with tlle Arya Buddhadeva,
a Sarviistiviidin, the Lion of Mathurii. The same Lion indicates the Sarviistiviidin
Budhila who seems to have a relationshlp with the Mahiisiiip.ghikas and who
is perhaps the Fo-t'i-lo of Hstian-tsang, 79 the author of the Chi-chin-lun (Tattva-
samuccayasiistra) for use in the Mahasarµghikas (?) (Levi, ibid.; Watters, i, 82).
In Konow (Kharoshfhf Inscriptions, 44-49) we will find the most recent comments
on these difficult inscriptions. - There is nothing wrong with Buddhadeva being
quite earlier than the Vibhii~ii. The Sarviistiviidins owe their name to the theory that
all exists, which Buddhadeva is probably one of the first to have explained.
78
On the never-returner (anagamin), Vibha~tl, 175, p. 879b; on the meaning of '!xistence
(bhava), (192, p. 96Gb); on the meditative attainments that follow a good thought of the realm
of desire (192, p. 961c).
79
A gloss says that the word signifies Bodhi-taking, which would give Bodhiliita.
124 Introduction
In addition to his theory that all exists (AKB v, F 54), Buddhadeva is unique in
maintaining that derived matter (bhautika) is merely a state (avastha) of the fun-
damental material elements (mahabhiita) (i, F 64), that the thought-concomitants
(caitta:, sensation, ideation, intention) are merely states of thought (citta, vijfiiina)
(ii, F 150; ix, F 262; Siddhi, 395; Vibha~a, 127, beginning; 142, p. 730, 2)-
a doctrine which connects Buddhadeva with Dharmatrata and with the Dar~tantikas-
Sautrantikas. 80
ED. Dharmatrata
There are at least two Dharmatratas:
1. The Bodhisattva who compiled the Udanavarga. <xlviii>The Vibha~a, followed
by the Kosa, quotes it to show that a work may be the word of the Buddha even
though composed by a master. According to the preface of Nanjio 1321, Taisho 212
(399 A.D.), this Dharmatrata was the maternal uncle of Vasumitra (Chavannes, Cinq
1
cents contes, iii, 297). 81

2. The maste~ quoted in the Vibha~a, the patron of a theory of all exists (AKB
v, F 53), which seemed to the Vaibha~ikas to be too akin to the system of the
heterodox, [i.e., Saqikhya].
3. This master of the Vibha~a is also the author of a Abhidharmasiira [see p. xliii],
which bears his name (Taisho 1552),82 a commentary and a new edition of the
80
The Dar~tantikas deny the thought-concomitants (caitta); the Sautrantikas admit the
thought-concomitants but differ on their number.
81
LS: 0.n Dharmatrata, the compiler of the Udanavarga, see Dessein (2003.293f.) and
Dhammajoti (1995; 2007) and LinO949). Dessein comments that "this Bhadanta Dharmatrata
of the Ch'u Yao Ching [*Udana] is generally accepted to be a Dar~tantika, and is also referred
to in the *Sa1'[1yuktabhidharmahrdaya, i.e., as the Dharmatrata of former times. [Lin (1949)
dates this Diir~tantika Dharmatriita around the second century B.C.]. See also Dhammajoti
ADCP.\1-53.
82
LS: Note that both Dhammajoti (~DCP.51-53) and Paul Dessein (EIP.VIII.314) disagree
with LVP on the authorship of this text. Dessein himself distinguishes (1999.xxii.f) between
three kinds of Dharmatrata:
1. a Bhadanta Dharmatrata, Dar~tiintika, and one of the four masters of the *Mahavibha$ii,
author of the Ch'u yao.Ching, ofthe second century A.D.
2. a Dharmatrata, author of the *Sal'[lyuktabhidharmahrdaya, and possibly commentator of
Vasumi'tra's Paficavastuka. He was a Sarvastivadin of the beginning of the fourth century:
Abhidharmasiira of Dharmasrf (Nanjio 1288, Taisho 1550). As a matter of fact,

the Dharmatrata of the Vibha~ii (74, p. 383, 2) denies the material form (rilpa)
that is part of the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana), i.e., the non-informative
form (avijfiaptirilpa); we find the same negation, somewhat more veiled but clear
nevertheless, in the Sara, chapter on action, p. 888, (see below).
4. There is nothing to oppose [the idea] that this same Dharmatrata is the com-
mentator on the Paficavastuka of Vasumitra (the Sautrantika), Nanjio 1283,
Taisho 1555, the Paficavastukavibhii~a. 83
EE. Bhadanta and Dharmatrata

The Vibhii~ii, it seems, ignores Kumaralata and Srilata, who are the heads of the
Sautrantika school (Siddhi, 221, teachings by K'uei-chi). The Sautrantika school-
more exactly the school that ought to take the name of Sautrantika-is represented in
the Vibhii~ii by the Dar~tantikas and by two masters: (1) Dharmatrata, a diver&ent
Sarvastivadin, and (2) the master whom the Vibhii~ii calls simply "Bhadanta", whom
the Vyakhyii of the Kosa calls the "Sautrantika Bhadanta" (AKB viii, F 151), who is
at the "top of the list of Sautrantikas" (viii, F 222), and who adheres to or leans
toward the Sautrantika system (i, F 36). 84
(Dessein elaborates that the *Saf!lyuktabhidharmahrdaya takes the Abhidharmahrdaya§astra of

Dhartnasre~!hin as its fundament, and that all doctrinal· deviations in it are adaptations of the
Mahavibha:jti, which makes the work posterior to the Mahavibha:jti.)
3. a Dharmatriita, Dhyiina master of the beginning of the fifth century, whose name is linked
to the Ta-mo-to-lo Ch'an Ching.
See Dessein's Dharmas Associated with Awarenesses and the Dating of the Sarvastivii.da
Abhidharma Works. (1996) and Dessein's Introduction (SAH.xix-lxxxv) to his translation of
the *Saf!lyuktabhidharmahrdayasii.stra (1999), as well as Dessein (2003).
83
See above p. xiv.
LS: Dhammajoti comments (ADCP.51ff.) that since Dharmatriita, the author of the Pafica-
vastµka-vibhii.:ji'i., upholds the Vaibhii~ika view, which consistently and explicitly insists that
"the eye sees", it is unlikely that he is the same one as Bhadanta Dharmatriita of the Mahii.-
vibhii.:ji'i., since the Mahii.vibha:jti tells us that the latter holds the "consciousness sees" theory.
Dhammajoti dates the author of the Paficavastuka-vibhi'i.:fi'i. around the fourth century A.D. and
attributes to him also the *Abhidharma~hrdaya-vyii.khyii. (T no. 1552), which Dessein names
*Saf!lyuktii.bhidharmahrdayasiistra.
84
Sautrii.ntikii. Bhadantii.dayaft; sautrantikadarsanavalambin.
126 Introduction
As for Hstian-tsang, P'u-kuang and Bhagavadvise~a. th~y sometimes recognize in

the "Bhadanta" of the Vibha!fa the Sthavira or Bhadanta Dharmatrata (AKB i, F 36;
iv, F 22). <xlix> - Yasomitra states that Bhagavadvise~a is mistaken: "Bhadanta is
the philosopher whom the Vibha~a mentions under the simple name of Bhadanta,
a philosopher who adheres to the Sautrantika system or leans toward this system;
whereas Dharmatrata, whom the Vibha!fa calls by his name, is a Sarvastivadin, the
author of one of the four theories of the Sarvastivada (AKB i, F 36)." - Moreover,
"the first version of the Vibhii!fG gives the name of this master [i.e., Bhadanta] in
transcription and precedes this, like those of the other masters, with the title of
venerable: [the doctrine of venerable Bhadanta says]" (note based on N. Peri, in
Cosmologie bouddhique, 276).
Be that as it may, "Dharmatrata" expresses opinions on major issues which clearly
depart from the system of the Vibha!fa, from the orthodox Sarvastivadin system; the
same, by the way, is true for Buddhadeva.
1. The Bhadanta does not accept that the eye sees: it is the visual consciousness that
sees (i, F 83);
he has a specific theory on the non-contact of atoms (Wassiliew, 279), which
Vasubandhu accepts and which SaJ!}ghabhadra discusses (i, F 91); 85
he admits three thought-concomitants (caitta) (ii, F 150, Add.), which
distinguishes him from the Dar~tantikas;
he denies, with the Sarvastivadins, that material form (rupa) is a condition as
the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya; ii, F 301);
he admits the prolonged existence of intermediate existence (antarabhava),
against the Sarvastivadins (iii, F 48);
he has a specific opinion onpratftyasamutpada and samutpanna (iii, F 74);
he denies the non-informative (avijfWpti), which is clearly anti-Sarvastivadin
(iv, F 22);
he has a very orthodox doctrine on the four ways in which factors are
wholesome (kusala), (iv, F 33);
he maintains that intelligent animals (iv, F 205) are capable of committing
a transgression with an immediately successive retribution (anantarya);
he gives an explanation of the word liberation (vimok!fa; viii, F 207);
he mixes the meditations (dhyiina), and the pure abodes (suddhiiviisika)
(Vibha!fa, 175, p. 881c);
85
According to Wassiliew, 279, Sarµgharak~ita differs a little. We do not know this master,
nor the Bhiimisena of p. 280.
he deals with the last thought of the perfected being (arhat) (Vibhii:jii, 191,
p. 954, 1);
he deals with annihilation (uccheda) and eternality (siisvata) (Vibhii:jii, 200,
p. 1003, 3);
he deals with the meaning of alpa, sulabha, anavadya, and with the praise
of the disciples by the Buddha (Vibhii:fii, 181, p. 909, 1, and 179, p. 900, 2,
where he differs from Vasumitra). 86 <l>
The Bhadanta is very clear on "investigation-initial-inquiry" (viciira-vitarka), 87
Vibhii:fii, 145, p. 744b (and 52, p. 269; AKB ii, F 174 and viii, F 183):
The author of the Jiiiinaprasthiina wants to refute what the Diir~tiintika says.
The latter says: "There is initial inquiry-investigation (vitarka-:viciira) from
Kamadhiitu up to Bhaviigra (summit of cyclic existence). - Why? - Because
the Siitra says that grossness of thought is initial inquiry, that subtleness of
thought is investigation: but grossness and subtleness of thought exist up to
Bhaviigra."
The Bhadanta says: "The masters of the Abhidharma say that initial inquiry-
investigation are grossness-subtleness of thought. But grossness and subtle-
ness are relative things and exist up to Bhaviigra. However, these masters
accept initial inquiry and investigation only in Kamadhiitu and in the
Brahmaloka. This is poorly said, this is not well said.''
The masters of the Abhidharma say: "What we say is well said, not poorly
said. In fact. . . ."
2. Vasubandhu (AKB vii, F 73) attributes to the Bhadanta Dharmatriita an opinion
on the strength of the body of the Fortunate One which is the opinion of the Bhadanta
accordin~ to Vibhii:jii, 30, p. 155c.
In the Vibha~a (13, beginning), Dharmatrata says that visible form is seen by
the visual consciousness (cak:jurvijiiiina): an opinion that the Kosa attributes to
a Vijfiiinaviidin (i, F 82), and which differs from that of the Bhadanta (Vibhii:jii, 13,
p. 3b): the eye sees because of light. .. , the manas knows because of mental applica-
tion (manaskiira).
86
The opinions on seeing by means of the visual consciousness, on the number of the
thought-concomitants (caitta), on the non-existence of the non-informative (avijfiapti), are
clearly non-Vaibhii~ika. Moreover, the Vibha~a carefully points out the opinions of the
Bhadanta.
87
See also Vibha~a, p. 219.
128 Introduction
3. Vibha1li, 127, beginning, p. 661c16.

The Jiilinaprasthlina wants to refute what the other masters say. In this
school there are two masters, the first is Buddhadeva, the second, Dharma-
triita:
i. Buddhadeva says that material form (rilpa) is solely the four fun-
damental material elements (mahlibhilta), that the thought-concomitants
(caitta) are thought (citta), Derivative material form (uplidliyarilpa) is
solely the particular fundamental material elements (mahlibhiltavise1a);
the thought-concomitants (caitta) are solely the particular thought (citta-
vise~a). -The siltras that are put fbrward in support of this theory:
a. 'fEverything that is in the eye, [the ball of flesh (mlirrisapi,:i(j,a),] is
solid, [humid, etc.]" (AKB i, F 65);
b. "Concentration (samlidhi) is application of thought to a single object
(cittaikiigrya) ... " (viii, F 128).
How does Buddhadeva establish the elements (dhlitu), the sense-spheres
(liyatana) and the aggregates (skandha)? ... The Abhidharmiiciiryas say:
"The siltras that are put forward do not have this meaning ... ".
ii. Dharmatriita accepts derivative material form (rilpa) apart from primary
material form (rilpa; i.e., the fundamental material elements), and thought-
concomitants (caitta) apart from thought (citta). But he maintains that
derivative tangibles and the material form (rilpa) that is part. of the sense-
sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana) do not exist. In this way he wants to
establish the existence of the elements, sense-spheres, aggregates, just as the
Abhidharma system has done. <li> But the derivative tangibles [LS: do
not??] exist apart, as the other derivative material forms do; but if the
material form of the sense-sphere of factors does not exist, then the non-
informative (avijiiiipti) does not exist (AKB i, F 64; iv, F 14).
4. Vibhli~a. 74, p. 383b.
The Abhidharma says: "What is the aggregate of material form (rilpa-
skandha)? Ten sense-spheres of material form (rilpliyatana) and the mate-
rial form (rilpa) included in the sense-sphere of factors (i.e., the non-
informative)." - What system does [the Abhidharma] want to refute? - It
wants to refute the Diir~tiintikas, for they deny any material form included in
the sense-sphere of factors.
Dharmatrata also says: "Everything that is material form is either support or
object of consciousness (vijiiana). How could there be material form which
is neither one nor the other?" It is in order to refute these opinions that
the above-mentioned definition of the aggregate of material form is given. -
But if the material form which is included within the sense-sphere of
factors is real, how can one explain what Dharmatrlita says? - It is not
necessary to explain it, for this is not in the Tripitaka. Or, if one must
explain it, one can say... that the material form included within the sense-
sphere of factors-arising from the fundamental material elements (mahii-
bhuta) which are the object of the body--can be considered to be the
object of tactile consciousness. Thus the statement of Dharmatrlita is without
error.
5. Vibhii~ii, 142, p. 730b:
Among the twenty-two controlling faculties (indriya) (AKB i, F 101), how
many are real entities on their own and how many are only names? - The
Abhidharmikas say that for twenty-two names there are seventeen I'eal
entities, since the two sexual faculties (parts of the body sense-faculty) and
the three pure faculties (combinations of faith, etc.) are not real entities on
their own (AKB ii, F 108, 116).
D!iarmatrata accepts only fourteen real entities: the first five faculties (eye,
etc.), the vitality faculty (jfvitendriya), the faculty of sensation of equanimity
(upek~endriya) and the (praxis-oriented) faculty of concentration (samiidhi-
indriya) are not real entities. In fact, the vitality faculty is one of the for-
mations dissociated from thought (viprayuktasaf!!skiira) (AKB ii, F 215) and
these are not real. 88 There is no sensation apart from the agreeable and the
disagreeable: thus the sensation of equanimity is not a real entity. There is
no concentration, apart from thought.
Buddhadeva says that only a single controlling faculty is real, namely
the mental faculty (mana-indriya): "Conditioned phenomena (sa,riskrta), he
says, are of two types: fundamental material elements (mahiibhuta) and
thoughts (citta) ... ".
The Name Index [see Appendix] contains the information, nearly complete, of the
references to the Bhadanta in the Vibhii~ii. <lii>
88
However, Dharmatrata, in Abhidharmasiira, 2, p. 885, explains the causes of the forma-
tions dissociated from thought (viprayukta).
130 Introduction
F. SOME SCHOOLS DISCUSSED IN THE VIBHA~'A. 89

FA. Dar~tantikas and Sautrantikas
The history of this school, being long, is not yet clear. The notes of K'uei-chi (Siddhi,
221-24; 90 Masuda, "Sects", Asia Major, ii, 67; Levi, Dmantapankti, p. 97) show that
Hsi.ian-tsang was not very well informed. Takakusu (Abhidharma Literature, 131)
says that the Vibha$a speaks of the Sautrlintikas, but rarely, in any case, for I have
found only a single reference to the Sautrlintikas; we can say that the Vibha$a knows
only the Dlir~tlintikas.
There has been some thought about establishing a relationship between this
name and the book of Kumlirallita, the Dr$tti.ntapankti; one may wonder if the
Dar~tantikas are characterized by the use of comparisons, as the Tibetans say
(Wassiliew, 274, according to whom Sautrlintika = DlirHlintika); nevertheless, the
meaning of the word d['${ti.nta is not established with certainty. J. Przyluski thinks
that the Dr~tanta is contrasted with scripture. 91 This way of looking at it is con-
firmed, I believe, by the Vibhti.$ti., 154, beginning.
It is said in the traditional Dr$tti.nta: 92
He who gives alms to a person who has come out of the attainment of
cessation (nirodhasamapatti) is endowed with an action that bears an effect
in this life.
Why? - There is no good reason to explain this text.
Why? - Because this is neither Sutra, nor Vinaya, nor Abhidhai.lna, but only
stated in the traditional Dr$tiinta. That which is said in the traditional
Dr$tii-nta may be true or not true. If, however, one wishes to explain it, one
should say that this alms-giver obtains the effect in this life or obtains great
89
See the references to the Maha~aiµghikas, the Vatsiputriyas, the Mahisasakas, and the
Dharmaguptas in the Index.
90
LS: See appendix to Introduction.
91
LS: Przyluski: Diir~fiintika, Sautriintika and Sarviistiviidin, 1940, p. 250: "In literature, the
dr:tfiinta is then opposed to the sutra or sutriinta, to which it is a kind of complement, or illus-
tration".
See SA.IV.74.
92
(Ch.) ch 'uan-yii; ch 'uan translates agama or avaviida.
effects. The text mentions only the first alternative because it pleases the
people of the world. 93 <liii>
We may speak of a Dar~tantika-Sautriintika school: in looking at it more closely, the
Vibhii~ii ascribes to its Dar~tiintikas almost all of the theses that the Kosa ascribes to
the Sautriintikas.
Here are the more important disagreements between the Sarvastivacjins and the
Dlir~tiintikas-Sautriintikas:
1. The Abhidharmas of the Sarviistiviidins are not authoritative (AKB i, F 5;
ii, F 104; vii, F 22).
2. The unconditioned factors (asal'!lskrta) do not have a real existence (ii, F 52).
3. The formations dissociated from thought (viprayukta; ii, F 178) do not have
a real existence: negation of the possessions (priipti), of the vitality faculty
(jfvitendriya), etc.
4. Past and future factors do not have a real existence (v, F 52).
5. The existence of past· factors allows the Sarvastivadins to explain the
play of causality; the possessions render the same service. Negating past
factors, the possessions, etc., the Dar~tantika-Sautrantika school accepts
a subtle thought or seeds (bfja) or traces (viisanii; perfuming), and thus
takes into account the modes of the stream (ii, F 185, 246; iv, F 173;
ix, F 295 ... ).
6. Destruction does not have a cause; things oo not have a duration (sthiti):
the moment (k~m:,,a) is of a size that tends toward zero (iv, F 4). (See
Rocznik, vol. viii).
7. Notable divergences with respect to action: negation (i) of the non-infor-
mative (avijiiapti; iv, F 14), (ii) of bodily action (iv, F 12), (iii) of the
unavoidable character of the retribution of a transgression with an immedi-
ately successive retribution (iinantarya) (Vibhii~ii, 69, p. 359b).
8. On the thought-concomitants (caitta) and the derived material elements
(bhautika): opinions that depart from the Sarvastivadin system (ii, F 150).
9. Explanation of the three categories (riisi) (AKB iii, F 137) that exist from
hell to Bhavagra: (i) beings having the factors (dharma) of Nirvii.I)a; (ii) beings
not having them; (iii) indetermined beings (Vibhii~ii, 186, p. 930c); compare
the Siddhi and its families (gotra).
93 Vasubandhu, AKB iv, F 123-and also Sarpghabhadra, 40, p. 572, which is rather sur-
prising-do not take the second alternative into account and follow the doctrine of the
(Ch.) ch'uan-yii.
132 Introduction
10. The body of perfected beings (arhat) is pure, being/ produced through under-
standing (i, F 4; Sruµghabhadra, 1, p. 331b).
11. Simultaneity of the Buddhas (iii, F 199).
The references which follow-completed in the Name Index (see entries Dar~tantika,
Sautrantika in the Appendix]-are listed according to the order of the material in the
Kosa:
1. The Dar~tantika rejects certain satras: how does he claim the na_me of
Sautrantika? Sarµghabhadra, 1, p. 332a.
The consciousnesses (vijiiana), including the mental consciousness (manovi-
jiiiina), have a special object, see AKB ix, F 242; Vibhii:jii, 87, p. 449, 1.
Whether the eye sees the visible form, see AKB i, F 82; Vibhii:jii, 13, beginning.
2. The Sthavira (= Srilata) and all the other Dar~tantika masters deny space (akiisa),
see Sruµghabhadra, 3, p. 347b.
Negation of possession (prapti), of cessation not due to deliberation (aprati-
sarµkhyanirodha), see Vibhii:jii, 93, beginning; 157, p. 796; 186, p. 931b. <liv>
The characteristics (lak:ja_,:ia) of the conditioned, Dar~tantikas, Vibhajyavadins,
Sarµtanasabhagikas ... , see Vibhii:jii, 38, p. 198ab.
The condition (pratyayatii) is not real, see Vibhii:jii, 131, p. 690b.
There is no ripening cause (vipiikahetu) outside of the intention (cetanii), no
ripened effect (vipakaphala) outside of the sensation (vedana), see Vibha:ja,
19, p. 96a.
Material form (rupa) is not a homogeneous cause (sabhagahetu) of material
form (rupa), the opinion of the Dar~tantika according to the gloss of Saeki
Kyokuga, see AKB ii, F 256; but, according to the Vibha:ja, 17, p. 87c), the
opinion of the Bahirdesakas.
"Among the Sautrantikas, the Bhadanta Dar~tantika holds sensation-ideation-
intention (vedana-sarµjiia-cetana) to be existing on their own; Buddhadeva
adds contact (sparsa) and mental application (manasikara): the other thought-
concomitants (caitta) are only thought (citta); the master SrTiata considers the
unconditioned factors (asarµskrta) and the formations dissociated from thought
(viprayukta) as nominal existents" (Wassiliew, 281, [309], corrected).
There is a subtle thought in the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti) and in
the attainment of non-ideation (asarµjiiisamiipatti) (as also maintained by the
Vibhajyavadins), AKB ii, F 212; viii, F 208; Vibhii:jii, 152, p. 774a; 151, p. 772c.
Negation of the reality of the dream, see Vibhii:ja, 37, p. 193. col. 2.
Introduction by Louis de La Vallee Poussin 133
The thought-concomitants (caitta) arise in sticcession, the Diir~tantikas and like-

wise the Bhadanta, see Vibhii~ii. 95, p. 493c and 145, p. 745a; thought cannot
be accompanied by cognition (jiiiina) and non-cognition (ajiiiina), 106, p. 547.
Initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (viciira) in the three realms (dhiitu), see
AKB ii, F 174; viii, F 183; Vibha~ii, 52, p. 269b; 145, p. 744b.
3. The intermediate existence (antariibhava) and miraculous emanation (nirmita),
see Vibhii~ii. 135, p. 700a.
Contact (sparsii) is not a real entity in itself, see Vibh~ii, 149, beginning.
4. Arising depends on the causal condition (hetupratyaya) but not destruction, the
Dar~tantikas against the A.bhidharmikas, see AKB iv, F 5; Vibha~a. 21, p. 105a.
Negation of the material form of the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatanariipa
= the non-informative [avijiiapti]), Dharmatrata, the Dar~tantikas, see Vibhii~ii,
74, p. 383b.
On the four and eight types of actions from the point of view of their being
determined, Dar~tantikas, or Sautrantikas according to Vyiikhyii (AKB iv, F 116);
Vibhii~ii. 114, p. 593b: all actions can be reversed; action of the intermediate
existence (antariibhava) (AKB iii, F 47); the transgression with an immediately
successive retribution (iinantarya); the action in bhavagra; action in the attain-
ment of non-ideation (asarrijfiisamapatti, Vibhii~a. 69, p. 359b; 152, p. 773c.
That covetousness (abhidhyii), malice (vyapada) and false view (mithyadmi) are
actions, opinion of the Dar~tlif!tikas, see AKB iv, F 136, 169; of the Vibhajya-
vadinikaya, Vibha~a. 113, p. 587a.
5. All the defilements (klesa) are unwholesome, Dar~tantikas, see Vibhii~a, 50,
p. 259c; contra, AKB v; F 42.
Adhering (anusayana), see Vibha~ii. 22, beginning; AKB v, F 37.
In conventional cognition (sarrivrtijiiana), the ordinary worldling (prthagjana)
does not cut off the defilements (klesa); Dar~tantikas and the Bhadanta, see
Vibha~a. 51, p. 264 col. 2; 144, p. 741c.
The object of attachment and the person (pudgala) are unreal, Dar~tlintikas
(compare the doctrine of thought only [cittamatravada]); the object of attach-
ment, attachment, and the person (pudgala) are real, Vatsiputriyas, see Vibh~a.
56, p. 288.
Reincarnation solely because of desire and hatred, see Vibh~ii, 60, p. 309a {in
fact, because of any defilement [klesa]). <lv>
On the tiJlle periods, see Vibha~a. 183, p. 919b.
134 Introduction
6-7.Definition of the truths, see AKB vi, F 122; opinion of the Abhidharmikas,
Dar~tantikas, Vibhajyavadins, Gho~aka, Parsva ... , see Vibhii~ii, 77, p. 397b.
On receptivity (k~iinti) and cognition (jfiiina), see AKB vii, F 1, 2, 50, 52;
Dar~tantikas, the Bhadanta, Vibhii~ii, 95, beginning.
Purity of the body of the perfected being (arhat), see AKB i, F 6; iv, F 19;
Dar~tantikas, according to Sarµghabhadra, 1, p. 331b.
8. Doctrine of meditation (dhyiina), the Bhadanta-Dar~tantikasautrantika, see AKB
viii, F 151-57.
The stages of the preliminary concentration (siimantaka) are wholesome,
Dar~tantikas, see AKB viii, F 180; Vibhii~ii, 164.
Mixed meditation (dhyiina), (AKB vi, F 221, 259; vii, F 55) explained by
perfuming, Dar~tantikas and Yogacarins, see Vibhii~ii, 175, p. 879c; compare
Siddhi.
The retrogression from the attainment of non-ideation (asa"f!ljfiisamiipatti),
Dar~tantikas, see Vibhii~ii, 152, p. 773c.
The miraculous emanation (nirmita) is not real, Dar~tantikas and the Bhadanta,
see Vibhii~ii, 135, p. 700a.
Vibhajyavadins
They are clearly defined as those who distinguish and admit the existence of a certain
kind of past factor and a certain kind of future factor (AKB v, F 52; P'u-kuang
quotes AKB v, F 24, and Vinitadeva, Traite sur les Sectes).
However, the information that we possess on the Vibhajyavadins is confused: the
Vibhajyav.adins are the Mahasarµghikas, the Ekavyavaharikas, the Lokottaravadins,
the Kaukkutikas (K'uei-chi; Siddhi, 109).
1. Vasumitra, in his treatise on the sects, does not mention them. Vinitadeva,
expounding the theories of the historical account of the Sarvastivadins, makes
them the seventh Sarvastivadin school. Bhavya (the Sthavira theory) makes them
a division of the Sarvastivadins, and (the Mahasarµgl:).ika theory) the third mother-
school. According to Bhik~vagra, they are the fourth Mahasarµghika school.
2. Here is the note by Kyokuga (edition of the AKB xix, fol. 14a-b).94
94 A note translated inaccurately in AKB v, F 24 (note).

K'uei-chi, commentating on the Siddhi [iv, 1, 35, p. 179 of the French translation],
says: "Those who were called Vibhajyavadins are now called Prajfiaptivadins." <lvi>
[This should be taken to mean: Paramartha, in his version of the Treatise of
Vasumitra, has written "Vibhajyavlidin", whereas] Vasumitra [in the version of
Hsilan-tsang] says: "In the second century, a school called the Prajfiaptivlidins came
out of the Mahlislixµghikas." On that, the commentator Fa-pao says: "According to
these two translations, the Vibhajyavlidins make up only one school ['liVith the
Prajfiaptivlidins)."95 In the Vibha:ja, 23, p. 116, the Mahlisliiµghikas, etc., are called
Vibhajyavlidins [that is to say: the Vibha:ja attributes to the Vibhajyavlidins an
opinion that we know to be the opinion of the Mahasaxµghikas, see AKB iii, F 77].
Therefore, the Arthapradfpa, 3, p. 48, says, "The Vibhajyavlidins are either some
divergent masters of the Great Vehicle or all the schools of the Small Vehicle are
called Vibhajyavadins: these are not a specific school. Therefore, in the Maha-
yanasal'Jlgraha (Nanjio 1183, Taisho 1593), the Vibhajyavlidins are explained as
Mahislisakas; in the Vibha:jii, as Saxµmifiyas." 96
3. In several texts, the meaning of the word Vibhajyavadin is clearly defined.
1. Bhavya: [The Sarvlistivadins] are called by the name of Vibhajyavlidin when
they distinguish (vibhaj) by saying, "Among these factors, some exist,
namely, the former action the effect of which has not occurred; some do not
exist, namely, the former action the effect of which has been consumed, and
future factors."
ii. AKB v, F 52: Those who affirm (a) the existence of the present [factors] and
of one part of the past [fact~rs], i.e., the action which has not given forth its
effect, and (b) the non-existence of the future [factors] and of one part of the
past [factors], i.e., the action which has given forth its effect, are regarded as
Vibhajyavadins, followers of those who distinguish. They do not belong to
the school of the Sarvastivadins.
iii. P'u-kuang, 20, fol. 4. (AKB v, F 42): They say that there is no opinion
that is completely right; thal [factors are] in part existence and in part
non-existence [or: in part true, in part false]: one should thus distinguish.
Thus they are called Vibhajyavlidins. <lvii>
iv. The Klisyap'iyas (Vasumitra, thesis 1 and 2) take up a clearly Vibhajyavlidin
position: "The action the effect of which has ripened does not exist;
95 The truth is that Paramartha wrote one word for another.

96 This is obscure; the Sarrigraha quotes the iigama of the Mahisasakas and ignores the
Vibhajyavadins; the Vibha~a. it seems, ignores the Sarp.mitiyas.
136 Introduction
the action the effect of which has not ripened exists." Now Buddhaghosa
(Kathavatthu, i, 8) attributes to the Kassapikas, a branch of the Sarvii.stivii.dins,
the opinion that one part of the past factors and of the future factors exists:
this is the second Vibhajyavii.din thesis of the summary of Vinitadeva. Yet
the Theravii.din, who should be a Vibhajyavii.din like the Buddha, denies and
refutes this.
4. Elsewhere: Vibhajyaviidins are called those who distinguish, i.e., accept that the
aggregates (skandha) are real, and the sense-spheres (iiyatana) and the elements
(dhiitu) are of nominal existence.
5. Vibhii~ii, 110, p. 571c and elsewhere, opposes the Vibhajyavii.din and the
Yuktavii.din.
6. Vinitadeva attributes to the Vibhajyaviidins the following theses:
a. The person (pudgala) exists absolutely;
b. the past factor does not exist, except the cause the effect of which has
not ripened; the future factor does not exist, except the effect; 97 the present
factor which is a non-concordant type (rigs mi mthun pa ?) does not
exist; 98
c. the factor (dharma) does not become an equivalent and immediate antece-
dent cause (samanantarahetu); 99
d. material form (riipa) does not have a homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu),
like the Dii.r~tiintikas (AKB ii, F 256).
7. More notable is the note of Hsi.ian-tsang (Siddhi, 179) which associates the
Vibhajyavii.dins and the Sthaviras with the belief in bhaviifigavijniina.
And also: pure (visuddha) thought, Siddhi, 109-11; persistence of a subtle
thought in the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti) (with the Dii.r~tiintikas),
207; see also 770.
8. References to: Kosa-Vibhii~a, completed in the Index:
i. Sound is of retribution (with the Vii.tsiputrlyas), see AKB i, F 69; Vibha~a
18, beginning; Siddhi, 190.
The body of birth (janmakiiya) of the Buddha is pure (with the Mahii.-
sii.rpghikas), see Vibhii~a. 173, p. 871c; Siddhi, 769-70.
97
Bareau: The effect [which has not yet ripened]. SBPV.180
98
Bareau: The meaning of this thesis is obscure. SBPV.180
99
Bareau: Kosa, ii, F 300-o. SBPV.180
ii. Faith (sraddha), etc., are pure, see AKB ii, F 118; Vibha~a, 2, p. 7.
Life is a thought-associate (cittiinuvartin), see AKB ii, F 248; Vibhii.~ii, 151,
p. 770, 3 (refuted by Vasumitra). Therefore, there is a subtle thought in the
attainment of non-ideation (as~TJ1,jnisamiipatti) and in the attainment of
cessation (nirodhasamiipatti), AKB viii, F 207; Vibhii~ii, 151, p. 772, 3;
152, p. 774, 1.
iii. Negation of intermediate existence (antariibhava), see AKB iii, F 32;
Vibhii~ii, 69, p. 356, 3; 135, p. 700, 1. - Whence the complicated explanation
of the never-returner who is destined to obtain Nirvfu:la in the intermediate
existence (antariiparinirviiyin), AKB iii, F 39; Vibhii~ii, 69, p. 357, 2. <lviii>
Dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida) is an unconditioned factor
(asafJ1-skrta), likewise the path, see AKB iii, F 77; Vibhii~ii, 23, p. 116, 3;
93, p. 479 (like the Mahasarµghikas and the Mahisasakas).
iv. Covetousness (abhidhyii), malice (vyapiida) and false view (mithyiidmi) are
action, see Vibhii~a. 113, p. 587, 1 (AKB iv, F 136: Dar~tantikas).
Definition of wholesome through their intrinsic nature (as jiiiina), of
wholesome through association (as vijiiiina), of wholesome through their
arousing cause (as action of the body ... ) (AKB iv, F 33: Dar~tantika);
ix, 248; Vibhii~a, 144, p. 741, 1.
The thought of the Fortunate One is always in concentration, see AKB iv,
F 40; Vibhii~ii, 79, p. 410, 2.
v. The craving for non-existence (vibhavatr~i:iii) is abandoned through cultiva-
tion (bhiivanii), see AKB v, F 29; Vibhii~ii, 27, p. 138, 3.
On mistaken views (viparyiisa), see Kosa v, F 23, Vibhii~ii, 104, beginning.
vi. Definition of the truths, see AKB vi, F 123; Vibhii~ii, 77, p. 397, 2.
Direct realization of the truths at once, see AKB vi, F 185, Vibhii~ii, 103,
p. 532, 1.
The perfected being (arhat) does not retrogress, see AKB vi, F 264;
Vibhii:jii, 60, p. 312, 2.
Forty-one factors conducive to enlightenment (bodhipiik~ika), see AKB vi,
F 281; Vibha~a. 96, at the end; 97, p. 499.
vii. Material form (rupa) in the realm of immateriality, see AKB viii, F 135,
141; Vibhii~ii, 83, at the end.
Only the first meditation (dhyiina) has members (ariga), see Vibha~a. 160,
p. 813, at the beginning.
138 Introduction
The noble one (iirya) of the fourth iirilpya obtains the quality of a perfected
being (arhat) without the assistance of the path, see Vibhii~ii, 185, p. 929, 2.
(This is thesis 12 of the Mahisasakas in the treatise ofVasumitra).
Fe. Yogikaras
Or yoga-iiciiryas, as the Chinese reads; we also have yogiiciiracitta (AKB ii, F 149;
Vyiikhyii, ii, 49).
1. People who practice yoga or the contemplation of yogins; 100 see AKB iv, F 18,
note, and the Vibhii~ii, passim: they seek the truth of cessation (nirodhasatya) (103,
p. 534a), practice the concentration of emptiness (sunyatiisamiidhi) (104, p. 540, 3),
are disgusted with sensation (vedanii; the realm of fine-materiality) and ideation
(saf!l)fiii; the realm of immateriality) (152, p. 775, 2); also 7, p. 35, 2; 102, p. 529, 2;
165, p. 832, 1. - The Ratnarasisutra (Sik~iisamuccaya, 55) examines the obligations
of the monk who does service (vaiyiivrtyakara 101 bhik~u), i.e., the steward and
secretary (?) of the monastery, toward (i) the forest-dwelling monk (iira1:iyaka),
(ii) begging monk (pi,:i<jaciirika), (iii) the contemplative monk (yogiiciirin bhik~u),
(iv) the student who is devoted to erudition (biihusrutye 'bhiyukta), (v) the preacher
(dharmakathika).
2. Devoted to yoga, to breathing exercises, to meditation (dhyiina), etc., the
yogiidira becomes, as the Chinese say, a master of yoga (yogiiciirya): he has theories
on the control of breath (prii,:iiiyiima), on the concentration of emptiness (silnyata-
samadhi), .... <lix> The AKB iv, F 18-19, indicates a thesis of this school of con-
templatives on material form (rilpa) that arises through the power of concentration.
3. [This school of contemplatives became a philosophical school, the Yogacara
school, when, under the influence of Maitreya-Asanga, it became devoted to the old
phrase of·the Dasabhilmika: "The threefold world is only thought." We can clearly
see the relationship between the theories of meditation and idealism, we can clearly
see how the study of the attainment of non-ideation (asaf!l}fiisamapatti) ends up in
the assertion of a subtle thought .... Asanga utilizes Dar~tantika-Sautrantika specula-
tions.]
Below are the references of the Kosa to the Yogacaras:
They explain mixed meditation (dhyiina; AKB vi, F 221) by perfuming, see
Vibhii~ii, 175, p. 879, 3, (like the Dar~tantikas do).
100
This is the meaning ofyogiiciira in the Saundarananda, in the ¥ahiivastu.
101
Or vaiyaprtya, Avadiinasataka, ii, 235.
They have connections with the Sautrantikas, see AKB ii, F 177; Vyiikhyii:
"of the opinion of the Sautrantika or the Yogacara".
The Y ogacaracitta accepts that an agglomerate can be formed from a single
fundamental material element (mahiihhata): a lump1 of dry earth;from two
fundamental material elements: the same, but wet ... , see AKB ii, F 149;
Vyiikhyii, ii, 49.
In the system of the Yogacara (yogiiciiradarsana), there is an element of the
mental faculty (manodhiitu) distinct from the six consciousnesses (vijfiiina)
Vyiikhyii, i, 40, ad i, 32; compare the Tamrapan:11yas.
[The Vijfianavadin denies that the eye sees, AKB i, F 82).
The Yogiiciiracitta defines resolution (adhimukti), see AKB ii, F 154;
Vyiikhyii, ii, 51.
According to the Yogiiciiras, the attainments of non-ideation (asaf!!jfii-
samiipatti) are endowed with thought due to the store-consciousness (iilaya-
vijiiiina), see Vyiikhyii ad ii, 211. - Yasomitra speaks here of the school of
Asailga; likewise AKB iii, F 3; Vyiikhyii, adv, F 21 (the 128 defilements
[klesa] of the Yogiicaras).
[The ancient masters of the AKB ii, F 212, should be the Diir~tantikas].
Elsewhere, the Vyiikhyii explains the ancient masters of the Bhii:jya as being
"the Yogiicaras" or "the Yogaciiras, Asailga, etc.", see Vyiikhyii ad iii, F 53;
iv, F 162; vi, F 141. <lx>
140 Introduction
G. THE S.ARIPUTR.A.BHIDHARMA
This book, Nanjio 1268, Taisho 1548, is divided into four parts, (1) sapra§naka,
(2) apra§naka, (3) saf!Zprayukta-saf!Zgraha (three titles that correspond to the first
four sections of the Abhidharma according to the Dharmaguptas-Haimavatas,
J. Przyluski, Concile, 179, 353-54, and remind us of the Dhatukiiya-Vibhafiga-
Dhatukathii, above p. xli), and (4) succession (krama or nidana??).
This is, strictly speaking, a sastra, without the usual siltra introduction: "Thus have
I heard .... " It was compiled by Siiriputra, either while the master was alive (Ta-
chih-tu-lun) or after his Nirvii9a, to set up a barrier to heresy, for some "counter-
feited the Dharma" (dharmapratirilpaka).
However that may be, it is a very extensive and archaic treatise, much in the style of
the Pali Vibhatiga.
The Ta-chih-tu lun establishes the relationship between the Abhidharma of Siiriputra
and the Viitsiputriyas. 102 But in the book of Siiriputra I have not found any mention of
the person (pudgala) in the Viitsiputriya sense of the word.
Saeki Kyokuga, AKB viii, F 135, points out that the Sariputrabhidharma accepts the
existence of material form (rilpa) in the realm of immateriality (arupyadhatu). See
indeed 4, p. 552a, at the end of the chapter on the aggregates (skandha). This material
form is, the non-informative (avijiiapti). The book accepts the non-informative, which
is a Sarviistiviidin invention.
But it is not an orthodox Sarviistivadin position. It believes that the proclivity
(anusaya) is dissociated from thought (26, p. 690 and AKB v, F 3). It contains
nothing about the existence of the past-future factors, 103 or about unconditioned
space. <lxi> It explains the element of abandonment (prahii1J,adhatu): "that
which should be abandoned" (576c and AKB vi, F 301). Its system of the
conditions (pratyaya), which is very developed (25, at the beginning), and its list
102
"Some say: 'When the Buddha was in this world, Sariputra, in order to explain the words
of the Buddha, compiled the Abhidharma. Later, the monk Vatsiputriya recited [this work]. Up
to now, this is what is called the Abhidharma of Sariputra' ," J. Przyluski, Concile, p. 73.
The only book of the Abhidharma that teaches the doctrine of the person (pudgala) seems to
be Nanjio 1281, Taisho vol. 32, no. 1649, the Saf!Zmitfya-nikaya-sastra, AKB ix, F 229,
261, 270f.
103
"The past is that which has arisen and is destroyed; the future (s that which has not arisen,
has not appeared", 3, at the beginning.
of the sense-sphyres (dhatu) (7, p. 575) have nothing of the Sarviistivadin posi-
tion.
We will have some idea of the style of Siiriputra by comparing (2) the description
of the aggregate of material form (rupaskandha; 3, at the beginning, p. 543) with
AKB i, F 35 and Vibharigd, 1 and following; (2) the definition of the element of
factors (dharmadhiitu; 2, p. 535) with Vibhiiriga, 89; (3) the definition of the truth of
cessation (nirodhasatya; 4, p. 553) with Vibhariga, 103.
GA. Dharmadhatu
The element of factors (dharmadhatu) is defined first as being identical with the
sense-sphere of factors (dharmayatana); then, as being made up of the aggregate of
sensation (vedanaskandha), the aggregate of ideation (saf!l}fiaskandha), the aggre-
gate of formations (saf!lskaraskandha), the invisible (anidarsana) and non-resis-
tant (apratigha) material form (rupa), and the unconditioned factors (asaf!lsKrta)
(compare Vibhariga, 86). A tlurd definition enumerates, after sensation (vedana)
and ideation (saf!l}fia), the series of the formations (sa"f!lskara) associated with
thought (beginning with intention [cetana] and ending with defilement-proclivity
[klesa-anusaya]); the series of the formations dissociated from thought (viprayukta;
see 3, p. 547b): jati, Jara, mara,:,,a ... nirodhasamapatti; finally: pratisa"f!lkhya-
nirodha, apratisa"f!lkhyanirodha, niyamadharma-st~iti(ta), akasayatana, vijfiana-
ayat,qna, akif!lcanyayatana, naivasaf!l}fianasaf!l}fiayatana, 104 [i.e., the list of the un-
conditioned factors (asaf!lskrta)]: "this is what is called the element offactors".
On the one hand, the formations dissociated from thought are not those of the
Sarviistiviidins; although one may have doubts about the equivalences of the transla-
tors (Dharmagupta and Dharmayasas, 414 A.D.), the group of names (namakaya) ...
are missing.
On the other hand, the unconditioned factors of Siiriputra remind one of those of the
Mahiisiirp.ghikas and the Mahisiisakas (see Siddhi, p. 78).
GB. Nirodhasatya
To the question: "What is the noble truth of the cessation of unsatisfactoriness
(dul:ikhanirodha aryasatya)?", our text answers in canonical terms: yo tassa yeva
tarihiiya asesaviraganirodho cago patinissaggo mutti analayo (Vibhariga, 103, PTS
104
For the last terms, compare the variant p. 526c: the Sanskrit reading is doubtful: liklisa-
liydtanajfilina . .. and liklisyliyatanapratyayaUfilina].
142 Introduction
No. 39: "That which is the entire dispassionate cessation of, the forsaking of, the
discarding of, the freedom from, the non-attachment to that same craving"), and
adds: "Already cut off, not to arise again: this is what is called the noble truth of the
cessation of unsatisfactoriness."
The question is repeated: "What is the noble truth of the cessation of unsatisfac-
toriness? The cessation due to deliberation (pratisaf!lkhyiinirodha) is called the noble
truth of the cessation of unsatisfactoriness. <lxii> This noble truth of the cessation of
unsatisfactoriness is, in truth, like that, not not like that, not different, not a different
thing. As the Tathagata has well expressed the truths of the noble ones (iirya), it is
the noble truth (iiryasatya)."
But, "What is the cessation due to deliberation (pratisaf!lkhyiinirodha)?" The ques-
tion is repeated three times: "If a factor (dharma) is destroyed when one obtains the
noble (iirya) path, the destruction of this factor is called cessation due to delibera-
tion." ... "The four noble fruits of religious praxis (sriimm:iyaphala) are called cessa-
tion due to deliberation."
"What is the fruit of the stream-enterer (srotaiipannaphala)? If the three defilements
(klesa) to be cut off by the path of insight are cut off; if the afflicted view of self
(satkiiyadr~fi), the doubt (vicikitsii) and the 'overesteeming of (such things as) moral-
ity and certain spiritual practices' (§flavrata) are exhausted, this is called the fruit of
the stream-enterer." 105 Sariputra repeats: "What is the fruit of the stream-enterer?
The three defilements (klesa) to be cut off by the path of insight being cut off-the
afflicted view of self, the doubt and 'the overesteeming of (such things as) morality
and certain spiritual practices' being exhausted, if one obtains immortality (amrta),
this is what is called the fruit of the stream-enterer."
It seems that we may have found here a terminology foreign to the Abhidharma and
to the Sarvastivada. <lxiii>
105
Compare the doctrine of the Dhammasaligm;i, AKB v, F 10 (note).
LOUIS DELA.VALLEE POUSSIN 143
H. THE ABHIDHARMASARA 106

1. Several masters, before Vasubandhu, undertook to summarize the doctrines of
the Abhidharma. We possess notably three works:
i. The Abhidharmasara of Dharmasri in ten chapters, made up of karikas
(probably in aryan strophe) 107 and a commentary;
ii. a second edition of this same Sara by Upasanta, 108 to which the Chinese give
the name of Abhidharmasara-ching: the same karikas with a more developed
commentary; and
iii. a third edition of the Sara, the Tsa Abhidharma-ching, by Dharmatriita, 109
which is, in fact, a new work containing a new chapter and many new
karikas. 110
2. The preface to the Vibha~a (Nanjio 1264, Taisho 1546) 111 by Tao-yen places the
work of DharmasrI before the Jiianaprasthana: "After the cessation (nirodha) of the
Buddha, the bhik~u DharmasrI composed the four books of the Abhidharmasara.
Then Kiityiiyaniputra composed the Abhidha~ma in eight books .... "
3. The work of DharmasrI contains ten chapters (varga):
i. Dhatuvarga (Elements)
ii. Sa,rzskaravarga (Formations)
iii. Karmavarga (Action)
iv. Anusayavarga (Proclivities)
v. A.ryavarga (Nobility)
vi. Jiianavarga (Cognition)
vii. Samadhivarga (Concentration)
viii. Sutravarga (Scriptural Texts)
106
Taisho volume 28, numbers 1550, 1551, 1552, Abhidharmahrdaya; see above p. xxviii.
107
We have the Sanskrit text of one of the kiirikiis, AKB v, F 5-6.
LS: See Charles Willemen's translation:The Essence of Scholasticism. Abhidharmahrdaya.
T 1550. Delhi, 2006. See also SAL.128-33; SBS.255-49; EIP.VII. 451-70.
108
LS: SBS.259-60; EIP.VIII.228.
109
LS: See Bart Dessein's translation: Sarf1,yuktiibhidharmahrdaya. Heart of Scholasticism
with Miscellaneous Additions. Delhi, 1999. See also EIP.VIII.314-19.
110
For example, the ninth chapter: Dharmatrata takes up twenty verses (kiirikii) of DharmasrI
and inserts six new verses; he continues with twenty-two new verses.
111
Mentioned by Takakusu, p. 128.
144 Introduction
ix. Tsavarga (Prakfr,:zakavarga; Miscellaneous Matters)

x. Sastravarga or Viidavarga (Dharmakathli; Discussion)
4. The Pravicayavarga (Investigations) of Dharrnatrata's *Sa,riyuktabhidharma-
hrdaya (SAH):
Between the ninth and the tenth chapter of Dharrnasrl, Dharrnatrata places a new
chapter, the Pravicayavarga (Investigations), which indeed seems to constitute an
independent work.
There is an introductory verse (SAH 500) [to the Pravicayavarga]: "Although many
factors (dharma) have already been spoken of, their meaning remains confused ... " 112
and four concluding verses: 113 "The ruthor has composed this book based on the
book of Dharmasrl, not because of conceit (mlina) or in order to acquire a reputation
(ya.fas) ... ".
The chapter [of the Pravicayavarga] begins (SAH 501) with an investigation of the
wheel of the doctrine (dharmacakra): "The Muni proclaimed that the path of insight
(darsanamlirga) is called wheel of the doctrine either because it penetrates into the
thought of others (paracitta) ... " (AKB vi, F 245,249). <lxiv>
Then comes the investigation.of the wheel of Brahma (brahmacakra; SAH 502; AKB
vi, F 244; vii, F 74), the uplisaka (SAH 503; AKB iv, F 69), the four parts of morality
(sf/a; SAH 504; AKB iv, F 67), the prlitimok:ja (SAH 505) .... Later (p. 959, 2),
cosmology is investigated: the periods of weapons, etc. (SAR 556; AKB iii, F 207),
the destruction by fire, etc. (SAR 557; AKB iii, F 216); and then follows the theory
of the three types of retrogressing (pariha,:zi) (SAR 559; AKB vi, F 267) and the
definition of the Bodhisattva (SAR 561; AKB iv, F 220).
All of a sudden, the question is asked (SAR 562): "How many types of Sarvastivada
are there?" Presentation of the four doctrines (AKB v, F 52) without mentioning the
names of the four masters. The second and the fourth masters are bad because they
mix up the time periods. The first (i.e.; difference in mode of existence [bhava],
translated [Ch.] fen): "One should know that this is the Sarvlistiviida of transforma-
tion (pari,:zlima-sarvlistiviida)." 114
112
LS: SAH 500: "Although many factors have already been spoken of, and [although] there
is certainty about all the many miscellaneous meanings, one further has to investigate the
essence regarding these unlimited objects."
113
LS: See SAH 568.
114
The third doctrine, difference of state (avastha), (trans. [Ch.] fen-fen).
There is a variety of opinions as to whether the truths are seen at the same time
(SAH 563; AKB vi, F 185): the Sarviistiviidins and Viitsiputriyas on the one hand,
Dharmaguptak.as on the other. The investigation [in regards to the existence of the]
intermediate existence (antariibhava; SAH 564; AKB iii, F 38). Then (SAH 565-66)
the explanation of Sarviistiviida. And at the end of verse 566, the discussion "whether
the Buddha is part of the saf!tgha [of listeners (sriivaka)]". - Finally, the concluding
verses (SAH 567-70).
5. The Saf!tskliravarga (Formations) deals (i) with the simultaneous arising of
thought and thought-concomitants (citta-caitta) and of the atoms (AKB ii, F 144),
(ii) with the four characteristics (lak~a,:ia) of the conditioned (AKB ii, F 222),
(iii) with the causes (hetu) and the conditions (pratyaya) (AKB ii, F 255, 299).
The Siitraviirga (Scriptural Texts) is a collection of notes: the three realms (dhiitu)
and a calculation of the places that they contain: sixteen in the realm of fine-
materiality, but, according to some, seventeen (AKB iii, F 2): the abidings of beings
(sattvlivasa; AKB iii, F 22), the stations of consciousness (vifiilinasthiti; AKB
iii, F 16); the three courses (vartman) of dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida;
AKB iii, F 60, 68), the twelve members; the fundamental material elements (mahii-.
bhiita), the truths, the fruits of the noble ones (iirya), etc.
The Tsavarga (Prakfn:i,akavarga; Miscellaneous Matters) defines the thought-
thought-concomitants as associated (sa7?1prayukta), having a basis (siisraya), etc.
(AKB ii, F 177); it enumerates the formations dissociated from thought (viprayukta):
the -state of ideation (iisaf!t}iiika), the two non-conscious attainments, the [group]
homogeneity (sabhiigatii), the collection of names, etc. (niimakiiyiidayas), the vitality
faculty (jfvitendriya), the possession of factors (dhartnapriipti), the nature of an
ordinary worldling (prthagjanatva), four characteristics (lak~a,:,,a) (compare AKB
ii, F 178); it ends with half a verse on the four existences (bhava; AKB iii, F 43, 45)
and a verse on disgust and detachment (AKB vi, F 302).
The Siistravarga (or Viidavarga; Dharmakathii: Discussion) is made up of questions
put into verse, followed by answers in prose, related to restraint (sarrtvara; AKB
iv, F 53), to the fruits, etc. Dharmatriita adds sixteen questions.
6. In order to assess the nature of the treatises of DharmasrI, Upasiinta and
Dharmatriita, and the indebtedness of Vasubandhu to Dharmatriita, which seems
noteworthy, <lxv> we can look at how two categories of factors (dharmaparyiiya),
LS: See Dessein (2003, vol. 2, p. 314).

146 Introduction
i.e., the subject of the three obstructions (iivarm:ia) and that of the non-informative
action (avijnapti), are dealt with by the different masters.
HA. Obstructions, AKB iv, F 201-12; Vibha~a, 115, p. 599

Dharmasrl, 1, p. 815:
The Fortunate One proclaimed thatthere are three obstructions (iivara,:ia):
(1) action (kaniian), (2) defilement (klesa) and (3) retribution (vipiika). What
is their definition?
(1) Actions entailing an immediately successive retribution (iinantarya)
that are without remedy, (2) developed defilements, and (3) unwhole-
some action experienced in the unfortunate planes of existence: those
are the obstructions.
These three make an obstacle to the Dharma; they hinder the gaining of the
factors of a noble one (iirya); they are thus called obstructions. - Which is
the gravest action?
The action which divides the Sa~gha is said to be the gravest.
This action is the worst. The guilty one remains for one aeon (kalpa) in
Avi:ci hell. - Which is the best action?
The intention (cetanii) of the summit of cyclic existence (bhavagra) is
the greatest.
The perception-sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation (naiva-sarrijiiana-
asarrijna-ayatana) is the summit of cyclic existence (bhavagra). The inten-
tion which belongs to t])e domain of this stage is the greatest and finest: its
effect is a life of some 80,000 aeons in length.
Upasanta, p. 843bc, has the same two verses~ but a fuller commentary:
The term obstruction is used for that which hinders the path of the noble
ones and the means (upaya) of this path.
Action as obstruction is the five actions entailing an immediately successive
retribution, namely, patricide, etc., .... He who commits such an action is
immediately and necessarily reborn in A vici: therefore the action is
immediately successive (anantarya). Patricide and matricide destroy the
benefactor, whence Avi:ci hell. The other three transgressions undermine a
field of merit.
Defilement as obstruction is the (1) agitated defilement and (2) sharp de-
filement: the first is the habitual defilement; the second is the dominant
defilement. This is a matter of current defilements, not of defilements that

one possesses (i.e., that one has as potential), for all sentient beings possess
all the defilements. . . .
There is a variant to the second verse: "False speech which divides the Sru:p.gha ... ;
the intention of the summit of cyclic existence, among wholesome actions, has the
greatest effect", which is better. The commentary notes the differences in the two
schisms (cakrabheda, karmabheda).
Dharmatrata is longer, 3, pp. 898b-899c, and very close to Vasubandhu:
After the first verse of DharmasrI, he has:
2. defilement as obstruction is the worst; the action as obstruction,
mediocre; and retribution as obstruction, the least; <lxvi>
3. the schism of the Saqigha, by nature, is non-harmony; this is a formation
dissociated from thought (viprayukta SG1!/Skiira) of the unobscured-non-
defined (anivrta-avyakrta) class;
4. schism is a matter of the Saqigha; the transgression is with him who
divides the Saqigha; he experience~, in Avici, a retribution for one aeon (kalpa);
5. the bhik:fUS are divided in their opinion of who is the Master, what is the
path: this is the schism of the Saqigha which was united. He who divides it is
an intellectual (dmicarita);
6. in three continents, a minimum of eight persons is required for the
schism of formal ecclesiastical action (karm(lbheda); in Jambudvipa, a
minimum of nine persons is required for the breaking of the wheel (cakra-
bheda);
7. the breaking of the wheel is impossible during six periods: (i) when
the parish ha§ no boundaries; (ii) at the beginning; (iii) at the end; (iv) when
the Muni has p1assed into Nirvary.a; (ivfoefure the appearance of the abscess;
(v) before the appearance of the pair of chief disciples (six quarter-verses
[pada]);
8. false speech which divides the Saqigh-a_ is the worst of actiQns; the inten-
tion of the s4mmit of cyclic existence is said to~ar the greatest effect.
HB. Non-informative action (avijfiapti), AKB iv, F 4, 14

Dharmasrl (i, p. 812c):
Bodily action is informative action (vijnapti) and non-informative action
(avijfiapti).
148 Introduction
The bodily informative action is the movement of the body, wholesome,

unwholesome or non-defined: wholesome when it arises from a wholesome
thought. ...
As for non-informative action: when one does an action in a firm manner,
thought can change, but the seed remains. If, for example, a person
undertakes the precepts, his thought can afterwards be unwholesome or
non-defined: nevertheless, morality continues .... Mental action is solely
non-informative action ... because this action is not visible .... Informative
action is wholesome, unwholesome or non-defined; the same for the non-
informative action which belongs to the mind (manas). The other non-
informative actions are never non-defined.
Upasanta (2, p. 840) adds a few things. T.he bird-catcher is considered as being
free from bodily non-informative action. Mental action is called non-informative
action because it does not inform others. Some say that it is called informative action
because it is discourse (jalpa?).
Dharmatrata (3, p. 888b) replaces the terms informative action (vijiiapti) and non-
informative action (avijiiapti) with doing (kara~w) and not doing (akara,:,,a) (AKB
iv,F 14):
Bodily action is of two types: (1) kara,:,,asvabhava, (2) akara,:,,asvabhava.
Doing (kara,:,,a): movement of the body, exercise 115 of the body is the doing
of the body.
Not doing (akara,:,,a, [Ch.] wu-tso): when the movement of the body has
ended, the nature (wholesome or unwholesome) of this [movement, of this
action which is the movement], <lxvii> continues to arise, simultaneous with
thoughts of a different nature. Just as wholesome morality produced through
undertaking (kusalasamiidiina.ffla) continues to arise even when unwhole-
some or non-defined thoughts (citta) are present. Just as with the immoral
person (daub§rlya-puru.ya): even when wholesome or non-defined thoughts
are present, the immorality continues to arise .
. . . Mental action is intention (cetanii) by nature ....
Not doing is also called nirati (? Vyut., 21, 114), virati, upek.yii, akriyii
(Tib. pu-tso). Because it does not do, it is called not doing. If one says that
115
We have [Ch.] fang-pien, which should translate vyiiyiina (see Demieville, Milinda),
instead of upiiya.
this is not an action (karman), this is not correct, because it does. [Even
though] the wholesome does not do the unwholesome, the unwholesome
does not do the wholesome: there is here also an action. Just as the
equanimity (upek:fii) limb of enlightenment (bodhyanga) is not ~quanimity
according to what is called equanimity; because the practice of the path,
stopping other things, is called equanimity. The same here. - Furthe~ore, in
doing the cause, one does the effect: therefore, one can call the ~ffect
according to the cause: .. . not doing is not material form (riipa), but the
doing [which is the cause 9fthe not doing or the non-informative] is materl~l
form; not doing is thus called material form. Likewise, not doing is action. 116
116
See above p. xlviii.
Remarks by the Translator
The following was originally written as the first endnote to chapter 1, but has been
extracted due to its length. It has been placed here since its content is meant to be
merely complementary to what has already been discussed in the preceding prefaces
and introduction by Etienne Lamotte and Louis de La Vallee Poussin (LVP), and, to
a lesser extent, in the new introduction by Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti, i.e., his Summary
and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosa-bhii~ya, which was received just prior to
publication. The topics of my Remarks can be outlined as follows:
(1) a brief outline of what has been discussed so far by Lamotte, La Vallee Poussin
(LVP) and Dhammajoti; (2) the new additions in our publication and some helpful
new sources; (3) the influences on our translation and its endnotes; (4) the strata-
gems of Hstian-tsang's, L VP's and our translation, as well as biographical data on
Hstian-tsang and La Vallee Poussin. Next we will focus on (5) "what further needs to
be addressed", i.e., (i) the life of Vasubandhu according to Paramiirtha and (ii) some
issues surrounding Vasubandhu as discussed by contemporary scholarship: (a) Vasu-
bandhu's other texts, (b) his life and (c) some thorny issues related to the schools of
the Sarvastivada, Dar~tiintika, Sautriintika and Yogiiciira, and their relationship to
each other and to Vasubandhu; (6) LVP's "additional" attributions in his translation
and Kritzer's identified passages, and finally (7) the structure of the Abhidharma-
kosabhii~a as well as (8) a more detailed outline of this endnote and (9) the obliga-
tory yet•heartfelt acknowledgements and thanks.
1. Brief outline of what was has been discussed so far by Lamotte, La Vallee
Poussin and Dhammajoti:
Since Etienne L.amotte in his Preface and Louis de La Vallee Poussin (LVP) in his
Preface and Introduction, as well as Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti in his Summary, have
already covered much of the introductory ground necessary for the reading of our
translation, we would like to briefly review these topics to get a clearer picture
regarding what still needs to be added or would be helpful for the reader of our
translation.
1. Etienne Lamotte first points out the two parts of the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya
(AKB), i.e., the Kiirikiis and the Bhii~ya, and their great success in all of the Far East.
He then addresses the reception of the AKB in the West and the publication of the
first French edition (1923-1931), which is unchanged from the second, French
edition (1971), except that LVP's Introduction has been moved from vol.' VI into
vol. I. Lamotte then goes on to list the sources upon which LVP's French translation
relied and to describe the "skillful stratagem" LVP used in l!is translation. Lamotte
notes that most of the canonical and post-canonical scriptures used by Vasubandhu
LODRO SANGPO 151
were successfully identified by LVP. He then informs us that the original Sanskrit
text of the AKB, considered to be lost, was not available to L VP, but was dis-
covered by Ra.hula Saiµlqtyayana in the Tibetan monastery of Ngor in 1935, three
years before La Vallee Poussin's death. Lamotte closes his Preface by saying that
"the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu and its French translation by Louis de La
Vallee Poussin are today inseparably united for the greatest benefit to Buddhist
studies" since the Chinese translation and its French version (with its cross refer-
ences)-being more analytical in nature than the original Sanskrit text-can be more
directly assimilated by the reader than the Sanskrit original.
ii. Lamotte's Preface is followed by Hubert Durt's Biblipgraphical Addendum,
listing the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese editions of texts and works relative to the
AKB published subsequent to the first 1923-1931 edition.
iii. LVP himself, in his Preface, points to the items included in Vol. VI (first edition),
i.e., the four indices (the general index of which we have divided and expanded into a
Sanskrit-English Index and English-Sanskrit Index) and the Additions and Correc-
tions. Since nearly all of the latter have been incorporated into the endnotes of our
translation, they have not been translated separately. In his Introduction, L VP makes
the following important comments (pp. iii-v): it "does not contain everything that I
wanted to put in it. (a) It lacks the summary of the doctrines of the Kosa. ... (b) One
will find here [in my Introduction], along with the bibliography of the Kosa, only the
beginnings of a study on Vasubandhu's sources." He lists the eight main sections of
his Introduction and states that "the Kosa is, by definition, a judicious and well-
ordered analysis of the Vibha~ii" .. LVP's study of the_ Vibhii~ii was particularly
facilitated by the references of Saeki Kiokuga's annotated edition (1887) of Hsiian-
tsang's Chinese translation of the Kosa (see further comments below). LVP makes
reference to the old Abhidharma treatises and the Sautrantikas as sources for
Vasubandhu, but points out in regard to the latter that, besides "the Dar~tantikas-
Bhadanta-Dharmatrata cited by the Vibhii~ii", we know only little about what
sources Vasubandhu used; he puts h1s hopes on a future reading of Saiµghabhadra
who had gathered information on "Snl.ata, who must be one of the Sautrantika
sources of Vastibandhu". - As for the topics of LVP's Introduction, consult its table
of contents.
iv. The masterly Summary by Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti-Glorious Sun Professor
of Buddhist Studies (University of Hong Kong)-gives us the missing summary: it
first discusses Abhidharma as being primarily a soteriology, the predecessors of the
AKB as a manual, the organizational structure of the AKB and the affiliation of the
AKB, before giving a brief summary of the main doctrines and content of each of the
nine chapters, while highlighting Vasubandhu's doctrinal positions.
152 Remarks by the Translator
2. The new additions in our publication and helpful new sources:

i. Before the missing summary of the chapters and their doctrines was available to
us, LVP had suggested filling the gap by referring to Rene Grousset's Analyse de
l'Abhidharmakosasastra and to his own already published articles and books, as well
as to further materials he planned to publish. Since these articles and books are at
present not, easily available, we have put some of them in PDF format on the
webpage of the Chokyi Gyatso Translation Committee,, which also includes other
source materials pertinent to our translation. See Electronic Appendix:
http://gampoabbey.org/translation-committee.php
In regard to summaries, there are now also a few other helpful sources available, for
example, Chaudhuri's Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakosa, which, however, is
more of a synoptic listing of the topics rather than a discussion of the meaning and
implications of the doctrines; the same applies to Anacker's summary in Potter's
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume VIIT.
As for our annotated translation, in our endnotes we will present summaries, over-
views, additional important information and source materials drawn mainly from
the work of contemporary scholars in the field, including La Vallee Poussin, as well
as many cross-references in the AKB, and we hope this will prove to be helpful
to the ieneral reader. This explains the many additional endnotes, but also why the
endnotes occasionally will be quite lengthy, the latter being very much in line with
LVP's own method of including longer overview footnotes at pertinent places. The
first two chapters have more endnotes than the later ones, simply due to their being
beginning chapters and their topics.
We will say a little m'ore below about the main sources on which the endnotes rely;
as for the nature of these endnotes, we would like to point out that they are mainly
intended to remain within the framework of what other contemporary scholars have
accomplished with their hard work, i.e., the reader should not expect to find, in these
endnotes, any new research of our own beyond what these scholars have published.
Choices had to be made and discussions of topics had to be abbreviated, sometimes
greatly; but we hope that we are presenting their work fairly and correctly.
ii. Iri addition to the bibliography of the Kosa in L VP's Introduction, we have
provided an updated bibliography in three parts: (A) Primary Sources (Sanskrit, Pali,
Chinese, Tibetan); (B) Indices; (C) Secondary Sources. The list of the primary
sources is based on the more detailed bibliography in Disputed Dharmas. Early
Buddhist Theories on Existence, by Collett Cox, pp. 417-23. The list of the secon-
dary sources includes the books referred to in the endnotes of our translation
LODRO SANGPO 153
and, as such, provides a record of the influences on our translation. For good
additional bibliographies of secondary sources, particular by the Japanese, see Dis-
puted Dharmas, pp. 423-40, and Sarvi'istivada Buddhist scholasticism, by Charles
Willemen, Bart Dessein, Collett Cox, pp. 294-311. Unfortunately Japanese Abhi-
dharma studies had only a minimal influence on this annotated translation, with the
exception of those written in English or mediated through scholars such as Cox,
Kritzer, etc.
A list of text abbreviations used in our translation and endnotes has been added after
the Remarks of the Translator.
iii. We have created (and inserted) section headlines for each chapter, a step which
was greatly influenced by Karmapa Wangchung Dorje's outline (sa bead) for his
commentary on the root verses of the Abhidharmakosa (chos mngon pa mdzad kyi
mam bshad gzhon nu mam rol zhes bya ba'i sa bead bzhugs so), kindly provided
by David Karma Choephel. Many clues also came from the parallel reading of the
two Hrdayas on which the AKB is structurally based, namely, Charles Willemen's
translation of Dharmasre~thin's The Essence of Scholasticism. Abhidhannahrdaya.
Tl550 (2006), and Ba_!:t Dessein's translation of Dharmatriita's Sa,µyukttibhidharma-
hrdaya. Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions (1999), as well as a.
close reading of the AKB itself. Gedun Drup's outline in his Clarifying the~,Path to
Liberation has also been consulted to some extent. The fact that we had to create an
outline for LVP's entire Bhi'i~ya and not just for the root verses (kariktis) has caused
our outline to be more detailed than Wangchuk Dorje's. As for chapter 9, its outline
and its numbering system is mainly taken over from James Duerlinger's work.
Based on the section headlines, we then generated a table of contents (TOC) and
inserted it at the beginning of each chapter. For.easier access and overview of the
material, we have also frequently inserted into the translation itself brief outlines of
subsections of the text; these inserts ar'? differentiated from the main text by left and
right indents, as well as smaller point size.
The work on the outline or "map" was one of the more interesting and challenging
aspects of the translation, and it is our hope that it will help the reader as much as it
did us in the process of accessing and grasping the main train of thoughts and
structure of the text. In general, we would advise the readers, before reading a
chapter, to first familiarize themselves with the TOC, since it is easy to lose the
overview in the wealth of all the material presented by Vasubandhu and in his
sometimes lengthy discussions on a topic. Any shortcomings of the outlines have
naturally to be blamed on us.
154 Remarks by .the Translator
1v. We have inserted into the endnotes the rediscovered original Sanskrit text of the
kiirikiis, which was published by V.V. Gokhale in the Journal of the Bombay Branch,
Royal Asiatic Society, XXII, 1946, pp. 73-102: By doing so we have mostly re-
placed L VP's renderings and reconstructions of them. At the same time we have
inserted next to the Sanskrit kiirikas the entire Tibetan translation of the kiirikiis
(reprinted by permission of Nitartha International).
Moreover, since the complete text of the AKB (i.e., Kiirikiis and Bhii~ya) was pub-
lished in 1967 by P. Pradhan in the Jayaswal Research Institute of Patna and since
Hirakawa published his detailed and very helpful Index to the Abhidharmakosa-
bhiisya (P. Pradhan Edition): Part 1 (1973) Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese. Part 2 (1977)
Chinese-Sanskrit. Part 3 (1978) Tibetan-Sanskrit, we were now able without too
much difficulty to trace and insert into the text many of the original technical San-
skrit terms to which LVP did not have direct access during his translation. With the
help of electronic search, we were also able to identify many of LVP's Sanskrit text
passages in his footnotes as stemming from Y asornitra' s Sphu{iirthti Abhidharma-
kosavytikhyii. While doing so we not only specified page and line numbers but also
separated out "the original text" (in italics) and the "commentary" (in non-italics)
according to Wogihara's 1971 edition (= WOG). As for identifying canonical cita-
tions in th~ AKB, see Bhikkhu Piisiidika's Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakosa-
bhii~ya.des V°'subandhu (find URL in our Bibliography).
We have also taK~n over the Taisho Canon references from Pruden, as well as his
Wade-Giles renderings. In the few instances where Pruden was unable to find the
Taisho Canon references, the references have been kept as ~iven by LVP.
Here we might also mention that we have inserted numbers (1, 2, 3; i, ii, iii; a, b, c;
etc.) into the text (as does LVP himself). These are intended to make the logic of the
text easier to follow and to avoid ambiguities since English has only genderless
articles (a, the) and relative pronouns (which, that). The numbers are often not meant
to suggest official lists, but are merely intended as help in reading. Also, we have
added drawings and charts for illustrative and didactic reasons.
3. Influences on our translation and its endnotes:

i. As will be seen from the endnotes, besides L VP's additional writings (see our
Bibliography), the main influence on the translation and its endnotes comes from
Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti's and Collett Cox's writings (see ~mr Bibliography), both
of whom have kindly given us permission to quote freely from their work. In par-
ticular, Dhammajoti's Sarviistivtida Abhidharma (fourth revised edition, Hong Kong
2009; SA.IV), which is probably the most comprehensive discussion of the major
LODRO SANGPO 155
Sarvastivada doctrines and topics within a single volume to date, and which has a
very helpful Sanskrit-English Glossary, has had the greatest impact on the translation
and its endnotes, especially since we had the good fortune to proofread and edit its
third edition. In this process we were able to clear up many of our questions and to
"squeeze in" a few directly AKB related issues (~iving Professor Dhammajoti plenty
of opportunity to practice patience!). Here we reproduce its chapter headings (fourth
edition) with the hope that it will give the reader a glimpse of an overview of the
maj?r Sarvastivada doctrines and topics (as presented in his book):
Chapter 1: Abhidharma - Its Origin, Meaning and Function

Chapter 2: The Abhidharmika - Standpoint, Scope and Methodology
Chapter 3: The Sarvastivada School and Its Notion of the Real
Chapter 4: The Abhidharma Treatises of the Sarvastivada
Chapter 5: Sarviistitva and Temporality
Chapter 6: Theory of Causality I: The Six Causes
Chapter 7: Theory of Causality II: The Four Conditions and the Five Fruits
Chapter 8: The Category of Matter (rupa)
Chapter 9: The Category of Thought and Thought-concomitants (citta-caitta)
Chapter 10: Theories of Knowledge
Chapter 11: The Category of the Conditionings Disjoined from Thought (citta-
viprayukta-sarµskiira)
Chapter 12: Defilements
Chapter 13: The Doctrine of Karma
Chapter 14: Karma and the Nature of its Retribution
Chapter 15: The Path of Spiritual Progress
Chapter 16: The Unconditioned (asarµskrta) Dharma-s
Further, we have included in the endnotes many passages from Dhammajoti's trans-
lation of Skandhila's Abhidharmiivatiira, which not only succinctly summarizes
all the basic categories of the Sarvastivada doctrines but "its presentation parallels
that of the AKB to which therefore it can serve also as an excellent introduction"
(ESD.2).
When quoting from Dhammajoti's works, we have emphasized selecting passages
from the Abhidharma-mahiivibhii~ii (MVS) and Sm:µghabhadra's *Nyiiyiinusiira (Ny),
which should be of great interest to scholars and students unable to read Classical
Chinese.
As for La Vallee Poussin's additional writings, unfortunately many of them are only
available in French right now, but it is our hope to publish a collection of a great
number of them (mainly Abhidharma related, but also other topics) in the near
future.
In addition to these three main influences (LVP, Dhammajoti, Cox), this translation
is generally influenced by specific works focusing on the AKB 's individual chapters
or topics. To mention just a few: for chapter 1, Bruce Cameron Hall's Vasubandhu
on "Aggregates, Spheres, and Components": Being Chapter One of the Abhidhanna-
kosa; for chapter 2, Collett Cox's Disputed Dharmas. Early Buddhist Theories on
Existence; for chapter 3, Akira Sadakata's Buddhist Cosmology. Philosophy and
Origins and Susan C. Stalker's A Study of Dependent Origination: Vasubandhu,
Buddhaghosa, and the Interpretation of "Pratftyasamutpada"; for chapter4, Alex-
ander von Rospatt's The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. A Survey of the
Origins and Early Phase of this Doctrine up to Vasubandhu; for the later chapters,
Etienne Lamotte's Le Traite de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nagarjuna (Maha-
prajfiaparamitasastra) (unpublished English translation by Migme Chodron). Chap~
ter 9 is particularly influenced by James Duerlinger's Indian Buddhist Theories of
Persons. Vasubandhu's "Refutation of the Theory of a Self". Professor Duerlinger.
kindly gave us permission to use his outline for the translation. In addition, Geshe
Jampa Gyatso's general commentary on the Treasury of Manifest Knowledge, on the
basis of Gedun Drup's Clarifying the Path to Liberation: An Explanation of the
"Treasury of Manifest Knowlc:dge''; has also been consulted.
ii. Another major influence on our translation comes from the English transla-
tions of two of the Hrdaya treatises, which in tum-as we hav~ seen in LVP's and
Dhammajoti's Summary-had a great influence on the structure and content of
Vasubandhu's AKB,. namely, Dharmasre~thin's Abhidharmahrdaya (= AH) and
Dharmatr~ta's Sarµyuktabhidharmahrdaya (= SAH). We have therefore cross-refer-
enced these two texts in our endnotes, following mainly Dessein's cross-references
in his endnotes.
4. Various translation stratagems and biographical data on Hsiian-tsang

and La Vallee Poussin:
i. LVP's general stratagem for translation has been described by Lamotte in his
Preface: "although French in terms of syntax, his translation is Indian in terms of
vocabulary, in the sense that the technical terms are retained in their original Sanskrit
form". As for LVP's more specific method of transiation, Robert Kritzer (2003a.203)
comments: "Although [La Vallee Poussin's translation of the Abhidharmakosa-
bha~ya] is a masterpiece that must always be consulted, t.a Vallee Poussin often
inserts, without comment, explanations from the Abhidharmakosavyakhya. Further-
LODRO SANGPO 157
more, he sometimes attributes a statement to, for example, Sautrantika, even when
neither the Chinese nor Tibetan translation (the Sanskrit text was not available to
him) does so. As we mention below, the attributions are usually actually those of the
seventh-century Chinese commentators, and they continue to circulate, unidentified,
in the scholarly literature."
ii. As for ourselves, we have modified L VP's general stratagem, thinking it advis-
able, as far as possible, to translate the Sanskrit terms into English, so that the text is
more accessible to a wider readership. On the other hand, we have maintained the
technical Sanskrit terms in brackets.
We also preferred not to make too literal a translation of the French. Instead we have
often chosen our English terms for technical Sanskrit terms from the "tested" English
Abhidharma terminology used by leading modem Abhidharma scholars, in particu-
lar, Dhammajoti, but also Cox and Schmithausen, and then tried to apply the chosen
terms consistently throughout the translation, as L VP did. As an aside, may I say
that this method is quite different from the method we used in our translatio~ of
Frauwallner's The Philosophy of Buddhism, where we tried to stay as close as pos-
sible to the German original.
Putting all of what has been said up until now together-i.e., what has. been newly
added and helpful new sources; influences on our transh1.tion and its endnotes; our
own translation stratagem-we can add to Lamotte's above statement that "the
Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu and its French traQslation by Louis de La Vallee
Poussin are today inseparably united for the greatest benefit to Buddhist studies",
etc., that the analytical nature has further increased in our publication, but that, at
the same time, certain aspects of it have moved closer to the rediscovered Sanskrit
original.
iii. Because La Vallee Poussin himself did not have the advantage of having access
to the Sanskrit· text of the Abhidharmakosabhii.~ya, which was considered to be lost,
and since his translation is mainly based on Hsi.ian-tsang's Chinese translation, it
might be valuable here to also provide some information in regard to the resources
available to Hsi.ian-tsang and his method of translation, which we will do by repro-
ducing a section from Collett Cox's Disputed Dharma~, pp. 59f:
Both Sari.ghabhadra's *Nyayanusara and his *Abhidharmasamayapradfpika
were translated into Chinese by Hsi.ian-tsang, who also translated many
other Sarvastivadin Abhidharma texts. Among the texts translated by Hsi.ian-
tsang are Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosakarika and Bhii.~ya, which had been
translated previously in 563 A.D. by Paramartha.• Hsi.ian-tsang began his
translation of both the *Abhidharmasamayapradfpika and the Abhidharma-
kosabha~ya in 651 A.D. Completing his translation of the *Abhidharma-

samayapradfpika in 652 A.D., Hsiian-tsang began the translation of the
*Nyayanusara in 653 A.D. and finished both the *Nyayanusara and the
Abhidharmakosabha~ya in 654 A.D. The multiple Chinese translations of
the Abhidharmakosabha~ya, the existence of the Sanskrit text of the Abhi-
dharmakosabha~ya, and the consistency of Hstian-tsang's translation of tech-
nical terms provide a basis for the study of the Abhidharma texts like the
*Nyayanusara not extant in Sanskrit or Tibetan translation.
The method of tran~)ation employed by Hstian-tsang was the product of sev-
eral centuries of development. In the earliest period of the translation of
Buddhist texts, .translation involved oral recitation of a text from memory
by a foreign monk who would explain (often in Chinese) the meaning to a
Chinese collaborator who would then "translate" the text into Chinese. By
Hstian-tsang's period during the T'ang dynasty, translations were p~.oduced
in well-funded bureaus that could support highly specialized collaborators.
Since Hstian-tsang had studied Sanskrit, he could himself combine the roles
of reciter and translator. Following the traditional method of oral translation,
Hstian-tsang translated each text aloud, but now from a written text. These
oral translations were then written down by a scribe-translator (pi shou),
whose tasks included not only taking dictation but also checking the mean-
ing of the Chinese translation with the Sanskrit original and finally ensur-
ing the intelligibility of the translation and its doctrinal consistency with
Buddhist teaching. The translated text then passed through several stages of
editing and correction, including primary editors (cheng i), who verified the
choice of Chinese translations in order to prevent mistakes in meaning,
stylists (chui wen), who refined the Chinese composition, editors of trans-
literation (tzu hsueh), who checked transliterations from Sanskrit, and the
Sanskrit editors (cheng fan-yu fan-wen), who ensured consistency of the
Chinese translation of terms with the Sanskrit.
Among these various specialists, the role of scribe-translator (pi shou) and
primary editor (cheng i) were most important; both roles demanded a thor-
ough knowledge of Buddhist doctrine and some knowledge of Sanskrit.
Among these scribe-translators and primary editors of translations of Abhi-
dharma texts were several disciples of Hsiian-tsang who were later to write
commentaries on the Abhidharmakosabha~a and *Nyayanusara. P'u-kuang,
a scribe-translator, Shen-t'ai, a primary editor, and Fa-pao, a disciple of
Hsiian-tsang who was later to serve as a primary editor, all wrote commen-
taries on the Abhidharmakosabha~ya. Ytian-yti, the primary scribe-translator
LODRO SANGPO 159
for both the Abhidhannakosabha~ya and the *Nyayanusara, also wrote a

commentary on the *Nyayanusara. Since Shen-t'ai, Fa-pao, and P'u-kuang
worked closely with Hstian-tsang, their commentaries undoubtedly contain
interpretations of the Abhidharmakosabhli~ya and *Nyayanusara offered by
Hstian-tsang himself and may well represent interpretations that Hstian-
tsang received in India. In an attempt to clarify the points of disagreement
between Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra, the commentaries on the Abhi-
dharmakosabha~ya also cite the *Nyayanusara frequently, often referring to
Ytian-yti's own commentary on it. Thus, they are a valuable source for the
study of the *Nyiiyiinusara.
• Paramartha's translation. is very literal, following both the syntax as well as the
verse aI'.d commentary divisions of the extant Sanskrit. Hstian-tsang combines the
parts of each verse, which in the Sanskrit had been interspersed with commentary,
and includes summary or introductory sentences to ease transitions in the commen-
tary from one verse section to another. He also frequently adds explanatory sen-
tences and references that present his understanding of assumptions underlying
doctrinal arguments.
iv. For biographical data on Hsiian-tsangand La Vallee Poussin, see our translation
of Lamotte's Biographical Note on Louis de La Vallee Poussin as well as Samuel
Beal's translations Si-yu-ki. Buddhist Records of the Western World. Translated from
the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629), and the Life qf Hsuan-tsang, all found in the
Electronic Appendix. For further data on Hsiian-tsang, see the references in Der Huey
Lee's entry: "Xuanzang (Hsiian-tsang) (60~-664 C.E.)" in The Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (http://www.iep.utm.edu/xuanzang/).
5. What further would be good to address:

We mentioned above LVP's comment that we find in his Introduction "only the
beginnings of a study on Vasubandhu's sources" and that regarding-Sautrantikas "we
have little information of the sources that he uses". In regard to these ysues, what
progress has been made by Buddhist research? And in terms of our introductory
remarks-even though LVP, Lamotte and Dhammajoti already provided a lot of the
necessary information so that the reader can more readily access the content of this
translation and its endnotes-what would still be good to further address?
As for the latter, although in his Introduction LVP has discussed the question of the
date of Vasubandhu and the bibliography related to it, as well as a few difficulties
within Paramartha's biography of Vasubandhu, not much was said about the life of
Vasubandhu himself. It seems thus worthwhile and appropriate here to say first a
few words about the life of the author of the AKB, Vasubandhu, and then address
further the issues surrounding his person, information pertinent to the above-meh-
tioned questions.
i. The life of Vasubandhu according to Paramartha
The oldest and basic source for the biography of Vasubandhu is Th(! Life ofVasu-
bandhu (P'o-sou-p'an-tou Fa-shi chuan) by Paramii.rtha (499-569 A.D.), trans-
lated by Takakusu (1904; see Electronic Appendix). There are also other accounts
by Hsiian-tsang (596/600-664), Vii.mana (ca. 800), Bu-ston (1290-1364), Tii.ranii.tha
(1575-1634), etc., that provide important additional bu.t also sometimes differing
information.
According to Paramii.rtha, Vasubandhu was born at J>uru~apura ("Territory of the
Hero"; Peshawar) in Gandhii.ra, as the second of three brothers, his father being
the Brahman Kausika; a court priest, his mother, Virifici. His youngest brother was
called Virifici-vatsa (son of Virifici), his oldest brother was the famous Asatiga
("Without Attachment") who (according to Tii.ral).atha's History, p. 167) became
a Buddhist monk one year before Vasubandhu's birth. Paramartha comments that
"Vasu means 'God' and Bandhu 'Kinsman'," and Bu-ston writes (HB.Il.145) that
"he was possessed of the wealth (vasu) of the Highest Wisdom and, having pro-
pagated the Doctrine out of mercy, had become the friend (bandhu) of the living
beings". Sarao (http://www.iep.utm.edu/vasubandhu/) comments that "during the
LODRO SANGPO 161
formative years of his life, Vasubandhu may have been introduced by his father not
only to the Brahmanical tradition but also to the postulates of classical Nyiiya and
Vaise~ika, both of which had influence on his logical thought".
GANDHARA
NoRTHERNINDIA
•
Puru~apura
AT THE TIME OF
VASUBANDHU
Gupta Empire
Gandhara was known as the seat of the "Western masters" of Abhidharma, that is,
the Pascatyas, and was the birth place of the Sarvastivada masters Dharmasri (or
Dharmasre~thin) and Bh,adanta Dharmatrata, but the main Sarvastivada movement
in force.in GaA.dhara were the Vaibha~ikas, taking the Mahavibhii~ii. as their authori-
tative text. Vasubandhu became a Sarvastivadin monk, studying primarily the scho-
lastic system of the Vaibha~ikas. Hstian-tsang states (Si.105ff.) that Vasubandhu was
the disciple of Manorhita (or Manoratha) but Paramiirtha mentions (LV.284) that his
teacher was a certain Buddhamitra who resided in Ayodhyii (central Gangetic valley;
now located in Uttar Pradesh, far removed from Gandhara and Kashmir).
According to Paramartha, "Vasubandhu's first apparent place of significant activity
was Ayodhya". He speaks of the arrival of the Saqikhya teacher Vindhyavasin in
Ayodhya who-while Vasubandhu is "absent travelling in other countries"-is
victorious over Vasubandhu's teacher Buddhamitra. Upon Vasubandhu's return, he
composed the Paramiirthasaptati ["Treatise on the Seventy Verses on the Truth"] in
which, although not encountering his opponent in person, he completely confuted

Vindhyavasin. The King (Vikramaditya) (LV.286f.) "gave him three lacs (lak$a) of
·gold as a prize. This amount he divided into three portions with which he built
three monasteries in the country of A-yu-ja (Ayodhya): 1. a monastery for pi-ku-ni
(Bhik~u~I); 2. a monastery for the Sat-ba-ta (Sarvasti-vada) school; 3. a monastery
for the Maha-yana school."
Paramartha continues (LV.287f.):
The Teacher of the Law (Vasu-bandhu) afterwards successively re-estab-
lished the true Law (of the Buddha). He studied, first, the principles of the
Bi-ba-sha (Vibha~a). When he was well versed in them, he lectured there-
upon before the general public. At the close of each day's lecture, he com-
posed a verse in which he summed up his exposition for the day.
Each verse was engraved on a copper plate. This he hung on the head of an
intoxicated elephant, and, beating a drum, made the following public decla-
ration: "Is there anyone who can refute the principles set forth in this verse?
Let him who is competent to do so come forth."
Thus he gradually composed more than 600 verses in which all the doctrines
of the Bi-ba-sha (Vibha~a) were contained. In the case of each verse he
repeated the same process. After all there was no one who could refute them.
This is the verse portion of the (Abhidharma) Kosa.
When these verses were completed, he sent them together with 50 pounds of
gold to Ki-pin (Kasmira) to the Bi-ba-sha (Vibha~a) masters, who, on seeing
them, were all exceedingly pleased, thinking that the true Law held by them-
selves would now be widely promulgated. The words of the verses, how-
ever, were so abstruse in meaning that they could not understand them all.
They therefore added 50 pounds of gold to the sum received from Vasu-
bandhu, thus raising the amount to 100 pounds altogether, and sent it back to
him, requesting him to write a prose explanation of the verses. Thereupon he
composed the prose portion of the Abhidharma-kosa, which is a commen-
tary upon them. He thus, established the tenets of the Sat-ba-ta (Sarvastiviida)
school; but whenever he found a doctrine pushed to an extreme in that
school, he refuted it by the principles of the Sautrantika school. This work
was called the A-bi-dat-ma-ku-sha (Abhidharma-kosa). When he had com-
pleted the work he forwarded it to the Bi-ba-sha (Vibha~a) teachers of
Ki-pin (Kasmira), who, on seeing their own opinions therein refuted, were
grieved.
LODRO SANGPO 163
Although Cox and Sarao think that, according to Paramlirtha, the AKB was written
in Ayodhyli, Hstian-tsang in his Si-yu-ki states (LV.105) that the AKB was composed
in Puru~apura (Gandhlira): "To the east of Parsvika's chamber is an old building in
which Vasubandhu Bodhisattva prepared the 'O-pi-ta-mo-ku-she-lun (Abhidharma-
kosha Scistra); men, out of respect to him, have placed here a commemorative tablet
to this effect." Also, according to Hstian-tsang's disciples P'u-kuang and Fa-pao
(SBS.271), "Vasubandhu had gone to Kasmrra in disguise and studied the Abhi-'-
dharma literature for four years under the instruction of Skandhila with the purpose
of preparing a thorough criticism of the *Mahiivibhii~ii. Afterwards Skandhila dis-
covered his.real intention and thereupon Vasubandhu returned to Gandhlira."
Paramlirtha continues (LV.288):
In former days the King (Vikramaditya) sent the Crown Prince [namely,
Balliditya] to Vasu-bandhu to receive his instruction. The Queen too went
forth from her family and became his pupil. - When the Crown Prince
succeeded to the throne,. he and the Queen-mother invited their teacher to
settle in Ayodhyli and accept the Royal support. He accepted the invitation.
Next Paramlirtha relates that the grammarian Vasurata, living in Ayodhya and well-
versed in Pai:iini's Vycikcira,:ta, attacked the construction of the words and sentences
of the Abhidharmakosa; Vasubandhu responded by writing a treatise refuting the
thirty-two chapters of the Vyakara,:ia. Thereupon king Blila:ditya and the Queen-
moth~r lavished three lacs of gold on Vasubandhu with which he built three temples,
one in Ayodhya, one in Puru~apura and one in Kasmrr. Paramlirtha then continues
(LV.289f.):
The heretic [i.e., Vasurata] was angry and ashamed, and, resolving to van-
quish the Buddhist teacher, sent a messenger to Tien-chu (Central India)
to invite the Buddhist priest, "Sang-ka-ba-da-la" (Sangha-bhadra) to come to
Ayodhya in order to compile a treatise and refute the Kosa. This tea~her of
the Law came and compiled two sastras. One, entitled the "Samaya of
Light" [*Samayapradfpikci], contained 10,000 verses, which merely explain
the doctrines of the "Bi-ba-sha" (Vibha~a). "Samaya" means "Groups of
meanings". The other bore the name "Conformity to the Truth" [*Nyaya-
anuscira], and contained 120,000 verses. It refutes the Kosa in favour of the
Vibhli~li. When these treatises were completed, he invited Vasu-bandhu to
meet him in person and have a decisive debate.
The latter, knowing that, in spite of his attempted refutation, his opponent
had not been able after all to overthrow the doctrine of the Kosa, was not
inclined to debate with him in person. He said: "I am now already old. You
may do .as you please. I formerly composed the siistra to refute the doctrines
of the Vibha~a. There is no need to enter further upon a decisive debate with
you. You have now composed two siistras. What is the use of challenging
me? Any person endowed with knowledge will himself judge which party is
in the right and which is in the wrong?"
This account, however, differs in detail from other accounts. See Collett Cox's dis-
cussion (DD.53ff.), who distinguishes three basic versions of biographical informa-
tion concerning Sanghabhadra and his two works as well as his relationship with
Vasubandhu: (a) Paramartha (LV.287-90), (b) Hstian-tsang (Si.192-96) and (c) Bu-
ston (HB.142-47).
Paramartha then ends this section of Vasubandhu's biography, creating a link to his
conversion to the Mahayana (LV.290-93), by commenting:
The Teacher of the Law (Vasu-bandhu) was versed in all the principles of
the eighteen schools (of Buddhism) and thoroughly understood the Hina-
yana. It was the Hina-yana that he held firmly to be right. He did not believe
in the Mahii-yana thinking that the "Ma-ka-yen" (Mahii-yana) was not the
Buddha's own teaching.
Hall summarizes (VASC.15): Vasubahdhu "wrote numerous Hinayana treatises until
his brother Asanga converted him to Mahayana. Thereafter he wrote numerous Maha-
yana treatises and commentaries, and became, along with Asanga, the co-founder
of the Y ogacara-Vijiianavada school. He enjoyed the patronage of two rulers of
Ayodhya (Vikramaditya and Baladitya), where he died at the age of eighty."
See beJow more on the life of Vasubandhu.
ii. Various issues surrounding Vasubandhu as discussed by contemporary

scholarship
In regard to the issues "what progress has been made by Buddhist research", etc.,
some of that has already been addressed by Dhammajoti in his Summary and will
be further discussed by us in relation to specific and concrete topics in our endnotes
to the nine chapters of the actual translation. Thus even though there does not seem
to be a need to add much more to this, it might still be worthwhile to present/select
some perspectives of contemporary scholarship regarding the following three themes
that are not directly related with specific topics discussed in the AKB but with its
author and his relationship with the various Buddhist schools, which then naturally
has its impact on the reading and translation of the specific topics discussed in the
AKB:
LODRO SANGPO 165
a. Which works can reasonably be attributed to Vasubandhu the Kosakiira?

b. The alternative hypotheses ·of one or two Vasubandhus, his life time, his
relationship to Asailga, the problems of the information available on the
relevant Gupta dynastic history.
c. Vasubandhu's relationship to the SarviistiviidinsNaibha~ikas, Diir~tantikas,
Sautriintikas and the Mahiiyana/Yogiiciira. To what school did he belong
when he was writing the AKB? Who were these schools? How did they
interact or influence each other?
The opinions expressed in the following are admittedly and maybe also unavoidably
selective and. sometimes also partial; for further detail and opposing views, the reader
can find the references and details in the works of the scholars mentioned.
a. In regard to "which works can reasonably be attributed to Vasubandhu the Kosa-

kiira", Peter Skilling presents two useful criteria (VVL.298f.):
The first is cross-references in the works of Vasubandhu himself or those of
his commentators. These establish that the works are related: that they were
known to and accepted by Vasubandhu, or held by representatives of his
lineage to be his own compositions.
The second 1criterion is style. Vasubandhu's prose style is distinctive: it is
confident and learned, replete with citations and allusions to canonical and
other literature, and to the opinions of different teachers or schools. It often
employs debate: an "opponent" raises an objection, which is resolved through
recourse to reasoning or scripture. Vasubandhu's prose cannot be mis-
taken for that of, say, Asaiiga or Candrakirti. His verse is terse: compact,
concise, mnemonic, it could not be mistaken for that of Niigiirjuna or Siinti-
deva.
Applying these criteria, I classify the works into two groups:
1. Works shown to be' by the Kosakara on the evidence of internal
cross-references or references by Vasub.andhu's commentators, and
confirmed by style, sources used, methodology, and development of
ideas: the Vyiikhyiiyukti, the Karmasiddhiprakaral}a, the Pratftya-
samutpiidiidivibhariganirdesa, and the Pancaskandhaprakaral}a;
2. Works that may be accepted as by the Kosakiira on the evidence of
style, sources used, methodology, and development of ideas: the
Giithiisa,rtgraha texts (and their excerpt, the Ekagiithiibhii,DJa), the
Vi,rtsatikii, the Tri,rtsikii, and the Trisvabhiivanirdesa.
Similar conclusions were reached by Deleanu (CMP.235) following Schmithausen

who limits Vasubandhu's corpus to the following works(= first group): Abhidharma-
kosabhii~ya, Vyiikhyiiyukti, Karmasiddhi, Pratftyasamutpiidavyiikhyii, Paiicaskandhaka,
Virµ,satikii and Trirµ,sikii, and prefers (AV.263) "to treat the Vasubandhu commen-
taries on Madhyiintavibhiiga, Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga, Mahiiyiinasarµ,graha and
Mahiiyiinasiitriilarµkiira ... as well as the Trisvabhiivanirdesa ... as a separate group,
because in these certain central doctrinal peculiarities of the comparable parts of the
first group seem to be lacking (or at best marginal). This procedure should not, how-
ever, be misunderstood as a commitment with regard to the authorship problem." See
in this context also Kritzer, VY.xxvi. On the full list of works attributed to Vasu-
bandhu in different traditions, see Mejor 1991, pp. 7-13.
b. In regard to "the alternative hypotheses of one or two Vasubandhus, his life

time, etc.", some scholars have suggested that there were two or even three or more,
while some others would preserve the traditional view of a single Vasubandhu. Still
others felt that, due to insufficient evidence, the issue could not be settled. On the
other hand, Deleanu (2006) has presented a seemingly well-balanced discussion
(CMP.186-96) of the issues that seems to solve some of the pitfalls of previous
proposals by suggesting that Vasubandhu the Kosakara lived between ca. 350 and
430, was the half-brother of Asaiiga (ca. 330-405), composed the Abhidharma-
kosabhii~ya sometime between or around 380-390, converted to the Mahayana
sometime in his forties, thus starting off his creative Mahayana period sometime
after ca. 390, and wrote his Trirµsikii, often considered to be his latest work, or at
least one of the latest, sometime between 410-430. Deleanu also assumes that the
Yogiiciirabhiimi "must have already assumed more or less its present form before
380", and that"Vasubandhu knew and drew inspiration from [the Yogiiciirabhiimi]
or, at least, was familiar with the doctrinal tradition which had produced it". He does,
however, not "rule out the possibility that a part of the works traditionally attributed
to 'Vasubandhu' might have been written by another person or even persons". This
basic argument for the dates is based on Schmithausen's analysis which states that
two passages in the Lankiivatiirasiitra (LAS) clearly appear to presuppose Vasu-
bandhu's Trirµ,sikii, and since "both passages form part of the LAS text already in
the earliest extant Chinese translation, viz. that by Gu:t;tabhadra, dated 443 A.D."
(NV.392f.), the most likely explanation is that the Trirµsikii must have been com-
posed before this date.
Yet Deleanu's proposed dates bring into question the passage of Paramartha's
biography, cited above: "In former days the King (Vikramaditya) sent the Crown
Prince [i.e., Baladitya] to Vasu-bandhu to receive his instruction ... ". Frauwallner and
LODRO SANGPO 167
other scholars had opted to identify these two kings as Skandagupta.(ca. 456-467)
and Narasiqihagupta (ca. 467-473), who was actually Skandagupta's nephew. But
Deleanu questions this identification "mainly because Narasiqihagupta's date and
order of ascending the throne is far from being clear" and he attempts to make a
case, taking his clues again from Anacker (1984) and Schmithausen (1992), that
Vikramaditya refers to Candragupta II (375-413/4i5) and Baladitya to Kumaragupta I/
Govindagupta. For more details see Deleanu's lengthy discussion in CMP.186-94.
c. La Vallee Poussin had stated that his Introduction was only the "beginnings of a
study on Vasubandhu's sources" and that in regard to Sautrantikas "we have little
information of the sources that [Vasubandhu] uses". He hoped that future research,
particularly connected with Saqighabhadra, would throw light on these issues.
This brings up some thorny issues which modern scholarship is still busy with,
namely: What is Vasubandhu's relationship to the SarvastivadinsNaibha~ikas, the
Dar~tantikas, the Sautrantikas and the Mahayana/Yogacara? Who were these schools?
How did they interact or influence each other? More specifically: What school did
Vasubandhu belong to when he was writing the AKB?
These issues will be addressed in three sections:
a. The traditional presentation of the four representative schools of Buddhism.
~- The origins of the(].) Sarvastivadins and (2.) Dar~tantikas and Sautrantikas,
and what defines them.
y. Vasubandhu's relationship to the SarvastivadinsNaibha~ikas, Dar~tantikas,
Sautrantikas and Mahayana/Yogacara. What school did he belong to when he
was writing the AKB?
a. The traditional presentation of the four representative schools of Buddhism:

While the Sarvastivada, Sautrantika and Yogacara have traditionally been presented
in the relatively later texts as three distinct schools, often mentioned together with
the Madhyamaka as the four representative schools of Buddhism, contemporary
scholarship has seriously questioned this simplistic framework in recent years (see
VY.xi; JIABS.26.225). The historical relationship between these three schools has
been a keen subject of investigation among some Japanese and Western scholars. We
will first briefly look at each of these three schools separately and mention some of
the works ofmoclem scholarship (Western language) in regard to them:
1. As for the Sarvastivada, for whom there is a wealth of data available, much work
has been done in screening all their texts and tenets as can be seen, for example,
in Erich Frauwallner's Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Bud-
dhist Philosophical Systems (English translation: 1995), in Collett Cox's Disputed

Dharmas. Early Buddhist Theories on Existence (1995), in Sarviistiviida Buddhist
scholasticism by Charles Willemen, Bart Dessein and Collett Cox (1998), and in
Dhammajoti's Sarviistiviida Abhidharma, his Abhidharma Doctrines and Contro-
versies on Perception and his many articles related to Sarvastivada. Regarding the
various stages of the development of these texts, see LVP's Introduction and
Dhammajoti's Summary, as well as Dhammajoti's chapter 4 (SA.IV.83-116), which
is outlined in the following way:
4.1. Seven canonical treatises
4.1.1. Treatises of the earliest period
4.1.1.1. Dharmaskandha-siistra (DSS)
4.1.1.2. Sarrigztiparyaya-sastra (SgPS)
4.1.1.3. Prajfiapti-siistra (PjS)
4.1.2. Later, more developed texts
4.1.2.1. Vijfiiinakiiycr-siistra (VKS)
4.1.2.2. Jfiiinaprasthana-siistra (JPS)
4.1.2.3. Prakara,:iapada-siistra (PrS)
4.1.2.4. Dhatukiiya-siistra (DKS)
4.2. Development of the Sarvastivada manuals
,4.2.1. Abhidharma-mahavibha~a (MVS)
4.2.2. Development of the more concise manuals
4.2.2.1. *Abhidharmiimrta(-rasa)-siistra (T no. 1553), by Gho~aka,
2 fasc., translator unknown.
4.2.2.2. *Abhidharmahrdaya (T no. 1550) by DharmasrI, 4 fasc., tr.
by Saqighadeva et. al.
4.2.2.3. *Abhidharmahrdaya-sutra (?/T no. 1551) by Upasanta,
2 fasc., tr. by Narendrayasas.
4.2.2.4. *Abhidharmahrdayavyiikhyii (? T no. 1552), by Dharmatrata,
11 fasc., tr. by Sarµghabhiiti.
4.2.2.5. Abhidharmakosa-mula-kiirikii (T no. 1560) by Vasubandhu,
1 fasc., tr. by Xuan Zang.
4.2.2.6. Abhidharmakosabha~yam (T no. 1558) by Vasubandhu,
1 fasc., tr. by Xuan Zang; (there is also an earlier translation
by Paramartha: T no. 1559).
4.2.2.7. *Abhidharmakosasiistra-tattvlirthli-ffkii_ (T no. 1561) by
Sthiramati, 2 fasc., translator unknown.
4.2.2.8; *Abhidharma-nyiiyiinusiira (T no. 1562) by Sarµghabhadra,
LODRO SANGPO 169
4.2.2.9. *Abhidharma-samayapradfpikii (T no. 1563) by Sa111ghabhadra,

4.2.2.10. *Abhidhanniivatiira (T no. 1554) by Skandhila, 2 fasc., tr.
by Xuan Zang.
As an important source on the Buddhist sects of the Sri'ivakayi'ina, we should now
also mention Andre Bareau's Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule (1955).
2. As for the Sautrantika, scholars nowadays still think, as L VP eighty years ago,
that it is not that clear who the Sautrantikas were, in particular the Sautrantikas
to whom Vasubandhu refers in his AKB. But as is shown in JIABS volume 26,
Number 2, 2003: "The Sautrantikas" (which covers also Japanese scholarship) and
Dhammajoti's books Sarvi'istivi'ida Abhidhanna (Fourth Revised Edition: 2009) and
Abhidhanna Doctrines and Controversies on Perception (Third Revised Edition:
2007) as well as his articles The Citta-caitta Doctrine of Srfli'ita and Srfli'ita's anu-
dhiitu doctrine (relying on Sa111ghabhadra's *Nyiiyi'inusi'ira), some progress has been
made, even though no consensus has been reached among scholars; but more on that
later.
3. As for the Y ogacara-in the context of Vasubandhu-some research was done
on the Yogiiciirabhumi, a fairly comprehensive work (comprising about 2,000 pages
in an English translation) that. can be regarded as the foundational work of the
Yogaciira school (see Kritzer's brief overview of it in his Vasubandhu and the Yogi'i-
ci'irabhami. Yogi'ici'ira Elements in the Abhidhannakosabhii~ya, 2005, pp. xii-xx).
Lambert Schmithausen makes the following interesting comment in his· lecture
Yogiici'ira School and the Tathi'igatagarbha Schools of Thought (1998; prepublished
English translation):
The work [i.e., the Yogiici'irabhumi] is attributed sometimes to the founder of
the school, Asail.ga, and sometimes to the mythical Bodhisattva Maitreya
(the future Buddha). It is, however, more likely a collective work in which
(apparently in .several passes) in the 3rd or 4 th century, the traditions or body
of thought of a specific group or movement was compiled or worked over.
Although the underlying canon is that of the Miilasarviistiviidins throughout,
it seems, however, that connections to other Schools also existed, in particu-
lar to the Mahisiisakas ....
The Yogi'ici'irabhumi is indeed regarded as a Mahayana text, but only certain
parts, in particular the chapter Bodhisattvabhumi ("Stage of the Bodhi-
sattva"), are specifically dedicated to the path of salvation in the spirit of
the Mahayana, .... Alongside this, there i.s also a chapter, "Stage of the
Hearer" (Sri'ivakabhumi), which describes the traditional path of salvation
of the "Hina"- or Sriivakayana. The other parts of the text as well contain
predominantly materials which remain within the scope of "traditional"
Buddhism, that is, the Sravakayana, or which are at least so formulated as
to be acceptable to both schools of thought. The text thus apparently is
derived from a milieu in which both schools of thought coexisted. Similar
things hold true for a few additional texts, in particular the Abhidharmasam-
uccaya, the "Compendium of the Abhidharma", a work whose title already
makes clear that it is drawing on the systematics of the older tradition, but
which nonetheless also contains mahayanistic elements.
Other early Y ogacara works are, by contrast, decidedly mahiiyanistic: for
instance the Mahiiyiinasutriilarµkiira ("Ornament of the Mahayana Dis-
courses"), ascribed to the Bodhisattva Maitreya, or the Mahiiyiinasarµgraha,
("Summary of the Mahayana"), composed by Asanga. These works too,
however, definitely recognize the goal of salvation of the Sravakayana, ....
As will be mentioned belo~, Kritzer finds it very likely that the Yogiiciirabhami
was available to Vasubandhu in a form similar to the one we know.
Work has also been done in mapping out the general development of the thought of
the Y ogacara school and its representatives, and in showing Vasubandhu' s involve-
ment in it, for example, in the long Yogacara section of Erich Frauwallner's The
Philosophy of Buddhism (2010), p. 280-437 and in his article Amalavijftiina and
Alayavijfiiina. A Contribution to the Epistemology of Buddhism, which is appended to
The Philosophy of Buddhism.
13. The origins of the (1.) Sarviistiviidins and (2.) Diir~{iintikas and Sautriintikas, and
what defines them:
To provid~ a better basis for the discussion of Vasubandhu's relationship to the
Sarvastivadins, Dar~tantikas, Sautriintikas and Yogacarins-as traditionally seen and
as seen by more modem scholarship-we will first briefly look into the origins of
some of these schools, what defines them and what distinguishes them from other
schools.
1. As for the origins of the Sarviistiviidins and what defines them, Collett Cox writes
(DD.23f.):
The causes and pattern of the emergence of distinct groups within the de-
veloping Buddhist community continue to be the subject of much scholarly
disagreement. Nevertheless, despite variation in the traditional sources as to
the date of what is generally accepted as the initial division between the
Mahiisanghika and the Sthavira nikiiyas, most scholars would agree that
LODRO SANGP0 171
even though the roots of these earliest recognized Buddhist groups predate
Asoka, their actual separation did not occur until after his death.
The Sarvastivadin sect emerged at a later point from within the Sthavira
group, and therefore, represents the phase of the secondary proliferation of
sects and schools. This secondary proliferation undoubtedly resulted from a
variety of conditions, different in each case, including external social con-
ditions or geographical separation, as well as internal reasons such as dif-
ferences in disciplinary codes or doctrinal interpretation, The traditional
reason given for the recognition of the Sarvastivadins as a distinct sect is
their doctrinal position that "everything exists", a position reflected in their
name that distinguishes the Sarvastivadins from other groups. [ ... ]
Scholars have proposed the second or first century B.C. as the date for the
emergence of the Sarvastivadins as a distinct group.[ ... ]
Of particular interest both for the origin of the Sarvastivadin sect and its
later textual development is the identity of the various groups that the
Sarvastivadins comprise, specifically those mentioned in the later Abhi-
dharma treatises: [l] those referred to by the terms "Sarvastivadin" and
"Miilasarvastivadin" [see DD.25ff.]; [2] the various presumably Sarvasti-
vadin groups such as the Westerners [piisciitya], the Foreign Masters [bahir-
desaka], the Sarvastivadins of Kasmira or of Gandhara [see DD.27f.]; and,
finally, [3] the various masters such as Gho~aka, Dharmatrata, Vasumitra,
and Buddhadeva [see DD.28]. [ ... ]
In scholarly attempts to determine the sectarian or geographical identifica-
tion of these [four] masters, ... the primary issue is their affiliation with a
non-Kasmira Sarvastivadin lineage or their association with the incipient
Dar~tantika faction within the Sarvastivadin school.
Dhammajoti adds (ADCP.5f.):
At the outset, it must be emphasized that "Sarvastivada", "Vaibhaeyika"; and
the "Mahiivibhii~ii orthodoxy" do not have the same connotations. The
Sarvastivada remained the most powerful and influential school in North-
western India from around the beginning of the Christian era to about the 7 th
century A.D., initially established in Mathura and expanding in the north
where Kasm'ira became its centre of orthodoxy. [ ... ]
The Sarvastivadins represent a fairly broad spectrum of people who are
united by their categorical doctrine that dharma-s persist (sarvadii asti
[= all exists, i.e., dharma-s always, sarvadii, exist, whether future, present
or past]) through the three periods of time. This doctrinal stance is opposed
to that of the Vibhajyavadins (the Distinctionists). The latter are so called

because they hold that the status of existence of the dharma-s in the three
periods of time has to be distinguished: only the present, or those karma-s
which have not given fruit exist; all other past dharma-s as well as future
ones are not existent. [ ... ] [SA.IV.56: It is noteworthy that in the Vijfiiina-
kiiya-siistra, the Sarvastivadins never call themselves as such. When arguing
against the Vibhajyavadins, they refer to themselves as the Yukta-vadins
("those who accord with (or emphasize) logical reasoning"); against the
Pudgalavadins, as the Siinyata-vadins ("those who proclaim the doctrine of
emptiness").]
Since the compilation of the Mahavibha:jii-siistra, the adherents of the Maha-
vibha:jii, based mainly in Kasmira, came to be known as the "Vaibha~ika".
But even this orthodox and conservative group of Sarvastivadins are not
entirely unanimous in what they uphold as the true doctrines of the MVS.
[SA.IV.57: This fact is reflected in the post-MVS works, such as the *Satya-
siddhi-siistra, the *Abhidharmahrdaya (T no. 1550) and its commentaries
(T no. 1551, no. 1552), the AKB and its commentaries, the Abhidharmadfpa
and the *Nyiiyiinusiira.]
In the *Nyiiyiinusara (ADCP.28; SA.IV.60), Sarpghabhadra provides an additional
requirement to the definition of Sarviistivada given above:
Only [those who] believe.in the existence of the tri-temporal [dharma-s] and
the three types of truly existent asafJlskrta can claim to be Sarviistiviida. For
it is only on account of their holding the existence of these dharma-s that
they are acknowledged as Sarvastivada. The others are not; because they
either superimpose/add on, or subtract from, [the dharma-s recognized by
the Sarviistiviida]. [l] The Superimposers [Samiiropaviidins = Pudgalaviidins]
assert that there exist the Pudgala and the previous dharma-s. [On the other
hand], [2] the Vibhajyavadins assert the existence of only the present and
those past karma-s that have not yet given fruit. [3] The K~ai;iikavadins"
assert the existence of only the 12 iiyatana-s in the single moment of the
present. [4] The Prajfiaptivadins assert that the dharma-s of the present too
are mere prajfiapti-s [designations]. [5] The Vainasika-s assert that all
dharma-s are completely without any svabhava like iikiisa-pu:jpa-s [sky-
flowers]. All of them are not Sarviistiviida.
• The Sautriintika, here referred to as K~ai;iikavadins, and are singled out by
Sarpghabhadra [Ny; 630c-631a] who denies that they qualify as Sarviistiviidins,
for their view "differs from the Vainasika:S by just a mere k:jmJa [moment]!"
LODRO SANGPO 173
2. As for the origins, history and factions of the Dar~tantika and Sautrantika and
what defines them, things are more complicated, particularly their relationship, and
scholars have different views. We will discuss this in more detail, while emphasiz-
ing Dhammajoti's views.
i. In regard to the founding fathers, Cox states (DD.40f.):
The founding of the Dar~tantikas (and Sautrantikas if they are identified
with one another) is traditionally attributed to Kumaralata.... However,
by analyzing positions attributed to Kumaralata, Kato concludes that the
Kumaralata who is associated with the Dar~tantikas must have lived after the
*Mahavibha~a. In that case, the traditional identification of Kumaralata as
the teacher of Harivarman, the author of the *Tattvasiddhisastra, is plausible.
However, admitting this late third century A.D. date for Kumaralata leaves
the origins of the Dar~tantika group cited in the Vibha~a obscure.• Never-
theless, it would appear that they emerged just prior to the. composition of
the Vibha~a compendia not as a distinct ordination lineage or sect, but rather
as a dogmatically distinguished group or school that objeGted to Sarvasti-
vadin doctrinal interpretations.
Traditional descriptions portray Srilata as the second Sautrantika master; he
is credited with the composition of a "*Sautrantikavibha~a" and is identified
with the Sthavira cited frequently in Sanghabhadra's *Nyayanusara. If one
accepts the identity of Sthavira as Snlata, t~e frequent and lengthy citations
of this Sthavira in the *Nyayanusara not only verify the existence of some
source text, but also provide a detailed, and indeed the only account of
its contents. Indeed, these citations in the *Nyayanusara would suggest
that Sthavira's text was itself a detailed exegetical treatise that, despite
Sautrantika claims to the contrary, must have been at least stylistically simi-
. lar to Abhidharma texts. By noting the biographical comments in the ref-
erences to Sthavira in the *Nyayanusara, Kato concludes that Srilata was
from a region to the east of that of Sanghabhadra. This would suggest that
in Sanghabhadra's period, the area of primary opposition to the Kasmira
Sarvastivadins had shifted from the west, as it had been several centuries
earlier, to the east. Given the often personal nature of Sanghabhadra's criti-
cisms, Kato also concludes that Srilata must have been an older contem-
porary of both Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra. Concerning the relation
among these roughly contemporaneous figures, Kato suggests that Kumara-
lata was the teacher of both Harivarman and Sn7ata and that Sriliita was the
direct teacher of V asubandhu.
• LS: See below Dhammajoti's view on the Dar~tantikas.

Dhammajoti dates Kumaralata (SA.IV.341) as "a Dar~tantika leader of ca. late 2nd or
early 3rd century C.E.''.
As for SrTiata, Dhammajoti states at the beginning of his Srflata 's anudhiitu Doctrine
(SAD):
Snlata (circa 4th century C.E.), a senior contemporary of both Vasubandhu
and Satµghabhadra, was a leading Diir~tantika-Sautrantika master. Accord-
ing to Xuan Zang, he composed the *Sautriintika-vibhii~ii (~~$.1:!e~rY~)
in ancient Ayodhya. Saqighabhadra as well mentions his writing(s), though
unfortunately without giving any title. In the *Nyiiyiinusiira, Satµghabhadra
calls him "the Sthavira", and, when refuting the Dar~tantika-Sautrantika
tenets, makes him his main target of attack.
ii. As for the term and definition of Sautriintika, Yasomitra states the following
(WOG.1 l.29f.): "What is the meaning of 'Sautrantika'? Those who take the siitra as
the authority, and do not take the siistra as the authority." However, Dhammajoti
(SD.202f.) and Kato show (DD.40) that this definition is not intended to be a suf-
ficient one, since the distinction between the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika is
not merely one pertaining to the attitude with regard to the Abhidharma siistra,
but entails the central Sarvastivadin tenet of sarviistitva, which is rejected by the
Sautrantikas.
Kato thinks (DD.38f.) that the earliest evidence of the Sautrantikas as a distinct
group is in the AKB where it occurs nineteen times, whereby Vasubandhu almost
always agrees, whereas the Dar~tantikas occur only three times, whereby Vasu-
bandhu disagrees in all three cases. But (DD.40) "Kato notes that there are passages
attributed to the Sautrantikas in the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya that do not agree with
SrTiata's own views. Therefore, Kato concludes that it is best not to construe the
appellation 'Sautrantika' as entailing either a distinct ordination lineage or a defined
set of doctrinal positions." He suggests instead that the appellation "Sautrantika"
could have been used to encompass a broad range of individual opinions that con-
form to the general guidelines mentioned above.
iii. As for the origin and significance of the "term" Diir~fiintika, commentators
interpret it differently (DD.37): "K'uei-chi, whose opinion became definitive in the
Chinese and Japanese commentarial traditions, suggests that it derives either from
comparisons-dr~fanta drawn between Kumaralata, the reputed founder of the
Dar~tantikas, and the light of the sun, or from the name of his text, the *Dr~{anta-
parikti. Yasomitra also explains the name 'Dar~tantika' as indicating their practice
of employing examples (dr~fiinta)." The earliest references to the Dar~tantikas occurs
LODRO SANGPO 175
in the Vibhii~a compendia, where the term occurs eighty-six times. Some scholars
think that the connotation of the term is pejorative used in contempt by an opponent,
for example, the Kasmira Sarvastivadins in the *Mahtivibha~a, to refer to those who
rely incorrectly upon the invalid authority of conventional examples.
· Cox comments (DD.39) that as a result of his investigations, "Kato corroborates the
view of Jean Przyluski that the terms 'Dar~tantika' and 'Sautrantika' simply repre-
sent different perspectives from which the same group can be seen: the term
'Dar~tantika' has a negative connotation and is used by opponents, such as the
Kasmira Sarvastivadins, to suggest the group's reliance upon the invalid authority of
conventional examples; the term 'Sautrantika' has a positive connotation and is used
by the group itself to refer to its own views'\ On the other hand, Saqighabhadra, who
uses predominantly "Dar~tantika", though also frequently "Sautrantika", seems to be,
according to Kato, the first to identify the two terms with one another, as does also
Yasomitra several centuries later, though then with no negative connotation.
Dhammajoti, on the other hand, does not agree with the view (influenced by
Przyluski's theory) that "the term Dar~tantika in itself' has a derogatory or pejorative
implication in the Vibhii~a. He states (SD.185):
My objections to Przy1uski's view can be summarized as follows:
a. They are quoted as "Venerable Dar~tantika masters" ( !I PfilJ- :f ;ft)-
hardly pejorative;
b. they are not the only group objected to as regards the use of similes;
c. the Vaibha~ika-s themselves use similes quite frequently as doctrinal
proofs;
d. as Jayatilleke argues [in his Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, 381f.],
Przyluski is topsy-turvy in claiming that in the Buddhist tradition, dr~ta
[LS: "what is seen"] (> dr~ttinta > dtir~ttintika) is inferior to sruta [LS:
"what is heard"];
e. the interchangeable use of "Sautrantika" and "Dar~tantika" is attested
only around Vasubandhu's time.
f. Very recently, it has further been pointed out that the Dar~tantika
leader, Kumaralata entitled his own book as Dr~tiintapailkti, and it is
hardly imaginable that he would have chosen such a title had dr~tiinta/
Dar~ftintika been treated by his opponents as a pejorative term.
iv. Furthermore, Dhammajoti (SD.186f.) distinguishes (1) the early Dar~tantikas,
with Dharmatrata and Buddhadeva as the most eminent, and (2) the later Dar~tantika-
Sautrantikas of the post-Mahiivibhii~ti-stistra period, and he states that the key factor
in considering their relationship is the doctrinal position concerning sarvtistitva and
that the latter are indisputably Vibhajyavadins while the former are Sarvastivadins
[see our discussion of these schools above]. He goes on:
Xuan Zang's tradition tells us that Kumaralata was the "original master" of
the Sautrantika. But even this Dar~tantika guru of the post-Vibhii~a era•
holds the sarvastitva standpoint [or the view of tri-temporal existence].•b
Harivarman, the author of *Tattvasiddhi, who, according to tradition, was
his pupil, had, on the other hand, become a Vibhajyavadin. From this fact,
we should learn to be more cautious not to hastily equate the early with
the later Dar~tantika-s. Moreover, Buddhadeva and Dharmatrata, two early
Dar~tantika masters, are well known to subscribe to the sarvastitva doctrine.
• ADCP.33: "The Dar~tantika leader Kumaralata must have been instrumental in
the final stage of the transition from the Dar~tantika to the Sautrantika."
b Cf. Abhidharmadfpa, 277, and also Frauwallner's comments on this passage,
SAL.207f.
Dhammajoti continues (SD.189):
[But,] there had inqeed been some confusion--even on the part of the
ancients---concerning the sectarian affiliation of "the Bhadanta". In the
MVS, this term generally refers to Dharmatrata whom everybody knew
as a Dar~tantika leader. But because a major section of the later-time
Sautrantika-such as that led by Sri:lata-advocated doctrines derived from
or heavily influenced by him, some commentators seeme_d to think of
him ·as a Sautrantika or "one leaning toward the Sautrantika". Secondly, for
others, the Bhadanta Dharmatrata-and for that matter the Dar~tantika-s
in the MVS-was a Vaibha~ika/Sarviistivadin, sharing the thesis of sarvasti-
tva. Thus, to say the least, it is certain that the ancient did not indiscrimi-
natively equate "Diir~tantika" with "Sautriintika".
v. To give a clearer presentation of Dhammajoti's views on the development
of the various factions of the above mentioned two groups (i.e., earlier and later
Dar~tantikas) in the context of the Sarvastivii.dins, in the following longer quote we
will reproduce various pertinent sections from his SA.IV.74ff:
The early Diir~tiintika masters were known for their active effort in popu-
larizing the Buddha's teachings, employing poetry and possibly other lit-
erary devices in the world in the process, and were particularly skilled in
utilizing similes and allegories in demonstrating the Buddhist doctrines. It
was most probably for this reason that they came to be known as the
Diir~tantikas. They were also noted as meditators and proponents of medita-
tion. At the same time, we see in the MVS some of their masters-such as
LODRO SANGPO 177
Dharmatriita and Buddhadeva-as being engaged in controverting the A.bhi-

dharmika doctrines. It is therefore conceivable that, broadly speaking, there
existed two sections of the early Diir~tiintikas-one more pre-occupied with
popular preaching and meditation, the other with doctrinal disputation. It
was probably from the latter section that the Sautriintika evolved. In this
process of disputation, they also seem to have contributed to the develop-
ment of Buddhist logic, as the Vaibhii~ikas, themselves proud of being in
conformity to logic, spoke of the Sautriintikas as being arrogant in their
logical skill (tarkiibhimiina). [ ... ]
From the beginning, divergent viewpoints within the [Sarviistiviida] school
were found and even tolerated-as long as they did not directly contra-
vene the thesis of Sarviistiviida. To take just a few examples: Dharmatriita,
Buddhadeva, Vasumitra and Gho~aka-the so called "four great A.bhi-
dharmikas of the Sarviistiviida"-each offered a different explanation as to
how, given the theory that a dharma exists as an everlasting dravya, 'the
difference in the three periods of time can be accounted for. [ ... ]
But since the compilation of the lfiiinaprasthiina-siistra (JPS), the Kiismirian
Sarviistiviidins upheld the supreme authority of the JPS system and raised
this work to the status of being the Buddha's words. As time went on, they
assumed the position of orthodoxy and became increasingly dogmatic and
intolerant toward all other views not compatible with the JPS system. Partly
to consolidate their position as the orthodox Sarviistiviidins, they eventually
compiled the encyclopedic MVS which purports to be a commentary on JPS.
In it, besides their own views, those of the following Sarviistiviida schools of
thought were also cited and usually criticized and rejected: The Diir~tiintikas,
the western masters (piisciitya; also called "the Venerables of the west"
W:ff :¢::j\f-; and "the western srama,:ia-s"), the foreign masters (bahirdesaka;
also called "the masters outside Kasmira", and the "Giindhiirian masters").
Even the so-called "old Kiismirian masters" were not spared.
Subsequent to the compilation of the MYS, the orthodox Kiismirians who
based themselves on it were known as the Vaibhii~ikas .... The term
"Vaibhii~ikas" eventually came to connote the orthodox Sarviistiviidins,
based mainly-but not exclusively-in Kiismira ....
This dogmaticism and intolerance of the Vaibhii~ikas inevitably brought
about a reaction from the other Sarviistiviidins. On the one hand, it resulted
in the split of the Sarviistiviida school into two major camps-the eastern
one representing the Kiismirian school and the western one representing the
Gandharian school-although it would seem that not all Kasmirian Abhi-

dharmikas were as orthodox or dogmatic as the professed Vaibha~ikas. On
the other hand, it compelled the satra-centered Dar~tantikas to co-operate
with other holders of heterodox views, including the Mahayana Sunyata-
vadins, prevailing around the first and second centuries C.E., and finally to
ch:mge over to the "present-only-exist" standpoint. ... It was in this process
that, a section among their radicals, the Dar~tantika, eventually evolved into
the Sautriintika.
Although the appellations "Gandharian masters", "western masters" and
"foreign masters" may suggest a considerable difference in the geographical
locations of these masters, in actual fact, they refer mainly to the Sarvasti-
vada masters west of Kasmira-the western masters--of Gandhara and
Parthia, with Gandhiira as the center ....
The western masters too studied JPS, although with a more critical attitude
than the KasmirianS. They too, being Sarvastivadin Abhidharmikas, were
not really opposed to the Kasmirians in a sectarian sense. The MVS com-
pilers held them in considerable regard, calling them "the honored ones of
the west" ....
But the work which most deeply influenced the basic attitude of these
western masters was the Prajiiapti-stistra (PrS) whose importance for the
Sarvastivadins was next only to the JPS. A new trend of development was
inherited from the tradition of the PrS, tending toward organization, the
essential and conciseness.
y. We should now be in a better position to deal with the second part of our
thorny issue, namely: Vasubandhu's relationship to the SarvastivadinsNaibhii~ikas,
Dar~tantikas, Sautrantikas and the Mahayana/Yogacara. What school did he belong
to when he was writing the AKB?
First of all, when looking at the above discussions regarding the Sarvastivadins,
Dar~tantikas, Sautrantikas, and to a lesser degree the Yogacaras, it should now be
clearer that answering these questions from the perspective of the traditional frame-
work of neatly distinguished schools is too simplified, both (1) when looking at
each school (and their representatives) separately, as well as (2) when looking at the
borders and interrelationship between the schools (and their representatives), par-
ticularly in a historical context. In other words, we would have to be more specific
about what kind of SarvastivadinsNaibhii~ikas, Dar~tantikas, etc., we are talking
about.
LODRO SANGPO 179
But even if we would accept this traditional framework, modem scholarship is run-
ning into further problems in regard to the views most commonly held in the past
regarding Vas~bandhu's own philosophical beliefs and relation to the mentioned
schools, which Hirakawa (1973-1978, v. 1: xi-xii) summarizes as follows:
It is generally accepted among scholars that the author of the Kosa was
ordained in the Sarvastivada School, but his thoughts were closer to those of
the Sautrantika School. The doctrine of the Sautrantika School is based on
"the prajfiapti" (provisional factor or provisional designation] which in-
cludes the teaching of bfja; therefore, the developed form of this doctrine
can be related to the doctrine of Vijfianavada. It does not necessarily mean
that the Sautrantika School itself developed into the Vijfianavada, but it can
be easily assumed that the author of the Kosa belonged to the Sautrantika
school [and] later changed to the Vijfianavada, for there is a certain common
ground between the doctrines.
Robert Kritzer comments (RCY A.198) that "according to this way of thinking, Vasu-
bandhu wrote the Abhidharmakosabha~ya when he was a Sautrantika, the Tri"f!lsika
when he was a Yogacara, and texts like the Karmasiddhiprakara,:za and the Pratrtya-
samutpadavyakhya at some time in between, while he was presumably in the process
of conversion from Sautrantika to Yogacara".
J. This account has been put into question by some modem scholars in the last
twenty years who think, for example Kritzer, that they have found evidence that
already in the AKB we find positions identified in the Sanskrit text as Sautrantika the
majority of which have correspondences in the Yogacarabhiimi, which is supposedly
to be a Mahayana text. Thus Kritzer states (JIABS.26.2, p. 373):
I assume that the Yogacarabhiimi was available to Vasubandhu in a form
similar to the one we know, i.e., with at least the Maulfbhiimi and the
Viniscayasa"f!lgraha,:zf included in one text. If Vasubandhu was not familiar
with the Yogacarabhilmi, then we would have to assume that he learned his
Sautrantika ideas from the same sources as the authors of the corresponding
passages in the Yogacarabhiimi. As we have seen [previously in my article]
written records of these sources, if they ever existed, are no longer extant.
Kritzer acknowledges (VY.xxxvii) that "with the exception of bfja, one can find
none of the characteristic terms of the Y ogacara among the above correspondences
[between the Abhidharmakosabha~ya and the Yogacarabhilmi, as discussed in his
article]: words such as alayavijfiana, vijfiaptimatra, and trisvabhava simply do not
appear. Nor is there any explicit statement of Mahayana themes, such as the empti-
ness of dharmas or the three bodies of the Buddha."
But his research brings him to the following conclusion (RCY A.19f.):
Vasubandhu is famous for upholding the Sautrantika position when it differs
from Sarvastivada. However, the fact that opinions that he identifies as
Sautrantika can often be found in the Yogiiciirabhumi has not been remarked
upon until recently. Moreover, in at least several _cases, when he does favor
Sarvastivada over Sautrantika (or Dar~tantika), the Yogiiciirabhumi position
also is in agreement with Sarvastivada .... I [Kritzer] suspect that Vasu-
bandhu 's so-called Sautrantika opinions are, in fact, Y ogacara abhidharma
in disguise. If this is true, it raises questions about the meaning of the terms
Sautrantika and Yogacara as well as about the definition of Mahayana.
Furthermore (2005.xxix):
[O]ne explanation for the correspondences between Vasubandhu's Sautrantika
positions and passages in the Yogiiciirabhumi is that the authors of both texts
rely on a common source that represented an intermediate stage between
Sarvastivada and fully developed Yogacara, based on the concept of iilaya-
vijiiiina . ... My own [Kritzer's] conclusion is that in the Abhidharmakosa-
bhii~ya Vasubandhu uses the term Sautrantika to designate positions in the
Yogiiciirabhi1mi that 'he prefers to those of orthodox Sarvastivada. As I argue
elsewhere (1999: 203-4; 2003b), Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya
adjusts the traditional Sarvastivadin abhidharma so that it no longer conflicts
with the central theories of Yogiiciira. Unlike in the Y ogacara texts attrib-
uted to him, his purpose in the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya is not to propound or
defend these theories. Therefore, he does not mention iilayavijfiiina, ....
2. Kritzer's view does not go unchallenged. Dhammajoti, who very much wel-
comes the new research, has a more conservative approach since he does not find
the "new" results all that compelling yet. He thinks that the cases put forth by
Kritzer could be interpreted differently.
For example, in regard to Kritzer's contention (JIABS.26.2, p. 379f.) that the iilaya-
vijfiii.na doctrine is to be expounded only at the highest level of truth, whereas the
bfja doctrine, at the provisional level, Dhammajoti comments (SD.205) that in this
context Kritzer also refers to the distinction made by Vasubandhu between abhi-
dharma in the conventional sense and in the absolute sense (piiramiirthika), sug-
gesting (JIABS.26.2, p. 379f.) that "from Vasubandhu's point of view, although
most of the Sarvastivada abhidharma that he describes without criticism in the
Abhidharmakosabhii~ya is conducive to pure wisdom, it is not necessarily a state-
ment of all that is known by pure wisdom".
LODRO SANGPO 181
But Dhammajoti replies (SD.205) that even the Vaibha~ika would have no problem
with this observation and that "the said distinction is in fact not Vasubandhu's
own, but [it is] based oh the explanations given in the Vibha~a [MVS, 2c, 3b], and
[that] Saiµghabhadra [T 29, 329a-b] expounds on it without the slightest protest". He
thus sees no justification for the assertion that Vasubandhu intentionally avoids the
alayavijiiana doctrine and prefers to think that Vasubandhu himself, in fact, did not
believe in it at the stage of composing the AKB. But he does not leave it there and
proceeds to specify his own views:
Yin Shun [Study, 678ff.] explains Vasubandhu's initial reluctance to accept
the iilayavijfiana doctrine as follows: Vasubandhu basically accepted the
Abhidharmika doctrines pertaining to the citta-caitta. At the initial stage of
the develop111ent of the iilayavijfiiina, it did not seem acceptable to Vasu-
bandhu that' the iilayavijfiiina as a vijfiana could be without associated
caitta-s. It is in fact out of the same kind of consideration that he preferred
the doctrine of the mutual seeding of nama and riipa, rather than the
Dar~iantika-Sautrantika doctrine that in nirodhasamiipatti there can be a
citta without any caitta. But when later on (at the stage of the Karmasiddhi)
it came to be articulated that the iilaya-vijfiiina too had associated caitta-s,
the doctrine became acceptable to him.
Similarly, in regard to many of the other passages discussed in Kritzer's Sautriintika
in the Abhidharmakosabha~ya article, which Dhammajoti discusses in his Sarviisti-
viida, Dar~fiintika, Sautrantika and Yogiiciira-Some Reflections on Their Interrela-
tion, Dhammajoti states (SD.198) tl:iat "Vasubandhu's sources in most cases could
very well be the MVS or some other sources that are now no more extant, rather than
necessarily the Yogiiciirabhiimi-siistra".
3. But in the context of the identity of the Sautrantika, Dhammajoti also pursues
the following issue in his article (SD.206): "If the Sautrantika cannot be considered
to belong to the Sarvastivada school ·and is a relatively independent school in its
I
own right, why is it that, as Lamotte points out, no Sautrantika monastery has ever
been attested?" He replies by referring to Yin Shun's interesting views that the
Sautrantikas failed to establish their organized monastic strongholds for the follow-
ing reasons (SD.206):
i. They emerged too late (to be properly established as a distinct sect),
[while] the Buddhist sects with their siitra-vinaya as basis were continuing
to thrive after flourishing for some 500 years, having long established their
specific area of propagation and monastic system. The fact that the Vinaya
was not the Sautrantika emphasis also did not help in this regard.
ii. Doctrinally, they tended to (a) be liberal, resulting in the lack of unity
and stability; (b) merge with other sects in the process of breaking away
from the Sarvastivada, which in tum added to the inconsistency in their
tenets; (c) be transformed by the then well-flourishing Mahayana thoughts of
the Siinyatavada and Yogacara, given the compatibility of some of their
tenets with those of the Mahayana--especially Yogacara that was nearing
doctrinal maturation.
iii. The early Dar~tantika-s and the Abhidharmika-s were at first mutually
benefiting, and each in their own way-the former being influential relig-
ious preachers and meditation masters, and the latter, articulate and thorough
theorists-contributing to the common cause of the Sarvastivada. But once
the later Dar~tantika themselves had turned into full-fledged theorists claim-
ing to be siltra-prama,:iika and were constantly engaged in anti-Abhidharmika
confrontation, they began to lose the charisma that they once had in the
hearts of the devotee whose support was needed in establishing regional
strongholds of their own.
4. But then again, even though Dhammajoti is more conservative in regard to
the Yogacara influence on Vasubandhu in the AKB, Dhammajoti agrees with
Nobuyoshi Yamabe's suggestion (see nABS.26.2, p. 243) that "the Dar~tantika or
Sautrahtika tradition was fairly closely linked to meditative traditions". He also
agrees, in the main, with Yamabe's provisional conclusions, namely, that "the Yoga-
cara tradition and the Sautrantika-like elements were almost inseparably interconnec-
ted long before the compilation of the Yogiiciirabhilmi". He then specifies (SD.195):
The ea,rly Dar~tantika-s and (Sarvastivadin) Yogacara-s all belonged to the
same Sarvastivada tradition originally. The term Yogacara master (:fi1:hu$ili)
occurs about 140 times in MVS. These masters are the meditators whose
primary concern is spiritual praxis and realization, generally well respected
by even the Abhidharmika-s .... Against this backdrop, we may understand
that Vasubandhu would have been familiar with doctrines propagated within
the larger Sarvastivada lineage, some of which later developed into the so-
called Sautrantika doctrines, and others, [imo] Yogacara doctrines. Of
course, being within the same milieu, the Dar~tantika-Sautrantika and the
Mahayanic Yogacara-particularly those who are praxis-oriented-must
have been mutually influenced doctrinally. Accordingly, it should not be
surprising to find doctrinal parallels between what Vasubandhu identifies as
Sautrantika doctrines in AKB on the one hand, and some of the doctrines in
the Yogacarabhilmi on the other.
LODRO SANGPO 183
He then comments that this does not necessarily imply that Vasubandhu bases his
Sautrantika doctrines on the Yogiiciirabhumi and that "while not ruling out the pos-
sibility entirely at this stage, and not contesting that Vasubandhu was probably
familiar with the Yogiiciirabhilmi", he concludes that the parallels presented so far
are mostly unconvincing.
5. What school did Vasubandhu belong to when he was writing the AKB?
Dhammajoti answers as follows (SD.200):
The Yogacara-s at least in part evolved from the praxis-oriented Sautrantika-s
who in turn evolved from the early Dar~tantika-s. In this process, it is pos-
I
J- sible that, given the attitude of openness to non-orthodox doctrines among

the early Dar~tantika-s-as witnessed in the MVS-and their predilection
toward the authority of meditation experience, some of them had been in-
fluenced (and reacted to) the then flourishing Mahayana tenets such as
Sunyatii, becoming perhaps the early members of the "Mahayanic" Yoga-
cara. But judging by the earliest portion of the Yogiiciirabhilmi-siistra (maulr
bhumi), even these early "Mahayanic Yogacarins" were still realists ....
Others within the Sautrantika lineage, who were in some way more "resil-
ient" to the new doctrines and ideals, remained as "Hinayana" Sautrantika-s,
holding on in particular to their form of realism. This latter group seemed
to have been greatly influenced by Bhadanta Dharmatrata (and later on
also by Kumaralata and others), and in Vasubandhu's time h~d Srilata as
a prominent leader. It is this group that preserved-sometimes with slight
modification (e.g., SrTiata's-doctrine that there are only the three caitta-s
vedanii, sarrijfiii and cetanii; all the other caitta-s being cetanii-vise~a')-
many of the Dar~tantika doctrines in the MVS.
In the AKB, Vasubandhu himself seems to be generally partisan to this latter
Hinayana group. But he too was evidently open-minded, of which fact the
AKB is a testimony, and accordingly did not seem to have become exclu-
sively partisan to the tenets of any group as such-be it those of Hinayana
or Yogacara Sautrantika or Sarvastivada.... As another illustration, Vasu-
bandhu is known to accept some of the Sarvastivada caitta-s, and the notion
of sarriprayoga of citta-caitta-s~differing from SrTiata. This also necessarily
means that he accepts the sahabhu-hetu doctrine, which SrTiata rejects.
Furthermore, he disagrees with a Sautrantika view-held also by Snlata-
that a subtle citta exists in the nirodhasamiipatti, and endorses the Purva-
iiciirya-s' view of the mutual seeding of niima and rupa, a view that is found
in YBS. Yet at times, Sarµghabhadra has to protest that he is partisan to

Sriliita.
Dhammajoti summarizes (SD.201):
The Vasubandhu of AKB [ ... ] belonged to the Hinayana Sautriintika school
of thought, while also maintaining allegiance to certain acceptable Sarviisti-
viidin tenets, and at the same time was open to the developing Y ogiiciirin
tenets. This is not surprising considering his own doctrinal background, as
well as the fact that the Y ogiiciira evolved from the broad Sarviistiviida
lineage. He must have been quite well exposed to the evolving Yogiiciira
tenets in North-western India where he had been active.
Moreover (SD.202):
Vasubandhu, subscribing to the Vibhajyaviidin standpoint as he does, can-
not qualify as a Sarviistiviidin.
For Vasubandhu's specific views held in the AKB, see Dhammajoti's Summary.
6. LVP's additional attributions and Kritzer's identified passages.

Since modern scholarship is still in the midst of sorting out who is who, who says
what and who influenced whom, and since La Vallee Poussin-often basing him-
self on Saeki Kiokuga, who in turn draws his attributions mainly from those of the
seventh-century Chinese commentators, for example, P'u-kuang, etc.-sometimes
attributes a statement to, for example, Sautriintika, when neither the Chinese nor
Tibetan translation does so, based on the Pradhan Sanskrit edition we decided to
identify these added attributions by round brackets.
For similar reasons, we also endnoted all of Kritzer's identified passages from his.
systematic comparative study of the AKB and the Yogacarabhumi.
7. The structure of the Abhidharmakosabha$ya

This will be discussed in the first endnote at the beginning of section B of chapter 1:
"Discernment of the factors (dharma); F 6-102; chapters one to nine." See also
Dhammajoti's Summary.
8. Outline of this introductory endnote:

1. Brief outline of what has been discussed so far by Lamotte, La Vallee
Poussin ~d Dhammajoti.
2. The new additions in our publication and helpful new sources:
LODRO SANGPO 185
i. Summary of the doctrines: Grousset, LVP' s articles and books, Electronic

Appendix, our endnotes and their sources, etc.
ii. New updated bibliography.
iii. The newly inserted outline and headlines and their sources.
iv; Further additions to the translation ,and endnotes: Gokhale's Sanskrit
root verses; Tibetan root text; inserted original technical Sanskrit terms;
inserted numbers.
3. Influences on our translation and its endnotes:
i. The three main influences and secondary influences.
ii. The specific influence from Willemen's and Dessein's translations of
two Hrdaya treatises.
4. The stratagems of LVP's translation, of our translation and of Hsilan-tsang's
translation. Biographical data on Hsilan-tsang and La Vallee Poussin.
5. What further needs to be addressed to facilitate further access for the reader
of this annotated translation:
i. The life of Vasubandhu according to Paramiirtha.
ii. Various issues surrounding Vasubandhu as discussed by contemporary
scholarship.
a. Which works can reasonably be attributed to Vasubandhu the Kosa-
kiira?
b. The alternative hypotheses of one or two Vasubandhus, his life
time, his relationship to Asa.Iiga, the problems of the information
available on the relevant Gupta dynastic history.
c. Vasubandhu's relationship to the SarviistiviidinsNaibhii~ikas, the
Diir~tiintikas, the Sautriintikas and the Mahiiyiina/Yogiiciira. What
school did Vasubandhu belong to when he was writing the Abhi-
dharmakosabhii~ya (AKB)? Who were these schools? How did they
interact or influence each other?
a. The traditional presentation of the four representative schools
of Buddhism:
1. The Sarviistiviidins.
2. The Sautriintikas.
3. The Yogiiciiras.
4. [The Miidhyamikas (omitted)]
13. The origins of (1.) the Sarviistiviidins and (2.) Diir~tiintikas and
Sautriintikas, and what defines them.
y. Vasubandhu's relationship to the SarviistiviidinsNaibhii~ikas,
Diir~tiintikas, Sautriintikas and the Mahiiy~a/Yogiiciira. What
school did he belong to when he was writing ~he AKB?
6. L VP's additional attributions and Kritzer's identified passages.

7. The structure of the Abhidharmakosabhii.$ya.
8. Outline of this introductory endnote.
9. Acknowledgement$ and Thanks

It has been a great honor and learning experience to work on this translation which
started more than ten years ago. It goes without saying that such an ·undertaken
cannot be done alone. Being a very good example of the "less gifted ones", it is thus
time for me to say thanks to the people who at the various stages of this project have
inspired me, encouraged me to go on and supported me in their own unique way to
bring this project to completion.
Despite deceiving outside looks, but actually not being much of a religious person, I
would not be of much use as a monk without the ongoing spiritual support (some-
times better called "babysitting") of my teachers. I therefore would first of all like to
thank my root teacher, the late Venerable Trungpa Rinpoche, for the very original
inspiration to start this project; the Venerable Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche, my
abbot, for encouraging me in this inspiration and my present personal teacher,
Dzogchen Po,nlop Rinpoche, for his modern-day pith instruction: "Back things up!"
Next, I would like to acknowledge my deep gratitude towards Bhikkhu KL
Dhammajoti with whom I have been in contact since 2006 and whose writings have
helped to raise this translation to a completely new level.
Further I would like to thank Collett Cox, Ernst Steinkellner, Alexander von Rospatt,
Anne MacDonald, James Duerlinger, Paul Dessein, Peter Skilling, Bill Waldron and
Karl Brunnholzl for being true Professor Bodhisattvas, willing to help and support
where thete was need.
In terms of hands-on-help, there is no real way that I can thank Bhik~ui:i.I Migme
Chadron, my friend and editor, i.e., "partner-in-crime", for so many years, who when
still doing research as a Chemist at the University of Alberta acquired ~ll these great
French translations of Buddhist texts, including La Vallee Poussin's AKB.
I also want to thank Bhik~ui:i.I Lodro Palmo, member of the Chokyi Gyatso
Translation Committee, for always being ready to help with some of the "French
puzzles" of the translation; Mildred Carrigan, my interlibrary loans "fairy"; Ane
Sangmo, who helped with some of the proofreading; Mike Peters, computer "god" in
Sydney; Stephanie Johnston, for cover design tips, and my Shedra students for being
guinea pigs for testrunning parts of the translation.
LODRO SANGPO 187
Last but not least, I would like to thank my late father and mother and my family as
well as my. monastic community of Gampo Abbey for "letting me get away" with
who I am and with this work.
May it be of benefit!
Abbreviations
A Atthasiilinf: Buddhaghosa
ACP The Abhidharma Controversy on Perception: KL Dhammajoti
AD Abhidhannadfpa with Vibhii~iiprabhiivrtti: Jaini
ADCP Abhidhanna Doctrines and Controversies on Perception: KL Dhammajoti
ADP Akiira and Direct Perception: Vaibhii~ika versus Sautrlintika: KL Dhammajoti
ADV Abhidharmadrpa (with Vibhii~iiprabhavrtti)
AH Abhidharmahrdaya: DhannasrI
AHV Abhidhannahrdaya-vyiikhyii: Dhannatriita
AIP Akiira and Immediate Perception: KL Dhammajoti
AKB Abhidharmakosabhii~ya: Vasubandhu
AKB(C) Chinese translation of AKB by Xuan Zang (T 1558)
AKBh Abhidharmako§abhii~ya: Vasubandhu
AKBP Abhidhannakosabhii~yam by Louis de La Vallee Poussin: Leo M. Pruden
A.K.V. Spufarthii Abhidhannakosavyiikhyii: Yasomitra
AKVy Spuffirthii Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii: Yasomitra
AmRS *Abhidhanniimrta-rasa-siistra (T 1553)
AMS The asubhii meditation in the Sarviistiviida: KL Dhamrrl.ajoti
AMSV The Apramii,:ia Meditation in the Sarviistiviida: KL Dhammajoti
AMVS Abhidhannamahavibhii~iisiistra
AN Anguttaranikiiya
AS Abhidharmasamuccaya: Asanga
ASA Analytical Study of the Abhidhannakosa: Sukomal Chaudhuri
ASB Abhidharmika Schools of Buddhism: Collett Cox
ATA Attainment through Abandonment: Collett Cox
ATV The"Atomic-Theory ofVasubandhu: Kajiyama
AV Alayavijfiiina: Lambert Schmithausen
Avatiira *Abhidharmiivatiira: Skandhila
BC Buddhist Cosmology: W. Randolph Kloetzli
BCO Buddhist Cosmology. Philosophy and Origins: Akira Sadakata
BD Buddhist Dictionary: Nyanatiloka
BDB The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature: Har Dayal
BDE A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: Thomas A. Kochumuttom
BDM The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness: Alexander von Rospatt
BE Buddhist Ethics: Jamgon Kongtrill Lodro Thaye
BEFEO Bulletin de l'Ecole Franraise d'Extreme-Orient
BHSD Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary: Franklin Edgerton
BL Buddhist Logic, Vol. I & II: Theodore Stcherbatsky
BM Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness (Routledge): Alexander von Rospatt
Abbreviations 189
BMC The Buddhist Monastic Code I: Thiinissaro Bhikkhu

BPUF Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux: Satkari Mookerjee
Brethren Psalms of the Brethren (Theragiitha): C.A.F. Rhys Davids
BSOS Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies
BTAC Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization: Ed.: Leslie S. Kawamura and Keith
Scott (ed.)
BTI Buddhist Thought in India: Edward Conze
BU The Buddhist Unconscious: William Waldron
CBN Conception of Buddhist Nirvii,:ia: Theodore Stcherbatsky
cc Cosmogony and Cosmology (Buddhist): Louis de La Vallee Poussin
CCB Central Conception of Buddhism: Theodore Stcherbatsky
CDS The Citta-caitta Doctrine of Srfliitti: KL Dhammajoti
CEGS Ceaseless Echoes of the Great Silence: Khenpo Palden Sherab, Rinpoche
Ch. Chinese
CM.6 Crystal Mirror, Volume VI: Dhanna Publishing
CMP The Chapter on the Mundane Path (Laukikamiirga) in the Sriivakabhumi: Florin
Deleanu
Compendium Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammattha-sangaha): Shwe Zan Aung and
C.A.F. Rhys Davids
CPBS Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies: Padmanabh S. Jaini
CPL Clarifying the Path to Liberation: Gedun Drup
CT Collected Topics: Achiirya Tenpa Gyaltsen
CTA Cutting Through Appearances: Jeffrey Hopkins
CWSL Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun: Hsiian Tsang, transl. Wei Tat
DA Documents d'Abhidharma: La Controverse du Temps: Louis de La Vallee
Poussin
DAE The Defects in an Arhat's Enlightenment: KL Dhammajoti
DB The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (Sa1µyutta Nikiiya): Bhikkhu Bodhi
DCO Demonstration of Consciousness Only, in: Three Texts on Consciousness Only:
Francis H. Cook
DD Disputed Dharmas. Earliest Buddhist. Theories on Existence: Collett Cox
DDSA Digital Dictionaries of South Asia: The Pali Text Society's Pali-English
Dictionary.
DEBCK Development in the Early Buddhist Concept of Kamma/Karma: James Paul
McDermott
DhCPS Dharmacakrapravartanasiltra
Dhp Dhammapada
Dialogues Dialogues of the Buddha (translation of Dfgha Nikiiya): C.A.F. Rhys-Davids
DIS Digniiga on the Interpretation of Signs: Richard P. Hayes
190 Abbreviations
DKB The Doctrine of Karma in Buddhism: A Study: Y. Krishan, in Amala Prajfia

DKS *Dhatu-kaya-sastra, r,J &e:l!~,b;!.jj, fi!..ii (T 1540)
DN Dfgha Nikaya: Maurice Walshe
DO Dependent Origination: Its Elaboration in Early Sarvastivadin Abhidharma
Texts: Collett Cox
DOP Dignaga, On Perception: Masaaki Hattori
DS The Doctrine of the Six-stage Mindfulness of Breathing: K.L. Dhammajoti
DSS *Dharma-skandha-sastra, r,J &e:l!~5'!-!.ifi!..ii (T 1537)
EBP Early Buddhist Philosophy: Alfonso Verdu
EBT The Early Buddhist Tradition and Ecological Ethics: Lambert Schmithausen
EEPR Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and Religion
EIP Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Ed.: Karl Potter
EIP.II EIP: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaiseeyika
up to Gailgesa: (Ed.) Karl P. Potter
EIP.III EIP: Advaita Vedanta up to Sarp.kara and His Pupils: (Ed.) Karl P. Potter
EIP.IV EIP: Siirp.khya. A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy: (Ed.) Gerald James
Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya
EIP.V EIP: The Philosophy of the Grammarian: Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni
Raja
EIP.VI EIP: Indian Philosophical Analysis. Nyaya-Vaiseeyika from Ganges to
Raghuniitha Siromai:ii: (Ed.) Karl P. Potter and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya
EIP.VII EIP: Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.O.: (Ed.) Karl P. Potter with Robert E.
Buswell, jr, Padmanabh S. Jaini and Noble Ross Reat
EIP.VIII EIP: Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.O.: (Ed.) Karl P. Potter
EIP.IX EIP: Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.O.: (Ed.) Karl P. Potter
\
EMA Essence of Metaphysics. Abhidharmahrdaya: Charles Willemen
EPL Elucidating the Path to Liberation: David Patt
EPS Rangjung Yeshe Wiki Dharma Dictionary
ER Encyclopedia of Religion: Ed.: Mircea Eliade
ESA Essence of Scholasticism. Abhidharmahrdaya: Charles Willemen
ESD Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine. Skandhila's Abhidharmavatara: KL
Dhammajoti /
EV The Entrance to tfie Vinaya: Vajirafiai:iavarorasa
F French page number
FCO From Category to Ontology: the Changing Role of Dharma in Sarvastivada
Abhidharma: Collett Cox
FDP Foundations of Dharmakfrti's Philosophy: John D. Dunne
FRC From Reductionism to Creativity: Herbert V. Guenther
G The Text of the Abhidharmakosakarika of Vasubandhu: V. V. Gokhale
Abbreviations 191
GGB Gewalt und Gewaltlosigkeit im Buddhismus: Zur Einfiihrung: Lambert

Schmithausen
GIP Geschichte der indischen Philosophie: Erich Frauwallner
HB History of Buddhism by Bu-ston: E. Obermiller
HIB History of Indian Buddhism: Hirakawa Akira. Transl. and ed.: Paul Groner
HIP History of Indian Philosophy: Erich Frauwallner
HoIB History of Indian Buddhism: Etienne Lamotte
IA Index to the Abhidharmakosabhi'i~ya: Hirakawa
IBP Researches in Indian & Buddhist Philosophy (Ed.: Ram Karan Sharma)
IBTP . Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons: James Duerlinger
IMM In the Mirror of Memory: Ed.: Janet Gyatso
IP Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy: Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
ISBP The inner science of Buddhist practice: Vasubandhu's Summary of the Five
Heaps with commentary by Sthiramati: Artemus B. Engle
IT Impermanence and Time. The Contemplation of Impermanence.< anityatii) in (he
Yogiiciira Tradition of Maitreya and Asaliga: Alexander von Rospatt
JA Journal Asiatique
JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society
J.As. Journal Asiatique
JASB Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
JIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy
JPS Jniinaprasthi'ina-siistra, )liiJ Et :i!liHf t' ~ (T 1544)
JPTS Journal of the Pali Text Society
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
K Karma: Louis de La Vallee Poussin, in: Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics
KA Kusala and Akusala (forthcoming): Lambert Schmithausen
KJ mKhas 'jug: Lama Mipham, Rinpoche
KL Knowledge and Liberation: Anne Klein
KvU Kathi'ivatthu
LA Logic in the Abhidharma-mahi'ivibhi'i~a: KL Dhammajoti
LAS Lalikavatiirasiitra
LI On some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of "Liberating Insight" and
"Enlightenment" in Early Buddhism: Lambert Schmithausen
LM Later Miidhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation: Yuichi Kajiyama
LO Lorik: Achiirya Sherab Gyaltsen
Lotus Le Lotus de la bonne Loi, traduit du sanserif, accompagne d'un commentaire et
de vingt et un memoires relatifs au buddhisme: Eugene Boumouf
192 Abbreviations
LPEB The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism: Bhikshu Thich Thi~n
Chau
LS Lodro Sangpo
LV The life of Vasu-bandhu by Paramlirtha (A.D. 499-569): Takakusu Junjiro
LVP Louis de La Vallee Poussin
MAS The Mahii-vibhii~li arguments for Sarvlistivlida: David Bastow
MB La Morale Bouddhique: Louis de La Vallee Poussin
MBP Mind in Buddhist Psychology: Herbert Guenther
MBPC A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy: Cosmology: William Montgomery McGovern
MCB Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
MCIY Memory in Classical Ind:an Yogliclira: Paul J. Griffiths (in: IMM)
MDA The Meaning of "Dharma" and "Abhidharma": Akira Hirakawa
MDB The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: Bhikkhu Bodhi
Mel. As. Melanges Asiatiques
MF Mind and its Functions: Geshe Rabten
MM Mindfulness and Memory: Collett Cox, in In the Mirror of Memory, ed.: Janet
Gyatso
MN Majjhima Nikliya
MOE Meditation on Emptiness: Jeffrey Hopkins
MPN The Mind and its Place in Nature: C.D. Broad
MPPS Mahiiprajfilipliramitlislistra: Nagarjuna (translated by Etienne Lamotte)
MPPUL Mahiiprajfilipliramitlislistra: Nagarjuna (translated by Etienne Lamotte)
MSA Mahiiylinasutriilankara
MSABh Mahiiylinasatriilankara-bhii~ya: Vasubandhu
MSADC Materials for the Study of Aryadeva, Dharmaplila and Chandrakfrti: Tom J.F.
Tillemans
MS(S). manuscript(s)
MVB Mahiivibhii~ii
MYS *Abhidharma-mahii-vibhii~li-siistra, fl,J l'e. :ii~ fc l'e. ~ il-'Wi (T 1545)
MVyut Mahiivyutpatti
MW Sanskrit-English Dictionary: M. Monier-Williams
MWBC Myriad Worlds. Buddhist Cosmology in Abhidharma, Kiilacakra, and Dzog-
chen: Jamgon Kongtriil Lodro Thaye
NA *Nyiiyanusiirasiistra: Sarµghabhadra, transl. Hsiian-tsang
Nanjio Bunyiu Nanjio, A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist
Tripi{aka, the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan
NAS *Nyiiylinuslirasiistra: Sarµghabhadra, transl. Hsiian-tsang
NS The Nyiiya-Satras of Gautama: (Tr.) Garigana~a Jha
NTB Nirvii'}a in Tibetan Buddftism: E. Obermiller
Abbreviations 193
NV A Note on Vasubandhu and the Lankavatiirasiitra: Lambert Schmithausen

Ny * Abhidharma-nyiiyiinusiira, ~ It :l!.$ Jill{ .iE JJ[ ~ (T 1562): Saiµghabhadra
OAO On the Abhidharma Ontology: Paul M. Williams
OB On the Buddhist Doctrine of the Threefold Unsatisfactoriness: Lambert
Schmithausen
OBB On Being Buddha: Paul J. Griffiths
OBM On Being Mindless: Paul Griffiths
OD On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu: Erich Frauwallner
OLD On-line discussion: with Richard Hayes, etc.
OP .On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarviistivadin and
Diir~fiintika Theories: Collett Cox
OTED Online Tibetan English Dictionary: Rangjung Yeshe Publications
PB The Philosophy of Buddhism: Erich Frauwallner
PDVA Prajiiii and Dr~!i in the Vaibhii~ika Abhidharma: Padmanabh S. Jaini
PED Pali-English Dictionary: (eds.) R.W. Rhys-Davids and W. Stede
PIPB Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism: Etienne Lamotte
PjS Prajiiapti-siistra, ~~Jt~ (T 1538)
PoB The Philosophy of Buddhism: Alfonso Verdu
PPA Philosophy and Psychology of the Abhidharma: Herbert V. Guenther
PPP Mind and Mental Factors: Achiirya Sherab Gyaltsen (in: Profound Path of
Peace, No. 16)
PrS Abhidharmaprakara,:ia-siistra, ~ It :i!.$ JI, ~.it.It~ (T 1542)
PS Paiicaskandhaka: Vasubandhu (original Sanskrit text)
PSME Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness: ~henpo Tsiiltrim Gyamtso
PTS Pali Text Society
PuB Pudgalaviida Buddhism: Leonard C.D.C. Priestley
RCYA Rebirth and Causation in the Yogiiciira Abhidharma: Robert Kritzer
RHR Revue de l'Histoire des Religions
RR Recognizing Reality: Georges Dreyfus
RSS Realism of the Sarviistiviida School: Yuichi Kajiyama
RT Reason's Traces: Matthew T. Kapstein
RTC From Reductionism to Creativity: Herbert Guenther
SA.N Sarviistivada Abhidharma (fourth revised edition): KL Dhammajoti
SAD Srfliita's anudhatu doctrine: KL Dhammajoti
SAH Sarriyuktiibhidharmahrdaya, Vol. I: Bart Dessein
SAHN Sarriyuktabhidharmahrdaya, Vol. II, Notes: Bart Dessein
SAL Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical
Systems: Erich Frauwallner
SatS *Satyasiddhi-siistra
194 Abbreviations
SAVSN The sect-affiliation of the Arthaviniscaya-nibandhana: KL Dhammajoti

SBAT The Sautriintika Background of the Apoha Theory: Massaki Hattori (in: BTAC)
SBE Sacred Books of the East
SBP Studies in Buddhist Philosophy: Yuichi Kajiyama
SBPV Les Sectes Bouddhique du Petit Vehicule: Andre Bareau
SBS Sarviistiviida Buddhist Scholasticism: Charles Willemen
SD Sarviistiviida, Diir~fiintika, Sautriintika and Yogiiciira: KL Dhammajoti
SDO A Study of Dependent Origination: Vasubandhu, Buddhaghosa, and the
Interpretation of Pratftyasamutpiida: Susan C. Stalker
sos The Sarviistiviida Doctrine of Simultaneous Causality: KL Dhammajoti
SE Zur Struktur der erlosenden Erfahrung im Indis~hen Buddhismus: Lambert
Schmithausen
SgPS Abhidharma-sangfti-paryiiya-siistra, ~iiJ" l :l!df ~ r~ ~ it (T 1536)
SH Satyasiddhisiistra of Harivarman. Vol. II. Translator: N. Aiyaswami Sastri
Si Si-yu-ki. Buddhist Records of the Western World: Samuel Beal
Siddhi Vijftaptimiitratiisiddhi. Translator: Louis de La Vallee Poussin
Skt. Sanskrit
SM Siintarak#ta 's M adhyamakiilarµkiira: Masamichi Ichigo
SMB The Sixteen-mode Mindfulness of Breathing: KL Dhammajoti
SN The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (Sarµyutta Nikiiya): Bhikkhu Bodhi
(Tr.)
SPPT Spirituelle Praxis und Philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus: Lambert
Schmithausen
SPrS *Abhidharma-samaya-pradfpikii-siistra (T 1563)
ss Sangftisutra: Maurice Walshe (in: ON)
STB The Sautriintika Theory of Bfja: Padmanabh S. Jaini
Study A Study of the Stistras and Actiryas of the Sarviistivtida and Other Schools: Yin
Shun
swv Seven Works of Vasubandhu: Stefan Anacker
T Taisho Shinsha Daizokyo or Taisho lsaikyo
TD Taisho Shinsha Daizokyo
TFT The two, the four, the three truths: Louis de La Vallee Poussin
Tib. Tibetan
TS Tattvasarµgraha: Santarak~ita
TSP Tattvasarµgrahapaftjikii: Kamalasila
TT Time and Temporality in Siirµkhya-Yoga and Abhidharma Buddhism: Braj M.
Sinha
TTVM Treatise in Thirty Verses on Mere-Consciousness: Swati Ganguly
TVB Trirµsikiivijftaptibhii~ya: Ed.: Sylvain Levi.
Abbreviations 195
TYDS Tibetan Yogas of Dream and Sleep: Tenzin Wangyal, Rinpoche

UM Understanding Mind: Geshe Kelsang Gyatso
V The Book of Analysis (Vibhmiga): Sayadaw U Thittila (Tr.)
VA Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa and the Commentaries preserved in the Tanjur:
Marek Mejor
VAR Vasubandhu on the Avifiiapti-Rapa: Thomas Lee Dowling
VASC Vasubandhu on 'Aggregates, Spheres, and Components': Being Chapter One of
the 'Abhidharmakosa ': Bruce Cameron Hall
VEE Versenkungspraxis und erlosende Erfahrung in der Sriivakabhumi: Lambert
Schmithausen
VKA Die vier Konzentrationen der Aufmerksamkeit: Lambert Schmithausen
VKS Abhidharma-vijiiiina-kiiya-siistra, i"T W, :lUJ ~ jJ- JU¼ (T 1539)
VM Visuddhimagga: Buddhaghosa
YP Youthful Play: An Explanation of the Treasury of the Abhidharma: Karmapa
Wangchuk Dorje
VRTS Vasubandhu's 'Refutation of the Theory of Selfhood' (Atmaviidaprati,redha):
James Duerlinget
VVL Vasubandhu and the Vyiikhyiiyukti Literature: Peter Skilling
Vy Sputtirthii Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii: Yasomitra
VY Vasubandhu and the Yogiiciirabhumi: Robert Kritzer
Vyii.. Vyiikhyii: Yasomitra
Vyut. Mahiivyutpatti
w Saf!1yuktiibhidharmahrdaya: Bart Dessein
WB Why Buddhas can't remember their previous lives: Paul J. Griffiths
WE Ways of Enlightenment: Nyingma Institute
WMFG Wohlwollen, Mitleid, Freude und Gleichmut: Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi
WOG Spu(arthii Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii by Yasomitra: Edited by Unrai Wogihara
WPT The Words of My Perfect Teacher: Patriil Rinpoche
WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift far die Kunde Siidasiens
YBS Yogiiciirabhumi-siistra
YIP Yoga. Immortality and Freedom: Mircea Eliade
ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenli:indischen Gesellschaft
ZF Zur zwolfgliedrigen Formel des Entstehens in Abhi:ingigkeit: Lambert
Schmithausen
ZII Zeitschriftfiir Indologie und Iranistik
Chapter One:
Exposition of the Elements
(Dhatunirdesa)
_r
Outline of Chapter One:
Exposition of the Elements
(DhiUunirdesa)
A. General introduction ....................................................................................................... 203

B. Discernment of the factors (dharma) .............................................................................. 208
BA. Twofold classification of factors: impure (sasrava) & pure (anasrava) ................ 208
BB. Threefold classification of factors: five aggregates (skandha), twelve
sense-spheres (iiyatana), eighteen elements (dhatu) .............................................. 214
BBA. Aggregate of material form (rapaskandha) ................................................ 214
BBA.l. Eleven types of material form ..................................................... 214
BBA.1.1. Five sense-faculties (indriya) ...................................... 215
BBA.1.2. Five object-referents (artha) ....................................... 216
BBA.1.3. The non-informative (avijiiapti) ................................. 222
BBA.2. Four fundamental material elements (mahabhata) or
elementary substances (dhatu) & large scale matter .................... 223
BBA.3. Definitions of material form (rupa) ............................................. 225
BBA.4. Ten sense-spheres and ten elements & aggregate of
material form ........................ ,...................................................... 228
BBB. Aggregate of sensation (vedanaskandha) ................................................... 229
BBC. Aggregate of ideation (sa1J1jfi.askandha) ..................................................... 22.9
BBD. Aggregate of formations (sa1J1skaraskandha) ............................................. 230
BBE. Sense-spheres and elements & the aggregates of sensation, ideation and
formations & the object of mental consciousness ....................................... 231
BBF. Aggregate of consciou~ness (vijfi.anaskandha) ........................................... 231
BBG. Discussion of various issues related to the threefold classification of
factors ................................................................................................. 232
BBG. l. Element of the mental faculty and its relation to the six
consciousnesses ................ ,.......................................................... 233
BBG.2. Element of the mental faculty (manas) ........................................ 233
BBG.3. Inclusion (sa1J1graha) & an abbreviated presentation of the
aggregates, sense-spheres and elements ...................................... 234
BBG.4. Twofold sense-faculties & enumeration of too many elements ... 235
BBH. Meaning of the terms "aggregate", "sense-sphere" and "element" ............. 236
BBI. Ontological status of aggregates, sense-spheres and elements .................... 238
BBJ. Need for giving the threefold instructions .................................................. 240
BBK. Definite number of the aggregates .............................................................. 241
BBL. Reasons for the set order and progression of the aggregates,
sense-spheres and elements ....................................................................... 243
BBM. Reasons for the names of rupa-ayatana and dharma-iiyatana .................... 246
BBN. Classification of other aggregates, other sources and other elements ......... 247
200 Chapter One: Exposition of the Elements (Dhatunirdesa)
BC. Twenty-two doctrinal perspectives on the eighteen elements ................................ 253

BCA. 1. Visible (sanidarsana) and invisible (anidarsana) ............................... 253
BCB. 2. Resistant (sapratigha) and non-resistant (apratigha) .......................... 254
BCC. 3. Wholesome (kusala), unwholesome (akusala), non~defined
(avyakrta) ............................................................................................ 257
BCD. 4. Realm of desire, realm of fine-materiality and realm of
immateriality ....................................................................................... 258
BCE. 5. Impure (siisrava) and pure (aniisrava) ................................................ 262
BCF. 6. Associated with initial inquiry and investigation (savitarka-
saviciira) - free from initial inquiry but associated with
investigation (avitarka-saviciira) - free from initial inquiry
and from investigation (avitarka-aviciira) .......................................... 262
BCG. 7. Having a cognitive object (siilambana) and not having a cognitive
object (aniilambana) ........................................................................... 265
BCH. 8. Appropriated (upiitta) and non-appropriated (anupiitta) ................. :... 266
BCI. 9. Primary matter (bhiitasvabhiiva) and secondary matter (bhautika) ..... 267
BCJ. 10. Aggregated (saY{lcita) and non-aggregated (asaY{lcita) ........................ 269
BCK. 11. How many cut off (chinnati), are cut off (chidyate); bum (dahati),
are burned (dahyate); weigh (tulayati), are weighed (tulyate) ............. 270
BCL. 12. Effect of retribution (vipiikaja), effect of accumulation
(aupacayika), effect of equal outflow (nai~yandika) ............ ,.............. 271
BCM. 13. Containing the [pernianent] real (dravyayukta) ................................... 274
BCN. 14. Momentary (k~ar:iika) .......................................................................... 274
BCO. 15. Acquiring accompaniment (samanviigamaY{I pratilambhate) and
accompaniment (samanviigama) ......................................................... 275
BCP. 16. Internal (iidhyiitmika) and external (biihya) ........................................ 277
BCQ. 17. Homogeneous (sabhiiga) and partially homogeneous (tatsabhiiga) .... 279
B,CR 18. Abandoned by insight (darsanaheya) and by cultivation
(bhiivaniiheya), and not to be abandoned (aheya) ............................... 282
BCS. 19. View (dr~ti) and not view (na dr~fi)·-····················· ............................ 285
BCT. 20. Cognized (vijiieya) by consciousness .................................. o••••••••••••••• 306
BCU. 21. Eternal (nitya) and non-eternal (anitya) .............................................. 306
BCV. 22. Controlling faculties (indriya) and not controlling faculties
(nendriya) ........................................................................................... 306
!J:j;;HIDHARMAKOSA-
iff!mAsYA
The Treasury of the Abhidharma
and its (Auto)commentary
by
Vasubandhu
Chapter One:
EXPOSITION OF THE ELEMENTS
(Dhatunirdesa)
A. fJl' ENERAL INTRODUCTION; 1 F 1-6

AA. Homage and pledge to compose;2 F 1-3
1. He~ [i.e., the Buddha Bhagavat,] has, in every respect, destroyed all
darkness; he has drawn out the world from the mire of cyclic
existence: I pay homage to him, to this teacher of truth, before
propounding the treatise called Abhidharmako§a.3
Desiring to compose a treatise for the purpose of making known the greatness
[mahatmya] 4 of his teacher [sastr], the author begins by rendering homage [namas-
kara] to him, having first declared his qualities [gu~a].
204 Chapter One: Exposition of the Elements (Dhiitunirdesa)
AAA. Homage; F 1-3

AAA.I. Qualities for the benefit of the Buddha himself; F 1-2
- "He, [i.e., the Buddha Bhagavat], has destroyed all darkness" [sarvahatiindhakiira],
that is to say: the darkness in regard to everything, in regard to all knowable objects
(jfieya), 5 is destroyed by him or for him.
- "Darkness" [andhakiira], i.e., ignorance or not-knowing [ajfiiina], for ignorance
hinders [pratibandha] the seeing of things as they are [bhutiirtha].
- "In every respect" [sarvathii], 6 i.e., of such a kind that [darkness] could no longer
rearise. <2> 7
By this, the Buddha Bhagavat8 { 1 b} 9 is sufficiently designated, for he alone, through
the possession of the counter-agent [pratipak~a] to-ignor-ance (_v. 60), has definitely
destroyed all ignorance.
Granted [kiimam], the self-enlightened ones (Pratyekabuddha) and the listeners
(Sravaka) 10 have also destroyed all darkness, for all ignorance defiled by the defile-
ments or defiled ignorance (kli~f(1Sa1?1moha) is completely absent [atyanta vigama] in
them; but they have not destroyed the darkness in every respect [sarvathii], for the
ignorance in which defilements are absent or undefiled ignorance [akli~fam ajfiiinam]
is active or manifests in them; they do not know:u
1. the qualities [dharma] belonging [uniquely] to the Buddha (vii. 28); 12
2-3. objects very distant [ativiprakma] in space [desa] or in time [kiila]
(vii. 55); 13
4. the infinite variety and divisions [anantaprabheda] ofthings. 14
AAA.2. Qualities for the benefit of others; F 2-3

Having thus praised the Fortunate One (Bhagavat) from the point of view of his
[completely accomplished] qualities for the Fortunate One's own benefit [iitma-hita-
pratipatti-sarripaaj, the author then praises him from the point of view of his
[completely accomplished] qualities for the benefit of others [para-hita-pratipatti-
sal?lpaaj.
- "He has drawn out the world from the mire of cyclic existence" [sarrisara-
palikiij jagad ujjahiira]: cyclic existence 15 is a mire [panka], because the world
remains stuck in it or attached to it [iisaliga], because it is difficult to cross
over [duruttara] cyclic existence. The Fortunate One, having compassion [anu-
kampamiina] for the world which finds itself drowned in this mire without re-
course, has drawn the people of the world out as far as possible, 16• by extend-
A. General Introduction 205
ing to each one the hands of the teaching of the True Doctrine [saddharma-
deiana]. 17 <3>
- "I pay homage", by respectfully bowing my head, "to this teacher of truth" [tasmai
namaskrtya yathii'rthasiistre]: 18 teacher of truth, because he teaches, without error
[aviparfta], in conformity with reality or with that which exists [yathiirtha].
By thus qualifying the Fortunate One, the author shows the method [upiiya] by
which the Fortunate One benefits others. It is by the teaching [sasana] of what
is truly real [yathabhuta] that the Fortunate One, the teacher, has drawn the
world out from the mire of cyclic existence, {2 a} and not by virtue [prabhava]
of the supernormal accomplishments [rddhi] or of the granting of boons [varapra-
dana].19
AAB. Pledge to compose; F 3

After having paid homage to this teacher of truth, what will the author do?
- "I shall propound a treatise" [sastraf?1 pravak:jyilmy]. That which forms and teaches
[sasana] disciples [si:jya] is called treatise. 20
Which treatise?
- The "Abhidharmakosa ".
AB. Explanation of the name of the treatise; F 3-5

What ·does the name Abhidharma refer to?
ABA. Three types of Abhidharma; 21 F 3-4

ABA.1. Abhidharma in the absolute sense: pure understanding; F 3-4
r
2a. The Abhidharma, [in the absolute sense (piiramlirthika),] is stainless
understanding with its following [i.e., the five pure aggregates]. 22
Understanding (prajiia), which will be defined below (ii. 24; vii. 1), is the discern-
ment of factors [dharmapravicaya]. 23
Stainless (amala) understanding is pure understanding [or understanding without a
(positive) relationship with the fluxes (aniisravaprajiia; vi. 25c, etc.)]. 24
That which is called the following (anucara) of understanding is its retinue (pari-
vara), namely, the five pure aggregates (skandha; i. 7a) which coexist with under-
standing.25 <4>
Such, in the absolute sense [piiramiirthika], 26 is the Abhidharma.
ABA.2. Abhidharma in the conventional sense: impure understanding &

Abhidharma as Treatise; F 4
2b. [The Abhidharma] is also any understanding and the Treatise which
make one obtain stainless understanding. 27
1. In common usage [sa,rivyavaharika], the word Abhidharma also designates any
understanding (prajfia) which makes one obtain the Abhidharma in the absolute
sense: the impure (sasrava) understanding, whether it is 28
i. innate or natural or acquired at birth (upapattipratilambhika; ii. 53b,
7lb),29 or
ii-iv. derived from an effort, i.e., from listening, reflection, cultivation (sruta-
cintii-bhiivanii-mayf; vi. 5c-25b) (ii. 71c),
receives, with its following, the name Abhidharma, by convention. 30
2. The name Abhidharma is also given: to the Treatise [sastra], 31 for the Treatise
also makes one obtain the pure understanding: it is thus a requisite [sa,ribhiira] for
the Abhidharma in the absolute sense.
ABB. Etymological explanation of dharma and abhi-dharma; F 4

[Etymologically,] dhanna signifies: that which upholds or sustains (dhiira,:ia) its own
characteristic or a particular inherent characteristic (svalak~a,:ia ). 32
The Abhidharma33 is called abhi-dhanna because it envisages or is face to face with
or is directed toward (abhimukha; pratyabhimukha) the factors (dhanna), i.e.,
1. toward the supreme factor [paramiirthadhanna], namely, NirviiQa, 34 [which
is absolute or supreme in the sense of] being the object-referent of supreme
cognition [paramasya jfiiinasyiirthaJ:i]; or else,
2. toward the characteristics of the factors [dhannalak~a,:ia], namely, (i) the
particular inherent characteristics or specific characteristics [svalak~a,:ia]
and (ii) the common characteristics [samanyalak~a,:ia]. 35 (See vi. 14cd). {2 b}
ABC. Meaning of Abhidharma-kosa; F 4-5

Why is the present treatise [siistra] called Abhidhannakosa?
2cd. The present treatise is called the Abhidharmakosa (1) because the
Abhidharma enters through its meaning into [our treatise]; or else,
(2) because the Abhidharma constitutes its basis.36 <5>
1. The Treatise bearing the name Abhidharma, namely the Abhidharmapifaka37
(see i. 2b), enters [antarbhata] through its meaning [artha], through what is most
important [pradhiina], into this [our] treatise, 38 which is, therefore, "[like] the sheath
A. General Introduction 207
(or case or treasury [kosasthanfya]) of [the meaning and what is most important of]
the Abhidharma" (Abhidharmakosa).
2. Or else, as the Abhidharma is the basis [asraya] of this [our] treatise, it can be
said that this treatise is drawn from or extracted from the Abhidharrna as from a
sheath [or case or treasury]; [our treatise] is thus called the Abhidharmakosa, "the
treatise which has the Abhidharma for its sheath [or case or treasury]".
Ac. Purpose for composing the Abhidharmakosa & the need for the
Abhidharma and its first teacher; 39 F 5-6
[Question:] -,- (1) For what purpose [artha] have the elaborative expositions (upa-
desa)40 of the Abhidharma [been uttered]? (2) By whom was the Abhidharma origi-
nally taught?
[Reply:] - The answer to these two questions will tell us why the author [acarya;
sastra-kilra] respectfully [adriyate] undertakes the composition of the Abhidharma-
kosa.
3. Since, apart from the discernment of factors, there is no method to
appease the defilements-and it is on account of the defilements
that people wander in this ocean of existence [bhavar!'ava]-it is
with a view to this discernment, it is said [by the Vaibhli~ikas] [kila],
that the Abhidharma has been expounded by the Teacher.41
Apart from the discernment of factors, there are no existing methods [upaya] to
appease [upasama] the defilements °[klesa; v. 1],42 and it· is the defilements which
cause the people [loka] {3 a} to wander in this great ocean [mahilr{lava] of cyclic
existence [sa7?1sara]. <6> This is why, the Vaibhli1?ikas say [kila], 43 the Teacher
[sastr], the Buddha Bhagavat, has uttered the Abhidharrna for the purpose of the
discernment of factors [dharmapravicaya]. For without the elaborative expositions
[upadesa] of the Abhidharma, the disciples would be incapable to discern the factors.
However, the Vaibhli~ikas explain that the Fortunate One uttered the Abhidharma in
a scattered way [prakf~a]. And in the same way that the Sthavira Dharmatrlita made
a collection of the Udanas [Sayings] dispersed throughout the Scriptures, i.e., the
Udanavarga,44 so the Bhadanta Klityayaniputra and others established the Abhi-
dharma by collecting it in the seven Abhidharmas. 45
B. w;;CERNMENT OF THE FACTORS (DHARMA); 46 F6-102;

CHAPTERS ONE TO NINE
A. Twofold classification of factors: impure (sasrava) & pure (anasrava); F 6

B. Threefold classification of factors: five aggregates (skandha), twelve sense-
spheres (ayatana), eighteen elements (dhatu); F 14
C. Twenty-two doctrinal perspectives on the eighteen elements; F 51-102
BA. '!YwoFOLD CLASSIFICATION OF FACTORS: IMPURE

(SASRAVA) &PURE(ANASRAVA); 47 F6-14
BAA. Brief exposition; 48 F 6
What are the factors (dhanna) of which the Abhidharma teaches the discernment
[pravicaya]?
4a. The factors are "impure", "in a [positive] relationship with the
fluxes" (slisrava), or "pure", "without a [positive] relationship with
the fluxes" (anlisrava). 49
[This is a brief exposition (samiisanirdesa) of all factors.]
BAB. Extensive exposition; 5°F 6-14

What are the impure factors [siisrava]?
4bd. The conditioned factors, with the exception of the (noble) path, are
impure; they are impure because the fluxes adhere to or grow con-
cordantly in them [samanuserate]. 51 { 3 b} <7>
As for what is understood by a conditioned factor (sa,riskrta), 52 see i. 7a; ii. 45cd. For
the fluxes (iisrava), see v. 40. 53
Granted [kiima,ri] that certain fluxes, for example, false view [mithyiidr~ti], can have
[the truth of] the (noble) path (miirgasatya) or the unconditioned factors (asa,riskrta;
the truth of cessation [nirodhasatya]) for their cognitive object. 54 Still, it does not
follow that the (noble) path or these factors are "impure", "in a [positive] relationship
with the fluxes" (siisrava), because the fluxes do not become installed in them, do not
adhere to [or grow concordantly in] them [anuserate]. This point is explained in the
fifth chapter (i.e., EXPOSITION 0F THE PROCLIVITIES, Anusayanirdesa; V, F 34-40, 70f.,
78f.). 55
[The impure factors have been discussed.] What are the pure factors [anlisrava]?
Sab. The truth of the (noble) path [vi. 2a, 25d; vii. 3b] and also the three
unconditioned factors are pure.56
BA. Twofold Classification of Factors 209
BAB.1. Extensive exposition of the unconditioned factors (asarµskrta); 57 F 7-10

What are the three kinds of unconditioned factors [asaJ?lskrta; ii. 45cd, 55cd
(F 275ff.)]? 58 <8>
Sc. [The three unconditioned factors are] space (iikiisa) and the two
cessations [i.e., cessation due to deliberation and cessation not due
to deliberation].59
[Question: - What are the two cessations (nirodha)?]
[Answer:] - They are the cessation due to deliberation (pratisa'!lkhyanirodha) and
the cessatiqn not due to deliberation (apratisarrikhyanirodha).
The three unconditioned factors and [the factors constituting] the truth of the (noble)
path are the pure (aniisrava) factors because the fluxes do not adhere to them.
BAB.1.1. Space (akasa); 60 F 8

5d. Space is that which does not hinder [matter or material form;,and
that which is not ~indered by matter or material form]. 61
Space is in its intrinsic nature [non-obstruction (aniivara,:ia), in that it] (1) does not
hinder (iivr,:ioti) matter or material form (rupa), which, in fact, takes place freely in
space; anci also (2) is not hindered (iivriyate) by matter or material form, for space is
not turned away by matter or material form. 62
BAB.1.2. Cessation due to deliberation (pratisarµkhyanirodha); 63 F 8-9

6ab. Cessation due to deliberation is disconnection [from the impure
factors], each disconnection taken separately.64
Cessation due to deliberation (pratisa'!lkhyii-nirodha) or nirva,:ia is disconnection
(visa1J1yoga; ii. 57d) from the impure factors. (See ii. 55cd; vi. 2a). <9>
Pratisa'!lkhyana or pratisa'!lkhya means a specific kind of understanding [prajfia-
vi.se$a], [i.e.,] the pure [aniisrava] understanding, the deliberation of the noble truths
[of unsatisfactoriness, etc.].
The cessation (nirodha) of which one takes possession by means of this under-
standing is called cessation due to deliberation (pratisa1J1khya-nirodha): we could say
pratisa1J1,khyii-prapya-nirodha, cessation to be possessed due to deliberation, but the
middle word (i.e., prapya) is elided, {4 a} as in the expression ox-cart, and not cart
yoked to or drawn by oxen (go-ratha = go-yukta-ratha).
[Question:] - Does this mean that there is only one single [eka] cessation due to
deliberation for all the impure factors? 65
[Answer:] - No: each disconnection taken separately is cessation due to deliberation.

There are as many things subject to connection (saf!Zyogadravya) as there are things
subject to disconnection (vismpyogadravya). 66
If it were otherwise, if the cessation due to deliberation were single, a person who
has obtained, i.e., realized (sak~atkar), the cessation of the defilements [klesanirodha]
which are abandoned by insight into the truth of unsatisfactoriness would have
obtained or actualized at the same time the cessation of the defilements which are
abandoned by insight [darsana] into the other truths and by cultivation [bhavana],
[i.e., the cessation of all the defilements (sarvaklesa)]. It would be futile [vaiyarthya]
then for the practitioners to cultivate the part of the (noble) path which counteracts
these [remaining (se~apratipak~a)] defilements (MYS, 164c16).
[Objection:] - But is it not said that "cessation (nirodha) is non-similar or non-
homogeneous (asabhaga)"?
[Answer:] - This does not mean that cessation would be single [eka], that there
would not be a cessation homogeneous to another cessation. This means that cessa-
tion does not have a homogeneous cause (sabhagahetu) and is not a homogeneous
cause to any effect (ii. 52; see discussion at ii. 55d). 67 <10>
[Cessation due to deliberation has been discussed.]
BAB.1.3. Cessation not due to deliberation (apratisaf!Zkhyiinirodha); 68 F 10

6cd. A different type of cessation, which consists of the absolute hinder-
ing of the arising [of future factors], is called cessation not due to
deliberation.69
The cessation which is different from disconnection and which consists of the
absolute hindering [atyantavighnabhiita] of the arising of future factors 70 is the cessa-
tion not due to deliberation. (This cessation) is called thus because it is obtained, not
by the deliberation [pratisaf!Zkhya] of the truths, but by the deficiency of the [neces-
sary] causes and conditions of arising (pratyayavaikalyat).
For example, when the eye sense-faculty and the mental faculty are occupied with
a certain visible form (riipa), other visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles
pass from the present into the past. It follows that the five sensory consciousnesses,
i.e., the visual consciousness, etc., which would have other visible forms,. sounds,
odors, tastes and tangibles for their cognitive object, cannot arise: for the sensory
consciousnesses are not capable of seizing their own object-field when this object-
field is past. There is thus an absolute hindering of the arisin!J. of the said conscious-
nesses, because of deficiency of the [necessary] causes and conditions of arising. 71 { 4 b}
Here we have a fourfold alternative [tetralemma72 between cessation due to delibera-

tion and cessation not due to deliberation] (MVS, 164c16):
1. solely cessation due to deliberation of the impure factors which are past,
present, destined to arise (utpattidharman);
2. solely cessation not .due to deliberation of pure conditioned factors which are
not destined to arise (anutpattidharman);
3. cessation due to deliberation and cessation not due to deliberation of the
impure factors which are not destined to arise;
4. neither cessation due to deliberation nor cessation not due to deliberation of
the .pure factors which are past or present or destined to arise. 73
[The three kinds of unconditioned factors have been discussed.] <11>
BAB.2. Extensive exposition of the conditioned factors (safJ1,skrta); 74 F 11-14

We have said (i. 4b) that "the conditioned factors, with the exception of the (noble)
path, are impure".
What are the conditioned factors (saf!1skrta)? 75
7ab. [On the other hand,] the conditioned factors are the fivefold aggre-
gates: material form, etc. 76
(1) The aggregate of material forms (rupaskandha), (2) the aggregate of sensations
(vedanliskandha), (3) the aggregate of ideations (saf[ljfiliskandha), (4) the aggregate
of formations (or conditioning forces) (saf!1skliraska~dha), (5) the aggregate of con-
sciousnesses (vijfilinaskandha), [these are the conditioned factors].
BAB.2.1. Etymological meaning of sai:µsk:p:a; 77 F 11

Saf[lskrta, conditioned factor, is explained etymologically as "that which has been
made (ktta) by causes or conditions [pratyaya] co-existing in assemblage (sametya,
saf[lbhuya)". 78 There is no factor which can be engendered by one single cause or
condition [ekapratyaya; ii. 64].
The expression saf!1skrta, although it signifies "that which has been made ... ", also
applies (1) to future factors, (2) to present factors, as well as (3) to past factors; in
fact, a factor (dharma) does not change its nature or type LJlitfyatvlit]79 by changing
its time period.
In the same way, the milk in the udder [i.e., that which has not yet been drawn] is
called dugdha, i.e., "that which has been drawn"; the tree [i.e., that which has not yet
been kindled] is called indhana, i.e., "kindling". <12>
BAB.2.2. Synonyms for conditioned factors; 8 °F 12-13

7cd. The conditioned factors are (1) the course or time periods; they are
(2) the ground of discourse; they are (3) endowed with escape;
(4) endowed with causes.81
1. Conditioned factors are the course [adhvan] 82-that is to say, the time periods,
i.e., the past, the present and the future-because (conditioned factors) have for their
nature [bhava] having gone, {5 a} presently going, shall be going. In the same way, it
is said that a path led, that it leads, that it will lead, to the town.
Or rather, conditioned factors are called time period because they are devoured
(adyante) by impermanence [anityata; ii. 45c].
2. By discourse (katha) is meant speech, discourse (vakya); and discourse has for
its ground (vastu) the name or word (naman; ii. 36). 83
[Question:] - Should the definition given by the stanza be taken literally and say that
conditioned factors are the words?
[Answer:] - No. Ground of discourse (kathavastu) means "the ground of discourse,
i.e., the words (naman), together with that which the words signify [artha]". To
understand by ground of discourse the words alone, one would be in conflict with the
Prakara,:zapada, 84 which says: "The grounds of discourse (kathavastu) are included
within the eighteen elements (dhatu)" (MVS, 74a20). 85
3. Nil:zsara signifies "necessary (avasyam) escape (sara = nil:zsara,:za)", the nirva,:za
(nirupadhise~anirvii,:za = nirva,:za without remainder) of all conditioned factors. As
one should leave conditioned factors, they are qualified as endowed with escape
[sani!:zsara]. 86 <13>
4. Conditioned factors depend on causes (sahetuka); they are thus qualified as
savastuka, i.e., endowed with causes. 87 - The Vaibhii~ikas say [kila] that, in the
expression savastuka, vastu signifies "cause" (hetu). 88
Such are the diverse synonyms [paryaya] for conditioned factors [saf!!skrta dharma].
BAB.2.3. Synonyms for impure conditioned factors; 89 F 13

BAB.2.3.t.Appropriative aggregates (upii.danaskandha); 9 °F 13
8ab. When [the conditioned factors] are impure, they are appropriative
aggregates.91
The impure (sasrava) conditioned factors constitute the five appropriative aggregates
(upiidiinaskandha). Everything that is an appropriative aggregate is an aggregate
(skandha); but the pure [aniisriiva] conditioned factors included within the aggre-
gates are not included within the appropriative aggregates (MVS, 387a9). {5 b}
The graspings (upadana) are the defilements (klesa; v. 38).
BAB.2.3.La. Three reasons for the name upadanaskandha; F 13

The upadanaskandhas are thus called:92
1. because they proceed [sa1J1bhiita] from the defilements, as we say grass fire
[t~tigni], straw fire [tu~agni]; or rather
2. because they are governed [vidheyatva] by the defilements, as we say the
king's man [r<ija-puru~a]; or rather
3. because they give rise [sa1J1bhavanti] to defilements, as we say theflower-
bearing tree [pu~pa-vrk~a],fruit-bearing tree [phala-vrk~a].
BAB.2.3.2. Endowed with conflict (sarm;a); 93 F 13-14

[These same impure factors are spoken of as follows:]
8c. [Impure factors] are also called endowed with conflict. 94 <14>
The defilements [klesa] are conflict (ra~za) because they harm oneself and others
[atmap<iravyabadhana]. The impure conditioned factors are qualified as endowed
with conflict or in a relationship with conflict (sara,:,a) because the defilements or
conflicts adhere to them. In the same way, as we have seen, they are qualified as
impure or endowed with impurity (s<israva ,i, because the fluxes (iisrava) become
attached to them.
BAB.2.3.3. Other synonyms of impure factors; 95 F 14

8cd. [Impure factors] are also (1) unsatisfactoriness, (2) the origin, (3) the
world, (4) the locus of afflicted views, (5) existence.96
1. Unsatisfactoriness [du?zkham], 97 because they are inimical or adverse [pratikula]
to the noble ones [iirya; vi. 2f.].
2. The origin [samudaya], because, unsatisfactoriness originates [samudeti] from
them (vi. 2).
3. The world [loka], because they are in the process of decomposition [lujyate]. 98
4. The locus of afflicted views99 [dr~{isthiinam], because the five afflicted views abide
in them (ti~{hati) and become attached to them [anusayana; v. 7] (Prakara,:,a, 33b7).
5. Existence [bhava], because they exist. 100
[Such are the synonyms, according to their meaning (anvartha), of the impure factors
(siisravii,:iiilJ1 dharmii,:iiim).]
BB. l]l;;EEFOLD CLASSIFICATION OF FACTORS: FNE

AGGREGATES (SKANDHA), TWELVE SENSE-SPHERES
(AYATANA), EIGHTEEN ELEMENTS (DHATU); 101 F 14-51
A. Aggregate of material form (rapaskandha); F 14
B. Aggregate of sensation (vedanaskandha); F 27
C .. Aggregate of ideation (sal'[ljfiaskandha); F 28
D. Aggregate of formations (sal'[lskaraskandha); F 28
E. Sense-spheres and elements & the aggregates of sensation, ideation and
formations & the object of mental consciousness; F 30
F. Aggregate of consciousness (vijfianaskandha); F 30
G. Discussion of various issues related to the threefold classification of factors; F 31
H. Meaning of the terms "aggregate", "sense-sphere" and "element"; F 35
I. Ontological status of aggregates, sense-spheres and elements; F 37
J. Need for giving the threefold instructions; F 39
K. Definite number of the aggregates; F 40
L. Reasons for the set order and progression of the aggregates, sense-spheres and
elements; F 42
M. Reasons for the names of rapa-ayatana and dharma-ayatana; F 45
N. Classification of other aggregates, other sources and other elements; F 46-51
We have seen that there are five aggregates 102 (i. 7). We will first study the aggregate
of material form (i. 9-14b).
BBA. Aggregate of material form (rupaskandha); 103 F 14-27

1. Eleven types of material form, F 14
2. The four fundamental material elements (mahabhata) or elementary substances
(dhatu) & derivative material elements and large scale matter, F 21
3. Definitions of material form (rupa), F 24
4. The ten sense-sources and ten sense-elements & aggregate of material form; F 27
BBA.1. Eleven types of materialform; 104 F 14-21

9ab. Matter or material form is (1-5) the five sense-faculties, (6-10) the
five object-referents [or object-fields of the five sense-faculties],
arid (11) the non-informative. 105
1.-5. The five sense-faculties [indriya; i. 9cd, 36ac, 44-47]: 106 {6 a}
1. eye sense-faculty (cak~urindriya);
2. ear sense-faculty (srotrendriya);
BB. Threefold Classification of Factors 215
3. nose sense-faculty (ghra1J,endriya);

4. tongue sense-faculty (jihvendriya);
5. body sense-faculty (kayendriya). <15>
6.-10. The five object-referents [artha], object-fields [vi~aya] (i. 10) 107 of the five
sense-faculties:
6. visible form (riipa);
7. sound [sabda];
8. odor [gandha];
9. taste [rasa];
10. tangible (spra~ravya).
11. The non-informative (avijiiapti; 108 i. 11, 13, 15bd; iv. 4-44).
Such is the aggregate of material form.
BBA.1.1. Five sense-faculties (indriya); 109 F 15

We have enumerated five object-referents (artha): visible form, sound, etc.
9cd. The bases of the consciousnesses of these [five object-fields], namely
the subtle material elements [rupaprasada], are the five sense-
faculties, i.e., the sense-faculty of the eye, etc.11°
The five [sense-faculties] which are the basis [asraya] of the consciousnesses (1) of
visible form, (2) of sound, (3) of odor, (4) of taste and (5) of ihe tangible, and which
are of the nature of suprasensible [atmdriya] subtle material elements, are, respec-
tively, the sense-faculty (1) of the eye, (2) of the ear, (3) of the nose, (4) of the
tongue and (5) of the body.
The Fortunate One says, in fact:
The eye, 0 bhik~us, is the internal sense-sphere [adhyatimikayatana], subtle
matter derived from the four fundamental material elements .... 111
Or else, it can be understood as: 112
[9cd.] The bases of the consciousnesses of these [sense-faculties], namely...
The bases of the visual consciousness (cak:jurvijiiana), etc. -This interpretation com-
plies with the Prakara,:ia (692c12), which says:
What is the eye sense-faculty? - It is the subtle matter [riipaprasada] which
is the basis of the visual consciousness. {6 b}
[The five sense-faculties have been discussed.]
216 Chapter One: Exposition of the Elements (Dhatunirde§a)
BBA.1.2. Five object-referents (artha); F 15-20

113
BBA.1.2.1. Visible form (riipa); F 16-17
Let us now discuss the five object-referents beginning with visible form, i.e., the
sense-sphere of visible form or sense-sphere of material form (riipiiyatana; see i. 24).
<16>
10a. [Vaibha~ikas:] - Visible form is (1) of two·types, (2) of twenty
types. 114
BBA.1.2.1.a. Two types; 115 F 16

Visible form is [twofold]:
1. color [va0a] and
2. shape [sa,risthiina; iv, F 4-12). 116
1. Color is fourfold:
i. blue [nfla],
ii. yellow [pfta ], 117
iii. red [lohita],
1v. white [avadata].
The other colors are substitutes or subdivisions [bheda] of the fourfold color.
2. Shape (iv. 3c) is eightfold:
i. long [dfrgha; iv, F 10-12],
ii. short [hrasva],
iii. square [vrtta], 118
iv. r9und [parima~qala], 119
v. high (unnata), 120
vi. low (avanata), 121
vii. even [or regular] [sata],
viii. uneven [or irregular] [visata].
BBA.1.2.1.b. Twenty types; F 16

This will give us twenty types:
1-4. primary colors;
5-12. eight shapes;
13-20. eight colors:
13. cloud [abhra],
14. smoke [dhuma],
15. dust [raja~],

16. mist [mahrka],
17. shadow [chaya],
18. sun-light [atapa],
19. light [aloka],
20. darkness [andhakara].
Some make one [additional] color out of the firmament (nabhas), which appears
as a wall [bhitti] of lapis-lazuli [vai4urya]; this would give us the number twenty-
one.122
[Among thes~,]
7. even (sata) signifies regular shape [samasthana];
8. uneven (visata) is the opposite, irregular shape [visamasthana];
16. mist [mahika] is vapor [nihiira], which rises from the ground and from
water;
18. sun-light (atapa) is the radiance of the sun [suryaprabha];
19. light (aloka) is the radiance [prabha] of the moon [candra], of the stars
[taraka], of fire [agni], of herbs [o~adhi] and of gems [ma~i];
17. shadow [chaya]-arisen from an obstruction to light [by an object]-is
where visible forms [rupa] remain visible [darsana];
20. darkness [andhakara] is the contrary to this [i.e., where there is no visibility
at all]. {7 a}
The other terms do not call for any.separate explanation as they are easy to under-
stand [sugamatva].
BBA.1.2.1.c. Visible form & its relationship to color and shape; F 16

[There are three alternatives (trilemma):] The sense-sphere of visible form
1. can be [vidyate] color with~ut being shape: 123 blue, yellow, red, white,
shadow, sun-light, light, darkness;
2. can be shape without being color: that part [pradesa] of long, of short, etc.,
which constitutes [svabhava]the bodily informative action (kayavijiiapti) 124
(iv. 2);
3. can be both [ubhayatha], color and shape: all remaining categories of the
sense-sphere of visible form.
Other scholars maintain that only sun-light [atapa] and light [aloka] are exclu-
sively color, for blue, yellow, etc., appear to the view [drfyate] under the aspects
[pariccheda] of long, short, etc.
BBA.1.2.1.ct. (Sautrantika:) A single real entity cannot be twofold; F 16-17

(Objection by the Sautrantikas: 125 ) - But how could a single [eka] real entity [dravya]
[i.e., the sense-sphere of visible form] be (vidyate) both or twofold [ubhayatha], color
and shape together? For-in the system of the Vaibha~ikas-color and shape are
established as distinct real entities [dravyi'intara] (see iv. 3 [F 8-12)). <17>
[Vaibha~ikas:] - [The sense-sphere of visible form is. both] because color and
shape are known (prajiiana) in a single real entity [i.e., the sense-sphere of visible
f~rm]. The root vid here (in vidyate: "is found, is known, occurs") has 1he
meaning of to know, to perceive [Jiianartha], and not the meaning of to be, to exist
[sattartha].
[The Sautrantikas:] - But (then) you should admit that bodily informative action
[i.e., the second alternative] is also both color and shape.
[The sense-sphere of visible form has been discussed.]
BBA.1.2.2. Sound (sabda); 126 F 17

BBA.1.2.2.a. Eight types; 127 F 17
10b. Sound is eightfold. 128
1. [Sound (sabda)] is fourfold:
i. having for its cause appropriated [upatta] [i.e., animated] 129 fundamental
material elements forming part of the sense-faculties (upattamahabhata-
hetuka; i. 34cd): first category: sound caused by the hand [hasta], by the
voice [vac];
ii. having for its cause unappropriated [anupatta] [i.e., inanimate] fundamental
material elements (anupattamahabhutahetuka; i. 34cd): second category:
sound of the wind [vayu], of the forest [vanaspati], of flowing water [nadf];
iii. included among factors indicative of sentient beings (sattvakhya): 130 third
category: {7 b} sound of vocal informative action [vi'igvijiiapti; iv. 3d];
iv. included among factors non-indicative of sentient beings (asattvakhya):13 1
fourth category: any other sound [anya].
Each of these four categories can be (a) agreeable [manojiii'i] or (b) disagreeable
[amanojiia].
2. According to other scholars, a sound can belong to the first two categories at one
and the same time, for example, the sound produced when the hand is in conjunction
with or beats [sa7?lyoga] the drum [mrdaliga]. But the School (MVS, 663c12) does
not accept that one atom of color (van:iaparami'i"IJ,u) would have for its cause.two
tetrads of fundamental material elements [bhatacatu~ka]; thus one cannot accept that
one atom of sound is produced by the four fundamental material elements of the hand
and the four fundamental material elements of the drum.
[Sound has been discussed.]
BBA.1.2.3. ,,..aste (rasa),· 132 F

.l 1 17
133
BBA.1.2.3.a. Six types; F 17
lObc. Taste is of six types. 134

[Taste (rasa) is of six types, because of the distinction (bheda) between]
1. sweet [madhura],
2. sour [amla],
3. salty [lava~a],
4. pungent [ka{uka],
5. bitter [tikta],
6. astringent [ka:jaya]. <18>
BBA.1.2.4. Odor (gandha); 135 F 18

BBA.1.2.4.a. Four types; 136 F 18
10c. Odor is fourfold. 137
[Odor (gandha) is fourfold because] good odor [sugandha] and bad odor [dur-
gandha] are either (1) excessive (sama [even] = utka{a) or (2) non-excessive (vi(fama
[uneven]= anutkata).
According to the Prakara~a (692c22), however, odor is threefold: (1) good [su-
gandha], (2) bad [durgandha], (3) even or neutral [samagandha]. 138
BBA.1.2.s. Tangible (spra~favya); 139 F 18-19
BBA.1.2.s.a. Eleven types,-1 40 F 18

10d. The tangible consists of eleven types. 141
Eleven real entities are tangible real entities (spra(ffavyadravya) [in their intrinsic
nature (svabhava)]: 142
1-4. the four fundamental material elements (mahabhuta), 143
5. smoothness [slak(f~atva], 144
6. roughness [karkasatva],
7. heaviness [gurutva],
8. lightness [laghutva],
9. coldness [szta],
10. hunger Uighatsa],

11. thirst fpipasa].
Among those,
1-4. the fundamental material elements (mahabhuta) will be explained below
(i. 12);
5. smoothness (slak~ftatva) is the softness [mrduta];
6. roughness (karkasatva) is the harshness fparu~ata];
7. heaviness (gurutva) is that in accordance with which bodies or things
[bhava] are susceptible of being weighed [tulyante; i. 36];
8. lightness (laghutva) is the contrary;
9. coldness (sfta) is that which produces the desire for heat [u~~abhilasakrt];
10. hunger (bubhuk~a; jighatsa) is that which produces the desire for food
[ bhojanabhila~akrt];
11. thirst (pipasa) is that which produces the desire for drink.
In fact, the words hunger and thirst designate the tangible which produces hunger
and thirst: by hypallage [upacara], 145 the cause [kara~a] is designated by the name of
its effect [karya]. In the same way, it is said; {8 a}
The appearance [utpada] of the Buddhas is [the cause of] happiness [sukha];
the teaching of the religion [dharmasya desana] is [the cause of] happiness;
the concord [samagrf] of the community [sa1Jigha] is [the cause of] happi-
ness; the austerity [tapas] of the monastics who live in concord is [the cause
of] happiness. 146
BBA.1.2.s.b. Realm offine-materiality & the tdngible; 147 F 18-19

In the realm. of fine-materiality [rupadhatu], 148 hunger and thirst are absent, but the
other tangibles occur there.
It is true that the garments [vastra] of the gods of the realm of fine-materiality
weigh nothing individually [ekasas]; but gathered together [sa1Jicita], they have
weight.
It is true that harmful coldness [upaghataka] is absent in the realm of fine-materiality,
but favorable or refreshing coldness (anugrahaka) occurs there: such <19> at least is
the opinion of the Vaibhii~ikas [kila]. [For us, it is concentration [samadhi] which
refreshes [anugraha] the gods, not the coldness.]
BBA.1.2.s.c. From how many real entities do the various consciousnesses arise? F 19
[It has been said that visible form is manifold:]
BB. Threefold Classification of Factors· 221
l. It may happen 149 that visual consciousness arises from one single [eka] real
entity (dravya), from one single category of visible form: when the characteristic
[prakara] of this real entity (blue, etc.) is distinguished or discerned separately
[vyavaccheda].
2. In other cases, (visual) consciousness is produced by many real entities: when
such a distinction is lacking; for example, when one sees from afar [durat] the
multiple [aneka] colors and shapes of an army [senavyuha] or a pile of jewels [ma~i-
samuha] all together.
The same comment applies to the ear consciousness, the nose consciousness, etc.
But a tactile consciousness arises from five tangibles [spra~favya] at most, namely,
the four fundamental material elements [mahabhuta] and one of any other tangible:
smoothn~ss, roughness, etc. Such is the opinion of certain scholars, yet, according to
another opinion, a tactile consciousness can arise from the eleven tangibles at the
same time.
BBA.1.2.6. Do the five sensory consciousnesses have particular inherent or

common characteristics for their object? F 19
Objection: 150 - According to what you say, each of the five sensory consciousnesses
bears on an ensemble or compound [samasta]; for example, the visual consciousness
bears on blue, yellow, etc.; consequently, the sensory cons_ciousnesses would have
for their object-field the common characteristic .(samanyalak~ana) and not, as
Scripture teaches, the particular inherent characteristic (svalak~a~a). {8 b}
The Vaibhli~ika (MVS, 65c12) answers: - [There is no fault (ado~a).] By particular
inherent characteristic, the Scripture understands, not the particular inherent charac-
tetistic of real entities [dravyasvalak~a~a], but the particular inherent characteristic
of the sense-sphere [ayatanasvalak~a~a; ii. 62c]. 151 <20>
BBA.1.2.?. Which consciousness arises first? F 20

[Question:] - When the body and tongue sense-faculty attain or reach [prapta] their
object-field at the same time [yugapad] (i. 43cd), which consciousness is the first to
arise? 152
[Answer:] -The one whose object is the more energetic [pafi"Yill?ls]. But if the energy
of the two object-fields is equal [sama], the gustatory consciousness arises first,
because the desire for food dominates.
We have discussed the object-referents [artha] of the five sense-faculties of the
sensory consciousnesses and how these object-referents are seized or apprehended
[graha~a].
BBA.1.3. The non-informative (avijnapti); 153 F-20-21

BBA.1.3.1. Definition; F 20-21
We will now discuss the non-informative (avijiiapti; see also i. 13, 15bd and
iv. 3d-44), which is the eleventh category of the aggregate of material form (rapa-
skandha).
11. [Vaibhii~ikas:] - Even in a person whose thought is distracted, or
who is [for a certain time] without thought, there exists a serial
continuity, good or bad, in reliance upon the fundamental material
elements: that, indeed, is what is called non-informative. 154
"(A person) whose thought is distracted (vik~ipta)" means (a person) who has
a thought different from the thought which has induced the non-informative; for
· example, an unwholesome thought when the non-informative has been induced by
a wholesome thought. 155 <21>
"(A person) who [for a certain time] is without thought (acittaka)" means (a person)
who has entered into one of the [two] attainments of non-consciousness called (1) the
attainment of non-ideation (asarrijiiisamiipatti) and (2) the attainment of cessation
(nirodhasamiipatti) (ii. 42).
"Even in a person ... [api]" means that the word even indicates that the non-
informativ,e also exists in a person whose thought is not distracted, in a person whose
1
thought is not immersed in the two attainments. 156
"A serial continuity ('yo anubandha)" means a flux or stream (praviiha).
"Good or bad (subha, asubha)" means wholesome or unwholesome (kusala,
akusala), [i.e., not non-defined (avyiikrta); see iv. 7a]. 15'1 [But in what is wholesome
and what is unwholesome, the flux or stream of possession (priiptipraviiha) is like
this (zdrsa) also. 158]
"In reliance upon the fundamental material elements (mahiibhuta upiidiiya)": this
is in order to distinguish [vise~a,:ia] the stream called non-informative (avijiiapti)
from the stream of the possessions [priipti] 159 (ii. 36). [The Vaibhii.~ikas hold that the
meaning of upiidiiya, "in reliance upon", is the same as that of hetu, "cause". 160] The
non-informative exists in reliance upon the fundamental material elements, because
those are (1) its generating cause [jananahetu], 161 (2) its reliance cause [nisrayahetu],
etc., [(3) its supporting cause (prati~thiihetu), (4) its maintaining cause (upastambha-
hetu) and (5) its growth cause (upabrrriha,:iahetu; vrddhihetu)] (ii. 65; MVS, 663a26).
(See i. F 26-28; iv, F 26-31.)
"That, indeed [hi], is what (is called) non-informative [sa hyavijiiapti]": {9 a}
[the word hi is used] in order to indicate the reason [kara,:ia] for the name avijiiapti.
Although this serial continuity is in its intrinsic nature [svabhiiva] material form
(rupa; i. 13 [F 26]) and action [or function] [kriyii; iv. 2a]-like bodily and vocal
informative action (vijiiapti)-nevertheless, it does nothing to inform another
(vijiiapayati), as does informative action. [Hence it is called the non-infonnative.]
"Is called [ucyata]", in order to indicate that the author is showing the opinion of
the Vaibha~ikas [iiciirya], not his own here. 162
In short, the non-informative is a material form (rupa; i. 13 [F 25]), wholesome or
unwholesome [kusaliikusala], 163 arisen [saf!Zbhuta] from informative action (vijfiapti) 164
or from concentration [samiidhi].1 65
BBA.2. Four fundamental material elements (mahabhuta) or elementary

substances (dhatu) & large scale matter; 166 F 21-24
BBA.2.1. Four types offundamental material elements & the reasons for calling
them dhatu and maha; F 21-22
[It has been said above: "in reliance upon the fundamental material elements (mahii-
bhuta upiidiiya)". What are these elements (bhata; see also i, F 49f.)?]
12ab. The elements, i.e., the great or fundamental material elements, are
(1) the elementary substance earth, (2-4) the elementary substances
water, fire and wind. 167 <22>
These four fundamental material elements are the four elementary substances or
dhiitu," so called because they uphold or sustain (dhiira,:i~) 168 both
1. their own characteristic or particular inherent characteristic [svalak,rn,:ia] and
2. the secondary or derivative material form (upadiiyarupa; derivative material
elements [bhautika]).
They are c_alled great or fundamental(= primary) [mahii]: they are fundamental or
great [or greatness; mahattvam] either
1. because they are the basis [iisrayatva] for all derivative material form, or
else
2. because they assemble on a large scale [mahiisa7?1nive,m] in the mass
[skandha] of earth, water, fire and wind, where their modes of efficacy or
function (vrtti) come forth together (MVS, 681al 7, 663all). 169
BBA.2.2. Efficacies of the four elementary substances; F 22

Through what efficacies [karma] are these elementary substances (dhiitu) established
or accomplished [saf!Zsiddha]?
12c. [The elementary substances (1) earth, (2) water, (3) fire and (4) wind]
are established or accomplished, by the efficacies of (1) supporting,
[(2) cohesion, (3) heating or maturation, and (4) expansion, respec-
tively].170
The elementary substances (1) earth [prthivf], (2) water [ap ], (3) fire [tejas] and
(4) wind [vayu] are established or accomplished {9 b} by the efficacies of (1) sup-
porting [dhrti], (2) cohesion (sarµgraha), (3) heating or maturation (pakti), 171 and
(4) expansion (vyuhana), respectively.
By expansion one should understand increasing (vrddhi) and displacement or loco-
motion (prasarpa"l},a).
Such are their efficacies [karma].
BBA.2.3. Intrinsic nature of the four elementary substances; F 22-23

What is the intrinsic nature [svabhava] of these elementary substances (dhatu)?
12d. [(1) Earth, (2) water, (3) fire, (4) wind] are [in their intrinsic
nature] (1) solidity, (2) humidity, (3) heat and (4) mobility, [respec-
tively].172
As for their intrinsic nature, (1) the elementary substance earth [prthivfdhatu] is
solidity [khara], (2) the elementary substance water [abdhatu] is humidity [sneha];
(3) the elementary substance fire [tejodhatu] is heat [u~"l},ata]; (4) the elementary
substance wind [vayudhatu] is mobility [fra"f},a]. 173 <23>
By mobility [fra"l},a] one should understand that which brings it about that the
stream of states that constitute an element [bhatasrotas] will reproduce itself in
different places; 174 just as one speaks of the mobility of a flame [pradipfra"l},avat]
(iv. 2cd).
The Prakara"l},as I75 and the Siitra 176 say:
What is the elementary substance wind? - Lightness (laghutva) [or the quali-
ty of lightly setting into motion (laghusamudfra"l},atva)].
The Prakara"l},as also say:
Lightness (laghu) is a derivative material form [upadayarapa].
Consequently, the factor (dharma) which has mobility for its intrinsic nature
(fra"l},atmaka; ira"l},asvabhava) is the elementary substance wind [vayudhatu]: I77 its
intrinsic nature (i.e., lightness) is manifested by its efficacy of mobility (1ra11a-
karman).
BBA.2.4. Difference between the elementary substance earth & earth, etc.; 178 F 23-24
What is the difference between the elementary substance earth fprfhivfdhiitu] and
earth [prthivf], between the elementary substance water [abdhiitu] and water [ap], etc?
13. In common usage [lokasa.,,,jiiii], the word earth signifies [actually]
color and shape; the same for [the common usage of the words]
water and fire, [i.e., they signify actually color and shape]. [The
common usage of the word] wind [signifies] either the elementary
substance wind, or else, color and shape. 179 { 10 a} <24>
[Just as earth, in common usage, signifies color and shape, so also does wind]. In
fact, one s'peaks of blue wind [nflika vatya] and of circular or whirling wind
[ma,:icj.alikii viityii]; but what one commonly [loke] calls wind is also the elementary
substance .wind.
BBA.3. Definitions of material form (rupa); 18°F 24c...27

BBA.3.I. Definition according to the meaning ofrupal).a (breaking or
oppression); F 24
DQuestion:] - Why do all these factors, from visible form to the non-informative,
I
receive the name material form (riipa)? Why do they together constitute the aggre-
gate of material form (riipaskandha)?
[Answer:] - [Because of being subject to "breaking" (riipa,:za).]
The.Fortunate One said [in the Sal'[lyuktiigama]:
Because it is subject to being broken [riipyate], 0 bhik~us, one calls it
appropriative aggregate of material form (riipa upadanaskandha). By what
is it broken? - As soon as it is touched by the hand, it is broken, .... 181
[Here] '.'is broken" (rupyate) signifies being oppressed, troubled or disturbed
(biidhyate), which is brought out in a stanza of the Arthavargfyas, in the K~udraka-
iigama (A{thakavagga, i. 2): 182
A person who ardently searches out the objects of desire [kama] 183 is
broken [= oppressed, disturbed] (riipyate) if the objects of desire are lacking,
just as someone who is pierced by an arrow [salyaviddha]. 184 (Compare
Mbh., xiii. 193, 48.)
[Question:] - But what oppression (biidhanii) does material form have?
[Answer:] - [An oppression] which is of the nature of transformation or change in
arising (vipari,:iiimotpadana), i.e., which is of the nature of being disfigurement or
deterioration (vikriyotpiidana ). {10 b}
BBA.3.2. Definition according to the meaning of rupal).a ("the nature of being

rupa"): as impenetrability, physical resistance, obstruction; F 24-25
According to other scholars, the quality that constitutes material form (riipa),
namely, riipa,:ia, is not breaking, [oppression,] deterioration (biidhanariipa,:ia, riipa,:ia
in the sense of deterioration), but rather impenetrability, physical resistance, or
obstruction (pratighiita; i. 29bc), the obstacle which a material form opposes to its
place being occupied by another material form (see i. 43cd). 185 <25>
BBA.3.3. Various objections to the definitions; F 25-27

BBA.3.3.1. An atom as a monad would not be material form; F 25
[Objection:] - If this is so, the material form which constitutes a single atom, a
monad [parama,:iuriipa, i.e., dravyaparama,:iu; see ii, F 144] will not qualify as
material form, for the monad [niravayavatva], not susceptible to deterioration
[badhana], not susceptible to offering obstruction (pratighata; i. 29bc), is free from
riipa,:za.
[Answer:] - Without a doubt, the monad is free from riipa,:za; but a single material
form as a monad (parama,:zuriipa) never exists in an isolated state [prthak]; 186
[however,] in the state of a composite (sarµghatastha), i.e., being in aggregation
(sarµcita), it is susceptible to deterioration and to offering resistance (MVS, 390al)
(iii, F 213).
BBA.3.3.2. Past and future material form would not be material form; F 2.5
[Objection:] - The material forms of the past and of the future would not qualify as
material form, for it cannot be said that they are actually in a state of resistance
(riipyante pratihanyanta iti).
[Answer:] - Without a doubt, but they have been, they will be in this state. Whether
past or future, they are of the same nature as the factor that is actually in a state of
resistance. In the same way one calls kindling (indhana) not only the actually burning
wood, but also the [non-burning] wood or fuel (see i. 7ab). 187
BBA.3.3.3. The non-informative would not be material form; F 25-27
[Objection:] - The non-informative (avijiiapti; see i. 11) would not qualify as

material form (riipa), for it is devoid of resistance.
[Answer:] - Without a doubt, but the quality of material form attributed to the
non-informative can be justified, [as may be seen from the following discussion].
<26>
BBA.3.3.3.a. The non-informative is material form because bodily and vocal

informative action from which it proceeds are material form; F 26
[First explanation.] - The informative (vijnapti), i.e., bodily or vocal informative
action, from whence proceeds the non-informative (avijnapti), is material form
(riipa); thus the non-informative is [also] material form, just as a [tree's] shadow
[chaya] follows the movement of the tree [vrk~a].
Reply: - No, because the non-informative is not subject to modifications [avikarat];
besides, if the comparison is supposed to be accurate, then the non-informative
should perish when the informative perishes (iv .. 4cd), as is the case for the shadow
and thtr tr~e'. 188
BBA.3.3.3.b.The non-informative is material form because the fundamental

material elements which constitute its basis are material form; F 26-27
Second explanation. 189 - The non-informative is material form, for the fundameq.tal
material elements which constitute its basis [a.fraya] are material form.
Objection. - According to this principle, the five sensory consciousnesses would be
material form, for their basis (the eye sense-faculty, etc.) is material form.
[First attempt to refute the objection:] 190 - This response is not valid. The non-
informative exists based [a.fritya] on the fundamental material elements, just as
the shadow exists based on the tree and as the light or glitter [prabha] of the gem
[ma!lj] exists based on the gem. [However,] the visual consciousness does not exist
based on the sense-faculty, which is merely the [external] cause of its. arisin~
[utpattinimitta].
Reply [to the first attempt]: - That the shadow exists based on the tree and that the
light or glitter exists based on the gem is a hypothesis not in conformity with the
principles of the Vaibha~ikas (MVS, 63c22). {11 a} [First of all,] the Vaibha~ikas
admit that any one of the color atoms [vizT!laparamiz!lu] constituting the shadow and
the light or glitter exists based on a tetrad of fundamental material elements. But
even if you suppose that: "The shadow exists based on the tree, for the shadow exists
based on the fundamental material elements which are particular to it, and these exist
based on the tree"-the comparison of the shadow and of the non-informative would
(still) be inadmissible. [This is so because] the Vaibha~ika admits that the non-
informative does not perish when the fundamental material elements which serve as
its basis perish (iv. 4cd). Consequently your refutation [parihara] ("This response is
not valid. The non-informative ... ") is without value.
[Second attempt:] - We say: But we can refute the objection: 191 "According to this
principle, the five sensory consciousnesses would be material form." <27>
228 Chapter One: Exposition of the Elements (DhiUunirdesa)
In fact, the basis of the visual consciousness, [etc.,] is twofold:

1. the eye sense-faculty, [etc.,] which are subject to being broken or resistant
[rupyate; sapratigha, i. 29b], which are material form;
2. the mental faculty (manas; i. 44cd) [which is not in a state of encounter],
which is not material form.
Now the same does not hold for the non-informative whose basis is exclusively
material form. Thus, from the fact that the non-informative is called material form
because the basis is material form, one cannot conclude, [as maintained in the objec-
tion,] that the visual consciousness should be called material form. Thus, the second
explanation is good. 192
BBA.4. Ten sense-spheres and ten elements & the aggregate of materialform;
F27
14ab. (The sense-faculties and the object-referents which have been
defined as aggregate of material form,) these same 193 sense-faculties
and object-referents are regarded as being ten sense-spheres, ten
elements. 194
1. Considered as iiyatand, i.e., as origin of thought and thought-concomitants
(i. 20), [the sense-faculties (indriya) and object-referents (artha)] are ten sense-
spheres (iiyatana):
i. sense-sphere of the eye (cak~uriiyatana);
ii. sense-sphere of visible form or sense-sphere of material form (rupiiyatana; i. 24);
iii. sense-sphere of the ear (srotriiyatana );
iv. sensessphere of sound (iabdiiyatana);
v. sense-sphere of the nose (ghrii,:iiiyatana);
v1. sense-sphere of odor (gandhiiyatana);
vii. sense-sphere of the tongue (jihviiyatana);
viii. sense-sphere of taste (rasiiyatana);
ix. sense-sphere of the body (kiiyiiyatana);
x. sense-sphere of the tangible (spra~(avyiiyatana ).
2. Considered as dhiitu, i.e., as minerals (i. 20), [the sense-faculties and object-
referents (i. 48)] are ten elements (dhiitu):
i. element of the eye (cak~urdhiitu);
ii. element of visible form or element of form (rupadhiitu; i. 24 );
iii. element of the ear (srotradhiitu);
1v. element of sound (iabdadhiitu);
v. element of the nose (ghrii"l}adhiitu);

vi. element of odor (gandhadhiitu);
vii. element of the tongue (jihviidhatu );
viii. element of taste (rasadhiitu);
ix. element of the body (kiiyadhiitu);
x. element of the tangible (spra~favyadhiitu ).
We have discussed the aggregate of material form (rupaskandha) { 11 b} and how it
is distributed among the sense-spheres (iiyatana) and elements (dhiitu);
We have to explain the other aggregates.
BBB. Aggregate of sensation (vedanaskandha); 195 F 27

BBB.I. Definition; F 27
14c. Sensation is affect or experience that is unpleasant, [pleasant, or
nei ther-unpleasan t-nor-pleasant]. 196
BBB.2. Three types; F 27

The aggregate of sensation is the threefold mode of sensing or experiencing (anu-
bhava, anubhuti, upabhoga), 197
1. unpleasant sensation [du~kha; vi. 3),
2. pleasant sensation [sukha; vi. 3: F 128-136),
3. neither unpleasant-nor-pleasant sensation [adu~khiisukha].
aaa.3. Six types; F 27

Six groups of sensations [vedaniikiiya] can also be distinguished (ii. 7ff; iii. 101):
1-5. [bodily sensations:] those that arise from contact [sa7!lsparsa] of the five
material sense-faculties: the eye sense-faculty [cak,ms], etc., with their
object;
6. [mental sensations:] those that arise from contact with the mental faculty.
<28>
BBc. Aggregate of ideation (sarrzfiiaskandha); 198 F 28

BBc.1. Definition; F 28
14cd. Ideation consists of the seizing or apprehension of signs. 199
The seizing or apprehending [udgraha"l}a] of [the signs or marks (nimitta)], of the
diverse intrinsic natures (svabhiiva), i.e., perceiving that this is blue [nrla], yellow
[prta], long [dfrgha], short [hrasva], male [puru~a], female [strr], friend (mitra; siita),
enemy (amitra; asata), agreeable [sukha], disagreeable [du!zkha], etc., is the aggre-
gate of ideation (see i. 16a).
aac.2. Six types; F 28

Six groups of ideation [sa7?ljiiiikiiya], according to the sense-faculty, as with sensa-
tion, can also be distinguished.
BBD. Aggregate offormations (sart1skaraskandha); 20°F 28-29

aao.1. Definition; F 28
15ab. The aggregate of formations (or conditioning forces) is the condi-
tioning forces [sa7?lskara] different from the other four aggre-
gates.201
The conditioning forces (sa7?lskiira) are everything that is conditioned (sa7?lskrta;
i. 7a); but the name aggregate of formations (or conditioning forces) 202 (sa7?lskiira-
skandha) is reserved for those conditioning forces (sa7?lskiira) which do not fit either
in the aggregates of material form (riipa), sensation (vedana), ideation (sa7?ljiia),
explained above, or in the aggregate of consciousness (vijiiiina), explained below (i. 16).
aao.1.1. Are formations only intention? 203 F 28-29

It is true that the Siitra says:
The aggregate of formations is the six groups of intention (cetaniikiiya);']J)4
<29>
and this definition excludes from the aggregate of formations:
1. all formations dissociated from thought (viprayukta-sa7?lskara; ii. 35),
2. tlre formations associated with thought (sa7?lprayuktasa7?lskara; ii. 23b, 34)
with the exception of intention itself.
But the Siitra expresses itself in this way because of the capital importance or pre-
dominance [priidhiinya] of intention, which, being action [karma] by nature [sva-
riipatva], is of capital importance [priidhana] for modeling, conditioning or creating
(abhisa7?lskar) the future existence. 205 Therefore the Fortunate One said:
The appropriative aggregale (upadiinaskandha) calledformations (sa7?lskiira)
is so called because it conditions (abhisa7?lskar) the conditioned factors
(sa7?lskrta), 206
that is to say, becau_se it creates and determines the five aggregates of the future
existence. 207 { 12 a}
To understand the exposition [nirdesa] of the Sutra literally, one would come to
the conclusion that the mental factors (caitasika; sarrzprayukta), with the excep-
tion of intention, and all the factors Qf the dissociated (viprayukta) class (ii. 35)
are not included in any aggregate (skandhiisarrzgraha). They would thus not be
included in the truths of unsatisfactoriness and of the origin: one would neither
have to know (parijnii) them nor to abandon (praha~a) them. But the Fortunate
One said:
If one has not completely known or mastered [aparijnii")'a], has not known
[anabhijniiya] even a single factor, I declare that one cannot put an end to
unsatisfactoriness (vi. 33). 208
And furthermore:
If one has not abandoned even a single factor ... (Sarrzyukta, 8, 22).
Thus the whole of the thought-concomitants (caitta) and of the dissociated factors
[see ii. 23-48] is included in the aggregate of formations (sarrzskiiraskandha). 209
<30>
BBE. Sense-spheres and elements & the aggregates of sensation, ideation

and formations & the object of mental consciousness; 210 F 30
15bd. These three aggregates [i.e., (1) sensation, (2) ideation and (3) forma-
tions,] along with (4) the non-informative and (5-7) the uncondi-
tioned factors, are [called] the sense-sphere of factors, the element of
factors. 211
(1) The aggregate of sensation, (2) the aggregate of ideation, (3) the aggregate of
formations, along with (4) the non-informative (i. 11; iv, F 16)212 and (5-7) the three
unconditioned factors (i. 5b), [i.e., space and the two kinds of cessations,] are seven
real entities [dravya] which are called the sense-sphere offactors (dhanniiyatana),
the element offactors (dharmadhiitu). (i. 24; 39bc, 48a)
BBF. Aggregate of consciousness (vijiianaskandha); 213 F 30-33

BBF.1. Definition of consciousness in general; F 30
16a. [The aggregate of] consciousness is that which makes known [vijiiapti],
[i.e., the apperception,] relative to each [object-field].214
The aggregate of consciousness (ii. 34) is that which makes known (vijfiapti), 215 [i.e.,]
the "naked or bare or generic apperception" (upalabdhi), 216 relative to each object-
field (vi~ayarrz vi~ayarrz prati). 217
BBF.2. Classification of consciousness; F 30-31

The aggregate of consciousness is, [again, (as with sensation, ideation and inten-
tion),] six groups of consciousnesses [vijiianakiiya]: 218 <31>
1. visual consciousness or consciousness of the eye [cak,rnrvijiiana];
2. auditory consciousness or consciousness of the ear [frotravijfiana];
3. olfactory consciousness or consciousness of the nose [ghra~avijfiana];
4. gustatory consciousness or consciousness of the tongue Uihvavijfiana];
5. tactile consciousness or consciousness of the body [kayavijiiana];
6. mental consciousness or consciousness of the mental faculty [manovijiiana].
BBF.3. Sense-spheres and elements & the aggregate of consciousness; 219 F 31

16b. (Considered as sense-sphere [ayatana; i. 20a], the aggregate of
consciousness) is the sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-
iiyatana ).220
16cd. (Considered as element [dhatu; i. 20a], the aggregate of conscious-

ness) is seven elements, namely, (1-6) the six consciousnesses and
(7) the mental faculty (manas). 221
That is to say:
1. • the element of the visual consciousness (cak~urvijiianadhatu),
2. the element of the auditory consciousness (frotravijiianadhatu),
3. the element of the olfactory consciousness (ghra~avijiianadhatu),
4. the element of the gustatory consciousness (jihvavijiianadhatu),
5. the element of the tactile consciousness (kayavijiianadhatu),
6. the element of the mental consciousness (manovijiianadhatu),
7. the element of the mental faculty (manodhatu) (i.e., the manas, the mental
faculty).
BBG. Discussion of various issues related to the threefold classification of

factors; 222 F 31-34
In this way, we have shown [nirdi~fa] that there are five aggregates, twelve sense-
spheres, eighteen elements.
1. The aggregate of material form is ten sense-spheres, ten elements, plus the non-
informative.
2. The aggregates of sensation, ideation and formations, plus the non-informative,
plus the [three] unconditioned factors, are the sense-sphere of factors (dharma-
ayatana), the element of factors (dharmadhatu).
3. The aggregate of consciousness is the sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-

iiyatana); it is seven elements (dhiitu), namely, the six groups of consciousness
(vijiiiinakiiya = vijiiiinadhiitu) and the element of the mental faculty (manodhiitu) or
mental faculty (manas).
BBG.1. Element of the mental faculty and its relation to the six
consciousnesses; F 31
[Objection:] - [But surely it has been said that the six groups of consciousness
constitute the aggregate of consciousness.] Now what could be the mental faculty or
element of the mental faculty which is distinct from the six groups of consciousness,
distinct from the sensory consciousnesses and of the mental consciousness?
[Answer:] -There is no mental faculty (manas) distinct from the consciousnesses. 223
BBG.2. Element of the mental faculty (manas); F 31-33

[Objection: - In that case, what is the element of the mental faculty?]
BBG.2.1. Definition; F 31-32

17ab. Of these six consciousnesses, the consciousness which has just
passed away is the mental faculty (manas, i.e., manodhiitu). 224 <32>
All consciousness which has just perished [samanantaraniruddha] is_ given the name
of element of the mental faculty (manodhiitu): {13 a} in the same way, the same man.
is the son [putra] [of one person] and the father [pitr] [of another], or the same
vegetable element is the fruit [phala] [of one plant] and the seed [bija] [of another].
BBG.2.2. Enumeration of the eighteen elements & the mentalfaculty; 225 F 32-33
Objection. - If the six consciousnesses which make up six elements (dhiitu) consti-
tute the mental faculty (manas) and if the mental faculty is not an entity distinct from
the six consciousnesses, there would be either seventeen elements, by excluding the
mental faculty which is made redundant [itaretariintarbhiiva] by the six conscious-
nesses, or twelve dements, by excluding the six consciousnesses which are made
redundant by the mental faculty-supposing, of course, that you want to enumerate
distinct real entities and not mere designations. [Why then are those elements clas-
sified as eighteen?]
17cd. (Answer: - Even though that is so, nevertheless) eighteen elements
are counted with the view of assigning a basis to the sixth con-
sciousness.226
234 Chapter One: Exposition of the Elements (Dhlitunirdesa)
The first five consciousnesses have the five material sense-faculties, i.e., the eye
sense-faculty, etc. (see i. 44cd) for their basis; the sixth consciousness, i.e., the
mental consciousness (manovijfilinadhlitu), does not have a similar basis, [i.e., has no
other (anya) basis]. <33>
Therefore, with a view of attributing a basis to this [mental] consciousness,
manas (mental faculty) or manodhiitu (element of the mental faculty), or further-
more, the mana-ayatana (sense-sphere of the mental faculty.) and mana-indriya
(mental faculty) is called that which serves as basis, i.e., any one of the six con-
sciousnesses.
In this way there are (1) six bases [asraya] or sense-faculties, (2) six consciousnesses
based on these six bases and (3) six cognitive objects (alambana), [and thus the
elements come to be eighteen in number].
BBG.2.3. La;st thought of a pe,jected being & the mental faculty; 227 F 33
Objection. - If the consciousness or thought is called mental faculty (manas) when,
having ceased, it is the basis of another consciousness, then the last (carama) thought
(citta) of a perfected being (arhat) would not be a mental faculty, since (this last
thought) is not followed by a thought of which it would be the immediately pre-
ceding cause and the basis (i. 44cd).
[Reply:] - [This is not so, since] this last thought has indeed the nature of the mental
faculty, the nature of basis. If it is not followed by a new thought, namely, the con-
sciousness-at-conception (pratisarµdhivijfilina) of a new existence (punarbhava), this
is not related to its nature but results from the absence or deficiency [vaikalya] of the
other causes, i.e., actions [kanna] and defilements [klesa], necessary for the pro-
duction of a new consciousness [uttaravijfianasambhutil-
BBG.3. Inclusion (sa,pgraha) & an abbreviated presentation of the aggregates,

sense-spheres and elemen_ts; 228 F 33 ·
All the conditioned factors (sarµskrta) are included [sarµgrah]) in all [sarva] of the
aggregates (i. 7); all the impure (slisrava) factors are included in all of the appropria-
tive aggregates (i. 8); all the (conditioned and unconditioned) factors are included in
all of the sense-spheres and of the elements (i. 14). {13 b}
18ab. (But in short, it should be known that) all the factors are included in
one aggregate [i.e., the aggregate of material form], plus one sense-
sphere [i.e., the sense-sphere of the mental faculty], plus one ele-
ment [i.e., the element of factors]. 229
[One should understand that all of the factors are included (sarµgraha)] in the aggre-
gate of material form (rupaskandha), the sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-
oyatana) and the element of factors (dharmadhatu).
BBG.3.1. Meaning of inclusion; 23°F 33-34

18cd. A factor is included by that which has the same intrinsic nature
[svabhava], for it is distinct from other-nature [parabhava]. 231
[A factor is distinct from other-nature (i.e., from that which is not itself). Therefore it
is not reasonable that] a factor (dharma) is included (sarµgrah) in that from which it
is distinct [viyukta]. <34>
For example, the eye sense-faculty is included (1) in the aggregate of material form
(rupaskandha), its intrinsic nature being material form; 232 (2) in the sense-sphere of
the eye (cak~urayatana), in the element of the eye (cak~urdhatu), for it is the
sense-sphere of the eye, the element of the eye [in its intrinsic nature]; (3) in the
truths of unsatisfactoriness and of the origin, for [their intrinsic nature] is unsat-
isfactoriness and origin; but the eye sense-faculty is not included in the other
aggregates, sense-spheres, etc., for it is distinct in its intrinsic nature from that which
it is not.
Without a doubt, [it is said that the four] assemblies (par~ad) 233 are included, i.e.,
won over or attracted (sarµgrah), by giving [dana] and the other [three] bases for
gathering [an audience] [sarµgrahavastu]: 234 thus there is sarµgraha of one thing by
another. But this sarµgraha is occasional (kadocitka) and, consequently, not real but
[merely] conventional (sarµketika ).
BBG.4. Twofold sense-faculties & the enumeration of too many elements; 235 F 34
[Possible objection:] - But there are two sense-faculties in regard to the eye, the ear,
the nose: therefore, one should count twenty-one elements.
19. [Answer:] - The sense-faculties of the eye, the ear and the nose,
although twofold, constitute, in pairs, only one element, for their
(1) type, (2) experiential domain and (3) consciousness are commpn
[siimanya]. It is for beauty's sake that they are twofold.236 { 14 a}
The two sense-faculties of the eye have
1. commonality of type Uatisamanya], for both of them are an eye sense-facul-
ty in their intrinsic nature [svabhava];
2. commonality of experiential domain [gocarasamanya], for they both have
visible form (rupadhatu) for their object-field [vi~aya];
3. commonality of consciousness [vijiianasamanya], for both of them are the

basis [asraya] of a single visual consciousness (cak~urvijiio.nadhatu).
Therefore, the two eye sense-faculties make up only one element.
The same holds for the sense-faculties of the ear and of the nose.
Although (the sense-faculties) make up only one element, these sense-faculties are
produced in pairs for the sake of the beauty [sobhartha] of the body [asraya].
[Otherwise,] with a single [physical seat (adhi~fhana)] of the eye or ear, or with a
single nostril [nasikavila], one would be very ugly [vairupya] 237 (ii. la; i. 43, 30).
{14b}<35>
[The aggregates, sense-spheres and elements have been discussed.]
BBH. Meaning of the terms aggregate, sense-sphere and element; 238 F 35-39
What should be understood by the terms skandha, ayatana, dhatu?
20ab. (i) Skandha signifies heap [rasi], (ii) iiyatana signifies gate of arrival
or gate of arising [iiyadviira] [of thought and thought-concomitants
(cittacaitta; ii. 23)], and (iii) dhiitu signifies lineage [or genus]
(gotra]. 239
BBH.1. Meaning of skandha; 240 F 35-37

In the Siitra, skandha signifies heap or group or mass (riisi): 241
Whatever material form (rupa) there is, (1) past [atfta] or future [anagata]
or present [pratyutpanna], (2) internal [adhyatmika] or external [bahya],
(3) gross [audarika] or subtle [suk~ma], (4) inferior [hfna] or superior
[pra~fta], (5) distant [dara] or near [antika], if all this material form-that
which is past, etc.-is grouped together into one heap [aikadhyam abhi-
sartzk#pya], this is called aggregate ofmaterialform. 242
aatt.1.1. The Sutra passage according to the Vaibhii~ikas; F 35-36

According to the Vaibhii~ikas, [this passage means that]:
1. past material form is the material form destroyed by impermanence [anityata], 243
future material form is the material form which has not yet arisen [anutpanna],
present material form is the material form which has arisen and which has not been
destroyed [utpanniiniruddha];
2. [as for material form being internal or external, there are two hypotheses:]
i. material form is internal (adhyatmika) when it forms part of the life-stream

(sarritana) called "me" (i. 39); any other material form is external [bahya]; or
rather,
ii. the terms internal and external are understood from the point of view of the
sense-sphere (ayatana): 244 the eye sense-faculty is internai because it forms
part of my life-stream or of the life-stream of another; <36>
3. [as for material form being gross or subtle, there are two hypotheses:]
i. material form is gross [audarika] when it is susceptible to offering resistance
[sapratigha; i. 29b]; it is subtle [suk~ma] when it is not susceptible to offer-
ing resistance [apratigha], (see iv. 4a); 245 or rather,
ii. these two designations, [i.e., grnss and subtle,] are established relative to
each other [apek~ika] and not ultimately.
[Objection:] - In this second hypothesis, the gross and the subtle are not established,
since the same material form is gross or subtle according to whether it is compared to
a material form more subtle or more gross.
[Answer:] - The objection is invalid, for the terms.of comparison do not vary: when
a material form is gross relative to another material form, it is not subtle relative to
this same other material form: just as the case of father and son;
4. inferior [hfna] material form is defiled (kli~fa) material form; {15 a} superior
[pra~fta] material form fa non-defiled [akli~ta] material form;
5. past or future material form is distant [dara]; present material form is near
[antika]. 246
The same for the other aggregates (skandha), with this difference:
1. gross consciousness is that which has the five sense-faculties for its basis
[asraya]; subtle consciousness is the mental consciousness; 247 or rather,
ii. the consciousness is gross or subtle according to whether it belongs to a
lower or higher stage [bhumi].
BBH.1.2. The Sutra passage according to the Bhadanta; F 36-37

According to the Bhadanta, [the Siitra passage means]: 248
1. gross [audarika] material form is that which is perceived [grahya] by the five
sense-faculties; all other material form is subtle [sak~ma];
2. inferior [hfna] signifies unpleasant (amanapa); superior [pra~fta] signifies plea-
sant [manapa];
3. distant [dara] 249 material form is that which occurs in a place that is not visible
[adrfyadesa]; near [antika] material form is that which occurs in a place that is
visible [drsyadesa]: the Vaibha~ika explanation [of distant and near] is bad, for past
material form, etc., has already been referred to under its own name [svasabda]. <37>
The same for sensation [and the other aggregates (vedaniidi)]: they are distant or near
depending on whether their bases are invisible or visible [adrsyiisraya; drfyiisraya];
they are gross or subtle depending on whether they are bodily or mental (ii. 7).
BBH.2. Meaning of ayatana; 25°F 37

A.yatana signifies the gate of arrival or gate of arising (iiyadviira) of thought and
thought-concomitants (cittacaitta; ii. 23). Etymologically [nirvacana], that which
extends [or makes the gate wider or prepares a way for] (tanvanti) the arising (iiya)
of thought and thought-concomitants is called iiyatana. 251
BBH.3. Meaning of dhatu; 252 F 37

Dhiitu signifies gotra (family, race, lineage, mine, genus). 253
1. Just as the place, namely a mountain [parvata], where many families [gotra] of
minerals: iron, copper, silver, gold, etc., occur, is said to have numerous dhiitus, in
the same way, in the single human complex (iisraya) or life-stream (sarµtiina), eight-
een kinds of families occur which are called the eighteen elements. That which is
signified by gotra {15 b} is thus a mine [or source] (iikara). 254
[Question:] - Of what is the eye sense-faculty (cak$urdhiitu) the mine [or source]?
Of what are the other elements the mine [or source]?
[Answer:] -The elements are the mine [or source] of their own genus (svasyiijiitel:i):
the eye, being a homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu; ii. 52) of the later moments of the
existence of the eye, is the mine [or source] (dhiitu) of the eye.
[Objection:] - But then how could the unconditioned factors, which are eternal, be
considered to be an element?
[Answer:] - In that case, let us say that (unconditioned factors) are the mine [or
source] of thought and thought-concomitants.
2. According to another opinion, dhiitu signifies genus (jiiti). The specific nature or
genus of the distinct eighteen factors [a${iidasadharmii,:ziirµ jiitayaJ:i svabhiivii] is what
is understood by the eighteen elements.
BBL Ontological status of aggregates, sense-spheres and elements; F 37-39

Objections: 255 <38>
1. If skandha signifies heap (riisi), then aggregates (skandha) exist only as a

provisional or nominal entity (prajiiaptisat) and not as a real entity (dravyasat), for
the aggregation (saf!lcita), the collection [samuha], is not one [aneka] thing: for
example, a heap of grain [riisi], or the person (pudgala). 256
The Vaibha~ika: - No, for [even a single] atom or monad (dravyaparamii,:iu) is a
skandha. 251
[Reply:] - In this hypothesis, since1he monad cannot have the quality, of being a heap
[riisitva], you cannot say that skandha signifies heap.
2. According to another opinion (MVS, 407c9), (i) skandha signifies that which
carries the load, namely, its effect [kiirya bhiirodvahana]. 258
Or else, (ii) skandha signifies part, section (praccheda, avadhi): 259 as one commonly
says: "I will lend money to you, if you promise to return. it in three sections or
installments (skandha ). " 260
[Reply: 261 ] - These two explanations do not conform to the Siitra. 262 The Siitra
[passage mentioned above (F 35)], in fact, attributes to skandha the meaning of heap
[only] and no other meaning:
Whatever material form there is, past or future or present, . . . if one puts
together all this material form ....
3. The Vaibha~ika says: - The Siitra teaches that all material form, i.e., past mate-
rial form, future material form, etc., is, individually [pratyeka], called skandha-in
the same way {16 a} that it teaches that hairs, etc., are the elementary substance earth
(below, F 49, note)--thus each [ekasas] "real" (atomic) element of past material
form, future material form, etc., is given the name of skandha. Thus the aggregates
(skandha) do exist as a real entity [dravyasat] and not as a provisional or nominal
entity [prajfiaptisat]. <39>
[Reply:] - This interpretation is inadmissible, for the Siitra (above F 35) says:
... if one puts together all this material form, this is called aggregate of mate-
rial form.
[Hence, the aggregates, too, exist as a nominal entity just as the heap does. 263 ]
4. (The Sautrantika: 264 ) - If this is the case, then the material sense-spheres
(iiyatana), i.e., the sense-faculties and the objects of the five sensory conscious-
nesses, must also exist only as a provisional or nominal entity, for the quality of
being a "gate of arising· [iiyadviira] of thought and thought-concomitants [citta-
caitta]" does not belong to atoms taken one by one, which alone are real, but to
the collections [bahu] of atoms which constitute the eye sense-faculty, the visible
object, etc.
Reply: - Each of these atoms possesses individually the quality of being a "gate of
arising of thought", of being the cause [kara~abhava] of consciousness (compare
i. 44ab: section "invisibility"), If you do not accept this doctrine, you deny to the
sense-faculty-considered in its totality-the quality of being a cause of conscious-
ness, for it does not produce the consciousness by itself and without the cooperation
of the object-field [vi~ayasahakiiritva].
5. On the other hand, the MVS (384a18) expresses itself thus:
When the Abhidharma scholars265 take into consideration the fact that the
term skandha is only the designation [prajnapti] for a heap [raii], 266 they
point out that the atom is a part [pradesa] of one element, one sense-sphere,
one aggregate;
when they do not take this fact into consideration, they point out that the
atom is one element, one sense-sphere, one aggregate. 267
In fact, one designates the part [pradesa] by the whole [pradesin] metaphorically
[upacara]; for example: "The garment [pafa] is burned", for: "One part of the gar-
ment is burned."
BBI. Need for giving the threefold instructions; 268 F 39-40

[Question:] - Why did the Fortunate One give this threefold instruction [desanii] of
the factors (dharma): as aggregates (skandha), sense-spheres (ayatana) and elements
(dhatu)? { 16 b} <40>
[Answer: - Because of the disciples (vineya ). ]
20cd. The instructions on the aggregates, [sense-spheres and elements
were given,] because (1) delusion, (2) faculty or ability, (3) prefer-
ence are [each] threefold.269
1. The delusion or bewilderment (moha, saf!tmoha) [of sentient beings (sattva)] is
threefold:
i. the first category of disciples are deceived by considering the mental factors
(caitta) as together [pi~¢a] constituting a self (atman); 270
ii. the second category of disciples is deceived similarly with respect to the
material elements (rilpa) [alone];
iii. the third category of disciples is deceived similarly with respect to both the
material and mental elements [rilpacitta].
2. The (praxis-oriented) faculties [indriya; faith, etc.; ii. 3cd], the fafulty of under-
standing (prajnendriya), are also of three categories,271
i. sharp [tfk~~a],
ii. mediocre [madhya],
iii. dull [mrdu].
3. The preference [or resolve] (ruci; adhimok~a) is also threefold:
i. the first category of disciples apply themselves to that' which is said in an
abbreviated [sa'!lk~ipta] way;
",
ii. the second to that which is said normally [madhya];
iii. the third to that which is said at great length (vistfr~a; vistara). 272
(a) The instruction on the aggregates addresses itself to the first category of disciples,
to those who are deceived with regard to mental factors, who have sharp faculties,
who are fond of abbreviated teachings; (b) the instruction on the sense-spheres
addresses itself to the second category;, (c) the instruction on the elements addresses
itself to the third category. 273
BBK. Definite number of the aggregates; 274 F 40-42

BBK.1. Why sensation and ideation constitute separate aggregates; 275 F 40-41
Sensation (vedana) and ideation (sa,rijna) each constitute a separate aggregate
(skandha): all the other mental factors (ii. 24) are placed in the aggregate of for-
mations (sa'!lskaraskandha; i. 15). Why?
21. The two thought-concomitants, i.e., sensation and ideation, are de-
fined as distinct aggregates [separate from other mental factors]
(1) because they are, [respectively,] the [predominant] causes of the
[two] roots of dispute [i.e., attachment to pleasures and attachment
to views], (2) because they are the causes o(cyclic existence and also
(3) because of the causes that justify the order of the aggregates.276
<41>
1. There are two roots of dispute (vivada): 277
1. attachment (adhyavasaya, abhi~vaftga) to pleasures or objects of desire
[kama];
ii. attachment to views (dr~ti).
Sensation and ideation are, respectively, the predominant cause [pradhanahetu] of
these two roots. In fact, if one becomes attached to pleasures, it is because one enjoys
(iisviida) the sensation; if one becomes attached to views, it is because of mistaken
'r' ideation (viparftasa'!ljiia; v. 9). {17 a}
2. Sensation and ideation are [also] the predominant causes of cyclic existence
[sa1Jlsiira]: the person who is greedy (grddha) to enjoy sensation and in whom idea-
tions are mistaken transmigrates.
3. The reasons justifying the order [krama] of the aggregates will be explained
below (i. 22bd).
BBK.2. Why the unconditionedfactors {j,o not form part of the aggregates; 278
F 41-42
[First, however,] why do the unconditioned factors (asa1J1skrta), which are part of the
sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana) and of the element of factors (dharmadhatu)
(i. 15d), not form part of the aggregates?
22ab. The unconditioned factors are not named with respect to the
aggregates because they do not correspond to the meaning [of
skandha].279
1. The unconditioned factors cannot be placed within any of the five aggregates,
for they are neither matter or material form, nor sensation ... [nor consciousness].
2. Nor can one speak of the unconditioned factors as a sixth aggregate [~a~fhafi
skandha], because it does not correspond to the meaning of skandha, since skandha
signifies heap [riisi], susceptible of being put together. What the Sfitra says of
material form (see F 35), one cannot say of the unconditioned factors, like: "If one
puts together all the unconditioned factors-that which is past, etc.-one has what
is called the aggregate of the unconditioned factors (asa1J1skrtaskandha)", for the
distinctions of past, etc., do not exist with respect to unconditioned factors. <42>
3. Furthermore, by the expression appropriative aggregate (upiidiinaskandha; i. 8a)
the assemblage [vistara] of that which is the cause [vastu] of pollution (sa1J1klesa) is
designated; by the expression aggregates (skandha) the assemblage of that which is
the cause of pollution (i.e., impure conditioned factors) and the cause of purification
(vyavadiina) (i.e., pure conditioned factors: the noble path) is designated. Thus the
unconditioned factors, which are neither· the cause of defilement nor the cause of
purification, {17 b} cannot be classified either among the appropriative aggregates
or among the aggregates.
4. According to one opinion, just as the end or ceasing (uparama) of a jug [ghafa]
is not a jug, in the same way the unconditioned factor, which is the end or ceasing of
the aggregates, cannot be an aggregate (skandha) (MVS, 385bl8). 280
[Reply:] - But, to reason like that, the unconditioned factors would be neither a
sense-sphere (iiyatana) nor an element (dhiitu ). 281
BBL. Reasons for the set order and progression of the aggregates, sense-
spheres and elements; 282 F 42"-46
BBL.I. Set order of the five aggregates; 283 F 42-43
We have defined the aggregates. We have now to explain the order [krama] in which
the aggregates are enumerated.
22bd. The order of the aggregates is justified by (1) their [relative] gross-
ness, (2) [the causes of the progression of] pollution, (3) the char-
acteristic of the pot, [food, seasoning, cook, consumer,] and also
(4) from the point of view of [the predominance in] the realms of
existence.284
1. [Relative grossness (audarika; F 36):] - (i) Material form (rupa), being suscepti-
ble to offering resistance [sapratighatva; i. 29b], is the most gross of [all] the aggre-
gates. Among the non-material (arupin) aggregates, (ii) sensation is the most gross,
because of the grossness of its operation [pracara; samudiicara]: in fact, sensation is
localized in one's hand, in one's foot, etc. (iii) Ideation (salJljiiii) is more gross than
the last two aggregates. (iv) The aggregate of formations is more gross than (v) the
aggregate of consciousness. 285
The aggregates are thus arranged in the order of their diminishing grossness
(audiirikatara).
2. [Causes of the progression (anukramahetu) of pollution (salJlklesa):] - In the
course of eternal [or beginningless (anadimat)] cyclic existence [salJlsara], men and
women [stri"puru~a] are mutually (i) enamoured by their bodies (rupa) because they
are (ii) attached to the enjoyment [asvada] of sensation (vedana). This attachment
proceeds from (iii) mistaken ideations (salJljiia-viparyasa), which are due to (iv) the
defilements (klesa) which are formations (salJlskiira). { 18 a} And it is (v) thought
(citta, vijiiana) which is defiled by the defilements [klesa].
The aggregates are thus arranged according to the progression of pollution (salJl-
klesa ). <43>
3. [Analogy (bhajanadyartha):] - (i) Matter or material form is [figuratively] the
pot [bhajana], (ii) sensation is the food [bhojana], (iii) ideation is the seasoning
[vyaiijana], (iv) formations are the cook [paktr] and (v) consciousness or thought is
the one who eats [bhoktr]. - We have here a third reason for the order [krama] of the
aggregates.
4. [Predominance in the three realms (dhiitu):] - Finally, to consider the aggregates
on the one hand, the realms of existence (dhatu) (ii. 14) on the other hand, it is seen
that:
i. the realm of desire (kamadhatu; iii. 1) is distinguished, specified, dominated

(prabhavita, prakar$ita) by matter or material form, namely, by the five
objects of sense enjoyments or of desire (kamagw:ia; Dharmaskandha, 5, 10;
MVS, 376; comp. Kathavatthu, viii. 3);
ii. the realm of fine-materiality (rupadhatu; iii. 2), i.e., the four meditations
(dhyiina), is distinguished by sensation (faculties of pleasure, satisfaction
and equanimity, viii. 12);
iii. "the first three [of the four] stages of the realm of immateriality (iirupya-
dhatu; iii. 3) are distinguished by ideation [alone]: ideation of infinite space,
(infinite consciousness, and nothingness, viii. 4);
iv. the fourth stage of the realm of immateriality, the summit of cyclic existence
(bhaviigra), is distinguished by intention (cetanii), the formation par excel-
lence [sa1?Zskiiramiitra], which creates an existence of 80,000 cosmic aeons
(iii. 81c);
v. these diverse stages are the stations of consciousness (vijiiiinasthiti; iii. 6):
it is in these places that the consciousness resides.
[The progression (anukrama) of the aggregates is for the sake of showing that] the
first four aggregates constitute the field [k$etra] and the fifth the seed [bija].
There are thus five aggregates, no more, no less.
We see"'how the reasons which justify the order of the aggregates also justify the
doctrine that makes sensation and ideation separate [prthak] aggregates: (1) they are
more gross than the other formations; (2) they are the cause of the progression of
pollution; (3) they are [figuratively] the food and the seasoning; (4) they dominate
two realms of existence.
BBL.2. Set progression of the sense-spheres and elements; F 43-45

Now we will explain the progression [anukrama] in which the six sense-spheres
(ayatana) or elements (dhatu) which are the six sense-faculties of consciousness,
i.e., the eye sense-faculty, etc., are enumerated; the progression in dependence on
which the object-field (vi$aya) and the consciousnesses that correspond to these
sense-faculties (riipadhatu, cak$urvijiianadhatu .. .) are arranged. {18 b}
23a. The first five [of the six sense-faculties, beginning with the eye
sense-faculty,] are the first because their object-referent [artha] is
present.286 <44>
Five [sense-faculties], beginning with th_e eye sense-faculty, are called the first,
because they bear only on present or simultaneous [vartamana;] object-fields.
On the contrary, the object-field of the mental faculty (manas; i. 39ab) [is undeter-
mined [aniyata]; i.e., it] can be either (1) simultaneous [vartamana] to this sense-
faculty; (2) previous or past [atfta]; (3) later or future [anagata]; (4) tritemporal [try-
adhva], i.e., simultaneous, previous and later; (5) outside of time [anadhva].
23b. The first four [of these five sense-faculties] are the first because
their object-referent is solely derivative or secondary matter. 287
The sense-faculties of the eye, ear, nose and tongue do not attain the fundamental
material elements (i. 12), but only the derivative material elements or derivative
material forms (bhautika, upadayariipa; ii. 50a, 65).
The object-field (vi~aya) of the body (kayendriya) is undetermined [aniyata; i. 35ab;
10d]: (1) sometimes the fundamental material elements [bhuta], (2) sometimes
the derivative material elements [bhautika], (3) sometimes both at the same time
[ubhaya].
23c. These [first] four [sense-faculties] are arranged according to the
range and speed of their function. 288
[The first four sense-faculties are listed progressively because] they function [vrtti]
(1) at a distance [diira], (2) at a greater distance [diiratara], (3) with greater speed
[asutara].
1. The eye sense-faculty and the ear sense-faculty function with regard to a
distant object-field (i. 43cd). They are thus named first.
2. The eye sense faculty functions at a greater distance than the ear sense-
0
faculty, for one may see a river [nadf] but not hear its sound. The eye sense-
faculty is thus named before the ear sense-faculty.
3. Neither the nose nor the tongue perceive at a distance. But the nose func-
tions quicker than the tongue, for the nose perceives the odor of food before
the tongue perceives the taste. {19 a}
23d. Or rather, the sense-faculties are arranged according to their posi-
tion [in the body]. 289
[In this body (sarfra),] the physical seat [adhi~thana] of the eye sense-faculty, i.e.,
the eye, is located uppermost; below it is the physical seat of the ear sense-
faculty; below it, the physical seat of the nose sense-faculty; below it, the physical
seat of the tongue sense-faculty. <45> As for the physical seat of the body sense-
faculty, i.e., the body (kaya), for the most part it is lower than the tongue. As for
the mental faculty, it is not material (i. 44ab). 290 [Thus, the order (krama) of these
(six sense-faculties) would be according to their (physical) position (sthana).]
aaM. Reasons for the names of rupa-ayatana and dharma-ayatana; 291 F 45-46
Among the ten sense-spheres included in the aggregate of material form, only one
receives the name riipa-iiyatana (sense-sphere of material form). Although all sense-
spheres are factors (dharma), only one is called dharma-iiyatana (sense-sphere of
factors). Why?
24. (1) In order to distinguish it from the other [senst"-spheres], because
of its predominance, one single sense-sphere is called riipa-ayatana
(sense-sphere of material form). (2) With a view to distinguish it
from the other [sense-spheres], because it includes many of the
factors, [i.e., sensations, ideations, etc.] and the best factor [i.e.,
nirvaQQ], one single sense-spb;ere is called dharma-ayatana (sense-
sphere of factors). 292
[Question: - Why is it "in order to distinguish it" (vise~a"(liirtha)?]
[Answer:] - 1. The ten material sense-spheres (i. 14ab) are, each separately [praty-
eka], one sense-sphere: five being the subject [vi~ayitva], five being the object
[vi~ayatva] of certain consciousnesses. They are not, when put together [samasta],
one single sense-sphere of consciousness, which one would call rilpa-iiyatana.
Nine sense-spheres are individualized by specific names: sense-sphere of the eye
(cakfurjiyatana), sense-sphere of the ear (srotriiyatana), sense-sphere of sound
(sabdiiyatana) ... .
The sense-sphere which does not bear any of these nine names and yet is matter or
material form (nlpa), is designated sufficiently by the expression rapa-ayatana
(sense-sphere of material form), without there being any need to give it another
name. {19 b}
[Question:] - But the other nine sense-spheres are also both sense-sphere (iiyatana)
and material form (riipa): why is the name of rupa-iiyatana given in preference to the
object of the eye sense-faculty?
[Answer:] - Because of its predominance [pradhiinya] [in three ways]. (Visible
form) is material form (riipa), in fact:
first, because of being rupa"(la in the sense of deterioration (badhanalak~a"/Ja-
rupa"(la; i. 13, F 24): on account of it offering resistance [sapratighatva]; visible
form is broken by the touch of the hand [pii"(lisaf!!sparsa], etc.;
second, because of being riipa"(la as being visible in a particular place (desa-
nidarsana-rupa"(la: i. 13, F. 25): [on account of its visibility (sanidarsanatva),]
one can indicate visible form [as being "this" (idam),] as being "here" [iha], as
being "there" [amutra)]
third, because of common usage [loka]: that which is commonly [loke] under-
stood by riipa, is the visible form: color and shape. <46>
2. The sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana; i. 15bd) is sufficiently distinguished
from the other sense-spheres by the name of dharmayatana (sense-sphere of factors).
Same explanation as above, i.e., because the sense-sphere of factors includes:
i. numerous [bahu] factors, such as sensation, ideation, etc.;
ii. the best[agra] factor (dharma), i.e., nirva,:za.
This is why the general name, dharma-ayatana, is attributed to [this sense-sphere]
par excellence.
***
According to another opinion (Dharmatriita),293 visible form is called riipayatana
(sense-sphere of material form) (1) because [of its grossness (audarikatva) in
that] it includes twenty varieties [prakara] [of visible form, i.e., blue, etc.],
(2) because it is the domain [gocara] of the three kinds of eyes: the fleshly eye
(mti1Jlsacalcyus), the divine eye (divyacak~us), the wisdom eye (prajiiiicalcyus)
(Jtivuttaka, 61). 294
BBN. Classification of other aggregates, other sources and other elements; 295
F 46-51
[Question:] - The Siitras name other skandhas, other ayatanas, other dhiitus. Are
these included (sarµgraha) in the aggregates, sense-spheres and elements, described
above, [or are they separate (vyatireka)]? {20 a}
[Answer: They are included, not separate.]
BBN.1. Other skandhas; 296 F 46-47

BBN.1.1. 80,000 aggregates of dharmas; 297 F 46-47
298
BBN.1.1.1. Aggregates of dharmas & their inclusion in the aggregates; F 46
25. The 80,000 aggregates of dharmas which the Muni promulgated,

according to whether one regards them (1) as voice or (2) as name,
are included in (1) the aggregate of material form or (2) the aggre-
gate of formations, [respectively].299
1. For the philosophers who say that the Buddha-word [buddhavacana] is in its
intrinsic nature voice (vac), these [80,000] aggregates are included in the aggregate
of material form (riipaskandha).
2. For those who consider the Buddha-word as being name (niiman) [in its intrinsic
nature,] these [80,000] aggregates are included in the aggregate of formations (sarri-
skaraskandha; ii. 36, 47ab).
BBN.1.1.2. Dimension or measure of the dharmaskandha; 30°F 46-47

What is the dimension or measure [pramii1J,a] of the aggregate of dharmas (dharma-
skandhq)?301 <47>
BBN.1.1.2.a. Various interpretations of the aggregate of dharmas; 302 F 47

26a. According to some, the aggregate of dharmas is of the dimension or
measure of the Treatise [known as Dharmaskandha].303
That is to say, of the dimension of the Treatise of Abhidharma known by the name of
Dharmaskandha, comprising 6,000 stanzas. 304
26b. [According to another opinion,] the expositions on aggregates,
[sense-spheres, elements, dependent origination,] etc., constitute as
many aggregates of dharmas. 305
According to another opinion, the expositions (katha, akhyana) on the aggre-
gates (skandha), sense-spheres (iiyatana), elements (dhiitu), dependent origination
(pratftyasamutpada), truths (satya), sustenances (ahara; iii. 38d), meditations
(dhyana), {20 b} immeasurables (apramii1J,a), formless meditative attainments
(arupya), liberations (vimok~a), perception-spheres of mastery (abhibhviiyatana),
perception-spheres of totality (krtsniiyatana), factors conducive to enlightenment
(bodhipak~ika), superknowledges (abhijfiii), unhindered knowledges (pratisarrivid),
cognition resulting from a resolve (pra1J,idhijfiiina), concentration of being without
conflict (ara1J,ii), etc., are each separately [pratyeka] as many aggregates of dharmas
(dharmaskandha ).
BBN.1.1.2.b. True interpretation of the aggregate of dharmas; 306 F 47

26cd. In fact, [however,] each aggregate of dharmas has been preached in
order to cure or counteract a certain category [of behavior] of the
faithful. 307
With respect to their behavior [carita; ii. 26], sentient beings are 80,000 in number:
some are dominated or distinguished [bheda] (1) by attachment [raga], others (2) by
hatred [dve~a], (3) by delusion [moha], (4) by conceit [miina], etc. 308 80,000 aggre-
gates of dhannas have been uttered by the Fortunate One in order to cure or
counteract these [behaviors].
BBN.2. Other skandhas, ayatanas, dhatus & their inclusion within the
aggregates, sense-spheres, elements; 309 F 47-51
27. [Just as the 80,000 aggregates of dharmas are included in (the
aggregates, i.e.,) the aggregate of material form or the aggregate of
formations,] so also the other skandhas, iiyatanas and dhiitus [men-
tioned in other Siitras] should be suitably arranged within the ag-
gregates, sense-spheres and elements as described above, by tak-
ing into account the specific characteristics attributed to them.310
<48>
The other skandhas, ii,yatanas and dhatus mentioned in other Sutras should be ar-
ranged within the five aggregates, twelve sense-spheres and eighteen elements, by
taking into account the specific characteristics [svalak~a~a] attributed to them in this
treatise [sastra].
BBN.2.1. Five pure groups; 311 F 48

There are five pure groups (skandha), 312
1. morality (sfla; iv. 13),
2. concentration (samadhi; vi. 68),
3. superior knowledge (prajna; ii. 25), {21 a}
4. liberation (vimukti; vi. 76a); and
5. cognition-insight of liberation (vimuktijniinadarsana):
the first is included in the aggregate of material form (rupaskandha); the others
(i.e., 2-5.) are included in the aggregate of formations (saf[lskaraskandha) (Saf[lyutta,
i. 99; Dfgha, iii. 279; Dharmasaf[lgraha, 23).
BBN.2.2. Other spheres (ayatana); 313 F 48-49

The first eight [of the ten] perception-spheres of totality (krtsnayatana)' (viii. 36)
being non-greed (alobha) in their intrinsic nature are included in the sense-sphere of
factors (dharmayatana). If they are considered along with their following (parivara),
they are the five aggregates (skandha) in their intrinsic nature, and they are included
in the sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-ayatana) and the sense-sphere of
factors (dharmayatana).
The same holds for the [eight] perceptfon.:Spheres of mastery (abhibhvayatana)
(viii. 35).
The last two [of the ten] perception-spheres of totality (krtsniiyatana), [i.e., the
infinite perception-spheres of space and of consciousness,] and the four formless
perception-spheres (arupyayatana; viii. 2c) are in their intrinsic nature the four
aggregates (skandha), with the exclusion of material form (rupa). They are included
in the sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-iiyatana) and the sense-sphere of
factors (dharmiiyatana).
The five gates of arrival into liberation (vimuktyiiyatana) 314 are in their intrinsic
nature speculative knowledge or understanding (prajfiii); they are thus included
in the sense-sphere of factors (dharmii)fatana). If they are considereq along with
their following, they are included in the/ sense-sphere of sound (sabda~atana), the
sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-iiyatana) and the sense-sphere of factors
(~harmiiyatana ).
two other iiyatanas remain to be mentioned: 315
1. the gods without ideation (asa1'{1jfiisattva; ii. 41bd), included in the ten sense-
spheres (iiyatana), with the exception of odors and tastes; <49>
2. the approachers of the perception-sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation
I -
(naivasa1'{1jfiiiniisa1'{1jfiiiyatanopaga), included in the sense-sphere of the

mental faculty (mana-iiyatana) and the sense-sphere of factors (dhanna-
iiyatana).
BBN.2.3. Other elements (dhatu); 316 F 49-51

BBN.2.3.t. Sixty-two elements; 317 F 49
In the same way, the sixty-two elements (dhiitu) enumerated in the Bahudhiituka
should be included within the eighteen elements by taking into 'account their nature
[yathiiyogarµ sarµgraha]. 318
BBN.2.3.2. Six elementary substances; 319 F 49-51

Among the six elementary substances (dhatu) 320 of which the Bahudhiitukasutra 321
speaks,
1. elementary substance earth [prthivfdhiitu],
2; elementary substance water [abdhiitu],
3. elementary substance fire [tejodhiitu];
4. elementary substance wind [viiyudhatu],
5. elementary substance space (iikiisadhiitu),
6. elementary substance consciousness (vijfianadhiitu),
the last two have not yet been defined.
BBN.2.3.2.a. Elementary substance space (akiUadhatu ); 322 F 49-50

[Question:] - Should we understand that the elementary substance space [iikiisa-
dhiitu] is the same factor as space (iiktisa), the first unconditioned factor (i. Sc)?
{21 b}
[Answer: -No.]
28ab. Cavity or empty space is what is called the elementary substance
space; according to the School [kilaJ, [empty space or elementary
substance space] is light and darkness. 323
(1) The cavity or empty space [chidra] of the gate [dvara], the window [vatayana],
etc., is the external (btihya) elementary substance space; (2) the cavity of the mouth
(mukha), the nose (niisikii), etc., is the internal (tidhyiitmika) elementary substance
space. 324 <50>
According to the School (kila), empty space or the elementary substance space is
light [iiloka] and darkness [lamas] (i. 10), i.e., a certain category of color (va~a), of
matter or material form (riipa; i. 9b), for what is perceived in a cavity is light or
darkness. Being light or darkness in its intrinsic nature, empty space will be day and
night in its intrinsic nature [ratrirµdivasvabhava]. 325
Empty space is called aghasiimantaka rupa (i.e., material form that is proximate to
agha) (MVS, 388b5).
Agha, some say [kila], is explained etymologically as that which is exceedingly
obstructive (atyartharµ ghatat): "because it is exceedingly obstructive or obstructed'.'. 326
Agha should thus be understood as solid, agglomerated matter or material form
(sarµcita rupa; citastha rupa). Empty space is thus a type of matter that is proximate
(samantaka) to agha.
According to another opinion, according to us, agha signifies "free from being
obstructive" (a-gha). Empty space is agha because other matter is not obstructed by
if [apratighata]; it is, at the same time, proximate (samantaka) to other matter; it is
thus agha and siimantaka.
BBN.2.3.2.b. Elementary substance consciousness (vijiianadhatu); 327 F 50-51

[Question:] - Should we understand that all consciousness is the elementary sub-
stance consciousness?
[Answer: - No.]
28cd. The elementary substance consciousness is an impure consciousness,
because it is the basis [nisraya] of the arising [of the ihought af
conception and of all existence until the mind at deathJ. 328
The impure (sasrava) consciousness, i.e., the mind that does not form part of the
(noble) path.
The six elementary substances are presented in the Siitra (F 49, note) as basis
[sadhara~a], as the raison d'etre of the arising, i.e., of the thought at conception
(pratisaf!!dhicitta) and all of existence until the thought at death (mara~acitta; cyuti-
citta). <51>
The p,ure (niriisrava) factors are opposed to arising, to existence. Thus the five
sensory consciousnesses, which are always impure, and the mental consciousness,
when it is impure, give us the elementary substance consciousness (MVS, 389a8).
Of these six elementary substances, [i.e., (1) elementary substance earth, (2) elemen-
tary substance water, (3) elementary substance fire, (4) elementary substance wind,
(5) elementary substance space and (6) elementary substance consciousness,] the first
four are included within the tangible (spra~favyadhatu), the fifth is included within
. visible form (riipadhatu), the sixth within the seven elements (dhatu) enumerated in
i. 16c, [i.e., the six consciousnesses and the mental faculty].
BC. Twenty-two Doctrinal Perspectives on the Eighteen Elements 253
BC. l?l;;;NTY-TWO DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE

EIGHTEEN ELEMENTS; 329 F s1-102
1. visible (sanidarsana)- invisible (anidarsana); F 51
2. resistant (sapratigha) - non-resistant (apratigha); F 51
3. wholesome (kusala)-unwholesome (akusala)-non-defined (avyakrta); F 53
4. connected with/pertaining to (pratisarµyukta) the realm of desire, realm of
fine-materiality, realm of immateriality; F 54
5. impure (sasrava) - pure (anasrava); F 58
6. associated with initial inquiry and investigation (savitarka-savicara) - free from
initial inquiry but associated with investigation (avitark-savicara) - free from
initial inquiry and from investigation (avitarka-avicara); F 62
7. having a cognitive object (salambana) - not having a cognitive object
(analambana); F 62
8. appropriated (upatta) - non-appropriated (anupatta); F 62
9. primary matter (bhata)- secondary matter (bhautika); F 63
10. aggregated (sarµcita) - non-aggregated (asarµcita); F 66
11. that which cuts off (chinnati), is cut off (chidyate); that which burns (dahaka), is
burned (dahyate); that which weighs (tulayati), can be weighed (tulya); F 67
12. effect of retribution (vipakaja)- effect of accumulation (aupacayika)- effect of
equal outflow (nai:jyandika); F 68
13. yoked with a [permanent] real (dravyayukta); F70
14. momentary (k:ja,:zika); F 71
15. acquiring accompaniment (samanvagamarµ pratilambhate)- accompaniment
(samanvagama); F 71
16. internal (adhyatmika)- external (bahya); F 73
17. homogeneous (sabhaga)-partially homogeneous (tatsabhaga); F 74
18. abandoned by insight (darsa~aheya)- abandoned by cultivation (bhavanaheya)
- not to be abandoned (aheya); F 78.
19. view (dmi) - not view (na dr:fti); F 80
20. consciousness (vijiian), object of consciousness/the cognized (vijiieya); F 100
21. permanent (nitya) - impermanent (anitya); F 100
22. controlling faculties (indriya) - not controlling faculties (nendriya); F 100--2
BCA. 1. Visible (sanidarsana) and invisible (anidarsana) & the eighteen

elements; 33°F 51
{ii 1 a} 331 Among the eighteen elements (dhatu), how many are visible or suscep-
tible to be pointed at with the finger (sanidarsana)? [How many are invisible
(anidarsana)?]
254 Chapter One: Exposition of the Elements (DhiUunirdesa)
29ab. [Among the eighteen elements,] the one element of visible form
(rupadhlltu) is visible. 332
One can indicate its location and say "this one" [idam], "here" [iha], "there" [amutra].
The remaining [seventeen] elements are invisible.
BCB. 2. Resistant (sapratigha) and non-resistant (apratigha) & the eighteen

elements·, 333 F 51-53 ·
How many of the elements are resistant (sapratigha)? How many are non-resistant
(apratigha)?
29bc. The ten elements which are exclusively material (rupi,:,,at,) are
resistant.334
The ten elements included in the aggregate of material form (riipaskandha) are
resistant (i. 13).335 { 1 b}
BCB.1. Three types of obstruction (pratighata); 336 F 51-52

[Resistance (pratigha) means obstruction (pratighiita). 337]
Obstruction (pratighiita, or abhighiita) is of three types:
1. obstruction qua obstacle (iivara"f}apratighiita);
•
2. obstruction qua object-field (vi:jayapratighiita);
3. obstruction qua cognitive object (iilambanapratighiita) (MVS, 391c6).
BCB.1.1. Obstruction qua obstacle (avara~apratighata); 338 F 51

Obstruction qua obstacle (or "common" physical resistance) is the quality belonging
to a body making a hindrance fpratibandha] to the arising of another body in its own
place, the impenetrability. 339
[For instance,] when the hand [hasta] encounters a hand or a rock [upala], or when
the rock encounters a rock or a hand, it is obstructive, it is repelled (pratihanyate).
BCB.1.2. Obstruction qua object-field (vi~ayapratighiita); 34 °F 51-52

Obstruction qua object-field is the obstruction of the sense-faculty (vi:jayin), [such as
the eye, etc.] when it encounters its object-field (vi:jaya), [such as visible form,
etc.]. 341 <52>
According to the Prajfiapti: 342
I. There is an eye, an eye sense-faculty, that is ~ncountering (= is struck
by) fpratihanyate] [its object-field, i.e., a visible form,] in water Uala] but
not on land [sthala], namely, the eye of a fish [matsya].
2. There is an eye that encounters [its object-field] on land but not in

water, namely, the eye of humans in general [manu~ya] (with the exclusion
of fishermen).
3. There is an eye that encounters [its object-field] both in water and on
land, namely, the eye of the crocodile [sisumara], frog [ma~{iaka], crab [or
demon (pisaca)], of the fishermen [kaivartta].
4. There is an eye that encounters [its object-field] neither in water nor on
dry land, namely, the eye which is none of the preceding categories (for
example, the eye of sentient beings who perish in the womb).
[Moreover:]
1. There is an eye that encounters [its object-field] at night [rdtri] [but not
during the day (diva)], namely, the eye of the bat [titfla], owl [uluka], etc.
2. There is an eye that encounters [its object-field] during the day, namely,
the eye of humans in general (with the exclusion of thieves, etc.).
3. There is an eye that encounters [its object~field] at night and during the
day, namely, the eye of the dog [svan], jackal [srgala], horse [turaga],
leopard [dvfpin], cat [marjara], etc.
4. There is an eye that encounters [its object-field] neither at night nor
during the day, namely, the eye which is none of the preceding categories.343
{2 a}
BCB.1.3. Obstruction qua cognitive object (alambanapratighata); 344 F 52

Obstruction qua cognitive object is the encounter of thought and thought-concomi-
tants (citta, caitta) with their cognitive object (svalambana) (ii. 62c). 345
BCB.1.4. Difference between object-field (vi~aya) and cognitive object

(alambana); 346 F 52
What is the difference between (1) the object-field (vi~aya) and (2) the cognitive
object (alambana)?
1. By vi~aya, one understands that place where [the eye, ear, etc.,] exercises its
operation [karitra], 341 i.e., seeing, hearing, etc. 348
2. Fy iilambana, one understands that which is grasped by thought and thought-
concomitants [cittacaitta]. 349
Thus, whereas thought and thought-concomitants have an object-field and a cognitive
object, the eye, the ear, etc., have only an object-field.
BCB.1.5. Meaning ofpratighiUa in vi~ayapratighata and alambanapratighata; F 52

Why is the issuing forth (pravrtti) or operation (karitra) of the sense-faculty or of
the thought with respect to its [own] object-field (vi~aya) or its [own] cognitive
object (alambana) called obstruction (pratighata)? 350
1. Because the sense-faculty does not issue forth [apravrtti], is not active, beyond
the object-field: thus it is obstructed by the object-field [for, in common usage, it is
said that.one is obstructed by a wall beyond which one cannot ''proceed"].
2. Or rather, by obstruction one understands "encounter, meeting, or the arrival
there" (nipiita, nipatana): this is the issuing forth or operation (pravrtti = kiiritra) of
the sense-faculty with respect to its own object-field. <53>
BCB.2. Ten elements and obstruction qua obstacle; F 53

When we say that ten elements are resistant (sapratigha), "characterized by ob-
struction (pratighiita)", we are speaking of the obstruction qua obstacle (iivarm;ia-
pratighiita): these are bodies that are mutually impenetrable, susceptible of collision.
BCB.,3. Tetralemma between obstruction qua object-field & obstruction qua

obstacle; F 53
You may ask if th~ factors that are resistant (sapratigha) in terms of obstruction qua
object-Held (vi~ayapratighata) are also resistant in terms of obstruction qua obstacle
(iivara,:iapratighiita).
Four alternatives (tetralemma):
i. the seven elements of thought (cittadhiitu; i. 16c) and one part of the element
of factors (dhannadhiitu), namely, the associated factors (saYJlprayukta;
ii. 23), are resistant only in terms of obstruction qua object-field;
u. the five object-fields, i.e., visible form, etc., (i. 9), are resistant only in terms
of obstruction qua obstacle;
iii. the five sense-faculties, i.e., the eye, etc., (i. 9), are resistant from two points
of view [i.e., qua object-field and qua obstacle];
1v. one part of the element of factors, namely, the dissociated factors (vipra-
yukta; ii. 35), is not resistant (sapratigha).
BCB.4. Relationship between "obstruction qua object-field" & "obstruction

qua cognitive object"; F 53
You may ask if the factors that are resistant in terms of obstruction qua object-field
[vi~ayapratighata] are also resistant in terms of obstruction-qua cognitive object
(iilambanapratighiita). {2 b}
We answer by speaking of that which accords with the latter (and not the former)
alternative (pasciitpiidaka), namely, the factors that are resistant in terms of obstruc-
tion qua cognitive object are also resistant in terms of obstruction qua object-field.
But there are factors that are resistant in terms of obstruction qua object-field without
at the same time being resistant in terms of obstruction qua cognitive object, namely,
the five sense-faculties.
BCB.s. Sapratigha and apratigha according to Kumiiraliibha; F 53

The Bhadanta Kumaralabha says:
1. We call sapratigha that in which [i.e., the sense-faculty] and with regard
to which [i.e., the object-field] a consciousness or mental faculty (manas)
can be obstructed from arising by a foreign [body];
2. in the contrary case, it is apratigha. 351
[Resistant and non-resistant have now been discussed.]
Bee. 3. Wholesome (kusala), unwholesome (akusala), non-defined (avyakrta)

& the eighteen elements; 352 F 53-54 ·
Among the eighteen elements, how many are wholesome (kusala), unwholesome
(akusala), non-defined (avyiikrta) (iv. 8, 9, 45)? 353 <54>
29cd. Eight elements [among the ten elements that are exclusively mate-
rial] are (morally) non-defined, namely, the preceding [ten ele-
ments] minus visible form and sound.354
The ten elements spoken of as resistant (sapratigha; i. 29bc), minus visible form
(rupa) and sound (sabda) 355-i.e., the eight elements: the five material sense-facul-
ties; odor; taste; and the tangible-are non-defined, because of not being defined as
wholesome or unwholesome, 356 or else, according to another opinion, because of not
being defined from the point of view of [karmic] ripening (vipiika).
30a. The other [ten of the eighteen elements] are of three types [i.e.,
wholesome, unwholesome, or non-defined]. 357
The other ten [of the eighteen] elements are, according to the case, [either] whole-
some, unwholesome, or non-defined (iv, F 33ff.). [Among these ten elements,]
1-7. the seven elements [of thought] (cittadhiitavab; i. 16c) are:
i. wholesome when they are associated with the three wholesome roots
[i.e., non-greed (alobha); non-hatred (adve~a); non-delusion (amoha);
ii, F. 160; iv. 8],
ii. unwholesome when they are associated with the unwholesome roots [i.e.,
greed, hatred, delusion; v. 20ab],
iii. non-defined in all other cases; 358 {3 a}
8. · the element of factors (dharmadhiitu; i. 15cd) includes:
i. the wholesome roots, factors associated with these roots, factors arisen
from these roots,359 the cessation due to deliberation (pratisaf!!khyiinirodha)
or nirvii~a [see iv. 8bc], [which are all wholesomer,
ii. the unwholesome roots, factors associated with these roots, factors arisen
from these roots, [which are all unwholesome];
iii. the other factors, for example, space [iikiisa], which are non-defined;
9-10. the element of visible form (rupadhatu) and the element of sound (sabdadhatu)
are:
i-ii. wholesome or unwholesome when they are included in bodily or vocal
action (iv. 26; 3d) arisen from a wholesome or unwholesome thought;
iii. non-defined in all other cases.
[Wholesome, unwholesome and non-defined have now been discussed.]
BCD. 4. Connected with (pratisa'!lyukta) the realm of desire, realm offine-

materjality and realm of immateriality & the eighteen elements;'3flJ F 54-58
Among the eighteen elements, how many exist in each of the realms of existence,
i.e., the realm of desire, the realm of fine-materiality, the realm of immateriality
(iii. 1-3)?361 .
.BcD.1. Realm of desire & the eighteen elements; 362 F 54-55

30ab. All [eighteen elements] exist in the realm of desire.363 <55>
All the elements are connected with or pertain to (pratisaf!!yukta) the realm of desire,
not dissociated from the realm of desire (MVS, 746cl).
BCD.2. Realm offine-materiality & the fourteen elements; 364 F 55-57

30b-d. Fourteen elements exist in the realm of fine-materiality, with the
exception of odor, taste, olfactory consciousness, gustatory con-
sciousness.365
BCD.2.1. Odor and taste are lacking because they are material food; 366 F 55
Odor and taste are lacking there, for they constitute mat~rial food [kavadfkiira-
iiharatva; iii. 39], and no one is born into the realm of fine-materiality who is
not detached [vftaraga] from this kind of food. 367 [Since the cognitive objects
(alambana), i.e.,] odor and taste are lacking, the olfactory and the gustatory con-
sciousness are also lacking.
Objection: -The tangible (spra~{avyadhiitu) should also be lacking, for it also consti-
tutes material food.
[Answer:] - No, for the tangible is not exclusively food. The tangible which is not
food [in its intrinsic nature] does exist in the realm of fine-materiality. {3 b}
Objection: - One can reason in the same way in regard to odor and taste.
[Answer:] - No. The tangible has a useful function (parivi~fi) apart from food:
1. it serves as a basis of the sense-faculties (a§rayabhiiva);
2. it serves as a support in general (iidhiirabhiiva);
3. it serves as garment [priivara!labhiiva].
Outside of consumption (ahiirlibhyavahiira), odor and taste have no use (paribhoga):
they have no utility [ni~prayojana] for sentient beings detached [vftaraga] from
food.
Bco.2.2. Srrlabha: Odor and taste are lacking because of a certain tangible; F 55
SrTiabha gives a different explanation. - When persons in the realm of desire enter
into meditative attainments [samapatti], enter into meditation (dhyana), they see
visible forms; they hear sounds; their body is favored, comforted (anugrah) by a
certain tangible that accompanies the bodily pliancy (prasrabdhi) produced by the
meditation (viii. 9b). 368 It can be concluded from this fact that, in the celestial abodes
of the realm of fine-materiality which bear the name meditation (dhyana; i.e., medi-
tation as birth [upapattidhyiina], iii. 2; viii. 1), there are [only] visible form, sound,
tangible, but not taste and odor. <56>
BCD.2.3. Vasubandhu & the number of elements in the realm of

fine-materiality; 369 F 56-57
[Vasubandhu: 370] - We think that, if odor and taste are absent in the realm of fine-
materiality, the nose and the tongue sense-faculties should also be absent there; for
they have no utility [ni~prayojana] there. Thus there would be only twelve elements
in the realm of fine-materiality.
Answer by a scholar who substitutes for the Vaibha~ikas (vaibhii~ikadesfya): - The
nose and the tongue sense-faculties have a utility in the realm of fine-materiality, for,
without them, [respectively,] bodily beauty [ii.frayasobhii] and elocution or com-
munication [vyavahiira] could not occur.
[Vasubandhu:] - The nose, i.e., the physical seat [adhi~{hiina] of the subtle matter
which constitutes the nose sense-faculty, suffices for beauty [sobhii], leaving aside
subtle matter (i. 44); the tongue, i.e., the physical seat of the tongue sense-faculty,
suffices for elocution [vacana], leaving aside subtle matter which constitutes the
tongue sense-faculty.
The Vaibhii~ikadesfya: - The physical seat, i.e., the nose and the tongue, which
supports the sense-faculty, cannot be without this sense-faculty. There is no nose, no
tongue where the subtle matter, which constitutes the nose or the tongue sense-
faculty, is lacking. In the same way, the male sexual organ is always invested with
this special body sense-faculty called male sexual faculty (puru~endriya) (i. 44a;
ii. 2cd).
[Vasubandhu:] - One can very well conceive that the sexual organ is absent when the
sexual faculty is absent, for, being left without this faculty, the sexual organ has no
utility; but [the physical seats of] the nose and the tongue have a utility independent
of the nose and tongue sense-faculties. Thus [the physical seats of] the nose and
tongue exist in the realm of fine-materiality although the corresponding sense-facul-
ties are absent there. Thus there would be only twelve elements in the realm of fine-
materiality.
Answer by the Vaibha~ika: -A sense-faculty can arise without having any utility, for
example, the sense-faculties of sentient beings destined to perish in the womb.
[Vasubandhu:] - Agreed! The arising of a sense-faculty can be without utility: but
it is never without a cause [nirhetuka]. {4 a} What is the cause of the arising of a
sense-faculty, if not a certain [past] action [karmavise~a] commanded by craving
[tmzii] related to this sense-faculty? But whoever is without craving [vitmza] for
the object-field, odor, is also without craving for the sense-faculty, the nose sense-
faculty. Thus, there is no reason for the nose and tongue sense-faculties to appear
among sentient beings who are reborn in the realm of fine-materiality, since these
sentient beings are detached from [the object-fields, i.e.,] odors and tastes. Or else,
tell us, why is the sexual faculty absent in the realm of fine-materiality? <57>
Answer by the Vaibha~ika: - The sexual faculty is a cause of ugliness [asobha-
karatva; ii. 12].
[Vasubandhu:] - Is it not beautiful among the sentient beings who possess the marks
of the Mahapuru~as? 371 Moreover, it is not because of its utility that the sexual
faculty arises, but rather because of its cause [svakara~a]. The cause being given, it
will arise, even if it is ugly.
BCD.2.3.L Vaibhii~ika: argument from scriptural authority and logical reasoning

that there are fourteen elements; F 57
Argument from authority.
Vaibha~ika: - To maintain that the nose and tongue sense-faculties are absent in the
realm of fine-materiality is to contradict the Siitra. The Siitra372 teaches that sentient
beings of the realm of fine-materiality possess all of the sense-faculties (ahfna-
indriya), all sense-faculties in a complete or unimpaired way (avikalendriya): they
are never one-eyed (kara) or one-eared (kul}{ha) (iii. 98a).
[Reply:] - This text teaches that sentient beings of the realm of fine-materiality
possess, completely, the faculties that [actually do] exist in the realm of fine-mate-
riality. If the Vaibha~ikas do not understand it in this way, [it would entail that] they
should attribute the sexual faculty to these sentient beings.
Answer [based on logical reasoning] and conclusion by the Vaibha~ika: - Although
odor and taste are absent there, the nose and tongue sense-faculties [do indeed] exist
· in the realm of fine-materiality.
In fact, the persons who are detached from odor retain the attachment in regard to the
nose sense-faculty as being part of the person (titmabhiiva, svasaf!!tiina). Craving
enters into action with regard to these six sense-faculties of consciousness, not
because of the object-field of these six sense-faculties, but because of the persons
themselves (iitmabhiivamukhena). Thus the arising of the nose and tongue sense-
faculties has a cause, even if one were detached from odors and tastes.
The same does not hold for the sexual faculty. The craving related to this faculty is in
regard to craving for the tactile consciousness of sexual union. 373 But sentient beings
who will be reborn in the realm of fine-materiality are detached from the afore-
mentioned consciousness; thus they have not accomplished the action commanded by
craving related to the sexual faculty, and therefore this faculty is absent in the realm
of fine-materiality. 374 { 4 b} <5 8>
[Thus, it has been established that there are fourteen elements that exist in the realm
of fine-materiality.]
BCD.3. Realm of immateriality & the three elements; 375 F 58

31ab. In the realm of immateriality, there are [only] (1) the mental faculty
(manodhiitu), (2) the object of the mental consciousness (dharma-
dhiitu), (3) the mental consciousness (manovijniinadhiitu). 376
Sentient beings detached [vftariiga] from matter (rupa) arise in the realm of im-
matiriality.
The ten elements that are material form in their intrinsic nature, namely, the five
sense-faculties and their object-referents, and the five consciousnesses that have a
material element for their basis [a.fraya] and for their cognitive object [alambana]
are thus absent in Ariipya (viii. 3c).
BCE. 5. Impure (sasrava) and pure (anasrava) & the eighteen elements; 377
F58
How many elements are impure [sasrava]? How many are pure [anasrava]?
31cd. The three elements which have just been named, [i.e., the mental
faculty, the object of the mental consciousness, the mental con-
sciousness,] are [either] (1) pure [when they are part of the truth of
the path or of the unconditioned] or (2) impure [in the opposite
case]. 378
They are:
1. pure (anasrava) when they are part of the truth of the path [margasatya] or
of the unconditioned [asal?lskrta];
2. impure [sasrava] [in the opposite case (i. 4)).
31d. The other elements, [fifteen in number,] are [solely] impure.379
The other elements, fifteen in number, are solely impure. 380 <59>
BCF. 6. Associated with initial inquiry and investigation (savitarka-savicara)

- free from initial inquiry but associated with investigation (avitarka-
savicara) - free from initial inquiry and from investigation ( avitarka-
avicara) & the eighteen elements; 381 F 59-61
How many elements are (1) associated with initial inquiry and with investigation
[savitarka?i, savicara?i,; ii. 28, 33), (2) free from initial inquiry but associated with
investigation [avitarkii viciiramiitriil;i], (3) free from initial inquiry and investigation
[avitarkii viciiriil;i]? 382
BCF.t. Associated with initial inquiry and investigation & the first Jive
consciousnesses; 383 F 59
32ab. [Vaibhii~ikas: - The first] five [of the seven] consciousness-elements
always (hi) involve initial inquiry and investigation.384 { 5 a}
[The first five of the seven consciousness-elements] are always [nityam] associ-
ated with initial inquiry (vitarka) and with investigation (vicara), for these [con-
sciousnesses] are gross, being turned toward the outside. 385 The word hi, "always",
BC. Twenty-two Doctrinal Perspectives on the Eighteen Elements 26.B
["indeed",] indicates restriction [avadhara~a]: they are exclusively factors involving

initial inquiry and investigation.
BCF.2. Three kinds & the last three elements; 386 F 59-60
32c. The last three [of the eighteen] elements, [i.e., the mental faculty,
the object of mental consciousness and the mental consciousness,]
are of three kinds [that is, (1) associate4 with initial inquiry and
with investigation, (2) free from initi~l inquiry but associated
with investigation, (3) free from both initial inquiry and investiga-
. tion]. 387
These elements are the mental faculty (manodhatu), the factors, i.e., the object of
mental consciousness (dharmadhatu), the mental consciousness (manovijiianadhatu).
[These three elements are of three kinds (prakara ). ]
1. In the realm of desire and in the first meditation (dhyana; viii. 7, 11), (i) the
mental faculty (manoahatu, (ii) the element of mental consciousness (manovijiiana-
dhatu), (iii) that part of the element of factors (dhannadhatu) which is associated
with thought (ii. 23), except for initial inquiry and investigation themselves, are
associated with initial inquiry and with investigation.
I
2. In the intermediate meditation (dhyanantara) (viii. 22d), these same elements are
free from initial inquiry but associated with investigation.
3. In the higher stages (bhumi), [i.e., beginning with the second meditation] up to
and including the last stage (naivasarrzjiianasarrzjiiayatana; bhavagra), these same
elementi, are free from both initial inquiry and investigation (viii. 23cd).
4. The part of the elements of factors which is dissociated from thought (ii. 35) and
the investigation of the special meditation [dhyanantara] are also free from both
initial inquiry and investigation. <60>
5. As for initial inquiry [itself], it is always accompanied by investigation and it is
always free from initial inquiry, in view of the impossibility of two simultaneous
initial inquiries. 388
But investigation [itself], in the realm of desire and in the first meditation, are not
included within any of the three kinds: in fact, there it is always associated with
initial inquiry and is never accompanied by investigation, in view of the impossibility
of two simultaneous inyestigations.
Thus we say that, in the stages (bhami) involving both initial inquiry and investiga-
tion (viii. 7), there are four categories (prakiira):
i. factors associated with thought, except for initial inquiry and investigation,
are associated with initial inquiry and investigation; {5 b}
ii. initial inquiry is free from initial inquiry but associated with investigation;
iii. factors dissociated from thought are free from initial inquiry and investiga-
tion;
iv. investigation is free from investigation but associated with initial inquiry.
BCF.3. Free from initial inquiry and investigation & the other ten elements; 389
F60
32d. The other elements [i.e., the ten material elements] are free from
both [i.e., initial inquiry and investigation].390
The other elements are the ten material (riipin) elements. Not being associated
with thought, they are [always] free from initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation
(vicii-ra).
acF.4. Associated with initial inquiry and investigation & free from
conceptualizing activity (avikalpaka); 391 F 60-61
But, if the [first] five sensory consciousnesses are always associated with initial
inquiry and investigation, how are they defined as free from conceptualizing activity
(avikalpaka)?
33ab. [The first five sensory consciousnesses] are free from conceptualizing
activity insofar as they are free from conceptualizing activity con-
sisting of examining and from conceptualizing activity consisting of
recollecting, [but they include conceptualizing activity in its intrin-
sic nature]. 392
BCF.4.1. Three types of conceptualizing activity (vikalpa); 393 F 60-61

According to the Vaibhii~ika [kila], 394 conceptualizing activity (vikalpa) is of three
kinds: 395
1. conceptualizing activity in its intrinsic nature (svabhavavikalpa);
2. conceptualizing activity consisting of examining (niriipm;zii; abhiniriipm;zii); 396
3. conceptualizing activity consisting of recollecting (anusmara,:ia). 397 <61>
The five sensory consciousnesses involve the first kind of conceptualizing activity
but not the other two kinds. 398 This is why they are said to be free from conceptualiz-
ing activity [avikalpaka], as when it horse has only one foot [ekapiidaka], it is said
that it has no feet [apiidaka].
The conceptualizing activity in its intrinsic nature or by definition [svabhiivavikalpa]

is the initial inquiry (vitarka), which we will study in the chapter on the thought-
concomitants (caitta) (ii. 33). 399
As for [the intrinsic nature (svabhava) of] the other two conceptualizing activities:
33cd. (1) Dispersed mental understanding [is the conceptualizing activity
consisting of examining or of defining]; (2) [all] mental recollection,
whatever it may be, [is the conceptualizing activity consistiI}g of
recollecting].400
1. Mental understanding (prajfia; ii. 24), i.e., the discernment of the factors
associated with the mental consciousnes8' [only, i.e., not with the sensory conscious-
nesses], when dispersed (vyagra), {6 a} i.e., non-concentrated (asamahita), not in the
state of meditating [bhiivana; viii. 1), is the conceptualizing activity consisting of
examining [nirupa~a] or of defining (abhinirupa~avikalpa). 401
2. All "mental" recollection (smrti), when either concentrated [samahita] or non-
concentrated, is the conceptualizing activity consisting of recollecting (anusmara~a-
vikalpa).402 <62>
BCG. 7. Having a cognitive object (sa1ambana) and not having a cognitive

object (ana1ambana) & the eighteen elements; 403 F 62
How many elements are having a cognitive object (salambana), i.e., are the subject-
matte.r of the consciousness? [How many are not having a cognitive object (an-
alambana)?]
34ab. Seven [elements, i.e.,] the elements of thought, are having a cognitive
object.404
(1-5) The elements of the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile conscious-
ness, (6) the element of the mental consciousness and (7) the mental faculty [mano-
dhatu], [these seven elements of thought (cittadhatu)] are having a c?gnitive object
(salambana) only, because they always seize their object field (vi~aya).
0
34b. And also one part of the element of factors [is having a cognitive
object].405
That part [of the element of factors (dharmadhatu)] which consists of the factors
associated with thought [or related to thought] [caitasikasvabhiiva; ii. 23], [is having
a cognitive object (salambana)].
The other elements, namely, the ten material elements and the part of the element of
factors which is not associated with thought (ii. 35), are not having a cognitive object
[aniilambana].
BCH. 8. Appropriated (upatta) and non-appropriated (anupatta) & the

eighteen elements; 406 F 62--63
How many elements are non-appropriated (anupatta)? How many are appropriated
[upatta]?
34cd. Nine [of the eighteen elements] are non-appropriated, namely. the
eight elements which have just been mentioned, [i.e., the seven
elements of thought and one part of the element of factors,] and
sound. 407
(1-7) The seven elements of thought [cittadhatu; i. 16c] [said to have cognitive
objects (salambana)], (8) [one part of] the element of factors (dhamiadhatu; i. 15c)
and (9) sound (sabdadhiUu) are never appropriated, [i.e., are non-appropriated].
34d. The other nine [of the eighteen elements] are of two klnds [i.e.,
sometimes appropriated, sometimes non-appropriated].408 { 6 b}
They are sometimes appropriated [upatta] and sometimes non-appropriated [anupatta].
(1) The five sense-faculties of the sensory consciousness (i.e., element of the eye,
etc.), when they are present, are appropriated. (2) Those sense-faculties, when they
are future and past, are non-appropriated. <63>
1. The four object-fields-visible form, odor, taste and tangible-when they are
present, when they are not separated from ,or are an integral part of the sense-
faculties (indriyabhinna, indriyavinirbhaga), are appropriated.
2. Any other visible form, any other odor, any other taste, any other tangible, is
non-appropriated; for example:
i. the visible form--color and shape-of head hair [kesa], body hair [roma],
nails [nakha] and teeth [danta], with the exception of their roots [mula],
which are tied up with the body or the body sense-faculty;
ii. the color and shape of excrement [vi~], urine [mutra], saliva [kheta], mucus
[singha~aka], blood [so~ita], etc.;
iii. the color and shape of earth [bhamzl, water [udaka], fire, etc.
acH.1. Meaning of the expression appropriated (upatta); 409 F63

[Question:] - How should the expression upatta, appropriated, be explained?
[Answer:] - That which thought and thought-concomitants seize (upagrhfta) and
appropriate (svfkrta) to themselves in the quality of a support or physical seat (adhi-
~thana) is called appropriated. Organic matter, i.e., the matter which constitutes the
five sense-faculties of consciousness, as well as the matter not separable from the
organic matter, is appropriated, is made one's own, by thought: this results from the
fact that, in the case of well-being [or benefit; anugraha] or of sickness [or injury;
upaghiita], there is a reciprocal reaction [anyoniinuvidhiina] between thought and this
matter. The matter called appropriated by the Abhidharma is, in the common lan-
guage [loka], called sacetana (animate matter), sajfva (living matter). 410
acr. 9; Primary matter (bhutilsvabhiiva) and secondary matter (bhautika) &

the eighteen elements; 411 F 63-66
How many elements (dhiitu) are primary matter or fundamental material elements [in
their intrinsic nature (bhiitasvabhiiva)]? How many are secondary matter or deriva-
tive material. elements [bhautika]? 412 {7 a} <64>
35ac. The tangible is of two kinds [i.e., primary matter and secondary
matter]. The other nine material elements are solely secondary
matter, as is also the part of the element of factors [i.e., the non-
informative] that is material. 413
(1) The four fundamental material elements (themselves): solidity [khara], humidity
[sneha], heat [u~~atii] and mobility [fra~a] (i. 12), and (2) the sevenfold secondary
matter: smoothness [slak~~atva], roughness [karkasatva], [heaviness (gurutva), light-
ness (laghutva), coldness (sfta), hunger(jighatsii) and thirst (pipasa) (i. lOd),] are
tangibles.
The other nine material elements (i. 15cd), i.e., the five sense-faculties, the object-
field~ of the first four sense-faculties, are solely secondary matter.
Likewise the part of the element of factors (dharmadhiitu; i. 15cd) that is called the
non-informative [avijiiaptisarrijiiaka; i. 11] [is solely secondary matter].
The [remaining seven] elements of thought [cittadhiitu; i. 16c] are neither primary
matter nor secondary matter.
Likewise the element of factors (dharmadhiitu), except for the non-informative
(avijiiapti), [is neither primary matter nor secondary matter].
ac1.1. Refutation of Bhadanta Buddhadeva 's view that the ten sense-spheres
are solely p . . imary matter; F 64-65
According to the Bhadanta Buddhadeva, the [first] ten sense-spheres (iiyatana),
i.e., the five sense-faculties of consciousness and their object-fields, are solely
primary matter [bhiitamiitra]. 414
[Reply:] - An inadmissible opinion. The Siitra teaches, in a restrictive manner [ava-
dhara~a], that there are four fundamental material elements and defines them in a
restrictive manner as being solid, humid, etc. (i. 12d). But solidity, humidity, etc., are
tangibles and tangibles only: hardness [kii{hinya] is not perceived by the eye sense-
faculty. Besides, each sense-faculty attains the secondary matter suitable to it: color
[va~a] is not perceived by the body sense-faculty. 415 <65>
Furthermore, that the tangible is primary matter (bhata) and secondary matter
(upiidaya rapa), that the other nine material sense-spheres are [not the primary
matter itself, but] secondary matter only, is clearly shown by the very words of the
Sutra:
The eye, 0 bhik~u, is the internal [adhya"tmika] sense-sphere of the con-
sciousness (i. 39), {7 b} subtle matter [rapaprasada] derived from the
four fundamental material elements [upiida"ya), material [rapin], invisible
[anidarsana], resistant [sapratigha],
and so on with respect to the other four material sense-faculties which are described
in the same terms.
With respect to that which concerns the first four object-fields:
Visible forms (rupli!Ji), 0 bhik~u. are the external [bahya] sense-sphere of
the consciousness, derived from the four fundamental material elements,
material, visible [sanidarsana], resistant.
Sound, 0 bhik~u, is the external sense-sphere of the consciousness, derived
from the four fundamental material elements, material, invisible, resistant.
The same for that which concerns odor and taste. But, with respect to the tangible:
The tangibles, 0 bhik~u, are the external sense-sphere of the consciousness,
the four fundamental material elements and matter derived from the four
fundamental material elements, material", invisible, resistant. 416
Bc1.2. Interpretation of various Sutra passages; F 65-66

[Objection:] - One can maintain that the five sense-faculties are primary matter, for
the Sutra (Smp.yukta, 11, 1) says: 417
Everything that is in the eye, the ball 'Of flesh (mlif!1sapi1J<Ja), is solid, resis-
tant. .. (khakkhata, kharagata ... ).
Answer: - Here the Sutra refers to the ball of flesh which is not separable from the
eye sense-faculty, and does not refer to the actual sense-faculty itself. <66>
[Objection:] - So be it. But the Garbhiivakriintisatra (F 49 note) states:
The person consists of six elementary substances (dhiitu), 418
i.e., (1) the elementary substance earth [prthivfdhiitu], (2) the elementary substance
water [abdhiitu], (3) the elementary substance fire [tejodhiitu], (4) the elementary
substance wind [vayudhatu], (5) the elementary substance space [akiisadhatu] and
(6) the elementary substance consciousness [vijiianadhatu]. Thus, in the embryonic
state [kalala], the body is primary matter, not secondary matter.
[Answer:] - No. For, in this first sentence: "The person consists of six ele-
mentary substances", the Sutra wants to describe the fundamental substances
making up a person (maulasattvadravya) 419 and does not pretend to give an ex-
haustive definition. In fact, the Siitra later says that the person consists of the six
bases or sense-spheres of the mental factor called contact (ii. 24) (sparsa-
ayatana), i.e., the six sense-faculties. 420 Besides, to take the definition "The per-
son consists of six elementary substances" literally would entail the non-existence
of the thought-concomitants (caitta; ii. 24, 34), for the thought-concomitants
are not included within the element of consciousness (vijfianadhatu), which is
thought.
[Objection:] - Could one not maintain that the thought-concomitants are thought
[citta] and; therefore, are included in the element of consciousness?
[Answer:] - No, for the Siitra says:
Sensation [vedana] and ideation (sa,rijfia) are mental factors (dharma),
i.e., factors related to thought (caitasika), {8 a} having thought for their
basis;
and the Sutra speaks of "thought that is with attachment" (sartigacitta; vii. 1 ld); thus
attachment, which is a thought-concomitant, is not thought.
It is thus established that [the ten material elements consist of fundamental material
elements and derivative material elements, and that] our definitions (i. 35ac) are
correct. 421
BCJ. 10. Aggregated (salJlcita) and non-aggregated (asalJlCita) & the

eighteen elements; F 66-67
How many elements (dhatu) are aggregated [sal?lcita]? [How many are non-aggre-
gated (asa,ricitti)?] <67>
35d. The ten material elements are aggregated.422
The five sense-faculties [indriya] of the sensory consciousness and their object-
fields [vi~aya] are [aggregated because they are] agglomerations or composites
of atoms (parama1Jusa,righiita; accumulations of atoms [parama1Jusa,ricaya])
(ii. 22).
[This establishes that the remaining eight elements are not-aggregated. 423 ]
BCK. 11. That which cuts off (chinnati ), is cut off (chidyate ); that which
bums (diihaka), is burned (dahyate); that which weighs (tulayati), can
be weighed (tulya) & the eighteen elements; 424 F 67-68
BcK.1. That which cuts off (chinnati ), is cut off (chidyate ); F 67-
Among the eighteen elements, how many cut off [chinnati], how many are cut off
[chidyate]; how many burn [dahati], how many are burned [dahyate]; how many
weigh [tulayati], how many are weighed [tulyate]?
36ab. Four external elements [i.e., visible form, odor, taste, tangible] cut
off [when they bear the name of axe, etc.] and are cut off [when they
bear the name of wood, etc.].425
Visible form [rupa], odor [gandha], taste [rasa] and tangible [spra~tavya] cut off
when they bear the name of axe [parasu], etc., and they are cut off when they bear
the name of wood [diirva], etc.
[Question:] - What is the factor called cutting ojf [cheda]?
[Answer:] -To produce the sectioning [vibhaktotpiidana] of the stream consisting
of a composite426 [sal!lghiitasrotas] the nature of which is to arise continuously
[sal!lbandhotpiidin]. {8 b} The axe cuts off a piece of wood which is a "stream" and
makes it into two "streams" which exist and develop separately.
The sense-faculties cannot be cut off. For example, the body sense-faculty [kiiya-
indriya] [itself]-when cutting off all the members [of the fleshly body] [nir-
avase~iiligaccheda]-is, for all this, not duplicated or multiplied [advaidha]: the
members that have been cut off, i.e., amputated from the trunk, do not possess the
body sense-faculty.
Moreover, the sense-faculties do not cut off because of their translucidity or trans-
parency (acchatva), 427 just like the light or glitter of a [luminescent] gem [ma~i-
prabha].
BCK.2. That which burns (diihaka ), is burned (dahyate ); that which weighs
(tulayati), can be weighed (tulya); F67-68
36c. In the same way, [four external elements, i.e., visible form, odor,
taste and tangible,] are burned and weigh. 428
The same holds for being burned [diihyate] and for weighing [tulayati] as for cutting
off and for being cut off.
The [same] four external elements are burned. The same weigh, for example, when
they constitute a scale. Not so the sense-faculties, because of their translucidity or
transparency [acchatva], just like the light or glitter of a [luminescent] gem [ma~i-
prabhii].
Sound does not cut, is not cut off, is not burned, does not weigh, because it [perishes
momentarily (uccheditva) and] does not exist in a [continuous] stream (apraviiha-
vartitva).
36d. There is no agreement with respect to what burns and what is
weighed. 429 <68>
According to some, the same four external elements burn and are weighed.
According to others, only the elementary substance fire (tejodhiitu) bums, namely
when it manifests its particular manner of being in flames; only heaviness (gurutva),
which is one type of secondary matter (i. 1Od), is weighed, but lightweight factors,
light, etc., cannot be weighed, although material form (riipa) manifests its particular
manner of being in them.
acL. 12. Effect of retribution (vipakaja), effect of accumulation

(aupacayika), effect of equal outflow (nai~yandika) & the eighteen
°
elements; 43 F 68-70
Among the eighteen elements (dhiitu), how many are an effect of retribution
(vipakaja), an effect of accumulation (aupacayika), an effect of equal outflow
(nai~andika )? 431
37-38a. (1) The five internal [adhyatma] elements, [i.e., the five sense-
faculties, except for the mental faculty,] are an effect of retribution
and an effect of accumulation; (2) [the external element] sound is
not an effect of retribution; (3) the eight elements free from resis-
tance [i.e., the seven elements of thought and the element of fac-
tors,] are an effect of equal outflow and also an effect of retribution;
(4) the others, [i.e., the external elements of visible form, odor, taste
and tangible,] are of three typ"s [i.e., an effect of retribution, of
accumulation and of equal outflow].432 {9 a}
acL.1. Definitions; F 68-69

acL.1.1. Definition of effect of retribution (vipakaja); F 68-69
Vipiikaja, 433 [effect] of retribution; literally, "arisen from retribution" stands for
arisen from the ripening cause or cause of retribution (vipiikahetuja) (ii. 54cd), by
omission of the middle word, in the same way that we say: "ox-cart" [goratha] for
ox-drawn-cart [gobhir yukto ratho].
Or else, in the expression vipakaja, "arisen from vipaka", the word vipaka desig-
nates, not retribution (as above), but action [karma], namely, the ripened action, i.e.,
the action reaching the time period when it gives forth its effect or fruit [phala-
kalaprapta], [thus taking vipaka in the sense of what is brought to fruition (vipacyata
iti krtva)]. 434 That which arises [jata] from ripened action, namely, the fruit or
effect or retribution, is called arisen from vi[}aka. Furthermore, the effect or fruit
[phala]. is also called vipaka, because it is [the very fact of] being well ripened
[vipakti]. 435
Or els~, the expression vipakaja, "arisen from retribution", signifies arisen from the
cause of retribution; but, [in contrast to the above interpretation,] one should not say
that the word cause is omitted. In fact, the cause [hetu] is often designated [meta-
phorically] [upacara] by the name of its effect [phala], in the same way that the
effect is often designated by the name of its cause, 436 as in: <69>
These present six sense-faculties, i.e., sense-spheres of contact, are known to
be old action437 (Ekottara, 14, s; Sa"f!l,yutta, ii. 65; iv. 132; below ii. 28).
BCL.1.2. Definition of effect of accumulation (aupacayika); F 69

Aupacayika, [effect] of accumulation, 438 i.e., "that which is accumulated on the side
or increased (upacita)" by a certain sustenance or food [ahara; iii. 39], a certain
grooming [sa"f!l,skara; bathing (snana), etc.], a certain sleep [svapna], a certain con-
centration [samadhi; iv. 6c]. 439
According to one opinion, 440 celibacy (brahmacarya) is also a cause of accumulation
[or increase]; but in reality, celibacy brings it about that there is [no damage or]
diminution (upaghata, apacaya); it is not a cause of increase (upacaya). 441
The stream of the effect of accumulation [aupacayasa"f!l,tdna] protects [arak~a] the
stream of the effect of retribution [vipakasalJltana] {9 b} like a rampart [prati-
prakara], by surrounding it.
BCL.1.3. Definition of effect of equal outflow (nai~yandika); F 69

Nai~andika, [effect] of equal outflow, i.e., effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala;
ii. 57), "that which is produced by a cause similar to its effect".
BCL.2. The three effects and the eighteen elements; 442 F 69

I' BcL.2.1. The five sense-faculties: not an effect of equal outflow; 443 F 69
Five sense-faculties or internal elements, except for the mental faculty, are an effect
I
of retribution and an effect of accumulation. They are not an "effect of equal outflow,
for there is no outflow [of the sense-faculties] [ni;Vyandabhava] apart [vyatirikta]

from [them being] the effect of retribution and the effect of accumulation. 444
BCL.2.2. Sound: not an effect of retribution; 445 F 69-70

Sound is an effect of accumulation, for the voice is weak when the body is emaciated
[anupacita]. 446 It is also an effect of equal outflow. It does not arise from a ripening
cause, for the voice proceeds from a [current effort (iha) or] desire to act [iccha;
chanda] (ii. 24). 447
Objection: The Prajnaptististra says:
The mark of the great man (mahtipuru;Va; iii. 98) called in.tonation of
Brahma-448 (brahmasvaratti) results from the perfect practice [subhtivitatva]
of abstinence from harsh speech [ptiru~ya; iv. 76c]. 449 <70>
Thus sound is retribution.
[Answer: 450 ] - Etiology (i.e., science of causes) of sound:
First opinion: - Three moments should be distinguished: (1) action [kanna]; (2) fun-
damental material elements [bhuta] arisen from this action and which are retribution;
(3) the sound which arises from the fundamental material elements. [Thus, sound is
the third step in the series (pararrtparti).]
Second opinion: - Five moments should be distinguished: (1) action; (2) fundamental
material elements as effect of retribution; (3) fundamental material elements as effect
of accumulation; (4) fundamental material elements as effect of equal outflow; and
(5) sound. [Thus, sound is the fifth step in the series.]
Thus sound is not an effect of retribution because it does not directly proceed from
action. (Vibhti~ti)
Objection. - To reason thus, bodily sensation (ii. 7), not being produced directly
through action but being directly produced by the fundamental material elements
arisen from [past] action (iii. 32), will not qualify as ripened effect.
Reply. - But sensation is not induced by the desire [icchti] to experience such a
sensation, whereas sound is induced by the desire to speak. If sensation were induced
by desire, it would not qualify as ripened effect.
acL.2.3. The eight elements not susceptible to"offering resistance: not an effect
of accumulation; 451 F 70
The eight elements not,susceptible to offering resistance (i. 29b), namely the seven
elements of thought [cittadhatu] and the element of factors (dharmadhtitu), are an
effect of equal outflow and an effect of retribution:
1. an effect of equal outflow 452 when they are produced by the homoge-
neous cause (sabhiigahetu) (ii. 52) or the pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu)
(ii. 54);
2. an effect of retribution when they are produced by the ripening cause
(vipiikahetu) (ii. 54c).
They are not an effect of accumulation because the non-material elements have
nothing in common with accumulation (saf(lcaya). 453 { 10 a}
BCL.2.4. The other elements are of three types; 454 F 70

The other elements, that is to say, the four not mentioned above, i.e., visible form,
odor, taste, tangible, are of three kinds: (1) an effect of retribution when they are not
separable from organic matter [indriyiivinirbhiiga; i. 34], (2) an effect of accumu-
lation and (3) an effect of equal outflow.
BCM. 13. Yoked with a [permanent] real (dravyayukta) & the eighteen
[Among the eighteen elements, how many are yoked with a [permanent] real
(dravyayukta )?]
38a. One single element [i.e., the element of factors] is yoked with a
[permanent] real.456
The unconditioned (asaf(lskrta), on account of being permanent, essential or inde-
structible (siiratviit = avinasat), is a real entity (dravya). <71>
The unconditioned is part of the element of factors (dharmadhiitu; i. 15); the element
of factors is thus the only element that is yoked with a [permanent] real (dravyavat;
dravyayukta ).
BCN. 14. Momentary (k$at:i,ika) & the eighteen elements; 457 F 71

[Among the eighteen elements, how many are momentary (k~a~ika)?]
38b. The last three elements [of the moment called receptivity to the cog-
nition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness,] are [called]
momentary.458,
The last three [of the eighteen] elements are (1) the mental faculty (manodhiitu),
(2) the object of the mental consciousness (dharmadhiitu), (3) the mental conscious-
ness (manovijfiiina-dhiitu ).
In the range of factors of the moment called receptivity to the cognition of the factors
with regard to unsatisfactoriness (duf:zkhe dharmajiiiinak~iinti), which is the first
moment in the path of insight into the truths (vi. 25) and, therefore, the first moment
that is pure (aniisrava), these [last] three elements are "not produced by the homo-
geneous cause" (sabhagahetu) (ii. 52), for-in the stream which constitutes the
person under consideration-no pure factor (dharma) has yet appeared that would
be the homogeneous cause of the receptivity to the cognition of the factors with
regard to unsatisfactoriness. This is why these three elements are called momentary
(k~a,;zika), because, for a moment, they do not proceed from this kind of cause [and
are "not an effect of equal outflow" (anai~yandika)].
In the range under consideration [tatra],
i. thought [citta] to which this receptivity (k~iinti) is associated constitutes [two
of the last three elements, i.e.,] the element of the mental faculty and the
element of mental consciousness;
ii. the factors which coexist (sahabhii; ii. 51) with this thought constitute
the [third element, i.e.,] the element of factors: pure restraint (iv. 13c);
sensation, ideation, intention and other thought-concomitants; posses-
sions (priipti; ii. 36) and characteristics of the conditioned (sarriskrtalak~ar;za;
ii. 46).
Bco. 15. Acquiring accompaniment (samanvagamarµ, pratilambhate)

and accompaniment ( samanvagama) & the eighteen elements; 459
F 71-73
There is a problem to be examined: Those who acquire accompaniment (samanv-
agamarJ1, pratilabhate) (ii. 36b) of the eye sense-faculty (cak~urdhatu) when pre-
viously they were not accompanied with it (asamanvagata), do they also acquire
accompaniment of the visual consciousness (ca~urvijnanadhatu)? Those who ac-
quire accompaniment of the visual consciousness when they were previously not
accompanied by it, do they also acquire accompaniment of the eye sense-faculty?
<72>
38cd. Those [who were not accompanied by the eye sense-faculty, who
were not accompanied by the visual consciousness,] can have acqui-
sition (liibha) of the eye sense-faculty and the visual consciowmess
(1) separately [prthak] and also (2) together [saha].460 { 10 b}
Bco.1. Acquisition separately.- acquisition as acquiring accompaniment; F 72

[As for the "acquisition separately", there is a tetralemma between acquiring accom-
paniment of the eye sense-faculty and acquiring accompaniment of the visual coii-
sciousness:]461
276 Chapter One: Exposition of the Elements (Dhii.tunirdesa)
1. Persons who are not accompanied by the eye sense-faculty acquiring accompani-
ment of it without at the same time fprthak] acquiring accompaniment of the visual
consciousness:
i. beings of the realm of desire (kiimadhatu) whose sense-faculties progres-
sively appear (ii. 14): for, before the eye sense-faculty appears in them, they
already have accompaniment of their past visual consciousness (intermediate
existence; iii. 14) and their future visual consciousness (on possession;
ii. 36b);
u. beings who die in the .realm of immateriality (iirupyadhiitu), [where the
visual consciousness and the eye sense-faculty are absent,] and are reborn in
the heavens of the second to fourth meditations (dhyiina), where the visual
consciousness is absent, although the eye sense-faculty exists (viii. 13ac).
2. Persons who are not accompanied by the visual consciousness acquiring accom-
_paniment of it without at the same time acquiring_ accompaniment of the eye sense-
faculty:
i. beings born in the heaven of the three higher meditations can manifest
(sammukhzkurviiiJ,a) a visual consciousness of the stage of the first medita-
tion (viii. 13): they do not acquire accompaniment of the eye sense-faculty
which they already possess;
ii~ beings who fall from fpracyuta] on~ of the three higher meditations and are
reborn below, [i.e., the first meditation or the realm of desire].
3. Persons who are not accompanied by the two a~quire accompaniment [samanv-
iigamarµ pratilabhate] of the two [at the same time (saha)]:
1. beings who fall from the realm of immateriality and are reborn, either in
the realm of desire or in the first meditation (i.e., world of Brahma).
4. [Persons may acquire neither: those situations apart from these three catego-
ries.462]
Bco.2. Acquisition together: acquisition as acquiring accompaniment and as

accompaniment; F 72-73
We have up to now understood the term liibha, "acquisition", which the stanza
uses, in the sense of pratilambha, "acquiring accompaniment"; but one can also
understand it in the sense of priipti, "possession" [samanviigama, "accompaniment";
ii. 36b].
[Question:] -Those who are already accompanied (samanviigata) with the eye sense-
faculty, are they also accompanied with the visual consciousness?
[Answer:] - Four alternatives are possible [tetralemma between possessing the eye
sense-faculty and possessing the visual consciousness]:
1. beings born in a heaven of the three higher meditations necessarily pos-
sess the eye sense-faculty, but possess the visual consciousness only when
they manifest a visual consciousness of the stage of the first meditation
[dhyana]; <73>
2. beings of the realm of desire who have not taken possession [alabdha] of the
eye sense-faculty in the course of embryonic life or who become blind
[vihfna]: they remain in possession of the visual consciousness acquired
in the course of the intermediate existence (iii. 14) or at conception;
3. (i) beings of the realm of desire who have taken possession [labdha] of the
eye sense-faculty and have not lost it [avihfna]; (ii) beings born in the
heaven of the first meditation; (iii) beings born in a heaven of the three
higher meditations who manifest a visual consciousness of the stage of the
first meditation: these three categories of beings are accompanied with the
sense-faculty and with the consciousness;
4. any other beings, the beings of the realm of immateriality, are not accom-
panied with the eye sense-faculty and with the visual consciousness.
***
The acquiring of accompaniment (pratilambha) and the accompaniment (samanv-
agama), simultaneously or not simultaneously, of the eye sense-faculty (cak~urdhatu)
{11 a) and of visible form (rupadhatu), of the visual consciousness (cak~urvijfiana-
dhiitu) and of visible form, of the ear sense-faculty (srotradhiitu) and of sound
(sabdadhatu), etc., will be defined as is fitting in each case.
scP. 16. lnternal (adhyiitmika) and external (biihya) & the eighteen
Among the eighteen elements, how many are personal or internal (iidhyatmika)?
How many are external (bahya)?
39ab. Twelve elements are internal or personal, [i.e., the six sense-faculties
and the six consciousnesses,] with the exception of [the elements of]
visible form, [sound, odor, taste; tangible and factors]. 464
1. Twelve elements, i.e., the six sense-faculties [iisraya] and the six conscious-
nesses, are internal or personal [adhyatmika].
2. Six elements, i.e., the six object-fields of the consciousness, that is, visible form,
etc., are external [bahya].
BCP.1. Sense-faculties and consciousnesses as basis of the mind (atman); 465

F73-74
[Question:] - But how can you speak of internal or personal elements or of external
elements since there is no iitman, i.e., no self or person? <74>
[Answer: 466 ] - The mind [citta] is the object or basis [sa1?1nisraya] of the notion of
self [ahal?lkara], the mind is what people falsely imagine to be their self. This mind
thus receives, metaphorically [upacaryate], the name of iitman.
This can be seen, for example, by comparing these two lines from Scripture:
By means of the well-tamed [sudanta] iitman, the teacher fpa~ita] obtains
heaven,
and:
It is good to tame thought [citta]; the tamed [danta] thought brings happiness
[sukha ]. 467 { 11 b}
But the sense-faculties and consciousnesses are close (pratyiisanna, abhyiisanna) to
the thought [citta] to which is given the name of iitman: they are in fact the basis
(iisraya) of it; thus they are qualified as "internal", "personal" (iidhyiitmika), whereas
visible form, etc., are held to be "external" (bahya) because of being object-fields of
the consciousness. 468
BCP.2. Can the consciousnesses as the past mental faculty be the basis of
thought? F 74
[Objection:] - But can you say that the six consciousnesses [as elements] are the
basis [iisraya] of thought [citta]? They are the basis of thought only when, having
perished, they acquire the quality of mental faculty (manodhiitu; i. 17). Thus they are
not "personal" [iidhyiitmika].
[Reply:] - This objection is without value. When the consciousnesses become the
basis of thought by having perished, it is indeed these very same consciousnesses that
become a basis: thus, having become a basis, Jhey do not exceed [atovartamte] [their
characteristic or nature (lak~a~a),] their quality of basis. They are thus "personal"
because of their future quality of basis.
Otherwise, the mental faculty would be past only; it would not be either future
or present. But it is well understood that the eighteen elements belong to the three
time periods.
Further, if the future or present consciousness did not have the characteristic or
nature [lak~a~a] of the mental faculty, it would be absurd to attribute this characteris-
tic or nature to it once it is past. For a factor (dharma) does not change or deviate
B(;.Twenty-two Doctrinal Perspectives on the Eighteen Elements 279
from [vyabhicara] its (defining) characteristic or nature in the course of time

[adhvan] (v. 25; MVS, 109a18, 200b2).
BCQ. 17. Homogeneous (sabhaga) and partially homogeneous (tatsabhaga)

& the eighteen elements; 469 F 74-78
Among the eighteen elements, how many are "homogeneous", "active", "participat-
ing'\ "in mutual assistance" (sabhaga; see below F 77)? How many are "partially
homogeneous", "non-participating" (tatsabhiiga) 470? <75>
BCQ.1. The elem~nt offactors is homogeneous; 471 F 75

39bc. The element called factors is [always] homogeneous.472
An object-field of consciousness (vi~aya) is qualified as "homogeneous", "active",
"in mutual assistance" { 12 a} when the consciousness of which it constitutes the
particular object-field has arisen [utpanna] or is destined to arise [utpatti] in regard
to it.
But there is no factor in regard to which mental consciousness, being without limit
(ananta manovijiiiina), has not arisen or is not destined to arise. All noble ones
[aryapudgala], in fact, necessarily produce the thought: "All factors are non-self'
[sarvadharmii anatmiina; vii. 13a]. Now it is true that this thought bears neither on
itself [svabhava] nor on the factors which are co-existing (sahabhii; ii. 50b) with it;
but tI:iis [(fifsffmoment (k~a~a)] of thought and the factors co-existing with it are
the cognitive object [alambana] of a second moment of thought which sees that all
factors are non-self; thus "all factors" are indeed included within the cognitive
object of these two moments of thought (vii. 18cd). 473 -Therefore the element of
factors (dharmadhatu; i. 15bd), i.e., the particular cognitive object of the mental
consciousness, is in its entirety always [nitya] homogeneous or active as a cogni-
tive object.
BCQ.2. The other elements are homogeneous and partially homogeneous; 474
F 75-77
39cd. The other elements are also partially homogeueous.475
The word "also" shows that they are homogeneous (sabhaga) and partially homoge-
neous (tatsabhiiga).
When are they partially homogeneous?
39d. When [the other elements] do not perform their particular task,
[they are partially homogeneous].476
This implies the definition: they are homogeneous when they perform their particular
task [svakannakrt].
BCQ.2.1. Six sense-faculties & homogeneous and partially homogeneous; 477 F 75-76
[In that regard,] the eye sense-faculty (cak~urdhatu) which has seen, sees or will see
visible form is qualified as homogeneous.
The same with respect to the other sense-faculties, [including the mental faculty,]
by indicating for each its own object-field (vi~aya) and its own particular activity
(kiiritra, puru~akiira; ii. 58).
According to the Vaibha~ikas of Kasmir, the eye sense-faculty is partially homogene-
ous in four cases:
1-3. the eye sense-faculty which has ceased, ceases, will cease, without having
seen, and
4. the eye sense-faculty not destined to arise (anutpattidhannan) (v. 24). { 12 b}
<76>
According to the Westerners (piisciitya), [there are five cases since] the eye sense-
faculty not destined to arise constitutes two categories according to whether or not it
is accompanied (samiiyukta = smr,.baddha) by visual consciousness.~78
The same with respect to the other sense-faculties, [including the body (kaya),] of
the sensory consciousness.
As for the mental faculty (manodhiitu), it is partially homogeneous [only] when it
is not destined to arise; in fact, when it does arise, it always has an object-field,
[i.e., it is homogeneous]. 479
BCQ.2.2. The other five objects & homogeneous and partially homogeneous; 480
F76
Visible forms which have been seen, which are seen or which will be seen by the eye
sense-faculty are homogeneous.
They are partially homogeneous [in four cases}:
1-3. when they have ceased, cease, or will cease: without having been seen,
and
4. when they are not destined to arise.
The same with respect to the other object-fields, [including the tangible,] of the sen-
sory consciousness by indicating for each the sense-faculty [indriya] and the activity
[kiiritra] that correspond to them.
BCQ.2.3. The unshared sense-faculties and the shared object-fields &

homogeneous and partially homogeneous; 481 F 76-7
The eye sense-faculty which is homogeneous or partially homogeneous is such for
everyone, i.e., for the person to whom this sense-faculty belongs and for other per-
sons [who have the sense-faculty]. The same for the other sense-faculties, [including
the mental faculty].
But a certain visible form is homogeneous for the person who sees it, partially
homogeneous for the person who does not see it. In fact, the visible form which a
person sees can be seen by many, for example, the moon [candra], exhibitions
[prelqa] of dance [na{a] or wrestling [malla], whereas two persons cannot see by
meails,pf one and the same eye sense-faculty. <77>
1. Therefore it is in relation to one person [sal?ltcina] that the eye sense-faculty, not
being shared [asadhara~a], is qualified as homogeneous or partially homogeneous:
the eye sense-faculty is homogeneous when it sees a visible form. {13 a}
2. On the contrary, visible form is shared [sadhara~a]: visible form is qualified
as homogeneous and partially homogeneous from the point of view of numerous
persons: it is homogeneous in relation to those who -see it, partially homogeneous
in relation to those who do not see it. The same holds for sound, odor, taste and
tangible as holds for visible form. 482
acQ.2.3.1. Are odor, taste and the tangible shared? F 77

[Objection:] - So be it in regard to that which concerns sound, which, like visible
form, is perceived at a distance [dura] and can be perceived by many people
(i. 43cd). But odor, taste and the tangible are not perceived at a distance, they are
perceived only when they enter into a close relationship [praptagraha~a] with the
sense-faculty; 483 thus the odor that one person perceives is not perceived by another.
Thus these objects are not shared [asadhara~a], and we should rank them with the
sense-faculties in regard to the qualification of "homogeneous", "partially homo-
geneous": when they are homogeneous for one person, they are homogeneous for
everyone.
We answer: - We regard these object-fields as shared [sadhara~a] because there is
the possibility of them being so. It is possible, in fact, that odor-the same atomic
group of odor-which produces the olfactory consciousness in one person, is also
perceived by another. 484 But this does not hold in the same way for the sense-facul-
ties. Therefore, odors, tastes and the tangibles should be ranked together with visible
forms and sounds.
BCQ.2.4. Six consciousnesses; F 77

As for the six consciousnesses, they are homogeneous or partially homogeneous
according to whether they are (1) destined to arise, (2) not destined to arise. This is
as in the case of the mental faculty.
BCQ.3. Meaning of the expressions sabhaga and tatsabhaga; 485 F 77-78

1. What is the meaning of the expression sabhiiga, [literally, "having a share in
common"]? <78>
"Share" (bhiiga) designates the mutual sharing, i.e., the mutual services (anyonya-
bhajana) which the sense faculties, the object-fields and the consciousnesses render
one another, in their quality of basis of the consciousness (iisraya), of object-field of
the consciousness (vi~aya), of consciousness relying on the sense-faculty (iisrayin).
Or else, "share" signifies sharing or possession (bhajana) of the activity (kiiritra):
(i) the activity of the sense-faculties is to see (darsana), etc.; (ii) the activity of the
object-field is to be the object of the consciousness (vi~aya, iilambana), of being
seen, etc.; (ii) the activity of the consciousness is to be the subject of the conscious-
ness, to be the cognizer (vijiiatrtva).
Therefore sabhiiga is called the factors (dharma) which possess (sa-) the share
(bhiiga), i.e., the sense-faculties, object-fields and consciousnesses which are endowed
with their particular activity (karitrabhajana), or else, the sense-faculties, objects-
fields and consciousnesses which render mutual services to one another (anyonya-
bhajana). Or else, the factors which have for their effect the same contact (sparsa-
samiinakiiryatva): the encounter of the eye, of the visible form, of the visual con-
sciousness; etc., are sabhiiga (iii. 22). 486
2. What is the meaning of the expression tatsabhiiga, [literally, "homogeneous to
those"]?
That which is not homogeneous (sabhiiga) but nevertheless is partially homogeneous
is called tatsabhiiga, that is, "part1ally (sabhiiga)-[in the sense of belonging to
the same kind (jiitisiimiinya)]-to those [elements] (tat) [that are homogeneous
(sabhiiga) (in the strict sense)]", that is, "partially homogeneous" (sabhiiga-
sabhiiga). 487
BCR. 18. Abandoned by insight (darsanaheya) and by cultivation

(bhavanaheya), and not to be abandoned (aheya) & the eighteen
elements; 488 F 78--80
How many elements can be abandoned (hii, prahii; v. 28; vi. 1) by insight into the
truths, in other words, by the path of insight (dar§anamiirga) or by insight (darsana;
vi. 25b)? How many can be abandoned by cultivation or repeated consideration

(bhiivanii) of the truths, in other words, by the path of cultivation (bhavaniimiirga)
or by cultivation (bhavanii)? { 13 b} How many elements are not to be abandoned,
cannot be abandoned [aheya]? 489
acR.1. The first fifteen elements and the last three elements,-490 F 78-80
40ab. (1) The ten [material elements] and. the five [sensory conscious-
nesses] are abandoned by cultivation. (2) The last three [elements]
are, [from the point of view of abandoning them,] of three kinds
[i.e., abandoned by insight, abandoned by cultivation, not aban-
doned].491 <79>
1. The ten material elements, i.e., the sense-faculties and object-fields, and the five
sensory consciousnesses are abandoned by cultivation [bhiivaniiheya].
2. The last three [of the eighteen] elements, i.e., the mental faculty [manodhiitu],
the mental object [dharmadhiitu] and the mental consciousness [manovijiiiina], from
the point of view of abandoning them, involve factors of three kinds:
i. eighty-eight [of the ninety-eight] proclivities (anusaya; v. 4);
a. with the coexisting (sahabha) factors-whether these coexisting factors are
of the associated (saY[lprayukta) class or of the dissociated (viprayukta) class
(ii. 46; characteristics [lak~a~a] and secondary characteristics [anulak~a~a]);
b. with the possessions (priipti; ii. 36) of the said proclivities and the said
coexisting factors;
c. with the following (i.e., secondary possessions [anupriipti] and characteris-
tics [lak~a~a]) of the said possessions,
are abandoned by insight [darsanaheya];
11. the other impure [siisrava] factors:
a. ten proclivities (v. 5) with the coexisting factors, possessions, etc.;
b. the wholesome-impure (kusalasasrava) and unobscured-non-defirred (anivrta-
avyakrta) (ii. 66) formations (saY[lskara); 492
c. the impure non-informative (avijiiapti) with its following (iv. 13),
are abandoned by cultivation [bhavanaheya];
111. the pure [anasrava] factors:
a. the unconditioned factors and
b. the factors which are part of the (noble) path,
cannot be abandoned [apraheya].
BCR.1.1. Objection by the Vatsfputrfyas; F 79
Objection of the Vatsiputrlyas: - We believe that not only the eighty-eight [of the
ninety-eight] proclivities (anusaya), but also some other factors are abandoned by
insight:
1. the status of the ordinary worldling [prthagjanatva] 493 is a factor which is
unobscured-non-defined: you classify it among the factors abandoned by
cultivation;
2. unwholesome bodily or vocal action [kayavakkarma], retributed by an
unfortunate plane of existence [iipiiyika], is material form (rapa): you _clas-
sify it also in the second category.
The status of the ordinary worldling and the action which causes an unfortunate
plane of existence are in contradiction with the (noble) path, with the path of insight
into the truths (darsanamarga). Thus, according to us, both are abandoned by
insight.
BCR.1.2. Refutation of the objection made by the Vatsfputrfyas; F 79--80
In order to refute the thesis of the Vatsiputrryas, the author says in brief:
40cd. Neither the (1) non-defiled nor (2) that which is material form, nor
(3) that which has arisen from the non-sixth, [i.e., that which has
arisen from the five sense-faculties),] are abandoned by insight into
the truths. 494 <80>
1-2. Nothing of that which is non-defiled (akli~ta), i.e., of that which is neither
un~holesome (akusala) nor obscured-non-defined (nivrtavyakrta) (ii. 66), and
nothia~ of that which is material form, can be ·abandoned by insight into the truths.
{14 a}
But the statiis, of the ordinary worldling [prthagjanatva] is non-defiled[-non-defined
(akli~{iivyakrta)]: it can belong to a person who has cut off the wholesome roots
[samucchinnakusalamiila; iv. 79] or it can belong to a person who is detached (vfta-
riiga).
But bodily action and vocal action are material form (riipa).
Thus the status of the ordinary worldling and bodily or vocal action are not contra-
dictory (vipratipatti) to the truths, for the first is not defiled by the defilements
(klesa) and is not a consciousness, a factor which has a cognitive object (an-
iilambaka); for the second is not a factor which has a cognitive object. Thus, neither
the one nor the other are abandoned by insight into the truths.
Besides, if the status of the ordinary worldling were abandoned by insight, it would
follow that it would exist 'at the first stage of the path of insight [du}:ikhe dharma-
jniinak~iinti; vi. 26.]-which iS'incorrect. 495
3. By "sixth" one should understand [the sense-sphere of] the mental faculty
[maniiyatana]. Arisen from the non-sixth (asa~{haja) is called that which has arisen
from a sense-faculty different from the sixth sense-faculty, i.e., that which has arisen
from the other five sense-faculties, i.e., the eye sense-faculty, etc. It refers to the
visual consciousness, etc.
This also is not abandoned by insight.
scs. 19. View (dr~ti) and not view (na dr~ti) & the eighteen elements; 496
FB0-100
1. Eight views within the element of factors; F 80

Definition of view (dmi) as judgment after contemplation; F 81
2. Eye sense-faculty; F 81
2.1. Different views on whether the eye sense-faculty or the visual
consciousness sees; F 8 I
2.2. Are visible forms seen by one eye or by two eyes? F 86
2~:f>erception of the object with or without reaching it with the sense-faculty;
F87
2.4. Insert: Do atoms touch one another or not? F 89
2.4.1. Vaibhii~ikas: atoms do not touch one another; F 89
2.4.2. Bhadanta (and Vasubandhu): atoms do touch one another meta-
phorically; F 91
2.5. Size of the sense-faculties and their object-fields; F 92
2.6. Issues related to the atoms of the sense-faculties: their arrangement, etc.;
F93
2.7. Simultaneity and non-simultaneity of the object-field or sense-faculty with
its consciousness; F 94
2.8. Sense-faculties as the basis (iisraya) of consciousness; F 95
2.9. Sense-faculties as the basis for naming the consciousnesses; F ~6
2.10. Stages (bhiimi) & the sense-faculties, body, object-fields and 1onscious-
nesses of the eighteen elements~ F 97-100
Among the eighteen elements, how many are view (dr~fi)? [How rrj.any are not view
(na dr~ti)?]
41ab. The eye sense-faculty [i.e., the element of the eye] and eight parts of
the element of factors are view.497
acs.1. Eight views within the element offactors; 498 F 80-81

[Question:] - What are these eight parts499 of the element of factors (dharma-
dhiitu)?
[Answer:] - 1-5. The five afflicted views (dr~ti; v. 7): (1) the afflicted view of self
(satkiiyadr~ti), [(2) the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (antagriihadr~ti);
(3) the false view (mithyiidr~ti); (4) the esteeming of (such things as bad) views
(dr~tipariimarsa); (5) the overesteeming of (such things as) morality and certain
types of spiritual practices (.fflavaratapariimarsa)]. They will be defined in the
chapter EXPOSITION OF THE PROCLIVITIES (anusayanirdesa) (v. 7). <81>
6. The mundane (laukikl) right view (samyagdr~ti), i.e., understanding (prajfiii;
ii. 24) associated with the mental consciousness, wholesome (kusala), but impure
(siisrava ). 500
7. The (right) view of those in training (saik~f dr~ti), i.e., the pure view [or
understanding] that is particular to the noble one who is not a perfected being
(arhat).
8. The (right) view of those beyond training (asaik~f dr~{i), i.e., the pure view [or
understanding] particular to the perfected being (vi. 50).
These eight factors that are part of the element of factors (dhannadhiitu) are view
(dr~fi)!- [There is no (either) view left over (avasi~{a).]
acs.1.1. Fourfold classification with their comparisons of the eight views; 501 F 81
Comparison. Just as visible forms are seen [differently] by night [riitri] or by day
[diva], with a cloudy sky [samegha] or with a clear sky [amegha], in the same way
the factors are seen [different! y]
1. by the defiled [kli~{a] mundane view-the five afflicted views;
2. by the non-defiled [akli~ta] mundane view or right mundane view;
3. by the view of those in training (saik~Q;
4. · by the view of those beyond training (asaikf(). 502
acs.1.2. Definition of view; 503 F 81

Why is mundane right view spoken of only as understanding (prajfiii) associated with
the mental consciousness?
41cd. The understanding [dhr] which arises with the five sensory con-
sciousnesses is not view because it is not judgment after contempla-
tion.504
View [dr~!i] is judgment after contemplation (tfra,:za, saf!Ztfra,:za), i.e., judgment [nis-
caya] preceding from contemplation (upadhyana = upanidhyana, "knowing exactly")
of the object-field [vi~aya]. 505
But understanding (prajfW) which arises with the five sensory consciousnesses does
not have this characteristic. Thus, it is not view. - For the same reason, it happens
thaL[other] understanding, even though mental, whether defiled [kli~ta] or non-
defiled [akli~ta], is not [necessarily] view, namely, when it is purely intuitive [i.e.,
cognition of exhaustion and non-arising (k~ayanutpadajnana)] (vii. 1). 506
Bcs.2. Eye sense-faculty; 507 F 81-100

[Objection:J - But the eye sense-faculty does not possess a "judgment preced-
ing from contemplation of the object" (saf!Ztfra,:za). How can you say that it is view
(dmi)? {15 a}
[Answer:] - "View" is understood here as the seeing (alocana) of visible forms (riipa). 508
Bcs.2.1. Different views on whether the eye sense-faculty or the visual

consciousness sees; 509 F 81-86
1. Vaibhii~ika: the eye sense-faculty and not the visual consciousness sees; F 81
a. Vaibhii~ika: the homogeneous eye sense-faculty sees; F 82
b. Vaibhii~ika argument through logical reasoning: because concealed visible
form is not seen; F 83
c. Vaibhii~ika argument from scriptural authority: the eye sense-faculty sees; f 83
d. Vaibhii~ika argument through logical reasoning: visual consciousness
cannot see and cognize at the same time; F 84
2. . Opinions of other schools; F 85
a. Vijfiiinaviida (Viitsiputriya) argument in regard to the relationship between
the agent of seeing and the action of seeing; F 85
b. Vijfiiinaviida (Dharmaguptaka) argument from the conventional worldly
point of view; F 85
c. Sautriintika: the play of causes and effects & the use of metaphors; F 86
3. Vaibhii~ika of Kasmir: the eye sense-faculty sees, the mental faculty cognizes; F 86
Bcs.2.1.1. Vaibhii~ika: the eye sense-faculty and not the visual consciousness
sees; 510 F 81-82
42. (1) It is the eye sense-faculty, when it is homogeneous (sabhllga),
[i.e., when it is conjoined with the visual consciousness,] that sees
visible forms. (2) It is not the consciousness of which this sense-
faculty is the basis [that sees], for concealed visible form is not seen.
Such is the opinion of the Vaibhii~ikas [kila]. 511 <82>
acs.2.1.1.a. Vaibhii~ika: the homogeneous eye sense-faculty sees; 512 F 82~3

The Vijfianaviidin (Vij)513 is a scholar who attributes yiew, not to the eye sense-
faculty, but to visual consciousness.
[Vij:] - If it were the eye sense-faculty that sees, then even the [eye] sense-faculty of
a person who .is occupied with an auditory or tactile consciousness should see
(i. 6cd).s14
[Vaibhii~ika (Vai):] - We do not say that every eye sense-faculty sees. The eye sense-
faculty sees [only] when it is homogeneous (sabhiiga; i. 39), i.e., when it is conjoined
with the visual consciousness [savijfianaka]. 515
acs.2.1.1.b. Vaibha~ika argument through logical reasoning: because concealed

visible form is not seen; F 83
[Vij:] - But then that which sees is indeed the consciousness based on the eye sense-
faculty .516 <83>
[Vai:] - No, for the visible form, concealed or separated [vyavahita] by a wall [ku{iya]
or any other screen, is not seen. But the consciousness is non-material [amurti], not
susceptible to offering resistance or to being repelled (apratigha; i. 29b). [Some
masters:] Thus, if the visual consciousness were to see, it should see even the visible
forms concealed or screened [avrta] by a wall.
The Vijfi.anavadin replies: - The visual consciousness does not arise in regard to
concealed or screened visible forms; not arising in regard to them, it does not see
them [or how can there be seeing? (katham drak~yati) 517 ].
[Vai:] - But why does it not arise in regard to these [concealed or screened] visible
forms? 518 We-the Vaibhii~ikas who attribute view to the sense-faculty and who
accept that the sense-faculty, being susceptible to offering resistance or to being
stopped (sapratigha), 519 cannot exercise its activity with regard to concealed visible
or separated forms-can easily explain why the visual consciousness does not arise
in regard to concealed or separated visible forms: the visual consciousness, in fact,
[cannot arise] since it must exercise its activity on the same object-field as its
basis [i.e., the sense-faculty]. But if you think that the consciousness sees, how would
you explain the fact that it does not arise in regard to concealed visible forms?
The author (acarya; Vasubandhu) takes on the opinion of the Vijfi.anavadin and
responds [on behalf of the Vijfianaviidin] to the last reply of the Vaibha~ika:
Do you maintain that the eye sense-faculty sees its object-field by entering into a
close relationship or "reaching" its object-field [priiptavi~aya], in the way that the
body sense-faculty experiences a tangible (i. 43cd)? 520
In this hypothesis, I would understand that, because ofbeing susceptible to offering
resistance or to being stopped, the eye sense-faculty does not see the concealed or
screened [avrta] visible forms. But you, (i.e., the Vaibha~ika,) maintain that the eye
sense-faculty sees at a distance (i. 43cd): thus, you must not say that, being suscepti-
ble of being stopped, it does not see the separated or concealed visible forms.
Besides, visible forms which are separated [antarita] by glass [kaca], a veil of clouds
[abhrapafala], crystal [sphafika], and water [ambu] can be seen: how would you
explain this fact? {15 b} [Therefore, it is not because of being susceptible to offering
resistance or to being stopped that the eye sense-faculty does not see screened or
concealed visible forms. 521 ]
Thus, [from the point of view of the Vijfianavadin,] I would say that the visual
consciousness sees; it arises [even] in regard to screened or concealed visible forms
when the screen does not form an obstacle to light [alokasyapratibandha]; it does not
arise in the contrary case. 522
acs.2.1.1.c. Vaibhii~ika argument from scriptural authority: the eye sense-faculty

sees; 523 F 83--84
The yaibha~ika makes an appeal to Scripture: -The Siitra says:
Having seen visible forms with the eye sense-faculty. 524
Thus the sense-faculty sees, not the visual consciousness. <84>
[Answer by the Vijfianavadin:] - The Siitra intends to say: "Having seen the visible
forms by means of the eye sense-faculty as basis (tena asraye,:ia), by relying (asritya)
on the eye sense-faculty." In fact, the same Siitra says:
Having cognized (vijfiaya) the factors with the mental faculty (manas). 525
But this sense:..faculty, because of being past (i. 17), cannot cognize [factors]; it is
actually with the mental consciousness (manovijfiana) that one cognizes; thus, if the
text says: "with the mental faculty", it means to say: "by relying on the mental
faculty, the basis of the mental consciousness". The same for seeing and the eye
sense-faculty.
One can also accept that the Siitra [metaphorically] attributes to the basis, to
the sense-faculty, the action which belongs to that which seizes the basis, i.e., to
the consciousness. One commonly says: "the benches cry" [mafica~ krosanti]; the
"benches" are the persons seated on the benches.
This manner of speaking is common in Scripture. We read:

Visible forms, agreeable [i~fa] and attractive [kiinta], are cognized (vijfieya)
by the eye sense-faculty.
But you do not maintain that the eye sense-faculty cognizes. You attribute the cog-
nition to the consciousness whose eye sense-faculty is the basis.
The Sutra (Sarp,yukta, 9, 20) also says:
·The eye sense-faculty, 0 Brahman, is the gate (dviira) just for the seeing
(darsaniiya) of visible forms. 526
This text proves that the visual consciousness sees by way of this gate which is the
eye sense-faculty. You would not maintain that the gate signifies the seeing, for it
would be absurd to say: "The eye sense-faculty is the seeing for the seeing of visible
forms." {16 a}
acs.2.1.1.ct. Vaibhii~ika argument through logical reasoning: visual

consciousness cannot see and cognize at the· same time; 527 F 84
Oujection by the Vaibha~ika: - If the visual consciousness sees (pasyati), what is it
that cognizes (vijiiniiti) 528 (i. 48a)?
[Answer by the Vijfianavadin:] - What is the difference between these two functions
of seeini and cognizing that would bring it about that the same factor could not see
and cognize at the same time? [The very cognizing of a visible form is the seeing of
it.] Is it not accepted that a certain type of understanding (prajfiii; darsaniitmika;
vii. 1) sees (pasyati) as well as understands (prajiiniiti)? 529 In the same way, a certain
consciousness, i.e., the visual consciousness, sees as well as cognizes. Here there is
just one single function designated by two names. 530 <85>
acs.2.1.2. Opinions of other schools; F 85-86

acs.2.1.2.a. Vijfilinaviida (Viitsfputrfya) argument in regard to the relationship
between the agent of seeing and the action of seeing; F 85
Certain followers of the thesis: "The visual consciousness sees", namely, the VatsI-
putrlyas, object: - If the eye sense-faculty sees, what then is the actiori of seeing
(drsikriyii), existing separate (anyii) [from the eye sense-faculty], which you attribute
to this sense-faculty, the agent [kartr] of this action?
[Reply by the Vaibha~ikas:] -The objection cannot be made. Just as you can have
it that the consciousness cognizes (vijiiniiti), without accepting a difference between
the agent [kartr] and the action [kriyii], in the same way we accept that the sense-
faculty sees.
- BC. Twenty-two Doctrinal Perspectives on the Eighteen Elements 291
Bcs.2.1.2.b.Vijnanavada (Dharmaguptaka) argument from the conventional

worldly point of view; F 85
According to another opinion, that of the Dharmaguptakas, it is the visual conscious-
. ness which sees; but, as the eye sense-faculty is the basis of this consciousness, one
says that it also sees. In the same way one says "the bell rings" [ghiinta nadati],
because it is the basis of the resounding (niida).
[Reply:] - But, according to this principle, one should also say that the eye sense-
faculty cognizes (vijiiniUi), for it is the basis of the visual consciousness (vijiiiina).
[Dharmaguptakas:] - No. For, in the world, it is conventional [ru¢ha] to give the
name of seeing (darsana) to the visual consciousness; in fact, when this conscious-
ness occurs, it is said that visible form has been seen (dr~!a); one does not say that
the visible form has been cognized (vijiiiita). And the MVS (489c19) confirms:
That which is reached by the eye sense-faculty or falls within its range
(cak~ul:zsa,ripriipta = cak~uriibhiisagata) and that which is perceived (anu-
bhuta) by the consciousness is said to be seen.
Thus, in the world we say that the eye sense-faculty sees, because it is the basis of
the visual consciousness that sees; we do not say that it cognizes, because the activity
attributed to the visual consciousness is seeing and not cognizing.
On the other hand, when we say that the consciousness (vijniina) cognizes, we do
not mean that it cognizes insofar as it would be the basis of a certain cognizing, as
we understand that the eye sense-faculty sees because it is the basis of the visual
consciousness. It is understood that the consciousness cognizes by itself or its mere
presence [siinnidhyamiitra], that it is itself cognizing. In the same way, we say that
the sun is the maker of the day [suryo divasakara] [when it rises by its mere pres-
ence].531 {16 b} <86>
Bcs.2.1.2.c. Sautrantika: the play of causes and effects & the use of metaphors; F 86
Opinion of the Sautrii.ntika: 532 - Are you not devouring empty space here! 533 The
Siitra teaches: "Dependent on the.eye sense-faculty and visible forms, there arises the
visual consciousness"; there is neither a sense-faculty that sees nor a visible form that
is seen; here there is no function of seeing [nirvyiipiira], no agent that sees; it is
[a mere play of factors (dharmamiitra),] a mere play of causes and effects [hetu-
phalamiitra]:534 In conformity with ordinary discourse [vyavahiira], we speak, if we
like, of this process by using metaphors [upaciira]: "The eye sees [cak~ul:z pafyati],
the consciousness cognizes [vijiiiina,ri vijiiniiti]." But [the wise ones] should not be
attached [abhinive~[avya] to these metaphors, for the Fortunate One has said:
One should not obstinately be attached to the manner of speaking of the

people or the country Uanapadanirukta], nor should one [unnecessarily]
insist on the expressions [sal?l}iia] used in the world [loka]. 535
Bcs.2.u. Vaibha~ika of Kasmfr: the eye sense-faculty sees; the mental faculty
cognizes; F 86
Accorqing to the system [siddhanta] of the Vaibha~ikas of Kasmir, the eye sense-
faculty sees, the ear sense-faculty hears, the nose sense-faculty smells, the taste
sense-faculty tastes, the body sense-faculty touches, the mental faculty cognizes. 536
Bcs.2.2. Are visible forms seen by one eye or by two eyes? F 86-87
[Then, if the eye sense-faculty sees,] are the visible forms seen by one eye or by two
eyes?
43ab. Visible forms are seen also with the. two eyes, as the clarity of sight
demonstrates.537
There is no fixed rule [niyama]: one sees with one eye; one also sees with both eyes.
The A.bhidharmikas 538 say: "[Visible forms are] seen also with the two eyes; the two
eyes being open, the view is clearer [parisuddhatara]."
Besid1:s, 539 when one eye is open [unmflita] { 17 a} and the other is half-closed
[ardhanimflita], one perceives two moons [dvicandra], but not when one completely
closes or half-closes that eye that was open, or when one opens or closes completely
the eye that was half-closed. <87>
From the fact that its basis [asraya] is twofold [viccheda], it should not be concluded
that the visual consciousness is twofold, for the consciousness is not material like
material form [rupa]; not having a mass (amurta), it is not situated in a [particular]
place (desaprati~thita).
Bcs.2.3. Perception of the object with or without reaching it with the sense-
°
faculty & the eighteen elements; 54 F 87-89
We have said that the eye sense-faculty sees; that the sense-faculties of the ear, the
nose, the tongue, the body, each perceive their object-field; that the mental faculty
cognizes. Do these sense-faculties reach or directly touch (prap; prapta) their object-
field [or not (aprapta)]?
43cd. The eye sense-faculty, the ear sense-faculty and the mental faculty
know their object-field without reaching [apriiptavi~aya] it. For the
other three sense-faculties, the opposite.541
BCS.2.3.t. Perception of the object-field without reaching it: the eye, ear and
mental sense-faculties; 542 F 87-88
(1) The eye sense-faculty [cak,rns] [sees visible form from a distance [dura], but
it does not see the eye-salve [aiijana] placed [directly] on the eye [ak~istha]; (2) the
ear sense-faculty [srota] hears the distant sound; (3) the mental faculty [manas],
being non-material, does not enter into 1a close relationship with its object-field. 543
<88>
If the eye and ear sense-faculties were to enter into a close relationship with their
object-field [praptavi~aya], then practitioners in meditation (dhyayin) would not be
endowed with the divine eye [divyacak~us], the divine ear [divyasrotra], just as they
do not possess a divine nose, [etc.] (vii. 42).
Objection: - If the eye sense-faculty has an object-field with which it is not in a close
relationship, why does it not see [all] visible forms [with which it is not in a close
relationship, including] what is too distant [to be seen] [dura] or what is concealed
[tfraskrta]? 544
Answer: - Why does the magnet [ayaskanta] not draw all iron [with which it is not
in a close relationship (aprapta)]? {17 b}
Besides, supposing that the sense-faculty enters into a close relationship with
the object-field [visaya], the same difficulty remains: why does the eye sense-
faculty not see all the object-fields with which it is in a close relationship, such
as the eye-salve [aiijana] and the little rod [used for painting the eye-salve;
salii.ka)]?
Or else, let us say that the same rule should apply to the eye sense-faculty and the
nose and tongue sense-faculties: [for example,] the nose sense-faculty smells only
the odor with which it is in a close relationship, but it does not smell the odor that
constitutes the sense-faculty itself (sahabhii.).
In the same way, the eye sense-faculty sees only distant visible form [with·which it is
not in a close relationship], but it does not see all distant visible forms.
[The mental faculty, however, not being material, is incapable of entering into a close
relationship at all. 545 ]
According to certain scholars, however, from the fact that one can hear sounds even
[of what is] inside the ear [kan:iabhyantara], one can conclude that the ear sense-
faculty [srotra] can hear sounds with which it is in a close relationship, as it also can
hear distant sounds. 546
Bcs.2.3.2. Perception of the object with reaching it: the nose, tongue and body
sense-faculties; 547 F 88-89
The other three sense-faculties, i.e., nose, tongue and body, perceive an object-field
with which they are in close relationship. For the nose, [for example,] this results
from the fact that in-breathing is necessary for the perception of the odor. 548
Bcs.2.3.2.a. Meaning of the expressions "reach" and "non-separation"; F88-89549

[Question:] - What should one understand by the expression "to reach" (to enter
into a close relationship) (prap; priipti)? What does it mean when one says that
the sense-faculty reaches its object-field, knows its object-field after having reached
it?
[Answer:] - To reach is to arise in non-separation [nirantarotpatti]. 550 The object-
field, which renews itself from moment to moment (iv. 2cd), occurs by arising in the
state of non-separation with the sense-faculty and vice versa. <89>
[What should one understand by the state of non-separation (nirantaratva)?
1. According to the Bhadanta, immediate juxtaposition, absence of interval (see
below). 551
2. According to the Vaibha~ika, immediate vicinity, absence of an interposed body
(see below).552]
Bcs.2.4. Insert: Do atoms touch one another or not? F 89-92

The question is then whether the atoms [paramii~u] do or do not touch [sprsanti] one
another. 553
1. Vaibha~ikas: atoms do not touch one another; F 89
a. Objections; F 89
If atoms do not touch, then how does sound occur? F 89
If atoms do not touch, why does the aggregation not fall to pieces
when being struck; F 89
b. Non-separation and reaching as absence of an interposed body; F 90
c. Composites can touch one another, but atoms do not; F 90
2. Bhadanta (and Vasubandhu): atoms do touch one another metaphorically; F 91
a. Non-separation as absence of interval; F 91
b. The composites are nothing other than the atoms; F 92
c. Spatial division of the atom; F 92
Bcs.2.4.1. Vaibha~ikas: atoms do not touch one another; F 89-91

The Vaibha~ikas ofKasmir (MVS, 683a24) say that atoms do not touch one another:
1. if the atoms were to touch one another in their totality [or with their whole
self; sarvatman], the real entities (dravya), i.e., the different atoms, would
"blend into one another" [misrfbhaveyu~], i.e., they would occupy only one
place;
2. if the atoms were to touch one another in one spot [ekadesa], they would
thus have parts (avayava): but the atoms do not have parts or are partless
[niravayava ]. 554
BCS.2.4.J.a. Objections; F 89-90

Bcs.2.4.1.aa. If atoms do not touch, then how does sound occur? F 89
[Objection:] - But if there is no contact between the atoms, how then is sound pro-
duced?
[Answer:] - For this very reason that there is no contact, sound is possible: {18 a} if
the atoms touched one another, the hand [hasta] in collision (abhyahata) with the
hand would merge [sajyeta] into it, the stone [upala] in collision with the stone
would merge into it, just as plant gum Uatu] merges into or sticks to plant gum. And
the sound would not occur.
If atoms do not touch, why does the aggregation not fall to pieces
Bcs.2.4.1.ab.
when being struck; F 89-90
[Objection:] - But if the atoms do not touch, why does the aggregation (sal'{lcita; cita)
or the composite of atoms not fall to pieces [visfryate] when it is struck [pratyahata]?
<90>
[Answer:] - Because the wind element (vayudhatu) concentrates it or holds it to-
gether [sa7!1dhiira~a]:
1. a certain wind element has dispersion [vikira~aya] for its fm1ction, for
example, the wind at the aeon of the dissolution [sa7!1vartakalpa] of the world;
2. a certain wind element has concentration or holding together [smr-
dhara~aya] for its function, for example, the wind at the aeon of creation
[vivartakalpa] [of the world] (iii. 91, 100).
Bcs.2.4.1.b. Non-separation and reaching as absence of an interposed body; F 90

[The Vaibhii~ikas continue the exposition of their doctrine.]
Of three sense-faculties, [i.e., nose, tongue and body,] it is said that they reach
[prapta] their object-field because their object-field is with them in a state of non-
separation (nirantaratva).
[Question:] - What does non-separation consist of?

[Answer:] - [The state of non-separation] consists of the fact that there is nothing in
the middle between the two (tad evai~iil!I, nirantaratval!I, yan madhye niisti kil!I, cit).
This is also what is meant by "to reach".
Bcs.2.4.1.c. Composites can touch one another, but atoms do not; F 90-91
Furthermore, as the composites (sal!l,ghiita) have parts, there is no problem [do~ti] in
composites touching one another. And from this point of view, the definitions of the
MVS (684) are justified:
Does the thing-in-contact [spr~ta] arise having a thing-in-contact [spr~ra-
hetuka] for its cause or does it arise having a thing-outside-of-contact
[aspr~tahetuka] for its cause? <91>
The same question in regard to that which concerns the thing-outside-of-contact.
This cannot be answered in an absolute manner:
1. sometimes the thing-outside-of-contact arises from the thing-in-
contact when the thing-in-contact falls to pieces [visi"ryate];
2. sometimes the thing-in-contact arises from the thing-outside-of-
contact when the thing-outside-of-contact becomes compounded
[cayal!l gaccchati];
3. sometimes the thing-in-contact { 18 b} arises from the thing-in-
contact when there is a compounding of compounds [cayavatal!I,
caya];
4. sometimes th~ thing-outside-of-contact arises from the thing-
outside-of-contact, for example, the dust particles moving sus-
pended in the empty space of the window [viitiiyanarajas].
The Bhadanta Vasumitra says:
If atoms touched one another, then they would abide for two moments
[uttarak~a~iivasthiina ]. 555
[(Therefore), they do not touch.]
Bcs.2.4.2. Bhadanta (and Vasubandhu): atoms do touch one another metaphori-

cally; F 91-92
[Opinions of Vasubandhu: 556]
Bcs.2.4.2.a. Non-separation as absence of interval; F 91

The Bhadanta says: 557
There is, in reality, no contact. Metaphorically it is said that the atoms

touch one another when they are juxtaposed without interval (nirantaratva).
(Quoted in MYS, 684a2, see note F 90). 558
This opinion [mata] is the correct one. 559 In fact, if the atoms were to allow an
interval between themselves [santara], this interval being empty [sanya], what would
prevent the movement [gati] of atoms into this interval that leaves the atoms
separated (santara)? It is accepted that atoms are impenetrable (sapratigha). 560
<92>
acs.2.4.2.b. The composites are nothing other than the atoms; F 92

[Since those atoms are admitted to possess resistance (sapratigha), and since] the
composites (saf[lghata) are nothing other than the atoms, they are the very atoms
which, in a state of aggregation [i.e., as composites], are contacted [sprsyante]; just
as they are material form (rupa; i. 13). 561 It is thus absurd to deny that the atoms
touch one another, and admit that agglomerates touch one another.
acs.2.4.2.c. Spatial division of the atom; F 92

1. If you admit the spatial division (digbhagabheda) of the atom, [i.e., the division
of the atom into different portions in different directions,] then the atom certainly has
parts [savayavatva] whether it enters into contact or not (spr~ta, aspr~ta).
2. ~f you deny it, it is hard to see why the atom, even if it enters into contact, would
have parts. 562
, acs.2.5. Size of the sense-faculties and their object-fields; 563 F 92-93

Should we think that the sense-faculties seize only an object-referent [artha] of their
own size [parima~a]? I.e., if it is thought that one sees the extended object-referent
[mahata] all at once [sakrt], for example, a mountain [parvata], then that is by way of
an illusion, because we see quickly [asuvrtti] the parts of the mountain: this is
obviously so when we see the circle of fire drawn by a whirling torch [alatacakra].
<93>
Or should we think that the sense-faculties seize an object-field of their own [tulya]
size and of a different [atulya] size indiscriminately? {19 a}
44ab. The three sense-faculties, of which the nose sense-faculty is the
first, [i.e., the nose, tongue and body sense-faculties,] seize an
object-field of their own size.564
A given number of atoms [parama~u] 565 of the sense-faculty, reaching the same
number of atoms of an object-field, produce the consciousness.
1-3. This holds for the nose, the tongue and the body in this way. (ii. 22)
4-5. But, there is no rule [aniyama] for [the sense-faculties of] the eye and the ear.
[As for the eye:]
i. sometimes the object-field is smaller than the sense-faculty, as when one
sees the tip of a hair [valagra];
ii. sometimes the same as the sense-faculty, as when one sees a grape
[dralcya];
iii. sometimes larger than the sense-faculty, as when one sees a great mountain
[pan 1ata] in a mere glance [unmisitamatra].
- The same for sound or noise [gho~a], [i.e., it is smaller, larger, etc.]: one hears the
buzzing of a mosquito [masaka]; the roaring of a thundering cloud [megha], etc.
6. -In regard to that which concerns the mental faculty which is non-material
[amurti], the question [of dividing it according to size (parimii,:iapariccheda)] does
not arise.
acs.2.6. Issues related to the atoms of the sense-faculties; F 93-94

Here some problems arise relative to the sense-faculties.
acs.2.6.1. Arrangement of the atoms of the sense-faculties; F 93-94

How are the atoms [paramii,:iu) of the different sense-faculties arranged? 566
1. The atoms of the eye sense-faculty are arranged on the pupil of the eye [ak#-
tarakii] like cumin flowers (ajiijipu~pavat, kiilajirakapu~pa), i.e., on one surface
[ekatala]; they are cov~red by a membrane or shield of translucent color (var,:ia;
acchacarmiivacchlidita) which prevents them from dispersing. 567
According to another opinion, they are arranged in depth or one on top of the other
[adharauttarya] like a pill or ball [pi,:i{iavat]; being translucent, like the crystal
[spha{ikavat], they do not obscure or obstruct one another.
2. The atoms of the ear sense-faculty are arranged in the interior [abhyantara] of
the bharja, a kind of birch-bark leaf found in the [inner] ear [kar,:ia].
3. The atoms of the nose sense-faculty {19 b} are arranged like two needles
[saliikiivat] in the interior of the nostrils (ghiifii, niisiipufi). <94>
These first three sense-faculties form a garland [or are arranged like a garland
(around the head)] [maliivat]. 568
4. The atoms of the tongue sense-faculty are arranged on the upper surface of the
tongue like a half-moon [ardhacandravat]. That is, in the middle of the tongue, a
space, the size of the tip of a hair [valagramatra], is not occupied [astrta; asphufa,
avyapta] by the atoms of the sense-faculty. Such is the opinion expressed in the
Scripture. 569
5. The atoms of the body sense-faculty are arranged like the form of the body itself
[kayavat].
6. The atoms of the female sexual faculty are arranged like the bowl of a drum
[bheri"kafahavat].
7. The atoms of the male sexual faculty are arranged like a thumb [aligu~fhavat].
Bcs.2.6.2. Homogeneous and partially homogeneous & the atoms of the sense-
faculties; F 94
1. As for the atoms [parama~u] of the eye sense-faculty, sometimes they can be all
homogeneous (sabhaga; i. 39); sometimes all partially homogeneous (tatsabhaga);
sometimes some homogeneous and some partially homogeneous.
2-4. The same for the atoms of the ear, nose and tongue sense-faculties.
5. But in regard to that which concerns the body sense-faculty, it is not the case that
its atoms are all homogeneous: even when the body is enveloped in the flames of the
Pratapana hell (iii. 58), an infinite number of atoms [of the body sense-fr..:.:ulty] are
partially homogeneous, because, the School says, the body [asraya] would fall
to pieces [visiryate] if all the atoms of the body sense-faculty were to work at the
same time.
Bcs.2.6.3. Aggregations as sense-faculties (basis) and cognitive objects of the

sensory consciousnesses & the invisibility of real-entity atoms; F 94
It does not happen that consciousness is produced by one single atom of a sense-
faculty [indriyaparama~u], by one single atom of an object-field [vi~ayaparania~u].
In fact, the five categories of consciousness have the aggregations (sa'!lcifa) for' their
basis and their cognitive object. 570 {20 a}
The result of this is that atoms [by themselves] are not seen [adrsyatva]; they are
therefore qualified as invisible (anidarsana; i. 29ab; iv. 4). 571
Bcs.2.7. Simultaneity and non-simultaneity of the object-fieVd or sense-faculty

with its consciousness & the eighteen elements; F 94-95
[There are these six elements of consciousness that have been discussed, from visual
consciousness through mental consciousness.] The object-field [vi~aya] of the first
five consciousnesses is [present, i.e.,] simultaneous [vartamana] with them; 572 the
object-field of the sixth consciousness is either prior to it, simultaneous with it, or
later than it; in other words, it is past, present, or future (i. 23).
Does the same hold for the basis [a.fraya] of the consciousnesses? <95>
44cd. Relative to the consciousnesses, (1) the basis of the sixth conscious-
ness is past [only]; (2) the basis of the first five [consciousnesses] is
also simultaneous [sahaja], [i.e., both earlier than and simultaneous
with the consciousness].573
1. The sole basis of the mental consciousness is the mental faculty (manodhatu),
i.e., the consciousness which has just perished (i. 17).
2. The basis of five consciousnesses is also simultaneous with them: that is to say,
it is prior to and simultaneous with the consciousness. In fact, the basis of these con-
sciousnesses is twofold:
i. the sense-faculty, i.e., the eye sense-faculty, etc., which is simultaneous with
the consciousness;
ii. the mental faculty, which is past at the moment when consciousness
arises.
The five consciousnesses thus have two sense-faculties as their basis.
[For this very reason] the question is posed: {20 b} Is that which is the basis of the
visual consciousness at the same time the condition as the equivalent and immediate
antecedent (samanantarapratyaya; ii. 62) of this consciousness?
Four alternatives (tetralemma):
i. the eye sense-faculty, which is the basis only;
11. the totality of the thought-concomitants, i.e., sensation, etc. (ii. 24), which
have just perished [samanantaratftas caitasiko dharmadhatu]: they are the
condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent only;
iii. the consciousness which has just perished, or the mental faculty, which is at
the same time the basis and the condition as the equivalent and immediate
antecedent;
iv. the other factors which are neither one or the other. 574
The same for the auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile consciousnesses.
In regard to the mental consciousness, [is that which is the basis of the mental
consciousness at the same time the condition as the equivalent and immediate
antecedent of mental consciousness?] The answer is in accord with the former (and
not the latter alternative) of the question [purvapadaka]: that which is the basis of the
mental consciousness is always the condition as the equivalent and immediate
antecedent of this consciousness; but the inverse is not true: [the totality of] the
thought-concomitants which just have perished is not a basis.
Bcs.2.s. Sense-faculties as the basis (iisraya) of consciousness & the eighteen

elements; F 95-96
The visual consciousness depends on both the eye sense-faculty and on the visible
form. Why is only the sense-faculty considered as the basis (asraya) of the con-
sciousness to the exclusion of the object-field? <96>
45ab. The basis of the consciousness is the sense-faculty, for the con-
sciousness changes or is modified [vikara] according to any change
or modality [vikaritva] of the sense-faculty.575
When the eye sense-faculty is the object of medical care (anugraha; application of
eye salve, etc.); when it is injured [upaghata] by dust [re~iu], etc.; when it is sharp
(pafu); when it is dull and weak (manda), the consciousness reproduces its change or
modality [vikara]: it is accompanied by pleasure [sukha] or by pain [du~kha], it is
sharp or weak.
[The change or modality of] the object-field, on the contrary, has no influence on the
change or modality of the consciousness.· {21 a}
Therefore, it is the sense-faculty and not the object-field that is [more properly
(siidhiyas)] the basis of consciousness (ii. 2ab).
Bcs.2.9. Sense-facuities as the basis for naming the consciousnesses & the
eighteen elements; F 96
The consciousness knows the object-field. Why is it designated by the name of the
sense-faculty: consciousness of the eye (cak~urvijfiana) ... consciousness of the
mental faculty (manas), and not by the name of the object-field: consciousness of the
visible form (rupavijfiiina) ... consciousness of the factors (dharmavijfiiina)?
45cd. (1) For the reason [that the sense-faculty is the basis of the con-
sciousness], and (2) also because [the sense-faculty] is "its own or not
shared'', it is the sense-faculty that gives its name to the conscious-
ness.576
1. Because the sense-faculty is its basis, the consciousness takes the name of the
sense-faculty.
2. Because the sense-faculty is "its own or not shared" [asadhara~atva]: the
eye sense-faculty of a given person is the basis of (i) the visual consciousness only,
(ii) of just this one person.
Visible form, on the contrary, is shared [sadhara~a], for a certain visible form is
perceived (i) by the visual consciousness and by the mental consciousness, (ii) by
one person and by another person.
The same observation for the (other) sense-faculties: ear, nose, tongue and body, and
for the (other) object-fields: sound, odor, taste and tangible.
We conclude that the consciousness is named after the sense-faculty, (1) because
the sense-faculty is its basis and (2) because the sense-faculty is its own or not
shared. The same does not hold for the object-field. [Just so,] it is said commonly
"the sound of the drum" [bherfsabda], and not "the sound of the stick" [da~{lasabda];
"the sprout of barley" [yavankura], and not "the sprout of the field" [k~etrankura].
<97>
Bcs.2.10. Stages (bhumi) & the sense-faculties, body, object-fields and

· consciousnesses of the eighteen elements; 577 F 97-100
Beings are born in a certain stage of the world (bhumi), in the realm of desire, in the
first meditation (dhyana), etc.; they are of this stage, and their body (kaya) is also of
this stage. They see-by means of the eye sense-faculty-visible forms.
Question: - Do the body, the eye sense-faculty, the visible forms and the conscious-
ness gelong to the same stage or to different stages?
Answer: - All can belong to different stages.
Bcs.2.10.1. Eye sense-faculty & the body, sense-faculty, visible form and
consciousness; 518 F 97-98
519
Bcs.2.10.1.a. Eye sense-faculty, body, etc., in the realm of desire; F 97
When beings who have arisen in the realm of desire see-by means of the eye sense-
faculty of their stage-the visible forms of their stage, then (1) the body, (2) the
sense~faculty, (3) the visible forms and (4) the consciousness are of the same stage.
When these beings see-by means of the eye sense-faculty of the first meditation
(dhyiina)--the visible forms of this stage (i.e., the realm of desire), then (1) the body
and (3) the visible forms are of the realm of desire, (2) the sense-faculty and (4) the
consciousness are of the first meditation {21 b}. If these beings see-by means of the
same sense-faculty-the visible forms of the first meditation, then ( 1) the body alone
is of the realm of desire; (2-4) the other three are of the first meditation.
When these beings see-by means of the eye sense-faculty of the second medi-
tation-the visible forms of the realm of desire, then ~1) the body and (3) the
visible forms are of the realm of desire, (2) the sense-faculty is of the second
meditation, (4) the consciousness is of the first meditation. [If these beings see-by
means of the same sense-faculty-the visible forms of the first meditation, then
(4) the consciousness and (3) the visible forms are of the first meditation, (1) the
body is of the realm of desire, and (2) the sense-faculty is of the second medita-
tion.580] If these beings see-by means of the same sense-faculty-the visible forms
of the second581 meditation, then (1) the body is of the realm of desire, (2) the sense-
faculty and (3) the visible forms are of the second meditation, (4) the consciousness
is of the first meditation. (viii. 13ac)
The cases where beings who have arisen in the realm of desire see-by means of the
eye sense-faculty of the third or of the fourth meditation-the visible forms of these
same stages or of a lower stage can be explained in the same way.
Bcs.2.10.1.b. Eye sense-faculty, body, etc., in the first meditation; 582 F 97-98
When beings who have arisen in the first meditation see-by means of the eye sense-
faculty of their stage-the visible forms of their stage, then (1) the body, (2) the
sense-faculty, (3) the visible forms and (4) the consciousness are of the same stage. If
these beings see-by means of the same sense-faculty-the visible forms of the
lower stage, then (1) the body, (2) the sense-faculty and (4) the consciousness are of
their stage, the first meditation.
When these beings see-by means of the eye ~ense-faculty of the second medita-
tion-the visible forms of their stage-then three (i.e., (l) the body, (3) the visible
forms and (4) the consciousness) are of their stage (first meditation), (2) the· sense- ·
faculty is of the second meditation. <98> If these beings see-by means of the same
sense-faculty-tht? visible forms of the realm of desire, then (1) the body and (4) the
consciousness are of their stage (first meditation), (3) the visible forms are of the
lower stage, (2) the sense-faculty is of the second meditation. If these beings see-by
means of the same sense-faculty-the visible forms of the second meditation, then
· (1) the body and (4) the consciousness are of their stage (first meditation), (2) the
sense-faculty and (3) the visible forms of the second meditation.
The cases where beings arisen in the first meditation see-by means of the e'!e sense-
faculty of the third or of the fourth meditation-the visible forms of these stages·or
of a lower stage can be explained in the same way.
Eye sense-faculty, body, etc., in the second, third and fourth

acs.2.10.1.c.
meditation; 583 F 98
According to the same principles, we can explain the cases where beings who have
arisen in the second meditation, the third meditation or the fourth meditation,
see-by means of the eye sense-faculty of their stage or of a different stage-the

visible forms of their stage or of a different stage. {22 a}
Bcs.2.10.2. General rules; 584 F 98-JO0

Bcs.2.10.2.a. General rule related to the eye sense-faculty; 585 F 98-99
The rule is the following:
46. (1) The eye sense-faculty is never of a [stage]·lower than the body,
[i.e., it can also be of a higher stage]; (2) the visible form is never of
a [stage] higher than the sense-faculty; (3) the consciousness is also
not [of a stage higher than the sense-faculty]; (4) the visible form-
in relation to the consciousness-and the visible form as well as the
consciousness-in relation to the body-are of all types [i.e., equal,
higher, lower]. 586
The body, the eye sense-faculty, the visible form can belong to five stages: the realm
of desire, four meditations (dhyiina).
The visual consciousness is of two stages only: the realm of desire and the first
meditation (viii. 13ac).
Having said all this, (1) the eye sense-faculty which a certain being employs can be
of the s,ame stage [tadbhiimika] to which the body of this being belongs, i.e., of the
stage wllere this being is arisen; it can be of a higher stage [iirdhvabhiimika]; it is
never of a lower stage [adharabhiimika].
(2-3) The visible form and the consciousness-in relation to the sense-faculty-are
either of the same stage or of a lower stage, never of a higher stage. A visible form of
a higher stage cannot be seen by an eye sense-faculty of a lower stage. A visual
consciousness of a higher stage cannot arise from a sense-faculty of a lower Stage.
(4) The visible form-in relation to the visual consciousness-is either equal, higher,
or lower. <99>
The visible form and the visual consciousness-in relation to the body-are as
visible form is in relation to the consciousness, i.e., equal, higher, lower.
Bcs.2.10.2.b. General rule related to the ear sense-faculty; 587 F 99

47a. The same holds for the ear sense-faculty.588
(1) The ear sense-faculty is not lower than the body. (2-3) Sound is not higher than
the ear sense-faculty, nor is the auditory consciousness. (4) Sound-in relation to the
auditory consciousness-and sound and the consciousness-in relation to the body-
can be of any type. {22 b}
Bcs.2.10.2.c. General rule related to the nose, tongue and body sense-faculties; 589 F 99
47ab. [With respect to the] three sense-faculties [of the nose, of the
tongue and of the body,] all, [i.e., the body, the sense-faculty, the
object-field and the consciousness,] belong [exclusively] to their
own stage.590
With respect to what concerns the nose, tongue and body sense-faculties, (1) the
body, (2) the sense-faculty, (3) the object-field and (4) the consciousness belong
exclusively to their own stage, to the stage in which the beings under consideration
have arisen.
Bcs.2.10.2.ca.Exception: tactile consciousness; 591 F 99

Having formulated this general rule [utsarga], the author indicates an exception
[apavada]:
47cd. The tactile consciousness is of its own stage or a lower stage.592
The body (kiiya), the body sense-faculty (kiiyadhiitu) and the tangible [spr~(avya]
are always of the stage in which the beings under consideration have arisen. But
the tactile consciousness (1) is of its own stage, in the case of beings who have
arisen in the realm of desire or in the first meditation; (2) is of a lower stage (first
meditation), in the case of beings arisen in the second meditation or higher.
Bcs.2.10.2.d. General rule for the mental faculty; 593 F 99-100

47d. There is no restriction with respect to that which concerns the
mental faculty. 594
1. Sometimes the mental faculty is of the same stage [samanabhiimika] as the body,
the element of factors (dharmadhii.tu) and the mental consciousness.
2. Sometimes (the mental faculty) is of a lower or a higher stage [iirdhvii.dho-
bhumika]. <100>
The body belonging to the first five stages, i.e., the realm of desire and the four
meditations, the mental faculty, the element of factors and the mental consciousness
can, in meditative attainment (samii.patti) or at conception (pratisarµdhi; upapatti), be
of whatever stage-all the stages, in addition, not being the same in each case. This
will be explained in the eighth chapter: EXPOSITION OF nrn MEDITATIVE ATTAINMENTS
(Samii.pattinirdesa; viii. 19cd]. To avoid making this treatise too long, we will not
discuss this here; little purpose fprayojana] would be served, and the pains [frama]
would be great.
acT. 20. Consciousness (vijfiiina), object of consciousness/the cognized

(vijneya) & the eighteen elements; 595 F 100
There are eighteen elements and six consciousnesses. Which element is cognized
[vijfieya] by which consciousness (vijftiina)?
48a. The five external elements are cognized by two consciousnesses,
[that is, by a sensory consciousness and by the mental conscious-
ness].596
(1) Visible forms, (2) sounds, (3) odors, (4) tastes and (5) tangibles are known (anu-
bhuta) by the consciousnesses (1) of the eye, (2) of the ear, (3) of the nose, (4) of the
tongue and (5) of the body, respectively.
They are all [also] cognized (vijfteya) by the mental consciousness [manovijftiina]. 597
Each of these external elements is thus cognized by two consciousnesses.
The other thirteen elements, not being of the object~field [vi~aya] of the [five gr~ups
of] sensory consciousness, are cognized by the mental consciousness alone.
acu. 21. Permanent (nitya) and impermanent (anitya) & the eighteen
elements; 598 F 100
[Question:] - How many elements are permanent [nitya] [and how many are imper-
manent, (anitya)]?
[Answer:] - No element is permanent in its totality.
48b. (But) the unconditioned factors [which form a part of the element
of factors] are permanent.599
The unconditioned factors (i. 5b) form a part of the element of factors (dharmadhiitu;
i. 15c). Thus one part of the element of factors is permanent, [the remaining ones
are impermanent600].
acv. 22. Controlling faculties (indriya) and not controlling faculties

(nendriya) & the eighteen elements; 601 F 100-2
How many of the elements are controlling faculties (indriya), i.e., rulers (ii. 1), [and
how many are not controlling faculties (nendriya)]?
48cd. (1) The twelve inter~a'.l elements and (2) a part of the element of
factors are controllin:g faculties. 602 <101>
acv.1. Enumeration of the twenty-two controlling faculties; 603 F 101

The Siitra604 enumerates twenty-two controlling faculties (indriya):
1. eye sense-faculty (cakfurindriya);

2. ear sense-faculty (srotendriya);
3. nose sense-faculty (ghrii,:iendriya);
4. tongue sense-faculty (jihvendriya);
5. body sense-faculty (kiiyendriya);
6. mental faculty (mana-indriya);
7. male sexual faculty (puru~endriya);
8. female sexual faculty (strfndriya);
9. vitality faculty (jfvitendriya);
10. faculty of sensation of pleasure (sukhendriya);
11. faculty of sensation of displeasure (duJ:,kha-i,ndriya);
12. faculty of sensation of satisfaction (saumanasya-i,ndriya);
13. faculty of sensation of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya-indriya);
14. faculty of sensation of equanimity (upek~a-indriya);
15. (praxis-oriented) faculty of faith (sraddhendriya);
16. (praxis-oriented) faculty of vigor (vfryendriya);
17. (praxis-oriented) faculty of mindfulness (smr~fndriya);
18. (praxis-oriented) faculty of concentration (samiidhfndriya);
19. (praxis-oriented) faculty of understanding (prajfiendriya );
20. faculty of coming to know what is not yet known (aniijfiatamiijfliisyiimi-
indriya);
21. faculty of perfect knowledge (iijfiendriya);
22. faculty of final and perfect knowledge (iijfiiitiivfndriya) (see F 117).
The Abhidhiirmikas (Prakara,:iapiida, fol. 31b) do not take into account the group
constituted by the six sense-faculties of consciousness (iiyatana), i.e., (1-5) the eye,
ear; nose, tongue and body sense-faculties and (6) the mental faculty, and thus do
not place the mental faculty after the body sense-faculty but after the vitality
faculty, because the mental faculty, just like the faculties of sensation (10-14), has a
cognitive object (iilambana; i. 29bc) and not only an object-field (vi~aya) as the
sense-faculties of the sensory consciousness (1-5). 605 {23 b} <102>
acv.2. One part of the external element offactors & the twenty-two
controlling faculties; F 102 ·
Among the twenty-two controlling faculties,
i. eleven controlling faculties, namely, the vitality faculty (9), the five faculties
of sensation (10-14), the five (praxis-oriented) faculties (15-19), and
ii. a part of the last three controlling faculties (20-22),
form a part of the element of factors (dharmadhiitu ). 606
BCV.3. Twelve internal elements & the twenty-two controlling faculties; F 102
The twelve internal elements are (1) the five sense-faculties of sensory conscious-
ness, which form five elements (dhatu) and the (first) five controlling faculties,
[being called by their own names (svaniimokta)], (2) the mental faculty (i. 16c), i.e.,
the sixth controlling faculty, which makes up seven elements of thought [cittadhatu],
and (3) a part of [the body sense-faculty, i.e., male and female sexual faculties
(strfpuru~endriye kiiyadhatupradesa )607 ].
BCV.4. The remaining five external elements & the twenty-two controlling
faculties; 608 F 102
(1) The five remaining [external] elements, [i.e., visible form, sound, odor, taste and
the tangible], and (2) a part of the element of factors (dharmadhatu; i. 15bd) are not
controlling faculties [indriya].
***
This concludes the
First Chapter (Kosasthana)
called.
EXPOSITION OF THE ELEMENTS (Dhatunirdesa)
in the
3'ibhidharmakosa- @lfha~ya.
Endnotes to Chapter One
Lodro Sangpo (LS): AH 1; SAH 1.

As for a brief discussion of chapter 1, see Dhammajoti's Summary and Discussion of the Abhi-
dharmakosa-bhii~ya (from now onwards: Summary), which also briefly addresses the usage of
dhiitu in its title: Dhiitunirdesa.
LS: Ibid.
Gokhale; [1] yal_i sarvathii sarvahatii'ndhakiiral_i I saf{lsiirapankiij jagad ujjahiira I tasmai
namaskrtya yathii'rthasiistre I siistraf{I pravak~yiimy abhidharmakosam II
Tib.: [1] gang zhig kun la mun pa gtan bcom zhing I 'khor ba'i 'dam las 'gro ba drangs mdzad
pa I don bzhin ston pa de la phyag 'tshal nas I chos mngon mdzad kyi bstan pcos rab bshad bya I
4
LS: This "greatness" refers, according to Yasomitra (WOG.2.6f.), to the "completeness of
his accomplishment for the benefit of himself and others" (svapariirtha-pratipatti-sampat)
(VASC.40).
LS: I.e., all twelve sense-spheres (iiyatana) (WOG.4.2f; VASC.41).
LS: According to the Vyiikhyii, "in every respect" refers to all modes, i.e., to the absence
of the defiled and undefiled darkness: sarvei:ia prakarel_la sarva-hataqi sarvathii sarva-hatam.
[ ... ] sarve,:,.a prakiire,:ieti kli~iakli~iandhakara-vigamata\l [WOG.3.3 lff.].
In his footnotes to the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya (hereafter AKB), La Vallee Poussin (LVP)
often quotes from Yasomitra's Sphutiirthii Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii (hereafter Vyiikhyii or
WOG) but does not italicize the original text. At the same time, he often does not identify his
Sanskrit quotes. With the help of electronic search. I attempted to identify the WOG Sanskrit
passages and was able to trace many, which are now indicated, for example, as [WOG.5.15ff.].
While doing so, I separated out "the original text" (in italics) and the "commentary" (in non-
italics) according to Wogihara's 1971 edition. On the other hand, the texts sometimes show
slight differences. When these differences were greater, the commentary was not separated out
and the passages were then referenced as: "cf. WOG" or "see WOG".
LS: I.e., LVP, page 2. The numbers in angle brackets hereafter refer to the page numbers
in LVP's 1923-1931 edition, which are the same page numbers as in the unchanged 1971
edition. As already mentioned in our Remarks by the Translator (hereafter Remarks), the
difference between the two editions is that the 1923-1931 edition contains LVP's Preface and
Introduction in vol. 6, whereas in the 1971 edition they are found in vol. 1. The 1923-1931
edition has also a brief introduction (2 pages) where L VP outlines his plans for the various
volumes and the sources he utilized, which-although omitted in the 1971 edition-we have
included in our Electronic Appendix (see URL in our Remarks). The 1971 edition adds Etienne
Lamotte's "Preface a la Reedition" (5 pages) and an "Addendum Bibliographique" (1 page) by
Hubert Durt.
La Vallee Poussin (LVP): The authors of the Vinayavibhii~ii say [tetralemma]:
1. there is a Buddha who is not a Fortunate One (Bhagavat), namely, the Pratyeka-
310 Exposition of the Elements (Dhatunirdesa)
buddhas (self-enlightened ones), because they are self-arisen ones (svayambhii), i.e.,
because they have obtained Bodhi by themselves, because they have not completed
the task of the perfection of generosity (diinaparamitii), etc. (vii. 34);
2. there is a Fortunate One who is not a Buddha, namely, the Bodhisattva in his last
existence;
3. there is a Buddha Bhagavat;
4. there are persons who are neither a Buddha nor a Fortunate One [cf. WOG.3.5ff.].
One can also say that the Sriivakas, i.e., the listeners or [enlightened] disciples, are Buddhas
(Aryadeva, Sataka, 270), for they obtain Bodhi (enlightenment; vi. 67).
LS: l. There are various traditional epithets given to the Buddha, ten of which form a
traditional formula of praise: bhagavarris tathiigato 'rharri samyaksarribuddho vidyiicarana-
sarripannal;z sugato lokavid anuttaral;z puru~adamyasarathil;z siista devamanu~ii~ii'!I buddho
bhagavarri. For the etymological explanations of the various epithets of the Buddha, see
Visuddhimagga, I, pp. 198-213 and MPPS, I, pp. 115-37.
2. As for "Bhagavat" and our translation "Fortunate One", the Visuddhimagga (I, pp. 224-27)
states:
Blessed (bhagavant) is a term signifying the respect and veneration accorded to him
as the highest of all beings and distinguished by his special qualities .... It may be
known that he [can also] be called "Blessed (Bhagavii)" when he can be called
"fortunate (bhiigyavii)" owing to the fortunate-ness (bhiigya) of having reached the
further shore [of the ocean of perfection] of giving, virtue, etc., which produce
mundane and supramundane bliss .... And by his fortunate-ness (bhiigyavatii) is
indicated: the excellence of his material body that bears a hundred characteristics of
merit; ... the esteem of worldly [people] ... ; that he is fit to be relied on by laymen.
The MPPS states (I, pp. 116f.):
1. In the word bhagavat, bhiiga means quality (gu~a) and vat indicates its possession:
"the one who possesses qualities". 2. Furt~ermore, bhiiga means analysis (vibhiiga)
and vat indicates· skill (kusala). Skillful in analyzing the specific and common
characteristics (svasiimiinyalak~a~a) of the dharmas, he is called Bhagavat. 3. Fur-
thermore, bhiiga means glory (yasas-) and vat indicates its possession. Thus this
word means "the one who possesses glory".... 4. Furthermore, bhiiga means to
break (bhariga) and vat indicates the ability. The person who can break desire or
attachment (raga), hatred (dve~a) and delusion (moha) is called Bhagavat.
LS: I.e., Hsiian-tsang, i, fol. lb. The numbers' in curly brackets hereafter refer to the page
references in the Kando edition of the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya [A-p'i-ta-mo chii-she-shih lun];
Vasubandhu, trans. Hsiian-tsang. See also Hirakawa's helpful concordance chart (IA.Ill.317-
22; see Electronic Appendix) of the various editions: Pradhan, Shastri, Taisho, Kando, Peking,
Derge.
10
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.257): "sravaka (i.e., 'disciple', referring in this
context mainly to an arhat), ... ".
11
LVP: In fact, the self-enlightened ones as well as the listeners have abandoned (prahf~a)
the undefiled ignorance (akli~tam ajiianam) just as they have abandoned the eye sense-faculty,
Endnotes to Chapter One 311
etc., by abandoning all predilection-attachment (chandaraga) with respect to it. But this
undefiled ignorance, just like the eye sense-faculty, remains active or manifest in them
(samudacarati) even though it is abandoned.
Such is not the case for the Buddha: this is why the author says that he has destroyed (hata) the
darkness in such a manner that it can not rearise.
LS: 1. In this beginning passage of the AKB, Vasubandhu discusses the distinction between the
Buddha and the two yanas, i.e., the sravaka and the pratyekabuddha, only with regard to
undefiled ignorance (akli~fajnana). Later in chapter 7, however, when discussing the eighteen
unique factors (ave,:ii/auiharma) of the Buddha, we find also two brief references to "traces"
(vasana) (see SA.IV.360):
i. vii. 32cd: "The eighteen iive,:iika-dharma-s of the Buddha are ave,:iika (unique) because
He has abandoned the defilements along with their viisanii (sa-vasanam)."
ii. vii. 34: "The Buddha's perfection as regards the abandoning of defilements (prahii,:ia-
safJlpad) is fourfold: (i) He has abandoned all defilements (sarvaklesa-prahii,:ia); (ii) He has
abandoned them absolutely (atyanta-prahii,:ia); (iii) He has abandoned them along with their
vasanii (savasanaprahii,:ia); (iv) He has abandoned all hindrances to the attainment of samiidhi
(sarva-samiidhi-samiipattyiivara,:iaprahii,:ia)." Dhammajoti comments that the last (iv) aspect
refers, for the Vaibhii~ikas, to the abandoning of akli~fa-ajfiiina.
See our detailed endnote on akli~fa-ajfiiina and vasana at vii. 32d.
2. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.257): "While both the Buddha and Siiriputra can correctly
understand all that is subsumable under the 12 iiyatana-s, the Buddha has both omniscience
(sarvajfiii/sarvajfiatii) and 'wisdom of all modes' (sarva-akara-jnana/sarvathii-jfiana), and
knows them with regard to both their common and intrinsic characteristics. Siiriputra has
onlY. sarvajfiii which knows only their common characteristics. A supreme-perfect Buddha
(anuttara-samyak-sambuddha) alone, as a result of having absolutely abandoned all defiled
(kli~fa) and non-defiled (akli~[a) ignorance (ajnana), understands all knowables, both conven-
tional and absolute."
12
LVP: Siiriputra does not cognize the five [pure] aggregates (skandha; i, F 48) [i.e.,
morality (sf/a), concentration (samiidhi), superior knowledge (prajfiii), liberation (vimukti), and
cognition-insight of liberation (vimuktijfianadarsana)] of the Tathagata.
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.258; WOG.4.32f.) that the self-enlightened ones and
listeners have ajniina with regard to the Buddha qualities (the eighteen unique qualities, etc.)
on account of their being extremely subtle and profound in nature (svabhava-parama-siik~ma-
gambhiratviit). The eighteen unique qualities (iive,:iika dharma), discussed at vii. 28, are:
(1-10) the ten powers (dasabala), (10-14) the four fearlessnesses (vaisiiradya); (15-17) the
three mindful equanimities (smrtyupasthiina) and (18) great compassion (mahiikaru,:iii).
13
LVP: [With regard to things far remote in space,] Maudgalyiiyana does not see that his
mother is reborn in Maricilokadhiitu.
[With regard to things or events extremely distant in time,] Siiriputra does not perceive tbe
wholesome roots of a candidate for ordination (mok~abhagfya-kusala-miila-adarsana); see
vii. 30: Siiriputra refused a person who asked for admission into the Order (pravrajyaprek~a-
312 Exposition of the Elements (Dhatunirde§a)
purufapratyiikhyiina); but the Buddha pointed out:

mo~abfjam aham hy asya susak~mam upala~aye I
dhiitupii~ii,:iavivare nilfnam iva kiiiicanaT(I 11 [see WOG.5.6ff.]
Compare Huber, SatriilaT(lkiira, p. 286.
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.258; WOG.5.3ff.): "The two yiinas [i.e., pratyekabuddha
and sriivaka] in fact cannot know visible matter composed of atoms [rupi,:i~ paramii,:iu-
saT(lcitiib] whlch are extremely distant, or invisible, non-material things Lavijiiapty-arupi,:iab]
belonging to far away places on account of their betng many world systems away [aneka-loka-
dhiitv-antarita-desatviit]."
14
LVP: As the stanza says (see ix, F 284; WOG.5.16f.):
sarviikiiraT[I kiira,:iam ekasya mayaracandrakasyii.pi
niisarvajiiair jiieya,rz sarvajiiajiumabala,rz hi taj-jiiiinam
The [generative] causes in all their various aspects for even a single eye in a pea-
cock's tail (mayiiracandraka), is not to be known by those without omniscience
(asarvajiia): for it is the power (bala) of the cognition of the Omniscient One
(sarvajiia) to know [a thing in all its modes/aspects].
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.258) that this refers to things difficult to perceive, such as
the divisions of realms (dhiitu), planes of existence (gati), mode of births (yoni) and births
(upapatti) [WOG.5.14f.]. For a discussion of these divisions see chapter 3.
15
LS: Hall translates (VASC.43) Yasomitra's gloss of saT(lsiira [WOG.5.28f.]: "SaT(lsiira
(transmigration) is the 'wandering about' (saT(lsara,:ia), the back and forth succession of birth
and death. Or, Saiµslira is that in which sentient beings transmigrate ('wander together', sa,rz-
sr), namely the three realms (dhiitu) of desires, forms, and formless states."
16
LVP: "As far as possible" (yathiibhavyam). This is obvious, as in the case when one says:
"He will give the Brahmins something to eat."
17
LVP: We read in the Vyiikhyii [WOG.56.5], saddharmadesaniihastapradiinaib. We have
the plural because the persons to save are numerous. ·
18
LVP: Expression of Aryadeva, Sataka, 265.
19
LVP: na tu rddhi-vara-pradiina-prabhiivena. First explanation: through the power of
supernormal accomplishments (rddhi; vii. 48); like Vi~1_1.u; through the power of giving, like
Mahesvara.
Second explanation: through supernormal accom,plishments, through giving, through their
power (prabhiiva) (vii. 34).
It is true that the Buddhas perform miracles (rddhi-priitihiirya) in order to attract the faithful
(iivarjanamiitra); but it is through the miracle of the teaching (anusiisanf-priitihiirya) that they
save the world by destroying the fluxes (vii. 47ab).
20
LS: The words siistra (treatise), siisana (teaching) and si~ya (disciple, student) all derive
from the root siis (teach) (VASC.44).
21
LS: l. Wangchuk Dorje (YP.llf.) distinguishes between absolute abhidharma, path
abhidharma and textual abhidharma. Hirakawa, in turn, states (MDA.168) that "in short, the
three types of abhidharma given in the Kosa are (i) the wisdom that realizes nirvii!Ja; (ii) the
wisdom of ordinary people that cognizes dharmas; and (iii) abhidharmic treatises". See also
VASC.1-12 and Dhammajoti's Summary, p. lf., lOf.
2. In regard to the endeavor of Abhidharma analysis, see in particular Collett Cox's From
Category to Ontology; the Changing Role of Dharma in Sarviistiviida Abhidharma. Regarding
the purpose of "dharmic" analysis, she points out (FCO.549):
The early, emergent scholasticism of Siirµkhya, Vaise~ika, and Buddhism was all
directed by a similar intention: that is, a refusal to accept the world as it presents
itself to untutored, common sense and a desire to analyze experience into its salient,
functional constituents .... Initially the primary concern is immediately soteriological
and is directed toward supplanting defiling or ensnaring dharmas with those condu-
cive to liberation.
She then comments that this soteriologically motivated analysis is succinctly reflected in the
term dharmapravicaya, the discernment of factors, that plays a significant role throughout the
history of Buddhist praxis, particularly as one of the seven members of enlightenment
(bodhyaligadharma) included within the thirty-seven factors conducive to enlightenment
(bodhipak~yadharma; vi, F 28lff.). Dharmapravicaya, as can be seen in the following sections
of the AKB, (1) is linked with understanding (prajfiii) and abhidharma, (2) discerns factors
according to their intrinsic nature (svabhiiva), or according to their particular inherent (sva-
lak~a!Ja) and common characteristics (siimiinyalak~a!Ja), and (3) provides the only method to
extinguish the defilements due to which the world wanders in cyclic existence and experiences
unsatisfactoriness.
3. See also the sections 1. 1. Character and Function of Abhidharma; 1.2. Origin of Abhi-
dharma Texts; and 1.3. Methods of Abhidharma Exegesis, in Collett Cox's Disputed Dharmas,
pp. 3-19. Likewise, chapter 1. Abhidharma - Its Origin, Meaning and Function, and chapter 2:
The Abhidharmika - Standpoint, Scope and Methodology, in Dhammajoti's SA.IV.1-54.
For numerous explanatory definitions of the term abhidharma, see section "Definitions of
abhidharma" in Dhammajoti's SA.IV.6-10.
22
Gokhale: [2a] prajfiii 'malii sii'nucarii 'bhidharmas I
Tib.: [2a] chos mngon shes rab dri med rjes 'grang bcas I
23
LVP: The factors (dharma) are mixed together (sal'[lkir!Ja) as in the case of flowers; they
are discerned (pravicfyante) and sorted (uccfyante) into bouquets: these are pure (aniisrava),
these are impure (siisrava), [these possess material form (riipi!Ja), these do not possess
material form (a;-iipi!Ja)] [see WOG.127 .27ff.].
In this operation, a certain factor associated with thought (caitta, caitasika, ii. 23) called under-
standing (prajfiii) plays the primary role. Consequently, understanding is defined as "discern-
ment of factors".
LS: 1. The definition of understanding in Skandhila's Avatiira is typically abhidharmic in
emphasis (SA.IV.219; ESD.83):
Understanding is the discernment (pravicaya) of dharma-s. It is the examination
(upalak~a!Ja), as the case may be, of the following eight kinds of dharmaas: inclusion
(sa"f!lgraha), conjunction (sa"f!lprayoga), endowment (samanviigama), causes (hetu),

conditions (pratyaya), fruitions (phala), specific-characteristic (sva-lak~wia), common-
characteristic (siimiinya-lalcya~).
2. Various modes of pure and impure understanding are later discussed in great detail in the
AK:B:
At first it is explained within the context of cessation due to deliberation (pratisa"f!lkhyii-
nirodha; i. 6ab) and then, as weak and strong understanding, in the context of the five sensory
consciousnesses or the mental consciousness and the three types of conceptualizing activities,
in particular the conceptualizing activity consisting of examining (abhinirupa,:iiivikalpa)
(i. 33). As view (dr~fi), understanding is discussed and defined within the context_of the
eighteen elements in i. 41; as one of the five praxis-oriented controlling faculties it is
explained within the context of the last four controlling faculties (i. 48cd and beginning of
chapter 2), i.e., the praxis-oriented faculty of understanding (prajiiendriya) and the three pure
controlling faculties: the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known (aniijiiiitam-
iijiiiisyiimTndriya), the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijiiendriya) and the faculty of final and
perfect knowledge (iijiiiitiivfndriya).
Understanding is defined at ii. 24 in the context of it being one of the ten generally permeating
factors (mahiibhamika); as such it can be either wholesome (kusala), unwholesome (akusala)
or non-defined (avyiikrta), pure (aniisrava) or impure (siisrava), right (samyaiic) or wrong
(mithyii), weak (mrdu) or sharp (tfk~,:ia).
The importance of understanding as defilement (klesa), i.e., the five afflicted views (dmi), is
discussed in chapter 5 (EXPOSITION OF THE PROCLNITIES), particularly at v, F 15-26.
The pure prajiiiis and their interrelationship are explained in chapter 7 as view (dr~fi), as
· receptivity (k~iinti), as cognition (jiiiina), i.e., as cognition of the factors (dharmajiiiina), as
subsequent cognition (anvayajiiiina), as cognition of destruction (!cyayajiiiina), as cognition of
non-arising (anutpiidajiiiina). In chapter 7 (vv. 12c-13) we also find a discussion of the sixteen
aspects or modes of activities (iikara) of pure understanding as related to the sixteen common
characteristics (siimiinyalak~a~) of the four noble truths and likewise (vv. 3-11) a detailed
exposition of the ten cognitions, including mundane conventional cognition (lokasarµvrti-
jiiiina), cognition of another's mind (paracittajiiiina).
As one of the five praxis-oriented controlling faculties it is naturally addressed throughout
chapter 6 (EXPOSITION OF THE PATH AND THE PERSONS IN WHOM THE NOBLE PATH ARISES), as
well as in chapter 8 (EXPOSITION OF THE MEDITATNE ATTAINMENTS).
24
LVP: Stain (mala) is a synonym for flux (iisrava). - We will translate aniisrava as pure. -
The fluxes are defined in v. 35. - See below i. 4.
IS: 1. Gedun Drup comments (CPL 1, p. 17) that the three pure paths of insight, cultivation
and those beyond training, as the subject, are ultimate abhidharma because they are stainless
understanding together with its following.
2. In regard to pure prajiiii and its relation to direct perception (pratyak~a) and concep-
tualized perception, see Dhammajoti's discussion (ADCP.137ff.) of the "three types of
direct perception" (according to Sarµghabhadra), i.e.:
i. that which is dependent on the sense faculty (indriya.frita), i.e., the direct grasping,
supported by the five sense faculties, of the five types of external objects, riipa, etc.;
ii. that which is experience (anubhava), i.e., the coming into the present of the citta-
caitta-dhamma-s;
iii. that which is discernment (*buddhi), i.e., the direct realization (siik.riit-vkr) of the
specific or common characteristic (sva-siimiinya-lak,va~)--accordingly as the cases
may be-of dharma-s.
Dhammajoti comments (ADCP.139):
Samghabhadra's articulation above, that the *buddhi-pratyak~a is the direct realiza-
tion of either svalak,vm:ia or siimiinyalak~m:ia accordingly as the case may be, can be
comprehended as follows: So long as the contribution from the co-nascent caitta-s
are still weak, it too, like the preceding consciousness, can only apprehend the mere
object, e;g., a blue color; it is therefore a grasping of a svalak~a,:ia. Butwhen the
contribution is strong enough and it can apprehend, using name, "it is blue", etc., it is
apprehending universals-Le., sii11!iinya-lak~a,:ia. This is then not a case of pratyak~a.
The mode of activity (iikiira = prajflii) that functions at this time can be erroneous.
However, in the case of spiritual realization-"realization-knowledge" (ilt'; pratyak~a-
buddhi, *pratyaksa-jfliina, adhigama-jfliina)-the meditator apprehends directly,
truly as they are, the universal characteristics· of all dhamma-s-unsatisfactoriness,
impermanence, etc. The modes of activity in this case differ not the slightest from the
true nature of the dharma-s being examined. This is a case of direct seeing par
excellence ( J!PJl it; *bhiita-pratyak~a, *tattva-pratyak~a)-without any conceptu-
alization-and therefore a case of pratyak,va even though siimiinya-lak,va,:ia is
involved. For this reason the Sarvastivada identifies the 16 modes of activity
pertaining to the four noble truths with prajfiii-i.e., prajflii in the sense of spiritual
insight. The MYS [217a] states that "outside the 16 modes of activity, there is,no
other outflow-free prajfiii". "The prajfiii-s not subsumed under the 16 modes of
activities mostly discern svalak~a,:ia-s; the prajflii-s subsumed under the 16 modes of
activities discern only siimiinya-laksa,:ia-s."
For more detail, see iii. 30cd (F 89) (endnote) and vii. 13.
25
LVP: The name Abhidharma designates not only the pure consciousness that <;iiscerns the
nature of factors, but also all pure elements of the psychological moment in which this
consciousness occurs: sensation, etc. (i. 14c). One of these elements is material (riipa): this is
what is called pure restraint (aniisrava saf!lvara; iv. 13c).
LS: 1. The Vyiikhyii [WOG.8.23ff.] mentions the aggregates of material form [specifying pure
restraint (aniisrava saf!lvara)], sensation, ideation, formations and consciousness. - See i. 27
for a discussion of a different set of five kinds of pure skandhas-also referred to as the five-
membered (panciiliga) or five-part (pancabhiiga) dharmakiiya (AKB vi, F 297; Siddhi 767)-
which do not seem to be the same five pure skandhas as the ones mentioned in the Vyiikhyii
since, from the Vaibhasika point of view (vi, F 297f.), they all can be included in two
aggregates, as stated in AKB i, F 48: "There are five pure groups (skandha), (i) morality (sfla),
(ii) concentration (samiidhi), (iii) superior knowledge (prajflii), (iv) liberation (vimukti), and
316 Exposition of the Elements (Dhiitunirdesa)
(v) cognition-insight of liberation (vimuktijniinadarsana): the first is included in the aggregate

of material form (riipaskandha), (ii-v) the others are included in the aggregate of formations
(sa,rtskiiraskandha ). "
Gedun Drup comments (CPL 1, p. 19): "Question: How many aggregates are there when
[uncontaminated wisdom] is together with its retinue? Response: Since in the retinue of
uncontaminated wisdom there is (i) the non-revelatory form included in the uncontaminated
vow, it has five aggregates because, in addition, there are (ii) mental happiness in dependence
on the first two concentrations, happiness of mind in dependence on the third, and equanimity
feeling in dependence on any of the other levels of equanimity; (iii) the discrimination aggre-
gate and (iv) the mental factors-the compositional factors aggregate-that arise in the retinue
of mental consciousness and any non-associate compositional factors, together with (v) the
mental consciousness."
2. Hall comments (VASC.45) that, due to its predominance, understanding (prajfiii) rather
than thought (citta)' is depicted here as the "king" (riija); the other factors accompanying it are
depicted as its "following" or "retinue" [WOG.8.16].
26
LVP: Vyiikhyii [WOG.8.27ff.]: paramiirtha eva piiramiirthikaJ:i I paramiirthe vii bhaval_l
piiramiirthikaJ:i Iparamiirthena va divyati caratiti vii piiramiirthika/:1.
27
Gokhale: [2b] tatpriiptaye yii 'pi ca yac ca siistram I
Tib.: [2b] de thob bya phyir gang dang bstan bcos gang I
28
LS: SA.IV.436 provides a chart of the preparatory stages that lead to the attainment of
perfect prajfiii (= Abhidharma in the absolute sense), namely: (1) studying the Buddha's
teachings with the support of the understanding derived from birth (the impure [siisrava]
upapatti-pratilambhika-prajfiii); (2) studying the Abhidharma-analyzing the characteristics
of dharma-s (the impure srutamayi-prajfiii); (3) meditations such as meditation on the loath-
some and mindfulness of breathing (the impure cintamayf prajfiii); (4) heat, summit, receptiv-
ity, and supreme mundane factors (= the impure bhiivaniimayi prajfiii), and (5) the attainment
of pure prajfiii or prajfiii "without a relationship with the fluxes" (aniisrava) [= Abhidharma in
the absolute sense] as final destination.
See AKB i. 4-5b for a brief clarification of the notions of siisrava and aniisrava. It has to be
kept in mind, that the scope of the impure (siisrava) factors (dharma) is greater than that of the
unwholesome (akusala) factors, since it can also include wholesome (kusala) and non-defined
(avyakrta) factors. See AKB iv. 8b-9d for the various ways of defining kusala, akusala and
avyakrta factors.
29
LS: Hall comments (VASC.46) that this kind'of conventional understanding "is dependent
on one's birth (upapatti) in a specific realm (dhiitu), world (loka), plane of existence (gati),
and so on".
30
LVP: sii,rtketika, sii,rtvyavahiirika abhidharma. [Cf. WOG.8.29].
31
LVP: The Treatise, i.e., either
l. the Abhidharmasiistra, the Abhidharmapifaka. In which case, (i) some think that we
should not understand: "The Treatise, with its following, receives the name of
Abhidharma", for a book does not have a retinue; (ii) some believe that the following
is constituted by the characteristics (lak~ai:za; ii. 45cd); or else,

2. the Jiiiinaprasthiina, considered as the body (sarfra) of the Abhidharma, having the
six books: Prakara,:zapiida, Vijiiiinakiiya, Dharmaskandha, Prajiiaptisiistra, Dhiitu-
kiiya, SarJlgftiparyiiya (Bumouf, Introduction, p. 448), for its feet (and "following")
(~a!piida). ·
LS: 1. Collett Cox comments (DD.29) that the Sarviistiviida sect possessed a canon in four
sections containing sutra (doctrinal discourses), vinaya (disciplinary codes and discourses),
abhidharma and k~udraka (miscellaneous) collections, and, among these, emphasized and
valued most the exegesis of the Abhidharma containing seven texts that came in the tradition
to be referred to collectively as the "Abhidharma with six feet" (~afpiidiibhidharma). Cox
explains (SBS.139, 173f.) that these seven treatises make up the early Sarviistiviida Abhi-
dharma canonical materials that primarily are available only through their Chinese transla-
tions.
Chinese translations also preserve (i) the later Sarviistiviida Abhidharma materials such as the
voluminous Vibhii~ii compendia, which are commentaries on one of the earlier Sarvii.stiviida
texts and reflect the emergence of full sectarian self-consciousness, expressed in a polemical .
style of exposition, and which enumerate the positions of contending groups when expounding
each doctrinal point, and (ii) the even "later polemical, summary digests such as Sangha-
bhadra' s *Nyiiyiinusiira and the Abhidharmadfpa, products of a single author, that attempt to
defend Kii.smira Sarviistivii.da-Vaibhii~ika orthodoxy in the fact of the challenge raised by
Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhii~a" and that "adopt an organization of topics that attempts
to present all aspects of the teaching according to a well-reasoned structure, in which virtually
the entirety of Buddhist doctrine is cogently summarized in the form of verse and auto-
commentary.
2. As for the "origin of Abhidharma", Collett Cox states (DD.8) that the majority of Western
scholars (for example, Lamotte and Frauwallner) find it in miitrkiis, whereas most Japanese
scholars (for example, Kimura Taiken) seem to think that Abhidharma originated from
"dialogues concerning the doctrine (abhidharmakathii) or monastic discussions in catechetical
style characterized by an exchange of questions and interpretative answers intended to clarify
complex or obscure points of doctrine".
In regard to miitrka, Frauwallner writes (SAL.3ff.) that the oldest Buddhist tradition had no
Abhidharmapitaka but only comprehensive lists (miitrka) that were meant to collect and
preserve the doctrinal concepts found scattered in the Buddha's many discourses (sutra) and
out of which the Abhidharma later developed. Of particular importance in this context were
the lists of the fundamental concepts, such as the five aggregates (skandha), twelve sense-
spheres (iiyatana), eighteen elements (dhiitu), into which one attempted to subsume alf the
various factors (dharmas). Next to these fundamental concepts, there occasionally also appear
the five appropriative aggregates (upiidiinaskan(iha) and the six elementary substances (dhiitu),
as well as frequently the twenty-two controlling faculties. These lists were intended to serve as
a basis for teaching and thus were accompanied by explanations, at first delivered orally but
later also in written form.
Besides this simple method, quite early on, a separate method to explain the lists of factors
was developed, which Frauwallner dubbs "attribute-miitrkas" and which consisted mainly of
dyads, such as: having a material form (rupa) and not having material form (arupa); visible
(sanidarsana) and invisible (anidarsana); resistant (sapratigha) and non-resistant (apratigha);
impure (siisrava) and pure (aniisrava); conditioned (saT{lskrta) and unconditioned (asaT{lskrta),
etc., and triads, such as: past (atfta), future (aniigata) and present (pratyutpanna); wholesome
(kusala), unwholesome (akusala) and non-defined (avyakrta); etc.
But in addition to explaining the nature of the factors collected in these lists, their relationship
to each other was also discussed, which included questions about (i) which factors are included
(saT{lgraha) in which factors, (ii) which factors were associated (saT(lprayoga) with which
factors, and (iii) which factors were the center or bearer of which factors, i.e., which factors
were accompanied (samanviigqma) by which factors. Questions such as these led to a
consistent systematization of the factors. Thus, besides the small number of fundamental
doctrinal statements, such as the Four Noble Truths, dependent origination and the description
of the path of liberation, it is from these lists and methods that the Abhidharma developed, and
these are for Frauwallner the most important ways in which the Abhidharma treats the
traditional doctrinal material. [Leaving the issue of the "origin" aside, many of these lists and
methods can easily be detected, particularly throughout chapter 1.] "The sole aim was to
·preserve safely what the Buddha had taught and to illuminate it from a variety of different
angles."
3. As for "mature Abhidharma" exegesis, Collett Cox comments (SBS.168f.) that it is char-
acterized stylistically by two methods: one is the practice of formulating matrices (matrka) or
categorizing lists of all topics found in the traditional teaching, a practice that results in
taxonomies arranged according to both numeric and qualitative criteria; the other is doctrinal
discussions (abhidharmakathii) in catechetical style held among monks in order to clarify
complex or obscure points of doctrine. These two methods are present, to varying degrees,
in virtually every Abhidharma text, where the taxonomies were used to record or preserve
a doctrinal outline that was then elaborated through a pedagogical question and answer
technique."
For more detail on the standard, scope and methodology of the A.bhidharmika, see chapter 2 in
SA.IV.
4. For general examinations of the Sarviistiviidin Abhidharma literature, their dating and
their doctrinal development, see section D "The seven canonical treatises of the Abhidharma",
pp. xxx-xliii, in LVP's Introduction, and also the chapter "The Canonical [Abhidharma]
Works {of the Sarviistiviida School]" and the chapter "The Origin of the Buddhist Systems",
pp. 119-34 in Erich Frauwallner's SAL, as well as the section "The Abhidharmapitaka",
pp. 179-91 in Lamotte's HOIB; see also chapter 3: "Kasmira: Vaibhii~ika Orthodoxy" (Collett
Cox) and chapter 4: Bactria and Gandhara" (Paul Dessein) in SBS, and Dhammajoti's discus-
sion (SA.IV.83-103) of the seven canonical treatises of the Sarvastiviida.
Dhammajoti states (SA.IV.85) that the Dharmaskandha-siistra, SaT{lgftiparyiiya-siistra and the
Prajiiapti-siistra are generally accepted to be the .treatises of the earliest period: "They all
exhibit features similar to the 'abhidharmic' discourses in the sutra-pifaka, and generally show
little organization and doctrinal articulation. There is also the absence of explicit definition or
establishment of the thesis of sarviistitva. Furthermore, these three texts are noticeably attrib-
uted by tradition to the immediate disciples of the Buddha. We may note here that the Sarvasti-
viida tradition enumerates these three texts by name as part of the abhidharma-pifaka."
SA.IV.91: "In contrast to the above three treatises, the remaining four are clearly more
developed in terms of organization and doctrinal concepts. Moreover, some divergence not-
withstanding, they all contain sectarian doctrines which can be regarded as specifically
Sarviistivlidin. In addition, as regards authorship, all traditions agree in ascribing them to the
abhidharma masters subsequent to the Buddha's time." Though there are various views on
this, Dhammajoti states: "the following enumeration reflects only a probable relative chronol-
ogy of these four treatises:" Vijfiiinakiiya-siistra; Jfiiinaprasthiina-siistra; Prakarai:ia-siistra;
and Dhiitukiiya-siistra.
32
LVP: svalakfa1_1adhiira1_1a, Madhyamakavrtti, 457; see Siddhi, 4, 568. - "the supreme
dharma" or paramiirtha.
LS: 1. Pradhan.2.9f. has: nirvacanaf!I tu svala/cya1_1iidhiira1_1iid dharmafi I tadaya'!l paramiirtha-
dharmal'{I vii nirvii1_1al'{I dharmalakfa1_1af!1 vii pratyabhimukho dharma ityabhidharmafi I ukto
'bhidharmafi I
The Vyiikhyii has [WOG.9.18ff.]: tad ayam iti. tad iti viikyopanyase. ayam iti svalalcya,:ia-
dhiira1_1atvena nirukta):l piiramiirthika):l siiiµketiko 'bhidharma):l. paramiirtha-dharmam iti.
paramasya jfiiinasyiirtha):l paramiirthafi. paramo vii 'rtha):l paramtirthafi sarva-dharmiigratvilt
paramiirthafi. paramiirthas ciisau dharrnas ca paramiirtha-dharmafi. dharma-lakfa1_1af!I veti.
sva-siimiinya-lak~al).aiµ khakkhatalak~al).a):l prthiv"i-dhiitur anityaiµ du):lkham iti-evam-iidi. tat
pratyabhimukhafi ... .
2. The AKB definition of dharma and its source:
Cox comments (FC0.558f.): "Neither the early Sarviistiviida, canonical Abbidharma texts nor
the Vibhiifii compendia contain an abstract definition of dharmas as such. A definition is
found, however,. in Upasiinta's and Dharmatriita's commentaries on the *Abhidharmahrdaya,
and is transmitted in the Abhidharmakosabhiifya and subsequent texts: that is, dharma means
upholding, [namely], upholding intrinsic nature (svabhiiva)." The AKB uses svalak~a1_1a in
place of svabhiiva in Upasanta's definition, but Yasomitra [see above] distinguishes between
particular inherent characteristics (svalakfa1_1a), such as solidity in the case of earth, and
generic characteristics (siimiinyalakfa1_1a), such as impermanence and suffering in the case of
all conditioned dharmas. Cox comments that this definition of dharma does not appear in
either Saiµghabhadra's *Nyiiyiinusiira or *Abhidharmasamayapradfpikii, but resembles the
exposition in Dharrnasre~thin's *Abhidharmahrdaya.
3. Soteriological and epistemological aspects of the 75 dharmas theory:
Dhammajoti writes (SA.IV.242.): "Like all other forms of Buddhism, Sarviistiviida Abhi-
dharma is primarily concerned with the problem of knowledge: Given that we are bound .to
saf!!siira through ignorance (avidyii), how can we overcome the topsy-turvy way of cognizing
things (viparyiisa) and acquire the liberating insight (prajiili) which sees things truly as they
are (yathiibhiitam)? With this central soteriological concern and starting from an epistemo-
logical investigation, the school arrives at a list of roughly 75 types of ultimate reals known as
dharma-s. This central concern and fundamental methodology of investigation are summarily
reflected in what the school underscores as Abhidharrna in the absolute sense: i.e., pure prajiiii
defined as dharma-pravicaya.
A dharma-whether, physical, mental, neither physical nor mental, or even unconditioned--is

a unique force, possessing a unique, intrinsic characteristic, that has impact on the human
experience, and it is discovered by a valid means of knowledge (pramiir.za), either direct
perception (including spiritual realization) or inference having its ultimate basis on direct
experience."
4. The relation of dhanna and svalak:;ar.zalsvabhiiva:
He also states (SA.IV.19):
For a dharma to be a dhanna, its characteristic must be sustainable throughout time
[see i. 18ab and 39a; v. 25): A rapa remains as a rupa irrespective of its various
modalities. It can never be transformed into another different dharma (such as
vedanii). Thus, a uniquely characterizable entity is a uniquely real (in the absolute
sense) entity, having a unique intrinsic nature (svabhiiva): "To be existent as an
absolute entity is to be existent as an intrinsic characteristic (paramiirthena sat
svafok:;ar.zena sad ityarthal:i)."
As the MVS explains, this is on account of the fact that "the entity itself is [its]
characteristic, and the characteristic is the entity itself; for it is the case for all
dharma-s that the characteristic cannot be predicated apart from the dharma itself'.
[MVS, 777a. Cf. Ny, 432b: lak:;ar.za = svarupalsvabhiiva]. This is no doubt quite in
keeping with the fundamental Buddhist stance which consistently rejects any
substance-attribute dichotomy. By accounting for the svalak:;ar.za of a dhanna-its
phenomenologically cognizable aspect-its very ontological existence as a svabhiiva/
dravya is established. Ultimately these two are one [MVS, 196c].
5. Tri-temporal existence of impennanent and conditioned dhannas and their activities:
Vasubandhu explains v, F 50, that "the Vaibha~ikas maintain that past and future factors really
exist (dravya); the conditioning forces, however, are not eternal, for they are endowed with the
characteristics (lak:;ar.za) of the conditioned (ii. 45cd)'\
Dhammajoti states (SA.IV.148f.):
In the Sarvastivlida perspective, all dhanna-s have always been existing, As a matter
of fact, time is an abstraction on our part derived from their activities [MVS, 393c].
A dhanna exists throughout time and yet is not permanent as it "courses in time"
(adhva-sal!fciira). But as MVS explains, "conditioned dharma-s are weak in their
-intrinsic nature, they can accomplish their activities only through mutual dependence".
We declare that the causes have the activities as their fruits, not the entities in
themselves (svabhiivaldravya). We further declare that the effects have the
activities as their causes, not the entities in themselves. The entities in them-
selves are eternally without transformation, being neither causes nor effects.
[MVS, 105c]
Moreover,
the tri-temporal dharma-s exist throughout time as enFties in themselves; there
is neither increase nor decrease. It is only on the basis of their activities that they
are said to exist or not exist [as phenomena]. [MVS, 396a]
But, in tum, their activities necessarily depend on causes and conditions [MVS,
108c]:
Being feeble in thdr svabhiiva-s, they have no sovereignty (aisvarya). They are
dependent on others, they are without their own activity and unable to do as they
wish. [MVS, 283b]
6. Dharmas as conditioned forces (sarµskrta) and as conditioning forces (sarµskiira):
Dhammajoti further explains (SA.IV.24): "All dharma-s in phenomenal existence are pratftya-
samutpanna--dependently originated from an assemblage of conditions. In this respect, they
are often called sarµskrta-s, 'the compounded/conditioned'. In the Sarvastivada conception,
dharma-s are distinct ontological entities that, in their intrinsic nature, abide throughout time,
totally unrelated to one another and totally devoid of any activities. Given such a theory, it is
of fundamental importance that the school has an articulated causal doctrine good enough to
accou~t for the arising of dharma-s as phenomena and their dynamic inter-relatedness in
accordance with the Buddha's teaching of pratftya-samutpiida. Moreover, for the establish-
ment of each of the dharma-s as a real entity, a conditioning force (sarµskara), its causal
function in each case must be demonstrated. It is probably for this reason that the Sarvii.stivada
was also known as Hetuvii.da-a school specifically concerned with the theory of causation."
Further (SA.IV.146): "A dharma ... is a real on account of it being a real force-of having a
causal efficacy-in other words, on account of it being a cause. It is for this reason that
dharma-s are also called Sllf!lskiira-s-conditioning force~. Failure to prove an alleged
existent's causal efficacy is tantamount to failure to prove its very existence/reality. Accord-
ingly, if sarµskiira-dharma-s are asserted to be real tri-temporally, they must be established
to belong to one category of hetu or another."
7. For more detail on dharma, see Hirakawa's The Meaning of "Dharma" and "Abhidharma".
See also Collett°Cox's From Category to Ontology: the Changing Role of Dharma in Sarviisti-
viida Abhidharma which discusses how the term dharma was used within Abhidharma-
specifically within the Sarvii.stiviida Abhidharma literature-and its relationship to other terms
used to explain and elaborate it, such as bhava, svabhliva, dravya, prajftapti, svalak!Jal)-a,
siimiinyalak!fa1Ja, etc.
33
LS: Hirakawa comments (MDA.167, footnote): "There are two interpretations regarding
the word abhidhamma. One takes it as meaning "as regards the dhamma", and the other sees it
as meaning "excellent dhamma" (dhammiitireka, dhammavisesa: At[hasiilinf, p. 2, line 2). In
the Abhidharma-Mahiivibhli!fli (Amv), altogether 25 different views on the meaning of
"abhidharma" are given, including the two given above: .... Kosa adopts from among these
25 that of "regarding the dharma" (pratyabhimukho dharma ity abhidharmal:,: Kosa, p. 2, lines
9-10). Various scholars have brought forth studies on the original meaning of the word:
cf. Geiger, pp. l 18ff; Homer, I.B., "Abhidhamma Abhivinaya in the First Two Pitakas of the
Pali Canon". Indian Historical Quarterly XVIi (1941), pp. 291-310; Lamotte, Etienne.
Histoire du bouddhisme indien. Louvain: 1958, p. 197; etc."
For a translation of the Abhidharma-Mahiivibhii!fli definitions, see Dhammajoti's SA.IV.6ff.
34 LS: SA.IV.532 (Glossary): "nirvii{la: The goal of the Buddhist spiritual life, explained in
Buddhism as the extinction/blowing out of the fire of raga [attachment], dve$a [hatred] and
moha [delusion]. It is the state of perfect bliss, and transcendence of all dubkha [unsatisfactori-
ness] and births. In Sarviistiviida, this is not a mere absence of dubkha, but a positive entity
acquired when a defilement is abandoned, which serves to prevent the further arising of the
defilement. It is a synonym for pratisa111khya-nirodha [cessations through_deliberation]."
Thu.s there are many pratisa1?1khyanirodhas (see i. 6ab), starting from the path of insight
(darsanamarga) upwards.
35
LS: Dhamniajoti comments that of all the A.bhidharmika studies, the examination of
intrinsic characteristic and common characteristic may be considered as the most important
one. We therefore cover this topic here in somewhat greater detail by reproducing sections
from Cox and Dhammajoti.
1. The move towards an epistemological ontology:
Collett Cox, putting svalakfa,:ia and samanyalakfa,:ia into a bigger context, writes (FC0.574ff.)
that from the period of the Vibhafa compendia onward an epistemologically grounded type of
causal functioning became dominant.
This epistemological emphasis is evident both in a shift in the terminology used to
describe the character of dharmas and in the later definitions offered for existence in
the abstract. The shift in terminology is indicated by the terms "particular inherent
characteristic" (svalakfa,:ia) and "generic characteristic" (samanyalakfa,:ia), which
come to be used in conjunction with and, in the case of the particular inherent
characteristic, often in place of intrinsic nature (svabhiiva). These terms do not
appear in the canonical Sarviistiviida Abhidharma texts, .... lakfa,:ia appears promi-
0nently ... in both Dharmasre~thin's *Abhidharmahrdaya and in Upasiinta's commen-
tary, as well as in Dharmatriita's *Misrakabhidharmahrdayasiistra, where the par-
ticular inherent and generic characteristics are explicitly defined and contrasted. [... ]
In general terms, a single dharma is marked by many characteristics: that is, every
dharma is marked by (at least) one particular inherent characteristic reflecting its
intrinsic nature and by multiple generic characteristics, which are shared with other
dharmas and hence signify the larger categories to which it belongs. The distinction
between the particular inherent and the generic characteristics thus discriminates
levels in the apprehension or discernment of dharmas that serve to clarify the
ambiguity encountered in the application of the term svabhiiva to both individual
dharmas and to categorical groups [see more on this below]. [ ... ] The two methods
of analytical description, either by intrinsic nature (svabhiiva) or by characteristics
are separated by one important difference: whereas intrinsic nature acquires its
special significance in the context of exegetical categorization, the starting point for
the characteristics lies in perspectivistic cognition. Ontology is a concern for both
systems, but the shift in terminology from intrinsic nature to the characteristics
reflects a concurrent shift from a category-based abstract ontology to an epistemo-
logical ontology [that] is experientially or cognitively determined.
And indeed, we find in the mature Sarviistiviida exegesis of Sailghabhadra, a
definition of existence in the abstract that expresses this new epistemological empha-
sis. For Saiighabhadra, as for all Sarviistiviidins, existence 1s causally grounded, but
his definition of existence suggests that this causal efficacy is specifically cognitive:
"To be an object-field that produces cognition (buddhi) is the true characteristic of
existence" [NA 50 p. 62lc21].
2. Distinction between intrinsic characteristic and common characteristic:
The Mahiivibhii~ii states (SA.IY.19):
The analysis of the characteristic (lalcya,:ia) of a single entity (dravya) is the analysis
of intrinsic characteristic. The analysis of the characteristic of numerous entities
[collectively] is the analysis of common characteristic.
Furthermore, the analysis of an individual aggregate (skandha), etc., is an analysis of
intrinsic characteristic. The analysis of two, three aggregates, etc., is an analysis of
corrimon characteristic. [MYS, 217a]
It further states (MYS, 179b):
The intrinsic nature (svabhiiva) of a dharma is the intrinsic characteristic of a
dharma. Homogeneity in nature is common characteristic. (Cf. Ny, 675b: "The
contemplation of svalak~a,;ia is the analysis that a given dharma is different from the
other dharma-s. The contemplation of siimiinyala/cya,:ia is the analysis that a given
dharma is not different from the other dharma-s.")
Dhammajoti comments (SA.IY.20):
Thus, all rupa-s, vedanii-s, sarµjiiii-s, etc., have the nature of being impermanent.
This impermanent nature is a common characteristic.
Whereas a sensory consciousness cognizes only the intrinsic characteristic of a
dharma, the mental consciousness with its ability of abstraction can cognize the
common characteristic. Thus, the latter pertains to the domain of inference
(anumana), the former to direct perception (pratyalcya).
However, distinguishing the understanding (prajiiii) that examines intrinsic charac-
teristic from that which examines common characteristic, MYS, 217a, also states:
Furthermore, the understanding derived from listening (sruta-mayi) and reflection
(cintii-mayi) mostly analyze intrinsic characteristics. The understanding derived
from cultivation (bhiivanii-mayi) mostly analyze common characteristics.
The understanding not subsumed under the 16 modes of understanding mostly
analyzes intrinsic characteristics; the understanding subsumed under the 16 modes
of understanding analyzes only common characteristics.
Furthermore, the understanding that apprehends (-fcar, lit: "courses") the [four]
truths mostly discerns intrinsic characteristics; the understanding at the time of
direct realization (abhisamaya) discerns only common characteristics.
This statement is to be understood as follows: The 16 modes of understanding
(iikiira) are those pertaining to the four noble truths (four each): unsatisfactory,
impermanent, etc., for the truth of unsatisfactoriness, etc. These are no doubt the
common characteristics of dharma-s. But they are the non-erroneous universal
characteristics (principles) discernible only by spiritual insight as direct perception
par excellence in direct realization.

3. Relativity as regards the notions of intrinsic characteristic and common characteristic:
In this connection Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.21):
Thus, among various rupa-s-different colors, different shapes-there is the com-
mon nature of being resistant and subject to deterioration. Accordingly, this intrinsic
characteristic of a rupa is distinct from a vedana, etc. But, at the same time, it is also
the common characteristic of these various types of rupa-s . ...
The Sarviistiviida Abhidharmikas distinguish two kinds of distinctive characteristic:
The first, dravya-svalak~a,;ia, is the intrinsic characteristic of the dharma as a unique
entity in itself; for instance, that of a particular color, say, blue. The second, ayatana-
svalak~ar_ia, refers to the intrinsic characteristic of the dharma as a member of a
unique class-an iiyatana-of which it is a member; for instance, the particular blue
color as a unique class of dharma-s known as "visibles" (rupa), i.e., the rupa-
iiyatana. We can see from this example that, in this context, the iiyatana-svalak~a,:ia
is, in a sense, a common characteristic in relation to the dravya-svalak~a,:ia. It is for
this reason that MVS, 65a, states:
From the point of view of dravya-svalak~a,:ia, the five sensory consciousnesses
(paiica-vijiiiina-kiiya) also take common characteristic as their cognitive object
(iilambana). But from the point of view of iiyatana-svalak~a,:ia, the five sensory
consciousnesses take intrinsic characteristic alone as their object.
36
Gokhale: [2cd] tasya 'rthato 'smin samanupravesiit Isa v asrayo 'sy ety abhidharmakosa~ I
Tib.: [2td] 'dir de don du yang dag chud phyir ram I 'di yi gnas de yin pas chos mngon mdzod I
37
LS: As for the three pi(akas, Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.9): "The nature and char-
acteristics of the abhidharma are distinguished from those of the other two pi(aka-s as follows
[MVS, lc-2a]: The Siitra is the emanation (ni~yanda) of the Buddha's power (bala), for none
can refute the doctrines therein. The Vinaya is the emanation of Great Compassion (maha-
karu,:ia), for it advocates morality (sf/a) for the salvation of those in the unfortunate planes
of existence (durgati). The Abhidharma is the emanation of fearlessness, for it properly
establishes the true characteristics of dharma-s, answering questions and ascertaining fear-
lessly."
The MVS states (SA.IV.18): "The meanings of the abhidharma-pi(aka should be understood
by means of 14 things: (1-6) the six causes (hetu), (7-10) the four conditions (pratyaya),
(11) subsumption/inclusion (saY(lgraha), (12) conjunction (saY(lprayoga), (13) endowment
(satnanviigama), (14) non-endowment (asamanvagama). Those who, by means of these
14 things, understand the abhidharma unerringly, are called Abhidharrnikas, not [those who]
merely recite and memorize the words." Other masters add skillfulness (kausalya) with regard
to intrinsic characteristic (svalak~a,:ia) and common characteristic (siimiinyalak~a,:ia). For a
discussion of these categories see SA.IV.19-25.
38
LS: Hall translates: "Abhidharma designated [in 2b] as 'Siistra' (text or corpus of texts)
has been included in this [present text] essentially-in accordance with a direct meaning
[of the word 'Abhidharma', or,] in terms of what is most imp.ortant [in the Abhidharma
corpus]." He refers (VASC.47) to Yasomitra's "double interpretation of yathiipradhiinam:

(1) 'Abhidharma-Siistra' is included here because it is one of three explicit (pradhiina)
meanings of the word 'Abhidharma' (ink. 2ab). (2) The 'Abhidharma-Siistra' is included, in
that its main points (pradhiina) are included, in the present text."
39
LS: AH 1.
40
LS: SA.IV.524/546 (Glossary): upadesa: "Teaching", "elaborative exposition"; the last
member of the twelvefold classification of the Words of the [Buddha] Dharma (dviidasiiliga-
dharma-pravacana):
I. s{itra, 2. geya, 3. vyiikarmJa, 4. giithii, 5. udiina, 6. nidiina, 7. avadiina, 8. itivrttaka/
ityuktaka, 9. jiitaka, IO. vaipulya, 1I. adbhuta-dharma, 12. upadesa.
In a specific .sense, it is synonymous with Abhidharma. In Saqighabhadra's words, "upadesa
refers to the non-erroneous revealing, answering of objections and ascertainment of the pre-
ceding [eleven] members".
See Dhammajoti' s Abhidharma and Upadesa (2005).
41
Gokhale: [3] dharmii,:ziirri pravicayam antare,:za nii 'sti I klesiiniirrt yata upasiintaye
'bhyupiiyal,i I klesais ca bhramati bhavii'r,:zave 'tra lokas I taddhetor ata udital,i kit ai~a siistrii 11
Tib.: [3] chos rnams rab tu rnam 'byed med par nyon mongs rnams Igang phyir nye bar zhi bar
bya ba 'i thabs med la I nyon mongs pas kyang 'jig rten. srid mtsho 'dir 'khyams te I de bas de
phyir 'di ni ston pas gsungs so lo II
LVP: The first two lines are cited, with the reading yad upasiintaya, in a commentary (Amrta-
ka,:zikii) on the Niimasarrigfti, 130; the third is cited in the Vyiikhyii [WOG.11.2].
42
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.329) that in the abhidharma scheme of explanation,
dul,ikha results from karma, and karma arises from defilements, and that, without defilements,
karmas are incapable of producing new existences. See in his SA.IV the sections 12.4:
"Defilements as the root of existence" (SA.IV.329-30) and 12.5: "Abhidharmika investigation
of defilements" (SA.IV.331-32), where Dhammajoti translates Saqighabhadra's sixteen
functions performed by a defilement and renders thirty-three essential taxonomical topics for
the investigation of defilements (dharmapravicaya). In summary, Saqighabhadra states
[Ny, 596b]: "It is after having properly understood the nature of the anusaya-s in this way that
one can decisively eliminate them." As for the elimination of defilements, Dhammajoti further
clarifies (SA.IV.345): "For the Sarviistivadins, defilements cannot be 'destroyed' in an onto-
logical sense since like all other dharma-s, their svabhiiva-s exist perpetually. Abandonment in
the proper sense means the severing of the acquisition (priipti) linking the defilement to the
individual series."
43
LVP: kila paramatadyotane. The word kila ["it is said"] shows that here Vasubandhu
explains an opinion, the opinion of the Vaibhii~ikas, which he does not accept. For the
Sautriintikas and for Vasubandhu, the Abhidharmas are not the word of the Master. The
problem of the authenticity of the Abhidharmas is studied in [La Vallee Poussin's] Intro-
duction.
Contradiction of the Siitra and the Abhidharmas, for example, iii, 104; vii, 22.
LS: 1. Yasomitra [WOG.l l.25ff.] comments (JIABS, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 322; translation
t'
by Yoshifumi Honjo):
The word kila indicates the statement of others. It means, "This is what is understood
by the Abhidhiirmikas, not by us Sautriintikas", since the authors [other than the
Buddha] of the Abhidharmasiistras are handed down to us; i.e., the author of the
Jfiiinaprasthiina is Arya Kiityiiyaniputra, the author of the PrakaraT_lapiida is Sthavira
Vasumitra, [the author] of the Vijfitinakiiya is Sthavira Devasarman, [the author] of
- ,~
the Dharmaskandha is Arya S_iiriputra, [the author] of the Prajfiaptisiistra is Arya
-
Maudgalyiiyana, [the author] of the Dhiitukiiya is PilrIJa, [the author] of the Sarigfti-
paryiiya is Mahiikau~thila.
Yasomitra then adds (AD.47; translation Jaini):
[Question:] - What is meant by the term Sautriintika?
[Answer:] - Those who hold the sutras as authentic and not the siistras, are called
Sautriintika.
[Question:] - If they do not accept the siistras as authentic, how do they explain the
division of the canon in the three Pitakas? ls it not a fact that the sutras know the
term "Abhidharma-pitaka", as for instance in an expression "a tripi(aka monk"?
[Answer:] - That does not matter. For a certain kind of Siltras themselves, dealing
with the determination of meanings and characteristics of dharmas are called
Abhidharma.
Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.2) that according to the Theravada tradition, Siiriputra trans-
mitted the abhidhamma to the disciples, but that the Sarviistiviida tradition accepts that their
canonical abhidharma works were compiled by the disciples. He adds (SA.IV.16f.):
For the Abhidharmikas, the abhidharma doctrines are not speculative philosophy or
intellectual inventions; they are the buddha-vacana ("words of the Buddha") par
excellence. Their opponents, the Sautriintikas, repudiate this claim. Saqighabhadra
analyses the Sautriintika disagreement as being threefold:
i. They were said to be composed by Kiityiiyaniputra and others.
ii. The Buddha never mentioned that abhidharma is a reliance (pratisaraT_1a) [but
exhorted Ananda to take the sutra-s as pratisaraT_la] ..
iii. The tenets of the different abhidharma schools vary.
2. Our kila passage here is the first of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to
chapter 1.
As referred to in our Remarks of the Translator, Kritzer-in his major study Vasubandhu and
the Yogiiciirabhumi. Yogiiciira Elements in the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya (2005), a systematic
comparison of the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya and the Yogiiciirabhumi-attempts to show the
extent ofVasubandhu's dependence on the Yogiiciirabhumi:
i. For a general description, issues of composition and authorship and doctrinal content
of the Yogiiciirabhami, see VY.xii-xx.
ii. For a general description of the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya, a discussion of V asubandhu 's
career and the question of Sautriintika, see VY.xx-xxx.
iii. For Kritzer's (a) methodology and (b) results in his systematic comparison, see
VY .xxxi-xxxvii.
But we also already mentioned that Kritzer's views do not go unchallenged. Dhammajoti who
very much welcomes the new research has a more conservative approach since he does not
find the "new" results all that compelling yet, i.e;, he thinks that the cases put forth by Kritzer
could also be interpreted differently.
In regard to the first eight chapters, Kritzer lists 174 passages(= 1.15 + 2.44 + 3.18 + 4.42 +
5.33 + 6.13 + 7.6 + 8.3)-indicated by Sarp.ghabhadra in his *Nyayanusdra-that are
attributed to Vasubandhu and for which he searched in the Yogdcdrabhami for similar pas-
sages. Throughout the endnotes to the first eight chapters of the AKB, we will, in general, only
mark the pla<;es of the 174 passages without reproducing them.
44
LVP: The Tibetan version of the Udanavarga (Mdo XXVI) has been translated by
W. Rockhill (London 1883) and published by H. Beck (Berlin 1911). A good part of the
original has been rediscovered in Turkestan (JRAS, 1912, pp. 355-77; J. As., 1912, I. p. 311,
showing the correspondence with the Pali sources). - S. Levi, J. As., 1912, II, pp. 215-22. -
See LVP's Introduction, F xxxii.
LS: SA.IV.545 (Glossary): udana: "Breathing out", inspirational verses said to be uttered
spontaneously by the Buddha; one of the twelvefold classification of the "Words of the
[Buddha] Dharma".
45
LVP: J. Takakusu, "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarviistiviidins", JPTS, 1905,
p. 75.
46
LS: After having set the agenda for the remainder of the text, namely, the discernment of
factors, we have arrived at the actual beginning of the _text. Even though having already looked
to some extent at the doctrinal affiliations of Vasubandhu in LVP's Introduction and Dhamma-
joti's Summary, at this point it seems appropriate to first briefly
1. address/repeat once more (but using different sources) the overall "structure" of
the entire text and where this structure comes from,
but then in particular to
2. examine specifically the "structure" of the first two chapters.
1. The overall "structure" of the entire text and where this structure comes fro.,m:
i. The AKB is structurally closely based on the *Abhidharmahrdaya (AH) and the
*SmJlyuktabhidharmahrdaya (SAH). Dessein writes (SBS.257) that Chiao-ching, when com-
menting on the overall structure in his preface to the SAH in the Ch'u Saii-tsang Chi Chi,
describes the SAH as corresponding to the four noble truths, namely:
I. truth of unsatisfactoriness (duJ:ikhasatya):
1. Elements (dhatuvarga)
II. truth of the origin (samudayasatya):
2. Formations (sarriskaravarga)
3. Action (karmavarga)
4. Proclivities (anusayavarga)
328 Exposition of the Elements (Dhiitunirdeia)
ill. truth of cessation (nirodhasatya):

5. Nobility (iiryavarga)
IV. truth of the path (miirgasatya):
6. Cognition (jiiiinavarga)
7. Concentration (samiidhivarga)
Dessein renders chapter 8: Scriptural texts (sutravarga), chapter 9: Miscellany (prakfrr,za-
varga), chapter 10: Investigations (pravicayavarga) and chapter 11: Discussion (dharmakathii)
as: V. additional chapters.
On the other hand, Dessein comments that Wanabe and Mizuno (1932) give chapters I and 2
as dul,tkhasatya, chapters 3 and 4 as samudayasatya, chapter 5 as nirodhasatya, and chapters 6
and 7 as miirgasatya.
Since Dharmatriita's SAH is structurally based on Dharmasn's *Abhidharmahrdaya (AH), and
the AKB on the AH and the SAH-as we have seen in L VP's Introduction and as we will see
further just below-the above given "four noble truths" classifications also applies to the AH
and the AKB. [As for the chapters 3 and 9 of the AKB, Dessein renders them as V. additional
chapters.]
A classification in three parts, based on Piin;iavardhana, can also be found in some Tibetan
commentaries on the AKB (cf. also Pu Guang's explanation in Dhammajoti's Summary). For
example, Jampaiyang comments (translation Coghlan, unpublished, p. 167ff.):
The master Piin;iavardhana states that the eight chapters are enumerated from the
perspective of extensively explaining the abbreviated meaning of "contaminated and
uncontaminated dharmas". The first two chapters teach in general the contaminated
and uncontaminated. Three chapters are (enumerated) from the perspective of teach-
ing the contaminated in detail: (The third chapter of} the Abhidharmakosa teaching
the mundane, teaches who is completely afflicted, i.e., the sentient beings of the three
realms and five migrations, and where they are completely afflicted, i.e., the mun-
dane environment, and how they are compietely afflicted, i.e., the four abodes of
birth and the twelve links of dependent arising. (The chapters 4 and 5 of) the
Abhidharmakosa teaching karma and the anusaya, teach what completely afflicts.
The last three chapters (are enumerated) from the perspective of teaching the
uncontaminated in detail. (The chapter 6 of) the Abhidharmakosa teaching path and
person teaches what person is purified, in what realm they are purified and the order
of realization (marking) how they are purified. (The chapter 7 of) the Abhidharma-
kosa teaching wisdom (teaches) by what (means) purification (is achieved). (The
chapter 8 of) the Abhidharmakoia teaching equilibrium teaches the support of
wisdom. (The master Piin;iavardhana explains it in that way) because that is the
principle of (their) relationship.
As for chapter 9, Kritzer comments (2005, p. xxii) that it is often characterized as an appendix.
It is entirely prose whereas the first eight chapters consist of verses and commentary on each
verse. He states that although inany commentaries cover all nine chapters, Sa:qighabhadra's
*Nyayanusiira ends with chapter 8. Stefan Anacker thinks (SWV.17) that it "may be the only
extant work by Vasubandhu written prior to the Kosa. This seems likely in view of the fact
that its arguments and solutions are less developed. It was originally an independent treatise,
but was finally attached by Vasubandhu to the Kosa as its last chapter." That chapter 9 is a
kind of appendix to the eight chapters can also be seen from the concluding sentence of the
Kosa at the end of the eighth chapter. Further, none of the previous works have a parallel to
this ninth chapter.
ii. Since Erich Frauwallner has researched in depth the structure and development of thought
within the above mentioned Abhidharma treatises in his Studies in Abhidharma Literature and
the Origins a/Buddhist Philosophical Systems, here we will reproduce two pages from his
chapter The Origin of Buddhist Systems, pp. 128f. [Bracketed text is inserted by LS.]
[The Abhidharmakosa] is a description of the Sarviistivada system and is one of the
most important descriptions of a Buddhist philosophical system that we possess. It is,
however, not entirely new in that it is based on the works of a number of pre-
decessors. The earliest of these works available to us (and probably the earliest of
them all) is the Abhidharmasara of a certain DharmasrI,* which gives a brief
description in verse explicated by an accompanying prose text This text long
enjoyed high standing: new commentaries were repeatedly written and the verse text
supplemented and extended until Vasubandhu eventually wrote a new verse text and
commentary in his Abhidharmakosa. Yet only the form is completely new: in all
essentials [Vasubandhu] bases his work on that ofDharmasrI.
It is, of course, obvious that if we want to explain the origin of the Sarvastivada
system we must start with the earliest work, DharmasrI's Abhidharmasara. This
work consists of ten chapters; [see LVP's Introduction, pp. lxiii-lxv:
l. Dhatuvarga (Elements)
2. Sarµskaravarga (Formations)
3. Karmavarga (Action)
4. Anusayavarga (Proclivities)
5. Aryavarga (Nobility)
6. Jfiiinavarga (Cognition)
7. Samadhivarga (Concentration)
8. Siitravarga (Scriptural Texts)
9. Tsavarga (Prakfrr;akavarga; Miscellaneous Matters)
10. Sastravarga or Vadavarga (Dharmakatha; Discussion).]
Its structure will be clearer if we differentiate between two parts. The first part,
consisting of chapters 1 to 7, contains a systematic description of the doctrinal con-
cepts. The second part, chapters 8 to 10, contains all the other transmitted material
that DharmasrI was unable to accommodate elsewhere in his work. Later, Vasu-
bandhu composed a further chapter on the structure of the world and incorporated
this into the systematic description [as his chapter 3), so that his version comprises
eight chapters. He also integrated the contents of the last three chapters into this
description. However, what his work now possessed in compactness, it lacked in
clarity and lucidity of exposition [Ubersichtlichkeit].
If we now look more closely at the systematic description in DharmasrI's work, the
following structure emerges: [Chapter 1:] following the 5 groups (skandhal:i), he first
discusses the constituent elements of which, according to old canonical doctrine, the
phenomenal world consists. [Chapter 2:] Proceeding from the realization that things
never come into being in isolation, he goes on to discuss the various kinds of mental
elements, briefly mentions the theory of atoms and afterwards deals with the
different temporal states and the doctrine of causality; that is, the four kinds of
conditions (pratyayii]:z) and the six causes (hetaval:z). Vasubandhu subsequently
inserted a description of the Buddhist conception of the world as consisting of
various spheres. There then follows [Chapter 3] a discussion of the doctrine of
karma; how good or evil actions determine the fate of beings in the cycle of
existence. This is followed [Chapters 4 and 5] by the doctrine of liberation, a
discussion of the propensities (anusayiil:z) that determine entanglement in the cycle of
existence and the knowledge by which these propensities can be eliminated. Finally
[Chapters 6 and 7] there is a description of the different kinds of knowledge
(jniiniini) and concentration (samiidhil:z).
The systematic structure of this description is striking. [1-2] It begins with a type of
theory of first principles. Then follow the conception of the world, [3] the laws
which determine the fate of beings in the vicissitudes of the world and finally
[4-5] the doctrine of liberation. The fact that [6] knowledge and [7] concentration are
then dealt with separately can be explained in that the idiosyncratic treatment of the
doctrine of liberation, to which I have given the name Abhisamayavada, gives the
customary form of these concepts too little emphasis. On the whole, however, we can
say that this constitutes a real system that covers all the principal doctrinal concepts
and presents them in a consistent, logically connected structure.
Nevertheless, however uniformly constructed and complete this work would seem to
be, it is not entirely original. Closer examination reveals that in all essential points it
was composed from older material, particularly that from the earlier sections of the
Abhidharmapi{aka mentioned above [see also LVP's Introduction, pp. xxix-xlii]. ·
[1] The beginning of the theory of principles is based on a Paficaskandhaka. [2] The
discussion of the mental elements is modeled on that of the Dhiitukiiya. The doctrine
of causality takes the four conditions (pratyayiil:z) from the Vijfitinakiiya and the six
causes (hetava]:z) from the Jfitinaprasthiina. [3] The doctrine of karma is modelled on
the 3rd part of [the Prajfiaptisiistra,] the Lokaprajfiapti. [ 4-5] The doctrine of
liberation (at least in its first part) can be attested in the Prakara,:ia in the doctrine of
the propensities (anusayiil:z) and elsewhere, and [6-7] the sections on knowledge and
concentration are again based on the Jfiiinaprasthiina.
* See L VP's Introduction, p. lxiii, but also notice that Dhammajoti thinks (based on Yin Shun;
see Summary, note 8) that the Abhidharmasiira or Abhidharmahrdaya post-dates the Mahii-
vibhii~ii.
Frauwallner finishes this brief overview ·regarding the general structure by commenting that
"here a scholar with an appreciation of logical connections and an understanding of systematic
thought has built up an edifice and thus a real philosophical system. His work also stood the
test of time: as I have pointed out, all later standard descriptions of the Sarviistivada system, up
to those of Vasubandhu and Sruµghabhadra, are based on this work."

In a similar vein, Collett Cox writes (DD.xxii): "Despite its later importance as the text
representative of northern Indian Abhidharma, one cannot assume that the Abhidharmakosa is
an original work that represents the culmination of Sarviistiviida-Vaibha~ika thought. Cer-
tainly, the Abhidharmakosa is a monument of Vasubandhu 's genius in organization, critical
analysis, and clear exegesis. But the structure that Vasubandhu adopts bears the influence of
earlier digests and the views that he expresses, whether his own, those of the Sarviistiviida-
Vaibhii~ikas, or those of other masters, are usually traceable to the Vibhii:Jii compendia.
Therefore, the role as representative or as the final determinant of Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ika
orthodoxy should more appropriately be accorded to the Vibhii:Jii compendia, or to the works
of Vasubandhu'.s opponent, Saiighabhadra."
Now from a less abstract point of view, we also should point out that the fairly close structural
dependence of the first eight chapters of the AKB (T 1558) on DharmasrI's Abhidharmasiira
(T 1550), but also on Dharmatriita's Sarriyuktiibhidhamiahrdayasiistra (T 1552), can be clearly
and easily seen in the detailed Concordance Chart assembled by Bart Dessein in his SAR.III,
pp. 413-61.
2. The structure of the first two chapters:
Since not all scholars agree on the classification of the first two chapters in relation to the four
noble truths, we present in the following the outlines of their specific structure together:
i. Within the overall context of the discernment of factors, Vasubandhu starts out discussing
(section BA.) the twofold classification of factors: impure (siisriiva) and pure (aniisrava),
which is no surprise since he had just determined the purpose of the AKB as the appeasement
of defilements (verse i. 3). But then he inserts into this classification immediately a discussion
of the conditioned and unconditioned factors, which is based on the "Miscellaneous" chapter
of the .AH and SAH, and deals more in detail with the three unconditioned factors: space
(iikiisa), cessation due to deliberation (pratisarrikhyiinirodha) and cessation not due to delibera-
tion (apratisarrikhyiinirodha). He returns to his theme of impure factors by providing syno-
nyms for impure conditioned factors and there, among others, mentions the appropriative
aggregates (upiidiinaskandha), unsatisfactoriness (dufikha) and origin (samudaya).
After this fairly brief section, Vasubandhu turns (section BB.) to the threefold classification of
factors: five aggregates (skandha), twelve sense-spheres (iiyatana), eighteen elements (dhiitu),
which is a longer section mainly dealing with the five aggregates--the aggregate of material
form (rilpa) receiving the most detailed treatment-but also the relationship between the
aggregates, sense-spheres and elements.
For the remainder of chapter 1 (section BC.), he continues with a presentation of twenty-two
doctrinal perspectives on the eighteen elements, i.e., not on the aggregates as one could have
expected from the previous section, ending with a doctrinal perspective that lists the twenty-
two controlling faculties (indriya).
ii. Chapter 2, entitled lndriyanirdesa, picks up the preceding theme from chapter 1 by giving
a detailed discussion (= section A) of the twenty-two controlling faculties, which is clearly an
insert based on the additional chapters of the AH and SAH. As for the name of this chapter,
see Dhammajoti's comments in his Summary. Vasubandhu then presents a new classification
(= section B), namely, the five-group (paiica-vastu) classification of factors:

a. matter or material form (rupa);
b. thought (citta);
c. thought-concomitants (caitta; caitasika) or factors (dharma) [or formations (sa'!!Skiira)]
associated with thought;
d. formations dissociated from thought (cittaviprayukta);
e. unconditioned factors (asarµskrta).
However, he does not give a detailed presentation. This new classification, representing the
most developed form of the classifications of the Vaibhii~ikas (see endnote in chapter 2), is
again an insert resulting indirectly from the "Miscellaneous" chapter of the AH and SAH. It is
introduced in the context of a discussion on the "genesis or origin" of the factors, how factors
come into existence, i.e., whether the five aggregates, etc., that have been discussed so far
arise independently from each other or if certain ones of them necessarily arise together,
which constitutes the beginning of the Sarµskiiravarga in the AH and SAH. But the new
classification is not presented in full as one might expect, for example, since unconditioned
factors do not arise, they are never discussed. On the other hand, based on the "Miscellaneous"
chapter of the AH and SAH, the presentation of the formations dissociated from thought is
inserted after the presentation of the thought-concomitants (caitta) (or formations associated
with thought). As for the issue of the simultaneous arising of factors, it seems to be dropped
after the detailed presentation of the thought-concomitants.
The chapter ends with a new classification(= section C), namely, the very detailed classifica-
tion of factors according to causes (hetu), effects (phala) and conditions (pratyaya).
iii. If we glance briefly at the topics discussed in chapters 1 and 2, it becomes more apparent
why certain scholars classify chapter 2 as belonging to the truth of the origin while others
classify it as still being part of the truth of unsatisfactoriness. On the other hand, the brief
outline also gives us a better sense of the "work method" of Vasubandhu in the AKB, which is
closely scrutinized-by Frauwallner in his discussion of the structure of the first two chapters in
his Paiicaskandhaka and Paiicavastuka (SAL, pp. 135-47).
What Frauwallner dubs as "Paficaskandhaka" is the "standard form being used [at an early
period of Buddhism, at the time of the old Abhidharma,] to represent comprehensively the
elements of being that were the material of_ the dogmatics". It contains, often after a brief
beginning assignment of all factors to the categories of undefiled (sasrava) or defiled
(aniisrava), the following main elements:
a. discussion of the aggregates, sense-sources and elements and their relationship, with
the emphasis, however, on the aggregates (skandha);
b. discussion of a list of attributes or doctrinal perspectives on the aggregates (or
elements);
to which could be added, as in chapter 2 of AH and SAH:
c. discussion of the arising of factors;
d. discussion of the doctrine of causality: causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya).
As for the emphasis on the aggregates, Frauwallner thinks (SAL.147) that "the skandhal).
seemed to have assumed more importance as the fields of matter and the mental elements can
thus be more easily distinguished. I believe it also possible that even at this. early stage of
development, matter was dealt with fairly extensively".
!
As for the list of attributes, Frauwallner shows (SAL.141ff.) that the lists used by various
scholars are not necessarily identical, for example, the list in the Jiiiinaprasthiina has only ten
items, whereas Vasubandhu has twenty-two.
In the above mentioned article, Frauwallner raises the question of why Vasubandhu did not
base his discussion "on the structure most obviously suited to a systematic description", i.e.,
the five-group classification or Paficavastuka, even though it constitutes the main content of
Vasubandhu's discussion in the first two chapters. As we.have seen, Frauwallner distinguishes
two distinct stages of development in the dogmatics of the early Abhidharma (SAL.147): "The
initial stage, which found expression in the Paficaskandhaka, is a first attempt at philosophical
systematics. The second, represented by the Paficavastuka, is an attempt at a comprehensive
and systematic doctrine of principles", independently of the old canonical categorization of all
factors according to skaridhas, ayatanas and dhiitus. Frauwallner concludes that although the,
Paficavastuka signified an important advance, it was not generally adopted since the old
Paficaskandhaka was already too deeply rooted in the tradition. Yet since its innovations could
not be ignored, they were somehow "forced" into the old framework, which prevailed "until
the end of the Abhidharma period and the last, authoritative reworking of the dogmatics in the
works ofVasubandhu".
47
LS: AH 4-6, 225; SAH 4-6, 458-59.
48
LS: AH 4; SAH 4.
49
Gokhale: [4a] siisravii'niisravii dharmiiJ:i
Tib.: [4a] zag bcas zag pa med chos rnams I
LS: Asrava (lit. ''flowing out/toward") is a synonym of klesa (defilement). For the doctrinal
perspective siisrava-aniisrava in regard to the eighteen elements (dhiitu), see i. 31cd. For a
discussion of the three fluxes, see v. 35-36; for an explanation of the term iisrava, see v. 40.
Dhammajoti comments in his Glossary (SA.IV.514, 542):
aniisrava: Outflow-free ("pure" in the sense that such a dharma does not conduce to
the saqisiiric process).
siisrava: With-outflow. A with-outflow object is one by taking which the defile-
ment adheres tci it and grows. It is also one whose effect is to retain us in
sa,rtsiira.
50
LS: AH4-6.
51
Gokhale: [4bd] sa,riskrtii miirgavarjitiiJ:i I siisravii iisraviis te~u yasmiit samanuserate I
Tib.: [4bd] lam ma gtogs pa'i 'dus byas rnams I zag bcas gang phyir de dag la I zag rnams kun
tu rgyas par 'gyur I
LVP: The conditioned factors, with the exception of those that are part of the (noble) path, are
called siisrava, "in a [positive] relationship with the fluxes".
How and why are they in a [positive] relationship with the fluxes?
1. One cannot say: because they are associated (sa,riprayukta) with the fluxes, for only the
_thought and the thought-concomitants that are defiled (kli~ta) are associated with the fluxes (i. 23).
2. One cannot say: because they coexist (sahotpada) with the fluxes. In this hypothesis,
(i) neither the external (bahya; i. 39a) factors, (ii) nor the five appropriative aggregates
(upadanaskandha; i. 8) of a person within whom the fluxes are not presently active would be
in a relationship with the fluxes.
3. One cannot say: because they are the support (iisraya) of the fluxes, for only the six sense
faculties of the consciousness are the support of the fluxes.
4. One cannot say: because they are the cognitive object (alambana) of the fluxes: in this
hypothesis, nirvii~a (= nirodhasatya) would be in a [positive] relationship with the fluxes, for
there can be false views with regard to Nirviii;ia; in this hypothesis, a higher stage would be in
a relationship with the fluxes by the fact of the fluxes ·of a lower stage that take this higher
stage as their cognitive object (opinions condemned; v. 18).
The author thus explains that a factor is called in a [positive] relationship with the fluxes
because the fluxes adhere (anuserate) to it, i.e., grow in it (pu:j(ilJl labhante) or take their
dwelling or support (prati:j(ha) in it, as a foot can stand on earth but not on red-hot fire. The
proclivities (anusaya) develop (salJlttiyante) by taking ·their growth or support in and on the
factors in a [positive] relationship with the fluxes.
According to another opinion, just as one says: "This food suits me" (mama anusete), in order
to say: "This food agrees with me, is favorable to me (anugu~fbhavati)", so the fluxes "suit
these factors", "are favorable to these factors". Thus those factors to which the fluxes are
favorable, namely, the conditioned factors with the exception of the (noble) path are called in a
[positl\,e] relationship with the fluxes: in fact, the conditioned factors are created by the actions
aroused by the fluxes; the fluxes are thus favorable to them (Vyakhya). See v. 1, 18, 29, 39, 40.
The schools are not in agreement in regard to whether the body of the Buddha is in a [positive]
relationship with the fluxes. See i. 31d.
LS: 1. As for the notion of "adhere and grow", Ny, 637c7ff. (ATA.79), referring to the Jfiana-
prasthana, states:
What is "adhering" or "growing" (anuserate)? It refers to the fact that contaminants
are associated with this [moment of] thought, are dependent upon thought, and not
yet abandoned.
What is "not adhering" or "not growing" (na anuserate)? It refers to the fact that
contaminants are [still] associated with this [moment of] thought, and yet one has
already attained complete abandonment [of them].
2. As for the notion "growing concordantly", (i) a defilement can grow concordantly with
the conascent defiled citta-caitta associated with it, by way of conjunction (salJlprayogatas).
(ii) It can also grow concordantly by way of taking a [with-outflow] object (alambanatas).
i. As for "anusayana by way of conjunction", Ny, 637c, elaborates on it as a threefold
operation (SA.IV.344):
a. inducing the acquisition (prapti) [of the defilements];
b. obstructing the thought series (citta-santati);
c. serving as the homogeneous cause for the emanation of the subsequent moment in
the series.
ii. As for "anu.foyana by way of taking an object", Ny, 616b, explains this to mean that "the
anusaya adheres along and grows in the (siisrava) dharma, i.e., it binds concordantly and
increases stagnation therein". Sa1p.ghabhadra explains further (Ny, 616b; SA.IV.343):
This is like the adherence of dust on a wet garment, or the growth of seeds in an
irrigated field. The anusaya-s that take the aniisravadharma-s-nirvii~a or the path-
or a higher sphere (than the one to which they belong) as objects, do not operate in
this mode, because these objects are not appropriated as the Self or what pertains to
the Self either through Self-view (iitmadr$[i) or craving (tmzii). As a matter of fact,
the wish for the attainment of the pure dharma-s or a higher sphere is not a greed as
such but a predilection or aspiration for the good (kusala-dharma-chanda). Besides,
the pure objects as well as the dharma-s belonging to a higher sphere are in nature
opposed to the anu.foya-s that take them as objects, and hence not supportive of their
growth. As such, the anusaya-s cannot find a footing in them, just as the sole of a
foot cannot stay when placed on a heated rock.
For further examples for the phenomena of anu.foyana given by the purviiciirya-s and "some
others", see SA.IV.344f.
52
LS: The Vyiikhya glosses [WOG.12.22]: hetu-pratyaya-janitii rupa'iidayaJ:i salJ'lskrtiilJ.
53
LS: As for the fluxes, v. 40 states: "The proclivities fix,' keep (iisayanti) beings in cyclic
existence (salJ'lsiira); they [cause beings to] flow around (iisravanti, gacchanti) from the highest
heaven (summit of cyclic existence [bhaviigra] = naivasalJ'ljiiiiniisalJ'ljfiiiyatana; iii. 3, 81) to
the hell of ceaseless torture (avfci; iii. 58); they discharge or ooze (k$ar) through the six
wound-like entrances (iiyatana; i.e., the sense-faculties). They are thus called.fluxes (iisrava)."
54
LS: Pradhan has nirodhamiirgasatyiilambana.
55
LS: As an example for acts that are wholesome or skillful (kusala) but may still be with-
outflow (siisrava), Dharnrnajoti mentions (SA.IV.42) that "one may practice generosity in the
hope of having a favorable rebirth in the future". Thus the scope of the "with-outflow" is
greater than that of the unwholesome or unskillful (akusala).
MVS, 444c-445a, mentions (SA.IV.43) a few examples given by the Venerable Vasumitra:
When a proclivity arises having a with-outflow dharma as its cognitive object, the
proclivity grows/waxes gradually. This is like the case of a man looking at the moon
which helps the growth of his visual faculty. Thus, the with-outflow dharma-s accord
with the growth of the proclivities.
When a proclivity arises having an outflow-free dharma as its cognitive object, the
proclivity wanes gradually. This is like the case of a man looking at the sun, which
damages his visual faculty. Thus, the outflow-free dharma-s do not accord with the
growth of the proclivities.
56
Gokhale: [5ab] aniisravii miirgasafyalJ'I trividha'!Z cii 'py asa'!Zskrtam I
Tib.: [5ab] zag med lam gyis bden pa dang I 'dus ma byas rnam gsum yang ste I
LVP: The truth of the (noble) path is the totality of the factors that constitute the insight into
and the cultivation of the truths (vi. 25d; vii. 3b).
On the unconditioned factors (asarµskrta), see i. 48b, ii. 55cd and the Introduction by LVP.
LS: The Avatara states (BSD. 110): "By outflow-free [anasrava] dharma-s are meant the Truth
of the Path (marga-satya) and the three unconditioned dharma-s, as all of them do not belong
to any of the three spheres (apratisarµ,yukta)."
As for the "unconditioned factors", we have seen above in our note on the structure of the first
two chapters of the AKB that the discussion of the unconditioned factors had no special place
in the main elements of the Paficaskandhaka, since the latter focused mainly on the skandhas,
which do not include the unconditioned ones in contrast to the ayatanas and dhatus. Thus
based on a Paficavastuka where they form the fifth group, they were added by DharmasrI and
Dharmatrata to the "Miscellaneous" c:hapter of their AH and SAH. Frauwallner shows
(SAL.136f.) that from the more advanced Paficavastuka point of view, Vasubandhu's moving
th~ discussion of the unconditioned factors into first place was due to his being bound by
tradition, i.e., the Paficaskandhaka, which often begins with a brief assignment of all factors to
the categories of undefiled (sasrava) or defiled (anasrava), before discussing its main elements,
i.e., the five aggregates, etc. Thus moving within the wider structure of the f>aficaskandhaka,
the discussion of the three unconditioned factors was incorporated with the "undefiled", which
gave them a prominent place as in the Paficavastuka.
As for the "path", Jampaiyang (transl. Coghlan; p. 158) clarifies: "Here, the masters GUl).amati
and Piin:i,avardhana state that since the term 'path' refers to both mundane and transcendent
(paths), therefore doubt arises as to whether the mundane path is uncontaminated. To
distinguish it from that, the term 'truth' is mentioned in the statement: 'The uncontaminated
truth of path.' That is because the mundane path is only the path and not the truth of path
because (the mundane path) is subsumed by the truths of unsatisfactoriness and the origin."
And Geshe Jampa Gyatso quotes (p. 34) Gedun Drup: "True paths do not increase contamina-
tions either by observing them or by being concomitant with them. True paths are the paths of
seeing, meditation, and no-more-learning. Because the contaminations do not increase by
observing them, they are uncontaminated."
57
LS: 1. As for the conditioned and unconditioned factors "in general", the MVS (392c-
393a) distinguishes (SA.IV.38):
A dharma is said to be conditioned if it has arising and ceasing, cause and effect, and
acquires the characteristics of the conditioned
A dharma is said to be unconditioned if it has no arising and ceasing, no cause and
effect, and acquires the characteristics of the unconditioned.
Dhammajoti explains that "the conditioned dharma-s have causes and conditions because they
are weak in nature and must therefore depend on causes and conditions for their activities. The
unconditioned dharma-s, on the other hand, are strong and therefore are not dependent on
them. Moreover, the unconditioned dharma-s have no activities ~tall, hence no use of causes
and conditions [MVS, 71 la-b]."
2. As for the conditioned factors, according to the Vaibha~ikas they are characterized by
the characteristics of conditioned factors (sarrzskrtalak~a,:za; ii. 45cd)-the four factors of
(i) origination (jati), (ii) deterioration (jara), (iii) duration (sthifi) and (iv) impermanence
(anityata)-considered to be real entities belonging to the class of formations dissociated
from thought (viprayuktasal'!lskiira).

3. As for the unconditioned factors, various schools interpret them and their ontological
status differently:
i. The "orthodox" Vaibha~ikas teach that all unconditioned factors-having no activities
and not being conditioned by causes and conditions-are not conditioned or accompanied by
the four characteristics of origination, duration, deterioration and impermanence (ii. 45cd), and
they accept the three factors mentioned in our root verse. Collett Cox discusses their ontologi-
cal status (FC0.558):
The *Mahiivibhii~ii specifies that unconditioned dharmas function riot only as
sovereign conditions (adhipatipratyaya), but also as comprehensive non-obstructing
causes (kiira,:iahetu) and as object-support conditions (iilambanapratyaya). Their
function as comprehensive non-obstructing causes is identical to their function as.
sovereign conditions: that is, as in the case of all dharmas, unconditioned dharmas
also function not to obstruct the arising of dharmas other than themselves. And in
this function as non-obstructing causes, unconditioned dharmas do not exert any
generative causal efficacy: that is to say, they are not active in producing an effect.
As object-support conditions, unconditioned dharmas function as objects of mental
perceptual consciousness, but here also they do not function as the generative causes
for its arising. Hence, unconditioned dharmas are said to have no cause, since they
do not arise, and no effect, since they do not function as generative causes in
producing their own effect. Nevertheless, even though unconditioned dharmas lack
generative activity, they do have a function, and this functioning, as in the case of
conditioned dharmas, makes known their characteristic nature and mandates their
existence as distinct dharmas.
Dhammajoti explains (SA.IV.474) that the essential characteristic of the unconditioned factors
is that they are neither temporalized nor spatialized, and since they are "beyond the space-time
dimensions, they can neither arise nor cease, and accordingly are not directly involved in any
causal process".
In this context see the longer discussion at ii. 55d.
ii. For the Sautrantika (SA.IV.472), the unconditioned is simply a concept (prajnapti) of that
which is opposed to the conditioned. The AKB ii, F 278ff., states that all the unconditioned are
not real or non-entities (sarvam eviisal'!lskrtam adravyam), for they do not exist as distinct or
real entities (bhiiviintara) as are rilpa, vedanii, etc. Thus cessation due to deliberation or
nirvii,:ia, for example, would be nothing more than the absolute absence of unsatisfactoriness
(du~kha). Or space as an unconditioned factor would be merely the absence of tangible things
(spra~fiivyiibhiiva-miitra), as when people in darkness say that there is space when they do not
encounter any obstacles.
iii. Dhammajoti adds (SA.IV.472f.):
Even within the Sarvastiviida school itself, opinions differ as regards the ontological
status of these unconditioned dharma-s. It appears that at the early stages, the
Sarvastiviida did not elaborate on the ontological status of the unconditioned
dharma-s. In the JPS, the canonical text upheld as the supreme authority by the
orthodox Sarvastivadins, one finds only the mention of pratisaf!lkhya-nirodha and

apratisaf!lkhya-nirodha, but not akasa. In the MYS, the various acarya-s hold
contradictory views. Thus, Buddhadeva accepts the realities of all three; the
Bhadanta (= Dharmatrata?) denies the reality of akasa; the Dar~tantika denies the
ontological.status of all three. Probably in response to the denial by the Dar~tii.ntika
and the Sautriintika, in the post AKB period there had consistently been an additional
requirement in the definition of "Sarvastivada": A Sarvastivadin must accept not
.only the tri-temporal existence of dharma, but also the reality of all three kinds of
unconditioned dharma-s.
58
LVP: Certain philosophers, the Vatsiputdyas, sa~ that there is only one unconditioned
factor (asaf!lskrta), namely, nirva,;a. The Vaise~ikas assert many unconditioned factors: the
atoms (parama,;u), etc. (WOG.15.2ff.). - Some assert three unconditioned factors; others
consider emptiness (§unyata), · which is the characteristic or nature of suchness (tathatii-
lakifa1Jti) (Madhyamaka, vii, 33, p. 176), as an unconditioned factor. - Wassilief, pp. 264, 282;
Kathiivatthu, ii. 9; vi. 1-6; xix, 5; Bhavaviveka, Nanjio 1237, 2, p. 275c.
LS: Thich Thien Chau (LPEB.202f.) and Bareau (SBPV.120; L'Absolue en philosophie
bouddhique, p. 260-61)-seemingly all based on LVP and Yasomitra-repeat the view that
the Vatsiputriyas say that there is only one unconditioned factor (asaf!lskrta), this view does
not seem to be corroborated by the Chinese sources. For example, it is not mentioned in the
Tridharmakha,:u)aka and the Stif!lmitfyanikiiyasastra; it is also not mentioned in Vasumitra's
Samayabhedoparaca,;a-cakra ("Wheel of statements of the dissensions of doctrines"), where,
if the asaf!lskrtas were different from the Sarvastiviida presentation, one would expect it to be
mentioned as it is with the Mahasii.qighikas and Mahisii.sakas; likewise, Dhammajoti (private
communication) points out that Fa Bao (Pu Guang's fellow student) states in his AKB
commentary (T 41, 470a): "although the schools designate the asaf!lskrtas differently, the
various [Hinayana] schools all have these three asaf!lskrtas. Mahayana adds six ... , Maha-
sii.qighika, etc., adds six ... , Mahisasaka ... ".
59
Gokhale: [5c] iiktisaf!l dvau nirodhau ca
Tib.: [5c] nam mkha' dang ni 'gog pa gnyis I
LVP: On the two cessations (nirodha), i. 6; ii. 55c; on the five cessations, i. 20ab.
60
LS: AH 225; SAH 458.
61
I
Gokhale: [5d] tatr aktisaf!l anavrtilJ.
Tib.: [5d] de la nam mkha' mi sgrib pa'o I
LVP: On iikiisa, see "Documents d' Abhidharma", BEFEO, 1930 [see Electronic Appendix];
see ii, 279; iii, 139, Add.
62
LVP: On the difference between space (iiktisa) and the elementary substance space
(akiisadhiitu), i. 28; on the nonexistence of the unconditioned factor (asaf!lskrta) called space
(Sautrii.ntika theory), see ii. 55cd. -Kathiivatthu, vi. 6-7.
The opinion of the Madhyamika on space and the other unconditioned factors, an opinion
identical to that of the Sautrantika, is explained by Aryadeva, Sataka, ix. 3 (Madhyamakavrtti,
505; Catul_,.Jatikii, 202, As. Soc. of Bengal, iii. p. 483, 1914): "Where there is no matter (rupa),
nothing opposes the arising of material factors: the absence of matter receives the name akiisa,
because the factors shine brightly there (bhrsam asyiintaJ:i kiisante bhiivii/:1). The Vaibhii~ikas
assume in the Abhidharmasiistra that space is a reality (vastu), not seeing that the Scripture con-
tents itself to giving a name to a non-reality, to a pure nothingness (avastusato kirrzcanasya) ... ."
LS: 1. The Avatiira states (ESD.124):
Space (iikiisa) has the characteristic of accommodating resistant things; as it is by the
dominant (adhipati) force of this that they are capable of being produced, and as it is
the nature of Space to be accommodative. If it were non-existent, there ought not to
be the production of resistant things, since there would be nothing to accommodate
them.
Thus, the Bilagavat has said, "O briihmm:ia, Wind is supported by Space." The
briihma,:ia asked, "By what is Space supported?" The Buddha further told him,
"Your question is unreasonable. Space is immaterial (ariipin), invisible (anidarsana)
and non-resistant (apratigha); what can be its support? Nevertheless, Space can be
known [to exist] on account of the existence of light."
2. But space as an unconditioned factor must be distinguished from the conditioned elemen-
tary substance space (iikii§a-dhiitu; i. 28), the latter (i) being empty space that is visible in
between objects occupying space, for example, the cavity of the door, mouth, etc., and
(ii) being "of the nature of material form (riipa)-more specifically of the nature of light and
darkness (iiloka-tamaJ:i-svabhiiva), as what we perceive in such cavities is light or darkness"
(SA.IV.491).
Cox comments (FC0.556) that the *Mahiivibhii:fii "contends that traditional sources do not
clearly distinguish space as an unconditioned dharma from space as a conditioned, material
element (iikiisadhiitu). Scriptural passages using the simple term 'space' (iikiisa) actually
describe space as a material element, and the Prakara,:iapiida also uses the 'gross' char-
acteristics of space as a material element to indicate the 'subtle' unconditioned dharma space."
Since the Jiiiinaprasthiina as well as Dharmatriita, for example, do not mention or accept
iikiisa as an unconditioned dharma, Dhammajoti suggests (SA.IV.491) that it is "possible that
this category came to be regarded as one of the three unconditioned at a relatively later stage
by the orthodox Sarviistiviidins".
The MVS, 388b, distinguishes the conditioned and unconditioned space as follows (SA.IV.491):
The A.bhidharmikas assert thus: What is the space element? It is the agha-siimantaka
riipa. By agha is meant agglomerated [matter] (citastham riipam), i.e., a wall, etc.
There exists a matter that is proximate to it, called agha-rupa. Such space as found in
the wall, in the forest, in the leaves, in the windows, among the fingers-they are
called the space-elements ....
What is the difference between Space and the space-element? Space is not matter;
the space-element is matter. Space is invisible (anidarsana); the space-element is
visible. Space is non-resistant (apratigha); the space-element is resistant (saprati-
gha). Space is outflow-free; the space-element is with-outflow. Space is uncondi-
tioned; the space-element is conditioned.
3. Dhammajoti remarks (SA.IV.492) that "Vasubandhu presents the Sautriintika view that
Space is unreal [AKB ii. F 278f.): It is merely the absence of tangible things (spra~favya-
abhava-miitra) . ... Sarµghabhadra informs us [Ny, 347b) that the Sautrantika master Sthavira
Sriliita and all the other Dar~tantika masters hold the view that the space-element is nothing
apart from Space; but Space does not exist as a real entity, hence the space-element too is
unreal."
63
IS: AH 225; SAH 458.
64
Gokhale: [6ab) pratisalflkhyiinirodho yo visalflyogaf:i prthak prthak I
Tib.: [6ab") so sor brtags pas 'gog pa gang Ibral ba'o so so so so yin I
LVP: Compare the discussion in Kathiivatthu, xix. 3.
The Sarviistivadin considers that "disconnection from a defilement", "the cessation of future
defilement or unsatisfactoriness" (visalflyoga, nirodha), is a phenomenon in and of itself, a real
factor, a real entity (dravya). Disconnection is not produced by causes, it is eternal. The
possession (priipti) of disconnection through pratisar,ikhyii (deliberation; comprehension of the
truths) is obtained.
IS: 1. Dhammajoti states (SA.IV.471 and 476) that cessations due to deliberation represent
the goal of Buddhist praxis and as such are the most important of the three unconditioned
factors. For the Sarviistiviida, these cessations are distinct positive entities (dravyiintara)
and ontologically real forces acquired by the practitioner when a given defilement is
completely abandoned, and they act to ensure that the posse&sion of the defilement so
abandoned will absolutely not be able to arise any more, "just like a dike holding back the
water or a screen blocking the wind".
These cessations are not causes or conditions in the proper sense and as such cannot be said to
have fruits (sa-phala) (see AKB ii. 55cd and 57d). "Nevertheless, in conformity with the sutra
tradition which speaks of the fruit of spiritual life (sriimii,:zya-phala) and conventional usage, it
is permissible to call pratisalflkhyii-nirodha a 'fruit of disjunction' (visalflyoga-phala) without
fmplying that it is causally produced, and it is also permissible to consider them as a 'condition
qua object' (iilambana-pratyaya)-e.g., as an object of thought of a yogi, and 'fruit of (pre)-
dominance' (adhipati-pratyaya)-making an indirect contribution by merely not obstructing."
2. In discussing pratisalflkhyiinirodha, Vasubandhu gives first its definition, which he then
linguistically links _to its three main components: (i) deliberation (pratisalflkhyii), of which he
provides a definition that is the same as the one given in the MVS, (ii) cessation (nirodha) and
(iii) possession or acquisition (priipti). The term nirvii,:za, which in the Sarviistivada is a
synonym for pratisaf[lkhyiinirodha, is added by L VP. In the remainder of this section
Vasubandhu then discusses whether pratisar,ikhyiinirodha is plural or not. Later (see ii. 55d),
in the context of discussing the five effects-including the effect of disconnection (visa1f1yoga-
phala)-Vasubandhu will venture into a longer discussion and debate on the ontological status
of pratisar,ikhyiinirodha, in which context he will then provide additional definitions of the
three unconditioned factors given by the Sautriintikas, who concede (ii. F 282) that these
factors, as well as acquisition, exist but merely as provisional designations (prajfiaptisat), (and
definitions given by other schools), and also further synonyms for nirvii,:za.
i. In regard to deliberation, see the next endnote.
ii. In regard to types of cessation (nirodha), L VP lists (F 35) five types:

a. cessation by the characteristic (lalqa,:uinirodha) (ii. 45cd);
b. cessation by attainment (samapattinirodha) (ii. 42f.);
c. cessation by birth (upapattinirodha =state of non-ideation [asaf!ljfiika]; ii. 41b);
d. cessation due to deliberation (pratisaf!lkhyanirodha) (i. 6ab);
e. cessation not due to deliberation (apratisaf!lkhyanirodha) (i. 6cd).
iii. In regard to possession or acquisition, the important role that this factor plays-for the
Vaibhii~ikas-in spiritual attainments is pointed out by Dhammajoti (SA.IV.481):
[With regard to the questions in the MVS, 162a-b:] when sentient beings realize
pratisaf!lkhyanirodha, (a) do they together realize a common one or (b) do they
inclividually realize a different (i.e., identical but distinct) one in each case? ... The
MVS compilers answer:
When sentient beings realize pratisaf!lkhya-nirodha, they realize a common one.
However, although nirviir;a is in actual fact common as an entity, it is said to be
non-common in respect to its acquisition since the visaf!Zyoga-prapti arises
separately in the series of each individual.
It is only when the acquisition of nirviir;a arises in a particular individual that he is
said to have acquired/attained nirvar;a. [ ... ]
Any religion or philosophy that posits a transcendental absolute needs to account for
the way in which the empirical is related to the transcendental. In the Sarviistiviida
perspective, the relationship is effected by acquisition, a real force existing in its own
right, which connects a dharma to a given series. The dhanna then is one possessed
by that particular individual. In abandoning a defilement, two final moments are
involved: In the first moment known as anantarya-marga [unhindered·path], the
acquisition of the defilement is severed. In the second moment, known as vimukti
marga [path of liberation], the acquisition of the corresponding pratisaf!lkhyti-
nirodha arises, and the practitioner is said to have realized the nirodha.
The notion of acquisition is also invoked to explain away the apparent contradiction
involved in stating that the nirVlilJa is a phala-visaf!Zyoga-phala-although it is not
causally produced by the spiritual path [cf. AKB ii, F 276f.] ....
3. In regard to the pratisa,µkhyanirodha of our passage and the nirvar;alnirodha of a
worldling, as well as the praptis related to them, Dhammajoti comments (private communi-
cation): "The AKB here clearly says that pratisaf!lkhya-nirodha is multiple. It is not a
reference to 'the' NirviiI_la; but to nirviir;a-s. It also does not refer to the nirviir;a/nirodha with
which a worldling (prthagjana) can be endowed through the mundane path. The point to note
is that the nirodha of a defilement acquired by a prthagjana is not a pratisaf!Zkhyii-nirodha; it
will become such through satya-abhisamaya. I.e., a prthagjana can have the acquisition
(priipti) of the pratisaf!lkhyii-nirodha of a klesa; but the pratisaf!lkhyii-nirodha cannot manifest
in him until he becomes an iirya. The priipti which was earlier siisrava now becomes
aniisrava. So, we can say that both a pratisaf!lkhyii-nirodha and a nirodha acquired through a
mundane path can be called a 'nirviir;a' (T27, 147b6-7). A pfthagjana, through the mundane
path, can have the 'priipti of visaf!Zyoga' arisen in him. (Note that the word visaf!lyoga applies
also to such a nirodha.) This prapti is neither-saik,rn-nor-afaik,rn (MYS, 170b7-11). After

abhisamaya, the prapti is transformed into the §aik~a [trainee] type. But [this] pratisarµkhya-
nirodha is necessarily acquired through an anasrava prajna. Pratisarµkhya-nirodha is na-
saik~a-nasaik~a; but its prapti can be either saik~a. a§aik~a or neither-faik~a-nor-a§aik~a.
(MYS, 161 b19-26). In brief: a pratisarµkhya-nirodha is a nirodhalvisarµyoga; but a nirodha/
visarµyoga is not necessarily a pratisarµkhyii-nirodha."
4. In regard to the object of acquisition, moral quality, etc., of the pratisarµkhyiinirodhas, the
MYS lists the following (SA.IV.488f.):
The pratisarµkhyii-nirodha-s are acquired with regard to the with-outflow dharma-s
of the three periods of time; ... are skillful (ku§ala) and so are their acquisitions;
... are outflow-free (aniisrava) and their acquisitions are either with-outflow or
outflow-free; ... are not bound to any sphere of existence (apratisarµyukta) and their
acquisitions may be bound to the fine-material sphere (rupa-dhiitu) or the non-
material sphere (iirupyadhiitu) or not bound to any sphere; ... are neither-trainee-nor-
nontrainee (naiva-saik~a-niisai~a) and their acquisitions may be trainee, non-trainee
or neither-trainee-nor-nontrainee; ... are not to be abandoned (aheya) and their
acquisitions are either to be abandoned by cultivation (bhiivanii-heya) or not to be
abandoned; ... are non-defiled (akli~{a) and so are their acquisitions; ... are without
retribution (avipiika) and their acquisitions are either with or without retribution;
... are fruits of the path (miirga-phala) and their acquisitions may be either paths and
fruits of the path or neither paths nor fruits of the path; ... are subsumed under truth
of cessation (nirodha-satya) and their acquisitions are subsumed under the oth_er
three truths.
65
LVP: Several pratisarµkhyiinirodhas, Vasumitra, Mahasaqighikas, thesis 34.
LS: 1. The unconditioned factors-with the exception of space-are pluralistic in nature. The
Avatiira states (ESD.125f.):
There are innumerable entities [of the cessations through deliberation], accordingly
as the amount of abandonables which is innumerable .... [T]here are as many cessa-
tions through deliberation as there are dharma-s with outflows, since this accords
with logic.
[However,] in accordance with the different [counteractive] paths, [the cessations
through deliberation] are established ·as eighty-nine. In accordance with the [differ-
ent] abandonment~knowledges (prahii,:ia-parijnii) they are established as nine. In
accordance with the five different classes. [of abandonables] they are established as
five. In accordance with the different fruits [of spiritual cultivation], they are said to
be four-stream-entry, etc. In accordance with the three different elements-of
abandonment, detachment and cessation (prahiil}a-dhiitu, viriiga-dhiitu, nirodha-
dhiitu)-they are established as three. In accordance with the abandonment of
unsatisfactoriness and the origin of unsatisfactoriness, and also accordingly as [the
nirvii,:ia] with or without remainder (sopadhi§e~a. nirupadhise~a), they are estab-
lished as two. From the point of view of the abandonment of births and deaths
collectively, it is established as one.
Comparing the cessations due to deliberation and not due to deliberation in terms of quantity,
Dhammajoti comments (ESD.205) that the MYS, 164, explains the latter to be "more numer-
ous because its quantity is in accordance with that of the sarriskrta dharma-s, whereas the
quantity of the former is only in accordance with that of the sasrava-dharma-s".
2. In the context of the abandonment of the defilements (klesa) and the plurality of the
pratisarrikhyanirodhas and its various synonyms (SA.IY.352f.), this then implies for the
Yaibhii~ikas a gradual and systematic abandonment of the defilements and realization of the
corresponding cessations (nirodha), i.e., not an "abrupt awakening", so that MYS, 465c, can
state that "there are eighty-nine different stages in the abandonment of the defilements; for in
all these stages there is the realization of nirodha". Thus depending on the specific stage of
progress at which a corresponding amount of defilements is abandoned, MYS, 321b-322b,
distinguishes between eight types of synonyms which may or may not apply in full in the
different stages (SA.IY.353):
The abandonment in its intrinsic nature [is given various names]-(!) "abandonment"
(prahaJJa), (2) "disjunction" (visarriyoga), (3) "cessation" (nirodha), (4) "truth" (satya),
(5) "complete knowledge" (parijfia), (6) "fruit of the spiritual life" (sramaJJya-
phala), (7) "sphere of nirva!Jll with a remnant of substratum" (sopadhise~a-nirvaJJa-
dhiitu), and (8) "sphere of nirvaJJa without a remnant of substratum" (nirupadhise~a-
nirvaJJa-dhiitu) . ... Thus, when the receptivity to the knowledge of dharma with
regard to du!Jkha (du!Jkhe dharma-jfiana-k~iinti) ceases and the knowledge of dharma
with regard to du!Jkha arises, that abandonment acquired is called "abandonment",
"disjunction", "cessation", "truth"; [but] it is not yet called "complete knowledge",
not yet called "fruit of the spiritual life", not yet called "sphere of nirvaJJa with a
remnant of substratum", not yet called "sphere of nirvaJJa without a remnant of
substratum" ....
66
LVP: The Fortunate One compares the impure object (sasrava) to a post, i.e., the object to
which the defilements, attachment, hatred, etc., can adhere; the defilements or fetters (sarri-
yojana) are the rope; the person (pudgala) is the animal. (Compare Sarriyutta, iv. 282). The
impure object is the place with binding (sarriyogavastu; safifiojaniya).
67
LVP: Dharmadinna was questioned by her former husband, the householder Visakha:
kirrisabhaga iirye nirodha!J? - She answered: asabhiiga ayu~man visakha. (Madhyamagama,
fasc. 18, fol. 3; MYS, 162bl 1; 162a). - Compare Majjhima, i. 304: nibbanassa pan' ayye kirri
patibhago ....
LS: Hall comments (Y ASC.54): "If 'non-homogeneous' (a-sabhaga) were taken literally it
would mean 'having nothing similar to it' (apratidisa). In that case there could be only one
unique cessation of all defilements. Therefore 'non-homogeneous' is here taken to mean 'not
having or being a homogeneous cause'. If 'cessation' had a homogeneous cause it would not
be 'unconditioned'."
68
LS: AH 225; SAH 459.
69
Gokhale: [6cd] utpadii'tyantavighno 'nyo nirodho 'pratisal!ikhyayii 11
Tib.: [6cd] skye la gtan du gegs byed pa I 'gog gzhan so sor brtags min pas II
LS: In discussing apratisarrikhyanirodha, Yasubandhu first gives its definition, then explains
its name-related to the way it is acquired-before providing an example. In chapter 2,

Vasubaridhu will first clarify the relationship of possession (priiptz) and non-possession
(apriipti) with apratisaf!lkhyanirodha (ii. F l 79f.), and then determine (ii. F 275) that the
apratisaf!lkhyiinirodha and iikiisa are not effects. Connected with the latter, he will also pro-
vide additional definitions of the three unconditioned factors given by the Sautriintikas and
other schools, and enter into a discussion on their ontological status.
1. In regard to its definition, Dhammajoti points out (ESD.44f.) that "the Vaibhii~ikas
generally explain the apratisaf!lkhya-nirodha as an entity acquired owing to the deficiency in
the conditions for a dharma's arising", but that Saiµghabhadra defines it as a positive force-a
notion that is not completely missing in the MYS-as follows (Ny, 434b):
The apratisaf!lhkya-nirodha is not merely the deficiency in conditions. It is a distinct
dharma, acquired by reason of the deficiency in conditions. This dharma has the
special potency of obstructing the dharma which may [otherwise] be produced,
causing it never to arise ....
2. In regard to its name and the way it is acquired, the MYS, 164b, explains [SA.IV.486]:
It is called a cessation independent of deliberation because it is not acquired through
deliberative understanding, not being an effect of deliberation. Furthermore, it is so
called because it is not acquired through deliberation by means of necessary effort,
necessary preparation or necessary exertion. Furthermore, ... because its acquisition
does not require the repeated ascertaining of dulJkha, etc ....
It is [acquired] on account of the deficiency in conditions (pratyaya-vaikalyat). Thus,
when one is focused [on an object] in one direction, all the other objects-visible,
sound, smell, taste and tangible-in the other directions cease ....
3. In regard to the object of acquisition, moral quality, etc., of the apratisaf!lkhyanirodhas,
the MYS lists the following (SA.IV.488f.):
The apratisaf!lkhyii-nirodha-s are acquired with regard to the future conditioned
dharma-s .destined not to arise; ... are non-defined (avyakrta), and so are their
acquisitions; ... are outflow-free (aniisrava), and their acquisitions are with-outflow
only; ... are not bound to any sphere, and their acquisitions are bound to the three
spheres orily; ... are neither-trainee-nor-nontrainee (naiva-saik:ja-nasaik:ja), and so
are their acquisitions; ... are not to be abandoned, and their acquisitions are to be
abandoned by cultivation only; ... may be either defiled or non-defiled, and so are
their acquisitions; ... are without retribution, and so are their acquisitions; ... are
neither paths nor fruits of the paths (miirga-phala), and their acquisitions are both;
... are not subsumed under the truths (satya), and their acquisitions are subsumed
under two truths, namely the truths of unsatisfactoriness and of origin (dulJkha- and
samudaya-satya).
4. As for the quantity of the cessations not due to deliberation, it is even greater than that of
the cessations through deliberation, the former being as numerous as the conditioned dharmas,
whereas the quantity of the latter is orily in accordance with that of the with-outflow dharmas.
Verdu: EBP.134ff., 144f.
70
LS: Hall comments (VASC.55): "Calling this the 'total' prevention of future arising rules
out those meditative attainments (asarrijfii- and nirodha-samiipatti) that, while they are in
effect, temporarily inhibit the arisal of future thoughts and concomitants. The use of 'arising'
rules out cessation-through-impermanence, which is the total prevention of the 'stability'
(sthiti)-not the arising-of dhannas."
71
LVP: MVS, 164bl3. -TheKathiivatthu, ii. 11, attributes to the Mahi:rp.siisakas (Wassilief,
p. 282) and to the Andhakas the distinction of cessation due to deliberation and cessation not
due to deliberation (pafisarrikhiinirodha and appatisarrikhiinirodha). Sa:rp.kara discusses these
two cessations ad ii. 2, 22 (see Album Kem, 111); he mixes up cessation not due to delibera-
tion and cessation of impennanence (anityatiinirodha) (i. 20ab).
LS: Hall comments (VASC.56): "According to Yasomitra (WOG.17-18), among the four
'preconditions' (the hetu-, samanantara-, iilambana-, and adhipati-pratyayas), this instance
shows a deficiency of the iilambana-pratyaya (of the cognitive object as a precondition for the
arisal of future thought moments)."
72
LS: The four alternatives (catu1-koti) have the following set-up:
1. p is true, not q (purva-piidaka);
2. q is true, not p (pascat-piidaka);
3. bothp and q are true (evarri-piidaka);
4. neither p nor q is true (naivam-piidaka).
73
LVP: This classification rests on two principles: (1) There can be cessation due to
deliberation (pratisarrikhyanirodha), (disconnection, detachment) from impure factors, of
whatever time period they may be, whether they are or are not destined to arise. (2) There is
cessation not due to deliberation (apratisarrikhyanirodha) of all factors, pure or impure, that
are not destined to arise: the future factors exist: they will arise when the causes of arising
cause "them to pass from the future into the present; they will not arise when one obtains their
cessation not due to deliberation. For example, the noble ones, at a certain moment, obtain the
impossibility of being reborn in an animal womb: they obtain the cessation not due to
deliberation of the animal womb, which is henceforth not destined .•o arise (anutpattidharman)
for them.
The Fortunate One says of the stream-enterer (srotaapanna): "For them the hells, the animal
wombs, the existences of the hungry ghosts (preta) are exhausted (niruddha)" (compare
Sarriyutta, v. 356, khf,:zanirayo khf,:zatiracchanayoniko .. . ). - The cessation not due to delibera-
tion is a factor in and of itself that renders the arising of such and such a factor absolutely
impossible for whoever possesses (prapti) [this cessation]. This absolute non-arising does not
result from the [mere] deficiency of the causes, for when later the necessary causes presented
themselves, the factor would have to arise, [but this is not so]: it is thus the possession of the
cessation not due to deliberation that renders the sufficient coming together of the causes and
the arising definitively impossible.
See ii. 55cd and v. 24.
74
LS: AH 5-6; SAH 5-7.
75
LS: This question: katame te sarrikskrta~? refers to conditioned factors in general, i.e.,
both pure (anasrava) and impure (siisrava).
DharmasrI writes and comments (AH 6):

6. All the formed that is pure, free from afflictions, and all the various aggregates
of grasping, are the aggregates, expounded by the noble. They are the five
aggregates: form, feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness.
I.e., the formed factors-because they are produced by causes-that are free from
the afflictions: the view of individuality, etc., and that are free from the impurities,
all these and the previously mentioned aggregates of grasping are all called
aggregates.* They are the five aggregates: form, feeling, perception, formation, and
consciousness.
* The aniisrava sal'{lskrtas and the siisrava sal'{lskftas (upiidiinaskandhos), i.e., all sal'{lskrtas
are called skandhas, aggregates.]
76
Gokhale: [7ab] te puna!J sal'{lskrtii dharmii riipiidiskandhapaficakam I
Tib.: [7ab] 'dus byas chos rnams de dag kyang Igzugs la sog~ pa'i phung po Inga I
LVP: The term skandha is explained in i. 20.
sa'['krta, Visuddhi, 293.
LS: Gedun Drup says (p. 13) that "also" or "on the other hand" means: "Not only do the
unconditioned have divisions, the conditioned also have divisions."
77
LS: AH6.
78
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.38): "What is conditioned is what is dependently
originated (pratftya-samutpanna) and characterized by the four characteristics of the condi-
tioned (sal'{lskrta-lak~a,:1iini: jiiti, sthiti, jariilanyathiitva, anityatii/vyaya) [see AKB ii. 45cd].
These four-each a distinct force-are real entities belonging to the class of viprayukta-
samskiira which together cause a so-called conditioned dharma to be impermanent, nay,
momentary (k~a,;iika)."
SA.IV.473: "In its aspect of being a dependently co-arisen (pratftya-samutpanna) existent, a
conditioned dharma is called a sal'{lskrta-'compounded', 'co-produced', 'conditioned'. In its
other aspect of being a causally productive force, it is also called a sal'{lskiira-'conditioning'
or 'conditioning force'."
79
LS: The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.20.22f.]: taj-jiitfyatviit sva-lak~a~a-sadrsyatvat.
According to the Vaibha~ikas, the svala~a,;ia (= svabhiiva) of a conditioned factor remains at
all times, while its special activity (kiiritra), which is neither different from nor completely
identical with the svabhiiva of a factor (dharma), arises and ceases.
Collett Cox summarizes Sarµghabhadra (EIP.VIII.652): "Future factors that have not yet
arisen, and even those that will not arise, can still be said to be conditioned because they are of
the same category as those present or past factors that have already arisen."
80
LS: AH 218; SAH 451.
81
Gokhale: [7cd] ta evii 'dhvii kathiivastu sanitisiiriilJ savastukiilJ
Tib.: [7cd] de dag nyid dus gtam gzhi dang Inges par 'byung bcas gzhi dang bcas I
82
LS: Hall comments (V ASC.58): "As Yasomitra makes clear, the word adhvan, which
means 'extent in space' (course, road) and 'extent in time' (duration, tense), here indicates the
'three times'."
83
LVP: According to the Siitra: trff}fmiini bhik~ava/:1 kathiivastiiny acaturthiiny apaficamiini
yiiny iisrityiiryii/:1 kathilf!l kathayanta/:1 kathayanti I katamiini trff}i I atftaf!l kathiivastu aniigataf!l
kathiivastu pratyutpannaf!l kathiivastu.
Compare Aliguttara, i. 197.
Saiµghabhadra, 633c13.
84 '
LVP: xxiii. 10, fol. 44a4: "The three paths, the three grounds for discourse (kathiivastu)
(1) are included in the eighteen elements, the twelve sense-spheres, the five aggregates; (2) are
known by nine cognitions, excluding the cognition of cessation (nirodhajfiiina); (3) are
cognized by six consciousnesses; (4) are affected by all proclivities (anusaya)."
85
LVP: Why is the unconditioned rtot a ground of discourse? - Because it is not the cause
of discourse (ii. 55); because there is no history of the unconditioned, in the same way that
one can say: "DTpaiµkara was such ... ; Maitreya will be ... ; King Kapphina (?) is such."
(WOG.21.21f.).
LS: Gedun Drup states (p. 14): "Although uncompounded phenomena are the objects of
expression of names, they are not presented as being a basis for conversation due to not being
causes and seldom being objects of expression."
86
LVP: According to Prakaraf}a, 716b23, we can reconstruct: san*siirii dharmii/:1 katame?
sarve sarriskrtii dharmii/:1.
One should "leave" not only the impure factors but also the (noble) path. The Vyiikhyii
[WOG.21.25f.] cites the text on the abandonment of the raft, Majjhima, i. 135; Vajracchedikii
§ 6: kolopamaf!l dharmaparyiiyam iijiinadbhir dharmii api prahiitavyii/:1 priig eviidharmii iti.
(Coqipare Bodhicaryiivatiira, ix. 33; Katha, ii. 14).
kolopama, viii, F 186.
LS: Geshe Jampa Gyatso comments: "According to the Vaibhii~ikas when one attains a
nirviif}a without remainder one leaves all compounded phenomena behind. The Dharma
aggregate:-..true paths-is likened to. a boat because, just as a boat is necessary to cross an
ocean but when the far shore is reached it is left behind, so too is the Dharma aggregate
necessary when one is in cyclic existence but is left behind when one attains a nirviif}a without
remainder."
87
LVP: According to Prakaraf}a, 716a3: savastukii/:1 sapratyayii dharmii/:1 katame? - sarri-
skrtii dharmii/J. - See ii. 55 at the end.
88
LVP: vastu signifies cause (hetu) according to the etymology [WOG.21.29]: vasanty
asmin priik kiiryiil)i pasciit tata utpattir iti.
Here the Vyiikhyii cites a fragment of the Bhiirya ad ii. 55 (at the end), on the five meanings of
the .word vastu in the Scripture (MVS, 980b12). - For Vasubandhu, savastuka signifies real:
the conditioned factors are real; the unconditioned factors are unreal.
LS: Hall comments (V ASC.59): "Here Yasomitra interprets this 'so say'' (kila) as Vasu-
bandhu's tacit endorsement of the Sautriintika view. The latter takes 'grounded' [sa~vastu-ka]
to mean that the conditioned dharmas are 'substantially existent' (savastuka = sasvabhiiva
= dravyasat), while the unconditioned dharmas exist merely as designations (prajiiapti-sat)."
89
LS: AH 5; SAH 5-6.
90
LS: Ibid.
91
Gokhale: [8ab 1] ye siisrava upiidiinaskandhiis te
Tib.: [8abl] gang dag zag bcas nyerlen pa'i lphung po'ang de dag
92
LVP: The MVS, 386cl2f. gives fourteen explanations of the term upiidiinaskandha. Vasu-
bandhu cites the first three explanations.
On aggregate (khanda) and appropriative aggregate (upiidiinakkhandha), Visuddhimagga, xiv,
apud Warren, p. 155.
93
LS: AH 5; SAH 5.
94
Gokhale: [8b2] sara,:ia api I
Tib.: [8b2] 'thab bcas kyang I
LVP: On ra~, sara,:ia, ara,:iii (vii. 35c), see Museon, 1914, p. 35; Walleser, Die Streitlosigkeit
des Subhiiti (Heidelberg, 1917); Majjhima, iii, 235.
LS: Dharmatriita comments (SAH.14): "There are three kinds of conflict (ra,:ia): conflict
defilement, conflict aggregate and conflict dispute. Conflict defilement is one hundred and
eight defilements; conflict aggregate is dying (mara,:ia); conflict dispute is the one opposing
the other. It should be known that [here] this conflict defilement is spoken of."
95
LS: AH 5, 236; SAH 5, 471.
96
Gokhale: [8cd] du[lkhal!I samudayo loko drffisthiinal!I bhavas ca te II
Tib.: [8cd] sdug bsngal kun 'byung 'jig rten dang I lta gnas srid pa 'ng de dag yin I
97
LS: See A V.66 and Schmithausen's Zur Buddhistischen Lehre von der dreifachen Leid-
haftigkeit (1977).
98
LVP: asminn eva rohita vyiiyiimamiitre kalevare lokal!I prajiiapayiimi lokasamudayaT[I ca
(Anguttara, ii. 48: rohitassadevaputta). - The Fortunate One further said: luhyate praluhyate
tasmiil lokal:i (SaT[lyutta, iv. 52). - A~fasiihasrikii, p. 256; Mahiivyutpatti, 154, t6 (Wogihara,
Bodhisattvabhiimi, Leipzig 1908, p. 37). -The root is luji, not Loki.
99
LS: Since other defilements also increase by having impure factors as their locus,
Jampaiyang asks (p. 176) why impure factors are called "locus of afflicted views". He replies
by quoting master Pii.11).avardhana:
At all times and for all,
view is without fragmentation and immutable.
Accordingly, attachment, etc., and
ignorance and doubt are not (that).
100
LVP: bhavatfti bhava[I. - Vyiikhyii [WOG.23.13]: According to the text: bhava[I katamal:i I
paiicopiidanaskandha[I.
Hsiian-tsang translates: "They are the threefold existence."
The source of Vasubandhu appears to be the Prakara,:ia, 715a9: "Which factors are existence
(bhava)? The impure factors. Which factors are not existence? The pure factors."
bhava; viii, 141.
JOI LS: AH 7-9, 14; SAH 7-15, 17-26, 51-52, 411, 458-59.
As for the threefold classification, see our endnote (i. 4) regarding the overall structure of the
first two chapters of the AKB.
The abhidharmic classifications or taxonomies of factors (dharma) into the five aggregates
(skandha), twelve sense-spheres (iiyatana) and eighteen elements (dhiitu) were at first taken
over from the satras by the Abhidharmikas for the examination of factors (dharma) in terms
of their intrinsic nature (svabhiiva) by the methodological device of inclusion (sarµ.graha;
SA.IV.22f., 2~35; cf. AKB i. 18).
1. The five aggregates (skandha) constitute the totality of phenomenal existence-with
emphasis on an ontological perspective-and this taxonomy is often employed in the satras to
explain the Buddhist doctrine of no-Self (nairiitmya). The AKB explains skandha as "heap or
group of mass" (riisi). The five aggregates do not include the three unconditioned factors, and
thus include seventy-two dharmas in the Vaibhii~ika system.
2. The twelve sense-spheres comprise the six sense-faculties (indriya) and the six corre-
sponding objects. The AKB explains iiyatana as "gate of arising" (iiyadviira) of thought (citta)
and thought-concomitants (caitta) and as such reflects the emphasis on an epistemological
perspective. The twelve sense-spheres include the three unconditioned factors in the twelfth
sense-sphere, i.e., the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana), and thus include seventy-five
dharmas in the Vaibhii~ika system.
3. The eighteen elements comprise the six sense-faculties, the six corresponding objects
and the six corresponding consciousnesses, and as such reflect again an emphasis on an
epistemological perspective. Dhammajoti points out again (SA.IV.30) that originally in the
sutras, "the 18-dhiitu taxonomy was a pragmatic classificatory scheme mainly employed to
underscore the Buddha's no-Self doctrine". The AKB explains dhiitu as gotra (family, race,
lineage, mine, source, genus). The eighteen elements include the three unconditioned factors in
the twelfth element, i.e., the element of factors (dharmadhiitu), and thus include seventy-five
dharmas in the Vaibhii~ika system.
4. Dhammajoti finds some incongruities concerning the Sarviistiviida explanations on
dharmiiyatana and dharmadhiitu, which will be addressed later (i. 15bd; cf. SA.IV.32f.).
5. In further endnotes, we will also address the controversy regarding the ontological status
or reality of skandha, iiyatana and dhiitu (cf. SA.IV.34f.).
102
LS: Skandha will be explained (i. 20ab) by Vasubandhu as "heap" (riisi), i.e., each of _the
five skandhas forms a heap of its own category which may be past, present or future, on the
other hand, Saqighabhadra maintains that skandha does not signify heap, but "that which is
susceptible of being collected together in a heap". Skandha is also discussed (i. F 38) as that
which carries a load or as a part. The five aggregates constitute the totality of phenomenal
existence but do not include the three unconditioned factors (see i. 22ab), which, being beyond
space and time, do not form such heaps. The import of this taxonomy will be brought out when
Vasubandhu discusses dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida), where he shows (iii. 18)
350 Exposition of the Elements (Dhatunirdesa).
that phenomena are all dependently arisen-i.e., without any ontological status, as, for
example, a permanent and independent self (atman)--and all reducible to these five skandhas
which alone are the ultimate reals forming the basis of our conceptual superimposition. The
Vaibhii~ikas consider the skandhas to be real entities (dravya). See SA.IV.25f.
JO~ LS: AH 7; SAH 7-8, 15.
As for material form, Vasubandhu provides further detail at various places in the AKB, but in
particular:
l. throughout his presentation of the twenty-two doctrinal perspectives on the eighteen
sense-spheres (i. 29ff.): (2) resistant (sapratigha) - non-resistant (apratigha); (9) pri-
mary matter (bhata) - secondary matter (bhautika); (JO) aggregated (saT(lcita) and
non-aggregated (asaT(lcita); (16) internal (adhyatimika) - external (bahya); (19) view
(driti)- not view (na dmi) [especially: Do atoms touch one another or riot? Arrange-
ment of the atoms of the sense-faculties?];
2. when discussing the simultaneous arising of material factors (ii. 22): real-entity
atoms (dravyaparama,:iu) and the composite molecule (saT(lghataparamanu);
3. when presenting the units for calculating space (physical matter) from the smallest
unit, i.e., the atom (parama,:iu), up to one league (yojana) (iii. 85l>-88a);
4. when discussing the third member of the twelvefold dependent origination (pratftya-
samutpiida; see iii. 18-38c), which is called name-and-form (niimarupa). For its
definition and meaning within the four types of dependent origination, i.e., momen-
tary (~anika), prolonged (prakarfika), connected (sliT(lbandhika), pertaining to states
(avasthika), see chapter 3, as for the fourth type, i.e., within a three-life-times model,
. it is defined as: "Name-and-form (namarupa) [is the five aggregates, in the womb,]
(i) from this moment [i.e., existence-as-birth], (iii) until the (complete) arising of
the six sense-spheres."
For a good discussion of (a) the general nature and definition of rapa, (b) primary and derived
matter and (c) atomic theory, see SA.IV.187-209.
104
LS: AH 7; SAH 7-8, 15.
105
Gokhale: [9ab] rupaT(I paficendriya,:iy arthal,i pafica 'vijfiaptir eva ca I
I
Tib.: [9ab] gzugs ni dbang po Inga dang don Inga dang rnam rig byed min nyid I
LVP: Compare the Prakara,:iapada, chapter I (Paficavastuka).
LS: Before discussing (i. F 24-27) more formal definitions of material form (rapa) in terms of
its self~characteristic (svala~a,:ia) or intrinsic nature (svabhava), Vasubandhu, in accordance
with early sutra and abhidharma custom, presents merely a delimitation-definition, i.e.,
a listing of eleven items, which are not only eleven derivative material elements (upadaya-
rupa) but include the four fundamental material elements (mahabhata) among the tangible.
Later (i, F 35), in the context of discussing the meaning of the term skandha as heap (rasi), he
adds the following satr« based delimitation-definition:
Whatever material form (rapa) there is, (1) past [atfta] or future [anagata] or present
pratyutpanna], (2) internal [adhyatmika] or external [bahya], (3) gross [audarika] or
subtle [sukima], (4) inferior [hfna] or superior [pra,:ifta]: (5) distant [dura] or near
[antika], if all this material form-that which is past, etc.-is grouped together into
one heap [aikadhyam abhisarrik~ipya], this is called aggregate of material form.
By contrast, Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka and Skandhila's Avatiira give only a delimitation-
definition based on the division between mahabhiita and upiidiiyariipa. See below the Sanskrit
text based on the original Sanskrit text of Vasubandhu's Paiioaskandhaka (critically edited by
Li Xuezhu and Ernst Steinkellner, 2008; words not attested by Paficaskandhakavibhii~a
[Sthiramati] [= photostat copy of the Potala Ms, which has seven missing lines at the
beginning] are in non-italics):
l. riiparri katamat. I yat kificid riipam, sarvaiµ tac catviiri mahabhiitiini catviiri ca
~ahabhiitiiny upadiiya I
1.1 catvari mahabhutani katamani I prthividhatur abdhatus tejodhatur vayudhatus ca
I tatra pfthividhatul). katamal). I khakkhatatvam I abdhatul). katamal). I snehal). I tejo-
dhatul). katamaI:i I u~ma I vayudhatul). katamal). I laghusamudirru:iatvam I
1.2 upadiiyariiparri katamat I cak~urindriya'!I srotrendriyaiµ ghra1,1.endriyaiµ jihva-
indriyaiµ kayendriyaiµ rupaiµ sabdo gandho rasal). spra~tavyaikadeso 'vijfiaptis ca II
tatra cak~urindriyarri katamat I var~avi~ayo riipaprasiida~ I srotrendriyarri katamat
I sabdavi~ayo riipaprasiida~ I ghra1,1.endriyaiµ katamat I gandhavi~ayo rupaprasadal). I
jihvendriyaiµ katamat I rasavi~ayo riipaprasadal). I kayendriyaiµ katamat I spra~tavya-
vi~ayo rupaprasadal). I rupaiµ katamat I cak~urvi~ayal}. - var~~ sal!ISthiinarri vijfiaptis
ca Isabda~ katama~ Isrotravi~aya~ - upiitto 'nupiitta ubhayas ca catviiri mahabhiUiiny
upiidiiya I gandha~ katama~ I ghrii~avi~aya~ - sugandho durgandhas tadanyac ca I
rasa~ katama~ Ijihvavi~aya~ - madhuro 'rnlo lava1,1.al). katukas tikta~ ka~iiyas ceti I
spra~ravyaikadesa~ katama~ Ikiiyendriyasya vi~ayo mahabhiitiini sthapayitva slak~~a-
tvarri karkasatvarri gurutvarri laghutvarri sftarri jig hats.ii pipiisii ca I avijiiapti~ katamii I
vijfiaptisamiidhijarri riipam anidarsanam apratigham 11
Engle translates (ISBP.229f.):
1. What is form? It is all form whatsoever that is included in the four great ele-
ments and that is derived from the four great elements.
1.1 What are the four great elements? The earth constituent, the water constituent,
the fire constituent, and the air constituent. [ ... ]
1.2 What is derivative form? The eye-faculty, [visible] form, sound, smell, taste,
a portion of tangible objects, and noninformative [form].
The Avatiira has (ESD.73):
Matter is of two kinds: The Great Elements (mahiibhuta) and the derived matter
(upiidiiyariipalbhautika).
106
LS: As for the five sense-faculties, in particular the eye sense-faculty, see Vasubandhu's
detailed discussion (i. 41-47) of the 19 th doctrinal perspective on the eighteen sense-spheres:
view (dmi) - not view (na dr~(i). Here is a brief outline of most of the points discussed:
1. Different views on whether the eye sense-faculty or the visual consciousness sees.
2. Are visible forms seen by one eye or by two eyes?
3. Perception of the object with or without reaching it with the sense-faculty.
4. When the sense-faculty reaches the object-field, do atoms touch one another or not?
5. Size of the sense-faculties and their object-fields.
6. Atoms of the sense-faculties.
6.1. Arrangement of the atoms of the sense-faculties.
6.2. Homogeneous and partially homogeneous atoms of the sense-faculties
6.3. Aggregations as sense-faculties and cognitive objects of the sensory conscious-
nesses & the invisibility of real-entity atoms.
7 .. Simultaneity and non-simultaneity of the object-field or sense-faculty with its con-
sciousness.
8. Why is the sense-faculty the basis (iisraya) of consciousness and not the object-field?
9. Why are the sense-faculties the basis for naming the consciousnesses?
As for Vasubandhu's presentation of the underlying atomic structure of the sense-faculties, see
ii. 22. But in regard to the atomic theory "in general", it is good to keep in mind Dhammajoti's
following comment (SA.IV.198f.):
Unlike the doctrine of the Great Elements, the Buddhist atomic theory is not discern-
able in the siitra-s. It was likely to have been taken over from outside the Buddhist
schools-probably from the Vaise~ika. However, no Buddhists-including the Sarvasti-
vada Abhidharmika-s-would conceive of atoms as being eternally immutable or
permanent. ... Atoms are in fact momentary .... At least by the time of MVS, the
Buddhist Abhidharmika-s had already articulated the theory to a large extent in their
own way.
As for the different epistemological models (Vaibha~ika, SrTiata, Vasubandhu) regarding
sensory' perception, see Vasubandhu' s detailed discussion-in the context of his presentation
of dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida)-in iii. F 101-7, in connection with which we
have written longer endnotes on the three types of direct perception (pratyak,Ja) of the
Vaibha~ika and the representational perception of the Sautrantika.
107
LS: As for the five object-referents (artha) or object-fields (visaya), see Vasubandhu's
discussion (1) of the 2nd doctrinal perspective on the eighteen sense-spheres: resistant (saprati-
gha) - non-resistant (apratigha), which includes a discussion of the three types of obstruction
(pratighata) and defines object-field (vi,Jaya) as that place where the eye, ear, etc., exercises its
operation [karitra], i.e., seeing, hearing, etc., and cognitive object (iilambana) as that which is
grasped by thought and thought-concomitants (cittacaitta), (2) of the 7 th doctrinal perspective:
having a cognitive object (siilambana) and not having a cognitive object (aniilambana), and
(3) the 20 th doctrinal perspective: cognized (vijfzeya) by consciousness. See also the above
given outline of the 19 th doctrinal perspective.
As for Vasubandhu's presentation of the underlying atomic structure.of the object-fields,
see ii. 22.
108 LS: In general, the non-informative (avijfzapti) can refer to non-informative form
(avijfzapti-riipa) and non-informative action (avijfzapti-karma). Cf. i. 11, 13 (F 25-27), 15bd;
iv. 4--44.
The SA.IV.Glossary.520 describes them as follows:
avijfzapti-riipa: Non-informative matter. This is a special type of matter (riipa)
which constitutes a non-informative action (avijfiapti-karma). It is non-resistant and

invisible, and comes into existence in dependence on the force of a volition (cetana),
an informative action and a set of great elements (mahabhiita). It is a special type of
derived matter (upadiiya-riipa) which is not comprised of atoms (paramar:iu).
avijfiapti-karma: Non-informative action. Unlike an informative action (vijfiapti
karma) which informs us of the mental state of the doer, this is a karmic force which,
once projected by a bodily or vocal action (karma), continues to exist as a series
invisibly; hence, non-informative.
109
LS: SAH 15.
110
Gokhale: [9cd] tadvijfianasraya riipaprasadas cak~uradayalJ I
Tib.: [9cd] de dag rnams kyi rnam shes rten I mig la sogs gzugs dang ba rnams II
LVP: The five sense-faculties (indriya) are suprasensible (atfndriya), transparent (accha),
distinct from the object of the sense-faculties, distinct from visible form, tangible, etc. It is
through logical reasoning that we cognize their existence. They have for their support (adhi-
~fhana) what common language calls the eye, etc. (i. 44ab).
On pasadacakkhu, cakkhupasada, Dhammasaitgar:ii, 616, 628.
The sense-faculties are bhiitavikaravise~a.
LS: 1. As for transparency, AKB i. 36ac states: "The S(;.1se-faculties do not cut off because of
their translucidity or transparency (acchatva), just like the light or glitter of a [luminescent]
gem (mar:iiprabha)."
2. As for obstructiveness and resistance, the MYS (63a) explains (SA.IV.192):
Because [the atoms of the sense-faculties] are transparent/clear in nature, they do not
mutually obstruct one another. That is to say, for such· a type of derived clear matter,
even when a large number of them are accumulated together, there is no mutual
obstruction. It is like the water in an autumn pond; on account of its clarity, even a
needle that is dropped into it can be visible.
Even though the atoms of the sense-faculties do not obstruct one another, i. 29bc (F 5 lf.) states
that they are resistant (sapratigha) when encountering their object-field.
3. As for riipaprasada, LVP renders it as "elements materiels subtils". Dhammajoti-
glossing (SA.IV.Glossary) prasada as "clarity, translucence, sensitivity (said of the sense
faculties)"-renders "clear matter" or "very subtle and perspicuous (prasada) kinds of matter"
or "translucent, sensitive matter".
Edgerton gives (p. 388): "(l) faith ... (2) tranquillity of the four physical elements (dhatu) in
sense-organs, as resulting in the sensitivity of the organs and so in sense-perception: Sik~
250.14ff; cf. 25 lf, which by contrast with k~obha (agitation) proves what prasada means .... "
Verdu, in his discussion of riipaskandha (EPB.21-38), elaborates on this notion of tranquility
or equilibrium (p. 24):
The idea seems to suggest that, in the production of this subtle "translucent" matter
(riipaprasada), the four activities that characterize the four mahabhiitas neutralize
one another into a perfect state of equilibrium .... Its prasada-translucidity (accha-
tva) would allow the permeation of these five prasiida-indriyii,:zi (sense-organs) by

the subject-awareness seated in the vijiiiina-dharma (fifth of the skandhas). Their
being "not resistant" (apratigha) to the dharma of the subjective awareness (vijiiiina)
would make them suprasensitive (atfndriya) to the "grosser" resistance (pratighiita)
offered to them by the other five derivative matters, i.e., the gross-matters or objects
of sensation. These coarser matters derive· from the four mahiibhiitas according to
the unbalar1ced combinations which would allow certain characteristics of the former
to predominate upon the others. The absence of "tranquillity" or "equilibrium"
(aprasiida) among the four elements-always entering into the composition of these
coarse and external (biihya) matters-would bring about the different physical deter-
minations that these latter exhibit, either as "colors and shapes" or as "sounds", or as
'"smells", or as "tastes", or as "tactile'! objects of sensation.
ui LVP: See the Siitra cited i. 35. - Compare Vibhaliga, 122; Psychology, 173.
112
LVP: The first interpretation according to the MVS, 369b21.
113
LS: SAH 15.
114
Gokhale: [10a] riipaf!! dvidhii Vif!!satidhii
Tib.: [10a] gzugs rnam gnyis dang rnam nyi shu I
LVP: MVS, 64a5; Mahiivyutpatti, 101; compare Dhammasaliga,:zi, 617.
115
LS: SAH 15.
6
u LVP: The Sautriintikas deny that shape is anything other than color (iv, F 8-12).
LS: As for the ontological status of color and shape, Dhammajoti states (SA.IV.200) that
althou•gh individual atoms of colors (such as blue, etc.) and shapes (such as long, etc.) are not
directly perceivable by the eye and visual consciousness, in their collective and accumulative
capacity they function as vi.sible objects, for the Vaibhii~ikas, since "if there were no individ-
ual atoms of color and shape, an agglomeration of atoms would not, for instance, become
green or long" (MVS, 64ab). For the Vaibhii~ikas, therefore, the individual atoms as well as
the agglomeration of atoms of the same type as perceivable visible forms-in contrast to a
unification of atoms of diverse species-are both real entities.
For the SautraO:tika, on the other hand, only color (var,:za) is a real entity (dravya), whereas
shape (saf!!sthiina) is merely a mental fabrication or provisional entity (prajiiapti), i.e., the so-
called shape atoms ate simply the color atoms arranged in various ways. See Vasubandhu's
proof in iv, F 8-12.
117
LS: LVP has: "blue, red, yellow, white", but Pradhan.6.12 and WOG.25.Sf., as well as the
Tibetan, have: "blue, yellow, red, white".
118
LS: Avatiira defines (ESD.74): "A square shape is that whose boundary is squa.re."
119
LS: Avatiira defines (ibid.): "A round shape is one [whose boundary] is circular."
120
LS: Yasomitra glosses [WOG.25.16f.]: unnatarri sthiil'iidi-riipaiµ.
121
LS: Yasomitra glosses [WOG.25.17.]: avanataf[I nimna-riipaiµ.
122
LS: Avatiira speaks (ESD.74) of twenty-one visible forms that are the object-fields
(vi~aya) of the visual consciousness as well as the mental consciousness induced thereby.
123
LVP: Vijiiiinakiiya, xxiii. 9, 45b18; MVS, 390b24.
. 124
LVP:. Dhammasaliga,:ii, 636.
125
LS: L VP mentions the Sautrii.ntikas here, but they are not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan.
126
LS: SAH 15.
127
LS: ibid.
128
Gokhale: [lObl] sabdas tv a~favidho
Tib.: [10b] sgra ni rnam pa brgyad yod de I
LVP: Dhammasaliga,:ii, 621.
129
LS: LVP _translates upiitta here as actuel, as does Jha.
Avatiira comments (ESD.74): "What is integrated into the human organism (iitmabhiiva) is
said to be appropriated [by consciousness], which is to say conscious; otherwise they are said
to be unappropriated."
130
LVP: sattviikhya = sattvam iica~(e. Any factor that denotes a sentient being is called
sattviikhya ("indicative of sentient beings"). When we hear the sound that constitutes the vocal
informative action (viigvijiiapti; iv. 3d), we know: "This is a sentient being."
LS: Articulate sound.
131
L VP: Any sound different from speech is asattviikhya ("non-indicative of sentient
beings").
LS: Inarticu1ate sound.
132
LS: SAH 15.
Even though Vasubandhu presented the usual order: rupa, sabda, gandha, rasa and spra~favya
in i. 9ab, here he explains rasa before gandha.
133
LS: SAH 15
134
Gokhale: [10b2cl] rasa[I I~o<)hii
Tib.: [lOcl] ro ni rnam drug
LVP: According to Dharmaskandha, 9, 9, of fourteen types. Compare Dhammasaliga,:ii, 629.
LS: Avatiira comments (ESD.75): "All these six kinds are the objects of the gustatory con-
sciousness and the mental consciousness induced thereby."
135
LS: SAH 15.
136
LS: Ibid.
137
Gokhale: [10c2] caturvidho gandha[I
Tib.: [10c2] dri rnam bzhi I
LVP: Dhammasaliga,:ii, 625.
Dharmatrii.ta comments (SAH.26): 'The sense-field smell (gandhiiyatana) is threefold: agree-
able smells, disagreeable smells and neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable smells."
138
LS: Avatiira comments (ESD.75): "That which nourishes the Great Elements of the sense-
faculties is said to be a good smell. That which does damage to them is said to be a bad smell.
356 Exf;osition of the Elements (Dhatunirdesa)
That which does neither the one nor the other, is said to be neutral. All these three kinds of
smell are the objects of the olfactory consciousness and of the mental consciousness induced
thereby."
139
IS: SAH 15.
140
IS: Ibid.
141
Gokhale: [10d] wrsyam ekiidasiitmakam I
Tib.: [lO_d] reg bya bcu gcig bdag nyid do I
LVP: MYS, 661cl4ff. Dhammasangar_zi, 648. - See I 35.
For middha and miirchana as being part of the tangible, see Siddhi, 410.
IS: The eleven tangibles consist of four fundamental material elements and seven derivative
material elements (bhautika; upiidiiyariipa). See ii. 65, where Vasubandhu discusses:
1. two ways in which fundamental material elements are a cause of fundamental mate-
rial elements;
2. five ways in which the fundamental material elements are the enabling cause of
derivative material elements;
3. three ways in which derivative material elements are a cause of derivative material
elements;
4. one way in which derivative material elements are a cause of fundamental material
elements.
See also below i. 12-13, where Vasubandhu discusses the fundamental material elements
(mahiibhiita) and elementary substances (dhiitu), their efficacies, their intrinsic nature and the
difference to common usages of earth, water, etc.
See further ii. 22, which discusses the four fundamental material elements within Buddhist
atomic theory and how we. can know that the molecule includes the four fundamental
elements.
142
IS: Even though the orthodox Vaibhii~ikas hold that the eleven tangibles are real entities,
LVP shows in his Introduction (p. xlvii; cf. also SA.IV.193) that among the four great masters
of the Sarviistiviida lineage Buddhadeva maintains that material form (riipa) consists merely of
fundamental material elements, i.e., that the derivative material elements (bhautika) are merely
a state (avasthii) or specific types (vise$a) of the fundamental material elements (mahilbhiita).
Dharmatriita, on the other hand, accepts the derivative material elements as distinct real
entities, but holds that there are no derivative tangibles, i.e., that the tangibles consist only of
the fundamental material elements. And Sthavira Sriliita also denies the existence of the
derivative tangibles, which are for him nothing more than the specific configuration of the
fundamental material elements.
143
LS: Earth, water, fire and wind are subsumed here under the tangibles (spr~tavya)
because their functions (i.e., supporting, cohesion, heating or maturation, and expansion) can
only be experienced through the body sense-faculty.
144
IS: Sarpghabhadra states (Ny, 333c) that each of the following seven derivative types of
tangibles results from a predominance or difference in intensity of one of the four fundamental
material elements. MYS, 665a, specifies (SA.IV.195):
5. water and fire for smoothness;

6. earth and wind for roughness;
7. earth and water for heaviness;
8. fire and wind for lightness;
9. water and wind for coldness;
10. wirid for hunger;
11. fire for thirst.
Saqighabhadra (Ny, 355b) criticizes Vasubandhu's explanation that the seven derivative tangi-
bles are due to the predominance of effect, whereas the orthodox Vaibhii~ika view is that they
are due to the predominance of substance.
On the other hand, since MYS, 682-683a, also explicitly maintains (SA.IV.196) that in a given
mass of rupa there can be ·a "quantitative" difference in the mahabhatas without contradicting
the principle of inseparability, it would follow that even though the four mahabhutas always
co-exist and are functionally interdependent, that they are not necessarily juxtaposed.
145
Oxford English Dictionary (Compact Edition): Hypallage = a figure of speech in which
there is an interchange of two elements of a proposition, the natural relations of these being
reversed.
146
LVP: Dhammapada, 194; Udanavarga, xxx. 23. - The appearance of the Buddhas is a
cause of happiness, not happiness itself.
147
LS: SAH 15.
148
LVP: See i. 30b.
149
LVP: According to MYS, 64al 1.
150
LVP: vii, F 17: Does one know the piece of cloth and the stain at the same time? -
dravyasvalak~alJa, iiyatanasvalak~a,:ia. Vasumitra, Sarviistivadins, thesis 28.
LS: See our note on intrinsic characteristic and common characteristic, and their relativity, at
i. F4.
151
LVP: The mental consciousness (manovijfiana) seizes the totality of the objects of the
sensory consciousnesses, i.e., visual consciousness (cak~urvijnana), etc.; this is why it is con-
sidered to have the common characteristic (samanyalak~alJa) for its sphere; in other words, it
is not specialized with respect to its object.
When, likewise, one says that the visual consciousness seizes the totality of the four objects of
the four visual consciousnesses bearing on blue, yellow, red and white, we should say that it
has the common characteristic for its sphere, since the characteristics of visible form, the
sense-sphere of visible form (rapayatana), are its object. The same for the auditory conscious-
ness, the olfactory consciousness, etc. - But this is in opposition to the Scripture.
Answer: - When the Scripture teaches that each of the five sensory consciousnesses has a
particular inherent characteristic (svalak~a,:1a) for its sphere, it refers to the particular or
unique or self (sva) characteristic (la~alJa) of the sense-spheres (ayatana), namely, the quality
of being the sense-sphere of visible form (rapayatana), i.e., the quality of being cognizable by
the visual consciousness, the quality of being the sense-sphere of sound (sabdayatana), i.e., the
quality of being cognizable by the auditory consciousness, etc. Scripture does not refer to the
particular inherent characteristic of real entities, namely, the quality of having a blue aspect or
the quality of being cognizable by a visual consciousness having a blue aspect, etc. It is not
from the point of view of these particular inherent characteristics of the real entities that the
five consciousnesses are said "to have the particular inherent characteristic for their sphere",
in other words, are said "to be specialized in regard to their object".
152
LS: According to Vaibhii~ika doctrine, a gustatory and tactile consciousness cannot arise
at the same time.
153
LS: SAH 8, 15.
154
Gokhale: [11] vik~iptii'cittakasyii 'pi yo 'nubandha[I subha'subha[I I mahiibhatiiny upiidiiya
sa hy avijiiaptir ucyate I\
Tib.: [11] g.yeng dang sems med pa yi yang I dge dang midge rjes 'brel gang I 'byung ba che
rnams sgyur byas pa \ de ni rnam rig byed min brjod II
LVP: Avijfiiipti will be described in detail at iv. 3d, etc. - It may be translated as non~
informative. This is an action that makes nothing known to another, in this way it resembles
the mental action; but [this action] is matter (rapa) and in this way it resembles the bodily and
vocal informative action. - We shall see that the Sautriintikas and Vasubandhu do not admit
the existence of a certain factor called the non-informative (avijfiapti).
Saiµghabhadra thinks that the definition of the non-informative, as Vasubandhu formulates it,
is not in conformity with the doctrine of the Vaibhii~ika. His objections (Nyiiyiinusiira) are
reproduced and refuted by Yasomitra (WOG.30.3lff.). In the Samayapradfpikii, he substitutes
a new verse (kiirikii) for the verse of Vasubandhu which Yasomitra cites [Ny, 335; WOG.32.21]:
krte 'pi visabhiige 'pi citte cittiityaye ca yat \
vyakrtapratigharri raparri sii hy avijiiaptir i~yate II
LS: Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka (2008) states:
avijiiapti[I katamii I vijfiaptisamiidhijarri rapam anidarsanam apratigham 11
What is noninformative [form]? It is form .that is derived either from informative

form or one-pointed concentration; and it ·is both not capable of being indicated and
does not possess resistance. ISBP.230
As already mentioned and briefly glossed (i. 9ab), the non-informative (avijiiapti) can refer to
non-informative form (avijiiapti-rupa) and non-informative action (avijfiapti-karma).
Here Vasubandhu gives his definition of the non-informative and, in his endnote, LVP provides
a brief introduction to the informative, explaining why this factor is called non-informative,
referring to Saiµghabhadra's "new verse", to whi'ch we will return below after first providing
more context and information about the features and history of the non-informative.
1. Here is a map for Vasubandhu's other main discussions regarding the non-informative:
As for the threefold classification of factors, below (i. 13), within the context of giving defini-
tions of material form (rapa), he will discuss how the non-informative can be included within
the aggregate of material form (rupaskandha) even though it is qualified as being "non-
resistant" (apratigha). Later (i. 15bd), he will include the informative with the sense-sphere of
factors (dharmiiyatana) and element of factors (dharmadhiitu) rather than in the rupa-iiyatana.
At iv. 3d-44 (F 14-105), Vasubandhu will discuss the non-informative in its aspect as non-
informative action in great detail:
First (F 14-25)-within the wider context of informative action (vijiiapti) and non-informative
action (avijiiapti)-he will discuss the ontological status of the non-informative action, giving
eight reasons by the Vaibha~ikas for its existence and their refutation by the Sautriintikas, and
then he will present (F 43-53) the three types of non-informative action:
i. restraint (sa,µvara ),
ii. non-restraint (asa,µvara),
iii. neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint (naivasarrivaraniisa,µvara),
whereby restraint is further divided into three types:
a. priitimok~a restraint (pratimok~asa,µvara),
b. restraint co-existent with meditation (dhyiinasa,µvara),
c. pure restraint (aniisravasa,µvara).
This is followed by a discussion (F 53-59) of the possession of informative and non-
informative action in regard to the time period to which these belong and by a discussion
(F 59-103) on how the three types of non-informative action can be acquired and how they
may be lost.
2. As for its specific features, even though it is classified as secondary matter (bhautika;
i. 35ac), it is a special case of rupa, since it is invisible (anidarsana; i. 29ab), non-resistant
(apratigha; i. 29bc), does not occupy space or have the nature of rupa!l(l (i. 13; MVS, 395a)
and is not atomic in nature (asa,µcita; i. 35d; Samayapradfpikii, 782a). It is said to be of the
nature of riipa (i. 13), since the fundamental material elements that constitute its basis (a.fraya)
are resistant material form. But, as already mentioned above, it is also included (i. 15bd) as a
special case under dharmiiyatana and dharmadhiitu, rather than rupiiyatana, which is justified
(iv. F 16: fifth reason) with the Elephant-simile satra reference to a specific rupa included in
the dharmiiyatana. It can be cognized only by mental consciousness (manovijfiiina) (ESD.78).
As for its moral quality (i. 30a), it is necessarily either wholesome (kusala) or unwholesome
(akusala), as pointed out by Vasubandhu in verse 11.
As for its ontological status, as already stated, the orthodox Sarviistiviidins, basing themselves
on scripture and reasoning, affirm its existence as a real entity (dravya), whereas the
Sautriintikas as well as the early Diir~~iintika masters (MVS, 383b), for example, Dharmatriita
and Buddhadeva, deny it.
In this context, Sarp.ghabhadra criticizes Vasubandhu's usage of "serial continuity" (anu-
bandha), since it implies that avijiiapti is not a real entity and would have certain other
unwanted consequences. As LVP points out, Sarp.ghabhadra replaces it therefore with the
following new verse (giving a word-by-word commentary in his Samayapradfpikii, 78 lc-
782a; see SA.IV.379):
That [morally] defined, non-resistant matter, which exists in the thought [citta] at the
time of the action as well [as subsequently], which is of a dissimilar as well [as
similar moral] species, and also in the thoughtless state-this is conceded as the non-
informative [matter].
On the other hand, in his *Nyiiyiinusiira, 335b, Sarp.ghabhadra also provides another definition
(SA.IV.379):
In brief, the non-informative [matter] is that non-resistant [apratigha] skillful [ku.fala]
a
or unskillful [aku§ala] matter which arises in dependence on specific corporeal or
vocal informative [vijiiapti] karma, and on a specific skillful or unskillful thought
[citta], etc.
3. As for its "history", the term avijiiapti is not directly mentioned in the satras, but is
implied according to the orthodox Sarviistiviidins. Dhammajoti (SA.IV.381) points to the fact
"that the Dharmaskandha-siistra, one of the earliest Sarviistiviida canonical abhidharma texts,
also makes no mention of the avijiiapti in all its discussion on matter", but (ESD.23) that since
the time of the Jiiiinaprasthana-including a whole section on avijiiapti (with clear notions of
safflvara, etc., and priitimok~a-safflvara, etc.)-it has been one of the central tenets of the
orthodox Sarviistiviida.
Dhammajoti also points out a shift in emphasis over time (SA.IV.402):
The avijiiapti doctrine ... was probably first formulated out of a twofold considera-
tion:
i. There are situations-such as that of a murder committed through an
emissary-in which an invisible force must be. assumed, capable of pre-
serving the karmic nature of the originating volition and serving as a
completing cause to ensure the future arising of the retribution fruit.
ii. The avijiiapti as an invisible force-called "restraint" or "abstention"-pre-
serving the essence of the ordination vows, serves as a legitimate cause for
the distinction among the bhik~u-s, bhik~ur_1f-s, etc.
From this, the contrasting categories called non-restraint and neither-restraint-nor-
non-restraint, as well as the categories of meditation and pure restraints came to be
elaborated. It would seem that the monastic abhidharma scholiasts gradually shifted
their focus of discussion on the avijiiapti as restraint and its related categories.
But this shift of emphasis [of non-informative matter qua· priitimok~a-safflvara] has
never obscured the nature of the avijiiapti as a karmic force ....
For more detail on avijiiapti as a karmic force, see SA.IV.389-402.
4. Returning now to L VP's endnote, as for the avijiiapti's name and its distinction from
informative action, the Avatiira states (ESD. 75f.):
An action which can by itself inform (vljiiiipayati) [others] of a specific variation
(parir_1iima-vi§e~a) in the thought and thought-concomitants (citta-caitta) [of the
doer], is one that is information (vijiiapti).
An action which is of the same species as the informing action-[being also material
and an action]-but incapable of [such] an information, is one that is non-informa-
tion (avijiiapti).
5. As for Vasubandhu's verse definition, Gedun Drup (p. 25) mentions five attributes:
(i) attribute of occasion: the three states of mind, i.e., distracted, non-distracted, without
thought, (ii) attribute of entity: good or bad, (iii) attribute of time: serial continuity,
(iv) attribute of cause: fundamental material elements, (v) attribute of etymology: "non-infor-
mative".
6. Finally, see also Vasubandhu's discussion of vijfiapti and avijfiapti in his Karmasiddhi-
prakaralJa (see our translation of Lamotte's introduction and translation in the Electronic
Appendix).
155
LS: Ny, 335a; ESD.134: "By distracted thought (vik~ipta citta) is meant the unwholesome
(akusala-) and non-defined thought (avyiikrta-citta); the other thoughts (citta) are non-distracted
(avik~ipta)."
156
LS: Cf. iv. 19-21b.
157
LS: When Vasubandhu uses subha and asubha in the Kosa root verses, in general in his
commentary he switches to kusala and akusala, but there are a few exceptions.
A$ for how informative and non-informative matter become wholesome or unwholesome,
Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.381):
Informative and non-informative matter-being karmic forces-must necessarily be
either skillful or unskillful. A neutral informative action-being weak in nature-
cannot generate a karmic force (i.e., non-informative karma). In this case, the moral
nature of the informative and non-informative karma-s is endowed by that of the
volition and the thought conjoined with the volition. The latter becomes skillful or
unskillful by virtue of their conjunction (sal'[tprayoga) with a thought-concomitant of
either nature-e.g., greed or moral shame (hrt). The informative karma, .on the other
hand, though being matter in nature becomes morally defined by virtue of the
morally defined volition that serves as, the originating cause (samutthana) for the
informative karma, which in turn defines the moral nature of the non-informative
karma that it generates.
In regard to Vasubandhu's discussion of kusala, akusala ~nd avyakrta in the context of the
eighteen elements (dhiitu), see i. 29c-30a; as for the. number of associated thought-concomi-
tants in regard to kusala, akusala and avyakrta thoughts, see ii. 28-30d; as for the various
classifications of kusala, akusala and avyiikrta factors, see iv. 8b-9c; as for the definitions of
kusala, akusala and avyiikrta actions, see iv. 45ab; in regard to the definitions of kusala and
akusala paths of action (karmapatha), see iv. 66bd.
In this context see also Lambert Schmithausen's article (forthcoming): "Kusala aqd Akusala:
Reconsidering the Original Meaning of a Basic Pair of Terms of Buddhist Spirituality and
Ethics and its Development up to Early Yogliclira."
158
LS: Pradhan.8.5 has: kusaliikusale priiptipravaho'pyastfdrsa.
159
LVP: I.e., possession (prapti) is not associated with thought; it is not of the nature of form
(rupa); it is included within the aggregate of formations (sal'[tskaraskandha); being non-
material, it resembles thought.
160
LS: Pradhan.8.7 has hetvartha upadiiyiirtha iti vaibha~ikal:i.
161
LS: AKB iv. 4cd discusses whether or not non-informative action is simultaneous with the
fundamental material elements upon which it arises, and distinguishes a first moment and later
moments of the arising of non-informative action. As for the later moments, it states:
"(1) (Specific) past fundamental material elements constitute-from the second moment
onward-the basis (lisraya) of the non-informative action, for they are the cause of its issuing
forth (pravrtti), they are its projecting cause (lik~epaklira,:ia); (2) the fundamental material
elements simultaneous with each of the moments, from the second moment onward, are the
support (sarµnisraya) of the non-informative action, for they are the cause of its continuance
(anuvrtti), they are its supporting cause (adhi~thlinaklira,:ia)."
162
· LS; This is the second of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1 (see
VY.4).
163
LS: The Vyakhyli glosses [WOG.30.16f.]: kusalarri pratimok~a-sarp.vara-saiµgrhitarp. naiva-
sarp.varana-sarp.varasarp.grhltarp. ca. akusalarµ punar asarp.vara-saip.grhitatp. naivasaip.varai:ia-
asaip.varasatp.gfhitaip. ca.
See iv. 13.
164
LS: WOG.30.lOf: kiiya-viik-vijfiapti-sambhiitaip..
See iv. F 4-104.
165
LS: iv. 6cd, 9d, 13cd, 17-18b, 20b-21b, 67d-68.
166
LS: Before entering into _the details regarding the fundamental material elements, we will
look briefly at the historical development of this doctrine and its relation to the Buddhist
atomic theory, and then at certain problems that result from it, particularly since this aspect is,
in the main, only unfolded later in chapters 1, 2 and 3 (although it is also brought up in an
objection below: i. F 25). Here are the pertinent points made by Dhammajoti in his section on
"Atomic" theory (SA.IV.198-206):
It would seem that at first the four mahiibhiita-s were conceived of as being material
qualities-Earth Element is solidity, etc. [see i. 12d]. They are real entities qua
material qualities. When the atomic theory was introduced into the abhidharma
system,* the notion that matter was constituted of atoms and that mahiibhiita-s
existed as atoms came to be developed. This led to a contradiction that seemed to
have been quietly left unsettled: On the one hand [see iii. 85d-88a], the atomic
theory requires that atoms are grouped as septuplets from which matter is derived.
The smallest molecule, an a,:iu, or sarµghlita-paramli,:iu, consisting of just seven
paramli,:iu-s [sapta paramli,:iavo ',:iufi] is the smallest unit of matter that is perceiv-
able-and even then not by an ordinary human being. On the other hand [see ii. 22],
a new doctrine was then articulated that a molecule that can arise in the empirical
world consists of a minimum of eight substances [a~tadravyaka]. Taking both
doctrines into consideration, one commentarial opinion [see ii, F 148, note], in fact,
arrives at 1,379 as the number of atoms that constitute a molecule of a visible! The
contradiction, however, would not have necessarily arisen if the mahiibhiita-s were
conceived of as dravya-s in the sense of real material qualities-real forces-rather
than atoms.
* It likely was taken over from outside the Buddhist schools. See Dhammajoti's qualifying
comments in our endnote at i. 9ab.
167
Gokhale: [12ab] bhiitlini prthivfdhiitur aptejovtlyudhlitavafi I
Tib.: [12ab] 'byung ba dag ni sa khams dang I chu dang me dang rlung khams rnams I
LVP: See ii, F 144,313.
Saqighabhadra explains: Why are the fundamental material elements (mahiibhiita) termed
dhiitu? - Because they are the place of origin of all material factors (rupadharma); the
fundamental material elements themselves have their origins in the fundamental material
elements. But in the world, the place of origin receives the name of dhiitu: it is thus that gold
mines, etc., are called dhiitus of gold, etc. - Or rather, they are called dhiitu because they are
the place of origin of the variety of sufferings. Examples as above.
Some say that they are called dhiitu because they bear or maintain both the particular inherent
characteristic of the fundamental material elements and the derivative material form (riipa).
The dhatus also bear the name of mahabhiita. - Why bhuta? Why mahiibhata?
At the moment when the diverse types of derivative material form (blue, etc.,) arise, each of
them comes forth under different aspects: this is why they are called bhata.
According to other scholars, it is because of the dominant (adhipati) power of the action of
sentient beings, in the course of eternal sal'{lsiira, that they always exist: this is why they are
called bhiita. Or else, the appearance or arising ( utpiida) of the factors is called bha.va .. ..
LS: 1. Later (i. F 49-51), Vasubandhu presents also a list of six elementary substances (dhiitu),
that is, earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness, where space, according to the
Vaibhii~ikas, refers to cavities or the em~ty space of _the gate, window, etc., defined as being
light (aloka) and darkness (tamas) in nature, i.e., refers to matter and not to unconditioned
space (iikiisa). Thus the Avatiira must refer to the unconditioned space when delimiting the
four fundamental material elements (ESD.73):
[The four Great Elements] are called the Great Elements because of their being both
great and having the nature of an Element (bhiita). Thus space [although great], is not
included among the Great Elements, as by "Element" is meant the ability to produce
its own fruit (svaphala).
2. As for the causal relationship of the four fundamental material elements -among them-
selves, see ii. 50bd, where Vasubandhu discusses them as existing inseparably from one
another, being co-existing causes (sahabhiihetu) but not associated causes (saT(lprayuktaka-
hetu). On the other hand, according to i. 51d (F 252) and 65c, some derivative material ele-
ments are not co-existent causes with one another, whereas others are.
As for the causal relationship of the four fundamental material elements to the derivative
material elements, ii. 65b states:
The four fundamental material elements are causes of derivative material elements
(bhautika)-color, taste, etc.-in five ways [prakiira], "in the quality of (i) generat-
ing (janana) cause, (ii) reliance (nisraya) cau~e, (iii) supporting (prati~fhii; sthiina)
cause, (iv) maintaining (upastambha) cause and (v) growth (upabrTflhm:ia) cause".
As for the reverse relationship, ii. 65d states that the derivative material elements are not a co-
existent cause of the fundamental material elements.
3. As for the difference between the fundamental material elements and the derivative
material elements, MYS, 665a, states that the fundamental material elements are invisible
(anidarsana), resistant (sapratigha), with-outflow (sasrava), non-defined (avyakrta), etc.,

whereas the derivative material elements are visible or invisible, resistant or non-resistant,
with-outflow or outflow-free, skillful, unskillful, or non-defined, etc. For the entire list, see
SA.IV.198.
For a discussion of primary matter (bhuta) versus secondary matter (bhautika) in the context
of the eighteen elements, see i. 35ac.
4. As for the fundamental material elements and derivative material elements in the context
of the atomic theory, see the discussion of atoms (parama,;u) in ii. 22, which states:
In the realm of desire, (i) the molecule (parama,;u; i.e., sarrighataparama,;u) that does
not involve sound and does not involve any sense-faculty, includes eight [kinds of]
real entities (dravya): [i.e., the four fundamental material elements and the four
derivative material elements: visible form, taste, odor, tangible]. (ii) When the body
sense-faculty is involved in [the molecule, it includes] nine real entities. (iii) When
any other sense-faculty is involved in [the molecule, it includes] ten real entities.
5. As for the question how-within the parameters of the atomic theory and the limitations
resulting from being co-existent causes-the great diversity, in manifestation and experience,
of material form (rupa) could be explained, see the endnote to smoothness (i. 10d).
6. As for the ontological status of the mahabhutas and bhautikas, even though all Sarviisti-
viidins accept the four fundamental material elements as real entities, not all of them
(SA.IV.193) accept the eleven derivative material elements as real. For example, Dharmatriita
does not accept the non-informative form (avijnaptirupa) and Buddhadeva even holds that all
derivative material elements are just specific types of the fundamental material elements. Also,
for the Sautriintika SrTliita they are nothing more than the specific configuration of the funda-
mental material elements.
168
• LS: Cf. the etymological explanation of dharma (i, F 4).
169
LVP: tadudbhutavrtti:tu prthivyaptejovayuskandhe:tu te:tv e:tarri mahasarrinivesatvat.
The etymological explanation of bhutani is bhutarri tanvanti.
170
Gokhale: [12c] dhrtyadikarmasa1J1siddha}:t
Tib.: [12c] 'dzin pa la sogs las su grub I
LVP: Water (in the popular sense of the word) supports ships: thus the substantial element
earth manifests its particular activity in it; it is warm; it moves; etc.
See ii. 22; Dhammasaliga,;i, 962-66; Compendium,.Appendix, p. 268•.
171
MW: pakti: cooking, preparing food; digesting; ripening, development, having results or
consequences,
172
Gokhale: [12d] kharasneho:t,;atera,;a}:t II
Tib.: [12d] sra gsher dro nyid g.yo ba rnams II
LS: SeePB.101-4.
173
LVP: Prakara,;a, 757a23. -The Mahavyutpatti (101) has khakkha(atva, dravatva, U:frJatva,
laghusamudfrarJatva.
174
LVP: desiintarotpiidanasvabhiivii ... frai:zii, compare the cited source in Compendium:
desantaruppattihetubhiivena.
175
LVP: The Sanskrit and the Tibetan have the plural. - Hsiian-tsang: Prakara,yapada;
Paramartha: Fen-pieh tao-Ii lun. -Prakara,ya, 699c5: viiyudhiitu~ katamah? laghusamudfrar;atvam.
176
LVP: The Sutra in question (Samyuktagama, 11, 1; MVS, 388al8) is perhaps the
Garbhiivakriintisiitra (Majjhima, III, 239; below, p. 49, n. 2). In the edition known through the
Sik~asamuccaya (p. 244), there is: (1) for earth: kakkha[atva kharagata (compare Mahiivastu,
i. 339), Divyiivadiina, 518, 2; Dhammasatigar;i, 648; Har~acarita, IRAS, 1899, p. 494); (2) for
water: iipas abgata aptva sneha snehagata snehatva dravatva; (3) for fire: tejas tejogata
u~magata; (4) for wind: viiyu viiyugata laghutva samudfrar;atva.
177
LVP: That is to say: light (laghu) is derivative material form (riipa); lightness (laghutva),
which, in its intrinsic nature is mobility (frar;a), is the elementary substance wind; the elemen-
tary substance wind is thus laghusamudfrar;atva: that which produces lightness and motion.
178
LS: SAH 495.
179
Gokhale: [13) prthivf van:zasal!lsthiinam ucyate lokasal!ljiiayii I iipas tejas ca viiyus tu
dhiitur eva tathii 'pi ca I
Tib.: [13) 'jig rten gyi ni tha snyad du I kha dog dbyibs la sa zhes brjod I chu me yang ngo rlung
tshogs khams I nyid yin de dang 'dra ba'ng yin II
LVP: Such is the reading cited in the Vyiikhyii, viii. 35; but, according to the Tibetan and the
Vyiikhyii, p. 35, the reading should be viitya tu ... . - Viityii = viitiiniil!I samiiha~, according to
PiiQini, iv, 2, 42.
See1viii. 36b (perception-sphere of totality of wind [viiyukrtsniiyatana]). In regard to whether
the wind is visible, there are two opinions in MYS, 441a, 689b3.
LS: As to how the great diversity-in manifestation and experience-of material form (riipa)
could be explained, see the endnote to "smoothness" (i. 10d).
As for "common usage" (lokasal!ljiiii), see Vasubandhu's classical explanation of the diff-
erence between conventional truth and absolute truth, see at vi. 4, which Hirakawa summarizes
(MDA.170) as follows:
The own-being of dharmas is considered as absolutely real (paramiirtha-sat) in the
Kosa, while things the existence of which depends on assemblages of the real
dharmas are called conventionally real (sal!lvrti-sat). For example, a vase or water
visible to the eye are said to be conventionally existent; the vase, on being smashed
apart, loses its existence. Yet even in the shards of the_ broken vase, the color
remains. Smashing the vase's shards further, even pulverizing them to atoms, still the
own-being of the color remains. Thus dharmas with own-being are absolutely real. In
contrast, visible water consists of color, odor, taste, tangibility (i.e., temperature,
weight, et cetera), which are analyzable. On analytic separation of these aspects, the
perception of water is lost. Things like the vase and visible water that lose their
perceptible existence on physical or analytical breaking up are said to be convention-
ally real. However, color, odor, and so on, the raw material of perception, cannot be
further analyzed. [For] the Sarviistivadins, not only color, but also odor and taste,
warmth (the great elementary quality fire), dampness (the great elementary quality
water), and so forth, are all seen as made of atoms. In the case of "matter", the raw
material of sense perception was thought to exist ... in the outer world as collective
bodies of these atoms.
180
LS: Vasubandhu, in accordance with early siitra and abhidharma custom, began his
discussion of material form (riipa; i. 9ab) with a mere delimitation-definition, but since the
fundame_ntal concern of abhidharma is the discernment of the particularly inherent and com-
mon characteristics of factors (dhannapravicaya, i. 2) (SA.IV.187), it was inevitable that the
.Abhidharmikas eventually had to seek a more formal and articulate definition for it.
LVP: There are two roots:
l. rup, rumpere, A:U:rtT], in Vedic Sanskrit: rupyati, ropana, etc.; in Pii)i: ruppati
(= kuppati gha!{iyati pfliyati domanassito hoti); in Classic Sanskrit: lup, lumpati;
2. riip, which gives riipa, shape, color, beauty, riipya, gold, etc.
LS: Dhammajoti elaborates (SA.IV.188):
The AKB defines riipa by the term riipa1Ja/riipa1Ji'i-which Xuan Zang renders as
"change-obstruction" ~-!il-understood in the sense of being subject to deterioration
or disintegration. For the verb form, riipayatilriipyate, he also occasionally renders
... ~;It ("deteriorate"). The term is evidently linked etymologically to the root ..frup
(connected to ..f/up)--"disturb", "violate", "break".
But riipa!JG is also often implicitly linked to ..friip, a denominative root from the noun
riipa, in which case riipa!Ji'i means no more than "the nature of being riipa".
We can see this distinction between ..frup and ..friip reflected in the first and second definition,
as given by Vasubandhu.
181
LVP: riipyate riipyata iti bhik:javaf:i ... . [The Tibetan and Chinese sources demand, it
seems, the translation: "What is it that is broken? As soon as it is touched by the hand .... "
Sarµyutta, iii, 86: ruppatfti kho bhikkhave tasmi'i riiparµ ti vuccati I kena ruppati I sftena ...
sirirµsapasampassena ruppati. (See the interpretation of Shwe Zan Aung in Compendium:
"form (riipa) means that which changes its form under the physical conditions of cold .... ")
The Mahi'ivyutpatti has: riipa!Ji'id riipam (111, 3; 244, 1137, 1153, 1154).
LS: Bhildchu Bodhi (DB.915) translates Sarµyutta, iii. 86 as:

And why, bhikkhus, do you call it form? "It is deformed", bhikkhus, therefore it is
called form. Deformed by what? Deformed by cold, deformed by heat, deformed by
hunger, deformed by thirst, deformed by contact with flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun,
and serpents. "It is deformed", bhikkhus, therefore it is called form.
The Chinese version of the Sarµyukti'igama reads (SA.IV .188):
That which is susceptible to being obstructed and decomposed is called riipa-
upi'idiina-skandha. It is obstructed by the fingers. It is touched by the hand, or stone,
or stick, or knife, or coldness, or heat, or thirst, or hunger, or insects such as
mosquitoes, or wind or rain-this is called resistance by touch. Thus, resistance is
[the characteristic] of the riipa-upi'idi'ina-skandha. Furthermore, it is because this
riipa-skandha is impermanent, unsatisfactory and subject to change.

182
LVP: The Sarvii.stivii.dins understand: "Useful Chapters"; the Pali signifies: "The
Octades". (S. Levi, J. As., 1915, i. 412; 1916, ii. 34).
tasya cet kiimayiinasya chandajiitasya dehina~ I
te kiimii na samrdhyanti salyaviddha iva riipyate 11
Mahiiniddesa, p. 5. - Kern, Verspreide Geschriften, ii, 261 (La Haye 1913), illustrates the
meaning of rup by Jiitaka iii, 368; Cariyapi(aka, 3. 6, etc.
183
LS: The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.34.8f.] kiima as object-field (vi~aya).
184
LS: Whereas Yasomitra in his Vyiikhyii links this passage to the following question-and-
answer and seems to want to explain away the subjective sense of "oppression" (biidhanii) by
stating that "riipa is unlike a pleasure-seeking human", Dhammajoti thinks (SA.IV.189) that
"one may understand this as the A.bhidharmika attempt to relate riipyate to the subjective sense
encountered in the siitra-s . ... Since [riipa] is of the nature of being subject to resistance and
impermanent, it is mutated or disfigured as it arises-visibly so in contrast to other dharma-s-
and therefore it is ultimately disturbing to the experiencer."
185
LVP: 1. riipm;arµ pratighiita ity apare. - pratighiita signifies svadese parasyotpatti prati-
bandha. - See below i, F 51.
Elsewhere, the sapratigha ("impenetrable/resistant"). phenomenon is defined as that which
covers a place, that which is extended.
We will see (i. 43) the kind of pratighiita that is referred to in Dhammasafiga~i, 618-19:
[618] What is that [material] form which is the sphere of visible shape?
That [material] form which, derived from the Great Phenomena, is visible under the
appearance of colour and reacting-is blue, yellow, red, white, black, crimson,
bronze, green-coloured, of the hue of the mango-bud; is long, short, big, little,
circular, oval, square, hexagonal, octagonal, hekkaidecagonal; low, high, shady,
glowing, light, dim, dull, frosty, smoky, dusty; like in colour to the disc of moon,
sun, stars, a mirror, a gem, a shell, a pearl, a cat's eye, gold or silver; or whatever
other shape there is which, derived from the four Great Phenomena, is visible and
reacting--0n which shape, visible and reacting, the eye, invisible and reacting, has
impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge-this which is visible shape, this which is
the sphere of visible shape, the constituent element of visible shape-this is that form
which is the sphere of visible shape.
[619] What is that [material] form which is the sphere of visible shape?
That [material] form which, derived from the Great Phenomena, is visible under the
appe~rance of colour and produces impact-which form, visible and producing
impact, has impinged, impinges, will, or may impinge on the eye that is invisible and
reacting-this which is visible shape, this which is the sphere of visible shape, the
constituent element of visible shape-this is that form which is the sphere of visible
shape.
2. There is a third definition of riipa~a. Madhyamakavrtti, 456, 9: tatredam ihiimutreti
niriipa~iid riipam = "This is called riipa because one can indicate it as being here or there",
and Vyiikhyii, ad i. 24 [WOG.51.30ff.] pii,:iyiidisal'flsparsair biidhaniilak~a,:iiid riipa,:iiit I idam

ihiimutreti desanidar§anariipa,:iiic ca. - Compare Mahiivyutpatti, 245, 1139, de§anirupa,:ia.
We have thus: rupa, that which is impenetrable, that which occupies a place; thus physical matter.
Saip.ghabhadra furthermore has other explanations: the rupa is thus calJed because it indicates
a previous action: "This man has performed an action, anger, which. has produced his malfor-
mation."
LS: As for the second definition, some Abhidharmika masters interpret "the nature of being
rupa" (rapa,:ia) as referring to physical resistance (pratighiita), wliich is further specified by
Vasubandhu (i. 29bc) as one of the threefold obstruction, namely, obstruction qua obstacle
(iivara,:iapratighiita). But MYS, 389c-390a, .also refers to Vasumitra's explanation, an elabo-
rated version of this rupiina, containing twelve characteristics (see SA.IV.189), which can be
narrowed down to two: (1) visibility [= indicability] (sanidarsanatva) and (2) resistance (sa-
pratighiitatva), which, over time, seemed to be stressed primarily by the Abhidharmikas,
which can be seen from the fact that they form the first two members of the twenty-two
doctrinal perspectives on the eighteen sense-elements as discussed by Vasubandhu (i. 29) .
. Saip.ghabhadra as well takes them to be the two qualities most distinctive of rupa (NY, 346b):
On account of it being obstructive, it deteriorates as soon as it is touched by the hand,
etc., and on account of it being visible, one can indicate it as being located differ-
ently-here, there.
Saip.ghabhadra even argues (SA.IV.191) that visibility as an intrinsic characteristic of the
category of rupa must apply to even the smallest unit, i.e., an atom, since otherwise it would
forfeit its very intrinsic nature as rapa. On the other hand, Saip.ghabhadra also gives three
defining characteristics ofrapa: (1) indicatability oflocation, (2) susceptibility to deterioration
through obstructive contact, (3) rupa by designation, whereby the third refers to non-informa-
tive matter (avijfiapti), a special type of matter, being devoid of the first two characteristics
(i.e., visibility and resistance) and subsumed under the dharmiiyatana rather than the rupa-
iiyatana.
186
LVP: na vai par~mii,:iurapam ekal'fl prthagbhatam asti. - See i. 43cd and ii. 22.
187
LVP: rupas of the past, Saip.ghabhadra, 636a8.
188
LS: This is "the third of Krit~er's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1 (see
VY.Sf.). Saip.ghabhadra [Ny, 338a9-14] comments thatthe analogy given is Vasubandhu's
and not that of the Vaibha~ika. On the other hand, Saip.ghabhadra hiJI1self maintains
(EIP.VIII.654) that the first explanation is unacceptable, "because in that case those types of
unmanifest material form that arise in accordance with mental action and are not produced
from manifest material form would not be classified as material form".
189
LVP: iisrayabhatarapa,:iiit [WOG.35.20]. This formula has passed into the Mahiivyutpatti.
109, 2. The Japanese editor refers to MYS, 390al.
The Vyiikhyii instructs us that this second explanation is due to the Vrddhii.carya Vasubandhu.
On Vasubandhu the master of Manoratha, who in tum is the master of Vasubandhu the author
of the Kosa, see Bhii~ya, iii. 27 and iv. 3a, and the sources discussed in the Avant Propos de la
Cosmologie Bouddhique, p. viii (Londres, 1918).
190
LS: This is the fourth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1 (see
VY.lOf.).
191
LS: Hall translates (V ACS.79): "But others offer a solution to this."
192
LS: Hall translates (VACS.8O): "It is demonstrated from this that something is form
(rupa) because of the 'striking' (rupa!la) of its [physical] basis (iisraya)" (ata upapannametad
iisrayariipa~d riipamiti).
193
LS: But not the non-informative (avijnapti).
194
Gokhale: [14ab] indriyii'rthiis ta ev e~!ii dasiiyatanadhiitaval:i I
Tib.: [14ab] dbang don de dag kho na la I skye mched dang ni khams bcur 'dod I
LVP: Saqighabhadra, in the Samayapradfpikii, reads: ta evoktii. - Vasubandhu uses the
expression i~fa, "are regarded by the Vaibha~ikas", because for him the aggregates (skandha)
do not really exist (i. 20).
195
LS: AH 9; SAH 10.
196
Gokhale: [14cl] vedanii 'nubhava/:1
Tib.: [14cl] tshor ba myong ba'o
LVP: ii. 7, 8, 24; iii. 32; Sarµyutta, iii. 96; Dhammasariga!Ji, 3; Theorie de douze causes, p. 23.
IS: The aggregates of sensation and ideation are not included among the other thought-
concomitants in the aggregate of formations which would be their natural place. Instead they
are treated as separate aggregates (skandha) because (i. 21) of their great importance as the
predominant causes (pradhiinahetu) (1) of the two roots of dispute (viviida), i.e., attachment to
pleasures (kiima) and attachment to views (dU(i), and (2) of cyclic existence (sarµsiira). But in
spite of their great importance, in comparison to the fairly detailed discussion of the aggregate
of material form, they, together with the fourth and fifth aggregates, are treated only rather
briefly "at this stage" in the AKB. The reason for this seems to be related with the Panca-
skandhaka and Pancavastuka as discussed in the introductory endnote at F 6.
1. As for a formal definition of sensation (vedanii), we have two, i.e., one of the aggregate of
sensation (i. 14c), and the other of the generally permeating factor sensation (ii. 24):
Sensation (vedanii; tshor ba) is the three kinds of sensation or experience or affect
(anubhava), i.e., (i) pleasant (sukha), (ii) unpleasant (du/:ikha) and (iii) neither-
unpleasant-nor-pleasant (adu/:ikhiisukha).
t
The seventh member of the twelvefold dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida; see iii. 18-38c)
is also called sensation (vedanii). For its definition and meaning within the four types
of dependent origination, i.e., momentary (k~anika), prolonged (priikar#kii), connected (siif!l-
bandhika), pertaining to states (iivasthika), see chapter 3, but as for the fourth type, i.e., within
a three-life-times model, it is defined as follows: "Sensation (vedanii; vitti) [is the five
aggregates] before sexual union, [i.e., as long as attachment to sexual union is not in action]."
As for other texts, Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaka (2008) defines:
2. vedanii katamii I trividho 'nubhaval:i - sukho du/:ikho 'du/:ikhiisukhas ca I sukho
yasya nirodhe sarµyogacchando bhavati Idu/:ikho yasyotpiidiid viyogacchando bhavati
I adu/:ikhiisukho yasyotpiidiit tadubhaya'!l na bhavati I
2. What is feeling? The three types of experience: pleasant, unpleasant, and neither
pleasant nor unpleasant. A pleasant experience is one that you desire to be united
with again when it ceases. An unpleasant experience is one that you desire to be
separated from when it arises. An experience that is neither pleasant nor unpleasant
is one for which you develop neither of those desires when it occurs. ISBP .231
The Avatiira (ESD.79) includes vedanii's epistemological connection with the contact (sparsa)
born of the coming together of the sense faculty, the object and the consciousness:
There are three kinds of experience (anubhava): (i) pleasurable (sukha), (ii) unpleas-
urable (dufikha) and (iii) neither pleasurable nor unpleasurable (adufikha-asukha).
These are the experiencing of three results of contact (sparsiinubhavana).
See also CEGS.51f; MBP.19; MF.56f; EBP.38ff.
2. As for classifications of vedanii itself, our i. 14c presents a threefold and six-fold clas-
sification. But it is also discussed as a single term and as threefold or six-fold classification at
various places of Vasubandhu 's extensive discussion of dependent origination (pratftya-
samutpiida; iii. F 56-119), which also includes a detailed presentation of mental sensation as
the eighteen types of mental-faculty-ponderings (manopaviciira; iii, F 107-16).
In addition, we also find (ii.7) a twofold classification: (i) bodily sensation and (ii) mental
sensation, whereby bodily sensation is explained as the sensation "that relates to the body",
that is associated with the five sensory consciousnesses, i.e., the visual consciousness, etc., and
mental sensation as the sensation associated with the mental consciousness (manovijfiiina).
But more importantly, there is also (i. 48cd; ii. 7-8) the following fivefold classification:
(i) plel!sure (sukha), (ii) displeasure (dufikha), (iii) satisfaction (saumanasya), (iv) dissatisfaction
(daurmanasya) and (v) equanimity (upek:fa), which is included and discussed within the
context of the twenty-two controlling faculties (indriya). As controlling faculties, the sensa-
tions exercise controlling power not only with regard to pollution (saf!!klesa) because the
proclivities (anusaya), i.e., attachment (raga), etc., become attached to the sensations and
become lodged therein, but also with regard to purification (vyavadiina) because it supports
concentration (samiidhi), faith (sraddha), etc.,
On the other hand, within the context of discussing the first noble truth of unsatisfactoriness,
Vasubandhu (vi. 128-36), based on scriptural authority and logical reasoning, (i) presents the
opinion of certain masters-identified by the Vyiikhyii and Satµghabhadra as the Bhadanta
SrI!iita, etc., and by the gloss of the Japanese editor, as the Sautrantikas, Mahiisiitµghikas,
etc.-that denies agreeable sensation as a whole and affirms that all sensation is only painful,
and (ii) presents its refutation by the A.bhidharmikas and also by Vasubandhu, who affirm that
agreeable sensation is agreeable in nature and exists as a real entity.
3. As for its relation to other thought-concomitants (caitta), vedanii is listed as the first of
the ten generally permeating mental factors (mahiibhumika) within the orthodox Vaibhii~ika
system (ii. 24). As for the Diir~~iintika Dharmatriita, it is also probably one of the thought-
concomitants that he accepts as being real entities, as does the Sautriintika SrI!iita. On the other
hand, Buddhadeva only accepts citta as a real entity and thus denies a real entity status to any
of the thought-concomitants.
Even though vedanii is a mahiibhumika, there are states where, according to the Vaibhii~ikas,
Endnotes to Chapter One. 371
all vedanas and all other thought-concomitants and also thought itself cease, as indicated in the
name "attainment of cessation of ideation and sensation" (sarJ?jiiiiveditanirodhasamapatti), the
term by which the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamapatti) sometimes is referred to.
As for its relation to the other aggregates, i. 22bd describes the five aggregates from the point
of view of (i) their relative grossness, (ii) their being causes of the progression of pollution,
(iii) analogy, and (iv) their predominance in the three realms.
Vedana is considered to be the most gross among the non-material aggregates, because of the
grossness of its operation.
4. As for the question of whether sensation arises later or simultaneously with contact, this
issue is discussed at iii. 32 [F 101-7], which includes also a long discussion regarding Srilii.ta's
doctrine of perception.
5. As for the question of whether vedana is a ripened effect (vipakaphala) or not, AKB
ii. lOac and iv. 57d argues that dissatisfaction is never a ripened effect for the Vaibhii.~ikas
(and seemingly also for Vasubandhu), whereas the other four of the five sensations are of two
types, i.e., sometimes a ripened effect and sometimes not. Gedun Drup comments (p. 13) that
dissatisfaction is not a fruition "because it is definitely either contaminated virtue or non-
virtue. This is because when there is mental unhappiness in regard to a virtuous action it is
non-virtuous, and when there is mental unhappiness in regard to a non-virtuous action it is
virtuous".
On the other hand, iv. 57 discusses sensation not only as an element of retribution of action,
but as tht "essential or predominant" element of retribution. ·
6. Vedanii is often translated as feeling or sensation. We have chosen "sensation" since it
seems to cover the momentary nature of vedana somewhat better, whereas in ordinary
parlance "feelings" can get mixed up quickly with all kinds of emotions and series of mental
events, which fall "more" into the domain of the fourth aggregate. As for the functioning of
vedana, see the next endnote.
197
MW: anubhava: perception, apprehension, fruition; understanding; experience, impression
on the mind not derived from memory.
LS: In the following, some of Dhammajoti's points (SA.IV.276-78), which clarify the role of
anubhava and vedana within sensory perception from the Vaibhii.~ika point of view, are
summarized. For more detail regarding the Vaibhii.~ika and Sautrii.ntika doctrine of sensory
perception, see Vasubandhu 's long discussion regarding Srilii.ta 's doctrine of perception
(iii, F 102-7), at which time we will also provide longer endnotes on the subject, based on
Dhammajoti's Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception (2007).
Saiµghabhadra [Ny, 736a] [enumerates three types of direct perception (pratyalcya)]:
1. that which is dependent on the sense faculty (1/Zi'!VJll.-; indriya-iisrita-
pratyak!fa);
2. that which is experience ( 4Ji fir'JJJl :I; anubhava-pratyak!fa);
3. that which is discernment (I; 1 JJl ii; *buddhi-pratyak:ja).
The first refers to the direct grasping (pratyak~arJl ,/grah?), supported by the five
sense faculties, of the five types of external objects, rupa, etc.
The second refers to the coming into the present of the citta-caitta-dharma-s, vedanii,
smµjiiii, etc.
The third refers to the direct realization (siik:jiit-vkr) of the specific or common
characteristic (sva-siimiinya-lak:faiza)-accordingly as the case may be-of dharma-s.
From this, it is clear that it is the visual consciousness, not the mere seeing by the
eye, that is indriya-pratyak:ja.
The second type of pratyak:ja is intrinsically linked with the first in-as-much as these
caitta-s become present at the first moment of the perceptual process together with
visual consciousness, sensing and categorizing (albeit weakly), etc., on the very same
object that is being grasped generically by visual consciousness.
The third type is mental consciousness that follows immediately from the first
moment. It can still be considered a type of direct perception since it is a clear vivid
perception directly induced by the immediately preceding sensory perception. [... ]
Saqighabhadra argues that sahabhii [co-existent] causality obtains in a sensory
perception; the sensory faculty and the object as the causes and the sensory con-
sciousness as the effect all arise .in the same first moment. Moreover, vedanii, the
instrumental force for anubhava, must be "conjoined with" consciousness-which
entails not only simultaneity, but also that both take the same object, etc. In fact, a
sensory consciousness necessarily has a present perceptual object, or it will not be
possible for one to have the pratyak:ja experience. For, with regard to what is person-
ally sensed, one experiences it and discerns it at different times. That is, the
anubhava-pratyak:ja and buddhi-pratyak:ja are not simultaneous. Discernment occurs
at the state of recollection, taking the experience-the vedanii-that has just ceased
as its object. Accordingly, "a sensation-pleasurable, etc.-must first be experienced
by the anubhava-pratyak:ja before a pratyak:ja discernment can arise having it as
its perceptual object. Likewise, an external object must first be experienced by
indriyiisrita-pratyak:ja before a pratyak:ja discernment can arise having it as the
perceptual object, by virtue of the thrust of presentness." This is consistent with the
Sarviistiviida view that the citta-caitta-dharma-s cannot discern themselves or those
conjoined or coexist with them.
198
LS: AH 9; SAH 10.
199
Gokhale: [14c2-d] sarrijiiii nimittodgraha,:iiitmikii II
Tib.: [14c2-d] 'du shes ni I mtshan mar 'dzin pa'i bdag nyid do II
LVP: By nimitta (signs) one should understand vastuno 'vasthiivise:ja, the diverse conditions or
states of the phenomenon. Udgraha,:ia signifies pariccheda (determination, discernment).
The Vijiiiinakiiya, 26a16, cited in the Nyiiyabindupiirvapak:jasarrik:fepa (Mdo, 111, fol. 108b)
and in the f1adhyamakavrtti (p. 74), says that the visual consciousness knows blue (nflarri
jiiniiti), but does not know "This is blue" (no tu nflam iti). - See the note ad i. 33ab. - It is
through ideation (sarrijiiii) that a name is given to the visual impression, to the external cause
of the visual impression.
Objection: - Consciousness (vijiiiina) and ideation (sarrijiiii) are alw!!yS associated (ii. 24); thus
the visual consciousness will know the signs of the object. - Answer: The ideation accompa-
nying the sensory consciousnesses is weak, indistinct, [i.e., includes only conceptualizing
activity in its intrinsic nature (svabhiivavikalpa; vitarka-vicara)]. Only the mental conscious-
ness is accompanied by, an efficacious ideation; it alone is (the three types of) savikalpaka
(i. 32-33).
Compare Sarriyutta, iii. 86; Atthasalinf, 291; Milinda, 61.
Majjhima, i, 293; Siddhi, 148; the ten signs (nimitta), viii, ·p 185:
1-5. the five sense-spheres (ayatana), external sense-spheres of the sensory conscious-
nesses, color-shape (rupa), sound, etc.;
6-7. male (puru~a) and female (stri);
8-10. the three characteristics of the conditioned (sarriskrtalak~ar;ia; ii. 45cd), (i) arising,
(ii) duration-change, (iii) passing away.
LS: 1. The translation of sarrijiia continues to cause scholars great trouble. William Waldron
(BU.198) comments:
Usually translated as "perception", the Sanskrit form sarrijiia is composed of the
prefix sarri, "together", plus the root verb jiia, "to know, perceive, understand", that
is, a "knowing-together". Sarrijiia (P. saiiiia) thus means "conception, idea, impression,
perception" (BHSD 551-52). Interestingly, it is etymologically parallel with
"conscious": com, "together, with", plus scire "to know". Saf[ljiia is formally the
opposite of vijiiana (P. viiiiiana), which is composed of vi-, "dis-", plus the same
root, jlia. While vijliana stresses disjunctive discernment, sarrijiia emphasizes a con-
junctive construction of an image or idea that brings disparate sensations together
into a whole, often connected with a name or concept. This is why sarrijlia is a saf[l-
skara (P. sankhiira) of mind, a construction ot complex (Sarriyutta, IV 293: saiiiiii ca
vedanii ca cittasankhiire ti).
Waldron, as well as some other scholars suggest "apperception". We will use "ideation",
following Dhammajoti, Deleanu, and also Schmithausen who.uses it in some of his writings.
2. In our endnote to the aggregate of sensation, we have already alluded to the great
importance of the aggregate of ideation, why it is treated as a separate aggregate (skandha) and
why it is nevertheless discussed only briefly "at this point". If we search the remaining
chapters of the AKB in regard to how the details are filled in, we find various perspectives that
seem to fall into the following two bigger categories: (A) sarrijiia as a generally permeating
factor and member of the five upadanaskandhas, and, as such, related to general psychology
and epistemology-distinguishing between the five sensory consciousnesses and mental con-
sciousness, and their moment by moment developments-and to the first noble truth;
(B) sarrijlia in it~ role withi~ meditation and the general Buddhist path to liberation, and, as
such, related to soteriology and the second, third and fourth noble truths. We will try to
address both categories in the following longer endnote.
A. l. Definitions: As for the first bigger category, we have two formal definitions of idea-
tion, i.e., a definition of the aggregate of ideation (i. 14cd), providing more detail, and a
definition of the generally permeating factor ideation (ii. 24), both of which are not explicit
about the relationship to other generally permeating factors or to factors discussed in the other
aggregates. Here is the one from ii. 24:

Ideation (sal'J1,jfia; 'du shes) is conceiving (sal'J1,jfiana), that which seizes or appre-
hends the signs (nimitta; male, female, etc.) of the object-field (vi~ayanimittagrahw;ia
= vi~ayavise~ariipagraha).
Vasubandhu's definition in his Paficaskandhaka (2008) is fairly similar (and also includes
a reference to a threefold sal'J1,jfia instead of a sixfold sal'J1,jfia as in i. 14cd):
3. safijfia katama I vi:Jayanimittodgraha,:zam I tat trividham - purfttal'J1, mahadgatam
aprama,:zal'J1, ca I
3. What is conception? The grasping of an object's sign, which is of three types:
limited, great, and immeasurable. ISBP .231
As for sal'J1,jfia's specific activity and function in the relatio~ship with other factors-within the
wider psychological and epistemological context-Le., its object and its connection with initial
inquiry or reasoning (vitarka) and investigation (viciira), name (niima), etc., it is addressed in
the definition of the Avatiira (ESD.80):
This is that which comprehends, by combining conceptually (sal'J1,--{jna) the appear•
ance (nimitta), name (niima) and the signified (artha) [of a dharma]. That is, with
regard to matter like blue, yellow, long and short [figures], etc.; sounds like those of
a conch-shell, a drum, etc.; smells like those of gharu-wood and musk, etc., tastes
like those of saltiness and bitterness, etc., tangibles like those of hardness and soft-
ness, etc., dharma-s like males and females, etc.-it comprehends them, [in each
case], by conceptually combining together (eka--fjnii) their appearances, names and
[the signified]. It is the cause of reasoning (vitarka) and investigation (viciira). Thus,
this is named ideation.
Sthiramati's definition clarifies further some of its aspects (TVB.21):
SaTJ1-jfiii is the grasping of the appearance of an object. The object is the cognitive
object. [Its] appearance is its distinctiveness-the cause for establishing the cognitive
object as a blue colour, a yellow colour, etc._The grasping of [this appearance] is the
determination (nirupa,:zii) that "this is blue, not yellow".
As for "determination", Dhammajoti (ESD.139) refers to Sarµghabhadra's definition of saJ?ljfiii
(Ny. 384b):
[ ... ] that which causes the determination and grasping of the diverse forms (nimitta)
of male, female, etc., is named ideation,
and explains that "determination" (see below) presupposes a proper investigation (viciira)
and understanding (prajfiii), which is why the Avatiira calls ideation the cause of vitarka and
viciira.
The Siddhi (F 148f; ESD.139), on the other hand, clarifies sal'J1,jfiii's relationship with speech
as follows [bracketed inserts by L VP]:
Ideation has, with regard to the objects, the grasping of forms as its nature [vi~aya-
nimitta-udgraha,:za], and [when it is mental (miinasi)] the designation of diverse
manners of speech [names and words] as its function [niinii-abhidhiina-prajfiapti-
karmikii]. It is only after the determination ["This is blue; not non-blue"] of the
particular characteristics of the objects that there arise the diverse manners of speech
[that correspond to these characteristics].
A.2. If we combine this now with Sai:pghabhadra's enumeration of three types of pratyak1a
(see our endnote on vedana), the following Vaibha~ika model of perception emerges:
i. In the first mo~ent, visual consciousness-as indriya§ritapratyak1a and anubhava-
pratyak:ja, when the contribution of the conascent thought-concomitants (caitta),
including ideation (sal'fljiili), is still weak-"directly perceives" the specific charac-
teristics (svalak!faf_la) of a visual object, for example, the blue (nflal'fljanati), but does
not know the common characteristic (samanyalak1af}G): "It is blue" (no tu nf/am iti).
ii. In the second moment, mental consciousness-as buddhipratyak1a, but while the
contribution of the conascent thought-concomitants (caitta) is still weak-"directly
discerns" the particular inherent characteristic of the visual object, for example, the
blue, i.e., takes the experience of the blue that has just ceased, in a state of recollec-
tion, as its object, but does not know yet: "It is blue" (no tu nflam iti).
iii. In the third moment, mental consciousness-when the contribution of the conascent
thought-concomitants (caitta), in particular ideation (sal'fljfiii), initial inquiry (vitarka)
and investigation (viciira), as well as understanding (prajnii), are strong enough, and
being no longer direct perception (pratyak1a)-knows the common characteris.tic of
the visual object through a determination (niriipaf_la), for example: "It is blue", by
combining conceptually (sal'fl--fjna) the appearance (nimitta), name (nama) and the
signified (artha) of a dharma. The generally permeating factor understanding (prajna)
that functions at this time can be erroneous.
iv. In the fourth moment, there "might" arise diverse manners of actual speech, etc.
A.3. In the AKB, we find the parts of this wider context, i.e., the relationship to (i) niima and
(ii) niFupana, vikalpa, vitarka and vicara, mentioned at various places, but never discussed as a
whole:
i. As for name (niima), ii. 47ab-discussing the collections of names, phrases and syllables-
explains (translation LVP):
By "names" or "words" (naman) one should understand "that which causes ideation
to arise" (saTfljii.akara,:ia), for example, the words "color", "sound", etc.
However, Collett Cox makes the following important comment (DD.164):
Both Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra define name in terms of concepts (sal'fljnii).
Vasubandhu identifies name simply as sal'fljfiakara,:ia, which Yasomitra interprets
[WOG.182.32ff.] in two ways. [1] It can be understood either as a dependent
determinative compound (tatpuru1a): that is, "[name is] the maker of concepts", or
"that by which the mental factor, concept, is made or produced". Or, [2] the com-
pound can be interpreted as a descriptive determinative (karmadharaya) used
exocentrically (bahuvrfhi): that is, "[name is] that of which the maker is concepts". In
other words, Yasomitra suggests a reciprocal functioning, whereby name is either the
cause of concepts, or concepts are the cause of names. P'u-kuang cites both of these
interpretations and adds a third, whereby name and concept are identified with one
another. However, Yasomitra observes that name and concept must be distinct "for if
name were said to be precisely concept, it would be possible for [name] to be a

mental factor", and name is, instead, classified among the dissociated factors.
AKB iii. 30cd further clarifies the notion of name (nama) and sa,rtjiia's role within mental
consciousness alluded to above:
Adhivacana (designation) means name (nama). Now, a name is the additional cogni-
tive object or the cognitive object par excellence (adhikam alambana) of contact
associated with the mental consciousness. In fact, it is said:
Through visual consciousness, one knows blue; but one does not know: "This is
blue"; through mental consciousness, one knows blue and one knows: "This is
blue".
Saqighabhadra explains (Ny, 506c) that it is "additional" because mental consciousness takes
1
both nama and artha as its object, whereas the five sensory consciousnesses, having only a
weak sa,rtjiia, do not take nama as their perceptual objects. In this context, Dhammajoti refers
to a longer version of the above quote (Vijiiana-kaya-sastra, T26, 559bc), which shows the
first three moments of the moment-by-moment time line presented above:
[a] The visual consciousness can only apprehend a blue colour (nflam), but not "it is
blue" (no ti nflam iti). [bl Mental consciousness can also apprehend a blue colour.
[But] so long as it is not yet able to apprehend its name, it cannot apprehend "it is
blue". [c] When it can apprehend its name, then it can also apprehend "it is blue".
ii. As for the close relationship of ideation with determination (nirupa,;a), conceptual con-
struction (vikalpa), initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicara), AKB i. 33ab clarifies
the notion abhinirupa,:ia-vikalpa within its discussion of the doctrinal perspective "associated
w1th initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicara) & free from conceptual construction
(avikalpaka)", which have already been mentioned as being part of the wider context of
sa,rtjiia. AKB i. 33ab distinguishes three kinds of conceptual construction (vikalpa):
a. conceptualizing activity in its intrinsic nature (svabhiivavikalpa);
b. conceptualizing activity consisting of determ~nation (nirupa,:ia; abhinirupa,:ia);
c. conceptualizing activity consisting of recollecting (anusmara,:ia).
The first refers to initial inquiry (vitarka), which .will be studied at ii. 33, where it is defined
together with investigation (vicara) simply as grossness and subtleness of thought, respec-
tively.
The second. refers to "mental" understanding (prajiia; ii. 24), i.e., the discernment of the
factors associated with the mental consciousness only [i.e., not with the sensory conscious-
nesses], when dispersed (vyagra) [i.e., non-concentrated (asamahita), not in the state of
meditating (bhiivana; viii. 1)).
The third refers to all recollection (smrti) that is exclusively "mental", when either concen-
trated (samahita) or non-concentrated.
The five sensory consciousnesses, even though always associated with initial inquiry and
investigation, as well as ideation (sa,rtjiia), are spoken of as being free from conceptualizing
activity (avikalpaka) in the sense of being "free of the second and third conceptualizing
activity", whereas mental consciousness involves all three. But as we have seen in the
discussion above, the contribution of the conascent thought-concomitants (i:aitta)-in the

context of sensory consciousnesses-is in general regarded as being weak, at least in contrast
to conceptual mental consciousness. This layered approach seems to be reflected also in the
explanation of vitarka and vicara in the Avatara (p. 83):
Reasoning (vitarka) has the characteristic of causing thought to be gross with
regard to an object (ciftaudaryalak~m:ta). It is also named discriminative reflection
(sal'J1,,kalpadvitvfyanama). Struck by the wind of ideation (saf[ljfiiipavanoddhata), it
operates (vartate) in a gross manner. It is this dharma which serves as the projecting
cause (paiicavijfiana-pravrtti-hetu) of the five consciousnesses.
Investigation (vicara) has the characteristic of causing thought to be subtle. It is this
dharma which serves as the cause that accords with the operation of mental con-
sciousness on its object (manovijfiana-pravrttyanukiila-hetu).
Thus since vitarka is "more" related with the sensory consciousnesses and vicara "more" with
mental consciousness, it is now more apparent why Vasubandhu (i. 33a) as well as Sarp.gha-
bhadra (Ny, 349a, 350b) explain svabhavavikalpa as vitarka only.
On a coarser temporal level or "stages" timeline, in contrast to a subtle temporal level or
"moment-by-moment" timeline as presented above, we may now distinguish two main stages
in which ideation plays a major role: (J) the initial stage and (2) the subsequent interpretive
stage, which Dhammajoti seems to have in mind when stating (ADCP.103):
In addition to grasping the mere object-substance, thanks to contribution from the co-
nascent concomitants-particularly understanding (prajfia) and recollection (smrti)
and ideation (saf[ljfia) which can function strongly therein-mental, consciousness
can also interpret a given perceptual data, and even abstractize and conceptualize on
it. In Abhidharma terms, it can perceive both the specific as well as the common
characteristics. This interpretive capability of mental consciousness is generically
indicated by the term vikalpa, "discrimination". The Sarvastivada speaks of three
types of vikalpa,
Returning now to our discussion of abhiniriipa,;a-vikalpa that is conjoined only with mental
consciousness, it is equated (ADCP.104, 108) particularly with the aspect of judgmental
investigation of prajfia, represented by Saf[ltfrm;ia, when prajfia is called view (dr~!i), whereby
it is good to keep in mind that this non-concentrated prajfia "derives its name from the fact
that it operates by way of determining (it ft lni ff; abhiriipa,;aya pravartate) the names of the
corresponding [cognitive objects]". Dhammajoti stresses (ADCP.107-8) that-besides prajfia-
ideation (saf[ljfia) is also a contributing factor for1 the abhiniriipa,;a through its functioning as a
synthetic comprehension of appearance (nimitta), name (nama) and the signified (artha). As
we have seen it is because of the contribution from saf/ijfia that mental consciousness is able to
operate by means of name (= adhivacana). The connection between abhiniriipana and saf[ljfia
is also obvious in Sthiramati's definition of Saf[ljfia (TVB.21) given above.
Dhammajoti summarizes some of the main features of the role of saf[ljfia in the following way
(ADCP.108-9):
According to the Sarv1istiv1ida, saf[ljfia is the cause of vitarka, and vitarka is in turn
the cause for the arising of a sensory consciousness. At this stage, there is a simple
378 Exposition of the Elements (Dhtitunirdesa)
inquiry or searching on the mere object grasped, in· the form "what is it?" .... Some
kind of inarticulate mental inquiry is involved here. The Sarvastivada perspective
may be understood to conceive of this as a c_ontribution coming from the co-nascent
thought-concomitants, sal'[ljiiii, prajiia and smrti-which all operate weakly-and
vitarka . ... At the same time, a sensory consciousness is said to be distinguished
from mental consciousness by its lack of abinirupa,:ia-vikalpa on account of its not
taking name as its object. This must then mean that, for the Sarvastivada, in a
sensory perception, the "wind of sal'[ljiia" is strong enough only for a rudimentary
determination, in a generic manner, of the object as a thing in itself, but not for
conceptualization based on judgement and association. In other words, sal'[ljiia could
be considered as the cause of the intrinsic discrimination(= vitarka) that is present in
all acts of consciousness, but when prajiia and smrti operate prominently in a mental
consciousness, it also functions to assist in the conceptualizing act involving name.
Vitarka, though not subsumed as a universal thought-concomitant, is nonetheless
always present at the arising of a sensory perception. It is in fact considered the
latter's cause, evidently in the sense that it makes the main contribution in such a
rudimentary discrimination as regards the object's appearance (nimitta) that consti-
tutes the grnsping of an object by a sensory consciousness.
A.4. As for sal'[ljiiii's relation to the other aggregates, i. 22bd describes the five aggregates
from the point of view of (i) their relative grossness, (ii) their being causes of the progression
of pollution, (iii) analogy and (iv) their predominance in the three realms. As for the first,
ideation is described as being less gross than the first two aggregates but more gross than the
last two aggregates. As for the second, attachment to the enjoyment of sensation is described
as proceeding from mistaken ideations (sal'[ljiiaviparyasa), which are due to the defilements
(klesa) that are formations (sarrisktira).
Before ending our comments on the first bigger category, we want to mention again that it is
probable that for the Dar~tantika Dharmatriita sarri}iia is one of the three thought-concomitants
that he accepts as being real entities, as does the Sautrantika SrTiiita. On the other hand,
Buddhadeva accepts only citta as a real entity and thus denies a real entity status to any of the
thought-concomitants. ·
B. Now as for the second bigger category, i.e., sarrijiia in its role within meditation and the
general Buddhist path to liberation, etc., we must first refer again to AKE i. 21 which states
that sensation and ideation are separate aggregates (skandha) because of their great importance
as the predominant causes (pradhanahetu) (1) of the two roots of dispute (vivada), i.e.,
attachment to pleasures (kama) and attachment to· views (dr,rti), and (2) of cyclic existence
(sarrisara).
In this context we also must keep in mind that, in the third moment of our moment-by-moment
time line-when the contribution of the conascent thought-concomitants (caitta) is strong
enough, in particular initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicara), understanding (prajiia)
and recollection (smrti), and when ideation conceptually combines (sarri--fjiia) the appearance
(nimitta), name (nilma) and the signified (artha) of a dharma-mental consciousness can
become erroneous since the generally permeating factor understanding (prajiia) that functions
at this time can be erroneous, particularly when influenced by defilements (klesa). This is
pointed out in i. 22bd, which states that attachment to the enjoyment of sensation is described
as proceeding from mistakeQ ideations (saf!ljiiiiviparyiisa), which are due to the defilements
(klesa) that are form'ations (saf!lskiira).
From these points of view it is no surprise that we find in the Buddhist path specific practices
such as calm abiding (samatha) or an emphasis on the five praxis-oriented faculties, for
example, concentration (samiidhi), mindfulness (smrti), understanding (prajiiii), etc., in order
to curb or completely eliminate (i) initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (viciira), sensation
(vedana) and ideation (saf!ljiia), and (ii) the "trouble" that they can cause when combined with
defilements (klesa).
As for vitarka and viciira, there is the intermediate meditation (dhyaniintara), which is
specified as being free from the manifestation of vitarka, and the second to eighth fundamental
meditative attainments, specified as being free from the manifestation of vitarka and vicara
(viii. 23cd).
As for saf!ljiiii, there is the perception-sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation (naiva-
saf!ljiiiiniisaf!ljiiayatana), which receives its name from the fact that ideation (saf!ljiiii) is very
weak (mrdu) in it, although not completely absent. In this connection, AKB viii. 4cd states:
No doubt, one prepares oneself for this formless meditative attainment by consider-
ing: "Ideation (saf!ljiiii) is a disease! Ideation is a tumor! Ideation is an arrow! The
state of non-ideation (iisaf!ljiiika; compare ii. 41b) is stupor (saf!lmoha)! The per-
ception-sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation (naivasa,_njiiiinasaf!ljiiaiiyatana) is
calmness, is excellent!"
But we also find the tendency and desire to abandon the manifestation of saf!ljiiii completely,
at least for an extended period of time, as in regard to (1-2) the two attainments (samapatti),
i.e., (i) the attainment of non-ideation (asamjfsamiipatti) and (ii) the attainment of cessation
(nirodhasamapatti) or the attainment of cessation of ideation and sensation (saf!ljiiavedita-
nirodhasamiipatti), and (3) the state of non-ideation (asaf!ljiiika).
The "negative" role that saf!ljiia plays in this context can be seen from the names given to
some of these practices, attainments and states.
Since the AKB not only discusses the issues related to the second bigger category in detail
but also fairly systematically in the entire chapter 8, entitled EXPOSITION OF THE MEDITATIVE
ATTAINMENTS (samapattinirdesa), and in chapter 2, pp. F 198-214, there is no further need to
discuss them here.
200
LS: AH 9; SAH 10, 12.
201
Gokhale: [15abl] caturbhyo 'nye tu saf!lskiiraskandha
Tib.: [15a] 'du byed phung po bzhi las gzhan I
LVP: On the saf!lskaras, Theorie des douze causes, pp. 9-12 (see Electronic Appendix).
LS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) explains the saf!lskaras as follows:
4. saf!lskara~ katame I vedanasaiijiiiibhyam anye caitasika dharmas cittaviprayuktas
ca II
4.1 caitasika dharma~ katame Iye dharmas cittena samprayukta~ II te puna~ katame I
sparso manaskiiro vedana safijfia cetanii cchando 'dhimok~a/:t smrti/:t samiidhi/:t

prajfiii sraddha hrfr apatriipyam alobha/:t kusalamulam adve~a/:t kusalamulam
amoha/:t kusalamularri vfryarri prafrabdhir apramada upek~ii 'vihirrisa riigaJ:t pratigho
miino 'vidyii dr~!ir vicikitsii krodha upaniiho mrak~a/:t pradiisa fr~yii miitsaryarri miiyii
fii!hyarri mado vihirrisa iihrfkyam anapatriipyarri styiinam auddhatyam afraddhyarri
kausfdyarri pramado mu~itasmrtitii vik~epo 'samprajanyarri kaukrtyarri middhaf/1 vitarko
viciira§ ca II
e~arri pafica sarvatragii/:t pafica pratiniyatavi~ayii ekada§a ku§alii/:t ~ar kle§a ava§i~!ii
upakle§iis catviiro 'nyathiipi I [... ]
4.2 cittaviprayuktii/:t sarriskiirii/:t katame I ye rupacittacaitasikavasthiisu prajfiapyante
tattviinyatvata§ ca na prajfiapyante 11 te punaJ:t katame I priipiir asafijfiisamapattir
nirodhasamiipattir iisafijiiikarri jfvitendriyaf/1 nikiiyasabhiigatii jatir jarii sthitir anityatii
niimakiiyiif:i padakiiyii vyafijanakiiyii/:t prthagjanatvam ity evambhiigfyii/:t I [ ... ]
4. What are the formations? The mental factors other than feeling and conception,
and the entities that do not accompany consciousness.
4.1 What are the mental factors? Those entities that are concomitants of conscious-
ness. What are they? Contact, attention, [ ... ] and reflection.
Among these, five are universal, five are limited to a particular object, eleven are
virtues, six are [root] mental afflictions, the remaining ones are secondary mental
afflictions, and four can also vary. [ ... ]
4.2 What are the formations that do not accompany consciousness? They are [entities]
that are nominally ascribed to a particular state of form, consciousness, or the mental
factors. They are not [entities that are] ascribed to [form, consciousness, or the men-
tal factors] themselves or to something distinct from them. What, then, are they?
Acquirement, [ ... ] as well as those [other entities] that are of the same kind. ISBP.231
and 237f.
2. As for the AKB, for a detailed and systematic explanation of all the factors included in
the aggregate of formations,.see chapter 2, pp. 150-244, which discusses:
i. Forty-six formations associated with thought (cittasarriprayuktsarriskiira) or thought-
concomitants (caitta) i,,cluded in the following six groups:
a. ten generally permeating factors (mahiibhumika), those that accompany all
thoughts (ii. 24);
b. ten wholesome permeating factors (kusalamahiibhumika), those that accompany
every wholesome thought (ii. 25);
c. six permeating factors of defilement (klesamahiibhamika), those that accompany
every defiled thought (ii. 26ac);
d. two unwholesome permeating factors (aku§alamahiibhamika), those that accom-
pany every unwholesome thought (ii. 26cd);
e. ten factors of defilement of restricted scope (parfttakle§abhumika), which have
the restricted defilement for their stage (ii. 27);
f. eight undetermined factors (aniyata) (ii. 27).
ii. Fourteen formations dissociated from thought (cittaviprayuktasalJlskiira; ii. 35-48).

As for the thought-concomitants intention (cetanii), defilements (kle§a), understanding (prajfiii)
and concentration (samtidhi), they are, respectively, discussed further in great detail in chapter 4:
EXPOSITION OF ACTION (karmanirdesa); chapter 5: EXPOSITION OF THE PROCLIVITIES (anusaya-
nirdesa); chapter 7: EXPOSITION OF THE COGNITIONS (jfiiinanirdesa); chapter 8: EXPOSITION OF
THE MEDITATIVE ATTAINMENTS (samiipattinirdesa).
The five praxis-oriented faculties, but in particular mindfulness (smrti) and understanding
(prajfiii), are discussed in great detail in chapter 6: EXPOSITION OF THE PATH AND THE NOBLE
ONES (miirgapudgalanirdesa).
The second member of the twelvefold dependent origination (pratff;yasam_utpiida; see iii. 18-38c)
is called karma-formations (sa1J1skiira). For its definition and meaning within the four types of
dependent origination, i.e., momentary (k~anika), prolonged (priikar~ikii), connected (sii1J1-
bandhika), pertaining to states (iivasthika), see chapter 3, but as for the fourth type, i.e.,
within a three-life-times model, it is defined as follows: "(Karma-)formations (salJlskiira) are,
in a previous life, the state of [wholesome, unwholesome or non-defined] action [of the five
aggregates]."
202
LS: In order to make the sa1J1skiiras (when referring to the sa1J1skiiraskandha) easier to
distinguish from the sa1J1skiiras (when referring to the conditioning forces in general), from
now onwards we will translate the former as formations and the latter as conditioning forces.
203
LS: SAH 12.
204
I
LVP: sa1J1skiiraskandhal:t katamaft ~ac cetaniikiiyiift. - Compare Sal!lyutta, iii. 60 katame
ca bhikkhave sa1J1khiirii I chayime cetaniikiiyii I rupasaf!!Cetanii ... dhammasaf!!cetanii; Vibhiiliga,
p. 144; Sumaligalaviliisinf, p. 64.
LS: Bhikkhu Bodhi translates SalJlyutta, iii. 60, as follows: "And what, bhikkhus, are volitional
formations? There are these six classes of volition: volition regarding forms, volition regard-
ing sounds, volition regarding odours, volition regarding tastes, volition regarding tactile
objects, volition regarding mental phenomena."
Collett Cox summarizes (EIP. VIIl.655f.) the exchange in Sa111ghabhadra's *Nyiiyiinusiira
(338c):
The conditioning aggregate [sa1J1skiiraskandha] includes all conditioning factors-
those associated with thought and those dissociated from both thought and material
form-except for those included in the other four aggregates.
Objection (by the Diireytiintika teacher SrTiiita): All [those] conditioning factors are
merely varieties of thinking [cetanii].
Answer: This interpretation is not justified. The aggregate of conditioning factors is
often represented by thinking because thinking [cetanii] is the essence of action
[karma], is predominant in the development of the effects of action, and therefore is
the primary factor among the conditioning aggregates. However, the conditioning
aggregate as a whole karmically prepares other conditioned and contaminating factors.
Sriliita: "Karmically developing conditioning factors" means that thought creates
conditioning factors that were originally nonexistent.
Answer: We Abhidharma masters maintain that factors in their essential nature exist
as actual entities. Only nominal entities can be said to exist after being originally
nonexistent. "Developing" means projecting the production of an effect: though the
effect already extsts in its essential nature as an actual entity, its activity can be
projected and then produced.
As for Dharmatrii.ta, even though MYS, Sc, states: "(b) The Venerable c•-4\'")
Dharmatrii.ta
asserts thus: the citta-caitta-s are specific [modes of] cetanii", such brief statements need
interpretation. See in this context ADCP, chapter 7.1: The citta-caitta doctrine of Bhadanta
Dharmatrii.ta, pp. 114-20, where Dhammajoti comments:
[F]or Dharmatrii.ta, cetanii is the main terminology for the mind in activity, of which
citta as well as caitta-s are specific modes. That is to say, cetanii in statement
(b) does not seem to mean, volition in the specific sense of the same term for one of
the ten mahiibhumi~ dharma-s of the Abhidharmikas. Rather, being derived from
the sam~ root (-f cit) as citta, it seems to be taken to denote the sense of "con-
sciousness", "awareness" '.or "activity of thinking". Accordingly, given Dharma-
trii.ta's position that the citta-caitta-dharma-s arise successively, the statement that
citta-caitta-s are specific [11).odes of] cetanii, coupled with the doctrine that caitta-s
are not identical with citta, seems to mean: citta as it arises in the present moment is
consciousness (vijiiiina), and the caitta-s which arise subsequently in a succession are
not identical with the consciousness in the first moment, but are distinct modes-just
as consciousness/thought is a distinct mode-of the mental flow. However, given the
general outlook of the Diir~Fintikas-of whom Dharmatriita is a prominent member-
it is probable that Dharmatrii.ta accepts vedanii and sa1J7jiiii too as such distinct
modes, since these two mental dharma-s are usually mentioned together with cetanii
in the sutra-s whose authority the Dar~tantikas uphold.
205
LVP: Intention is action (iv. 1), the cause of birth (upapatti), in contrast with craving, the
cause of the re-existence (abhinirvrtti) (vi, F 137f.):
[Question:] - (1) What should one understand by birth (upapatti)? (2) What should
one understand by re-existence (abhinirvrtti)?
[Answer:] - 1. By birth, one should understand a birth or an existence characterized
by a certain realm (dhiitu; the realm of desire, etc.), a certain plane of existence (gati;
god, human, etc.), a certain mode of birth (yoni; birth from the womb, from the egg),
a certain gender, etc.
2. By re-existence, one should understand the re-existence without qualification.
LS: As we can see clearly from his endnote, L VP reads the whole section here as being
oriented toward future birth, i.e., focusing mainly on cetanii's more long term effect. Later, at
ii. 24, cetanii is defined as a generally permeating factor, focusing mainly on the present
thought (citta) as karmic cause:
Intention (cetanii; sems pa) is that which instigates or causes thought to be [karmi-
cally] creative (cittiibhisa1J7skiira; cittaprasyanda); it is mental action (manaskarma).
Saiµghabhadra defines (SA.IV.217):
Cetanii is that which causes citta to do kusala, akusala and avyakrta [karma],
resulting in good, bad and neutral [vipiika]. On account of the existence of cetanii,
the citta has the activity of moving forth (;(sf j)J it r¥l) with regard to the object. It is
like a magnet, owing to the force of which iron can move forth.
According to the Vaibhii~ikas, every intention is action, but not every action is intention; for
example, bodily and vocal action are not intention (iv. lb).
As for the relationship of the ripening cause (vipiikahetu) and action (karma) according to the
Vaibha~ikas, we could formulate the following tetralemma: (1) there are factors that are only
action but not a ripening cause, for example, non-defined actions; (2) there are factors that are
only a ripening cause but not action, for example, sensation associated with a wholesome
intention; (3) there are factors that are both a ripening cause and action, for example, whole-
some intention (cetanii) or wholesome bodily and vocal action; (4) there are factors that are
neither, for example, space (iikiisa) or sensation associated with a non-defined intention.
206
LVP: That is to say: "Because it conditions that which should be conditioned", as one
says: "Cook the porridge that should be cooked."
207
LVP: 1. Sarµyutta, iii. 87: sarµkhatam abhisarµkharontfti bhikkhave tasmii saYftkhiirii ti
• vuccanti I kiii ca sal'[lkhatam abhisaYftkharonti I riipalJl riipattiiya salJlkhatam abhisalJlkharonti I
vedanal'[I vedanattiiya ... .
2. Sal'[lyutta, v. 449: jiitisal'[lvattanike 'pi SalJlkhiire abhisarrikharonti I jariisarrivattanike 'pi ...
Imara,:iasal'flvattanike 'pi ... I te jiitisarrivattanike 'pi samkhiire abhisaYftkharitvii ... jiitipapiitam
pi papatanti I ...
3. abhisal'[lskara,:ialak$a1Jii/:i sal'[lskiirti/:i (Madhyamakavrtti, 343, 9); cittabhisal'[lskiiramanas-
kiiralak$a,:tii cetanii (ibid. 311, 1); rakta/:i san riiga}al'fl karmiibhisal'[lskaroti (ibid. 137, 7;
Mahiivastu, i. 26 and 391).
208
LVP: niiham ekadharmam apy anabhijfiiiya aparijiiiiya du}:lkhasyiintakriytif!I vadiimi.
LS: The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.37.3lff.] that anabhijfiiiya and aparijiiiiya refer, respectively,
either to the mundane path and supramundane path, or to the path of insight and path of
cultivation.
209
LS: Cox writes (DD.68): "Th[e] newly established category of discrete factors dissoci-
ated from both thought and form presented a challenge to the traditional methods of classify-
ing all experienced phenomena. The traditional lists of the five aggregates (skandha), the
twelve sense spheres (iiyatana), and name and form (niimarupa) were ill-suited to incorporate
factors that are neither thought nor form, nor associated with either. [... ] The inclusion of
these dissociated forces within the sal'[lskiiraskandha contributed to a certain tension in the
meaning of the term sal'[lskiira evident in later Abhidharma discussions of the term, ....
The challenge presented by these discrete dissociated forces to the traditional categories of
factors contributed significantly to the creation of new taxonomies: specifically, the new
fivefold taxonomy of form (rupa), thought (citta), thought concomitants (caitta), dissociated
forces (cittaviprayuktasal'[lskiira), and unconditioned forces (asarriskrtadharma)." See ii. F 143.
210
LS: AH 9; SAH 10, 15.
211
Gokhale: [15b2-d] ete punas traya}:I I dharmiiyatanadhatviikhyaJ:i sahii 'vijfiaptyasal'[I-
skrtait,, II
Tib.: [15bd] de gsum rnam rig byed min dang I "dus ma byas rnams bcas pa ni I chos kyi skye
mched khams zhes bya II
LS: 1. Although the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana) and the element of factors
(dharmadhiitu)-the object of mental consciousness (manovijfiiina)-are here defined as being
limited to seven factors, at other places in the AKB the object of mental consciousness is
referred to as including all factors. For example, i. 48a, the twentieth doctrinal perspective,
discusses· which elements (dhiitu) are cognized (vijfieya) by consciousness and states:
(J) Visible forms, (2) sounds, (3) odors, (4) tastes and (5) tangibles are known (anu-
bhuta) by the consciousnesses (J) of the eye, (2) of the ear, (3) of the n6se, (4) of the
tongue anq (5) of the body, respectively. They are all [also] cognized (vijfieya) by the
mental corjsciousness (manovijfiiina). Each of these external elements is thus cognized
by two consciousnesses:
The other thirteen elements, not being of the object-field (vi~aya) of the [five groups
of] sensory consciousness, are cognized by the mental consciousness alone.
Or, AKB ii. 62c, discussing the cognitive object condition (iilambanapratyaya), states:
62c. All factors are the cognitive object (iilambana) of consciousness [i.e., the
cognitive object condition].
All factoi:s (dharma), i.e., the conditioned (sa1J1skrta) as well as the unconditioned
(asa'!lskrta) factors, are a cognitive object condition of thoughts and thought-con-
comitants' (cittacaitta), accordingly as the case applies (yathiiyoga1J1): for example,
visual con.sciousness (cak~urvijfiiina) and the thought-concomitants, i.e., sensation,
etc., associated with it, have all visible forms [rupa] for their cognitive object;
auditory consciousness, sounds; olfactory consciousness, odors; tactile conscious-
ness, tangibles. [On the other hand,] mental consciousness (manovijfiiina) and the
thought-concomitants associated with it have all the factors [sarvadharma] for their
cognitive object. [With respect to the mental faculty (manas), verse 62c is thus
understood literally.]
But as for "all factors", i. 39bc comments:
There is no factor in regard to which mental consciousness, being without limit
(ananta manovijfiiina), has not arisen or is not destined to arise. All noble ones
(iiryapudgala), in fact, necessarily produce the thought: "All factors are non-self"
(sarvadharmii aniitmiina; vii. 13a). Now it is true that this thought bears neither on
itself (svabhiiva) nor on the factors which are co-existing (sahabha; ii. 50b) with it;
but this [(first) moment (k~a~za)] of thought and the factors co-existing with it are
the cognitive object [iilambana] of a second moment of thought which sees that all
factors are non-self; thus "all factors" are indeed included within the cognitive
object of these two moments of thought (vii. 18cd).
AKB vii. 18cd further specifies:
When a moment of conventional cognition (sa1J1vrtijfiiina) cognizes all factors as not
being a "self', that is by excluding, from the totality of factors,
i. itself, this same moment of conventional cognition, for the subject of cogni-
tion cannot be its own object (vi:fayivi:fayabhediit);
ii. the mental factors (caitta) associated with it, for they have the same cogni-
tive object as it does (ekiilambanatviit);
iii. the factors dissociated from thought (viprayukta) which accompany it
(sahabhii), for example, its characteristics (lak~ar.ta; ii. 45c ), for they are too
close.
Thus in the AKB we have two incongruent interpretations regarding the object of mental
consciousness, one maintaining that it consists of seven dharmas and the other that it consists
of all dharmas.
2. If we now look into the historical records regarding the dharmadhiitu, Dhammajoti
comments (SA.IY.30f.):
We must remember that originally in the siitra-s, the 18-dhiitu taxonomy was
a pragmatic classificatory scheme, mainly employed to underscore the Buddha's
no-Self doctrine. This scheme was intended to show the correlation between the six
faculties of a human being with their corresponding objects and the consciousnesses
generated. It is essentially an epistemological consideration without any explicit
ontological commitment. In this scheme, dharma-dhiitu corresponded to the objects
of the mind and mental consciousness just as the visibles corresponded to those of
the eye and visual consciousness. When this scheme (together with those of the
skandha- and iiyatana-taxonomies) came to be adopted as a methodology of dharma-
pravicaya, what is the Abhidharmic principle that it was made to represent? ... In the
words of the MYS, "these 18 dhiitu-s are established on the basis of (intrinsic)
characteristic" .... The consideration in terms of intrinsic characteristic would mean,
among other things, that the specific items assigned to each of the 18 dhiitu-s must
represent ultimate real existents (i.e., dharma-s in the proper Abhidharmic sense).
Accordingly, even though the mind can think of all kinds of things, the dharma-
dhiitu cannot be said to comprise objects that are relatively real.
This is clear from the items enumerated [below] in the MYS, the Vijfiiinakiiya and Prakarar.ta-
sastra as objects cognized by mental consciousness (eye ... mental consciousness), which may
be said to be still in keeping with the intent of the siitras.
MYS, 370c, as well as the earlier Prakarar.ta-siistra (T 26, 699a), state:
What is dharmadhiitu? Dharma-s that have been, are being and will be cognized by
the mind are called dharmadhiitu.
Here dharmadhiitu clearly refers to the mental objects as being cognized in the three times,
which should include-for the orthodox Yaibhli~ikas-all possible "categories" of dharmas, as
explicitly stated in the Vijfiiina-kiiya-siistra (T 26, 546c):
What does mental consciousness cognize? Mental consciousness cognizes: eye,
visibles and visual consciousness; ear, sounds and auditory consciousness; nose,
odors and olfactory consciousness; tongue, tastes and gustatory consciousness; body,
tangibles and bodily consciousness; mind, dharma-s (mental objects) and mental con-
sciousness.
Thus it includes even mind, objects of mind and mental consciousness.

But then, at least starting from the Jfiiinaprasthiina, dharmadhiitu is referred to or implied as
"seven dharmas" by the orthodox Vaibhaeyikas, seemingly influenced by their five-group tax-
onomy (paficavastuka; SA.IV.35ff.) that had gradually become their standard classification of
dharmas, which includes the avijfiapti-rupa and the three unconditioned factors.
Thus the Jfiiinaprasthiina (T 26, 1027b), as well as AKB i. 18ab, can state that all of the
factors 1;1.re included (sarµgraha) in the aggregate of material form (rupaskandha), the sense-
sphere ·of the mental faculty (mana-iiyatana) and the element of factors (dharmadhiitu), and
not just in the dharmadhiitu. On the other hand, the Sautrantika SrTiata maintains that all
dharmas are subsumed under the dharmiiyatana. Although this is repudiated by Sarpgha-
bhadra, he also seemed to speak at times explicitly-apparently under the shadow of the sutra
tradition-of the dharmiiyatana as the cognitive objects corresponding to mental conscious-
ness (Ny, 448b):
The totality of dharma-s is just the twelve iiyatana-s, i.e., the visual, auditory, olfac-
tory, gustatory and mental consciousness, with their corresponding cognitive objects,
the visibles, sound, odors, tastes tangibles and dharma-s.
3. But we also find in the above passages a second incongruity concerning the Sarvastivada
explanation on dharmiiyatana and dharmadhiitu, namely, in regard to material form (rupa),
i.e., the sense-faculties (indriya), which in fact can be cognized only by thought but are not
included among the "seven dharmas". Dhammajoti explains (SA.IV.33):
The reason for this, however, is not far to seek. In keeping with the classification in
the sutra, the six faculties must be retained as the corresponding supporting bases
(iisraya) of the six types of consciousness generated by the six corresponding types
of object. This means that the dharma-s, constituting the dharmiiyatana and dharma-
dhiitu, must not be comingled with the five sensory faculties or the mental faculty
(the mind). The five sensory faculties must be retained as five of the ten traditional
subdivisions of matter. The mental faculty likewise has to be separated from the
mental objects. The result is that the dharmadhiitu then came to subsume all the
remaining dharma-s qua mental objects excluding the five sensory objects, the six
faculties and the six consciousnesses. It must of course further take in the non-
information matter, the conditionings disjoined from thought and the three uncondi-
tioned which were newly established as real entities by the orthodoxy.
4. As for a discussion of the reasons why only the object of mental consciousness receives
the name of dharmiiyatana even though all iiyatanas are dharmas, see AKB i. 24.
As for the skandhas, it is good to keep in mind, as later pointed out (i. 22ab), that even
though Vasubandhu inserts here into his general discussion of the five aggregates a correlation
of the skandhas with the iiyatanas and dhiitus, the scheme of the five aggregates does not
include the three unconditioned factors.
212
LS: We have already mentioned above that even though avijfiapti is classified as
secondary matter (bhautika), it is a special case of rupa since it is invisible (anidarsana), non-
resistant (apratigha), does not occupy space, does not have the nature of rupa!la and is not
atomic in nature. Although it is said to be of the nature of rupa since the fundamental material
elements that constitute its basis (a§raya) are res'istant material form, it is also included as a
special case under dharmtiyatana and dharmadhtitu, rather than riiptiyatana, which is justified
(iv. F 16: fifth reason) with the Elephant-simile siitra reference to a specific riipa included in
the dharmtiyatana. Further, it can only be cognized by mental consciousness (manovijfiiina).
213
LS: AH 8; SAH 9, 15, 20, 26.
214
Gokhale: [16a] vijiiiinarri prativijiiaptir
Tib.: [16a] rnam shes so sor rnam rig pa I
LVP: citta and caitta, see ii, F 177.
LS: As for the definitions of vijiiiina in the Paiicaskandhaka and the Avatiira, see endnote to
ii. 34ab.
Here Vasubandhu provides the often quoted definition of consciousness (vijiiiina), before
presenting the sixfold classification of consciousness and linking up the aggregate of con-
sciousness with the sense-spheres (iiyatana) and elements (dhiitu). Since this is again only a
fairly brief presentation on a very important subject, what other aspects does Vasubandhu
discuss later in the AKB?
1. As for its relation to the other aggregates, i. 22bd describes the five aggregates from the
point of view of (i) their relative grossness, (ii) their being causes of the progression of
pollution, (iii) analogy and (iv) their predominance in the three realms. Vijiiiina is considered
to be the most subtle among the non-material aggregates.
2. As for its being included in other lists, AKB i. 28cd discusses vijiiiina as the sixth member
of the six elementary substances, namely as the elementary substance consciousness (vijiiiina-
dhiitu ), an impure consciousness that does not form part of the noble path.
Vijiiiina is also listed as the third member of the twelvefold dependent origination (pratftya-
samutpiida; see iii. 18-38c). For its definition and meaning within the four types of dependent
origination, i.e., momentary (k~anika), prolonged (priikar~ika), connected (sarribandhika), per-
taining to states (tivasthika), see chapter 3. But as for the fourth type, i.e., within a three-life-
times model, it is defined as follows (iii. 21c): "Consciousness (vijflana) is the (five) aggre-
gates; (in the womb,) at conception (pratisarridhi)."
3. As for the mental faculty (manas; mano-ayatana; manodhiitu), it is briefly discussed
(i. 17ab):
Of the six consciousnesses, the consciousness that has just passed away is the mental
faculty.
4. As for the twenty-two doctrinal perspectives, Vasubandhu clarifies (i. 29bc) the distinc-
tion between the objects of the sense-faculties and the consciousnesses, wherein the conscious-
nesses are determined to have both an object-field (vi~aya) and a cognitive object (alambana),
whereas the sense-faculties can have only an object-field (vi~aya).
AKB i. 33a clarifies the difference between the five sensory consciousnesses and the mental
consciousness (i) from the point of view of the three conceptual constructions (vikalpa);
whereby the mental consciousness is described as involving all three and the sensory con-
sciousness as involving only conceptual construction in its intrinsic nature (svabhavavikalpa)
and is thus declared to be "free from conceptual construction", i.e., from the second and third
conceptual construction. This difference is also (i. 48a) further discussed (ii) from the point of
view of which and how many elements (dhiitu) are cognized (vijfieya) by which and by how .
many consciousnesses. The first five consciousnesses are described as cognizing, each, one
element (dhatu) only, whereas mental consciousness is described as being able to cognize all
eighteen elements. The same difference is, furthermore (i. 23a), discussed (iii) from the point
of view .of the tim~ period to which the object-field of the sense-faculty and of the mental
faculty (manas) belongs. Whereas the object-field of the first five sense-faculties c~ be only
present or simultaneous, the object-field of the mental faculty (manas; i. 39ab)-depending on
whether the manas is a sensory consciousness or a mental consciousness-can be ei.ther
(i) simultaneous (vartamiina] to the manas; (ii) previous or past [atfta]; (iii) later or future
[aniigata]; (iv) tritemporal [try-adhva], i.e., simultaneous, previous and later; (v) outside of time
[anadhva].
Further, vijfiiina is discussed at length when addressing (ii. 42) the question of whether it is the
eye sense-faculty that sees, as maintained by the Vaibhii~ikas, or whether it is the visual
consciousness. In this context Vasubandhu also addresses (ii. 44cd) (i) whether or not the
object-field and sense-faculty occur simultaneous with the resulting consciousness, (ii) why
the sense-faculty is considered to be its basis (iisraya) and not the object-field, (iii) why the
sense-faculties are the basis for naming the consciousnesses.
As for the sense-faculties of the consciousnesses, i. 44cd specifies that the sole basis of the
mental consciousness is the mental faculty, i.e., the consciousness that has just perished,
whereas the basis of the five consciousnesses is twofold: (i) for example, the eye sense-faculty
that is simultaneous with the visual consciousness; etc., and (ii) the mental faculty, which is
past at the moment when one of these five consciousnesses arises.
5. In chapter 2, Vasubandhu continues his discussion of vijfiana within a detailed
presentation of thought and thought-concomitants (ii. 23-34), which does not include
another formal definition of vijfiiina, but features a presentation of the etymology of citta,
manas and vijfiiina. These are trefited as synonyms in the Vaibhii~ika system, although distin-
guished in terms of their differen~ functional aspects of the mind they represent (ii. 34ab):
34ab. (i) Thought (dtta), (ii) mind (manas) and (iii) consciousness (vijfiiina),
these names designate the same object-referent [ekiirtha].
i. The mind is named citta (T. sems; thought) because it accumulates or collects
together (cinoti).
ii. It is named manas (T. yid; mind) because it considers or thinks (manute).
m. It is named vijfiana (T. rnam par shes pa; consciousness) because it cognizes its
cognitive object (tilambanaJ?1 vijtintiti).
See MYS, 371ab, for a discussion of various other distinctions (SA.IV.212).
For the Yogiiciirins, however-but only those who maintain eight consciousnesses-citta,
manas and vijfitina "also" take on a different significance (BU.226), i.e., citta can refer to the
alaya-vijfitina, manas to the kli:;ta-manas and vijfiana to the traditional classification of six
forms of sensory and mental consciousnesses.
6. As for the detailed exposition of thought and thought-concomitants, and their relationship,
in ii. 23-34, which occurs within the context of his discussion of the simultaneous arising of
thought, thought-concomitants and formations dissociated from thought, Vasubandhu starts
out by explaining that, within the orthodox Vaibha~ika system, thought and thought-concomi-
tants necessarily arise together or simultaneously. Later (ii. S0b-51 and 53cd), this relationship
is further specified and discussed as associated cause (sarµprayuktakahetu) and as an exem-
plification of the co-existent cause (sahabhuhetu). He then continues (ii. 23c-33) with a very
detailed discussion of the forty-six thought concomitants-Le., the formations associated
with thought (cittasarµprayuktasarµskiira), presenting them in six distinct groups (see chart at
ii, F 143)--representing more or less the classic one by the Sarviistivadins. This includes the
discussion (ii. 28-30b) as to which and how many thought-concomitants arise in association
with which thought. For example, in regard to the realm of desire (kiimadhiitu):•
i. wholesome (kusala) thought;
ii-iii. unwholesome (akusala) thought, according to whether it is:
"independent" (iive~iki), i.e., associated with ignorance (avidyii) alone, or
associated with the other defilements, i.e., attachment (raga), etc.;
iv-v. non-defined (avyiikrta) thought, i.e., thought that is unproductive in regard to retri-
bution, according to whether it is:
obscured (nivrta), i.e., associated with the afflicted view of self (satkiiyadr~!i) or
with the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (antagriihadmi) (v. 3), or
unobscured (anivrta), i.e., an effect of retribution (vipiikaja), etc. (i. 37; ii. 71).
(i) The wholesome thought involves twenty-two thought-concomitants, i.e., ten generally
permeating factors, ten wholesome permeating factors, initial inquiry and investigation;
(ii-iii) the unwholesome thought, either twenty or twenty-one thought-concomitants; and
(iv-v) the non-defined thought, eighteen or twelve thought-concomitants. But all involve ten
generally permeating factors, which are therefore of special importance, being distinct forces
that together make possible the operation of consciousness. Here it should be pointed out that
the acceptance of the doctrine of the mahiibhumikas was far from being unanimous within the
early Sarviistiviida lineage; for example, for Dharmatriita, the citta-caitta "arise successively
and not simultaneously, like a group of merchants who pass through a narrow road one by
one" (SA.IV.225), and for Buddhadeva, there is no caitta apart from the citta.
7. Vasubandhu ends his detailed exposition (ii. 23-34) by presenting the five equiva-
lences (samatii; ii. 34d), due to which thought and thought-concomitants are associated:
i. equivalence with respect to basis [or sense-faculty] (iisraya; rten);
ii. equivalence with respect to cognitive object (iilambana; dmigs);
iii. equivalence with respect to aspect or a mode of activity (iikiira; rnam pa);
iv. equivalence with respect to time [of occurrence of the activity of thought and thought-
concomitants] (kiila; dus);
v. equivalence with respect to the number ofreal entities [or the singular instance of the
occurrence of a real entity or the status as real entities] (dravya; rdzas).
But although he ends his discussion with the five equivalences, Vasubandhu's discussion has
shown the general differences between the first five and the sixth consciousnesses as well as a
general difference in functionality between citta and caittas (SA.IV.227f.):
390 Exposition of the Elements (DhiiJunirde§a)
Citta or vijfiilna is the general discernment or apprehension with respect to each

individual object [AKB i. 16a]. This discernment is the mere grasping of the object
itself, without apprehending any of its particularities. A caitta, on the other hand,
apprehends the particularities of the object [cf. Vy, 38 and ESD.120). Thus, in a
visual perception, the citta, i.e., visual consciousness in this case, can only apprehend
a blue object. It is only in conjunction with the caitta called saf!!}fiil, whose function
it is to categorize, and prajfiil whose function it is to discriminatively conceptualize,
that the mind apprehends specifically: "This is blue."[ ... ]
The Abhidharmadfpa explains that while the citta is conascent with the caitta-s, it is
distinguishable as the chief substance (pradhana-dravya) inasmuch as it is the citta
that grasps the mere object. The specifics pertaining to the object so apprehended are
grasped simultaneously by a caitta-saf[l}fiil ideates, smrti recollects, prajfiil examines,
etc. The implication is that without the raw or general grasping of the object to begin
with, there cannot be the specific functioning of the caitta-s. Accordingly, the
caitta-s are functionally subordinate to and dependent on the citta which is like the
governor (rilja-sthilnfya) in relation to the governed. It is by the citta that the
fundamental essence of a being (mula-sattva-dravya) is designated [ESD.120). That
the citta is the chief is also to be understood from the fact that the unenlightened are
attached to it-not to the caitta-s-as the Atman. [ ... ]
According to Xuan Zang's disciple [i.e., Pu Guang], there are four ancient schools or
views on the functional relationship between the citta and the caitta-s: ... [For details
see SA.IV.229).
8. In this context, Dhammajoti also raises the question of the original nature of thought (see
SA.IV .232ff.) and summarizes the Sarviistivada position as presented by Sarpghabhadra
(Ny, 733ab):
When citta abides in its intrinsic nature, i.e., the neutral nature, it is necessarily
pure-essentially agreeing with the Theravada commentarial tradition. But when
it abides in adventitious nature, it can be defiled.
See here also Vasubandhu's discussion of the two modes of wholesome factors (ii, F 184),
i.e., "(1) the innate wholesome factors not produced through effort (ayatnabhavin), which are
[referred to as] those that are acquired at birth (aupapattika, upapattililbhika), and (2) the
wholesome factors produced [only] through effort [yatnabhavin], which are [referred to as]
those that are acquired through preparatory effort (prilyogika, prayogalilbhika; ii. 71b)", where
we also find the comment that the wholesome factors can never have their roots completely
cut off. See also Jaini's discussion of kusala-dharma-bfja (AD.111-17).
9. Vasubandhu continues with a detailed discussion of the formations dissociated from
thought (cittaviprayuktasaf[lskilra; ii. 35-48). Sarpghabhadra comments (EIP.VIII.685) that
these are conditioning factors (i) that necessarily arise simultaneously with other factors, and
as such also with vijfiilna, as for example: possession (prilpti), vitality (jrvita), the four
conditioning characteristics (lak$ana; origination, duration, deterioration, impermanence),
or (ii) that explicitly do not arise with vijfiilna, as, for example, the state of non-ideation
(ilsarrl}nika), the attainment of non-ideation (asaf!!}fiisamilp.ptti) and the attainment of cessat-
ion (nirodhasamtipatti). These factors are conditioned, but cannot be classified with thought,
thought-concomitants or material form (rupa).
10. As for the life-force, it is determined (ii. 45ab) as the support of heat (u~man) and con-
sciousness (vijiitina), i.e., it is the cause of the duration of their stream. The life-force itself, in
turn, is supported by heat and consciousness.
11. At the end of chapter 2, Vasubandhu returns once more to a discussion of vijiitina, where
he gives a specific explanation (ii. 66-73) of the immediate condition, i.e., the causal relation-
ships between different thoughts (wholesome, unwholesome, obscured-non-defined, and
unobscured-non-defined thought of the realm of desire; etc.) and different thoughts.
12. In chapter 9, Vasubandhu discusses consciousness in relation to the self, the person,
memory, the agent and its action. "As to the sutra statement that consciousness cognizes
(vijiitinaffl vijanati), Vasubandhu explains that in the cognitive process consciousness in fact
does nothing (it is not a true, independent agent)" (see Dhammajoti's Summary, p. 57).
The above passages seem to cover the main points as presented by the AKB concerning
vijiitina and its wider context.
215
LS: Schmithausen comments (SPPT.164; translation is by LS): "The Sanskrit word
vijiiapti-a causative form with the basic meaning 'making known', 'informing'--explains the
aspect of the actual execution of cognition and the relatedness of cognizance to an object. In
contrast to that, citta and vijiiana do not designate only the actual cognition as correlate to an
object, but also, from a more ontological perspective, [1] the changing and intermittent stream
of perceptions and cognitions in contrast to a substantial self, or [2] the mind in contrast to
matter. Citta is used in particular in the latter sense." In this context see the usage of vijiiana in
the twelvefold pratftyasamutpada pertaining to states (avasthika).
Hall e:omments (JIABS.9/1, p. 8): "In ordinary parlance vijiiapti (Pali viiiiiatti) means
'information' or the act of informing someone, that is 'report' or 'proclamation', especially a
report to a superior, and hence, 'reql'est' or 'entreaty'. Vijiiapti is a noun of action derived
from the causative stem (jiiapaya- or jiiapaya-) of the verb root jiiti ("know") with the prefix
vi-. Etymologically the term vijiiapti would mean the act of causing [someone] to know
[something] distinctly, or in a concrete sense, that which causes [one] to know distinctly."
216
LVP: The Vyakhyti explains upalabdhi by means of the gloss vastumiitragraha~a
[WOG.38.24], and adds vedantidayas tu caitasika vi§qagrahar_iarupaJ:i:
The consciousness (vijiiana) or thought (citta) apprehends (grahar_ia) the specific
entity, nothing more (vastumtitra); the thought-concomitants (caitasika) or factors
associated with consciousness (ii. 24), that is to say, sensation, etc. (vedana sarµjiia ... ),
apprehend particular characteristics, special conditions.
For example, the tactile consciousness (kayavijiitina) apprehends unevenness, softness, etc.
(i. 10d); it is associated with an agreeable sensation (vedanti) that apprehends a certain
characteristic of unevenness or softness, the characteristic of being the cause of an agreeable
sensation (sukhavedanfyatti). The visual consciousness [LS: LVP should say "mental con-
sciousness"; see i. 14cd] apprehends color (blue, etc.,) and shape (saf[lsthtina); it is associated
with a certain thought-concomitant called ideation (sarrijiiti), which apprehends a certain char-
acteristic of the color and shape under consideration: "This is a man, this is a woman, etc."
This doctrine has been adopted by the school of Nagarjuna. Madhyamakavrtti, p. 65 cittam
arthamiitragriihi caittii vi§e~iivsthiigriihi,:iaft suhkhiidayaft; and by the school of Dignaga,
Nyiiyabindu(fkii, p. 12, Tibetan version, p. 25.
The Japanese editor of the Kosa cites the Koki and the Vibhii~ii, which indicate four opinions
on this problem.
See ii. 34bd.
217
LVP: That is to say, according to Saqighabhadra: "The visual consciousness, even though
numerous material objects may be present, seizes solely visible form, not sound; it seizes blue,
etc., but does not say that it is blue, etc., that it is agreeable, disagreeable, male, female, etc., a
stump, etc .... ".
218
.LS: As for the simultaneity of consciousnesses, Schmithausen states (AV.45f.): "Taking
alayavijiiiina as a continuous entity ... inevitably implies that-apart from unconscious
states like nirodhasamiipatti--one has to assume the simultaneous occurrence of at least two
vijiiiinas: one or the other of the ordinary v1jiiiinas, and iilayavijiiiina. But this was problematic
since there is explicit evidence showing that the pre-iilayavijiiiinic materials of the Yogiiciira-
bhami share the view of most Abhidharma schools [-especially Vaibha~ikas (explicit
statement: MYS, 47b29ff.), Sautrantikas, and Theravadins, the only exception pointed out by
the sources being the (or some) Mahasanghikas-] that in one and the same stream-of-
personality several vijiiiinas cannot arise simultaneously ....
But a ... theory of simultaneous occurrence not only of a continuous subliminal form of mind
with actual vijfiiinas but-given the necessary conditions-also of several actual vijfiiinas
(occasionally even of all the six kinds) is, as is well-known, categorically affirmed in the Vth
chapter of the Sarrzdhinirmocanasutra."
In this context, Dhammajoti mentions in his Summary, p. 20, that Saqighabhadra alleges that
Vasubandhu actually seems to align with "some masters" who hold that several conscious-
nesses arise simultaneously within a single body. For (Ny, 403c24-404a9), "if it is held that
consciousness arises simply in dependence on the body possessing the faculties (sendriya-
kiiya), without having to depend on the causal conditions pertaining to its_ own species
(*svajiitfya), what, for him, prevents the simultaneous arising of consciousnesses of all object~
domains in all stages?"
219
LS: AH 8; SAH 9.
220
Gokhale: [16b] manaiiyatana1J1 ca tat I
Tib.: [16b] yid kyi skye mched kyang de yin I
221
Gokhale: [16cd] dhiitavaJ:i sapta ca matiiJ:i ~acf- vijfiiiniiny atho manaJ:i II
Tib.: [16cd] khams bdun dag tu'ang 'dod paste I rnam par shes pa drug dang yid I
222
LS: SAH 20-21, 26, 51-52.
223
LVP: The consciousnesses (vijiiiina) succeed on\'<- another; they can be visual... mental.
The consciousness that disappeared is the immediately preceding con<.iition (ii. 62a), the basis
(iisraya) of the consciousness which immediately follows. Under this aspect it receives the
name of mental faculty (manas), of sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-iiyatanp,), of-
element of the mental faculty (manodhiitu), of the mental faculty (mana-indriya; ii. 1). It is to
the consciousness that follows it what the eye sense-faculty is for the visual consciousness.
224
Gokhale: [17ab] ~aririiim anantarii'tftalJl vijftiinalJl yad dhi tan manal:z I
Tib.: [l 7ab] drug po 'das ma thag pa yi I rnam shes gang yin de yid do I
LVP: See i. 39ab.
According to the Vyiikhyii [WOG.39.25f.], the Yogiiciiras assert a manodhiitu, a manas or
mental faculty, distinct from the six consciousnesses.
The Tiimrapan:iiyas, the scholars of Taprobane, imagine (kalpayanti) a material sense-faculty,
the heart (hrdayavastu), a basis of the mental consciousness. This heart exists also in the realm
of immateriality, the nonmaterial sphere: these scholars assert, in fact, the existence of matter
in this sphere (viii. 3c); they explain the prefix ii [in Arupyadhiitu] in the sense of "a little", as
in iipiligala, "a little red".
The Patthiina (cited in Compendium of Philosophy, p. 278) assigns a material basis (riipa) to
the mental consciousness, without giving to this basis the name heart, whereas it calls eye the
basis of the visual consciousness. But the later Abhidhamma (Visuddhimagga; Abhidhamma-
saligaha) considers the heart as the sense-faculty of thought.
The teaching of the Vibhaliga, p. 88,-is less clear: "From the consciousness of the eye, ear, . ,.
body that has just perished arises the mind, the manas, the mental faculty (miinasa = manas),
the heart (=the mind), the manas, the manas sense-faculty ... " (Atthasiilinf, 343).
LS: 1. Collett Cox, in her On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness:
Sarviistiviidin and Diir~tiintika Theories, comments (nABS.11.35f.): "Mental perception
differs from external perception in several significant respects. The mental organ (manas),
which conditions the arising of a present moment cif mental perceptual consciousness, is
defined as the immediately preceding moment of perceptual consciousness, regardless of its
types: That is to say, any of the six varieties of perceptual consciousness may be designated as
the mental organ for a subsequent moment of mental percept1,1al consciousness. Unlike the
other five externally directed sense organs, this mental organ, precisely because it is past,
cannot be said to perform its distinctive activity ... of sensing or grasping the object-support of
the present moment of perceptual consciousness. Instead it serves simply as the door, or
immediately coritiguous condition (samanantarapratyaya) for the arising of the present
moment of mental perceptual consciousness, which then apprehends the object-support.
Therefore, unlike the five externally directed sense organs and corresponding types of
perceptual consciousness, the prior mental organ and its resultant present mental perceptual
consciousness are not simultaneous, and do not necessarily share the same object-support.
Nevertheless, the two requisite conditions for the arising of a present moment of mental
perceptual consciousness, that is, a basis (iisraya) and an object-support (iilambana), are still
provided through the past mental organ and the object-support."
See i. 44cd.
2. For Vasubandhu's discussion whether the last thought of the perfected being (arhat) is a
manas, see ii, F 305.
225
LS: SAH 20, 26.
226
Gokhale: [17cd] ~a~thiisrayaprasiddhyarthalJl dhiitavo '~!iidasa smrtii/:i I
Tib.: [17cd] drug pa'i rten ni rab bsgrub phyir I khams ni bco brgyad dag tu 'dod I
LVP: hrdayavastu, Compendium, 122, 278; JPTS, 1884, 27-29; Atthasalinf, 140; Mrs. Rhys
Davids, Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, iii, 353, cites Comm. Jiitaka: ... hadayamam-
santare pafi(!hitii pafifiii; Siddhi, 281.
227
LS: SAH 20.
228
LS: SAH 52.
229
Gokhale: [18acl] sarvasaf!!graha ekena skandhen iiyatanena ca Idhiitunii ca
Tib.: [18ab] phung po dang ni skye mched dang Ikhams gcig gis ni thams cad bsdus I
LVP: The non-informative (avijiiapti) forms part of the aggregate of form (riipaskandha) and
of the element of factors (dharmadhiitu).
230
LS: AH 14; SAH 51.
231
Gokhale: [18c2-d] svabhiivena parabhiivaviyogatalJ 11
Tib.: [18cd] rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis te I gzhan gyi dngos dang mi ldan phyir 11
LVP: The problem of inclusion (sarrigraha) is examined in Dhiitukathiipakara,:ia; Kathiivatthu,

vii. 1; Dhiitukiiya; Prakara,:ia (see below i. 20, F 39, note).
LS: 1. DharmasrI's root verse says (AH 14): "All factors are separated from factors of another
nature. Everything dwells naturally on something of its own nature. Therefore they say that all
factors are comprised (saf!!graha) within something of their own nature."
2. For a discussion of the historical development of the method of saf!!graha ("inclusion",
"subsumption"), see the section "Svabhiiva and the method of inclusion", pp. 558-65, in
Collett Cox's From Category to Ontology: The changing role of Dharma iii Sarviistiviida
Abhidharma. She writes (p. 560f.):
[The] method of inclusion, integral to any taxonomic practice, is implicit within
Abhidharma categorization in all periods. However, even though the earliest canoni-
cal Sarviistiviida Abhidharma texts classify specific dharmas according to a method
of simple inclusion, they do not utilize the intricate matrices typical of the vibhii~ii
compendia, nor do they explicitly consider the meaning of "inclusion", its rationale,
and its implications for the nature of the dharmas so classified, as evident in the
controversy concerning intrinsic nature and other-nature .... The early method of
simple inclusion is expanded in the canonical texts of the middle period such as the
Praka,:iapiida, Vijfiiinakiiya, and the Jfiiinaprasthiina, which relate entire categories
rather than simply classifying individual dharmas, but which still do not explicitly
discuss the rationale for the method of inclusion in terms of a fundamental contrast
between intrinsic nature and other-nature.[ ... ]
[I]t is significant to note that the term svabhiiva in the distinctive sense of the
intrinsic nature of a category or of an individual dharma is not used in the earliest
Sarviistiviida canonical Abhidharma texts; it appears only in texts from the period of
the early vibhii~ii compendia onward, that is, concurrent with the systematic develop-
ment of the analytical method of categorization by inclusion. It is then plausible to
infer that this sense of svabhiiva as intrinsic nature, so important in later Sarviistiviida
Endnotes to Chcpter One 395
exegesis for the interpretation of the character of dharmas per se, first emerged
through its function as the criterion determining categories of dharmas, specifically
in the context of inclusion.
3. As for "other-nature", she points out that the topic of "inclusion" is raised to counter the
view of the Vibhajyaviidins (MYS, 306b12-14] that "dharmas are included on the basis of
other nature (parabhava), and not on the basjs of intrinsic nature (svabhava)", w1hich they
support by appealing to both scriptural authority and common usage in which "ili~t which
includes" and "that which is included" are clearly distinct from one another, as in the case of a
householder who states "I possess land, domestic animals". Yet the *Mahavibha~a points out
that these commonplace examples involve inclusion (sarrigraha) merely in a conventional sense,
whereas Abhidharma ·analysis applies inclusion in the absolute sense (paramarthika) by
declaring (MYS, 306bc) that "all dharma-s are included with respect to intrinsic nature".
4. In this context, Dhammajoti (SA:IV.22) and Cox (p. 560) both refer to the passage in
MYS, 308a, where inclusion/subsumption (sarrigraha) vis-ii-vis intrinsic nature is explained:
Because, vis-ii-vis intrinsic nature, an intrinsic nature is existent, real, apperceivable
(upa--f labh); hence it is called sarrigraha. Because, vis-ii-vis intrinsic nature, an
intrinsic nature is not different, not external, not separated, not distinct, not empty;
hence it is called sarrigraha: [Cox: It is not the case that it has not existed, does not
exist, or will not exist; it neither increases nor decreases. Inclusion by intrinsic nature
does not involve one thing grasping another.] When dharma-s are subsumed vis-ii-vis
intrinsic nature, it is unlike the case of taking up food with the hand or that of nipping
a garment with the fingers. Rather, each of them sustains itself so as not to be disinte-
grated; hence it is called sarrigraha. It is named sarrigraha in the sense of sustaining.
Hence, sarrigraha in the absolute sense (paramartha) is subsumption of intrinsic nature
alone.
Dhammajoti then comments (SA.IV.22):
The study of subsumption in terms of intrinsic nature is none other than the study of
the intrinsic characteristics of all dharma-s. This analysis may be made between one
single dharma and another dharma, or between one dharma and several other dharma-s,
or. between one category of dharma-s and another category, or between one category
and several other categories.
However, this should not be understood as an ambiguous application of the term
intrinsic nature-to both individual dharma-s and categorical groups of dharma.
Although the method of subsumption does serve to discriminate the different cate-
gorical-types, its fundamental function is to investigate into the essential or intrinsic
nature of a given group of forces (phenomenal or unconditioned) which through
having the same intrinsic nature are experienced by us in diverse modes or forms.
This is the essential meaning of "subsumption in respect of intrinsic nature".
232
LS: Yasomitra explains (cf. WOG.41.l0ff; FCO.564) that "the smaller is to be included
within the larger, and not the larger within the smaller. Hence, the smaller category of the
visual controlling faculty, which constitutes merely one part of the material form aggregate, is
to be included within the larger category of the material form aggregate, which includes all
varieties of material form. Yasomitra explains that such inclusion based upon intrinsic nature
is absolute (paramiirthika), and not conventional or consensual (sii1J1ketika)."
233
LS: The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.41.23]: catasraJ:i par~adal; bhik~u-bhik~ul).y-upasakopiisikiiJ:i.
234
LVP: Digha, iii. 232: "four bases of sympathy (sa1J1gaha-vatthuni): generosity [diina],
pleasing speech [priyavaditii], beneficial conduct [arthacaryii], and impartiality [siimaniirthatii]"
(Walshe). Dharmasa1J1graha, 19; Mahiivyutpatti, 35, etc.
LS: Ariguttara-nikiiya (PTS) iv. 218: "Lord, it is by those four bases of gatherings, which have
been declared by the Exalted One, that I gather this following together. Lord, [1] when
I realize that this man may be enlisted by a gift, I enlist him in this way; [2] when by a kindly
word, then in that way; [3] when by a good turn, then so; or [4] when I know that he must be
treated as an equal, if he is to be enlisted, then I enlist him by equality of treatment."
235
LS: SAH 21.
236
Gokhale: [19] jiitigocaravijiiiinasiimiinyiid ekadhlitutii I dvitve 'pi ca~uriidfnlif/1 sobhii'rthaf!l tu
dvayodbhaval; I
Tib.: [19] mig la sogs pa gnyis mod kyi I rigs dang spyod yul rnam par shes I 'dra ba'i phyir na
khams gcig nyid I mdzes bya 'i phyir na gnyis byung ngo I
237
LVP: Great ugliness would result from the fact of having only one eye, one ear, one
nostril. - But many animals: camels, cats, owls, etc., although having two eyes, etc., are not
beautiful! -They are not beautiful in comparison with the other types of animals, but, among
their fellow creatures, the individuals who have only one eye, etc., they are ugly.
Saiµghabhadra explains the meaning of beauty (sobhiirtham) in the sense of for supremacy's
sake (iidltipatyiirtham; see ii. 1). Those who possess supremacy are beautiful, shine in the
world. Individuals who have only one eye do not possess supremacy, i.e., the capacity for clear
vision, for sight is not as clear with one eye as with two eyes ... (i. 43).
238
LS: SAH 7, 24-25.
239
Gokhale: [20ab] riisyiiyadviiragotrii'rthiil; skandhiiyatanadhiitavaft I
Tib.: [20ab] spungs dang skye sgo rigs kyi don I phung po skye mched khams rnams yin I
240
LS: SAH 7, 25.
241
LVP: skandha, riisi, Vibhii~ii, 74, p. 383.
LS: Each of the five aggregates (skandha) forms a heap (riisi) of its own category which may
be past, present or future.
242
LVP: Sa1J1yukta, 15, 2: yat ki1J1cid rupam atftiiniigatapratyutpannam iidhyiitmika1J1 vii
biihya1J1 vii audiirika1J1 vii suk~ma1J1 vii hfna1J1 vii pra,:ifta1J1 vii dura1J1 vii antika1J1 vii tad
ekadhyam abhisa1J1k#pya ayam ucyate rupaskandhal;.
Compare Vibhariga, p. 1.
The edition of the Vyiikhyii has aikadhyam [WOG.42.32], but the Mahiivyutpatti, 245, 343
ekadhyam abhisa1J1k~ipya. Wogihara indicates ekadhye in Divya, 35, 24; 40, 22.
243 LVP: anityatiiniruddha, i.e., destroyed by impermanence, which is one of the characteris-
tics of conditioned factors (ii. 45cd).
There are five types of cessation (nirodha):

1. cessation by the characteristic (la/cyal}llnirodha) (ii. 45cd), which is referred to here;
2. cessation, by attainment (samiipattinirodha; (ii. 42f.);
3. cessation by birth (upapattinirodha = state ofnon-ideation [iisaf!ljiiika]; ii. 41b);
4. cessation d1.1e,t~ deliberation (pratisaf!lkhyanirodhaf(i. 6ab);
5. cessation not due to deliberation (apratisa,fzkhyaniroaha) (i. 6cd).
If the text said: "Past, the clestroyed riipa", it could mean that it refers to the cessations 2-5.
But cessations 2 artd 3 are the destruction of the future thought and thought-cp~comitants;
cessation 4 is the clestructlon of the impure 1hought and thought,concomitants; cessation 5. is
the destruction of the future factors not destined to arise (anutpattfd~rman).
• - ' - I
244
LS: Hall brackets: " ... [and the organs are the internal spheres while their objects are the
external spheres]".
245
LS: As for gross and subtle, the Vyiikhyii [WOG.43.19f.] renders: audiirikaf!l sapratigham
iti. paramiinu-saiµcaya-svabhiivaiµ. siik~mam apratighaf!l. avijfiapti-riipaiµ. Yasomitra thus
states that the gross form has the collection of atoms as its intrinsic nature and that subtle form
refers to the non-informative form. See iv. 4a.
246
LVP: Aryadeva, Sataka, 258, · shows that this definition contradicts the thesis of the
existence of the future.
247
LS: Pradhan.13.13 has: ayaf!I tu vise~a~ Iaudarikaf!I paficendriyasrayaf!I siik~mafJI miinasam.
248
LVP: Hsilan-tsang translates: Bhadanta Dharmatriita. But the Vyiikhyii says [WOG.44.14ff.]:
Bhadanta, i.e., a Sthavira Sautriintika, or the Sthavira Sautriintika of this name. (On the other
hand,) Bhagavadvise~a (also) thinks that this refers to the Sthavira (or Bhadanta) Dharmatriita.
We object to this. Dharmatriita is a follower of the existence of the past and of the future, thus
a Sarviistiviidin, and we ar-e concerned here in this passage (i, F 36) with a Sautriintika, i.e.,
with a Diir~tiintika. For the Bhadanta Dharmatriita has a Sarviistiviidin theory presented later
(v. 25). The "Bhadanta" mentioned here is the philosopher whom the Vibhii~ii cites under the
simple name of Bhadanta, a philosopher who adheres to the Sautriintika system (sautriintika-
darsaniivalambin), whereas the Vibhii~ii calls the Bhadanta Dharmatriita by his name. Thus we
have here a certain Sthavira Bhik~u Sautriintika, different from Dharmatriita. (See Introduction;
p. xlviii.)
The Japanese editor refers to the MYS, 383bl6, where it is said that Dharmatriita does not
assert that the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana) includes material form (riipa) (see iv. 4ab).
249
LVP: diiratii, Kathiivatthu, vii, 5.
250
LS: SAH 25.
251
LVP: The MYS, 379al2, presents twenty opinions on the meaning of the term iiyatana. -
Atthasiilinf, 140--41. The definition of the Kosa is reproduced in the Madhyamakavrtti, p. 552.
LS: As for "gate of arising", Dharmatriita comments (SAH.38): "Because frustration and
satisfaction pass through it." Moreover, MVS, 379a, comments (SA.IV.28):
The meaning of iiyatana is "gate of arising": Just as various things arise within a city
on account of which the bodies of sentient beings are nourished, so, within the
supporting bases (iifraya) and object-supports (iilambana)__:_[the two constituent
components of the ayatana-s]-various citta-caitta-dharma-s arise on account of

- which the defiled and pure serial continuities (santati) are nourished.
252
IS: SAH 24, 25.
253
LVP: MVS, 367c21, has eleven etymologies. We have here the first.
IS: Dhammoti comments (SA.IV.29):
The MVS enumerates the following senses of dhatu:
1. Family/kin/species (gotra)-like the different species of metals, gold, iron,
etc., in a mountain.
2. Cluster/lump (R; kava(la?)-like a cluster of timbers etc., arranged in a
certain order resulting in what is called a mansion, a house, etc.
3. Part/constituent (?t-; bhaga?)-like the 18 parts of a human body.
4. Piece/division U\-)-like the 18 pieces/divisions of a human body.
5. Dissimilar-the eye-element is dissimilar to the other elements in a human;
etc.
6. Demarcation/boundary-the demarcation of the eye-element is distinct from
the other 17 elements.
7. Distinctive cause-that by virtue of which there is the eye-element is a
cause distinctively for the eye-element alone, and not for other elements.
8. Running (-f dhiiv)-these elements tun around saf!1siira.
9. Sustaining/holding (-f dhii)-these elements each hold or sustain their own
intrinsic nature.
10. Nourishing ({dha)--,-they nourish other entities.
The last three meanings are attributed to the grammarians (sabdika). In the AKB,
Vasubandhu gives the meanings of dhiitu as species/family and as causal origin.
See Dhammajoti's chapter (ADCP.162--04): "The Sautrantika doctrine that only the dhiitu-s
are real".
254
LVP: gotra signifies mine [akara] in the expression suva~agotra, Asaiiga, Sutriilaf!1kara,
iii. 9 and note of the translator.
IS: Hstian-tsang (ADCP.162f.) "renders akara as 1._;$:., 'birth-origin' or 'arising-source'. The
dhatu-s are mines of their own species, each being the homogeneous cause of the later
moments in the existence of a given dhanna. This Sautriintika interpretation of dhiitu, which
clearly has the connotation of causal efficacy, is rejected by Saqighabhadra (Ny, 343c), as it is
more in tune with the Sautriintika bfja theory. He proposes instead that the eighteen dhiitu-s
are said to be gotra-s in the sense of being eighteen different species, each having its distinct
essential nature."
255
LVP: 1. The Vaibhiieyika believes that the aggregates (skandha), the sense-spheres (iiyatana)
and the elements (dhiitu) exist as real entities.
2. The Sautriintika holds that the elements exist as real entities, but that the aggregates and
the sense-spheres exist as provisional or nominal entities.
3. Vasubandhu holds. that the aggregates exist as provisional or n_ominal entities, but that the
sense-spheres and the elements exist as real entities.
LS: In the following we will elaborate on LVP's terse statement regarding the•differences of
these three important epistemological-ontological positions concerning the skandhas, iiyatanas
and dhiitus, by amply quoting Kajiyama and Dhammajoti.
1. As for Vasubandhu, Kajiyama comments (ATV.23f.):
Vasubandhu's approach to the problem of whether the skandha, iiyatana and dhiitu
are real or not was epistemological. The rupa-skandha means matter in general. Thus,
the cognitive organ of the eye and the color-form as its object are both included in
the same rupa-skandha, although they are different in function-one being internal
and organic, the other being external and mechanical. An existent material thing of
the present time and an inexistent material thing of the past or future time belong to
one and the same category of rapa-skandha, though the former is real and the latter
unreal [for Vasubandhu]. In the rupa-skandha, things different in nature and function
or things real and unreal are put into one kind. Vasubandhu c·ould not find any
principle by which he could distinguish one from the other. This is the reason why he
declared the skandha as nominally existent and rejected it from epistemological
categories.
On the contrary, the iiyatana of an eye and the iiyatana of color-form cooperate to
produce the same effect of visual perception. Therefore, it is reasonable to subsume
these two under the category of cognition. However, the atoms of the internal and
organic organ of an eye are homogeneous and have the same kind of causal effi-
ciency of seeing, whereas the atoms of the iiyatana of color-form have the causal
efficiency of being seen, which is heterogeneous to that of the atoms of an eye.
Therefore, these two kinds of atoms can be classified under two different subdivi-
sions, i.e., as visual organ (calquriiyatana) and visual object (rupiiyatana).
Thus, the material iiyatana (rupf,:,y iiyataniini) is further classified into five cognitive
organs and five cognitive obje~ts: and the mental organ (mana-iiyatana) and mental
object (dharmtiyatana) are differentiated from the above ten tiyatanas. As for dhiitus,
the epistemological principle common to them and their classification into eighteen
kinds are easily understood in a similar way.
Vasubandhu's statement under Abhidharmakosa I, v. 20ab [that skandha means "heap"
(riisi) and that in the case of an tiyatana the aggregate of atoms is a cause of
cognition, each individual atom _contributing to it,] purports the following signifi-
cance:
First, according to him, the theory that' a sense-organ and its object form two
different iiyatanas means that the atoms constituting a sense-organ are of one kind
and those constituting its object are of another. In other words, the same kind of
atoms, when gathered together, form a real aggregate.
Second, Vasubandhu seems to suggest that the atom.s of a sense-organ and those of
its object, though both are the same as a cause of sense-perception, differ in function.
Vasubandhu thinks that in sense-perception knowledge is the effect of its object, a
cause, and that knowledge appears resembling the object, i.e., in the form of it.
Although a sense-organ is also a cause of sense-perception, it does not throw its form
into knowledge. Therefore the atoms of an object and the atoms of a sense-organ
have different functions. ·
Third, the Sarvii.stivii.din says that an atom is not cognized* [i.e., is invisible] but only
assembled atoms are the cause of cognition. Against this standpoint, Vasubandhu
thinks that the atom of an eye has causal efficiency for perception, though it is very
minute. Therefore, when many atoms of an eye gather together, the aggregate is
efficient enough to produce a visual perception in cooperation with the aggregate of
atoms of color-form and other conditions. The same thing can be said of the atoms
· of the object of perception. This can be understood only when we note that for
Vasubandhu the criterion of reality or existence is causal efficiency (kiirai:iabhiiva,
iakti). An atom and the aggregate of the same kind of atoms are both real because the
two are different not in essencr but only in grade.
* LS: Notice (see below), that Sarp.ghabhadra does disagree with this presentation.
2. As for the Sarvii.stivii.dins and the Sautrii.ntikas, their positions will be discussed more in
detail in chapter 3, in the context of Vasubandhu's discussion of Srilii.ta's theory of percep-
tion (F 101-7), but here is the gist of them.
i. The Sarvii.stivii.dins maintain that the aggregates (skandha), sense-sphere (iiyatana) and
the elements (dhiitu) really exist (ADCP.142):
For the Sarvii.stivii.dins, in a pratyak:;a [direct perception] experience, whether
sensory or mental, the cognitive object as the iilambana-pratyaya is actually the
object out there existing at the very moment when the corresponding consciousness
arises. It is a real entity, just as a single atom is a real. Sarp.ghabhadra argues that a
sensory consciousness necessarily takes a physical asse~blage or agglomeration of
atoms {¥0~; *sal!lcaya, *saf!lghiita, *samasta) as its object. What is directly per-
ceived is just these atoms assembled together in a certain manner, not a conceptual-
ized object such as a jar, etc. The jug per se is never perceived by the visual
consciousness; only the riipa as agglomerated atoms of colour and shapes. This is
direct perception. It is the succeeding mental consciousness, with its abhiniriipai:ia
capability and using names, that determines that the object is a "jug". At this stage-
as opposed to the initial stage immediately following the visual perception-it is no
more an experience of pratyak:;a, but an inference.
ii. As for the Sautrii.ntikas, Sarp.ghabhadra summarizes (Ny, 350c) the view of Srilii.ta, the
leading Dii.r~tii.ntika-Sautrii.ntika at the time, who maintains that dhiitu, i.e., anu-dhiitu, alone is
real (ADCP.163):
Herein, the Sthavira asserts thus: Both the supporting basis as well as the objects for
the five sensory consciousness do not exist truly. For each individual atom by itself
cannot serve as a supporting basis or an object; they can do so only in the form of a
unified complex ('fl11l-); ... He and his disciples employ the simile of the blind in
support of their doctrine. It is said that (kila-showing Sarp.ghabhadra's disagree-
ment) each blind person by himself is devoid of the function of seeing visible forms;
an assemblage ( 'fl1 ~) of these blind persons likewise is devoid of the function of
seeing. Similarly, each individual atom by itself is devoid 9f the function of being a
supporting basis or an object; an assemblage of many atoms likewise is devoid of

such functions. Hence; iiyatana is unreal; dhiitu alone is real.
For Sriliita the dhii~us alone are real in the sense of being causally efficacious factors of
existence (dharmas) existing only in the present moment of a dharma-series. Dhammajoti
comments (SA.IV.35):
In this sense, as Saiµghabhadra argues, dhiitu has essentially the same significance as
the Sautriintika notion of seeds (bfja), the causal efficacy that is passed down in the
series. This significance is well brought out by the term anudhiitu or *piirvii_nudhiitu,
proposed by Sriliita, which is said to subsume all the karmic efficacies hitherto accu-
mulated in a given moment of a series.
m. Dhammajoti presents Saip.ghabhadra's and Sriliita's various objections to each other
and then makes the link to Vasubandhu (SA.IV.35):
Saip.ghabhadra, however, points out the difficulty in the bfja doctrine, since the
Sautriintika does not consider bfja-though real as a causal efficacy-as being an
ontological entity. This causal efficacy-the dharma-is neither identical with nor
different from the serial continuity itself, and the serial continuity is considered to b<?
unreal (a mere concept); and yet, at the culminating moment of the serial transmis-
sion of the causal efficac;', is productive of a fruit!
Thus (ADCP.l42f.):
Saip.ghabhadra rejects Sriliita's theory that the object of visual perception is a unified
complex ( %; *siimagrf, *sartighiita) of atoms.
In return [as already mentioned above] Sriliita ridicul~ the Vaibhii~ika notion of
assembled atoms as a cognitive object, comparing it to the case of a group of blind
persons who, like an individual member, is incapable of vision.
Saiµghabhadra answers this, and states that even an individual atom is in actual fact
visible,* even though its visibility is almost nil, on account of its being very subtle
for visual consciousness which can grasp only a gross object (:l[jt;lt,1,-/k). In fact, it
is conceded that each individual atom, in its own right, actually serves as a cogni-
tive object (iilambana) or a supporting basis (iisraya). He argues that such a super-
imposed unity as proposed by Sriliita can only be grasped by abhiniriipa,µ:i-vikalpa
[see AKB i. 33ab]. A sensory consciousness, lacking this capacity, can only take an
existent-not a conceptualized u~ty-as its object. He further explains that a unified
complex obtains where speech operates, as a result of the arising of an appellation
(adhivacana) with regard to a multiplicity of dharma-s. It is on account of its non-
discriminative nature that visual consciousness is incapable of discerning the ex-
tremely subtle form of an atom; only those endowed with the power of excellent
wisdom can do so. In any case, he says, atoms are always found assembled, ~nd thus
are visible.
As a matter of fact, Saip.ghabhadra· does not seem to be entirely alone or innovative
in the way he considers the efficacy of the atoms. In the AKB [i.e., our section here],
Vasubandhu argues for the reality of the iiyatana (a dissent here from the
Sautriintika) by saying that an aggrega(e of atoms, constituting an iiyatana, together
402 ·Exposition of the Elements (Dhiitunirdesa)
serve as the cause for cognition, each individual atom contributing to the causal
efficacy (ekasiilJ samagriil)iiJ?l kiiral)abhiiva).
On this, Yasomitra comments that it is like the case of many people gathering
sufficient strength to drag a log, each contributing his share of strength; and again
like the case of,many strands of hairs becoming sufficiently visible, each single
piece of hair contributing to the visibility.
Surprisingly, such explanations coming from a professed Sautriintika do not seem
very different from what Sai:µghabhadra says above. The common factor in this case,
uniting these three masters of different sectarian affiliation, appears to be the
criterion of causal efficacy being identified with reality. As far as Sai:µghabhadra is
concerned, he is being true to, the Vaibha~ika orthodoxy in maintaining that if an
atom as well as an agglomeration of them constituting an object of perception are
real substances, they must in each case be causally efficient.
0
* LS: Thus differing from Kajiyama's presentation above.
256
LVP: The doctrine of the persons (pudgala) is discussed in a supplement to the Kosa:
Chapter 9.
LS: This is the fifth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1 (VY.12f.):
"Sai:µghabhadra does not specify that this is the opinion of the sutra-master, but he refutes it
[Ny, 344a15-18], .... P'u-kuang attributes it to Vasubandhu and distinguishes it from the
position of the Vaibha~ikas, who say that skandhas, iiyatanas, and dhiitus are all real, and that
of the Sautriintikas, who say that, since the iiyatanas are also prajflapti, only the dhiitus are
real. Comparison: There are a number, of statements in the Yogiiciirabhami to the effect that
the meaning of skandha is 'collection'."
257
LVP: Sai:µghabhadra: This objection is without value. Skandha does not signify heap, but
"that which is susceptible of being collected together in a heap", [i.e., the real dharmas that
comprise the skandhas].
258
LVP: As, in the world, skandha signifies shoulder, so name-and-form (niimarupa) is the
two shoulders that bear the six sense-spheres (~a<jiiyatana; iii. 21).
259
LVP: T~e part that is material form (rupa), the part that is sensation ....
260
LVP: Paramiirtha: "I will return to you three skandhas." - Tibetan: dbul bar bya ba'i
phung po gsum dag tu dbul bar bya'o = deyaskandhatrayel)ll diitavyam (?).
261
LS: This is the sixth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1
(VY.14f.): "Sai:µghabhadra [Ny, 344a13-18] comments only on the second of these definitions
[i.e., being a 'part'], saying that the statement that it does not conform with sutra is the opinion
of the sutra-master and criticizes it [Ny, 344a14-18], saying that Vasubandhu insists too
strictly on sutra in determining the meaning of skandha, w.hen he should rely more on reason."
262
LVP: utsµtra, Mahiibhii~ya, i. p. 12; Kielhorn, IRAS, 1908, p. 501.
263
LS: tasmiid riisivad eva skandhiilJ prajfiaptisantalJ.
Dhammajoti, referring to this section, comments (ESD.3) that Vasubandhu denies the reality
of the skandha, as well as that of the asaJ?7skrta.
264
LS: LVP attributes the following remark to the Sautrantikas but, according to Kajiyama
(ATV.20), it is a counterattack by the Sarviistivadin expressing the logical consequences of the
aforementioned reply to the Vaibhii~ika statement. The term Sautriintika is not mentioned in
Pradhan.
265
LVP: _The .Abhidharmika scholar is not always clearly distinguished from the Vaibhii~ika.
- See the Introduction [by La Vallee Poussin].
266
LVP: skandhaprajfiaptim apek1ate.
267
LVP: Compare Prakara,:iapiida, chapter vi (731cl9): The element of the eye (cak1ur-
dhiitu) is included in one element, one sense-sphere, one aggregate; it is known (jfieya)
through seven cognitions (jfiiina; see Kosa, vii.) excluding the cognition of another's mind
(paracittajfiiina), the cognition of cessation (nirodhajfiiina), the cognition of the path (miirga-
jfiiina); it is cognized by one consciousness (vijfiana); it exists in the realm of desire and in
the realm of fine-materiality; it is affected by the proclivities (anusaya) to be abandoned by
cultivation (see Kosa, v.).
Dhiitukathiipakara,:ia (PTS, 1892) p. 6: cakkhudhiitu ekena khandhena ekeniiyatanena ekiiya
dhiituya sarrzgahita.
268
LS: SAH 24.
269
Gokhale: [20cd] mohendriyarucitraidhiit tisrab skandhiididesaniib I
Tib.: [20cd] rmongs dbang 'dod rnam gsum gyi phyir I phung po la sags gsum bstan to .II
LVP: According to MYS, 366c26.
LS: This is the seventh of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1
(VY.16f.): "Vasubandhu says that the teachings of the skandhas, iiyatanas, and dhiitus are
directed variously at people who have differing degrees of ignorance, faculties, and faith. [. .. ]
Sarµghabhadra [Ny, 344a24-27] says that the sutra-master has abbreviated the explanation and
gives an expanded explanation [Ny, 344a27-b2].
270
LVP: pi,:it;liitmagraha,:iatas.
271
LS: Jampaiyang (p. 213): "From the perspective of those of sharp faculty [who understand
through a slight movement of the heag, (they) comprehend] the five skandhas [and in
addition, by themselves, the ayatanas and dhiitus]. From the perspective of those of inter-
mediate (faculty) [who understand through elaboration, they comprehend] the twelve iiyatanas
[when taught, and in addition, (by themselves,) the dhiitus]. From the perspective of those of
dull (faculty) [who (comprehend) through appli~ation,] the eighteen dhiitus are explained
[for without extensive explanation they don't understand]."
272
LS: The Vyakhyii glosses [WOG.48.lOff.]: samatha-caritaniirµ sarrzk!fiptii rucib. samatha-
vipasyanii-caritiinarµ madhya rucib. ~ipasyana-caritaniirµ vistfr,:iii rucir.
273
LVP: Teaching of the aggregates (skandha) to persons of sharp faculties (prajiiendriya).
Example: yad bhik!fo na tvarrz sa te dharmab prahiitavyab I ajiiiitarrz bhagavan I katham asya
bhik10 sarrzk!fiptenoktiirtham iijiiniisi I ruparrz bhadanta niiharrz sa me dharmab prahiitavyab I
The three types of listeners, i.e., (1) udghafitajiia (those who, during the course of a given
explanation, come to penetrate the truth), t2) avipaficitajfia (those who realize the truth after
explanation), (3) padarriparama (those for whom the words are the highest attainment)
(Puggalapaiiiiatti, p. 41; Siitriilarrikiira, transl. p. 145), correspond to the three classes of faculties.
274
LS: SAH 11, 23
275
LS: SAH 1 1.
276
Gokhale: [21) viviidamiilasarrisiirahetutviit kramakiiraT,1iit I caittebhyo vedaniisarrijiie prthak
skandhau nivesitau II -
Tib.: [21] rtsod pa'i rte_ bar gyur pa dang I 'khor ba'i rgyu phyinim rgyu'i phyir-1 sem}iyung
rnams las tslJMJJa dang7 'du shes logs shig phung por bzhag 11
LVP: D_harmaskandha, 9~ 10; MVS, 385a29.
277
LVP: Six roots.of contention (viviidamiila) in Dfgha, iii. 246, etc.
LS: MY$,_c!f_ ',
.;n~b9ff.,
'
states (DD.284):,/ "Conception and feelings are able to give rise to two
types of.defilements: desires and [false] views. Desires arise through the power of feelings,
[false] views, through the power of conception. All defilements have these two as their head."
Cox comments: "Thus the two categories-desires and false views-represent all defilements;
false views include all those defilements to be abandoned by the path of vision, and desires,
those to be abandoned by the path of cultivation."
278
LS: SAH 23.
279
Gokhale: [22abl] skandhe~v asarriskrtam n oktam arthti'yogtit
Tib.: [22ab] phung po-dag tu 'dus ma byas Idon du mi rung phyir ma bshad I
LVP: MVS, 385bl5.
280
LS: Cox summarizes Sayµghabhadra (Ny, 345a; EIP.VIII.658): "Others suggest that;
because the unconditioned factors are equivalent to the inactivity of the aggregates, they
cannot themselves be aggregates. The inactivity of the aggregates results from the termination
of the false imagination of self because the aggregates, in every case, serve as the basis for the
imagination of self. The sense bases and elements, however, do not necessarily give rise to the
idea of self. Therefore, the unconditioned factors can be included within the factor basis of the
twelve sense bases, or the factor element of the eighteen elements."
281
LS: This is the eighth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1
(VY.18f.): Sayµghabhadra (Ny, 345a10-11) identifies the objection as that of Vasubandhu and
criticizes it (Ny, 345al 1-20), justifying the simile of the pot.
282
LS: SAH 7, 17-18.
283
LS: SAH 7.
284
Gokhale: [22b2-d] kramal:z punal:z I yathaudiirikasarriklesabhtijaniidyarthadhtitutal:z 11
LS: Gokhale has: "yathaudarika-".

Tib.: [22cd] rim ni rags dang kun nyon mongs I snod sogs don khams ji bzhin no II
LVP: According to MVS, 384bl-6.
285
LS: Jampaiyang (p. 218): "Consciousness is the subtlest of all since cognizing the mere
nature of the object is difficult to comprehend."
286
Gokhale: [23a] prtik paiica vtirtamtintirthytid
Tib.: [23a] da lta'i don phyir dang po Inga I

287
Gokhale: [23b] bhautikiirthyiic catu:t{ayam I
Tib.: [23b] 'byung ba las gyur don phyir bzhi I
288
Gokhale: [23c] diiriisutaravrttyii 'nyad
Tib.: [23c] gzhan mi ches ring myur 'jug phyirl
289
Gokhale: [23d] yathiisthiinal'(t kramo 'tha vii II
Tib.: [23d] yang na ji /tar gnas bzhin rim 11
LS: This is the ninth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1 (VY.20f.):
"Saqighabhadra [Ny, 345c27-346a5] quotes this passage in a slightly expanded form, says that
the siitra-master is either speaking provisionally or following some 'other' interpretation, and
points out that the organs of seeing, hearing, and smelling are arranged like a garland, with
none higher or lower."
290
LS: Pradhan.16.12 has: mana?i punastanyeva nisritamadesasthal'(t, Hall translates as fol-
lows (VASC.104): " ... while the mind (manas), although dependent on just those [organs], is
not located in [one] place".
29
' LS: SAH 17-18
292
Gokhale: [24] vise:twza'rtham priidhiinyiid bahudharmii'grasal'(tgrahiit I ekam iiyatanal'(t
riipam ekal'(t dharmiikhyam ucyate I
Tib.: [24] bye brag don dang gtso bo'i phyir I chos mang ba dang mchog bsdus phyir I gcig ni
gzugs kyi skye mched dang I gcig ni chos zhes bya bar brjod II
LVP: The MYS, 399c4-7, enumerates eleven reasons that justify the terms riipiiyatana,
dharmiiyatana.
LS: 1. Cox summarizes (EIP.VIII.659) Saqighabhadra (Ny, 346b): "Though ten of the twelve
sense bases have the nature of material form and all sense bases may be objects of mental
perceptual consciousness, they are differentiated in order to enable disciples to distinguish
their characteristics, that is, to distinguish those that are contents and those that are organs,
i.e., have contents."
2. Saqighabhadra highlights (Ny, 346b) visibility (sa-nidarsanatva) and resistance (sa-prati-
ghatva) as constituting the distinctive nature of riipa, yet, of the ten material elements (dhiitu),
only visible form has visibility and therefore is given the name riipa as such, without being
individuated by a specific name. See i. 29ac:
Although we have translated rupiiyatana so far by offering two translations, i.e., "sense-
sphere of visible form" and "sense-sphere of material form", and since we have translated it in
this verse--<lue to context--only as "sense-sphere of material form", we will, from the next
verse onwards, translate it only as "sense-sphere of visible form", i.e., we will drop the
subtlety presented in this verse since "sense-sphere of visible form" is more specific.
3. Cox summarizes (EIP.VIII.660) Saqighabhadra (Ny, 346b): "Though the sense basis of
factors (dharmiiyatana) includes many different types of factors, including the factor of
cessation through realization or nirvii,:za, their character as factors enables them to be placed in
the same category."
293
LVP: This is the opinion of Dharrnatriita (Nanjio 1287), i. 17.
294
LS: Jampaiyang (p. 221): The Vyiikhyiiyuktirrkii.states:
The flesh eye is any that exists like ours. The divine eye is the eye of higher per-
ception because it is the ground of the first absorption, etc. The wisdom eye of an
Arya is uncontaminated primordial awareness. The eye of dharma is transcendent
post-equipoise primordial awareness because it fully differentiates any dharma. The
Buddha eye comprehends all aspects of all objects of awareness.
295
LS: SAH 13-14, 19, 22, 411.
296
LS: SAH 13-14.
297
LS: Ibid.
298
LS: SAH 13.
299
Gokhale: [25] dharmaskandhasahasriil}i yiiny asftif!! jagau muni?i I tiini viili niima v ety
e~lif!l riipasaf!!skiirasaf!!graha/:1 I
Tib.: [25] chos kyi phung po brgyad khri dag I gang rnams thub pas gsungs de dag I tshig gam
ming yin de dag ni I gzugs dang 'du byed dag tu 'dus I
LVP: 1. [Yasomitra states (WOG.52. lOff.):] (i) According to the Sautriintikas, the speech of
the Buddha (buddhavacana) is vocal informative action (viigvijiiapti; iv. 3d); (ii) according to
another school (nikiiyiintarfya), it is name (niiman). (iii) For the Abhidhiirmikas, it is, at the
same time, speech or voice (viic) and name (niima).
2. In another canon, the Sutra says that there are 84,000 dharmaskandhas. The Sutra has
Ananda saying: "I have learned from the Fortunate One more than 80,000 dharmaskandhas":
siitirekiil}i me 'sftir dharmaskandhasahasriil}i bhagavato 'ntikiit saf!!mukham udrgrhftiini. (See
Bumouf, Introduction, p. 34; Sumaligalaviliisinf, i. p. 24; Theragiithii 1024; Prajiiiipiiramitii in
the Akutobhaya of Niigiirjuna, i. 8; A.vadiinasataka, ii. 155).
Vasumitra, Bahusrutfyas, thesis 1. - Nature of the teaching, Demieville; Milinda, 52-57, 62;
Siddhi, 795. - Dasabhumi, 74: caturasftiklesacaritaniiniitvasahasra.
On the 84,000, 2,000 are from Siiriputra
IS: 1. Here is a translation of Burnouf, Introduction, p. 34:
In a philosophical compilation, the Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii, [... ] I found a passage
[WOG.52.24ff.] in regard to a certain tradition-[becoming generally widespread
among the Buddhists of the North and of the South, a tradition that speaks on the
whole of up to 84,000 texts of the law ]-that proves that it is not just oral:
I have received from the mouth of the Fortunate One, says a sacred text (satra),
80,000 texts of the law (dharmaskandha) and more. Another collection (nikiiya-
antara), .the commentary adds, says there are 84,000. The body of the law
(dharmaskandha) consists of books (siistra) that have authority (pramiil}a); now
these books, according to some, are 6,000 in number, and they are designated
with the title of Dharmaskandha, or body of the law. As for the 80,000 texts of
the faw, they are lost (antarhita); the only one that remains is the single (eka)
body [of 6,000 volumes]. Others understand by Dharmaskandha each of the
articles (katha) of the law, and in this way there are 80,000.
It is rather in the latter sense that one should understand the term skandha. If one
were to admit [in the first sense] that there ever was such a voluminous collection, a
fact which M. Hodgson rightly contests, one would be forced to imagine it as con-
taining works of very diverse propottions, from an actual treatise to a simple stanza,
for in this way we know of a work on Buddhist metaphysics, the Prajiitiptiramitti, of
which there are two versions, one of 100,000 articles and the other of only one
vowel, multum in parvo ["much in little", i.e., A, which contains all!]. The tradition
that I have just spoken of is, moreover, old among the Buddhists. It might even have
given the number 84,000 as a kind of blessing; for we know that [the Buddhists] have
applied this number to other objects than their religious books.
Whatever the case may be with these 84,000 texts of the law, in the reality of which
one can believe, if by texts one understands articles, the books that remain today are
divided into three classes, called collectively Tripifaka, that is to say, 'the three
baskets or collections'. These three classes are the Sutrapifaka or the Discourses of
the Buddha, the Vinayapifaka or the Discipline, and the Abhidharmapifaka or the
manifested laws, i.e., metaphysics."
2. Cox points out (DD.160f.) that in the Saftgftiparytiya the Buddha's teachings (dharma) are
defined as the three sets of name, phrase and syllable (see AKB ii. 47), and that that which is
manifested, understood, indicated, and so on, by these three is called the referent (artha). The
Jiitinaprasthtina, on the other hand, offers t}le following two passages regarding the Buddha's
teaching (WOG.52.15ff; SA.IV.309):
What is buddha-vacana? That which is the Tathiigata's speech, words, talk, voice,
explanation, vocal path, vocal sound, vocal action, vocal expression (vagvijnapti) ....
What is this dharma that has just been spoken of as buddha-vacana? The sequential
arrangement, sequential establishment, and sequential combination of the ntima-
ktiya, pada-ktiya, and vyaiijana-ktiya.
MVS, 658c and 659c, explains that the motive of the first passage is to eliminate misconcep-
tion regarding what buddha-vacana is and what it is not, ahd to establish what is spoken by the
Buddha as true buddha-vacana, the nature of which is described by the compilers of the MVS
as being vocal information (vtig-vijiiapti). By contrast, the motive of the second passage is to
show the function of buddha-vacana. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.309) that "the MVS also
mentions here the opinion of some who assert that buddha-vacaria has ntima, etc., as its nature.
The compilers do not reject this view [although preferring the first as being vocal informa-
tion by nature]; instead, they interpret it as referring to vocal \peech as the successive
cause-speech (vtik) gives rise to ntima; ntima manifests the artha. H9wever, properly speak-
ing, it has vag-vijiiapti as its nature."
3. Siiqighabhadra-not objecting to either of the two positions-exp\ains this position as
follows (Ny, 346c; SA.IV.310):
Some assert that buddha-vacana has vtik as its svabhtiva. They assert that the
dharma-skandha-s are all subsumed under the rupa-skandha, for vacana has sabda
as its svabhava.
Some assert that buddha-vacana has niima as its svabhiiva. They assert that the
dharma-skandha-s are all subsumed under the saf!lskiira-skandha, for niima is of the
nature of a viprayukta-sarriskiira. [Now,] viik and vacana being synonyms, vacana
may be conceded as viik; [but] niima and viik are distinct entities, how is the
[buddha]vacana niima? They explain thus: There must be niima for it to be called
vacana; hence the nature of buddha-vacana is none other than niima. Why? It is
called buddha-vacana because it conveys the artha truly; niima can convey artha;
hence vacana is niima. Accordingly, buddha-vacana definitely has niima as its sva-
bhiiva.
4. See in this context Collett Cox's discussion: "Origins of Language Analysis and the
Nature of the Buddha's Teaching" (DD.160ff.) and Dhammajoti's "Word (niima) and the
nature of Buddha-word (buddha-vacana)" (SA.IV.309f.).
300
LS: SAH 14.
301
LS: Cox summarizes (EIP.VIII.660) Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 346c): "These 80,000 factor
aggregates have been interpreted in various ways, [1] as the content of a specific text by that
name, or [2] as the discourse on each of the topics of the teaching, but actually [3] they are
antidotes to the 80,000 types of defiled behavior."
302
LS: SAH 14.
303
Gokhale: [26a] slistrapramiilJa ity eke
Tib.: [26a] ka cig bstan bcos tshad ces zer I
LVP: MVS, 385c18: The Dharmaskandhasiistra is 6,000 verses (giithii) long.
See analysis ofTakakusu, JPTS, 1905, p. 112.
304
LVP: The 80,000 dharmaskandhas have perished; a single dharmaskandha has been
preserved [WOG.52.27ff.].
305
Gokhale: [26b] skandhiidfniif!I kath aikasalJ I
Tib.: [26b] phung po la sogs gtam re yin I
LVP: This is the explanation of Buddhaghosa, Sumangala, i. 24.
306
LS: SAH 14.
307
Gokhale: [26cd] caritapratipak~as tu dharmaskandho 'nuvar1Jita1J I
Tib.: [26cd] spyod pa rnams kyi gnyen por ni I chos kyi phung po mthun par gsungs I
308
LS: The Vyiikhyii has (WOG.53.Sff.): kecit sattva riiga-caritiiJ:i. kecid dve~a-caritiiJ:i. kecin
moha-carital;i. kecin miina-ciiritiih. kecid dr~~i-caritiil;i. kecid vicikitsii-caritiil;i. kecid riiga-
dvesa-caritiil;i. kecid riiga-dve~a-moha-caritiiJ:i. kecid riig'iisayii dve~a-prayogiiJ:i ....
309
LS: SAH 13, 19, 22,411.
310
Gokhale: [27] tathii 'nye 'pi yathiiyogaf!I skandhiiyatanadhiitavalJ I pratipiidyii yathokte~u
saf!lpradhiirya svalak~alJam II
Tib.: [27] de bzhin gzhan yang ci rigs par I phung po skye mched khams. rnams ni I rang gi
mtshan nyid legs dpyad de Iii skad bshad par bsdu bar bya I
LVP: Among the collections of dhiitus, the Siitra on the seven dhiitus, Vibhii~ii, 85, p. 437:
vidytidhiitu, subhadhtitu (?), tikiistinantyadhtitu ... nirodhadhtitu.

311
LS: SAH 13.
312
LS: This is also referred to as the five-membered (panctinga) or five-part (pancabhtiga)
dharmaktiya; see AKB vi, F 297, Siddhi, 767.
1. LVP comments in his Musfla and Ntirada, F 190, footnote (see Electronic Appendix):
The theory of salvation is ... summarized in the list of three, four or five members
(anga) (Anguttara, i. 162) or constitutive groups (skandha) of the perfected being
(arhat, asaiksa): Three things are necessary: morality (filp), concentration (s<;1mtidhl),
understanding (prajnti) [Kosa, i, F 3; Vytikhyti, 8; Visuddhimagga and its three
divisions]. Understanding arises only in the moral and concentrated person. By
means of understanding, the meditators attain liberation (vimukti), i.e., removal of the
fluxes, which is the fourth and last member in Dfgha, II, 123, and ill, 229. Finally, a
fifth member w~s added, a consecutively acquired cognition (Kosa, Index: pr~tha-
labdha) that is the "cognition of liberation'1 (vimuktijnana): "I have been liber-
ated ... ".
[A curious variant in the Ekottartigama, J. Przyluski, Funerailles, ~2: erudition
(btihusrutya) is the fourth al).d last member].
If two members are added to the three essential members, it is perhaps in order to
establish parallelism between the five "normal" aggregates (skandha) (material form
or. body, sensation, ideation, formations, consciousness) and the five groups
(skandha) that make up the perfected beings: supramundane (lokottara), pure
(antisrava), "dharmic" groups (dharmaskandha). - Again: "groups of the Victor"
(jinaskandha), "dharmaktiya of five parts (as morality, by itself, constitutes the
dharmakiiya of the mendicant)". - Kosa, vi, F 297; Siddhi, 764; Pali Text Diet. s.v.
khandha.
But it should be noted:
i. the path (or the cognition) that destroys the fluxes (tinantaryamtirga) is followed
by a path called "path of liberation" (vimuktimtirga): it is one thing to chase the
thief out of the house, another to close the door. This distinction is important
in the Abhidharma (Kosa, Index: vimuktimtirga). Liberati_on (vimukti), the work
of understanding (prajnti), will make up a separate group (skandha) or member ·
(anga);
ii. it is one thirtg to be liberated, another to cognize that one has been liberated. The
schools have discussed whether the perfected beings (arhat) cognize that they
are perfected beings. We will see, Musfla F 220, that the acquisition of "libera-
tion" and the acquisition of the "cognition of liberation" are not simultaneous.
2. Gedun Drup states: "According to the V aibhii~ikas, they are included in the form and
compositional factors aggregates because morality is the form of the seven abandonments of
body and speech, while the others are mental factors that are other than feeling and discrimina-
tion[ ... ]
The Sautriintikas and so forth assert that the aggregate of morality is also an attribute of inten-
tion, therefore they assert all of them to also be included in the compositional factors aggre-
gate."
313
LS: SAH 19.
314
LVP: The Vyakhya cites a Siitra, a more developed recension of Dfgha, iii. 241, and
Anguttara, iii. 21.
vimuktyayatana = vimukter liyadvliram.
315
LVP: riipiTJ,a/:t santi sattvli asaJ'!ljiiino 'pratisaJ'!ljiiinaJ:i tad yathli devli asaJ'!ljiiisattvli/:t I idaJ'!I
prathamam liyatanam I ariipiTJ,a/:t santi sattvli/:t sarvasa likiJ'!lcanyaliyatanaJ'!I samatikramya
naivasaJ'!ljiilinlisal'!ljiiiiyatanam upasaJ'!lpadya viharanti I tadyathli deva naivasaJ'!ljiilinlisaJ'!ljiili-
liyatanopagli/:t I idaJ'!I dvitfyam liyatanam I
316
LS: SAH 22.
317
LS: Ibid.
318
L.VP: They oppose the sixty-two afflicted views (dmi) (MYS, 376c6f.). -The Bahudhlituka
(Madhyama, 48, t6; Dharmaskandha, chapter xx) is closely related to the Majjhima, iii. 6lf.
(41 dhlitus). Compare Asailga, Siitrlilal'!lklira, iii. 2.
LS: Dessein lists (SAHN.62) the sixty-two elements: "sixty-two elements: six faculties, six
objects, six forms of consciousness (18); the six elements earth, water, fire, wind, space and
consciousness (24), the six elements greed, hatred, harmfulness, absence of greed, absence of
hatred and kindness (30); the six elements satisfaction, frustration, contentedness, regret,
equanimity and ignorance (36); the four elements feeling, conceptual identification, condition-
ing factors and consciousness (40); the three elements of the sensual, the material and the
immaterial (43); the three elements of the material, the immaterial and cessation (46); the three
elements of the three times (49); the elements good, bad and in between (52); the three
elements good, bad and neutral (55); the three elements still having learning to do, having no
more learning to do, and neither still having learning to do nor having no more learning to
do (58); the two elements pure and impure (60); the two elements conditioned and uncondi-
tioned (62)".
319
LS: AH 182; SAH 411.
320
LS: Cox summarizes (EIP.VIII.660) Saqighabhadra (Ny, 347a23): "This list [of six
elements] indicates those components that serve as the basis of one lifetime from the moment
of conception to death."
321
LVP: This refers to the Siitra that explains the constitutive elements of the human
individual: ~a{idhlitur ayal'!I bhik~o puru~aJ:i. Vasubandhu cites it (i. 35) under the name of
Garbhlivakrlintisiitra (VinayasaJ'!lyuktavastu, § 11, Nanjio 1121; Ratnakiifa, chap. 14; Nanjio,
23. 15). In the Majjhima, this Siitra is called Dhlituvibhaligasutta (iii. 239); it is one of the
sources of Pitliputrasamligama of which we have extracts in Sik~lisamuccaya, p. 244; Bodhi-
carylivatlira, ix. 88; Madhyamaklivatlira, p. 269.
See i, F 23, note, F 63, note and PrakaraTJ,aplida cited in the note ad iL23cd.
On the six elementary substances (dhlitu), see Aliguttara, i. 176; Vibhaliga, pp. 82-85; Abhi-
dharmahrdaya, viii. 7.
The Vyiikhyii refers [WOG.56.32] to the Biihudhiituka.

322
LS: AH 182; SAH 411.
323
Gokhale: [28ab] chidram iikiisadhiitviikhyam iilokatamasf kila I
Tib.: [48ab] bu ga nam mkha 'i khams shes bya Isnang dang mun pa dag yin lo I
LS: See our endnote to i. 5d, which discusses the distinction between the conditioned and
unconditioned space. At ii. F 278f., Vasubandhu explains the three unconditioned factors from
the point of view of the Sautriintikas who deny that they are real entities,
324
LVP: MVS, 388a29; Dharmaskandha, 10, p. 503b. - Same definition in Vibhiinga, p. 84:
katamii ajjhattikii iikiisadhiitu? yal'fl ajjhattal'fl paccattam iikiiso akiisagatlll'fl aghal'fl aghagatal'fl
vivaro vivaragatam ... kar;,r;,acchiddal'fl niisacchiddal'fl ... .
325
LVP: P'u-kuang (Ko-ki, 17/TD 41, p. 32c28): "It is said that the elementary substance
space (iikasadhiitu) is light and darkness in order to show that it is a kind of color (varr;,a) and
a real entity." The author does not believe that the elementary substance space is a real
entity, that is why he adds the word kila ["so said", ''so reported"]. For Vasubandhu and the
Sautriintikas, the elementary substance space is just the absence of a resisting body (sapratigha-
dravyiibhiivamiitra). See ii. 55cd.
MVS, 388b19: What difference is. there between space (iikasa) and the elementary substance
space (iikiisadhiitu)? - The first is non-material (ariipin), invisible (anidarsana), non-resistant
(apratigha), pure (aniisrava), unconditioned (asaTflskrta); the second is material ....
326
· LVP: The edition of the Vyiikhyii reads· iigha: iighal'fl kila citasthal'fl rupam iti citasthaqi
saqighiitastham I atyartharJ1,.hanti hanyate cety iigham I ... atyarthasabdasya iikiiriides~ kfto

hantes ca ghiidesal;l [WOG.57.16]. But the Bumouf MS. reads: agham ... akiiriidesal,,; we
have, ad iii. 72, agha = citastharupa (aggregated matter or form); Mahiivyutpatti, 245, 162.
327
• LS: AH 182; SAH411.
328
Gokhale: [28cd] vijniinadhiitur vijnanal'fl siisrava1'J1, janmanisrayal,, I
Tib.: [28cd] zag dang bcas pa'i rnam shes ni I rnam shes khams yin skye ba'i rten II
329
LS: AH 10-13; SAH 27, 30-38, 43-47, 49-50.
See Frauwallner's discussion (SAL.141ff.) of the development of this list of twenty-two
doctrinal perspectives, which is part of what he dubs "Paiicaskandhaka" (see our endnote to
Section B at ii. 4a) .
.Tibetan and Chinese sources, however, give different listings of the these twenty-two perspec-
tives, although referring to the same listed items.
1. As for Pu Guang's listing (T41, no. 1821, 34b6-44cll), see Dhammajoti's Summary,
p. 14. Dhammajoti adds (private communication) that another well-known master of the
Chinese tradition, Yuan Hui, also belonging to the Tang Dynasty (but posterior to Pu Guang),
states the same in his commentary on the Kosa kiirikii: T41, no. 1823, 826b: "Yuan Hui is most
likely influenced by Pu Guang; it is indeed the 'general Chinese tradition' (no doubt trans-
mitted through the Xuan Zang school)."
2. Our list follows fairly well the one presented by Gedun Drup. Comparing Gedun Drup
and Pu Guang, we find that the doctrinal perspectives (J) - (JO) and (15) to (22) are the same,
but that Gedun Drup combines Pu Guang's doctrinal perspectives (11) - (13) into his doctrinal
perspective (11), whereas Pu Guang combines Gedun Drup's doctrinal perspectives (12) -(14)
into his doctrinal perspective (14).
3. Moreover, from the point of view of ease of expression, Gedun Drup 's Clarifying the
Path to Liberation groups the twenty-two doctrinal-perspectives into the following categories:
i. The five, those that can be indicated and so fortli (J-5) .
ii. The division of those with investigation and with analysis and so forth (6)
iii. The five, those with observed objects and so forth (7-11)
iv. The classification of the three arisals (12)
v. The five, those having substance·and so forth (131,,17)
vi. The classification of those that are objects of abandonment of the path of seeing and
so forth (18)
vii. The classification of those that are views and non~views (19)
viii. The three that are to be understood by the two and so forth (20-22)
4. But Tibetan sources also have different listings of the twenty-two doctrinal perspectives,
see, for example, Mikyo Dorje's Youthful Play. He groups the twenty-two into the following
.seven topics (Gedun Drop's twenty-two perspectives are rendered first in italic numbers and
then Mikyo Dorje's):
i. Classifying in two categories (J-2; two perspectives)
ii. Classifying in three categories (3-4; two perspectives)
iii. Whether they possess something or not (5-7; three perspectives)
iv. Classification of those with form (8-11; five perspectives)
v. Three modes of production (12-14; two perspectives)
vi. Distinctions of attainment (15; one perspective)
viii. Classifying as external, internal and so forth (16-22; seven perspectives)
330
LS: AH 10; SAH 27.
331
LS: Hstian-tsang, ii, fol. la.
332
Gokhale: [29abl] sanidarsanam eko 'tra riipar,i
Tib.: [29a] bstan yod 'dir ni gzugs gcig pu I
LS: l. See iv. 4a, which quotes the Sutra (cf. Dighanikliya, iii, 217) saying that material form
(riipa) is of three types:
Material form is included in a threefold material form (riipasya riipasar,igrahal:i):
(1) there is a material form that is visible [sanidarsana] and resistant [sapratigha]
(visible form) (see i. 29ac); (2) there is a material form that is invisible [anidarsana]
and resistant [sapratigha] (the eye, etc.) (see i. 29ac); (3) there is a material form that
is invisible [anidarsana] and non-resistant [apratigha].
The Vaibhii1?ikas state that besides the element of visible form, all other elements are invisible,
which leaves us with nine material elements that are both invisible and resistant. As for the
third type, they claim that it refers to non-informative action (avijiiapti).
2. See also i. 24, which gives three reasons for the predominance of the sense-sphere of
visible form (riipliyatana): resistance (sapratighatva), visibility (sanidarsanatva) and common
usage (loka), the first two being singled out by Sarµghabhadra as constituting the distinctive
nature of visible form (rilpa). He elaborates (Ny.348a; SA.IV.190) regarding being visible or
"with seeing" (sanidarsana):
This is in two senses:
i. Matter is necessarily co-existent with seeing (darsana), hence said to be visible
("with-seeing", sanidarsana), for matter and the eye arise simultaneously; this is like
[the sense of] "with companion".
ii. Matter has indicatability, hence said to be visible, for it can be differently
indicated as being here or being there; this is like [the sense of] "with-object" (sa-
iilambana).
3. Visibility and the theory of atoms: Even though the Buddhist atom theory was not yet
developed during the time of the Buddha, thus could not have been addressed in the Siitram
the Vaibhii~ikas (SA.IV.199) admit that an atom as the smallest unit of matter is known
through mental analysis and is referred to as "conceptual atom" (*prajiiapti-paramiir_iu). This
conceptual atom is, however, based on the ultimately real atom having the intrinsic character-
istic of matter (the visibles, etc.), which as individual paramiir_iu cannot be directly observed
by the human eye (cf. i, F 94) and thus cannot serve individually as the object of visual
perception. As a physical assemblage ( 5fti ~; he ji) (i. 35d; ii. 22), however, it can be known
through direct perception (pratyak~a) (Ny, 522a), as stated in AKB iii. F 213: "The atoms
(paramiir_iu), although suprasensible (atfndriya), become sensible (pratyak~atva) when they are
combined (samasta)." "---'
The MYS, 702ab, gives the following descriptive definition of an "atom" (SA.IV.199):
An atom (paramiir_iu) is the smallest rilpa. It cannot be cut, broken, penetrated; it
cannot be taken up, abandoned, ridden on, stepped on, struck or dragged. It is neither
long nor short, square nor roun~, regular nor irregular, convex nor concave. It has no
smaller parts; it cannot be decomposed, cannot be seen, heard, smelled, touched. It is
thus that the paramiir_iu is said to be the finest (sarva-sa~ma) of all rupa-s.
Seven of these paramiir_iu-s constitute an ar_iu-the finest among all rilpa-s perceiv-
able by the eye and visual consciousness. [However,] this [ar_iu] can be seen by only
three types of eyes: 1. the divine eye (divya-cak~us), 2. the eye of a Universal
Monarch (cakravahin), 3. the eye of a bodhisattva in his last birth. Seven ar_iu-s
constitute a tiimra-rajas ["Copper-dust"]. ... Seven go-rajas-s ["Cow-dust"] constitute
a viitiiyana-rajas ["Dust in the wind passage"] ... [in this way, the whole physical
universe is composed].
Based on Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 383c), we can speak of two types of paramiir_iu-s: (1) the "real-
entity atom" (dravya-paramiir_iu)-the smallest conceivable building block of matter that
cannot be further divided into many parts by means of another matter or the intellect
(buddhi)-which is the parama-a(iu in the proper sense ot the term, i.e., the "ultimately
small", since there can be no further part; (2) the "aggregate-atom" (sarrighiita-paramiir_iu) in
the sense of a molecule-a multitude of dravya-paramiir_iu-s that are mutually combined and
necessarily inseparable-which is the smallest unit of matter that can actually occur in the
phenomenal world.
Now, although in the MYS passage, cited above, the human eye is said to be unable to
perceive an atom (cf. also i. F 94), Sai:µghabhadra argues that this does not mean (SA.IV.201)
that an atom is invisible (anidarsana) in its intrinsic nature, but simply means that its visibility
is extremely minute, i.e., virtually nil, since otherwise it would forfeit its very intrinsic nature
(svalak~ar_ia) as visible form (rapa), i.e., visibility (sa-nidarsana). Therefore, with regard to an
atom of colour or shape, another passage in the MYS (64a; SA.IV.244) can state:
There exists [an atom of green]; it is only that it is not_ grasped by visual con-
sciousness. If a single atom is not green, an accumulation of numerous atoms cannot
be green; likewise for yellow, etc., ....
There exists [an atom of a long shape, etc.]; it is only that it is not grasped by visual
consciousness. If a single atom is not long, etc., in shape, an accumulation of numer-
ous atoms cannot be long, etc., in shape.
Furthermore, there exist rupa-s which are not visible on account of being extremely
fine, not on account of being non-objects (avi~aya).
According to Vaibhii~ika epistemology, an agglomeration of visible form atoms comes to be
directly perceived and exists as an absolutely real entity (paramiirtha-sat). Not being a super-
imposition on the real atoms, it is not a relatively real entity or conceptually existent entity
(prajiiiipti-sat), since (ADCP.147) "it is but the 'form' which is none other than the very atoms
themselves-each atom is contributing in its own right and the collective contribution comes
to be strong enough to generate a sensory consciousness. This is essentially the same as saying
that a visible rupa is as much a real entity (dravya) as an individual atom. But the assembled
atoms directly perceived by a sensory· consciousness-and only directly by a sensory con-
sciousness-are not anything in the form of a jar etc., which can only be perceived by mental
consciousness when superimposition takes place."
333
LS: AH 10; SAH 30.
334
Gokhale: [29b2-cl) sapratighii dasa I rupir_io
Tib.: [29b] tho gs dang bcas pa gzugs can bcu I
· LVP: See above i. 24ff.
LS: The Siddhi has (F 38): "The Foundational Vehicle distinguishes two types of form
(rupa): (i) resistant (sapratigha) form, which consists of atoms (paramiir_iumaya), which
includes the first ten sense-spheres (iiyatana): eye ;md visible form, ... body and tangible;
(ii) non-resistant (apratigha) form, which does not consist of atoms, which includes one part of
the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana) (Kosa, iv, F 16). - In our language, material and
immaterial form."
335
LVP: The element of factors (dharmadhiitu) is eliminated: it includes the non-informative
(avijiiapti) that is material and not resistant.
336
LS: SAH 30.
337
LS: Pradhan.19.6 has pratigho niima pratighiital;i: Sai:µghabhadra explains (Ny, 348a;
SA.IV.190): "Resistance means obstruction. 'This has the obstruction by that' (i.e., this is
obstructed by.that), hence it is said to be 'with-resistance' [sa-pratigha]. Obstruction (pratighiita)
is threefold: ... ".
Dessein thinks (JIABS, vol. 26, No. 2, 2003, p. 302f.) that, according to P'u-kuang, "in the
early Abhidharma literature, 'resistance' was explained to be the relation between a faculty
and its respective object. In the course of philosophical development, three forms of 'resis-
tance' came to be distinguished: 'resisting by way of being an obstruction' (iivara~aprati-
ghata), 'resisting of the object' (vi:jayapratighiita), .and 'resisting of the supporting object'
(iilambanapratighiita). Of these, 'resisting of the object' corresponds to the interpretation of
'resisting' presented in early Abhidharma literature."
338
LS: SAH 30.
339
LS: Two material factors are mutually resistant or obstructive in this sense to each other
(Ny, 348a; SA.IV.191).
340
LS: SAH30.
341
LS: The contact between the sense-faculty, thought or thought-concomitants and the
content or object-field is referred to as •:~~istance". When the sense-faculty meets with its
corresponding.object-field and "its efficacy elf the sense-faculty (e.g., seeing) is exercised, then
it is said to be obstructed by that object domain inasmuch as its sphere of vision is at that time
confined to that object" (Ny, 348a; SA.IV.191).
342
LVP: ·See Kiira~aprajiiaptisiistra, analyzed in Cosmologie bouddhique, p. 339.
343
LVP: Compare SarJtyutta, iv. 201: puthujjano cakkhusmil'J'I hafifiati maniipiimaniipehi
. riipehi.
344
LS: SAH 30.
345
LS: The sense of obstruction here refers to the thought and thought-concomitants being
obstructed by-confined to-their cognitive object (Ny, 348a; SA.IV.191).
346
LS: SAH 30.
347
LS: Hsiian-tsang translates here kiiritra as gong neng. In his *Nyiiyiinusiira he translates
kiiritra very consistently as zuo yong (11 ffl), and uses gong neng (r}J ~t), efficacy, for the terms
denoting activities other than kiiritra. See SA.IV.207.
348
LS: A dharma, y, is the object-field (visaya) of another dharma, x, if x exercises its effica-
cy (seeing, etc.) in y. The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.59.4ff.]: yasmirJt yasya kiiritrarri. sa tasya
vifaya iti. kiiritraip. puru~a-kiiriih. cak~ul,:i-srotra'iidiniiip. riipa-sabda'iidi~v iilocana-srava1,1 'iidi-
kiiritraip.. tac ca sva citta.-caittan praty iisraya-bhiiva-sakti-vise~a-lak~anaip. veditavyaip..
349
LS: Dhammajoti comments (ADCP.4'1f.):
The Sarviistivada distinction is that whereas an external object that is sensed by a
sense faculty is called a vi,l'aya-the domain wherein it can exercise its activity-
sometimes also called an artha; an object that generates a corresponding conscious-
ness is called an lilambana (<ii-vlamb, "hang on to"). This latter is so called because
it is that which is hung on to-i.e., is grasped (grhyate)-by a mental dharma so as to
arise at the present. In its capacity of serving as one of the two necessary conditions
for the arising of a consciousness, it is called an iilambana-pratyaya, "condition qua
object".... The iilambana-pratyaya subsumes all dharma-s -i.e., all the twelve
ayatana-s-since all real entities known as dharma-s have this capacity.
416 Exposition of the Elements (DhiUunirdesa)
350
I.s: Cox summarizes (EIP.VIII.661) Sarp.ghabhaclra (Ny, 348a): "This contact between the
sense-organ, awareness or awareness concomitants and the content or supporting object is
referred to as 'resistance' because the sense organs, awareness and so on cannot operate with
regard to anything else."
351
LVP: yatrotpitsor manasa?i pratighiita?i sakyate [parai?i] kartum I tad eva sapratigharri
[tad] viparyayiid apratigham i~tam.
That is to say: the consciousness that arises having for its object-field (vi~aya) blue and for its
support (iisraya) the eye, can be hindered from arising through the· interposition of a foreign
body betwe'en the eye and the blue object: the eye and the blue are thus resistant (sapratigha).
On the contrary, neither the mental faculty (manodhiitu) functioning as the sense-faculty of the
mental consciousness (manovijfiiina) nor the element of factors (dharmadhiitu) that is the
particular object of the mental consciousness (e.g., sensation) are resistant (sapratigha): with
respect to the element of factors, nothing can hinder-by making an obstacle or placing a
screen (iivara~)-the mental consciousness from arising by means of the mental faculty.
I.s: Dessein translates (JIABS, vol. 26, No. 2, 2003, p. 299) the corresponding passage in the
A-p'i-t'an Hsin Lun Ching (T. 1551: 835b27-28): "That which, at the moment an idea (manas)
is about to arise, is resisting, should be known as 'resisting' (sapratigha). In the contrary case,
it is unresisting (apratigha)." P'u-kuang comments (p. 302):
When, in this stanza, "obstruction" (iivara~a) is mentioned, the idea is that it is
so that because something is hindered by something else, it does not succeed in
arising. When properly taking the specific object (svavi~aya) as supporting object
(iilambana), what is then said to be obstructing? It is as when visual consciousness
(cak~urvijfiiina) wants to arise regarding matter (rapa) as object (vi~aya), its arising
would be hindered by such other things as sound (sabda). Whe11 .it would be
obstructed by other things, it should be known it is "resisting" (sapratigha); when
properly taking matter as supporting object, it is said to be "unresisting" (apratigha).
352
I.s: AH 10, 222-23; SAH 27; 34.
353
LS: 1. Regarding the meaning and etymology of the word kusala, Buddhaghosa
(Atthasiilinf:48) states:
The word "kusala" (moral) means "of good health", "faultless", "skilful", "produc-
tive of happy sentient results", etc ....
To come to word-definitions:
kusalas are so called in that they cause contemptible things to tremble [from ku,
"bad",+ ✓sat, "to tremble"], to shake, to be disturbed, destroyed.
Or, kusa are those (vices) which lie in a person under contemptible conditions [from
ku, "bad",+ -fsf, to lie]. And kusalas (from kusa, so derived+ -fta, to cut) are so
called because they lop off, cut off what are known as immoralities (a-kusala).
Or, knowledge is called kusa [from ku, "bad", + ✓so, to reduce] because of the
reduction or eradication of contemptible things, and kusala [from kusa, so defined,+
✓Iii, to take] is so called because things should be taken,_grasped, set in motion by
that'kusa.
Or just as the kusa grass cuts a part of the hand with both edges, so also certain
things cut off the corrupt part in two portions, either what has arisen, or what has not
arisen. Therefore kusalas are so called because they cut off the corruptions like the
kusa grass.
2. MVS, .741a, provides, among others, the following definitions of the triad wholesome
(kusala), unwholesome (akusala), non-defined (avyiikrta) (SA.IV.39):
A dharma which is to be subsumed as being skillful, which effects a desirable fruit,
and whi.ch is by nature secure (lqema) is said to be kusala. ... Some say: A dharma
which can produce the germs of a desirable existence and of liberation is said to be
kusala.
A dharma which cannot produce the germs of a desirable existence and of liberation
is said to b~ akusala.
That which is opposed to these two classes is said to be avyiikrta.
Vasubandhu deals with wholesome, unwholesome and neutral factors mainly in chapter 4:
ExrosmoN OF ACTION (karma), where he defines (at iv. 8b-9c) dharmas as being wholesome
or unwholesome in four ways:
i. aosolutely (paramiirthatas);
ii. through their intrinsic nature or in and of themselves (svabhiivatas = iitmatas);
iii. through association (saTJ1prayogatas);
iv. through their originating cause (samutthiinatas);
at which oc.:asion he also briefly explains "that which is absolutely non-defined".
But as for the "general" non-defined dharmas (avyiikrta), they are divided into two groups:
(i) nivrta-avyiikrta (veiled-non-defined or obscured-non-defined) and (ii) anivrta-avyiikrta
(non-veiled-non-defined or unobscured-non-defined) (SA.IV.40f.):
i. A veiled-non-defined dharma, being weak in nature, is that which, though
incapable of inducing an undesirable fruit, is nevertheless obstructive to the arising
of the outflow-free understanding or the noble path. This fact of obstructiveness of
the defiled dharma-s is what is meant by its being "veiled". An example of this is the
"Self-view", satkiiya-dr~fi, which is a defiled prajiiii.* ...
ii. An non-veiled-non-defined dharma is that which is neither capable of inducing a
retribution-fruit...'.-clesirable or undesirable-nor obstructing the arising of the noble
path. Examples of this category are: the knowledge (a prajiiii) of a particular art and
craft (sailpasthiinika), or the mind assocfated with a supernormal power (abhijiiii-
phala), or with deportment (fryiipatha). (a) Karmic retribution, and (b) physical
matter-rupa, gandha, rasa and spra~favya-are also non'..veiled-non-defined. The
latter are in fact non-defined (avyiikrta) in their intrinsic nature (svabhiivatas). The
two asa7'!1skrta-s-apratisa7'!1khyii-nirodha and iikiifa-are non-defined absolutely
(paramarthato'vyiikrta), also belong to this category.·
* MVS, 259c-260a [SA.IV ..41], explains why satkiiya-dr~ti is not akusala, but avyiikrta
(nivrta).
Sarµghabhadra gives the following definitions (Ny, 348c; SA.IV.39):
A non-defined dharma is that which cannot be defined as being either skillful or

unskillful, its nature being indistinct.
A dharma is said to be (morally) defined (vyakrta) if it is praise-worthy or con-
temptible, and definable as pertaining to the "black" or "white" (i.e., good or bad)
species.
A skillful dharma is that which is opposed to the unskillful, or that which sustains or
is sustained by understanding (prajfiii), or that which brings about the auspicious.
The opposite to this is unskillful.
3. As for the definitions of kusala, akusala and avyiikrta actions (karma) in terms of their
effect, see iv. 45ab.
4. As for the definitions of kusala and akusala paths of action (karmapatha), see iv. 66bd
5. As for the number of associated thought-concomitants in regard to kusala, akusala and
avyiikrta thoughts, see ii. 28-30d.
6. See also in particular Lambert Schmithausen's Kusala and Akusala: Reconsidering the
Original Meaning of a Basic Pair of Terms of Buddhist Spirituality and Ethics and its Develop-
ment up to Early Yogiiciira (forthcoming).
354
Gokhale: [29c2-d] 'vyakrtii a~tau ta evii 'rupasabdakii/:1 I
Tib.: [29cdl] lung ma bstan brgyad de dag nyid Igzugs sgra ma gtogs
LVP: See ii. 9a; MVS, 263c12, 740b8.
355
LS: Visible form and sound-since they include bodily and vocal acts-belong to all three
moral eategories.
356
LS: Schmithausen comments (KA, section 3):
One of the achievements of the canonical Abhidharma works is the attempt to fix the
range of employment of the categories kusala and akusala, as one item within the
scheme of properties applied to the list of dharmas-basic factors of existence
established on the basis of the Siitras and considered to comprise everything that
exists-in order to determine their common and distinctive features. If kusala and
akusala are to cover all dharmas, akusala would have to be taken in the sense of a
mere negation of kusala, i.e., as "not wholesome". But in most if not all of its
occurrences in the canon it is used in the sense of something opposed to kusala, i.e.,
"unwholesome"= "detrimental", "baneful", implicitly admitting the possibility of
factors that are neither kusala nor akusala. For this reason, most Abhidharmic
traditions share the assumption of a third alternative, namely avyiik[ta, "unexplained
[as either kusala or akusala]",* "neutral".
* kusaliikusalabhiivenavyiikara1_1iid avyakrtalJ. Another explanation says: "because they are
not explained with regard to (i.e., as entailing an agreeable or disagreeable) retribution
(vipakarr,, praty avyiikara1_1iid ity apare)."
351
Gokhale: [30al] tridhii 'nye
Tib.: [29d2] gzhan rnam gsum I
358
LVP: The Mahisasakas believe that the first four consciousnesses are all non-defined; the
tactile consciousness and the mental consciousness are of three types. The problem is dis-
cussed in Siddhi.
359
LS: The Vyiikhyii has [WOG.60.16f.]: dharma-dhiitur iti vistara):i. alobh'iidi•svabhiivo yo'
'yam ukia):i. alobh'iidi-sa,riprayukto vedan'iidi):i. alobh'iidi-samuttho viprayukta):i. priipti-jaty-
iidiJ:i. avijiiaptis ca.
360
LS: AH 11; SAH 31.
361
LS: The three realms (dhiitu), i.e., the world (loka) and their related meditative attain-
ments (samiipatti) are discussed in great detail later by Vasubandhu in chapter 3, EXPOSITION
OF THE WORLD (lokanirdesa), and chapter 8, EXPOSITION OF THE MEDITATIVE ATTAINMENT
(samiipattinirdesa).
Here is the outline of chapter 3:
A. The three realms (dhiitu): the world of sentient beings & the receptacle world (vv. 1-3)
Realm of desire (kiimadhiitu)
Realm of fine-materiality (rilpadhiitu)
Realm of immateriality (iiriipyadhiitu)
Definition of the three realms (dhiitu)
Are the triple realms unique (single)?
The arrangement of the triple realms
B. The world of sentient beings (sattvaloka) (vv. 4-44)
The planes of existence (gati), modes of b_irth (yoni), intermediate beings
(antariibhava), Process of reincarnation (pratisa,ridhi)
Dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida) & refutation of the doctrine of self
(iitman)
The enduring of sentient beings
- · Death and birth of sentient.beings
C. The receptacle world (bhiijanaloka) (vv: 45-74)
D. The measurements (pramii,:za) of the bodies and life-expectancy (iiyus) of sentient
Beings (vv. 75-89)
E. The great aeon (mahiikalpa) of the world ( vv. 90-102)
The four stages of dissolution, nothingness, creation and duration
362
LS: AH 11; SAH 31.
363
Gokhale: [30a2-bl] kiimadhiitviiptii/:i sarve
Tib.: [30a] 'dod khams gtogs pa thams cad do I
LVP: The factors that do not belong to any realm of existence, that are transcendent to exis-
tence (adhiitupatita, adhiitviipta, apariyiipanna), are the unconditioned factors and the pure
factors (aniisrava).
364
LS: AH 11; SAH 31.
365
Gokhale: [30b2-,d) riipe caturdasa I vinii gandharasaghrii,:zajihviivijiiiinadhiitubhit, I
Tib.: [30bd] gzugs kyi khams na bcu bzhi'o I dri dang ro dang sna dang ni I lee yi mam shes
khams ma gtogs I
LVP: The examination of this problem is taken up again in ii. 12.
Compare Kathiivatthu, viii, 7.
366
LS: AH 11; SAH 31.
367
LS: Dharmatriita comments (SAH.48): "[The realm of form] is without the nature of solid
food: because the body is subtle (sllk:jma)."
368
LVP: The bodily well-being is kiiyakarmal}yatii.
369
LS: SAH 31.
370
LS: This is the tenth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1
(VY.22f). Saiµghabhadra [Ny, 349b22-25] identifies the objection as Vasubandhu's.
371
LVP: kosagatavastiguhya.
LS: Hall translates literally: "Would it not be beautiful in the case of those [Buddhas and
others] who have their private parts concealed in a sheath (kosa-gata-vasti-guhya)?" He
comments (V ASC.124) that "this is the tenth of the thirty-two marks of a great man (mahii-
puru:jii-that is of a future Buddha or cakravartin) in the list given, for example, in the
Lakkhana-suttanta of the Dfgha-nikiiya".
372
LVP: Comp. Dfgha, i. 34, 186.
373
LS: Pradhan.21.19 has maithunasparsamukhena.
374
LVP: MYS, 746a4: "Do the male and female sexual faculties exist in the realm of
fine-materiality? Neither of the sexual faculties exist there.
First opinion: it is because one wishes to abandon these faculties that one cultivates the
meditations (dhyiina) and that one will be reborn in the realm of fine-materiality. If the
sentient beings of the realm of fine-materiality did possess these faculties, one would not wish
to be reborn in this realm.
Second opinion: these faculties are created by coarse food (iii. 39); the Sutra (iii. 98c) says, in
fact, that human beings at the beginning of the cosmic aeon did not possess these faculties, that
they all ha~ the same shape; later, when they ate the earth-juice, the two faculties arose, the
difference between man and woman appeared; in the absence of coarse food, the two faculties
are lacking.
Third opinion: the two faculties have a use in the realm of desire, but have no use in the realm
of fine-materiality: thus they are lacking in the realm of fine-materiality .... "
On the gods of the realm of desire, see iii. 70.
375
LS: AH 11; SAH 31.
376
Gokhale: [31 ab] iirupyiiptii manodharmamanovijfiiinadhiitava/:1 I
Tib.: [3 lab] gzugs med gtogs pa yid dang ni I chos dang yid kyi rnam shes khams I
377
LS: AH 11; SAH 31.
378
Gokhale: [31 cd 1] siisravii 'niisravii ete traya/:1
Tib.: l3lc] de gsum zag bcas zag pa med I
LS: This is the twofold classification with which Yasubandhu starts out. For details and further
AKB references, see i. 4. For its soteriological context see i. 3.
379
Gokhale: [31d2] se~iis tu siisraviif:i II
Tib.: [31d] lhag ma rnams ni zag bcas so 11
380
LVP: The Mahiisiiqlghikas and the Sautriintikas maintain that the body of the Buddha is
pure (anasrava) (see iv. 4ab, discussion of the non-informativt: [avijnapti]). (Compare
Kathiivatthu, iv. 3, xiv. 4). The MYS, 229al 7, 391c27 and 871cll [see Siddhi, 770]: Certain
scholars maintain that the body of the Buddha is pure, namely the Mahiisiirµghikas who say:
"Scripture says that the Tathiigata remains above the world, that he is not mundane, that he is
not defiled; we know. thus that the body of the Buddha is pure." In order to refute this opinion,
it is shown that the body of the Buddha is impure. To say that it is pure is to contradict the
Siitra.
The body of the Buddha is not pure (aniisrava) because it can be the occasion for the
defilement of another. MYS, 871cl 1; see Siddhi, 770: The body of the Buddha is the result of
ignorance and of craving; thus it is not pure. The Siitra says that ten iiyatanas (the eye sense-
faculty ... , the visible form ... ) in their entirety, and two sense-spheres (iiyatana) in part (mana-
iiyatana; dharmas) are impure .... If the body of the Buddha were pure, women would not
have affection for him; the body would not produce, among others, desire, hatred, confusion,
arrogance ....
Compare Vyiikhya, p. 14; see above, F 6.
381
LS: AH 12; SAH 32, 50.
382
LVP: Same question in Vibhanga, 97, 435. - Initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation
(viciira) are defined ii. 28, 33.
383
~: AH 12; SAH 32.
384
Gokhale: [32ab] savitarkaviciirii hi pafica vijniinadhiitavaf:i I
Tib.: [32ab] nges par rtog dang rjes dran pa'i I rnam par rtog pas rnam mi rtog I
385
LS: This is the eleventh of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1
(YY.24f.). Sarµghabhadra [Ny, 350a7-12] states that this is Yasubandhu's own reasoning and
presents as the real reason why these five consciousnesses are always associated with vitarka
and viciira the fact that these kinds of consciousness arise only where both occur, i.e., in the
realm of desire and the first meditation (dhyiina) (EIP.YIIl.662).
386
LS: AH 12; SAH 32.
387
Gokhale: [32c] antyiis trayas triprakiiraf:i
Tib.: [32c] tha ma gsum ni rnam gsum mo I
388
LS: This is the twelfth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1
(YY.26f.). Dhammajoti comments (private communication) that "Sarµghabhadra says that this
is not the proper reason, because even if there were two simultaneous vitarka, no vitarka can
be associated with itself. So the correct reason that should be given is: no svabhiiva can be
associated with itself."
389
LS: AH 12; SAH 32.
390
Gokhale: [32d] se:fii ubhayavarjitiil,z 11
Tib.: [32d] lhag ma mams ni gnyis ka spangs 11

391
LS: SAH 50.
392
Gokhale: [33ab] nirapar_1ii'nusmara1)llvikalpenii 'vikalpakiil,z I
Tib.: [33ab] nges par rtog dang rjes dran pa'i Imam par rtog pas rnam mi rtog I
LVP: They are called free from conceptualizing activity (avikalpaka) according to the text:
cak:furvijfiiinasamaflgfnflarri vijiiniiti no tu nflam iti (see above p. F 28, note).
See Kosa, iii, F 109; iv, F 39; Siddhi, 282, 389-91.
LS: 1. See our endnote to ideation (sarrijnii; i. 14cd), where we have discussed the relationship
of ideation with determination (nirupar_1ii), conceptual construction (vikalpa), initial inquiry
(vitarka) and investigation (viciira).
2. Here, V asubandhu emphasizes the difference between the non-conceptualizing or non-
discriminative sensory consciousnesses and the conceptualizing or discriminative mental con-
sciousnesses.
i. As for the difference regarding their object, Dhammajoti explains (ADCP.103):
While all the six forms of consciousness are said to have the same intrinsic nature of
being conscious, and all grasp in each case the object-substance generically [see
AKB i. 16a], the Sarviistiviida sees distinct differences as regards the functional
nature between the five sensory consciousnesses on the one hand and mental con-
sciousness on the other ....
To begin with, each sensory consciousness is confined to its specific object at the
present moment only: visual consciousness can cognize only a single present visual
object, auditory consciousness, only a single present sound; etc. Its object is always
external; the sense faculties and the consciousnesses cannot become its objects ....
In contrast, mental consciousness can at once take multiple objects, including
those of the five sensory co11sciousnesses, and its objects need not be confined to a
single species or time period.
ii. As for the difference regarding their conceptualizing activity or discrimination (vikalpa)
(ADCP.103):
Moreover, in addition to grasping ·the mere object-substance, thanks to contribution
from the co-nascent concomitants-particularly understanding (prajflii) and recol-
lection (smrti) and ideation (sarrijnii) which can function strongl3/ therein-mental
consciousness can also interpret a given perceptual data, and even abstractize and
conceptualize on it. In Abhidharma terms, it can perceive both the specific as well as
the common characteristics. This interpretive capability of mental consciousness is
generically indicated by the term vikalpa, "discrimination".
In the Sarviistiviida explanation, the smrti and prajfla-identified with the second
and third vikalpa, respectively--conjoined with the five sensory consciousnesses are
weak,· and hence the latter two types of vikalpa-s are not operative. They are thus
said to be without vikalpa, "non-discriminative" (avikalpaka) ... .
In contrast, because mental consciousness possesses all the three types of vikalpa, it
is said to be vikalpaka, "discriminative". [... ]
Samghabhadra elaborates further (Ny, 349a) as to why mental consciousness is said to be
"discriminative" or "conceptualizing" (vikalpaka) and how it therefore can generate a stream
of thoughts, and why the sensory consciousnesses are said to be "non-discriminative" or "non-
conceptualizing" and do not have the ability to generate a stream of thoughts (SA.IY.265f.):
If a consciousness can, within a single moment, grasp objects belonging to numerous
species, and can, with regard to one given perceptual object, generate a stream of
thoughts-a consciousness of such a nature is said to be discriminative. The five
groups of vijiiiina, on the other hand, grasp only present objects. No two moments [of
thought] have the same perceptual object, for when the previous grasping of a
perceptual object has ceased, there cannot be the arising of a repeated grasping [of
the same object] by the consciousness in the second moment. Mental consciousness
can take objects belonging to the three periods of time. [In this case,] a dharma,
though having ceased, can still be its object, and a stream of thoughts can be
generated with regard to the same object. For these reasons, only this [consciousness]
is said to be discriminative. However, since the five vijiiiina-kiiya-s are always
conjoined with svabhiiva-vikalpa, they are also discriminative. The satra-s speak of
them as being non-discriminative [only] in the sens.e of being without anusmara,:ia-
and abhinirupa,:iii-vikalpa-s.
3. See in this context also our endnote below, regarding anusmara,:ia, and also Vasu-
bandhu's discussion of dr:J!i (i. 41cd) which Vasubandqu explains as judgment after con-
templation (tfra,:ia, sarµtfra,:ia), i.e., judgment (niscaya) preceding from contemplation (upa-
nidhyiina) of the object-field, since, as Dhammajoti states (ADCP.104), it is particularly the
aspect of judgmental investigation of prajiiii, represented by sarµtfra,:ia, that characterizes the
function of abhinirupa,:iiivikalpa.
4. As for the co-nascent concomitant understanding (prajiiii,,; iikiira) that is conjoined with a
sensory consciousness, MVS, 490c, further specifies:
i. it does not have a keen or sharp (tikij,:ta, pafu) mode of activity (iikiira) and
cannot penetrate deeply into the perceptual object;
ii. it cannot discriminate;
iii. it can have as their cognitive object only the svalakija,:ta, but not the siimiinya-
lakija,:ia;
iv. it has only present objects, whereas a view [dr:Jti] can have as objects dharma-s
of all the three temporal periods as well as the unconditioned;
v. a view can grasp an object repeatedly, but this prajiiii can only grasp an object in
a single moment;
vi. unlike a view, it cannot cogitate and examine a perceptual object.
393
LS: SAH 50.
394
LVP: kila ["so said", "so reported"]: this is an opinion of the Vaibhii1?ikas without support
in the Siitra.
The opinion of Vasubandhu is explained below, ii. 33. For him, as for the Sautriintika, initial
inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (viciira) are thought (citta), the mental consciousness
(manovijiiiina), [i.e., (ii, F 174) by vitarka and viciira one should not understand two distinct
factors but rather the collection of thought and thought-concomitants that induce speech and
that are sometimes gross, sometimes subtle].
395
LS: SAH.85f.
396
MW: niriipa,:ut = stating, defining, determining, examination, searching, investigation.
397
LVP: MVS, 21,9b7: Conceptualizing activity in its intrinsic nature (svabhiivavikalpa) is
initial inquiry-investigation (vitarka-viciira); conceptualizing activity consisting of recollect-
ing (anusmara,:,avikalpll) is the recollection associated with mental consciousness; concep-
tualizing activity consisting of examining (niriipa1Jiivikalpa) is non-absorbed understanding
(prajiiii) of the sphere of the mental consciousness. In the realm of desire, the five conscious-
nesses have only the first type of conceptualizing activity (vikalpa), i.e., the conceptualizing
activity in its intrinsic nature: they involve recollection but not conceptualizing activity
consisting of recollecting, for they are not capable of recognition; they involve understanding
(prajiiii) but not conceptualizing activity consisting of examining, for they are not capable of
examination.
Nyiiyiinusiira: The nature of conceptualizing activity in its intrinsic nature (svabhiivavikalpa) is
initial inquiry (vitarka).
MW: anusmara1Ja = remembering, repeated recollection.
LS: See: Cox: IlABS.11.36f; Dhammajoti: SA.IV.229-32; ADCP.103-9.
398
LVP: Understanding (prajiiii) and recollection are associated with the five sensory con-
sciousnesses, but their function is reduced therein (Sarp.ghabhadra).
399
LS: Even though every sensory consciousness is accompanied by both initial inquiry
(vitarka) and investigation (vicara)-according to the Vaibha~ikas-the AKB, as also
-Sarp.ghabhadra in this context, define svabhiiva-vikalpa as vitarka only. The reason for this is
that due to their opposing nature, these two thought-concomitants cannot be dominant
simultaneously, as can be seen from their characteristics, i.e., vitarka causes thought to be
gross with regard to an object whereas viciira causes it to be subtle; vitarka is the projecting
cause of the five sensory consciousnesses, whereas viciira is the projecting cause of mental
consciousness. This then implies that even though they both exist simultaneously, for the
Vaibhii~ikas, vitarka is predominant in the ·sensory consciousnesses, whereas viciira is
predominant in the mental consciousnesses (cf. SA.IV.265f.)
400
Gokhale: [33cd] tau prajiiii miinasf vyagrii smrtil;i sarv aiva manasf I
Tib.: [33cd] de dag yid kyi shes rab gyeng I yid kyi dran pa thams cad nyid I
401
LS: The Vyiikhyii has [WOG.65.lff.]: sii hy abhiniriipa1Jiivikalpa iti. sii miinasy asamiihitii
prajiiii sruta-cintii.-mayy upapatti-pratilaqibhikii ca. sii hi manasi bhavii miinasf. vyagrii vividhii
'grii vyagrii vividh'iilambanety arthal:i. vigata-pradhiinii vii muhur-muhur iiltmbaniintara-
iisrayaQ.iit. vyagrii kasmiid abhiniriipaQ.ii-vikalpa ity ucyate. tatra-tatr' filambane niimiipek~ayii
'bhipravrttel:i. riiparp. vedanii anityarp. dul:ikham ity-iidy-abhiniriipaQ.iic ca. samiihitii tu bhiivanii-
mayi niimiinapek~y• iilambane pravartata iti. nai~ii 'bhiniriipaQ.iivikalpa ity ucyate.
LVP: 1. Mental (miinasl) understanding (prajiiii), i.e., manasi bhavii, whether it proceeds from
listening to Scripture or from reflecting (srutacintiimayi), or whether it is innate (upapatti-

priitilambhikii); dispersed (vyagrii), i.e., non-concentrated, having .different objects (agra), or
else, "discrowned" (vigatapradhiinii) by the fact that it successively seizes after different
objects.
[Question:] - Why does one give the name of abhinirupa,:iiivikalpa (conceptualizing activity
consisting of defining) to this understanding?
[Answer:] - Because it applies itself to a given object by taking into account its name
(niimiipek~ayii) and it examines (abhinirupa,:iii): "This is form (rupa), sensation (vedanii),
impermanent (anitya), unsatisfactory (du!Jkha)", etc.·
2. On the contrary, concentrated (samiihitii) understanding, proceeding from meditating
(bhiivaniimayl), applies itself to the object without taking into account its name. Thus it is not
conceptualizing activity consisting of defining (abhinirupa,:iiivikalpa).
LS: As for ideation (sarrijiiii), which also is an important contributing factor for abhinirupa,:iii,
see our endnote to ideation (i. 14cd).
402
LS: The Vyiikhyii has [WOG.65.8ff.]: miinasy eva sarvii smrtir iti. samiihitii ciisamiihitii
ca. sii kila niimiinapek~ii anubhutiirtha-miitr'filambanii pravartate. smrtil:} katamii. cetaso 'bhi-
lii~a iti lak~ai:iat. parp.ca-vijfiana-kaya-sarp.prayuktii tu niinubhiita-arthiibhilii~apravrtteti nanu-
smarai:ia-vikalpa itI~yate.
LVP: 1. All mental mindfulness (smrti), i.e., mental mindfulness whether concentrated or not.
For, according to the School, the mental mindfulness has solely the phenomenon previously
experienced for its object and. does not take into account its name (niimiinapek~ii), according
to the definition: "What is mindfulness? The expression of thought or mental speech (cetaso
'bhiliipa!J)."
2. As for mindfulness connected with the five consciousnesses, its mode of existence is not
an expression (abhiliipa) of the phenomenon previously experienced. It is thus not concep-
tualizing activity consisting of recollecting (anusmara,:iavikalpa) (WOG.65.lOf.). See ii. 24;
i. 33ab. . .
LS: In the AKB, smrti, smara,:ia, etc., are discussed and translated variously according to
different contexts (conceptualizing activity consisting of recollecting; mindfulness; applica-
tions of mindfulness; memory; etc.): see ii. 24; v, F 6f; vi. 14ff; ix, F 273-79.
As for anusmara,:ia (ADCP.105), it "presupposes the ability to examin1e the object (more
correctly, object-series) clearly and for more than one moment. There must also be a clear
mental noting of the object in the form 'it is such and such'-a kind of mental speech (abhi-
lapanii). This means that the prominent functioning of smrti here requires the assistance of
prajfiii, vitarka (and viciira), and sarrijnii."
403
LS: AH 12; SAH 32.
404
Gokhale: [34abl] sapta siilambanas cittadhiitavo
Tib.: [34a] dmigs bcas sems kyi khams bdun no I
LVP: On the meaning of cognitive object (iilambana), i. 29b.
Compare Vibhaliga, p. 95.
426 Exposition of the Elements (Dhlitunirdesa)
LS: In this context Sarp.ghabhadra (Ny, 350b; EIP.VIII.663) presents a discussion with SrTiata,
who maintains--while referring to the atom theory-that the sense-spheres (iiyatana) as com-
posite cognitive objects (iilambana) exist only as nominal designations (prajfiaptisat) within
the process of perception and that the respective elements (dhiitu) alone exist as actual entities
(dravyasat). To this thesis Saxµghabhadra replies that both sense-spheres and elements exist as
real entities, that composite cognitive objects can only be perceived by conceptual mental
consciousnesses and that no distinction can be drawn between those factors classified as sense-
spheres and those classified as elements. For the details, see Vasubandhu's discussion con-
cerning the ontological status of aggregates, sense-spheres and elements (i. F 37ff., and its
endnotes).
405
Gokhale: [34b2] 'rdharµ ca dharmataJ:, I
Tib.: [34bl] chos kyi phyed kyang
406
LS: AH 13; SAH 33-34.
407
Gokhale: [34cdl] navii 'nupiittiis te cii '~fau sabdas cii
Tib.: [34b2c] ma zin dgu Ibrgyad po de dag rnams dang sgra I
408
Gokhale: [34d2] 'nye nava dvidhii II
Tib.: [34d] dgu po gzhan ni rnam pa gnyis II
409
LS: SAH 33.
410
LVP: The Abhidhamma (Vibhaliga, p. 96; Dhammasaliga~i, 653, 1211, 1534) understands
upiidinna in the same sense. Modem commentators of the Abhidhamma translate upiidinna as
issue of grasping; they do not see that upiidii = upiidiiyarupa (derived form), bhautika (derived
material element), and create great confusion.
Moreover, the Vibhaliga does not classify the elements (dhiitu) as does the Abhidharma. (See
also Suttavibhaliga, p. 113; Mahlivyutpatti, 101, 56; Divyiivadana, p. 54; Bodhicaryiivatiira,
viii. 97, 101). And there is some wavering even in the Sanskrit sources. For example,
Majjhima, iii. 240, reproduced in Pitiiputrasamiigama (see above i, F 49, note), gives hair ...
excrement as ajjhattarµ paccattam kakkhalam upiidinnam. But hair is not upiidinna. The des-
cription of bodily matter (iidhyiitmika; see Majjhima, iii. 90) has been confused with the
description of organic matter (upiitta).
Organic (uplitta) matter, plus the mental facQlty (manas), is given the name of basis (li.fraya;
see ii. 5). This is the subtle body of the non-faithful.
LS: Dhammajoti (ESD.132), basing himself on Karunadasa's Buddhist Analysis of Matter,
pp. 103-7, disagrees here with LVP's statement that uplitta and anupiitta have the same
meaning as the Pali upiidinna, and anuplidinna, etc.
411
LS: SAH 36.
412
LVP: bhata, mahiibhiita; upiidiiya riipa, bhautika; see i. 12, 23-24; ii. 12, 50a, 65. -
bhautika = bhiite bhava = derived from the bhiitas.
413
Gokhale: [35ac] spra~{avyarµ dvividharµ se~ii riipi~o nava bhautikiil_i I dharmadhlitveka-
desas ca
Tib.: [35ac] reg bya rnam pa gnyis yin te I lhag ma gzugs can dgu po ni I 'byung gyur chos
khams phyogs gcig kyang I

LVP: Compare Vibhariga, p. 96.
414
LVP: MVS, 661c14: In this school, there are two masters, Buddhadeva and Dharmatriita.
Buddhadeva says: "Material form (riipa) is only the fundamental material elements; thought-
concomitants (caitta) are only thought (citta)." He says that "upiidiiyariipa (secondary matter
or derived material form) is a type of the fundamental material elements (mahiibhiitavise~a),
that the thought-concomitants are a type of thought. .. " (compare Kathiivatthu, vii. 3). - MVS,
383c24: The Siitra says: "Material form is the four fundamental material elements and that
which derives from the four fundamental material elements." Which opinion does the Siitra
want to refute? It wants to refute the opinion of Buddhadeva. The Buddha sees that, in the
future, there will be a master, Buddhadeva, who will say: "There. is no distinct derivative
material elem~nt outside of the fundamental material elements." In order to refute this opinion,
Buddha says: "Material form is the four fundamental material elements .... ". - 142, 1: Buddha-
deva says: "All conditioned factors are either the fundamental material elements or thought;
outside of the fundamental material elements, there is no derived material form; outside of
citta (thought), there is no caitta (thought-concomitant)."
On thought and thought-concomitants, see below F 66 and ii. 23c.
Buddhadeva is perhaps the master named in the inscription of the Mathurii lion.
Ll: Cox summarizes (EIP.VIII.664f.) Saiµghabhadra's discussion with SrTiiita (Ny, 352b):
StTiiita: The tangible element consists only of the great elements because this
so-called derivative material form is merely a distinctive arrangement of these four
great elements. [ ... ]
Answer: [ ... ] Since the activities of smoothness and so on belonging to derivative
material form are recognized as distinct from the activities hardness and so on
belonging to the four great elements, derivative material form and the four great
elements must be admitted to exist separately. [ ... ]
Sriliita: Further, lightness and heaviness ... are established simply by mutual com-
parison and do not exist as actual entities.
Answer: Though one thing may be light or heavy with respect to two different things,
it is not light and heavy with regard to the same thing. Therefore, though the
description of a thing may vary relative to other things, its nature as light or heavy is
without alteration. Varying description does not constitute a reason for the unreality
of the quality described.
Sriliita: Coldness ... is simply a small degree of or the absence of the fundamental
element fire.
Answer:[ ... ]
SrTiiita: Hunger and thirst have the mental factor called "interest" (chanda) as their
nature and therefore do not exist as actual entities.
Answer:[ ... ]
SrTiiita: All types of derivative form are nothing other than the four great elements.
Answer: In that case, all material sensory objects would have the same char-
acteristics of hardness· and so on that define the four great elements, and the sensory
range of all externally directed sense-organs would be identical.
Furthermore, the sense-organs and their objects would have the same inherent char-
acteristic of hardness and so on, and would not be capable of being distinguished
from one another.
415
LVP: Thus (1) the sense-faculties are not primary matter, not being solidness, etc.; (2) the
tangible involves the primary matter, since solidness is perceived by the body; (3) the
secondary matter perceived by the other sense-organs is not perceived by the body.
LS: Hall comments (VASC.133f.): "Each organ perceives different secondary characteristics
of the elements, or rather of their derivatives. If all sense objects were only the elements
themselves, then the eye should be able to see tangible qualities, the body be able to feel
visible ones, and so on."
416
LVP: cak~ur bhik~o ii.dhyiitmikam iiyatanaiµ catvii.ri mahii.bhiitiiny upiidii.ya riipaprasii.do
riipi anidarsanaiµ sapratigham I •.. mano bhik~o ii.dhyiitmikam ii.yatanam ariipy anidarsanam
apratigham I riipii.Iµ bhik~o bii.hyam ii.yatanaiµ catvii.ri mahii.bhiitii.ny upii.dii.ya riipi sanidarsanaiµ
sapratigham I ... spra~tavyiini bhik~o bii.hyam iiyatanaiµ catvii.ri mahii.bhiitii.ni catvii.ri ca
mahiibhiitiiny upii.dii.ya riipi anidarsanaiµ sapratigham I dharmii. bhik~o 'bii.hyam ii.yatanam
ekiidasabhir ii.yatanair asaiµgrhitam ariipi anidarsanam apratigham I [WOG.58.12ff.]
417
LVP: Vibhii~ii. 127, p. 661.
418
LS: ~atµlhiiturayarri bhik~o puru~alJ.
419
LVP: See ii. 5. - The first four elementary substances· (dhiitu) (earth ... wind) are funda-
mental elementary substances because the sense-faculties arise from these elementary sub-
stances; the elementary substance consciousness (vijfiiinadhiitu) or element of the mental
faculty (manodhiitu) is fundamental because it gives rise to the mana/Jsparsiiyatana.
Or else, the first four fundamental elementary substances are fundamental because they give
rise to the secondary matter; the elementary substance consciousness is fundamental because it
gives rise to the thought-concomitants (caitta; caitasika).
420
LVP: Thus the first five bases of contact, the five sense-faculties of sensory conscious-
ness, are secondary matter: otherwise, they would be included in the definition: "The person is
made up of six fundamental elementary substances (dhiitu)."
421
LVP: According to the Abhidhamma (DhammasatigatJ,i, 647), the derivative material form
(rupa) is not a tangible. Saiµghabhadra (Ny, 352cl) refutes this opinion, which is attributed to
the Sthavira: "The ignorant Sthavira maintains that the tangible does not include derivative
material form." On this subject, there is a discussion on the authenticity of the Siitras in the
Introduction of La Vallee Poussin. See Documents d'Abhidharma.
422
Gokhale: [35d] sarricitii dasa rupinalJ II
Tib.: [35d] gzugs can bcu ni bsags pa'o I
LVP: MYS, 39lc6.
423
LS: l;'radhan.24.18f. has se~ii na sarricitii iti siddharri bhavati.
424
LS: SAH 494.
The three topics mentioned in Gedun Drop's eleventh doctrinal perspective form three
separate doctrinal perspectives in Pu Guang' s listing of the twenty-two doctrinal perspectives.
425
Gokhale: [36ab] chinatti cchidyate c aiva biihyarri dhiitucatu~fayam I
Tib.: [36ab] gcod byed gcad par bya ba nyid I phyi rol gyi ni khams bzhi yin I
LVP: MVS, 689c5ff.
426
LS: The Vyakhya glosses [WOG.68.14]: saf!!ghiitas,:ota riip'iidi-saiµghiita-saiµtana ity arthal_i.
427
MW: accha = pellucid, transparent, clear.
428
Gokhale: [36c] dahyate tulayaty evaf!!
Tib.: [36c] de bzhin bsreg bya 'jal byed pa'o I
429
Gokhale: [36d] viviido dagdhrtulyayo"l_t I
'tib.: [36d] sreg dang gzhal la mi mthun smra I
430
LS: SAH 45.
431
LS: Here Pradhan.25.6f. adds the categories 13 and 14: "How many are 'containing the
[permanent} real'? How many are 'of a moment' (kw,:iika)?" These questions\are omitted by
LVP, but we will add these below to our translation.
All factors can be classified intoJive groups according to their status as an effect: (1) effect of
retribution (vipakaja), (2) effect bf accumulation (aupacayika), (3) effect of equal !)Utflow
(naifYandika); (4) containing the [permanent] real entity (dravyayukta); (5) momentary
(k~a,;iika). See DD.441 and SAH.75.
In the twenty-two doctrinal perspectives as listed by Pu Guang, these five form one doctrinil
perspective; in Gedun Drup, they form three perspectives.
See chapter 2, for a discussion of (1) the ripened effect or effect of retribution (vipiikaphala;
ii. 56a, 57ab) and (2) the effect of equal outflow ('r/ifYandaphala; ii. 56c, 57c).
432
Gokhale: [37-38al] vipiikajaupacayikii"l_t paficii 'dhyiitmarµ vipakajii"l_t Ina sabdo 'pratighii
a~fau naifyandikavipakaja"l_t I tridhii 'nye
Tib.: [37-38a] rnam par smin las byung ba dang I rgyas las byung ba nang gi lnga I sgra ni
rnam smin las skyes min I rgyu mthun las byung mam sm1'n skyes I thogs pa med brgyad gzhan
rnamgsum I
433
LS: Dhammajoti points out (ADCP.99) an important difference in the understanding of
the term "retribution-born" or "arisen from retribution" (vipakaja) between the Sarviistiviida
and SrTiiita's school of thought. ·
1. The Sarviistiviida defines vipiikaja as "that which is born of retribution-cause" or "that
born from the karma which has become matured" and considers .the karmic cause as either
skillful or unskillful, whereas the retribution-effect (ii. 54cd, 57ab; NY, 454b)-being
projected by the force of previous karma and not by an effort-is always non-defined and
unobscured (anivrtavyakrta); thus being weak like rotten seeds, the retribution-effect is
incapable of generating a skillful (or unskillful) citta of effort and cannot serve as a karmic
cause.
2. Sthavira Sdliita, however, asserts [Ny, 359ab, 359c] that "retribution-born" signifies
whatever is born of retribution and asserts that all twelve sense-spheres (iiyatana) are retri-
bution-born.
SrTiiita's theory entails the following (ADCP.101):
i. All pertaining to the sentient serial continuity (the six iiyatana-s) arise in each
moment from the anudhiitu (= bfja) within the being. These anudhiitu-s have
been possessed by the being since previous times. Their nature is ineffable, and
is neither unitary nor differentiated-neither identical with nor different from
the serial continuity.
ii. All dharma-s are arisen immediately in the present moment.
iii. The totality of empirical existence-the twelve iiyatana-s-is vipiikaja, which is
to be distinguished from vipiika of the karma of a sentient being.
As for the anudhiitu theory, it is meant to account "for the continuous manifestation of the
totality of a sentient being's existence-the six iiyatana-s-from one present moment to the
next. The anudhiitu is the causal efficacy within the sentient being's present serial continuity,
and the next moment of the serial continuity is the effect."
From the above we can also see that SrTiiita makes a distinction between what is retribution-
born and what is properly termed the retribution of past karma, and since the former can serve
as a cause generating dharmas of different moral species, it is possible in his system that
dharmas, even though being vipiikaja, can also be skillful or unskillful at the same time.
434
LVP: This is the etymology vipacyata iti vipiikaft; vipiika is what has become ripe.
435
LVP: This is the etymology vipaka = vipakti.
I.S: Hall translates (VASC.138): "However the 'fruit' (phala) is the very fact of coming to
fruition (vipakti), in that sense it is [also called] fruition (vipiika)."
436
L VP: See ii, F 271.
437
I.S: Hall adds in brackets (VASC.138): "[ when 'prior action' is really the cause of these]".
438
LVP: See ii, F 30 l; Vibhii~li, 118 at the beginning; Siddhi, 190.
439
I.S: The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.70.5ff.]: iihiira-saf!1skiira-svapna-samiidhi-vise~air upa-
citli aupacay'ikli iti. vise~a-sabda~ pratyekam abhisarµbadhyata. tatr'iihiira-svapnau Joke pratitau.
sai:µskiiro 'bhyai:µgasnananuviisan'iidi-svabhiiva~. samiidhis cittaikiigratii-lak~aQa~.
Hall comments (VASC.138f.): "Yasomitra takes lihiira (food, nourishment) and svapna (sleep)
in their everyday meanings. He takes Sllf!lskiira-elsewhere 'disposition'-here in the sense of
'cleansing' (compare the ritual sense of saf!1skiira as a Hindu 'sacrament'). Here samlidhi
(concentration) has its technical, meditational sense of 'one-pointed-ness of thought'."
440
LVP: It seems that this is the opinion of Dharmatriita, i. 45 (Nanjio 1287).
441
I.S: Hall comments (VASC.139): "Chastity, continence, or restraint (brahmacarya) re-
moves some causes that damage the organs, but does not directly nourish or foster them."
442
I.S: SAH 45.
443
I.S: Ibid.
444
LVP: See iv, F 29.
Let us consider a moment or state of existence of this subtle matter, which is the eye sense-
faculty (prasada-element). One part of this matter is the retdbution of a former action; another
part proceeds from food: all of this matter is the effect of equal outflow of the previous
moment, or state, in the existence of the eye. But this previous moment or state is not, in and
of itself, capable of generating the present moment: in fact, at death, the eye sense-faculty
ceases to produce itself through equal outflow. Thus, by definition, the eye sense-faculty is not
an effect of equal outflow. But consider, on the contrary, the flesh that makes up the body: it
persists after death; it is thus an effect of equal outflow, the effect, in each of the moments of
its existence, of the previous moment.
The Kathiivatthu, xii, 4, xvi. 8, does not hold that matter is retribution.
445
LS: SAH. 45,
446
LVP: Nine reasons are enumerated at MYS, 612c. Vasubandhu cites the third.
LS: Yasomitra glosses as follows [WOG.70.15f.]: sabda aupacayika ity anupacita-kayasya
sabda-sau~thavadarsanat.
447
LVP: The Vlitsiputriyas and the Vibhajyavadins maintain that sound is an effect of retri-
bution.
LS: Cox summarizes Saqighabhadra stating (Ny, 358a; EIP.Vill.666) that sound is not an
effect of retribution because it is discontinuous and arises in accord with one's wish at any
given time.
448
LS: Hall comments (VASC.139f.): "This 'intonation of Brahma' is number 13 in the list
. '
of thirty-two marks of a great man in Mahavyutpatti (248). It would seem to be a sound, which
qualifies as the fruition of past action. However, it is only the great man's vocal organs, which
are, strictly, fruitional. His vocal acts too are current deeds resulting from conscious effort."
449
LVP: Compare Dfgha, iii. 173, cited by the Mahasaqighikas in Kathiivatthu, xii. 2: saddo
vipako.
450
LS: Dharmatrata comments (SAH.75f.):
Question: Why is it that sound is not arisen by retribution?
Answer: Because it arises by present effort (vyayama). Sound arises by present
effort; retribution (vipaka) is what is produced by former action. Sound is what arises
according to desire; retribution is not what arises according to desire.
451
LS: SAH 45.
452
LS: Hall comments (VASC.140): "The 'continuing' (nai~yandika) components continue
their moment to moment 'on-flow' (ni~yanda) even apart from karmic fruition and nutritive
addition. An example is the bodily components that persist for some time after death."
453
LS: Cox summarizes Saqighabhadra who states (Ny, 358a; EIP.Vill.666) that· the eight
elements are not the effects of accumulation because, unlike material form, they do not consist
of collections of atoms, and therefore cannot be accumulated.
454
LS: SAH 45.
455
LS: AH 13; SAH 33, 45.
456
Gokhale: [38a2] dravyavan ekal_,.
Tib.: [38bl] rdzas dang ldan gcig

LS: Of the five groups: (1) effect of retribution (vipakaja), (2) effect of accumulation
(aupacayika), (3) effect of equal outflow (nai~andika); (4) containing the [permanent] real
entity (dravyayukta) and (5) momentary (k~a,:iika), the unconditioned element of factors
(asarµskrta dharmadhiitu) is only included in the fourth group.
Cox summarizes Saqighal:)hadra stating (Ny, 358a; EIP.Vill.666f.) that some suggest that the
element of factors (dharmadhatu) alone exists as an actual entity (dravaysat) because it
contains ·the unconditioned factors, but that others suggest that ail factors exist as jactual
entities.
457
LS: SAH 45.
458
Gokhale: [38b] k~a,:iikal:z pascimas trayal:z I
Tib.: [38b2-<:1] tha ma gsum Iskad cig ma si'e
LS: Cox summarizes Saqighabhadra stating (Ny, 358a; EIP.VIII.666f.; see also DD.411)
that some suggest that (1) the element of the mental faculty (manodhiitu), (2) the element of
factors (dharmadhiitu) and (3) the element of mental consciousness (manovijfiiinadhiitu) that
occur with the first moment of the noble path are said to be momentary (~a,;iika) but others
suggest that all factors, with the exception of the unconditioned factors, are momentary. Since
these three are (1) not an effect of retribution (vipakaja) of previous action, (2) nor an effect
of accumulation (aupacayika) because they are not material form and, therefore, are not
composed of atoms, (3) nor are they the effect of equal outflow (nail:z~andika) resulting
from a homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu) in the previous moment, and finally, (4) since
they are'tlot unconditioned, they are not classified as existing only as real entities (dravyavat).
They are, therefore, merely momentary (k~a,:iika).
459
LS: SAH 48.
460
Gokhale: [38cd] cak~urvijfiiinadhiitvol:z syat prthag liibhal:z sahii 'pi ca II
Tib.: [38c2-e] mig dang ni I rnam shes khams dag so so dang I lhan cig tu yang 'thob pa yod I
LVP: MVS, 823a20, 449a16; Dharmatrata (Nanjio 1287), i. 48c.
461
LS: For !Jnderstanding the tetralemma, Hall provides the following sketch (VASC.271):
1. realm of immateriality: here neither the eye sense-faculty nor visual consciousness exist;
2. realm of fine-materiality, i.e., second to fourth meditation: here the eye sense-faculty
exists, but not the visual consciousness, except as a memory, etc., of lower levels;
3. realm of desire and first meditation of the realm of fine-materiality: here both the eye
sense-faculty and visual cognition exist.
462
LS: Jampaiyang comments (p. 252): "The fourth is when born in the formless realm."
463
LS: SAH 36.
464
Gokhale: [39abl] dviidas adhyatmikii hitva riipadfn
Tib.: [39abl] nang gi bcu gnyis gzugs la sogs Ima gtogs
LVP: MVS, 714a7ff. The difference between the internal or personal (adhyatmika) and
external (biihya) factors is threefold:
1. difference from the point of view of the stream (sa1J1tiina): the factors that occur in a
particular person (sviitmabhiiva) are internal or personal; those that occur among others, and
also those that are not indicative of sentient beings (asattviikhya; i. 10b), are external;
2. difference from the point of view of the sense-sphere (iiyatana): the sense-spheres that are
the basis (iisraya) of thought and thought-concomitants are internal or personal; those that are
the cognitive object (iilambana) are external;
3. difference from the point of view of the sentient being: the factors indicative of sentient
beings can be intemal or personal; the others are external.
LS: At first sight. i. 39ab seems to suggest that thought-concomitants (caitta) in general, i.e.,
sensation, ideation, formations, etc.-being included in the sense-sphere of factors-would be
considered to.be external to thought! But the distinction of the Vibhii~ii seems to make it clear
that whether they are considered to be external or internal is dependent on the point of view
from which the thought-concomitants are considered, i.e., whether they are considered as
being simultaneously associated with thought, having the same cognitive object, or whether
they are considered as being the cognitive object of thought and thought-concomitants. See in
this context also i. 39bc, as well as vii. 18cd which states:
When a moment of conventional cognition (sa1J1vrtijniina) cognizes all factors as not
being a "self', that is by excluding, from the totality of factors, (1) itself, this same
moment of conventional cognition, for the subject of cognition cannot be its own
object (vi~ayivi~ayabhediit); (2) the mental factors (caitta) associated with it, for they
have the same cognitive object as it does (ekiilambanatviit); (3) the factors dissoci-
ated from thought (viprayukta) that accompany it (sahabha), for example, its char-
acteristics (la~ar:ia; ii. 45c), for they are too close.
465
LS: SAH 36.
466
LS: This_ is the thirteenth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1
(VY.28f.). Sarµghabhadra criticizes (Ny; 360b2lc4; EIP.VIII.667) Vasubandhu's view that
thought serves as the basis for the sense of self and can be referred to figuratively as the
internal "self', while those factors that serve as its basis, i.e., the sense bases, should be
internal, since this view leads to confusion as to whether or not certain factors act as the basis
of thought. For example, why are thought-concomitants (caitta) that are simultaneous with and
share the same effect as thought, not considered to be internal?
467
LVP: iitmanii hi sudiintena svarga1JI priipnoti pa1J<f.ital:, ...
cittasya damana1JI siidhu citta'!I diinta1J1 sukhiivaham [WOG.74.27ff.]
See Udiinavarga, xxiii; Madhyamakavrtti, p. 354; Dhammapada, 160.
468
LS: LVP translates: "whereas visible form and other object-fields of consciousness are
held to be external".
469 LS:.SAH 37.
470
LS: Cox and Dessein translate tatsabhii.ga: partially homogeneous; sabhiiga: homogeneous.
Dhammjoti glosses (SA.IV.545): "tatsabhii.ga-'Similar to that (which is presently active,
although this itself is non-active)', a 'facsimile'."
Sarµghabhadra states (Ny, 362a; EIP.VIII.668; JIABS.11.73) that "those elements that have
carried out their own activity, are carrying it out, or will carry it out together are called
homogeneous because they share their function, depend for their functioning upon the
functioning of others, or share the same contact. For example, when the eye and the object
function as the conditions for the arising of visual perceptual consciousness, these three
elements are homogeneous.
The elements that do not carry out their activity, [for example, those sense organs or object-
fields that arise and pass away. without performing their particular function of grasping or
being grasped, as well as those future sense organs or object-fields that will never arise,] are
partially homogeneous because they are of the same category as those elements that do
function."
471
LS: SAH 37.
472
Gokhale: [39b2-cl] dharmasarrz}iiakaJ:i Isabhiigas
Tib.: [39b2-cl] chos zhes bya bani Isten ba dang bcas
LVP: Prakara,:ia, 699a3-28.
473
LS: MVS, 42c-43a (SA.IV.253):
There are some who hold that the citta-caitta-dharma-s can cognize their own
intrinsic natures (i.e., themselves), like the Mahasarµghika which asserts: "Because
knowledge, etc., has cognition as its intrinsic nature, it can cognize both itself and
others. This is just like the case of a lamp; because it has illumination as its intrinsic
nature, it can illuminate both itself and others."
1'here are some, like the Dharmaguptaka which holds that the citta-caitta-dharma-s
can cognize what are conjoined with them. It asserts thus: "Prajiiii can cognize the
sensation conjoined with it."
There are some, like the Mahisiisaka, which holds that the citta-caitta-dharma-s can
cognize what are co-existent with them. They assert thus: "There are two types of
prajiiii which arise simultaneously: one is conjoined [with thought], the other not
conjoined. The conjoined prajiiii knows the unconjoined one; the unconjoined prajiiii
knows the conjoined one."
There are some, like the Viitsiputriya, which holds that the pudgala can cognize
dharma-s. It asserts thus: "It is the pudgala that knows dharma-s, not knowledge
(jiiiina) ... ".
Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.255):
In later Indian treatises, the Sautriintikas are described as holding the view of
reflexive knowledge, denoted by the term svasarrzvedana/svasarrzvitti (also, iitmasarrz-
vedana) which means "self-awareness". In the MVS, as we have seen, the doctrine is
attributed to the Mahiisarµghikas, but not to the Dar~tantikas who were the fore-
runners of the· Sautrantikas. In the Ny, although there is no explicit attribution of
such a theory under this term to the Sautrantika-Dar~tantikas, in a discussion on the
latter's doctrine of direct perception, it is mentioned that they as.sert the simultaneous
occurrence of "_sensation as direct perception" (anubhava-pratyak~a) and "awareness
as direct perception" (buddhi-pratyak~a). That is to say, one has awareness of what
one is directly sensing [Ny, 374c]: "One has the awareness of a direct perception
(:fJi..itjt; *pratyak.ra-buddhi) with regard to one's own sensation." This is clearly a
doctrine of reflexive awareness. SrTiata argues there that unless this fact is accepted,
we will not be able to account for the sense of vividness-as demanded by experi-
ence of direct perception-in the subsequent moment when one is completely con-
vinced that "this is directly perceived by me" (idaf!I me pratyak~am iti).
474
LS: SAH 37.
475
Gokhale: [39c2-dl] tatsabhiigas ca se~ii
Tib.: [39c2-d] lhag ma ni Ide dang mtshungs pa dag kyang yin I
476
Gokhale: [39d2] yo na svakarma/q1 I
Tib.: [39e] gang zhig rang gi las mi byed 11
477
LS: SAH 37.
478
LS: Jampaiyang (p. 256f.): "The Western Vaibha~ikas say there would be five since the
non-generated instances are two: possessing consciousness [in the Desire (Realm) and.the first
(absorption), for example,] and not possessing (consciousness) [in the second, etc.]."
479
LVP: MYS, 368a21: The sense-faculty that has seen, sees, or will see visible form (riipa),
and the partially homogeneous (tatsabhiiga), (i.e., the sense-faculty that resembles this sense-
faculty,) is the element of the eye (cak~urdhiitu). The sense-faculty that has seen is the past
element of the eye; the sense-faculty that sees is the present element of the eye; the sense-
faculty that will see is the future element of the eye. As for the partially homogeneous, the
scholars of this country say that it is of four types: (1-3) the past, present, future partially
homogeneous eye is the element of the eye that has perished, perishes, will perish, without
having seen the visible form; (4) the element of the eye that will absolutely not arise should be
added.
The foreign scholars (bahirdesaka) say t~at it is of five kinds: (1) past, (2) present, (3) future,
as above. In addition, the future element of the eye that absolutely will not arise is of two
types: accordingly as it (4-5) is, or is not, associated with consciousness.
LS: Hall comments (VASC.149): "A homogeneous .cause is that which actually at some time
produces a homogeneous result, such as an eye that actually sees forms. A quasi-homogeneous
eye could see, but does not happen to. Since the sense organs are material, one may infer their
continued existence when not functioning. Not so mind (manas). One can imagine a non-exis-
tent mind (which might have come about under certain circumstances) but one cannot infer an
existing but non-functioning mind, since something immaterial like mind does not exist apart
from its activity. Therefore mind is either 'homogeneous', or is 'quasi-homogeneous' in the
sense of possessing the nature of not actually arising."
480
LS: SAH 37.
481
LS: Ibid.
482
LVP: MYS, 368b13: Three opinions. - Can one see the visible form by means of the ey,,,
of another? - Who maintains such an opinion? - If one cannot see by means of the eye of
another, how could the eye of a certain being be called homogeneous (sabhiiga) in relation to
other sentient beings? - Because the activity of the eye is determined: this activity consists of
seeing. When the eye, after having been active, has perished, it is called homogeneous: neither
for the person him- or herself, nor for another, does this name homogeneous (sabhiiga) change.
In the same way ....
483
LS: Hall comments (VASC.151): "One such particle, of odor for instance, could not
simultaneously touch different organs."
484
LS: Jampaiyang (p. 258): "Since it is possible that nose consciousness is produced for a
minute worm living in the nose, it is not definite that touch with any nose power, etc., pro-
duces nose consciousness for just that (being)."
485
LS: SAH 37.
486
LVP: By explaining bhiiga in the passive, bhajyata iti bhiigal:z.
LS: Hall translates (VASC.152): "Or else it is that they are the common results of [the same]
sense contact."
487
LVP: "The eye that perishes without having seen is similar to the eye that sees, etc."
The Miidhyamikas (Vrtti, p. 32 and the note that should be corrected) take advantage of this
theory: "In reality, the homogeneous eye does not see visible form because it is a sense-
faculty, exactly like the partially homogeneous": na paramiirthatal:z sabhiigarri cak~ul:z pasyati
rupiil)i, cak~urindriyatviit, tadyathii tatsabhiigam.
488
LS: SAH 38.
489
LVP: Three categories: darsanaheya, bhiivaniiheya, aheya. We should distinguish
unqualified loss (vihiini) and retrogressing (parihiiQ.i), vi, 173. The pure factors (dharmas
forming part of the path of vision) can be let go, but they are not abandoned, to be rejected
by the path of insight or cultivation: they are the object of cessation due to deliberation
(apratisarrikhyiinirodha), viii, F 209. - See Index aheya, Vibhii~ii, 364b, in Documents d'Abhi-
dharma (on nil:zsara1Ja) and Siddhi, 666.
490
LS: SAH 38.
491
Gokhale: [40ab] dasa bhiivanayii heyiil:z panca cii 'ntyiis trayas tridhii I
Tib.: [40ab] bcu ni bsgom pas spang bya yin I lnga yang tha ma gsum rnam gsum I
LVP: MVS;265cb: The same problem is examined in Vibhariga, pp. 12, 16, 97; Dhamma-
sarigal)i, 1002, 1007, 1008.
492
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.43): "Among the with-outflow (siisrava) dharma-s,
the kusala and avyiikrta ones, not being defilements, are not really abandonable in the proper
sense. However, when the defilement which takes a kusala or an avyiikrta dharma as its object
is destroyed, this dharma is said to be abandoned (tadiilambana-klesa-prahiil)iit); for at that
time the dharma comes to be disconnected. In fact, having been 'abandoned', a kusala dharma
can still re-arise. Thus, this is not a case of abandonment in terms of the dharma's intrinsic
nature (svabhiiva-prahiil)ll ). "
493
LVP: On the quality of the ordinary worldling (prthagjana), ii. 40c; vi. 26a, 28cd. - At
MYS, 232c13-23, divergent explanations of Vasumitra, Bhadanta and Gho~aka. On prthag-
jana, see Siddhi, 639.
494
Gokhale:· [40cd] na dr~fiheyam akli~farri na ruparri nii 'py a~a~{hajam I
Tib.: [40cd] nyon mongs can min mthong spang min I gzugs min drug pa min skyes min I
LVP: See ii. 13; iv. 1 lab.
495
LVP: We will see that the first stage is the unhindered path (anantaryamiirga), the path
that destroys the defilement; the second stage is the path of liberation (vimuktimiirga), the path
in which the defilement has been destroyed (vi. 28).
LS: As for the ceasing of the status of ordinary worldling in relation to the receptivity to the
cognition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness (dhanirajfiiina-k~iinti), see vi. 26
(F 181f.).
496
LS: SAH 34-35, 43-44, 46-47.
497
Gokhale: [41 ab] cak~us ca dharmadhiitos ca pradeso dr~fir a~fadhii I
Tib.: [41ab] mig dang chos\kyi khams phyogs ni I lta ba yin te rnam pa brgyad I
LS: Cox summarizes Sanghabhadra stating (Ny, 363c; EIP.VIII.668f.) that only two among all
factors (dharma) have view (dr~fi) as their essential nature: (1) the visual sense-faculty alone
because it illumines visible form, opposes darkness and has an acute activity; (2) the internally
directed understanding (prajiiii) that is ~cute with respect to contemplation of the features of
the mental object and judges it.
498
LS: SAH 34.
499
LS: Cox summarizes Saip.ghabhadra stating (Ny, 363c; EIP.VIII.669) that these eight
types of view represent stages in the cultivation of purity and clarity of understanding
related to objects, whereby purity or clarity mainly resides in the view itself, "in the eye of the
beholder",.so to speak.
500
LVP: We do not think that the Visuddhimagga, 509, knows the mundane right view
(sammiidif!hi); it knows only the sammadif!hi, which is the member of the noble path
(maggarigga), the member of enligfitenment (bojjhariga) (Kosa, vi, 290).
501
LS: SAH 34.
502
LS: Dharmatrata comments (SAH.54): "[1] Viewing factors with defiled wisdom
(vida~a~ii prajfiii) is as seeing colours in a dark night; [2] conventional view is as seeing
colours in a clear night; [3] view of still having learning to do is as seeing colours on a dark
day; [4] view of having no more learning to do is as seeing colours on a clear day."
503
LS: SAH 34.
5
tl4 Gokhale: [41cd] paiicavijfiiinasahajii dhfr na dr~fir atfra~iit I
Tib.: [41 cd] rnam shes lnga dang mtshungs skyes blo I nges rtog med phyir [ta ma yin I
LVP: dhfin place of prajfia, for prosodic reasons (ii. 57d).
LS: 1. As for our section here, Yasomitra glosses [WOG.80.Sf.]: atfra~ad iti asaip.firai:tii.t.
saqitirru;iaqi punar vi~ayopanidhyana-piirvakaqi niscay'akar~ru;iaqi.
2. MVS, 490c-49la, defines (SA.IV.250) view (dr~fi)-other than the case of the eye-as
"that which has the nature of judgment or decision (saT[ltfrakatva), which is also part of
Vasumitra's definition which requires judgment and investigation. Elsewhere [MVS, 744a],
four characteristics of view are given, namely, seeing, judging, firm attachment, and pene-
trating into the objects of perception." But since for Sarviistiviida it is the eye that sees-and
not consciousness, as held by the Vijiiiinaviidins-the eye is also "included as a view on
account of its functioi:i of seeing (iilocana) in spite of its being non-epistemic".
3. Drlf(i is also later defined (ii. 29ab)-as pointed out by Jaini in his Prajfiii and Drlf(i in the
Vaibhiilfika Abhidharma-as prajfiiiviselja ("a special kind of prajfiii"), to which Yasomitra
adds the following (WOG.134.lf; CPBS.271): ,
santfrikii ya prajfiii, sii drlfril:1 ("drlf(i is that kind of prajfiii that involves judgement").
Jaini comments:
Our translation of the word santfrikii ("involving judgement") requires some expan-
sion here. This seems to have been a Buddhist technical term that, along with the
related santfra~a, denoted that stage of the cognitive process that followed percep-
tion and that comprised the making of discriminative decisions, i.e., "this is (an) x
as opposed to (a) y". Now, it will be immediately apparent that the decision or judge-
ment arrived at may be either incorrect or correct. In the former case we would have
an example of mithyiidr!f(i, "inaccurate view"; such views may be of various types,
but as we have suggested earlier the term most often implies satkiiyadrlf(i, belief in
a permanent soul. (This is the most pernicious, hence most important, of mithyii-
drlf(is.) If, on the other hand, one's judgement is correct, i.e., made in accord with the
Buddha's teachings ("that thing is nothing but the five skandhas; it is characterized
by suffering; it is impermanent"; etc.), we have a samyakdrlf(i, "accurate view".
4. See vii, F 1 for a discussion of cognition (jfiiina), understanding (prajfiii) and view (dmi)
and also for a chart that indicates the relation between these three important terms. For drlf(i
and upanidhyiina, see also vii. 1 and viii. 1 (F 130f.). Further see our endnote to i. 33ab and
specifically our comments to conceptual construction of examining (abhiniriipa~iivikalpa),
which is linked to sarritfra~.
505
LVP: upanidhyiina, viii. 1 (F 130f.).
506
LS: Yasomitra glosses [WOG.80.7f.]: ata eviisai:µtirar;tiid anyii 'pi miinasI klilf(ii riig'iidi-
sru:µprayuktii aklilffii vii k~ayiinutpiida-jfiiiniinivrtavyiilqtii prajfiii na dmr/:i.
507
LS: SAH 34-35, 43-44, 46-47.
508
LS: Ny, 364a, classifies it in this way for three reasons (ADCP.70): "(1) because it is
considered in the world that the eye sees (a-iloc) visible forms; (2) because it is opposed to
darkness; and (3) because its activity is clear and sharp". As can be seen from the chart at vii. l,
the eye is not a member of the set of understanding (prajfiii). Also, even though the
Vaibhii~ikas maintain, as we will see, that it is .the eye that sees and not visual consciousneds,
nevertheless, strictly speaking, the mere seeing by the eye is non-epistemic, since the proper
operation of prajfiii is not involved, whereas the simultaneously arising visual consciousness is
"conscious seeing", better, discernment, and as such epistemic, since the operation of prajfiii is
involved; and the same applies to the subsequent moment of mental consciousness (mano-
vijfiiina), and so on.
Dhammajoti explains (SA.IV.262) that "in the *Nyiiyiinusiira, Saiµghabhadra argues vehe-
mently that it is absolutely necessary for the function of seeing visible forms to belong
uniquely to the visual organ .... This absolute necessity, of course, stems fi:om the central
Vaibha~ika conception that in the persistence of all dharma-s in the three periods of time, each
and every dharma is a distinct dharma by virtue of its specific nature and function."
509
LS: SAH 34-35.
Find a much more detailed presentation of the following debate in Dhammajoti's Abhidharma
Doctrines and Controversies on Perception, chapter 5: "The 'What Sees' Debate in the AKB,
Vy and Ny", pp. 69-91.
510
LS: SAH 34-35.
511
Gokhale: [42] calcyufi pasyati riipa,:ii sabhiiga1J1 na tadiisritam I vijfiiina1J1 drsyate riipa1J1 na
kilii 'ntarita1J1 yatafi I
Tib.: [42] mig gis gzugs rnams mthong sten bcas I de la brten pa'i rnam shes min I gang phyir
bar du chod pa yi I gzugs ni mthong ba min phyir lo I
LVP: See Nyiiyabindutikiifippa,:ii, p. 26; Bodhicaryiivatiirapafijikii, p. 520; Atthasiilini, p. 400;
Warren (Visuddhimagga), p. 297; Buddhist Psychology, p. 351, note; Spence Hardy, Manual,
p. 419. - Kathiivatthu, xviii. 9, or the thesis: "The eye sees", is attributed to the Maha-
siirµghikas. Compare Samayabheda, W assilief, p. 262. W assilief sums up the discussion of the
Kosa, p. 308 (Read: "das Auge nicht das MaB des Sichtbaren sieht", and not "ist".)
MVS, 489b14: According to another opinion, all conditioned phenomena (sarriskrta) are by
their nature view (dr~ti). That which one understands by view is the manifested characteristic
of its manner of being (pafupraciira). All conditioned phenomena possess this characteristic.
Others say that the cognition of the exhaustion of defilements and of non-arising (k~aya-
anutpiidajfiiina; vii. 1) is view.
MVS, 61c.ff:
1. Dharmatrata claims that the visual consciousness (cak~urvijiiana), [and not the.eye,] sees
visible forms. - If the visual consciousness sees visible forms, the consciousness would have
seeing for its characteristic; but this is not the case: thus this opinion is false.
2. Gho~aka claims that the understanding (prajiiii) associated with visual consciousness sees
visible forms. - If the understanding associated with visual consciousness sees visible forms,
the understanding associated with the auditory consciousness should also hear sounds; but the
understanding does not have hearing for its characteristic: thus this opinion is false. [For more
detail see ADCP.54]
3. The Diir~tantika claims that the complete assemblage (siimagrl) of causes [of citta-caitta
(Paiicavastuka, 991 be; of the eye, etc. (Abhidharmadfpa, 3 lf.)] sees visible forms. - If the
complete assemblage sees visible forms, one should always see visible forms, for the complete
assemblage is always present.
4. The Vatsiputriya claims that a single eye sees visible forms. - If one eye, and not both
eyes, sees visible forms, the parts of the body would not experience tangibles at one and the
same time: since the two arms, however distant they may be from each other, can simul-
taneously experience tangibles and produce one single tactile consciousness, what obstacle is
there that the two eyes, however distant they may be from each other, simultaneously see and
produce one single visual consciousness?
LS: 1. For a more elaborated form of this controversy, see Dhammajoti's translation
(ADCP.52f.) of the related passage in the Pancavastuka-vibhii~ii by a certain Dharmatriita of
about the fourth century A.D.
2. This is the fourteenth of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1
(VY.32f.): "In verse 42, Vasubandhu gives the accepted Vaibhii~ika opinion that it is the eye
that sees rupa, but, according to Saipghabhadra, he uses the word kila to indicate that he
disagrees. Vasubandhu then examines a number of other opinions found in the Vibhii~ii,
most prominently that of Dharmatriita, to the effect that it is the visual consciousness that sees
rupa. As Kato points out (1989: 24), the commentators think that Vasubandhu favors Dharma-
triita's opinion, but in fact Vasubandhu may just be using it to refute the Vaibhii~ikas.* At the
end of the discussion, he ascribes to the Sautriintikas the opinion that there is nothing that sees
or is seen; consciousness simply arises in dependence on the organ and the object. [ ... ]
Comparison: The Yogiiciirabhami contains a number of statements to the effect that cognition
is really the result of the laws of cause and effect, not of something seeing and something else
being seen."
* LS: But see below the endnote at F 86, top, where Dhammajoti disagrees with Kato and
Kritzer on this point.
512
LS: SAH 35.
513
LS: As for the Vijfianaviida or Vijfianavadins mentioned here in the following "What
sees" debate, as well as in Yasomitra's Vyiikhyii and Saipghabhadra's *Nyiiyiinusiira, they do
not refer to the Yogiiciira Vijfiiinaviida and its followers but rather stand for the "consciousness
sees" theory and its followers (cf. ADCP.69).
514
LS: The argument seems to assume that the "seeing" eye occurs simultaneously with
visual consciousness, but the Vaibhii~ika tenet does not allow for two consciousnesses to occur
at the same time.
•sis LS: 1. Saipghabhadra adds (Ny, 364ab; ADCP.62 and 70f.) that it is not the case that all
the sense-faculties are simultaneously sustained by their respective consciousnesses. For
example, it is only the sabhiiga-cak~us that sees its object when being assisted by the visual
consciousness, i.e., the eye sense-faculty participating in the activity of seeing when being in
the simultaneous (sahabhu) cause-effect relationship which obtains when the visual conscious-
ness, the eye and other necessary· conditions flash forth their individual functions in co-
ordination to give r_ise to the seeing of a visible form. This is like the arising of the specific
activity of fire when there is the support of the force of fuel, etc.
Dharmatriita comments (SAH.55f.); "There is no vision at the moment [the eye] is together
with another form of consciousness: because when together with another form of conscious-
ness, it would be idle, and, the eye, [although] present, would not be homogeneous. Because of
this reason, all objects are not acquired together. ... There are no two forms of consciousness
that proceed together: because there is no second condition as direct antecedent (samanantara-
pratyaya)."
2. In regard to the "seeing" of a visible form, visual consciousness is a cause (for the
Vaibhii~ika), not an effect (seeing) (ADCP.62f.):
It serves as the proximate condition and as the support for the visual organ; it
1
nourishes the co-nascent Great Elements (mahii-bhiUa-s), causing the potent (vise~a
-lit. specific: that is the indriya that has come to the stage of being capable of
exercising its potency) sense organ to arise and see visible forms.
Dhammajoti comments that "this is in contrast to the Sautrlintika view that visual conscious-
ness-which is the seeing of the object [for the Sautrlintika]-is an effect produced in the
moment subsequent to that when the eye, the visible form, etc., were present."
516
LS: Dhammajoti adds (ADCP.71): " ... since whether there is seeing or not depends on the
presence or otherwise of visual consciousness".
517
LS: See Saiµghabhadra's reply to this counter-question (ADCP.76).
518
LS: Based on the Vyiikhyii [WOG.80.19; ADCP.75] Dhammajoti comments: "Conscious-
ness being not susceptible to obstruction, having penetrated the wall, etc., should arise, just as
in the case where the object is not intervened."
519
LS: Ny, 365c, clarifies what the Vaibhii~ikas mean _by "being susceptible to obstruction"
(sapratigha) (ADCP.78): "We do not simply mean that the [visual organ], being susceptible to
obstruction on account of hindrance (iivara,:ia-pratighiita), can only take objects that are in
contact, and hence cannot take objects, which are screened. 'Being susceptible to obstruction'
here also includes the meaning of being 'susceptible to obstruction on account of being
confined to a given object (vi~aya-pratighiita)': When it is confined to a given object, it cannot
exercise its activity on any other object, even if the object is not screened-how much more so
if it is screened. This in fact applies to any dluirma, which takes an object-it cannot simul-
taneously take all objects."
520
LS: The Vyiikhyii states (WOG.80.30-81.2; ADCP.78): "Do you mean that like the
tangible organ which, being susceptible to obstruction, cannot move over the screen which is
obstru~tive, to reach the object, and thus cannot exercise its activity on the object: The eye
cannot see in this case because it needs to move over the screen which it cannot do, being
susceptible to obstruction to reach and see the object?"
521
LS: tasmiinna sapratighatviiccak~u~a avrtasya riipasyiidarsanam.
522
LVP: This is the thesis of the Bhadanta (MVS, 63b23, c12).
LS: 1. McGovern (MBPC.121f.) tells us: "The later Buddhists distinguish between the eye and
ear on one hand, and the no:ssc, tongue and body on the other. The latter can sense only that
which is in immediate contact with them, while the former can sense that which is at a
distance .... (This distinction) is insisted upon by the Sarvlistivlidins both in the Mahlivibhli~li
and the Abhidharma Kosa. Vasubandhu tells us, moreover [ii. 23c], that the scope of the eye is
even greater than that of the ear. It is to be regretted that the Buddhists did not tell us more
concerning the nature of the medium between the sense organ and the sense-object."
2. However, as for iiloka, it is defined at i. 10 a:
18. sun-light (iitapa) is the radiance of the sun (siiryaprabhii);
19. light (iiloka) is the radiance (prabhii) of the moon (candra), of the stars (tiiraka),
of fire (agni), of herbs (o~adhi) and of gems (ma,:ii);
17. shadow (chiiyii)-arisen from an obstruction to light [by an object]-is where
visible forms (riipa) remain visible (darsana);
442 Exposition of the Elements (Dhlitunirdesa)
20. darkness (andhakiira) is the contrary to this [i.e., where there is no visibility at
all].
Further, i. 28ab states the following:
According to the School (kila), empty space or the elementary substance space is
light (iiloka) and darkness [tamas] (i. 10), i.e., a certain category of color (var~). of
matter or material form (rupa; i. 9b), for what is perceived in a cavity is light or
darkness. Being light or darkness in its intrinsic nature, empty space will be day and
night in its intrinsic nature (riitri1µdivasvabhiiva).
3. Dhammajoti, in his chapter 5 of his Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Per-
ception renders a section (ADCP.78ff.) from the *Nyiiyiinusiira, 365c, presenting the debate
between the Vaibhii~ika (Vai) and the Vijfiiinaviida (Vij) related to why objects obstructed
by glass, crystal, etc., are visible even though the visual organ cannot see obstructed objects
on account of its being obstructive. Unfortunately, this section is too long to reproduce here.
We will therefore give here just the section that sheds more light on iiloka:
Vij: Why ... does the eye not see visible forms screened by a wall, etc?
Vai: We do not explain as you do, that it is because there is no light herein, since in
the world it is observed that there. cart be perception in the absence of light. Rather,
this is because of the [different] ways accumulated forms (sarricita-rupa) constitute
obstruction. Thus, light and darkness differ in the ways they constitute hindrance:
Though darkness and light both belong to the category of material forms (rupa-
iiyatana), we can see what is obstructed by light, but not what is obstructed by
darkness. Nocturnal creatures, while capable of seeing forms obstructed by darkness
as well, cannot see what is obstructed by a wall, etc. In this way, though the visual
organ can see forms screened by a glass, etc., it cannot see those screened by a wall,
etc. By virtue of the obstructive nature of accumulated forms, the visual organ can
only see the wall, etc., and not the objects screened by the wall, etc.
Such is the nature of dharma-s; it is not a matter for speculation. There are organs,
though capable of taking objects in a distance, fail to take some such objects due to
certain obstruction. There are organs, though capable of seeing objects in contact,
fail to see some such objects. Thus, as regards the author's question mentioned
above-"Do you mean that the visual organ, like the organ of touch, can take an
object only when in contact, so that on account of its being susceptible to obstruction,
it cannot see a screened object"-we may retort: Your assertion will be futile; unless
it is the case that an organ capable of taking objects in contact can actually take all
such objects, and one capable of taking objects in a distance can actually take all such
objects.
Collett Cox summarizes Saiµghabhadra as follows (EIP.VIII.670):
For those who accept the theory that the eye sees, the eye is incapable of seeing an
obstructed object because that eye has resistance. Since :visual perceptual conscious-
ness proceeds in accordance with the same object as its lpcus, the eye, it cannot
cognize obstructed objects. Vasubandhu maintains that visibility of an object
obstructed by something transparent is due to the ability of light to pass through to
the object. I (Sarp.ghabhadra), however, claim that the visibility or invisibility of an

obstructed object depends upon the degree of resistance offered by the atomic struc-
ture of the obstruction.
4. Cf. also Harivarman's Tattvasiddhi (SH.95f.):
The heretics say: In the eye the fire element is predominant because of equality in
their action-cause. The eye is obtained by donation of the lamp. The eye sees in
collaboration with the light. The light illuminates distant things. The eye also has
contact with the distant thing because of its ray ....
See also in particular the entire section 49: "Contact and non-contact between the sense and
the object" (SH.101-6), which is a debate with the Nyiiya-Vaise~ika masters, discussing
among others, their theory that the ray of the eye travels to the object.
523
LS: SAH 35.
524
LVP: cak~u~ii rupii,:ti dr~tvii ... cited in iii. 32d. - Sarriyukta, 13, 4; Vibhaliga, p. 381;
Madhyamakavrtti, p. 137; Dhammasaliga,:ii, 597. - This is the argument of the Mahiisiirµghikas,
Kathiivatthu, xviii. 9.
LS: As for the visual organ, Cox summarizes Sarp.ghabhadra (Ny, 366; EIP.VIII.670): "The
visual organ has two activities: (1) it acts as a door, or as the locus for the emerging of
aspects within awareness and accompanying mental factors with regard to the object. (2) It is
able to grasp the object, that is, it sees colored shapes. Now we maintain that visual perceptual
consciousness supports the eye and enables it to see because the eye cannot see apart from
visual perceptual consciousness. However, visual perceptual consciousness itself does not
see because, if it did, all types of perceptual consciousness, which are not different in nature
from one another, should be able to see. The difference in the perceptual activity of seeing,
hearing and so on can only be accounted for by the distinctions among the various organs.
525
lS: cak~urvijfieyiini rupii,:if~tiini kiintiini.
526
LS: ca~ur briihma,:ia, dviirarri yiivad eva rupii,:iiim rupii,:iiirri.darsaniiya.
527
LS: SAH 35.
528
MW: vijiiniiti: to distinguish, discern, observe, investigate, recognize, ascertain, know,
understand.
pasyat: seeing, beholding.
529
LVP: Compare the formula: tasyaivarrijiinata evarri pasyataJ:i ... .
530
LS: For Sarp.ghabhadra's reply, see ADCP.74-75
531
LVP: Bhii~ya: vijfiiinarri tu sarrinidhyamiitre,:ia [ruparri vijiiniitftyucyate] I yathii suryo
divasakara iti. - Vyiikhyii [WOG.24ff.]: vijfiiinarri tu siirrinidhyamiitre,:ieti niisrayabhiiva-
yogeneti darsayati I yathii suryo divasakara iti I yathii siirp.nidhyamiitre1_1a suryo divasarp.
karotity ucyate tathii vijfiiinarp. vijaniifity ucyate I kasmiit IJoke tathii siddhatviit.
532
LS: 1. This is the first place in Pradhan (31.12) where the term Sautriintika is explicitly
mentioned.
For Sarp.ghabhadra's reply see ADCP.88-90.
2. We have already mentioned above Kato's and Kritzer's view that Vasubandhu-even
though the commentators think that he favors Dharmatriita's view that it is the visual
consciousness (cak~urvijniina) and not the eye sense-faculty that sees visible forms-in fact
may just be using it to refute the Yaibhiifkas. Now here at the end of the discussion,
Yasubandhu ascribes to the Sautriintikas the opinion that there is nothing that sees or is seen.
Dhammajoti comments (SD.198f; ADCP.23f.):
However, it does seem wiser to trust the commentators' opinion, not only because
these ancient masters were much closer to the time of AKB, but also in consideration
of the following fact: The Sautriintika remark at the end effectively denies the reality
of the iiyatana-s-there is neither the internal iiyatana as that which sees, nor the
external iiyatana as the object of vision. This is in line with Srnata's position that
"both the supporting bases (iisraya; i.e., the organs) and the objects (iilambana) of
the five [sensory] consciousnesses do not exist truly; the dhiitu-s alone are real
existents". For him, even the consciousnesses themselves do not exist as real entities
[Ny, 484b]:
When the sutra speaks of consciousness as that which is conscious (vijiiniitfti
vijniinam), it is not a discourse of paramiirtha; it is a conventional one (sarrivrti-
desanii). [ ... ]
In contrast, Yasubandhu is known to hold that the iiyatana-s exist truly in as much
as they are epistemic facts. According to Sthiramati, this view, contrary to the
understanding of some scholars, is not Yasubandhu's own, but a Sautriintika view.
Accordingly, it is more reasonable to understand Vasubandhu as basically advocating
the "consciousness sees" position, rather than the one that is in line with Srnata's
denial of the iiyatana-s. There is some confusion concerning the holders of this
"consciousness sees" position. In the MYS it is attributed to Dharmatriita; in the
Abhidharmadfpa (31), the Diir~iantika-pak~a, likewise in Ny (367b), in Tattviirthii,
the Sautriintika-s. [... ]
According to [the Tattviirthii] it is correct to attribute the "consciousness sees" view
to the Sautriintika(-Diir~tiintika), and also correct to attribute the concluding remark
to the Sautriintika. But the two Sautriintika are not exactly identical. The former is
the Hinayiina Sautriintika, ·[holding in particular to their form of realism,] and we
might call them Diir~tantika Sautriintika; the latter, the Sautrantika Yogacara, who
were probably Mahayanists ... derived from the broad Sautrantika lineage. [ ... ]
[The "Hinayana" Sautrantika] group seemed to have been greatly influenced by
Bhadanta Dharmatrata (and later on also Kumaralata and others), and in Vasu-
bandhu's time had Srnata as a prominent leader. It is this group which preserved-
sometimes with slight modification (e.g., Srnata's doctrine that there are only three
caitta-s vedanii, sarrijnii and cetanii; all the other caitta-s being cetanii-vise~a)-many
of the Dar~tantika doctrines in the MYS ....
In the AKB, Vasubandhu himself seems to be generally partisan to this Hinayana
group. But, he too was evidently open-minded, of which fact the AKB is a testimony,
and accordingly did not seem to have become exclusively partisan to the tenets of
any group as such-be it those of Hinayana or Yogiicara Sautrantika or Sarvastivada.
Thus, in the context of the "what sees" debate, he seems to basically side [with]
the view of Dharmatriita; and yet at the same time probably senses the meaningful-
ness of the Yogiiciira-Sautriintika's concluding remark.
533
LS: Pradhan. 31.12 has: kimidamiikiisal!I khiidyate?
534
LS: Dhammajoti translates based on Pradhan (SA.IV.263):
Conditioned by the visual organ and visible objects, visual consciousness arises.
Therein, what is it that sees, and what is it that is seen? It is really devoid of any
function (nirvyiipiira)--a mere play of dharma-s as cause and effect" (nirvyiipiiral!I
hfdal!I dharmamiitral!I hetuphalamiitral!I ca).
He comments (ADCP.162):
Given its Dar~tantika inheritance (see above), it is not difficult for the Sautrantika to
arrive at the conclusion that causality per se, as an abstract principle dictating a
necessary relationship between two entities conceived as "cause" and "effect", is a
mentally superimposed concept. [... ]
Obviously, it is not that the Sautrantika denies the empirical fact of causal efficacy as
such. But what we do experience-and ipso facto know to exist-are no more than
the momentary flashing of dharma-s, now experienced as so-called "cause", now as
so-called "effect". The Sautriintika acknowledgement of causal efficacy as the only
reality finds explicit expression in its view that, in the traditional threefold classifi-
cation of dharma-s-skandha, iiyatana, and dhiitu-only dhiitu can be considered as
real.
535
LVP: Or rather: "The expressions or words used in the world should not be rejected for
the reason that they do not correspond to the realities." - janapadaniruktil!I niibhiniveseta
sal!ljfiiil!I ca lokasya niitidhiivet. (Madhyama, 43, 1s; Sal!lyukta, 13, 12). Compare Majjhima, iii. 230:
janapadaniruttil!I niibhiniveseyya samanfial!I niitidhiiveyya; Sal!lyutta, iv. 230: ya'!'- ca siimal!I
iiiita1?1 ta'!'- ca atidhiivanti, ya'!'- ca toke saqcasal!lmatal!I ta'!'- ca atidhiiviinti. -Jtivuttaka, 49.
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.281): "In the last sentence, niibhidhavet could also be
rendered as 'not [unnecessarily] contravene (/find faults with)'."
Majjhima, iii. 224f. explains (Translation: Bhikkhu Bodhi):
How, bhikkhus, does there come to be insistence on local language and overriqing of
normal usage? Here, bhikkhus, in different localities they call the same thing a dish, a
bowl, a vessel, a saucer, a pan, a•pot, a mug, or a basin. So whatever they call it in
such and such a locality, one speaks accordingly, firmly adhering [to that expression]
and insisting: "only this is correct; anything else is wrong". This is how there comes
to be insistence on local language and overriding of normal usage.
536
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.264f.):
In terms of intrinsic efficacy, the Vaibhii~ika maintains that whereas the eye sees,
consciousness cognizes (vijiiniiti). But, what exactly does consciousness do in the
perceptual process? In the AKB [ix. F 280f.], Vasubandhu discusses this question:
It is said in the siitra, "consciousness cognizes". Herein what does consciousness do?
It does nothing .... Although doing nothing, consciousness is said to cognize

because of the obtaining of itself resembling [the object] (siidrseniitma-liibhiid
akurvad api ki1?1cit)-[i.e., with the object as its supporting condition, it simply
arises as an effect resembling the object]. What is its resemblance [with the
object]? This consists in having the form or aspect of that [object] (tadiikaratii).
Given the proper context-especially Vasubandhu's usage of the term iikiira (equated
with the resemblance of the object) here-this doctrine, as some scholars like La
-Vallee Poussin [Siddhi, F 445] assert, can be considered a Sautrantika one. Neverthe-
less, even the Vaibhaliika would have no objection to the statement that conscious-
ness in this process does nothing in particular. Sarp.ghabhadra too accepts that it is
only with regard to the specific nature of dharma that one speaks in conventional
terms of an agent, so as to refute the view that apart from consciousness there exists
a real agent which is conscious; consciousness actually does nothing in the percep-
tual process [Ny, 342a]:
In what other situations does one see the reference of an agent as a conventional
expression (prajftapti) to nothing more than the nature of a dharma? One sees in
the world that people speak of a shadow as that which moves. In this case there
is no movement; but when it arises in a different place in the following
moment (anantaram), it is said to move. The same is true for the case of
consciousness; when it arises serially with regard to a different object, it is
said to be that which cognizes-i.e., it cognizes the object-even though there
[really] is no action [on its part].
537
Gokhale: [43ab] ubhiibhyiim api cak1urbhyiim pasyati vyaktadarsaniit I
Tib.: [43ab] mig ni gnyis ka dag gis kyang I mthong ste gsal bar mthong phyir ro I
LVP: According to Jftiinaprasthiina, 919c27; MYS, 62bl.
Against the Vatsiputriyas. - See above note ad i. 42, at the end.
LS: Cox summarizes Sarp.ghabhadra (Ny, 368a; EIP.VIII.671):
Both eyes can be said to see material form at the same time because the object
ap~ears clearer when both eyes are open. If the eyes saw in succession, there would
be no difference between the clarity of an object seen with two eyes or one.
Srilata: The two eyes give rise to their activity successively. Perceptual conscious-
ness produced by two eyes is clearer than that produced by one alone because the
two successive moments of the visual organ exchange their activity producing a
clearer perceptual consciousness.
Answer: Whether one or two eyes are open in any given moment, only one moment
of visual perceptual consciousness is produced. However, if two eyes, both open,
acted successively, they would produce two distinct moments of visual perceptual
consciousness. Finally, since awareness and accompanying mental factors, which
include all varieties of perceptual consciousness, cannot be established in a particular
place, the two spatially distinct sense-organs do not produce two spatially distinct
instances of visual perceptual consciousness.
538
LS: "An A.bhidharmika is one who specializes in the abhidharma and takes the abhi-
dharma as the final authority. For him, the abhidharma is definitive (liik~a,:,ika) and repre-
sents the true intention of the Buddha, taught at the level of absolute truth (paramtirtha-satya),
with fully drawn out meanings (nftiirtha). In contrast, the satra-s are implicit (tibhiprtiyika)
and do not represent the Buddha's true intention. They generally represent the expedient
(aupaciirika) teachings whose meanings are yet to be fully drawn out (neytirtha)." (SA.IV. IS)
539
LVP: Argumentation of Vasubandhu, Paficavastuka, i. 10.
540
LS: SAH 43.
541
Gokhale: [43cd] cak~usrotramano 'priiptavi~ayarµ trayam anyathii I
Tib.: [43cd] mig dang yid dang rna ba ni Iyul dang ma phrad gsum gzhan du II
LVP: Compare Atthastilinf, 629.
MYS, 63b14ff: It is said that the object is attained (prtipta) in a twofold sense:
1. either because it is seized as object or perceived;
2. or else because there is a juxtaposition (nirantaratva) of the object and the sense-
faculty.
In the first sense, the six sense-faculties attain the object.
In the second sense, three sense-faculties only, i.e., the sense-faculties of the nose, of the
tongue and of the body, attain the object; on the contrary, three sense-faculties, i.e., the sense-
faculties of the eye, of the ear and of the mental faculty, perceive without attaining:
the eye sense-faculty perceives visible form because of the light; when the visible
form is close to the sense-faculty, it hinders the light: the sense-faculty does not see;
the ear sense-faculty perceives sound because of space or the void; when the sound is
close to the sense-faculty, it does not hinder the void: the sense-faculty hears ... ;
the nose sense-faculty perceives because of the wind;
the-iongue sense-faculty perceives because of the water;
the body sense-faculty perceives because of the earth;
the mental faculty perceives because of mental application (manasktira).
Fa-pao comments that the rupa of the moon does not abandon the moon in order to juxtapose
itself onto the eye.
Compare Aryadeva, Sataka, 288.
542
LS: SAH 43.
543
LS: Cox, summarizing Sruµghabhadra (Ny, 370a; EIP.VIII.672), adds: "Further, the eye
can produce doubtful or erroneous visual perceptual consciousness; if it touched its object,
all visual perceptual consciousnesses would be certain. The ear also does not touch its object
because distinctions of direction, distance .and clarity are noticed in the perception of sounds.
The mind does not touch its object because it does not apprehend connected factors that are
simultaneous with it. Further, the mind is not material form, and therefore cannot touch or be
touched."
544
LVP: Objection by the Vaise~ikas.
LS: See also part 3 in our endnote regarding light (iiloka) at i, F 83.
545
IS: Pradhan.32.7f. has: manastvariipitviit priiptumeviisaktam.
546
LVP: This doctrine is refuted by Saqighabhadra; Tao-thai attributes it to the Siiqimitiyas;
Fa-pao, to certain masters of the Vibhii~ii.
547
IS: SAH 43.
548
LVP: Saqighabhadra discusses this thesis.
549
- LVP: In regard to the entire discussion of i, F 88-92, see Saqighabhadra, Ny, 370b23ff.,
Documents d'Abhidharma.
550
LVP: Here and below (definition of the Bhadanta, F 91), our Tibetan version translates
nirantara by 'dab chags pa. But the Tibetan Siddhiintas analyzed by Wassilief (p. 307)
contrast the nirantara of the Bhadanta (bar med pa) with the nir,antara of the other scholars
('dab chags pa).
According to the Bodhicaryiivatiira, p. 516, ~he sense-faculty arn;l the object cannot be either
separated (savyavadhiina, siintara) or contiguous (nirantara).
m IS: Yasomitra [WOG.85.9]: nirantare tu spr~ta-salJ?jiieti Bhadantal}.
552
LVP: Saqighabha:dra (Ny, 37lc7): What is the meaning of to reach? When the object
arises in proximity to the sense-faculty, the sense-faculty seizes it. To understand factors in
this way, one can say that the nose, the tongue and the body seize the object that they reach;
just as one says that the eye sense-faculty does not see the eyelid, the little rod, and the other
visible forms that it reaches. The eyelid does not [actually] "touch" the eye sense-faculty: one
says, nevert~eless, that the eye sense-faculty "reaches" it. From the fact that the eyelid arises
in proximity with the sense-faculty, one says that the sense-faculty reaches it. As the eye
sense-faculty does not see the visible form reached in this way, one says that the eye sense-
faculty seizes without reaching and not by reaching; moreover, it does not seize a very distant
object. In this same way, even though the nose seizes the object that it reaches, it does not
seize that which is very close.
553
LVP: According to the MVS, 683c24: Do the atoms touch one another? - They do not
touch one another; if they did touch ·one another, they would touch one another (1) in their
totality or (2) partially. If they did touch one another in their totality, they would form only
one real entity; if they would touch one another partially, they would thus have parts. But the
atoms do not have parts.
How is it that agglomerated factors, striking one another, do not separate? - They do not
separate because the wind element (viiyudhiitu) holds them together.
But does the wind element not separate? - (1) Sometimes it separates, for example, at the end
of the cosmic aeon. (2) Sometimes it holds together, for example, at the beginning of the
cosmic aeon.
If the atoms do not touch, how does striking produce sound? - For this same reason, sound is
produced. For, if the atoms did touch one another, how could there be the production of
sound? If the atoms did touch one another, the hand and the body that the hand strikes would
blend, and there would be no free space, how could sound arise?
Vasumitra says: "The atoms do not touch one another: if they were to touch, they would thus
last for a second moment."
The Bhadanta says: There is no real contact; through acquiescence to popular truth, one says
that there is contact when the atoms arise in a union without interval (nirantara).
Does the real entity in contact arise having a real entity in contact for its cause? . , .
LS: The Siddhi states (F 39): "We pose two dilemmas: (1) either the atoms are, 'substantially
repellent' [Ch.: ti-tche-ngai] or they are not; (2) either the atoms are 'extended', or they are
not."
LVP comments:
According to the Sautrantikas, the atom is. "extended", it involves spatial division
(digbhiigabheda or digvibhiiga); according to the Sarvastivadins, the atom is 'unex-
tended'; we would say that it is merely a point.
Both schools maintain that the atom is "resistant" (sapratigha) through "obstruction
qua obstacle" (iivaraf,lapratighiita): that one atom cannot occur in the place where
another atom is. But the two schools, as they are not agreeing on the extension of the
atom, do not understand "obstruction qua obstacle" (iivaraf,lapratighiita) in the same
way, i.e., the Sautrantikas admit that thiatoms touch one another and that they "are
resistant due to their extension" (digdesabheda-pratighiita), whereas the Sarvasti-
viidins cannot admit that their atom-points touch one another (Kosa, i, F 89); they
therefore attribute to them an obstruction (pratighiita) that is called, in Chinese, ti-
tche-ngai or tche-ngai of which I [LVP] do not attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit,
a~d which, until something better turns up, I render as "substantial repellence",
(a repellence due to which the atom-points resist or repel each other at a distance,
which brings it about that nothing is able to enter in between them). - The
Sautrantikas do not accept the resistance called "substantial repellence" (ti-tche-
ngai).
We have already previously noted that the Buddhist atomic theory is not discernable in the
satras and thatit was likely taken over {rom outside the Buddhist schools-probably from the
Vaise~ika-though articulated in their own way. As for an overview of the Vaise~ika theories,
see EIP.II.79-86: Atomic Theory and Theory of "Cooking", and EIP.Il.115ff., which addresses
whether atoms are non-locus-pervading or locus-pervading.
554
LVP: Compare the Vi7!1!aka of Vasubandhu, 12-14; Bodhicaryiivatiira, p. 503; Prasasta-
pada, p. 43, etc.
555LVP: They should have arisen (firs,t moment) in order to touch one another (second
moment). Opinion of Vasumitra, cited by Kouei-ki, Twenty Stanzas, iii, 1 lb.
556 LS: This is the last of Kritzer's fifteen passages discussed in relation to chapter 1 (VY.34f.).
557
LS: Cox summarizes Saqighabhadra (EIP.Vill.673): "One master proposes that atoms do
not contact one another; instead, the idea of contact arises when there is no interval between
atoms. This proposal can be accepted as long as a clear distinction is drawn between 'having
no interval' and 'contact'. 'Having no interval' means that the atoms of the four fundamen-
tal elements arise in close proximity; it does not mean that atoms have contact and hence,
parts. Nor does it mean that they have no resistance and hence abide in the same place."
558
LS: Pradhan.33.3 has na sprsanti I nirantare tu spmasarrijfleti bhadanta~ 1- Jha translates:
"In case they do not touch, when there is no interval, that will be called contact-this is the
opinion of Bhadanta."
559
LVP: Vasubandhu believes that the Bhadanta understands juxtaposition without interval in
the sense that the atoms do not allow an interval between them. We will see that Sarpgha-
bhadra is of a different opinion.
560
LVP: For Vasubandhu, the atoms are immediately juxtaposed; nevertheless they do not
mingle one with another, for, being impenetrable, they remain distinct in spite of their contiguity.
Here is the essential point of the explanations of Sarpghabhadra.
Nyiiyiinusiira, i. 43cd (fol. 43al 7):
The Bhadanta nevertheless says: "The atoms do not touch one another; it is said metaphori-
cally that they touch one another, because they are juxtaposed without interval" (nirantara).
The Sautriintika (that is to say, Vasubandhu), indicating that this is the best theory, says: "This
doctrine is the correct one; otherwise, the atoms would present intervals (siintara); these
intervals beil;lg empty, what would hinder the atoms from moving (one toward the other)? One
admits that they are impenetrable (sapratigha)."
(Sarpghabhadra continues:) This theory of the Bhadanta should be neither approved nor
censured; one should merely examine how there can be an absence of interval without it
having contact: the reasoning not being explicit, this theory is difficult to understand.
One might say that the atoms are absolutely without intervals and yet do not blend with one
another, it is necessary that they should have parts: a wrong opinion. Furthermore, if nirantara
signifies without interval (anantara), how could the atoms not touch one another?
Conseqbently, the word nirantara signifies close. (1) The prefix nis signifies certitude. As
there certainly is an interval, the atoms are nirantara, i.e., with intervals: the same way as
nirdahati means "it burns". Or else, (2) the prefix nis signifies absence. The atoms are called
without interposition (nirantara) because there is no rupa-in-contact (spr~ta) of the dimension
of an atom between them. When the atoms of the fundamental material elements arise close to
one another without interposition, it is said metaphorically that they touch one another.
To understand the Bhadanta in this way, we approve him ....
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.206) that "the Vaibhii~ika position is a logical consequence
of the doctrine that an atom has no spatial extension, and yet is aggregated with six other
atoms in the six directions-north, east, south, west, above and below-with the given atom at
the centre. This may imply that an atom has at least six sides-a point seized upon by the
Vijfiiinaviidins in their refutation of the Abhidharmika notion of atom. To avoid this fallacy,
atoms must be thought of as being aggregated in such a way that in between the atoms there
must be gaps that are less than the size of a single atom."
561
LVP: salJlghiite sprsyante yathii rupyante.
562
LVP: Sarpghabhadra reproduces this paragraph (The Sautriintika says: "If you admit. .. ")
and pursues:
This is not correct. To have parts, and to be spatially divided: two expressions of the
same idea. By the fact that it is said: "The atom does not have parts", it is said that it
is foreign to all spatial division. How can you be in doubt with respect to this point
and say: "If you admit the spatial division ... "? - Since the atoms are foreign to this
division, how could they touch one another? We have explained that contact can only
be total or partial; thus the atom, foreign to spatial division, cannot enter into contact.
How can you thus say: "If you deny the spatial division, there will be no difficulty
in the atoms touching one another." - Thus the atoms are called nirantara, "not
separated", because there is no rupa-in-contact (spr~ra) of the dimension of an atom
between them.
See ii. 22 and the Introduction.
563
LS: SAH 43-44.
564
Gokhale: [44ab] tribhir ghrai:iadibhis tulyavi~ayagrahai:iam matam I
Tib.: [44ab] sria la sogs pa gsum gyis ni Iyul ni mnyam pa 'dzin par 'dodj
LVP: According to the MVS, 63cl2.
565
LS: Discussing the paramai:ius of objects and sense-faculties, Kosa ii. 22 (F 144) states:
"By paramai:iu one does not understand the atom (paramai:iu) here [in verse 22] in the strict
sense, the real-entity atom (dravyaparamai:iu), the atom or monad that is a single real entity
(dravya; i. 13); but rather the composite molecule (saf!!ghiitaparamiinu), i.e., the most subtle
(sarvasuk~ma) among the composite matters (rupasaf!!ghiita), since there is nothing more
subtle than it among the composite matters."
In a footnote to ii. 22 (F 145), LVP comments: "The (composite) molecules that involve the
body sense-faculty, the eye sense-faculty, etc., are the 'atoms' that are discussed in i. 44ab."
566
LS: Cux summarizes Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 373c; EIP.VIII. 673): "Since the atoms in these
five externally directed organs cannot be seen, their arrangement is difficult to determine, but
because they have resistance, and therefore occupy a particular place, they are arranged."
567
LVP: The opinion of the Sarviistivadins.
568
LVP: mliliivad avasthita = mat,1~alena samapanktyiivasthita [WOG.86.7).
569
LVP: The text has kila ["so said", "so reported"]. As a general rule, Vasubandhu indi-
cates, by the word kila, that the opinion in question is an incorrect opinion of the Vaibhii~ikas;
but here the Vyiikhyii says: iigamasucaniirthal:i kilasabdiil:i [WOG.86.8].
570
LS: For the Sarviistivadins, the object of sensory perception (ADCP.142-44) is an assem-
blage or agglomeration of atoms ('f!l;t, he-ji; *saf!!caya, *saf!!ghiita, *samasta), "capable of
being seen by the eye", "a set of entities of the same species": "what is directly perceived is
just these atoms assembled together in a certain manner, not a conceptualized object such as a
jar, etc."
On the other hand, for the Sautriintikas (including SrUiita, but not Vasubandhu; see i. 20ab, F 39),
the object of sensory perception is a unified complex ('fllil'-, he-he; *siimagri, *samghiita) of
atoms, which is not a real entity.
As for Vasubandhu, see Dhammajoti's comment in the next endnote.
For a discussion of the important epistemological and ontological issues and implications
underlying the Sarviistiviidin and Sautriintika views regarding the object of sensory perception,
see the long endnote at iii. F 104.
571
LS: As for the visibility of atoms, see part 2.iii of our endnote at i, F 37, bottom.
Dhammajoti adds (ADCP.143f.):
The Vaibhii~ika speaks summarily of two types of atoms, real (dravyatas) and con-
ceptual (prajfiaptitas) [Ny.522a]:
The real are the svalalcya,:za-s of riipa, etc., which are universally acknowledged
(prasiddha); they are perceived through pratyak:Ja at the assembled state
(;fll~,&; *sa,ricitavasthii, *samastavastha). The conceptual ones are those
[arrived at] through analysis, and known through inference (anumiina).
In a similar manner, Vasubandhu too, in his AKB [iii, F 213], when refuting the
Vaise~ika, explains the Buddhist view that "in spite of the atoms being imperceptible
by the senses [individually], there is the direct perception (samastana,ri pratyak:jatva)
of them in agglomeration". Moreover, it is also the doctrine of the MVS [63c] that
the first five consciousnesses have, for their supporting bases and objects, an
agglomeration of atoms, not the atoms singly.
See also Kajiyama's article The Atomic Theory of Vasubandhu, the Author of the Abhidharma-
kosa, SBP.171-76.
572
LS: See our endnotes at iii, F 99 and 104.
573
· Gokhale: [44cd] caramasy asrayo 'tfta?z paficiinii,ri sahajas ca tai?z II
Tib.: [44cd] tha ma 'i rten 'das Inga rnams kyi I de dag lhan cig skyes pa 'ng yin I
LS: In terms of the discussion as to whether or not Vasubandhu accepts simultaneous causation
(see for example ii. 50bd [F 253f.]), it should be noted that he does not object here to the
simultaneity of object and sense-faculty in regard to the five sensory consciousnesses. As
already mentioned in our introductory note, Dhammajoti states (SD.201) that "Vasubandhu is
known to accept some of the Sarviistiviida caitta-s, and the notion of sa,riprayoga of citta-
caitta-s-differing from Sriliita. This also necessarily means that he accepts the sahabhii-hetu
doctrine which Sn7iita rejects."
574
LS: Yasomitra glosses (WOG.86.21f.): koti-traya-muktii viprayuktii asaiµskrt'iidaya~.
575
Gokhale: [45ab] tadvikaravikiiritviid asrayiis cak:Juriidaya?z I
Tib.: [45ab] 1e dag gyur pas 'gyur nyid phyir I rten ni mig la sogs pa yin I
LVP: According to the MVS, 369c10ff.
576
Gokhale: [45cd] ato 'sadhiira,:zatviic ca vijfiiina,ri tair nirucyate II
Tib.: [45cd] de phyir thun mong ma yin phyir I de dag gis ni rnam shes bstan I
LS: Cox summarizes Saiµghabhadra (EIP.VIII.675): "Though the arising of perceptual con-
sciousness depends upon many causes and conditions, the organ and the object are designated
as the locus and supporting object because they are essential for its arising, in each and every
case."
577
LS: SAH 46-47.
578
LS: SAH 46.
579
LS: Ibid.
580
LS: This passage is missing in LVP. Pradhan.35.7f. has: prathamadhyiinabhiimfni pasyato
vijiiiinariipe tadbhiimike kiiyaf:i kiimiivacarascak1urdvitfyadhyiinabhiimikam.
581
LS: LVP has second meditation, but Pradhan has prathamadhyiina. Jha has "first medita-
tion".
582
LS: SAH 46.
583
LS: Ibid.
584
LS: Ibid.
585
LS: Ibid.
586
Gokhale: [46) na kiiyasyii 'dhara1J1 cak1ur iirdhva1J1 riipa1J1 na cak1u1af:i I vijiiiina1J1 ca 'sya
riipa1J1 tu kiiyasy obhe ca sarvataf:i II
Tib.: [46] lus la 'og ma'i mig ma yin Imig gi gong ma'i gzugs ma yin I rnam par shes pa'ng de
yi gzugs I lus kyi 'ng gnyis ka thams cad du II
LVP: See vii, F 107; viii, F 154.
587
LS: SAH 47.
588
Gokhale: [47al] tatha srotra1J1
Tib.: [47al] ma ba'ng de bzhin
589
LS: SAH 47.
590
Gokhale: [47a2-b] trayii1Jii1J1 tu sarvam eva svabhiimikam I
Tib.: [47a2-b] gsum dag ni I thams cad rang gi sa pa nyid I
591
LS: SAH 47.
592
G_okhale: [47cdl] kiiyavijiiiinam adharasvabhiimy
Tib.: [47cdl] lus kyi rnam shes 'og dang ni I rang gi sa
593
LS: SAH 47.
594
Gokhale: [47d2] aniyata1J1 manaf:i I
Tib.: [47d2] yid manges te II
595
LS: SAH 49.
596
Gokhale: [48a] paiica biihyii dvivijiieyii
Tib.: [48a] gnyis kyi rnam shes phyi yi Inga I
597
LS: See our endnote regarding the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana) and the element
of factors (dharmadhiitu) at i. 15bd.
598
LS: SAH 37.
599
Gokhale: [48b] nityii dharmii asa1J1skrtaf:i I
Tib.: [48b] 'dus ma byas chos rtag pa' o I
LVP: Unconditioned factors are eternal because they do not go from one time period to
another time period (adhvasa1J1ciiriibhiiviit; v. 25). - Unconditioned factor (asa1J1skrta; iy. 9),
eternal factor (nitya), firm factor (dhruva; iv. 9) and real entity (dravya; inherent in the real
entity [dravyavat], see i. 38a) are synonyms.
600
LS: Pradhan.37.4 has ie!fd anityafi.
601
LS: AH 203; SAH 36, 432.
602
Gokhale: [48cd] dharmii'rdham indriya'!I ye ca dvada§ adhyatmikafi smrtafi I
Tib.: [48cd] chos kyi phyed dang gang dag ni I bcu gnyis nang gi~ bshad dbang po I
LVP: According to another reading (kecit pa(hanti): dharmardham ... .
See Dhammasaliga,:ii, 661.
603
LS: AH 203; SAH 432.
604
LVP: The Vyakhya cites the conversation of the Brahmin Jatisroi;ia with the Bhagavat:
indriyiiI_lindriyiii;iiti bho Gautama ucyante I kati bho Gautama indriya)?.i I kiyatii cendriyiii;iiiip.
samgraho bhavati ... [WOG.90.29f.].
LS: Cox summarizes Saip.ghabhadra (Ny, 377a; EIP.VIII.675f.):
Concerning those elements (dhatu) that are controlling faculties [indriya], the five
sense organs, the seven mental elements, part of the tactile organ element, and part of
the factor element [dharmadhatu] are controlling faculties.
The tactile organ element includes the masculine and feminine faculties, and the
seven mental elements constitute the mental faculty.
Those controlling faculties included within the factor element are the five feeling
faculties of satisfaction, frustration, contentedness, irritation and equanimity; the five
faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, meditation and insight; the controlling faculty
of vitality; and the three faculties of coming to know what is as yet unknown, under-
standing, and perfect knowledge. ·
605
LVP: The order of the controlling faculties (indriya) is justified in ii. 5-6.
We have the order of our Sutra in Vibhaliga, p. 122; Kathavatthu, transl. p. 16; Visuddhi-
·magga, xvi; and also in the Indriyaskandhaka, sixth book ·of the Jfiiinaprasthana (Takakusu,
"Abhidharma Literature", JPTS, 1905, p. 93).
The small treatise of Anuruddha (Compendium, p. 175) follows the same order as the Pra-
kara,:iapada.
The Mahavyutpatti (108) places the vitality faculty at the end.
LS: Collett Cox discusses a slightly different order of the twenty-two controlling faculties
as follows (FCO.552):
Early efforts to organize the multiplying categories of dharmas resulted in compre-
hensive taxonomic systems that combine both the "evaluative" and "descriptive"
purposes. For example, the early comprehensive system of the twenty-two control-
ling faculties (indriya) subsumes earlier standard sets, which were reordered in large
part to reflect these two purposes.
It begins with a "descriptive" presentation of the five externally directed, corporeal
sense organs (1-5), which are followed by the three controlling faculties (6-8)-
namely, .femininity, masculinity, and the life-force that further qualify the final
corporeal sense organ of the body. The mental sense organ is listed next (9), and
is followed by the five varieties of feelings (10--14) that determine the affective
quality of mental events.
Here the focus shifts to the "evaluative" or soteriological purpose represented by
eight praxis-oriented controlling faculties, culminating in the controlling faculty of
one possessed of complete knowledge (iijniitiivfndriya), which is tantamount to arhat
ship or enlightenment.*
* Dharmaskandha (T.1737) 10 p. 498bl2-499c24; Prakara1Japiida (T.1542) 8 p. 723a24-
c2. For a discussion of the 22 controlling faculties and their development throughout early
Sarvastivada Abhidharma texts, see Saito (2002). Saito also examines the different orders in
which the controlling faculties are enumerated and explores various related doctrinal and
historical questions.
606
LVP: The last three controlling faculties (indriya) are made up of (1-3) three faculties of
sensation; (4-8) the five (praxis-oriented) faculties; (9) the mental faculty: 1-8 are the element
of factors (dharmadhiitu). [See WOG.91.18f.].
607
LS: Here LVP has "(3) une partie des trois derniers souverains".
608
LS: SAH 36.
Chapter Two:
Exposition of the Faculties
(Indriyanirdesa)
Outline of Chapter Two:
Exposition of the Faculties
(Indriyanirdesa)
A. Controlling faculties (indriya) ........................................................................................ .463

AA. Name and meaning of indriya & the link between chapters .................................. 463
AB. Brief Vaibhii~ika explanation of the controlling power of each controlling
faculty .................................................................................................................... 464
AC. Brief Sautriintika explanation of the controlling power. of each controlling
faculty ................................................................................................................... .468
AD. Explanation of the enumeration and order of the twenty-two controlling
faculties ................................................................................................................. 470
AE. Detailed explanation of the intrinsic nature (svabhiiva) of the twenty-two
controlling faculties ............................................................................................... 473
AF. The different mode.s (pr~kiirabheda) of the controlling faculties ......................... .478
AG. Original acquisition (labha) of the controlling faculties at conception & final
discarding (tyiiga) of the controlling faculties at death ......................................... .491
AH. The obtaining (priipti) ofthe fruits of the religious praxis & the number of
controlling faculties ..........................................•.................................................... 494
AI. The number of controlling faculties with which people are accompanied
(samanviigata) ....................................................................................................... 499
B. The way conditioned factors (sal'[l,skrta) arise & five-group (pafica-vastu)

classification of factors .............................................................. :.................................... 505
BA. The simultaneous arising (sahotpiida) of factors ................................................... 507
BAA. The simultaneous arising of atoms or molecules (paramii,:zu) ......... ,.......... 507
BAB. The simultaneous arising of thought, thought-.concomitants and
formations dissociated from thought .......................................................... 511
BAB. 1. The formations associated with thought (cittasal'[l,prayukta-
sal'[l,skiira): forty-six thought-concomitants ................................ .512
BAB. 1. 1. The five determined kinds and one undetermined
kind .................................................... ,. ........................ 512
BAB.1.1.1. The ten generally permeating factors
(mahabhamika) ...................................... 513
BAB.1.1.2. The ten wholesome permeating factors
(kusalamar.iibhamika) ............................ 515
BAB.1.1.3. The six permeating factors of
defilement (klesamahiibhamika) ............ 518
BAB .1.1.4. The two unwholesome permeating
factors (akusalamahiibhamika) ............... 521
BAB.1.1.5. The factors of defilement of restricted
scope (parfttaklesabhumika) .................. 521
BAB .1.1.6. The undetermined factors (aniyata) ....... 522
460 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Jndriyanirdesa)
BAB.1.2. Which thought-concomitants arise in association

with which thought? ................................................... 523
BAB.1.3. Drawing distinctions between similar thought-
concomitants ............................................................... 528
BAB.1.4. Thought and thought-concomitants ........................... .534
BAB.2. The formations dissociated from thought (cittaviprayukta-
sa'{lskiira): fourteen types ............................................................ 536
BAB.2.1. The name "formations dissociated from thought" ...... 537
BAB.2.2. Possession (priipti) & non-possession (apriipti) ........ .537
BAB.2.3. Group homogeneity (nikiiyasabhiigatii) ... :.................. 555
BAB.2.4. State of non-ideation (iisa'{ljfiika) ...............--; ............... 559
BAB.2.5. The two attainments (samiipatti) ................................ 561
BAB.2.6. Vitality faculty (jfvitendriya) ...................................... 575
BAB.2.7. Characteristics (la/qa,:ia) ............................................ 583
BAB.2.8. Collections of names, phrases and syllables
(niimakiiya, padakiiya, vyanjanakiiya) ........................ 599
BAB.2.9. The modes of group homogeneity, possessions,
characteristics, two attainments, non-possession ........ 605
C. Classification of factors according to causes (hetu), effects (phala), conditions

(pratyaya) ........................................................................................................................ 601
CA. The six causes (hetu) ............................................................................................. 607
CAA. Efficient cause (kiira,:iahetu) ....................................................................... 608
CAB. Co-existent cause (sahabhuhetu) ................................................................ 610
CAC. Homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu) ..... .'...................................................... 611
CAD. Associated cause (sa'{lprayuktakahetu) ...................................................... 630
CAE. Pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu) ............................................................... 631
CAF. Ripening cause (vipiikahetu) ....................................................................... 633
CAG. The six causes and the unconditioned factors & the three time periods ...... 638
CB. The five effects (phala) .................•........................................................................ 638
CBA. The correspondence of the effects with the causes ..................................... 639
CBB. The defining characteristics of the five effects ........................................... 652
CBB. l. Ripened effect (vipiikaphala) ....................................................... 652
CBB.2. Effect of equal outflow (ni~andaphala) ..................................... 653
CBB.3. Effect of disconnection (visa'{lyogaphala) ................................... 654
CBB .4. Effect of human action (puru:jakiiraphala) .................................. 654
CBB.5. Effect of dominance (adhipatiphala) ........................................... 655
CBC. Two stages of causing an effect.. ................................................................ 656
CBD. The four effects of the Westerners ............................................................. 660
CC. Topics related to causes and results ....................................................................... 660
Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdesa) 461
CD. The four conditions (pratyaya) .............................................................................. 662

CDA. The nature of each of the four conditions ................................................... 663
CDA.1. Causal condition (hetupratyaya) .................................................. 663
CDA.2. Condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent
(samanantarapratyaya) ............................................................... 663
CDA.3. Cognitive object condition (alambanapratyaya) ......................... 669
CDA.4. Condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya) ................................ 670
CDB. Conditions & their "activities/capabilities" with regard to factors of
different states ............................................................................................ 671
CDC. The different factors & the number of their conditions and causes ............ 673
CDD. Specific explanation of the immediate condition: the causal
relationships between different thoughts and different thoughts ................ 680
Chapter Two:
EXPOSITION OF THE FACULTIES

(Indriyanirdesa) 1
A. Controlling faculties (indriya); F 103

B. The way conditioned factors (saf{lskrta) arise & five-group (panca-vastu)
classification of factors: (1) matter or form (riipa): atoms and molecules;
(2) thought (citta); (3) thought-concomitants (caitta) or formations associated
withJhought (cittasaf[lprayukta); (4) formations dissociated from thought
(cittaviprayukta); (5) unconditioned factors (asa,µskrta); F 143
C. Classification of factors according to causes (hetu), effects (phala) and
conditions (pratyaya); F 244-331
A. Cfi3oNTROLLING FACULTIES (INDRIYA); 2 F 103-43

AA. Name and meaning of indriya; F 103
AB. Brief Vaibhii~ika explanation of the controlling power of each controlling
faculty; F 103
AC. Brief Sautriintika explanation of the controlling power of each controlling
faculty; F 107
AD. Explanation of the enumeration and order of the twenty-two controlling
faculties; F 110
AE. Detailed explanation of the intrinsic nature (svabhava) of the twenty-two
conrrolling faculties; F 113
AF. The different modes (prakiirabheda) of the controlling faculties; F 118
AG. Original acquisition (labha) of the controlling faculties at conception & final
discarding (tyiiga) of the controlling faculties at death; F 131
AH. The obtaining (priipti) of the fruits of the religious praxis & the 1-iumber of
controlling faculties; F 134
AI. The number of controlling faculties with which people are accompanied
(samanviigata); F 138-143
AA. NAME AND MEANING OF INDRIYA & THE LINK BETWE_EN

CHAPTERS; 3 F 103
In regard to the elements (dhatu; i. 48), we have enumerated the controlling faculties
or indriyas. 4 What is the meaning [artha] of the word indriya?
The root idi signifies supremacy or supreme power or supreme dominion (idi
paramaisvarya) (Dhiitupli-{ha, i. 64). That which exercises supreme power is called
464 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (lndriyanirdesa)
indriya._ 'fhus, in general, indriya signifies adhipati [sovereign, ruler, commander,

regent, king; iidhipatya: sovereignty or controlling power or dominance]. 5
BRIEF VAIBHA$IKA EXPLANATION OF THE CONTROLLING

POWER OF EACH CONTROLLING 1'ACULTY; 6 F 103-7
What is the object of the controlling power [iidhipatya] of each controlling faculty?
1. According to the School [i.e., the Vaibha~ika]:
(1) five controlling faculties [i.e., the five sense-faculties of the sen-
sory consciousnesses] exercise controlling power with regard to
four things [artha] [i.e., beauty, protection, production, special mode
of activity];
(2) four controlling faculties [i.e., the two sexual faculties, vitality
faculty, mental faculty] exercise controlling power with regard to
two things [i.e., division and differentiation; forming an initial con-
nection and supporting the nikiiyasabhiiga; connection at rebirth
and continual domination]; 7
(3) five controlling faculties [i.e., the faculty of sensation of plea-
sure~ displeasure, satisfaction, dissatisfaction and equanimity] and
eight controlling faculties [i.e., the praxis-oriented faculties of
faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, understanding and the
three pure controlling faculties] exercise controlling power with
regard, [respectively,] to pollution [sa,µklesa] and purification [vy-
avadana].8
The five sense-faculties & the object of the controlling power;9 F 103-4
Each of the five controlling faculties of which the eye sense-faculty is the first-the
five sense-faculties of the sensory consciousness---exercises controlling power
[iidhipatya]:
1. with regard to the beauty of the person (iitmabhiivasobhii), 10 <104>
2. with regard to the protection of the person (iitmabhiivaparikar:;a1Ja), {1 b }11
3. with regard to the production of a consciousness (vijiiiina) and of the
thought-concomitants associated with this consciousness,
4. with regard to its particular or uncommon activity (asiidhiira1Jakiira,:,,atva)
(MVS, 730a29).
A. The Controlling Faculties (indriya) 465
ABA.1. The sense-faculty of the eye and the ear & the object of the controlling
power; 12 F 104
The sense-faculties of the eye and the ear exercise controlling power:
1. with regard to beauty, for the body in which they are missing is not beautiful
(i. 19);
2. with regard to protection, for thanks to the eye and the ear, the person avoids
that which is harmful or adverse (vi~amaparihiira);
3. with regard to production of two consciousnesses, i.e., of the visual con-
sciousness and auditory consciousness, and of the mental factors which are
associated with them;
4. with regard to their particular or uncommon activity: the seeing of visible
forms, the hearing of sounds.
ABA.2. The sense-faculty of the nose, the tongue, the body & the object of the
controlling power; 13 F 104
The sense-faculties of the nose, tongue and body exercise controlling power:
1. with regard to beauty, as above;
2. with regard to protection, through the consumption of material food
(kavar;J,fkiiriihiira; iii. 39);
3. with regard to the production of three consciousnesses;
4. with regard to their particular or uncommon activity [astidhiira,:iakara,:ia-
tva]: smelling odors, tasting tastes, touching tangibles.
ABB. The two sexual faculties, the vitality faculty, the mental faculty & the
object of the controlling power; 14 F 104-5
Four controlling faculties, namely, (1-2) the two sexual faculties, (3) the vitality
faculty (jfvitendriya) and (4) the mental faculty (mana-indriya), each exercise con-
trolling power with regard to two things [artha] [see the specifics below] (MYS,
731b12).
ABB.1. The two sexual faculties & the object of the controlling power; 15 F 104-5
The sexual faculties exercise controlling power:
1. with regard to the (primary) distinction among sentient beings (sattvabheda):
it is because of these two faculties that sentient beings form the categories of
(i) male fpuru~a] and (ii) female [strf];
2. with regard to the differentiation (of secondary characteristics) among
sentient beings (sattvavikalpa): because of these two faculties there are,
among the sexes, a difference [anyathatva] (i) of physical form (sal'{lsthiina),

[breasts (stana), etc.,] (ii) of voice (svara) and (iii) of manner of being
(iiciira). 16
Other masters 17 do not admit this explanation. In fact, the sexes show differences
(sattvavikalpabheda) among the gods of the realm of fine-materiality who do not
possess the sexual faculties (i. 30), and the distinction into sexes results from these
differenyes. <105> - Thus, if the sexual sense-faculties exercise controlling power
from two points of view, they exercise controlling power with regard to pollution
(sal'{lklesa) and purification (vyavadiina): in fact, the three kinds of eunuchs [~a!lfiha,
pa!lfiaka] and hermaphrodites [ubhayavyaiijana] {2 a} are alien to (1) the factors
(dhanna) of pollution (siil'flklesika), non-restraint [asal'flvara; iv. 13b], transgression
with an immediately successive retribution [iinantarya; iv. 103), the cutting off of the
wholesome roots [kusalamulasamuccheda; iv. 80) and (2) the factors of purification
(vaiyavadiinika), restraint [sal'flvara; iv. 23]), acquisition of the fruits [phalapriipti;
vi. 51], detachment (vairiigya: vi. 45c) (see ii. 19cd).
ABB.2. The vitality faculty & the object of the controlling power; 18 F 105
The vitality faculty Ufvitendriya; ii. 45ab] exercises controlling power: 19
1. with regardto "[forming an initial] connection" (sal'{lbandha) to the nikiiya-
•sabhiiga20 (ii. 41a), i.e., in regard to the arising (utpatti) of a personal exis-
tence;
2. with regard to "supporting or maintaining" (sal'fldhtira!la) the nikiiyasa-
bhiiga, i.e., in regard to the continuation (avasthiina) of a personal existence
from birth to death.
ABB.3. The mental faculty & the object of the controlling power; 21 F 105
The mental 'faculty (mana-indriya) exercises controlling power: 22
1. with regard to the connection at rebirth [or the first moment of the next
existence] (punarbhavasal'{lbandha), as the Siitra explains:
Then there occurs in the Gandharva, in the being of the intermediate
existence (antariibhava), one or the other of two thoughts, (i) a thought
associated with lust [anunayasahagata] or (ii) a thought associated with
hostility [pratighasahagatr;i] ... (iii. 15);
2. with regard to (continual) domination (vasibhtiviinuvartarJa): the world, the
factors (dhanna) are subjected to thought, as the stanza says:
The world .is led by thou~ht, is maneuvered by thought: all the factors
obey this silwle factor, thought. 23
ABC. The five sensations, the five praxis-oriented faculties, the three pure
controlling faculties & the object of the controlling power; 24 F 105-6
(1) The five faculties of sensation (vedanendriya), i.e., the five sensations of pleasure,
displeasure, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, equanimity (ii. 7), and (2) the eight control-
ling faculties of which the first is faith, i.e., the five (praxis-oriented) faculties of
faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration and understanding (ii. 24), and the three pure
controlling faculties [aniisravendriya; i. 10], exercise controlling power with regard,
respectively, to pollution [salJlklesa] and to purification [vyavadiina]. <106>
1. The sensations exercise controlling power with regard to pollution (sa1J1klesa),
for the proclivities (anusaya), i.e., attachment (riiga), etc., become attached to the
sensations, and become lodged therein (tadanusayitviit).
2. Faith and the seven other controlling faculties exercise controlling power with
regard to purification [vyavadiina], for it is thanks to them that one obtains purity. 25
According to other masters (MVS, 73b6), the sensations also exercise controlling
power with regard to purification, {2 b} as follows from the Siitra:
sukhitasya ciftalJl samiidhfyate ["the thought of those who experience agree-
able sensation gets concentrated"],26
dufikhopani~ac chraddhii ["faith arises [having] unsatisfactoriness [for its
proximate cause]"], 27
~ar nai~kramyiisritiifi saumanasyiidayafi ["there are, because of the visible
forms, etc., six sensations of satisfaction, six sensations of dissatisfaction,
six sensations of equanimity, favorable to the pure and impure path"]. 28
Such is the explanation of the Vaibha~ikas.. <107>
ABD. Critique by (the Sautrantikas); F 107

(The Sautrantikas29 ) criticize this explanation (ii. 2-4):
1. The sense-faculties, the eye, e'tc., do not exercise controlling power with
regard to the protection of the person [iitmabhiivaparikar~ara]. Here, the
controlling power belongs to the consciousness (vijiiiina), the visual con-
sciousness, auditory consciousness, etc: it is after having distinguished that
one avoids the harmful or adverse, that one takes material food.
2. That which you understand by "particular or uncommon activity of the
sense-faculty" [asiidhararakiiraratva], namely, the seeing of visible forms,
etc., belongs to the consciousness (i. 42) and not to the sense-faculty.
The explanations relative to the controlling power of the other controlling faculties
are equally incorrect.
468 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdesa)
Ac. BRIEF SAUTRANTIKA EXPLANATION OF THE CONTROLLING

POWER OF EACH CONTROLLING FACULTY; 3°F 101-10
Then how should one understand the controlling power of the controlling faculties?
ACA. The six sense-faculties & their controlling power; 31 F 107

2ab. The six sense-faculties [are considered as controlling faculties] be-
cause of their controlling power (1) with regard to the apperception
(upalabdhi; i. 16a)32 of their own particular object-referent, (2) with
regard to the apprehension of all object-referents.33
That is to say, because of their controlling power with regard to the six conscious-
nesses (vijfiiinakiiya).
1. The five sense-faculties, of which the first is the eye sense-faculty, exercise
controlling power with regard to the five sensory consciousnesses, the visual con-
sciousness, etc., which distinguish [upalabdhi] each their own particular object-
referent, visible form, etc. {3 a}
2. The mental faculty (mana-indriya) exercises controlling power with regard
to the mental consciousness (manovijniina) which distinguishes all the object-refer-
ents.
It is in this way that each of these six sense-faculties is a controlling faculty.
[Objection:] - But the object-referents of the senses, visible form, etc., also exercise
controlling power with regara to the consciousnesses and, therefore, should also be
considered as controlling faculties.
[Answer:] - In fact, they do not exercise coiitrol)ing power. By controlling power
AE (iidhipatya), one understands "predominant power" (adhikaprabhutva). The eye exer-
cises contr-0lling power, for (1) it exercises this predominant power with regard to
the arising of the apperception [upalabdhi] which apperceives \isible forms, being
the common cause [siimiinyakiira~atva] of all the apperceptions of visible forms,
whereas each visible form contributes only to the arising of a single apperception;
(2) the visual apperception is sharp or obscure, strong [pa{u] or weak [mandatii], etc.,
according to whether the eye is strong or weak: the visible form does not exercise a
similar influence. -The same comment for the other sense-faculties and their object-
referents (i. 45ab). <108>
Acs. The two sexual faculties & their controlling power; 34 F 108
2cd. The two sexual faculties which have to be distinguished within the
body [are considered as controlling faculties] because of their con-
trolling power with regard to (1) masculinity and (2) femininity. 35

Separate from the controlling faculty that is called body sense-faculty (kiiyendriya),
two sexual faculties [are listed]. These two controlling faculties, [in terms of their
intrinsic nature,] are not distinct from the body sense-faculty: they perceive tangi-
bles. But there is a part of the body sense-faculty which receives the name of male
sexual faculty or female sexual faculty because this part exercises controlling power
over (i) masculinity [pwpstva] or (2) femininity [strftva].
Femininity [strfbhiiva]3 6 is (i) the physical form (iikrti), (ii) the voice (svara), (iii) the
movement (ce:jfii), (iv) the dispositions (abhipriiya) proper to women. {3 b}
The same for masculinity.
Since the difference between these two naturys is due to these two parts of the body,
we know that these two parts exercise controlling power with regard to these two
natures; they thus constitute controlling faculties.
Acc. Vitality faculty, five sensations, five praxis-oriented faculties & their
controlling power; 37 F 108-9
3. (1) The vitality faculty, (2) the five sensations and (3) the five
(praxis-oriented) faculties of which the first is faith are considered
as controlling faculties because of their controlling power with
regard, [respectively,] (1) to the duration of existence, (2) to pollu-
tion, (3) to purification. 38
1. The vitality faculty exercises controlling power with regard to the continuance
of a personal existence from birth to death [nikiiyasabhiigasthiti; ii. 4la]-but not,
as the Vaibha~ikas say, with regard to the connecting up (saf!Jbandha) of one per-
sonal existence with another: this connecting up depends, in fact, on the mind
(manas)39•
2. The five sensations exercise controlling power with regard to pollution [saf!1-
klesa ], for the Siitra40 says: <109>
Attachment lodges in the sensation of pleasure; hostility in the sensation of
displeasure; ignorance in the sensation of equanimity. 41
On this point (the Sautriintikas42 ) are in accord with the Vaibhii~ikas.
3. The five (praxis-oriented) faculties of which the first is faith-(i) faith [sraddhc],
(ii) vigor [vfrya], (iii) mindfulness [smrti], (iv) concentration [samiidhi], (v) under-
standing [prajiiii]-exercise controlling power with regard to purification [vyava-
diina], for, through their power, the defilements (klesa) are shaken or subdued (vi:j-
kambhyante) and the (noble) path is invoked (iiviihyate). 43
470 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Jndriyanirdeia)
Aco. The three pure controlling faculties & their controlling power; F 109-10
4. [The three pure controlling faculties, i.e.,] (1) the faculty of com-
ing to know what is as yet unknown (anlijniitamiijniisylimfndriya),
(2) the faculty of perfect knowledge (lijiiendriya) and (3) the faculty
of final and perfect knowledge (lijfilitliv'indriya), are, likewise, [con-
sidered as controlling faculties] because of their controlling power
(i) with regard to ascending acquisitions, (ii) with regard to nirvli~a,
(iii) etc.44
"Likewise" (tatha), 45 that is to say: these three are, likewise, considered as con-
trolling faculties (indriya). These are the three pure controlling faculties, defined
ii. 9ab.
a. The first [pure controlling faculty] exercises controlling power with regard to the
acquisition of the second [pure controlling faculty].
The second exercises controlling power with regard to the acquisition of the third.
The third exercises controlling power with regard to the acquisition of nirva,:,,a, i.e.,
nirva,:,,a without remainder (nirupadhise:fanirva,:,,a), for there is no parinirva,:,,a when
thought is not liberated (vimukta ). 46 <110>
b. The word et cetera [adi] indicates that there is another explanation: 47
The first [pure controlling faculty] exercises controlling power with regard to the de-
struction [pariha,:,,a] of the defilements (klesa) which are abandoned by insight into
the truths (v. 4).
The second, with regard to the destruction of the defilements which are abandoned
by cultivation of the truths (v. 5a).
The third, with regard to the happiness in this life (dr:ftadhannasukhavihara), i.e.,
the experience (pratisaf!1vedana) of satisfaction (prfti = saumanasya) and well-
being (sukha = pleasure as pliancy [prasrabdhisukha; viii. 9b]) of the liberation from
defilements (vimukti). (See F 112).
Ao. EXPLANATION OF THE ENUMERATION AND ORDER OF THE

TWENTY-TWO CONTROLLING FACULTIES; F 110-13
[Objection:] - Why does one enumerate [upasaf!1khyana] only twenty-two control-
ling faculties?
If you regard as controlling faculty that which exercises "controlling power", then
ignorance (avidya) and the other members of dependent origination (pratftyasam-
utpada; iii. 21) should also be enumerated among the controlling faculties, for the
causes (avidya, etc.,) exercise controlling power with regard to their effects (sarrz-
sklira, etc.).
Likewise, [even] (1) the voice (vlik), (2) the hand [pli,:ii], (3) the foot [piida], (4) the
anus [payu], (5) the sexual organ (upastha) [should be enumerated among the con-
trolling faculties, for they] exercise controlling power (respectively) with regard
(1) to speech (vacana), (2) to grasping [lidlina], (3) to walking (vihara,:ia = can-
krama,:ia), (4) to excretion [utsarga], (5) to sensual pleasure (linanda). 48
ADA. Answer to the first part of the objection; F 110-12

ADA.I. First opinion; 49 F 110-11
There is no reason to add ignorance, etc., to the list proclaimed by the Fortunate One.
For the enumeration [and order of the twenty-two] controlling faculties, the Fortu-
nate One has taken into account the following characteristics:
5. (1) The basis of thought [i.e., the six sense-faculties of conscious-
ness]; (2) that which subdivides this basis [i.e., the sexual faculties];
(3) that which makes this basis endure [i.e., the vitality faculty];
(4) that which defiles this basis [i.e., the sensations]; (5) that which
prepares the purification of this basis [i.e., the five praxis-oriented
faculties]; (6) that which purifies this basis [i.e., the three pure
controlling faculties]: these are all controlling faculties. 50 { 4 b}
1. The basis (li.fraya) of thought, namely, the six sense-faculties of consciousness,
the eye sense-faculty up to the mental faculty (manas). These are the six internal
sense-spheres (liyatana; i. 39, iii. 22), which are the primary real entities or consti-
tuents of the sentient beings (maula sattvadravya). 51 <111>
2. This sixfold basis is subdivided [vikalpa] because of the sexual faculties.
3. This sixfold basis endures for a certain time [sthiti] because of the vitality faculty.
4. This sixfold basis is defiled [sa1?1klesa] because of the five sensations.
5. The purification of the sixfold basis is prepared (vyavadlinasa1?1bhara,:ia) by the
five (praxis-oriented) faculties, faith, etc.
6. The sixfold basis is purified (vyavadana) by the three pure controlling faculties
[anlisravendriya ].
The factors (dharma) which possess this characteristic of exercising controlling
power with regard to the constitution, the subdivision, etc., of the sentient being, are
considered as controlling faculties. This characteristic is lacking in the other factors,
i.e., in the voice, the hand, etc.
472 Clraprer Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdesa)
AoA.2. Second opinion; 52 F 111-12

Other masters give a different explanation [for the enumeration and order of the
twenty-two controlling faculties]:
6. Or else, there are fourteen controlling faculties [i.e., (i) 1-6, (ii) 7-8,
(iii) 9, (iv) 10-14, which are, respectively,] (i) the basis of transmi-
gration [pravrtti], (ii) the arising of this basis, (iii) the duration of
this basis, (iv) the enjoyment of this basis; the other controlling
faculties [i.e., 15-22] have the same role [i.e., (i) basis, (ii) arising,
(iii) duration, (iv) enjoyment] with regard to nirvii,:,.a. 53
The expression "or else" (va) introduces the explanation of other masters (apar'aJ:t
kalpaJ:i).
1-6. The six sense-faculties (:ja<j,ayatana; iii. 22), from the eye sense-faculty (cak:jur-
ayatana) up to the mental faculty (mana-ayatana), are the basis, the raison d'etre
.of sarrisara [pravrtter a.fraya]. 54
7-8. It is through the sexual faculties [stripuru:ja] that the six sense-spheres (:ja{j,-
iiyatana) arise [utpatti]. 55
9. It is through the vitality faculty Ufvitendriya] that the six sense-spheres endure
(avasthana).
10-14. It is through the five sensations [vedana] that the six sense-spheres enjoy
[upabhoga].
On the other hand: {5 a} <112>
15-19. The five (praxis-oriented) faculties-faith (.fraddhii), vigor (vfrya), mind-
fulness (smrti), concentration (samadhi), understanding (prajfia)-are the basis
(asraya, prati:jfha) of nirva,:ia (i. 6ab).
20. Nirva,:ia arises (prabhava), appears for the first time (adibhava), through the first
pure controlling faculty, the faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown
(ajfiatamajfiasyamfndriya ).
21. Nirva,:ia endures [sthiti], develops, through the second pure controlling faculty,
the faculty of perfect knowledge (ajfiendriya).
22. Nirva,:ia is "experienced or enjoyed" (upabhuj; upabhoga) through the third pure
controlling faculty, the faculty of final and perfect knowledge (ajfiatavfndriya),
for, through this faculty, one experiences the satisfaction. and well-being (prfti-
sukha) of liberation (see F 110).
The number of the controlling faculties is thus determined, as well as the order
[anukrama] in which the Sutra gives them.
AD.B. Answer to the second part of the objection; F 112-13

In regard to (1) the voice (viik), (2) the hands (piir_ii), (3) the feet (piida), (4) the anus
(piiya), (5) the sexual parts (upastha), these are not controlling faculties:
1. the voice [viik] is not a controlling faculty with regard to speech (vacana), since
speech presupposes a certain instruction (sik~ii); 56
2-3. the hands fpiir_ii] and feet [piida] are not controlling faculties with regard to
grasping (iidiina) and walking (viharar_ia), for that whi~h one calls grasping and
walking is simply the hands and feet arising at a second moment in another
place and with a new shape (iv. 2bd); on the other hand, one sees, as for ex-
ample with snakes [uraga], that the hands and feet are not indispensable for
grasping and walking; 57
4. the anus [piiya] is not a controlling faculty with regard to the excretion of feces
(utsarga), for heavy things (gurudravya) in empty space (iikiisa = chidra) always
fall down; moreover, the wind (viiyudhiitu) pushes the feces (prerar_ia) and expels
them;
5. the sexual organs [upastha] are not controlling faculties with regard to sensual
pleasure (iinanda), since sensual pleasure is produced through the sexual sense-
faculties.58 <113>
If you consider the hands, feet, etc., as controlling faculties, then you should group
among the controlling faculties also (i) the throat (kar_ifha), (ii)"teeth (danta), (iii) eye-
lids (ak#vartman), (iv) the joints (angutiparvari) whose function [kriyii] it is, [re-
spectlvely,l (i) to swallow (abhyavaharar_ia), (ii) to chew (carvar_ia); (iii) to open and
close (unme~anime~a), (iv) to bend and extend the bones (sarJlkocavikiisa). {5 b}
Likewise, everything that is a cause [kiirar_ia], exercising its activity (puru~akiira;
ii. 58) with regard to its effect [kiirya], would be a controlling faculty. But the name
indriya or controlling faculty should be reserved for that which exercises controlling
power (iidhipatya).
AE. DETAILED EXPIANATION OF THE INTRINSIC NATURE

(SVABIL4VA) OF THE TWENTY-TWO CONTROLLING
FACULTIES; 59 F 113-18
We have [already] explained (1....:.8) the sense-faculties of consciousness and the
sexual faculties (i. 9-44); (9) the vitality faculty (jfvitendriya) will be explained
along with the formations dissociated from thought (cittaviprayukta; ii. 35) among
which it is placed; (15-19) the five (praxis-oriented) faculties-faith, vigor, etc.-
being thought-concomitants (caitta), will be explained with the thought-concomitants
(ii. 24).
We will now explain (10-14) the faculties of sensation (vedanendriya; ii. 7) and
(20-22) the pure controlling faculties (aniisravendriya; ii. 9) that are not treated
elsewhere.
AEA. The five sensations & the controlling faculties; F 113-16

AEA.1. Agreeable and disagreeable bodily sensation; F 113-14
7ab. Disagreeable bodily sensation is the faculty of displeasure. 60
"Bodily" [kiiyika] [sensation], i.e., [sensation] "that relates to the bodies",61 which is
associated with the five sensory consciousnesses, the visual consciousness, etc.
"Disagreeable" (asiita), {6 a} i.e., that which hurts (upaghatikii).
The sensation related to the five sense-faculties of the sensory consciousnesses and
which hurts is called faculty of displeasure (dul:zkhendriya). <114>
7bc. Agreeable bodily sensation is the faculty of pleasure.62
"Agreeable" (siita), i.e., that which comforts, benefits, does good (anugriihika).
The agreeable bodily sensation is called faculty of pleasure (sukhendriya).
AF;A.2. Agreeable and disagreeable mental sensations; F 114-15

7cd. In the third meditation, agreeable mental sensation is also (spoken
of as) the facultY: of pleasure.63
The mental [caitasf] sensation is the sensation associated with the mental conscious-
ness (manovijiiiina).
The agreeable mental sensation of the third meditation (dhyiina) also receives the
name faculty of pleasure (sukhendriya). This name, everywhere else, is reserved for
agreeable bodily sensation: but, in the third meditation, the bodily sensation is lack-
ing because the five sensory consciousnesses are lacking there. Thus, when one
speaks of pleasure (sukha) of the third meditation, one means to speak of agreeable
mental sensation. (See viii. 9).
Sa. Everywhere else, [i.e., in the stages lower than the third meditation,]
agreeable mental sensation is [the faculty of] satisfaction.64
Everywhere else [anyatra], that is, in the stages lower than the third meditation
(dhyiina), in the realm of desire and in the first two meditations, the agreeable mental
sensation is satisfaction (saumanasya) or faculty of satisfaction (saumanasyendriya).
Above the third meditation, the agreeable mental sensation is lacking.
In the third meditation, the agreeable mental sensation is calm ("/qema) and peaceful
(siinta), because the practitioners, in this meditation, are detached from joy (pr'ftivfta-
riigatviit): thus it is [spoken of only as the faculty of] pleasure (sukha) and not [as the
faculty of] satisfaction (saumanasya). 65 <115>
Below the third meditation, agreeable mental sensation is gross (audiirika; riikfa?)
and agitated because, in the stages below the third meditation, the practitioners are
not detached from joy: thus it is [the faculty of] satisfaction. - Joy (prfti), which has
a joyous exaltation (sarµprahar~a) for its mode [iikiiratva], is not distinct from satis-
faction.
8bc. Disagreeable mental sensation is [the faculty of] dissatisfaction.66
The sensation associated with the mental consciousness and which hurts is dissatis-
faction (daurmanasya) or the faculty of dissatisfaction [daurmanasyendriya].
AEA.3. Bodily and mental sensation of equanimity;.F 115

8cd. Bodily or mental intermediate sensation is [the single faculty of]
equanimity, because there is no conceptualizing activity here.67
Intermediate [madhya] sensation, which is [neither agreeable or disagreeable, tha{
is,] neither .hurts nor comforts, is the "neither displeasure nor pleasure" sensation
(adul;ikhiisukhii). This is what is called sensation of equanimity or faculty of equanim-
ity (upekfendriya).
[Question:] - Is this sensation bodily [kiiyika] or is it mental [caitasika]?
[Answer:] - Whether it is bodily or mental, the intermediate sensation is sensation of
equanimity. Sensation of equanimity is thus both [ubhaya] [i.e., bodily and mental];
nevertheless, it constitutes only one controlling faculty, because there is no concep-
tualizing activity (vikalpana) here.
AEA.4. Conceptu,alizing activity (vikalpana) & sensation; F 115-16

I. There is no conceptualizing activity (vikalpana), intellectual operation. - Bodily
or mental, sensation of equanimity is equally free from any conceptualizing ele-
ment (vikalpa = abhiniriipa1:iiivikalpa, conceptualizing activity consisting of defining,
i. 33).
As a general rule [priiye~a], 68 agreeable or disagreeable mental sensation proceeds
from a conceptualizing activity (vikalpa), from the conceptualizing activity of
"dear" [priya], or "horrible" [apriya], etc. On the contrary, bodily sensation {6 b} is
produced from an external object-field (vi~ayavasiit), independent of a psychological
state: perfected beings (arhat) are alien to sympathies and antipathies, they do not
conceive of the idea of "dear", the idea of "horrible", but nevertheless they are liable
to bodily displeasure [dul;ikha] and pleasure [sukha]. <116>
Thus we should distinguish controlling faculties relative to agreeable and dis-

agreeable sensations [vedana] according to whether these sensations are bodily or
mental.
But the sensation of equanimity, even the mental one, occurs spontaneously (sva-
rasena, anabhisalJlskiire,:ia),69 exactly like bodily sensation; it occurs in those who do
not form any conceptualizing activity (avikalpayatas, anabhiniriipayatas): thus we
recognize only one single controlling faculty for the two sensations of equanimity,
the mental and the bodily [sensation of equanimity].
2. There is no conceptualizing activity (vikalpana), differentiation. - According to
whether the agreeable or disagreeable sensations are bodily or mental, they hurt or
comfort according to a mode of operation that is special to them, and they are not felt
in the same way.
The sensation of equanimity neither hurts nor comforts; it is not differentiated; men-
tal or bodily, it is felt in the same way.
AEB. The three pure controlling faculties; F 116-18; AHJJ8; SAH 275
AEB.1. Nine controlling faculties in the path of insight, of cultivation, of those

beyond training & the three pure controlling faculties of the noble
°
ones; 7 F 116-18
9ab. The nine controlling faculties [i.e., the mental faculty, the sensation
of pleasure, the sensation of satisfaction, the sensation of equanim-
ity, and faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration and understanding]
in the paths (1) of insight, (2) of cultivation and (3) of those beyond
training, constitute, [respectively,] three controlling faculties [for
the noble ones: (1) the faculty of coming to know what is as yet un-
known, (2) the faculty of perfect knowledge, (3) the faculty of com-
pletely perfect knowledge].71
The (i) mentalfaculty, (ii) sensation of pleasure, (iii) sensation of satisfaction,
(iv) sensation of equanimity, (v) faith, (vi) vigor, (vii) mindfulness, (viii) concentra-
tion and (ix) understanding (prajnii) constitute:
1. in the noble ones who dwell on the path of insight (darsanamiirga), the
faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown (anajnatamajniisyiimi-
indriya);
2. in the noble ones who dwell on the path of cultivation of the truths
(bhiivaniimiirga), the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijnendriya);
3. in the noble ones who dwell on the path of those beyond training [asaik~a-
rm1rga] (= the perfected beings [arhat]), the faculty of final and perfect
knowledge (iijiiiitiivfndriya). 72 <117>
1. Dwelling on the path of insight7 3 [darsanamiirga], the noble ones are en-
gaged in coming to know what is as yet unknown (aniijiiiitam iijiiiiturµ pravrtta),
namely, the four truths: they think "I will know". Their controlling faculty is thus
called faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown (aniijiiiitamiijiiiisyiimi-
indriya ). 74
2. Dwelling on the path of cultivation75 of the truths [bhiivaniimiirga], the noble
ones no longer have anything new to know; they are perfectly knowing (iijfia)
persons. But in order to cut off the proclivities (anusaya) that remain in them, they
recognize again and again the truths which they already know perfectly. Their
controlling faculty is called faculty of perfect knowledge (iijfiendriya), the faculty of
the perfectly knowing person, or the perfectly knowing faculty (iijfiam evendriyam iti
vii).
3. Dwelling on the path of those beyond training (asaik~a), {7 a} the practitioners
become aware that they know: they attain the knowledge (iiva = avaga~a)76 that the
truths are finally and perfectly known (iijfiiitam iti). Possessing finally and perfect-
ly known knowledge (iijfiiita-iiva), they are finally and perfectly knowing per-
sons (iijfiiitiivins), and their controlling faculty is called faculty of final and perfect
knowledge (ajfiatavfndriya). - Or else, the noble ones who have the char~cter or habit
(sfla) to ensure or know (avitum) that the truth is finally and perfectly known
(iijfiiita), are finally and perfectly knowing persons (iijfiiitiivin): in fact, when the
noble ones have attained (i) cognition of exhaustion (~ayajfiiina) and (ii) cognition
of non-arising (anutpadajfiana) (vi. 50, 67), they know in truth:
Unsatisfactoriness is known; I have nothing more to know,
and the rest. 77 <118>
We have explained the intrinsic natures [svabhiiva] of the controlling faculties. We
must explain their different modes fprakarabheda]:
A. Are the controlling faculties pure? (ii. 9bd).
B. Are they a ripened effect? (ii. lOac)
C. [Do they have a ripened effect?] (ii. lOc-1 lb)
D. Are they wholesome, [unwholesome, non-defined]? (ii. 1 lcd)
E. To what realm do they belong? (ii. 12)
F. How are they abandoned? (ii. 13)
AF. THE DIFFERENT MODES (PRAKA.RABHEDA) OF THE

CONTROLLING FACULTIES; 78 F 118-31
AFA. Being pure ( sasrava) and being impure ( aniisrava) & the controlling
faculties; F 118-20
How many are pure (sasrava)? How many are impure (aniisrava)?
9bd. (1) The [last] three controlling faculties are [exclusively] stainless.
(2) [Ten controlling faculties, i.e.,] the seven material controlling
faculties, the vitality faculty and the two unpleasant sensations are
[exclusively] impure.
(3) Nine controlling faculties [i.e., the mental faculty, sensation of
pleasure, sensation of satisfaction, sensation of equanimity and the
five praxis-oriented faculties] are of two types [i.e., either pure or
impure].79
I. The last three controlling faculties are exclusively stainless or pure (amala,
aniisrava). Stain (mala) and flux (iisrava) are synonyms [paryaya]. 80
2. The material (riipin) faculties are seven in number: (i-v) the five sense-faculties
of the eye, etc., plus (vi-vii) the two sexual faculties, for all these seven sense-
faculties are included in the aggregate of form (riipaskandha). With (viii) the vitality
faculty, (ix) the sensation of displeasure and (x) the sensation of dissatisfaction, ten
controlling faculties in total are exclusively impure.
3. (i) The mental faculty (manas), (ii) the sensation of pleasure, (iii) the sensation
of satisfaction, (iv) the sensation of equanimity, (v-ix) the five (praxis-oriented)
faculties (faith, vigor, etc.) {7 b} constitute nine controlling faculties which can be
either pure or impure.
AFA.1. Refutation of the opinion that the praxis-oriented faculties are only
pure; F 118-20
Other masters 81 (MVS, 7c3) [object]: - The five (praxis-oriented) faculties are only
pure, for the Fortunate One has said:
Those in whom all these five controlling faculties, faith, etc.-to whatever
degree this may be-are completely lacking, I qeclare them to be excluded
persons [bahya], belonging to the cla~ of orpinary worldlings (prthag-
jana).82
Thus, those who possess them-to whatever degree this may be-are noble ones
(iirya); thus they are pure. <119>
[Answer:]..,, This passage is not conclusive (jfi1ipaka), since the Fortunate One speaks
here [in the context] of persons in whom the five "pure" (aniisrava) (praxis-oriented)
faculties are lacking. In fact, in the passage which precedes the statement in question,
the Fortunate One defines the noble ones (iiryapudgala) according to the five (praxis-
oriented) faculties. 83 Thus he refers to the five (praxis-oriented) faculties that are par-
ticular to the noble ones, i.e., the pure (praxis-oriented) faculties. Those in whom
they are lacking are evidently ordinary worldlings.
Or else, if this text speaks of the (praxis-oriented) faculties in general, we would
comment that there are two types of ordinary worldlings (MVS, 8b3): (1) those out-
side (biihyaka), (2) those inside (iibhyantaraka); the first have cut off the wholesome
roots [kusalamula; iv. 79), the second have not cut them off. It is in regard to the first
that the Fortunate One says: "I declare them to be excluded persons, belonging to the
class of ordinary worldlings." 84
Besides, according to the Siitra, even before setting into motion the Wheel of Dharma
(vi. 54), there were in the world persons with sharp [tik,v~a], mediocre [madhya] or
dull [mrdu] controlling faculties. 85 Thus, the (praxis-oriented) faculties, faith, etc., are
not necessarily and exclusively pure.
Finally, the Fortunate One has said:
If I did not know in truth the origin [samudaya], disappearance [astagama],
advantages (iisviida), disadvantages (iidfnava), escape (ni{zsara~a) in the
case of the five controlling faculties, faith, vigor, etc., I would not be lib-
erated (mukta), gone forth (ni!zsrta), separated (visa,riyukta), delivered (vi-
pramukta) from the world where there are gods, Maras, {8 a} and Brahmas,
from the world where there are brahmins and mendicants (srama~a); I
would not reside with a thought free from mistaken views [viparyiisa] ... .86
<120>
Now, a similar description does not apply to pure factors (dharma), which are free
from advantages, disadvantages, escape.
Thus the (praxis-oriented) faculties, faith, vigor, etc., can be either pure [aniisrava]
or impure [siisrava].
AFB. Being a ripened effect (vipaka) and not being a ripened effect
(na vipaka) & the twenty-two controlling faculties; 87 F 120-28
AFB.I. The vitality faculty & being a ripened effect; 88 F 120-24
Among the controlling faculties, how many are a ripened (effect) (vipiika; ii. 57ab),
how many are not a ripened (effect) [na vipiika]? 89
10 a. [Vaibh~ikas: - Only] the vitality faculty is always a ripened (ef-

fect).90
Only the vitality faculty Urvitendriya; ii. 45ab] is always a ripeneL :effect).
AFB.1.1. Stabilization and rejection of the conditioning forces of the life-force &
being a ripened effect; 91 F 120-24
AFB-.1.1.1. Stabilieation and rejection of the conditioning forces of the life-force;
F 120-21
Objection. - The conditioning forces of the life-force (iiyulJsarr,,skiira; see below

F 122) which a perfected being (arhat) who is a bhik~u stabilizes or causes to endure
(sthiipayati, adhiti~fhati) are evidently the vitality faculty Urvitendriya]. 92 Of what
action is the vitality faculty, thus stabilized or prolonged, the ripened (effect)?93
[Answer:] -According to the Malastistra (Jiitinaprasthtina, 981a12):
How do [perfected beings who are] bhik~us stabilize the conditioning forces
of the life-force?
Perfected beings in possession of supernormal accomplishments (rddhimiin
= priiptiibhijiiaJ:t, vii. 42), in possession of the mastery of thought (ceto-
vasitva), i.e., non-circumstantially liberated (asamayavfmukta; vi. 56, 64),
give-either to the Satµgha or to a person [pudgala]-things useful to the
life (jfvitapari~ktira) [of a mendicant (sriima~aka)], clothes [cfvara], bowls
[piitra], etc.; after having given, {8 b} they direct their thought t6 their
life-force [iiyuJ:t]; 94 they then enter into the maximum fourth meditation
(dhyiina; priintakofika: "whose highest point has been pursued up to the
extreme"; vii. 41); leaving this meditation, they produce thought (citta) and
utter the words: "May the action that should produce a ripened (effect) as
enjoyment (bhogavipiika) be transformed aqd produce,[instead] a ripened
(effect) as life-force (iiyurvipiika)!',9 5 - Then the ac.tion (giving and medita-
tion) that should produce a ripened (effect)-as enjoyment will produce a
ripened (effect) as life-force. <121>
According to other masters, the prolonged life-force of the perfected beings is
the ripened effect of a previous action. According to these masters, there is a
remainder (ucche~a) of the ripened effect as life-force which should have ripened
in a previous birth LJati], which had been i.J}terrupted by premature death (ii. 45).
It is the power of.the cultivation [bhiivaniibala] of the fourth meditation which
attracts (iikar~aka) this remainder and b]iings it about that this remainder ripens
now.
How do [perfected beings who are] bhik~us reject (tyajati, utsrjati) the con-
ditioning forces of the life-force [ayu?,sal!lskara]?
Perfected beings in possession of supernormal accomplishments ... enter
into the fourth meditation ... ; leaving this meditation, they produce thought
and utter the words: "May the action that should produce a ripened (effect)
as life-force be transformed and produce [instead] a ripened (effect) as
enjoyment!" - Then the action that should produce a ripened (effect) as life-
force Will produce a ripened (effect) as enjoyment.
AFB.1.1.2. Bhadanta Gho~aka: stabilization and rejection of the conditioning

forces of the life-force; F 121
[But] the Bhadanta Gho~aka says: It is through the power of the maximum medita-
tion [dhyanabala], which these perfected beings have produced, that the fundamental
material elements (mahabhiita) of the realm of fine-materiality are attracted and
introduced (sarrimukhfbhiita) in their bodies. These fundamental material elements
are favorable to {9 a} or contrary to the conditioning forces of the life-force (ayu?,-
sal!lskara). It is in this way that the perfected beings stabilize or reject the [condition-
ing forces of the] life-force.%
AFB.1.1.3. ( Sautrantika:) stabilization and rejection of the conditioning forc,es of

the life-force; F 121
With (the Sautrantikas97 ), we say that the perfected beings-thanks to their mastery
or power in concentration (samadhiyasitva; samadhiprabhava)--cause the momen-
tum of the period of duration_~kaliivedha) of the fundamental material ele-
ment& constituting the sense~faculties to cease [vyavartayante], a momentum due to
previous actions; inversely, they produce a new [apiirva] momentum caused by con-
centration [samiidhija]. Thus the vitality faculty, in the case of the prolonged life-
force of perfected beings, is not a ripened (effect). But in other cases, it is a ripened
(effect).
AFB.1.1.4. The purpose of prolonging and rejecting the conditioning forces of the
life-force; F 121-22
One question fprasna] leads to another.
[Question:] - For what purpose [artha] do perfected beings cause the conditioning
forces of the life-force [ayu?,sal!lskara] to endure [adhiti~{hanti]?
[Answer:] - For two purposes: (1) with a view to the benefit of others [parahita],
(2) with a view to the longer duration of the teaching (sasanacirasthiti). 98
482 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirde§a)
They see that their life-force is going to end; they see that others are incapable of
assuring these two purposes. <122>
[Question:] - For what purpose do the perfected beings reject [kff,:,,a] the condition-
ing forces of the life-force?
[Answer:] - For two purposes: (1) they see that their dwelling in this world has but
little use for the benefit of others, (2) they see themselves being tormented by sick-
ness, etc: 99 As the stanza says:
The religious life [brahmacarya] has been practiced well, the path has been
cultivated well: they are satisfied with the destruction of the life-force, {9 b}
as in the case of the disappearance of a sickness. 100
AFB.1.1.s. By whom, and in what place, are the conditioning forces of the life-
force stabilized or rejected; F 122
[Question:] - By whom, and in what place, are the [conditioning forces of the] life-
force stabilized [sthiipana] or rejected [utsarjana]?
[Answer:] - In the three continents (dvzpa; iii. 53 ), [they are stabilized or rejected by]
men or women, the perfected beings (arhat) of the non-circumstantially liberated
(asamayavimukta) class who possess the maximum meditation (dhyiina; priinta-
ko{ika; vi. 56, 64): in fact, they possess mastery of concentration [samiidhi] and are
free froth defilements [klesa]. 101
AFB.1.1.6. The difference between the conditioning forces of life (jfvita

sarµskara) ahd the conditioning forces of the life-force (ti,yus
sarµskara); 102 F 122-23
According to the Siitra:
The Fortunate One, after having stabilized the conditioning forces of life
(jfvita saf!!skiira), rejected the conditioning forces of the life-force (iiyus). 103
[Question:] - (1) What differe~e is there between the conditioning forces of life
and the conditioning forces of the life-force; (2) what is the meaning of the plural
[bahuvacana] "the conditioning forces" (saf!!skiira)? 104 <123>
[Answer:] - In regard to the first point: 105
i. According to certain masters, there is no difference. In fact, the Miilasiistra
(Jiiiinaprasthiina, 993b2; Prakara,:,,apiida, 694a23) says:
What is the vitality faculty (jfvitendriya)? - It is the life-force (iiyus)
in the three realms (dhiitu).
ii. According to other masters, 106 the expression "conditioning forces of the
life-force (iiyul:,-sarµskiira)" designates the [conditioning forces of the] life-
force which are the effect of actions of a previous life; the expression "con-
ditioning forces of life (jfvita-sarµskiira)" designates the [conditioning forces
of] life which are the effect of actions of this life (giving to the Saiµgha, etc.,
F 120).
iii. According to (still) other masters, 107 that by means of which the personal
existence endures (nikiiyasabhiigasthiti) is the conditioning forces of the life-
force (iiyul:,-sarµskiira); that by means of which th.e life force is prolonged
for a little while is the conditioning forces of life (jfvita-sarµskiira).
'
In regard to the second point:
1. The Siitra uses the plural [bahuvacana] "the conditioning forces" (sarµskiira)
because the noble ones stabilize or reject many conditioning forces. There
is no advantage, in fact, in stabilizing one moment, in rejecting one moment:
it is only by means of a stream of moments that the noble ones can procure
the good of others; on the other hand, one moment cannot be the cause of
pain.
ii. According to another opinion, the plural condemns the doctrine according
to which life (jrvita), the life-force (iiyus); is one single real entity (dravya)
susceptible of duration (kiiliintarasthiivara). 108
iii. According to (still) another opinio,n, 109 the plural condemns the doctrine
of the Sarvastivadins who consider life (jrvita) and the life-force (iiyus) to be
a real entity [dravya], a factor (dharma). The terms life and life-force desig-
nate a number of conditioning forces (sarµskiira) existing simultaneously
and belonging to either four or five aggregates (skandha) according to their
realm of existence (dhiitu). { 10 a} If it were otherwise, the Siitra would
not use the expression the conditioning forces of life; it would say: "The
Fortunate One, after having.stabilized the lives (jfvita), rejects the life-forces
(iiyus ). " 110
AFB.1.1.1. For what purpose does the Fortunate One stabilize and reject the
conditioning forces of the life-force ?111 F 123-24
[Question:] - For what purpose does the Fortunate One reject (death) and stabilize
(the conditioning forces of the life-force)? <124>
[Answer:] - In order to demonstrate that he possesses mastery over death
(mara,;iavasitva), he rejects death; in order to demonstrate that he possesses mastery
over life Urvitavasitva], he stabilizes the conditioning forces of the life-force. -
He stabilizes it for a period of three months (traimiisya), no more, no less; for, after
three months have passed, there is nothing more to do for the disciples (vineyakiirya),
and his task (buddhakilrya) is well achieved (subhadriiyasiina); for, short of three
months, he would leave his teaching duties unachieved. 112
Or else, 113 in order to fulfill his statement (pratijfiiitasaf!lpiidaniirtham):
All bhik~us who have cultivated well the four bases of supernormal accom-
plishments (rddhipiida; vi. 69b), if they so desire, will remain for an aeon
(kalpa) or more than an aeon.11 4
The Vaibha~ikas 115 say: The Fortunate One rejects or stabilizes in order to dem-
onstrate his victory [nirjaya] over (1) Mara who is the aggregates [skandhamiira]
and (2) Mara who is death [mara~amiira]. 116 Under the Bodhi tree [bodhimula],
he has already been victorious [nirjita] over (3) Mara who is a demon [or a son
of a god] [devaputramara], in the first watch of the night [yiima], and (4) Mara
who is defilements [klesamara], in the third watch of the night (Ekottarikil,
39, 1). 117
AFB.2. Other controlling faculties & being a ripened effect (vipaka) and not
being a ripened effect (avipaka); 118 F 124-25
lOab. Twelve controlling faculties [i.e., the seven material controlling
faculties, the mental faculty and the four controlling faculties of
sensation, but not dissatisfaction,] are of two types [i.e., sometimes
being a ripened (effect) and sometimes not being a ripened (ef-
fect)].'19
Which twelve controlling faculties?
lObc. [Twelve controlling faculties are of two types,] with the exception
of [ten controlling faculties:] (1-8) the last eight controlling facul-
ties and (9) dissatisfaction, [which are never a ripened (effect),] [and
with the exception of (10) the vitality faculty, which is always a
ripened (effect)]. 120 <1?5>
With the exception of the vitality faculty, which is always a ripened (effect), and
the nine controlling faculties that have just been indicated (ii. lObc) and that are
never a ripened (effect), the twelve remaining controlling faculties are of two types:
(i) sometimes a ripened (effect), (ii) sometimes not a ripened (effect). This refers
to (1-7) the material controlling faculties, (8) the mental faculty (mana-indriya) and
(8-12) the four sensations, the sensation of dissatisfaction [daurmanasya] being
excluded.
1-7. The seven material controlling faculties (i.e., eye sense-faculty, ... male sexual
faculty) are not a ripened (effect) [avipaka], insofar as they are an (effect of) accu-
mulation (aupacayika; i. 37). { 10 b}
In other cases, they are a ripened (effect) [vipaka].
8-12. The mental faculty and the four [aforementioned] controlling faculties of sen-
sation are not a ripened (effect) (i) when they are wholesome (kusala) or defiled
(kli~ta), for that which is a ripened (effect) is non-defined (avyakrta; ii. 57);
(ii) when-still being non-defined-they arise, according to their type, either in
association. with modes of proper deportment (airyapathika), or with skill in arts and
crafts (sailpasthanika), or with emanations (nairmar;ika) (ii. 72). 121
In other cases, they are a ripened (effect).
The last eight controlling faculties, i.e., faith, etc., the faculty of coming to know
what is as yet unknown (anajfiatamajfiasyamfndriya), etc., are wholesome and, there-
fore, are not a ripened (effect).
AFB.3. Dissatisfaction & being a ripened effect; F 125-27

AFB.3.1. Discussion based on scriptural authority; F 125-26
[We could say: 122] - But how can one affirm that [the controlling faculty of] dissatis-
faction (daunnanasya) is never a ripened (effect) (see also iv. 58)? In fact, the Siitra
says:
There is an action to be retributed as sensation of satisfaction (saumanasya-
vedanfya), there is an action to be retributed as seqsation of dissatisfaction
(daunnanasyavedanfya), there is an action to be retributed as sensation of
equanimity (upek~avedanfya). 123
According to the Vaibha~ika: - The expression daunnanasyavedanfya should be
understood not as: action to be sensed or retributed as sensation of dissatisfaction,
but rather as: action with which the sensation of dissatisfaction is associated. In fact,
the Siitra says of contact (sparsa) that it is sukhavedanfya: but pleasure (sukha) is not
a ripened (effect) of contact. 124 From all evidence, the sukhavedanfya contact is the
contact with which the sensation of pleasure is associated. Thus the daunnanasya-
vedanfya action is action with which a sensation of dissatisfaction is associated.
<126>
We respond: - You should explain the expressions saumanasyavedanfya and
upek~avedanfya in the same way as you explain the expression daunnanasya-
vedanfya, since the three expressions appear in the same enumeration of the Siitra.
It will follow that (1) the saumanasyavedanfya action is an action with which the
sensation of satisfaction is associated, not an action to be retributed as satisfaction;

(2) that, therefore, the sensation of satisfaction is not a ripened (effect).
The Vaibha~ika. - I have no objections [na do~a~] to explaining the expression
saumanasyavedanfya, either (1) as "to be retributed as satisfaction", or (2) as "with
which satisfaction is associated". But the second explanation of vedanfya is valid
only for the expression daurmanasyavedanfya. It refers to an action with which dis-
satisfaction is associated.
AFB.3.2. Discussion based on logical reasoning; F 126-27

We respond: - One could accept your interpretation of the Siitra if one could solve
the other issue, i.e., if it could be rationally established that dissatisfaction is not a
ripened (effect). 125
The Vaibhii~ika. - (1) Dissatisfaction is produced by a [special] imagination [pari-
kalpavise~a]: when one thinks of something that is undesirable [ani~fa]; (2) dis-
satisfaction is calmed [vyupasamyate] by a [special] imagination: when one thinks
of something that one desires [i~fa]. But it is not like this with what is a ripened (ef-
fect).
We say: - But this would apply also to satisfaction, which, therefore, would not be a
ripened effect.
Vaibha~ika. - If, as you maintain, dissatisfaction is a ripened effect, then when a
person has committed a mortal transgression (anantarya; iv. 106) and experiences
dissatisfaction with regard to it, i.e., when having regrets (kaukrtya; ii. 29d), { 11 a}
one could say that the transgression is already, then and there, retributed [vipakva]:
this is unacceptable (ii. 56a). <127>
[Answer:] - But you accept that satisfaction is a ripened (effect), and we would
reason as you have just done: when a person has accomplished a meritorious action
and experiences satisfaction from it, it is then that this action is, then and there,
retributed [vipakva].
The Vaibhii~ika. - Persons detached from attachment (vftaraga) do not possess the
controlling faculty of dissatisfaction; 126 but they possess the controlling faculties that
are a ripened effect, .the eye sense-faculty, etc.; thus the controlling faculty of dis-
satisfaction is not a ripened (effect).
We say: - But how could detached persons possess a satisfaction that would be a
ripened (effect) in its nature? Without doubt, they possess a satisfaction that arises
fr«;>m meditative attainment [samapatti]: but this satisfaction is wholesome [kusala],
and is thus not a ripened (effect). They do not possess any other. 127
[Vaibha1?ika:] - The fact is that detached persons possess the controlling faculty of
satisfaction, whatever the nature of this controlling faculty may be,' whether it is or
is not a ripened (effect); 128 whereas dissatisfaction never occurs among them. Thus,
(we) conclude, the controlling faculty of dissatisfaction is not a ripened (effect). 129
AFB.4. The ripened effects of wholesome and unwholesome actions & the
twenty-two controlling faculties; F /27-28
1. Eight controlling faculties, i.e., (i-v) the five sense-faculties of the sensory con-
sciousnesses, (vi) the vitality faculty, (vii-viii) the sexual faculties, are, in a fortunate
plane of existence (sugati), the ripened (effect) of wholesome action; in an unfortu-
nate plane of existence (durgati), a ripened (effect) of unwholesome action.
2. The mental faculty-in, a fortunate plane of existence as in an unfortunate one-
is a ripened (effect) of wholesome action or of unwholesome action.
3. The sensations of pleasure, of satisfaction and of equanimity are the ripened
(effect) of a wholesome action.
4. The sensation of displeasure is the ripened (effect) of unwholesome action. 130
<128>
5. The material controlling faculties, in a fortunate plane of existence, are, we say,
the ripened (effect) of wholesome action. In the case of hermaphrodites [ubhaya-
vyaiijana], in a fortunate plane of existence, the one and the other controlling faculty
are the ripened (effect) of wholesome action, but the status of a hermaphrodite is
attained by an unwholesome action. 131 { 11 b}
AFC. Having a ripened effect and not having a. ripened effect & .the twenty-
two controlling faculties; 132 F 128-29
Among the twenty-two controlling faculties, how many "have a ripened (effect)", are
"with a ripened (effect)" (savipaka)? How many "do not have a ripened (effect)", are
"without a ripened (effect)" (avipaka)?
10c-lla. Only dissatisfaction always has a ripened (effect); ten control-
ling faculties, namely, (1) the mental faculty, (2-5) the four
sensations (with the exception of dissatisfaction) and (6-10) faith
and its following, either have a ripened (effect), [when they are
unwholesome or wholesome-impure,] or do not have a ripened
(effect). 133
i. Dissatisfaction (daurmanasya) always has a ripened (effect), for, on the one
hand, it is never non-defined (avyakrta), being the result of a [special] conceptualiz-
ing activity (vikalpavise~a: the idea of "dear", "horrible", etc.) (ii. 8c); but, on the
other hand, it is never pure (aniisrava), never occurs in the state of being concen-
trated [asamiihitatva].
ii. The first eight controlling faculties (i.e., the eye sense-faculty, etc., the vitality
faculty, the sexu~l faculties) never have a ripened (effect), because they are non-
defined; the last ~pree controlling faculties (i.e., the faculty of coming to know what
is as yet unknowh, etc.) never have a ripened (effect), because they are pure (an-
iisrava) (iv. 60).
iii. In regard to the remaining ten controlling faculties: {12 a}
(1-4) The mental faculty and the sensations of pleasure, satisfaction and equanimity
have a ripened (effect) when they are unwholesome (akusala) or wholesome-impure
(kusalasiisrava); they do not have a ripened (effect) when they are non-defined or
pure.
(5) The sensation of displeasure (dul:zkha) has a ripened (effect) when it is whole-
some or unwholesome; it does not have a ripened (effect) when it is non-defined.
<129>
(6-10) Faith and the other (praxis-oriented) faculties have or do not have a ripened
(effect) depending on whether they are impure or pure.
AFD. The moral quality & the twenty-two controlling faculties; 134 F.129
Among· the twenty-two controlling faculties, how many are wholesome [kusala],
unwholes.ome [akusala], non-defined [avyiikrta]?
llcd. (1) Eight controlling faculties [i.e., faith, etc., the faculty of coming
to know what is as yet unknown, etc.] are only wholesome.
(2) Dissatisfaction is of two types [i.e., wholesome or unwholesome].
(3) The mental faculty and the sensations, with the exception of
dissatisfaction, are of three·types [i.e., wholesome, unwholesome, or
non-defined].
(4) The other [controlling faculties, i.e., the eye sense-faculty, etc.,
the vitality faculty, the sexual faculties, are] of one type [i.e., non-
defined].135
1. Eight controlling faculties, i.e., (i-v) faith, etc., (vi-viii) the faculty of coming to
know what is as yet unknown, etc., are only wholesome.
2. Dissatisfaction is wholesome or unwholesome (ii. 28).
3., The mental faculty and the four [other] sensations are wholesome, unwholesome,
or non-defined.
A. The Controlling Faculties (indriya) 489,
4. [The other controlling faculties, i.e., the first eight,] the eye sense-faculty, etc.,
the sexual faculties and the vitality faculty are non-defined.
AFE. The three realms & the twenty-two controlling faculties; 136 F 129-30
Among the twenty-two controlling faculties, how many belong to each of the three
realms of existence [dhiitviipta]? { 12 b}
12. (1) In the realm of desire, the stainless or pure controlling faculties
[i.e., the last three controlling faculties] are absent.
(2) In the realm of fine-materiality, in addition, the sexual faculties
and the two disagreeable sensations are absent.
(3) In the realm of immateriality, in addition, all the material
controlling faculties and the two agreeable sensations are absent. 137
<130>
AFE.t. Realm of desire & the controlling faculties; 138 F 130

With the exception of the last three controlling faculties, the stainless (amala), i.e.,
pure controlling faculties, all controlling faculties are connected with the realm of
desire (kiimiipta; pratisaf[lyukta): these are without connection to the realms of exis-
tence, are transcendent to the realms of existence (apratisarriyukta = adhiitupatita).
Thus, nineteen controlling faculties, with the exception of the last three, are connec-
ted with the realm of desire [apratisaf[lyukta].
AFE.2. Realm offine-materiality & the controllingfaculties; 139 F 130

In regard to the realm of fine-materiality, by excluding in addition [to the stainless
controlling faculties] (1-2) the two sexual faculties and (3-4) the two disagreeable
sensations, [i.e.,] the sensation of displeasure (du!Jkha) and the sensation of dissatis-
faction (daurmanasya): Fifteen [of these nineteen] controlling faculties, which are
common to the first two realms of existence (viii. 12ab), remain.
1-2. The sexual faculties are absent in the realm of fine-materiality:
i. because sentient beings who are born in this realm have abandoned the
desire for sexual union [maithunadharmavairiigya],
ii. because these [sexual] faculties make one look ugly [asobhiikaratva; i. 30bd].
[Objection:] - However, the Siitra says:
That a woman [strf] is Brahma does not happen, this is impossible. That a
man [puru~a] is Brahma happens, this is possible. 140
It seems that this Siitra would present a difficulty.
[Answer:] - No. The sentient beings in the realm of fine-materiality are male without
possessing the male [sexual] faculty. They possess, [however,] the other aspects
of masculinity (puru~abhtiva) that one sees among males of the realm of desire,
i.e., physical form [salJlsthana], the sound of the voice [svara], [of manner of being
(tictira)] (ii. 2cd).
3. The sensation of displeasure (dul:zkha, physical suffering) is absent in the realm
of fine-materiality:
i. because of the "fluidity" (acchatva [= translucidity, transparertcy] = shining,
brilliance [bhasvara]) of the body, from whence there is absence of displeas-
ure produced by striking (abhighataja); 141
ii. because of the absence of unwholesome actions liable to be retributed and
thus the absence of displeasure "arisen from [the cause of] retribution"
(vipakaja).
4. The sensation of dissatisfaction is absent:
i. because sentient beings in the realm of fine-materiality have their life-stream
penetrated by calm abiding (samathasnigdhqsalJltlina);
ii. be~ause any cause of displeasure or irritation, (aghatavastu 142 ) is absent. 143
AFE.3. Realm of immateriality & the controlling faculties; 144 F 130

In regard to the realm of immateriality, exclude in addition [to the three pure
controlling faculties, the sexual faculties, etc.,] the five material controlling faculties
(eye, etc.) (viii. 3c), the sensations of pleasure and of satisfaction. There remain
[eight of the fifteen controlling faculties mentioned above, i.e.,] the mental faculty,
the vitality faculty, the sensation of equanimity, faith and its following (i. 31).
<131>
AFF. The abandonment of the controlling faculties; 145 F 131

Among the twenty-two controlling faculties, (i) how many are abandoned by insight
into the truths [darsanaprahiitavya]? (ii) How many by cultivation [bhiivanii]?
(iii) How many are not the object of abandoning [aprahatavya]?
13. (1) The mental faculty and three sensations [i.e., pleasure, satisfac-
tion and equanimity] belong to three categories [i.e., (i) abandoned
by insight into the truths, (ii) abandoned by cultivation, (iii) not
abandoned].
(2) Dissatisfaction is (i) abandoned by insight and (ii) abandoned by
cultivation.
A The Controlling Faculties (indriya) 491
(3) Nine controlling faculties [i.e., the five sense-faculties and the
two sexual faculties, the vitality faculty and the sensation of dis-
satisfaction] are (ii) abandoned by cultivation alone.
(4) Five controlling faculties [i.e., faith, etc.] are either (ii) aban-
doned by cultivation or are (iii) not abandoned.
(5) [The last] three controlling faculties [i.e., the faculty of coming
to know what is as yet unknown, etc.] are (iii) not abandoned. 146
1. The mental faculty [manas] and the sensations of pleasure, satisfaction and equa-
ni~jty are of three kinds [i.e., (i) abandoned by insight, (ii) abandoned by cultivation
and (iii) not abandoned].
2. Dissatisfaction is (i) abandoned by insight and (ii) abandoned by cultivation, for,
never being pure (anasrava), itis always the object of abandoning.
3. The nine controlling faculties, namely, the five sense-faculties, the two sexual
faculties, the vital faculty and the sensation of displeasure, are only of the class•
(ii) "abandoned by cultivation", for: (a) the first eight are not defiled (kli~fa); (b) the
ninth does not arise from the mental faculty (a~a~fhaja [= "arisen from the non-
sixth", i.e., arisen from the other five sense-faculties]; i. 40); and (c) all [nine] are
always impure.
4. The five controlling faculties of which the first is faith are not defiled, thus they
are not (i) abandoned by insight; [when impure, they are abandoned by cultivation;]
they can [also] be pure, thus can be (iii) "not abandoned".
5. The last three controlling faculties (the faculty of coining to know what is as
yet unknown; faculty of perfect knowledge; faculty of final and perfect know-
ledge) {13 b} are (iii) "not abandoned", because they are pure, because factors with-
out defects (iidfnava, apak~ala?; nirdosa) are not fo be abandoned.
[Thus the different modes (prakiirabheda) (of the controlling faculties) have been
explained.]
Ao. ORIGINAL ACQUISITION (LABHA) OF THE CONTROLLING

FACULTIES AT CONCEPTION & FINAL DISCARDING (TYAGA)
OF THE CONTROLLING FACULTIES AT DEATH; 147 F 131-34
How many controlling faculties that are a ripened effect by nature do the sen-
tient beings in the different realms of existence originally acquire [prathamato
labhyate]?
14. (1) In kiimas, [i.e., the realm of desire,] sentient beings acquire
originally [-at conception-] two controlling faculties [i.e., the body
sense-faculty and the vitality faculty] that are a ripened effect,

exception being made for apparitional sentient beings who acquire
six, seven or eight controlling faculties. <132>
(2) In riipas, [i.e., in the realm of fine-materiality, sentient beings
originally acquire] six controlling faculties.
(3) Above, [i.e., in the realm of immateriality, sentient beings origi-
nally acquire] one controlling faculty. 148
The realm of desire or Kamadhatu is called "the kiimas" on account of the capital
role or predominance (pradhiinatva) of the [five] objects of sense-enjoyments (kiima-
gu~a; i. 22bd, F 43) in this realm.
The realm of fine-materiality or Riipadhatu is called "the rupas" on account of the
capital role of material form (rupa). 149
The Siitra uses this way of speaking:
These calm liberations, beyond the material forms .... 150
AGA. The acquisition (labha) of the controlling faculties at conception; 151

F 132-33
AGA.1. Realm of desire; 152 F 132
In the realm of desire, (1) sentient beings who are born from a womb Uariiyuja],
from an egg [a~qaja] and from moisture [sa1?1sveda] (iii. 8) originally, i.e., as soon
-as conception takes place, acquire two controlling faculties that are a ripened (ef-
fect), namely, the body sense-faculty (kiiyendriya) and the vitality faculty (jfvita-
indriya). It is gradually that the other controlling faculties appear in them.
[Question:] - Why are the mental faculty (manas) and the sensation of equanimity
(iii. 42) not included?
[Answer:] - Because, at conception [pratisa1?1dhikiila], both of them are always
[avasya] defiled [kli~fa]; thus, they are not a ripened effect (iii. 38).
(2) Apparitional sentient beings [upapiiduka; iii. 9] [originally] acquire [either] six,
seven or eight controlling faculties:
i. apparitional sentient beings without sex [avyaiijana], namely, apparitional
sentient beings at the beginning of the cosmic aeon (iii. 98), acquire six con-
trolling faculties: the five sense-faculties of the sensory consciousnesses,
plus the vitality faculty;
ii. apparitional sentient beings with sex [ekavyaiijana], namely, gods (deva),
etc., acquire seven controlling faculties;
iii. bisexual apparitional sentient beings [ubhayavyanjana] acquire eight con-

trolling faculties.
[Question:] - But can an apparitional sentient being be bisexual?
[Answer:] - Yes, in the unfortunate destinies. {14 a}
AGA.2. Realm offine-materiality; 153 F 132

In the realm of fine-materiality, sentient beings originally acquire six controlling
faculties that are a ripened (effect), [i.e., the five sense-faculties of the sensory con-
sciousnesses, plus the vitality faculty,] like the apparitional sentient beings without
sex in the realm of desire. <133>
AGA.3. Realm of immateriality; 154 F 133

"Above", i.e., in the realm of immateriality. - This realm of existence is.not situated.
above the realm of fine-materiality (iii. 3); but it is said that it is "above" (1) because
it is superior (para) to the realm of fine-materiality from the point of view of medi-
tative attainment [samapatti]: the meditative attainments of the realm of immate-
. riality are practiced after those of the realm of fine-materiality; (2) because the realm
of immateriality outshines (pradhiinatara) it from the point of view of its mode of
existence, of the duration of its existence (upapattitas).
In this realm of existence, sentient beings originally acquire [only] one controlling
faculty that is a ripened (effect), i.e., the vital faculty. 155
We have e.xplained how many controlling faculties that are a ripened (effect) by
nature are acquired at conception.
AGB. The discarding (tyiiga) of the controlling f acuities at death; 156 F 133-34
I
[Now discarding (tyiiga) is to be spoken of.] How many controlling faculties cease
[nirodhayati] at death?
15a-16b. (1) In the realm of immateriality, it is the vitality faculty, the
mental faculty and the sensation of equanimity which cease for the
dying person.
(2) In the realm of fine-materiality, there are eight controlling
faculties [i.e., plus the five sense-faculties of the sensory conscious-
nesses] which cease for the dying person.
(3) In the realm of desire, [when death takes place suddenly,] there
are ten controlling faculties which cease [for the hermaphrodite];
nine controlling faculties, [for the unisexual person]; eight con-
494 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Jndriyanirdeia)
trolling faculties, [for the being without sex]; or, when death takes
place gradually, there are four controlling faculties [i.e., body sense-
faculty, vitality faculty, mental faculty and faculty of equanimity]
which cease. In the case of a good death, [i.e., if one's thought is
wholesome at the last moment,] add five (praxis-oriented) faculties
in all cases. 157
1. Fqr the being in the realm of immateriality-at death-three controlling faculties
[i.e., vitality faculty, mental faculty, sensation of equanimity] cease at the last
moment.
In the realm of fine-materiality, one has to add the five sense-faculties of sensory
consciousnesses, the eye sense-faculty, etc. {14 b} In fact, the apparitional sentient
beings (upapiiduka) are born and die with all the sense-faculties (samagrendriya).
In the realm of desire, death takes place either (i) suddenly (yugapat; sakrt) or
(ii) gradually (kramamrtyu): (i) In the first case, eight, nine or ten controlling facul-
ties cease, according to whether the being is without sex, with sex, bisexual or
hermaphroditic. (ii) In the second case, four controlling faculties, i.e., body sense-
faculty, vitality faculty, mental faculty and faculty of equanimity, cease simultane-
ously at the last moment. These four controlling faculties do not cease separately
[prthak].
2. The preceding concerns the case where the thought of the dying person is defiled
(kli~fa) or unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta). <134> If, [at the last moment,]
the thought is wholesome (kusala), then the five (pra~is-oriented) faculties, faith,
etc., should be added [to all cases] in the three realms of existence. 158
AH. THE OBTAINING (PR.APT/) OF THE FRUITS OF THE RELIGIOUS

PRAXIS & THE NUMBER OF CONTROLLING FACULTIES; 159 F 134-38
In the exposition on the controlling faculties, 160 all the characteristics of the
controlling faculties, their nature [avasthii] and their activities [kiiritra], are inves-
tigated. { 15 a} We ask, therefore, how many controlling faculties come into play
in the obtaining [priipyate] of the fruits of the religious praxis (sriima,:iyaphala;
vi. 52).
16cd. One obtains [iipti] the two "extreme" fruits [i.e., (1) of stream enterer
and (4) of perfected being] through nine controlling faculties.
The two "intermediate" fruits [i.e., (2) of once-returner and (3) of
non-returner] are obtained through seven, eight or nine controlling
faculties. 161
The "extreme" fruits are the fruits of stream-enterer (srotaiipanna) and of perfected
being (arhat), for these two fruits are the firs1::and the last [of the four] fruits.
The "intermediate" fruits are the fruit of once-returner (sakrdiigiimin) and the fruit of
non-returner (aniigiimin), for these two fruits are found between the first and the last
fruit.
AHA. The obtaining of the extremefruits; 162 F 134-35

AHA.I. The obtaining of the fruit of stream enterer & the number of controlling
faculties; 163 F 134-35
The fruit of stream-enterer (srotaiipanna; vi. 35c) is obtained through nine con-
trolling faculties: (1) the mental faculty; (2) equanimity; 164 (3-7) the five (praxis-
oriented) faculties, faith, etc.; (8) the faculty of coming to know what is as yet
unknown (aniijfiiitamiijfiiisyiimfndriya), (9) the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijiia-
indriya; ii. 9ab ). 165
The faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown constitutes the unhin-
dered path (iinantaryamiirga; vi. 30c); the faculty of perfect knowledge constitutes
the path of liberation (vimuktimiirga): 166 It is through these two controlling facul-
ties that one obtains the fruit of stream-enterer, for the first induces (iiviihaka) the
possession (priipti) of disconnection from defilements (visarµyoga; ii. 55d, vi. 52);
the second supports and makes firm this possession (sarµni.fraya, iidhiira). 167
<135>
AHA.2. The obtaining of the fruit of perfected being & the number of
controlling faculties; 168 F 135
The fruit of perfected being (arhat; vi. 45) is obtained through nine controlling
faculties: (1) the mental faculty, (2) pleasure or satisfaction or equanimity, (3-7) the
five (praxis-oriented) faculties, (8) the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijfiendriya) and
(9) the faculty of final and perfect knowledge (iijiiiitavfndriya).
Here the faculty of perfect knowledge constitutes the unhindered path (iinantarya-
miirga); { 15 b} the faculty of final and perfect knowledge constitutes the path of
liberation (vimuktimiirga). 169
AHB. The obtaining of the intermediate fruits; 17°F 135-37

ABB.I. The obtaining of the fruit of once-returner & the number of controlling
The fruit of once-returner (sakrdiigiimin; v. 36) is obtained either:
1. by the successive ones (tinupurvaka; vi. 33a)-the practitioners who, before

pursuing the obtaining of the fruit of once-returner, have obtained the fruit
of stream-enterer; or
2. by those who are detached for the most part (bhuyovftaraga; vi. 29cd)-the
practitioners who, before entering into the pure or supramundane path, i.e.,
into the direct realization of the truths (satytibhisamaya), have abandoned
[prahf~a] the first six categories [praktira] of defilements of the realm of
desire through the impure, mundane path: therefore, when they have
achieved the path of insight into the truths, they become once-returners
without beforehand having been stream-enterers. 172
1. The successive ones (tinupurvaka)~who are stream-enterers (srotaapanna)-
obtain the fruit of once-returner, either (a) through a mundane path [laukika], which
does not involve the cultivation of the truths; or (b) through the pure or supra-
mundane p~th (anasrava, lokottara). - In the first case, [they obtain the fruit of once-
returner through] seven controlling faculties: (i) the mental faculty, (ii) equanimity,
(iii-vii) the five (praxis-oriented) faculties. - In the second case, [they obtain the fruit
of once-returner through] eight controlling faculties: the same, plus (viii) the faculty
of perfect know ledge (ajnendriya).
2. Those who are detached for the most part (bhuyovftaraga}-who are ordinary
worldlings (prthagjana}-obtain the fruit of once-returner through nine control-
ling faculties. They should, in fact, realize the direct realization of the truths; thus
[they obtain the fruit of once-returner through the just mentioned seven control-
ling faculties, plus] (viii) the faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown
(anajnatamajnasytim'indriya) and (ix) the faculty of perfect knowledge (ajnendriya),
as for the obtaining of the fruit of stream-enterer (see above). <136>
AHB.2. The obtaining of the fruit of non-returner & the number of controlling
The fruit of non-returner (anagamin) is obtained either:
1. by the successive ones (anupurvaka), i.e., the practitioners who have already
obtained the previous fruits, or
2. by those with detachment (vftariiga), i.e., the practitioners who, without
having entered into the pure or supramundane path, have abandoned [pra-
hf~a] nine categories of defilements of the realm of desire or even the
defilements of the higher stages up to and including the perception-sphere
of nothingness (akif{lcanyayatana ).
1. The successive ones (anupurvaka) obtain the fruit of non-returner thanks to

seven or eight controlling faculties, according to whether they use the mundane path
or the pure or supramundane path, as in the case when the successive ones, as
mentioned above, obtain the fruit of once-returner.
2. Those with detachment (vftaraga) obtain the fruit of non-returner through the
direct realization of the truths (darsanamarga), through nine controlling faculties, as
in the case when those who are detached for the most part (bhuyovftaraga), as men-
tioned above, obtain the fruit of once-returner.
AHB.3. Further specifications; F 136-37

These general explanations call for more specifications [vise~a].
1. Those with detachment (vftaraga) obtain the fruit of non-returner (anagamin)
through "directly realizing the truths". In order to directly realize the truths, they lean
[nisritya] either (i) on the meditative attainment of the third meditation (dhyana), or
(ii) on the meditative attainment of the first or of the second meditation, or (iii) on
the meditative attainment of the preparatory meditation [to the first meditation]
(anagamya) or of the intermediate meditation (dhyanantara) or of the fourth medita-
tion: according to whether their faculty of sensation is the controlling faculty (i) of
pleasure, (ii) of satisfaction, (iii) of equanimity [viii. 22b].
On the contrary, those who are detached for the most part (bhuyovitaraga) always
obtain the fruit of once-returner with the faculty of equanimity.
2. The successive ones (anupurvaka) who endeavor to gain the fruit of non-returner
in the meditative attainment of the preparatory meditation (anagamya), when their
(praxis-oriented) faculties are sharp [tfk~~za], start out for the last moment (i.e., the
ninth path of liberation) of the preparatory meditation { 16 a} and [then] enter into the
first or the second meditation.
i. When they expel the defilements through the mundane path, it is then through
eight and not through seven controlling faculties that they obtain the fruit: in fact,
(a) the preparatory meditation, to which the penultimate moment (i.e., ninth unhin-
dered path) belongs, involves the sensation of equanimity, and (b) the first or the
second meditation, within which the last moment takes place, involves the sensation
of satisfaction. The disconnection from the defilements results then from equanimity
and from satisfaction; in the same way we have seen that disconnection, in the case
of the stream-enterer (srotaapanna), results from the faculty of coming to know what
is as yet unknown (ajfiasyamfndriya) and from the faculty of perfect knowledge
(ajfiendriya). <137>
ii. -When they expel the defilements through the pure or supramunc:lane path
[lokottara], i.e., by cultivation of the truths, then the faculty of perfect knowl-
edge (iijfiendriya) should be added as ninth controlling faculty. The unhindered
path (iinantaryamiirga) and the path of liberation (vimuktimiirga) are both a fac-
ulty of perfect knowledge. 174
AHc. Refutation qf the view that the fruit of pe,fected being is obtained
through eleven controlling faculties; 175 F 137-38
17ab. It is said that the status of the J>erfected being is obtained through
eleven controlling faculties, because it is possible that a given per-
son may obtain it in this way. 176
[Objection:] - We read in the Mula§astra (Jiianaprasthiina, 994cl):
Through how many controlling faculties is the status of the perfected being
obtained? - Through eleven.
[Answer:] - In fact, the quality of the perfected being (arhat) is obtained [at a single
time], as we have said, through just nine controlling faculties. The Sli.stra answers:
"Through eleven", for it does not look at the obtaining of the status of the perfected
being, but at the person who obtains this status.
Noble o.nes can retrogress on several occasions from the status of the perfected being
and can obtain it again by means of diverse meditative attainments, (1) sometimes
with the faculty of pleasure (sukhendriya; third meditation), (2) sometimes with the
faculty of satisfaction (saumanasyendriya; first and second meditation), (3) some-
times with the faculty of equanimity (upke:jendriya; preparatory meditation, etc.). But
[these] three controlling faculties never coexist.
[Objection:] - But why does the Sli.stra not look at things from the same point of
view when'it speaks of the status of the non-returner? <138>
[Answer:] - The case is different. It does not happen that noble ones, retro-
gressing from the fruit of non-returner (aniigiimin), obtain it again by means of
the faculty of pleasure (sukhendriya). 177 {16 b} On the other hand, persons de-
tached [vitariiga] from all the defilements of the realm of desire, who have
obtained the fruit of non-returner, cannot retrogress from this fruit, because their
detachment [vairiigya] is obtained through two paths [miirga], i.e., produced by
the mundane path [laukika] and confirmed by the pure or supramundane path
[lokottara] (vi. 51).
AI. THE NUMBER OF CONTROLUNG FACULTIES WITH WHICH

PEOPLE ARE ACCOMPANIED (SAMANVAGATA); 178 F 138-143
With how many controlling faculties are the persons who are accompanied [saman-
vagata] by such and such controlling faculties, accompanied? (Jnanaprasthana, 6, s;
Vibha~a, 90, 2)
AIA. The twenty-two controlling faculties & the number of controlling

faculties with which people are accompanied; 179 F 138-42
AIA.1. The mental faculty,. the vitality faculty, the faculty of equanimity &
being accompanied by three controllingfaculties; 18 F 138-39 °
17cd. Those who are accompanied [yukta] by the mental faculty or the
vitality faculty or the faculty of equanimity are necessarily accom-
panied by three controlling faculties. 181
Those who are accompanied [samanvagata] by one of these three controlling facul-
ties are necessarily [avasya] accompanied by the other two controlling faculties:
when one of them is absent, the other two controlling faculties are absent. 182
The accompaniment [samanviigama] of the other controlling faculties is not deter-
mined [aniyama]. Those who are accompanied by these three controlling faculties
may or may not be accompanied by the other controlling faculties ..
1. Beings born in the realm of immateriality are not accompanied by the eye, ear,
nose and tongue sense-faculties. {17 a}
Beings in the realm of desire cannot be accompanied by these sense-faculties: when
they have not acquired [apratilabdha] th~m (at the beginning of embryonic life) or
when they have lost [vihfna] them (blindness [andhatva], etc.; gradual death [krama
mara~a]).
2. Beings born in the realm of immateriality are not accompanied by the body
sense-faculty.
3. Beings born in the realm of immateriality or in the realm of fine-materiality are
not accompanied by the female sexual faculty [strfndriya].
Beings born in the realm of desire cannot be accompanied by it; when they have not
acquired it or have lost it.
The same for the male sexual faculty [puru~endriya]. <139>
4. Ordinary worldlings (prthagjana) 183 born in the fourth meditation (dhyana), in
the second meditation, 184 in the formless perception-spheres (iirupya), are not accom-
panied by the faculty of pleasure.
5. Ordinary worldlings born in the fourth meditation, in the third meditation, in the
formless perception-spheres, are not accompanied by the faculty of satisfaction.
6. Beings born in the realm of fine-materiality or in the realm of immateriality are
not accompanied by the faculty of displeasure.
7. Detached persons (vftaraga) are not accompanied by the faculty of dissatisfaction.
8. Persons who have cut off the wholesome roots (iv. 79) are not accompanied by
the five (praxis-oriented) faculties, faith, etc.
9. Neither ordinary worldlings nor noble ones in possession of a fruit are accom-
panied by the faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown (anajiiatam-
ajiiasyamfndriya).
10. Ordinary worldlings, the noble ones who are found in the path of insight into the
truths (vi. ,31ab) and perfected beings (arhat) are not accompanied by the faculty of
perfect knbwledge (ajiiendriya).
11. Ordimiry worldlings and those in training (saik~a) are not accompanied by the
faculty of final and perfect knowledge (ajiiatavfndriya).
This enumeration allows us to determine the number of controlling faculties with
which the categories of sentient beings that have not been specified are accompa-
nied.
AIA.2. The faculty of pleasure and the body sense-faculty & the being
accompanied by four controlling faculties; 185 F 139
18a. Those who are accompanied by the faculty of pleasure or the body
sense-faculty are certainly accompanied by four controlling facul-
ties.1s6
Those who are accompanied by the faculty of pleasure are [necessarily] accompa-
nied, in addition, by (1) the vitality faculty, (2) the mental faculty, (3) the faculty of
equanimity. {17 b}
Those who are accompanied by the body sense-faculty are accompanied, in addition,
by the same three controlling faculties.
AIA.3. The other sense-faculties and the faculty of satisfaction & being
accompanied by five controlling faculties; 187 F 139
18b. Those who are accompanied by one of the [other].sense-faculties of
the sensory consciousnesses are necessarily accompanied by five
controlling faculties. 188
Those who are accompanied by the eye sense-faculty are [necessarily] accompanied,
in addition, by (1) the vitality faculty, (2) the mental faculty, (3) the faculty of equa-
nimity and (4) the body sense-faculty.
The same applies for those who are accompanied by the ear sense-faculty, etc. <140>
18c. The same applies for those who are accompanied by the faculty of
satisfaction. 189
Those who are accompanied by the faculty of satisfaction are [necessarily] accompa-
nied, in addition, by (1) the vitality faculty, (2) the-mental faculty, (3) the faculty of
equanimity and (4) the faculty of pleasure.
[Question: 190] - But with what kind of faculty of pleasure can beings who are born in
the heaven of the second meditation (dhyana) and who do not practice therein the
meditative attainment of the third meditation be accompanied?
[Answer:] - They are accompanied by the faculty of defiled [kli~ta] pleasure of [the
stage (bhumi) of] the third meditation.
AIA.4. The faculty of displeasure & being accompanied by seven controlling

faculties/ 91 F 140
18cd. Those who are accompanied by the faculty of displeasure certainly
are accompanied by seven controlling faculties; 192
Bein~ accompanied by the faculty of displeasure, these sentient beings evidently
belong to the realm of desire. They are necessarily accompanied by [seven con-
trolling faculties:] (1) the vitality faculty, (2) the mental faculty, (3) the body sense-
faculty and (4-7) the four controlling faculties of sensation: the faculty of dissat-
isfaction is absent in them since they are detached (vftaraga).
AIA.5. The two sexual faculties, the f acuity of dissatisfaction, the five
praxis-oriented faculties & being accompanied by eight controlling
faculties; 193 F 140-41
18d-19a. Those who are accompanied by the female sexual faculty [or the
male sexual faculty or the faculty of dissatisfaction or one of the
(praxis-oriented) faculties] are necessarily accompanied by eight
controlling faculties. 194
One should understand: Those who are accompanied by (1) the female sexual faculty
or (2) the male sexual faculty or (3) the faculty of dissatisfaction or (4) one of the
(praxis-oriented) faculties: faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration and understand-
ing (prajiiii). <141>
I
1-2. Those who are accompanied by one sexual faculty are necessarily accompa-
nied-in addition to this controlling faculty-by seven controlling faculties, which
have been specified in ii. 18cd, since these sentient beings evidently belong to the
realm of desire.
3. Those who are accompanied by the faculty of dissatisfaction _are necessarily
accompanied-in addition to this controlling faculty-by the same seven controlling
faculties.
4. Those who are accompanied by one of the (praxis-oriented) faculties can be
born in whichever of the three realms of existence; they are necessarily accompanied
by (i-v) five (praxis-oriented) faculties, which always appear together, plus (vi) the
vitality faculty, (vii) the mental faculty, (viii) the faculty of equanimity.
AIA.6. The faculty of perfect knowledge, the faculty offinal and perfect
knowledge & being accompanied by eleven controlling faculties; 195 F 141
19ab. Those who are accompanied by the faculty of perfect knowledge or
the faculty of final and perfect knowledge are necessarily accom-
panied by eleven controlling faculties. 196
Namely: (1) the vitality faculty; (2) the mental faculty; (3-5) the faculties of pleas-
ure, of satisfaction, of equanimity; 197 { tg a} (6-10) the five (praxis-oriented) facul-
ties, and (11) the eleventh, i.e., either the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijfiendriya)
or the faculty of final and perfectknowledge (iijfiiitiivfndriya).
AIA.7. The faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown & being
accompanied by thirteen controlling faculties; 198 F 141-42
19cd. Those who are accompanied by the faculty of coming to know what
is as yet unknown are necessarily accompanied by thirteen control-
ling facul ties. 199
In fact, it is only in the realm of desire that one practices the path of insight into the
truths (vi. 55). Thus those who are accompanied by this controlling faculty are beings
of the realm of desire. They are necessarily accompanied by (1) the vitality faculty,
(2) the mental faculty, (3) the body sense-faculty, (4-7) four controlling faculties of
sensation, (8-12) the five (praxis-oriented) faculties, and (13) the faculty of coming
to know what is as yet unknown (iijfiiisyiimfndriya). They are not necessarily accom-
panied by the faculty of dissatisfaction or the sense-faculties of the eye, etc.; in fact,
they can be "detached", in which case dissatisfaction is absent in them; they can be
blind [andha], etc. 200 <142>
A1B. The smallest possible number of controlling faculties with which people
are accompanied; 201 F 142-43
With how many controlling faculties are those who are accompanied with the
smallest possible number of controlling faculties accompanied?
20ab. Sentient beings in whom the good is absent are accompanied
with a minimum of eight controlling faculties, i.e., (1) body sense-
faculty, (2-6) five sensations (vid), (7) vitality faculty and (8) men-
tal faculty. 202
Beings in whom the good is absent (niftsubha) are those who. have cut off the whole-
some roots. They necessarily belong to the realm of desire (iv. 79); they cannot be
"detached". Thus they are necessarily accompanied with the enumerated controlling
faculties.
"Sensation" [vedana] is referred to, in the verse (karika), as vid. That is to say, "that
which experiences or feels" (vedayate) by understanding it as a form of kartari kvip;
or "sensation" [vedana] (bhavasadhana: au,:iadikaJ:i kvip). 203 [Sensation is vit in the
same way that sampadana is sampat.]
20cd. In the same way, ignorant persons [i.e., ordinary worldlings] who
are born in the realm of immateriality are accompanied by eight
controlling faculties, namely, (1) equanimity, (2) vitality faculty,
(3) mental faculty and (4-8) good controlling faculties [i.e., the five
praxis-oriented faculties]. 204
Ordinary worldlings (prthagjana) are called ignorant persons (bala) because they
have not seen the truths. {18 b} <143>
The good controlling faculties (subha) are the (praxis-oriented) faculties, faith, etc. -
Since it is a question of ignorant persons and since the total is eight controlling
faculties, the pure controlling faculties (the faculty of coming to know what is as yet
unknown, etc.) are not alluded to here by the author.
Aic. The largest possible number of controlling faculties with which people
are accompanied; 205 F 143
With how many controlling faculties are those who are accompanied with the largest
possible number of controlling faculties accompanied?
21ac. Hermaphrodites (dvilinga) [are accompanied] with a maximum of
nineteen controlling faculties, with the exception of the three stain-
less controlling faculties. 206
504 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdeia)
Hermaphrodites [dvivyaiicana] necessarily belong to the realm of desire. These sen-

tient beings are not "detached"; can be accompanied by the (praxis-oriented) facul-
ties; can be accompanied by all the sense-faculties of the sensory consciousnesses.
But these sentient beings are ordinary worldlings (prfhagjana): thus the pure con-
trolling faculties (the faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown, etc.,) are
necessarily absent in these sentient beings.
In the verse (kiirikii), the pure (aniisrava) controlling faculties are called stainless
[amala]. (1) The faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown (iijiiiisyiimi),
(2) the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijiia) and (3) the faculty of final and perfect
knowledge (iijiiiitiivin) are pure because they are not in connection with the fluxes
\ '
(iisrava) either du_~ to the cognitive object or due to association (v. 17).
2lcd. Noble ones, not detached, [i.e., those in training,] can be accom-
panied by all the controlling faculties [i.e., with a maximum of nine-
teen controlling faculties], with the exception of one sexual faculty,
I \
[i.e., the male or female sex~al faculty,] and two pure or stainless
co11trolling faculties. 207
Noble ones (iirya) who are not detached (rtigin), thus those in training (iailqa) and
not perfected beings (arhat), are accompanie,d with a maximum of nineteen control-
ling faculties. (1) One has to exclude either the male sexual faculty or the female
sexual faculty; (2) .
one has to exclude the itaculty
'
of final and perfect knowledge
(iijiiiitiivfndriyd) in all cases; in addition, (3) [one has to exclude] the faculty of per-
fect knowledge (iijiiendriya) when those in training are found in the path of insight
into the truths, and (4) [one has to exclude] the faculty of coming to know what is as
yet unknown (iijfiiisyamrndriya) when those in training are in the path of cultivation
of the truths. 208 {iv. 1 a} 209
B. The Way Conditioned Factors Arise & Five-Group Classification of Factors 505
B. X WAY CONDITIONED FACTORS (Skfr!SK1f..TA) ARISE &

FIVE-GROUP (PANCA-VASTU) CLASSIFICATION OF FACTORS; 210
F 143-244
The conditioned factors 211 (sal!lskrta) (i. 7a), i.e., matter or form, sensation, ideation,
etc., are, as we have seen, of distinct characteristics [bhinnalak~a,:ia]. <144> One
may ask if, in the same way, they arise independently or dis_tinctly from one another
[bhinnotpiida]; or rather if, in certain cases, they necessarily arise together or simul-
taneously (niyatasahotpiida).
Certain conditioned factors always arise together or simultaneously.
The factors (dharma) are divided into five categories: 212
I. matter or material form (rupa; i. 9-14b);
II. thought (citta; i. 16-17);
III. thought-concomitants (ca_itta; caitasika) or factors (dharma) [or formations
(sal!lskiira)] associated with thought (ii. 23-34);
IV. formations dissociated from thought (cittaviprayukta) (ii. 35-48);
V. unconditioned factors (asal!lskrta; i. 4-6).
I. RUPA (matter or material form, 11)

l. cak~ur-indriya (eye sense-faculty) 6. riipa-artha (visible form object-referent)
2.. srotra-indriya (ear s.-f.) 7. sabda-artha (sound o.-r.)
3. ghrii,:ia-indriya (nose s.-f.) 8. gandha-artha (odor o.-r.)
4. jihvii-indriya (tongue s.-f.) 9. rasa-artha (taste o.-r.)
5. kiiya-indriya (body s.-f.) 10. spra~{avya-artha (tangible o.-r.)
11. avijiiapti-riipa (non-informative matter)
IT. CIITA (thought, 1)

III. CAIITASJKA DHARMAS (thought-concomitants, 46)
i. mahlibhamika dharmas (generally permeating factors, 10)
1. vedanii (sensation) 6. prajiiii (understanding)
2. cetanii (intention) 7. smrti (mindfulness)
3. saT[ljiiii (ideation) 8. manaskiira (mental application)
4. chanda (predilection) 9. adhimok~a (resolve)
5. sparsa (contact) 10. samiidhi (concentration)
ii. kusala-mahlibhiimika dharmas (wholesome permeating factors, 10)
l. sraddhii (faith) 6. apatriipya (shame)
2. apramiida (diligence, heedfulness) 7. alobha (non-greed)
3. prasrabdhi (pliancy) 8. adve~a (non-hatred)
4. upek~ii (equanimity) 9. avihi,rtsii (non-harmfulness)
5. hrf(modesty) 10. vfrya (vigor)
506 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Facuities (lndriyanirdesa)
iii. klesa-mahiibhiimika dharmas (permeating factors of defilement, 6)

1. moha (delusion) 4. asraddhya (non-faith)
2. pramiida (non-diligence, heedlessness) 5. styiina (torpor)
3. kausfdya (slackness) 6. auddhatya (restlessness)
iv. akusala-mahiibhiimika dharmas (unwholesome permeating factors, 2)
1. iihrfkya (non-modesty) 2. anapatriipy(l (shamelessness)
v. parfttaklesa-bhiimika dharmas (factors of defilement of restricted scope, 10)
1. krodha (anger) 6. mrak~a (concealment)
2. upaniiha (enmity) 7. miitsarya (avarice)
3. siifhya (dissimulation) 8. miiyii (deceit)
4. fr~yii (jealousy, envy) 9. mada (pride)
5. pradiisa (depraved opinionatednA~s) 10. vihirrisii (harmfulness)
vi. aniyata dharma-s (undetermined factors, 8)
1. kaukrtya (regret) 5. riiga (attachment)
2. middha (sleepiness) 6. pratigha (hostility)
3. vitarka (initial inquiry) 7. miina (concei9
4. viciira (investigation) 8. vicikitsii (doubt)
IV. C/1TAVIPRAYUKTASA!y!SKARA DHARMAS (formations dissociated from thought, 14)
1. priipti (possession)
2. apriipti (non-possession)
3. nikiiyasabhiiga or sabhiigatii (group homogeneity)
4. iisarrijiiika (ideationle:,sness)
5. iisarrijiii-samiipatti (attainment of non-ideation)
6. nirodha-samiipatti (attainment of cessation)
7. jfvitendriya (vitality faculty)
8. jiiti-lak~ar;,.a (characteristic of origination)
9. sthiti-lalcya,;a (characteristic of duration)
10. jarii-lak~a,;a (characteristic of deterioration)
11. anityatii-l~a,;a (characteristic of impermanence)
12. niima-kiiya (collection of names)
13. pada-kiiya (collection of phrases)
14. vyaiijana-kiiya (collection of phonemes)
V. ASA!y!SK]J.TA DHARMAS (unconditioned factors, 3)
1. iikiisa (space)
2. pratisarrikhyii-nirodha (cessation due to deliberation)
3. apratisarrikhyii-nirodha (cessation not due to deliberation)
Fig. 1: The five-group-seventy-five-dharmas classification of the Sarviistiviida
The unconditioned factors do not arise (i. 5; ii. 58) and so we do not need to occupy
ourselves with.them here.
BA. THE SIMULTANEOUS ARISING (SAHOTPADA) OF FACTORS; 213

F 144-244
BAA. The simultaneous arising of atoms or molecules (parama,:zu); F 144

BAB. The simultaneous arising of thought, thought-concomitants and formations
dissociated from thought; F 149-244
BAA. The simultaneous arising of atoms or molecules (paramii:t:i,u); 214 F 144-49

We shall first study the law [niyama] of simultaneous arising (sahotpiida) of material
factors (riipa).
22. In the realm of desire, (1) the molecule [paramii1Ju, i.e., sa-rµghiita-
paramii1)u]215 which does not mvolve sound and which does not
involve any sense-faculty includes eight [kinds of] real entities
[a~fadravyaka]: 216 [i.e., the four fundamental material elements and
the four derivative material elements: visible ,form, taste, odor,
tangible]. 217
(2) When the body sense-faculty is involved in [the molecule, it
includes] nine real entities.
(3) When any other sense-faculty is involved in [the molecule, it
includes] ten real entities. 218 { 1 b}
BAA.1. The f!leaning of the term parama1:m in this context; 219 F 144
By paramii1;tu one does not understand the atom (paramii1;tu) here in the strict sense,
the real-entity atom (dravyaparamii1;tu), the atom or monad which is a single real
entity (dravya; i. 13), but rather the composite molecule (saf!1ghiitaparamii1;tu), i.e.,
the most subtle (sarvasiik~ma) among the composite matters (riipasaf!lghiita), since
there is nothing more subtle than it among the composite matters. 220 <145>
BAA.2. The various numbers of real entities of the molecule in the realm of
desire 221 • F 145-47
'
1. In the realm of desire, the (composite) molecule which does not involve sound
(sabda, sabdayatana) and which does not involve any sense-faculty (indriya) in-
cludes eight [kinds of] real entities and not less than eight [kinds]: namely, the four
fundamental material elements (mahabhiita, the elementary substances earth, water,
fire, wind; see i. 12c) and the four derivative material elements (bhautika), namely,
visible form (riipa; i. 10a), odor, taste, tangible (see ii. 50cd: co-existent cause; see
65ab: causal relationship between fundamental and derivative material elements).
2. The (composite) molecule which does not involve sound but which involves the
body sense-faculty (kiiyendriya; kiiyayatana) 222 includes a ninth real entity (dravya),
i.e., the real entity which is the body sense-faculty.
3. The (composite) molecule which does not involve soun-d 1:mt which involves
any sense-faculty other than the body sense-faculty (sense-faculty. of the eye, etc.)
includes a tenth real entity, i.e., the real entity which is this other sense-faculty
(eye sense-faculty, etc.), since the sense-faculties of the eye, of the ear, etc., do not
exist independently from the body sense-faculty and constitute distinct sense-spheres
(ayatana).
4. When sound is involved in the aforementioned aggregations, the total rises to
nine, ten or eleven real entities: in fact, sound (sabdayatana) that is produced by the
fundamental material elements, which form part of the organism (upiitta; i. 10b),
does not exist independently of the sense-faculties. 223
BAA.2.1. Objections; F 145-47

BAA.2.1.1. Why are the characteristics of the four fundamental material elements
not experienced at once? F 145-46

[Objection:] - If the four fundamental material elements, the elementary substance
earth, etc., are never disassociated (avinirbhiiga) and coexist in every (composite)
molecule, how is it that a given (composite) molecule is perceived either as solid
[ka{hina] or liquid [drava] or hot [u~~a] or moving [samudfra~a] (i. 12d), and not as
these four substances or characteristics at once? <146>
[Answer: 224] - In a given (composite) molecule, those real entities (dravya, elemen-
tary substance earth, etc.) that occur most active in it (pafutama, sphufatama) are
perceived [on account of their power] and not the others. In the same way, when one
touches a bundle of plant-stalks and needles (siicf-tiilf-kaliipa),w one perceives
(only) the needles; when one eats oversahed gruel [saktulava~acu~a], one perceives
, (only) the taste of salt. {2 a}
BAA.2.1.2. How do we know that the molecule includes the four fundamental
material elements? F 146-47
[Objection:] - How do you know that a given (composite) molecule includes the
fundamental material elements whose presence is not perceived there?
[Answer:] - All of the fundamental material elements manifest their presence
through their particular efficacy, namely, supporting (dhrti), cohesion (sa,,igraha),
heating or ripening (pakti), and expansion (vyiihana) (i. 12c). 226
According to another opinion, [that of Bhadanta Sriliibha,] the (composite) molecule

includes [= consists 227 of) the four fundamental material elements, since, given the
activity of certain causes [i.e., fire (agni), etc.] [pratyayalabha], solid phenomena
become liquid, etc. 228 The elementary substance fire [tejodhatu] exists in water, since
water is more or less cold, 229 which is explained through the presence of the ele-
mentary substance fire in a greater or lesser quantity.
But, we would say, that coldness is more or less intense [atisaya] does not im-
ply that there. would be a mixture (vyatibheda; misrfbhava) of a certain real
entity (dravya), the coldness [sfta], with its opposite, the heat [u,v~a], because sound
[sabda] and sensation [vedana], though homogeneous, each vary in intensity.
<147>
According to (still) another opinion (apara; i.e., that of the Sautrantikas230 ) the
fundamental material elements that are not perceived in a given (composite)
molecule exist in the state of seed (bfjatas, saktitas, samarthyatas), not in activity,
and not in and of themselves (svarapatas). 231 It is in this way that the Fortunate One
was able to say (Sartzyuktiigama, 18, 10):
In this piece of wood [diiru] there are many mineral substances [dhatu]. 232
The Fortunate One means that this wood contains the seeds, the potentialitie~ (sakti)
of many mineral substances; for gold [suva~a], silver [rupya], etc., do not actually
exist in the wood.
BAA.2.1.3. How can one establish the presence of color in wind? F 147
(The Sautriintikas) object again: - How can one establish the presence (sadbhava) of
color (va~a) in wind [viiyu]? 233
The Vaibhii~ikas respond: - This is [either] an object of faith (sraddhanfya), i.e., not
of inference (anumeya), or else, the color exists in the wind because one perceives
the odor [gandha] due to contact with wind and the odorous object; but odor is never
dissociated [avyabhicara] from color . 234
BAA.3. The various numbers of real entities of the molecule in the realm of
fine-materiality; 235 F 147
We know that odor and taste are absent in the realm of fine-materiality (i. 30); thus,
in regard to the (composite) molecule of the realm of fine-materiality, the numbers
must be reduced. There will be six, seven and eight real entities, and when sound
intervenes, seven, eight and nine real entities. We will not explain again the details
which have been discussed above.
BAA.4. The meaning of the term dravya in "includes eight dravyas"; 236 F 147-49
Objection: - The Vaibha~ika says that a (composite) molecule in the realm of desire
includes, at a minimum, eight dravyas. Should dravya be taken here:
1. as dravyas in the strict sense (dravyam eva), as individual real entities, as
real entities which have a particular inherent characteristic [svalak,m~a], 237
or
2. · as sense-spheres (ii,yatana) which can be termed dravyas [in the broader
sense], real entities, since they each possess distinctive general characteris-
tics [siimiinyavise:jalak:ja~a]? 238
1. In the first hypothesis, the proposed numbers are too small [atyalpa]. <148>
You say, [namely,] that the (composite) molecule includes four derivative material
elements of which the first one is visible form (rupa): we would thus say that then
[-according to your own system-] the (composite) molecule will include not ortly
the visible form of color (var~a, the real entity blue or red, etc.) but also the visible
form of shape (saf{lsthiina, the real entity long and short, etc.) (i. 10; iv. 3c), since a
number of atoms are agglomerated therein. {2 b}
[Moreover, since] the (composite) molecule [also] includes the derivative mate-
rial element called tangible (spra:jfavya), we would say further that the (com-
posite). molecule will then be heavy or light, rough or smooth; it could be "of
coldness", "of hunger", "of thirst"; it would thus include [in addition] the real
entities (dravya), which are heaviness [gurutva] or lightness [laghutva], smooth-
ness [slak:j~atva] or roughness [karkasatva], coldness [sfta], hunger [bubhuk:jii],
and thirst [pipiisa] (i. 10d).
Therefore, the proposed numbers are too small.
2. But if,,on the contrary, the Vaibha~ika means to take [dravya as] sense-spheres
(ayatana), the numbers are too large [atibahu], for the fundamental material elements
form part of the sense-sphere tangible [spra:jfavyiiyatana; i. 35a].
Therefore, it should be said that a (composite) molecule includes [only] four real
entities (dravya), visible form, odor, taste and tangible.
The Vaibha~ika responds. - Our definition of the (composite) molecule is good
(ii. 22a). The word dravya is to be taken, according to the case, as both
1. real entities in the strict sense, or
2. sense-spheres (iiyatana).
Among the eight dravyas of the (composite) molecule, there are:
L four real entities properly so called: namely, the four fundamental material
elements [bhuta], the bases and sources (iisraya) of derivative material ele-
ments (bhautika), and
2. four sense-spheres (iiyatana): the four kinds of derivative material elements
supported by the fundamental material elements: visible form (rupa), odor,
taste and tangible (excluding the fundamental material elements which are
included within the tangible, i. 10d).
[Answer:] - This answer is not good, for each of these four derivative material
elements is supported by the tetrad of fundamental material elements. The (com-
posite) molecule will [then] include twenty dravyas. 239 <149>
The Vaibhii~ika replies: - No, for we look at the nature or type (jiiti) of the fun-
damental material elements, i.e., solidity, etc. The nature or type of the tetrad of the
fundamental material elements remains the same in that they support the derivative
material element odor or the derivative material elements visible form, taste, tangi-
ble.
[Answer:] - But why do you express yourself in an ambiguous manner and use the
word dravya in two different acceptations? Words follow the dictates of caprice,
indeed one has to examine the meaning.240
BAB. The simultaneous arising of thought, thought-concomitants and

formations dissociated from thought; 241 F 149-244
[The law of the simultaneous arising of material factors has been discussed; there
remains to be discussed the same with respect to the remaining factors (i.e., thought,
thought-concomitants and formations dissociated from thought).]
Brief exposition; 242 F 149-150

23a. Thought and thought-concomitants necessarily arise together or
simultaneously.243
Thought (citta) and thought-concomitants (caitta) cannot arise independently or the
one without the other.
23b. All [conditioned] factors necessarily arise with their characteristics
[i.e., origination, duration, deterioration and impermanence]. 244 {3 a}
All conditioned factors (sa1J1skrta), i.e:, matter, thought (ii. 34), thought-concomi-
tants, formations (sa1J1skiira) dissociated from thought (ii. 35), necessarily arise with
their conditioned characteristics (sa1J1skrtalak~a,:za), i.e., origination, duration, dete-
rioration and impermanence (ii. 46a). <150>
23c. Sometimes [factors arise] with possession.245

Among the conditioned factors, those indicative of sentient beings (sattviikhya,
sattvasal[l,khyiita; i. 10) necessarily arise together with possession (priipti), which
relates to each one of them (ii. 37b). There is no possession of other [factors]. That is
why the stanza says "sometimes" [vii].
Extensive exposition; 246 F 150-244

1. The formations associated with thought (cittasarriprayuktasarriskiira); F 150
2. The formations dissociated from thought (cittaviprayuktasarriskiira); F 178-244247
BAB.I. The formations associated with thought (cittasa1J1,prayuktasa1J1,skara):

forty-six thought-concomitants; 248 F 150-78
1.1. Five determined kinds and one undetermined kind of thought-concomitants; F 150
1.2. Which thought-concomitants arise in association with which thought:
wholesome, unwholesome, etc.? F 165
1.3. Drawing distinctions between similar thought-concomitants; F 169
1.4. Thought and thought-concomitants; F 176
1.4.1. Mind (citta), mind (manas), consciousness (vijiiiina): different in name
but one in meaning; F 176
1.4.2. Thought and thought-concomitants: "having a basis", etc.; F 177
1.4.3. Thought and thought-concomitants: the five equivalences; F 178
BAB.1.1. The five determined kinds and one undetermined kind; 249 F 150-65
[Thought-concomitants (caitta) are mentioned.] What are thought-concomitants? 250
<151> <152>
23cd. Thought-concomitants are of five [determined] kinds: (1) the gener-
ally permeating factors; [(2) the wholesome permeating factors;
(3) the permeating factors of defilement; (4) the unwholesome per-
meating factors; (5) the factors of defilement of restricted scope;
and of one undetermined kind]. 251
Thought-concomitants are of five [determined (niyata)] kinds (prakiira) [i.e., thirty-
eight thought-concomitants]:
1. generally permeating factors (mahiibhumika), those that accompany all
thoughts (ii. 24): [ten thought-concomitants]; 252
2. wholesome permeating factors (kusalamahabhumika), those that accompany
every wholesome thought (ii. 25): [ten thought-conc<:>mitants];
3. permeating factors of defilement (klesamahabhiimika), those that accompany

every defiled thought (ii. 26ac): [six thought-concomitants]; 253
4. unwholesome permeating factors (akusalamahabhiimika), those that accom-
pany every unwholesome thought (ii. 26cd): [two thought-concomitants];
5. factors of defilement of restricted scope (parfttaklesabhiimika), which have
the restricted defilement for their stage (ii. 27; iii. 32ab): [ten thought-con-
comitants]. 254
[Thought-concomitants are of one undetermined (aniyata) kind: eight thought-con-
comitants.255]
BAB.1.1.1. The ten generally permeating factors (mahabhumika); 256 F 152-56

BAB.1.1.1.a. The meaning of the term mahabhiimika; 257 F 152
Bhiimi (stage) signifies "place of movement or arising" (gativifaya; utpattivifaya).
The place of arising of a factor (dharma) is the stage to which this factor belongs.
The "great stage" (mahabhiimi) [i.e., thought] is so called because it is the stage, the
place,of arising, of great factors [i.e., of factors of great extension, which occur
everywhere]. We will call mahabhiimika the factor that is inherent in the great stage
(mahabhiimi), {3 b} i.e., the factor that always occurs in any thought. 258 <153>
BAB.1.1.1.b. The definitions; 259 F 153-55

What are the generally permeating factors (mahabhiimika)?
24. (1) Sensation, (2) intention, (3) ideation, (4) predilection, (5) contact,
(6) understanding, (7) mindfulness, (8) mental application, (9) re-
solve,26() and (10) concentration coexist in any thought.261
These ten factors, according to the School [kila], 262 all (samagra) exist in any
moment of thought (cittak~a-,_ia).
1. Sensation (vedana; tshor ba) is the three kinds of sensation or experience or
· affect (anubhava), i.e., (i) pleasant [su'kha], (ii) unpleasant [du~kha] and (iii) neither-
unpleasant-nor-pleasant (i. 14). 263 <154>
2. Intention (cetana; sems pa) is that which instigates, conditions, informs, models
the thought (cittabhisa1J7,skara; cittaprasyanda); it is mental action [manaskarma] (see
i. 15; iv. 1). 264
3. Ideation (sa1J7,jfia; 'du shes) is conceiving (sa1J7,jfiana), is that which seizes or
apprehends the signs [nimitta; male, female, etc.] of the object-field (vifayanimitta-
graha-,_ia = vi~ayavise~ariipagraha) (i. 14; ii. 34bd, F 177, note). 265
4. Predilection (chanda; 'dun pa) is the desire for action [kartrkamatii]. 266
5. Contact (sparsa; reg pa) is the state of contact (spr~ti) born from the coming
together (sarµnipataja) of (i) tpe sense-faculty, (ii) the object-field [vi~aya] and
(iii) the consciousness (vijfiiina); in other words, it is that factor by virtue of which
(yadyogiit) the sense-faculty, the object-field and the consciousness are as if touching
one another (iii. 30). 267
6. Understanding (prajna, mati; blo gros), referred to in the stanza as mati, is dis-
cernment of factors [dharmii!liirJ1 pravicaya~; i. 2]. 268
7. Mindfulness (smrti; dran pa) is the not-letting-drop (asarµpramo~a) of the
cognitive object (iilambana); a factor by virtue of which the mind (manas) does not
forget (vismarati) the cognitive object, by virtue of which the mind cherishes the
cognitive object so to speak [or clearly notes the cognitive object] (abhila~at[va;
abhilapatlva). 269 (See ix, F 273-79.).
8. Mental application (manaskiira; yid la byed pa) is the tilting or orienting or
alerting (iibhoga) 270 of thought (cetas): that which makes thought lean toward its cog-
nitive object and restricts thought to the cognitive object (iilambane cetasa iivar-
janam avadhiira!lam). (Manaskiira is explained as an act by the mind [manasa~
kiira~] or, in other words, the mind [manas] acts in making (itself) lean toward
[mana~ karoty iivarjayati].) (ii, F 325-28). 271
9. Resolve (adhimok~a; mos pa) is the affirmation [avadhiira!la] [with regard to an
object], [is resolution (adhimukti)]. 272 <155>
10. Concentration (samiidhi; ting nge 'dzin) is the one-pointedness of thought
(cittaikiigratii) toward a cognitive object (agra = iilambana; i. 33); this is the factor
by virtue of which thought, in an uninterrupted stream, remains focused on a cog-
nitive object (viii. 1). 273 <156>
BAB.1.1.1.c. How do we know that the ten generally permeating factors coexist?
F 156
[Question:] - How do we know that these ten thought-concomitants, having distinct

characteristics [bhinnalak~a!la], coexist in one and the same thought? 274
[Answer:] - Subtle [suk~ma], surely, is the distinctive characteristic (vise~a) of
thought and of thought-concomitants. It is discerned only with difficulty (durlak~a)
even when one limits oneself to considering each of the thought-concomitants as
developing in a continuous stream [praviiha; prabandha]; how much more so when
one looks at one psychological moment [k~a!la] in which they all exist together.
If the many tastes [bahurasa] of plants [o~adhi]-tastes which we know through {4 a}

a material sense-faculty-are difficult to distinguish (duravadhiina; duJ:ipariccheda),
how much more so does this hold for non-material factors which are perceived
through the mental consciousness.
BAB.1.1.2. The ten wholesome permeating factors (kusalamahabhumika); 275 F 156-60

BAB.1.1.2.a. The meaning of the term kusalamahabhumika;· 276 F 156
The "stage" of wholesome facto:r;s of great extension is called kusalamahiibhiimi.
Thought-concomitants which rise from this stage are termed the wholesome per-
meating factors (ku§alamahiibhiimika): the factors which occur in any wholesome
thought.
BAB.1.1.2.b. The definitions; 277 F 156-60

25. (1) Faith, (2) diligence or heedfulness, (3) pliancy, (4) equanimity,
(5) modesty, (6) shame, (7-8) two [wholesome] roots: non-greed,
non-hatred, (9) non-harmfulness, and (10) vigor occur only in the
wholesome thought, occur in any wholesome thought.278
BAB.1.1.2.ba. Faith (§raddha)/ 79 F 156-57

Faith (sraddhii; dad pa) is the clarification [or clearing] [prasiida] of thought. 280
<157>
According to another opinion, 281 it is adherence to or firm belief in [abhisarµ-
pratyaya] (1) the doctrine of the effect of actions [karmaphala; iv. 78b], (2) the
three jewels [ratna; Buddha, Dharma, Sarµgha, vi. 73c], and (3) the [four] truths
[satya].
BAB.1.1.2.bb. Diligence or heedfulness (apramada); 282 F 157

Diligence or heedfulness (apramiida;. bag yod pa) is the cultivation (bhiivanii) of
wholesome factors, i.e., the acquisition [pratilambha] and practice [ni~eva~a] of
wholesome factors. 283
Objection: - The acquisition and practice of wholesome factors is none other than the
acquired and practiced wholesome factors. How can you make a separate mental
factor of diligence or heedfulness?
[Answer:] - Diligence or heedfulness is the application or attention (avahitatii) to
wholesome factors. It is said metaphorically [upaciira] that it is cultivation. In fact, it
is the cause of the cultivation [bhiivaniihetu].
According to another school [nikaya], 284 diligence or heedfulness is the guarding

(arak~a) of thought.
BAB.1.1.2.bc. Pliancy (prasrabdhi); 285 F 157

Pliancy (prasrabdhi; shin tu sbyangs pa) {4 b} is that factor through which thought is
clever (karmar:,,yata), i.e., light or apt or versatile (laghava). 286
BAB.1.1.2.bca. Pliancy of the body; F 157-58

(The Sautrantika287 observes:) - But does the Siitra not speak of pliancy of the body
[kayaprasrabdhi]? 288 <158>
[Vaibha~ika:] - The Siitra speaks of pliancy of the body as it speaks of bodily
sensation (kayikf vedana). Any sensation is, in its nature, mental; however, the
Siitra calls bodily the sensation that has the five sense-faculties constituted by
atoms for its basis, the sensation associated with the five sensory consciousnesses
(ii. 7a). Likewise, pliancy of thought [cittaprasrabdhi] that depends on the five
sense-faculties, pliancy of the five sensory consciousnesses, is called pliancy of
the body.
BAB.1.1.2.bcb. Pliancy of the body & member of enlightenment; F 158-59

(The Sautrantika289 replies:) - How can the pliancy of the body [kayaprasrabdhi],
understood in this way, be counted among the members of enlightenment (sa,ri-
bodhyaliga) (vi. 68)? In fact, (1) the five sensory consciousnesses are of the domain
of the realm of desire, since they are "non-concentrated" (asamahita), that is to say,
since they do not occur in a concentrated state, and (2) the members of enlightenment
are "concentrated" (vi. 71a). Thus, in our opinion, in the Siitra which we have cited,
the pliancy of the body is aptitude of the body (kliyavaisaradya) or cleverness of the
body (kayakarmar:,,yata) (viii. 9).
The Sarvastivadin: - How could the pliancy of the body, understood in this way, be a
member of enlightenment? The aptitude of the body is, in fact, impure (sasrava).
(The Sautrantika:) - But it is favorable (anukula) to the pliancy of thought, which is
a member of enlightenment; it receives, for this reason, the name member of enlight-
enment.
The Siitra often expresses itself in this manner. For example:
1. It teaches that joy and the factors (dharma) which cause the joy (prfti-
sthanfya) constitute the member of enlightenment called joy (prftisa,ribodhy-
aliga; vi. 71). 290
2. It teaches that hostility and the causes of hostility (pratighanimitta) consti-

tute the hindrance of malice (vyiipiidanivarar:ia) (v. 59). 291 <159>
3. It teaches that right view (dr~ti), right thinking (sarµkalpa) and right exer-
tion (vyiiyiima) constitute "the element of understanding" (prafiiiiskandha)
(vi. 76): and yet neither thinking, which is initial inquiry (vitarka) in its
intrinsic nature [svabhiiva], nor exertion, which is vigor (vfrya) in its intrin-
sic nature, are [of the intrinsic nature of] understanding; but they are favor-
able [anugur:ia]) to this understanding and are, therefore, considered as [elt!-
ment of] understanding. 292
[Thus,] the pliancy of the body, being a condition of pliancy of thought, is consid-
ered-like the latter, with the latter-as a member of enlightenment.
BAB.1.1.2.bd. Equanimity (upek~a); 293 F 159-60

Equanimity (upek~ii; btang snyoms) is the equivalence, balance or evenness of
thought (cittasamatii), the factor· by which thought remains equivalent, balanced Clr
even (sama), free from tilting (aniibhoga). 294
BAB.1,1.2.bda. Equanimity & mental application; F 159-60

(The Sautrantika: 295 ) - If every thought is associated with mental application
(manaskiira), which is "tilting" or "orientation" or "alerting" in its nature [iibhoga-
iitmafw], how could every wholesome thought be associated with equanimity, which
is non-tilting in its nature [aniibhogiitmika]?
The Vaibha~ika: - We have already commented on this (F 156): the specific char-
acteristic [vise~a] of thought and of thought-concomitants is very difficult to cognize,
to determine (durjfiiina).
(The Satitrantika:)-This is not the focus here: {5 a} it is quite unacceptable that the
same thought is associated with thought-concomitants which are ·contradictory to
each other, like tilting [iibhog]) and non-tilting [aniibhoga], pleasure [sukha] and dis-
pleasure [dut,kha]. 296 <160>
The Vaibha~ika: 297 - There is tilting toward a certain cognitive object, non-tilting
toward another cognitive object: thus, there is no contradiction to the coexistence of
tilting and of non-tilting.
(The Sautrantika:) - If it were like that, the associated thought-concomitants would
not bear on the same cognitive object, which is contradictory to your definition of
associated factors [sarµprayukta; ii. 34d]. For u~, the factors which are contradictory,
here mental application (manaskiira) and equanimity (upek~ii), and later, initial
inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicara; ii. 33), do not exist simultaneously but
successively.
BAB.1.1.2.be. The other wholesome permeating factors; 298 F 160

5-6. We will explain modesty (hrf; ngo tsha shes pa) and shame (apatrapya; khrel
yod pa) later (ii. 32). 299
7-8. [The two roots are] the two wholesome roots: non-greed (alobha; ma chags pa)
and non-hatred (adve~a; zhe sdang med pa) (iv. 8; viii. 29c-30a). 300 In regard to
non-delusion (amoha), the third wholesome root, it is understanding in its nature
[prajiiatmaka]: thus it is already listed among the generally permeating factors
(mahiibhumika ). 301
9. Non-harmfulness (avihirrisa; rnam par mi 'tshe ba) is non-hurting or non-cruelty
(avihefhanii). 302
10. Vigor (vfrya; brtson 'grus) is the enduring energeticness of thought (cetaso
'bhyutsiihal_z). 303
Such are the thought-concomitants which are associated with any wholesome thought.
BAB.1.1.3. The six permeating factors of defilement (klesamahabhumika); 304 F 160-64

aAa.1.1.3.a. The meaning of the term klesamahabhUmika; F 160
The stage of the great defilement factors (mahiiklesadharma) is called mahaklesa-
bhiimi. The [defiled] thought-concomitants that belong to this stage, i.e., that exist in
any defiled (kli~fa) thought, are termed the permeating factors of defilement (klesa-
mahiibhiimika).305 <161>
BAB.1.1.3.b. The definitions; 306 F 161

26ac. (1) Delusion, (2) non-diligence or heedlessness, (3) slackness, (4) non-
faith, (5) torpor and (6) restlessness occur always and exclusively in
defiled thought.307 { 5 b}
1. Delusion (moha; rmongs pa), i.e., ignorance (avidya; iii. 29), non-cogni:ion
(ajiiiina), non-perceiving [asarriprakhyana; mi gsal ba; iii, F 92f.]. 308
2. Non-diligence or heedlessness (pramiida; bag med pa) is the non-cultivation
[abhiivanii], i.e., the non-acquisition and non-practice, of wholesome factors; it is the
opposite [vipak~a] of diligence or heedfulness [apramiida]. 309
3. Slackness (kausfdya; le lo) [is the non-energeticness of thought (cetaso nabhy-
utsiiha)]; it is the opposite of vigor [vfrya]. 310
4. Non-faith (asraddhya; ma dad pa) 311 [is the non-clarity of thought (cetaso 'pra-
sada!i)]; it is the opposite of faith [.fraddha]. 312
5. Torpor (styana; rmugs pa) is the opposite of pliancy (prasrabdhi) (vii. l ld). 313 .
It is said in the Abhidharma (Jnanaprasthana, 925b10):

What is torpor (styana)? -The heaviness (guruta) of the body, the heaviness
of thought, the non-cleverness (akarmm:i,yata) of the body, the non-clever-
ness of thought. Bodily [kayika] torpor and mental [caitasika] torpor are
named styana, torpor.
[Question:]- Now, torpor is a "mental" factor. How can it here be spoken of as
bodily torpor?
[Answer:] - In the same ""ay as there is bodily sensation [kayikf vedanii; see
i, F 157].
6. Restlessness (auddhatya; rgod pa), i.e., non~calmness (avyupasama) of thought
(vii. 1 ld). 314
There are only six factors that are permeating factors of defilement (klesamahii-
bhiimika)..
BAB.1.1.3.c. The ten permeating factors of defilement of the Mula Abhidharma; 315
F 161-64
[Objection:] - But the Mula Abhidharma, 316 on the one hand, says that there are ten
permeating factors of defilement (klesamahabhiimika) and, on the other hand, omits
torpor (styiina) in its enumeration. <162>
BAB.t.1.3.ca. The ten permeating factors of defilement; 317 F 162-63

What are these ten [permeating factors of defilement (klesamahabhiimika)]?
(1) Non-faith (asraddhya), (2) slackness (kausfdya), (3) forgetfulness (mu$itasmrtitii),
(4) distraction of thought (cetaso vik$epa), (5) ignorance (avidya), (6) non-introspec-
tion (asaf!lprajanya), (7) incorrect mental applicatibn (ayonisomanaskara), (8) false
resolve (mithyadhimok$a), (9) restlessness (auddhatya), (10) non-diligence or heed-
lessness (pramiida).
[Reply:] - How foolish you are (devanaf!lpriya!i)! 318 {6 a} You hold on to the letter
and ignore the intention (praptijii.o na tv i$fijii.aft)1 319
[Question:] - What is the intention [i$fi] here?
[Answer:] - Five of the factors mentioned in the Abhidharma as permeating fac-
tors of defilement, namely, (3) forgetfulness, (4) distraction, (6) non-introspection,
(7) incorrect mental application and (8) false resolve, have already been mentioned
as generally permeating factors (mahabhiimika): there is no reason to name them
again as permeating factors of defilement. This is just as in the case of the whole-
some root non-delusion (amoha), which, although being a wholesome permeating
factor (kusalamahabhiimika), is not catalogued as such, because, being understanding
(prajiia) in its intrinsic nature, it is classified as a generally permeating factor (maha-
bhiimika). (See below F 154, note).
(3) Forgetfulness (mu~itasmrtita), in fact, is none other than defiled [kli~{a] mindful-
ness (smrti). 320
(4) Distraction (vik~epa; iv. 58) is defiled concentration (samadhi). 321
(6) Non-introspection (asa1J1prajanya) is defiled understanding (prajiia). 322
(7) Incorrect mental application (ayonisomanaskara) is defiled mental application
(manaskara). 323
(8) False resolve (mithyadhimok~a) is defiled resolve (adhimok~a).
This is why the Milla Abhidharma counts ten permeating factors of defilement by
taking into account the generally permeating factors in the state of being defiled
(kli~fa).
[Question:] -Is a generally permeating factor (mahabhiimika) also a permeating fac-
tor of defilement (klesamahabhiimika)? <163>
[Answer:] - There are four alternatives (tetralemma):
1. sensation (vedana), ideation (sa1J1jfia), intention (cetana), contact (sparsa)
and predilection (chanda) are generally permeating factors only;
2. non-faith (asraddhya), slackness (kausfdya), ignorance (avidya), restlessness
(auddhatya) and non-diligence or heedlessness (pramada) are permeating
factors of defilement only;
3. mindfulness (smrti), concentration (samadhi), understanding (prajiia), men-
tal application (manaskara) and resolve (adhimok~a), [i.e., forgetfulness, dis-
traction, non-introspection, incorrect mental application, false resolve, 324 ]
belong to both categories;
4. the other factors (i.e., wholesome permeating factors, etc.) are foreign to
both categories.
Certain masters (MYS, 220a22) maintain that distraction (vik~epa) is not false con-
centration (mithyasamadhi): the alternatives or categories are then established dif-
ferently; distraction is added to the second category, and concentration is taken out
froiµ the third.
BAB.1.1.3.ch. The omission of torpor (styiina) in the list of the Mula

Abhidharma; 325 F 163-64
As for the following remark [see above]: "The Mala Abhidharma omits torpor
(styiina) in its enumeration of the permeating factors of defilement (klesamahii-
bhiimika)", it is [nevertheless] accepted (i~yate) that torpor is associated with all
defilements [klesa].
[Question:] - If torpor is omitted in the list, {6 b} is this my fault (mamiipariidha)
or the fault of the author of the Abhidharma (iibhidharmika = abhidharmakiira)?
<164>
The .Abhidharmikas 326 explain the omission: - Torpor should be mentioned; it is
not mentioned because it is favorable [anugu~a] to concentration (samiidhi). In
fact, [we Abhidharmikas] declare that persons who are habitually given to torpor
(styiinacarita), i.e., dull persons, realize concentration quicker [k~ipratara] than
persons who are habitually given to restlessness (auddhatyacarita), i.e., restless per-
sons.327
[Objection:] - But who is dull [styiina] without being restless [auddhatya]? Who
is restless without being dull? Torpor and restlessness always go together [saha-
cari~~u].
[Answer by the .Abhidharmikas:] - Yes, torpor and restlessness always go together.
But the term -carita indicates excess (adhimiitra). The persons in whom torpor domi-
nates are called dull, even though they are also restless.
[Response by the author:] - We know this as well as you; but it is because of their
nature that one classifies the factors (dharma) in diverse categories. It is thus
established that [only] six factors are permeating factors of defilement, because they
alone arise with any defiled thought.
BAB.1.1.4. The two unwholesome permeating factors (akusalamahiibhumika); 328 F 164

26cd. (1) Non-modesty and (2) shamelessness occur always and exclusively
in unwholesome thought. 329
These two factors [i.e., non-modesty (iihnkya) and shamelessness (anapatriipya)]-
being defined below (ii. 32)--always occur in unwholesome thought. {7 a} Therefore
they are called unwholesome permeating factors (akusalamahiibhiimika). 330
BAB.1.1.s. The factors of defilement of restricted scope (parfttaklesabhiimika.); 331

F 164-65
27. (1) Anger (krodha),nz (2) enmity (upaniiha),'333 (3) dissimulation (liifhya),334
(4) jealousy or envy (fr~ya), 335 (5) (depraved) opinionatedness (pra-

337
diisa),336 (6) concealment (mrak~a), (7) avarice (miitsarya), 338 (8) deceit
339
(miiyii), (9) pride (mada), 340 and (10) harmfulness (vihiTf'sli), 341 etc.,
are the factors of defilement of restricted scope (panttaklesa-
bhuniika). 342
BAa.1.1.s.a. The meaning of the term par'ittaklesabhiimik:a; 343 F 164-65

They are thus called because they have the small defilement (parfttaklesa) for
their stage (bhiimi). <165> By small defilement (parftta = alpaka) one should under-
stand ignorance (avidya; iii. 28cd), i.e., isolated ignorance (kevala avidya) or inde-
pendent ignorance (ave,:iikf avidya) (v. 14), not associated with attachment [raga],
etc.
They are conjoined with ignorance alone, (1) with the ignorance that is abandoned
by the path of cultivation (bhavanamarga; bhavanaheya), (2) with the ignorance
that pertains to the stage of mental consciousness or mental stage [manobhumika ].
This is why they are called factors of defilement of restricted scope (parfttaklesa-
bhumika). 344
They will be studied in the fifth chapter (v. 46ff.).
BAB.t.t.6. The undeterminedfactors (aniyata); 345 F 165

We have studied five categories of thought-concomitants [i.e., the generally per-
·meating factors, the wholesome permeating factors, etc.]. There are other thought-
concomitants which are undetermined (aniyata), which are sometimes associated
with a wholesome [kusala] thought, sometimes with an unwholesome [akusala] or
non-defined [avyakrta] thought:
1. regret (kaukrtya; 'gyod pa) (ii. 28); 346
2. sleepiness (middha; gnyid) (v. 47; vii. 1 ld); 347
3. initial inquiry (vitarka; rtog pa) (ii. 33); 348
4. investigation (viciira; dpyod pa) (ii. 33); 349
etc., [i.e.: 350
5. attachment (raga; 'dad chags) (iii. 3cd; v. 2bd); 351
6. hostility (pratigha; khong khro); 352
7. conceit (mana; nga rgyal) (ii. 30b; v. 10ab); 353
8. doubt (vicikitsa; the tshom) 354 ]. {7 b}
BAB.1.2. Which thought-concomitants arise in association with which

thought? 355 F 165-69
BAB.1.2.1. Realm of desire: The five classes of thought & the number of associated
thought-concomitants; 356 F 165-68
357
How many thought-concomitants [caitta] arise necessarily [avasya] with each
thought [citta] of each class, with the wholesome, unwholesome and non-defined
thought?
There are five classes [vidha] of thought in the realm of desire:
1. wholesome (kusala) thought constitutes one class;
2-3. unwholesome (akusala) thought constitutes two classes, that is, accord-
ing to whether it is:
• "independent" (ave,:iikl), i.e., associated with ignorance (avidya) alone,
or
• associated with the other defilements, i.e., attachment (raga), etc.;
4-5. non-defined (avyakrta) thought, i.e., [thought that is] unproductive in regard
to retribution, constitutes two classes according to whether it is:
• obscured (nivrta), 358 i.e., associated with the afflicted view of self (sat-
kayadr~ti) or with the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (anta-
grahadr~fi)359 (v. 3), or
• unobscured (anivrta), i.e., an effect of retribution (vipakaja), etc. (i. 3:7;
ii. 71). 360
BAB.1.2.1.a. The class of wholesome thought & the number of associated thought-
concomitants;361 F 165-67
28. Since it is always associated with initial inquiry and investigation,
thought in the realm of desire, when it is wholesome, always in-
volves twenty-two thought-concomitants [i.e., ten generally perme-
ating factors, ten wholesome permeating factors, initial inquiry,
im·estigation]. Sometimes regret should be added.362 <166>
Thought in the realm of desire is always [avasya] associated with initial inquiry
(vitarka) and with investigation (vicara) (ii. 33ab). This thought, when it is whole-
some, [necessarily (avasya)] involves twenty-two thought-concomitants: ten general-
ly permeating factors (mahabhumika); ten wholesome permeating factors (kusala-
mahabhumika); plus two undetermined factors (aniyata), namely, initial inquiry and
investigation.
When wholesome thought involves regret (kaukrtya), the total rises to twenty-three
thoughts. {8 a}
BAB.1.2.1.aa. Regret (kaukrrya); 363 F 166-67

[Question:] - What does the term kaukrtya 364 signify?
[Answer:] - Kaukrtya in the strict sense of the word refers to the nature of that which
is badly done (kukrtabhiiva), but here kaukrtya means a thought-concomitant which
has kaukrtya in the strict sense of the word for its cognitive object (alambana), i.e., it
means remorse (vipratisara) relative to that which is badly done.
In the same way, (1) the gate of liberation (vimok~amukha) which has emptiness
(siinyata) or the absence of self (atman) for its cognitive object is called emptiness
(siinyata) (viii. 24-25); (2) the non-greed (alobha) which has the loathsome (asubhii;
vi. l lcd) for its cognitive object is called the loathsome (asubhii).
In the same way, it is commonly said that the whole village [grama], the whole
town, the whole country [desa], the whole universe has come together, designat-
ing in this way the inhabitants (sthiinin, asrayin) by the name of the habitat (sthiina;
asraya).
Kaukrtya in the strict sense of the word, [i.e., the badly done,] is the basis, the raison
d'etre of remorse; thus remorse is termed kaukrtya. For the effect receives the name
of its cause, as for example, in the text: <167>
The six sense-spheres of [the mental factor called] contact (sparsayatana)
[i.e., the six sense-faculties] are to be known as the former action (pauri'ilJ,al'J'l
karma).365
[Question:] - But how then can the regret that has an action not done [akrta] for
its cognitive object be designated by the name kaukrtya, "regret as the badly
done"?
[Answer:] - Because one says: "Not to have done this action was badly done by me",
designating in this way an omission as "done", "badly done".
[Question:] - When is regret wholesome [kusala]? [When is it unwholesome?]
[Answer:] - [Regret is wholesome] when it is relative (1) to an omitted wholesome
action, (2) to a committed unwholesome action.
[Regret] is unwholesome when it is relative (1) to an omitted unwholesome action,
(2) to a committed wholesome action.
These two kinds of regret both rest on [adhi~thiina] the two categories of action. {8 b}
BAB.1.2.1.b. The two classes of unwholesome thought & the number of associated
thought-concomitants; 366 F 167-68
BAB.1.2.1.ba. Unwholesome thought associated with only ignorance or affeicted
views: twenty thought-concomitants; 367 F 167
29ab. [In the realni of desire;] unwholesome thought involves twenty
thought-concomitants when it is (1) indepe~dent [i.e., associated
with ignorance but not associated with attachment, etc.] or (2) asso-
. ciated with afflicted views. 368
1. Independent (iiver.zika) thought is thought associated with ignorance (avidyii;
v. 1) [only (kevala)], not associated with other defilements, i.e., attachment, (riiga),
etc.369
2. Unwholesome thought associated with afflicted views (dr:fti) is thought associ-
ated with (i) false view (mithyiidr:f{i) or (ii) esteeming of (such things as bad) views
(efr:ffipariimarsa) or (iii) the overesteeming of (such things as) morality and certain
types of spiritual practices (sflavratapariimarsa) (v. 3); [on the other hand,] thought
associated with afflicted view of self (satkiiyadr:f!i) and with the afflicted view of
holding to an extreme (antagriihadr:fti) is not unwholesome (akusala), but obscured-
non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta).
In these two cases, unwholesome thought involves [twenty thought-concomitants]:
ten generally permeating factors (mahiibhumika), six permeating factors of defile-
ment (klesamahiibhumika), two unwholesome permeating factors (akusalamahii-
bhumika), plus two undetermined factors (aniyata), namely, initial inquiry (vitarka)
and investigation (viciira).
Afflicted view (dr:fti) does not count, since afflicted view is a certain understanding
(prajiiii; i. 41cd), and understanding is a generally permeating factor. 370
BAB.1.2.1.bb.Unwholesome thought associated with one defilement or one

subsidiary defilement or regret: twenty-one or twenty-two thought
concomitants; 371 F 167-68
29cd. [In the realm of desire, unwholesome thought involves] twenty-one
thought-concomitants, when it is associated [either] (1) with one of
four defilements [i.e., either with attachment or hostility or conceit
or doubt] [or] (2) with anger, etc. [i.e., with one of the subsidiary
defilements] [or] (3) with regret.372
1. Associated either with attachment [riiga] or hostility [pratigha] or conceit
[miina] or doubt [vicikitsii] (v. 1), unwholesome thought involves twenty-one
thought-concomitants, the same [twenty thought-concomitants] as above, plus attach-

ment or hostility, etc. {9 a} <168>
2. Associated with anger [krodha], etc., [unwholesome thought involves twenty-
one thought-concomitants,] i.e., [the same twenty thought-concomitants as above,]
plus one of the subsidiary defilements (upaklesa) enumerated above, ii. 27.
[3. Even with regret (kaukrtya), (unwholesome thought involves) twenty-one thought-
concomitants, regret being the twenty-first thought-concomitant.]
BAB.1.2.1.c. The two classes of the non-defined thought & the number of
associated thought-concomitants; 373 F 168
30ab. [In the realm of desire,] (1) non-defined thought involves eighteen
thought-concomitants when it is obscured; (2) non-defined thought
involves twelve thought-concomitants in the contrary case [i.e.,
when it is unobscured]. 374
BAB.1.2.1.ca. Obscured-non-defined thought: eighteen thought-concomitants; 375 F 168

In the realm of desire, the non-defined thought, i.e., [the thought that is] unproductive
in regard to retribution, is obscured [nivrta], i.e., covered by defilement (nivrta
= klesacchadita), when it is associated (1) with the afflicted view of self (satkaya-
dr~ti) &r (2) with the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (antagrahadmi). This
thought involves [eighteen thought-concomitants]: ten generally permeating factors
(mahabhiimika), six permeating factors of defilement (klesamahabhiimika); plus
initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicara).
'BAB.1.2.1.cb. Unobscured-non-defined thought: twelve thought-concomitants; 316 F 168

Unobscur!!d [anivrta], non-defined [avyakrta] thought involves twelve thought-
concomitants: ten generally permeating factors, one initial inquiry, one investigation.
The Foreign Masters [bahirdesaka] believe that regret [kaukrtya] can be non-defined,
for example, in a dream [svapna]. - Unobscured-non-defined thought associated with
non-defined regret wiU [thus] involve thirteen thought-concomitants.
BAB.1.2.1.d. Sleepiness (middha) & the number of associated thought-

concomitants;377 F 168
30cd. Sleepiness is not in contradiction to any category [i.e., wholesome,
unwholesome or non-defined]; wherever it occurs, it increases the
number by one. 378
Sleepiness (middha; v. 47, vii. lld) can be wholesome, unwholesome, non-defined.

The thought with which it is associated will thus involve (1) twenty-three thought-
concomitants instead of twenty-two, (2) twenty-four thought-concomitants instead of
twenty-three, (3) etc., according to whether it is (1) wholesome and free from regret,
(2) wholesome and accompanied by regret, (3) etc. {9 b}
BAB.1.2.2. The higher realms: the meditations (dhyana) & the absence of thought-
concomitants;379 F 168-69
31. (1) In the first meditation, the unwholesome thought~concomitants,
regret and sleepiness are absent; (2) beyond that, in the intermediate
meditation, initial inquiry is also absent; (3) beyond that, [i.e., in the
second meditation and above, up to and including the realm of im-
materiality,] in addition, investigation, etc., [i.e., dissimulation and
deceit, are absent]. 380 <169>
1. In the first meditation (dhylina):
i. [the unwholesome thought-concomitants:]hostility (pratigha; v. 1); the series
of anger [krodha], [enmity (upanaha), jealousy or envy (fr~ya), depraved
opinionatedness (pradafa), concealment (mrak~a), avarice (mlitsarya), harm-
fulness (vihil!lsa) (ii. 27),] with the exception of dissimulation (slifhya), pride
(mada) and deceit (mliyli); the two unwholesome permeating thought-con-
comitants (akusalamahlibhumika), i.e., non-modesty [lihrfkya] and shame-
lessness {anapatrlipya] (ii. 32), are absent; plus
ii. regret [kaukrtya], since dissatisfaction [daurmanasya; ii. 8bc] is lacking, and
iii. sleepiness [middha], since material food [kavar.j,fkiira ahiira; iii. 38c] is
lacking.
The other thought-concomitants of the realm of desire exist in the first meditation. 381
2. In the intermediate meditation [dhyanantara], in addition, initial inquiry (vitarka)
is absent.
3. In the second meditation (dhyiina) and above, up to and including the realm
of immateriality, in addition, investigation (viciira), dissimulation [siifhya] and
deceit [miiyli] are absent. 382 Pride (mada) exists in the three realms of existence
(v. 53cd).
According to the Siitra,383 dissimulation and deceit exist up to the world of Brahma,
but not above the heavens in which the sentient beings exist in relationship [sal!l-
bandha] with an assembly (par~ad). { 10 a} Mahiibrahmii, while sitting in his assem-
bly, was asked by bhik~u Asvajit:
Where do the four fundamental material elements [mahiibhiita] completely

disappear?
Incapable of answering, he answered deviatingly by boasting:
I am Brahma, the great Brahmii.,384 the Sovereign [fsvara], the Maker [kartr],
the Creator [nirmatr], the Emanator [sra~tr], the Nourisher [srja], the Father
of all fpitrbhiita].
Later, leading Asvajit out of the gathering, he advised him to return to the Master
and to ask him. 385
BAB.1.3. Drawing distinctions between similar thought-concomitants; 386 F 169-76

BAB.1.3.1. The distinction between non-modesty (ahrf) & shamelessness
(anapatriipya); 387 F 169-71

BAB.I.3.1.a. Definitions; F 169-71
We have seen how many thought-concomitants are associated with each type of
thought in the three realms of existence. We have to specify [the difference] between
thought-concomitants enumerated above. <170>
What is the difference [ntiniikiira~a] between non-modesty (ahrt) and shamelessness
(anapatriipya)?
32a. Non-modesty is disrespect. 388
Lack of respect (agauravatii), { 10 b} i.e., lack of veneration (apratfsatii), 389 lack of
fearful submission (abhayavasavartitii) (1) with regard to the qualities [gu~a]
(loving-kindness [maitrf], compassion [karu~ii], etc.) of oneself and others, and
(2) with regard to the persons endowed with these qualities [gu~avant] (iiciira-
gocaragauraviidisaf!1panna), is what is meant by_ iihrfkya, ahrf, a mental factor
opposed to respect (gaurava, sagauravatii, sapratfsatii, sabhayavasavartitii).
32ab. Shamelessness (anapatrapya or atrapa) is the factor which brings it
about that persons do not see the fearful consequences [bhaya-
adarsitva] of evil.390
[Here] "evil" (avadya) means that which is condemned by the good ones [vigarhitaf!I
· sadbhifi].
Undesired consequences (ani~faphala) are, in this verse (karikii), called fear (bhaya),
because these undesired consequences engender fear.
The condition the person is in who, when involved with evil, does not see the con-
sequences-[more precisely,] the factor which produces this.condition-is shame-
lessness (anapatriipya or atrapa).
BAB.1.3.1.aa. The meaning of the expression "not seeing the fearful

consequences"; F 170-71
Objection. - What do you understand by this expression "not seeing the fearful
consequences" (abhayadarsitva)? Whether you interpret it as (1) "seeing that there
are no fearful consequences" (abhayasya darsitvam), or as (2) "not seeing that there
are fearful consequences" (bhayasya adarsitvam), neither of these two explanations
is satisfactory. In the first case, we have a defiled understanding (prajiia), a wrong
cognition [i.e., seeing wrongly]; in the second case, we simply have ignorance
[avidya] [i.e., not seeing]. <171>
[Answer:] - The expression abhayadarsitva signifies neither (1) seeing [darsana,
darsita; i.e., as defiled discrimination], nor (2) non-seeing [adarsana, adarsita; i.e.,
as ignorance]. It describes a special factor (dharma) which is classified among the
subsidiary defilements (upaklesa; v. 46), which has false view (mithyadr~ti) and
ignorance for its cause [nimitta], and which is called anapatrlipya (shamelessness)
(MVS, 180a17).
BAB.1.3.J.b, Different definitions; F 171

According to other Masters, (1) non-modesty (ahrfkya) is the lack of embarrassment
[alajjana] vis-a-vis oneself [atmapek~a], when one is committing a transgression
[do~a]; (2) shamelessness (anapatrlipya) is the lack of embarrassment vis-a-vis
others [parapke~a], [when one is committing a transgression]. 391
[Objection:] - But in this case, how could it be possible that one considers oneself
and others at the same time?
[Reply:] - We do not say that the two forms of lack of embarrassment are simultane-
ous [yugapad]:
L there is non-modesty-an outflow of attachment (ragani~yanda)-when the per-
sons do not experience embarrassment [alajja] about their transgression while con-
sidering themselves;
2. there is shamelessness-an outflow of delusion (moha)--when they do not
experience embarrassment about their transgression while considering others.
BAB.1.3.2. The distinction between modesty (hrf) & shame (apatrapya); F 171
BAB.J.3.2.a. Definitions; F 17]
(1) Modesty (hn") and (2) shame (apatrapya) are opposed to these two unwholesome
factors (dharma) [i.e., non-modesty and shamelessness]. 392
Their definition, according to the first theory [F 169], is:
1. [modesty is] respect [gauravata], veneration [pratfiata], fearful submission

[bhayavasavartita];
2. [shame is] seeing or fearing the consequences of their manifest vices
[avadye bhayadarsita].
[Their definition,] according to the second theory [F 171], is:
1. [modesty is] decency [or embarrassment (lajjana) vis-a-vis oneself (atnian-
apek~ii), when one is committing a transgression (do~a)];
2. [shame is] human respect [or embarrassment vis-a-vis others (parapek~ii),
when one is committing a transgression].
BAB.1.3.3. The distinction between affection (preman) & respect (gaurava);

F 171-72
BAB.1.3.3.a. Definitions; F 171-72

Some believe that affection (preman) and respect (gaurava) are the same entity.
[What is the difference (nanakiira,:ia) between affection and respect?]
32c. Affection is faith. 393
Affection [preman] is of two kinds: (1) defiled (kli~{a), (2) non-defiled [akli~{a]
(MVS, 151a8).
The fifst is attachment [or craving] (raga; tr~,:ia), for example, affection for one's
wife [dara] or children [putra].
The second is faith (sraddha), for example, affection for one's teacher [sastr], [for
one's master (guru),] for virtuous persons [gu,:ianvita].
[Tetralemma between faith and affection:]
1. Faith may not be affection, namely, faith with regard to the truths of unsat-
isfactoriness and of the origin. <172>
2. Affection may not be faith, namely, defiled affection.
3. Faith may be affection, namely, faith with regard to the truths of cessation
and of the path.
4. The other thought-concomitants, i.e., the factors dissociated from thought,
etc., are neither faith nor affection.
According to another opinion, that is to say, ours, faith is having confidence in
qualities (gu-,_iasa,p,bhavana): from this confidence arises love (priyata), [which
receives the name of affection (preman)]. Affection is thus not faith but the result
of faith.
32c. Respect is modesty.394

As we have explained above (ii. 32a), respect (gurutva, gaurava) is veneration
[pratfsata], etc.
1. (Yet), every modesty (hri) is not respect, namely, the modesty with regard to the
truths of unsatisfactoriness and of the origin. 395 { 11 b}
2. Modesty with regard to the truths of cessation and of the path is also respect.
According to another opinion, respect is veneration (sapratfsata); from respect arises
embarrassment (lajjii), which receives the name of modesty (hri). Thus respect, the
cause of modesty (hri), is not modesty.
BAB.1.3.3.b. Tetralemma between affection & respect; F 172

In regard to that which concerns affection [preman] and respect [gaurava], there are
four alternatives (tetralemma):
1. Affection that is not respect, with regard to one's wife, one's children,
one's companion in the religious life (sardhaviharin), one's pupil (ante-
vasin).
2. Respect that is not affection, with regard to the master of another [anya-
guru], to a virtuous person [guiianvite~u], etc.
3. Respect that is affection, with regard to one's master [svaguru], one's father,
one's mother, etc.
4. Neither respect nor affection: with regard to other persons.
BAB.1.3.3.c. Affection and respect & the three realms; F 172-73

32d. Both [i.e., affection and respect] exist in the realm of desire and the
realm of fine-materiality. 396
Affection [preman] and respect [gaurava] are absent in the realm of immateriality.
<173>
[Objection:] - But you have said that affection is faith (sraddha), that respect is
modesty (hrt): now, faith and modesty are wholesome permeating factors (kusala-
mahabhamika; ii. 25): thus affection and respect should exist in the realm of immate-
riality.
[Answer:] -Affection and respect are of two kinds: (1) relative to factors (dharma)
or (2) relative to persons [pudgala]. The text refers to the second kind; the first kind
exists in the three realms of existence.
532 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Inariyanirdesa)
BAB.1.3.4. The distinction between initial inquiry (vitarka) & investigation

(vicara); F 173-76
BAB.1.3.4.a. Definitions of the Vaibha$ikas; F 173
33ab. Initial inquiry and investigation are grossness and subtleness of

thought, [respectively].397 {12 a}
Grossne~s (audiirikatii), i.e., the gross state, of thought [citta], ~s called initial inquiry
(vitarka; i. 33ab; ii, F 165).
Subtleness (sak~matii), i.e., the subtle state, of thought, is called investigation (viciira;
ii, F 165).
BAB.1.3.4.aa. Objections to these definitions; F 173-74

[Objection:] - How can initial inquiry and investigation be associated (sarp,prayukta)
with thought both at the same time? Can thought be gross and subtle at the same
time?
[Answer:] - According to one opinion,398 (1) investigation is to be compared to cold
water, (2) thought is to be compared to fermented curd which floats on the surface of
this cold water, (3) initial inquiry is to be compared to the warmth of the light rays of
the sun which shirie upon the fermented curd. Because of the water and the sun, the
fermented curd is not too melted [ativilf; atidrava] nor too coagulated [atisyii;
atighana]. In the same way, initial inquiry and investigation are associated (yukta)
with a thought: thought is neither too subtle [atisuk~ma] because of initial inquiry,
nor too gross [atyaudiirika] because of investigation.
[Reply:] - But, we would say, it follows from this explanation that initial inquiry and
investigation are not grossness and subtleness of thought but the cause (nimitta) of its
grossness, the cause ofits subtleness: the cold water and the warm light rays of the
sun are not the solidified state [syanatva] and the fluid state [vilfnatva] of the ghee
but the causes of these two states. <174>
Other objections are presented: - Grossness and subtleness of thought are relative
[iipek~ika] factors. They involve many degrees: (1) [in regard to different stages,] the
thought of the first meditation (dhyiina) is subtle in relation to the thought of the
realm of desire, but gross in relation to the thought of the second meditation; (2) in
regard to the same stage, the qualities and the defilements can be more or less
gross or subtle, since they divide into nine categories .. Thus, i{ initial inquiry and
investigation are grossness and subtleness of thought, we would be forced to admit
that they both exist up to the highest stage of the realm of immateriality. 399 But they
have ceased from the second meditation onwards. - On top of that, grossness and
subtleness cannot establish a specific difference (jiitibheda): thus one cannot differ-
entiate initial inquiry and investigation.
BAB.1.3.4.b. The definitions of (the Sautriintika); F 174

According to another opinion, (according to the Sautrantika,400 ) initial inquiry and
investigation are "constituents for speech" [viiksa,riskiira]. 401 The Siitra says in fact:
It is after having initially inquired, after having investigated (vitarkya;
viciirya) that one speaks, not without having init1ally inquired, not without
having investigated. 402
The constithents for speech that are gross are called vitarkas; { 12 b} those that are
subtle are called viciiras. [According to this explanation, by vitarka and viciira one
should not understand two distinct factors, but rather the collection of thought and
thought-concomitants which provoke speech and which are sometimes gross, some-
times subtle.]
BAB.1.3.4.c. Can initial inquiry and investigation be simultaneous? F 174-76

(The Vaibha~ika:) - What contradiction [virodha] is there in the case where two
factors (dharma)-the first (i.e., vitarka) being gross and the second (i.e., viciira)
being subtle-are associated with one and the same thought?
(The Sautrantika: 403 ) - There would not be any contradiction if these two factors had
a specific difference or difference in type Uiitibheda]; 404 for example, sensation
(vedanii) and ideation (sa,rijnii)--although the first is gross and the second subtle
(i. 22)--can coexist. But, when considering the same type Uiiti], two states, a weak
state and a strong state [mrdhvadhimatratii], a gross state and a subtle state [audiirika-
siik~matii], cannot coexist.
(The Vaibha~ika:) -There is a specific difference between initial inquiry and investi-
gation. <175>
(The Sautrantika:)- What is this difference?
(The Vaibha~ika.) - This difference is difficult to speak about [durvaca]; but
it is manifested (vyakta) through the weakness and strength of thought (mrdvadhF
miitratii).405
(The Sautrantika:) - The weakness and strength of thought does not demonstrate the
presence of two specifically different factors, since one and the same type is some:.,
times weak, sometimes strong.
According to another opinion-i.e., ours-initial inquiry and investigation are not
associated with one and the same [ekatra] thought. They exfst in tum.406
(The Vaibhli~ika would object:) - The first meditation (dhyiina) is connected [yukta]
with five members (viii. 7) including initial inquiry and investigation. <176>
We answer: - The first meditation is connected with five members in the sense that
five members occur in that stage, i.e., the stage of the first meditation; but a
particular moment of the first meditation is connected with only four members,
namely, (1) joy (prfti), (2) pleasure (sukha), (3) concentration (samadhi), plus (4) ini-
tial inquiry or investigation.
BAB.1.3.5. The distinction between conceit (miina) & pride (mada); F 176
BAB.1.3.5.a. Definitions; F 176
What difference [niiniikiira~a] is there between conceit (miina) and pride (mada)?
33b. Conceit is elevation. 407
Elevation of thought (cetasa unnatil:i) is in respect to others. Measuring (mii) the
superiority in regard to qualities which one has or which one believes one has over
others, one elevates oneself and depreciates others (v. 10a).
33cd. On the contrary, pride is the exhausting oneself of the thought of
those who are enamoured with their own qualities.408
Because of its being enamoured [raktasya] with their own qualities, thought
[at first] prides itself, exalts itself and [through that] abolishes or exhausts itself
fparyiidiina]. 409 { 13 a}
According to other masters, in the same way that wine [madya] produces a distinc-
tive joyous excitement (sarriprahar~avise~a) called intoxication, so too does the
attachment [riiga] which persons have for their own qualities. 410
BAB.1.4. Thought and thought-concomitants; 411 F 176-78

BAB.1.4.1. Mind (citta), mind (manas), consciousness (vijiiana): different in name
but one in meaning; 412 F 176-77
We have defined thought (citta) (i. 16) and thought-concomitants [caitta; ii. 23-34].
We have seen in which categories the thought-concomitants are classified, in what
;~umber they arise together, what their different characteristics are. Thought and
thought-concomitants receive different names in the Scriptures. 413 [As for thought:]
34ab. (1) Thought (citta), (2) mind (manas), 414 and (3) consciousness (vi-
jniina), these names designate the same object-referent [ekiirtha]. 415
<177>
1. The mind is named citta (T. sems; thought) because it accumulates or collects
together (cinoti). 416
2. It is named manas (T. yid; mind) because it considers or thinks (manute). 417
3. It is named vijfitina (T. rnam par shes pa; consciousness) because it cognizes its
cognitive object (tilambanaT{l vijtintiti). 418
Some say: 419
1. It is named citta (thought) because it is variegated (citra) [or is accumulated
(cita)] with good and bad elements [subhtisubhairdhtitubhilJ,]. 420
2. [It is named] manas (mental faculty; i. 17) insofar as it is the basis [tadevtisraya-
bhuta], i.e., of the thought that follows it.
3. [It is named] vijfitina (consciousness) insofar as it is based on (tisritabhilta) the
sense-faculty and the object. {13 b}
These three names thus expres~ different meanings, but they designate the same
object-referent.
BAB.1.4.2. Thought and thought.;.concomitants: "having a basis", etc.; 421 F 177-78

34bd. (In the same way,) thought and thought-concomitants are (1) "having
a basis", (2) "having a cognitive object", (3) "having an aspect or mode
of activity", (4) "associated".422
These four different names: "having a basis", etc., [express different meanings, but]
designate the same object-referent.
Thought and thought-concomitants are named:
1. "having a basis" (stisraya), because they are based on sense-faculties [i.e.,
eye sense-faculty, etc., mental faculty];
2. "having a cognitive object" (stilambana; i. 34), because they seize their
object-field (vi~ayagrahm;a );
3. "having an aspect or a mode of activity" (stiktira), because they take on
[tikara~a] a mode or the same features [praktira] according to the cognitive
object [tilambana]; 423 <178>
4. "associated" (saT(lprayukta), i.e., equivalent and united, because they are
equivalent (sama) with each other and not dissociated (aviprayukta) from
each other.
BAB.1.4.3. Thought and thought-concomitants: the five equivalences; 424 F 178

How are they associated (saT(lprayukta), i.e., equivalent and united?425
34d. [Thought and the thought-concomitants are associated] in five

ways.426
Thought and thought-concomitants are associated because of five samenesses or
equivalences (samatii):
1. equivalence with respect to basis [or sense-faculty] (iisraya;_ rten);
2. equivalence with respect to cognitive object (iilambana; dmigs);
3. equiv· 1ence with respect to aspect or a mode of activity (iikiira; mam pa); 427
4. equivalence with respect to time [of occurrence of the activity of thought
and thought-concomitants] (kiila; dus);
5. equivalence with respect to the number of real entities [or the singular
instance of the occurrence of a real entity or the status as real entities]
(dravya; rdzas).
That is to say: the thought-concomitants (sensation, etc.) and thought are associated:
1-3. because they share the same basis, the same cognitive object and the same
aspect or mode of activity;
4. because they [arise and pass away] simultaneously;
5. because, in this association, each kind is represented by only one real
entity (dravya): only one thought can arise at any given moment, and one
sensation (ekarµ vedaniidravyam), one ideation [sarµjiiii], one thought-con-
comitant of each kind are associated with this one single thought. (See
ii. 53cd).
We have explained thought and thought-concomitants in detail together with their
features or categories.428
BAB.2. The formations dissociated from thought (cittaviprayuktasarµskii.ra):

fourteen types; 429 F 178-244
[The law of the simultaneous arising of the-formations dissociated from thought must
now be described.]
What are the formations (sarµskiira) dissociated from thought (cittaviprayukta)?
35-36a. The formations dissociated from thought are (1) possession, (2) non-
possession, (3) [group] homogeneity, (4) the state of non-ideation,
(5-6) the two attainments, (7) vitality [faculty], (8-11) character-
istics, (12) collection of names, etc. [ad11, [i.e., (13) collection of
phrases, (14) collection of syllables,] and those of that type [ca].430
{14 a} <179>
BAB.2.1. The name "formations dissociated from thought"; F 179
These factors (dharma) [or formations (saJ?lskara)] are not associated (saJ?lprayukta;
see above ii. 34d) with thought and they do not have matter or form (rupa) as their
intrinsic nature, but they are included within the aggregate of formations (saJ?lskifra-
skandha; i. 15), hence [these formations] are called cittaviprayukta saJ?lskara (1) because
they are dissociated [viprayukta] from thought and (2) because, being non-material,
they resemble thought [citta].
[The formations dissociated from thought will be discussed under seven headings: 43.1]
2.2. Possession (priipti; ii. 36b, 37) and non-possession (apriipti; ii. 36b, 39c); F 179
2.3. Group homogeneity (nikayasabhiigata); F 195
2.4. State of non-ideation (iisal'[ljfiika); F 198
2.5. Two attainments: attainment of non-ideation (asal'[ljfiisamiipatti) and attainment
of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti); F 200
2.6. Vitality faculty (jrvitendriya); F 214
2.7. Characteristics (lak~m:ia): origination, deterioration, duration, impermanence; F 222
2.8. Collection of names (niimakaya), collection of phrases (padakaya), collection of
syllables (vyafijanakiiya); F 238-44
BAB.2.2. Possession (prapti) & non-possession (aprapti); 432 F 179-95

1. Definitions of possession and non-possession; F 179
2. Possible object of possession and non-possession; F 179
3. Existential status of possession and non-possession; F 181
4. Modes of possession: time periods, moral quality, reafms of existence, relation
to the path, etc.; F 186
5. Modes of non-possession: time periods, moral quality, realms of existence,
.relation to the path, etc.; F 190
6. The root-possession (miilapriipti) & the secondary possession (anupriipti); F 194
7. The increasing number of possessions from moment to moment; p. 194
8. The non-material and accommodating nature of the possessions; p. 195
BAB.2.2.1. Definitions of possession an_d non-possession; 433 F 179

36b. Possession refers to (1) acquisition [labha] and (2) accompaniment
[samanvaya ].434
Possession (prapti) is of two kinds:
1. acquisition (labha; pratilambha) (i) of that which has not been attained
(aprapta) or (ii) of that which has b~en lost (vihfna) [and re-acquired];
2. accompaniment (samanvligama; samanvaya) of that which, having [already]

been attained or acquired [pratilabdha], has not been lost.
[It is established that] non-possession (aprlipti) is the opposite [vipa,yaya] [of pos-
session]. 435
BAB.2.2.2. Possible objects of possession and non-possession; F 179-80
36cd. Possession and non-possession apply only (1) to the factors that fall
within one's own life-stream and (2) to the two cessations [i.e., ces-
sation due to deliberation and cessation not due to deliberation]. 436
<180>
BAB.2.2.2.a. Conditioned factors as possible objects; 437 F 180

1. When a conditioned (sal'J'lskrta) factor (dharma) "falls within one's own life-
stream" (svasal'J'ltlinapatita), there is possession (priipti) or non-possession (aprlipti)
with respect to this factor. 438
2. When a conditioned factor "falls within the life-stream of another person"
[parasal'J'ltlinapatita], there is no [possession ·or non-possession with respect to this
factor], for no one can be accompanied by factors that fall within another life-stream.
3. When a conditioned factor "does not fall withiri any life-stream" [asal'J'ltlitipatita;
asaT{ltlinapatita], there is [likewise] no [possession or non-possession with respect to
.this factor], for no one can be accompanied by factors non-indicative of sentient
beings (asattviikhya; i. lOb). 439
BAB.2.2.2.b. Unconditioned factors as possible objects; F 180

As for unconditioned (asa7!1skrta) factors, { 14 b} there is possession (prlipti) [and
non-possession (apriipti)] of the cessation due to deliberation (pratisal'J'lkhyiinirodha)
and of the cessation not due to deliberation (apratisal'J'lkhyiinirodha) (i. 6; ii. 55).
1. All sentient beings are accompanied by the cessation not due to deliberation with
respect to factors which do not arise due to an insufficiency or deficiency of condi-
tions [pratyayavaikalya].
2. The Abhidharma (Jiiiinaprasthiina, 1022a) expresses itself thus:
Who is accompanied by pure (anlisrava) factors 440? -All sentient beings.
[All sentient beings] are accompanied by the cessation due to deliberation-with
the exception of (i) the noble persons (iirya) in the first moment of the path of in-
sight (iidi~a'l)astha) who are bound by all bondages (sakalabandhana) and (ii) the
ordinary worldlings (prthagjana) who are bound by all bondages. The remaining
noble ones and ordinary worldlings are accompanied by cessation due to delibera-
tion.441
3. No one is accompanied by (samanvtigata) space (tiktisa). Thus there is no pos-
session of space.
BAB.2.2.2.c. Possession and non-possession come in pairs; F 180

According to the Vaibha~ikas, possession and non-possession are in opposition [or
come in pairs]: if there is possession (prtipti) of a factor, there is also non-possession
(aprtipti). 442 As this. is easy to see [and an established principle (siddhanta)], the
stanza does not speaJ.<.ofit in an express manner. <181>
BAB.2.2.3. Existential status of possession & non-possession; F 181-86

(The Sautrantika443 ) denies the existence of a factor (dharma) called possession
(prapti).
How does the Sarvastivadin-Vaibha~ika establish the existence of a distinct real
entity (dravyadharma; bhavtintara)444 called possession (prtipti)? 445
BAB.2.2.3.a. (The Sarviistivada:) proof based on scriptural authority & its

Sautriintika refutation; F 181
The Sarvastivadin: -The Siitra (Madhyamtigama 49, 16) says:·
Through the arising (utptida), acquisition (pratilambha) and accompaniment
(samanvagama) of the ten factors characteristic of those beyond training
(asaik~adharma), noble ones become persons having abandoned five mem-
bers [pafictirigaviprahf,:ia]. 446
(The Sautrantika: 447 ) - If you conclude the existence of possession from this text,
we would comment that one could then also be accompanied (samanvtigama) by
(1) factors non-indicative of sentient beings (asattvtikhya) and also (2) by factors
indicative of other persons (parasattva); [but this goes against the rule stated in
ii. 36cd], for, in fact, the Siitra (Cakravartisutra) says:
Know, 0 bhik~us, that the wheel-turning king (cakravartin) is accompanied
by the seven royal treasures [ratna] ... .448
Now, among these royal treasures, there are (1) the royal treasure of the wheel,
(2) the royal treasure of the queen, etc.
The Sarvastivadin: - In this text, the [non-technical] expression "is accompanied
by" (samanvtigata) signifies "mastery over" (vasitva). It is said that the wheel-
turning king (cakravartin) enjoys mastery (vasitva) over the royal treasures, for
540 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Jndriyanirde§a)
they follow his desire (kiimaciira). But, in the Sutra on "the accompaniment of the
ten factors of a perfected being" (dasiisaik~adharmasamanviigamasiitra), the word
accompaniment [is used in the technical sense and] designates a distinct real entity
[dravyiintara]. 449
BAB.2.2.3.b. The Sarviistivada: proof based on logical reasoning & its Sautriintika
refutation; F 181-83
(Sautrantika objection: 450 ) - If the word "accompaniment" (samanviigama) signifies
"mastery" in the Cakravartisiitra, {15 a} how do you ascertain that, in another Siitra,
this same word designates a possession (priipti), which you maintain has an intrinsic
nature [svabhiiva]? In fact: <182>
1. this possession is not discerned or directly perceived (prajnayate; praty-
ak~a), (i) as this is the case for form [riipa], sound [sabda], etc., (ii) as this is
the case for attachment [raga], hatred [dve~a], etc.;
2. one cannot infer [anumiina] the existence of possession because of its effect
[or activity] (krtya), as is the case for the sense-faculties, the eye sense-
faculty [cak~us], etc. (i. 9): for a similar effect [or activity] is not perceived
[in the case of possession].
BAB.2.2.3.ba. Possession as the cause of the arising offactors (utpattihetu); F 182

(The Sarvastivadin: 451 ) - Wrong [ayoga]! Possession [priipti] has an effect [or activ-
ity]. It is the cause of the arising (utpattihetu) of factors (dharma). 452
· (The Sautrantika: 453 )-This answer is unfortunate [for the following reasons]:
1. You maintain that one can possess the two cessations (nirodha); now these,
being unconditioned, do not arise: only conditioned factors are "caused" (i. 7d).
[Thus possession cannot be the cause of the arising of the two cessations.]
2. As for the conditioned (sa1J1,skrta) factors, there is at present, in a given per-
son, no possession (priipti) (i) of factors which this person has not yet attained
[apriipta], 454 nor (ii) of factors of which this person has abandoned the possession by
means of changing the stage of existence (bhiimisal?lciira) or by means of "detach-
ment" [vairiigya]: 455 the possession of the first has never existed, whereas the posses-
sion of the second has perished. Thus how could these factors arise if the cause of
their arising is possession?
(The Sarvastivadin:) - The arising of these [conditioned] factors-has for its cause the
possession that arises at the same time as they do (sahajapriiptihetuka) .
. (The Sautrantika:) - A regrettable answer! If the factors arose by virtue of possession:
1. then origination Uati] and the origination-of-origination Uiitijiiti] (ii. 45c)

would have no function;
2. then the factors non-indicative of sentient beings (asattviikhya) would not
arise;
3. then how could one explain the distinction among the various grades of
defilements (klesa)-weak [mrdu], medium [madhya] and strong [adhi-
miitra] defilement-in the case of the persons who are bound by all bond-
ages (sakalabandhana): all of these persons, in fact, possess the same pos-
sessions of all defilements of the realm of desire. 456
[The Sarvastivadins might reply:] - This distinction [in the various grades] proceeds
from causes distinct from possession (priipti)? <183>
[The Sautra11tika:] - In that case, these causes [i.e., the causes distinct from posses-
sion] are the only causes of weak, medium or strong defilement; then what would be
the point of assigning possession as causes? {15 b}
BAB.2.2.3.bb.Possession as the cause of the distinction between states of sentient

beings (vyavasthiihetu); F 183
The Sarvastivadin: - Who maintains that possession (priipti) is the cause of the
arising (utpattihetu) of factors? Such is not the role that we attribute to it. For us,
possession is the cause which determines the state or condition [vyavasthiihetu] of
sentient beings. 457 Let us explain: [For argument's sake,] let us suppose the non-
existence of possession (priipti): what distinction could there then be between (1) the
noble ones (iirya) at the moment in which they produce a mundane (laukika) thought
and (2) the ordinary worldlings (prthagjana)? Now the distinction consists solely in
that the noble ones, even when they have a mundane thought, are in possession
(priipti) of a certain number of pure factors (dharma).
BAB.2.2.3.bc. Accompaniment and non-accompaniment as distinction in the basis

or person (iisrayavise~a); 458 F 183-85
BAB.2.2.3.bca. Accompaniment and non-accompaniment of defilements; F 183
(The Sautrantika: 459 ) - For us, the distinction [between the noble one and the ordi-
nary worldling] is that the first has abandoned particular defilements, while the
second has not abandoned them (prahf,;iiiprahz,;iaklesatiivise~a).
The Sarvastivadin: - Without doubt; but if one supposes the non-existence of pos-
session (priipti), how can one say that a defilement is abandoned or not abandoned?
There can only be the abandonment of a defilement through disappearance (vigama)
of the possession of this defilement; the defilement is not abandoned as long as its
possession does not disappear [avigama]. 460
(The Doctrine of the Sautrantikas: 461 ) - To us, [the distinction between the states of]
abandonment [prahf{la] and non-abandonment [aprahf{la] of defilements is made in
terms of a specific condition or difference in the basis or person (iUrayavise:ja; ii. 5,
6, 44d [F 211]);--
l. In the case of the noble ones (arya), the personal basis is totally transmuted
(pariivrtta), becomes different from what it was by means of the power of the path
(i.e., insight into the truths, cultivation). The defi1ement [klesa], once it has been
destroyed by the power of the (noble) path, is not capable of arising further. Just as
grains of rice [vrfhf], being burned by fire [agnidagdha], become different from what
they were before and are no longer capable of germinating,in the same way one says
that the noble ones have abandoned defilements, because their whole personal basis
[asraya] no longer contains the seeds or potencies (bfja) capable of producing the
defilements. 462
2. As for the mundane path [laukikamiirga], this path does not completely de-
stroy the defilements; it only damages or weakens them [upaghiita]: [nevertheless,]
one would say that ordinary worldlings (prthagjana)-who can cultivate only the.
munda,ne path-have abandoned defilements {16 a} when their basis or pepon con-
tains only the seed-states [bfjabhava] of the defilements damaged (upahata) by the
mentioned path.
3. In the opposite case [viparyaya], when the seeds are neither burned [agnir-
dagdha] nor damaged [anupaghiita], one says that persons have not abandoned the
defilements (aprahf{laklesa). <184>
One says that persons are accompanied (samanviigata) by the defilements when they
have not ;,abandoned" them in the manner which we have just explained; one says
that they are not accompanied (asamanvagata) by the defilements when they have
abandoned them. "Accompaniment" and "non-accompaniment" are not real entities
[dravya], but provisional entities (prajfiapti).
So much for that which concerns the accompaniment and the non-accompaniment of
the defilements (klesa).
BAB.2.2.3.bch. Accompaniment and non-accompaniment of wholesome factors; F 184
As for the accompaniment and the non-accompaniment of wholesome (kusala) fac-

tors (dharma), 463 one must distinguish [two modes (prakiira)]:
L the innate wholesome factors not produced through effort (ayatnabhiivin),

which are [referred to asJ those that are acquired at birth (aupapattika, upa-
pattilabhika), and
2. the wholesome factors produced [only] through effort [yatnabhavin], which
are [referred to as] those that are acquired through preparatory effort (pra-
yogika, prayogalabhika; ii. 71b).
1.464 We speak of a person who has accompaniment of the first factors, [i.e., the
wholesome factors not produced through effort,] when the seeds of these wholesome
factors have not been damaged within the person (iisrayasya tadbfjabhiiviin-
upaghiitiit).
When their seeds have already been damaged [upaghiita], one speaks of a person
who has non-accompaniment of the wholesome factors. However in actual fact,
whereas the seeds of defilements can be completely destroyed (atyantarri samud-
ghiita, apoddhara,:ia), as is the case with the noble ones (arya), the wholesome fac-
tors never have their roots completely cut off. This qualification has to be kept in
mind when one says of the persons whose wholesome roots have been cut off (sam-
ucchinnakusalamula) by false view [mithyiidr~fi] (iv. 79-80) that they have aban-
doned these rnots because the seed-states [bfjabhiiva] of these roots-states which
belonged to the person (iisraya; sa,ritati)-have been c;iamaged through false view
(mithytidr~f1).
2. 465 We speak of a person who has accompaniment of the second factors, i.e., the
wholesome factors produced [only] through effort: through listening, reflection, cul-
tivation, when-these factors having arisen-one's mastery and capability (vasitva,
samarthyavise~a) to make them arise [again] is not damaged.
BAB.2.2.3.bcc. Accompaniment & the theory of seeds; F 184-85

Thus, that which is understood by "accompaniment", the "fact of being endowed
with" (samanviigama), is not a factor constituting a distinct real entity (niinyad
dravyam ), < 185> namely, the alleged ·possession (priipti) of the Sarviistivadins, but
[seeds, 466 ] a certain c_ondition (avasthii) of the basis or person or name-and-form
(asraya = niimarupa), that is:
1. seeds of defiled [kli~ta] factors that are not yet uprooted (anapoddhrta) by
the noble path (iiryamiirga);
2. seeds of defiled factors that are not yet damaged (anupahata) by the mun-
dane path (laukikamiirga);
3. seeds of innate (aupapattika) wholesome [kusala] factors that are not yet
damaged by false view [mithyiidr~?i];
4. seeds of wholesome factors produced [only] by effort (priiyogika, yatna-
bhiivin) which are to be nourished to the point of mastery (paripu~tarrz
vasitvakiile ). 467 { 16 b}
When the person (iisraya) is in such a state, this is called accompaniment of defile-
ments, etc.
The Sarvastivadin asks: - But what should be understood by "seed" (bfja)?
[Answer:] - Seed (bfja) is that name-and-form (niimariipa; iii. 30), i.e., the complex
of the five aggregates (skandha), which has capability [samartha] in the production
of its own effect either directly [siik~iit] or remotely (piiramparye~a] (iii, F 81); 468
[this capability becomes effective] by means of a distinctive characteristic in the
transformation of the life-stream (sa1?1tatipari~iima-vise~a; see also ix, F 295f.), 469
whereby:
1. "stream" (sa1?1tati) is the conditioning forces (sa'!lskiira) of the past, present
and future, having the nature of cause and effect [hetuphalabhiita], that con-
stitute an uninterrupted life-stream;
2. "transformation" (pari~iima) of the stream is the change (anyathiitva) [be-
tween prior and subsequent moments] within the stream, the fact that the
life-stream arises differently at each moment;
3. "distinctive characteristic" (vise~a), or the culminating point of this transfor-
mation, is that (moment of this life-stream) which is capable of producing an
effect immediately [anantara]. 470
BAB.2.2.3.bd. Accompaniment and non-accompaniment as consent (adhiviisana);

F 185-86
The Vaibha~ika objects: -The Siitra says: <186>

Those who are accompanied by greed (lobhena samanviigatal:z) are not cap-
able of producing the four applications of mindfulness (smrtyupasthiina;
vi. 14).
(The Sautrantika: 471 ) - In this text, "accompanied by greed" should be understood as
"consent to greed" (adhiviisana, abhyanujfliina), or "not rejecting greed" (avinodana,
avyupasama). The Siitra does not say that the persons in whom the seeds of greed
occur are, [in general,] incapable of producing the applications of mindfulness; it
says that the active greed makes persons, at present, incapable of producing these
spiritual practices.
B. The Way Conditioned Factors Arise & Five~Group Classification of Factors 545
BAB.2.2.3.be. Summary; F 186

To sum up, in whichever manner we might understand accompaniment (samanv-
agama ), either
1. as "cause of the arising [utpattihetu] of factors" (F 182), or
2. as "principle of the condition [or cause of the distinction between states]
[vyavasthahetu] of sentient beings" (F 183), or
3. as "special state [or distinction] in the basis or person" [asrayavise~a]
(F 183); or
4. as "consent to" [adhivasana; avinodana] (F 186),
accompaniment appears to us not as a real entity or real factor (dravyadharma), but
as a provisional factor (prajfiaptidharma).
The same holds for non-accompaniment [asamanvagama], which is purely and
simply the negation (prati~edha) of accompaniment.
The Vaibha~ikas say that both, possession (prapti) and non-possession (aprapti), are
real entities [dravya]. Why?
Vaibha~ikas: - Because this is our doctrine (siddhanta). 472
BAB.2.2.4. Modes of possession (prii,pti ); 473 F 186-90

[This has six topics:]
a. Time periods; F 186
b. Moral quality; F 187
c. Realms of existence; F 187
d. Relation to the path; F 188
e. Factors to be abandoned and not to be abandoned; F 188
f. Particular varieties of the time periods; F 189-90
BAB.2.2.4.a. Time periods & possession; 474 F 186-87

37a. The factors of the three time periods [i.e., past, present and future
factors] have, [in each case,] three varieties of possession [i.e., past,
present and future possession].475
Past factors can be the object of three varieties of possession, i.e., past, present,
future.
The same for present and future factors. 476 <187>
[For a discussion of the exceptions to this general principle, see below F 189f.]
BAB.2.2.4.b. Moral quality & possession; 477 F 187

37b. Good [subha] factors, etc., [i.e., bad (asubha) factors, non-defined
(avyakrta) factors, have, respectively, only] good possession, etc.
[i.e., bad possession, non-defined possession].478
Wholesome [kusala], unwholesome [akusala], non-defined [avyakrta] factors have,
respectively [yathiikrama], [only] wholesome, unwholesome, non-defined posses-
sion.
BAB.2.2.4.c. Realms of existence & possession; F 187

37c. The factors connected. [iipta] to the realms of existence [i.e., the
impure factors] have possession belonging [only] to their own realm
[svadhatu ].479
The factors connected [iipta] to the realms of existence [dhatu] are the impure
(siisrava) factors. The possession of a factor of the realm of desire is, itself, [only] of
the realm of desire; and so forth.
37d. The possession of factors which are not connected [anopta] to the
realms of existence [i.e., the possession of pure factors] has four
varieties.480
To consider this [possession] in general (samiisena), the possession of these fac-
tors-the pure (aniisrava) factors~has four varieties: (i-iii) [the possession] is con-
nected [samiisa] to (one of) the three realms, (iv) [the possession] is pure [i.e., not
connected to any realm].
But it is necessary to make distinctions:
1. The possession of cessation not due to deliberation (apratisalflkhyanirodha)
(see ii, F 180) is connected to the realm to which the persons who attain it
be1ong [i.e., only to the three realms].
2. The possession of cessation due to deliberation (pratisalJlkhyanirodha) is
(i-ii) [only] connected to the realm of fine-materiality (rupadhatu) and
{17 b} to the realm of immateriality (iirupyadhatu), (iii) is pure [i.e., not
connected to any realm]. 481
3. The possession of [the truth of] the (noble) path (miirgasatya; vi. 25d) is
only pure [i.e,, not connected to any realm]. 482 <188>
BAB.2.2.4.d. Relation to the path & possession; F 188

The possession of the factors of those in training (saik~a; vi. 45b) is [only] of those in
training.
The possession of the factors of those beyond training (asaik:ja) is [only] of those
beyond training (asaik:jl). 483
38a. The factors belonging to those neither in training nor beyond
training have three varieties of possession.484
These factors, i.e., the factors belonging to those neither in training nor beyond
training (naivasaik:janiisaik:ja; vi. 45b)-so named because they differ from .the fac-
tors of those in training and from the factors of those beyond training-are impure
factors [sqsrava] and unconditioned factors (asaf!lskrta).
To consider this in general, the possession of these factors is of three varieties. But it
is necessary to make distincti~ms:
1. The possession of the impure factors [siisravadharma] is [only] of those
neither in training nor beyond training (naivasaik:jfniisaik:jl);
2. Likewise, the possession of the cessation not due to deliberation (apratisaf!l-
khyiinirodha) and the cessation due to deliberation (pratisaf!lkhyiinirodha)
attained [priipta] by [the path of] the non-noble-persons [aniirya] [is only of
those neither in training nor beyond training]; 485
3. The possession of the cessation due to deliberation, (i) when attained by the
[noble] path of those in training [saik:jamiirga], is [only] of those in training;
(ii) when attained by the [noble] path of those beyond training [asaik:ja-
. miirga], is [only] of those beyond training.
BAB.2.2.4.e. Factors to be abandoned and not to be abandoned & possession; F 188-89

1. The possession of the factors to.be abandoned [heya] either by the path of insight
or by the path of cultivation is abandoned, respectively, either by the path of insight
or by the path of cultivation. Thus, from the point of view of abandonment, the
possession [priipti] belongs to the category of these factors (ii. 13).
2. As for the factors not to be abandoned [aheya], their possession is differentiated
[bheda] (as follows):
38b. The factors not to be abandoned [i.e., the pure factors] have two
varieties of possession [i.e., to be abandoned and not to be aban-
don~d].486
The factors not to be abandoned are pure (aniisrava) factors (i. 40b, ii. 13d). <189>
1. The possession of the cessation not due to deliberation (apratisaf!lkhyiinirodha)
is to be abandoned by the path of cultivation (bhiivaniiheya) [i.e., is not "not to be
abandoned"].
The same for the possession of the cessation due to deliberation (pratisarµkhya-
nirodha) attained by [the path of] the non-noble-persons [anarya].
2. But the possession of the cessation due to deliberation attained by the path of the
noble ones is pure, i.e., not to be abandoned [aheya]. { 18 a}
The same for the possession of the noble path [and of the truth of the (noble) path,
i.e., it is pure and not to be abandoned]. 487
BAB.2.2.4.f. Particular varieties of the time periods & possession; F 189-90

BAB.2.2.4.fa. Possession of the unobscured-non-defined factors & the. time periods;
F 189-90
We have established the general principle [utsarga; ii. 37a]: "The factors of the three
time periods have, [in each case,] three varieties of possession [i.e., past, present and
future]." [Since there are exceptions (apavada) to this general principle,] we must be
more specific.
38cd. The possession of [unobscured,] non-defined factors arises [only]
simultaneously [sahaja] with them, with the exception of the posses-
sion of (1-2) the two superknowledges [of seeing and hearing] and
of (3) the [thought of supernormal] "emanation".488
The possession of unobscured-non-defined factors (anivrtavyakrta) arises [only
(eva)] simultaneously [sahaja] with those factors (dharma), i.e., it does not arise
either prior to them [agraja] or subsequent to them [pascatkalaja]. When they are
past, the possession is [only] past, when they are future, the possession is [only]
future. This is due to the weakness [durbalatva] 489 of these [unobscured-non-defined]
factors.
This rule, [however,] does not apply to all of the unobscured-non-defined fac-
tors. [Exception must be made for (varjayitva)] (1-2) the superknowledge of
the [divine] eye and of the [divine] ear (divyacak~urabhijiia, divyasrotrabhijiia;
vii. 45ab) and (3) the thought of emanation (nirma,:iacitta), which are strong (bala-
vat), because they are accomplished by an extraordinary or special effort (pra-
yogavise~a); therefore, [even though they are included among these factors whose
nature is unobscured (anivrta) and non-defined (avyakrta),] they have possession
which arises prior to [purva], subsequent to [pascat] and simultaneously with [saha]
them. 490 <190>
Certain masters491 maintain that the possession of the unobscured-non-defined factors
of skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthanika) and proper depprtment (airyapathika)
categories (ii. 72)-when they have been the object of an intense practice (atyartham
abhyastam = bhrsam atmanaft krtam)-arises [not only simultaneously with] but also
prior to and subsequent to them. {18 b}
BAB.2.2.4.fb. Possession of the obscured-non-defined forms & the time periods;

F 190
[Does only the possession of the unobscured-non-defined factors arise simultane-

ously with them?]
39a. The possession of obscured, [non-defined] forms also arises [only]
simultaneously with them. 492
. The possession (prapti) of obscured-non-defined (nivrtavyakrta) forms (rilpa) arises
only simultaneously with these forms. These forms are bodily action and vocal action
resulting from an obscured-non-defined thought (kliya-, vligvijfiaptirilpa). These
actions, even though produced by a strong [adhimlitra] thought, are incapable-as
this thought itself-of creating the non-informative action (avijfiapti; iv. 7a): hence
they are weak [durbala; daurbalya]. 493 Thus the possession of these forms arises only
simultaneously with them, but not prior to or subsequent to them.
BAB.2.2.4.tc. Possession of wholesome and unwholesome factors & the time

periods; F 190
Is the tri-temporal differentiation [bheda] of the possession (prtipti) of wholesome
and unwholesome factors (dharma) subject to certain restrictions, as is the case with
the possession of non-defined factors?
39b. The possession of [wholesome or unwholesome] forms within the
realm of desire does not arise prior [agraja] to these forms [i.e., it
arises simultaneously and subsequently].494
The possession of these wholesome [kusala] or unwholesome [akusala] 495 forms
(rilpa), for example, the pratimok~a restraint (pratimok~asarJlvara; iv. 19 and so on),
does not arise prior to its having arisen. The possession arises simultaneously or
subsequently, not prior.
BAB.2.2.s. Modes of non-possession; 496 F 190-95

[This has five topics:]
a. Moral quality; F 190
b. Time periods; F 190
c. Realms of existence; F 191
d. Relation to the path; F 191
e. Discarding of non-possession; F 193-94
550 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (/ndriyanirdesa)
BAB.2.2.s.a. Moral quality & non-possession; F 190

Can non-possession (aprapti), like possession (prapti), be good, bad, non-defined?
39c. Non-possession is [always only] undefiled and non-defined [akli,1fa-
avyakrta].497
Non-possession is always [only] unobscured-non-defined (anivrtavyakrta; ii. 66).
BAB.2.2.s.b. Time periods & non-possession; F 190-91

39d. [The factors of the] past and future time periods (atftajata) [each]
have three varieties of non-possession [i.e., past, present, future]. 498
{19 a} <191>
The non-possession of past and future factors (dhanna) can be past [atfta], future
[anagata] and present [pratyutpanna]. But one necessarily possesses the present fac-
tors: thus present factors can only have past and future [but not present] non-posses-
sion. 499
BAB.2.2.s.c. Realms of existence & non-possession; F 191

40a. (1) The factors connected [apta] with the realms of existence and
(2) the stainless [amala] factors have a threefold [non-possession]
[i.e., belonging either to the realm of desire, or the realm of fine-
materiality, or the realm of immateriality]. 500
1. The non-possession of the factors connected to the sphere of the realm of desire
belongs either to the realm of desire, the realm of fine-materiality or the realm of
immateriality, according to whether the person endowed with this non-possession
belongs to such and such a realm of existence.
2. The same applies to the non-possession of the pure (anasrava) factors [i.e., the
non-possession belongs either to the realm of desire, the realm of fine-materiality or
the realm of immateriality].
BAB.2.2.s.d. Relation to the path; 501 F 191-93

In fact, non-possession (aprapti) is never pure [anasrava; see ii. 39c]. 502
Why?
40bc. According to the School, the non-possession of the (noble) path is
referred to as the nature of an ordinary worldling; 503
As is said in the Miilasastra (Jiianaprasthana, 928c5; MVS, 232b9):
What is the nature of an ordinary worldling (prthagjanatva)?....: It is the non-

acquisition of the noble factors (aryadharma,:zam alabhal:i).
[Non-acquisition (alabha) means non-possession (aprlipti).]
Now, the nature of an ordinary worldling (prthagjana) is not pure [anasrava]; thus
the non-possession (aprapti = alabha) is not pure.
BAB.2.2.5.da. Three definitions of the nature of an ordinary worldling; 504 F 191

Let us examine this definition:
[Question:] - When the Siistra teaches that the nature of an ordinary worldling is the
non-acquisition of the noble factors, to what noble factors does it refer? These factors
begin with the receptivity to the cognition of the factors with regard to unsatisfac-
toriness (du~khe dharmajnanak~anti) and include the entire pure path or noble path
(vi. 25).
BAB.2.2.5.daa.The definition of the ordinary worldling according to the School:

"the non-acquisition of all noble factors ",'. 505 F 191-92
The Sarviistiviidin. - The Siistra means to refer to all these factors since'it does not
specify any. < 192>
[Reply:] - Be careful! To believe you, the persons in possession of the receptivity
with _regard to unsatisfactoriness (du~khe k~anti) would be ordinary worldlings since
they do not possess all the other noble factors.
The Sarviistiviidin. - The Siistra, [when defining the nature of an ordinary worldling,]
means to speak of the non-acquisition [of all or any noble factors], which is not
mixed with [vinli] the acquisition [of any noble factor]: the persons of whom you
speak, [however, i.e., the persons in possession of the receptivity with regard to
unsatisfactoriness,] although they have no acquisition of the other noble factors, are
not ordinary worldlings because the non-acquisition of these other [noble] factors is
mixed with the acquisition of the receptivity [with regard to unsatisfactoriness]
(k~anti). This is quite evident, for, otherwise [anyathii], even the Lord Buddha, who
does not have accompaniment of those [noble] factors characteristic of the "family"
[gotraka] of the listeners (sravaka) and of the self-enlightened ones (pratyekabµd;dha)
(vi. 23), would be an ordinary worldling (anarya).
[Reply:] - Very well. But if this were so, the Siistra should say: "The nature of an
ordinary worldling is exclusively the non-acquisition (alabha eva) of the noble fac-
tors [i.e., is without any acquisition of noble factors]", and not: " ... the non-acquisi-
tion (alabha)":
The Sarvastivadin: - The Sastra expresses itself very well, for single words (eka-
pada) (Nirukta, 2, 2) allow a restrictive meaning (avadhtira"l}tini) so that the par-
ticle eva is not necessary: (for example,) abbhak~a means "those who live on
water alone [as food]", and vtiyubhak~a, "those who live on air alone [as food]".
{ 19 b}
BAB.2.2,s.c1ab. A different definition of the ordinary worldlihg: "the non-possession

of the first stage of the path of insight and its concomitantfactors"; 506
F 92-93
According to another opinion,507 the nature of an ordinary worldling [prthagjanatva]

is the non-acquisition [altibha] of the first stage of the path of insight, i.e., the
receptivity to the cognition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness (dul_zkhe
dharmajfitinak~tinti) and its concomitant (sahabhu) factors [i.e., sensation, etc.]
(vi. 25).
Objection: - In this hypothesis, at the sixteenth moment (mtirge 'nvayajfitina), the
noble ones would [again] become ordinary worldlings and [would no longer be]
noble ones: for, in this moment, the initial receptivity (k~tinti) is discarded. 508
[Answer:] - No, for the non-acquisition of the receptivity (k~tinti), which constitutes
the nature of an ordinary worldling, has been completely [atyanta] destroyed [hata-
tva] in the first stage [of the path of insight].
Objection: - The receptivity in question has three varieties: (1) the receptivity of
the family [gotra] of listeners (srtivaka), (2) the receptivity of the family of self-
liberated ones (pratyekabuddha), (3) the receptivity of the family of Buddhas (vi. 23).
To which of these three varieties do you refer in your definition of the nature of an
ordinary worldling?
[Answer:] - We mean to refer to all three varieties of receptivity.
[Objection:] - Be careful! Because then the Buddha, who does not possess the three
varieties of receptivity, would be an ordinary worldling [antirya]. <193>
[Answer:] - We mean to refer to the non-acquisition of the receptivity, which is not
mixed with [vinti] the acquisition ... and so on, as above, to the examples: "those who
live on water alone", "those who live on wind alone".
BAB.2.2.s.c1ac.The Sautrantika definition of the ordinary worldling: "the life-

stream in whtch the noble factors have not yet arisen"; F 193
[Objection:] - Then [tarhi] the effort [yatna] undertaken to avoid [parihtira] the
[first] objection [purvapak~ado~a; F 192f.]: "Be careful! To believe you, the persons
in possession of the receptivity with regard to unsatisfactoriness (dulJ,khe k:jiinti)

would be ordinary worldlings ... " is useless [vyartha].
I
[Answer:] -The good [siidhu] explanation is that of the Sautrlintikas. 509 For them, the
life-stream which has not yet produced noble factors (anutpanniiryadharmii sarµtatil:i)
is the nature of an ordinary worldling fprthagjanatvam]. 510
BAB.2.2.s.e. Discarding of non-possession; F 193-94

How is non-possession (apriipti) discarded [vihtyate]?
40cd. [The non-possession of a factor] i~ discarded (1) by the possession
(priipti) [of that factor] and (2) by pa~sing to another stage. 511
.For example, the non-acquisition [aliibha] of the nople path, which constitutes the
nature of an ordinary worldling (prthagjana), is discarded [vihfyate] (1) when one
acquires (liibha) the noble path,512 (2) when one passe~ to another stage [bhumi-
sarµciira ]. 513
The same holds for the non-acquisition of the other factors. 514 .<194>
BAB.2.2.6. The root-possession (mulaprii,pti) & the secondary possession

(anuprii,pti); 515 F-190
Objection: - [According to this view,] the non-possession is dis~arded (vihfyate)
first when the non-possession of the non-possession occurs [¥tpadyqte], i.e., when,
changing to another stage of existence, one ceases to possess the. nature of an
ordinary worldling; and second when the possession of the. non-possess\on is cut off
[chidyate], i.e., when by attaining the noble path, one cuts off the nature of an
ordinary waddling. {20 a} Does this mean
1. that there is a possession (i) of the possession and. (ii) of the non-possession,
2. that there is a non-possession (i) of the possession and (ii) of the non-posses-
sion?
[Answer:] - Yes: (1) of the possession (priipti) and (2) of the non-possession
(apriipti), there is (i) a possession and (ii) a non-possession which are called, [respec-
tively,] (i) secondary possession (anupriipti) and (ii) secondary non-possession [anu-
apriipti]. Thus
1. the root-possession (mulapriipti) and
2. the secondary possession (anupriipti) or possession of possession (pr.iiptipriipti)
are distinguished.
[Objection:] - Does this doctrine not lead to infinite regress (anavasthii)? 516
[Answer:] - No, for through the power of the possession of possession (priiptipriipti
= anupriipti), one is accompanied by the possession (priipti), and vice versa [i.e.,
through the power of the possession, one is accompanied by possession of posses-
sion]. There is accompaniment of one another (parasparasamanviigama). 517
Let us explain:
When a certain factor occurs in a given person (sa,ritati), three factors arise together,
namely:
1. this factor itself, which is called root-factor (maladharma);
2. the possession of this root-factor;
3. the possession of this possession.
The person in question is accompanied (samanviigata) by the root-factor and
the possession of the possession through t~e power of the arising of the posses-
sion.
This person is accompanied by the possession through the power of the arising of the
possession of the possession.518
Thus, there is no infinite regress.
BAB.2.2.1. The increasing number of possession from moment to moment; F 194
1. At the very moment when a wholesome (kusala) or defiled (kli~ta) factor5 19

arises, three factors arise together, including this wholesome or defiled factor,
namely: (i) the root-factor (muladharma), (ii) its possession (priipti), (iii) the posses-
sion of this possession (priipti-priipti). 520 <195>
2. At the following moment, six factors (dharma) arise together, namely: (i) the
possession of the root-factor, (ii) the possession of possession of the first mo-
ment, (iii) the possession of the possession of the possession (priipti-priipti) of the
first moment, plus (iii-vi) three secondary possessions (anupriipti) through the
power of which one is in accompanimertt of the three aforementioned posses-
sions.
3. At the third moment, eighteen factors arise together, namely, (i-ix) nine posses-
sions (priipti): the possessions of three factors produced at the first moment, the
possessions of six factors produced at the second moment, plus (x-xviii) the nine
secondary possessions (anupriipti) through the power of which one is in accompani-
ment of the nine aforementioned possessions.
4. The possessions (priipti) of this kind continue increasing in number from
moment to moment. 521 The possessions of present and future defilements (klesa
and upaklesa), and of wholesome innate factors (upapattiliibhika; ii. 71b) along
with the factors that are associated (,mrriprayukta; ii. 53cd) and coexisting (saha-
bha; ii. 50b) with them {20 b} arise in an infinite [ananta] number from mo-
ment to moment throughout beginningless and endless transmigration [anadyanta-
sarrisara ].
BAB.2.2.s. The non-material and accommodating nature of the possessions; F 195

-
If one considers the life-stream of- a single sentient being in the course of
transmigration, [the possessions] which arise in each moment are infinite in num-
ber.
To consider the entirety of sentient beings, [the possessions] are without measure,
without limit.
How wondrous it is [bata], [the possessions] posse_ss a great quality [atyutsava]: they
are [non-resistant (apratighiitin),] non-material [arupi~itva], they give a place to one
another [avakiisamakase labhante].
If they were material, the possessions of a single being could not find a place
[avakasa] in the universe [akasa]; not to speak of the possessions of two sentient
beings! {v, 1 a} 522
BAB.2.3. Group homogeneity (nikayasabhagata); 523 F 195-98

1. Definition; F 196
2. The name "group homogeneity"; F 196
3. The range of the group homogeneity; F 196
4. Existential status: reasons for the group homogeneity to be a real entity; F 196
5. Discarding and acquiring the homogeneity of sentient beings; F 197
6. Five objections to the group homogeneity being a real entity; F 197
7. Discussion based on scriptural authority; F 198
BAB.2.3.1. Definition; 524 F 195-96

What is the [group] homogeneity (sabhagata; nikayasabhaga)?
41a. [Group] homogeneity is (that which causes) the resemblance [siimya]
among sentient beings.525 <196>
[Vaibha~ikas:] - There is a real entity (dravya) called [group] homogeneity
(sabhagata). [It is the mutual similarity [siidrsya] among sentient beings,] a factor
(dharma) by virtue of which (1) sentient beings as well as (2) the factors in-
dicative of sentient beings (sattvasarrikhyiita; i. 10) are mutually similar or homo-
geneous (sadrsya; sabhaga; sama; samana; sadrsa) among themselves (MVS,
138a9).
BAB.2.3.2. The name "group homogeneity"; F 196

In the Sastra (Jiiiinaprasthiina, etc.), this real entity is given the name group homo-
geneity (nikiiyasabhiiga): 526 the author [i.e., Vasubandhu] uses the term sabhiigatii [in
verse 35 and 41a] for metrical reasons [slokabandhiinugu,:iyat].
BAB.2.3.3. The range of the group homogeneity; 527 F 196

BAB.2.3.3.a. Homogeneity of sentient beings (sattvasabhiigatii): two types; 528 F 196
The homogeneity [of sentient beings] (sabhiigatii) is of two kinds:
1. general or non-differentiated (abhinna) [homogeneity of sentient beings] and
2. particular or differentiated (bhinna) [homogeneity of sentient beings].
The first occurs in all sentient beings [sarvasattva]: by virtue of it, there is the
resemblance of each sentient being [pratisattva] with all sentient beings. It is called
[general or non-differentiated] homogeneity of sentient.beings (sattvasabhiigatii). 529
The second has innumerable varieties or subdivisions: each of these subdivisions
occurs only in certain sentient beings. - Sentient beings are distinguished accord-
ing to. [the specificness (pratiniyatii) in terms of] (1) the realm of existence (dhiitu:
the realm of desire, etc.), (2) t~e different stages (bhiimi) of these realms, (3) plane of
existence (gati; iii. 4: hell byings, etc.), (4) mode of birth [yoni; iii. 9: born from
an egg, ,etc.], (5) caste (jiiti; Brahman, .etc.), (6) gender [strfpuru~a], (7) status of lay-
man (upii.saka) (iv. 14), of fully ordained monk (bhik~u), of those in training
(saik~a), of perfected bein,gs (arhat), etc. 530 { 1 b} This holds as well for the homo-
geneities (sabhiigatii), [i.e., they are distinguished according to the re.aim of exis-
tence, etc.,] by virtue -of which each sentient being of a distinctive species
resembles all sentient beings of this species. 531
BAB.2.3.3.b. Homogeneity offactors (dharmasabhii.gatii.); F 196
Further, there is [also] a homogeneity with regard to factors indicative of sen-

tient beings-[called] homogeneity of factors (dhannasabhiigatii)-which is dis-
tinguished according to the aggregate (skandha), sense-sphere (iiyatana) and ele-
ment (dhiitu) [classifications]: that is, homogeneity of the aggregates (skandha-
sabhiigatii), etc., homogeneity of the aggregate of form (riipaskandhasabhiigatii),
etc. 532 ·
BAB.2.3.4. Existential status: reasons for the group homogeneity to be a real

entity; F 196
1. If the .homogeneity of sentient beings (sattvasabhagatii) did not exist as
a non-particular (avisi~ta) real entity, there would be no notions (buddhi) or
provisional designations (prajfiapti) "sentient beings" in general [abhedena], etc.,

in regard to sentient beings who are specified (bhinna) by means of mutual dis-
tinctions.
2. In the same way, it is solely by virtue of the homogeneity of factors (dharma-
sabhagata) that the notions and provisional designations "aggregate", "element",
etc., are justified. 533 <197>
BAB.2.3.5. Discarding and acquiring the homogeneity of sentient beings; F 197

Does it happen that one transmigrates, i.e., dies [cyavet]) and is reborn [upapadyeta],
without discarding [vijahyat] and without acquiring fpratilabha] a certain homogene-
ity of sentient beings (sattvasabhagata) ("humans", etc.) [i.e., without changing a
certain homogeneity]?
Tetralemma (catu:jkofi) [between transmigration & changing a homogeneity]:
1. one dies in one place (the realm of desire, for example) and is reborn in the
same place: the homogeneity remains the same, in spite of there being trans-
migration;
2. one enters into the stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment
is assured (niyamavakranti; vi. 26a), [i.e., the first stage of the path of
insight,] by discarding the homogeneity of an ordinary worldling (prthag-
janasabhagata) and by acquiring the homogeneity of a noble one (arya-
sabhagata): there is no transmigration;
3. [both:] one dies in one plane of existence, i.e., the plane of existence of
"humans" [manu:jya], etc., and is reborn in a different plane of existence
(gatisaf!Zcara ).
4. [neither:] All other cases.
BAB.2.3.6. Five objections to the group homogeneity being a real entity; F 197-98
(The Sautrlintika534) does not accept the existence of the factor called [group] homo-
geneity (sabhagata) an~ presents several [i.e., five] objections.
BAB.2.3.6.a. 1. Objection: homogeneity of an ordinary worldling is the nature of

an ordinary worldling; F 197
If a certain real entity called homogeneity of an ordinary worldling (prthagjana-
sabhagata) existed, what would be the use in assuming the nature of an ordinary
worldling (prthagjanatva) consisting of the "non-acquisition of the noble factors"
(see ii. 40c)? Somebody would be an ordinary worldling by means of the homo-
geneity of an ordinary worldling, just as somebody is a human being by means of the
homogeneity of a human being (manu~yasabhiigatii): for the Vaibha~ikas do not

assume a nature of a human being (manu~yatva) different from the homogeneity of a
human being. 535
BAB.2.3..6.b. 2. Objection: homogeneity cannot be known or inferred; F 197

[Since it has no form (arupin),] the world [loka] does not know [pasyati] the [group]
homogeneity (sabhiigatii) by direct sense perception (pratyaksa); one does not infer
' .
the existenc~ of the [group] homogeneity (paricchinatti; anumiina) by an operation
of understanding (prajiiii), for the [group] homogeneity does not exercise any
action by wb\ch one could kno,w it: {2 a} nevertheless, although the world does
not know anything of a homogeneity of sentient beings (sattvasabhiigatii), it recog-
nizes (pratipadyate) the undifferentiated category of "sentient beings" (sattviiniif!1
jii.tyabheda). Thus, supposing that the [group] homogeneity exists, what would be its
function (vyiipii.ra )?536
BAB.2.3.6.c. 3. Objection: homogeneity of insentient entities; F 197

Why does the School not allow the homogeneity (sabhiigatii) to insentient entities
[asattva], such as rice [siili],. barley [yava], mango [mii.~amra], bread-fruit tree
[panasa], iron [loha], gold [kii.iicana]? Yet generic [sadrsya] designations or catego-
ries LJati] are used in regard to them. 537
BAB.2.3.6.d. 4. Objection: an infinite regress results since other general group

homogeneities are required; F 197
The various kinds of [group] homogeneity (sabhiigata) recognized by the School,
i.e., the homogeneity of (1) sentient beings and (2) the homogeneities of the realms,
of the des~inies, etc., are mutually different [anyo'nyabhinna]. Yet then there has
to be [another] general [abhedena] notion [buddhi] and provisional designation
[prajiiapti] for all of them: all are [group] homogeneities. 538 [Thus there would be the
fault of an infinite regress.] <198>
BAB.2.3.6.e. 5. Objection: the group homogeneity is nothing other than the

Vaise~ika categories of generality or particularity; F 198
The Sarvastivadin champions (dyotayati) the doctrine of the V aise~ikas. The
Vaise~ikas accept (1) a certain category (padiirtha) called generality or universal
(sii.mii.nya; spyi), by virtue of which there occur "common" notions and designations
[samanapratyaya] with regard to [specific kinds of] entities [atulyaprakiira]; they
believe also in (2) another category called particularity (vise~a), by virtue of which
there occur "distinctive" notions and designations with regard to specific kinds
[of entities]. 539
The Vaibhii~ika protests: Our theory is not to be confused with that of the Vaise~ikas,
who believe that the universal (siimiinya), a single category (padiirtha), exists in the
multitude of individuals (eko 'py anekasmin vartate). Thus, if I would agree (dyotita)
with the Vaise~ikas in terms of accepting the universal (siimiinya), I still condemn the
interpretation which they give to it.
BAB.2.3.7. Discussion based on scriptural authority; F 198
As for the [gtoi.Ip] homogeneity (sabhiigatii), it is an individual real entity (dravya),

for the Fortunate One, speaking of a murderer who is reborn in hell, goes on to say:
If he comes back here and. acquires the sabhiigatii of "humans"[manu,rya] ...
(Madhyama, 24, 3). 540
(The Sautriintika541 answers:) - By expressing itself in this way, the Siitra does not
refer to the existence of a distinct real entity [dravyiintara] called [group] homo-
geneity. {2 b}
[Question:] - Then what does the Siitra refer to by the term sabhiigatii?,
(The Sautrii.ntika:) -The Siitra refers to the "conditioning forces (sa1'flskiira) of a
certain nature" to which the designations "humans", etc., are provisionally applied
much in the same way as homogeneity (sabhiigatii) is applied to rice [siili], barley
[yava] and so on. 542
This opinion is not accepted by the Vaibhii.~ika. 543
BAB.2.4. State of non-ideation (asaf!1-fnika); 544 F 198-200

1. Nature & the state of non-ideation; F 198
2. Effects & the state of non°ideation; F 199
3. Location & the state of non-ideation; F 199
4. Being "with ideation" at birth and when falling from the state of non-ideation; F 199
5. Realm of desire as location of rebirth after the state of non-ideation; F 200
BAB.2.4.1. Nature & the state of non-ideation; F 198-99

What is the state of non-ideation (iisa1J1jfiika)? <199>
41bc. The state of non-ideation is [a factor which is able to cause] the
cessation of thought and thought-concomitants [for a period of
time] among [those sentient beings who are] without ideation.545
For those born among the gods [deva] who are sentient beings546 without ideatiod
[asaf!ljiiisattva], there is a factor (dharma) called state of non-ideation which is able
to cause the cessation [nirodha] of thought and thought-concomitants. This factor [is
a real entity (dravya)] which can obstruct [saf!lnirudhyantt!] future thought and
thought-concomitants, and can cause them not to arise [notpattuf!l labhante] for a
period of tike [kalantara], 547 like the dam which prevents the flow of the water of a
river ~nadftoyasaf!lnirodhavat). 548
BAB.2.4.2. Effects & the state of non-ideation; 549 F 199

41d. (This factor is exclusively) a ripened effect.550
It is exclusively [ekantena] a ripened .;:!ffect [vipaka; i. 37, ii. 57a] produced by the
attainment of non-ideation (asaf!ljiiisamapatti; ii. 42a). 551
BAB.2.4.3. Location & the state of non-ideation; F 199

Where do sentient beings without ideation [asa7!ljiiisattva] abide?
4Jd. [Sentient beings without ideation] abide among the Brhatphala gods
[i.e., within the fourth meditation].552
In the heaven of the Brhatphalas ["Abundant Fruit"; i.e., within the fourth medita-
tiqn,] there is an elevated region [pradesa] which is the abode of sentient beings
withouNdeation; just as the abode of the Mahabrahmas-the intermediate stage
(dhyanantarika) [i.e., the elevated region located between the first and second medi-
tatfon]-arises in the heaven of the Brahmapurohitas (i.e., within the first medita-
tibn.;553 iii. 2c; MVS, 784b5).
BAB.2.4.4. Being "with ideation" at birth and when falling from the state of non-
ideatio~; F 199-200
[Question:] - Do the sentient beings without ideation receive their name because they
are always "without ideation" [asa7!ljiia], or are they sometimes "with ideation"
[sa7!ljiiii]? <200>
[Answer:] - They are "with ideation" at birth [upapatti] and when falling [from this
region] [cyuti], i.e., when dying (iii. 42; MVS, 784c8); 554 they are called sentient
beings without ideation because their ideation [sa7!ljiiii] is suspended for a long
period of time. {.3 a} When, after this long period of time, an ideation arises
again, they fall, i.e., they die. As is said in the Siitra:
Similar to a person who wakes up after a long sleep, [those beings who
have abided there for a long time,] will fall, i.e.; die, when ideation arises
again.
BAB.2.4.5. Realm of desire as location of rebirth after the state of non-ideation;

F200
Dying in the heaven of sentient beings without ideation, they are necessarily reborn
in the realm of desire and in no other place.
1. In fact, since the power of attainment of non-ideation (asaf!Zjnisamiipatti;, ii. 42a)
by which these beings are born among the sentient beings without ideation h~s been
exhausted [parik~aya] and since in the course of their existence among sentient
beings without ideation they were not in a position to practice again the attainment of
non-ideation [to accumulate (upacaya) future effects], they die like arrows [i~u]
which, [having been shot into the air,] quickly fall to the ground when their momen-
tum or impetus is exhausted (k~fnavega).
2. On the other hand, sentient beings who will be reborn among the sentient beings
without ideation necessarily possess an action the effects of which are [also] to be
experienced later, i.e., in the third life-time or after [karmiiparaparyiiyavedanfya],
within the realm of desire (iv. 50b), and to be experienced in the second or next life-
time. This is similar to the case of sentient beings who will be reborn in Uttarakuru
(iii. 90cd); they necessarily [also] possess an action the effects of which are to be
experienced in a rebirth among the gods [devopapattivedanfya] immediately after the
existence in Uttarakuru.
BAB.2.s. The two attainments (samii,patti); 555 F 200-14

1. The attainment of non-ideation (asafJ1jiiisamiipatti); F 200
2. The attainment of cessation (1J,irodhasamiipatti); F 203
3. Summary; F 210
4. The rearising of thought after attainment; p.F211
5. Existential status & the two attainments and the state of non-ideation; F 213-14
The Mulaiiistra says:

What are the two attainments (samiipatti)? 556 - The attainment of non-
ideation (asaf!ljfiisamiipatti) and the attainment of cessation (nirodhasam-
iipatti). 557
BAB.2.s.1. The attainment of non-ideation (asaY(ljfiisamiipatti); 558 F 200-3

I. Nature and name; F 200
2. Location; F 201
3. The intended purpose why ordinary worldlings practice the attainment of non-
ideation; F 201
4. Moral quality; F 201
5. The time of sensing the effects of the attainment of non-ideation; F 201

6. Practitioners; F 202
7. The way of acquisition; F 202
BAB.2.s.1.a. Nature and name & the attainment of non-ideation; F 200

What is the attainment of non-ideation (asarp,jfiisamiipatti)?
42a. (As the state of non-ideation [iisarp,jnika] is a factor ( able to cause
the cessation of thought and thought-concomitants,) in the same
way [tatha], the attainment of non-ideation [is a factor able to cause
the cessation of thought and thought-concomitants].559 <201>
The attainment of non-ideation is the attainment in which 'the practitioners are
without ideation (asarp,jfiiniirp, samiipattiJ:i) or the attainment which is without idea-
tion [asarp,jfiii]. 560
The phrase "in the same way" [tathii] indicates that this attainment, {3 b} like the
state of non-ideation (ii.sarp,jiiika), is able to cause the cessation of thought and
thought-concomitants.
BAB.2.s.1.b. Location & the attainment of non-ideation; F 201

To which stage (bhumi) does [the attainment of non-ideation] belong?
42b. [The attainment of non-ideation is located] in the last [stage of]
. meditation.561
In order to practice [paryiipanna] this attainment, the practitioners should enter into
the [last meditation (antyadhyana), i.e.,]the fourth meditation (dhyiina), [and in
no other stage (anyabhiimika)].
BAB.2.s.1.c. The intended purpose why ordinary worldlings practice the

attainment of non-ideation; F 201
For what intended purpose [artha] is [the attainment of non-ideation] practiced [sam-
iipddya]?
42b. [The attainment of non-ideation is practiced] with a desire for
deliverance [nifisrtfccha].562
The practitioners [i.e., ordinary worldlings only] falsely claim [manyante] that the
millennium-state of non-ideation (ii,sa,pjfiika) which constitutes the [ripened] effect
of the attai.rurtent of non-ideation, is true escape or deliverance [ni~sara~a]. [They
practice\it with a desire for liberation (mok~akiima).]
BAB.2.s.1.d. Moral quality & the attainment of non-ideation; 563 F 201

The state of non-ideation, being a ripened effect, is necessarily morally non-defined
(avyakrta).
42c. (As for the attainment of non-ideation, it is) good [.fubha]. 564
[This attainment of non-ideation is wholesome (kusala)]. It produces as its ripened
effect the five aggregates (skandha) of the gods without ideation who, as we know,
are "with ideation" at birth [upapatti] and when falling [from this region (cyutz), i.e.,]
when dying.
BAB.2.5.1.e. The time of sensing the effects of the attainment of non-ideation; F 201
To what category does this attainment belong from the point of view of sensing its
effects?
42c. [The effects of the attainment of non-ideation] are to be experi-
enced only in the next life. 565
[The attainment of non-ideation is to be experienced only in the next life (upapadya-
vedanfya).] It is not (1) to be experienced in the present life [dr~fadharmavedanfya]
nor (2) to be experienced later, i.e., in the third lifetime or after [aparaparyaya-
vedanfya], nor (3) are its effects undetermined [aniyata] (iv. 50). 566
Without doubt, the practitioners can retrogress (pariha) from this attainment after
having produced it; but, according to the Vaibha~ikas, they will produce it again and
will be reborn among the sentient beings without ideation. 567 That is to say, the
practitioners who acquire (labhin) this attainment will certainly not enter into the
stage in which the eventual attainment of enlightenment is assured (niyomlivakranti;
vi. 26a). 568 <202>
BAB.2.5.t.f. Practitioners & the attainment of non-ideation; 569 F 202

42d. (This attainment is practiced by ordinary worldlings only and) not
by noble ones. 570 { 4 a}
Noble ones [arya] see this attainment as a deep pit, a calamity (vinipatasthana, i.e.,
apayasthana: an unfortunate rebirth state, or giri-tafa-vinipatasthana) and do not
desire to enter or practice it. 571
On the contrary, ordinary worldlings (prthagjana) identify the state of non-ideation
(asa"f!ljfiika) with true liberation [mok~a], they have the notion of escape (nil;isara,:za-
sa"f!ljfia) in regard to it, and thus practice [samapadyante] the attainment which leads
to it. But the noble ones know that the impure (sasrava) cannot be true liberation.
Thus they do not practice this attainment.
BAB.2.s.1.g. The way of acquisition & the attainment of non-ideation; F 202

[Question:] - When the noble ones (arya) enter [labha] into the fourth meditation
(dhyana), do they attain [pratilabhante] the possession (prapti) of this past and future
attainment, [i.e., the attainment of non-ideation], as one attains the possession of the
past and future fourth meditation as soon as one enters into the fourth meditation? 572
[Answer:] -The non-noble-ones themselves do not attain [pratilabha,;,te] the posses-
sion of the past and future attainment of non-ideation.
[Question:] - Why?
[Answer:] - [First,] since even if one would have formerly practiced it on several
occasions, this attainment can be accomplished only through great efforts or great
mental instigation (mahabhisaf!lskarasadhy~). 573
42d. ([Second,] since attainment of non-ideation is not thought [acitta],) it
is acquired belonging to one time period [ekadhvikii 'pyate] [i.e., the
present].574
One acquires (iipyate, labhyate) this attainment, not as past [atzta], not as future
[anagata], but as of a single time period [ekakiilika], i.e., as present time period
[vartamanakalika]; just as this is also the case for the pratimok~a restraint (prati-
mok~asa1'{lvara; iv. 35). <203>
In the second moment [k~a~a] of this attainment and in all the moments which follow
the acquisition of this attainment until the moment when it comes to an end, one is
accompanied [samanvagata] by it as past and present. On the other hand, it is not
possible to acquire the possession (prapti) of this attainment while it is still future
(niiniigata bhavyate) because this attainment is not thought [acittakatva]. 575
BAB.2.s.2. The attainment of cessation (nirodhasamapatti); 576 F 203-10

1. Nature; F 203
2. Distinctions between the two attainments & modes of the atta~nment of
cessation; F 203
i. Intended purpose why noble ones practice the attainment of cessation; F 203
ii. Location; F 203
iii. Moral quality; F 203
iv. The time of sensing the effects of the attainment of cessation; F 204
v. Practitioners; F 204
3. The way of acquisition; F 204
4. Other similarities with and distinctions from the attainment of non-ideation; F 207
5. Retrogression; F 208
BAB.2.s.2.a. Nature & the attainment of cessation; 577 F 203

What is the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti)? 578
43a. The attainment which bears the name of cessation (nirodha) is also
like~ise, [i.e., it is a factor able to cause the cessation of thought and
thought-concomitants].579
Like the state of non-ideation (ii.saJ?l}iiika; ii. 41 b) and the attainment of non-ideation
[asamjiiisamiipatti; ii. 42a], the attainment of cessation is also thus: it is a factor
which is able to cause the cessation of thought and thought-concomitants.
BAB.2.s.2.b.Distinctions between the two attainments & modes of the attainment

of cessation; F 203-4
What are the differences (vise~a) between the attainment of non-ideation and the
attainment of cessation?
43bd. [(1) The attainment of cessation is practiced] in order to [reach] a
peaceful abode; (2) [it is] produced from [the sphere of] Bhaviigra
[i.e., the summit of cyclic existence]; (3)[it is] good; (4) its effects
·are to -be experienced at two [specified times, i.e., in the next life
or later,] and are undetermined; (5) it is acquired by noble ones;
(6) it is [only] attained through preparatory effort [prayoga-
labhya].580
BAB.2.s.2.ba. The intended purpose why noble ones practice the attainment of
cessation; F 203
Noble ones (iirya) practice this attainment of cessation because they consider it as
peaceful abode or concentration [siintavihiira]. 581
As for the attainment of non-ideation, it is practiced [by ordinary worldlings]
because the state of non-ideation [iisaJ?l}iiika] is regarded as escape or liberation
(ni~sara,:ia = mok~a).
BAB.2.s.2.bb. Location & the q,ttainment of cessation; F 203

[The attainment of cessation] is located in the stage [bhumi] of the summit of cyclic
existence (bhavii.gra), 582 i.e., it is entered from the attainment of the perception-
sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation (naivasarµJiiii.nii.sa1J1,}iiii.yatana; viii. 4 );
whereas the attainment of non-ideation is located in the stage of the fourth meditation
(dhyiina).
BAB.2.~.2.bc. Moral quality & the attainment of cessatio~; 583 F 203

[The attainment of cessation] is wholesome; it is neither non-defined [avyakrta] nor
defiled [kli~fa] since its originating cause is wholesome (iv. 9b). <204>
BAB.2.5.2.bd. The time of sensing the effects of the attainment of cessation; F 204
[The attainment of cessation] has two kinds of ripened effects [vipaka] which are
(1) to be experienced in the next life (upapadyavedanfya) or (2) to be experienced
later, i.e., in the third lifetime or after (aparaparyayavedanfya) (iv. 50). 584
It is also unde,terrnined [aniyata], [i.e., it might never develop into a ripened
effect] since the practitioners who practice it can enter nirvil!la in the present exis-
tence.
[Question:]- Of what does its ripened effect consist?
[Answer:] - This attainment is able to produce the four [non-material] aggregates
(skandha) within bhavagra, i.e., in an existence in bhavagra (iii. 3). {5 a}
BAB.2.5.2.1ie. Practitioners & the attainment of cessation; F 204

[The attainment of cessation] is acquired by noble ones (arya) only, not by ordinary
worldlings (prthagjana ). 585 These latter are not capable of giving rise to it
1. because they dread annihilation (ucchedabhfruiva), 586
2. because this attainment can only be given rise to by the power of the noble
path: in fact, it is the practitioners for whom nirvil!la is present [dr~ta-
dharmanirva!la] who are resolved with regard to this [attainment].587
BAB.2.5.2.c. The way of acquisition & the attainment of cessation; F 204-7

Although acquired by the noble ones (arya), [the attainment of cessation] is not
attained [labhya] by the mere fact of detachment (vairilgya). It is attained only
through preparatory effort (prayogalabhya).
One cannot acquire [labhyate] this attainment as past or future, [because it is brought
into existence by the power of thought (cittabalena tadbhavanad)]; this point has
been explained in the discussion of the attainment of non-ideation (ii. 42d).
BAB.2.5.2.ca. The Muni & the attainment of cessation; F 204-7
[(Question:)- Did the Fortunate One also attain (the attainment of cessation) through
preparatory effort (prayoga)?
(Answer:) - He did not.]
44ab. In the case of [the attainment of cessation of] the Muni, it is attained
with enlightenment (bodhi) and not before, for the Muni attains
Bodhi in thirty-four [consecutive] moments. 588 <205>
The Lord Buddha acquires the attainment of cessation at the time when he becomes a
Buddha, i.e., at the same time [samakiila] as the cognition of exhaustion (k~ayajfiiina;
vi. 67). 589 No quality (gu~a) of the Buddha is attained through preparatory effort
[prayoga]; all of his qualities are attained by the simple fact of detachment
[vairiigya]: as soon as he desires it, the collection of qualities appear at his will. 590
[Objection:] - How is it that the Fortunate One, at the time of the enlightenment
(bodhi), i.e., the cognition of exhaustion (k~ayajfiiina), without having previously
given rise to this attainment (nirodhasamiipatti), becomes one who is liberated
through both parts (ubhayatobhagavimukta), i.e., (1) liberated from the obstacle con-
stituted by defilements (klesiivara~a) and (2) liberated from the obstacle to medi-
tative attainment (samiipattyiivara~a; vi. 64)?591
[Answer:] ~ He becomes one who is liberated through both parts, just as if he
had previously produced this attainment, for he possesses mastery [vasitva], i.e., the
power to realize this attainment if he merely wishes (MVS, 780b26). {5 b}
BAB.2.5.2.caa. The opinion of the Westerners; F'205

The Westerners (Pasciitya)592 claim that the Bodhisattva first gives rise to this attain-
ment in the state of those in training [sai~iivastha], and afterwards attains enlighten-
ment.
Why do we not adopt this opinion? This would be to follow the Netrfpadasiistra
of the Sthavira Upagupta, which says: "One who, after having given rise to the
attainment of cessation, gives rise to the cognition of exhaustion, should be called
a Tathiigata. "593
BAB.2.5.2.cab. The opinion of the Vaibhii~ikas of Kasmfr; F 205-7

The Vaibha~ik1;ts of Kasmir deny that the Bodhisattva gives rise to the attainment
of cessation [nirodhasamiipatti] before giving rise to the cognition of exhaustion
(k~ayajfiiina). <206>
The School [kila] maintains infact (MVS, 780b10) that the Bodhisattva attains
enlightenment in thirty-four [consecutive] moments, namely:
1. sixteen moments which constitute the direct realization of the truths (satya-
abhisamaya; vi. 27), and
2. eighteen moments which constitute the abandonment of the defilements
in bhaviigra (that is, naivasal'Jl}fiiiniisal'Jl}fiiiyatana) [through detachment
(vairiigya)]: that is to say, those of the nine [moments of the] unhindered
568 Chapter Two: Exposition df the Faculties (Jndriyanirdesa)
path (.ii.nantaryamarga) and nine [moments of the] path of liberation (vi-

muktimarga; vi. 44). The eighteenth moment is the cognition of exhaus-
tion.
These thirty-four(= 16 + 18) [consecutive] moments suffice because, before enter-
ing into the direct realization of the truths, the Bodhisattva, still an ordinary
worldling (prthagjana; iii. 41), has detached himself [vftaraga], through the mun-
dane path, from all the stages (bhumi) with the exception of bhavagra. - The
eighteen moments form a series in the course of (antara) which the noble one
does not give rise to a dissimilar moment of thought [visabhagacitta], i.e., a mun-
dane, impure (sasrava) thought, for example, the thought to enter into the attain-
ment of cessation. Thus the Bodhisattva, in the state of those in training [saik~a-
avastha], i.e., before being a perfected being (arhat), enters the direct realization of
the truths and the eighteenth moment of the abandonment of bhavagra, and so
does not give rise to the attainment of cessation.
Objection qy the Foreign Masters (bahirdesaka), 594 [i.e., Westerners]: - What fault
(do~a) would there be if the Bodhisattva produced this impure [sasrava] thought,
[i.e., the dis~imilar mom~nt of thought, in the course of these thirty-four consecutive
moments]? {6 a}
[Answer:] - In this hypothesis, the Bodhisattva would veer from his intention
(vyuttha.,,asaya}:i syiit) [to attain enlightenment]; 595 but the Bodhisattva does not veer
from his intention.
[Foreign Masters:] - It is true that the Bodhisattva does not veer from his intention
[to attain enlighteninent];,but this does not mean to say that he does not veer from the
pure path in order to give rise to an impure thought.
[Question:] - How, in this hypothesis, would he not veer from his intention [to attain
enlightenment]?
[Foreign Masters:] - He has undertaken the intention [to attain enlightenment]
(Madhyamagama, 56, 6):
As long as I have not attained [aprapta] the exhaustion of all fluxes [a.frava-
k~aya], I will not break [na bhetsyami] this cross-legged position [for
meditation] (utkutukasana; paryanka). 596 <207>
Now, the Bodhisattva does not veer from his intention [to attain enlightenment], for
it is in a single "sitting" (asana; vi. 24ab) that he completes his goal [sarvarthapari-
samapti]. 597
BAB.2.s.2.d. Other similarities with and distinctions from the attainment of non-
ideation; F 207-8
Although the two attainments, i.e., the attainment of non-ideation and the attain-
ment of cessation, have many distinctions [vise~a], they have this ·in common
[siimya]:
44c. Both [of these two attainments] have their basis [asrayaJ in the
realm of desire and the realm of fine-materiality. 598
[Both of these attainments, i.e., attainment of non-ideation and the attainment of
cessation, will be produced (utpatsyate) in the realm of desire and the realm of fine-
materiality.]
· To deny that the attainment of non-ideation occurs in the realm of fine-materiality is
to contradict the Miilasiistra: 599 <208>
There is a type of existence in the realm of fine-materiality which is not
endowed with the five aggregates [paiicavyavaciira], 600 namely, (1) those of
th~ realm of fine-materiality who [are abiding in a dissimilar moment of
thought (visabhagacitta) among the gods who] are "with ideation" [sa,ri-
jfi.inii,ri deviiniim] by nature,@ who enter into or practice (samiipanna)
the attaiI?-ment of non-ideation or the attainment of cessation,ro2 { 6 b} \or
(2) those of the realm of fine-materiality who are born among gods without
ideation who have attained the state of non-ideation (tisa,rijnika).ro 3
From this passage, it results that the two attainments are practiced by sentient beings
[who have their basis] in the realm of desire and of the realm of fine-materiality
[kiimariipiisraya].
There is, however, this distinction [vise~a] between the two attainments:
44d. The attainment of cessation [is produced] for the first time [aditasJ
among human beings [nr~u]. 604
A person who has never produced the attainment of non-ideation can produce this
attainment [for the first time in one whose basis is] either in the realm of desire or in the
realm of fine-materiality; but it is necessary to be a human being [manu~ya] [in the realm
of desire] in order to produce the attainment of cessation for the first time [prathamatas].
BAB.2.s.2.e. Retrogression & the attainment of cessation; F 208-10
Human beings, noble ones (iirya), who have produced the attainment of cessation,
can retrogress from it (parihii,:ii), can lose the possession (priipti) of it, can be reborn
in the realm of fine-materiality and produce this attainment there once again.
[Question:] - Can one retrogress [pariha~i] from the attainment of cessation, which
is similar (sadrsa) to nirva~a?
BAB.2.s.2.ea. The opinion of the Vaibha~ikas; F 208-9
The Vaibha~ikas answer: - Yes; to deny retrogressing would be to contradict the

Udayisutra: 605 <209>
[Sariputra:] 0 Venerable ones [ayu~mant]! There are bhik~us [in this world
(tatra)] who, having perfected [saJ?lpanna] morality [sfla], concentration
[samadhi], understanding [praj,ia], are able to enter and emerge from [the
cessation of ideatipn and sensation [saJ?ljiiaveditanirodha], i.e.,] the attain-
ment of cessation, repeatedly; [it is true that] this is possible. If they are
unable to attain iijiia [i.e., the faculty of final and perfect knowledge] 606
either in this present life or at the moment of death when their present body
is broken up, they will surpass the gods who eat material food [kava¢zkara]
to be reborn in a divine body produced by the mind (manomayakaya). {7 a}
Having been reborn there, they will again repeatedly enter and emerge ~rom
[the attainment of the cessation of ideation and sensation, i.e., the attainkent
of cessation; [it is true that] this is possible.
This passage shows in fact that one can retrogress from the attainment of cessation
(nirodhasamapatti). [This is so, because,] on the one hand, Lord Buddha has ex-
plained that the "divine body produced by the mind" of which Sariputra speaks (in
this passage) is in the realm of fine-materiality. 607 On the other hand, the attainment
of cessation of ideation and sensation is located only in bhaviigra, the highest stage
of the realm of immateriality. If bhik~us who have attained this attainment (tal-
liibhin), would not retrogress from it, if they would not lose it, they would not be able
to be reborn into the realm of fine-materiality. 608 <210>
BAB.2.s.2.eb. The opinion of the Mahasarµghikas; F 210

609
According to another school, the attainment of cessation also belongs to the fourth
meditation (dhyana) and is not subject to retrogressing.
[Reply:] - This opinion is .~ot correct. This attainment does not belong to the
fourth meditation [of the re~lm of fine-materiality], for the Siitra teaches that one
acquires nine successive stages of meditative attainments [anupurvasamapatti]. 610
[Objection:] L How then does one explain the meditative attainment called meditative
attainment which leaps over (vyutkrantaka; viii. 18c), in which the practitioners leap
over various stages of meditative attainments?
[Answer:]-The rule [niyama] of the successive production of meditative attainments

concerns beginners. 611 Those who have acquired mastery [vasitva] leap over the
meditative attainments at will.
BAB.2.5.3. Summary; F 210-11

BAB.2.5.3.a. Six distinctions; F 210-11.
There are thus (the following six) distinctions [vise~a] between the two attainments:
1. the attainment of non-ideation and
2. the attainment of cessation,
from the point of view:
i. of the stage [or location] [bhumi]:
• the first is of the fourth meditation (dhyana),
• the second is of bhavagra (perception-sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-
ideation);
ii. of the motive or preparation (prayoga):
• the first proceeds from [mental application (manasikara) directed toward]
the notion of escape [ni~sara~a] which is falsely identified with the state
of non-ideation;
• the second, proceeds from [mental application directed toward] the notion of
a peaceful abode [santavihara];
iii. o"f the life-stream or practitioner (sa'!ltana) in which they occur:
• the first occurs in an ordinary worldling (prthagjana);
• the second, in a noble one (arya);
iv. of the nature of their [ripened] effects [phala]:
• the first produces birth among those without ideation [i.e., the state of non-
ideation (asa1'Jl}iiika)];
• the second, birth in bhavagra (Kathavatthu, xv. 10);
v. of [the time of] experiencing the [ripened] effects [vedanfya]: {7 b}
• [the effect of] the first is determined (niyata), is to be experienced in the next
life [upapadyavedanfya];
• [the effect of] the second is determined in the case of a non-returner
(aniigamin) and undetermined [aniyata] in the case of a perfected being.
(arhat); when it occurs, it is to be experienced in the next life [upapadya-
vedanfya] or later, i.e., in the third lifetime or after [aparaparyiiyavedanfya]; ,
vi. of where they are produced for the first time fprathamotpiidana]: <211>
• the first is produced indiscriminately within the two realms of existence
[i.e., the realm of desire or the realm of fine-materiality];
• the second, only among human beings.
BAB.2.s.3.b. Common characteristic and explanation of the name of the two

attainments; F 211
The common: characteristic of these two attainments is the cessation of thought and
thought-concomitants (cittacaittiiniil'Jl nirodhal:i).
[Objection:] - [If they have this common characteristic,] why is the first attainment
called attainment of non-ideation (asal'Jljfiisamiipatti) and the second attainment of
cessation of ideation and sensation (sal'Jljftiiveditanirodhasamiipatti)?
[Answer:] - [They are so called] because the motive or preparation (prayoga) of
the first is merely opposed (pratikula) to ideation [sa1Jljftii], 612 whereas the motive
or preparation of the second is opposed to both ideation and sensation (i. 21). 613
Likewise, [although] the cognition of another's mind (paracittajftiina; vii. Sb) bears
[also] upon the thought-concomitants [i.e., sensation (vedanli), etc.] of another, it
receives a restrictive name because its motive or preparation refers only to the
thought of others. 614
BAB.2.5.4. The rearising of thought after the attainment; F 211-13

~n these two attainments, thought is interrupted [or stopped] [niruddha] for a long
time (bahukiila). 615
[Question:] - How then does it happen that-leaving this attainment-thought once
again arises LJiiyate], considering that thought has been interrupted [or stopped] for
such a long time? 616
BAB.2.5.4.a. The Vaibha#ka theory; F 211

The Vaibhii~ikas find no d_ifficulty in this: past factors (dharma; v. 25)617 exist.
Therefore, the moment of thought [just] prior to this attainment, i.e., the thought of
attainment (samlipatticitta) or the "thought of entry into the attainment", is the
condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya; ii. 62)
of the thought [just] subsequent to the attainment, i.e., the emerging-thought
(vyutthtinacitta) (MVS, 777b18). <212>
BAB.2.s.4.b. (The Sautrantika) theory; F 212

(The Sautrantikas618 ) reason as follows:
1. When persons are born in the realm of immateriality, form or matter (riipa) is
cut off [niruddha] for a long period of time [cira] (iii. 81b): if these persons are then
reborn in the realm of desire or in the realm of fine-materiality, their new form does
not arise from the serial continuity of form (riipa) interrupted long before, but only
[eva] from thought [citta].
2. Likewise, the thought emerging from the attainment does not arise from the
thought Uust] prior to the attainment: it arises [only] from a "body possessed with
sense-faculties" (sendriyakiiya).
This is why the ancient masters fpiirviiciirya] say:
Two factors (dharma) are one another's seeds (anyo'nyabfjaka): these two
factors are thought and the body possessed with sense-faculties.
BAB.2.5.4.c. The theory ofVasumitra & the debate with Gho~aka; F 212-13
Vasumitra says in the treatise entitled Pariprcchii: 619
"How is thought reborn after the attainment?" is a problem [do~a] for those
who claim that the attainment of cessation is without thought [acittika]. But
I claim that this attainment is accompanied by a subtle thougbt [siik~macitta;
sacittika]. The problem does not exist for me. 620
The Bhadanta Gho~aka regards this opinion as incorrect. {8 a} In fact, if any
consciousness (vijfiiina) would remain in this attainment, there would be contact
(sparsa) through the coming together of the three [sal!lnipiita], (1) consciousness
(vijfiiina), (2) sense-faculty [indriya]; (3) object-field [vi~aya]; due to contact, there
would be sensation (vedanii) and ideation (sal?l}fiii) (iii. 30b). As the Fortunate One
teaches:
In dependence on the mental faculty and factors (dharma), mental con-
sciousness arises; the coming together [sal!lnipiita] of the three is contact.
[With contact as their condition (sparsapratyaya),] there arise [at the same
time] sensation, ideation, intention (cetanii). 621 <213>
Thus, if one accepts that thought (vijfiiina; citta) persists in this attainment, sensation
and ideation will not cease [nirodha]. But this attainment is called cessation of
ideation and sensation (sal?l}fiiiveditanirodha).
Vasumitra answers: -The Siitra says:
Craving [tr~~ii] has sensation as its condition [vedaniipratyaya].
However, even though perfected beings (arhat) have sensations, craving does not
arise among them. The same here, i.e., not all types of contact produce sensations,
and so on.
[The Vaibha~ikas answer:] - This reasoning is not demonstrative. [Certain] Siitra

passages, in fact, explicitly qualify [contact] as follows:
Craving arises in dependence [pratftyotpanna] on sensation, which (itself)
has arisen (in dependence on) contact having ignorance [avidylisarrisparsaja]
(iii. 27).622
Whereas (here) it [simply] says:
Sensation arises in dependence on contact.
Thus we V aibha~ikas say that thought is interrupted in the attainment of cessation,
[that the attainment of cessation is without thought (acittika).]
Vasumitra says: - If this attainment is completely without ihought, how is it an
attainment (samiipatti)? 623
Vaibha~ikas: -The attainment is thus called because it causes [samatiipiidana] the
fundamental material elements [mahiibhiita] to be in an even state624 that is contrary
to the arising of thought. Or else, alternatively, [attainment is thus called] because
the practitioners enter into an even state [of thought and thought-concomitants]
(samiigacchanti, samiipadyante) through the power of the thought [of attainment
(samiipatticitta)]: it is for this reason that the meditations (dhyiina), etc., are called
meditative attainments (samiipatti)..
BAB.2.s.s. Existential status & the two attainments and the state of non-ideation;
~2}3;-14
[Question:] - Should one consider the two attainments [samiipatti] to be real entities
(dravyatas, svalak~a,:,atas) [or provisional entities (prajiiaptitas)]?
The Sarv,astivaoin answers: .,.. Yes, [they exist as real entities] for they obstruct the
arising of thought (cittotpattipratibandhaniit). 625 { 8 b} <214>
(The Sautrantika626 answers:) - No. It is not what you term attainment that ob-
structs the arising of thought; rather, it is the moment of the "thought of attain-
ment" (samiipatticitta), i.e., the thought just prior to the state of attainment: for
it is that very moment of thought which arises opposed [viruddha] to other mo-
ments of thought, that causes other moments of thought merely not to operate
[apravrttimiitra] for a period of time [kiiliintara]. The moment of thought just
prior to attainment projects [iipiidana] a corporeal basis (Mraya) 627 or life-stream
(sarritiina) opposed to the arising of other moments 9f thought. [Thus, first inter-
pretatron,] it is t);ie state of the "mere non-operation of thought" (apravrtti-
iniitra) for a certaih period of time that is provisionally referred to as attainment,
which is not a real entity (dravyadharma), but a provisional entity (prajiiapti-

dharma).
The Sarvastivadin: - How can the attainment be a conditioned factor (sal'{lskrta) if it
is not a real entity?
[Answer:] - This "mere non-operation of moments of thought" did not exist before
fpurva] [entering] the attainment and [it will not exist after (pasciit) emerging from
the attainment, i.e.,] when the practitioners produce again the em_erging-thought
(vyutthiinacitta). One can thus, in a manner of speaking (sal'{lvyavahiiratas), provi-
sionally designate (prajiiiipyate) it as being a conditioned factor [sal'{lskrta] since it
begins and ends.
Or [athavii], [second interpretation,] what we provisionally designate by the term
attainment is the particular condition (avasthiivise~a) of the corporeal basis (iisraya),
a condition which is projected by the moment of the thought [just prior to] attainment
[in such a way that (tathii) (thought does not arise)].
The same holds for the state of non-ideation (iisal'{ljftika; see ii. 4lbc). The state of
non-ideation is not a real entity that obstructs the arising or operation of other
moments of thought [cittapravrttiviruddha]; by this term we (provisionally) desig-
nate the state of non-ideation, i.e., a "mere non-operation [apravrttimiitra] of mo-
ments of thought", of the gods without ideation, a state which results from a certain
thought.
The Vaibha~ikas do not accept this opinion; they maintain that the state of non-
ideation and the two attainments are _real entities. 628
BAB.2.6. Vitality faculty (jfvitendriya); 629 F 214-22

1. Nature; F 214
2. Existential status; F 215
3. Varieties of death and their causes & the life-force (ayus); F 217-22
BAB.2.6.1. Nature & vitality faculty; 63°F 214-17

What is the vitality faculty (jfvitendriya )? {9 a}
45a. The vitality (jrvita) is the life-force (iiyus). 631 <215>
In fact, the Abhidharma632 states:
What is the vitality faculty? -The life-force [belonging to a being in any] of
the three realms of existence.
What kind of factor is [referred to (nama)] as life-force (ii. lOa)?

45ab. [The life-force is] the support of heat and consciousness.633
For, the Fortunate One said:
When the life-force, heat and consciousness leave the human body
[kaya], the abandoned body lies stiff, unconscious [acetana] like a log
[kaffha]. 634
Therefore, there exists a distinct factor (dharma), which is the support [adharabhiita]
of heat [iifman] and consciousness [vijnana], which is the cause of the duration
(sthitihetu) of their serial continuity (sal?ltana) and which is referred to as life-force
(ayus).635
BAB.2.6.2. Existential status & vitality faculty; F 215-16

636
(The Sautriintika ) denies the existence in and of itself of the vitality faculty
(jfvitendriya, ayus).
BAB.2.6.2.a. The Vaibha~ika reasons for the existence of the vitality faculty;
F215
BAB.2.6.2.aa. Heat and consciousness & the simultaneous support of the life-force
itself; F 215 ·
(Objection by the Sautrantika: 637 ) - If the life-force is the support [adharabhiita] of

heat and consciousness, by what is it itself supported?
The Vaibhii~ika: -The life-force is supported by heat and consciousness.
BAB.2.6.2.ab. Action & the previous support of the life-force itself; F 215-16
(Objection by the Sautriintika: 638 ) - If these three factors, i.e., life-force, heat and
consciousness, mutually support one another and operate continuously (sal?ltana-
pravrtti) through this mutual support, how do they come to an end? Which one
perishes first, the destruction of which entails the destruction of the others? For, if
one of them does not perish first, these three factors will be eternal [nitya] and will
not perish (anivrtti). <216>
The Vaibhii,~ika: - The life-force (ayus) is supported by [previous] action (karman),
for the life-force has been projected [ak~ipta] through [previous] action and operates
continuously as long as this projection of [previous] action enta.ils [anuvarttana] it,
[i.e., for the period of one lifetime].
BAB.2.6.2.ac. Ripened effect & the life-force; F 216

(Objection by the Sautrantika: 639 ) - If this is so, why do you not accept that heat and
consciousness are [also] supported by [previous] action? [And if so,] why do we have
to involve the life-force? {9 b}
The Vaibha~ika: - That which is [exclusively] supported by [previous] action is,
in its nature, [exclusively] a ripened effect [vipaka]. 640 If the consciousness were
[exclusively] supported by action, any consciousness, from the conception up to
death, would be [exclusively] a ripened effect: this is false, [as you also accept].
Hence the necessity of the life-force (ayus), which is [exclusively] supported by
[previous] action and is the support of heat [u~man] and consciousness [vijiiana].
BAB.2.6.2.ad.Life-force as the support of consciousness in the realm of

immateriality; F 216
(Objection by the Sautrantika: 641 ) - Then say that action supports heat and that heat
supports consciousness. The life-force is [thus] unnecessary.
The Vaibha~ika: - The life-force (ayus) is necessary since, in the realm of immate-
riality, .heat is absent. What would be the support of consciousness in the realm of
immateriality if the life-force does not exist?
(The Sautrantika: 642 ) - Consciousness, in the realm of immateriality, is supported by
[previous] action.
The Vaibha~ika: - Do you have the right to change your opinion? Sometim.es you
assume that consciousness is supp?rted by heat, sometimes you maintain that it is
supported by [previous] action. - 643 Moreover, you have accepted this [above]: one
has to avoid the consequence that any consciousness, from conception up to death, is
a ripened effect. Therefore, the life-force exists, it is the support of heat and of
consciousness.
BAB.2.6.2.b. The Sautrantika definition of the life-force; F 216-17

(The Sautrantika: 644 ) - I do not [completely] deny the existence of the life-force
(ayus). I only say that the life-force is not a distinct real entity [dravyantara].
The Vaibha~ika: - What then is the factor (dharma) designated by the name life-
force? <217>
(The Sautrantika:) - The life-force is the momentum or the particular capability [of
the period of duration (sthitikalavedha; 645 samarthyavise~a) of the homogeneous
collection of components (nikayasabhaga)] that the action [karman] of a previous
birth fpurvajanman] [in the three realms (traidhatuka)] places in a being at the
moment of its conception [pratisarµdhi], a momentum through which, for a deter-

mined period of time, the aggregates (skandha) renew themselves in the homogene-
ous collection of components, i.e., the homogeneous stream which constitutes a
per~onal existence (nikayasabhiiga; ii. 41). 646
In the same way, a seed of grain [sasya; bija] places a momentum or certain capabil-
ity [iivedha] in the sprout [arikura] by which, [for a given time (kiila)], the plant
develops to maturity [piika].
In the same way, a momentum or certain capability is placed into an arrow
[i:,\'u] that has been shot [k:,\'ipta], which brings it about that, for a given time, it
moves. 647
BAB.2.6.2.ba. The Vaise#ka theory of saf!lskara; F 217

The Vaise~ika believes that a certain type of gu,:ia or "quality", called sarriskiira and
also vega, impetus, arises in the arrow [i:,\'u]. Through the force of this quality, the
arrow always moves without stopping up to the moment when the arrow falls. 648
The sarµskiira, [however,] is [considered by them to be] a unity [ekatva]; 649 on
the other hand, the arrow does not encounter an obstacle: thus, no difference would
be possible in the speed [sfghra] of the arrow; 650 moreover, the arrow will not fall
(patana).
[Possible explanation by the Vaise~ika:] - The "wind" [viiyu] makes an obstacle

[pratibandha] to the sarriskiira.
[Reply:] - Since "wind", which makes an obstacle, is the same [avise:,\'a], near [samipa]
or far [dura], the arrow will either fall at first [arviikpatana] or will not fall [at all].
The Vaibhii~ikas maintain that the life-force (iiyus) is a real entity. 651
BAB.2.6.3. Varieties of death and their causes & the life-force (iiyus ); F 217-22
How death [mdra,:ia] takes place:
[Question:] - Does death take place solely through the exhaustion of the life-force
(iiyu"f:zk:.\'ayiit) [or also otherwise (anyathiipi)]?
[Answer:] - The Prajfiaptisiitra 652 says:

There is (the possibility that) death results from the exhaustion of the life-
force and not from the exhaustion of merit (pu,:iyaqayiit).
Four alternatives (tetralemma between action having the life-force as ripened effect
and action having enjoyment as ripened effect):
1. death through exhaustion [paryadana] of [the force of] actions which have
the life-force as their ripened effect [ayurvipaka];
2. death through exhaustion of [the force of those meritorious] actions which
have enjoyment as their ripened effect [bhogavipaka]; 653 <218>
3. death through exhaustion of [the force of] these two kinds of actions
(ubhayak~ayat);
4. [neither:] death through the inability to avoid unfavorable circumstances
(vi~arµaparihara), for example, excess of food (atyasana).
Death through relinquishment at will [utsarga] of conditioning forces of one''s life-
force (ayttJ:isdrµskara; ii. 10) should be mentioned. 654
In the state in which the life-force is exhausted, the exhaustion of [the force of]
actions which have enjoyment for their ripened effect has no further capability
[samarthya] to effect death; { 10 b} and reciprocally, [i.e., in the state in which
enjoyment is exhausted, the exhaustion of the force of actions which have the life-
.force for their ripened effect has no further capability to effect death]. Therefore,
the third alternative means that death occurs when the two kinds of actions are
exhausted.
I
BAB.2.6.3.a. Untimely death & the life-force; F:ps
Untimely death (akalamrtyu, akalama,:a,:ia; iii. 85c): 655
The Jiianaprasthana (997b28) says:
Should one say: (1) the life-force continuously op~rates bound to or in
dependence upon the life-stream [sarµtatyupanibaddha], or (2) the life-force
abides [for the entire time determined for it], having once arisen [sakrd-
utpanna]?
One should say:
1. the life-force of those sentient beings entangled in the realm of desire
[kamavacara] who have not entered into the two attainments [i.e., the
attainment of non-ideation (asa7J1jftisamapatti) or the attainment of cessation
(nirodhasamapatti)] is of the first category [i.e., it continuously operates
bound to their life-stream];656 ·
2. the life-force of those sentient beings entangled in the realm of desire

who have entered [samapanna] the attainment of non-ideation or the attain-
ment of cessation as well as all sentient beings of the spheres of fine-
. materiality and immateriality. [raparapyavacara] is of the second category,
[i.e., it should be said to abide (for the entire time determined for it), having
once arisen].
What is the significance of this passage [bha~ita]? 657
[First interpretation:]
1. When the bodily basis (iisraya) is damaged [upaghata], the life-force accord-
ingly is damaged; (this refers to) the first case in which the life-force operates bound
to or in' dependence upon the serial continuity of the bodily basis (iisrayasa,ritati-
p ratibaddha; santatyadhfnatva).
2. When the bodily basis is not capable of being damaged, the life-force abides for
the entire time [determined for it] when it arose [utpanniivasthiina]; (this refers to)
the second case in which the life-force abides [for the entire time determined for it],
having once arisen. 658
[Second interpretation:]
The Masters of Kasmir say that (1) the first kind of life-force (iiyus) is "subject to
having an obstacle" (siintariiya); (2) the second is ''not subject to having an obstacle"
[nirantariiya].
Thus, untimely death [akiilamrtyu] is possible. 659 <219>
BAB.2.6.3.aa. Intention & mortal injury; F 219-22

[To clarify the issue of damage to the bodily basis], the Siitra states: 660
There are four varieties of acquiring modes of personal existence [atma-
bhiivapratiliibha] :661 that is to say [tadyathii], there is an acquiring of a mode
of personal existence whereby mortal injury can occur (1) only thrpugh
one's own intention [iitmasa,ricetanii], not through the intention of another
fparasa,ricetanii] ;662
and fOOn, [i.e., (2) only through the intention of another, not through one's own
intention; (3) through both; (4) through neither].
There are four alternatives (tetralemma) [between mortal injury through one's own
intention (iitmasa,ricetanii) and mortal injury through the intention of another (para-
sa,ricetanii)]:
1. personal existence [whereby mortal injury can occur only] through one's
own intention: those sentient beings of the realm of desire, namely, (i) the
gods who are spoiled by amusements [krft,iiipramo~aka] and (ii) the gods
who are corrupted in mind with anger [mana]:iprad_ii~ika], 663 who destroy
their personal existence themselves { 11 a} (i) by engaging in excessive
rapture [prahar~a] or (ii) by giving rise to excessive anger [prado~a] [and

not otherwise]. Here one should also mention the Buddhas who enter into
nirva~a by their own accord;
2. personal existence [whereby mortal injury can occur only] through the
intention of another: those sentient beings who are in the womb [garbha] or
in an egg [g~{ia]; 664
3. personal existence [whereby mortal injury can occur] through both their
own intention and the intention of another: the majority of sentient beings in
the realm of desire; exception must be made for hell beings (ntiraka), beings
in the intermediate state (antariibhavika; iii. 12), etc.;
4. personal existence whereby neither type [of mortal injury occurs]: all
sentient beings in the intermediate state [aritariibhavika], all sentient beings
of the realm of fine-materiality and of the realm of immateriality, and one
part of sentient beings in the realm of desire, namely, hell beings [ntiraka;
iii. 82], inhabitants of Uttarakuru (iii. 78c), <220> those who abide in the
path of insight into the truths [darsanamiirga; vi. 28], those in the meditative
attainment of loving-kindness [maitrfsamiipatti; viii. 29], those in the two
attainments of cessation and non~ideation (ii. 42; Kathtivatthu, xv. 9); the
sages (rtijar~i), i.e., the wheel-turning king (cakravartin) who has entered
the religious life [pravrajita]; the messenger of the Buddha Uinaduta]; 665
those predicted by the Buddha to live for a certain period of time: 666
Dharrnila,667 Uttara,668 Gangila,669 and the youth (kumiira) Yasas who is the
son of a leading merchant [sre~thin], Jivaka, etc.; the Bodhisattva in his last
lifetime [caramabhavika] and the mother [matr] who is carrying the Bodhi-
sattva; the wheel-turning king (cakravartin) and the mother who is carrying
the wheel-turning king.
Objection: - The Sutra gives an account of a question asked by Sariputra and the
answer which the Fortunate One gives to it:
Siiriputra: "Fortunate One, who are the sentient beings who acquire·~
mode of personal existence (atmabhtivapratiliibha) not capable of having
mortal injury either through their own intention or through the intention of
another?"
Buddha: "Siiriputra, the sentient beings who belong to the perception-sphere
of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation (naivasarµjfiiintisarµjfiiiyatana), i.e., in
the highest realm of the realm of immateriality, in bhaviigra." <221>
How can you say, in view·of this passage, that the existence of "all" sentient beings
of the realm of fine-materiality and of the realm of immateriality is not capable of
having mortal injury either through their own intention or through the intention of
another?
[First explanation:]
The School [kila; MVS, 772a29] gives an explanation: {11 b} - The sentient beings
in the realm of fine-materiality and in the first three stages of the realm of im-
materiality are capable of mortal injury of their personal existence:
1. throuih their own intention [atmasamcetanii], i.e., through the [noble] path
(iiryamiirga) of their own stage [svabhamika];
2. through the intention of another [parasal?lcetanii], i.e., through the [mun-
dane] path [laukikamiirga] of the preliminary concentration of the [next]
higher stage [uttarabhiimisiimantaka] (vi. 48; viii. 22).
But, in the last stage of the realm of immateriality, neither of [these two kinds of
mortal injury, that is,] (1) the [noble] path of their own stage and also (2) the [mun-
dane] path of the [next] higher stage are possible: thus the existence of sentient
beings who reside there is not subject to injury either through their own intention or
through the intention of another.
[Objection:] - This answer seems weak to us; in fact, one can, in the last stage of the
realm of immateriality, practice the [noble] path of the immediately lower stage
[i.e., the perception-sphere of nothingness (iikificanyiiyatana; viii. 20)]. Thus another
explanation (Vibhii~a. ibid.) must be allowed.
[Second explanation:]
In his response to Siiriputra, the Buddha, by naming the sentient beings of the
perception-sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation (naivasal?ljfiiiniisal?ljfiii-
iiyatana), means [implicitly] all the sentient beings in the realm of fine-mate-
riality (riipadhiitu)· and in the realm of immateriality (iiriipyadhiitu), since by
naming the last one (paryanta) [in a series], the first [members of the series] [iidi]
are [also implicitly] to be understood (sal?lpratyaya). It can be shown that this is
the custom:
1. Sometimes Scripture names the first term of a list the totality of which it refers
to, for example:
The first blissful birth (sukhopapatti; iii. 72) (within the realm of fine-
materiality), namely (tadyathii), the Brahmakiiyika gods.
One should understand [all gods belonging to the first meditation (dhyiina)]: "the
Brahmakiiyikas, the Brahmapurohitas, the Mahiibrahmiis".
2. Sometimes Scripture names the last term:
The second blissful birth (sukhopapattz), namely (tadyathti), the A.bhasvara

gods.
One should understand [all gods of the second meditation]: "the Parittabhas, the
Apramai:iabhas and the A.bhasvaras".
[Objection:] - But this explanation can [also] be challenged. In the two passages
given above, the expression tadyathti appears, which introduces an example. It
should not be translated as: "that is to say", or "namely", but as "for example". This
is the rule in regard to examples, that by naming one case, all the similar cases are
designated. And we accept that, in the two passages on blissful births (sukhopapatti),
Scripture designates all the terms of the list by naming the first or the last. But as for
the answer of the Fortunate One to Sariputra [F 220], it does not contain the expres-
sion tadyathti. <222>
[Answer:] - The expression tadyathti, we say, does not introduce an example, since
we encounter it in Siitras that give a complete enumeration:
The material sentient beings, different in body, different in ideation, namely
(tadyathti) humans and one part of the gods ... (iii. 6). { 12 a}
Thus the expression tadyathti introduces a definition (upada-,,santirtha). Thus the
Fortunate One, in his response to Sariputra, designates the first by naming the last,
i.e., he means to speak of the two higher realms in their totality. 670
BAB.2.1. Characteristics (lak~a7J,a); 671 F 222-38

1. Nature; F 222
a. Four types of characteristics in Abhidharma doctrine; p. 222
b. Three types of characteristics in the Trilak:fm:iasiitra; F 223
2. Secondary characteristics (anulak:fai:ia) & refutation of infinite regress; F 224
a. The Trilak:fai:iasiitra & its Sautriintika interpretation as referrjng to a serial
continuity; F 226
b. Provisional existence: the stream & the four characteristics; F 227
c. The moments; F 229
d. The relationship of the characterized factor (lak~ya) & the characteristic
(lak:fai:ia); F 230
e. Objections regarding the simultaneous or successive activity/capability of
the characteristics; F 231
f. The Vaibhii~ika reply: definition of the moment; F 232
g. Objections regarding the individual characteristics as causally efficient
factors; F 232
584 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (lndriyanirdeia)
h. The notions of "arisen", "the arising of form", etc. & real entities; F 235
i. Vaibha~ika: the four characteristics as real entities & the scriptures; F 237
BAB.2.1.1. Nature & the characteristics; 672 F 222-24

BAB.2.1.1.a. Four types of characteristics in Abhidharma doctrine; 673 F 222
What are the characteristics (lak~a,:,,a) of conditioned factors (saT{l,skrtasya)?
45cd. The characteristics [of conditioned factors] are: (1) origination,
(2) deterioration, (3) duration, (4) impermanence.674
These four factors (dharma), (1) origination (jiiti), (2) deterioration (jarii), (3) dura-
tion (sthiti), (4) impermanence (anityatii), are the characteristics of conditioned
factors.
The factor in which these characteristics occur is a conditioned factor (saf!lskrta).
The factor in which they d9 not occur is an unconditioned factor (asaT{l,skrta). 675
,+; · • 676 ·
BAB.2.7.1.aa. D eJinltlOnS; F 222
1. Origination [jati] is that which produces or causes conditioned factors to arise
(utpiidayati; janayati); 677
2. duration [sthiti] is that whic;li stabilizes or causes conditioned factors to perdure
(sthapayati); 678
3. deterioration [jara] is tqat which deteriorates or causes conditioned factors to
· decay [jarayati] ;679
4. impermanence [anityata] is that which destroys or causes conditioned factors to
perish [viniisayati]. 680 <223>
BAB.2.7.1.b. Three types of characteristics in the Trilak~a-1:i,asutra; F 223-24

[Objection:] - Does not the Sutra teach the existence of [only] three conditioned
characteristics (saT{l,skrtalak~fJIJ,a) of the conditioned? The Sutra says,681 in fact:
There are, 0 bhik~µs, three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned
[trf,:,,fmiini bhik~ava(z. saT{l,skrtasya saT{l,skrtalak~a,:,,iini]. 682 What are these
three? Of the conditioned, 0 bhik~us, (1) the arising (utpiida) can [also] be
discerned [prajiiiiyate]; (2) the passing away (vyaya) can [also] be discerned,
and (3) also the duration-change (sthityanyathatva). 683
[See alternate translation, F 227.]
BAB.2.1.1.ba. Various views about the number of characteristics mentioned in the

Trilak~ar;asutra; F 223-24
The Vaibha~ika: - The Siitra should name four characteristics. The characteristic
that is omitted is the characteristic of duration (sthiti). Strictly speaking, it uses
the word sthiti in the compound sthityanyathatva, duration-change: but sthity-
anyathatva is an expression which signifies fparyaya] deterioration. As the Siitra
says (1) "arising" (utpada) in place of "origination" (jati), (2) "passing away" (vyaya)
in place of "impermanence" (anityata); in the same way, it says (3) "duration-
change" (sthityanyathatva) in place of "deterioration" (jarii,).
1. If the Siitra specifies only three characteristics, this is because-with a view to
arousing disgust among the faithful 684-it points out, as the characteristics of
the condit.ioned factor, the factors which cause it to travel through the three time
periods:
i. the power of origination causes it to pass (saf!tcarayati) from the future into
the present; {12 b}
ii. deterioration, i.e., duration-change (sthityanyathatva) and impermanence
(vyaya) causes it to pass from the present into the past, because, after
deterioration, i.e., duration-change has weakened (durbalfkrtya) it, imperma-
nence finishes it (vighatat). <224>
The School [kila] makes a comparison (MVS, 20lb7): Let us suppose that there is a
man in an inaccessible forest [gahana], and three enemies [satru] desire to kill him.
The.first brings it about that this man leaves the forest; the second weakens him; the
third destroys his vitality [jfvita]. Such is the role of the three characteristics in
regard to the conditioned factor. 685
Duration (sthiti), on the contrary, sustains the conditioned factor and causes it to
perdure: this is why the Siitra does not count it among the characteristics.
2. Moreover, the unconditioned factor (asaf!tskrta) persists eternally in its own
nature (svalak~a,:ze sthitibhava): the characteristic of duration is not without resem-
blance to the persistence of the unconditioned factor. In order to avoid any con-
fusion, the Siitra does not indicate duration as a characteristic of the conditioned
factor.
3. Others [anye] 686 think that the Siitra does indeed name duration; it names it as an
associate of deterioration (Jara), i.e., duration-change (sthityanyathatva), i.e., sthiti
(duration) and anyathatva (change).
[Question:] - What purpose fprayojana] is there, would you say, in making one
single characteristic of these two characteristics?
[Answer:] - Persons are attached [saliga] to duration: in order to be disgusted

with or not attached [asanga] to duration, the Sutra names it together (abhi-
samasya) with deterioration, just as prosperity [srf] is linked with a black ear
[kalaka~a] [or Sn (the goddess of prosperity) with Kalakan:i-1 (the goddess of bad
luck)]. 687
Conclusion: there are four characteristics.688
BAB.2.1.2. Secondary characteristics (anulak$m;a) & refutation of infinite

regress; 689 F 224-26
[Objection:] - The origination, duration, etc., of any factor (dharma) whatsoever are
also conditioned factors. They should thus arise, perdure, decay, perish; they should
thus, in their turn, possess four characteristics: origination-of-origination Uiitijati],
etc., which will be the secondary characteristics (anulak~a,:ia) of the factor under
consideration. These secondary characteristics, being conditioned factors, have, in
their turn, four characteristics. So there is the fault of infinite regress [aparyavasiina-
do~a].
[Answer:] -There is no infinite regress. {13 a}
46ab. [The four primary characteristics of conditioned factors] have in
their turn [secondary] characteristics termed (1) origination-of-
origination, (2) duration-of-duration, [(3) deterioration-of-deteriora-
tion, (4) impermanence-of~impermanence].690
The primary characteristic functions [vrtti] with regard to eight
factors [i.e., the principal factor, three other primary characteristics,
and four secondary characteristics].
The se.condary characteristic functions with regard to one factor
[i.e., the primary characteristic that corresponds to it].691 <225>
The four primary characteristics (miilalak*a,:ia) are described above.
The four secondary characteristics (anula~a,:ia) are (1) origination-of-origination
Uiitijiiti]), (2) duration-of-duration [sthitisthiti], (3) deterioration-of-deterioration
[iariijarii], (4) impermanence-of-impermanence [anityatiinityatii].
All conditioned factors [salJlskrta] are conditioned factors due to their primary
characteristics; these, in their turn, are conditioned factors due to four secondary
characteristics.
[Objection:] - [Then] each of the primary characteristics should have, just like the
principal factor which it characterizes, four characteristics, and so forth.
[Answer:] - You do not understand the function [of the primary and secondary
characteristics].
[Question: - What is this function (vrtti) 692 ?]
[Answer:] - It is the activity/capability [karitra] or operation [puru~akara] of the
different characteristics [i.e., the primary and secondary characteristics].
When a factor (dharma) arises-which we will term the principal factor (miila-
dharma), a thought, a thought-concomitant (caitta)-nine factors, including itself,
arise at the same time, i.e., the principal factor, four primary characteristics, four
secondary characteristics.
[For example,] the first primary characteristic, the primary origination (jati; miila-
jati) causes (1) the principal factor, (2-4) plus three primary characteristics (dura-
tion, deterioration and impermanence), (5-8) plus· four secondary characteristics
to arise: in total, eight factors, (The primary origination) does not cause itself
to arise: it arises through the secondary characteristic origination-of-origination
(jiitijati). { 13 b} - (i) In the same way, one hen [kukkuff] gives birth to many eggs
[apatya], and each egg gives birth only to one chick (MVS, 200c19); (ii) in the same
way,Jhe primary origination (jati; miilajati) causes eight factors to arise, whereas
origination-of-origination causes only one factor to arise, namely, the primary
origination. 693
The same goes for the other primary and secondary characteristics. Duration-of-
duration causes primary duration-10---I2erdure, (whereas primary duration) causes
(1) the principal factor, (2-4) three primary characteristics and (5-8) four secondary
characteristics, in which is included the duration-of-duration, to perdure.
The same for primary deterioration and primary impermanence which cause eight
factors to decay and to perish, and which decay and perish themselves by means of
the secondary characteristic, which corresponds to them, i.e., deterioration-of-dete-
rioration, impermanence-of-impermanence (jarajara; anityatanityatii). <226>
Thus the characteristics themselves have characteristics called secondary charac-
teristics (anulak:w1;a); they are four in number and not sixteen, and [thus] there is no
fault of infinite regress [anavasthiiprasaliga}.
BAB.2.7.3. Existential status & the characteristics; F 226-38

The Sautrantika694 says: - All this is splitting empty space! 695 Origination, duration,
etc., do not exist as real entities (na dravyataf:,. sa,p.vidyante) [in the way (yatha) 696 in
which they have been discriminated (vibhajyante). For what reason?] We know that
factors exist as real entities [dravya] either through (1) direct perception [pratyak~a],
(2) inference [anumiina] or (3) scriptural authority [iiptiigama], [as in the cases of
factors such as form (rilpa), etc.], yet these three means of valid cognition (pramii,;za)
are absent with respect to these characteristics.
BAB.2.1.3.a. The Trilak~a,:iasutra & its Sautrantika inte,pretation as referring to a

serial continuity; F 226-27
The Sarvastivadin says: 697 - But the Siitra says:
Of the conditioned factors, the arising can [also] be discerned (utpiido 'pi
prajiiiiyate), [the passing away can also be discerned, and also the duration-
change].698
[Reply by the Sautrantika: 699] - Fool! You cling to the words [granthajiiafz] and miss
the meaning [na tu arthajiiaft]. The Fortunate One, however, said that it is the
meaning [artha], and not the words, on which one should rely. 700 The [true] meaning
of this Siitra passage is evident:
Blinded by ignorance [avidyiindha], foolish people are convinced [adhimukta] that
the uninterrupted stream (prabandha; praviiha) of conditioned forces (saf!1skrta;
saf!1skiira)701 [has the nature of] self (iitman), of what belongs to the self [atmfya], and
are, therefore, obsessed [abhi~yvajante] with the stream. {14 a} For the sake of
removing their false conviction [mithyiidhimok~a] and the obsession that results from
it, the Fortunate One702-wanting to make it clear that the stream (praviiha) [of con-
ditioned forces (saf!1skiira)] has the nature of being conditioned (saf!1skrtatva), i.e., of
"being produced [through dependence or] through successive causes" (pratftya-
samutpannatii)-made the following statement about the three characteristics of that
which is produced through [dependence or] successive causes:
There are three sa,pskrta-characteristics of the conditioned [trf,;zfmiini sarµ-
skrtasya sarµskrtalak~a,;ziini] (see F 223 ). 703
It is the stream which the Fortunate One means to characterize as being conditioned,
for, obviously, he does not [makethis statement to] attribute the three characteristics
to every single moment [k~a,;za] of the serial continuity, since he [also] says that these
characteristics can be discerned: Indeed, the arising [utpiida], passing away [vyaya]
and duration-change [sthityanyathiitva], [belonging to a single moment,] cannot be
dis.cerned [prajiiiiyante]; 704 that which cannot be discerned does not deserve to be
· established as a characteristic [lak~a,;za]. 705 <227>
If the Siitra uses the word sarµskrta twice: 706 "There are three sarµskrta-characteris-
tics of the conditioned (sarµskrta)", this is in order that one should know that these
three characteristics are not (1) indications revealing the presence of a conditioned
factor (saf!1skrtastitve lak~a,;ziini), as in the case of seeing herons [baliikii], which
indicates that water Uala] must exist nearby; or (2) qualitative signs of a conditioned
factor, as in the case of the signs of a maiden [kanyalak~a,:ia], which indicate her
nature as virtuous [siidhu] or unvirtuous [asiidhu]. No, these characteristics, occur-
ring in a given entity, indicate that this given entity has the nature of being con-
ditioned (sarriskrtalak~a,:iam = sarriskrtatve lak~a,:iam).
[Thus we will translate this canonical text (see F 223) in the following way:
The conditioned (i.e., the serial continuity of conditioned factors) possesses
three noticeable characteristics which indicate that it is conditioned, i.e.,
produced through successive causes. These characteristics are (1) arising,
(2) duration-change, (3) passing away.]
BAB.2 7.3.b. Provisional existence: the stream & the four characteristics; F 227-29
[The Sautriintika: 707 ] -According to us, what one should understand is the following:
1. arising or origination (utpada; jiiti) is the beginning of the stream [of con-
ditioned factors] (praviihasya adil:,,);
2. passing away or impermanence (vyaya; anityatii) is the extinction or stop-
ping (nivrtti; uparati) of the stream;
3. duration (sthiti) is the very stream continuing (anuvartamiina) from its
beginning until its cessation;
4. duration-change (sthityanyathiitva) or deterioration (jarii) is the modification
of the continuous stream, the (qualitative) difference [vise~a] between its
earlier and later or successive [moments].
It is by looking at it from this viewpoint-that is to say, by considering origination,
impermanence, etc., as being the stream itself, the stream which is beginning,
ending, prolonging itself, modifying itself (praviiharupa)-that the Fortunate One
said to Nanda who applies unceasingly mindfulness to his states of thought (nityam
upasthitasmrti): 708
Son of a good family [kulaputra], sensations are indeed well known by
you as arising [utpadyante], as abiding [ti~fhiinte], as coming to an end,
disappearing or going to exhaustion [astal?l parik~ayarµ, paryiidiina1?1
gacchanti]. 709 <228>
We thus say: 710
1. Origination LJati] is the beginning of the stream [praviiha];
2. passing away of (the stream) [vyaya] is the cutting off [uccheda; cheda]
[of the stream];
3. duration [sthiti] is the stream itself;
4. duration-change [sthityanyathiitva] is the (qualitative) difference between

earlier and later or successive (moments).
And moreover:
1. Arising (or origination) is existence following non-existence or exis-
tence that has not existed before;
2. duration is the stream [prabandha];
3. passing away (or impermanence) is the cutting off of the stream;
4. duration-change is considered to be the (qualitative) difference between
earlier and later or successive moments of the stream.
[And:]
Do you say-the factor (dharma) being momentary-that the factor would
perish (immediately) if duration were absent? But, (if the factor is. momen-
tary,) it perishes spontaneously: it is useless that you attribute duration to the
momenta;y factor. 711 <229>
Therefore, it is the stream (praviiha) that the Siitra refers to when it speaks of
duration, and the definition of the Abhidharma (Prakaraf}apiida, 694a26) is found to.
be justified: { 15 a}
What is duration [sthiti]? The conditioning forces (saf!lskiira) arisen [utpanna]
and not having been perished [aviniisa].
The nature of the moment (k~af}adharmatii) cannot be "arisen and not having been
perished".
[Objection:] - However, the Jfiiinaprasthiina (926b21) says:
With respect to one thought (ekasmin citte),712 what is arising [utpiida]? It is
origination (jiiti).
What is passing away (vyaya)? It is death (maraf}a).
What is duration-change (sthityanyathiitva)? It is deterioration (jarii).
[Answer:] - But this passage of the Siistra does not refer to one moment of thought
but to the thought of a "homogeneous personal existence" (nikiiyasabhiigacitta). [In a
homogeneous personal existence (ii. 41) the thoughts are multiple, but this multiplic-
ity can be designated as being one thought.]
BAB.2.7.3.c. The moments & the four characteristics; F 229-30

[The Sautrantika: 713 ] - However, provided that one does not consider the charac-
teristics as distinct real entities [dravyiintara], these four characteristics [of the
conditioned, i.e., of a stream of conditioned factors,] can also be applied to each

moment (k~m:ia). 714 [How is that?]
In fact,
1.arising [utpada] [as applied] to each moment [refers to the fact that it] exists
after not having existed (abhatva bhaval:i);
2. passing away (vyaya) [refers to the fact that] having existed, it no longer
exists (bhutva abhaval:z);
3. duration [sthiti] [refers to] the connection of each prior [moment] with
subsequent moments (uttarottarak~a,;ianubandha): in fact, the later moment
resembles the previous moment, it is thus its substitute (pratinidhfbhiita): the
previous moment still exists, still abides, so to speak (avati~fhata iva). Thus
the later moment can be considered as the continuance of the previous moment;
4. duration-change (sthityanyathatva) [refers to] the qualitative difference (vi-
sadrsatva) in this continuance or connection.
[Question:] - Then would you say that, when the successive moments arise alike
(sadrsa), there is no qualitative difference [visadrsatva] [i.e., no duration-change]?
[Answer:] - There is (some) qualitative difference, as this follows from the differ-
ence in the .speed, slow or swift, of the falling of a vajra which is hurled or not
hurled, which is hurled with force or without force: 715 a difference due to the trans-
formation--different in each case--of the fundamental material elements (maha-
bhutapari,:,.amavise~a) of the vajra. - When the factors succeed one another in a
homogeneous stream, the difference !S small; that is why, although they differ, they
are considered to be alike. {15 b} <230>
The Sarviistiviidin objects. - Your definition (vyavastha) of the characteristics does
not hold for all conditioned factors. In fact, your definition of duration supposes a
subsequent moment: this moment is lacking for the last moment of a sound [sabda]
or of a flame [arcis], for the last moment of thought of a perfected being (arhat;
parinirva,:,.akala). Thus the last moment of sound, of the flame, of the perfected
being, has neither duration nor duration-change.
[Reply:] - We do not attribute duration to all conditioned factors! We say that all
duration is subject to duration-change. The Fortunate One teaches three character-
istics because, in certain cases (sa1?1-bhava1?1- prati), there are three characteristics.
But, for the last moment of the flame, there is only arising and passing away, not
duration, not duration-change.
In summary, conditioned factors, (1) after not having existed, exist; (2) after having
existed, exist no longer; (3) the stream of these factors is their duration; (4) the
qualitative difference of the stream is their duration-change. Such is the teaching
which the Fortunate One gives in the satra on the three characteristics. There is no
use for distinct real entities [dravyantara], origination, etc.
BAB.2.7.3.d. The relationship of the characterized'jactor (lak~ya) & the

characteristic (lak~a-lJ,a); F 230-31
The Vaibhii~ika objects: - According to you, origination is the factor itself (dharma)
insofar as it exists after having been non-existent. The factor which is the character-
ized factor (lak:jya) would then also be the characteristic (la"/cya"(la).
[Reply:] - What is wrong with that?
1. The characteristics (lak:fa"(la) marking a great person (mahapuru:ja) are not dif-
ferent or distinct from the great person.
2. The dewlap [sasna], the tail [langala], the hump [kakuda], the hoof [saph11], the.
horns [vi:ja~a], etc., of a cow, which are its characteristics [gotvalak:fa"(la], do not
differ from the cow.
3. The fundamental material elements (mahabhata), [earth (prthivz), etc.,] do not
exist apart from their defining characteristics, solidity (kathinya), etc. (i. 12d).
In the same way, for the Vaibhii~ika, who affirms the "momentariness" of fac-
tors (kfm:iikavadin), the rising of smoke is none other than the smoke itself.716
<231>
Let us have a closer look at this. Although I seize (grah) the intrinsic nature
(svabhava) of visible forms, etc., which are conditioned factors, as long as I do
not know the fact (1) that they do not exist previously, (2) that they do not
exist later, (3) that their stream transforms itself, so long do I not know their
quality of being conditioned. Therefore, the quality of the conditioned does not
have for its mark the quality of the conditioned, but rather the previous non-
existence, etc. 717 And characteristics, [origination (jati), etc.,] as distinct real
entities, i.e., distinct from visible forms and other conditioned factors, do not
exist.
BAB.2.7.3.e. Objections regarding the simultaneous or successive activity of the

characteristics; F 231-32
[Objection: 718 ] - Moreover, even if the characteristics were indeed distinct real
entities (dravyantara), [why would this nevertheless be imp~ssible (ayukta)? Be-
cause] one factor (dharma) would have to (1) be born Uata], (2) abide [sthita],
(3) decay Uz111a] and (4) perish [na:ffa] at one and the Sflme time, [since these
characteristics exist] together or simultaneously (sahabhata) [ with that factor].
The Sarviistiviidins in vain will maintain: - The characteristics [of the conditioned]
do not perform their activity/capability at the same time (kiiritrakalabheda); [for we
Sarviistiviidins maintain]
1. that origination engenders [its activity/capability] 719 when it is still future,
i.e., before being born itself [anagata hijati/:i karitrafJZ hi karoti], and that
once being born, it no longer engenders;720
2. that, [when a factor is already produced,] duration, deterioration and imper-
manence perform their activity/capability when they are present but not
when they are still future;
The last three characteristics are, therefore, active in a moment when the first is no
longer active, so that the four characteristics can be simultaneous without contradic-
tion [or, it is not the case that when (a factor) is produced, it is also abiding, decaying
and perishing721 ].
BAB.2.7.3.ea: The activity/capability of origination; F 231-32

[Objection:] - Let us first look at origination, which, when it is future, engenders [its
activity/capability]. One would have to examine:
1. [first (tdvad),] whether a future factor really exists (dravyatas) (v. 25 [F 50]);
2. [afterwards (pa§cat),] whether a future factor, supposing that it does exist,
can be active [janayati].
If origination, existing as future, engenders [its activity/capability], how can
one say that it is future? <232> In. fact, according to the Vaibha~ika, the future
factor is one that does not yet exercise its activity (apraptakaritrafJZ hy anagatam
iti siddhantal:i). You would have to redefine [vaktavya] the characteristic of the
future.
On the other hand, when the factor [or the characteristic of origination] has arisen,
has engendered [its activity/capability], and the operation of origination is past [or
has disappeared] [uparatakaritra], how can you say that origination is then present?
You would have to redefine the characteristic of the present. 722
BAB.2.7.3.eb. The activity/capability of duration, deterioration, impermanence; F 232

[Objection:] - In regard to the other characteristics, there are two possibilities,
either (1) their activity/capability is exercised simultaneously [yugapad] or (2) their
activity/capability is exercised successively [krame~a].
In the first hypothesis, 723 { 16 b} while duration causes a factor to perdure [sthapa-
yati], deterioration causes it to decay [jarayati], and impermanence causes it to perish
[vina.fayati], it would follow that the factor would abide [sthita], decay Urr~a] and
perish [vina,sfa] at one and the same moment [ekak,sa~a].
As for the second hypothesis, to accept that the activity/capability of the character-
istics is not excercised simultaneously [but successively (krame~a)] is to accept
three moments, and this infringes upon the doctrine of momentariness [k,sa~ika-
tva]. 724
BAB.2.7.3.f. The Vaibha~ika reply: definition of the moment; F 232

The Vaibha~ika answers: - For us, the moment (k,sa~a) is [precisely] the time in the
course of which all these characteristics have completed their operation (karyapari-
samaptilak,sa~a e,sa naJ:i k,sa~aJ:i). 725
BAB.2.7.3.g. Objections regarding the individual characteristics as causally

efficient factors; F 232-35
BAB.2.7.3.ga. Criticism of duration; F 232-33
[Objection:] - In this hypothesis, explain then why duration, arising at the same
time [sahotpanna] as deterioration and impermanence, accomplishes its opera-
tion of "causing to abide that which should abide" (stapya"f!l sthapayati) before
deterioration and impermanence accomplish their operation of causing things to
decay and perish.
[The Vaibha~ikas might answer:] - Duration, being st~onger, accomplishes its opera-
tion first.
We would then ask: - How is duration later weakene~ in such a manner that, encoun-
tering deterioration and impermanence, it decays and perishes, not alone, but with
the factor (dharma) that it should have caused to abide?
[The Vaibha~ikas might say:] - Duration, having achieved its task (krtakrtya), cannot
fulfill it again, in the same way that origination, having engendered [its activity/
capability], no longer engenders [it].
[Answer:] -The comparison [to origination] is not appropriate:
[On the one hand,] the operation (puru,sakara) of origination consists in attracting
from the future the factor which origination should engender, and in causing it to
enter into the present: <233> once the factor has entered into the present, origination
is incapable of causing it to enter again.
On the other hand, the operation of duration is (i) to cause the factor, "which should
be caused to abide" (sthapya), to abide (styapayati), (ii) to hinder the factor, "which
the operation causes to abide", from deteriorating and perishing. Duration is capable
of causing that which should be caused to abide, to abide indefinitely [atyanta].

Therefore, duration is capable of repeating its operation.
[We then would ask:] - Due to what obstacle or due to what adverse forces (prati-
bandha) will the activity/capability of duration cease once (the activity/capability)
has begun? {17 a}
[You might say:] - The forces are deterioration and impermanence, whereby
deterioration is weakening duration and impermanence then is killing it.
[We would then say:] - Since in this hypothesis deterioration and impermanence
are stronger than duration, it is fitting that they exercise their activity/capability
first.
Moreover, according to your conception of duration and its role, it is through the
activity/capability of duration that, not only the principal factor but, moreover,
deterioration and impermanence abide. Thus, when the activity/capability of duration
comes to an end, the principal factor, deterioration and impermanence cease to per-
. dure. We, [therefore,] ask: How and with regard to what object will deterioration and
impermanence exercise their activity/capability of causing to decay and causing to
perish?
[Furthermo.'."e,] we do not really see what deterioration and impermanence have to
do. It is through duration that a factor, once arisen, does ncit perish for a certain time,
does not perish as soon as it arises (utpannamlitra). If duration, its task being accom-
plished, neglects the factor, quite certainly it will abide no longer; that is to say, it
perishes by itself.
BAB.2.7.3.gb. Criticism of deterioration; F 233
[Objection: 726 ] - We could reasonably understand (1) duration and (2) impermanence
in regard to a [single (eka)] factor: (1) "A factor, after having arisen, has not yet
perished"; (2) "A factor, after having abided, perishes." - But how can one attribute
deterioration to a [single] factor? 'Deterioration is transformation [vipari~ama]
[within the stream of conditioned factors], the qualitative difference [vise~a] between
prior and subsequent [moments]. And yet, can one say of a [single] factor that it
becomes different from itself?
If [a factor] remains this, it is not that; if it becomes something different, it is
no longer this. Thus the change of a [single] factor is impossible. 727 <234>
BAB.2.7.3.gc. Criticism of impermanence; F 234

According to another school [nikaylintarfya]: 728 - The characteristic of imperma-
nence causes certain [material] factors (dharma), wood, pitcher [ghata], etc., to
perish once it has encountered the external causes of destruction [viniisakiira~a], fire,
hammer [mudgara], etc., {17 b}
[Reply:] - An absurd theory! This is like a sick person who, after having taken a
laxative [harftakf], supplicates the gods to make it efficacious! In the logic of this
system, it is the external causes of destruction which destroy, and the characteristic
of impermanence is of no use.
The same school [also] assumes: - Through the virtue o:fc their characteristic of
impermanence-without foreign causes intervening-thought and thought-con-
comitants [citta; caitta], [the sound and the flame,] immediately perish (k~a~a-
nirodha). Impermanence and duration accomplish their operation at the same time: a
factor abides and perishes at the same time.
[Reply:] - This 'is unacceptable.
We conclude: it is with regard to the stream [praviiha] that the Fortunate One teaches
the characteristics of the conditioned. Understood in this way, the Sutra (ii, F 223,
227) does not lend itself to criticism: 729
There are three characteristics which make it clear that the conditioned is
conditioned, i.e., produced through dependence .... 730
BAB.2.7.3.gd. Criticism of origination; F 234-35

[Objection:] - If arising, while in its future state, is engendering Uanika] the factor
which is to be engendered Uanya], why do not all future factors arise together or
simultaneously [yugapad]?7 31
46cd. [Sarviistiviidin:] - Origination is able to engender that which is to be
engendered, but.not without the [corresponding] complete assem-
blage of causes and conditions.732
Apart from the [corresponding] complete assemblage (siimagrya) of causes [hetu]
and conditions [pratyaya], origination alone does not have the capability (siimarthya)
to engender the factor which is to be engendered. Therefore, future factors do not all
arise together or simultaneously. <235>
Objection (by the Sautrantikas:)733 - If that is so, we observe that it is only the
causes and conditions which have the capability [siimarthya] to engender, and
not origination, i.e., this characteristic which, [according to. the Sarvastivadins, is
supposed] to accompany the factor (dharma) from the beginning of time and causes
the factor to arise when, finally, the causes and conditions of this factor come
together! [The dependence of production upon a complete assemblage of causes and
condition is proven by the fact that] when there is complete assemblage of causes and
conditions, the factor is produced; when there is no such complete assemblage, it is

not produced: what efficacy could we attribute to origination? [Therefore, only the
causes and conditions are generating.734] { 18 a}
Reply by the Sarvastivadin: - Do you claim to know all the factors (dharma) which
exist? The nature of factors [dharmaprakrti] is subtle [suk~ma]! 735 Although their
reality is evident, they are unknowable. 736
BAB.2.7.3.h. The notions of "arisen", "the arising ofform", etc. & real entities;
F 235-37
[Sarvastivadin:] - Moreover, in the absence of the characteristic "origination", the
notion of "arisen" (jiitabuddhi = jiita iti) would be absent. 737 And if origination is
nothing other than the factor itself existing after having been non-existent, the
genitive [~a~{hfvacana] "the arising of form" [rupasya utpiida], "the arising of sen-
sation", would not be justified; for this is tantamount to saying "the form of form"
[rupasya r~pam], "the sensation of sensation". -The same for duration, deterioration
and passing away.
Reply by (the Sautrantika: 738 ) - This theory will lead you very far afield: in order to
justify the notion of empty (sunya), the notion of nonself [aniitmabuddhi], you would
[have to] accept the existence of an entity called emptiness [sunyatii], the existence of
an entity called non-seifhood [aniitmatva]. And moreover; in order to establish
notions [buddhi] such as: (1) one [eka], two [dvi]; (2) great [mahat], small [a~u];
<236> (3) separate (prthak); (4) conjoined [sa,µyukta]; (5) disjoined [vyukta]; (6) far
[para]; (7) near [apara]; (8) existing [sat]; etc., you would [have to] accept, in
conformity with the Vaise~ikas, the whole series of entities: (1) number (sa1?1khyii);
(2) extension (pdrimii~a); (3) separateness (prthaktva); (4) conjunction (sa'!lyoga);
(5) disjun\:tion (vibhiiga); (6) farness (paratva); (7) nearness (aparatva); (8) existence
(sattii); etc. You would require "pitcher-ness" (ghafatva) in order to establish the
notion of a pitcher [ghafa].
[The Sautrantika:] - As for the genitive [~a~ffvidhiina], you do not accept that the
intrinsic nature of form [rupasya svabhiiva] and form [rupa] are distinct [anya]
entities, and yet you speak of the intrinsic nature of form.
On that account [tasmiit], you have not established that "origination" is a distinct real
entity [dravya]; you have not established that origination is not merely a provisional
designation (prajiiiiptimiitra) of the factor (dharma) insofar as it exists after having
been non-existent.
When I want to make known to someone (jiiiipaniirtham) that a certain factor exists
which, previously, did not exist, I say to them: "this factor has arisen", I designate
this factor as being arisen. - Many factors, form, sensation, etc., arise, i.e., "exist
after having been non-existent". Thus there are many arisings, i.e., many factors
arising. Arising [utpada] being multiple (bahuvikalpa), {18 b} with the intention to
specify it so that my interlocutors know that it refers to arising having the name form
and not to arising having the name sensation, I would use the genitive [~a~{f],
"arising of form", "arising of sensation", though the arising of form is only the form
arising. In the same way, one commonly says "the odor of sandalwood" [candanasya
gandha], although sandalwood is only odor, and "the body of the torso" [silaputra-
kasya sarfra], although the torso is only body. 739 •
BARZ.7.3.ha. The distinction of conditioned and unconditioned factors & the

existence of the characteristic "origination"; F 236-37
Sarvlistiviidin: - Since we accept the existence of the characteristic "origination",
which belongs to conditioned factors and <237> does not belong to unconditioned
factors, we can easily explain why unconditioned factors do not arise. But if con-
ditioned factors arise without "origination", why do unconditioned factors, i.e., space
[akasa], etc., not arise?
[Answer:] - We say that conditioned factors arise, for, after not having existed, they
exist (abhiitva bhavanti). But [if] the unconditioned factor is eternal [nitya], how
could it arise? - You explain that certain factors (dharma), i.e., the unconditioned
factors, are without the characteristic "origination", because, you say, such is the
nature of factors (dharmata): 740 we say that, by virtue of the nature of factors, all
fa<::tors are without arising (na sarvarµjayate).
What is more, according to you, all conditioned factors (sarµskrta) equally pos-
sess the characteristic "origination" (tulye jatimattve ), which you refuse to uncoQ-
ditioned factors (asarµskrta): however, you admit that certain causes are capable
of producing form [riipa] and incapable of producing sensation [vedana]. In
the same way, according to us, since co'nditioned and unconditioned factors
are equally devoid of the characteristic "origination", all causes [and conditions]
which produce conditioned factors are inefficacious with regard to unconditioned
factors.
BAB.2.7.3.i. Vaibha~ika: the four characteristics as real entities & the scriptures;
F 237-38
The Vaibha~ika says that the four characteristics, i.e., origination, etc., are real
entities [dravya]. 741 - Why?742 - Should we abandon the Agamas 743 for the reason
that there are persons who object to them [dii~aka]? {19 a} One d°'~s not give up
sowing [barley (yava)] for fear of gazelles [mrga], one does not give up eating
sweetmeats [modaka] because of flies [mak~ika].7 44 <238> One must refute the
objections and hold on to the Doctrine (do~e~u pratividhiitavyarri siddhiintas
ciinusartavyaJ:i).
[The characteristics have been discussed.]
BAB.2.s. Collections of names, phrases and syllables (ncimakaya, padakaya,

vyafijanakciya); 745 F 238-4-3
1. Nature; F 238
a. Objection 1: Names, phrases and syllables are material form; ,F 240
b. Objection 2: Speech as articulated sound established by convention
suffices; F 240
c. Objection 3: Names cannot issue forth from speech; F 240
d. Objection 4: Syllables do not issue forth from speech; F 241
e. Objection 5: Present names would not designate the past and future
signified; F 242
f. Objection 6: Only syllables would suffice to exist as real entities; F 242
3. Location, range, effect, moral quality & syllables, names and phrases; F 243
BAB.2.s.1. Nature & the collections of names, phrases and syllables; 746 F 238-4-0
What is the collection of names (niimakaya), collection of phrases (padakaya),
collection of syllables (vyaiijanakiiya)?
47 ab. (1) The collection of names, [(2) the collection of phrases and (3) the
collection of syllables] are [respectively] the collections [samukti]
of (1) ideations (sa-rµjii.ii), (2) sentences (vakya) and (3) phonemes
(akfara).747
1. By "names" or "words" (niiman) 748 one should understand sarrijf'iii,karal},a:
"that which causes ideation to arise" [or "that which is caused by ideation"], 749 for
example, the words "color", "sound", "odor", etc.
2. By "phrases" (pada)7 50 one should understand sentences (vakya), phrases
[long enough or] including the necessary details to bring to completion [the
explication] of the signified (yavatarthaparisamllpti), 751 for example the verse,
"[Alas], impermanent are the conditioning forces (sarriskiira) ... " and so on. 752
<239>
Or else, by "phrases" one should understand that which causes one to understand
(yena gamyante) the distinctive relations (sarribandhavise~a) of (i) [verbal] activity
[kriyii], (ii) quality [gul},a], (iii) tense [kiila] [of words in an expression] with regard
to a certain person: for example: (i) he cooks, he reads, he goes [pacati pa{hati
gacchati]; (ii) it is black, yellow, red [kr~,:zo gauro raktal:i]; 753 (iii) he cooks, he will
cook, he cooked [pacati pak~yati aplik~ft]. 754
3. By "syllables" (vyaiijana) 755 one should understand phonemes (ak~ara; iii. 85bc),
i.e., the letters (va~a), vowels and consonants, for example, a, a, i, f, etc. [ka, kha,
ga, etc.).
[Question:] - But are the phonemes not the names (nlima) of the [written] letters
(lipyavayava)?
[Answer:] - One does not make or pronounce (_pra,:zfta) the phonemes in order to
indicate, to give .an idea [pratyliyana] of the [written) letters; but one makes or writes
[pra,:zfta] the letters in order to indicate, to give an idea of the phonemes, for, when
one does not hear them [asruyama,:za], one nevertheless comes to understand them
[pratfyeran] through writing [lekhya]. Therefore, the phonemes are not the names of
the [written) letters. { 19 b}
[Of these, the collection of names is the collection of icieations, (the collection of
phrases is the collection of sentences, the collection of syllables is the collection of
phonemes).)756
4. "Body, collection" (kaya), i.e., "collection" (samukti); samukti, in fact, has the
meaning of "gathering" (samavliya), according to Dhlitupli{ha, iv. 114.
Thus we have:
1. collection of names (nlimakliya) = "visual form", "sound", "odor", etc.; <240>
2. collection of phrases (padakliya) = "All conditioning forces (saf!Zski'ira) are
impermanent [anitya], all factors (dbanna) are nonself [anlitman]; nirvli,:za is
peaceful [slinta] ... ", etc.;
3. collection of syllables (vyaiijanakliya) = ka, kha, ga, gha, na, etc.
BAB.2.s.2. Existential status & the collections of names, phrases and syllables; F 240
BAB.2.s.2.a. Objection 1: Names, phrases and syllables are material form; F 24d
Objection by (the Sautrantika: 757 ) - Are not names, phrases and syllables (ni'iman;
pada; vyaiijana) "speech" (vi'ic) in their intrinsic nature [svabhliva] and, therefore,
have sound as their nature (sabdatmaka)? Thus they form part of the aggregate of
material form (rupaskandha); they are not formations (saf!Zski'ira) dissociated from
thought [cittaviprayukta] as the Sarviistiviidin teaches.
The Sarvastivadin: - These [three, i.e., names, phrases and syllables,) are not
"speech" [vlic] [in their intrinsic nature). Speech is "articulated sound" (gho~a), but
an articulated sound alone (gho~amatra)-for example a cry-does not indicate and

cause one to understand [pratfyante] the signified [artha].
[Question:] - What does [indicate it]?
[The Sarvastivadin:] - It is the name (naman)-issuing forth, moreover, from articu-
lated sound [i.e., speech] (vacam upadaya; pravartate)--which brings to light (dyota-
yati), or indicates and causes one to understand (pratyayayati), the signified.
BAB.2.s.2.b. Objection 2: Speech as articulated sound established by convention

suffices; F 240
(The Sautriintika: 758 ) - What I call "speech" [vac] is not articulated sound alone
[gho~amiitra], but rather the articulated sound which indicates or causes one to
understand fpratfyate] the signified.
[Question: - What is the articulated sound which indicates or causes one to under-
stand the signified?]
[Answer:] - It is the articulated sound with regard to which speakers [vaktr] have
come to an agreement [krtavadhi] that itindicates a certain signified. It is in this way
that the Ancients invested the sound go with the power to indicate nine things
[svartha]: {20 a}.
The scholars [medhavin] have established the sound go in regard to nine
things: (1) speech [vac], (2) cardinal region [dig], (3) earth [bha], (4) rays of
light [rasmi], (5) diamond [vajra], (6) cattle fpasu], (7) eye [aksi], (8) heaven
[svarga] and (9) water [vari]. 759
The philosopher for whom "it is the name (naman) which manifests or brings to light
[dyotayati] the signified", should accept that the sound "go" has been endowed,
through convention, with these different acceptations. Thus, if such and such a signi-
fied is indicated to the listener by such and such a name, it is indeed articulated
sound alone (gho~a; sabdamatra) that indicates the signified. What then is the use of
positing the distinct entity that you call "name"?
BAB.2.s.2.c. Objection 3: Names cannot issueforthfrom speech; F240-41

(The Sautrantika) continues: 760 - [The following is not yet known: how does
name (nama) issue forth from "speech" (vac)?] Would name be either (1) produced
(utpadya; janya) from speech761 or (2) manifested (prakiisya; vyangya) from
speech?762 <241>
1. In the first hypothesis, since speech has articulated sound (gho~a) as its intrinsic
nature, then any articulated sound [gho~amatra], whatever it may be, even the cry of
an animal, will "produce" name. Or if name is held to be "produced'' only through an

articulated sound of a particular nature [gho,savise,sa]-the lettered articulated sound
(var~uztmaka)-then this partic,:ular articulated sound, being capable of "producing"
name, will be quite sufficient to manifest or bring to light [dyotaka] the signified.
2. In the second hypothesis, this same criticism holds, by replacing the verb "to
produce" with the verb "to manifest".
BAB.2.s.2.ca. The various moments of sound do not exist in the same moment; F 241
[Sautrantika: 763 ] - 1. But it is absurd to suppose that speech [vac] "produces"
[utpada] name [nama]. In fact, the [various moments (samagrya) of] sound [sabda]
[which constitute a word] do not exist [as one factor] in the same moment [k~a1:iaika-
milana], for example r-ii-p-a. 764 Name, [on the other hand,] which you define\as one
factor (dharma), i.e., one real entity [ekasya; dravya], cannot arise part by part
[bhagasas]. Thus how does speech, when it produces name, produce it?
[Possible answer:] - The case is analogous to that of non-informative action (avi-
jiiapti; iv. 3d): the {20 b} last moment of informative action (vijiiapti), i.e., bodily or
vocal action, produces [utpadayati] non-informative action in dependence upon
[apek,sa] past moments [of informative action]. 765
[The Sautrantika:] - But if the last moment of the sound of speech produces [utpiida]
name, it would suffice to hear the last sound [sabda] in order to understand [prati-
padyeta] the sigttified.
!
It is not a way out to suppose (1) th11t speech [vac] produces (janayati) syllables
(vyaiijana), (2) that syllables further produce name [niima], (3) that name makes one
understand the signified. In fact, the same objection [as above] appears: "The
[various moments of] sound [which constitute a word] do not exist or meet [as one
factor] in the same moment, etc."
2. For the same reason, it is absurd to-suppose that speech ."manifests" [prakiisa]
name. [The (various moments of) sound [which constitute a word] do not exist or
meet [as one factor] in the same moment, and one factor, i.e., one real entity, such as
name, cannot arise part by part ... and so on.]
BAB.2.s.2.ct. Objection 4: Syllables do not issue forth from speech; F 241-42

[Sautrantika:J - (The hypothesis that speech [viic] produces syllables [vyaiijana]-a
hypothesis we have (above} provisionally tolerated-calls, moreover, for new com-
ments:)
Experts apply their minds vainly but cannot find the syllables distinct from speech. 766
Moreover, speech [vac] neither (1) produces [utpadika] nor (2) manifests [pra-
kasika] syllables [vyaiijana], for the same reasons which bring it about that speech
neither produces nor manifests name [nama; see above]: (Since speech has arti~
culated sound as its intrinsic nature, any articulated sound alone, whatsoever it
may be, would have to produce or manifest syllables. <242> Or if syllables are
held to be produced or manifested only through an articulated sound of a particu-
lar nature .. ; [same as at the beginning of objection 3].)
BAB.2.s.2.e. Objection 5: Present names would not designate the past and future
signified; etc.; F 242
But the Sarvastivadin may assume: - Like the characteristic "origination", the name
arises together with (sahaja) the signified [artha]. The question of knowing whether
it is (1) produced or (2) manifested by speech, [thus] disappears.
[Reply:] - In this hypothesis, one would have no present [vartamana] name designat-
ing a past [atfta] or future [anagata] signified [artha].
· Moreover, a father, a mother or other persons arbitrarily fix the name which is the
particular name of the son, daughter, etc: how can you accept that the name, like the
characteristic "origination", arises simultaneously with the signified?
Finally, unconditioned factors [asaf!lskrtaniif!l dharmanam] would not have a name
since they do not arise: a consequence which the Sarviistivadin cannot accept.
BAB.2.s.2.f. Objection 6: Only syllables would suffice to exist as real entities;

F 242-43
But the Sarvastivadins support their claim with a text. The Fortunate One said:
The verse [gatha] is based on names, [and the poet (kavi) is the basis of the
verse]. 767
(The Sautriintika768 ) answers: - (1) Name (naman) is a sound (sabda) upon which
persons agree [krtavadhi] that it indicates a certain signified [artha]. 169 (2) Verse
(gatha) or phrase (vakya; pada) is a certain arrangement (racana) of names: it is in
this sense that, according to the Fortunate One, it is based (saf!lnisrita) on the names.
{21 a} - To assume a distinct real entity (dravyantara) called phrase (pada) is a
superfluous hypothesis. You might as well maintain that distinct real entities termed
"a line (of ants)" [pankti] or "a succession of thoughts" [cittanupurvya] exist distinct
from ants [pipflika] and thoughts [citta]. 770 Assume then that the syllables alone
(a~ara; vyaiijanamatra), which (from our point of view) are sounds (in their
intrinsic nature), exist as distinct real entities. 771 [The collection of names, etc., will
be only collocations (samiiha) of those (syllables). The designation (prajiiapti) of that

(names, etc., as distinct real entities) would thus be useless (apiirthika). 772 ]
The Vaibhii~ika: - We accept the collection of names (niimakiiya), the collection
of phrases (padakiiya) and the collection of syllables (vyafijanakiiya) as [real enti-
ties (dravya),] as formations dissociated from thought [viprayuktasarrzskiira], for all
factors (dharma) are not accessible through understanding or reasoning [tarka-
gamya],773 <243>
BAB.2.s.3. Location, range, effect, moral quality & syllables, names and phrases;
F243
One asks:
l. [Location:] With which realm of existence are the syllables, names and
phrases connected fpratisarrzyukta]?
2. [Range:] Are the syllables, etc., [factors] indicative of sentient beings
(sattviikhya) or non-indicative of sentient beings (i. lOb)?
3. [Effect:] Are the syllables, etc., [effects], i.e., an effect of retribution
[vipiikaja], an effect of accumulation [aupacayika] or an effect of equal
outflow [nai~yandika] (i. 37)?
4. [Moral Quality:] Are the syllables, etc., wholesome [kusala], unwholesome
[akusala] or non-defined [avyiikrta]?
47cd. (1) [The syllables, names and phrases] are connected with the realm
of desire and the realm of fine-materiality; (2) they are factors
indicative of sentient beings; (3) they are an effect of equal outflow;
(4) they are [unobscured]-non-defined. 774
1. Syllables, etc., are connected [iipta] with two realms of existence. According to
one opinion, they are also connected with the realm of immateriality, but there they
are "not expressible" (anabhiliipya, akathya). 775 { 21 b}
2.. They are factors indicative of sentient beings, proceeding from the efforts
fprayatna] of'sentient beings and consisting of lettered articulated sound (va111a), etc.
In fact, they [manifest or bring to light [dyotayati] the signified, yet] accompany
[samanviigata] the person who speaks, not the signified which they manifest or bring
to light [dyotyate].
3. They are an effect of equal outflow (nai~yandika) [only], being produced
through the homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu; ii. 52); they are not an effect of
retribution [vipiikaja], since they proceed from the desire [icchii] of the person who
speaks; they are not an effect of accumulation (aupacayika), since they are not
material [ariipin]. 776
4. They are unobscured-non-defined [anivrtavyakrta; ii. 28] [only]. 777
BAB.2.9. The modes of group homogeneity, possessions, characteristics, two

attainments, non-possession; F 243-44
We will explain in brief the modes, not yet indicated, of the other formations dis-
sociated from thought [viprayuktasal!lskiira; ii. 35].
47d-48b. In the same way, the [group] homogeneity [(1) is connected wit,h the
realm of desire and the realm of fine-materiality; (2) is a factor
indicative of sentient beings; (3) is an effect of equal outflow; (4) is
unobscured-non-defined, yet] is, in addition, (5) an effect of
retribution, (6) is connected with the three realms of existence.778
<244>
"In the same way" [tathii], that is to say: like the syllables, names and phrases, the
[group] homogeneity (sabhiigatii) (1) is connected with the first two spheres
[avacara] [i.e., the realm of desire and the realm of fine-materiality], (2) is a factor
indicative of sentient beings, (3) is an effect of equal outflow, (4) is unobscured-non-
defined. But the [group] homogeneity is not only an effect of equal outflow: in
addition, (5) it is an effect of retribution; (6) it is not only connected with the first
two spheres: it is also connected with the third.
48b. Possessions are of two types [i.e., an effect of equal outflow and an
effect of retribution]. 779
[Possessions (priipti)] are (1) an effect of equal outflow and (2) an effect of retribu-
tion.
48c. The characteristics, [i.e., origination, deterioration, duration and
impermanence, are] also [of two types, like the possessions.780
The characteristics [lak~a~a], origination, etc., are-like the possessions--of two
types [i.e., (1) an effect of equal outflow and (2) an effect of retribution].
48cd. The two attainments and non-possession are [only] an effect of
equal outflow. 781
The two attainments without thought [acittasamiipatti], [i.e., the,attainment of non-
ideation and the attainment of cessation,] and the non-possessions [apriipti; asam-
anviigama] are an effect of equal outflow only.
As regards [all of them, i.e., the possession, the characteristics, the two attainments
and non-possession,] their being connected to a realm, their being factors indicative
of sentient beings or non-indicative of sentient beings], their moral quality (whole-
some, etc.), the explanations have been given above. {22 a}
The characteristics coexist [sahabhutva] with all conditioned factors, thus they are
factors indicative of sentient beings or non-indicative of sentient beings [sattva-
asatfvlikhya].
For the state of non-ideation (lisarµjiiika) and [vitality (jfvita), i.e.,] the life-force
(liyus), see ii. 41d and 45a. {vi. 1 a} 782
[The formations dissociated from thought have been discussed.]
C. Classification of Factors according to Causes, Effects, Conditions 607
C. Cf!jLASSIFICATION OF FACTORS ACCORDING TO CAUSES

(HETU), EFFECTS (PHALA), CONDITIONS (PRATYAYA); 783 F 244-331
A. Causes (hetu); F 245
B. Effects (phala); F 275
C. Topics related to causes and results; F 297
D. Conditions (pratyaya); F 299-331
We have seen (ii. 46cd) that "origination Uiiti] is able to engender that which is to be
engendered, but not without the [corresponding] complete assemblage of causes (hetu)
and conditions (pratyaya)". 184 What are the causes, what are the conditions?785 <245>
4 CONDITIONS 6CAUSES 5EFFECTS

co-existent cause (sahabhil-hetu)
effect bf human action
}
associated cause (saTflprayuktaka-hetu) (puru~akqta-phala)
causal condition homogeneous cause (sabhiiga-hetu)

(hetu-pratyaya)
pervasive cause (sarvatraga-hetu)
} effect of equal outflow
(ni~yanda-phala)
ripening cause (vipiika-hetu) ripened effect

(v(piika-phala)
immediately preceding condition

(samanantara-pratyaya)
cognitive object condition

(iilambana-pratyaya)
condition of dominance - - - efficient cause (kiira,:ia-hetu) effect of dominance

786
.(adhipati-pratyaya) (adhipati-phala)
effect of disconnection
(visaTflyoga-phala)
(not an effect of any of
the 6 causes)
Fig. 1: The correlation between conditions, causes and effects787
CA. THE SIX CAUSES (HETU); 788 F245-75

49. Cause is considered as sixfold: (1) efficient cause, (2) co-existent
cause, (3) homogeneous cause, (4) associated cause, (5) pervasive
cause, (6) ripening cause. 789 { 1 b}
1. Efficient cause (kiirarJ,ahetu; ii. 50a);

2. co-existent cause (sahabhiihetu; ii. 50b);
3. homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu; ii. 52a);
4. associated cause (saf!lprayuktakahetu; ii. 53c);
5. pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu; ii. 54a);
6. ripening cause (vipiikahetu; ii. 54c):
these are the six types of causes [hetu] which the Abhidhii.rmikas (Jfiiinaprasthiina,
920c5) recognize. 790 <246>
CAA. Efficient cause (kii,ra,;ahetu); 791 F 246-48

CAA.1. General definition; 792 F 246
50a. All [conditioned and unconditioned] factors are an efficient cause
with regard to any [(other) conditioned factor], with the exception
of themselves. 793
A factor (dharma) is not the efficient cause (kiirarJ,ahetu) of itself. 794
With this exception [svabhiivavarjya], all [conditioned and unconditioned] factors 795
are an efficient' cause with regard to any conditioned (saf!lskrta) factor, because-in
regard to the arising of the factor susceptible to arise (utpattimant; utpiidaf!l prati)-
these factors do not constitute an obstacle [or al;)ide in the state of non-obstacle]
(avighnabhiiviivasthiina ).
CAA.2. The range of the efficient cause; 796 F 246

From this definition, it results that the factors which are a co-existent cause (saha-
bhiihetu), etc., are also an efficient cause (kiirarJ,ahetu): the other causes are part of
the efficient cause. 797
CAA.3. The name "efficient cause"; F 246

The cause (hetu) (1) which is not referred to by a special name [vise~a-sal'!l-
jfiaya], (2) which is simply [eva] kiirarJ,a, 798 i.e., reason of existence or causa-
tion or efficient, without qualification, that is the efficient cause (kiirarJ,ahetu):
it receives as its particular name the name which suits all causes. Compare this
with the name of the sense-sphere of form [i.e., of visible form] (riipiiyatana;
i. 24).
The efficient cause calls for the following observations.
cAA.4. Clarifications to the given definition; F 246-47

cAA.4.1. The meaning of "arising (offactors)"; F 246-47
[Objection:] - The fluxes (iisrava) are produced among the ignorant; once the truths
are known, they are not produced. In the same way, the stars (jyotis) are not visible
when the sun [siirya] shines. <247> Thus the cognition LJiiiina] of the truths and the
sun [actually] make an obstacle (vighna) to the fluxes, the stars. Thus it is wrong lo
say that all conditioned factors are an efficient cause (kiira,:iahetu) because they do
not constitute an obstacle [or abide in the state of non-obstacle] to the arising [of a
factor susceptible to arise].
[Answer:]- We understand that the cognition of the truths and the light of the sun do
not make an obstacle to the arising of the factor which is "arising" (utpadyamana),
i.e., to the factor which-its causes and conditions being completely assembled799-
is going to exist without delay (anantarabhiivin).
cAA.4.2: The meaning of "cause" and the two types of efficient cause; F 247
[Question:] - Granted that it is possible to call "cause", "reason of existence",
"causation"·, "enabling", that which is "capable" of making an obstacle [vighna-
kiira,:ia] yet does not make an obstacle [avighnakara,:ia]. For example, villagers
[gramf,:ia], {2 a} when their lord (bhojaka) does not oppress them (anupadrotar),
say: "We are happy because of our master (sviimina smalJ sukhitiilJ)."800 But can one
call that which is "incapable" of making an obstacle [and thus] does not make an
obstacle a cause? [For example,]
1. nirvii,:ia is incapable of making an obstacle to the arising of any conditioned
factor, whatever it may be_; 801
2. .in the same way, future factors [anutpattidharma] [are incapable of making
an obstacle] with regard to past factors;
3. in the same way, hell beings (naraka) or animals [tiryak] [are incapable of
making an obstacle] with regard to sentient beings of the realm of immate-
riality.
[Thus,] with respect to making an obstacle to the arising of the conditioned factors in
question, (1) nirva,:ia, (2) future factors and (3) hell beings are as if they did not exist
(asattulya). Can they be considered as causes?
[Answer:] - They are causes; for, even when their lord would be incapable of
harming them, the villagers would express themselves as we have said; but not about
a non-existing lord.
The exposition (nirdesa) which we have given of the efficient cause (kara,:iahetu) is a
general exposition and includes (see ii. 56b): 802
i. that which is the chief (pradhana) 803 efficient cause, the efficient cause par
excellence, and
ii. that which is the subordinate (apradhana) efficient cause.
The efficient cause par excellence is the generative (janaka) cause: in this sense, the
eye and the visible form [cak~urapa] are an efficient cause of the visual conscious-
ness [cak~urvijiiana]; likewise food [ahara] with regard to the body [sarfra], 804 the
seed [bija], etc., with regard to the sprout [ankura], etc. <248>
Objection: - If all factors (dharma) are the causes of other factors because they do
not make an obstacle [anavara,:iabhava], why do not all factors arise together or
simultaneously [yugapad]? 805 When a murder [prii,:iiitipiita] is committed, why are
not all sentient beings, like the murderer [ghataka] himself, guilty of the transgres-
sion of murder?
[Answer:] - This objection is vain. In fact, all the factors receive the name of effi-
cient cause because they do not make an obstacle: it is not that they are all agents
(karaka).
Other masters: - All efficient causes (kara,:iahetu) possess a real capability
(samarthya) with regard to any factor (dharma). {2 b} For example:
1. nirva,:ia [is capable of indirectly producing] the visual consciousness.
[Question: - How is that?]
[Answer:] - [First,] a mental consciousness [manovijiiana], wholesome or unwhole-
some, arises having nirva,:ia as its cognitive object (alambana; ii. 62cd); later, from
this mental consciousness a visual consciousness arises; nirva,:ia thus has capability,
indirectly [para,pparaya], with regard to the visual consciousness.
2-3. The same argument applies to future factors [anutpattidharma], to hell beings
[naraka], etc.
[The efficient cause has been discussed.]
cAa. Co-existent cause (sahabhuhetu); 806 F 248-55

CAB.t. General definition; 807 F 248-49
50bd. Factors which are reciprocally effects [mithafiphala], for instance,
(1) {fundamental materialf elements (bhuta), (2) thought and thought-
/associates, (3) the characteristics [i.e., origination, etc.] and the
factor they characterize, are a co-existent cause. 808
The factors (dharma) that are effects of one another [parasparaphala] [i.e., the effect
of human action (puru~akaraphala); ii. 56d, 58a] are called co-existent cause
(sahabhiihetu). 809 <249>
For example, (1) the fundamental material elements (mahiibhilta) 810 are, with one
another [anyo'nya], co-existent causes. (2) The same also for thought [citta] and [the
factors that are] its associates [cittanuvartin] (ii. 51); (3) the same also for the [four]
characteristics [sa1J1skrtalak~w;za], origination, etc. (ii. 45b), and the [conditioned]
factor (dharma) they characterize [lak,rya].
Thus all ccmditioned (saf!!skrta) factors are part of the category of co-existent cause,
[where applicable (yathiiyogaf!l), i.e.,] in each case, the factors which are in a mutual
relationship of causality must be distinguished. 811
cAB.2. Clarifications to the given definition; 812 F 249-53

cAB.2.1. The range of the co-existent cause; F 249
We have reason to complete the above definition. - A factor (dharma) is [also
considered to be] a co-existent cause (sahabhiihetu) of its secondary characteristics
(anulak~a"l}a; ii. 45), [although] not being in a mutual relationship of causality
[anyo'nyaphalatva] with them: for the secondary characteristics are not co-existent
causes of their factor. This is a case to be added [upasa1J1khyatavya] to the defini-
tion.813 {3 a}
cAB.2.2. Thought-associates; 814 F 249-52

815
cAB.2.2.1. Range of the thought-associates; F 249
To what factors (dharma) is the name thought-associates (cittanuparivartin; cittanu-
vartin) given?
Slac. (1) Thought-concomitants; (2) the two restraints [i.e., the restraint
co-existent with meditation and pure restraint]; (3) the characteris-
tics of thought-concomitants, of the two restraints and of thought,
are thought-associates. 816
[The name thought-associates is given to]
1. all factors (dharma) associated with thought (cittasaf!!prayukta; ii. 24),
2. the restraint co-existent with meditation [dhyanasaf!!vara] and pure restraint
[anasravasa1J1vara] (ii. 65c; iv. 17d), 817 and
3. the characteristics, i.e., origination Uati], [deterioration (jara), duration (sthiti),
impermanence (anityata); ii. 45b], of all these, [i.e., (1) and (2),] and also of thought.
cAB.2.2.2. Ten reasons why the thought-associates are termed "associates"; 818
F 249-50
51d. [Thought-concomitants, the two restraints, etc., are thought-associ-

ates,] from the point of view (i) of time, (ii) of effect, [i.e., the effect
of human action and the effect of disconnection,] et cetera, [i.e., the
ripened effect and the effect of equal outflow,] and (iii) of good-
ness, [badness, non-definedness]. 819
The associates.are associated with thought.
CAB.2.2.2.a. 1.-4. reason'.· Associates from the point of view of time; 82°F 249-50
In regard to "time" [kala]:
i. they have the same [eka] arising [utpiida; i.e., reason 1], the same duration
[sthiti; i.e., reason 2], the same cessation [nirodha; i.e., reason 3], as does
thought;
ii. they are of the same [eka] time period [adhvan; i.e., reason 4] as thought.
1. When we say "the same arising ... ", we understand the word "same" [eka]in the
sense of concomitance: the associates arise, perdure and perish at the same time as
thought; but their arising is distinct. <250>
ii. In regard to thoughts which are not destined to arise (anutpattidharmin),
they do not arise or perdure or perish: likewise their associates. This is why
one adds: "The associates are of the same time period as thought." (Thought
which is compelled not to arise is future until the moment when thought would
have arisen had it arisen: its associates are then future; thought is past after the
moment when thought would have perished had it arisen: its associates are then
past.)s21
cAB.2.2.2.b. 5. -7. reason: Associates from the point of view of effect; 822 F 250
In regard to "effect [phala], et cetera" [adi]: 823
1. by "effect" (i.e., reason 5) one should understand the effect of human
action (puru~akaraphala; ii. 58ab) and the effect of disconnection (visa1!1,-
. yogaphala; ii. 57d);
ii. by "et cetera" one should understand the ripened effect (vipakaphala;
ii. 57d; i.e., reason 6) and the effect of equal outflow (ni~andaphala; ii. 57c;
i.e., reason 7).
[Thus,] the associates have the same effect, the same vipaka; the same ni~yanda as
thought: {3 b} "same" indicates identity (sa1!1,khyii.ne, sii.dhii.ra'(te).
CAB.2.2.2.c. 8. -10. reason: Associates from the point of view of moral quality; 824
F250
In regard to "goodness [subhata], etc":

The associates are wholesome [kusala; i.e., reason 8], unwholesome [akusala; i.e.,
reason 9], non-defined [avyakrta; i.e., reason 10], like the thought which they accom-
pany.
Thus there are ten (i.e., 3 + 4 + 3) reasons [kara~a] by virtue of which the associates
are named thought-associates [cittanuparivartin]. 825
cAB.2.2.3. Number of associates of the most reduced thought; 826 F 250-52

[Vaibha~ikas:] - The thought for which the retinue is the most reduced (sarvalpa
citta) 821 is a co-existent cause (sahabhilhetu) of fifty-eight (= 50 + 4 + 4) factors
(dharma): namely, (1) the ten generally permeating factors (mahabhilmika; ii. 23)
with the four characteristics for each of them [tallak~a,:ia]; (2) the (thought's) four
characteristics [svalak~a,:ia] and its four secondary characteristics (anulak~a,:ia_;
ii. 46).
If, from these fifty-eight factors, the four secondary characteristics of thought are set
aside-those that have no activity [vyapara] in regard to it [see F 249]-there are
fifty-four factors which are a co-existent cause of this particular thought. 828 <251>
According to another opinion [apara], only fourteen factors are a co~existent cause
of this thought, namely, the four characteristics and the ten generally, permeating
factors. In the same way that the (thought's) secondary characteristics have no
activity in regard to thought, the characteristics of the generally permeating factors
[tallak~a~a] do not have an activity in regard to thought.
The Vaibha~ikas reject this opinion, i.e., that the forty characteristics of the generally
permeating factors (mahabhilmika) are not a co-existent cause (sahabhilhetu) of
thought, as being contradictory to the doctrine of the Prakara,:iagrantha according
to which "the four characteristics, i.e., origination, deterioration, duration and im-
permanence, of the afflicted view of self (satkayadr~ti) and of the factors associated
with this afflicted view (comprising the generally permeating factors), are, at the
same time, an effect and a cause of the afflicted view of self'. 829 <252>
Certain masters, in their reading of the Prakara~agrantha, omit the words: "and of
the factors associated with this afflicted view" [tatsarriprayuktanarri ca dharma,:iarri].
According to the Vaibha~ikas ofKasmir, {4 a} these words figure in the text; or,
when they are absent there, the context indicates that they should be supplied and
that the text is incomplete.
CAB.2.3. The relation between co-existing factors and co-existent causes: eight
categories which are not co-existent causes; F 252-53
Any factor which is a cause as a co-existent cause (yat tavat sahabhuhetuna hetul:i) is
sahabhu, i.e., co-existing. But there are some co-existing items which are not a co-
existent cause (sahabhuhetu):
1. the secondary characteristics [anulak~a~a] of the principal factor (mula-
dharma) are not a co-existent cause with regard to this factor (ii. 46ab; 50bd);
2. these same (secondary characteristics of the principal factor) are not co-
existent causes with one another [anyo'nya];
3. the secondary characteristics of the thought-accompaniments are not a co-
existent cause in regard to thought;
4. these same (secondary characteristics of the thought-associates) are not co-
existent causes with one another;
5. derivative material elements or forms (bhautika; upadayarupa), i.e., blue,
etc., susceptible to offering resistance (sapratigha) and, in addition, arisen
together (sahaja), are not co-existent causes with one another; <253>
6. a small part [ki1?1cidJ of derivative material elements or forms not susceptible
to offering resistance [apratigha] and, in addition, arisen together are not co- ·
existent causes with one another; with the exception of the two restraints
(see ii, F 249);
7. no derivative material element, even though arisen together with the ele-
ments (bhata), is a co-existent cause in regard to the elements;
8. the possessions (prapti), even when they arise with the factor to which they
are related (praptimat), are not a co-existent cause in regard to it.
The factors of these eight categories are co-existing factors (sahabha), but are not a
co-existent cause, because (i) their effect [phala], (ii) the ripened effect (vipaka-
phala), (iii) the effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala), are not the same [aneka]
(see ii, F 250).
As for the possessions (prapti), they do not always accompany the factor (saha-
cari~~u): they arise either before the factor, or after it, or at the same time
(ii. 37-38) .
. cAB.3. The existential status of the co-existent cause; 83 F 253-55°

cAB.3.t. Sautrantika: The co-existent cause is not established by common
examples; F 253 ·
(The Sautriintika831 ) criticizes the doctrine of the causality of coexistent factors:
All this may be correct (sarvam apy etat syiU), that "what is a co-existent cause is
sahabha, i.e., co...:existing", and so on [see above, F 252]. 832 Nevertheless, in the
world, the relationship of cause and effect (hetuphalabhiiva) is well established in
certain cases: the cause is previous to the effect. It is in this way that the seed [bija] is
the cause of the sprout [ankura], the sprout of the stalk [niila], etc. But a similar
relationship is not observed between reciprocal factors. You should thus demonstrate
that simultaneously arisen [things] [sahotpanna; LVP: sahabha] can be in a relation-
ship of cause and effect. {4 b}
cAB.3.2. Proof of the simultaneity of cause and effect via two examples; F 253-54
The Sarvlistivadin gives two examples:
1. the lamp [pradfpa] arises together with its radiance (saprabha);
2. the sprout [ankura], growing in the sunlight [prabha], arises together with its
shadow (sacchiiya).
But the lamp is the cause of its radiance, the sprout is the cause of its shadow. Thus
cause and effect can be simultaneous.
(The Sautrlintika: 833 ) - These examples are not established.
[Regarding the first example,] we must examine (sar!7,pradharyam) whether the lamp
is the cause of its radiance, or if not, as we think, both the lamp with its radiance are
the effect of the complex or assemblage [siimagrf] of previous causes and conditions:
oil [sneha], wick [vani], etc. 834
In the same way, [regarding the second example,] a complex or assemblage of
previous causes (seed, sunlight) is the cause of the sprout and of its shadow, of the
sprout with its shadow. <254>
cAB.3.3. Proof of the simultaneity of cause and effect via the definition of
causality by the logicians; F 254
The Sarvastivadin: - The relationship of cause and effect is established by the
existence and non-existence of what is called effect, parallel to the existence and non-
existence of what is called cause. The definition [of causality] by the logicians (hetu-
vid; haituka) is very good:
When, due to A existing or non-existing, B (necessarily) exists or does not
exist, then A is considered to be the cause and B is considered to be the
effect [yasya bhiivabhiivayo/:i yasya bhaviibhavau niyamata/:i sa hetur itaro
hetuman].
Assuming this to be the case, if we examine the factors (dharma) that we have
defined as co-existing factors and co~existent causes (sahabhuhetu), we see that
they all exist when one of them exists, and that none exist when one of them does
not ex~st. 835 They are then in a mutual relationship of cause and effect [hetuphala-
bhiiva].
(The Sautriintika: 836 ) - Let us accept (for arguments sake) that, among the simultane-
ously arisen factors [sahotpanna], a factor can be the cause of another factor: [for
example,] the eye sense-faculty is the cause of the visual consciousness. 837 But how
could simultaneously arisen factors be causes and effects with regard to one another
[anyo'nya] [since the visual consciousness does not become the cause of that visual
faculty] ?838
The Sarviistivadin: - The reciprocal causality is established through the definition of
causality [kiira~a] which we have given: [when the one exists or does not exist, the
other likewise exists or does not exist]; when thought exists, the thought-concomi-
tants (caitta) exist, and vice versa.
(The Sautrantika:) - Very well, but then the Sarvastivadins should revise their
system (see ii. 50bd [F 249 and 252]). In fact, (1) they have denied the mutual
causality of derivative material elements (upiidiiyarupa, bhautika; visible form, taste,
etc.; see category 5, above F 252), although visible form never exists without
(aviniibhiivin) taste (see ii. 22); (2-3) they have denied the mutual causality of the
derivative material elements and of the fundamental material elements [see category
7, F 253], and the mutual causality of. the secondary characteristics and of thought
[see category 1, F 252].
CAB.3.4. Proof of the simultaneity of cause and effect via the example of the
three sticks supporting one another; F 254-55
The Sarviistiviidin. - The relationship of cause and effect in the case of coexisting
factors (sabhabhu) such as thought and thought-concomitants, etc., is established in
the same way that three sticks [trida~4a] stay in position (avasthiina), [i.e.,] by sup-
porting one another [or by their mutual power] [anyo'nyabala]. {5 a} <255>
(The Sautrantika: 839 ) - This new example should be examined. One wonders whether
the three sticks stay in position through the power which the three sticks possess
insofar as they are arisen together (sahotpannabalena), or rather, if the power of the
complex or assemblage [siimagrf] of previous causes which made them arise together
does not also make them arise supporting one another.
Moreover, there are other things involved here besides the mutual power of support
(anyo'nyabala): there is a rope [sutraka], a hook [salikuka]; there is the ground [prthivf],
[which cause the sticks to stand together].

The Sarvastivadin replies: - But the coexistent factors (sahabha) have also other
causes than the co-existent cause (sahabhuhetu), namely, the homogeneous cause
(sabhiigahetu), the pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu), the ripening cause (v.ipiikahetu),
which have a role analogolls to that of the rope, etc., [in this ex!lmple]. The co-
existent cause is thus established.
cAc. Homogeneous cause (sabhagahetu); 84°F 255-67

cAc.1. General definition; 841 F 255-257
52a. Similar factors are a homogeneous cause. 842
Similar (sabhiiga; sadrsa) factors (dharma) are homogeneous causes (sabhiigahetu)
of factors similar [to them].
1
cAc.1.1. Same moral quality and scope & the homogeneous cause; 843 F 255-56
1. The five wholesome (kusala) aggregates (skandha) are the homogeneous causes
(sabhiigahetu) of five wholesome aggregates, [among themselves (anyo 'nya)].
2. When [the aggregates] are defiled (kli~{a), i.e., unwholesome (akusala) and
obscured-non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta), they are the homogeneous causes of defiled,
[i.e., unwholesome and obscured-non-defined aggregates], .[in each case, among
themselves].
3. When [the aggregates] are non-defined [avyiikrta], i.e., unobscured-non"defined
(anivrtiivyakrta), they are the homogeneous causes of non-defined [aggregates], [in
each case, among themselves]. {5 b}
Nevertheless, the masters do not agree on this last point [i.e., 3.]: 844
i. According to some, non-defined material form (rupa) is the homogeneous
cause of the five non-defined aggregates, but the other four. aggregates, i.e.,
sensation, etc., are not the homogeneous causes of material form (ii. 59). 845
[This is because (the material form aggregate) is inferior (nyunatva) (in
nature 846 to the other aggregates).]
11. According to others, four aggregates are the homogeneous causes (sabhiiga-
hetu) of five aggregates; but material form is not/only847 the homogeneous

cause of [the other] four aggregates.
iii. According to still others, material form is not the homogeneous cause of
four aggregates and vice versa. 848
4. When considering one personal existence [nikiiyasabhiiga]:
i. the first embryonic stage is the homogeneous cause of ten stages:

the five embryonic states (garbhiivasthii): (1) kalala, (2) arbuda, (3) pesin,
(4) ghana and (5) prasiikhii;
the five post-embryonic states (jiitiivasthii): (6) biila [small child under five
years], (7) kumiira [child up to sixteen years], (8) yuvan [grown person],
(9) madhya [mature person] and (10) vrddha [advanced in years]. <256>
ii. The second embryonic stage is a homogeneous cause of nine stages (arbuda ...
viirddha), and so on. A previous moment of each stage is th.e homogeneous cause of
the later moments of this stage. (Compare iv. 53).
When considering the stages of the next personal existence of the same type
[samiinajiitfya], each of the stages of the previous personal existence is the homo-
geneous cause of ten stages.
5. The same holds for external (biihya) entities, i.e., barley [yava], rice [siili], etc.,
that is to say, the quality of a homogeneous cause remains confined in each series:
barley is a similar cause of barley, not of rice.
6. (The Diir~tiintika849 ) denies that material form (rupa) is a homogeneous cause of
material form; but this contradicts the Mahiisiistra (Jniinaprasthiina, 985bl4):
The past [atfta] fundamental material elements (mahiibhiita) are hetu and
adhipati of the future [aniigata] fundamental material elements.
By adhipati, one should understand the condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya;
· ii. 62d); by hetu, one should understand [the causal condition (hetupratyaya; 850
ii. 61d), i.e.,] the homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu), for the other causes [of the
causal condition, i.e., the co-existent cause, associated cause, pervasive cause and
ripening cause,] are here evidently outside of being the cause.
cAc.1.2. Same categories of abandonment and same stages & the homogeneous
cause; 851 F'256-57
[Question:] -Are all similar [sadrsa] factors (dharma) homogeneous causes of
similar factors?
[Answer:] - No.
52b. (Similar factors) belonging to a given category and a given stage
(bha) (are homogeneous causes only of similar factors). 852 .•.
That is to say: the factors belonging to a given category [nikiiyq] [of abandonment;
see ii. 52cd] and to a given stage (bhami) are homogeneous causes only of similar
factors of their own category [of abandonment] and their own stage.
1. Factors are classed into five categories [nikaya] according to whether tbey are
susceptible of being abandoned [prahatavya]:
i-iv. by insight [darsana] into each of the four truths, or
v. by cultivation (bhavana) (i. 40).
2. Factors belong to nine stages [bhumi]: they are either
i. in the realm of desire, or.
ii-v. in one of the four meditations (dhyana), or {6 a}
vi-ix. in one of the four formless meditative attainments (arupya). <257>
1. [Thus,] (i) a factor susceptible of being abandoned by insight into the truth of
unsatisfactoriness (dul;ikhadrgheya) is a homogeneous cause of a factor susceptible of
being abandoned by insight into the truth of unsatisfactoriness, and not of the factors
belonging to the other four categories; and (ii-v) so on.
2. (i) Among the factors susceptible of being abandoned by insight into the truth of
· unsatisfactoriness, the one belon~ing to the realm of desire is a homogeneous cause
of a factor belonging to the realm of desire, [and not by the ones belonging to the
other stages]; and (ii-ix) so on.
cAc.2. Clarifications of the given definition; 853 F 257-62

The homogeneous cause has not yet been defined exactly.
cAc.2.1. Past, present and future factors & the homogeneous cause; 854 F 257
52b. (In fact, only [similar] factors which have) arisen previously (are
homogeneous causes). 855
The factor-arisen Uata], i.e., past [atfta] or present [pratyutpanna], and previous
[agra], (purvotpanna; agraja)-is a homogeneous cause of a later [pascima] similar
factor, arisen [utpanna] or not arisen [anutpanna]. The future factors cannot be
homogeneous causes. 856
[Question:] - On what authority is this definition based?
[Answer:] - It is based on the Mulasastra, for the Jiianaprasthana [920c15] says:
[Question:] - What is a homogeneous cause (sabhagahetu)?
[Answer:] - The previously arisen (agraja; purvotpanna) wholesome root is
a cause [hetu] in the quality of a homogeneous cause with regard to the later
wholesome root and the factors associated with it (tatsaf!iprayukta), of the
same category and stage. In that way, the past wholesome roots are a
homogeneous cause in regard to past and present wholesome roots; past and
present wholesome roots are a homogeneous cause in regard to future

wholesome roots.
cAc.2.1.L Future factors & the homogeneous cause; F 257

Objection. - The future factor is a homogeneous cause, for one reads in the same
Jfilinaprasthlina:
[Question:] - Is there a time period when the factor (dharma) that is a cause
of a certain factor, is not a cause of it?
[Answer:] - Never is this factor not a cause (na kadiicin na hetul:z). {6 b}
<258>
cAc.2.1.1.a. First explanation: by the Vaibhii~ika; F 258

The Vaibhii~ika: -This text does not contradict the first; for the lfilinaprasthlina do~s
not refer here to that which is a cause in the quality of a homogeneous cause
(sabhligahetu), but rather to that which is a cause in the quality of the co-existent
cause (sahabhuhetu), of the associated cause (saf!?prayuktakahetu), of the ripening
cause (viplikahetu ).
cAc.2.1.1.b. Second explanation: by the followers of the last state; F 258-59

According to another opinion, i.e., that of the "followers of the last state"
(paramiivasthiiviidin), the answer of the Jfiiinaprasthiina: "Never is this factor
. (dharma) not a cause", refers to the homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu) and is
justified as follows: The future factor, in the arising state (jiiyamiiniivasthii), is
certainly a homogeneous cause. Thus, taking into account the future factor in its last
state, the Jfiiinaprasthiina can say that the factor is never not a cause, is always a
cause, since at a certain moment of the future, it is a cause.
[Reply: 857] - This explanation does not resolve the difficulty. In fact, if the future
factor, after not having been a cause, becomes a cause by arriving at the arising state,
it is not always a cause: but the Jfiiinaprasthiina says in an unrestricted way that
never is this factor not a cause.
Besides, this explanation is not reconcilable with the answer that the lfilinaprasthiina
(1026b19; MVS, 87a2) gives to another question:
[Question:] - Is there a time period when the factor that is the condition as
the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantara; ii. 62ab) of a certain
factor is not the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent?
[Answer:] - Yes, when. it has not arisen (yadi sa dharmo notpanno bhavati).
Now, the case of the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent
(samanantara) is analogous to that of the homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu): the
future condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent, arriving at the arising
state, is a condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent. Thus, if the inter- .
pretation of the answer: "Never is this factor not a cause", in the sense of: "The
future factor, in the arising state, is a homogeneous cause", is correct, the Jiiiina-
prasthiina, dealing with the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent,
should answer·as for the homogeneous cause: "Never is this factor not a condition as
the equivalent and immediate antecedent." But the Jiiiinaprasthiina answers: "It is
riot a conditipn as the equivalent and immediate antecedent when it has not arisen."
Thus, the word "cause", in the first answer, should not be understood as homogene-
ous cause.
The "followers of the last state" say: - The Jiiunaprasthiina answers the first ques-
tion by saying: "Never is this factor not a cause", and the second question by saying:
. "It is not a cause when it has not arisen", in order to show that one can answer in
two ways in order to express the same meaning (dvimukhapradarsaniirtham). One
can answer the first question as the second and the second question as the first.
<259>
[Reply: 858 ] - What a bizarre method of explanation! The author of the treatise
[siistrakiira] must truly be inept [akausala]! Thus the proposed first solution [pari-
hiira] is the best explanation. {7 a}
cAc.2.1.1.c. Answers to various further objections; F 259-62

[Objection:] - If the future factor (dharma) is not a homogeneous cause (sabhiiga-
hetu), why does the Prakara,:,.apiidasiistra teach that the future afflicted view of self
(satkiiyadr~fi) has the afflicted view of self for its cause and is a cause of the afflicted
view of self? We read in fact (in the cited text, p. 252 n. 2 B,1,b):
... with the exception of the future afflicted view of self and of the truth
of unsatisfactoriness which is associated with it (aniigatiirµ satkiiyadr~firµ
tatsarµp rayuktarµ ca du"l_ikhasatyarp. sthiipyitvii). 859
Answer by the Vaibha~ika: -This reading is corrupt (vina~faka). One should read [in
its place]:
... with the exception of the truth of unsatisfactoriness associated with the
future afflicted view of self (aniigatasatkiiyadr~fisaf!1prayuktam).
To suppose that your reading is authentic, it would imply, because of the meaning
that the text should express (arthato vaivarµ boddhavyam), that your reading must be
considered as without authority (na tantram), as having been determined by imitating

the preceding phrase of the commentary (bhiifyiik~epat). <260>
[Objection:] - If the future factor is not a homogeneous cause, how could this com-
mentary (bhii~ya) of the Prajfiapti be explained (katharri nfyate)?8c,o This treatise says
in fact:
All factors are determined from a fourfold point of view (catu~ke niyatiil:i):
(1) cause [hetu]; (2) effect [phala]; (3) basis (iiiraya); (4) cognitive object
(iilambana). 861
The Vaibha~ika answers: - When it says: "This factor is never not a cause of this
factor", the treatise does not mean to discuss all types of causes:
1. by ''cause", one should understand the associated cause (sarriprayuktakahetu)
and the co-existent cause (sahabhiihetu);
2. by "effect", the effect of dominance (adhipatiphala) and the effect of human
action (puru~akiiraphala) (ii. 58); 862
3. by "basis", the six sense-faculties (the eye sense-faculty, etc.);
4. by "cognitive object", the six object-fields (vi~aya), i.e., visible form, etc.
[Objection:] - If the future factor (dharma) is not a homogeneous cause (sabhiiga-
hetu), then, at first the homogeneous cause does not exist and then exists (abhiitva
bhavati).
[Answer:] - But this is precisely what the Vaibha~ikas affirm! The "state (avasthii) of
being a homogeneous cause" of the homogeneous cause is new, it exists not having
existed (abhiitvii bhavati); however, the "real entity" (dravya) which is a certain
homogeneous cause is not new. A future factor is not a homogeneous cause; once it
has arisen, it becomes a homogeneous cause. In fact, the effect of the complete
assemblage (siimagrya) of causes [and conditions] is the "state" (avasthii) and not the
"real entity" (dravya), the factor (dharma). (The future factor exists as a real entity
[dravyatas]; the complete assemblage of the causes (and conditions) makes it pass
from the future into the present, endows it with the state of the present [vartamana-
avasthii], and endows it, by the same fact, with the quality of homogeneous cause;
see v. 25.) <261>
[Objection:] - What harm do you see in this future factor being a homogeneous cause
(sabhiigahetu) just as it is a ripening cause (F 258; vipiikahetu, ii. 54c)?
[Answer:] - If it were a homogeneous cause, it would have been mentioned as such
in the Jfiiinaprasthiina; but the Jfiiinaprasthiina, answering the question (see above
F 257): "What is a\h?mogeneous cause?", does not say th!1t the future wholesome
roots would be a homo9eneous cause with regard to future wholesome roots.
[Objection:] - We do not think that the omission of the future factor (dharma) in this
text creates an argument against us. {7 b} This text, in fact, names only the homo-
geneous causes (sabhiigahetu) which are capable of "taking or projecting" and
"giving forth" an effect (phaladiinagraha,:iasamartha; ii. 59).
[Answer:] - No (naitad asti), for the effect of the homogeneous cause is the effect of
equal outflow, the effect which accords with its cause (ni~yandaphala; ii. 57c), and
this type of effect does not suit a future factor, because in the future there is no
anteriority and posteriority (piirvapascimatiibhiiviit). On the other hand, one cannot
accept that an already arisen [utpanna] factor, i.e., past [atfta] or present [vartamiina],
is an equal outflow [ni~yanda] of a future factor, in the same way that a past factor
cannot be the equal outflow of a present factor, for the effect is not anterior to the
cause. - Thus the future factor is not a homogeneous cause.
[Objection:] - If this is the case, then the future factor (dharma) would no longer be
a ripening cause (vipiikahetu; ii. 54c), for (1) the ripened effect (vipiikaphala; ii. 56a)
cannot be either simultaneous [saha] with or anterior [piirva] to its cause; (2) the
future factors do not present anteriority and posteriority [piirvapascimatiibhava].
The Vaibha~ikas answer: - The case is not the same. The homogeneous cause
(sabhagahetu) and its effect, which is an [effect of] equal outflow (ni~yanda), are
similar [sadrsa] factors. To suppose that they exist in the future, which lacks
anteriority and posteriority [vinii paurviiparya], would imply that they would be
mutually causes of one another [anyo'nyahetutva], and therefore effects of one
another: now it is not acceptable that two factors would be an [effect of] equal
outflow of one another [anyo'nyani/:i~Y.andatii]. On the contrary, the ripening cause
and the ripened effect are dissimilar [bhinnalak~a,:iatva]. [Thus,] even if anteriority
and posteriority were absent [vinii paurviiparya], the cause remains only a [ripening]
cause, the effect remains only a [ripened] effect. <262> [Therefore,] the quality of
a homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu) results from the state (avasthiivyavasthita):
a future factor (dharma) is not a homogeneous cause; but when it enters into the
present state, into the past state, it is a homogeneous cause. The quality of a ripening
cause results from the very nature of the factor itself (lak~a,:iavyavasthitas tu vipiika-
hetul:i).
cAc.2.2. The stages and the impure and pure factors & the homogeneous
cause; 863 F 262
[Question:] - We have said that a factor (dharma) is a homogeneous cause (sabhiiga-
hetu) of only those factors which belong to its stage [bhii]. Does this restriction·
[niyama] apply to all factors?
[Answer:] - This restriction applies only to impure (siisrava) factors, not to pure
factors [i. 5ab]: {8 a}
52cd. But the [truth of] the (noble) path [is a homogeneous cause to
the truth of the (noble) path], without distinguishing the nine
stages.864
[The reference (adhikiira) [in the verse] is to the homogeneous cause.]
The path is of nine stages [bhami]:
1. the preparatory meditation to the first meditation (aniigamya);
2. the intermediate meditation (dhyiiniintara);
3-6. the four fundamental (mula) meditations (dhyiina);
7-9. the three lower, fundamental formless meditative attainments (iirupya;
vi. 20c);
in the sense that practitioners, abiding in these nine stages of meditative states, can
cultivate the path.
The factors (dharma) which constitute [the truth of] the path [miirgasatya] are a
homogeneous cause of the factors which constitute [the truth of] the path, from stage
to stage.
[Qus:stion: - What is the reason for this?]
[Answer:] - In fact, [the truth of] the path resides in the different stages as a guest
(iigantuka), i.e., without forming part of the realms of existence (dhiitu) to which the
stages belong: the craving [tmiii] of the realm of desire, the realm of fine-materiality,
the realm of immateriality, does not turn upon [the truth of] the path. [The truth of]
the path-whatever the stage may be on which the practitioners rely in order to
cultivate it-remains of the same nature (samiinajiitfya) [i.e., pure (aniisravajiitfya)];
[the truth 0f] the path is thus a homogeneous cause of [the truth of] the path, [even
though it might be of a different stage (anyabhamika)].
However, the entire [truth of the] path is not a homogeneous cause of the entire
[truth of the] path. One should not take into account the stage in which it is
cultivated, but rather the characteristics proper to [the truth of] the path itself.
cAc.2.3. The paths & the homogeneous cause; 865 F 262-64

cAc.2.3.1. The supramundane paths & the homogeneous cause; 866 F 262-64
52d. The (noble) path is a homogeneous cause to a11 equal [sama] or
superior [vi.fiffa] (noble) path, [i.e., not of an inferior (noble) path,
because the (noble) path is always acquirecfthrough preparatory
effort]. 867
[The noble path is] not [a homogeneous cause] of an inferior [nyuna] (noble) path,
because the (noble) path is always acquired through preparatory effort (prayogaja).
<263>
Let us describe these terms: (1) inferior [nyuna] path, (2) equal [sama] path, (3) supe-
rior [visi~ta] path.
[As for the equal path:] When the past or present receptivity to the cognition of the
factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness (duf:ikhe dharmajfiiinak~iinti; the first moment
of the path of insight [darsanamiirga], vi. 25d) is a homogeneous cause of the same
future receptivity (k~iinti), the caused path is "equal" [sama] to the causing path.
[As for the superior path:] When this receptivity is a homogeneous cause of the
cognition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness (duf:ikhe dharmajfiiina; the
second moment of the path of insight, vi. 26a), the caused path is "superior" [visi~ta]
to the causing path.
And so on up to the cognition of non-arising (anutpiidajfiana; vi. 50) which, not
having a superior path, can only be a homogeneous cause of an equal [sama] path,
. namely, of a future cognition of non-arising.
To be more specific:
1. the path of insight is a homogeneous cause of [three paths]: the path of
insight (darsanamiirga), the path of cultivation (bhavanamarga), the path of
those beyond training (asaik~amarga);
2. the path of cultivation (is a homogeneous cause) of [two paths]: the path of
cultivation and the path of those beyond training;
3. the path of those beyond training (is a homogeneous cause) of [one path]:
the equal or superior path of those beyond training.
Considering any [of these three] paths, this path can be cultivated by practitioners
with (i) weak (praxis-oriented) faculties (mrdvindriya) or (ii) sharp (praxis-oriented)
faculties (tfk~,:,,endriya):
1. a path of weak (praxis-oriented) faculties is a homogeneous cause of the
same path of weak (praxis-oriented) faculties and [of the same path] of sharp
(praxis-oriented) faculties; {8 b}
ii. a path of sharp (praxis-oriented) faculties is a homogeneous cause of the
same path ?f sharp (praxis-oriented) faculties.
i. Therefore, the paths (a) of pursuers through faith (sraddhanusiirin; vi. 29), (b) of
those who are freed through predominance of faith (sraddhadhimukta; vi. 31) and
(c) of those who are circumstantially liberated (samayavimukta; vi. 56-7), [i.e., of
the practitioners who have weak (praxis-oriented) faculties,] are, respectively,
a homogeneous cause (a) of (3 x 2 =) six paths, (b) of (2 x 2 =) four paths, (c) of

(1 x 2 =) two paths.
ii. The paths (a) of pursuers through their own understanding of the doctrines
(dharmiinusiirin; vi. 29), (b) of those who have attained through views (dr~fipriipta;
vi. 31) and (c) of those who are non-circumstantially liberated (asamayavimukta;
vi. 56--7), [i.e., of the practitioners who have sharp (praxis-oriented) faculties,] are,
respectively, a homogeneous cause (a) of three paths, (b) of two paths, (c) of one
path.s6s
[Question:] - When a path cultivated in a higher stage [iirdhvabhiimika] is a homo-
geneous cause of a path cultivated in a lower stage [adhobhiimika], how can it be a
cause of a path of an equal or superior path? <264>
[Answer:] - The path cultivated in an lower stage can be equal or superior (1) from
the point of view of the (praxis-oriented) faculties (indriya) which can be weak or
sharp in any stage, or (2) from the point of view of the accumulation of causes (hetu-
upacayatas). [In the case of the paths of insight, etc., which are of weak-weak, etc.,
(praxis-oriented) faculties, the subsequent ones (uttara) have more and more highly
accumulated causes (hetiipacitatara).] 869
It does· not happen that the same person [ekasa1?1tiina] successively seizes the path of
pursuers through faith (sraddhiinusiirin) and the path of pursuers through their own
understanding of the doctrines (dharmiinusiirin); nevertheless, the first, present or
past, is the homogeneous cause of the second, the later one. 870
cAc.2.3.2. The mundane paths & the homogeneous cause; F 264

[Question:] - Does the rule of equal or superior effects (ii. 52d) apply only to pure
(aniisrava) factors (dharma), i.e., to factors that form part of the (noble) path?
[Answer: - Np. (The rule applies) also to the mundane (laukika) faators.]
53a. The [mundane] factors acquired through preparatory effort are the
homogeneous cause of the same two classes, i.e., the equal and the
superior, [but not the inferior factors]. 871
The mundane factors acquired through preparatory effort (prayogaja) are the homo-
geneous cause (sabhiigahetu) of the equal [sama] and superior [visi~fa] factors, but
not inferior [nyiina] factors.
cAC.2.4. Various kinds offactors acquired through effort and innate factors &
the homogeneous cause; 872 F 264-67
What are the factors (dharma) acquired through preparatory effort [prayogaja]?
53b. [The equal and superior factors acquired through preparatory effort
are] those derived (1) from listening, (2) from reflection, [(3) from
cultivation]. 873
The factors "acquired through preparatory effort" [prayogika)] are contrasted with
the "innate" factors (upapattipratilambhika). [The factors acquired through prepara-
tory effort] are the qualities (gu~a) proceeding (1) from listening (sruta), i.e., from
the word of the Buddha [buddhavacana], (2) from reflection (cinta), (3) from culti-
vation (bhavaria). <265>
cAc.2.4.1. The wholesome-impure factors acquired through preparatory effort

and their nine modes & the homogeneous cause; 874 F 265
[As for the wholesome-impure factors] acquired through preparatory effort, {9 a}
they are a homogeneous cause of superior [visi,\'{a] or of equal [sama] [factors], not
of inferior [nyuna] [factors].
·l. The factors derived from listening (srutamaya) of the sphere [avacara] of desire
are a homogeneous cause
i. of factors derived from listening and from reflection (cintamaya) of the realm
of desire;
ii. not of factors derived from cultivation (bhavanamaya), because these factors
do not exist in the realm of desire, because a factor is a homogeneous cause
of factors of the same realm of existence.
2. The factors derived from listening of the realm of fine-materiality are a homo-
geneous cause
i.
of factors derived from listening and from cultivation of the realm of fine-
materiality;
ii. not of factors derived from reflection, because these factors are absent in
this realm of existence: in the realm of fine-materiality, as soon as one
begins to reflect, one immediately enters into concentration (samadhi).
3. The factors derived from cultivation of the realm of fine-materiality are a homo-
geneous cause
i. of factors derived from cultivation of the realm of fine-materiality;
ii. not of fac!ors derived from listening of the realm of fine-materiality, because
these are less good.
4. The factors derived from cultivation of the realm of immateriality are a homo-
geneous cause
i. of factors derived from cultivation of the realm of immateriality;
ii. not of factors derived from listening and from reflection, because these
factors are absent in this realm of existence.
Moreover, one must take into account that the factors (dharma) acquired through
preparatory effort are of nine modes [prakiira]:
(1) weak-weak [mrdumrdu], (2) weak-medium, (3) weak-strong,
(4) medium-weak, (5) medium-medium [madhyamadhyq], (6) medium-strong,
(7) strong-weak, (8) strong-medium, (9) strong-strong [adhimiitriidhimiitra].
(1) The weak-weak are a homogeneous cause of factors of nine modes; (2) the
weak-medium, of factors of eight modes, with the exception of the weak-weak; and
(3-9) so forth.
cAc.2.4.2. The wholesome-impure "innate" factors and their nine modes & the
homogeneous cause; 875 F 265
As for the wholesome-[impure] [kusala] "innate" [upapattipratilambhika] factors
(dharma), the nine modes are a homogeneous cause of one another (paraspara). 876
cAC.2.4.3. The defiled factors and their nine modes & the homogeneous cause; 877
F265
As for the defiled (kli~fa) factors, the same, [i.e., their nine modes are a homogene-
ous cause of one another (paraspara)]. 878
cAC.2.4.4. The unobscured-non-defined factors and their four kinds & the
homogeneous cause; 879 F 265-66
As for the unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta) factors (dharma), 880 they are of
four kinds (ii. 72), the subsequent one being "better" than the previous one: {9 b}
1. factors arisen from [the cause of] retribution (vipiikaja; i. 37);
2. factors associated with the proper deportment (airyapathika) of lying down
[sayana], sitting [iisana], [standing (sthiti), walking (ca1?1krama~a)];
3. factors associated with skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthiinika);
4. the thought of emanation (nirmii~acitta) (vii. 48).
These four kinds are, respectively, a homogeneous cause of (1) four kinds [i.e., effect
of retribution, etc.]; (2) three kinds [i.e., proper deportment, etc., but not the effect of
retribution], (3) two kinds [i.e., skill in arts and crafts, etc., but not effect of retribu-
tion, etc.], and (4) one kind [i.e., only the thought of emanation]. <266>
Moreover, as a thought of emanation in the realm of desire can be the result [phala]
of each of the four meditations (dhyiina) (MVS, 89a12), there is reason to establish
/
the same distinction here: the thoughts of emanation constitute four modes, and are-
according to their mode-a homogeneous cause (1) of four modes, (2) of three
modes, (3) of two modes, (4) of one mode of a thought of emanation. In fact, when
being the result of a higher meditation, the thought of emanation is not a homogene-
ous cause of the thought of emanation that is the result of an inferior meditation:
from a homogeneous cause (i.e., a thought of emanation) realized with greater effort
(iibhisa1J7,skiirika; mahiiyatnasiidhya) cannot proceed a factor less good [hfyamiina],
realized with less effort [amahiiyatnasiidhya]. 881
cAc.2.4.s. The pure factors; 882 F 266-67

This principle being stated [ii. 52cd], the following questions (ata evahul:z) are posed
and resolved: 883
[Question:] - Is there a pure (aniisrava) factor (dharma), already arisen (utpanna),
which is not a cause of a pure factor not destined to arisl;l (anutpattidharman)?
[Answer:] - Yes. The cognition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness
(dulJ,khe dharmajfl.iina), already ·arisen, is not a qmse of the receptivity to the cog-
nition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness (dulJ,khe dharmajfl.iinak:,iinti)
not destined to arise. Besides, any superior (visi:,{a) factor is not a cause of an
inferior (nyiina) fi;ictor.
[Question:] - Is there, in one life-stream [ekasa1J7,tiina], a pure factor, previously
acquired (piirvapratilabdha: of which one has at first attained the possession
[prapti]), which is not a cause of a pure factor arisen later?
[Answer:] - Yes. The future receptivities to the cognition of the factors with regard
to unsatisfactoriness, [but the possession of which has been attained at the first
moment of the (noble) path,] are not a cause of the cognition of the factors with
regard to unsatisfactoriness alreaqy arisen. Because the effect cannot be anterior to
the cause, or moreover, because the future factor is not a homogeneous cause.
[Question:] - Is there a pure factor, arisen previously, which is not a cause of a pure
factor arisen later?
[Answer: 884 ] - Yes. The superior (adhimiitra = visi:,ta) factor is not a cause of an
inferior [nyiina] factor. For example, when, after having retrogressed from a superior
result, one realizes an inferior result, the superior result is not a cause of an inferior
result. <267> { 10 a} Besides, the possession of the cognition of the factors with
regard to unsatisfactoriness, arisen previously, is not a cause of the possessions of the
receptivity to the cognition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness which will
arise in the following moments (the moment of the subsequent receptivity to the
cognition with regard to unsatisfactoriness [dul:zkhe 'nvayajfiiinak.yiintik.ya-,:1e], etc.),

because these new possessions are less good.
[The homogeneous cause has been discussed.]
CAD. Associated cause ( saf!Zpnayuktakahetu); 885 F 267-68

cAD.1. General definition; 886 F 267
53cd. Only thought and thought-concomitants are an associated cause. 887
Thought and thought-concomitants are an associated cause (sarriprayuktakahetu).
cAD.2. Further specification of the definition; 888 F 267-68

[Question:] - Is this to say that thoughts and thought-concomitants-arisen at differ-
ent moments and in different life-streams [bhinnakiilasarritanaja]-'lre among them-
selves [anyo'nya] associated causes (sarriprayuktakahetu)?
[Answer:] - No.
[Question:] - Would we then say that the thought and thought-concomitants (1) of
the same aspect or mode of activity (ekiikiira), i.e., having the same aspect or mode
of activity [ii. 34d], of blue [n~la], etc., and (2) of the same c:ognitive object
(ekiilambana), i.e., having for their cognitive object[ii .. 34d] the same blue, etc., are
associated causes?
[Answer:] - No. This definition gives rise to the same criticism: thoughts and
thought-concomitants of different time periods [bhinnakiila] and of different life-
streams [bhinnsarritiina] can have the same aspect or mode of activity and the same
cognitive object.
[Question:] - Would we then say that the thought and thought-concomitants of the
same aspect or mode of activity and of the same cognitive object, should, moreover,
be of the same time period [ekakiila; ii. 34d]?
[Answer:] - This sJill does not suffice: for different persons [bhinnasarritiinaja] can
see the new moon, etc. [navacandriidi] at the same time.
Therefore, the author adds:
53d. [Thought and thought-concomitants] which have the same basis
[sama.fraya] [are among themselves associated causes]. {10 b}
Thought and thought-concomitants which have the same [samiina] basis [iisraya;
ii. 34d] are among themselves [anyo'nya] associated causes.
"Same" (sama; samiina) signifies undivided or non-different (abhinna; ii. 34d). 889 <268>
For example, a given moment (k~a,:za) of the eye sense-faculty (cak~urindriya)

is the basis (1) of a visual consciousness, (2) of sensation (vedanii) and of the
other thought-concomitants associated (sarµprayukta) with this consciousness. And
likewise for the other sense-faculties up to the mental faculty (manas): a certain
moment of the mental faculty (manas) is the basis (1) of a mental consciousness and
(2). of the thought-concomitants associated with this consciousness.
cAo.2.1.1. The difference between the associated cause and the co-existent
cause; 890 F 268
[Question:] - That which is an associated cause (sarµprayuktakahetu) is also a co-
existent cause (sahdbhiihetu). What is the difference between these two causes? 891
[Answer:] - 1. As for the factors [which are a co-existent cause,] they are called co-
existent cause (sahabhiihetu) because they are mutually the effects of one another
(anyo 'nyaphalarthena ).
[For example,] the companions in a caravan (sahasiirthika) travel (miirgaprayii~a)
thanks to the support which they give one another (parasparabalena). In the same
way, thought is the effect of the thought-concomitant, and the thought-concomitant is
the effect of tho~ght.
2. As for the factors (dharma) [which are an associated.cause,] they are called
associated cause (sarµprayuktakahetu) or mutual cause in the quality of association
[sarµprayukta; ii. 34d], because they function identically (samaprayogiirthena, pra-
yoga = pravrtti), that is to say, because they have the five samenesses or equiva-
lences (samatii), [i.e., with respect to basis (ii.fraya), to cognitive object (iilambana),
to aspect or mode of activity (iikara), to time (kiila), and to the number of real
entities (dravya),] as defined in ii .. 34.
[Thus iri this case,] the travel of the companions in a caravan is assured [not only] by '
the mutual support which they give one another, but they use, in addition, the same
food [anna], the same drinks [piina], etc. In the same way, thought and thought-
concomitants use the same basis, have the same aspect or mode of activity, etc: if
even one of these five samenesses or equivalences is absent, they no longer have the
same function and are not associated 892
[The associated cause has been discussed.]
cAE. Pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu); 893 F 268-70

cAE.1. General definition; 894 F 268-69
[What is the pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu)?]
54ab. The former [i.e., past or present] pervasive [factors] are a pervasive
cause in regard to the defiled factors of their own stage. 895
These pervasive (sarvaga) factors (dharma)-arisen previously [purvotpanna],
i.e., past [atfta] or present [pratyutpanna], and belonging to a certain stage (bhami)-
are the pervasive causes of later defiled [kli~{a] factors of the same stage, which
are defiled (1) through their intrinsic nature [svabhava], (2) through association
[sal?lprayukta] or (3) through their originating cause [samutthana] (iv. 9c). We shall
be studying the pervasive factors in the EXPOSITION OF THE PRocuvmEs [anusaya-
nirdesa; v. 12]. {11 a} <269>
cAE.2. The difference between the pervasive cause and the homogeneous
cause; 896 F 269
The pervasive factors are only a cause of defiled factors; 897 they are a cause
[hetutva] of defiled factors in their own category and in other categories (nikaya;
ii. 52b): it is through the power [prabhava] [of the pervasive factors] that defile-
ments [klesa] with their following (parivara)-belonging [also] to categories
different from [the pervasive factors]-arise (upajayante). 898 They thus constitute
a cause separate [prthak] from the homogeneous causes (sabhagahetu). 899 (See
ii. 57c).
cAE.3. Further specification of the definition; F 269-70

cAE.3.1. Noble ones & the pervasive cause; F 269-70
[Objection:] - Then would the defiled factors of noble ones [aryapudgala] (attach-
ment [raga], etc.) have as their cause the pervasive factors? The noble ones, how-
ever, have abandoned all pervasive factors, for these are abandoned [prahatavya] by
insight into the truths [darsana].
[Answer: 900 ] - The Vaibhii1?ikas of Kasmir accept that all defiled factors have for
their cause the factors abandoned by insight into the truths. Indeed the Prakarm:ia-
pada901 expresses itself in these terms:
What factors have for their cause the factors abandoned by insight into the
truths? - (1) The defiled [kli~fa] factors 902 and (2) the retribution [vipaka] of
factors abandoned by insight into the truths.
What factors have for their cause non-defined (avyakrta) factors? - (1) The
non-defined conditioned factors (saf!lskrta) 903 and (2) the unwholesome
(akusala) factors. <270>
Is there a truth of unsatisfactoriness (duftkhasatya) which has for its
cause the afflicted view of self (satkayadr~!i) and which is not a cause
of the afflicted view of self? . . . and so on until: with the exclusion

of origination-deterioration-duration-impermanence Uati, jara, sthiti,
anityata] of the future 904 afflicted view of self and of its associates
[comprising the generally permeating factors], any other defiled truth
of unsatisfactoriness [is a truth of unsatisfactoriness which has for its
cam~e the afflicted view of self and is a cause of the afflicted view of
self].
[Objection:] - If unwholesome (akusala) factors have for their causes non-defined
factors and not just unwholesome fa~tors, {11 b} how can one explain this commen-
tary (bhii~ya) of the Prajfiapti: 905
Is there an unwholesome factor which has for its cause only an unwhole-
some factor? - Yes; the first defiled intention (cetana) which noble ones
retrogressing from detachment [vairiigya] produce. 906
Answer: - The non-defined factors, which are abandoned by insight into the truths,
are a cause (i.e., pervasive cause [sarvatragahetu]) of this unwholesome intention.
If the Prajfiapti does not mention it, it is because it intends to name only the causes
which have been abandoned.
[The pervasive cause has been discussed.]<271>
cAP. Ripening cause (vipakahetu); 907 F 271-75

CAP.I. General definition; 908 F 271-75
54cd. [Only] (1) bad factors [which are completely impure] and (2) whole-
some factors which are impure are a ripening cause.909
Only (1) unwholesome [akusala] factors, which are completely or necessarily
[avasya] impure [siisrava], and (2) wholesome [kusala] factors which are impure910
are a riJ)ening cause, because their nature is to ripen (vipakadharmatvat = vipakti-
prakrtitviit).
(3) The non-defined [avyiikrta] factors are not a ripening cause, because they are
weak [durbalatvat]; just as rotten seeds [p~tibi]a], even though moistened [abhi-
~yandita], do not grow [into sprouts (ankura)].
(4) The pure [aniisrava] factors, [although strong (balavanto 'pi),] are not a ripening
cause because they are not moistened (abhi~yandita) 911 by craving (tr~,:zii); just as
intact seeds (siirabi]a), not moistened, do not grow [into sprouts]. Besides, pure
factors are not bound (pratisarriyukta), i.e., do not belong to any realm of exis-
tence: to which realm could the ripened effect belong that they would pro-
duce?
cAF.1.1. The two qualities for producing a ripened effect; F 271

The factors (dharma) which are neither non-defined nor pure, [i.e., the unwholesome
and the wholesome-impure factors], possess the two qualities [ubhayavidhatva;
ubhayaprakaratva] necessary for producing a ripened effect:
1. the proper strength [balavat] and
2. the moistening [abhi~yandita] of craving,
just as the intact and moistened seed [has the two qualities necessary for the growth
of the sprout].
cAF.1.2. The meaning of the expression vipaka-hetu; F 271-72

Objection. - What is the meaning of the expression vipakahetu? You have the choice
of two interpretations of this compound: vipakahetu signifies either
1. cause of vipaka (vipakasya hetuft; i.e., as determinative compound [tat-
puru~a]), {12 a} or
2. cause in the quality of vipaka (vipaka eva hetuft; i.e., as descriptive com-
pound [karmadharaya]).
In the first case, the suffix a (ghaii) [in vipaka] denotes the state [bhava-sadhana]:
the vipiika ( = vipakti) is the effect of the operation indicated by the root vi-pac.
In the second case, the suffix a [in vipiika] denotes the operation [kanna-siidhana]:
the vipiika is [the cause,] that which is ripened (vipacyate), i.e., the action arriving at
the time when it gives forth an effect. 912
Which of these two interpretations do you hold?
If you accept the first, how would you justify the text (Jfianaprasthana, 974a26):
"The eye arises from vipiika (vipakajaf!l cak~us)"? <272>
If you accept the second, how would you justify the expression "vipaka of action"
[kahna~o vipaka]?
[Answer:] - We have shown (i. 37) that the two interpretations of the word vipiika
are correct. (1) When one examines the effects, one must understand the word vipaka
according to the first explanation; the meaning is: effect, retribution, ripened effect.
(2) The text "The eye arises from vipaka" should be understood as "The eye arises
from the cause of vipiika."
cAF.t.3. The meaning of the compound vi-paka; F 272
[Question:] - What is the meaning of the compound vi-paka?

[Answer:] - The prefix vi indicates difference. Vipaka is a paka, i.e., an effect or

maturation, dissimilar (visadrsa) from its cause. [The other causes, however, have
similar effects (sadrsaJ:i piikaJ:i). (See insert in endnote. 913 )]
cAF.1.3.1. The single ripened effect & the different numbers of aggregates as
ripening cause; 914 F 272-73
[Question:] - How is that?
In the realm of desire,
1. a ripei;iing cause (vipiikahetu) consisting of only one aggregate (skandha),
[i.e., formations,] namely, possession (priipti; ii. 36b; i.e., aggregate of
formations; pratyaya) with its characteristics (lakw1:ia; ii. 45c; i.e., aggregate
offormations), produces one single effect [ekaphala];
2. a ripening cause consisting of two aggregates, [i.e., form and formations,]
namely, bodily and vocal action [kayavakkarma; i.e., aggregate of form]
with their characteristic~ (i.e., aggregate of formations), produces one sing~e
effect;
3. a ripening cause consisting of four aggregates, [i.e., not form,] namely,
thought and thought-concomitants [cittacaitta; i.e., the aggregates of sensa-
tion, ideation, formations and consciousness], wholesome and unwholesome
[kusaliikusala], with their characteristics (i.e., aggregate of formations), pro-
duces one single effect. <273>
In the realm of fine-materiality,
1. a ripening cause consisting of one single aggregate, [i.e., formations,]
namely, possession [priipti] with its characteristics, the attainment of non-
ideation (asarrijiiisamiipatti; ii. 42a) with its characteristics, produces one
single effect;
2. a ripening cause consisting of two aggregates, [i.e., form and formations,]
namely, the informative action (vijiiapti; iv. 2) of the ·first meditation
(dhyana) with its characteristics, produces one single effect;
3. a ripening cause consisting of four aggregates, [i.e., not form,] namely,
the wholesome thought, not concentrated (cetasyasamahita; for the con-
centrated thought always involves the form [rupa] of restraint [iv. 13] and
thus five aggregates), with its characteristics, produces one single effect;
{13 a}
4. a ripening cause consisting of five aggregates, namely, the concentrated
thought (samiihita) with its characteristics, produces one single effect.
In the realm of immateriality,

1. a ripening cause consisting of one single aggregate, [i.e., formations,]
namely, possession [priipti], the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti;
ii. 43), with the respective characteristics, produces one single effect;
2. a ripening cause consisting of four aggregates~ [i.e., not form,] namely,
thought and thought-concomitants [cittacaitta], [wholesome (kusala),] with
their characteristics, produces one single effect.
cAF.1.3.2. The single ripening cause & the different numbers of sense-sphe,res as
ripened effect; 915 F 273-74
[One sense-sphere:] - There is an action the ripened effect of which is included in
one single sense-sphere (iiyatana), namely, in the single sense-sphere of factors
(dharmiiyatana; i. 15): the action which has for its ripened effect the vitality faculty
(jfvitendriya; ii. 45a). 916 In fact, the action which has for its ripened effect the vitality
faculty necessarily has for its ripened effect the vitality faculty and its characteristics
(ii. 45c); both form part of (1) the sense-sphere of factors.
[Two sense-spheres:] - The action '?{hich has for its ripened effect the mental faculty
(manas) necessarily has for its ripened effect two sense-spheres, namely; (1) the
sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-iiyatana; i. 16b) and (2) the sense-sphere of
factors (dharmiiyatana), (which includes sensations, etc., and the characteristics
which necessarily accompany the mental faculty). <274>
The action which has for its ripened effect the sense-sphere of the tangible
(spra.J{avyiiyatana), necessarily has for its ripened effect two sense-spheres, namely:
(1) the sense-sphere of the tangible and (2) the sense-sphere of factors, (which in-
cludes the characteristics of the tangible).
[Three sense-spheres:] - The action which has for its ripened effect the sense-sphere
of the body (kiiyiiyatana) necessarily has for its ripened effect three sense-spheres:
(1) the sense-sphere of the body, (2) the sense-sphere of the tangible, (namely, the
four fundamental material elements which support the sense-sphere of the body),
(3) the sense-sphere of factors, (which includes the characteristics).
In the same way, the action which has for its ripened effect either the sense-sphere of
visible form (rupiiyatana) or the sense-sphere of odors (gandhiiyatana) or the sense-
sphere of taste (rasii,yatana), necessarily has for its ripened effect three sense-
spheres: (1) the sense-sphere of the tangible and (2) the sense-sphere of factors as
above, plus, according to the case, (3) the sense-sphere of visible form or the sense-
sphere of odor or the sense-sphere of taste.
[Four sense-spheres:] - The action which has for its ripened effect either the sense-
sphere of the eye (cak~us). or the sense-sphere of the ear (srotra) or the sense-sphere
of the nose (ghri'i1:za) or the sense-sphere of the tongue (jihvii) necessarily has for its
ripened effect four sense-spheres: (1) one of the four sense-faculties, (2) the sense-
sphere of the body, (3) the sense-sphere of the tangible, (4) the sense-sphere of·
factors.
[Five to eleven sense-spheres:] - An action can have for its ripened effect five, six,
seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven sense-spheres. 917
Actions [kannan], in fact, are of two types: (1) of varied effect (vicitra) and (2) of
non-varied [avicitra] effect.
The same holds for [external] seeds [biihyabfja], [i.e., they are of two types:] {13 b}
[some external seeds, for example,] (1) lotus [padma], pomegranate [dii4ima], fig
[nyagrodha], etc., [have varied fruits (vicitraphala)]; 918 [some external seeds, for
example,] (2) barley [yava], wheat [ghoduma], etc., [have non-varied fruits (avicitra-
phala)].
cAF.1.3.3. The ripened cause of one single time period and one instant & the
number of time periods and moments of the ripened ejfect; 919 F 274
It can happen that the ripened effect of an action belonging to one single time period
(ekii.dhvika) belongs to three time periods (traiyadhvika); 920 but the reverse is not
true, 921 for the effect cannot be lower than its cause (mabhiid atinyiinarµ hetol:z
phalam).
The ripened effect of an action abiaing for one moment (ekak~a,:,.ika) can abide for
numerous moments [bahu~a,:,.ika]; but the reverse is not true, for the same reason.
(MVS, 98a7) <275>
cAF.2. . Further specification of the definition; F 275

CAF.2.1. The time of the earliest occurrence of the ripened effect & the ripening
cause; F275
The ripened effect is not simultaneous with the action that produces it, for a ripened
effect is not experienced at the moment when the action is accomplished. 922
The ripened effect does [also] not immediately (anantara) follow the action, for it is
the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya;
ii. 63b) which brings about (ii.kar~) the moment that immediately follows the action:
in fact, the ripening cause depends [apek~ii], in order to realize its effect, on ·the
development of the stream [pravii.ha].
cAo. The six causes and the unconditioned factors & the three time
periods; 923 F 275
To which time period should a factor (dharma) belong in order that it might be any
of these six causes? We have mentioned the rule [for the time periods (adhva-
niyama)] implicitly [arthatas]; but we have not stated it in a verse (kiirikii):
SSab. The pervasive cause and the homogeneous cause are of two time
periods .[i.e., past and present]; three causes [i:e., the associated, the
simultaneous and ripening causes] are of three time periods [i.e.,
past, present and future]. 924
A past factor, as well as a present factor, may be a pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu),
may function as a homogeneous cause (sabhagahetu) (ii. 52b).
Factors of the past, of the present and of the future may function as an associated
cause (sa,µprayuktakahetu), a co-existent cause (sahabhahetu) and a ripening cause
(vipakahetu ).
The verse does not speak of [the rule for the time periods (kalaniyama) of] an
efficient cause (kara'f}ahetu; ii. 50a): (1) the conditioned factors of the three time
periods may function as efficient causes; (2) the unconditioned factors are timeless
[adhvaviprayukta ].
[The causes have been discussed.]
CB. THE FNE EFFECTS (PHALA.); 925 F 275--97

A. The correspondence of the effects with the causes; F 275
1. Relationship of the effects to the conditioned and unconditioned factors; F 275
2. Effects which do not have a cause: the effect of disconnection (visa1J?yoga-
phala); F 276
3. Effects which do have a cause: ripened effect (vipiikaphala), effect of
dominance (adhipatiphala), effect of equal outflow (ni:f)'andaphala),
effect of human action (puru~akiiraphala); F 287
B. The defining characteristics of the five effects; F 289
1. Ripened effect (vipiikaphala); F 289
2. Effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala); F 290
3. Effect of disconnection (visalJ?yogaphala); F 291
4. Effect of human action (puru~akiiraphala); F 292
5. Effect of dominance (adhipatiphala); F 292
C. Two stages of causing an effect; F 293
D. The four effects of the Westerners; F 297
cBA. The correspondence of the effects with the causes; 926 F 275-89
To which effect do the causes correspond? Because of which effects are (the causes)
recognized as causes?
cBA.1. The relationship of the effects to the conditioned and unconditioned

factors; F 275-76
55cd. (1) Conditioned [factors] and (2) disconnection [from impure
(sasrava) factors] [visa1f1yoga] "are" effects. 927
Just as it is s.aid in the Miilasastra:

What factors are an effect? (1) Conditioned [saf!lskrta] [factors] and (2) ces-
sation due to deliberation (pratisaf!lkhyanirodha = nirva~a). 928 <276>
Objection: - If the unconditioned [factor] [asa1Jlskrta] "is" an effect, it should "have"
a cause of which it could be said that it is the effect fphala]. Moreover, since you
maintain that it "is" a cause (i.e., an efficient cause; ii. 50a), it should "have" an
effect of which it could be said that it is the cause (hetu). 929
The Sarviistiviidin answers: - The conditioned [factors] [sa1Jlskrta] alone "have" a
cause, [i.e., are produced by a cause,] and "have" an effect, [i.e., produce an effect].
55d. [Sarviistiviidins:] - The unconditioned [factor] "has" neither a cause
nor an effect.930
[Question: - What is the reason for this?]
[Answer: - The unconditioned factor "has" neither a cause nor an effect,] for one
cannot attribute to it any of the six kinds of causes or any of the five kinds of effects.
cBA.2. Effects which do not have a cause: the effect of disconnection

(visaf!lyogaphala); 93•1 F 276-87
CBA:2.1. The unconditioned factor which "is" an effect but does not "have" a
cause; F 276-77
932
cBA.2.1.1. The noble path & the effect of disconnection; F 276-77
[Question:] - Why can one not assume that the part of the (noble) path called
unhindered path (anantaryamarga 933 ) is the efficient cause (kara~ahetu) of the effect
of disconnection (visa1Jlyogaphala; ii. 57d)?
[Answer:] - We have seen that the (;lfficient cause is a cause which does not make an
obstacle to the "arising" [utpadavighnabhava] [of factors susceptible to arise]; now,
disconnection, being unconditioned, does not "arise". One cannot attribute to it the
unhindered path (anantaryamarga) as an efficient cause (kara~ahetu).
640 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdeia)
[Question:] - Then how is disconnection an effect of the (noble) path? Of what is it

an effect?
[Answer:] - Disconnection is the effect of the (noble) path, for it is attained due to
the power [bala] of the (noble) path (vi. 51): in other words, it is by means of
the (noble) path that practitioners attain the "possession" (prapti; ii. 36cd) of discon-
nection. {14 b}
[Objection:] -Thus it is [only] the attaining, the possession [prapti] of disconnection
that is the effect of the (noble) path, and not disconnection itself [visa7?lyoga]: for the
(noble) path is capable [samarthya] with regard to the attaining of disconnection, not
with regard to disconnection. <277>
[Answer:] - Wrong! There is a difference in the capability [samarthya] of the (noble)
path with regard to (i) attaining [prapti], on the one hand, and (ii) disconnection
[visa7?lyoga], on the other.
[Question: - How does the (noble) path have capability with regard to attaining?]
[Answer:] -The (noble) path produces attaining.
[Question: - How does the (noble) path have capability with regard to disconnec-
tion?}
[Answer:] - The (noble) path makes one attain (prapayati) disconnection. Thus,
although the (noble) path is not the cause of disconnection (== cessation due to
deliberation), it may be said that disconnection is the effect of the (noble) path. 934
CBA.2.2. The unconditioned factor which "is" a cause but does not "have" an
effect; F 277-78
cBA.2.2.1. The efficient cause and cognitive object condition & the unconditioned
factor; F 277-78
[Objection:] - Since the unconditioned [factor] (asa7?lskrta) does not ''have" an effect
of dominance (adhipatiphala; ii. 58d), how can one define it as an efficient cause
(kara1J,ahetu)?
[Answer:] - Th~ unconditioned [factor] "is" an efficient cause, for it does not make
an obstacle to any arising factor; but it does not "have" an effect, for, being time-
less (adhvavinirmukta), it does not have the capability [asamarthatva]) of either
(1) taking or projecting [pratigraha1J,a] or (2) giving forth [dana] an effect (ii. 59ab).
The Sautrantika: 935 - We deny that the unconditioned [factor] could be a cause. In
fact, the Siitra [or Fortunate One (bhagavant)] does not say that the cause can be
unconditioned; it says that the cause is only [a synonym (paryaya) for being] condi-
tioned:
All causes (hetu), all conditions (pratyaya)which have for their effect the
production [utpada] of material form [rupa], ... of consciousness [vijnana],
are themselves also impermanent [anitya]. 936 Produced [pratftyotpanna] by
impermanent causes and conditions, how could material form, ... and con-
sciousness be permanent?
The Sarviistiviidin replies: - If the permanent [factor], the unconditioned [factor], is
not a cause, it will not be a cognitive object condition (alambanapratyaya; ii. 63) of
the consciousness that is directed at it. {15 a}
(The Sautrantika: 937 ) -The Siitra [passage] declares that the causes and conditions
capable of producing [consciousness (vijnana)] are impermanent [anitya]. It does not
say that "all" conditions (pratyaya) of consciousness are impermanent. The uncondi-
tioned [factor] could then be a cognitive object condition [alambanapratyaya] of
consciousness; for [in that case] the cognitive object condition is not generative
Uanaka]. <278>
The Sarviistiviidin: - The Siitra says that it is the generative (janaka) causes [ii. 247]
that are impermanent: thus the Siitra does not deny [prati~edha] that the uncondi-
tioned [factor] may be an efficient cause (kara-i:iahetu), that is to say, a cause which
does not make an obstacle [anavara-i:iabhavamatra].
(The Sautrantika:) - The Siitra accepts the cognitive object condition [ii. 61c]; but it
does not speak of an efficient cause, "the cause which does not make an obstacle". It
is thus not established that the unconditioned [factor] is a cause.
The Sarvastiviidin: - Indeed, the Sii-tra does not say that that which does not make an
obstacle is a cause; but it does not contradict it. Many Siitras have disappeared. 938 ·
How can you be assured that the Siitra does not attribute to the unconditioned
[factor] the quality of an efficient cause?
cBA.2.3. Disconnection (visaf!lyoga) & cessation due to deliberation

(pratisaf!lkhyanirodha); F 278-87
(The Sautrantika: 939 ) - What is the factor (dharma) called disconnection (visalJl-
yoga)?
The Sarvastiviidin: - The Mulasastra (Jnanaprasthana, 923b6) says that disconnec-
tion is cessation due to deliberation (pratisalJlkhyanirodha; ii. 57d).
CBA.2.3.1. The inexpressibility of the cessation due to deliberation &

disconn~ction; F 278
(The Sautrantika:) - When I asked you [previously; i. 6] what cessation due to
deliberation is, you answered: "It is disconnection"; when I ask you [now] what
disconnection is, you answer: "It is cessation due to deliberation!" The two answers
give a circular reasoning [itaretarasraya] and do not explain the intrinsic nature
of the factor, i.e., the unconditioned [factor], to which they refer. You owe us
another explanation.
Sarviistiviidin: -This factor (dharma), in its intrinsic nature [svabhava], is real but
indescribable; { 15 b} only the noble ones (arya) "realize" it internally each for
the~selves [pratyatmavedya]. It is only possible to indicate its general char-
acteristics by saying that there exists a real entity--distinct from others (dravya-
antara)--which is wholesome (kusala) and eternal [nitya], which is called ces-
sation due to deliberation (pratisaf!lkhyanirodha) and also disconnection (visaf!l-
yoga).
cBA.2.3.2. The definition and existential status of the three unconditioned

factors; F 278-87
cBA.2.3.2.a. The Sautriintika definition; F 278-79
The Sautriintika940 affirms that the unconditioned [factor], i.e., the threefold uncon-
ditioned [factor] (i. 5b), is not real [adravya]. The three factors (dharma) which it
refers to are not distinct and real entities [bhavantara], as are material form [rupa],
sensation [vedana], etc.941 <279>
1. What is called space (akasa) is the mere absence [abhavamatra] of the tangible
(spra~favya), i.e., the absence of a resistant body (sapratighadravya). Persons in the ·
dark [andhakara] say that there is space when they do not encounter (avindantaf:i)
any obstruction [pratighata]. 942
2. What is called cessation due to deliberation (pratisaf!lkhyanirodha) or nirva,:ia
is-at the time of the cessation of the already arisen proclivities (anusaya) and of the
already arisen existence [ianman]-the absence of arising [i.e., the non-arising
(anutpada)] of any other proclivities or any other existence, and that because of the
power [bala] of understanding (pratisa1'{lkhya = prajiia). 943 [See below the discussion
of this definition.]
3. When, independent of the power of deliberation (pratisa1'{lkhya) and because of
the mere lack of causes. [and conditions] [pratyayavaikalya], there is an absence of
arising [i.e., the non-arising] of factors, this is called cessation not due to deliberation
(apratisaf!lkhyanirodha). For example, when premature death (antaramara,:ia) inter-
rupts the personal existence (nikayasabhaga; ii. 10, 41), there is cessation not due to
deliberation of the factors which would have arisen in the course of this personal
existence if it had .continued. 944
cBA.2.3.2.b. The definition by other schools; F 279-80

According to another school [nikayantarfya]: 945
1. cessation due to deliberation (pratisaTJ1,khyanirodha) is the future non-arising
of proclivities (anusaya) on account of [samarthya] understanding (prajfia); ·
2. cessation not due to deliberation (apratisaTJ1,khyanirodha) is the future non-
arising of unsatisfactoriness, i.e., of existence, because of the disappearance
[or lack (vaikalya)] of proclivities-[the cause of the arising (of unsatisfac-
toriness) (utpadakara,:ia)]-and not directly on account of understanding. 946
<280>
[The first would thus be nirva,:ia with remainder (sopadhise~a nirva,:iadhatu), the
second would be nirva,:ia without remainder (nirupadhise~a nirva,:iadhatu).]
(The Sautriintika: 947 ) - But the future non-arising of unsatisfactoriness supposes
deliberation (pratisaTJ1,khya); it is thus included in cessation due to deliberation.
Another School [apara] 948 defines cessation not due to deliberation as: "later non-
existence (pascad abhava) of the factors which have arisen, by virtue of their spon-
taneous [svarasa] cessation".949 ·
[Comment:] - In this hypothesis [kalpana], { 16 a} cessation not due to deliberation

would not be eternal (nitya), since it is absent (abhava) as long as the factor involved
(= the proclivity [anusaya]) has not perished.
[Reply:] - But does cessation due to deliberation not have a certain deliberation (i.e.,
pratisaTJ1,khya) for its antecedent [purvakatva]? Therefore, it too would not be eternal,
for, if the antecedent were absent, the consequent would also be absent.
[Comment:] - You cannot say that cessation due to deliberation would hot be eternal
because it has deliberation (pratisaTJ1,khya) for its antecedent: in fact, it does not have
deliberation for its antecedent. One cannot say that deliberation is earlier, that the
"non-arising [anutpada] of non-arisen factors" is later. - Let us explain. The non-
arising [of non-arisen factors] always exists in and of itself. (i) If deliberation is
absent, the factors will arise; (ii) but if deliberation arises, the factors will absolutely
the non-arising [of non-arisen factors] consists in this:
1. before this deliberation, there is no obstacle to their arising [utpattiprati-
bandha];
2. given the deliberation, the factors, the arising of which has not been previ-
ously hindered (akrtotpattipratibandha), do not arise.
But it does not create the non-arising. 950
644 Chapter Two: Exposition of the ,Faculties (Indriyanirdesa)
cBA.2.3.2.c. The Sarviistiviidins: the Sautriintika definition and the existential

status of the unconditioned factors; F 280-83
cBA.2.3.2.ca. Refutation based on scriptural authority: Sutra on the praxis-oriented
faculties; F 280-82
(The Sarvastivadin refutes the Sautrantika: 951 ) - If nirvii"l:za is simply non-arising
(anutpiida), how can one explain the Siitra (SarJlyukta, 26, 2)? <281>
The practice [iisevita], the habit [bhiivita], the increased cultivation [bahulf-
krta] of the five (praxis-oriented) faculties, faith, etc., lead to the abandon-
ment of past, future and present unsatisfactoriness. 952
In fact, this abandonment [prahii,:ia] is none other than nirvii,:ia, and, [on the other
hand,] it is only of a future factor (dharma) that one can have non-arising, not of a
past or present factor.
(The Sautrantika: 953 [1. Explanation of past and present unsatisfactoriness:]) - This
Siitra does not contradict our definition of nirvii,:ia. In fact, by "abandonment of past
and present unsatisfactoriness" one understands the abandonment [prahii,:ia] of defile-
ments (klesa) bearing on (iilambana) past and present unsatisfactoriness [du~kha].
Our interpretation is justified by another text (SarJlyukta, 3, 11): { 16 b}
Abandon predilection-attachment (chandariiga) 954 relative to material form
(rupa), sensation [vedanii], ... consciousness [vijiiiina]; when predilection-
attachment is abandoned, material form, ... consciousness will be abandoned
and completely known (parijiiii) by you. 955
It is in this way that we should understand "abandonment of past and present unsatis-
factoriness" of which the Siitra on the (praxis-oriented) faculties speaks.
[2. Explanation of past and future defilement:] - If one adopts another reading of the
Siitra on the (praxis-oriented) faculties:
The practice, [the habit, the increased cultivation] of the (praxis-oriented)
faculties lead to the abandonment of past, future and present defilement
(klesa),
the explanation is the same.
Or rather, past defilement is defilement of the previous birth (paurvajanmika: purve
janmani bhava); present defilement is defilement of the present birth (aijiajanmika);
it does not refer to defilement of a past or present given moment (ekak(fa,:tika).
The same for the eighteen modes of craving (lfftJiivicarita) (Aliguttara, ii. 212):
under the name past, one designate& the modes (vicarita) re!ated to past birth; under
the name present, those related to present birth; under the namefutute, those related
to future birth. <282>
Past defilements and present defilements place seed-states [bijabhava] designated
to produce future defilement in the present self [sa'!ltati]: when these seeds are
abandoned, past and present defilement is abandoned: in the same way, one
can say that action [kanna] is exhausted when the ripened effect [vipiika] is ex-
hausted.
[3. Explanation of future unsatisfactoriness and. future defilement:] - As for future
um,atisfactoriness, so for future defilement; that which one understands by their
"abandonment" is the fact that they absolutely [atyanta] will not arise, in view of the
absence of seed-states.
4. How otherwise is the abandonment of the past or present unsatisfactoriness
understood? There is no reason to make an effort [yatna] in order to cause that
which has ceased [niruddha] or that which is ceasing (nirodhabhimukha) to cease.
{ 17 a}
CBA.2.3.2.cb. Refutation based on scriptural authority: Passage on detachment;

F 282-83
The Sarviistiviidin: 956 - If unconditioned [factors] do not "exist", how can the Siitra
say:
Among all conditioned and unconditioned factors, detachment (viraga) is
supreme [agra].
How can a factor which does not exist (asat) be said to be supreme among the factors
which do not exist?957
(The Sautriintika: 958 ) - We do not say that unconditioned [factors] do not exist at all.
They exist actually in the manner in which we say that they exist. Let us explain:
Before sound [sabda] is produced, one says: "There is former non-existence of
sound" [asti sabdasya priigabhava]; after sound has perished, one says: "There is
later non-existence of sound" (asti sabdasya pasciid abhiival:i), and yet, it is not
established that non-existence [abhava] exists (bhavati): 959 the same holds [also] for
unconditioned [factors].
Although non-existent, one unconditioned [factor] is most praiseworthy [prasasya-
tama], namely, detachment (viraga), the absolute [atyanta] future non-existence of
. all distress [upadrava]. This non-existent factor is the most distinguished (visifta)
among the non-existent [factors]. <283> The Siitra praises [prasa'!lsa] it by saying
646 Chapter Two: Exposition of the F acuities (Indriyanirdesa)
that it is supreme [agra] so that the disciples [vineya] conceive joy and affection [or
are enticed] [upacchandana] with regard to it.
caA.2.3.2.cc. Refutation based onlogical reasoning: cessation due to deliberation

is a noble truth; F 283
The Sarvastivadin: - If cessation due to deliberation (pratisarµkhyanirodha) or
nirva,:ia is [merely] non-existence, how can it be one of the noble truths? How can
it be the third noble truth [i.e., cessation (nirodha)]?
[Answer:] - What should one understand by noble truth (aryasatya)? Without
doubt the meaning of satya is: "non-erroneous" (aviparfta). The noble ones (arya)
have seen [both] that which exists and that which does not exist in a "non-
erroneous" manner: in that which is unsatisfactoriness (dul:,,kha), they have seen
only unsatisfactoriness; { 17 b} in the non-existence of unsatisfactoriness, they
have seen the non-existence of unsatisfactoriness. What contradiction do you find
in the non-existence of u'nsatisfactoriness, i.e., cessation _due to deliberation, being
a noble truth?
And this non-existence is the third truth, because the noble ones have seen it and
proclaim it immediately after the second [i.e., the truth of the origin (samlfdaya-
satya)].
caA.2.3.2.cd.Refutation based on logical reasoning: Unconditioned factors are a

cognitive object; F 283
·The Sarvastivadin: - But if unconditioned [factors] are [merely] non-existents
[abhavamatra], then consciousness which has space [akasa] and the two cessa-
tions (nirodha) for its cognitive object would have a non-existent for its cognitive
object.
[Reply:] - We do not see any inconvenience in this, as we shall explain in the
discussion of [the existence (astitvacinta) of] the past [atfta] and future [anagata]
[factors] (v. 25).
caA.2.3.2.ce. Refutation based on protecting the Vaibhii~ika doctrine; F 283
The Sarvastivadin asks: - What fault [do1a] do you see in maintaining that the
unconditioned [factor] is a real entity [dravya]?
[Reply:] - What advantage [gu,:ia] do you yourself see in (maintaining that the
unconditioned factor is a real entity)?
[The Sarvastivadin:] -The advantage is that the Vaibha~ika doctrine fpak~a] is pro~
tected (palita ).
cBA.2.3.2.d. Sautrantika: Refutation of the unconditioned factors as a real entity;

F 283-87
CBA.2.3.2.c1a.Refutation based on logical reasoning: direct perception and
inference; F 283
May the gods [devata] take it upon themselves to protect ~his doctrine, if they judge
it to be possible! But to maintain the distinct existence of the unconditioned [factor]
amounts to affirming a non-existent factor [abhata] as being a real entity. In fact,
(1) the unconditioned [factor] is not known through direct perception (pratyak:ja), as.
is the case for material form [rapa], sensation [vedanii], etc.; (2) it is not known
through inference (anumiina) on the grounds of its activity [karma], as is the case for
the [subtle] sense-faculties, [like the eye (cak:jus), etc.].
cBA.2.3.2.dh. Refutation based on logical reasoning: the genitive dul).khasya

nirodhal)., etc.; F 283-84 ·
Besides, if cessation [itself] (nirodha) is a distinct entity [vastuno], how could one.
justify the genitive [,sa,s{hfvyavasthii]: duflkhasya nirodhafl, destruction or cessation
of unsatisfactoriness, cessation of attachment [raga], cessation of the object of the
attachment? <284> '- In our system, this is easy to explain: the cessation of [such and
.
such (amu,sya)] an entity [vastu] is simply [a negation (pratifedhamiitra), i.e.,] the

absence or non-existence of such and such an entity [amu:jyiibhava]. "Cessation of
unsati~factoriness" signifies "unsatisfactoriness will no longer exist". But we cannot
conceive any relationship [saf!!bhandh]) (i) of cause [hetu] with its effect [phala],
(ii) of effect with its cause, (iii) of the whole [avayavin] with its part [avayava], etc.,
between (1) the entity, i.e., attachment, and (2) cessation conceived of as distinct
entity, which would justify the genitive. 960
The Sarvastivadin answers: - We affirm that cessation is a distinct entity. {18 a} We
can, however, specify ce~sation as being in relationship with such and such an entity
(cessation of attachment [raga], etc.), for one gains possession (priipti; ii. 37b) of
cessation at the moment when one cuts off the possession [priiptiviccheda] of such
and such an entity [i.e., of defilements (klesa)].
We reply: - But what is that which determines or specifies [niyama] the gaining of
possession of cessation?961
The Sarvastivadin. - The Siitra speaks of the bhik:jus who have gained possession of
nirva~a in the present life. 962 If nirva~a is non-existence, nothingness (abhiiva), how
could they gain possession of it?
(The Sautrantika: 963 ) - The bhik,sus, through the acquisition of the opposing force
or of the counter-agent (pratipak,saliibhena), i.e., through the acquisition of the
noble path, have attained a personality (afraya) absolutely contrary [atyantavi-

ruddha] [to the arising (utpiida)] of defilements (klesa), of a new personal exis-
tence [punarbhava]. This is why the Sutra says that they have gained possession of
nirvii,:ia.
CBA.2.3.2.dc. Refutation based on scriptural authority: Sarrzyukta, 13, s; F 284-86

Besides, we have a text [agama; Sarµyukta, 13, s] which shows that nirva,:ia is mere
non-ex:istence (abhavamatra). The Sutra says: 964 <285>
With regard to all these kinds of unsatisfactoriness, the complete abandon-
ment (ase~apraha,:ia), [casting aside (pratinib,sarga),] expurgation (vyantf-
bhava or vantfbhava), exhaustion (k~aya), detachment (viraga), cessation
(nirodha), appeasement (vyupasama), disappearance (astarµgama); the non-
rebirth (apratisarµdhi), non-arising (anutpiida), non-appearance (apradur-
bhava) of other kinds of unsatisfactoriness-this is peaceful (santa), this. is
excellent (pra,:iftam), namely, the casting aside of all substratum (sarvopa-
dhipratinrf:isarga), the exhaustion of craving (tr~,:iak~aya), detachment (vi-
riiga), cessation (nirodha), nirva,:ia. 965
The Sarviistivadin: - When the Sutra says that nirvii,:ia is non-appearance (apriidur-
bhtiva) of new unsatisfactoriness, the Sutra means to say that there is no appearance
of unsatisfactoriness "in" nirvii,:ia [niismin pradurbhava]. 966
C
(The Saut,rantika:%7) - I do not see that the locative [saptamf], "in nirva,:ia", has any
force in order to establish that nirva,:ia is an entity. In what sense do you understand
the locative asmin?
1. If this means to say: asmin sati, "nirvii,:ia existing, there is no appearance of
unsatisfactoriness", then unsatisfactoriness never would appear, for nirva,:ia
is eternal [nitya].
2. If this means to say: asmin prapte, "nirvana being attained, there is no
appearance of unsatisfactoriness", { 18 b} you would have to admit that
future unsatisfactoriness would not appear when the noble path-by virtue
of which you suppose that nirva,:ia is attained-either is, or, rather, has been
C
attained. 968 <286>
CBA.2.3.2.dd. Refutation based on scriptural authority: Comparison with the

extinction of aflame; F 286
Therefore the comparison [dmanta] of the Sutra is excellent:
Like the nirva,:ia of a flame [pradyota], so the liberation [vimok~a] of one's
thought.%9
That is to say: just as the extinction [nirva1Ja] of the flame is merely the "passing
away" (aty-aya) [or non-existence (abhava)] of the flame and not a certain distinct
entity, so is the liberation of the thought of the Fortunate One.
cBA.2.3.2.c1e.Refutation based on scriptural authority (Abhidharma): the avastuka

factors; F 286-87
(The Sautrantika view970 ) is also.backed up by the Abhidharma where we read:
What are the avastuka factors? - The unconditioned factors.
The term avastuka signifies ["bodiless" (aiarfra),] "unreal", "without intrinsic na-
ture" [asvabhiiva].
CBA.2.3.2.dea. Vaibha~ika: the five meanings of vastw 971 F 286-87

The Vaibhii~ikas do not accept this interpretation. The term vastu, in fact, is used in
five different acceptations:
1. vastu in the sense of specific entity (svabhavavastu), for example: "When
one has attained (pratilabh) this vastu (the asubha, vi. 11), one is accom-
.panied (samanviigam) by this vastu" (Jfiii,naprasthana, 1026c 11; MVS,
985a22);~72
2. vastu in the sense of cognitive object of consciousness (iilambanavastu),
for example: "All the factors are known (jfieya) by way of the differ-
ent cognitions (jfiiinena), each knowing its particular object (yathiivastu)"
(PrakaralJa, 713c20);
3. vastu in the sense of "place with binding" (sa,µyojanfya; sa,µyogavastu), 973
for example: "Are those who are fettered to a vastu by the fetter [sa,µyojana]
of lust [anunaya] those who are fettered to this vastu by the fetter of hostility
fpratigha]?" (MVS, 298k);
4. vastu in the sense of cause (he_tuvastu), for example: "Wh~t are the factors
endowed with a cause (savastuka)? - The conditioned factors [sa,µskrta]"
(Prakara1Ja, 716a4);974 { 19 a} <287>
5. vastu in the sense of "action of taking possession" (parigrahavastu), for
example: "vastu of a field [k~etra], vastu of a house [grha], vastu of a shop,
vastu of riches: abandoning the action of taking possession of these (pari-
graha ), they renounce them" (MVS, 288b5). 975
The Vaibha~ika concludes:'In the passage that concerns us, vastu has the meaning
of cause; avastuka signifies "that which has no cause". Unconditioned [factors],
although real [dravyata?,], being always devoid.of activity, do not have a cause which
produces them, do not have an effect which they produce.
650 Chapter Two: Exposition of the ,Faculties (Indriyanirdesa)
CBA.3. Effects which do have a cause; 976 F 287-89

We must explain what type of effect proceeds from each type of cause.
cBA.3.1. The ripened effect (vipakaphala) & its cause: the ripening cause; 977 F 287
56a. The ripened effect is the effect of the last cause [i.e., the ripening
cause]. 978
The last cause is the ripening cause (vipiikahetu), because the ripening cause is
named last in the list (see ii, F 245). The first effect (see ii, F 275), i.e., the ripened
effect (vipiikaphala; ii. 57), is the effect of this cause.
CBA.3.2. T-he effect of dominance (adhipatiphala) & its cause: the efficient
cause; 979 F 287-88
56b. The effect of dominance is the effect of the first cause [i.e., the
efficient c_ause].980 <288>
The first cause is the reason of existence or efficient cause (klira,:iahetu); the last
effect [i.e:, the effect of dominance] proceeds from it.
Because this effect is the effect of the sovereign or dominator [or predominance of
the efficient cause] [adhipatiphala; ii. 58cd], this.effect is called (1) adhipaja, i.e.,
arisen from the dominator [or predominance], or (2) iidh~pata, i.e., appertaining to
the dominator [or predominance]. The efficient cause is considered to play the part of
the dominator [or predominance] (adhipati).
[Objection:] - But since the quality of not making an obstacle (anavara,:iabhiiva-
mlitriivasthiina; ii. 50a) suffices to constitute the efficient cause (kiira,:iahetu), how
can it be regarded as dominator [or what predominance does it have]?
[Answer:] The efficient cause is either:
1. a non-efficacious cause (upek~afw)-and it is then regarded as sovereign981
or dominator [or predominance] because of this fact itself, i.e., not making
an obstacle; or rather
2. an efficacious cause (kiiraka)-and it is then regarded as dominator [or
predominance] because it is of the nature of the contributive efficacy
(aftgfbhiiva), i.e., the predominant cause (pradhiina), the generative cause
(janaka). { 19 b} For example, the ten sense-spheres (iiyatana), (visual
form and the eye sense-faculty, etc.,) are dominators with regard to the
ijve sensory consciousnesses; the collective actions [karman] of sentient
beings are dominators with regard to the receptacle world [bhiijanaloka]. 982
The ear sense-faculty, etc., also have an indirect predominance, [through
a succession,] [poraytlparye1J,odhipatya] with regard to the arising of

visual consciousness, for after having heard, the person experiences the
desire [kama] to see; and so forth. (ii. 50a)
cBA.3.3. The effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala) & its causes: the
homogeneous cause and the pervasive cause; 983 F 288
56cd. · The effect of equal outflow is the effect (1) of the homogeneous
cause and (2) of the pervasive cause. 984
The effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala) proceeds (1) from the homogeneous
cause (sabhagahetu; ii. 52) and (2) from the pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu; ii. 54):
for the effect of these two causes is similar_ to its cause (ii. 57c; iv. 85).
CBA.3A. The effect of human action (puru~akiiraphala) & its causes; 985 F 288-89
cBA.3.4.t. The metaphorical or specialized effect of human action & its two
causes; 986 F 288-89
56d. The human (pauru~a) [effect, i.e., the effect of human action,] is the
effect of two causes [i.e., of the co-existent cause and the associated
cause]. 987 <289>
The effect of the co-existent cause (sahabhuhetu; ii. 50b) and of the associated cause
(saf!lprayuktakahetu; ii. 53c) is called pauru~a, "human", i.e., effect of human action
(pur.u~akiiraphala ).
As the action is not distinct from the very person which does the action, "human
action" (puru~akara) is the very person itself (puru~abhava). The effect of human
action (puru~akaraphala) can therefore be termed human effect (pauru~a'!l phalaf!l).
[Question:] - [In our context,] what should one understand by this co-called human
action [jmru~akiira]?
[Answer:] - The "activity"988 (kiiritra; kriyii; karman) of a factor (dharma) is termed
its human action (puru~akara), because this activity is like the action of a human
(puru~a). In the same way, in the world, a certain plant [o~adhi] is called kakajanghii
("foot of a crow") because it resembles the foot of a crow; a hero [manu~ya] is called
mattahastin ("furious elephant") because he resembles a furious elephant.
cBA.3.4.2. The effect of human action & the other causes; F 289
[Question:] -Are the associated cause (saf!lprayuktakahetu) and the co-existent cause
(sahabhiihetu) the only causes which have an effect of human action [puru~akiira-
phala]?
[Answer:] - According to one opinion, the other causes also have this type of effect,
with the exception of the ripening cause (vipakahetu). This effect arises, indeed,
either simultaneous with (sahotpanna) or immediately following [samanantara-
utpanna] its cause; such is not the case with the ripened effect.
According to other masters [apara], 989 the ripening cause also has a distant .[vipra-
kr~tal effect of human action, for example, the fruit [sasya] harvested by a farmer
[kar~akci].
cee. The defining characteristics of the five effects; 990 F 289-93

[Thus a factor is:
1. the effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala), because it arises similar (sadrsa)
to its cause;
2. the effect of hu~an action (puru~akaraphala), because it arises through the
power (bala) of its cause;
3. the effect of dominance (adhipatiphala), because it arises on the grounds of
the non-obstacle (avighnabhavavasthiina) of its cause:]
What are the (defining) characteristics [lak~a~a] of the various effects? {20 a}
CBB.t. Ripened effect (vipakaphala); 991 F 289-90

57ab. The ripened effect is (1) an [unobscured]-non-defined factor, (2) a
factor indicative of sentient beings, (3) arising later [i.e., not at the
same time, not immediately afterwards] than a [morally] determi-
nate [action-its cause]. 992
1. The ripened effect (vipaka) is an unobscured-non-defined (anivrtavyakrta) factor
(dharma). <290>
2. Among the unobscured-non-defined factors, some are indicative of sentient
beings (sattvakhya), others are non-indicative of sentient beil}gs [asattvakhya].
Therefore, the author specifies: indicative of sentient beings, i.e., arising in the life-
streams of sentient beings.
3. [Among the factors] indicative of sentient beings, [some] factors are called an
effect of accumulation (aupacayika; coming from food, etc., i. 37), and an effect of
equal outflow (nai~yandika; originating from a cause which is similar to them, i. 37,
ii. 57c). Therefore, the author specifies: "arising later than a [morally] determinate
action":
"[Morally] determinate action" [vyakrta] is so called because it produces [or is
morally determined with respect to] a ripened effect [vipakarri prati vyakara~ad];
[this determinate action] is (i) the unwholesome (akusala) action and (ii) the whole-
some-impure (kusalasiisrava) action (ii. 54cd).
From an action of this nature there "arises later" [uttarakiila; udbhava], i.e., (i) not at
the same time (saha) and (ii) not immediately afterwards [antara], the effect which
one terms ripened effect or matured effect or effect of retribution (vipiikaphala ). 993
[This is the defining characteristic of the ripened effect.]
CBB.1.1. Difference between the ripened effect and the effect of dominance; F 290
[Question:].- Why are the factors which are non-sentient things [asattviikhya], i.e.,
mountains, rivers, etc., not considered to be a ripened effect? Do they not arise from
wholesome or unwholesome actions [kannaja]?
[Answer:] - Because the factors which are non-sentient things are, by nature,
common [siidhiira~atva], for other people are also similarly able to partake of
them. But the ripened effect, by definition, is one's own [or unique or non-
common] [asiidhiira~a], for it is not the case that another person ever experiences
the ripened effect of an action which some other person has accomplished. In
addition to a ripened effect, the action produces the effect of dominance (adhi-
patiphala ).
[Question: - Why does another person experience the effect of dominance?] {20 b}
[Answer:] - Sentient beings partake of this effect in common because it is brought
into being by the collective actions [siidhiira~akarmasaf!lbhatatva] (F 288, note).
<291:>
caa.2. Effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala); 994 F 290-91

57c. The effect which is similar to its cause is called effect of equal
outflow.995
The factor (dhanna) which is similar [sadrsa] to its cause is the effect of equal
outflow (ni~andaphala). Two C'auses, i.e., (1) the homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu;
ii. 52) and (2) the pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu; ii. 54ab), give forth an effect of
equal outflow.
caa.2.1. The difference between the pervasive cause and the homogeneous
cause; F29J.
[Question:] - If the effect of the pervasive cause is an effect of equal outflow, i.e., an
effect similar (samiina) to its cause, why not call the pervasive cause "a homo-
geneous cause"?
[Answer:] -The effect of a pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu) is always similar

[sadrsya] to its cause:
1. from the point of view of its stage [bhumi]: the effect of the pervasive cause,
like the pervasive cause, belongs to the realm of desire, etc. (ii. 52b);
2. from the point of view of its moral quality: the effect of the pervasive cause,
like the pervasive cause, is defiled (kli~fa).
But it may belong to a different category [prakara] than,the category of its cause.
By "category" (nikaya; prakara) is meant the mode of abandonment: susceptible
of being abandoned by insight into.the truth of unsatisfactoriness, etc. (ii. 52b).
When there is a similarity [sadrsya] between the cause and the effect from this
last point of view, then the pervasive cause is, at the same time, a homogeneous
cause.
There are four alternatives (tetralemma) [between homogeneous cause (sabhagahetu)
and pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu)]:
1.A homogeneous cause which is not a pervasive cause: for example, the non-
pervasive [asarvatraga] defilements (klesa; attachment [raga], etc.) in rela-
tion to the defilements of their own category (nikii.ya);
2. A pervasive cause which is not a homogeneous cause: the pervasive defile-
ments in relation to a defilement of another category;
3; A pervasive cause .which is at the same time a homogeneous cause: the
pervasive defilements iQ relation to a defilement of their own category;
4. Any other factor (dharma) which is neither a homogeneous cause nor a
perv,asive cause. 996
caa.3. Effect of disconnection (visarµyogaphala); 997 F 291

57d. ·Exhaustion [k1aya] [attained] through intelligence (i.e., under-
standing) [dhr] is the effect of disconnection.998
Disconnection (visa,riyoga) or the effect of disconnection (visa,riyogaphala), i.e.,
"the effect which consists of disconnection", is exhaustion (k~aya = nirodha)
attained through uncferstanding (dhf = prajiia). The effect of disconnection is thus
the cessation due to deliberation (pratisa,rikhyanirodha). (See above ii, F 278).
<292>
caa.4. Effect of human action (puru~akiiraphala); 999 F 292

58ab. A [conditioned] factor is the effect of human. action of the factor by
,the power of which it arises. 1000
This [definition] refers to a conditioned factor (sa,riskrta).

Examples: 1. The concentration [samadhi] of the first meditation (dhyana; upari-
bhiimika) is the effect of human action [puru~akaraphala] of a thought in the sphere
(avacara) of desire [adharabhiimika] which provokes it or prepares it (tatprayoga-
citta); the concentration of the second meditation is the effect of human action of a
thought in the sphere of the first meditation.
2. A pure [anasrava] thought can be the effect of human action of an impure
[sasrava] factor (dharma), [i.e., the supreme mundane factors (laukikagradharma)
have for their. effect the receptivity to the cognition of the factors with regard to
unsatisfactoriness (dul:zkhe dharmajfianak~anti), vi. 25cd]. {21 a}
3. The thought of emanation (nirma~acitta) is the effect of human action (ii. 56d) of
a thought in the sphere ofa meditation (vii. 48).
And so on. 1001
CBB.4.1. Unconditioned factors & the effect of human action; F 292

The cessation due to deliberation (pratisa,rikhyanirodha) or nirva~a is considered as
an effect of human action; but the definition given in verse 58ab does not apply to
cessation (nirodha), which, being eternal [nitya], does not arise. Let us say then that
it is the effect of human action of the factor by the power [bala] of which one attains
the possession of it. 1002
cBB.5. Effect of dominance (adhipatiphala); 1003 F 292-93

58cd. Any conditioned factor is the effect of dominance of conditioned
factors, with the exception of the factors that are later than it. 1004
cBB.s.1. The difference between the effect of dominance and the effect of human
action; 1005 F 292-93
[Question:] - What difference is there between the effect of human action [puru~a-
karaphala] and the effect of dominance [adhipatiphala])? 1006 <293>
[Answer:] - The first is connected with the agent (kartar); the second is connected
with the agent and the non-agent.
For example, in regard to the artist [silpin] who created it [i.e., the agent], the work
of art [§ilpa] is both the effect of human action and the effect of dominance; in regard
to that which is not the artist [i.e., the non-agent], the work of art is only the effect of
dominance.
CBC. Two stages of causing an ~ffect; 1007 F 293-97

In whttt state (avastha), i.e., in the state of past, present or future, does each of the
causes (hetu) occur (1) when it "takes" or "projects" (grh~iiti; iik~ipati) and (2) when
it "gives forth" or "produces" (prayacchati, dadiiti) its effect? 1008
[59.] (1) Five causes take their effect [only when they are] in the present;
(2) (i} two causes [i.e., the co-existent cause and the associated cause]
give forth their effect in the present; (iiJ two causes [i.e., the
homogeneous cause and the pervasive cause] give forth their effect
in the past and present; (iii) one cause [i.e., the ripening cause] gives
forth its effect in the past. 1009
CBc.1. Definition of taking and giving forth an effect; F 293

[Question:] - What should be understood by "taking or projecting an effect", "giving
forth or producing an effect"? 1010
[Answer:] -A factor (dharma) "takes" [pratigrhfta] an effect when it becomes its
seed-state [biJabhava]. 1011
A factor "gives forth" an effect at the moment when it gives to this effect the power
of arising, i.e., at the moment when-the future effect being turned toward arising,
being ready to arise (utpiidiibhimukha)-this factor gives it the power which causes it
to enter into the present state.
CBc.2. The time periods & taking and giving forth an effect; 1012 F 293-97
CBc.2.1. The present & taking an effect; 1013 F 293-94
59ab. [The last] five causes take their effect [only when they are] in the
present [state]. 1014
Five causes take their effect only when they are in the present [state]: (1) when they
are in the past [state], they have already taken or projected their effect [prati-
grhftatva]; (2) when they are in the future [state], they have no activity [ni~puru~a-
kiiratva] (v. 25).
The same holds for[the first cause, i.e.,] the efficient cause (kiira~ahetu);·but the
verse. does not, mention it because the efficient cause does not necessarily have an
effect (saphala). 1015 <294>
CBc.2.2. The present & giving forth an effect; 1016 F 294

59b. Two causes [i.e., the co-existent cause and the associated cause] give
forth their effect in the present [state]. 1017
The co-existent cause (sahabhii) and the associated cause (sa'f!lprayuktaka) give forth
their effect only when_they are in the present [state]: {21 b} these two causes in fact
take and give forth their effect at the same time.
cac.2.3. The present and the past & giving forth an effect; 1018 F 294-97
59c. Two causes [i.e., the homogeneous cause and the pervasive cause]
give forth their effect in the past and present [state]. 1019
The homogeneous cause (sabhaga) and the pervasive cause (sarvatraga) give forth
their effect when they are in the present [state] and when they are in the past [state].
[Question:] - How can they give forth their effect, i.e., the effect of equal outflow
(ni,Jyanda; ii. 56c), when they are in the present [state]? We have seen (ii. 52b, 54a)
that they are earlier than their effect.
[Answer:] - It is said that they give forth their effect in the present [state] because
they create it immediately antecedent (samanantaranirvarttana). When their effect
has arisen, they have passed away (abhyatfta): they have already given it forth; they
do not give forth the same effect twice. 1020
cac.n1. Homogeneous causes not having a cognitive object; 1021 F 294-96

cac.2.n.a. Wholesome homogeneous cause & taking and giving forth an
effect; i022 F 294-95
It happens that, at a given moment, a wholesome (kusala) homogeneous cause takes
an effect ~d does not give forth an effect. Four alternatives (tetralemma): (1) taking,
(2) giving forth, (3) taking and giving forth, (4) neither taking nor giving forth. 1023
1. The possessions (prapti) of the wholesome roots [kusalamiila] abandoned at
the last moment by the persons who cut off the wholesome roots (iv. 80a),
take an effect, do not give forth an effect. <295>
2. The possessions of the wholesome roots acquired at the first moment by
the persons who take up (pratisa,rzdadhana) the wholesome roots again
(iv. 80c), give forth their effect, but do not take an effect. 1024
One should say: 1025 These same possessions, i.e., the possessions abandoned
at the last moment by the persons who cut off the wholesome roots, give
forth their effect but do not take-their effect at the moment when these per-
sons again take up the wholesome roots.
3. The possessions of the persons whose wholesome roots are not cut off-
with the exception of the two preceding cases: (i) that of the persons ~ho
complete cutting them off, (ii) that of the persons who take up the whole-
some roots again-take [an effect] and give forth [their effect].
4. In any other case, the possessions neither take nor give forth [an effect]:
for example, the possessions of the wholesome roots [kusalamala] of the
persons whose wholesome roots have been cut off; the possessions of the
wholesome roots of a higher stage [iirdhvabhiimi] by persons who have
retrogressed [parihf~a] from this stage: these possessions have already
taken their effect, thus do not take it any longer; they do not give it forth,
since the persons cannot, at the present time, have possession of these
roots.
cBo.3.1.b. Unwholesome homogeneous cause & taking and giving forth an

effect; 1026 F 295-96
In regard to the unwholesome (akusala) homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu), the
Vibhii~ii establishes the same alternatives (tetralemma):
1. [Only taking:] The possessions of unwholesome factors which the per-
sons who attain detachment from desire (kiimavairiigya) abandon at the last
moment.
2. [Only giving forth:] The possessions Which the persons who retrogress from
detachment acquire at the first moment.
One should say: 1027 These same possessions, when the persons retrogress
from the detachment.
3. [Taking and giving forth:] The possessions of the persons who are not
detached, with the exception of the two preceding cases. <296>
4. The possessions in any other case: for example, the possessions of the per-
sons who are detached and not subject to retrogressing.
cBc.2.3.1.c. Obscure,d-non-defined homogeneous cause & taking and giving forth

an effect; 1028 F 296
In regard to the obscured-non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta) homogeneous cause, {22 a}
there are four alternatives (tetralemma):
1. The last possessions of obscured-non-defined factors which the noble ones
who become perfected beings (arhat) abandon.
2. The first possessions which the retrogressed perfected beings acquire.
To be more exact: the aforementioned possessions among the perfected
beings who retrogress.
3. The possessions of the persons who are not detached from bhaviigra, with
the exception of the two preceding cases.
4. The possessions in any other case: the possessions of the perfected beings.
cBc.2.3.1.d. Unobscured-non-defined homogeneous cause & taking and giving

forth an effect; 1029 F 296
In regard to the unobscured-non-defined (anivrtavyakrta) homogeneous cause, when
it gives forth its effect, it [also] takes it (because the unobscured-non-defined abides
until nirvii,:ia); but it can take its effect without giving it forth: the last [carama]
aggregates (skandha) of the perfected beings (arhat) have no effect of equal outflow
(ni~yanda). 1030
cBc.2.3.2. '!f-omogeneous causes having a cognitive object; F 296-97

CBc.2.3.2.a. Wholesome and unwholesome homogeneous causes & taking and
giving forth an effect; F 296-97
We have up to now considered [the rule (niyama) for] the factors (dharma) which are
not "having a cognitive object" (siilambana). If we consider [the rule for] thought
and thought-concomitants in their successive moments [k~~~iasas; k~ai:ziinantara], we
establish the following four alternatives for the wholesome homogeneous cause:
1. [The wholesome thought] takes and does not give forth. When the whole-
some thought is immediately followed by an obscured or unobscured-non-
defined thought, this wholesome thought, as a homogeneous cause, takes,
i.e., projects, an effect of equal outflow, namely, a future wholesome thought
which is or is not destined to arise; it does not give forth an effect of equal.
outflow, since the thought which follows it, whether obscured-non-defined
or unobscured-non-defined, is not an effect of equal\outflow of a wholesome
thought.
2. It gives forth and does not take. When a wholesome thought immediately
follows an obscured or unobscured-non-defined thought, an earlier whole-
some thought gives forth an effect of equal outflow, namely, the wholesome
thought which we are considering; this earlier thought does not take an
effect since it has taken it formerly. <297>
3. It takes and gives forth. Two wholesome thoughts follow one another, the
first takes and gives forth an effect of uniform outflow, which is the second
thought.
4. It neither takes nor gives forth. When obscured or unobscured-non-defined
thoughts succeed one another, the earlier wholesome thought, as a homo-
geneous cause, has formerly taken its effect and later will give forth its
effect; for an instant, it neither takes nor gives forth.
The alternatives regarding the unwholesome homogeneous causes could be estab-
lished in a symmetrical way.
cBc.2.4. The past & giving forth an effect; 1031 F 297

59d. One cause [i.e., the ripening cause] gives forth its effect in the past
[statel 1032
The ripening cause gives forth its effect when it is in the past [state], for this effect is
not simultaneous to [saha], nor immediately following [samanantara], its cause.
cBD. The four effects of the Westerners; 1033 F 297

Other masters (anya), i.e., the Westerners [Pascatya] (MYS, 630b15), say that there
are four effects which are different from the five effects that we have just mentioned:
1.effect of the base (prati~fhaphala ): { 22 b} the circle of water (jalama,:irjala)
is the effect of the circle of wind (vayuma,:irjala) (iii. 45) and so forth up to
the grass (tr,:ia), i.e., the effect of the great earth (mahaprthivi');
2. effect of the preparatory practice (prayogaphala): the cognition of non-
arising (anutpadajfiana; vi. 50), etc., is an effect of the meditation on the
loathsome (asubhii), etc. (vi. 11 );
3. effect of a complex or complete assemblage (samagrfphala): the visual
consciousness is the effect of the eye sense-faculty [calcyus], of visible
form [rupa], of light [iiloka] and of mental application [manaskiira] (Madhya-
makavrtti, 454);
4. effect of cultivation (bhavanaphala): the emanation of thought [cittasya
nirmii,:ia; vii. 48] is the effect of meditation (dhyiina).
According to the Sarvastivadins, the first of these four effocts is included in the
category of effect of dominance (adhipatiphala); .the other three are included in the
category of the effect of human action (puru~akiiraphala).
We have explained causes and effects.
cc. TOPICS RELATED TO CAUSES AND RESULTS; 1034 F 297-99

ccA. The four categories offactors & the number of their causes; 1035 F 297-98
We must now examine by how many causes the different factors (dharma) are
produced. 1036
From this point of view, the factors fall into four categories:
1. defiled (kliffa) factors, i.e., (i) defilements (klesa), (ii) factors associated
with defilements (sarµprayukta) and (iii) factors having their origination in
defilements (samuttha) (iv. 8); <298>
2. factors as ripened effect or factors arisen from the ripening cause [vipiikaja]
(ii. 54c);
3. the first pure [prathamiiniisrava] factors, i.e., the receptivity to the cog-
nition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness (duf:ikhe dharma-
jiiiinak~iinti; i. 38b, vi. 27) and factors coexistent with this receptivity
(k~iinti);
4. other factors [se~a], i.e., (i) non-defined (avyiikrta) factors, with the excep-
tion of the factors as ripened effect, and (ii) wholesome (kusala) factors,
with the exception of the first pure factors.
ccA.1. Thought and thought-concomitants & the number of their causes; 1037 F 298
60-61a. Thought and thought-concomitants, [when they are] (1) defiled;
(2) arisen from the ripening cause, (3) others, and (4) pure for the
first time, arise from causes which remain when [the following
causes] are excluded, in this order: (l) ripening cause, (2) pervasive
cause, (3) these two causes [i.e., the ripening and pervasive causes],
(4) these two causes [i.e., the ripening and pervasive causes] plus the
homogeneous cause, 1038
Thought and thought-concomitants,
1. when they are defiled, arise from five causes, .with the exclusion of the
ripening cause; {23 a}
2. when they are a ripened effect, arise from five causes, with the exclusion of
the pervasive cause;
3. when they are different from these [first] two categories and from the fourth,
arise from four causes, with. the exclusion of the ripening cause and the
pervasive cause;
4. when they are pure for the first time, arise from three causes, with the
exclusion of the aforementioned two causes [i.e., the ripening cause and the
pervasive cause] and the homogeneous cause.
ccA.2. The factors which are not thought and thought-concomitants & the
number of their causes; 1039 F 298
61ab. In regard to the factors which are not thought or thought-concomi-
tants, the associated cause is further excluded. 1040
The factors (dharma) which are not thought or thought-concomitants, namely, the
material factors (riipin) and the formations (saf!!skiira) dissociated from thought
(ii. 35), accordingly as they fall into one of the four categories, arise from causes
proper to this category, with the exclusion of the associated cause (saf!!prayuktaka-
hetu ): [these factors,]
1. when they are defiled, arise from four causes, [i.e., with the exclusion of the
ripening cause and the associated cause];
2. when they are a ripened effect, arise from four causes, [i.e., with the exclu-
sion of the pervasive cause and the associated cause];
3. when they are different [from the first two categories and from the fourth],
arise from three causes, [i.e., with the exclusion of the ripening cause, the
pervasive cause and the associated cause];
4. when they are pure for the first time (pure restraint [anasravasal?lvara],
iv. 13), arise from two causes, [i.e., with the exclu.sion of the ripening
cause, the pervasive cause, the homogeneous cause and the ·associated
cause].
There is no factor which is the result of one single cause (ekahetusal?lbhiita): the ef-
ficient cause (kara1Jahetu) and the co-existent cause (sahabhiihetu) are never ab-
sent.1041 {vii, 1 a} 1042 <299>
We have explained [the number (vistara) of] the causes (hetu) [of the different
factors]. 1043
co. THE FOUR CONDITIONS (PRATYAYA); 1044 F 299-331

A. The nature of each of the four conditions; p. 300
B. Conditions & their "activities/capabilities" with regard to factors of different
states; F 308
C. The different factors & the number of their conditions and causes; F 309
D. Specific explanation of the immediate condition: the causal relationships
between different thoughts and different thoughts; F 315-331
What are the conditions (pratyaya)?
61c. The conditions, are said to be four. 1045
[1. Causal condition (hetupratyayata; ii. 61d);
2. immediately preceding condition or condition as the equivalent and immedi-
ate antecedent (samanantarapratyayata; ii. 62ab);
3. cognitive object condition (alambanapratyayata; ii. 62c);
4. condition of dominance (adhipatipratyayata; ii. 62d).]
[Question:] - Where is this said?
[Answer:] - In the Sutra:
There are four types of condition (pratyayatas), namely, (1) hetupratyay_ata,
(2) samanantarapratyayata, (3) alambanapratyayata, (4) adhipatipratyayilta,
i.e., that which is a condition (1) in the quality of a cause, (2) in the quality
of the immediately antecedent, (3) in the quality of a cognitive object, (4) in

the quality of the dominator. <300>
By pratyayata is meant "type of pratyaya" (pratyayajati). 1046
coA. The nature of each of the four conditions; 1047 F 300

coA.1. Causal condition (hetupratyaya); 1048 F 300
coA.1.1. Definition; 1049 F 300
What is the causal condition (hetupratyaya)?
61d. [If one excepts the efficient cause,] the condition which bears the
name of "cause" is five causes. 1050
If one excepts the efficient cause (kara,:iahetu), the five remaining causes (hetu)
constitute the type of condition called causal condition (hetupratyayata).
coA.2. Condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent

(samanantarapratyaya); 1051 F 300-6
coA.2.1. De.finition; 1052 F 300
What is the immediately preceding condition or condition as the equivalent and
immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya)?
62ab. [Only] the thought and thought-concomitants which have arisen,
[i.e., past or present]-with the exception of the last [thought and
thought-concomitants of the perfected being at the moment of
nirva,:ia]-are a condition as the equivalent and immediate antece-
dent.1053 {1 b}
With the exception of the final thought and the final thought-concomitants (citta-
caitta) of the perfected being (arhat) at the moment of nirva,:ia, all thoughts and
thought-concomitants which have arisen are a condition as the equivalent and
immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya).
coA.2.2. Clarification of the definition; F 300-6

coA.2.2.1. Clarification of equivalence, range of the condition and range of the
effect; F 300-3
[Question:] - Only thoughts [citta] and thought-concomitants [caitta] are a con-
dition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya). Of_
which factors are they the condition as the equivalent and immediate antece-
dent?
CDA.2.2.1.a. Clarification of equivalence F 300-2

This type of condition is called samanantara because it produces equivalent (sama)
and immediate antecedent (anantara) factors (dharma). The prefix sam is understood
in the sense of equivalence.
Therefore, 1054 only thoughts and their thought-concomitants are a condition as the
equivalent and immediate antecedent, because, with respect to the other factors, as
for example the material forms (rupa), there is no equivalence [vi~amotpatti]
between cause and effect. As a matter of fact, immediately after one material form
[rupasyilnantara] of the realm of desire, there can arise ~t the same time either
two material forms, i.e., one. of the realm of desire·, the other of the realm of fine-
materiality, 1055 or two material forms, i.e., one of the realm of desire, the other pure
[anasrava]. 1056 <301> Whereas immediately after one thought [cittanantara] of the
realm of desire there never arises at the same time one thought of the realm of desire
and one thought of the r-ealm of fine-materiality. The present operation (sarrimukhf-
bhava) of the material forms is confounded (ilkula; vyilkula): but the conditi9n
as the equivalent and immediate antecedent does not give forth a confounded
effect; thus the material factors are not the condition as the equivalent and immediate
antecedent.
Vasumitra says: A second material form (rupa) as an effect of accumulation
(aupacayika) can arise in the same body without the stream of a material form
as an effect of accumulation being stopped [aniruddha]; thus material form is not
· a condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent. 1057
The Bhadanta1058 says: The factor (dharma) of material form (riipa) is immediately
followed by more [bahutara] or by less [alpatara]. Thus it is not a condition as the
equivalent and immediate antecedent. From more arises less: [for example,] when
a great mass of burning straw [palalara§i] becomes ash [bhasman]. From less arises
more: [for example, when] a small seed [vafanikaya~] [successively (krame~a)]
produces the roots of a fig tree [nyagrodha], the trunk, the branc}J.es and the leaves.
{2 a}
Objection: - (1) When thoughts (citta) immediately succeed one another, do they
always involve the same number of types Uati] of associated thought-concomitants
[caitta]? No. It happens that the previous thought involves a larger [bahutara]
number of types of thought~concomitants, and the following thought, a lesser
[alpatara] number; and vice versa. The thoughts, whether wholesome, unwholesome,
or non-defined, succeed one another; and they do not involve the same number of
associated thought-concomitants (ii. 28-30); (2) the three concentrations [samadhi-
traya], which succeed one another, involve or do not involve initial inquiry (vitarka)
and investigation (vicara) (viii. 7). Thus, for the thought-concomitants, just as for the
material factors (dharma), there is no equivalence (MVS, 52a21). <302>
[Answer:] ..., ~at is true [with regard to other types (jatyantara)]: there is a succes-
sion from less to more, and vice versa (second opinion of the Vibha~a); but only
through increase or diminution of the number of types of thought-concomitants
(MVS, 50c5). In regard to one specific type [svajati], there is never a non-equi-
valence: more numerous sensations (vedana) never arise after less numerous sensa-
tions, or vice versa; that is to say: a thought accompanied by one sensation is never
followed by. a thought associated with two or three sensations. The same holds for
ideation (sa,µJfia) and the other thought-concomitants.
coA.2.2.1.b. Clarification of the range of the effect; 1059 F 302-3

[Question:] - Is it then only in relation to its own type [svajati] that what is earlier is
a condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya) of
what is later? Is sensation then the condition as the equivalent and immediate ante~
cedent of a single sensation?
[Answer:] - No. In general, earlier thought-concomitants are the condition as the
equivalent and immediate antecedent of the thought-concomitants that follow, and
not only of the thought-concomitants of their type. But, when considering one type,
there is no succession from less to more, and vice versa: this justifies the expression
sa·manantara or equivalent and immediate antecedent.
The Abhidharmikas who take the name of Sarµtanasabhagikas (MVS, 50c5): -
Contrary to this, we maintain that a factor (dharma) ofa specific type [svajati] is the
condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent of a factor of this type only:
[for example,] from thought arises thought, from sensation arises sensation, etc.
Objection: - In this hypothesis, when a defiled (kli~fa = unwholesome [akusala] or
obscured-non-defined [nivrtavyakrta]) factor arises after a non-defiled [akli~ta]
factor, this defiled factor will not proceed from a condition as the equivalent and
immediate antecedent.
[Reply:] - It is a previously destroyed fpiirvaniruddha] defilement (klesa) which
is the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent of the defilement that
defiles this second factor [i.e., the defiled factor mentioned in the objection]. The
previous defilement is considered as immediately preceding the later defilement,
even though it is separated (vyavahita) by a non-defiled factor, for the separa-
tion by a factor of a different nature (atulyajiitfya) does not constitute separation.
In the same way as the emerging-thought (vyutthiinacitta) of the attainment of
cessation (nirodhasamapatti; ii. 43a) {2 b} has the thought-of-entry-into-attainment
(samapatticitta), which was previously destroyed, for its condition as the equivalent
and immediate antecedent: the attainment (samiipattidravya) does not bring about
separation. <303>
[Reply:] - We think that the theory of the Saiµtanasabhagikas is inadmissible; for in
this theory, the pure (anasrava) thought produced for the first time (i. 38b) would not
have a condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent.
coA.2.2.1.c. Clarification of the range of the condition; 1060 F 303

The formations (saf!tskara) dissociated from thought (viprayukta; ii. 35), 1061 just as
the material factors, occur confounded (vyakula): thus, they are not a condition as the.
equivalent and immediate antecedent. In fact, after a possession of the realm of
desire, possessions relative to the factors (dharma) of the three realms of existence
and to the pure factors, etc., can occur at the same time [yugapad].
coA.2.2.2. Clarification of "immediately antecedent" and the time period of the

condition; 1062 F 303-5
[Question:] - Why deny that future factors (dharma) are a condition as the equivaient
and immediate antecedent?
[Answer:] - The future factors are confounded (vyakitla): there is no anteriority,
posteriority among them [parvottarabhava] (see ii. F. 261). 1063
coA.2.2.2.a: Omniscience of the Fortunate One & the confoundedness of the future
factors; F 303-5
[Question: 1064] - How then does the Fortunate One know that such and such a future
factor will arise first; such and such a factor will arise later? [For] he knows the order
of the arising of all that arises until the end of time.
1.. First answer. 1065 His cognition results from an inference drawn from [saf!tprata-
anumana] (i) the past and (ii) the present:
i. he sees the past: 1066 "From such and such a type [evaf!t}atfyaka] of action
[karman] arises such and such a ripened effect; from such and such a factor
(dharma) there proceeds such and such a factor";
. ii-. he sees the present: "Here is such and such a type of action: from this action
will arise in the future such and such a ripened effect; here is such and such
a factor: from this factor will proceed such and such a factor."
Nevertheless, the cognition of the Fortunate One is what is called cognition
resulting from a resolve (pra,:iidhijiiana; vii. 37), and not cognition derived
from inference [iinumanika]. By means of inference drawn from the past and
the present,. the Fortunate One directly sees [pratyak~am fk~itvii janiiti] the fac-
tors which reside, confounded [vikf~a], in the future, and he produces this
cognition: {3 a} "This person [pudgala], having accomplished such and such
an action, will certainly receive such and such a future ripened effect." 1067
<304>
[Reply:] - To believe you, if the Fortunate One does not consider the past [purviinta],
then he does not know the future [apariinta]. Hence he is not omniscient (scirva-
vfrf).
2. According to other Masters, 1068 there is a certain factor-in the life-streams of
sentient beings-which is ,the indication (cihna = linga) of the effects that will arise
in the future, namely, a certain formation (sal'{lskiira) dissociated from thought. The
Fortunate One contemplates it [vyavalokya], 1069 and he knows future effects [even]
without having cultivated the meditations (dhyiina) and the superknowledges (abhi-
jfia; vii. 42: cognition of death and of rebirth of sentient beings [cyutyupapiidajfiiina])
for it.
(The Sautrantika: 1070 ) - If this is the case, the Fortunate One would be an inter-
preter of prognostic signs [naimittika]; 1071 he would not be a "direct seer" (siik~iitkiirin,
, siik~iiddarsin). <305>
r
3. Therefore, according to the opinion of the Sautrantikas, 1072 the Fortunate One
knows all things by merely wishing [icchiimiitra] and by knowing them directly, not
by inference, not by divination. This is justified by the word of the Fortunate One
(Ekottara, 18, 16; comp. Dfgha, i. 31):
The qualities of the Buddhas, the object-field of the Buddhas [buddha-
vi~aya], are inconceivable [acintya].
coA.2.2.2.b. Former and later stages & the confoundedness offuture factors; F 305
[Question:] - If the future does not have anteriority and posteriority [parva-
pascimatiibhiiva], how can one say: "Immediately after [anantara] the supreme
mundane factors (laukika agradharma) only the receptivity to the cognition of the
factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness (du~khe dharmajfiiinak~iinti) arises and not
another factor" (vi. 27), and so forth until: "Immediately after the adamantine con-
centration (vajropamasamiidhi) the cognition of exhaustion (k~ayajfiiina) arises"
(vi. 46c)?
The Vaibha1?ikas (MVS, 51bl) answer: - If the arising of this factor (dharma) is
bound to or dependent on [pratibaddha] that factor, then this arises immediately after
that, {3 b} just as, [for example,] a sprout [alikura] arises after the seed [bija], with-
out the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent intervening.
coA.2.2.3. Clarification of "with the exception of ihe last thought"; 1073 F 305
[Question:] - Why are the last (carama) thought and the last thought-concomitants of
perfected beings (arhat) not a condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent
· (samanantarapratyaya) (MVS, 50a22)?
[Answer:] - Because no [other] thought and thought-concomitant arise ot continue
after them.
[Objection:] - But you have given us to understand (i. 17) that by mental faculty
(manas) is meant the thought (citta; vijfiana) which has just perished and serves as
the basis of the following thought. [Now,] since no thought follows the last thought
of the perfected being, this last thought should not receive either the name of mental
faculty (manas) or the name of condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent
(samanantarapratyaya); and yet you consider it as being a mental faculty.
[Answer:] -The case is not the same:
1. That which constitutes the mental faculty is not the activity (ki'iritra) but the
quality of being a basis (asraya) for this thought, i.e., the fact of supporting the
subsequent thought; whether this (latter thought) arises or does not arise is of little
importance. The last thought of the perfected being (arhat) is a "basis": if a sub-
sequent thought [vijfianantara], which would be supported by this basis, does not
arise, it is due to the .absence [vaikalya] of other causes i1eces1,ary for its arising.
2. On the contrary, that which constitutes the condition as the equivalent and
immediate antecedent is the activity. Once this condition (pratyaya) has taken or
projected [pratigrhfta] an effect, nothing in the world can hinder [pratibanddhum]
this effect from arising.
Thus, the last thought of the perfected beings is rightly called mental faculty, and not
condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent.
coA.2.2.4. Clarification of "immediately antecedent"; 1074 F 305-6

[Question:] - The factor (dharma) that is cittasamanantara, i.e., which has for its
equivalent and immediate antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya) a certain
thought, is this factor [also]a cittanirantara, i.e., does it immediately follow this
thought? 1075 <306>
[Answer:] - There are four alternatives (tetralemma) [between "having a condition as
the equivalent and immediate antecedent" and "immediately following a thought"].
1. The thought and thought-concomitants of emerging (vyutthi'ina) from the
two attainments [samapatti] which are without thought [acittakaya; ii. 41],
and all the moments [k~a~a] of these two attainments with the exception of
the first, have the thought-of-entry-into-attainment for their condition as the

equivalent and immediate antecedent, and do not immediately follow this
thought. (ii. 64b)
2. The characteristics (lalcya,:ia; ii. 45c) (i) of the first moment of these two
attainments, (ii) of any thought and of any thought-concomitant of the con-
scious state (sacittakiivasthii), immediately follow a thought, but do not have
a condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent.
3. (i) The first moment of the two attainments as well as (ii) any thought and
any thought-concomitant of the conscious state have the thought which
they immediately follow for their condition as the equivalent and immediate
antecedent.
4. The characteristics (i) of all the moments of the two attainments with the
exception of the first, (ii) of the thought and thought-concomitants of emerg-
ing from the two attainments, do not have a condition as the equivalent and
immediate antecedent, for they are factors dissociated from thought (vipra-
yukta; ii. 35), and they do not immediately follow any thought.
· [The factor that is cittasamanantara, i.e., which has for its equivalent and immediate
antecedent condition a certain thought, is this factor also a samiipattinirantara, i.e.,
does it immediately follow the attainment? ... 1076]
[The equivalent and immediate antecedent condition has been discussed.]
coA.3. Cognitive object condition (alambanapratyaya); 1077 F 306-7

CDA.3.1. Definition; 1078 F 306
What is the cognitive object condition (iilambanapratyaya)? 1079
62c. All [conditioned as well as unconditioned] factors are the cognitive
object (alambana) of consciousness [i.e., the cognitive object condi-
tion].10so
All factors (dhanna), i.e., the conditioned (sarµskrta) as well as the unconditioned
(asaJ!lskrta) factors, are a cognitive object condition of thoughts and thought-
concomitants (cittacaitta), accordingly as the case applies (yathiiyogarµ): for exam-
ple, visual consciousness (ca~urvijnana) and the thought-concomitants, i.e., sensa-
tion, etc., associated with it, have all visible forms [rupa] for their cognitive object;
auditory consciousness, sounds; olfactory consciousness, odors; {4 b} tactile con-
sciousness, tangibles. <307> [On the other hand,] mental consciousness (mano-
vijnii.na) and the thought-concomitants associated with it have all the factors
[sarvadhanna] for their cognitive object. [With respect to the mental faculty
(manas), verse 62c is thus understood literally.]
coA.3.2. Clarification of the range of the condition; 1081 F 307

When a facto,r (dharma) is the cognitive object [alambana] of a thought, it can-
not be that at any moment whatsoever this factor would not be a cognitive object
of this thought. That is to say: even if a visible form is not seized as a cogni-
tive object (alambyate) by the visual consciousness, it is a cognitive object, for,
whether it is seized or not seized as a cognitive object, its nature remains the
same [tathalak~m:zatva], just as fuel (indhana), [i.e., a piece of wood (ka~fha),
etc.,] remains [in its nature] a combustible, even when it is not on fire [anidhya-
mana].
When considering the problem from the point of view of the thought which seizes
a factor (dharma) as a cognitive obje~t, a threefold determination [niyama] is estab-
lished. Thought is determined:
1.with regard to its sense-sphere (ayatana): for example, a visual conscious-
ness bears only on visible form (riipa-ayatana);
2. with regard to the real entity (dravya): a certain visual consciousness,
i.e., consciousness of blue, of red, etc., bears on the blue, the red, etc.
(i. 10);
3. with regard to the moment (k~ana): a certain visual consciousness bears on a
certain moment of blue.
[Question:] - Is thought determined in the same way with regard to its basis (asraya),
that is to say, sense-faculty, i.e., the eye sense-faculty, etc?
Answer: - Yes. 1082 However, when present, thought is joined [sahita] with its basis;
when past or future, it is separated [visli~fa] from it.
According to others, when present and past, thought is joined with its basis. 1083
[The cognitive object condition has been discussed.]
coA.4. Condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya); 1084 F 307-8

coA.4.L Definition; 1085 F 307-8
What is the condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya)?
62d. The cause called kara,:ia [i.e., efficient cause] is named dominator
(adhipa; adhipati) [i.e., condition of dominance]. 1086
The condition of dominance (adhipatipratyayatii) is none other than the cause called
reason of existence or efficient (kiira"fJ,ahetu; ii. 50a), for the efficient cause is the
condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya). <308>
cnA.4.2. Clarification of "dominance" (adhipati); F 308
This name is justified from two points of view. - The condition of dominance, or
causality of dominance, is
1. that which belongs to the greatest number of factors (adhikaJ:,, pratya");aJ:,,), and
2. that which is the condition for the greatest number of factors (adhikasya vii
pratyayaJ:,,).
1. All factors (dharma) are a ~ognitive object condition of mental consciousness
[and also a condition of dominance]. However, the factors coexisting (sahabha) with
a certain thought are not the cognitive object of this thought, whereas they are the
efficient cause (kiira,:zahetu) of it. Thus the factors, without exception, are a condition
of dominance as efficient cause, but not as cognitive object condition.
ii. Any factor has all [conditioned] factors, with the exception of itself [svabhava-
varjya], for its efficient cause [or any factor is the efficient cause for all conditioned
factors, with the exception of itself]. -"- [Could there be a factor which is not a .
c,ondition in the sense of all the four conditions? Yes. 1087 ] A factor is not any of
the conditions of itself. - [There could also be the case that a factor is not any of
the conditions of another existent (parabhavo 'pi syat).] A conditioned factor
(saYflskrta) is not any condition of an unconditioned factor, and an unconditioned is
not any condition of an unconditioned factor [saYflskrtamasaYflskrtasya asaYf1skrtaYf1
ciisaYflskrtasya]. 1088
cna. Conditions & their "activities/capabilities" with regard to factors of

different states; 1089 F 308-9
In what state (avastha), i.e., past, present, or future, do the factors (dharma) occur
with regard to which the diverse conditions exercise their "activity/capability" 1090
[kiiritra]?
cna.1. The causal condition & the time periods ofthefactors; 1091 F 308..JJ
Let us first examine the causal condition (hetupratyaya), i.e., the five causes, with the
exception of the efficient cause (kiira,:zahetu).
coa.1.1. The co-existent cause and the associated cause & the present factor;
F 308
63ab. Two [of the five] causes [i.e., (1) the co-existent cause, (2) the asso-
ciated cause] exercise their "activity" with regard to a perishing
factor [i.e., a factor of tll,e present]. 1092
By "perishing" [nirudhyamiina], one should understand "present" [vartamiina]. The

present factor (dharma) is called "perishing", "being engaged in perishing", because,
having arisen, it is turned (abhimukha) toward its cessation [nirodha].
The co-existent cause (sahabhuhetu; ii. 50b) and the associated cause (sal'Jlprayukta-
kahetu; ii. 53c) bring about their operation (kiiritrarri karoti) with regard to the
present factor because they bring about their operation with regard to a factor which
arises ·at the same time [sahotpanna] as they do. 1093 <309>
coB.1.2. The homogeneous cause, the pervasive cause and the ripening cause &
the future factor; 1094 F 309
63bc. Three [of the five] causes [i.e., (3) the homogeneous cause, (4) the
pervasive cause and (5) ripening cause] [exercise their "activity/
capability"] with regard to an arising [i.e., future] factor. 1095
By arising factor (dharma), one should understand a future factor, because the future
factor, not having arisen, is turned toward its arising [utpiida]. {5 b}
The three causes in question are the homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu; ii. 52a), the
pervasive cause (sarvatragahetu; ii. 54a), the ripening cause (vipiikahetu; ii. 54c).
coB.2. The ,condition as the equival(!nt and immediate antecedent and the
cognitive object condition & the time periods of thefactors; 1096 F 309
Concerning the other conditions:
63cd. Two other conditions [i.e., (1) the condition as the equivalent and
immediate antecedent and (2) the cognitive object condition]
[exercise their "activity/capability"] in reverse order, [i.e., respec-
tively, (1) with regard to a future factor, (2) with regard to a present
factor ].1097
1. In the list of the conditions, the condition as the equivalent and immediate ante-
cedent (samanantarapratyaya) comes first: it exercises its "activity/capability" as do
the three causes, [i.e., the homogeneous cause, the pervasive cause and ripening
cause,] namely, with regard to an arising [i.e., future] factor (dharma), for the
thought and thought-concomitants of a given moment give up their place (avakiisa-
diina) to the thought and thought-concomitants which are arising.
2. The cognitive object condition (iilambanapraty.aya) follow.s in the list: it exer-
cises its "activity/capability" as do the two causes, [i.e., the co-existent cause and
the associated cause,] namely, with regard to a perishi!lg, [i.e., present,] factor:
this perishing factor is thought-and-thought-concomitants, i.e., the subjects of
consciousness (ii.lambaka), which, in periShing, i.e;, in the present, seize a present

object.
cDB.3. The condition of dominance & the time periods of the factors; F 309
As for the condition of dominance (adhpatipratyaya), its "activity/capability" (karitra)
consists solely in not making an obstacle (aniivara,:iabhavena ... avasthana): it does
not make an obstacle either to the present factor (dharma), the past factor or the
future factor.
[The conditions with their "activities/capabilities" (kiiritra) have been discussed.]
cDc. The different factors & the number of their conditions and causes; 1098
F 309-15
Because of how many conditions do the different kinds of factors (dharma) arise?
cDc.1. General presentation; 1099 F 309-13

cDc.1.1. Buddhist tradition: the arising of the world from multiple causes and
°
conditions; 110 F 309-10
1101
cDc.1.1.1. Thought and thought-concomitants & the four conditions; F 309-10
64a. Thought and thought-concomitants arise because of four_condi-
tions:1102
1. The causal condition (hetupratyaya) is the five causes;
2. the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantara-
pratyaya) is the earlier thought and thought-concomitants which have arisen
not separated [avyavahita] by other thoughts, by other thought-concomitants;
<310>
3. the cognitive object condition (ii.lambanapratyaya) is the five objects-fields
[vi~aya] of which visible form (riipa) is the first, or, in the case of mental
consciousness, all factors (dharma);
4. the condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya) is all factors, except the thought
and thought-concomitants themselves [svabhavavarjya] whose arising is under
consideration.
cDc.1.1.2. The two attainments & the three conditions; 1103 F 310
64b. Two attainments [i.e., the attainment of non-ideation and the attain-.
ment of cessation] [arise] because of three conditions, [excluding the
cognitive object condition]. 1104
The cognitive object condition (iilambanapratyaya) must be excluded, because the

attainment of non-ideation [asa1?1,}nisamiipatti; ii. 42] and the attainment of cessation
[nirodhasamiipatti; ii. 43] do not seize, do not cognize a cognitive object. One has:
1. the causal condition (hetupratyaya) is two causes, (i) the co-existent cause
(sahabhuhetu) (namely, the characteristics, i.e., origination, etc., [ii. 45c] of
the attainment) and (ii) the homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu) (namely, the
earlier wholesome factors, already arisen, belonging to the [same stage or]
stage of meditative attainment [samiinabhamika], i.e., to the fourth medita-
tion or to bhaviigra, according to the case);
2. the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantara-
pratyaya) is the thought-of-entry-into-attainment [samiipatticitta] and the
thought-concomitants which are associated with this thought; the thought-
of-entry is not separated by any thought during all the moments of attain-
ment;
3. the condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya) is as above, [i.e., it is all
factors, except the thought and thought-concomitants whose arising is under
consideration].
These two attainments arise from an instigation, from an inflection, of thought
(cittabhisarµskiiraja; cittiibhogaja): they thus have a thought as the condition as
the equivalent and immediate antecedent. They make an obstacle to the arising of
thought (cittotpattipratibandha): thus they are not the condition as the equivalent and
immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya) of the emerging-thought [vyutthiina-
citta] of the attainment, although they are immediately preceding it (nirantara; see
ii, F 306).
coc.1.1.3. The other factors & the two conditions; 1105 F 310
64c. The other factors, [namely, (1) the other formations dissociated
from thought and (2) the material factors, arise] because of two
conditions [i.e., causal condition and condition of dominance].11 06
The other factors (dhanna), namely, (1) the other formations (sa1?1,skiira) dissociated
from thought (cittaviprayukta) [-besides the two attainments discussed above-]
and (2) the material factors (rupa), arise because of the causal condition (hetu-
pratyaya) and condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya) (MVS, 702b21).
coc.1.2. Non-Buddhist tradition: the arising of the world from a single cause
(eka1J1, kiira1J,am); F 310-13
All the factors (dharma) that arise, arise because of the five causes (hetu) and the
four conditions (pratyaya) which we have just explained. <311> [Further,] the world
[iagat] [as a whole (sarvasya)] does not originate from one single cause which one
calls (1) God [isvara], (2) Self (Puru~a), (3) Primal Source (Pradhana) or any other
name [sabda].11°7
[Question:] - How do you establish this thesis?
[Answer:] - If you think that these theses are established through [various] argu-
ments [hetukrta], { 6 b} you [will be forced to] give up [vyudasa] your doctrine
[vada] that the world as a whole arises from a single cause [ekal!l kara~am] [through
the following refutation].
64d. [The world does not arise from a single cause,] not from God [l§vara,
e.g., Mahadeva or Vasudeva,] or from any other [single] cause, [i.e.,
the Self (Puru~a), Primal Source (Pradhana), etc.,] because there is a
succession [krama], etc.11°8
That things [i.e., the world as a whole] would be produced only from a single cause,
by God (isvara, e.g., by] Mahlideva or Vasudeva, 1109 is inadmissible for several
reasons .11 10
coc.1.2.1. Refutation of various theist arguments for God being the single cause
of the world; F 311-13
coc.1.2.1.a. Theist argument 1: things are produced by a single cause; F 311
The Theist: - Things [that is to say, the world as a whole] are produced by a single
cause.
[Answer:] - If this were so, things would arise all at the same time [yugapad]: but
everyone sees that they arise successively [kramasal!lbhava].
coc.1.2.1.b. Theist argument 2: Things arise successively because of the desires of

God; F 311-12
The Theist: - They arise successively because of the [power of the] desires [chanda-
vasa] of God: "May this arise now [idanfm]! May this perish now! May this arise and
perish later [pascat]!"
[Answer:] - If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause,
because the desires (of God) are multiple [chandabheda; vistara].
Besides, these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous [yugapad], but since
God-the cause of these desires-is not multiple [abhinnatva], things would all arise
at the same time.
coc.1.2.1.ba. Theist argument 3: The desires of god are not simultaneous because
there are other causes; F 311-12
a. The Theist: - The desires of God (lsvara) are not simultaneous, because God,
in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes [kara,:iantara-
bhediipek~a,:ta].
[Answer:] - If this were so, then God is not the single cause of all things. Also, the
other causes which God takes into account arise successively [kramftpatti]: they
depend thus on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes. There is thus
the fault of infinite regress [anavasthiiprasmiga].
The Theist: - Let us allow that the stream of causes has no beginning [aniiditvabhy-
upagama]. {7 a}
[Answer:] - This would allow that cyclic existence (sa'!lsara) does not have an
origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause in order to take sides with the
Buddhist (siikyaputrfya) theory [nyiiya] of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya).
<312>
coc.1.2.1.bb. Theist argument 4: God's desires are simultaneous but he desires

things to arise successively; F 312
b. The Theist: - The desires of God [fsvaracchanda] are simultaneous, but things
[i.e., the world (jagat)] do not arise simultaneously [yaugapadya] because things
arise as God desires them· to arise, i.e., in succession.
[Answer:] - This is unacceptable. The desires of God remain what they are (te~ii'!l
pasciid avise~iit). Let us explain. Suppose that God [simultaneously] desires: "May
this arise now! May that arise later!" We do not see why the second desire, at first
non-effica~ious, will be efficacious later, and why, if it is efficacious later, it will not
be so initially.
coc.1.2.1.c. Theist argument 5: The advantage of God; F 312
[Question:] - What advantage [artha] does God [lsvara] attain from this great effort
by which he creates the world [sargaprayiisa]?
The Theist: - God creates the world for his own joy (prfti).
[Answer:] - He is then not God, the Sovereign (Isvara), with regard to his own joy,
since he is not able to realize it without a means (upiiya). And if he is not Sovereign
with respect to his own joy, how can he be Sovereign with respect to the world
[trailokya]?
C. Classification of Factors according to Causes, Effects,. Conditions 677
coc.1.2.1.d. Counter-argument 1: The creation of the distress of existence; F 312

Besides, do you say that God finds joy [prfyate] in seeing the creatures [praja] which
he has created in the prey of all the distress of existence, including the tortures of the
hells [naraka]? Homage to this kind of God! The profane stanza expresses it well:
"One calls him Rudra because he bums [nirdahati], because he is sharp [tfk~,:ia],
fierce [ugra],_ redoubtable [pratapavant], an eater of flesh, blood and marrow [mal?lsa-
so,:iitamajjad]. " 1111 {7 b}
coc.1.2.1.e. Counter-argument 2: The denial of the visible causes and conditions;

F 312
The followers of God [Isvara], i.e., as a single cause of the world Uagat], deny
visible [pratyak~a] .causes-causes and conditions__:_i.e., the efficacy (puru~akara) of
the seed [bi]a] with regard to the sprout [ankura], etc.
coc.1.2.u. Counter-argument 3: Invisibility of the activity of the (divine) cause;

F 312
If, modifying their position, the followers of God allow the existence of these causes
and claim that these causes serve God as auxiliaries (sahakarin): this is nothing
more than a pio~s affirmation (bhaktivii.da), because we do not see the activity
(vyaparadarsana) of a (Divine) Cause next to the activitr of the causes called
secondary. <313>
coc.1.2.1.g. Counter-argument 4: God is not sovereign with regard to other

auxiliary causes; F 313
Besides, God would not be Sovereign with regard to [other] auxiliary causes, since
these are engaged in the production of the effect through their own efficacy [sva-
siimarthya].
coc.1.2.1.h. Counter-argument 5: The creation of the world by God would not

have a beginning; F 313
Perhaps, in order to avoid the denial of causes which are visible [pratyak~a-
puru~akiira], in order to avoid the [pious] affirmation of a present action by God
[fsvara], an action which is not visible [vyaparadarsana], the Theist would
say that the work of God is the [first] creation [of the world] (iidisarga): but it
would follow that creation, dependent only on God, would never have a begin-
ning, like God himself (anaditvaprasanga). This is a consequence which the Theist
rejects.
678 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Faculties (lndriyanirde§a)
coc.1.2.2. Refutation of the proponents of the Self, Primal Source, etc., being the
single cause of the world; F 313
We would refute the doctrine of Self (Puru~a), of Primal Source (Pradhana), etc.,
just as we have refuted the theist doctrine, mutatis mutandis ("with the necessary
changes"; yathtiyogam). Thus, no factor (dharma) arises from a single cause ..
Alas, beings are not illumined! 1112 Like birds and animals, truly pitiable [vartika],
they go from birth [iati] to birth, accomplishing diverse actions; they experience the
effect of these actions 111 J and falsely [mithya] think [parikalpayanti] that God is the
cause of this effect. - 1114We must explain the truth in order to put an end to this false
conception. {8 a}
coc.2. Specific presentation of the number ofways in which the material

factors are causal conditions; 1115 F 313-15
We have seen (ii. 64c) that the material factors (dharma) arise because of two
conditions, i.e., causal condition (hetupratyaya) and condition of dominance (adhi-
patipratyaya). We must specify and see how (1) the fundamental material elements
(bhiita; mahtibhuta) and (2) the factors of secondary or derivative forms (uptidaya-
riipa) or derivative material elements (bhautika) are a causal condition, either among
themselves or with one another.
coc.2.1. Fundamental material elements as cause offundamental material

elements; 1116 F 313
65a. The fundamental material elements are the cause of fundamental
material elements in two ways [i.e., as homogeneous cause and co-
existent cause]. 1117
The four fundamental material elements (bhiita), i.e., the elementary substance earth
(prthivfdhtitu), etc., .are causes of four fundamental material elements in the quality
(1) of homogeneous cause (sabhtigahetu) and (2) of co-existent cayse (sahabhiihetu).
<314>
coc.2.2. Fundamental material elements as cause of derivative material

elements; 1118 F 314
65b. [The fundamental material elements. are the cause] of derivative
material elements [i.e., visible form, taste, etc.] in five ways [i.e., in
the quality of (1) generating cause, (2) reliance cause, (3) supporting
cause, (4) maintaining cause and (5) growth cause]. 1119
C. Classification of Factors according to Caus~s, Effects, Conditions 679
The four fundamental material elements are causes of derivative material elements
(bhautika)-color, taste, etc.-in five ways [prakara], "in the quality of (1) generat-
ing (janana) cause, (2) reliance (nisraya) cause, (3) supporting (prati:jfha; sthana)
cause, (4) maintaining (upastambha) cause and (5) growth (upabrrriha,:ia) cause".
[It is, however, only the efficient cause (kara,:zahetu) which is divided in five
ways.] 1120
1. Generating cause (jananahetu), bycause derivative material elements [newly]
arise [utpatti] from [the fundamental material elements], like a child from its
parents.11 21
2. Reliance cause (nisrayqhetu), because the derivative material elements, once
arisen, come under their influence (anuvidha), like monastics who rely [nisraya)]
on their. teacher (acarya) and th~ir preceptor (upadhyaya ).
3. Supporting cause (prati:jfhahetu), because the derivative material elements are
supported (adhara) by them, like a painting [citrakrtya] is supported by a
wau.1122
4. Maintaining cause (upastambhahetu), because the fundamental material elements

are the cause of the non-interruption [anucchedahetu] of the derivative material
elements.
5. Growth cause. (upabr,riha,:iahetu; vrddhihetu ), because the fundamental material
elements are a cause of the development of the derivative material elements.
{8 b}
This means that, with regard to derivative material elements, the fundamental mate-
rial elements are:
1. cause of birth (janmahetu);
2. cause of transformation (vikarahetu);
3. supporting cause (adharahetu);
4. cause of duration (sthitihetu);
5. cause of development (vrddhihetu).
coc.2.3. Derivative material elements as cause of derivative material elements;

F 314-15
65c. Derivative material elements are a cause of derivative material

elements in three ways [i.e., in the quality of (1) co-existent cause,
(2) homogeneous cause and (3) ripening cause].
[Derivative material elements (bhautika) are a cause of derivative material ele-
ments] in the quality of (1) co-existent cause (sahabhiihetu), (2) homogeneous cause
680 Chapter Two: Exposition of the Facuities (Indriyanirdesa)
(sabhligahetu) and (3) ripening cause (viplikahetu), not to mention the efficient cause
(kiira1_1ahetu), for any factor is an efficient cause of any other factor. 1123
.1. [Co-existent cause:] The actions of body and of speech [kliyavlikkarma] of
the category described in ii. 51a, [i.e., the two restraints of the thought-associates
(cittlinuparivartin),] which are derivative material elements, are a co-existent cause.
[Other derivative forms are not co-existent causes (nlinyaduplidliyariipa:rr,.)]. 1124
<315>
2. [Homogeneous cause:] All derivative material elements which have arisen [pre-
viously (piirvotpanna)] are a homogeneous cause with regard to similar or homo-
geneous (sabhiiga) derivative material elements. 1125
3. [Ripening cause:] The actions of body and of speech are a ripening cause: the
eye, etc., is produced through the ripened effect of action. 1126
coc.24. Derivative material elements as cause offundamental material

elements; F 315
65d. And derivative material elements are a cause of fundamental mate-
rial elements in [only] one way, [i.e., as a ripening cause].11 27
Actions of body and of speech, [being derivative material elements,] give rise to the
fundamental material elements (bhiita) as a ripened effect: they are thus [only] a
(
ripening cause (vipiikahetu).
COD. Specific explanation of the immediate condition: the causal

relationships between different thoughts and different thoughts; 1128
F 315-31
We have seen that antecedent thought and thought-concomitants [cittacaitta] are a
condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya) of the
subsequent thought and thought-concomitants. But we have not explained how many
types of thought can arise immediately after each type of thought.
In order to define the rule [niyama], we must first establish the classification of
( thoughts.
CDD.1. The.twelve categories of thought; 1129 F 315-16

First of all, we distinguish twelve categories [of thought (citta)]:
66. (1-4) The wholesome, unwholesome, obscured-non-defined, and un-
obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of desire. (5-10). The
wholesome, obscured-non-defined, and unobscured-non-defined thought
of the realm of fine-materiality and of the realm of immateriality,

[i.e., excluding the unwholesome thoughts]. (11-12) The two pure
thoughts [of those in training and of those beyond training]. 1130
1-4. Four types of thought belong to the realm of desire: wholesome (kusala),
unwholesome (akusala), obscijred-non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta), unobscured-non-defined
(anivrtiivyiikrta ).
5-10. There are three types of thoug~t, excluding the unwholesome thought, in
regard to each of the two higher realms. <316>
[In this way there are ten impure (siinusrava) thoughts.]
11-12. There·are two pure [aniisrava] types of thought, i.e., that of those in training
(saik~a) and that of those beyond training (asaik~a), i.e., of the perfect beings
(arhat).
coo.2. The rules regarding combining with the twelve thoughts; 1131 F316-19
These twelve thoughts do not arise indiscriminately [abhedena] one after another.
· coo.2.1. Combining with the ten impure thoughts of the three realms; 1132 F 316-19
coo.2.1.1. Combining with the four impure thoughts of the realm of desire; 1133
F 316-17
67a-68b. First, when considering the thoughts of the realm of desire,
(1) immediately after the good thought,· nine thoughts can arise;
[on the other hand,] the good thought can arise immediately after
eight thoughts.
(2) The unwholesome thought can arise immediately after ten
thoughts; [on the other hand,] four thoughts can arise immediately
after the unwholesome thought.
(3) The same for the obscured-non-defined thought.
(4) The unobscured-non-defined thought can arise immed~ately
after five thoughts; [on the other hand,] seven thoughts· can arise
immediately after the unobscured-non-defined thought. 1134 { b} 9
coo.2.1.1.a. Combining with the wholesome thought of the realm of desire; 1135
F 316-17
a. Immediately after [anantara] a wholesome (ku§ala; §ubha) thought of the realm

of desire, nine [of the twelve] thoughts can arise [utpadyante], namely:
1-4. the four thoughts of the realm of desire;

5-6. the two thoughts of the realm of fine-materiality: a wholesome (kusala)
thought, when the practitioners enter into meditative attainment [samiipatti-
klila], an obscured-non-defined (nivrtavyti-krta) thought, when the person,
dying [nivrta] in the realm of desire with a wholesome thought, passes
[pratisa'!ldhikiila] into the intermediate existence of the realm of fine-mate-
riality (iii. 38c);
7. the one thought of the realm of immateriality, which is [only] an obscured-
non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta) thought, when the person, dying in the realm of
desire, is reborn fpratisa'!ldhikiila] in the realm of immateriality; [t4is
thought of the realm of immateriality is] not a wholesome (kusala) thought,
because-the realm of immateriality being very distant [ativiprakr~fa] from
the .realm of desire through the four kinds of distancing [duratii] 1136-one
cannot pass directly from the realm of desire into a meditative attainment of
the realm of immateriality; <317>
8-9'. the two pure thoughts-of those in training (saik~a) or of those beyond
training (asaik~a)--at the entry into the direct realization of the truths
(satyiibhisamaya) (vi. 27).
b. The wholesome (kusala) thought can arise immediately after [samanantaram~
utpadyate] eight [of the twelve] thoughts, namely:
1-4. the four thoughts of the realm of desire,
5-6. the two thoughts of the realm of fine-materiality-a wholesome thought
and an obscured-non-defined thought-when emerging [vyutthiinakiila]
from meditative attainment [As for the second,] it may happen, in fact,
that the practitioners, troubled (utpf{l,ita) by a defiled (kli~fa) meditative
attainment, emerge from the meditative attainment: after the defiled (kli~fa
= nivrta) thought which is this meditative attainment, they produce a
wholesome thol;lght of a lower [adhara] stage [bhumi], thus preventing
!etrogressing by having recourse [sa'!lfraya~a] to a wholesome lower
thought (viii. 14);.
7-8. two pure thoughts-of those in training or of those beyond training-when
emerging from the direct realization of the truths.
coo.2.1.1.h. Combining with the unwholesome and the obscured-non-defined

thoughts of the realm of desire; 1137 F 317
a. The defiled (kli~fa) thought, i.e., the unwholesome (akusala) and the obscured-
non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta) thought, can arise immediately after ten [of the twelve]
thoughts, i.e., excluding the two pure thoughts, because the thought-of-rebirth in the
realm of desire (pratisarµdhikala) is defiled (ii. 14; iii. 38) and can follow any
thought belonging to the three realms of existence.
b. Immediately after the defiled (kli~{a) thought, four [of the twelve] thoughts can
arise~ i.e., the four thoughts of the realm of desire. { 10 a}
coo.2.1.1.c. Combining with the unobscured-non-defined thought of the realm of

desire; 1138 F 317
a. The unobscured-non-defined (anivrtavyakrta) thought can arise immediately
after five [of the twelve] thoughts, namely: {l-4) the four thoughts of the realm of
desire, (5) plus the wholesome (kusala) thought of the realm of fine-materiality:
because the thought of emanation (nirma,:,,acitta) of the realm of desire, [being
unobscured-non-defined and] having the miraculous emanation of an object of the
realm of desire for its object, can immediately follow a wholesome thought of the
realm of fine-materiality.
b. Immediately after the unobscured-non-defined thought, seven [of the twelve]
thoughts can arise, namely:
1-4. four thoughts of the realm of desire,
5-6. two thoughts of the realm of fine-materiality, a wholesome thought
(kusala), because, immediately after the aforementioned thought of emana-
tion, a wholesome thought of the realm of fine-materiality reappears, a~d
an obscured-non-defined (nirvrtavyakrta) thought, when a person, dying
with an obscured-non-defined thought, is reborn [pratisarµdhikala] in the
realm of fine-materiality, the first thought of which is necessarily obscured-
non-defined (iii. 38);
7. one thought of the realm of immateriality, i.e., an obscured-non-defined
thought, when a person, dying with an obscured-non-defined thought, is
reborn in the realm of immateriality.]
coo.2.1.2. Combining with the three impure thoughts of the realm of

fine-materiality; 1139 F 317-18
68c-69b. [Second,] in regard to the thoughts of the realm of fine-materiality,
(1) immediately after the good thought, eleven thoughts can arise;
[on the other hand,] the good thought can arise immediately after
nine thoughts. <318>
(2) The obscured-non-defined thought can arise immediately after
eight thoughts; [on the other hand,] immediately after the obscured-
non-defined thought, six thoughts can arise.
(3) The unobscured-non-defined thought can arise immediately

after_ three thoughts; [on the other hand,] immediately after the
unobscured-non-defined thought, six thoughts can arise.'1 40
coo.2.1.2.a. Combining with the wholesome thought of the realm of

a. Immediately after the wholesome (kusala) thought of the realm of fine-material-
ity, eleven [of the twelve] thoughts can arise, except for the unobscured-non-defined
(anivrtavyakrta) thought of the realm of immateriality. 1142
b. The wholesome thought can arise immediately after nine [of the twelve] thoughts,
except for (l-2) the two defiled thoughts of the realm of desire (i.e., the unwhole-
some and the obscured_;non-defined thoughts) and (3) the unobscured-non-defined
thought of the realm of immateriality.
coo.2.1.2.b. Combining with the obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of

a. The obscured-non-defined thought can arise immediately after eight [of the
twelve] thoughts, except for (1-2) the two defiled thoughts of the realm of desire and
(3-4) the two pure thoughts.
b. Immediately after the obscured-non-defined thought, six [of the twelve] thoughts
can arise, namely, (1-3) the three thoughts of the realm of fine-materiality, (4-6) the
wholesome, the unwholesome and the obscured-non-defined thoughts of the realm of
. desire.
coo.2.1.2.c. Combining with the unobscured-non-defined thought of the realm of

fine-materiality;l 144 F 318
a. The unobscured-non-defined (anivrryavyiikrta) thought can arise immediately
after [three of the tweive thoughts,. namely,] the three thoughts of the realm of fine-
materiality.
b. Immediately after the unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyakrta) thought, six [of
the twelve] thoughts can arise, namely: (1-3) the three thoughts of the realm of
fine-materiality (riipadhtitu), (4-5) the two defiled thoughts of the realm of desire
(kiimadhiitu) (i.e., the unwholesome [akusala] arid obscured-non-defined [nivrta-
avyiikrta] thoughts), (6) the defiled thought of the realm of immateriality (nivrta-
avyiikrta). { 10 b}
coo.2.1.3. Combining with the three impure thoughts of the realm of

immateriality; 1145 F 318-19
69c-70b. [Third,] in regard to the thoughts of the realm of immateriality,
(1) for the unobscured-non-defined thoughts as above, [i.e., the un-
ob~cured-non-defined thought can arise immediately after three
thoughts; on the other hand, immediately after the unobscured-nc;>n-
defined thought, six thoughts can aris'e].
(2) Immediately after the good thought, nine thoughts can arise;
.[on the other hand,] the good thought can arise immediately after
six thoughts.
(3) Immediately after the obscured-non-defined thought, seven
thoughts can arise; [on the other hand,] the obscured-non-defined
thought can arise immediately after seven thoughts.11 46
coo.2.1.3.a. Combining with the unobscured-non-defined thought of the realm of

immateriality; 1147 F 318
a. The unobscured-non-defined (anivrtavyakrta) thought of the realm of immate-
riality can arise immediately after [three of the twelve thoughts, namely,] the three
thoughts of its own stage (svabhumika).
b. Immediately after the unobscured-non-defined thought of the realm of immate-
riality, six [of the twelve] thoughts can arise, namely:
1..:.3_ the three thoughts of this stage,
4-6. the two defiled thoughts of the realm of desire (i.e., the unwholesome and
obscured-non-defined thoughts) and the one defiled thought of the realm of
fine-materiality (i.e., the obscured-non-defined thought). <319>
coo.2.1.3.b. Combining with the wholesome thought of the realm of

immateriality; 1148 F 319
a. Immediately after the wholesome (kusala) thought, nine [of the twelve] thoughts
can arise, except for (1) the good thought of the realm of desire and (2-3) the unob-
scured-non-defined thought of the realm of desire and of the realm of fine-materiality.
b. The wholesome thought can arise immediately after six thoughts, namely:
1-3. the three thoughts of the realm of immateriality,
4. the one wholesome thought of the realm of fine-materiality,
5-6. the two pure thoughts.
coo.2.1.3.c. The obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of immateriality; 1149

F 319
a. hnmediately after the obscured-non-defined (nivrtiivyakrta) thought, .seven [of

the twelve] thoughts can arise, namely:
1-3. the three thoughts of the realm of immateriality,
4. the wholesome thought of the realm of fine-materiality, .
5-6. the two defiled thoughts of the realm of desire {i.e.; the unwholesome and
. obscured-non-defined thqughts),
7. the defiled thought of the realm of fine-materiality.
b. The obscured-non-defined (nivrtiivyakrta) thought can arise immediately after
seven [of the twelve] thoughts, except for (1-2) the two defiled thoughts of the realm
of desire, (3) the defiled thought of the realm of fine-materiality and (4-6) the two
pure thoughts.
coo.2.2. Combining with the two pure thoughts; 11 5°F 319

70c-71a. (1) The thought of those in training can arise immediately after
four thoughts; [on the other hand,] five thoughts can arise immedi-
ately after the thought of those in training (§aikfa).
(2) The thought of those beyond training can arise immedi-
ately after five thoughts; [on the other hand,] four thoughts can
arise immediately after the thought of those beyond training
(asaikfa ).'1 51
coo.2.2.1. Combining with the thought of those in trainirz:g; 1152 F 319

a. The thought of those in training-the thought belonging to the noble qnes who
are not perfected beings (arhat)---can arise immediately after four [of the twelve]
thoughts, namely (1) the thought of those in training and (24) the wholesome
(kusala) thought of each of the three realms.
b. Immediately after the thought of those in training, five [of the twelve] thoughts
can arise, namely, (1-4) the four thoughts which have just been named and (5) the
thought of those beyond training.
coo.2.2.2 .. Combining with the thought of those beyond training; 1153 F 319
a. The thought of those beyond training can arise after five [of the twelve]
thoughts, (1) the thought of those in training, (2) the thoughJ of those beyond train-
ing, (3-5) the wholesome thoug~t of each of the three realms.
b. Immediately after the thought of those in training, four [of the twelve] thoughts
can arise, (1) the thought of those beyond training and (2~) the wholesome thought
of each of the three realms.
It is according to these rules (niyama) that the twelve types of thought can immedi-
ately follow one. another. {11 a}
coo.3. The twenty categories of thought; 1154 F 319-21

71b-72. The twelve types of thought make twenty thoughts: (1) by dividing
the good thought of the three realms into two thoughts: the thought
acquired [through preparatory effort]; the innate thought, [i.e., ac-
quired at birth]; (2) by dividing the unobscured-non-defined thought
of the realm of desire into four thoughts: the thought arisen from
the ripening cause; the thought associated with proper deportment;
the thought associated with skill in arts and crafts; 1155 <320> and the
thought associated with supernormal emanations; (3) by dividing the
unobscured-non-defined thought of the realm of fine-materiality
into three thoughts, [i.e., the thought arisen from the ripening cause,
the thought associated with proper deportment, the thought capable
of creating emanations,] by excluding the unobscured-non-defined
thought associated with skill in arts and crafts.11 56
coo.3.1. The divisions of the wholesome thought of the three realms; 1157 F 320
The wholesome (kusala) thought of ~ach of the three realms (dhatu) is divided into
two categories:
1. acquired through preparatory effort (yiitnika; prliyogika), 1158
2. acquired at birth or innate (upapattiliibhika; upapattipratilambhika). 1159
·There are thus six types of wholesome thought corresponding to the three types of
the first list.
coo.3.2. The divisions of the unobscured-non-defined thought of the three

realms; 1160 F 320
The unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyakrta) thought of the realm of desire is
divided into four categories:
1. ari,sen from the ripening cause (vipiikaja; ii. 57);
2. associated with proper deportment (airyiipathika): lying down [sayana],
sitting [lisana], standing [sthiti], walking [caf!lkrama~a];
688 Chaptf!r Two: Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdesa)
3. associated with skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthiinika); 1161

4. associated with supernormal emanations (nairmita; nairmii"l),ika): the thought
by which the possessor of supernormal accomplishments creates visible
forms [rupa], etc., and which is called the effect of superknowledge (abhijfiii-
phala; vii. 49) (see ii, F 265).
The unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta) thought of the realm of fine-materiality
is divid~d into three categories, since the thought associated with skill in arts and
crafts (sailpasthiinika) is lacking in this sphere.
There is no reason to divide the unobscured-non-defined thought of the realm of
immateriality, since it is exclusively [an unobscured-non-defined thought] "arisen
from the ripening cause".
There are thus seven types of unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta) thought cor-
responding to the two unobscured-non-defined thoughts [of the realm of desire and·
the realm of fine-materiality] of the first list.
coo.3.3. Adding up the twenty categories of thought; 1162 F 320

By taking into account the wholesome (kusala) thoughts, we get a total of twenty
(= 6 wholesome,+ 1 unwholesome + 3 obscured-non-defined + 8 unobscured-non-
defined + 2 pure~ thoughts. <321>
coo.3.4. Thoughts associated with modes of proper deportment, with skill in arts
and crafts, with emanations; F 321
The three unobscured-non-defined (anivrtyiivyiikrta) thoughts, i.e., the thought asso-.
ci11ted with proper deportment and the following, [i.e., the thought associated with
skill in arts and crafts, the thought associated with emanations,] have visible form,
odor, taste and tangible for their cognitive object (iilambana). 1163 The thought associ-
ated with skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthiinika), furthermore, has [also (api)] sound
for its cognitive object. 1164
These three unobscured-non-defined thoughts are just mental consciousnesses (mano-
vijiiiiniini) .. {11 b} However, the five sensory consciousnesses precede and prepare
(priiyogika) the thought associated with proper deportment and the thought associ-
/
ated with skill in arts and crafts. 1165
According to another opinion [apara], 1166 there is a mental consciousness produced
(abhinirhrta; utpiidita) by the thought associated with proper deportment, 1167 which
has the twelve sense-spheres (iiyatana)-from the eye sense-faculty (cak~uriiyatana)
up to the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana)-for its cognitive object.
cno.4. The rules in regard to combining with the twenty thoughts; 1168 F 321-24
These twenty thoughts arise immediately after [samanantara] one another, in confor-
mity with the following rules:
coo.4.1. Combining with the eight thoughts of the realm of desire; 1169 F 321-22
Realm of desire: Eight types of thought of the sphere [avacara] of desire, namely:
1-2. two wholesome (kusala) thoughts;
3-4. two defiled (kli~fa; i.e;, unwholesome and obscured-non-defined) thoughts;
5-8. four unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta) thoughts.
1. The wholesome thought acquired through preparatory effort (priiyogika kusala):
• "is immediately followed" [anantara] by ten thoughts:
i-vii. seven thoughts of the same stage [svabhumika], except for the effect
of the superknowledge (abhijfiiiphala; i.e., the thought of emanation
[nirmii~acitta]);
viii. thought acquired through preparatory effort (prayogika) of the
realm of fine-materiality;
ix-x. thought of those in training (saik~a) and thought of those beyond
training (asaik~a).
(The wholesome thought acquired through preparatory effort:)
"immediately follows after" [anantara] eight thoughts:
i-iv. four thoughts of the- same stage, i.e., two wholesome thoughts and
two defjled thoughts;
v-vi. thought acquired through preparatory effort and obscured-non-
defined [kli~fa 1170 ] thought of the realm of fine-materiality;
vii-viii. thought of those in training and thought of those beyond training.
<322>
2. The wholesome thought acquired at birth (upapattiliibhika kusala):
• "is immediately followed" by nine thoughts:
i-vii. seven thoughts of the· same stage, except for the effect of super-
knowledge;
viii-ix. the obscured-non-defined [kli~fa 1171 ] thought of the realm of fine-
materiality and of the realm of immateriality.
(The wholesome thought acquired at birth:)
• "immediately follows after" eleven thoughts:
i-vii. seven thoughts of the same stage, except for the effect of super-
knowledge;
viii-ix. thought acquired through preparatory effort and obscured-non-
defined [kli~fa 1172] thought of the realm of fine-materiality;
x--xi. thought of those in training and thought of those beyond training.
3-4. The unwholesome (akusala) thought and the obscured-non-defined (nivrta-
civyakrta) thought:
• "are followed" by seven thoughts, of the same stage, except for the effect of
superknowledge.
(The unwholesome thought and the obscured-non-defined thought:)
• "follow" fourteen thoughts:
i-vii. seven thoughts of the same stage, except for the effect of super-
knowledge;
viii-xi. four thoughts of the realm of fine-materiality, except for the thought
- acquired through preparatory effort {12 a} and the effect of super-
knowledge;
xii-xiv. three thoughts of the realm of immateriality, except for the thought
acquired through preparatory effort.
5-6. Tlie thought arisen from the ripening cause (vipakaja) and the thought associ-
ated with proper deportment (airytipathika):
• "are followed" by eight thoughts:
i-vi. six thoughts of the same stage, except for the thought acquired
through preparatory effort and the effect of superknowledge;
vii-viii. the obscured-non-defined [kli~fa 1173 ] thought of the realm of fine-
materiality and of the realm of immateriality.
(The thought arisen from the ripening cause and the thought associated with
proper deportment:)
• ~'follow" seven thoughts, of the same stage, except for the effect of super-
knowledge.
7. The thought associated with skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthanika):
• "is immediately followed" by six thoughts of the same stage, except for the
thought acquired through preparatory effort and the effect of superknow-
ledge.
(The thought associated with skill in arts and crafts:)
• "immediately follows after" seven thoughts, pf the same stage, except for the
effect of superknowledge.
8. The effect of superknowledge (abhijfiiiphala):
• "is immediately followed" by two thoughts, the effect of superknowledge of
the same stage and the thought acquired through preparatory effort of the
realm of fine-materiality.
(The effect of superknowledge:)
• "immediately follows after" two thoughts: the same thoughts.,
coo.4.2. Combining with the six thoughts of the realm offine-materiality; 1174
F 322-23
Realm of fine-materiality: six types of thought of the realm of fine-materiality, namely:
1-2. two wholesome (kusala) tqbughts;
3. one defiled (kli~{a; i.e.,.obscured-non-defined) thought;
4-6. three unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta) thoughts.
• "is immediately followed" by twelve thoughts:
i-vi. six thoughts of the same stage,
vii-ix. three thoughts of the realm of desire: wholesome thought acquired
through preparatory effort; wholesome thought acquired at birth
(upapattiliibhika kusala); effect of superknowledge (i.e., the thought
of emanation);
x. thought acquired through preparatory effort of the realm of iwmate-
riality;
xi-xii. thought of those in training and thought of those beyond training.
• "immediately follows after" ten thoughts:
i-iv. four thoughts of the same $tage, except for the thought associated
with proper deportment and the thought arisen from the ripening
cause, {12 b} <323>
vi-vi. two thoughts of the realm of desire: thought acquired through pre-
paratory effort and effect of superknowledge;
vii-viii. two thoughts of the realm of immateriality: thought acquired through
preparatory effort and obscured-non-defined thought;
ix-x. thought of those in training and thought of those beyond training.
2. The wholesome thought acquired at birth (upapattiliibhika kusala):

• "is immediately followed" by eight thoughts:
i-v. five thoughts of the same stage, bxcept for the [unobscured-non-
defined] effect of superknowledge [i.e., the thought of emanation];
vi-vii. two [defiled] thoughts of the realm of desire: unwholesome thought
and obscured-non-defined thought; 1175
viii. obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of immateriality.
• "immediately follows after''. five thoughts of the same stage, except for the
effect of superknowledge.
3. The obscured-non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta) thought:
• "is immediately followed" by nine thoughts:
1-v. five thoughts of the same stage, except for the effect of superknow-
ledge;
vi-ix. four thoughts of the realm of desire: two wholesome thoughts; two
defiled thoughts.
(The obscured-non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta) thought:)
• "immediately follows after" eleven thoughts:
i-v. five thoughts of the same stage, except for the effect of superknow-
ledge;
vi-viii. three thoughts of the realm of desire: thought acquired at birth; ·
thought associated with proper deportment; thought arisen from the
ripening cause;
ix-xi. three thoughts of the realm of immateriality, except for the thought
acquired through preparatory effort.
4"-5. The thought arisen from the ripening cause (vipiikaja) and the thought .associ-
ated with proper deportment (airyiipathika):
• "are followed" by seven thoughts:
i-iv. four thoughts of the same stage, except for the thought acquired
through preparatory effort and the effect of superknowledge;
v-vi. two [defiled] thoughts of the realm of desire: unwholesome thought
and obscured-non-defined thought;
vii. one thought of the realm of immateriality, i.e., the obscured-non-
defined thought.
C. Classification of Factors according to" Causes, Effects, Conditions 693
(The thought arisen from the ripening cause and the thought associated with
proper deportment:)
• "follow" five thoughts, of the same stage, except for the effect of super-
knowledge.
6. The effect of superknowledge (abhijfiiiphala; i.e., the thought of emanation
[nirmii~acitta]):
• "is immediately followed" by two thoughts, of the same stage, i.e., thought
acquired through preparatory effort and effect of superknowledge.
(The effect of superknowledge:)
• "immediately follows after" two thoughts: {13 a} the same thoughts.
coo.4.3. Combining with the four thoughts of the realm ofimmateriality; 1176
F 323-24
Realm of immateriality: four types of thought of the realm of immateriality, namely:
1-2. two wholesome thoughts;
3. obscured-non-defined thought;
4. thought arisen from the ripening cause.
• "is immediately followed" by seven thoughts:
i-iv. four thoughts of the same stage;
v. thought acquired through preparatory effort of the realm of fine-
materiality,
v1-v11. thought of those in training and thought ofthose beyond training.
• "immediately follows after" six thoughts:
i-iii. three thoughts of the same stage, except for the thought arisen from
the ripening cause;
iv. thought acquired through preparatory effort of the realm of fine-
materiality,
v-vi. thought of those in training and thought of those beyond training.
ii. The wholesome thought acquired at birth (upapattilabhika kusala):
• "is immediately followed" by seven thoughts:
v. obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of fine-materiality;
vi-vii. unwholesome thought and obscured-non-defined thought of the realm

of desire. <324>
• "immediately follows after" four thoughts, of the same stage.
iii. The obscured-non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta) thought:
• "is immediately followed" by eight thoughts:
v-vi. thought acquired through preparatory effort and obscured-non-
defined thought of the realm of fine-materiality;
vii-viii. unwholesome thought and obscured-non-defined of the realm of
desire.
(The obscured-non-defined thought:)
• "immediately follows after" ten thoughts:
v-x. thought acquired at birth, thought associated with proper deport-
ments, thought arisen from the ripening cause of the realm of fine-
materiality and of the realm of desire ..
iv. The thought arisen from the ripening cause ~vipiikaja):
• "is immediately followed" by six thoughts:
i-iii. three thoughts of the same stage, except for the thought acquired
through preparatory effort;
iv. obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of fine-materiality;
v-vi. unwholesome thought and obscured-non-defined thought of the
realm of desire. {13 b}
(The thought arisen from ,the ripening cause:)
• "immediately follows after" four thoughts of the same stage.
cnn.4.4. Combining.with the two pure thoughts·; 1177 F 324

Two pure (anasrava) thoughts:
1. The thought of those in training (saik~a):
• "is immediately followed" by six thoughts:
1-m. thought acquired through preparatory effort of the three realms;
1v. thought acquired at birth of the realm of desire;
v-vi. thought of those in training and thought of those beyond training.
(The thought of those in training:)

• "immediately follows after": four thoughts:
i-iii. thought acquired through preparatory effort of the three realms;
iv. thought of those in training.
2. The thought of those beyond training (asaik~a):
• "is immediately followed" by five thoughts, i.e., six thoughts which follow
the thought of those in training, except for the thought of "those in training".
(The thought of those beyond training:)
• "immediately follows after" five thoughts:
i-:-iii. thought acquired through preparatory effort of the three realms,
iv-v. thought of those in training and thought of those beyond training.
coo.s. Comments about the thought acquired through preparatory effort and
the innate thought; 1178 F 324'-25
Remarks:
coo.s.1. Thought acquired through preparatory effort & other minds; 1179 F 324-25
(1) Thought arisen through the ripening cause (vipii.kaja), (2) thought associated with
proper deportment (airyii.pathika) and (3) thought associated with skill in arts and
crafts (sailpasthanika) arise immediately after a thought acquired through prepara-
tory effort (prayogika) of the realm of desire. For what reason is the reciprocal not
true?
1. Thought arisen from the ripening cause is not favorable (anukula) to a thought
acquired through preparatory effort, because it is weak (durbala), because it develops
spontaneously (anabhisa1?1skii.ravahitvii.t = ayatnena pravrtteM.
2-3. Thought associated with proper deportment and thought associated with skill in
arts and crafts are not favorable to a thought acquired through preparatory effort,
because their reason for being lies in the creation of a proper deportment or of a
created thing (fryli.pathasilpii.bhisa1?1skara,:iapravrttatvat). <325>
On the contrary, the thought of leaving (ni~krama,:iacitta)-that is to say, any
thought, i.e., the thought arisen from the ripening cause, etc., through which the
yo gins leave the stream [pravaha] of the thoughts acquired through preparatory effort
(prii.yogika), such as reading, philosophical reflection, etc.-develops spontaneouslt
(anabhisa1?1skaravahin = anii.bhogavii.hin). The thought of leaving can thus immedi-
ately follow after the thought acquired through preparatory ~ff-Ort.
Objection. - If the thought acquired through preparatory effort does not arise imme-
diately after the thought acquired through preparatory effort, etc., because they are
not favorable to it, still less will it arise after the defiled (kli~{a) thought which is
contrary (vigw:za) to it.
[Answer:] - The defiled (kli~{a) thought is contrary to the thought acquired through
preparatory effort. However, when the practitioners get tired (parikhinna) of the
activity (samudacara) of the defilements (klesa), by the very fact that the practitio-
ners seize complete cognition (parijfiana) of this activity, the thought acquired
through preparatory effort arises. { 14 a}
con.s.2. Innate thought & other thoughts; 11 8 F 325 °

The innate wholesome (kusala) thought of the realm of desire is sharp (pa{u); it
can thus arise immediately after the two pure (anasrava) thoughts and also immedi-
ately after the thought acquired through preparatory effort of the realm of fine-
materiality; but, as it develops spontaneously, it is not immediately followed by these
same thoughts.
The innate wholesome thought of the realm of desire, being sharp, can arise
immediately after the defiled (kli~fa) thought of the realm of fine-materiality; but the
innate wholesome thought of the realm of fine-materiality, not being sharp, cannot
arise immediately after the defiled (kli~fa) thought of the realm of immateriality.
coo.6. Mental application as cause of the arising ofthought; 1181 F 325-28

Thoughts arise immediately one after another, and they arise because of mental
application (manaskara; manasikara,:za). We must, therefore, study mental applica-
tion.
coo.6.1. Three types of mental application; 1182 F 325-28

One can distinguish three mental applications:
1. Mental application bearing on the particular inherent characteristics (sva-
lak~a,:zamanaskara ), for example, the judgments: "Material form (riipa) has
(
breaking/deterioratiori or obstruction (riipa,:za) as its characteristic, ... con-
sciousness (vijfiana) has impression or perception relative (prativijfiapti) [to
each external object-field] as its characteristic" (i. 13, 16).
2. Mental application bearing on the common characteristics (samanyalak~a,:za-
manaskara ); it bears on the sixteen aspects or modes of activities [akara] of
the truths, i.e., impermanent [anitya], etc: "The .conditioned factors (dharma)
are impermanent" (vii. 10). <326>
3. Mental application (proceeding from) resolution (adhimuktimanaskara).

This mental appli~ation does not bear-as the first two mental applications
do-upon that which exists (bhutarthe); it proceeds from resolution (adhi-
mukti), i.e., from visualization (adhimuktya ... manaskaraJ:i; see F 154);
it governs the contemplations of the meditation on the loathsome (asubha;
vi. 9), 1183 of the immeasurables (aprama,:ia; viii. 29), of the liberations [of
Arupya] (vimok:ja, arupyavimok:ja; viii. 32), of the perception-spheres of
mastery (abhibhvayatana; viii. 34), of the perception-spheres of totality
(krtsnayatana; viii. 35), etc.
coo.6.t.t. Mental application & the noble path; F 326-28

1. (According to the first masters quoted by the MVS, 53a19,) the noble path can
be realized (sarrimukhfbhava) immediately after [any one of] these three mental
applications, and, inversely, these three mental applications can be produced immedi-
ately after the noble path. This opinion is supported by the text (as translated accord-
ing to these masters):
They produce the member of enlightenment [sarribhodhyariga] called mind-
fulness [smrti] accompanied with (i.e., immediately after) [sahagata] the
meditation on the loathsome (asubha). 1184
2. (According to the third masters quoted by the Vibha:ja,) it is only immediately
after the mental application bearing on the common characteristics (samanyalak:ja,:ta-
manaskaranantarameva) { 14 b} that the noble path can be realized; immediately
after the noble path, the three mental applications can be produced. - As for the text
alleged by the first masters, it should be understood in the sense that, after having
subdued thought by means of meditation on the loathsome, the practitioners are
capable. of producing the mental application bearing on the common characteristics,
immediately after which they realize the noble path. The text is directed at this
mediate action [para1J1paryamabhisa1J1dha] related to the meditation on the loathsome
and says:
They produce the member of enlightenment called mindfulness accompanied
with (i.e., after, although not immediately after) the meditation on the
loathsome.
3. (According to the fourth masters quoted by the Vibha:fa,) it is [also] only
immediately after the mental application bearing on the common characteristics that
· the practitioners can realize the noble path; yet, immediately after the noble path,
they can also only produce the mental application bearing on the common char-
acteristics.
coo.6.1.1.a. The number of mental applications which can follow the noble path;
F 326-28
The author refutes the third masters:
Certainly, it can be seen that the practitioners-who have entered into the assurance
of the eventual attainment of the absolute good (samyaktvaniyiima), into the noble
path (see vi, F 180ff.), by relying on one of the three lower stages (bhumi) (i.e., either
preparatory meditation [aniigamya] or first meditation [dhyiina] or intermediate
meditation [dhyiiniintara])---could produce, upon leaving the noble path, a mental
application bearing on the common characteristics (siimiinyalalcya,:iamanaskiira) of
the sphere of Kama, derived from listening and from reflection (.frutamaya; cintii-
maya), because the stages in question are near; but, when the practitioners have
entered into the assurance of the eventual attainment of the absolute good by relying
on the second, the third or the fourth meditation, to what stage could the mental
application bearing on the common characteristics belong that the practitioners
would produce upon leaving the noble path? <327>
1. They would not produce the mental application bearing on the common char-
acteristics of the realm of Kama, because Kiim~ is too distanced [ativiprakr~fa] from
the higher meditations.
2. They would no longer produce the mental application bearing on the common
characteristics of the stage of the three higher meditations, because they have not
previously acquired this mental application (manaskiira), except [anyatra] in the
·course of the practice of the stages conducive to penetration (nirvedhabhiigfya;
vi. 17: the preliminary contemplations to the entry into the noble path): but noble
ones (iirya) cannot newly realize the stages conducive to penetration, for one cannot
assume that, already possessing the fruit [priiptaphala], they newly realize the pre-
paratory path [of the noble path (tatprayoga)].
[~eply:] - But other types [jati] of mental applications bearing on the common
characteristics (samiinyamanaskara) { 15 a} exist that have beeri cultivated at the
same time as the stages conducive to penetration, which are by nature stages
conducive to penetration (as they bear on the·truths [saty'alambanatva] but differ by
not bearing on the sixteen aspects): for example, seeing that: "all conditioning forces
[sarvasa,µskara] are impermanent [anitya]", "all factors [sarvadharma] are imper-
sonal [aniitman]", "nirvii1;ia is peaceful [santa]", (i.e., a generic [samanya] judg-
ment, since it bears on all nirvii,:ia). - It is this other type of mental application
bearing on the common characteristics (samanyamanaskiira) that the practitioners
manifest upon leaving the noble path.
[Answer:] -The Vaibhii~ikas do not accept this opinion, because it is illogical. [Indeed,
the cultivation of the mental applications. of this type is connected with the stages
conducive to penetration]. (MVS, 53b3).
coo.6.1.1.aa. The correct doctrine; F 327-28

(The correct doctrine is that the noble path can be followed by three categories of
mental application:)
1. When one acquires the fruit [or status] of the perfected being (arhattva) by
relying on the preparatory meditation (anagamya) (MVS, 53b25), the thought
emerging [vyutthana] from the contemplation is either of this stage (i.e., preparatory
meditation) or of the sphere of Kama.
2. When one acquires the same fruit [or status] by relying on the perception-sphere
of nothingness (akificanya), the emerging-thought is either of this same stage (i.e.,
perception~sphere of nothingness) or of the perception-sphere of neither ideation nor
of non-ideation (naivasaT{ljfianasaT{ljfiayatana) or bhavagra.
3 .. When one acquires the same fruit [or status] by relying on any other stage (se~a),
the emerging-thought is of this other stage only [svabhumikameva]. <328>
coo.6.2. The four types of mental application; F 328

There are four types of mental application:
1. innate or natural mental application (upapattipratilambhika);
2. mental application de_rived from [listening to] the teaching (srutamaya);
3. mental application derived from reflection (cintamaya);
4. mental application derived from cultivation (bhiivanamaya).
coo.6.2.1. The eight mental applications of the three realms; F 328

1. [Only] three mental applications are possible in the realm of desire, i.e., the first,
the second and the third, because the mental application derived from cultivation is
not of the realm of desire.
2. [Only] three mental applications are possible in the realm of fine-materiality,
i.e., the first, the second and the fourth, because, [the mental application derived from
reflection is not of the realm of fine-materiality,] since, in this sphere, as soon as one
begins cultivation or reflection (cintii), one enters into concentration [samiidhi].
3. [Only] two mental applications are possible in the realm of immateriality, i.e.,
the first and the fourth.
There are, then, eight mental applications, i.e., three, three and two (MVS, 53bl4).
coo.6.2.2. Innate mental application & the noble path; F 328

The noble path is never produced immediately after innate or natural mental applica-
tion (upapattipratilambhika), whatever sphere it may belong to, for the noble path
requires preparatory effort (prayogapratibaddha). { 15 b} The noble path is thus
produced immediately after five mental applications: two of the realm of desire, two
of the realm of fine-materiality, and one of the realm of immateriality. - But, [on the
other hand,] immediately after [anantara] the (noble) path, the innate or natural
mental application of the realm of desire can manifest [sarrimukhfbhiiva], because it is
sharp (pafu).
coo.1. Acquisition & the twelve thoughts; 1185 F 328-31

How many thoughts are acquired (liibha; pratilambha) when each of the twelve types
of thought (ii. 67) is manifested (sarrimukhfbhiiva)?
coo.1.1. Defiled thought of the three realms & acquisition of the twelve
thoughts; 1186 F 328-29
73ab. With the defiled thought of each of the three realms, there is,
respectively, the acquisition (1) of six thoughts, (2) of six thoughts,
(3) of two thoughts, [of the twelve types of thought]. 1187
coo.1.1.1. Definition of acquisition; F 328

Acquisition [liibha] means taking possession by those who, previously, did not
possess (ii. 36a).
coo.1.1.2. Defiled thought of realm of desire & acquisition of six of the twelve
thoughts; F 328-29
Acquisition of six [of the twelve] thoughts with the defiled thought of the realm
of desire:
1. One acquires the wholesome (kusala) thought of the realm of desire (a) when
one takes up again the wholesome roots [ku,folamalapratisa~ndhiina] by way of doubt
[vicikitsayii], 1188 which is defiled (iv. 80c); (b) when one returns to the realm of desire
by retrogressing from the higher realms (dhiitupratyiigamana). Thought at concep-
tion [pratisal'[ldhicitta] is necessarily defiled [avasyakli~fa; iii. 38]; with this thought
one takes possession of the wholesome thought of the realm of desire, for one did not
possess it before. 1189 <329>
2-3. One acquires the unwholesome (akusala) thought and obscured-non°clefined
(nivrtiivyiikrta) thought of the realm of desire (i) when one returns to the realm of
desire by retrogressing from the higher realms: for one then takes possession of
whichever of these two thoughts manifests; (ii) when one retrogresses from the
detachment [vairagya] of the realm of desire.
4. One acquires the obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of fine-materiality
when one retrogresses from the realm of immateriality into the realm of desire. With
the defiled thought at conception in the realm of desire, one, in fact, takes possession
of the obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of fine-materiality.
5-6. One acquires the obscured-non-defined thought of the realm of immateriality
and of the thought of those in training (fa{lqa) when onet~trogresses from the status
of a perfected being [arhattva] by a thought of the realm of desire.
coo.1.1.3.Defiled thought of the realm of.fine-materiality & acquisition of six of

the twelve thoughts; F 329
Acquisition of six [of the twelve] thoughts with the defiled thought of the realm of
fine-materiality: {16 a}
One acquires (1) the unobscured-non-defined (anivrtavyakrta) thought of the realm
of desire (thought of emanation [ninna~citta]) and (2-4) the three thoughts of the
realm of fine-materiality, when one retrogresses from the realm of immateriality into
the realm of fine-materiality.
One acquires (5) ~he obscured-non-defined (nivrtavyakrta) thought of the realm of
immateriality and (6) the thought of those in training (saik~a), when one retrogresses
from the status of a perfected being [arhattva] by a thought of the realm of fine-
materiality.
1
coo.1.1.4. De.filed thought of the realm of immateriality & acquisition of two of
the twelve thoughts; F 329
[Acquisition of two of the twelve thoughts] with the defiled thought of the realm of
immateriality:
One acquires (1) the obscured-non-defined (nivrtavyakrta) thought of the realm of
immateriality and (2) the thought of those in training (saik~a), when one retrogresses
from the status of a perfected being (arhat) by a thought of the realm of immate-
riality.
coo.1.2. Wholesome thought of the realm offine-materiality & acquisition of

three of the twelve thoughts; 1190 F 329
73bc. With the good thought of the realm of fine-materiality, one
acquires three thoughts. 1191
With the wholesome (kusala) thought of the realm of fine-materiality, one acquires
three [of the twelve] thoughts: (1) this [wholesome] thought itself; (2-3) the un-
obscured-non-defined (anivrtavyiikrta) thought of the realm of desire and of the
realm of fine-materiality, i.e., the thought of emanation relative to the two spheres.
<330>
coo.7.3. The thought of those in training & acquisition offour of the twelve
thoughts; 1192 F 330 ·
73cd. With the thought of those in training, one acquires four thoughts. 1193
When one realizes the first thought of those in training (saik~a), namely, the receptiv-
ity to the cognition of the factors with regard to unsatisfactoriness (duf:zkhe dhanna-
jfiiinak~iinti; vi. 25d), one acquires four [of the twelve] thoughts:
1. the thought of those in training itself;
2-3. two unobscured-non-defined thoughts, of the realm of desire and of the
realm of fine-materiality (i.e., the thoughts of emanation);
4. the wholesome thought of the realm of immateriality,
there is, by virtue of the noble path, entry into the noble path (niyiimiivakriinti;
vi. 26a) and detachment (vairiigya) from the realm of desire and from the realm of
immateriality.
1194
coo.7.4. The other thoughts &-acquisition of th~ twelve thoughts; F 330
73d. With the other thoughts, one acquires these very thoughts.ll95
As for the thoughts not specified above, [i.e., (1-2) the wholesome thought of the
realm of desire and of the realm of immateriality, (3) the thought of those beyond
training, (4-6) the unobscured thought of the three realms,] when they manifest, one
acquires them by themselves.
coo.7.5. General statement about the three types of thought & other thoughts;
F 330-31
According to another opinion [anya], 1196 one can, without making a distinction
[abhedena] between the spheres, say: {16 b}
The wise ones [budha] say that one acquires nine [of the twelve] thoughts
with the defiled (kli~ta) thought; one acquires six [of the twelve] thoughts
with the wholesome (ku§ala) thought; one acquires the non-defined (avyiikrta)
thought with the non-defined thought. 1197
C .. Classification of Factors according to Causes, Effects, Conditions 703
con.7.s.1. Wholesome thought & other thoughts; F 330

Concerning the wholesome (ku.fola) thought, one should correct this passage and
read: "one acquires seven thoughts": (1) When persons take up again the wholesome
roots by way of right view (samyagdr~{i; iv. 80), they acquire the wholesome thought
of the realm of desire; (2-3) when they detach themselves from the realm of desire,
they acquire the thought of emanation of the realm of desire and the realm of
fine-materiality, which are two unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta) thoughts;
(4-5) when they seize the concentrations [samiidhi] of the realm of fine-materiality
and the realm of immateriality, they acquire the wholesome thoughts of these two
spheres; (6) by entry into the noble path [niyiimiivakriinti], they acquire the thought
of those in training (.saik~a); (7) by entry into the fruit [or status] of a perfected being
[arhattva], they acquire the thought of those beyond training (a.foi~a). <331>
coo.1.s.2. Defiled thought and the non-defined thought & other thoughts; F 331
For the two other thoughts [se~a], [i.e., the defiled thought and the non-defined
thought,] the assessment of the thoughts acquired is established according to the
explanations which we have given.
con.7.6. A stanza on acquisition of thoughts; F 331

Here is an aide-memoire stanza [sarµgrahasloka]:
In relation to conception, meditative attainment, detachment, retrogressing
and the taking up again of the wholesome roots, one acquires thoughts which
one did not possess. 1198
***
.This concludes the
Second Chapter (Kosasthiina)
called
EXPOSITION OF FACULTIES (Jndriyanirdesa)
in the
.!J!ti;hidharmako.fo- @Jha~ya.
Endnotes to Chapter Two
Lodro Sangpo (LS): As for a brief discussion of chapter 2, see Dhammajoti 's Summary.
For the structure of the first two chapters, Dhiitunirdesa and Indriyanirdesa, see our endnote to
i. 4a.
As for chapter 2, it is divided into three main sections:
1. Entitled Indriyanirdesa, chapter 2 picks up the topic with which chapter 1 ends and gives
a detailed discussion(= section A) of the twenty-two controlling faculties, which is clearly an
insert based on the additional chapters of the AH and SAH, as can be seen from the references
in the next endnote. It being an insert at the very beginning of chapter 2, could also have been
the reason why Vasubandhu changed the title of the second chapter of AH,i.e., sa,riskiira (but
see here also Pu Guang's view as discussed in Dhammajoti's Summary, p. 7 and 15). For an
overview of the main topics treated in section A, see the outline inserted into the translation.
2. Having dealt with the twenty-two controlling faculties, Vasubandhu then presents a new
classification(= section B), namely, the five-group (paiica-vastu) classification of factors. This
is introduced in the context of a discussion on the "genesis or origin" of the factors, how
conditioned factors come into existence, which constitutes the beginning of the second chapter
in the AH and SAH.
3. Vasubandhu's· chapter 2 ends with another classification (= section C), namely, the very
detailed. classification of factors according to causes (hetu), effects (phala) and conditions
(pratyaya).
2
LS: AH 118, 203-6, 208-9, 237; SAH 275, 432-41, 453,472.
LS: SAH433.
4
LS: 1. Collett Cox summarizes Sa:qighabhadra stating (Ny, 377b; EIP.VIII.676) that the
twenty-two indriyas are "controlling faculties because they are dominant or have supreme
self-mastery with regard to a certain state. Though all factors have their own dominant
activity, these twenty-two are exceptionally powerful, and therefore are listed separately."
·2. See also the endnotes on the controlling faculties at i. 48cd.
La Vallee Poussin (LVP): Below ad ii. 2a, iidhipatya = adhikaprabhutva, dominant or con-
trolling power. - Compare the explanation of the indriyas in Atthasiilinf, 304, etc.
LS: AH 203-4; SAH 433-34.
LS: According to Dharmatriita, it is because these five and four controlling faculties are
the basis for transmigration (sa,risiira) that they are established as a controlling faculty. Cf.
SAH.568f.
Gokhale: [1) catur~v arthe~u paiiciiniim iidhipatya,ri dvayofi kila I caturf1iil?1 paiicaka-
a~tiinii,ri sa,riklesavyavadiinayofi I
Tib.: [1] lnga po rnam ni don bzhi la I dbang byed bzhi mams gnyis la lo I lnga dang brgyad po
de mams ni Ikun nas nyon mongs rnam byang la I
LVP: The kiirikii ii. 1, in the Samayapradfpikii, omits the word kila by which Vasubandhu
Endnotes to Chapter Two 705
indicates that he does not share the doctrine of the School. The kiirikiis ii. 2-4, where Vasu-
bandhu presents the doctrine of the Sautriintikas, are omitted in the Samayapradfpikii.
9
LS: AH 203; SAH 433.
10
LS: AKB i. 19: "It is for beauty's sake that they are twofold.... With a single [physical
seat (adhi~fhlina)] of the eye or ear, or with a single nostril [nlisikiivila], one would be very
ugly [vairupya]."
II
LS: Hsiian-tsang, iii, fol. lb.
Pradhan.38.7 has parikar~a,:,,a for LVP's reconstructed parira~a,:,,a.
12
LS: AH 203; SAH 433.
13
LS: Ibid.
14
LS: Ibid.
IS
LS: Ibid.
16
LVP: Vibhii~ii, 142, at the end; Buddhaghosa explains in the Atthasiilinf (641) that the
games of boys are not the games of girls, etc.
Atthasiilinf, 321: "Feminine features are not the female controlling faculty; they are produced
in course of process because of that faculty."
17
LVP: According to the Vyiikhyii [WOG.94.13], the Ancient Masters (purvliclirya).
18
LS: AH 203; SAH 433.
19
LS: MVS, 731b23ff, gives two explanations (see DD.126) of which Vasubandhu cites the
second.
20
LS: Collett Cox comments (DD.130) that "the Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ikas ... , in particular
the early Sarviistiviidins and early Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ikas, use the term nikiiyasabhiiga with
both the general meaning, 'homogeneous collection of components', and the more technical
meaning as the dissociated factor, 'h<?mogeneous character'. Indeed, in the Sarviistiviida-
Vaibhii~ikas' treatment of vitality, it is not clear which meaning, if either exclusively, is
intended for nikiiyasabhiiga." She further comments (DD. 109) that in the context of Vasu-
bandhu's own definition of the vitality faculty (ii, F 216; see also ii. 3), Yasomitra glosses
the term nikiiyasabhiiga as "conditioned forces of a certain nature having the aggregate of
form, and so on, as their intrinsic nature" [WOG.168.30f: ... ta eva tathiibhautiis saqiskiirii
riipiidiskandhasvabhiivii iti] and that Sruµghabhadra replaces Vasubandhu's non-technical use
of nikiiyasabhiiga with "the six sense organs together with their basis".
21
LS: AH 203; SAH 433.
22
LVP: The mental faculty exercises controlling power with regard to defilement and
purification, Vibhii~ii, 142, pp. 731, 732 (Bhadanta Kusavarman); Siddhi, 214.
23
LVP; cittena nfyate lokas cittena parikr~yate I
ekadharmasya cittasya sarva .dharmii vasiinugii?i 11 [WOG.95.22f.]
SaTflyutta, i. 39.
Asatiga (SutriilaTflkiira, xviii. 83, p. 151 ed. Levi) shows the controlling power of thought over
the condititioning forces ( saTflskiira): citteniiya'!! loko nfyiite cittena parikr~ate cittasyot-
pannasya vase vartate. (Aliguttara, ii. 177).
706 Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdesa)
24
LS: AH 204; SAH 434
25
LVP: Hsiian-tsang: "for all the pure factors ((iharma) arise and develop following them".
26
LVP: "The thought of those who experience agreeable sensation is concentrated." Extract
from the Siitra on the Gates of Entries into Liberation (vimuktyiiyatana), cited in Vyiikhyii,
p. 56 ad i. 27; Mahiivyutpatti, 81.
27
LVP: "Faith arises from unsatisfactoriness", Sarriyutta, ii. 31. - On the meaning of the
word upani~ad, "cause", see below ii. 49 (note on hetu and pratyaya), Atiguttara, iv. 351 = Sutta-
nipiita (Dvayatiinupassaniisutta) ( ... kii upanisii savaniiya), Siitriilarrikiira, xi. 9 (yogopani~ad
= having effort for its cause).
In the sense of "comparison", "approach", Pai;iini, i. 4. 79, Vajracchedikii, 35, 10, 42, 7 and
Hoernle, Manuscript remains, i. p. 192 (upanisiirri na k~amate), Sukhiivatfvyiiha, 31, 9, Mahii-
vyutpatti, 223, 15 (or the Tibetan has rgyu).
In the sense of uparrisu, "secret", Yasomitra (ad ii. 49) indicates Dfgha, ii. 259 (siiryopani~ado
devii/:t = suriyassiipanissii devii): upani~acchabdas tu kadacid upaip.sau kadacit pramukhye
tadyatha siiryopanisado deva ity upaip.suprayoga upani~atprayoga iti [WOG.188.17ff.].
(E. Leumann, ZDMG, 62, p. 101 assumes upanisrii = upanissii = Grundlage, Niihe, or the
adjective upanissa).
See Minaev, Zapiski, ii. 3, 277; Wogihara, ZDMG, 58, 454 (diinopani~adii §flopani~adii ...
prajnayii) and Asailga's Bodhisattvabhiimi, p. 21; S. Levi, Siitriilarrikiira, ad xi. 9.
28
LVP: The Siitra says: cak~urvijfieyani riipiii;ii prafityotpadyate saumanasyaip. nai~kramy-
iisrita:qi j- •. :man~ pratitya dharma:qis ca utpadyate saumanasya:qi I ... daurmanasya:qi ...
upek~ii [\YOG.96.7ff.]
nai~kramya = "pure or impur~ path", or else, "leaving (ni~kramatJa) or detachment from a
sphere of existence (dhiitu) or from sarrisara". - See also iv. 77bc.
iisrita = "having for its object", or else, "favorable to".
We have thus: "There are, because of the visible forms, etc., six sensations of satisfaction, six
sensations of dissatisfaction, six sensations of equanimity, favorable to nai~kramya."
Compare Majjhima, iii. 218; Sarriyutta iv. 232; Majjhima, iii. 217; Milinda, 45 (nekkhammasita).
29
LVP: Va$ubandhu says: "Other Masters (apare) ... ".
30
LS: AH 204; SAH 433-34.
31
LS: SAH433.
32
LS: Dhammajoti comments (ADCP.55; SA.IV.262) that in this section Vasubandhu dif-
ferentiates the Vaibhii~ika view, according to which the eye is an indriya because it exercises
dominance in the seeing of visual forms, from the Sautriintika view, according to which
the dominance is with regard to the apperception of its specific object (sviirtha-upalabdhi). See
i. 42.
33
Gokhale: [2ab] sviirthopalabdhyiidhipatyiit sarvasya ca ~a<f,indriyam I
Tib.: [2ab] rang gi don dang thams cad la I dmigs par dbang byed phyir dbang drug I
34
LS: SAH 433.
35
Gokhale: [2cd] strftvapul'{lstviidhipatyiit tu kiiyiit strfpuru~endriye I
Tib.: [2cd] mo nyid pho nyid la dbang phyir I lus las mo dang pho dbang dag I
36
LVP: Compare Dhammasatiga,:ii, 633, and Atthasiilinf, 641.
37
LS: AH 204; SAH 434.
38
Gokhale: [3] nikiiyasthitisa,µkleSavyavadiiniidhipatyataJ:t jjfvitaf!l, vedanaJ:, paiica Sraddhiidyl#
c endriya,ri matiil;z I
Tib.: rigs gnas kun nas nyon mongs dang I rnam par byang la dbang byed phyir I srog dang
tshor ba mams dang ni Idad sogs dbang po Ingar 'dod do II
39
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.303): "The MYS explains that the dominance of the
vital faculty consists in (1) enabling one to assert that a being is in possession of the faculties
(sa-indriya), (2) sustaining the faculties.*"
* MYS, 731. Another view gives four aspects of its dominance: (i) in connecting up with the
nikiiya-sabhiiga, (ii) in sustaining the nikiiya-sabhiiga, (iii) in fostering the nikiiya-sabhiiga,.
(iv) in enabling the nikiiya-sabhiiga to continue uninterrupted.
40
LVP: The Japanese editor refers to Madhyamiigama, 17, 11. - Compai-e Sarµ.yutta, iv, 208:
yo sukhiiya vedaniiya riigiinusayo so anuseti.
41
LVP: sukhiiyiirp. vedaniiyiirp. riigo 'nusete I dul;ikhiiyiirp. dve~aJ:i I aduJ:ikha-asukhiiyii_rp. mohaJ:i
[WOG.95.26f.]. - By sensation of pleasure (sukhii), one has also to understand sensation of
satisfaction (saumanasya) .... See ii. 7.
Compare v. 23 and 54; also Yogasutra, ii. 7-8: sukhiinusayf riigal;z Idul;zkhiinusayf dve~al;z.
42
LS: L VP mentions the Sautriintikas here, but they are not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan.
43
LVP: In the mundane (laukika) path, faith and the other (praxis-oriented) facultie;s obstruct
the defilements; in the stages conducive to penetration (nirvedhabhiigfya; vi. 45c), they "lead
to" the (noble) path; pure, they constitute the faculty of coming to know what is as ye( unknown
(aniijiiiitamiijiiiisyiimi), etc. (ii. 9b; vi. 68).
44
Gokhale: [4] iijiiiisyiimyiikhyam iijfiiikhyam iijiiiitiivfndriyarµ. tathii I uttarottarasampriipti-
nirvii,:iiidyiidhipatyatal;z II
Tib.: [4] mya ngan 'das sogs gong nas gong I 'thob pa la ni dbang byed phyir I kun shes byed
dang kun shes dang I de bzhin kun shes ldan dbang po II
LVP: Paramiirtha and Hslian-tsang translate the first line: "Because of their controlling power
in regard to the acquisition of higher and higher paths, of Nirvii,:ia, etc." - The Tibetan mya
ngan 'das sogs gong nas gong thob pa la ni dbang byed phyir = nirvii,:iiidyuttarottaraprati-
lambhe 'dhipatyatal;z.
Dhammasatiga,:ii, 296,505, 553; Nettipakara,:ia, 15, 60; Compendium, p. 177.
45
LS: This is the first of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.36). He states that for Vasubandhu the term tathii means that the three mentioned con-
trolling faculties, like the preceding nineteen, are separate controlling faculties whereas for
Sarp.ghabhadra tathii should mean (Ny, 378b22-c3.): "like strfndriya and puru~endriya, which
do not exist separately from kiiyendriya".
46
LVP: The faculty of final and perfect knowledge (iijiiiitiivfndriya) is mingled with the
quality of a perfected being (arhat); it involves the cognition of exhaustion (k~ayajiiiina) and
the cognition of non-arising (anutpiidajiiiina): cognition that the defilements are destroyed and
will no longer re-arise, etc. (vi. 45; NettipakararJa, p. 15); the perfected beings are liberated
(vimukta) by liberation from the defilements (klesavimukti) and by liberation from continued
existence (sCllJ'ltiinavimukti): they thus exercise controlling power .in relation to the parinirviir;ia
or "nirvar;ia without remainder" (nirupadhise~anirvar;ia).
47
LS: This is the second of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.38). Sarpghabhadra (Ny, 378c3-5) attributes this explanation to Vasubandhu, criticizes it
(Ny, 378c5-10), "saying that it would result in many problems regarding the order of accom-
plishments on the Path."
48
LVP: Objection of the Sarpkhyas. - Sii,rikhyakiirikii, 34.
49
LS: Wangchuk Dorje and Gedun Drup attribute this opinion to the Vaibhii~ikas.
Cox summarizes Sarpghabhadra (Ny, 379a; EIP.VIIl.677): "Certain other factors that have
certain areas of control ... are not controlling faculties because only those factors that support,
differentiate, afflict, prepare to purify, and purify perceptual consciousness are referred to as
controlling faculties."
so Gokhale: [5] cittiisrayas tadvikalpal:t sthitil:t sa,riklesa eva ca I sambhiiro vyavadiinCllJ'I ca
yiivatii tiivad ind~iyam I
Tib.: [5] sems kyi rten dang de 'i bye brag I gnas dang kun nas nyon mongs nyid I ts hogs dang
rnam byang ji snyed pa I dbang po dag kyang de snyed du 11
LVP: This verse (kiirikii) becomes verse 2 in the Samayapradfpikii.
s1 LVP: We have. encountered this expression, i. 35 (see also next footnote). - The six
supports,of the sense-faculties (indriyiidhi~thiina), that is to say, the "visible" eye, etc., and the
six consciousnesses (~a<J vijiiiinakiiyiil:t) are also real entities of sentient beings (sattvadravya ),
but not primary (maula) real· entities, for they depend on the controlling power of the six
sense-faculties.
52
LS: Wangchuk Dorje and Gedun Drup attribute this opinion to the Sautriintikas.
53
Gokhale: [6] pravrtter iisrayotpattisthitipratyupabhogatal:t I caturdasa tathii 'nyiini nivrtter
indriyii1Ji vii I
Tib.: [6] yang na 'jug pa 'i rten dang ni Iskye dang gnas dang nyer spyod las I bcu bzhi de bzhin
ldog pa la I dbang po rnams ni gzhan yin no I
s4 LVP: ~a<;liiyatanaiµ mulasattvadravyabhutaiµ saiµsaratiti pravrtter iisrayal:t [WOG.98.21f.].
-The six sense-spheres (~a<}iiyatana) are essentially the sentient being who is said to transmi-
grate: it is thus the basis of cyclic existence.
55
LVP: Only two sense-spheres (iiyatana), i.e., those of the body (kiiya) and of the mental
faculty (manas), exist from conception (ii. 14).
s6 LVP: The newborn child sees, but does not speak. Speech is action (karman) of the
tongue; which is the support (adhi~thiina) of the tongue sense-faculty (jihvendriya) [cf.
WOG.98.31ff.]. - For the Siirpkhyas, the faculties of action (karmendriya) are, like the sense-
faculties of consciousness, suprasensible substances (atfndriya). "Voice" is the power to speak;
the "hand" is the power to grasp, etc.
51 LVP: You assert that snakes possess subtle '(suk~ma) hands and feet, yet you must prove
that.
58
LVP: The sexual parts (upastha) are conceived as distinct from the male or female sexual
faculty, which is one portion, one place, of the body sense-faculty (kiiyendriyaikadesastrf-
puru~endriyavyatiriktakalpita).
Bliss (iinanda) is defiled happiness (kli$!a saukhya).
59
LS: AH 118; SAH 275.
60
Gokhale: [7abl] duJ:tkhendriyam asiitii yii kiiyikf vedanii
Tib.: [7abl] lus tshor sim pa ma yin gang I sdug bsngal dbang po'i
LVP: Compare the definitions of the Vibhanga, p. 123.
61
LVP: The bodies are the eye sense-faculty and the other four sense-faculties of the sen-
sory consciousnesses: these sense-faculties, in fact, are collections (kiiya) or accumulations
(sat[lcaya) of atoms. The sensation that occurs in a "body", or that accompanies a "body" on
which it rests, is called bodily. (See ii. 25, on the bodily pliancy [prasrabd~i].)
62
Gokhale: [7b2--cl] sukham Isiitii
Tib.: [7b2--c 1] sim pa ni I bde ba 'o
63
Gokhale: [7c2-d] dhyiine trtfye tu caitasf sii sukhendriyam 11
Tib.: [7c2-d] bsam gtan gsum pa na I sems kyi de ni bde dbang po 11
64
Gokhale: [8a] anyatra sii saumanasyam
Tib.: [8a] gzhan na de yid bde ba yin I
65
LVP: Pleasure (sukha) is siita, the agreeable, that which does good (siitatviid hi sukham
ucyate); satisfaction, moreover, supposes joy (pnti). -This problem is taken up again viii. 9b.
66
Gokhale: [8bcl] asiitii caitasfpunaJ:t I daurmanasyam
Tib.: [8bcl] sems kyi sim pa ma yin pa Iyid mi bde ba'o
67
Gokhale: [8c2-d] upek$ii tu madhy obhayy avikalpanatll
Tib.: [8c2-d] btang snyoms ni I bar ma'o gnyis ka'i mi rtog phyir I
68
LVP: An exception should be made of agreeable mental sensation, which proceeds from
concentration (samiidhi) or which is a ripened effect (vipiikaphala) (ii. 57).
69
LVP: It is solely a ripened effect (vipiikaphala) and of outflow (nai~yandiki) (ii. 57c).
70
LS: AH 118; SAH 275.
11
Gokhale: [9abl] drgbhiivanii'saik$apathe nava trf,:iy
Tib.: [9abl] mthong bsgom mi slob lam la dgu Igsum yin
12
LVP: In fact, the group (kaliipa) that constitutes; the three pure controlling faculties
includes 'only seven controlling faculties, for the three sensations never coexist. _When, in order
to cultivate the (noble) path, practitioners abide in the first two meditations (dhytina), they
possess the single sensation of satisfaction (saumanasyendriya); they possess the single
sensation of pleasure (sukhendriya) when they cultivate the (noble) path in the third .medita-
tion; and they possess the single sensation of equanimity (upek$endriya) when they cul(ivate
the (noble) path in the ot4er stages (preparatory meditation [aniigamya], intermediate medita-
tion (dhyiiniintara), fourth meditation, first three formless meditative attainments [iirupya]). -
See ii. 16c-17b.
73
LVP: The path of insight (darsanamiirga) includes the first fifteen moments of the direct
realization of the truths (abhisamaya), moments in the course-of which one sees that which one
has not previously seen (vi. 28cd). - It is exclusively pure (aniisrava), vi. I.
74
LVP: aluksamiisa/:t }iikhyiitapratiriipaka§ ciiyam iijfiiisyiimftisabda/:t - In the Abhidhamma,
one has anafifiiitafifiassiimftf(!driya (Vibhanga, p. 124).
15
LVP: The term bhiivanii ha~ many meanings. - In the expression bhiivanamaya (derived
from cultivation), it is synonymous with concentration (samiidhi). - Other exceptions are
studied in vii. 27 (compare ii. 25, 2). - In the expression bhiivaniimiirga (path of cultivation),
bhiivanii signifies "repeated insight, cultivation".
There are two paths of cultivation (bhavaniimiirga):
I. Pure (aniisrava) or supramundane (lokottara) path of cultivation, which is under consid-
eration here: this is cultivation of the truths that have already been seen in the path of insight
(darsanamiirga). This path begins with the sixteenth moment of the direct realization of the
truths (vi. 28cd) and comes to an end with the acquisition of the status of a perfected being
(arhat).
2. Impure (siisrava) or mundane (laukika) path of cultivation; it does not have the truths for
its object (vi. 49); it obstructs (vi~kambh) the defilements without uprooting them; it can
precede and follow the path of insight.
76
LVP: Dhiitupiifha, i. 631.
77
LVP: It seems, however, that Paramiirtha differs from Hstian-tsang.
78
LS: AH 205-o, 209, SAH 435-36, 439, 453.
79
Gokhale: [9b2-<i] amalal'J'I trayam I riipf,:ii jfvitarµ du/:tkhe siisravii,:ii dvidhii nava I
Tib.: [9b2-<i] gsum ni dri ma med I gzugs can srog dang sdug bsngal dag I zag dang bcas pa
dgu rnam gnyis II
80
LVP: On this topic, the Japanese editor quotes the work of Harivarman (Nanjio 1274).
81
LVP: The Mahisiisaka, according to the Japanese editor. The Hetuviidin and the Mahiqi-
siisaka in the Kathiivatthu, xix. 8. - Compare ibid. iii. 6.
82
LVP: Sarµyutta, v. 204: yassa kho bhikkhave imiini paficindriyiil}i sabbena sabbarµ sabbathii
sabbal'J'I natthi tarµ ahal'J'I biihiro puthujjanapakkhe {hito ti vadiimi. - See ii. 40bc.
. LVP: paiicemiini bhik~ava indriyiiQ.i I kafamiini paiica I sraddhendriyaqi yiivat prajiiii-
83
indriyaqi I e~iiqi paiiciiniim indriyiiQ.iiqi tik~Q.atviit paripuTQ.atviid arhan bhavati I tatas tanutarair
mrdutarair aniigiimI bhavati I tatas tanutarair mrdutarail;i sakrdiigiimI I tatas tanutarair mrdu-
tarail;i srotaiipannaJ:i I tato· 'pi tanutarair mrdutarair. dharmiinusiirI I tatas tanutarair mrdutarail;i
sraddhiinusiirI I iti hi bhik~ava indriyapiiramitiiqi prafitya phalapiiramitii prajiiiiyate I phala-
piiramitiiqi pratitya pudgalapiiramitii prajiiayate I yasyemiini paiicendriyiiQ.i sarvei:1a sarviiQ.i na
santi tam ahaqi biihyaqi pfthagjanapak~iivasthitaqi vadiimi [WOG.103.lff.].
This text is cited in Vijfiiinakiiya, 535b29ff., with some developments.
Compare Sarµyutta, v, 200.
84
LVP: Compare Sumangalaviliisinf, p. 59, on the two types of ordinary worldling (prthag-
jana), (1) the andha and (2) the kalyii!Ja.
. LVP: brahmii. 'vocat I santi bhadanta sattvii lake [jata lake] vrddhiis trk~,:iendriya api
85
madhyendriya api mrdvindriyii api [WOG.104.4f.]. - Compare Dfgha, ii. 38; Majjhima, i, 169;
Mahavastu, iii, 314; Lalita, 395; Divya, 492; Atthasalinf, 35. - The Kathavatthu cites Dfgha,
ii. 38 ( ... tikkhindriye mudindriye ... ).
86
LVP: Sa1J1,yuktagama, 26, 4. - Compare Sa1J1,yutta, v. 193 and foll. - MVS, 8a14.
87
LS: AH 206; SAH 436, 453.
88
LS: SAH453.
89
LVP: Compare Vibhaliga, p. 125; MVS, 74lbl9.
90
Gokhale: [lOal] vipako jfvita1J1.
Tib.: [lOal] srog ni rnam smin
LVP: On life and death, see ii. 45.
91
LS: SAH 453.
92
LS: For a discussion of the prolongation of the life-force, see Yuichi Kajiyama's article:
Transfer and Transformation of Merits in Relation to Emptiness, in SBP, pp. 1-20.
93
LVP: yad arhan bhik~ur ii.yuJ:isai:µskii.rii.n sthii.payati taj jivitendriyai:µ kasya vipii.kaJ:i
[WOG.105.lf.].
94
LVP: tat pra,:iidhaya. Commentary: tad ayuJ:i pra,:iidhaya cetasikrtvii. - MYS, 656b 17-c3.
95
LVP: yad dhi bhogavipakaf!l karma tad ayurvipakadiiyi bhavatu.
96
LVP: Compare the theory of the divine eye, vii, F 123.
97
LS: L VP mentions the Sautrii.ntikas here, but they are not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan.
This is the third of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.42f.).
Sai:µgh~bhadra criticizes (Ny, 380c23-38la4; EIP.VIIl.678) Vasubandhu's explanation.
98
LVP: Vyakhya {WOG.105.4]: The Buddha for the benefit of others, the listener (sravaka)
for the duration of the Dharma. - See Levi and Chavannes, "Les seize Arhats protecteurs de la
Loi", J. As., 1916, ii. 9 and following.
99
LVP: rogiidyabhibhuta; one should understand sickness (raga), abscess (ga,:i<;la), thorn
(salya), corresponding to the threefold unsatisfactoriness, vi. 3, [i.e., ·unsatisfactoriness that is
suffering, unsatisfactoriness that is transformation or change, unsatisfactoriness that is the fact
of being conditioned].
100
LVP: brahmacarya1J1. sucarita1J1, miirgas cqpi subhavitaJ:i I
ayuJ:ik~aye tu~fo bhoti rogasyapagame yatha II
In Milinda, 44, the perfected being, although suffering in his body, does not enter nirva,:ia:
nabhinandiimi jfvitam ... .
101
LVP: Literally: "their life-stream is not supported by the defilements" (klesair anupa-
stabdha sa1J1,tatih): These are the defilements (klesa) that support and make the life-stream
abide. -The circumstantially liberated (samayavimukta) perfected beings (arhat) are free from
defilements, but do not have mastery in concentration; those who have attained through views
(dr~fiprapta) possess this mastery, but are not free from defilements (vi. 56).
102
LS: SAH 453.
103
LVP: jivitasmµskiiran adhi~thaya ayu):ismµskiiriin utsr~tavan [WOG.106.4].
Compare Divyiivadiina, 203: atha Bhagaviirµs tadruparµ samadhirµ samiipanno yathii samiihite
cittejfvitasarµskiiriin adhi~!hiiya iiyuT:tsarµskiiriin utsra~fum iirabdhal:t. - We have the singular
in Mahiivastu, i. 125, 19.
Dfgha, ii. 99: yan nuniiharµ imarµ iibiidharµ viriyena pafippa,:,,iimetvii jfvitasarµkhiiram adhi!{hiiya
vihareyyam; ii. 106 .. .iiyusarµkhiiram ossaji. (Compare Sarµyutta, v. 152; Ariguttara, iv. 3 ll;
Udiina, vi. 1). ~ Bumouf, Lotus, 291.
104
LVP: The Pfili has the plural in other contexts, Majjhima, i. 295 (afifie iiyusarµkhiirii afifie
vedaniyii dhammii); Jiitaka, iv. 215 (iiyusaqikhiirii khfyanti).
105
LS: For additional explanations, see DD.297, 303.
LVP: MYS, 657c10ff., enumerates fourteen opinions on this point.
106
LVP: Eleventh opinion in the Vibhii~ii.
107
LVP: Sixth opinion in the Vibhii~ii.
108
LVP: Doctrine of the Sruµmitiyas, according to the Japanese editor.
109
LVP: Opinion of the Sautrantikas.
110
LS: Yasomitra has [WOG.105.24]: Bhagaviinjivitany adhi~thaya iiyiirµ~y utsr~taviin.
111
LS: SAH 453.
112
LVP: According to the Japanese editor, this is the opinion of the author.
113
LVP: MVS,657c5, the fifth of the six opinions.
114
LVP: kalparµ vii ... kalpiivaie~arµ vii. -That is to say, according to the very clear version
of Paramiirtha, "an aeon (kalpa) or beyond an aeon". It is usually translated: "an aeon or the
remainder of an aeon" (Windisch, Rhys Davids, 0. Franke). - Dfgha, ii. 103, ll5, iii. 77;
Divya, 201. - Kathiivatthu, xi. 5. - Siddhi, 803.
115
LVP: They adopt the sixth opinion of the Vibhii~ii.
116
LS: Jampaiyang comments (p. 289): "In Vaisiili by blessing his life-span, the miira lord of
Death was conquered. In Kusinagara by relinquishing his life-span, the miira of the aggregates
was conquered."
117
LVP: devaputramiira, klesamiira, mara~amiira, skandhamiira. Dharmasa,rigraha, lxxx;
Mahtivastu, iii. 273, 281; Sik~iisamuccaya; 198, 10; Madhyamakavrtti, 49 n. 4, xxii. 10;
Bodhicaryiivatiira, ix. 36 (the Fortunate One [bhagavat] is a Victor 1}ina] because he has
conquered the four Maras); Yu-chia chih-ti lun, xxix, translated by S. Levi, Seize Arhats, p. 7
(J. As., 1916, ii.). In iconography (Foucher, Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Xill, ii. 19), the Buddha
is flanked by four Maras, blue, yellow, red and green. - The list of the four Maras in
glossaries, Zachariae, Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen, 1888, p. 853. - See also the lists of
Childers (five Maras by adding abhisarµskiiramiira). The Nettippakara~a distinguishes
kilesamiira and sattamiira ( = devaputra ).
118
LS: AH 206; SAH 436.
119
Gokhale: [10a2-bl] dvedhti dviidaiii
Tib.: [10a2] bcu gnyis gnyis I
120
Gokhale: [10b2-d] 'ntyii~fakiid rte [ daurmanasyiic ca
Endnotes .to Chapter Two 713
Tib.: [10b] tha ma brgyad dang yid mi bde I ma gtogs paste

121
LVP: Sensation of displeasure (dul;ikhendriya) never arises in association with modes of
proper deportment (airyiipathika), etc.
122
LS: Even though Vasubandhu plays the part of opponent in the following debate, at the
end he seems to agree with the Vaibha~ikas that dissatisfaction is never a ripened effect, which
also is confirmed by iv. 57d, where he states that discontentedness is never a ripened effect.
123
LVP: Ekottariigama, 12, 9. - The Tipi(aka knows action conducive to or retributed as
pleasure (sukhavedanfya karman) (Anguttara, iv. 382, etc.) (see iv. 45); contact (spar.fa)
conducive to or retributed as pleasure (sukliavedanfya), contact conducive to or retributed as
dissatisfaction (daurmanasyavedanfya) (Sal'/lyutta, v. 211, etc.). - See iv. 57d.
124
LVP: According to the etymology of the author, saumanasyavedanfya karman signifies
"action entailing satisfaction to be experienced as retribution" (saumanasyal'/l vipiikatvena
vedanryam asya). According to the Vaibhii~ika, "action in which satisfaction should be experi-
enced" (saumanasyal'/l vedanfyam asmin): this is experience through association (sal'/lprayoga-
vedanfyatii; iv. 49).
125
LVP: sal'/lprayoge 'pi na do:jo vipiike pi I agatyiipy etad evam gamyeta I ka.punar atra
yuktir daurmanasyal'/l na vipiikal;i I [see WOG: 107.6ff.]
126
LVP: According to the Sutra, the "non-detached" .have two thorns, (1) physical displeas-
ure (kiiyika dul;ikha), (2) mental dissatisfaction (caitasika daurmanasya); the "detached" are
free from mental dissatisfaction.
127
LVP: Thus detached persons do not possess all the controlling faculties (indriya) that are
retribution.
128
LVP: yiidrsal'/l tiidrsam astu iti I aparicchidyamiinam api tad asty eveti darsayati I tasyiisti
vipakavakiiso na daurmanasyasya. [see WOG.107.26]
129
LS: Since Vasubandhu states at iv. 57d that "we have established that discontentedness is
never a ripened effect" (ii. lObc), it seems that Vasubandhu agrees here with the Vaibhii~ikas.
The issue is also further clarified at iv. 58cd [F 126-27], where Vasubandhu clarifies how
mental trouble arises "from" the retribution of action, while its mental sensation is not retribu-
tion.
130
LVP: Omitted by Hsiian-tsang. ·
131
LVP: The quality of an androgyne, that is to say, the obtaining (pratilambha).of the two
sexual faculties, is a factor (dharma) dissociated from thought (viprayukta), ii. 35.
132
LS: AH 206; SAH 436.
133
Gokhale: [ 10c2-11 a] tat tv ekal'/l savipiikal'/l dasa dvidhii I mano 'nyavittisraddhiidfny
Tib.: [10c2-1 la] de gcig ni I rnam par smin bcas bcu rnam gnyis 11 yid dang tshor gzhan dad la
sogs I _ ·
LVP: This says implicitly that the first eight controlling faculties (indriya), as well as the last
three, are always without a ripened effect. Hsiian-tsang completes the verse (kiirikii) in order to
make this point explicitly. ·
The verse has tat tv ekal'/l savipiikam: tu in the sense of eva, and out of place; the meaning calls
for: tad ekal'/l savipiikam eva = dissatisfaction alone is exclusively "with a ripened effect".
134
LS: AH 205; SAH 435.
135
Gokhale: [11 bd] a~{akarri kusalarri dvidhii I daurmanasyarri mano 'nyii ca vittis tredhii
'nyad ekadhii I
Tib.: [llb-d] dge ba brgyad yid mi bde ba I rnam gnyis yid dang tshor gzhan ni I rnam gsum
gzhan ni rnam pa gcig I
LVP: Hsiian-tsang: the last eight controlling faculties are only wholesome; dissatisfaction is
wholesome or unwholesome; the mind and the other sensations are of three types; the first
eight controlling faculties are non-defined only.
Although the eight controlling faculties appear at the end of the list of [twenty-two controlling
faculties], here they are named first because [five of these eight] are mentioned last in the
preceding verse (kiirikii).
Compare Vibhiinga, p. 125.
136
LS: AH 205; SAH 435.
137
Gokhale: [12] kiimiiptam amalarrz hitvii riipiiptarrz strfpumindriye Idul:,khe ca hitv iirupyiiptarrz
sukhe cii 'pohya rapi ca II
Tib.: [12] dri med ma gtogs 'dod par gtogs I pho mo'i dbang dang sdug bsngal dag I ma gtogs
gzugs gtogs gzugs can dang I bde ba'ang ma gtogs gzugs med gtogs I
138
LS: AH 205; SAH 435.
139
LS: Ibid.
140
LVP: See the definition of the powers of the Tathaga,ta (tathiigatabala) in Vibhanga,
p. 336: a!{hiinam etarri anavakiiso yarri itthi sakkattarri kiireyya marattarri kiireyya brahmattarri
kiireyya n 'etarri fhiinarri vijjati... .
Compare Lotus 407, Chavannes, Cinq cents contes, i, 264.
141
· LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.192):
Besides the non-information matter, which is unlike other matter that we encounter
in phenomenal existence, the Sarvastivada concedes other types of special matter,
such as that in the fine-material sphere and that of the intermediate beings (antara-
bhava); these kinds of matter are said to be transparent (accha). In fact, one reason
that the faculty of suffering (dul:,khendriya) is absent in the beings of the fine-
material sphere is that their bodies (iisraya) are constituted by transparent matter on
account of which they are not subject to being injured.... [T]he sense faculties are
said to comprise very subtle and perspicuous (prasiida) kinds of matter which are
suprasensible (atfndriya), and their atoms, being transparent like crystal, are mutually
non-obstructive. The MYS (63a) has a si~ilar, but more illustrative description:
Because they are transparent/clear in nature, they do not mutually obstruct one
another. That is to say, for such type of derived clear matter, even when a large
number of them are accumulated together, there is no mutual obstruction. It is
like the water in an autumn pond; on account of its clarity, even a needle that is
dropped into it can be visible.
142
LS: Yasomitra glosses [WOG.109.25f.]: iighiital:, kopal_i. tasya vastu vi~ayal_i aghiita-vastu.
143
LVP: Dfgha, iii. 262; Anguttara, iv. 408, v. 150.
144
LS: AH 205; SAH 435.
145
LS: AH 209; SAH 439.
146
Gokhale: [13) mano vittitrayarµ tredhii dviheyii durmanaskatii ~nava bhiivanayii pafica tv
aheyiiny api na trayam II
Tib.: [13) yid dang tshor ba gsum rnam gsum I gnyis kyis spang bya,yid mi bde I dgu ni bsgom
pas Inga po ni I spang bar bya min yang gsum min II
LVP: Compare i. 40; Vibhariga, p. 133.
147
LS: AH 207-8; SAH 437-38.
148
Gokhale: [14) kiime~v iidau vipiikau dve labhyete n opapiidukai]:z I tai]:z ~arf, vii sapta vii
·~rau vii ~arf, rapeF ekam uttare II
Tib.: [14) 'dod par dang por rnam smin gnyis I rnyed de rdzus te sky~ bas min Ide yis drug gam
bdun nam brgyad I gzugs na drug go gong mar gcig II
. ,
LVP: Compare Kathiivatthu, xiv. 2, Abhidhammasarµgaha (Compendium, p. 165).

149 '
LVP: This we should understand as, "because the material forµis (rapa) are luminous
(accha = bhiisvara) there", or else "because the material foqns, not the objects of sens.e-
enjoyments (kiimagulJ(l), are important there". See i. 22ab, 4, a different doctrine.
150
LVP: ye 'pi te siintii vimok~ii a~ikramya rupiilJY iirupyiis te 'py anityii adhruvii anasviisikii
vipari1_1iimadharmii.1_1a}_l ... [see WOO.ll 1.8fT Compare Sarµyutta, ii. 123. See viii, F 140,
Majjhima, i, 472: "A forest-dwelling bhikkhu should apply himself to those liberations that are
\ I '
peaceful and immaterial, tram,cending forms." (Bhikkhu Bodhi comments, MDB, 1270: This
refers to the eight meditatiye attainm~nts. As a minimum he should become proficient in the
preliminary work of one meditation subject, such as a kasitJa.)
151
LS: AH 207; SAH 437.
152
LS: Ibid.
153
LS: Ibid.
154
LS: Ibid.
155
LS: <;::ox summarizes Saqi.ghabhadra (EIP.VIII. 679): "From this it is clear that vitality
exists as an actual entity: otherwise, there would be nothing upon which birth in the immaterial
realm could depend."
156
LS: AH 208; SAH 438.
157
Gokhale: [15-16b] nirodhayaty uparamann iirupye jfvitarµ mana]:z I upek~iim c aiva rape
•~rau kame dasa navii •~ta vii II kramamrtyau tu catviiri subhe sarvatrwp.(Jiica ca I
Tib.: [15-16b] gzugs med dag tu 'chi bani I srog dang yid dang btang snyoms nyid I 'gag par
'gyur ro gzugs na brgyad I 'dod par bcu'am dgu'am brgyad I ri,n gyis 'chi ba dag la bzhi I dge
la thams cad dag tu Inga I
LVP: CompareAbhidhammasarigaha, Compendium, p. 166.
158
LVP: On the psychological state at death, iii. 42-43b. - In what part of the body the
mental consciousness is destroyed, iii. 43c-44a. - How the vital faculties perish, iii. 44b.
159
LS: SAH 441.
160
LVP: indriyaprakara1;1e. Some understand: "In the exposition that we give here of the
controlling faculties"; others understand: "in the Indriyaskandhaka", the sixth book of the
Jiiiinaprasthiina (Takakusu, Abhidharma Literature, p. 93).
161
Gokhale: [16cd] naviiptir antyaphalay¢J:, saptii'~fanavabhir dvayoJ:, II
Tib.: [16cd] 'bras bu tha ma gnyis dgus 'thob I gnyis ni gdun dang brgyad dang dgus II
162
LS: SAH 441.
163
LS: Ibid.
164
LVP: For, at the moment when they obtain the fruit of the stream-enterer (srotaiipanna),
the practitioners find themselves always in the state of meditative attainment called prepara-
tory meditation (anagamya; vi. 48), which involves the sensation of equanimity.
165
LVP: The fruit of stream-enterer is obtained in the sixteenth moment of the direct realiza-
tion of the truths; the first fifteen moments are iijiiiisyiimi (the faculty of coming to know what
is as yet unknown), the sixteenth is iijiia (the faculty of perfect knowledge).
166
LVP: The first moment is the unhindered path (iinantaryamiirga); the second, the path of
liberation (vimuktimiirga); and so on. But all the moments that precede the sixteenth moment
can be considered as unhindered path in relationship to this moment.
167
LVP: The unhindered path (iinantaryamiirga) destroys the defilement and leads to the
possession of disconnection from the defilement: it drives out the thief. The path of liberation
(vimuktimiirga) closes the door. - The Japanese edit~r cites here the MVS, 465c9, where the
Westerners, followers of a non-Kasmirian doctrine, are cited.•
168
LS: SAH 441.
169
LVP: The fruit of a perfected being (arhat) is obtained at the moment of adamantine
,concentration (vajropamasamiidhi; vi. 44cd), the unhindered path (iinantaryamiirga), which is
the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijiiendriya). Thus the faculty of perfect knowledge is actu-
ally present. The cognition of exhaustion (k~ayajiiiina), the path of liberation (vimuktimiirga),
which is the faculty of final and perfect knowledge (iijiiiitiivfndriya), is in the process of
arising (utpiidiibhimukha). - Sensation of satisfaction, etc., according to the nature of the medi-
tative attainment in which the pracfltioner realizes the adamantine concentration.
170
LS: SAH 441.
171
· LS: Ibid.
172
LVP: This doctrine of the mundane path is condemned in the Kathiivatthu, i. 5 and xviii. 5.
- Buddhaghosa attributes it to the Sa111mitiya.
173
LS: SAH 441.
174
LVP: Only the successive ones (iinupurvaka) change from meditational attainment, not
those who are detached (vftariiga). The latter, in fact, if they begin the direct realization of the
truths (satyiibhisamaya) in the meditative attainment preparatory meditation (aniigamya), will
not pass in the first meditation (dhyiina) to the sixteenth moment. What interests them is the
direct realization of the truths, not the meditations with which they are familiar. On the
: contrary, the successive ones are interested in meditation that is new f~r them.
175
LS: SAH 441.
176
Gokhale: [17ab] ekiidasabhir arhattvam ukta'!I tv ekasya SllTJ'lbhaviit I
Tib.: [l 7ab] bcu gcig dag gis dgra bcom nyid I 'ga' zhig srid phyir bshad pa yin I
177
LVP: The non-returners (aniigiimin) who retrogress from the detachment of the higher
stages, up to and including the second meditation (dhyiina), do not retrogress from the fruit of
non-returner because of this: they remain non-returners, since they remain detached from the
realm of desire. But they lose the fruit of non-returner when they retrogress from the detach-
ment of the first meditation: thus retrogressed, they cannot regain the fruit through the faculty
of pleasure, since this controlling faculty is of the third meditation, and the thitd meditation is
beyond their reach.
Could it be said that they regain the fruit through the faculty of satisfaction? They could
if, starting out again to gain the fruit in the meditative attainment preparatory meditation
(aniigamya), they would be capable of passing, in the last moment, into the first meditation.
'
But they cannot do'tb.at: only practitioners whose (praxis-oriented) faculties are sharp can
bring about this pass~e. and the practitioners whom we are considering here are of weak
(praxis-oriented) faculties since they have retrogressed. Only practitioners ·of weak faculties
retrogress from a fruit.
Could it be said that, having retrogressed, practitioners can bring about the transformation of
their (praxis-oriented) faculties (indriyasa,riciira; vi. 4lc-61b) and make them sharp? - Without
a doubt, and they will obtain the fruit with eight or nine controlling faculties according to
whether their path is mundane or pure, as we have said, for, in no case will they regain the
· _fruit with the faculty of pleasure.
178
LS: AH 237; SAH 440, 472.
179
LS: SAH 440.
180
LS: Ibid.
181
Gokhale: [l 7cd] upelcyiijfvitamdnoyukto 'vasyal'{1 trayii'nvita!i I
Tib.: [17cd] btang snyoms dang ni srog dang ni I yid dang ldan la nges gsum ldan /I
182
LVP: na hy e~iim anyonyena vinii sa~anviigama!i [WOG.118.19).
183
LVP: The noble ones (iirya) possess the faculty of "pure" pleasure, for they do not lose
this faculty by changing the stage (see ii, F. 141, note).
184
L VP: Omitted by Hsiian-tsang. - See viii. 12ab.
185
LS: SAH 440.
186
Gokhale: [18a] caturbhi!i sukhakiiyiibhyiil'{1
Tib.: [18a] bde lus ldan la bzhi dag dang I
187
LS: SAH 440.
188
Gokhale: [18b] paficabhis cak~uriidimiin I
Tib.: [18b] mig sogs ldan la Inga dang ldan I
189
Gokhale: [18cl] saumanasyf ca
Tib. : [18c 1] yid bde ldan yang
190 LVP: There is, in the realm of desire, the faculty of pleasure in relation to the five sensory
consciousnesses; in the first meditation (dhyiina), the faculty of pleasure in relation to the three
sensory consciousnesses (the olfactory and gustatory consciousnesses being excluded, i. 30);
in the second meditation, there is no faculty of pleasure (viii. 12); in the third meditation, the
faculty of pleasure in relation to the mental consciousness (ii. 7cd). Thus, beings born in the
heaven of the second meditation, if they do not cultivate the meditative attainment of the third
meditation, will not possess the faculty of pleasure, since, by being reborn in [the heaven of]
the second meditation, they have lost the faculty of pleasure of the lower stages. - Answer:
According to Vaibha~ika doctrine (siddhiinta), any beings born in a lower stage possess the
defiled (kli~ta) faculty of the higher stage if they have not abandoned it.
191
LS: SAH 440.
192
Gokhale: [18c2-dl] duJ:ikhf tu saptabhiJ:t
Tib.: [18c2-dl] sdug bsgnal ldan I bdun dang
193
LS: SAH 440.
194
Tib.: [18d2-19al] strfndriyiidimiin 11 aHiibhir
Tib.: [18d2-19al]mo yi dbang sogs ldan I brgyad dang
LVP: See iv. 80a, which cites the Jfiiinaprasthiina, 997al6 and 1000c3. - Ad iv. 79d, the
number of faculties in the first three continents (dvfpa).
195
LS: SAH 440.
196
Gokhale: [19a2-b] ekiidasabhis tv iijfiiijfiiitendriyanvitaJ:i I
Tib.: [19a2-b] kun shes ldan pa yi I dbang po ldan la bcu gcig ldan I
191
LVP: How are the possessors of the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijfiendriya), i.e., those
in training (sai~a),_ necessarily in possession of the faculties of pleasure and of satisfaction?
They can, in fact, be in the heaven of the fourth meditation or in the realm of immateriality.
The noble ones (iirya) necessarily obtain the faculty of satisfaction if they detach themselves
from the realm of desire; they necessarily obtain the faculty of pleasure when they detach
themselves from the second meditation; the same when they transmigrate (bhiimisaf!1ciira),
they do not lose the good (subha) that they have obtained (according to iv. 4,0); they lose the
good obtained when they have gained a fruit or when they perfect their (praxis-oriented)
faculties (iv. 40), but this is in order to obtain the same kind of good of a higher quality.
198
LS: SAH 440.
199
Gokhale: [19cd] iijfiiisyiimfndriyopetas trayodasabhir anvitaJ:i II
Tib.: [19cd] kun shes byed pa'i dbang ldan la I bcu gsum dag dang ldan pa yin I
200
LVP: But can these sentient beings be bisexual? This is difficult, since we have seen (F 105)
that sentient beings without sex cannot obtain either the restraint, or a fruit, or detachment.
According to one opinion: Persons who have obtained the restraint can obtain a fruit; but these
persons preserve the restraint even if they lose their sex, since the Abhidharma specifies they
lose the restraint by becoming androgyne (iv. 38c) and it does not specify that they lose the
restraint by losing their sex. - One can, moreover, look at gradual death: persons who have
cultivated the stages conducive to penetration (nirvedhabhiigfya; vi. 17) could, after the loss of
the sexual faculty, see the truths at the moment of death.
Second opinion: The possessors of the faculty of coming to know what is as yet unknown
(iijfiiisyiimfndriya) are never without sex. But they do not possess lhe female sexual faculty
when they are a male, they do not possess the male sexual faculty when they are a female.
Thus it cannot be said that they necessarily possess one or the other.
201
LS: AH 237; SAH 472.
202
Gokhale: [20acl] sarvii'lpair niJ:isubho ·~rabhir vinmanaJ:ikiiyajfvitaiJ:i Iyukto
Tib.: [20ab] dge med nang na nyung ldan pa I lus tshor srog yid brgyad dang ldan I
203
LS: kvip = krt affix zero, added to the root, used to form nouns from roots; kartr = agent;
kartrsiidhana = an affix applied in the sense of the agent of an activity; bhiivasiidhana = an
affix applied for .the formation of a word in the. sense of verbal activity; au~iidika = an affix
mentioned in the class of affixes called u~iidi in treatises of Piil_lini and other grammarians.
204
Gokhale: [20c2-d] biilas tath iiriipya upeqii'yurmanaJ:isubhaiJ:i II
Tib.: [20cd] gzugs med byis ba 'ang de bzhin te I btang snyoms srog yid dge rnams dang I
205
LS: AH 237; SAH 472.
206
Gokhale: [21acl] bahubhir yukta ekiin na vil'{lsatyii 'malavarjitaiJ:i Idviliriga
Tib.: [21acl] mang por ldan la bcu dgu ste Idri ma med mams ma gtogs so Imtshan gnyis
201
Gokhale: [21c2-d] iiryariigy ekalirigadvyamalavarjitaiJ:i 11
Tib.: [2 lc2-d] 'phags pa chags bcas te I mtshan gcig dri med gnyis ma gtogs I
208
. LVP: ukta indriyii~iil'fl dhiituprabhedhaprasarigena (i. 48c) iigatiiniil'{I vistare~a prabhedaJ:i
[WOG.123.lf.].
209
LS: Hsiian-tsang, iv, fol. la.
210
LS: AH 16, 23-24, 220-21, 224; SAH 15, 54-o6, 450, 453-55, 457,484.
211
LS: 1. Dharmatriita's chapter 2 of the SAH is entitled sal'{lskiiravarga and, since it does
not include a section dealing with the controlling faculties (indriya), it starts out here by con-
trasting the second chapter with the first chapter (SAH, p. 91), which is described as being
related to the characteristics (laqa~a) of the factors:
That factors (dharma) abide in characteristic marks (lak~a~) has already been said.
The genesis of factors shall now be spoken of. It is not right that since factors are
included in their specific nature (svabhiiva), they arise through their specific power
(svabala).
According to Dharmatriita, the intrinsic nature of factors is weak (durbala) and they cannot
arise through their own power or by themselves (svabala). All factors achieve arising through
the multiple power condition (pratyayabala). It is compared to when a person and a boat make
use of one another, and so ac/1ieve the crossing over to the other bank.·
Dharmatriita closes chapter 21n the following way:
Question: Why are th~se factors said to be formations?
Answer:
(96) Manyfactors make one factor arise. One can also make many arise. The
formatjons formed by conditions and the forming conditions should be
known as the formations.
There is no facto~ that arises through its specific power (svabala): one factor arises
because of the power of many factors; also many factors arise because of the power
of one factor. This is the way all conditioned factors are. That is why it is said: "The
formations formed by conditions and the forming conditions should be known as the
formations."
Because they are the condition for formations and because they form, formations
formed by conditions are spoken of, because of being formed by conditions and
because of forming formations, forming formations are spoken of.
2. Cox summarizes Sai:p.ghabhadra (Ny, 383c; EIP.VIII.680): "All conditioned factors arise
from both previous and simultaneous causes and conditions. The simultaneous arising of
various conditioned factors will be presented in order to refute erroneous theories of causa-
tion. For example, some maintain that conditioned factors arise only from previous causes, or
that they arise from only one cause, or that they arise from their own essential nature, or that
they arise spontaneously without a cause."
212
LS: For the Paficavastuka and its place within the first two chapters, see our endnote at
the beginning of the text (i. 4). See also Frauwallner's Paficaskandhaka and Paficavastuka
(SAL.135-47).
Cox writes (FCO.552-54):
The later Sarviistiviida fivefold taxonomy (pancavastuka) is another comprehensive
taxonomic system that contains both "evaluative" and "descriptive" categories, but
unlike the set of 22 controlling faculties, its arrangement is not soteriologically
hierarchical. Instead, it attempts to present a complete and systematic listing of all
possible dharmas classified abstractly by distinctive intrinsic nature (svabhiiva),
without regard for the particular causal or temporal conditions of their occurrence.
The previous taxonomic systems begin from specific circumstances of praxis,
perception, and so forth, and present detailed descriptions of the significant activities
or events (dharma) that interact cooperatively in those particular circumstances. The
fivefold taxonomy, by contrast, takes the perspective of the dharmas themselves and
sets out a delimited number of abstract genera that are intended to encompass every
experienced event or phenomenon, or in other words every possible individual
instance of a dharma . ...
Tfie historical development of this fivefold taxonomy has yet to be fully studied, but
the categories themselves suggest certain general principles of organization and,
more importantly, of progression in the interpretation of the term dharma. A tradi-
tional distinction between the material and the mental, typical of the older system of
the five aggregates (~kandha), is evident in the first three categories of material form,
thought, and thought concomitants. But new principles of organization can also be
observed that evolved from the doctrinal elaboration and resulting controversies of
the early Abhidharma period.
First, the distinction within the mental sphere between the tw:o categories of thought
(citta) and thought concomitants (caitta) can be seen as a natural development from
the earlier distinction within the five aggregates between perceptual consciousness
(vijniina), identified in the new fivefold taxonomy as tl1.ought, and the other three
non-material aggregates, which are subsumed and further expanded within the single
category of thought concomitants. However, this distinction between thought and

thought concomit~s_ also reflects an emphasis upon perception as the central sen-
tient experience and a ~wly recognized need to isolate thought as an identifiable hub
that connects the various activities constituting one sentient being and, thereby,
facilitates a distinction between one sentient being and another.
Second, the new category of thought concomitants (caitta) comprises, according to
the later, standard enumeration, 46 dharmas that are divided into six sub-groups
according to their moral character as virtuous, unvirtuous, and so forth. In this
regard, the category of thought concomitants clearly incorporates an "evaluative",
soteriological purpose into the otherwise "descriptive" fivefold taxonomy.
Third, the category of dissociated forces (cittaviprayuktasaf!lskiira) includes dharmas
that were proposed to account for a varied range of experiential or doctrinally
necessary events and is, therefore, a miscellany of dharmas not unified by any
overall integrating principle other than dissociation from both material form and
thought.
Finally, the last category of the unconditioned (asaf!lskrta) reflects a fundamental
distinction between dharmas included within the first four categories that are condi-
tioned (saf!lskrta), or arise and pass away through causal interaction, and dharmas
that are not so conditioned and, therefore, neither arise nor pass away.
As for the motive and history of the five-group classification of factors, Cox states (DD.68f.):
"Unlike the earlier classifications according to the five aggregates or the twelve sense spheres,
which appear to have been motivated by an attempt to demonstrate non-self and imperma-
nence, this new fivefold taxonomy reflects a concern for completeness, an interest in classifi-
cation for its own sake, and a desire to demonstrate the individual, distinctive characteristic of
each of the factors classified. This fivefold taxonomy is traced by the tradition to the Abhi-
dharmika, Vasumitra, and indeed, it is the first topic treated in the Prakaraf.!Opiida attributed to
him. Regardless of Vasumitra's actual.historical contribution, the impetus for this fivefold
taxonomy can in part be found in the recognition within early Sarviistiviidin Abhidharma texts
of the discrete and real existence of both conditioned forces dissociated from thought and
unconditioned factors as well as in the difficulty of including these two types of factors within
the traditional categories."
213
LS: AH 16, 23-24, 220-21, 224; SAH 15, 54-66, 450, 453-55, 457,484.
214
LS: AH 23; SAH 64.
In this context see also i, F 89ff. (and our endnotes), which discusses the different views on
whether or not atoms touch one another and their relationship to agglomer~tes. Likewise see
iii, F 177ff. (and our endnotes) for a discussion of the smallest unit of phys,ical matter and the
various units of space up to one league (yojana).
215
LS: Tib.: phra rab rdul.
216
LVP: On the meaning of this term, see below F 147.
LS: Tib.: rdzas.
217
LS: Discussing-in the context of the Abhidharma of the Sriivakayiina-the general view
that all entities lack a solid, permanent core, Frauwallner deals (PB.102f.) with the field of
722 Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirde.fo)
material elements and the ~radravyaka (i.e., the molecule "comprising eight real entities") as
follows:
In the sphere of the elements, the primary concern was with the five properties that,
since ancient times, had been held to be the objects of the sense-perceptions, namely:
visible form; sound; odor; taste; and tangibility. In the doctrinal discourses of the
Buddha, these properties are usually mentioned alone, without reference to the
[invisible] elements, since to the Buddha the external world was of interest only
· insofar as it affects the person and arouses sensations and passions. Now, it was
explicitly taught that [visible form, etc.,] are not properties that adhere to the ele-
ments, but they are .rather autonomous entities. And as the doctrine of atoms-which
had been created and propagated in the meantime--was adopted, it was taught that
these entities consist of atoms. The things of the external world are therefore not
composed of elements but are formed from atoms of color, sound, odor, taste, and
tangibility.
Of course, it was also necessary to deal with the old conception of the elements,
since elements-specifically the commonly known four elements of earth, water,
fire, and wind-are often mentioned in the doctrinal discourses of the Buddha. What
are these elements then? To explain this, one reverted to the following idea. Since the
ancient times, in addition to the five properties that, as objects of the sense-percep-
tions, correspond to the five sense-organs, a second set of characteristic properties
had been attributed to the elements. These were: solidity to earth; wetness to water;
heat to fire; and motion to wind. Now it was said that the so-called four elements
were nothing other than these same properties. With that, these four properties
were classified within the tangible and of course the theory of atoms was also applied
to them. The four elements are therefore atoms of hardness, wetness, heat, and
motion.
At the same time, however, according to the commonly held view, the properties of
the elements never appear in isolation. The Vaise~ika, for example, taught that each
element unites several qualities within itself, and all the other systems followed the
Vaise~ikas in this. Opinions differed only with regard to the number and distribution
of these qualities. Buddhism thus also taught accordingly that the atom-like pro-
perties of the elements never occur in isolation as single atoms, but always combined
into molecules. Each molecule, to be exact, contains one property atom of each type
[i.e., visible form, etc.], each of which are joined as support, so to speak, by one atom
of each of the four elements. Since sound occurs only occasionally, the molecule
therefore consists of a minimum of eight [types of] atoms, which may occasionally
be joined by further atoms. The entire material world is built from these atoms and
the diversity of individual materials derives from the predominance of this or that
property atom. In this way then, against the Vaise~ika doctrine of the elements,
Buddhism set its own doctrine, in which the concept of a [permanent] substance was
eliminated and a loose association of autonomous property atoms took the place of
[permanent] substance atoms with their numerous qualities.
As for the historical development of the Buddhist atomic theory, it is not discemable in the
sutras. Dhammajoti states (SA.IV.198) that it was likely adopted from outside the Buddhist
schools-probably from the Vaise~ika (EIP.Il.79-86)-and that it was at least by the time of
the Mahiivibhii~ii articulated to a large extent in a specific Buddhist way, i.e., where atoms
are seen as momentary and not permanent, etc. MVS, 702ab, presents the doctrine of the
sevenfold incremental atomic agglomeration (see AKB iii. 85d). On the other hand, the
Sarvlistiviidin doctrine that a minimum of eight real entities (a~fadravyaka)-constituting the
subtlest aggregate, sa,rzghiita-paramiiQu-necessarily arise simultaneously in the realm of
desire was apparently articulated only after the period of the MVS (see SA.IV.201). As for the
latter doctrine, Dhammajoti comments that "it is sufficiently clear that this 'octad molecule'
does not really mean a molecule comprising eight atoms. It represents the smallest unit of
matter that can be cognized by us." In this context he speaks (SA.IV.204f.) of "a contradiction
that seems to have been quietly left unsettled: On the one hand, the atomic the.ory requires that
atoms are grouped as septuplets from which matter is derived. The smallest molecule, an aQu,
or sarrzghiita-paramiiQU, consisting of just seven paramiiQu-s is the smallest unit of matter that
is perceivable-and even then not by an ordinary human being. On the other hand, a new
doctrine was then articulated that a molecule that can arise in the empirical world consists of a
minimum of eight substances. Taking both doctrines into consideration, one commentarial
opinion, in fact, arrives at 1,379 as the number of atoms that constitute a molecule of a visible"
(see AKB iii, F 148f., footnote).
218
Gokhale: [22] kiime •~tadravyako 'sabdalJ paramtiQur anindriyalJ I kiiyendriyf navadravyo
dasadravyo 'parendriyalJ I
Tib.: [22] 'dod na dbang po med pa dang I sgra med phra rab rdul rdzas brgyad I lus dbang
lean la rdzas dgu'o I dbang po gzhan ldan rdzas bcu'o 11
LVP: Vasubandhu follows Dharmottara (Nanjlo 1288), ii. 8; Upaslinta (Nanjio 1294), ii. 9;
Dharmatrlita (Nanjio 1287), ii. 11: "The atoms residing in the four sense-faculties are of ten
types; in the body sense-faculty, of nine types; elsewhere, of eight types, when there is odor
(that is to say: in the realm of desire)." - Upasiinta: " ... external, of eight types: in a stage
1
where there is odor".

An analogous doctrine is found in the Abhidhamma of Buddhaghosa (Atthasiilinr, 634) and in
the Compendium (p. 164). - See above i. 13, 43c, and Th. Stcherbatsky, The soul theory of the
Buddhists, p. 953.
219
LS: SAH 64.
220
LVP: According to Saqighabhadra (Ny, 799a24-29): "Among the material forms (rupa)
that are resistent (sapratigha), the most su~tle part, which is not susceptible of being divided
again, is called paramiiQu; that is to say: the paramiiQu is not susceptible of being divided into
many parts by another material form (rupa) or by mind (buddhi). It is this paramtiQU that is
called the smallest material form [or "ultimately small" among matter]; as there can be no
further parts, it is given the name "smallest" [or "ultimately small"]. In the same way a
moment (~aQa) is called the smallest unit of time and cannot be further analyzed into half-
moments (iii. 86).
An agglomeration [or multitude] of such a~us, [i.e., paramiiQUS,] that are [mutually combined
and necessarily inseparable or] not susceptible of disaggregation, receives the name sarrz-
ghtitiiQU (Dhammajoti: sarrzghtita-paramiiQu). [See the description of the 1,379 atoms of the
molecule of visible form in the footnote on page F 148.]
724 Exposition of the Faculties (lndriyanirdesa)
In the realm of desire, when sound and sense-faculty are absent, a minimum of eight real
entities (dravya) arise together in order to constitute a sarµghiitii1:m (Dhammajoti: sarµghiita-
paramii,:iu). - What are these real entities? - Four fundamental material elements (mahiibhiita),
four derivative material elements (upiidiiya), namely, visible form (riipa), taste (rasa), odor
(gandha), tangible (spr~tavya)."
LS: L VP translates the sarµghiitaparamii,:iu as "molecule" and the dravyaparamii,:iu as "atome
ou monade", "paramii,:iu au sense propre". In chapter 3, verse 85bc, he returns to the discus-
sion of the paramii,:iu as the limit or smallest unit of matter where he translates: "l 'atome
proprement dit (parama-a,:iu)", which thus should refer to the jJaramil,:iu as monad.
For more detail on the atom, its definition and its two types, i.e., dravyaparamii,:iu and sarµ-
ghiitaparamii,:iu, see our endnote at iii. 85bc.
221
LS: AH 23; SAH 64.
222
LVP: The (composite) molecules that involve the body sense-faculty, the eye sense-
faculty, etc., are the "atoms" that are discussed in i. 44ab.
223
LVP: A molecule of sound (1) produced by the hands involves the four fundamental·
material elements, the four derivative material elements, sound, the body sense-faculty: ten
real entities; (2) produced by the tongue, eleven real entities, by adding the tongue sense-
faculty whose invisible atoms are arranged on the tongue. [Note of the translator (i.e., L VP)].
224
LS: This is the fourth of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.44f.).
Dhammajoti clarifies (SA.IY.195) that even though MYS, 665a, presents two answers-
predominance of substance, predominance of effect-it does not comment on which view
represents the orthodox Yaibhii~ika standpoint. On the other hand, Saqighabhadra (Ny, 355b)
"criticizes the Kosakiira for .giving the latter view as the Vaibhii~ika view. According to
Saqighabhadra, the orthodox Yaibhii~ika view is· that of predominance of substance."
As for the predominance of substance, MYS, 682c-683a, explicitly affirms that there can be
a quantitative difference in the mahiibhiitas without contradicting the principle of their insepa-
rability:
Question: Do the mahiibhiita-s increase or decrease in substance (i.e., vary quantita-
tiv~ly)? ... There is a fault in either case-if they increase or decrease, how can they
be inseparable? For, if in a solid substance there are more atoms of Earth (prthivf-
paramii,:iu) and fewer of Water, Fire and Air, the Earth atoms quantitatively inter-
mingled with Water, etc., [accordingly as the case may be,] would be separated from
the other Elements. [On the other hand,] if there is no increase or decrease, sub-
stances like water, stones, etc., ought not to differ in being solid, soft, etc.
Answer: One should say that there is increase or decrease in substance among the
mahiibhiita-s . ... Although there is an increase or decrease, they are not separated,
because together they perform a function by mutually supporting one another. Thus,
in a solid substance, where the number of Earth atoms is greater than those of Water,
Fire and Air, the Earth atoms are incapable of performing their functions in isolation
from Water, etc .... It is like the case of many villages in which there is a collective
management; t.here is a difference in the number of villagers [among the villages],
yet [the villagers are in each case] mutually dependent and cannot be separated.
Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV .196) that "it is therefore clear that inseparability does not
necessarily mean that the four Great Elements are juxtaposed. It means that the four always
co-exist and are functionally interdependent. They are what the Sarvastivadins_ call co-existent
causes to one another. Their inseparability can be inferred from their specific characteristic
and activity that can be observed in all material aggregates."
225
LVP: tiilyo vira1_1il.dipu~pamiilada1_u,la.J:i yil.1,1 shµka(?) iti pril.krtajanapratital,I [WOG.124.6f.].
- See J. Bloch, Formation de la langue marathe, p. 42: sinka (sikya), "a cord to suspend
objects".
LS: Tib.: khab dang sdong bu'i tsogs.
226
LVP: The elementary substance water (abdhiitu) exists in wood (diiru): it is the elemen-
tary substance water that holds things together (sarJ1graha) and that hinders them from
dispersing. It is through the elementary substance fire (tejas) that wood matures (pakti) and
rots. It is through the elementary substance wind that wood moves (vyiihana; prasarpana). -
The elementary substance earth exists within water, since water supports (dhrti) ships; etc. -
· See above F. 22, Vyakhya, p. 34.
227
LS: The objection of how we know that a given composite molecule includes the funda-
mental material elements is addressed from the point of view of predominance of substance
(= mixture) versus predominance of effect(= efficacy, mtensity). Dhammajoti specifies
(SA.IV.193): "SaIµghabhadra informs us [Ny, 352c.ff.] that the Sthavira Srilata ... denies the
existence of the derived tangibles. For him they are nothing more than the specific configura-
tion of the Great Elements. Thus, he argues, the so-called coldness is simply a designation for
the state wherein the Heat Element becomes less or not predominant. Likewise, heaviness or
lightness is simply a designation of the fact that there exists a bigger or smaller quantity of the
Great Elements within a given form of matter."
228
LVP: Iron melts (becomes liquid) due to heat, thus it contains the elementary substance
water; water becomes solid through coldness, thus it contains the elementary substance earth;
solid bodies, rubbed one against the other, become hot, thus they contain the elementary
substance fire, etc.
229
LVP: apsu saityatisayad au~~ya171 gamyate [WOG.124.28f.].
230
LS: L VP mentions the Sautril.ntikas here, but they are not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan.
Yasomitra labels this opinion [WOG.125.5f.] as "Sautrantika".
231 LS: Tib.: gzhan dag na re de dag las de dag sa bon gyi sgo nas yod kyi rang gi ngo bor ni
ma yin te.
The Vyakhyii_ glosses [WOG.125.7.): na svariipato na dravyata ity arthal,I.
232 LVP: santy asmin daruskandhe vividhii dhiitaval,i [see WOG.125.9f.]. -On the meaning of
dhiitu, i. 20.
233 LVP: A presence that results from the definition: the molecule (sa171ghiitaparamii~u)
involves eight [kinds of] real entities.
234 LVP: var1_1avil.n vayur gandhavattvaj jatipu~pavat [WOG.125.20). -See also i. 13cd.
235
LS: AH 23; SAH 64.
236
LS: SAH 64.
237
LVP: yasya svalak1;1at).am asti tad dravyam [see WOG.125.31]. Blue is a real entity
(dravya).
238
LVP: siimiinyavise1;1alak~aQasadbhaviit [WOG.125.32f.]. - Rapa possesses the characteris-
tic ofresistance (rupyate) that is common to color and shape, to blue, etc.
LS: Dhammajoti specifies (SA.IV.203): "Does it refer to ... iiyatana-s (i.e., rupa as rupa-
iiyatana, etc.) each possessing a distinctive common characteristic applicable to the type as a
whole (e.g., all visibles are rupa-s as a type-an iiyatana)?" For the distinction between the
two types of characteristics and their relativity, see the two endnotes to i. 2b (section: Etymo-
logical explanation of dharma and abhi-dharma).
239
LVP: We have seen (i. 13 [F 25]) that an atom or monad never exists in an isolated state.
On this point the Japanese editor cites the commentary (in six chapters) by Hui-hui. P. Pelliot
has discovered this citation in T'ao 83, 5, fol. 414, where it is accompanied by a gloss that
justifies the number of 1,379 atoms for the molecule of visible form, etc.
Errors excepted, here is the meaning of these glosses:
An atom never exists in an isolated state. There are, at the minimum, groups--or molecules-
of seven atoms: four faces, top and bottom: six sides; the center; thus seven. To consider a
molecule of derivative material form (mahiibhutiiny upiidiiya rupam, bhautikarri rupam), for
example, a molecule of visible form (rupa) or of odor (gandha), there are thus seven atoms of
visible form or of odor.
Each of these seven atoms is supported by complexes of seven atoms, seven atoms having the
four fundamental material elements for their nature, seven atoms where the four fundamental
material elements are present.
Each of these seven atoms involves four atoms, atoms of earth, of water, of fire, of wind: the
atom of earth involves seven atoms of earth, etc.
Thus:
1. Seven atoms of earth, of water, of fire, of wind, in total, twenty-eight atoms, constitute
one atom of four-fundamental-material-elements.
2. One atom of four-fundamental-material-elements does not exist isolated: seven of them
are grouped together (7 x 28 = 196) in order lo support one atom of derivative material ele-
ment [196 + 1 = 197].
3. One atom of derivative material element (here, visible form) with its supports, namely,
the atoms of four-fundamental-material-elements (i.e., 196 atoms), form a group with six
other similar atoms: the molecule of derivative material element involves thus 1,379
atoms (7 x 197).
(But any derivative material element possesses visibility, odor, taste, tangibility. Thus this
number should be multiplied by four in order to obtain the smallest part of matter existing in
an isolated state, [i.e., the sarrighatiiparamariu].
240
LVP: chandato hi viiciim pravrttifl I arthas tu parfk~a!t [WOG.126.21]. - That is to say,
chandata icchiital). sarµk1;1epavistaravidhiiniinuvidhayino viical). pravartante I arthas tv iibhyiirµ
parflqyafi [see WOG.126.21].
241
LS: AH 24, 220-21, 224; SAH 15~16, 5~3, 65--66, 450, 453-55, 457,484.
See the chart of the five-group-seventy-five-dharmas classification of the Sarviistiviida at
ii, F 144.
In the following discussion, Vasubandhu defines all the thought-concomitants and formations
dissociated from thought but does not again give a definition of thought (citta = vijfiiina). The
latter he defines at i. 16a and at various other places in the AKB. For the various ways in
which he discusses thought, see our long endnote at i. 16a, which also addresses the difference
in functionality between thought and thought-concomitants. By contrast, in the folk>wing
expositions Vasubandhu stresses the simultaneous arising and cooperation of thought, thought-
concomitants and formations dissociated from thought
In general it can be said that within the five-group classification of factors (paiicavastuka}-
ip comparison to the older threefold classification of aggregates (skandha), sense-spheres
(iiyatana) and elements (dhiitu)-the central role of thought (citta) is highlighted, as can be
seen from the fact that thought (citta) is singled out, forming the second category, whereas all
thought-concomitants (caitta) or formations associated with thought (cittasaf!1prayuktasaf!1-
skiira) are grouped together into the third category and all formations dissociated from thought
(cittaviprayuktasaf!lskiira) into the fourth category.
242
LS: AH 16; SAH 54.
243
Gokhale: [23a] cittacaittiiJ:i sahii 'vasyaf!I
Tib.: [23a] sems dang sems byung nges lhan cig I
LVP: citta = manas·= vijfiiina. [See ii. 34ab].
caitta = caitasa = caitasika = cittasaf!1prayukta.
LS: L Hirakawa (HIB.159f., 162f.) points out that the Sarviistiviidins maintained t~at thought-
concomitants were independent entities as, for example, attachment and hostility seemed to
perform such directly opposed activities that they had to be distinct dharmas. However, in
spite of the independent entities, each person appeared to have a certain unity that marked him
or her as an individual. To explain that unity, the Sarviistiviidins argued that thought (citta) and
thought-concomitants arise at the same time and work associated (saf!1prayukta); see the
discussiop of the fivefold equivalence (samatii), ii. 34bd, and also of the associated cause
(saf!1prayitktakahetu), ii. 53cd, which is an exemplification of the co-existent cause (s,ahabhii-
hetu), ii. 50bd. But Hirakawa further points out that, as the thought and thought-concomitants
arose and ceased in an instant, the theory of saf!1prayukta still did not sufficiently explain this
"certain unity" and that therefore the Sarviistivadins described thought as a ground or base or
stage (citta-bhiimi; see below ii, F 152: the meaning of the term mahiibhiimika). In contrast,
the Yogiiciirins explained this unity by postulating the store-consciousness (iilayavijfiiina),
from which both the conscious thought and its objects arose; but the Sarviistiviidins did not
accept the iilayavijfiiina.
Notice hereby that Vasubandhu, in the brief exposition here, singles out "possession" from the
formations dissociated from thought. But in this context-and in terms of this "certain
unity"-the Sarviistiviidins can naturally also take recourse in their doctrine of sarviistitva,
i.e., the tri-temporal existence of all factors (dharma).
2. As for the Diir~tiintika, Collett Cox (DD.119f.) writes:
It is far more difficult to characterize the Diir~tantika psychological model because

several models of psychological functioning are attributed to the Diir~tiintikas or to
masters aligned with the Diir~tantika school. For example, the *Mahavibhti[fii cites
the Diir~tantikas in general as maintaining that mental operations, or mental forces-
a general term for any type of psychological event, including all thought or thought
concomitants as discriminated by other schools or masters-occur only successively,
and not together in one moment. The Diir~tantikas are also cited as identifying
certain of the discrete thought concomitants recognized by the Sarviistiviida-
Vaibhii~ikas as varieties of thought: for example, initial inquiry (vitarka) and in-
vestigation (victim), or volition (cetanii) and discernment all are identified with
thought. Though the *Mahtivibha[fii does not describe the Diir~tiintikas in general
as equating all thought concomitants with thought, the *Nytiytinustira cites the
Diir~tiintikas as rejecting any distinct thought concomitants [Ny, 395alff.]. In the
*Mahavibhti[fti, this more radical view that all thought concomitants are to be
identified with thought is attributed to a master, Buddhadeva, affiliated with the
Diir~tiintika school. His view is contrasted with that of Dharmatriita, whose views
are also often similar to those associated with the Diir~tiintika school. Dharmatriita
identifies thought and thought concomitants as varieties of volition (cetanii).• Like
the Diir~tiintika view cited above that identifies both volition and discernment with
thought, Dharmatriita's view that identifies thought and thought concomitants with
volition leaves open the possibility that certain thought concomitants could be
recognized to exist independently of thought. Indeed, this is precisely the position
that Sail.ghabhadra attributes to the Dar~tantika master, Sriliita, who is said to reject
all thought concomitants except for three: feelings (vedanii), conception (sa,µ,jfiii),
and volition (cetana).b Sriliita is described as supporting a serial model for the opera-
tion of mental forces: specifically, that the sense organ and the object-field in the first
moment condition the arising of perceptual consciousness in the second moment,
and the collocation of the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness,
condition the successive arising of the three thought concomitants of feelings, con-
cepts, and volition, in the third and subsequent moments [see iii, F 102-7].
• LS: But see more on this in our endnote to i, F 28 bottom.
h See Ny, 384b12. Cf. also Ny, 339b14ff., where Sriliita identifies the forces aggregate (sa,µ,-
skiiraskandha) with volition and explains all specific factors classed withjn the forces aggre-
gate as varieties of volition.
3. As for Vasubandhu himself, Dhammajoti thinks (private communication) that he "may"
have accepted most of the thought-concomitants enumerated in the AKB. See more on this in
our "kila" endnote below (ii. 24).
244
Gokhale: [23b] sarva,µ, sa1J1skrtalak[fa1Jai1J I
Tib.: [23b] thams cad 'dus byas mtshan nyid dang I
245
Gokhale: [23c 1] priiptyii vii
Tib.: [23cl] thob pa'm
246
LS: AH 24, 220-21, 224; SAH 15, 55-66, 450, 453-55, 457,484.
247
LS: The Avatiira states (ESD.81): "[Thi,: conjoined conditionings (i.e., citta-sartiprayukta-
Saf!!Skdra)J are said to be conjoined because of their being on a par (samata) with thought in
five respects, [i.e., because they both] (i) have the same basis (asraya), (ii) have the same
object (alambana), (iii) have the same mode of activity (akara), (iv) are simultaneous, and
(v) because each of them has, [in a given conjunction (samprayoga),] only one substance
(dravya). [See ii. 34bd].
The disjoined conditionings are those that do not COJ?.form to the [five conditions above, and
which belong to the category of neither material nor mental].
All these conjoined and disjoined conditionings are collectively named the 'aggregate of
conditionings' (sal'Jlskara-skandha)."
See also ii. 34bd.
248
LS: AH 17-22, 217; SAH 15, 55-63, 450.
249
LS: AH.17, 19; SAH 55-60.
250
LVP: [This long endnote has three parts:]
A. The theory of thought-concomitants according to Vasubandhu, according to the
Sautriintikas.
B. Prakara,:iapada and Dhatukiiya.
C. Abhidhamma.
A. The commentary of the Vijfiaptimatrasastr~ says that the Sautriintikas have two systems:
1. some, the Diir~tiintikas, maintain that only thought exists, that thought-concomitants do
not exist, in agreement with Buddhadeva (see i. 35 note);
2. others admit the existence of thought-concomitants and are divided into many opinions:
i. that there are three thought-concomitants: sensation (vedana), ideation (sal'Jljfia),
intention (cetana);
ii. that there are four thought-concomitants (by adding coritact [sparsa]);
iii. ten thought-concomitants (the ten generally permeating factors [mahabhamika]),
iv. fourteen thought-concomitants (by adding greed [lobha], hatred [dve~a], delusion
[moha], conceit [mana];
v. furthermore, certain Sautriintikas admit all the thought-concomitants of the Sarviisti-
viidins.
(The information of Wassilief, p. 309, differs:
Among the Sautriintikas, the Bhadanta Diir~tiintika [i.e., "Bhadanta", i, 36] recog-
nizes vedana, sal'Jljfia, cetanii as real, but the Bhadanta Buddhadeva adds sparsa and
manasikiira ... . The Bhadanta SrTiiita ....
Read "Bhadanta Sautriintika" instead of Bhattopama).
See ii. 26cd; iii. 32ab.
On the problem of the thought-concomitants (caitta), Kosa, i, F 64 (footnote), viii, F 159,
ix, F 252, Siddhi, 395; also Compendium, 12.
Vasubandhu presents his doctrine of the thought-concomitants in his Paficaskandhaprakara,:ia
(Nanjio, 1176; Mdo, 58):
What are the thought-concomitants (caitta)?
The factors associated (sa'!lprayukta) with thought, namely:

1. five pervasive (sarvaga) [factors]: sparsa, manaskiira, vedanii, sa'!ljfiii, cetanii;
2. five object-specific' (pratiniyatavi~aya) [factors]: chanda, adhimok~a, smrti,
samiidhi, prajiiii;
3. eleve~ wholesome factors: sraddhii, hr'i, apatriipya, alobha kusalamala, adve~a
kusalamala, amoha kusalamala, v'irya, prasrabdhi, apramiida, upek~ii, avihi'!lsii;
4. six defilements (klesa): raga, pratigha, miina, avidyii, dr~!i, vicikitsii;
5. the other [twenty factors] (se~a) are subsidiary defilements (upaklesa): krodha,
upaniiha, mrak~a, pradiisa, fr~ii, miitsarya, miiyii, siifhya, mada, vihirµsii,
iihrfkya, anapatriipya, styiina, auddhatya, iisraddhya, kaus'idya·, pramiida, mu~ita-
smrtitii, vik~epa, asa'!lprajanya;
6. four [factors], of unstable (or undetermined) character (gzhan du yang 'gyur ba):
kaukrtya, middha, vitarka, viciira.
B. · According to the Prakara,:iapiida (692b20):
There are five factors (dharma): (1) material form (rupa); (2) thought (citta); (3) the
factors of thought-concomitants (caittadharma); (4) formations dissociated from
thought (cittaviprayuktasaf!lskiira); (5) unconditioned factors (asaf!lskrta) . ...
What is thought? It is the thought (citta), the mental faculty (manas), the conscious-
ness (vijfiiina), that is to say, the six categories of consciousness, the visual con-
sciousness, etc.
What are the thought-concomitants (caitta)? All the factors (dharma) associated with
thought. What are these factors? Namely, vedanii, saf!ljfiii, cetanii, sparsa, manasi-
kiira, chanda, adhimukti, smrti, samiidhi, prajfiii, sraddhii, v'irya, vitarka, vicara,
pramada, apramada, kusalamala, akusalamula, avyakrtamala, all the fetters (saf!l-
yojana), proclivities (anusaya), subsidiary defilements (upaklesa), envelopments
(paryavasthiina) (v. 47), all that is cognition (jfiana; vii. 1), all that is view (dr~.ti), all
that is direct realization (abhisamaya; vi. 27), and again all the factors of this type,
associated with thought, are thought-concomitants (caitta).
Further on (698b28 = Dhiitukiiya, 614b10):
There are eighteen elements (dhiitu), twelve sense-spheres (ayatana), six aggregates
(skandha), five appropriative aggregates (upadanaskandha), six elementary sub-
stances (dhiitu), ten generally permeating factors (mahabhumika), ten wholesome
permeating factors (kusalamahabhamika), ten permeating factors of defilement
(klesamahiibhumika), ten factors of defilement of restricted scope (par'ittaklesa-
bhamika), five defilements (klesa), five contacts (saf!lsparsa), five afflicted views
(dr~!i), five faculties (of sensation) (indriya), five factors (dharma), six groups of
consciousnes~ (vijfiiinakiiya), six groups of contact (sparsakiiya), six groups of
sensation (vedaniikiiya), six groups of ideation (saf!ljiilikiiya), six groups of intention
(cetaniikiiya), six groups of craving (tr~,:iakiiya).
What are the eighteen elements (dhiitu)? ...
What are the six elementary substances (dhiitu)? Namely, the elementary substance
earth ... (Kosa, i. 28).
What are the ten generally permeating factors (mahabhiimika)? Namely, sensation
(vedana) ... understanding (prajiia).
What are the ten wholesome permeating factors (kusalamahabhiimika)? Namely,
sraddhii, vfrya, hrf, apatrapa, alobha, adve~a, prasrab</hi, upek~a, apramada,
ahif!lsa. '
What are the ten permeating factors of defilement (klesamahabhamika)? Namely,
asraddhya ... pramada (list cited below ii. 26ac).
What are the ten factors of defilement of restricted scope (parfttaklesabhiimika)?
Namely, krodha, upanaha, mrak~a, pradasa, fr~ya, matsarya, sa{hya, may a, mada,
vihif!lsa.
What are the five defilements (klesa)? Namely, kamaraga, riiparaga, ariipyaraga,
pratigha, vicikitsa (v. 1).
What are the five afflicted views (dmi)? Namely, satkayadr$!i, antagrahadr$!i,
mithyadmi, dr${iparamarsa, !flavrataparamarsa (v. 3).
What are the five contacts (saTflsparsa)? Namely, pratighasaTflsparsa, adhivacanasal'fl-
sparsa, vidyiisaTflsparsa, avidyasaTflsparsa, naivavidyanavidyasaTflsparsa (iii. 30c-3 la) .
What are the five faculties (of sensation) (indriya)? Namely, sukhendriya, duQkha-
indriya, saumanasyendriya, daurmanasyendriya, upe~endriya (ii. 7).
What are the five factors (dharma)1 Namely, vitarka, vicara, vijfiana, ahrfkya,
anapatrapya. [In the Kosa, ii. 27, vitarka and vicara are classified as undetermined
factors (aniyata); ii. 26d, ahrfkya and anapatrapya are classified as unwholesome
permeating factors (akusalamahabhiimika), a category pictured later, see ii. 32ab; as
to the consciousness (vijiiana) referred to by the Prakara,:ta and the Dhatukaya, it
refers without doubt to the six groups of consciousness (vijiianakfiya).]
What are the six groups of consciousness (vijfianakaya)? Namely, visual conscious-
ness (cak~urvijiiana), ... mental consciousness (manovijfiana).
What are the six groups of contact (sal'fl~parsakaya)? Namely, contact of the eye
(cak$UQSllf!ISparsa), ... contact of the mental faculty (manaQSaf!lsparsa) (iii. 30b).
What are the six groups of sensation (vedanakaya)? Namely, cak$UQSllf!ISparsaja-
vedana . .. (iii. 32a).
What are the six groups of ideation (sa'71jfiiikiiya)? Namely, cak$UQSaTflsparsajasal'fljfiii ... .
What are the six groups of intention (cetaniikiiya)? Namely, cak$UQSlll'flSparsajacetanii ... .
What are the six groups of craving (tmiakiiya)? Namely, cak$UQSaTflsparsajatm1ii ... .
The Dhatukaya continues by explaining the generally permeating (actors (mahabhiimika):
What is sensation (vedana)?
See ii. 24 (F 153 note, part C).
C. Kathavatthu, vii. 2-3, the Riijagirikas and the/Siddhatthikas denJ the-association (saf!l-
prayoga) of the factors (dharma), deny,the existence of the thought-concomitants (caitasika);
ix. 8, the Uttariipathakas consider initial inquiry (vitarka) to be a generally permeating factor
(mahabhiimika) (the technical term is missing). - Visuddhimagga, xiv. -Abhidhammasaf!l-
gaha, ii. In Compendium, p. 237, S.Z, Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids make interesting obser-
vations on the development of the doctrine of the thought-concomitants (cetasika).
LS: As for the historical development of the various groups of the thought-concomitants
(caitta), see Bart Dessein's "Dharmas Associated with Awarenesses and the Dating of
Sarviistiviida Abhidharma Works" and Dhammajoti's discussion of the development of the
theory of thought-concomitants (caitasika) (SA.IV.213-24.):
1. Reference to cetasika/caitasika in the nikiiya/iigama: Dhammajoti comments. that there is
"no indication of the abhidharmic theory of caitasika in siitra-s".
2. Development in the early abhidharma texts (Dharmaskandha-siistra, Sarrigftiparyiiya-
siistra, Prajfiapti-siistra): theory of caitasika characterized by a lack of systen1atization.
3. Further development in the abhidharma texts (from the Dhiitukiiya onwards): explicit
classification of the caittas.
Dessein comments (p. 631) that it is the Dhiitukiiya in which the category called mahiibhiimika
appears for the first time.
251
Gokhale: [23c2-d] paficadhii caittii mahiibhiimyiidibhedatafi II
Tib.: [23c.2-d] sems byung rnam Inga ste I sa mang la sogs tha dad phyir I
I..i: 1. Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka (ISBP.231) states:
4.1 What are the mental factors? Those entities that are concomitant.s of con•~cious-
ness. What are they? Contact, attention, [ ... ]and reflection.
Among these, five are universal, five are limited to a particular object, eleven are
virtues, six are [root] mental afflictions·, the remaining ones are seconllary mental
afflictions, and four can also vary.
2. MYS, 220bc, lists (SA.IV.216) seven classes totaling fifty-eight dharmas, i.e., adding
two classes:
vi. The universal veiled-non-defined dharma-s (nivrta-avyiikrta-mahiibhiimika):
dharma-s which exist in all nivrta-avyakrta-citta-s-citta conjoined with the
satkiiyadr~fi and antagrahadr~ti. pertaining to the kiimiivacara; citta conjoined
with all the defilements pertaining to the riipa- or iiriipy9-dhiitu; all nivrta-
avyakrta-citta-s existing in the mind-ground [mano-bhiimi] or the first five
groups of consciousness.
vii. The universal non-veiled-non-defined dharma-s (anivrta-avyakrta-mahiibhiimika):
dharma-s which exist in all anivrta-avyakrta-citta-s-whether bound to kiima-,
riipa- or iiriipya-dhiitu; in the mind-ground or the first five groups of conscious-
ness; whether retribution-born (vipiikaja), pertaining to deportment (airyapathika),
pertaining to arts and crafts (sailpa-sthiinika) or supernormal power (lit. "fruit of
higher knowledge", abhijfiii-phala = nairmiiJJika).
3. See AKB ii. 30ab for a discussion of the obscured and unobscured non-defined thought
and thought-concomitants.
4. For the Sautriintika explanation of the expression mahiibhiimika and their doctrine of
the generally permeating factors (mahiibhiimika), the wholesome permeating factors (kusala-
mahiibhiimika), etc., see the discussion in chapter 3, F 104ff.
For Vasubandhu's position, see our endnote below.
252
LS: The MVS, 220b, explains (SA.IV.215): "The universal dharma-s (mahiibhiimika):
dharma-s which exist in all types of citta-whether kli~fa or akli~fa; siisrava or aniisrava;
kusala, akusala or avyiikrta; bound to the three realms of existence or not bound to any sphere;
pertaining to the trainee (saik~a), to the non-trainee (asaik~a) or to neither; abandonable by
vision (darsana-heya), by cultivation (bhiivanii-heya) or not to be abandoned (aheya); in the
mind-ground (mano-bhiimi) or in the first five groups of consciousness."
253
LS: The MVS, 220 b-c, explains (SA.IV.216): "The universal dharma-s of defilement
(klesa-mahiibhiimika): dharma-s which exist in all defiled citta-s-whether akusala or
avyiikrta; bound to any sphere of existence; abandonable by vision or cultivation; in the mind-
ground or the first five groups of consciousness."
254
LS: The MVS, 220 b-c, explains (SA.IV .216): "The defilements of restricted scope
(parftta-klesa-bhiimika): dharma-s which exist only in a small number of defiled citta-s, are
abandonable by cultivation and exist in only the mind-ground; 'when one arises there is
necessarily not a second one, being mutually opposed'."
255
LS: Regarding the undetermined (aniyata) thought-concomitants, Dhammajoti writes
(SA.IV.222f.):
Among the extant abhidharma texts, AKB was apparently the first to make an
explicit mention of this class .... This class seems to be acceptable to the Vaibhii~ikas;
Sru:pghahhadra, for one, mentions it in the same way [Ny, 392a].
Yasomitra explains that they refer to "those which sometimes exist in a skillful,
sometimes in an unskillful, sometimes in a non-defined thought. ...
Yasomitra [Vy, 132.14ff.] further remarks that by the word "etc. [i.e., middh'iidayal;z;
AKB ii. 27]", in Vasubandhu's prose commentary, are to be included:
1. secondary defilements (upaklesa) such as disgust (arati), yawning (vijrmbhikii),
exhaustion (tandrl), uneven consumption of food (bhakte asamatii) (these four
together with mental sunken-ness (cetaso lfnatva) occur in AKB [v. 59bc] as the
five nourishments (iihiira) of torpor-sleep (styiina-middha); and
2. defilements such as greed (riiga), etc. "These [thought-concomitants], greed,
etc., are indeterminate with regard to [their inclusion in] any of the five classes:
They are not mahiibhiimika-s ·because they are not found in all cases of thought;
not kusala-mahiibhiimika-s because they are not connected with skillfulness
(kusalatva-ayogiit); not klesa-mahiibhiimika-s because they are not found in all
cases of defiled thought-for greed does not exist in a mind conjoined with
hostility (sa-pratighe cetasi) nor does hostility exist in a mind conjoined with
greed (sariige cetasi)" [WOG.132.15ff.].
He further quotes a stanza [WOG.132.20ff.] by iiciirya Vasumitra which states that
eight aniyata dharma-s are recognized-vitarka, viciira, kaukrtya, middha, pratigha,
sakti (= riiga), miina and vicikitsii. It is to be noted that later on Pu Guang, a promi-
nent disciple of Xuan Zang, followed this tradition and explained tflat the word ."etc."
in the AKB stanza subsumes greed, hostility, conceit and doubt.

However, Yasomitra here objects [WOG.132.23f.] to the number of eight, for "why
are view (dr~ti), etc., not conceded as indeterminate as well-since false view
[mithya-dr~ti] does not arise in a thought conjoined with either hostility or doubt?"
256
LS: AH 17; SAH 55-56.
257
LS: AH 17, SAH 56.
258
LVP: According to the MVS, 80b8, cited by the Japanese editor: What is the meaning of
the expression mahabhamikadharma?
1. The great refers to thought; these ten factors are the bhumi, the place of arising of
thought; being the bhami of the "great", they are called mahabhami. Being mahabhami and
dharmas, they are·mahabhamikadharmas.
2. Some say: Thought is great due to the superiority of its nature and of its activity; it is
great and it is a bhami, thus it is called mahiibhumi, because it is the place that serves as basis
of the thought-concomitants (caitta). The ten factors (dharma), sensation (vedana), etc., because
one encounters them everywhere in the mahabhumi, are called mahabhamikadharmas.
3. Some say: The ten factors (dharma), sensation, etc., occurring everywhere with thought,
are called great; tP.ought, being their bhumi, is called mahabhumi; sensation, etc., being inher-
ent in the mahiibhami, are called mahiibhumikadharmas.
Vasubandhu reproduces the third etymology.
We shall see (iii. 32ab [F 104f.]) that Sriliibha does not admit this definition of the term mahii-
bhamika.
Theory of the connection (sa1J1sarga) of pafifili and vififiii~a. Majjhima, i, 293.
259
LS: AH 17; SAH 55.
260
LS: LVP has in his volume 1: resolution (adhimukti) instead of resolve (adhimok.ra), but
footnote iii, F 104 states: "One should replace adhimukti by adhimok~a at ii,'F 153, 155." Also
in LVP's Additions and Corrections (vol. vi), he writes: "F 153: Read adhimok~a and not
adhimukti. The reading adhimukti seemed justified to me based on Vyiikhya cited vol. ii, F 154,
n. 5".
261
Gokhale: [24] vedanii cetana sa1J1jfiii chandaJ:i sparso matiJ:i smrtiJ:i I manaskaro 'dhi-
mok~as ca samiidhilJ sarvacetasi I
Tib.: [24] tshor dang sems pa 'du shes dang I 'dun dang reg dang blo gros dran Iyid la byed
dang mos pa dang I ting nge 'dzin sems thams cad la I
LVP: [In regard to adhimok~aladhimukti, note that we adjusted the kiirika 11nd its commentary,
since LVP states in his footnote at iii, F 104 that one should replace adhimukti by adhimok~a at
ii, F 153, 155; but we did not adjust his footnotes.]
A. Hstian-tsang corrects: vedana, sa1J1jfia, cetana, spar§q, chanda, prajfiii, smrti, manaskara,
adhimukti, samiidhi.
The order of the Abhidharma (Prakara~apiida, Dhiitukaya) is the following: vedana, sa1J1jfia,
cetana, sparsa, manaskara, chanda, adhimukti, smrti, samiidhi, prajfiii.
Vasubandhu (Paficaskandhaka) distinguishes five pervasive (sarvatraga) factors: sparsa,
manaskiira, vedanii, saf!ljiiii and cetanii, and five object-specific (pratiniyatavi1aya) factors:
chanda, adhimukti, smrti, samiidhi and prajiiii.
The order of Mahiivyutpatti 104 (which reads adhimok1a) differs from other sources.
The reading of adhimukti is confirmed by the Vyiikhyii citing BhiifYa, ii. 26ac,'"F 162.
B. We have inserted the essential part from the Vyiikhyii [W OG .127 .23-128.7] into the text:
cetanii cittiibhisaf!lskiira iti. citta-praspandal;l praspanda iva praspanda ity arthaJ:i.
visaya-nimitta-griiha iti. vi1aya-vi§e~a-riipa-griiha ity arthaJ:i. sparsa-indriya-vi1aya-
vijiiiina-saf!1nipiita-jii spr1tir iti. indriya-vi1aya-vijiiiiniiniif!1 saf!lnipiitiij jiitii SPr1fifl.
spr1fir iva spr1tifl. yad-yogiid indriya-vi1aya-vijiiiiniiny anyonyaip sprsantiva sa
sparfat,. dharma-pravicaya iti. pravicinofiti pravicayat,. praviciyante vii anena dharmii
iti pravicayat,. yena saipkin:tii iva dharmiit,. pu~pii1jiva praviciyante ucciyanta ity
arthaJ:i. ime siisravii ime 'niisraviiJ:i. ime rupil).al;l ime 'rupil).a iti. dharmiil).iitp pra-
vicayaJ:i dharma-pravicayat,. pratitatviit prajiieti vaktavye sloka-bandh'iinu gul).yena
rnatir iti kiirikiiyiim uktatp. smrtir iilambaniisaf!1pramo1a iti. yad-yogiid iilambanaf!l
na mano vismarati. tac ciibhilapativa. sii smrtiJ:i manaskiiras cetasa iibhoga iti. ii-
lambane cetasa iivarjanam. avadhiiral).am ity arthal;l. manasal;l kiire. manaskiirat,.
mano vii karoti iivarjayatiti mtinaskiirat,. adhimuktis tad-iilambanasya gul).ato 'va-
dhiira,:iaf!l. rucir ity anye. yathiiniscayayaip dhiiral).eti. Y og 'iiciira-cittiil;l. samiidhis
cittasyaikiigrateti. agram iilambanam ity eko 'rthal;l. yad-yogiic cittaip prabhandena
ekatr' iilambane vartiite. sa samiidhit,. yadi samiidhiJ:i sarva-cetasi bhavati. kim arthaip
dhyiine~u yatnal;l kriyate. balavat-samiidhi-ni~piidaniirthaip..
Here is the Tibetan version of the Bhii1ya:
'tshor ba ni myong ba rnam pa gsum ste I bde ba dang I sdug bsngal dang I bde ba yang ma yin
sdug bsngal yang ma yin pa' o I sems pa ni sems mngon par 'du byed pa' o I 'du shes ni 'dus nas
shes paste I yul la mtshan mar 'dzin pa'o 11 'dun pa ni byed 'dod pa'o 11 reg pa ni yul dang
dbang po dang rnam par shes pa 'dus pa. las skyes pa 'i reg pa' o 11 blo gros ni shes rab ste I chos
rab tu mam par 'byed pa'o 11 dran pa ni dmigs pa mi brjed pa'o 11 yid la byed pa ni sems kyi 'jug
pa'o I mos pa ni 'dod pa'o I ting nge 'dzin ni sems rtsa gcig pa nyid do I
C. The Dhiitukiiya (614c22) gives definitions that are all in the style of the Abhidhamma. For
example, concentration (s<lmiidhi) is defined: "The sthiti of thought, the sarµ.sthiti, the abhi-
1fhiti, the upasthiti, the avik1epa, the agha(!ana, the sarµ.dhiira,:ia, the samatha, the samiidhi, the
cittasyaikiigratii, this is what is called conc~ntration." (Vibhaliga, p. 217, Dhammasaliga,:ii, 11).
In the same way, sensation (vedanii) is vedanii, saf!lvedanii, pratisaf!1vedanii, vedita, that which
will be experienced, that which is included within vedanii. - Mindfulness (smrti) is smrti,
anusmrti, pratismrti, smara,:ia, asaf!1pramo1atii ... cetaso 'bhiliipa.
262
LVP: The word kila ["so said", "so reported") shows that the author presents the opinion
of the School (Vibhii1ii, 12, 10). He has explained fiis own doctrine in the Paiicaskandhaka
cited in Vyiikhyii to iii. 32 [WOG.339.7:lf.,]; we will compare the definitions of this text with
those of the Twenty Verses, Siddhi and Abhisamayiilarµ.kiiriiloka.
LS: See iii. 104f. for a discussion of different interpretations of the status of the generally
permeating factors (mahiibhiimika) and Vasubandhu 's stance on it. Referring to iii. 104f.,
Kritzer comments (RCYA.135) "Vasubandhu agrees with the Vaibhii~ikas regarding the
meaning of mahiibhiimika and the simultaneity of spar.fa and vedanii and disagrees with the
opponent, even though he only accepts half of the Vaibhii~ikas' list of mahiibhiimikas as being
truly universal. Elsewhere [WOG.127.20-23], Yasomitra refers to the Paiicaskandhaka to
show the contrast between a position mentioned in the Abhidharmakosabhii~a and Vasu-
bandhu's own. For example, when Vasubandhu comments on Abhidharmakosa II24, which
gives the Vaibhii~ika list of mahiibhiimikas, he uses the word kila to indicate that he himself
does not believe that they are all present at every moment, and Yasomitra mentions the defini-
tions of chanda and adhimoksa in the Paiicaskandhaka to illustrate that Vasubandhu really
believes that they are pratiniyata [i.e., of limited occurence]."
Dhammajoti explains (private communication) that "although in AKB ii. 24, Vasubandhu uses
'kila' when explaining the Vaibhii~ika view that there are ten mahiibhiimika-s, he does not
contest their realities. Saxµghabhadra (Ny, 384aff.) also does not charge that Vasubandhu
denies any of them. He disputes only with SrTiiita who asserts that there are only three
mahiibhamika-s, denying sparsa and the rest as non-entities (Ny, 384b).... [Also note that]
in AKB iii. 28cd, Vasubandhu refutes the Sautriintikas and others, and adopts the Sarviistiviida
view that avidyii is a distinct entity.
It is fairly safe to say that Vasubandhu accepts at least the ten thought-concomitants known as
the mahiibhiimika-s even though he may classify them somewhat differently, as in his Paiica-
skandhaka (following Yasomitra's suggestion): There he groups the first five as 'sarvatraga',
and the next five as 'pratiniyata' (as in Yogiiciira). In fact, if we judge by this text, he would
accept most of the caitta-s enumerated in AKB. Note. further that he describes them all as
sal'{lprayukta-saqiskiira-s, conjoined with citta. (This remark, however, does not take into
consideration the question as to whether at the time of composing the Paficaskandhaka he had
already held the view of vijiiaptimiitra).'.'
263
LS: Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (ISBP.231) states:
2. What is feeling? The three types of experience: pleasant, unpleasant, and neither
pleasant nor unpleasant. A pleasant experience is one that you de.sire to be united
with again when it ceases. An unpleasant experience is one that you desire to be
separated from when it arises. An experience that is neither pleasant nor unpleasant
is one for which you develop neither of those desires when it occurs.
Avatiira (E~D.79): "There are three kinds of experience (anubhava): (i) pleasurable (sukha),
(ii) unpleasurable (du~kha) and (iii) neither pleasurable nor unpleasurable (adu~kha-asukha).
These are the experiencing of three results of contact (sparsiinubhavana)."
264
LS: Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.5 cetanii katamii Igw:zato do,Fato 'nubhayatas cittabhisal'{lskiiro manaskarma I
4.1.5 What is volition? It is the shaping of consciousness.in relation to that which is
good, bad, or neither; and it is activity of the mind. ISBP.232
Ny, 384b (SA.IV.217): "Cetanii is that which causes citta to do kusala, akusala and avyiikrta
[karma], resulting in good, bad and neutral [vipiika]. On account of the existence of cetanii, the
citta has the activity of moving forth with regard to the object. It is like a magnet, owing to the
force of which iron can move forth."
Avatara (ESD.82): "Volition (cetanii) is that which renders thought [karmically] creative
(abhisarµskiira)-it is mental karma. This is also to say that it moves forth (pta--f syand) the
thought."
265
LS: Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (ISBP.231) states:
3. What is conception? The grasping of an object's sign, which is of three types:
limited, great, and immeasurable.
Ny, 384b (SA.IV.218): "That which causes the determination and grasping of the diverse
forms (nimitta) of male, female, etc., is named ideation."
Avatiira (ESD.80): "This is that which comprehends, by combining conceptually (sarµ--fjfiii)
the appearance (nimitta), name (niima) and the signified (artha) [of a dharma]. That is, with
regard to matter like blue, yellow, long and short [figures], etc.; sounds like those of a conch-
shell, a drum, etc.; smells like those of gharu-wood and musk, etc., tastes like those of saltiness
and bitterness, etc., tangibles like those of hardness and softness, etc., dharma-s like males and
females, etc.-it comprehends them, [in each case], by conceptually combining together (eka-
-{jfiii) their appearances, names and signification. It is the cause of reasoning (vitarka) and
inv~stigation (viciira). Thus, this is named ideation."
266
LVP: Compare Atthasiilinf, 329: kattukamyatii. (See iL 55cd arid iii, 1, where predilection
(chanda) is defined as aniigate priirthanii.)
LS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.6 chanda~ katama~ Iabhiprete vastuny abhilii~a~ I
4.1.6 What is aspiration? The desire for an object that has been thought about.
ISBP.232
Sthiraniati, commenting on the Paiicaskandhaka, states (ISBP.277f.):
The reason for saying that the object must be one that "has been thought about" is to
make clear that no aspiration can develop toward something that has not been
thought about. Thus, it indicates the quality that aspiration [only] occurs in relation to
a particular kind of object:
An entity that has been thought about is one that has been considered as a possible
object for such actions as seeing, hearing, and the like. Thus, [aspiration is] a desire
for and an eagerness to see, hear, etc., some. particular thing.
Avatiira (ESD.82): "Predilection (chanda) is the liking for an undertaking (kartu-kiimatii). It
accords with vigor (vfrya), [arising from the thought]: 'I will make such and such an undertak-
ing'."
2. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.218) that chanda is the desire for action (kartu-kiimatii)
and is indispensable for the undertaking of any action, wholesome or unwholesome. AKB
v. 16 and 18ab distinguish chanda from desire in the bad sense of attachment (riiga) and
craving (tm1ii).
267
4.1.1 sparsa~ katama~ I trikasamaviiye pariccheda~ I
4.1.1 What is contact? The determination that occurs upon the convergence of
three. ISBP.232
Avatiira (ESD.82): "Contact (sparsa) is that which is born of the coming together (sarµ-
nipiitaja) of the faculty, the object and consciousness, and which enables thought to come in
contact with the object. It has the characteristic of enlivening the thought-concomitants
(caitasika-dharma-jfvanalalcya,;ialJ,). "
2. Kritzer comments (RCYA.113) that this is Vasubandhu's clearest and most detailed
description of the Sarviistiviidin definition of contact. Vasubandhu, however, does not discuss
the Diir~tiintika position on contact here. For this and the controversy in regard to its existential
status, see Vasubandhu's more detailed discussion of contact at iii. 30b-31 (F 95-101).
Dhammajoti writes (SA.IV.218): "The early Sarviistiviidin Diir~tiintikas deny the reality of
contact, citing the sutra passage which speaks of the coming together of the three-the visual
faculty, the visible and the visual consciousness-as contact. So also the Sautriintika SrTiiita.
The MVS compilers argue that contact is not the mere meeting of these three. They in fact
serve as the conditions for the arising of a real entity called contact. Without the operation
of this real force, the fact of contact among the three would be impossible." But the MVS,
983c-984, also distinguishes between two kinds of contact (ESD.142):
Question: The sparsa conjoined with the [first] five sensory consciousnesses arises
from the indriya, vi~aya and vijfiiina [which equally exist] in the present: It is said to
be a sparsa [born of] the coming-together of the three-this is admissible. [But in the
case of] the sparsa conjoined with manovijfiiina, the indriya is past, the vi~aya may
be [present, past or] future, the vijfiiina is present, how can it be said to be a sparsa
[born of] the coming-together?
Answer: J'here are two kinds of coming-together: (i) coming-together in the sense of
co-arising and mutually not separated from each other; (ii) coming-together in the
sense of not mutually contradictory, and co-operating in achieving one and the same thing.
268
LVP: Paficaskandhaka: upaparfk~ye vastuni pravicayo yogiiyogavihito 'nyathii ca.
LS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka (2008) states (ISBP.232, 235):
4.1.10 prajfiii katamii I tatraiva pravicayo yogiiyogavihito 'nyatluJ ca I
4.1.10 What is wisdom? Discrimination with respect to that same object [i.e., the
object that is closely examined], whether it is generated correctly, incorrectly, or
otherwise.
4.'i.26 dr~fil:i katamii I pafica dmayalJ, - satkiiyadr~tir antagriihadr~fir mithyadr~fir
dr~fipariimarsalJ, sflavratapariimarsas ca I
4.1.26 What are views? There are five views: the perishable collection view, the
view that grasps an extreme, wrong view, the consideration that views are supreme,
and the consideration that morality and asceticism are supreme.
4.1.26.1 satkiiyadr~til:i katamii Ipaficopiidiinaskandhiin iitmata iitmfyato vii samanu-
pafyato yii kli~fii prajfiii \
4.1.26.1 What is the perishable collection view? The afflicted wisdom that regards
the five grasping heaps as "I" and "mine".
4; 1.26.2 antagriihadr~!il:i katamii I tam eviidhipatilJ'I krtvii siisvatata ucchedato vii
samanupasyato ya kli~fii prajnii I
4.1.26.2 What is the view that grasps an extreme? The afflicted wisdom that, in
relation to that very [view], regards [its object] as undergoing extinction or as

existing permanently.
4.1.26.3 mithyadmtf:1 katama I hetu,ri vapavadatafi phala,ri va kriyam va sad va
vastu nasayato va ya klif!d prajiia I · ·
4,1.26.3 What is wrong view? The afflicted wisdom that denies causes, results, and
actions, and rejects entities that exist.
4.1.26.4 drffiparamarsati katamati I tam eva ca trividha,ri drffi,ri tadasraya,ris ca
skandhan agratafi sreffhato visiffatafi paramatafi samanupa§yato ya kliffd prajiia I
4.1.26.4 What is the consideration that views are supreme? The afflicted wisdom
that regards those very three views and their basis, the heaps, as foremost, superior,
most excellent, and the highest.
4.1.26.5 sflavrataparamarsati katamati I sfla,ri vrata,ri tadasraya,ris ca skandhan
suddhito muktito nairya,:iikatas ca samanupa§yato ya kliffa prajiia·I
4.1.26.5 What is the consideration that morality and asceticism are supreme? The
afflicted wisdom that regards morality, asceticism, and their basis, the heaps, as
purifying, liberating, and conducive to deliverance.
Sthiramati, commenting on the Paiicaskandhaka, states (ISBP.280):
The phrase "That same object" means the very same "object that is closely exam-
ined". Thus, wisdom is also being indicated as having a specific object, as was the
case with concentration.
Avatara (ESD.83): •:understanding (prajiia) is the discernment (pravicaya) of dharma-s. It is
the examination (upalakfa,:ta), as the case may be, of the following eight kinds of dharma-s:
inclusion (salflgraha), conjunction (salflprayoga), endowment (samanvagama), causes (hetu),
conditions (pratyaya), fruitions (phala), specific.characteristic (sva-laqa,:ia), common-charac-
teristic (samanya-lakfa,:ia)."
2. Vasubandhu has already discussed the importance of understanding (prajiiji) in the con-
text of (i) the three types of Abhidharma (i. 2ab), (ii) cessation due to deliberation (prati-
salflkhya-nirodha), (iii) the three types of conceptualizing activity (vikalpa; i. 33) and (iv) the
last four controlling faculties (i. 48cd and beginning of chapter 2), i.e., the praxis-oriented
faculty of understanding (prajiiendriya) and the three pure controlling faculties: the faculty of
coming to know what is not yet known (anajiiatamajiiasyamfndriya), the faculty of perfect
knowledge (ajiiendriya) and the faculty of final and perfect knowledge (ajiiatavfndriya). See in
particular our endnotes to i. 2ab and 33, which list the main issues and the other main sections
where prajiia is discussed in the AKB. Dhammajoti summarizes as follows (SA.IV.218f.):
[Understanding (prajiia)], defined as the investiiation of dharma-s (dharmapra-
vicaya), is one of the most important caitta-s. For the Abhidharmikas, "apart from
dharma-pravicaya (= prajiia), there is no proper means for the appeasement of
defilements on account of which the world wanders in the ocean of existence" [AKB
i. 3]. In its pure form, it is abhidharma per se [i. 2a]. The specific understanding that
operates in the discernment of the four noble truths in the course of spiritual progress
is called discriminative deliberation (/consideration) [i. 6]. It is through this that
absolute cessation of a defilement, and finally nirva,:ia (= pratisalflkhya-nirodha), is
acquired. In other words, when fully perfected, prajfiii is the perfect wisdom of a
Buddha. However, in its general functioning, it may be pure or impure, right or
erroneous. Thus, all views, both right or false, are prajiiii in their essential nature.
Likewise, asalJlprajanya [lack of proper discernment] and akli~ta-ajfiiina [non-
defiled ignorance] are also prajfiii. Prajfiii is in fact the sine qua non for the element
of understanding in any perceptual process. Saqighabhadra explains [Ny, 396a] that,
among the various caitta-s conjoined with a citta, it is prajfiii alone that has the
function of being aware. Hplays a predominant role in powering the mental capacity
of conceptual discrimination.
In regard to prajiiii as defilement (klesa), i.e., the five afflicted views (dr~ti), see chapter 5,
particularly v, F 15-26.
269
LVP: See i. 33; ii, F 162; vi, F 258.
LS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states (SWV.68-69):
4.1.8 smrti/:t katamii I salJlstute vastuny asampramo~as cetaso 'bhilapanatii I
4.1.8 What is recollection? The avoidance of inattentiveness toward a familiar
object; a state o~ mental discourse. ISBP.232
Sthiramati, commenting on the Paiicaskandh{lka, states (ISBP.279):
The term "familiar" indicates that there can be no recollection of an object that is
unfamiliar. A familiar object is one that was previously experienced.
Saqighabhadra (Ny, 384b7f; OP.60): "Mindfulness is the cause of the notation (abhilapana)
and non-loss (asalJlpramo~a) of the object-support."
Avatiira (ESD.83): "Mindfulness (smrti) is that which enables thought to remember an object
clearly (cittasyiirthiibhilapanii); i.e., not to forget (avipramo~a) what has been done (krta), is
now being done (kriyamiina), or will be done in the future (kartavya)."
2. Vasubandhu has already discussed the importance of mindfulness (smrti) tn the context of
the three types of conceptualizing activity (vikalpa; i. 33) and the last four controlling faculties
(i. 48cd and beginning of chapter 2), i.e., the praxis-oriented faculty of mindfulness (smrti-
indriya) and the three pure controlling faculties: the faculty of coming to know what is not yet
known (aniijiiiitamiijiiiisyiimfndriya), the faculty of perfect knowledge (iijfiendriya) and the
faculty of final and perfect knowledge (iijfiiitiivfndriya). As one of the five praxis-oriented
controlling faculties it is naturally also addressed throughout chapter 6 (EXPOSITION OF THE
PATH AND THE PERSONS), as also within chapter 7 (EXPOSITION OF THE COGNITIONS) and
chapter 8 (EXPOSITION OF THE MEDITATIVE ATTAINMENTS). Memory is discussed in chapter 9
(F 273-79). Depending on the context, in the AKB smrti, smara~a. etc., are discussed and
translated variously (conceptualizing activity consisting of recollecting; mindfulness; applica-
tions of mindfulness; memory; etc.): see i. 33, 48cd; v, F 6f; vi. 14ff; ix, F 273-79.
3. As for our definition here in the AKB, Jaini comments (CPBS.281f., 284):
Vasubandhu ... defines smrti as the "retention of' or "not letting drop the object"
(iilambana-asampramo~a). He however does not specify if the term object in this
definition is past or present and thus leaves open the possibility that the term could
be taken to mean either memory of the past or mindfulness of the present. . . . [Yet]
the fact that smrti is found in every mental event can only lead one to conclude
that here too the term smrti is understood to mean mindfulness and not memory of
the past, for the latter is not a phenomenon that occurs at all times. Vasubandhu
must have perceived some anomaly here, for in this Paftcaskandhakaprakara,:ia,
smrti is not included in the group of mental factors that occur invariably, but in the
next group of five factors that are found only in certain mental events (viniyata-
dharmas). [ ... ]
We already have referred to Vasubandhu's brief definition of smrti and how it was
understood as mindfulness by the Vaibha~ikas. However, in his appendix to the
Abhidhamiakosabhii~ya, called the Pudgalaviniscaya, Vasubandhu provides us with
detailed material on smrti, not as he defined it earlier as mindfulness, but as memory
of-the past.
4. As for the historical development of mindfulness, in his article The four concentrations of
mindfulness: on the historical development of a spiritual practice of Buddhism (VKA265),
Lambert Schmithausen comments that the four concentrations of mindfulness could be seen to
function as a mirror for a great part of the Buddhist history of ideas, in which, in the course
of development, nearly all dominant theories of the different directions of Buddhism are
mirrored. He states that-originally being largely a formal, content-neutral training of the
capacity of attentiveness-the framework of the four "concentrations of mindfulness" was, at
the same time, an empty structure, which, if need be, could be filled with all kinds of possible
contents and indeed also was so filled. Here we will therefore discuss smrti more extensively
by relying mainly on Collett Cox's article Mindfulness and memory. The scope of smrtifrom
early Buddhism to the Sarviistiviida Abhidharma.
i. In her Introduction she comments that it would be tempting to distinguish two distinct
functions of smrti which, in various contexts, suggest themselves, namely, smrti (a) as a tech-
nique central to religious praxis and (b) as an aspect of ordinary psychological processes. The
first is a mode of attentiveness operative in several Buddhist models for practice and the
second coincid.es with some of the psychological operations normally associated in the West
with memory: specifically, retention and recollection. She concludes, however, that "the
apparent twofold distinction in the functioning of smrti does not represent a semantic bifurca-
tion, but rather an interrelated semantic complex".
ii. Mindfulness in Early Buddhist Scriptures: In the first actual part of her article she
investigates mindfulness in early Buddhist scriptures, where mindfulness refers "almost exclu-
sively to techniques of religious praxis, its importance ... amply indicated by its inclusion in
many of the lists of exercises or qualities that the early scriptural collections recommend
as aids in abandoning all defilements and attaining enlightenment" [see vi. 67-75b]. In this
context she also refers to Schmithausen's article The four concentrations of mindfulness,
which reconstructs the original form of this practice. Schmithausen summarizes his results
(VKA.265f.):
[a] [The original form] must have consisted in a progressive training of the faculty
of awareness, starti11:g from various bodily postures as simple objects of Mindfulness,
then passing over to feelings and mental states as subtler objects, and finally directed
on the psychic factors (dharmas) responsible for bondage and release, and on the
mechanism of their origination, the aim being to subjugate the bad factors and foster
the good ones.
[b] In the literary form which the four Applications of Mindfulness have found in
the received Satipaf!hiinasutta, the description of the Application of Mindfulness to
the Body has been enlarged by the incorporation of various other spiritual practices
concerned with the body, especially breath control, contemplation of the impure
constituents of the body, and contemplation of corpses.
The last two practices seem to reveal a tendency to choose objects of meditation
because they were suited not only to train awareness, but also to inculcate the
detestability and negativity of existence and thus to prepare the way for the realiza-
tion of the Noble Truth of Suffering. [ ... ]
[c] The tendency to transform the four Applications of Mindfulness into forms of
contemplation aimed at evaluating their objects in terms of the Buddhist analysis of
existence thus virtually anticipating the realization of the Noble Truth of Suffering, i;
particularly in evidence in a part of a stereotyped conclusion formula which recurs at
the end of each paragraph of the Satipaf!hiinasutta and which admonishes that one
should contemplate on the objects of meditation of the paragraph concerned as
subject to origination and decay.
In the context of the early Buddhist scripture, Cox comments that the practice of mindfulness
is often treated as being "tantamourtt to the central praxis of Buddhism: namely, as the single
path leading to the ultimate soteriological goal of enlightenment .and nirviil].a". She then also
addresses the operation of mindfulness and its relation to other mental functions, for example,
to awareness (samprajanya).
iii. Mindfulness as a Technique of Religious Praxis in Abhidharma: In the second part of her
article, Collett Cox focuses in particular on the four applications of mindfulness (see vi. 14-16),
in regard to which Schmithausen continues his above summary:
And the same tendency is systematically worked out by the Hinayana Schools of
Abhidharma, especially by the Sarviistiviidins, who explicitly define the four Appli-
cations of Mindfulness as a spiritual exercise preparatory to the realization of the
Four Noble Truths and as consisting in contemplating on their objects as imperma-
nent, entailing suffering (dufikha), and without Self.
Cox states (p. 73f.):
The northern Indian Abhidharma texts continue the tradition of mindfulness as a
technique of religious praxis, but not without significant changes in its character and
operation. The four applications of mindfulness are no longer recommended as a
completely independent and self-sufficient technique of praxis, but rather are in-
cluded as the first four members in the standardized list of thirty-seven aids to
enlightenment (bodhipakfYa). The thirty-seven aids are further incorporated within a
new path structure [i.e., the five paths] [... ] Though particularly associated with and
predominant in this initial stage of praxis, the four applications, like all of the
subsequent aids, nonetheless are said to characterize the entire path from their stage
of predominance onward Therefore, they continue to be practiced throughout the
entire path. [ ... ] When discussing the four applications of mindfulness, Abhidharma
texts focus on three issues: [a] the nature of their respective objects; [b] the distinc-
tive character of their mode of operation; and [c] their relation to other techniques of
religious praxis.
As for the first issue, the objects taken together are extended to encompass all possible factors
(see vi. 14cd, 16).
As for the second and third, Cox comments (p. 75) that "the four applications, originally
classified within the mindfulness component among the controlling factors, forces, limbs of
enlightenment, and members of the eightfold noble path, are reclassified in later Abhidharma
texts among the corresponding insight [prajiiii] components" (see vi. 15ab). She then investi-
gates the relationship between mindfulness and understanding (prajiiii) (see vi, F 160f.). At
vi, F 160f., discussing the compound smrtyupasthana (mindfulness applications), Vasubandhu
presents the two alternatives, i.e., either understanding is applied through mindfulness oi:
mindfulness through understanding. Vasubandhu opts for the second, i.e., in the operation of
mindfulness, one fixes or notes (abhilapana) the object through mindfulness as it had been
seen through understanding. This then forms the bridge to the psychological retentive, and
possibly recollective, aspects of mindfulness as discussed here at ii. 24 and later in chapter 9,
F 274-78.
iv. The Development of a Psychological Description of Mindfulness in Abhidharma: In the
third part of her article, Collett Cox explains that parallel to the reinterpretation of the
applications of mindfulness as varieties of understanding (prajiiii), "there emerges a new
analysis of the function of mindfulness as an ordinary psychological operation", i.e., as a
thought-concomitant (caitta); thus mindfulness. is no longer simply equated with the sote-
riologically oriented four applications of mindfulness. This then is also reflected in the defini-
tions of mindfulness in which the psychological description becomes more and more the norm
in Abhidharma texts. For example, the Prakara1_1apiida (627b23) .defines mindfulness as
the-nonloss (or nondrifting) of mind events and the Sariputriibhidharmasiistra (624a21) as
retention (*smara1_1a) and recollection (*pratisamara1_1a, *saYJlsmara1_1a). In this context she then
also explores the various connotations of abhilapana-which plays a key role in later Abhi-
dharma psychological definitions of mindfulness-for which· there are at least two possible
derivations, each of which lending a different sense to the operation of mindfulness (p. 81):
one derived from the root plu, "to float", with a privative prefix (a-piliipana); the
other apparently derived from the root lap possibly in the sense "to repeat" or,
especially in the causative, "to note" with a prefix api, or possibly abhi. The deriva-
tion from the root plu with a privative would support the sense of "not drifting",
"entering", or "fixing". The derivation from the root lap could have the sense of "to
repeat" or, especially in the causative, "to note" [LS: causing one to be attentive to
factors and to cultivate them], or possibly the sense of "to chatter" or "to express".
v. The Psychological Operation of Mindfulness in Recollection and Memory: Cox comments
that later Abhidharma treatises furnish more information in regard to the psychological func-
tion of mindfulness as a discrete mental factor (pp. 82f.):
This is provided in descriptions of the relation of mindfulness to other mental factors,
in arguments concerning its existential status, and finally, in examinations of the
events of retention and recollection, in which mindfulness plays a central role ....
[T]he operation of mindfulness and, in particular, its role in the act of recollection
must be understood in terms of the general Buddhist model of psychological
744 Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdeia)
functioning. [ ... ] There are two divergent interpretative models: that S\.lpported by
the Kiismira Sarviistiviidins of a single mind event associated with concomitant
factors; and that advanced by the Diir~\iintikas of a mind event followed by mental
factors in a series. These two models of psychological functioning entail a radically
different understanding of the operation of mindfulness and the event of recollection.
In this context, Cox explains the following (pp. 83-85):
Mindfulness functions to cause the nonloss (asampramo~a) of th~ object, and the
fixing or noting (abhilapana) by the mind of the object. Such a definition is ambigu-
ous-it could refer either to functions critical to the maintenance of meditative
concentration, or to the more prosaic act of retention. However, there is some
evidence to indicate that such a definition of mindfulness refers explicitly to the
ordinary psychological event of recollection. In the course of a discussion on the
relation between mindfulness and insight, the Mahiivibhii~ii presents several distinc-
tive functions of mindfulness that relate to the event of recollection: for example,
through the power of mindfulness, the object is not lost, enabling one to give rise
to both specific and general activities with regard to it; or through the power of
mindfulness, the practitioner thoroughly fixes or notes the object-support, and even if
the object-support is forgotten, it can be recollected once again; or, mindfulness
stabilizes or sustains the object-support, enabling insight to investigate it, or supports
insight itself. Here mindfulness performs the functions of retention, noting or fixing,
and stabilizing that are requisite for recollection.
This connection between the operation of mindfulness and recol!ecti'Qn is made
explicit in an argument about the existential status of mindfulness. The argument
[Ny, 389b12ff.] occurs between the Kiismira Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ika master
Saiighabhadra, and his major opponent, Sthavira, identified as the Diir~tantika
master, SrTiiita (fourth-fifth century AD). Saiighabhadra identifies the activity of
mindfulness as that of fixing or noting (mi;g-chi, *abhilapana), which must occur
when the mind cognizes any object. But SrTiiita, who denies the separate existence of
all but three mental concomitants-feelings, conception and volition-claims that
mindfulness is riot a separate mental factor operating on present objects in each
momentary mind event. Instead, mindfulness, which for SrTiiita means specifically
memory of the past, is used merely ·as a provisional designation to refer to mental
operations directed toward past objects. The activity of fixing or noting attributed to
mindfulness by Saiighabhadra, for SrTiiita, is simply a feature of the operation of
knowledge in general (jiiiiniikiira) and does not necessitate the existence of mindful-
ness as a separate factor.
Saiighabhadra's response indicates that it is precisely fixing or noting, which is the
distinctive activity of mindfulness, that links mindfulness to ordinary memory. [... ] ·
Thus, for Saiighabhadra, mindfulness is not simply the recollection of past objects,
but rather the activities of fixing or noting and retention as they occur with regard to
every present object. Indeed, in: the absence of this activity of mindfulness, which
fixes or notes the present object in each and every moment, subsequent recollection
would be impossible. This interpretation of the activity of mindfulness undoubtedly
[is] ... completely consistent with the traditional praxis-related function of mindful-
ness, which stabilizes and attentively observes a present object without distraction.
These different views of mindfulness as functioning with regard to past or present
objects reflect different views of its role in the events of retention and recollec-
tion. For those who claim that mindfulness pertains only to past objects, smrti pro-
visionally refers to the conventional experience of memory: it is the recollection of a
previously experienced object. SrTiiita, Sthiramati and Hsi.ian-tsang would all accept
this view. Memory is then not a distinct function attributed to a discrete and actually
existing mental factor. Instead, as Vasubandhu explains [at ix, F 274ff.], memory
refers to a process whereby recollection arises as a result of a complex set of con-
ditions.
For:~Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ikas, however, smrti is a separately existing factor that
operates on present objects in each and every moment; it is this present functioning
of fixing or noting that enables the subsequent event of recollection. Therefore,
though the Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ikas would accept that the process of recollection
generally occurs as Vasubandhu describes, they would not limit smrti to the event of
recollection.
vi. In the last part of her article, Collett Cox discusses the source of the general model of
recollection accepted by both Vasubandhu and the later Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ikas, namely, a
passage of the Mahiivibhti,Jii (MVB 11 T.27 55al6) where eight Buddhist and non-Buddhist
theories concerning ordinary memory are refuted.
vii. Cox ends by stating:
For Sailghabhadra ... , in accordance with Sarviistiviidin psychological analysis, mind-
fulness is a discrete and actually existing mental factor that arises together with each
mind event. That mindfulness, which arises simultaneously with the knowledge of a
prior experience, has the capability to initiate a series of mindfulness factors, one of
which will arise simultaneously with the subsequent recollecting knowledge. Thus,
Sailghabhadra, like Vasubandhu, SrTiiita and others, does assert that a successive
cause and effect relation underlies the event of recollection. But, unlike them, he
denies that this serial cause-;md-effect relation is one simply between two moments
of knowledge: one moment that grasps the original object and a subsequent one that
is provisionally described as its recollection. Instead, according to_Sailghabhadra, the
causal series consists of successive moments of smrti, each of which is an actually
existing concomitant mental factor, which appears simultaneous with mind events
and performs a function essential to the process of recollection.
270
LVP: On iibhoga, see S. Levi ad Siitriila,rtkiira, i. 16, and Museon, 1914.
271
LVP: manaskiira = cetasa iibhoga iilambane cittadharal'}a-dharmakaf:t (Abhisamaya).
4.1.2 manaskiiraf:t katamaf:t Icetasa iibhogaf:t I
4.1.2 What is attention? The bending of the mind. ISBP.232
Avatiira (ESD.82): "Mental application (manaskiira) is that which alerts (a--{bhuj) thought,
i.e., it directs thought towards an object. It is also the holding in thought (samanviihiira) of an
object which has earlier been experienced (piirviinubhauta),* etc. There are three kinds of
mental application: that of a trainee (saik:ta), of a non-trainee (asaik:ta), and of one who is
neither a-trainee nor a non-trainee (naivasaik:ta-niisaik:ta). The outflow-free mental applica-
tions in the seven trainees are named mental applications of trainees. The outflow-free mental
application in an arhat is named mental application of a non-trainee. The mental application
with outflows [in an ordinary person] is named mental application neither of a trainee nor a
non-trainee."
* When the mind is alerted to an object, there arises in the mind a familiar image (of a pre-
viously experienced object) which matches this object. This is the alerting of the mind.
Sthiramati (Trirrisikiivijiiaptibhii:tya, verse 3cd; p. 20) explains (based on Jatobi's German
translation, p. 16): "Attention (manaskiira) is (so to speak) the bending or tilting of the mind,
whereby the mind (citta) is turned towards its cognitive object. It has for its effect that mind is
held on to its object. The holding on of the mind [to its cognitive object] is due to the fact that
mind is directed again and again towards its cognitive object. The effect spoken of here refers
to that kind of attention which is characterized as a series [of moments] in the context of the
establishment of a certain object for the mind, but not to that kind of attention which occurs in
each and every moment of the mind, for the latter [kind of attention] functions in only one
moment and not in another."
As for the three kinds of mental application, see ii, F 325-28.
272
LVP: [As already mentioned above, note that we have adjusted the kiirikii and Vasu-
bandhu's commentary, since LVP states in his footnote at iii, F 104, that.one should replace
adhimukti by adhimok:ta at ii, F 153, 155; however; we did not adjl.l,st:~_YP's footnotes.]
This term presents a difficulty. - Vyiikhyii [WOG.128.2-4: adhimuktis tatjiilambanasya gm;iato
'vadhiira,:iiid (-,:iam ?). rucir iti anye I yathiiniscayaxp. dhiiraneti yogacaracittiil).: "Adhimukti is
the consideration of the object from the point of view of its qualities; according to otherr, it is
preference or inclination; according to the practitioners, it is the contemplation of the qlSject in
· conformity with the decision taken." (This last point is explained ad ii. 72, mental application
proceeding from resolution [adhimuktimanaskiira]).
According to the Paiicaskandhaka [see below], adhimok:ta = niscite vastuny avadhiira,:i-am.
According to the Prakarar,iapiida, 693al 7: "What is adhimukti? The delectation of thought in
sensation and contact."
The Tibetan version of our text, mos pa ni 'dodpa'o, gives: adhimuktir icchii or ruci/:i (?).
Paramiirtha translates: "Adhimukti is a factor that brings it about that thought is sharp in regard
to the characteristics of the object." -This is not a translation, but a gloss.
Hsilan-tsang translates: "Adhimukti, that is neng yil ching yin-k'o." We can translate: "that
which makes a sign of approbation with respect to the object". The expression yin (= mudrii)
k'o (possible) is indicated by Rosenberg in several glossaries. A. Waley, who consulted the
Japanese glosses, translates: "the sign of approval given to a disciple who has understood what
has been taught to him". We would thus have k'o = k'o-i = "this is allowable" (A. Debesse).
Adhimukti is the approbation of the object, the factors due to which orie takes the object into
consideration; it marks a first stage of mental application: - See the note of Shwe Zan Aung,
Compendium, p. 17 and 241, on adhimokkha: " ... the settled state of a thought...; it is deciding
to attend to this, not that, irrespective of more complicated procedures as to what 'this' or
'that' appears to be".

Sa:ipghabhadra (384b9): Approbation (yin-k'o) with respect to an object is called adhimukti.
According to other masters, adhi signifies superiority, dominance; mukti signifies liberation
(vimok.ra). Adhimukti is a factor by virtue of which thought exercises its dominance over an
object without any obstacle; like adhisfla (higher morality). - (57b8): Adhimukti is a separate
factor, for the Siitra says: "Thought, because of adhimukti, approves (yin k'o) of the object."
When thoughts arise, all approve (yin) the object; therefore, adhimukti is a generally per-
meating factor (mahiibhumika). - Nevertheless, the Sthavira says: "It is not established that
adhimukti is a separate factor, for we see that its characteristic is not distinguished from that.of
· cognition (jniina): the characteristic of adhimukti is that thought is determined (niscita) with
respect to its object. But this is not different from the characteristic of cognition (jniina).
Therefore, adhimukti is not a separate factor." - This is not correct, for approbation (yin-k'o)
brings about determination.
Some say: "Adhimukti is determination (avadhiira1Jll, riiscaya)." This is to give to the ~ause of
resolution (adhimukti) the name of its effect. - If this is the case, adhimukti and determination
would not be simultaneous. - No: for these two mutually condition one another: because of
deliberation (pratisarµkhyii), approbation arises; because of approbation, determination (niscay.a)
arises. There is no contradiction: thus there is no obstacle to their being simultaneous. - If any
thought includes these two, then all the categories of mind will be approbation and determina-
tion. - Thi_s objection is worthless, for it happens that, dominated by other factors, their
activity is damaged: even if there would be approbation (yin) and determination, they are small
and recognizable only with difficulty.
LS: 1. Pradhan.54.23 has adhimok~o 'dhimukti/:!.
Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1. 7 adhimok~al,t katamal,t Iniscite vastuni tathaiviivadhiira1J(lm I
4.1.7 What is conviction? The certitude that an object about which a determination
has been made exists in just that manner. ISBP.232
Sthirarnati, commenting on the Paficaskandhaka, states (ISBP.278):
The object is described as one "about which a determination has been made" in order
to make clear that not all things can become· the object of conviction. That is, if no
determination has been reached about an object, it is not possible to [have a sense] of
certitude [that it exists] in just that manner.
A determination is the freedom from doubt about an object that is gained through
reasoning or trustworthy scripture. It is the strong adherence by the mind to a deter-
mination that has been made about some aspe~t of an object, such as its imper-
manence or its suffering [nature]. Conviction is the [sense of] certitude that [some
particular object exists] in that [very] manner and not ap.y other.
Avatiira (ESD.83): "Resolve (adhimuktiladhimok~a) is the affirmation (!:!HIT; avadhiira,:ia)
with regard to an object, i.e., it enables one to be free from diffidence with regard to an object
perceived (cittasya vi~ayiipratisarµkoca)."
2. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.221) that adhimok~a is not easy to translate due to its
various connotations, such as: (1) affirmation/commitment/acceptance/approval; (2) decisive-
ness/determination/resolve; (3) conviction/faith; (4) liking/inclination; (5) mental freedom

(resulting from the eradication of indecision).
273
LS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.9 samiidhi/:1 katama/:1 I upaparrk:jye vastuni cittasyaikiigratii I
4.1.9 What is concentration? One-pointedness of mind toward an object that is
being closely examined. ISBP.232
Sthiramati, commenting on the Paficaskandhaka, states (ISBP.279):
[The description of the object as one] "that is being closely examined" indicates [that
concentration] will not [be achieved] otherwise. Thus, concentration is also being
presented as a mental factor that has a specific object.
Avatiira (ESD.83): "Concentration (samiidhi) is that which causes thought to be focused on an
object. It controls the monkey-like thought (citta) so that it can operate (vartate) on a single
object. The Vaibhii~ika says thus: 'Just as a snake that is confined in a bamboo pipe does not
move in a crooked manner, thought, when concentrated (samiihita), proceeds upright'."
2. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV .222): "Concentration may be either defiled or non-defiled;
in the former case, it is also name.d dispersion (1!k ~L; vik:jepa). Within the single moment in the
cognitive process, there is always the abiding of the mind on the object, thanks to this force
called concentration. But when the thought happens to be conjoined with concomitant, distrac-
tion (auddhatya), it is made to fluctuate with regard to the object within a series of moments.
This is called dispersion, though in its intrinsic nature it. is also none other than the same
dharma, concentration [see ii, F 162]."
Vasubandhu has already discussed the importance of concentration (samiidhi) within the con-
text of the controlling faculties (i. 48cd and beginning of chapter 2), i.e., the praxis-oriented
faculty of concentration (samiidhfndriya) and the three pure controlling faculties: the faculty of
coming to know what is not yet known (aniijfiiitamiijfiiisyiimfndriya), the faculty of perfect
knowledge (iijfiendriya) and the faculty of final and perfect knowledge (iijfiiitiivfndriya). As
one of the five praxis-oriented controlling faculties, it is addressed throughout chapter 8
(EXPOSITION OF THE MEDITATIVE ATTAINMENTS), as well as in chapter 6 (EXPOSITION OF THE
PATH AND THE PERSONS) and chapter 7 (EXPOSITION OF THE COGNITIONS).
274
LVP: Subtlety of the mental factors, Milinda, 63, 87; Atthasiilinf, 142; Kosa, ix, F 284.
275
LS: AH 19; SAH 57; AH 19; SAH 57.
276
LS: AH 19; SAH 57.
277
LS: Ibid.
278
Gokhale: [25] sraddhii 'pramiida/:1 prafrabdhir upek:jii hrfr apatrapii I muladvayam ahirrisii
ca vfryarri ca kusale sadii II
Tib.: [25] dad dang bag yod shin tu sbyangs I btang snyoms ngo tsho shes khrel yod I rtsa ba
gnyis rnam mi 'tshe dang I brtson 'grus rtag tu dge la 'byung I
LVP: According to the MYS, 220b2, and the Prakara~a: fraddhii, vfrya, hrf, apatrapii, alobha,
adve:fa, prasrabdhi, upek:jii, apramiida, avihirrisii. - The Mahiivyutpatti (104) names the third
root (amoha) and places vigor (vfrya) after the roots. The Paficaskandhaka also names the
third root and has the same order as the Mahiivyutpatti, except that it places diligence or
heedfulness (apramiida) before equanimity (upelcyii).

LS: Sruµghabhadra remarks (Ny, 391b; SPrS, 800a) that the two "ca" in AKB ii. 25 indicate
that delight and disgust !Ire also to be included under the kusalamahiibhumikas.
The Avatiira (ESD.85) defines them as follows:
Delight (*priimodya?, *rati?) is gladness and inclination. Seeing the virtue in what
conduces to centrifugal process (nivrtti-bhiigfya), one's thought aspires for it and
accords with the cultivation of the wholesome. Because of the presence of this
dharma, one's thought rejoices in nirvii~a. [The thought-concomitant] conjoined with
this is named "mental application to delight".
Disgust (*nirveda? *arati?) is repulsion (udvega). Seeing the faults in what conduces
to the centripetal process (pravrtti-bhiigfya), one's thought becomes averse to it and
accords with detachment (vairiigya). Because of the presence of this dharma, one is
disgusted with sarµslira. [The thought-concomitant] conjoined with this is named
"mental application of disgust".
Saxp.ghabhadra explains why they are not listed (SPrS, 800a; ESD.31):
It is because the modes of activity of delight and disgust are mutually contradictory,
and [hence] cannot be co-nascent, that they have not been directly indicated here [in
the verse]: They do not [strictly] fulfill the condition of being kusalamahiibhumika
[which requires that they be co-nascent with the other kusalamahiibhamika-s in all
the kusala citta-s] .... The two "ca" have been mentioned in order to indicate that
these two [caitta-s] do not operate together, being mutually contradictory in their
modes of act~vity.
279
LS: AH 19; SAH 57.
280
LVP: cetasaJ:, prasiidaJ:, [Pradhan.55.6). - According to the Jniinaprasthiina, 1, 19. - In
other words, faith (sraddhii) is the factor by which (yadyogiit) thought, troubled by defilements
(klesa) and subsidiary defilements (upaklesa), becomes clear: as troubled water becomes
clear by the presence of a gem that purities water (udakaprasiidakama~i). We find the same
example in Atthasiilinf, 304.
See Kosa, vi, F 293; viii, F 158. - Vyiikhyii [WOG.128.16ff.]: sraddhii cetasaJ:, prasiida iti.
klesopaklesa-kalu~itaxp. cetal;t sraddhii-yogat prasidati I udaka-prasadaka-mru:ii-yogad ivodakaqi.
satya-ratna-karma-phaliibhisarµpratyaya ity apare iti. akare1_1a sraddhii-nirdesal;t. satye~u catur~u
... saxp.ty evaitanity abhisarµpratyayo 'bhisaxp.pratipattil]. sraddha.
0
LS: Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaka (2008) states:

4.1.11 sraddhii katamii I karmaphalasatyaratne~v abhisampratyayas cetasaJ:, pra~
siifiaJ:, I
4.1.11 What is faith? Belief, aspiration, or clarity of mind toward karma and its
results, the [Four Noble] Truths and the [Three] Jewels. ISBP.232
Avatiira (ESD.83f.): "Faith (sraddhii) is that which causes the clarification of thought (cetasaJ:,
prasiida/:1) with regard to its object. It is named faith on account of being receptivity based on
direct realization (abhisarµgrahapratyaya) to the Three Jewels, the cause-effect relationship
(hetuphala-sambandha) and the existence (astitva) [of dharma-s]. It is a dharma which removes
mental turbidity (kiilu~ya). Just as a water cleansing gem (udakaprasiidakama~i), when-placed
inside a pond, at once clarifies the turbid water; likewise, the faith-gem within the mind-pond
at once gets rid of all its turbidities. Faith to the Buddha's attainment of Enlightenment, to the
Dharma as being well-expounded (sviikhyiita), to the Saqigha as being enclowed with good
conduct (supratipanna), as well as to dependent-origination (pratftya-samutpiida), the true
nature of dharma (dharmatii) which is not understood by the heretics (tmhika)-such is the
domain of activities of faith."
281
LVP: The explanation adopted by Vasubandhu in the Paficaskandhaka.
282
LS: A.H 19; SAH 57.
283
LVP: kusaliiniil'!l dharmii1Jiil'!1 bhiivanii [WOG.128.20f.]. - According to vii. 27, bhiivanii
signifies acquisition (pratilambha), practice (ni$eva,;a).
4.1.19 apramiida/:t katama/:t I pramiidapratipak$o 'lob ho yiivad vfryam, yiin nisritya-
akusaliin dharmiin prajahiiti tatpratipak$ii1'!1S ca kusaliin dharmiin bhiivayati I
4.1.19 What is mindfulness? The antidote to lack of mindfulness-[that is to say,]
the abandoning of nonvirtuous entities together with the cultivating of those vir-
tuous entities that are their antidotes, on the basis of the mental factors ranging
from avoidance of attachment to effort.
Avatiira (ESD.84): "Heedfulness (apramiida) is the cultivation of the wholesome dharma-s
(kusaladharma-bhiivanii). It is opposed to heedlessness (pramiida), and is of the nature of
guarding (iirak$a) thought."
284
LVP: The Mahiisiiqighikas. - Diligence or heedfulness holds thought safe from the factors
of pollution (sa1?1klesika).
285
LS: AH 19; SAH 57.
286
LVP: The Abhidhamma distinguishes passaddhi and lahutii (Dhammasaliga,;i, 40--43),
which the Abhidharma seems to identify. -Pliancy (prasrabdhi) in the meditatipns (dhyiina) is
analyzed in viii. 9. -Anguttara, v, 3.
4.1.18 prasrabdhi/:t katamii IdaU$fhulyapratipaqaJ:t kiiyacittakarma,;yatii I
4.1.18 What is agility? The antidote to indisposition-[that is to say,] fitness of
body and mind. ISBP.233
Avatiira (ESDJ!4): "Calm (prasrabdhi) is the aptitude of the mind (cittakarma,;yata). It is
opposed to torpor (styiina), and accords with the wholesome dharma-s."
287
LVP: According to the Japanese editor. - S. Levi, Siitriilamkiira, vi. 2.
288
LVP: The pliancy member of enlightenment (prasrabdhisambodhyaliga) is twofold:
(i) pliancy of thought (cittaprasrabdhi) and (ii) pliancy of the body (kiiyaprasrabdhi) (Pra-
kara,;apiida, iii. 1). - Sa1?1yuktiigama, 27, 3; .. . tatra yiipi kiiyaprasrabdhis tad api prasrabdhi-
sal'!lbodhyangam abhijfiiiyai sa1?1bodhaye nirvii,;iiya sal'!lvartate I yiipi cittaprasrabdhis tad api
sa1?1bodhyangam ... . A shorter recension in Sal'!lyutta, v. 111. - In the presence of this text,
says the Sautriintika, how can you define pliancy (prasrabdhi) as only "the aptitude of
thought"?
289
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautriintika here.
290
LVP: The Vyiikhyii [WOG.129.9ff.] cites the SUtra: tirthikaJ:i kila bhagavacchriivakiin
evam iihuJ:i I srama1_10 bhavanto gautama evam aha I evarp yiiyarp bhik~avaJ:i paiica nivara1_1ani
prahiiya cetasa upaklesakarii1_1i prajiiadaurbalyakariil).i sapta bodhyaii.gani bhiivayateti I vayam
apy evarp briimal;i I tatrlismakarp srama1_1asya ca gautamasya ko vise~o dharmadesanayaJ:i I
tebhyo bhagavatii etad upadi~µirp I paiica santi dasa bhavanti I dasa santi paiica vyavasthiipyante I
... tathii sapta santi caturdasa bhavanti I caturdasa santi sapta vyavasthapyante. - Compare
Sal'!l-yutta, v. 108.
291
LVP: The Fortunate One has said that the nine bases of pain or strife (iighiitavastu) .
(Anguttara, iv. 408) are the hindrance of malice (vyiipiidanivara,:ia).
292
LVP: When one regards the (noble) path as constituted by three elements, i.e., the element
of morality (sflaskandha), the element of concentration (samiidhiskandha), the element of
understanding (prajiiiiskandha), [then] right thinking and right exertion are classified in the
element of understanding as well as right view, which, alone, is understanding (prajiiii)'in its
intrinsic nature. We read in the Prajiiiiskandhanirdesa: prajiiiiskandhalJ katamalJ I samyag-
dr~{ilJ samyaksal'!l-kalpalJ samyagvyiiyiimalJ.
293
LS: AH 19; SAH 57.
zg.i LVP· This is the formation of equanimity (sal'!l-skiirope~ii), to be distinguished from
the sensation of equanimity (vedanopek~ii) (i. 14; ii.. 8cd) and from the equanimity of the
immeasurables (viii. 29) The Atthasiilinr (397) names ten equanimities (upek~ii); we find there
the definition of jhiinupekkhii: majjhattalakkhal)ii aniibhogarasii avyiipiirapaccupa{{hiinii ...
(p. 174, 2).
4.1.20 upek~ii katamii I sa eviilobho yiivad vrryam, yiin nisritya cittasamatiil'!I- citta-
prasa{hatiil'!I- cittiiniibhogafiil'!I- ca pratilabhate, yayii nirviisite~u kli~{e~u dharme~v
asankli~{avihiirr bhavati I
4.1.20 What is equanimity? Evenness of mind, inactivity of mind, and.effortless-
ness of mind that is gained on the basis of those very same mental factors ranging
from avoidance of attachment to effort. It is that [mental factor] which, having dis-
pelled afflicted entities, remains in a state of constant adherence to those that are free
from affliction. ISBP .233 ·
Avatiira (ESD.84): "The equilibrium of thought (citta-samatii) is named equanimity (upek~ii),
as it is the equanimity with regard to the aversion to the untrue and the inclination towards the
true. By the force of this, the thought neither inclines towards nor turns away from the true and
the untrue [respectively]; abiding in equilibrium, as a scale in perfect balance."
295
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, L VP mentions the Sautriintika here.
This is the fifth of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.46f.).
Samghabhadra (Ny, 392b8-13) attributes this objection to Vasubandhu and "explains tha1; like
0
the pair, vfrya, which is not resting while doing good, and upek~ii, which is equaniniity while
abstaining from doing bad, manaskiira and upek~ii are not really opposites".
Sarpghabhadra-leaving out aniibhogatii-defines upek~a as follows (Ny, 391a; ESD.149):
Upek~ii is mental equilibrium (cittasamatii). It is opposed to auddhatya. Induced by
conformity to what is proper, it enables citta not to go off the track (4 •~' :f ~)--this
752 E;xposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirdesa)
is the meaning of upeklfa. Auddhatya, on the other hand, is that which causes the
mental disquietude which, when conjoined with it, goes off the track.
296
LVP: Literally: There are factors difficult to know that can be known. [5 a] But it is quite
difficult to know (or to admit) that there would be no contradiction (hostility, impossibility of
coexistence) between contradictory factors: asti hi nama durjniinam api jfiiiyate \ idarrz tu khalu
atidurjfianarrz yad virodho 'py avirodhaft.
297
LVP: According to Hstian-tsang and the glosses of the Japanese editor:
The Vaibhii~ika. - What contradiction is there in that mental application is the tilting of
thought, that equanimity is the non-tilting of thought? In fact, we consider mental application
and equanimity as distinct factors.
The Sautriintika. -Then mental application and equanimity would not have the same object; or
else, one would have to admit that all the thought-concomitants (desire, hatred, etc.) are
associated.
We will encounter other factors (initial inquiry [vitarka], investigation [vicara]) showing the
same characteristic of hostility ....
298
LS: AH 19; SAH 57.
299
4.1.12 hrift katama Iatmanarrz dharmarrz vadhipatirrz krtvii 'vadyena lajjii I
4.1.12 What is shame? Embarrassment about objectionable acts for reasons relating
to oneself or the Dharma. ISBP.232
4.1.13 apatrapyarrz katamat \ lokam adhipatirrz krtva 'vadyena lajja \
4.1.13 What is abashment? Embarrassment about objectionable acts for reasons
relating to the world. ISBP.233
Avatara (ESD.84): "Modesty (hnj is that which conforms to the proper. It is produced on
account of the dominant influence of oneself and of the Dharma. It is a mental freedom (citta-
vasita) opposed to the emanation of craving (trlf,:iii-nilfyanda). By virtue of this, one abides
respecting virtues and the virtuous.
Shame (apatrapya) has the cultivation of virtues as its precondition (gw:,abhavana-piirvika). It
being opposed to the emanation of delusion (moha-niljyanda), one [possessing it] scorns at
lowly dharma-s. By virtue of this, one dreads evil (avadye bhayadarsin)."
300
LS: AKB viii. 20c-30a states that loving kindness (maitri) and also compassion (karu~a)
are non-hatred (adve!fa).
Dharmatriita states (SAH.453) that loving kindness and compassion are non-hatred "because
of being the antidote (pratipaklfa) for hatred (dve!fa). Justified (sthana) hatred (dve!fa) is cured
by loving kindness; unjustified (asthana) hatred is cured by compassion. Furthermore, hatred
(dve!fa) produced for abandoning (praha~a) life (jfvita) of beings (sattva) is cured by loving
kindness; hatred produced for certain punishment of beings is cured by compassion. That is
why those who seek for merit can produce these unlimited ones; not those who seek for what
is vicious (do!fa)."
301
LVP: The Paficaskandhaka classifies non-delusion (amoha) among the wholesome per-
meating factors (kusalamahabhumika). (In fact, understanding [prajfia] can be "erroneous".)
- Absence of greed (alobha) is the opposite of greed (lobha), udvega and aniisakti. - Non-
hatred (adve~a) is the opposite of hatred (dve~a), namely, loving kindness (maitrf; viii. 29).
- Non-delusion (amoha) is the opposite of delusion (delusion), is right .thinking (sa,riyaksa,ri-
kalpa; vi. 69).
LS: Vasubandhu's Paftcaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.14 alobhalJ katamalJ I lobhapratipa~o nirvid aniigrahalJ I
4.1.14 What is avoidance of attachment? The antidote to attachment-[that is to
say,] dissatisfaction and freedom from acquisitiveness. ISBP.233
4.1.15 . adve~al:t katamalJ I dve~apratipa~o maitrr I
4:1.1.5 What is avoidance of hatred? The antidote to hatred-[that is to say,] loving-
kindness. ISBP.233
4.1.16 amohalJ katamalJ I mohapratipak~o yathiibhutasampratipattilJ I
4.1.16 What is the avoidance of ignorance? The antidote to ignorance-[that is to
say,] the correct understanding of things as they truly are. ISBP.233
Avatiira (ESD.85): "There are three roots of wholesomeness (kusala-mula): (i) non-greed
(alobha), a dharma opposed to greed (lobha); (ii) non-hatred (adveia), a dharma opposed to
hatred (dveia); and (iii) non-delusion (amoha), a dharma opposed to delusion (moha) and
having the aforementioned understanding (prajftii) as its specific nature (svabhiiva). These
three dharma-s are named the roots of wholesomeness, because they are wholesome in their
specific nature, and are also productive of other wholesome dharma-s. 'Wholesome' means
'secure' (!cyema), as [what is kusala] can bring about the germs of desirable (i~ta) existence
and of liberation. Or again, 'wholesome' means being skilful through training (sik~ita), by
reason of which one can, [for example], produce beautiful images. Thus, in the world people
call an artist kusala for producing beautiful images."
302
4.1.21 avihi,risii katamii I vihi,risiipratipak~al:t karu1,1ii I
4.1.21 What is avoidance of harm? The antidote to harmfulness-[that is to say,]
compassion. ISBP.233
Avatiira (ESD.84): "Harmlessness (avihi,risii) is the mental goodness (citta-bhadratii). By the
force of this, one does not harm others, and becomes averse to the harmful activities in which
others indulge."
303
LVP: Energeticness in wholesome action (kusalakriyii); for energeticness in unwholesome
action is not vigor (vfrya), but, on the contrary, slackness (kausfdya). The Fortunate One said:
"The vigor of persons foreign to this religion (itobiihyaka) is slackness (kausfdya)" (ii. 26a). -
Paftcaskandhaka: "Vigor is the energeticness of thought in the wholesome, the opposite of
slackness."
4.1.17 vfryal'{Z katamat I kausfdyapratipak~al:t kusale cetaso 'bhyutsiihalJ I
4.1.17 What is effort? The antidote to laziness-[that is to say,] exertion of the
mind toward virtue. ISBP.233
Avatiira (ESD.84): "Vigour (vfrya) has the nature of being energetic (abhyutsiiha) in the
production and cessation, [respectively], of the wholesome and unwholesome dharma-s. That
is, it goads the thought of those sunk in the mire of transmigration (sa'!lslirapankanimagnasya
cetaso'bhyunnatirity-arthal:z) to get out quickly."
Sarµghabhadra (Niy, 391b; ESD.147): "Virya is that which protects and discards, respectively,
one's virtues ancj' faults whk:h have already arisen; and that which causes to arise~,not to
arise, respectively, one's virtues and faults which have not yet arisen. It is the non-slackn~ss of
the mind."
304
LSi SAH 58-59.
305
LS: As for the term klesa, Dhammajoti states (SA.IV.324): "This. term is understood in the
sense of 'defilement' or impurity. In the Buddhist usage, the corresponding past participle,
kli~ta, means 'defiled', 'soiled'. However, the primary etymological sense of 'molest' or 'be
v.exed' is found in the early treatises [MYS, 244a, 417c] and continues to be emphasized even
in the late abhidharma treatises. Thus, the Avatlira defines [ESD.95] the term as follows:
Defilements· (klesa) are thus named because they perturb and afflict ( ~L:l! ·~ -
klisnantfti kleslil:z) the psycho-physical series. These [defilements] are none other than
the proclivities [anusaya].
The occurrence of this term is rare in the sutra-pifaka. Its use was historically preceded by that
of upaklesa, although subsequently the latter generally came to be understood as 'secondary
defilements'-those which proceed from klesa. At this later stage, it is explained that the
upaklesa-s [see v. 46] are also the klesa, but they additionally include other defilements that
are not called klesa; Examples of these secondary defilements are moral immodesty, avarice,
and restlessness, which are said to be emanations (ni~yanda) from greed (rliga)."
Vasubandhu devotes his entire-chapter 5 to the proclivities (anusaya).
306
LS: SAH 58-59.
307
Gokhale: [26acl] mohal:z pramlidal:z kausfdyam lisraddhyaf!I stylinam uddhaval:z I kli~te sad
aivli
LS: Pradhan.56.4 has kausfdyam.
Tib.: [26ac] rmongs dang bag med le lo dang I ma dad pa dang rmugs dang rgod I nyon mongs
can la rtag tu 'byung I
LVP: [mohal:z pramlidal:z kausfdyam lisraddhya'!l styqnam uddhatil:z I - sarvadli kli~te]
Our sources give sadli (rtag tu 'byung).
308
LVP: According to a gloss of the Japanese editor, the path of insight expels ignorance
(avidyii), the path of cultivation expels non-cognition (ajfiiina), the path of those beyond
training (asai~a) expels non-perceiving (asa'!lprakhyiina).
LS: 1. Tib.: rmongs pa zhes bya bani mar rig paste mi shes pa dang mi gsal ba'o II
Yasomitra glosses [WOG.130.15f.]: moho niimiividyeti. vidya-vipak~o dharmo 'nyo 'vidyeti.
2. Vasubandhu's Paficaski:mdhaka (2008) states:
4.1.25 avidyii katamii I karmaphalasatyaratne~v ajfiiinam I sii punal:z sahajii pari-
kalpitli ca I
riigal:z klimiivacaral:z pratigho 'vidyii kiimiivacarii - etiini trf,:iy akusalamuliini lobho
'kusalamulaf!I dve,Fo mohas ca I

4.1.25 What is ignorance? Absence of knowledge with regard to karma and its
results, the [Four Noble] Truths, and the [Three] Jewels; moreover, it is innate and
contrived.
The desire, hatred, and ignorance that occur in the desire realm are the three roots of
nonvirtue-that is, the root of nonvirtue that is attachment, the root of nonvirtue that
is hatred, and the root ofnonvirtue that is ignorance. ISBP.234f.
Avatiira (ESD.88): "The ignorance fetter (avidyii-sar!'yojana) is the nescience (ajiiiina) in the
three spheres. It is·characterized by non-discernment. It is named avidyii-non-knowledge,
because it is opposed to vidya-knowledge; like a blind man [who is deprived of knowledge of
the visible world]. This is an expression negating (prati-..f sidh) the opposite (pratipa!cya). It is
like calling those who are not friends (mitra), enemies (a-mitra); and words which are not true
(rta), etc., untrue words (anrta), etc. Ignorance itself is the fetter, therefore it is named
ignorance-fetter."
Saqighabhadra describes the characteristics of ignorance as follows (Abhidharma-samaya-
pradipika-siistra, 843c-844a):
There is a distinct dhanna which harms the capability of understanding (prajiiii). It is
the cause of topsy-turvy views and obstructs the examination of merits and faults.
With regard to dharma-s to be known (jiieya-dharma) it operates in the mode of
disinclination, veiling the thought and thought-concomitants. This is ignorance.
3. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.336): "There has been a controversy among the Sarviisti-
viida masters since the time of the MYS as to its exact nature, particularly as regards whether
it is abandonable by vision only, or also to be abandoned by cultivation. The compilers of the
MYS are inclined towards the former position, but apparently also tolerate the latter. There has
also been a controversy as to whether the ignorance that arises with a defilement of restricted
scope (parftta,-klesa-bhumika-dharma; AKB ii. 27) can qualify as an 'independent igno-
rance'."
4. The Sarvastivadins developed a doctrine of two types of avidyii, i.e., conjoined ignorance
(saf!1prayukta-avidyii) and independent ignorance (iiveriikf avidyii); they were already attested
in the Vijiiiinakiiyasiistra and further developed in the MVS-:--SCe SA.IV.223f., but in particular
Dhammajoti 's The iiveriikf avidyii in the Sarviistiviida school (2009).
5. In the latter, Dhammajoti speaks of a basic ambiguity, i.e., on the one hand, avidyii was
generally defined as simply non-cognizance or non-discernment [see, for example, ii. 26ac],
on the other, it was to be specifically associated with the non-discernment of the Four Truths
[see, for example, iii, F 92], and states that this ambiguity within,itsdefinition probably led to
(i) the innovation of iiveriikf avidyii ("independent/unique ignorance"; ;r.:: # ~ llJl; ma rig pa ma
'dres pa), or non-conjoined avidyii, which can arise as a distinctive force of ignorance in itself,
as well as to (ii) the controversy whether iiveriikf avidyii is abandonable by insight (darsana-
heya) only or abandonable by cultivation (bhiivanii-heya) as well.
6. Vasubandhu will discuss ignorance (avidyii) in greater detail within the context of de-
pendent origination (pratftyasamutpiida) at iii. 28c-29 (F 88-94); see also iii. 21a.
As for ignorance being one of the three unwholesome roots, see iv, 8cd; but when conjoined
with ·satkiiyadr~!i and antagrii.hadr~!i, then ignorance is not unwholesome (akusala) but
obscured-non-defined (nivrtii.vyii.iqta) (see AKB ii. 30ab, iv, F 41f. and v, F 42, note; SA.IV.334).
See also ESD.86.
As for ignorance being a pervasive proclivity, see v. 12.
309
I.S: Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.44 pramii.daJ:t katama/:t I yai rii.gadve~amohakausfdyaiJ:t klesii.c cittarri na rak~ati
kusalarri ca na bhii.vayati I
4.1.44 What is lack of mindfulness? Those forms of desire, hatred, ignorance,
and laziness that do not protect the mind from the mental afflictions and do not
cultivate virtue. ISBP.237
Avatii.ra (ESD.85): "Heedlessness (pramii.da) is the non-cultivation of wholesome dharma-s
(kusalii.nii.Tfl dharmii.,µim abhii.vanii.), and is opposed to the heedfulness (apramii.da) mentioned
above. It is the inability to guard thought."
310
4.1.43 kausidyaf!I katamat I kusale cetaso 'nabhyutsii.ho vfryavipa~a/:t I
4.1.43 What is laziness? [It is] the mind's lack of exertion toward virtue; and the
antithesis of effort. ISBP.237
Avatii.ra (ESD.85): "Slackness (kausfdya) is the non-energetic-ness of thought (cetaso 'prasii.da);
it is opposed to the vigour (vfrya)mentioned above."
311
LVP: The MSS. have asraddhya, asrii.ddhya and ii.sraddhya; see the Mahii.vyutpatti of
Wogihara.
312
I.S: Vasubandhu's Paifcaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.42 ii.sraddhyaf!I ·katamat I karmaphalasatyaratne~v anabhisampratyayas cetaso
'prasii.da/:t sraddhii.vipa~a/:t I
4.1.42 What is lack of faith? [It is] the lack of belief and lack of clltrity of mind to-
ward karma and its results, the [Four Noble] Truths, and the [Three] Jewels; and
the antithesis. ISBP.236
Avatii.ra (ESD.85): "Faithlessness (ii.sraddhya) is the non-clarity of thought (cetaso 'prasii.da).
It is a dhanna opposed to the faith (sraddhii.) mentioned above."
313
I.S: Vasubandhu's· Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.40 styii.naf!I katamat I cittasyii.karma,:,yatii. staimityam I
4.1.40 What is torpor? [It is] unfitness and immobility of the mind. ISBP.236
Avatii.ra (ESD.96): "Torpor is the lack of aptitude (akarmanyatii.) of the psycho-physical series.
It is the heaviness (gurutii.) [of the mind and body]."
314
LVP: nrtya-git' adi-spµgara-ve~filai:pkarak 'ady-auddhatya-sai:pnisraya-dana-karmakas
caitasiko dharma):i. I [WOG.130.22f.]- Comp. Dhammasaliga,:ii, 429.
4.1.41 auddhatyaf!I katamat I cittasyii.vyupasamaJ:t I
4.1.41 What is excitation? Lack of calmness in the mind. ISBP.236
Avatara (ESD.96): "Restlessness is that which causes non-tranquility of the mind (avyupa-
sama)."
315
LS: SAH 58-59.
316
LVP: See above, F 151.
317
LS: SAH 58-59.
· LVP: ko 'yaqi deviindf!lpriyo niima I rjukajiitiyo devdniif!lpriya ity eke vyiicak~ate I asatho
318
•
hi deviindf!I priyo bhavati I miirkho deviindf!lpriya ity apare I yo hisvarii1_1iim i~taI:i sa na

tii<,ianena si~ata iti miirkho bhavati [WOG.130.27ff.]. - The Japanese editor cites numerous
glosses.
319
LVP: patha-priimii1_1ya-miitre1_1a dasa klesa-mahiibhiimikiil:i priiptii ity etiim eva priiptiqi
jiinite [WOG.130.25f.].
Vasubandhu reproduces the formula of the MahabhafYa ad ii. 4, 56 ( episode of the grammarian
and the driver of a chariot).
See S. Levi, JA, 1891, ii. 549 (Notes de chronologie indienne. Deviindf!lpriya, A~oka ·et
Katyiiyana). - According to Kem, Manual, 113, the meaning of "idiot" derives from the
meaning "harmless, pious": this appears to be unlikely. - See my (LVP) note in Bulletin· de
l'Academie de Bruxelles, 1923,
320
LS: Vasubandhu's Paiicas~ndhaka (2008) states:
4.1.45 mu~itasmrtitJ katamii Iya kli~ra smrti/:1 kusalasyiinabhilapanatii I
4.1.45 What is c1Jded recollection? [It is] afflicted recollection; and a lack of
clarity with regard to virtue. ISBP.237
The Avatiira does not mention it.
321
• LS: Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.46 vik~epa/:1 katama/:1 I paiicasu kiimagu,:ze~u riigadve~amohiif!lsiko yas cetaso
visiira/:1 I
4.1.46 What is distraction? Those forms of desire, hatred, and ignorance that cause
.the mind to flow outward to the five sense objects. ISBP.237
The Avatara does not mention it.
322
,4.1.47 asamprajanyaf!I katamat I klesasamprayuktii prajiia kiiyaviigmanalJpraciire~v
asaf!lviditaviharitii I
4.1.47 What is vigilance? [It is] wisdom that is concomitant with a mental affliction
and [the mental factor] that causes one to engage in activities of body, speech, or
mind inattentively. ISBP.237
The Avatiira does not mention it.
323
LS: As for incorrect mental application being a cause of ignorance, and vice versa, see
iii, F 70-72.
324
LS: WOG .131.17f: tftiyii smrty-iidayas catvarat:i. mu~itii-smfty-asaqiprajanyiiyoniso-
manaskiira-mithyii'dhimok~ii ity arthat:i.
325
LS: SAH 58.
326
LVP: evarri tv iihu/:t. - Vyiikhyii: iibhidharmikiiJ:i [WOG.131.23].
I believe that with the plural (iihu/:t) Vasubandhu designates Dharmatriita here-author of the
Sarriyukta-Abhidharmahrdaya-and his followers. This seems to result from the passages that
follow (Nanjio 1287, chap. ii. 5 and foll.= xxiii, 12, 28b):
The permeating factors of defilement (klesamahiibhumika) have to be explained:
ii. 5. mithyiidhiinok~a. asarriprajanya, ayonisomanaskiira, asriiddhya, kausfdya, vik~epa,
avidyii, auddhdtya, pramiida.
By false resol~e (mithyiidhimo~a), one should understand ....
ii. 6. The ten permeating factors of defilement (klesamahiibhamika) are found in a~y
defiled thou&ht. Non-modesty (a/:tri) and shamelessness (atrapii) are called unwhole-
some perme<,tting factors (akusalamahiibhumika).
The ten permeating factors of defilement occur in any defiled thought. The ten
factors, of which the first is false resolve (mithyiidhimo~a), accompany any defiled
thought, sensory consciousness or mental consciousness, in the realm of desire, in the
realm of fine-materiality, in the realm of immateriality. They are thus permeating
factors of defilement. - Question: Torpor (styiina) occurs in any defiled thought: why
is it not counted among the permeating factors of defilement? - Answer: Because it
is favorable to concentration (samiidhi). ~at is to say, persons with lethargic behav-
ior realize concentration quickly. This is why torpor (styiina) is not counted in the
list. - Is the factor that is a generally permeating mental factor (mahiibhumika) also a
permeating factor of defilement? Four alternatives: 1. generally permeating factors
without being a permeating factor of defilement. ...
327
LVP: The author does not admit this opinion. Torpor (styiina, laya) and dissipation,
defiled factors, are opposed to a "white" factor like concentration (samiidhi).
328
LS: SAH 59.
329
Gokhale: [26c2-d] 'kusale tv iihrfkyam anapatrapii I
Tib.: [26d-27al] midge la ni khrel med dang II ngo tsha med pa'o
LS: Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaka (2008) states:
4,1.38 iihrfkyarri katamat I svayam avadyeniilajjii I
4.1.38 What is shamelessness? Lack of embarrassment about objectionable acts for
reasons relating to oneself. ISBP.236
4.1.39 anapatrilpyarri katamat I parato 'vadyeniilajjil I
4.1.39 What is absence of abashment? Lack of embarrassment.about objection-
able acts for reasons relating to others. ISBP.236
Avatilra (ESD.97): "Immodesty is that which causes disrespect (agauravatil) to virtues and
those who are virtuous. It is a dharma opposed to respectfulness.
Shamelessness is [that which causes] one not to see the fearful consequences of evil (abhaya-
darsitva). It is capable of leading to [rebirth in] the low planes of existence (durgati). [Here]
evil (avadya) means that which is condemned by the good ones (vigarhitarri sadbhi/:t)."
330
LVP: According to the MYS, 220b4, there are five unwholesome permeating factors
(akusalamahiibhiimika): (1) ignorance (avidyii), (2) torpor (styiina), (3) restlessness (auddhatya),
(4) non-modesty (ahn1, (5) shamelessness (anapatriipya). -See iii. 32ab and above at F 151.
331
LS: SAH 60.
332
LS: AKB v. 48a, defines: "Anger (krodha; ii. 27), the irritation (iighiita) of thought con-
cerned with living beings (sattva) and non-living things (asattva), an irritation distinct [varjita]
from malice (vyiipiida) and harmfulness (vihirµsii)."
Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.28 krodhal,i katamal,i I vartamiinam apakiiram iigamya yas cetasa iighiital,i I
4.l.'.48 What is anger? Animosity of the mind toward a current source of harm that
has become evident. ISBP.235
Avatiira (ESD.97): "Anger [krodha] is, excluding hostility and harmfulness, that which causes
hatefulness (iighiita) With regard to the sentient and the non-sentient."
As for the difference between hostility (pratigha; ii. F 165) and krodha, Sthiramati comments,
in his commentary to the Paficaskandhaka (ISBP.292 and 303f.), that pratigha is "animosity
toward sentient beings", whereby "animosity is a harshness of the mind toward sentient beings
that, if you are overctme by it, will cause you to consider engaging in such wrongful coh-
duct as killing or bin ·ug sentient beings". As for krodha, he comments that it "occurs only
toward an object that s a source of harm in the present moment and not otherwise. The phrase
'animosity of the mirld' indicates both the essential nature of this mental factor and the fact
that it is associated,wi~h consciousness. Given that its nature is animosity, anger is not distinct
from [the root mental ,affliction of] hatred [pratigha]; however, because the term is ascribed
to. a certain type of hatred that occurs in a particular circumstance, it is a form of hatred. Thus,
anger is ascribed to the animosity of the mind that occurs in relation to a source of harm that is
actually present. Its object can be a sentient being or something that is inanimate. Its action is
to give support to such conduct as inflicting punishment and the_like."
333
LS: AKB v. 49c-50b, defines: "Enmity (upaniiha) is what results from the repeated think-
ing over of the objects of anger (iighatavastubahulfkiira)."
4.1.29 upaniihal,i katamal,i I vairiinubandhal,i I
4.1.29 What is resentment? Adherence to enmity. ISBP.135
Avatiira (ESD.95) "Enmity (upaniiha) is the harbouring of hatred within and not letting go of
it, which results from the repeated thinking over of the objects of anger."
334
LS: AKB v. 49c-50b, defines: "Dissimulation (sii(hya), the crookedness of thought [citta-
kau(ilya] that brings it about that one does not express things as they are [yathiibhiitam], either
that one does not deny something when one should deny it, or that one explains something
in a confused manner."
4.1.35 sii(hyarµ katamat I svado:fapracchiidanopiiyasangrhftarµ cetasal,i kau(ilyam I
4.1.35 What is guile? A deviousness of mind that adopts a means of concealing
one's faults. ISBP.236
Avatiira (ESD.95): "Dissimulation (siifhya) is the crookedness of the mind (cittakau{ilya)."

335
LS: AKB v. 47, defines: "Jealousy or envy (fr,rya), the anger or inner disturbance [vyii-
ro,ra] of thought that is concerned with the prosperity of others [parasaf!lpatti]."
Vasubandhu's Paftcaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.32 frfJii katamii Iparasampattau cetaso vyiiro,ral; I
4.1.32 What is envy? The complete vexation of mind at another's success. ISBP.236
Avatiira (ESD.89): "The jealousy fetter (fr,ryii-saf!lyojana) is that by virtue of which the mind
becomes unable to bear the excellences of others: When others acquire respect, offering,
wealth, learning and other excellences, [a person having this fetter] becomes envious-this is
the meaning of being unable to bear. Jealousy itself is a fetter, therefore it is named the
jealousy-fetter."
336
· LS: AKB v. 49c, defines: "Depraved opinionatedness (pradiisa), firmly seizing or esteeming
of various reproachable things (siivadyavastudr<!hagriihita; pariimarsa) that brings it about that

one does not accept rightful admonition [nyiiyasaf!ljfiapti]."
4.1. 31 pradii'sal; katamab I car:u;lavacodiisitii I
4.1.31 What is spite? Acrimony [expressed] through heated words. ISBP.236
Avatiira (ESD.95): "Depraved opinionatedness (pradiisa) is the clinging to various reproach-
able things (siivadyavastu-drdhagriihitii), as a result of which one would not accept any rightful
admonition (nyliya-samjftapti)."
337
LS: AKB v. 48a, defines: "Concealment (mrak,ra), hiding one's own evil or imperfections
[avadyapracchtidana]."
4.1.30 mrak,ra!J katama!J atmano 'vadyapracchtidanli I
J
4.1.30 What is dissembling? Concealment of objectionable acts. ISBP.236

Avatlira (ESD.97): "Concealment (mrak,ra) is the hiding of one's own evil."
338
LS: AKB v. 47, defines: "Avarice (miitsarya) (mii mattal; saratu), 'tenacity' (ligraha,
Mahtivyutpatti, 109, 29) of thought [citta], which opposes giving [kausalapradlinavirodhin],
whether spiritual (dharma) or material (limi,ra) (iv. 113) (Atthastilinr, 373)."
4.1. 33 mlitsaryaf!l katamat Idanavirodhr cetasa ligraha!J I
4.1.33 What is stinginess? The acquisitiveness of mind that opposes generosity.
ISBP.236
Avatlira (ESD.90): "The avarice fetter (mlitsarya-saf!lyojana) is that which causes the mind to
be hoarding with regard to one's own belongings and wealth. [It is the mental attitude]: 'What
belongs to me must not go to others.' The avarice itself is the fetter, therefore it is named the
avarice-fetter."
339
LS: AKB v. 49c, defines: "Deceit (miiyli), the factor that brings it about that one deludes
others (paravaftcanli)."
Endnotes to./2hgpter Two 761
Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states:

4.1.34 miiyii katamii Iparavaiicaniibhipriiyasyiibhutiirthasandarsanatii I
4.1.34 What is deceitfulness? The displaying of something that is untrue [in order
to] deceive others. ISBP.236
Avatiira (ESD.95): "Deceptiveness (miiyii) is the deluding of others (paravafzcana)."
340
LS: AKB ii. 33cd, defines: "Pride (mada) is the exhausting oneself of the thought of those
who are enamoured with their own qualities."
Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.36 madal:z katamal:z I svasampattau raktasyoddhar:Jas cetasal:z paryiidiinam I
4.1.36 What is [LS: pride]? [It is] the delight of someone who is infatuated with [his
or her] own well-being and [a state in which] the mind is overwhelmed. ISBP.236
Avatiira (ESD.95): "Pride (mada) has the nature of being arrogant and caring for no-one
(cetasal:z paryiidiina1Jl), which results from an attachment to one's own physical appearance,
strength, lineage, purity of precept, learning and eloquence, etc." ·
341
LS: AKB v. 49c-50b, defines: ."Harmfulness (vihi1Jlsii), harming [vihefhana], that finds
expression in beating [prahiira], harsh speech [piiru:Jya], etc., harming others."
Vasubandhu's Pafzcaskandhaka (2008) states:
4. L 37 vihi1JlSii katamii I sattvavihethanii I
4.1.37 What is harmfulness? [The impulse to do] injury to sentient beings.
Avatiira (ESD.95): ''Harmfulness (vihi1Jlsii) is the harming of others·, as a result of which one
pr3:ctises the acts of beating and scolding etc."
342
Gokhale: [27] krodhopanahasiifhyer:Jylipradasamrak:Jamatsariil:z I mayamadavihif!tsiii ca
parfttakleia-bhamikal:z 11
Tib.: [27a2-e] khro ba dang I khon du 'dzin dang g.yo dang ni I phrag dog 'tshig 'chab ser sna
dang I sgyu dang rgyags dang rnam 'tshe ni I nyon mongs chung ngu'i sa pa rnams 11
LVP: Hsiian-tsang translates: " ... the factors of this nature(= iti) are called factors of defile-
ment of restricted scope (parfttakleiabhiimika)".
Saiµghabhadra [Ny, 392a6]: The text says: "The factors of this nature", in order to include
impatience (ak:jiinti), discontent (arati), displeasure (iighiita), etc.
343
LS: SAH 60.
344
LVP: Dharrmtrata: (1) Because they are abandoned by cultivation and not by insight into
the truths, (2) because they are associated with the mental consciousness and not with the other
five consciousnesses, (3) because they do not arise with all thought and exist separately, they
are the factors of defilement of restricted scope.
LS: The MYS, 220b, explains (SA.IV.223):
Those dharma-s [of defilement] which obtain in some [but not all] defiled thoughts
are called dharma-s of defilement of restricted scope. That is: the seven-anger,
[enmity, depraved opinionatedness, concealment, avarice, jealousy and harmful-
ness]-are exclusively unskillful; dissimulation;· deceptiveness and pride may be
either unskillful or non-defined. Moreover, the seven, anger, etc., pe:tain only to the
762 Exposition of the F acuities (Indriyanirdes{l)
sensuality sphere; dissimulation and deceptiveness pertain to the sensuality sphere

and the first dhyana; pride pertains to all three spheres. Moreover, these ten are
abandonable by cultivation only and pertain exclusively to the mental stage (mano-
bhumi). When one of them arises, there is definitely no another. Being mutually
contradictory [among one another in nature], they are called dhanna-s of defilement
of restricted scope.
Yasomitra comments on parftta and alpaka (WOG.132; SA.IV.224):
Restricted [parftta] means little/minor (alpaka). What is that? Mere-ignorance (avidya-
miitra); this means solely avidyii (avidyaiva kevala). "With that mere-ignorance"
means "not with other defilements, greed, etc".
LVP has incorporated this passage of Yasomitra into his AKB translation, i.e., the original
Sanskrit (Pradhan) does not state whether avidya is ave1J,ikf or not.
In this context the MYS reports a controversy, i.e., whether the ignorance which arises
together with these restricted defilements refers to the "conjoined ignorance" (saf[1,prayukta-
avidyii)-ignorance always arising in conjunction with other defilements-or to the "inde-
pendent ignorance" (iive1J,ikf avidyii), which arises through its own strength. Dhammajoti
discusses this controversy in his article The ave1J,ikf avidyii in the Sarviistivada school (2009).
1. In the latter, Dhammajoti points out that the doctrine of ave1J,ikii avidya is not attested in
the canonical texts belonging to the earlier periods, i.e., the Dharmaskandha, the Sangfti-
paryiiya and the Prajiiapti-sastra.
The Vijiiiinakiiya, on the other hand, attests iive1J,ikf avidyii as pertaining to the four noble
truths, while describing it as not being abandonable by insight (darsana-heya) alone but also
by cultivation (bhiivana-heya). The Jiiiinaprasthiina, 925c, defines it as follows (p. 7):
What is the ave1J,ikf avidyii anusaya?
Those avidya-s which are non-clarity/unclear/confused (:f 1; *asaf[1,prakhyiinal
*avyaktal*miirf-ha) with regard to duftkha, with regard to samudaya, nirodha, miirga
[= the four truths].
2. The Mahiivibhii~ii (196c-197a) elaborates (p. 8):
Herein, "non-clarity" signifies "being disinclined" (:f-tik.; *na rocate, *akamaka) and
"being non-receptive". That is, as a _result of avidyii veiling the citta, one is disin-
clined and non-receptive toward the Four Noble Truths, hence said to be "unclear". It
is not a mere lack of understanding ( ~H!!. :;f U)l ). Just as a poor person who has
[swallowed] bad food in his stomach, even though finding excellent food, is not
inclined to consume it. Likewise is the case of an ordinary worldling (prthagjana):
his citta being veiled by avidyii, when he hears the Four Noble Truths, he is not
inclined toward and is not receptive to them....
Question: What is the cognitive object (iilambana) of this avidyii?
Answer: The Four Noble Truths ....
Comment (by the compilers of the MVS): This avidyii has as its intrinsic nature
(svabhiiva) the invariable (- f.J; ekiinten~)/bluntness/foolishness, invariable dullness,
invariable non-clarity and invariable inconclusiveness (,F: i;I!;~; *aniscitatva) with
regard to the Four Truths ....
Question: Why is this avidya said to be aver;ikf'l What does aver;ikfmean?

Answer: This avidya arises on its own strength; it does .not arise in conjunction with
the other anusaya-s. Hence aver;fkf. It is unlike those avidya-s conjoined (smµ-
prayukta) with raga, etc., which arise through the strength of others.
Dhammajoti comments (p. 9) that "the consistent specification that the aver;ikf avidya is the
ignorance pertaining to the Four Truths would entail that it is abandoned once the practitioner
enters into the darsal!a-marga, which is the process of the direct seeing of the Four Truths, the
satyiibhisamaya", i.e., it would thus not be abandoned through cultivation (bhavana-heya).
This is in fact the MYS compilers' own opinion, i.e., the aver;ikf avidyii-s are darsana-heya
only and-besides being not conjoined with other anusaya-s-they arise through their own
strength. This would then also mean that the compilers' position is that the avidyii which arises
together with krodha, upanaha, etc., having arisen through the strength of the latter, is not to
be called ave,:zikf.
3. In this context, it is worthy to mention that the MYS also presents a dissenting opinion-
in all probability belonging to some other Sarviistiviida masters-which comprises the follow-
ing set of perspectives (p. 12): "(i) The aver;ikf avidya-s are also bhiivana-heya. (ii) Whereas
the darsana-heya iivenikf avidyii-s are deluded with regard to the Four Truths, the bhavana-
heya iive,:zikf avidya-s are not so deluded. (iii) Whereas the darsanii-heya ones arise only in the
ordinary worldlings, the bhiivanii-heya ones can also arise in the iirya-s. (iv) The dar§ana-heya
ave,:zikf-avi.dyii-s can take objects which are siisrava or aniisrava, sal'[lskrta or asal'[lskrta. The
bhiivanii-heya om~s take only siisrava and sal'[lskrta objects. (v) The darsana-heya iive,:zikf
avidyii-s arise through their own strength. The bhavana-heya ones are adsen through the
strength of others."
Thus Yasomitra's view (followed by LYP) noted above appears to be based on this second
opinion in the MYS. It is further noteworthy that Saqi.ghabhadra clearly shares this· view that
ave,:zikf avidyii is also bhiivanii-heya. He states (Ny, 613c) (p.13):
For those who concede that there are bhavana-heya avenikf avidya-s, they should
concede that there are avenikf avidya-s which take only bhavanii-heya dharma-s as
cognitive objects and are not deluded with regard to the Truths of du(lkha and
samudaya, for it is illogical to speak of such an avidyii as taking darsana-heya
avenikf avidyii-s as cognitive o.bjects. They also should concede t~at when an arya ...
practices the contemplation of the True Dharma, there ought to be the ave,:zikf avidyii
which is bhiivanii-heya, operating in the mode of torpor and disinclination, like the
case of drowsiness which obstructs the mind. Accordingly, it is known that an iirya
in whom the samudaya-jnana has arisen still has the ave,:zikf avidya which takes only
bhiivanii-heya dharma-s as objects and which obstructs the contemplation of the True
Dharma.
4. Both of these opinions in the MYS, i.e., that of the compilers and the dissenting one,
appear to have been transmitted to later times, as can be seen from the following remarks
from Pu Guang (T 41, no. 1821, 80a; SA.IY.224):
i. The independent ignorance in such cases of thought is so called because it is not
conjoined with other defilements-both the fundamental ones such as greed (raga),
etc., and the secondary defilements such as anger (krodha), etc., and also the indeter-
minate ones such as regret (kaukrtya)-and arises through its own strength. It is
abandonable by vision [into the four truths] only.
ii. The independent ignorance includes those ignorances which are not conjoined
with the fundamental defilements such as greed, etc., as well as those ignoirances
conjoined with anger, etc., and regret, etc.
5. As for the two avidyiis, i.e., sarriprayuktii avidyii and iive,:iikf avidyii, Dhammajoti (2009)
summarizes:
Inspired by the satra teaching that we are bound to sarrisiira on account of avidyii, the
Abhidharma tradition generally continued with this interpretation of avidyii, and
defined 'it principally as the ignorance or non-cognizance with regard to the Four
Truths. It even underscored the central importance of avidyii by virtually equating it
with defilement per se. No defilement could arise in the absence of avidyii. This l~d
to the notion of" sarriprayuktii avidyii"-avidyii conjoined with the defilements.
On the other hand, avidyii being a powerful defilement itself ought to be able to arise
by its own strength, all the more so when it came to be recognized as one of the most
fundamental defilements in the Abhidharma. Moreover, its specific nature and
function-in addition to being merely a generic cause of defilement and sarrisiira
ought to be properly determined. This may in fact be seen as a natural development
expected in a system like Sarviistivada Abhidharma that attaches the greatest impor-
tance to dharma-pravicaya through the process of which the intrinsic characteristic
of each and every real existent force in the universe is to be precisely determined.
This seemed to be a major reason leading to the formulation of the doctrine of
independent (iive,:iiki) avidyii. This is not to say that there are two distinct dharma-s,
one called "avidyii" the other, "iive,:iikf avidyii"; rather, there are two modalities of
one and the same dharma called "avidyii" whose general characteristic is non-
cognizance or non-clarity.
As for the two opinions regarding iive,:iikf avidyii, he adds:
One major consideration between these two different camps of thought is: whether
this new category, the iive,:iikf avidyii, is to be understood more generally as the cause
of spiritual ignorance to reality, or exclusively as the non-cognizance of the Four
Truths.
34
~ LS: Among the extant abhidharma texts, the AKB was apparently the first to make an
explicit mention of this class (SA.IV .222). See our endnote at ii. 23cd.
346
4.1.48 kaukrtyarri katamat I cetaso vipratisiiral_i
4.1.48 What is regret? The mind's sense of remorse. ISBP.237
Avatiira (ESD.96): "[Properly speaking] kaukrtya is the being of that which is badly done
(kukrtabhiiva). [But] a distinct thought-concomitant, which arises by taking this kaukrtya [in
its proper sense] as its object (kaukrtyiilambana), is given the name kaukrtya. Its meaning is
remorse (vipratisiira). This is the case of giving the name of the cause to its fruit. It is just like
giving the name "emptiness" (sunyatii) to that which takes emptiness as its object, a~d
"impurity" (asubha) to that which takes impurity as its object. Similarly in the world, one
speaks [of the inhabitants (sthiinin)] in terms of the habitat (sthiina), as when one says,
'coming from all the villages, towns', [meaning the people coming from these places]. It is
classified as an envelopment also only when it is defiled."
347
4.1.49 middharµ katamat Iasvatantravrtti§ cetaso 'bhisank~epalJ, I
4.1.49 What is sleep? The uncontrolled contraction of the mind's activity. ISBP.237
Avatiira (ESD.96): "Drowsiness (middha) is the inability to sustain the psycho-physical series
(kiiya-citta-sarµdhiiral)iisamartha). It causes mental compression (abhisarµk~epa). This is clas-
sified as an envelopment only when it is defiled."
S~e also AKB v. 47.
348
4.1.50 vitarkalJ, katamalJ, I parye~ako manojalpa§ cetaniiprajftiivi§e~alJ, I yii cittasy-
audarikatii I
4. 1.50 What is deliberation? It is a form of mental discourse that investigates; and a
particular type of wisdom and volition that is a coarseness of mind. ISBP .237
Avatiira (ESD.83): "Reasoning (vitarka) has the characteristic of causing thought to be gross
with regard to an object (cittaudiiryalak~a1Ja). It is also named discriminative reflection (sarµ-
.kalpadvitfyaniimii). Struck by the wind of ideation (sarrijniipavanoddhata), it operates (vartate)
in a gross manner. It is this dharma which serves as the projecting cause (paftcavijftiina-
pravrtti-hetu) of the five consciousnesses.
349
4.1.51 viciiralJ, katamalJ, Ipratyavek~ako manojalpas tathaiva Iyii cittasya suk~matii II
4.1.51 What is reflection? It is a form of mental discourse that examines [an object]
closely. It is like [the previous mental factor (i.e., vitarka), except that it is] a fineness
of mind.
The Avatiira (ESD.83): "Investigation (viciira) has the characteristic of causing thought to be
subtle. It is this dharma which serves as the cause that accords with the operation of mental
consciousness on its object (manovijftiina-pravrttyanukula-hetu)."
350
LVP: See v, F 46.
According to the Chinese. - The Japanese editor explains the final et cetera by attachment
(riiga; v. 2), hostility (pratigha), conceit (miina; v. 1), doubt (vicikitsii).
The Vyiikhyii reads: "regret (kaukrtya), sleepiness (middha), etc.", and explains [WOG .132.14ff.]
"etc." by: disgust (arati), yawning (vijrmbhitii), exhaustion (tandrl), uneven consumption of
food (bhakte 'samatii), etc. - It goes on: The defilements (klesa), i.e., attachment (raga), etc.,
are also undetermined, for they are not classified in any of the five categories: they are not
generally permeating factors, because they do not occur in all cases of thought; they are not
wholesome permeating factors, because they are not connected with the wholesome (kusalatva-
ayogiit); they are not permeating factors of defilement, because they do not occur in all cases
of defiled thought: for there is no attachment (riiga) in a thought conjoined with hostility
(sapratigha ).
The Aciirya Vasumitra has written a summary mnemonic stanza (sloka): "The tradition (smrta)
is that there are eight undetermined factors (aniyata), namely, initial inquiry (vitarka), investi-
gation (viclira), regret (kd,ukrtya), sleepiness (middha), hostility (pratigha); attachment (sakti =
raga), conceit (mlina), doubt (vicikitsli)." But we (= Yasomitra) do not admit this number
eight. Why would the afflicted views (dr~fi; v. 3a) not be undetermined? There is no false view
(mithyadr~!i) in a thought ',conjoined with either hostility or doubt.
351
LS: Vasubandhu's Pa,ficaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.1.22 rligaJ:t kafamaJ:t Ipaficasiiptidtinaskandhe~u sneho 'dhyavaslinam I
4,1.22 What is desire? Strong affection for, and attachment to, the five grasping
heaps. ISBP.233
Avatara (ESD.90): "Sens~ality greed is so named as it is greed (raga) for sensual desire
(kama). This greed itself is the proclivity, therefore it is named sensual-greed proclivity. There
are five of this, belonging to the five classes in the sense-sphere only, namely: the sensual-
greed proclivity abandonable by insight into unsatisfactoriness (duJ:tkha-darsana-prahatavya)
and so on up to that abandonable by cultivation (bhavana-prahatavya)."
352
4.1.23 pratigha/:t katamaJ:t I sattve~v aghata/:t I
4.1.23 What is hatred? Animosity toward sentient beings. ISBP.234
Avatara (ESD.87): "The hostility fetter (pratigha-saYJlyojana) is the hatred (dve~a) belonging
to the five classes [of abandonables]. It is named hostility as it is characterized by the delight
in harming (aghata) and not being benevolent to sentient beings, etc. [It brings about the future
unsatisfactoriness], just like bitter seeds. Hostility itself is the fetter, therefore it is named
hostility-fetter."
353
4.1.24 mana/:t katamaJ:t I sapta miinaJ:t - miino 'tima:no miiniitimano 'smimiino 'bhi-
mana iinamano mithyamanas ceti I
4.1.24.1 ma:na/:t katamaJ:t I hina:c chreyan asmi sadrsena va sadrsa iti ya cittasyon-
nati/:t I
4.1.24.2 atima:naJ:t katamaJ:t I sadrsa:c chreya:n asmi sreyasa va sadrsa iti ya cittasyon-
natiJ:t j
4.1.24.3 manatimana/:t katamaJ:t I sreyasaJ:t sreyan asmiti ya cittasyonnati/:t I
4.1.24.4 asmimana/:t katamaJ:t I paiicopadanaskandhan atmata atmiyato vii samanu-
pasyato ya cittasyonnatiJ:t I
4.1.24.5 abhimana/:t katama/:t I aprapta uttare vise~adhigame prapto mayeti ya
cittasyonnatiJ:t I
4.1. 24. 6 iinamanaJ:t katamaJ:t I bahvantaravisi~!ad alpantarahfno 'smfti ya cittasyon-
nati/:t I
4.1.24.7 mithyamanaJ:t katamaJ:t Iagutiavato gutiavan asmfti ya cittasyonnati/:t I
4.1.24. What is [LS: conceit]? There are seven types of pride: [ordinary] conceit,
extraordinary conceit, extreme conceit, egoistic conceit, exaggerated conceit, conceit
of inferiority, and·wrong conceit. ·
4.1.24.1 What is [ordinary] [conceit]? The swelling up of the mind in which you
think of someone who is inferior to you, "I am better [than him or her]", or of some-
one who is your equal, "I am [his or her] equal".
4.1.24.2 What is extraordinary [conceit]? The swelling up of the mind in which
you think of someone who is your equal, "I am better [than him or her]", or of
someone who is superior to you, "I am [his or her] equal".
4.1.24.3 What is extreme [conceit]? The swelling up of the mind in which you
think of someone who is superior to you, "I am better [than him or her]".
4.1.24.4 What is egoistic [conceit]? The swelling up of the mind that originates
from the mistaken notion that the five grasping heaps 9onstitute an "I" and a "mine".
4.1.24.5 What is exaggerated [conceit]? The swelling up of the mind in which you
think toward higher special attainments that you have not achieved, "I have achieved
them".
4.1.24.6 What is [conceit] of inferiority? The swelling up of the mind in which you
think of someone who is very much superior to you, "I am only slightly inferior to
him".
4.1.24.7 What is wrong [conceit]? The swelling up of the mind in which you think,
"I possess good qualities", when you are not someone who possesses good qualities.
ISBP.234
Avatiira (ESD.87f.): "The conceit fetter (miina-sarrzyojana) is the conceit in the three spheres.
It is named conceit as it is characterized by mental elevation (unnati) when one compares
one's own virtues with those of others, as in the case of an arrogant person (stabdha-puru~a)
depreciating others. It is further divided into seven kinds: (i) miina, (ii) atimiina, (iii) miiniiti-
miina, (iv) asmimiina, (v) abhimiina, (vi) unamiina, (vii) mithyiimiina.
i. If, with regard to these-clan (kula), lineage (gotra), wealth (dhana), appearance (var~a),
strength (bala), observance of the precepts (sfla), learning (biihusrutya), skill in the arts and
crafts (silpa), etc.-others are inferior and one claims that one is superior, or others are equal
to one, and one claims that one is equal; the mental elevation so produced is named miina.
ii. If others are equal to one, and one claims one is superior, or if others are superior and one
claims one is equal; the mental elevation so produced is named atimiina.
iii. If others are superior, and one claims one is superior, the mental elevation so produced is
named miiniitimiina.
iv. If one clings to the five aggregates of grasping (paflcopiidiina-skandha) as the Self
(iitman) or what pertains to the Self (iitmfya), the mental elevation so produced is asmimiina.
v. If one has not attained the distinctive attainment (vise~iidhigama) of the fruit of stream-
entry (srotaiipatti) and one claims that one has, th,e mental elevation so produced is abhimiina.
vi. If others excel one greatly, in respect of clan and lineage, etc., and one claims that one is
only a little inferior; the mental elevation so produced is named anamiina.
\
vii. If one claims that one has virtues when in reality one has not, the mental elevation so
produced is named mithyiimiina.
These seven kinds of conceit are collectively named the conceit-fetter."
354
4.1.27 vicikitsii katamii I satyiidi~u yii vimatiJ:i I
4.1.27 What is doubt? Ambivalence about the [four Noble] Truths and so forth.
Avatiira (ESD.89): "The doubt fetter (vicikitsii-sarriyojana) is that which causes hesitation
(vimati) in the mind with regard to the Four Noble Truths. It is like [a man] being undecided
when confronted with an intersection or a straw-man. [In the first case he is uncertain as to
which is the right way to take; in the second case, he is uncertain-when seeing from afar or in
darkness;-as to whether it is a real man or simply a straw-man]. Likewise, there arises
hesitation as to the truth or falsehood of the [Truth of] Unsatisfactoriness (duJ:ikha); etc. The
doubt itself is the fetter, therefore it is named the doubt-fetter."
355
LS: AH, 20-22; SAH 61-63.
356
LS: AH 20-21; SAH 61-62.
As for Vasubandhu's discussion of kusala, akusala and avyakrta in the context of the eighteen
elements (dhiitu), see i. 29c-30a; as for the number of associated thought-concomitants in
regard to kusala, akusala and avyakrta thoughts, see ii. 28-30d; as for the various classifiea-
t,ions of kusala, akusala and avyakrta factors, see in particular AKB iv. 8b-9c; as for the
?efinitions of kusala, akusala and avyiikrta actions, see in particular AKB iv. 45ab; as for the
1
definitions of kusala and akusala paths of action (karmapatha), see iv. 66bd.
357
LS: L VP has the following section after kiirikii 28, but Pradhan places it before. I follow
Pradhan since it is more conducive to headlining the text.
358
LVP: souille, defiled.
359
LVR: Compare Kathiivatthu, xiv. 8.
360
LS: AKB ii. 71: The unobscured-non-defined (anivrtavyakrta) thought of the realm of
desire is divided into four categories:
1. arisen from the ripening cause (vipiikaja; ii. 57);
2. associated with proper deportment (airyiipathika): lying down [sayana], sitting
[iisana], standing [sthiti], walking [carrikrama1,1a];
3. associated with skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthiinika);
4. associated with supernormal emanations (nairmita; nairmii1,1ika): the thought by
whlch the possessor of supernormal accomplishments creates visible forms [rupa],
etc., and which is called the effect of superknowledge (abhijfiiiphala; vii. 49) (see
ii, F 265).
361
LS: AH 21; SAH 62.
362
Gokhale: [28] savitarkaviciiratviit kusale kiimacetasi I dviivirrisatis caitasikii/:t kaukrtyam
adhikarri kva cit I
Tib.: [28] 'dod pa'i dge ba'i sems la ni I rtog dang dpyod dang bcas pa'i phyir I sems las byung
ba nyi shu gnyis I la la dag tu 'gyod pa bstan I
363
LS: AH 21; SAH 62.
364
LVP: Dhammasatiga1,1i, 1161; Atthasiilinf, 784-87.
LS: See ii, F 165.
365
LVP: Cf. i, F 69.
366
LS: AH 20; SAH 61.
367
LS: Ibid.
368
Gokhale: [29ab] iiver;,ike tv akusale dr~fiyukte ca virrisatil;i I
Tib.: [29ab] midge bani ma 'dres dang I lta dang ldan la'ang nyi shu 'byung I
369
LVP: iive,:iika = riigiidipf(hagbhiita.
370
LVP: Any view (dr~fi) is "judgment after deliberation" (sarritfrikii prajnii; i. 41cd; vii. 1).
371
LS: AH 20; S.AH 61.
372
Gokhale: [29cd] klesais caturbhil;i krodhiidyail;i kaukrtyen aikavirrisatil;i I
Tib.: [29cd] ~yon mongs bzhi dang khro sogs dang I 'gyod pa dang ni nyi shu gcig II
373
LS: AH 20.:.21; SAH 62.
374
Gokhale: [30ab] nivrte '~fiidasii 'nyatra dviidasii 'vyiikrte matiilJ I
Tib.: [30ab] bsgribs la bco brgyad lung ma bstan I gzhan la bcu gnyis dag tu 'dod I
LS: As Collett Cox points out (DD.214f.), the Vaibhii~ikas propose that non-defined factors,
whose moral quality is not manifest as either wholesome or unwholesome, are of two types:
1. Obscured-non-defined (nivrtiivyiikrta): factors that are obscured by association with
defilements (klesiidita), and, like unwholesome factors, they constitute an obstacle to the
·(noble) path. However, unlike unwholesome factors, they are incapable of producing an unde-
sirable effect. For example, a moment of thought within the realm of desire can be ob-
scured and non-defin~d in moral quality if associated with the afflicted view of self (sat-
kiiyadr~fi) or with the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (antagriihadr~fi). A moment of
thought within the realm of fine-materiality or the realm of immateriality can be obscured and
non-defined if associated with any defilement.
2. Unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta): factors that are certain types of form (riipa),
space, cessation not due to deliberation, Certain dissociated factors, all ripened effects (vipiika-
phala), and moments of thought associated either with skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthiinika)
or with modes of proper deportment (airyiipathika), and thoughts capable of miraculous
emanations (nairmii,:iika ).
. See Dharnrnajoti' s explanation of the non-defined dharmas in our endnote to iv. 9d (F 35).
375
LS: AH 20; SAH 62.
376
LS: AH 21; SAH 62.
377
LS: Ibid.
378
Gokhale: [30cd] middharri sarvii'virodhitviid yatra syiid adhikarri hi tat I
Tib.: [30cd] gnyid ni kun la mi 'gal phyir I gang la yod pa de bsnan no I
379
LS: AH 22; SAH 63.
380
Gokhale: [31] kaukrtyamiddhii'kusaliiny iidye dhyiine na santy atalJ I dhyiiniintare vitarkas
cii vicii,ras cii 'py atalJ param II
Tib.: [31] de las 'gyod gnyid midge rnams I bsam gtan dang po dag named I rtog pa'ang bsam
gtan khyad par can I de yi gong na dpyod pa yang I
381
LVP: Thought in the first meditation (dhyiina), when it is (1) wholesome, involves thus
twenty-two thought-concomitants; (2) obscured-non-defined, it involves (i) eighteen thought-
concomitants when it is independent or associated with afflicted view (dr~ti), (ii) nineteen
thought-concomitants when it is associated with attachment (raga), arrogance (miina) or doubt
(vicikitsii) ... .
382
LVP: Literally: The word "also" (api) shows that one has to exclude, in additi~n to initial
inquiry (viciira), dissimulation (siithya) and deceit (miiyii).
383
LVP: According to the Japanese editor, Saddharmasmrti[upasthiina]siitra, 33, 10 (Nanjio
679, Mdo 24-27). - MVS, 670b24.
384
LVP: By adding: "I am the great Brahma", he distinguishes himself from the other
Brahmas.
385
LVP: Cf. Dfgha, i. 219ff., and below iv. Sa, v. 53ab.
Dfgha, i. 221f. (Transl. Walshe):
Then, Kevaddha, the Great Brahma, took that monk by the arm, led him aside and
said:
Monk, these devas believe there is nothing Brahma does not see, there is nothing he
does not know, there is nothing he is unaware of. That is why I did not speak in front
of them. But, monk, I do not know where the four fundamental material elements
cease without remainder. And therefore, monk, you have acted wrongly, you have
acted incorrectly by going beyond the Blessed Lord and going in search of an answer
to this question elsewhere. Now, monk, you just go to the Blessed Lord and put this
question to him, _and whatever answer he gives, accept it. [ ... ]
(Lord Buddha:)
Where consciousness is signless, boundless, all-luminous,
That is where earth, water, fire and air find no footing,
There both long and short, small and great, fair and foul -
There "name-and-fonn" are wholly destroyed.
With the cessation of consciousness this is all destroyed.
386
LS: SAH 59.
387
LS: Ibid.
388
Gokhale: [3 lal] ahrfr agurutii
Tib.: [32al] ma gus ngo tsha med
LVP: ahrfr agurutii. ~ Jfliinaprasthiina, i. § 5 (according to Takakusu, p. 87).
389
LVP: pratfsa = guru, because si~arµ. pratf~tal;i.
390
Gokhale: [32a2-b] 'vadye bhayii'darsitvam atrapii I
Tib.: [32a2-b] khrel med Ikha na ma tha 'jigs mi lta I
LVP: Compare the definition of higher morality (adhisfla): .. .a~umiitre~v apy avadye~u bhaya-
darsf....
391
LVP: Vasubandhu,_ in the Paiicaskandhaka, adopts this definition.
LS: This is the sixth of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.48): "[Vasubandhu] defends the opinion of others, saying that ahrfkya and anapatriipya
are not intended to be simultaneous. Sarµghabhadra says [393b23-25] that the objection to this
opinion cited by the sutra-master reflects his misunderstanding because the real problem with
the opinion is that it does not treat ahrfkya and anapatrapya as completely separate dharmas."
392
LVP: hrf and apatrapya, see Lalita, 32.
See ii, F 160.
393
Gokhale: [32cl] prema sraddha
Tib.: [32cl] dga' dang
LVP: Jfiiinaprasthana, i. § 4 (according to Takakusu, p. 87).
394
Gokhale: [32c2] gurutva1J1, hrfs
Tib.: [32c2] gus nyid ngo tsha shes I
LVP: MVS, 151a15.
395
LVP: Since one cannot have respect with regard to impure (sasrava) factors. (Note by the
Japanese editor.)
396
Gokhale: [32d] te punal:t kamarupayo/:tII
Tib.: [32d] de gnyis 'dod dang gzugs dag na I
397
Gokhale: [33abl] vitarkaciiriiv audiiryasuk~mate.
Tib.: [33a] rtog dang dpyod pa rtshing zhib nyid I
LVP: This definition is based on a Sutra that is not indicated in our sources. - Cf. i. 33.
LS: As for vitarka and vicara, see the definitions in our endnotes at ii, F 165, and also our
endnotes to i. 14cd and 33.
398
LVP: The seventh opinion of the MVS, 219b3.
399
LVP: The argument shown in the MVS, 269bl0, and attributed to the Diir~tiintikas.
400
LS: L VP mentions the Sautriintikas here, but they are not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan.
401
LVP: That is to say, "they make speech appear" (viiksamutthapaka).
402
LVP: vitarkya vicarya vacam bhii~ate niivitarkya niivicarya [WOG.139.10]. - Compare
Majjhima, i. 301; Sa1J1,yutta iv. 293: pubbe kho ... vitakketvii vicaretvii pacchii vaca1J1, bhindati.
- On the other hand, Vibhanga, 135: viicfsa1J1,cetana = vacfsa1J1,khiiro.
403
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in .Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautriintika here.
404
LS: Dhammajoti comments (ESD.145) that according to the Sautriintika "vitarka and
vicara are not real entities but merely two designations for the gross and subtle states of citta.
Their difference is one of degree, not of kind (jiitibheda). Vasubandhu explains that their
operation is not simultaneous but alternate (prayayel)a)."
405
LS: Sarµghabhadra writes (Ny, 394a; ESD.145):
[Objection:] Grossness and subtleness being mutually contradictory, vitarka and
vicara should not be co-nascent in the same citta.
[Answer:] Although the substances of the two co-exist in one and the same citta, the
predominance of their activities differs in time. Hence they do not contradict each
other. It is like equal parts of water and vinegar in combination: Although there is
772 Exposition of the F acuities (Jndriyanirdesa)
equality in substance (i.e 7 quantity), there is a predominance in activity [of the one
over the other]. In a gross citta, the activity of vicara is impaired as a result of the
predominance of the activity of vitarka; so that though [the former] exists, it is
difficult to detect it. In w subtle citta, the activity of vitarka is impaired as a result of
the predominance of th~ activity of vicara; so that though [the former] exists, it is
difficult to detect it.
One might argue that this analogy is not valid inasmuch as the activity of vinegar
predominates at all times. This objection is not reasonable. I do not say definitely that
the vinegar is to be compared to vitarka and water [to] vicara; only that which
predominates in activity is like vinegar: Within the citta, whichever of the two
dharma-s, vitarka and vicara, predominates in activity, is to be compared to vinegar;
that whose activity is feeble is to be compared to water. Hence it is not the case that
one and the same citta is at once gross and subtle; as vitarka and vicara, though co-
existing in the citta, operate at different times.
LVP adds: In the same way, attachment (raga) and delusion (moha) are coexistent: but a
person is termed "behaving through attachment" (ragacarita), when attachment manifests
itself.. ..
406
LVP: See viii, F 158f., for the Sautriintika view as to whether initial inquiry (vitarka) and
investigation (vicara) are separate real entities.
Initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicara) exist, not simultaneously, but successively
(paryaye,:ia). What is the difference between initial inquiry and investigation? The old masters
(parvacarya) say:
What is vitarka? - A mental conversation (manojalpa) of examination (parye:jaka),
which has for its basis intention (cetana) or the speculative consciousness (prajfia)
depending on whether or not it involves reasoning or inference (abhyuha). This is the
gross state of thought.
What is vicara? - A mental conversation of appreciation, of judgment (pratyavek(iaka),
which has for its basis intention ....
According to this theory, vitarka and vicara constitute two almost identical psychological
complexes: they differ in that the first involves "inquiry" and the second "judgment". Some
give an example: Someone examines numerous pots in .order to know which one is well-baked
and which one is soft: this inquiry (aha) is vitarka; finally, this person arrives at a conclusion,
"There are such a number of each category": this is vicara.
The Vyakhya, ad i. 33, cites the Paficaskandhaka of Vasubandhu, which is very close to the
opinion of the old masters: vitarkaJ:i katamaJ:i I parye~ako manojalpas cetaniiprajfiiivise~aJ:i I yii
cittasyaudiirikatii I viciiraJ:i katamaJ:i Ipratyavek~ako manojalpas cetaniiprajfiiivise~aJ:i I ya cittasya
silk~matii. 11 [see WOG.64.26ff.] The Vyakhya adds [WOG.64.28]: anabhyilhiivasthiiyiirµ cetanii
abhyilhiivasthiiyiirµ prajfieti vyavasthiipyate.
See Dhammasanga,:ii, 7-8, Compendium, pp. 10-11, Milinda, 62-63. -Atthasalinf, 296-97
defines initial inquiry as reasoning or deliberation (uhana), and gives it as coarse (o{arika),
whereas investigation is subtle (sukhuma). - Vyiisa ad Yogasutrai i. 17: vitarkas cittasya-
iilambane sthula iibhogal,i I sa~mo vicaral,i; i. 42-44.
407
Gokhale: [33b2] miina unnatifi I
Tib.: [32bl] nga rgyal khengs pa
408
Gokhale: [33cd] madafi svadharme raktasya paryiidiinaf!1 tu cetasafi II
Tib.: [32b2--d] rgyags pa ni I rang gi chos la chagspa yi I sems ni yongs su gtugs pa'o I
409
LVP: paryiidfyate = Saf!1nirudhyate; see Sik~iisamuccaya, 177, 1s; Divya, Satriilaf!lkiira,
i. 12.
Definition of Sarµghabhadra: yafi svadharme~v eva raktasya darpas cetasafi paryiidiinaf!1
kusaliinyakriyiibhyupapattisaf!1hiiro madafi.
LS: That is to say (EIP. VIII.684), due to the exhaustion caused by arrogant thoughts attached
to themselves, one withdraws from the pursuit of good factors.
410
LVP: That is to say, pride (mada) is sensation, 'fdefiled satisfaction" (kli~ta saumanasya).
The Vaibhii~ika does not admit this explanation: indeed, satisfaction does not exist beyond
the second meditation (dhyiina): now, according to v. 53c, pride exists in the three realms of
existence.
411
LS: SAH 15, 56, 450.
412
LS: SAH 15.
413
LS: At ii. 23a, L VP footnoted:
citta = manas = vijfiiina.
caitta = caitasa = caitasika =c,ittasal!lprayukta.
414
LS: For manas, LVP translates here "esprit" versus his usual "organe mental".
415
Gokhale: [34abl] citta1?1 mano 'tha vijfiiinam ekiirthaf!1
Tib.: _[34abl] sems dang yid dang rnam shes ni Idon gcig
LVP: Compare Dfgha, i. 21; Saf!1yutta, ii. 94. - Compare Atthasiilinf, 140: "In the exposition of
consciousness, consciousness (citta) is so called because of its 'variegated (citta) nature. Mind
(mano) is so called because it knows the measure of an object. Mental action (miinasa) is just
'mind' .... 'Heart' is the same as mind .... "
LS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka(2008) states:
5. vijfiiinaf!I katamat I iilambanavijfiaptifi I cittaf!1 mano 'pi tat I citratiif!I manafi-
sannisrayatiirµ coptidiiya I
5. What is consciousness? It is awareness of an object. It is also [referred to as]
thought and mind, because it is diverse and because mind serves as its support.
\
prqdhiinyena punas cittam iilayavijfitinam I tathii hi tac citaf!1 sarvasaf!lskiirabfjaifr I
tat jJUnar aparicchinniilambaniikiiraf!1 vijfiiinam ekajiitfY<lf!I santiiniinuvrtti ca I yato
nirodhasamiipattyasafijfiisamiipattyiisafijfiikebhyo vyutthitasya punar vi~ayavijfiapty-
iikhyaf!I pravrttivijfiiinam utpadyata tilambanapratyayiipek~af!I praktiriintaravrttittif!I
chinnapunarvrttitiif!1 saf!1siirapravrttinivrttitii1?1 copiidtiya I iilayavijfiiinatvaf!1 punafi
sarvabfjiilayatiim titmamtiniilayanimittatiif!I ktiytilfnatiif!I coptidtiya I tidtinavijfiiinam
api tat kiiyopiidiinattif!1 coptidiiya I
Primarily, thought is the storehouse consciousness, because that is where the seeds of
all the formations are collected. Moreover, [the storehouse consciousness] does not
have· a discernible object or aspect; it is of a single type; and it occurs continuously-

because, after coming out of the state of composure that is a cessation, the state of
composure without conception, and the state [of being born as a worldly god] that
has no conception, the active forms of consciousness, which are referred to as
"awareness of objects", arise again. It exists because of the occurrence of different
aspects in relation to the objective condition, [because of] their occurrence after
having been interrupted, and [because] saf!!siira is both set in motion and brought to
an end. That very [consciousness] is [called] the "storehouse consciousness", because
of its quality of being the storehouse and cause of [a sentient being's] individual
existence, and its quality of residing in [a sentient being's] body. It is also [called] the
"acquiring consciousness", because it take on [a sentient being's] embodied exis-
tence.
priidhiinyena mana iilayavijfiiiniilambanaf!I sadiitmamiiniitmamohiitmasnehiidisam-
prayuktaf!I vijiiiinam ekajiitlyarµ santiiniinuvrtti ca I arhattviiryamiirganirodhasamiipatty-
avasthiif!I sthiipayitvii I
Primarily, mind is what apprehends the storehouse consciousness as its object. It is a
consciousness that is always accompanied by bewilderment toward a self, the view
that believes in a self, pride toward a self, and attachment toward a self, and so on. It
is of one type and it occurs continually, except when [one becomes] an Arhat, [when
one has generated] the Arya path, and [when one is absorbed in] the state of compo-
sure that is a cessation. ISBP.239f.
Avatiira (ESD.120):
(5) The specific cognition (prativijfiapti), in a general manner, of an object-base
(vi~aya-vastu, vastu) such as a visible, etc., [without its particular details], is named
consciousness (vijfiiina). That is, the present function [of vision, etc.] with regard to
the six [external] objects of vision, etc., which arise with the accompanying assis-
tance of the visual faculties, etc. (indriya-sahakiira), and which apprehend visibles
and other objects only generally, are named consciousnesses.
(5.1) That which is able to apprehend the particular characteristics of [an object] is
named a thought-concomitant, such as sensation, etc. Consciousness does not have
this function; it serves only as the support [for the thought-concomitants]. The func-
tion of consciousness exists only ill' the present moment within the single moment
(k~a,:ia) of which the specific cognition takes place.
(5.2) Consciousness also receives the names of "mind" (manas) and "thought" (citta).
It is also that by which the fundamental essence of a sentient being (mula-sattva-
dravya) may be designated. Its function is the specific cognition of the visibles and
other objects. It is divided into six types by reason of the [six] different faculties
[of vision, etc., and the six] different objects. These are named visual consciousness
(cak~ur-vijfiiina), etc., up to mental consciousness (mano-vijfiiina). The Buddha
Himself has spoken of its characteristic (lak~a,:ia) in the satra: It is named conscious-
ness because it cognizes discriminatively (vijiiniiti). Hence, we know that its charac-
teristic is discriminative cognition.
2. MVS [371a-b] presents various distinctions (SA.IV.212):
Question: What is the difference between the three--citta, manas, vijiiiina-men-

tioned in the sutra?
[Answer:] There is the explanation that there is no difference--citta is none other
than manas, manas is none other than vijiiiina; for, although the three words are dif-
ferent, there is no difference in meaning ....
There is also the explanation that the three ... are also differentiated: that is, the
names themselves are different. ...
Furthermore, there is a difference with respect of time (adhvan): what is past is
called manas; what is future is called citta; what is present is called vijiiiina.
Furthermore, there is a difference with respect to designation (prajiiapti): citta is
designated among the dhiitu-s; manas, among the iiyatana-s; vijiiiina among the
skandha-s.
Furthermore, there is a difference in terms of signification (artha): citta signifies
"clan" (gotra); manas, "gateway of arising"' (ilya-dviira), vijiiilna, "agglomeration".
Furthermore, there is a difference in terms of activity (kriyil): that of citta is far-
going (duragama) ... ; mana~, fore-running (purvaligama) ... ; vijiiilna, birth-relinkini
(sarµdhiina/pratisarµdhi) .. ..
Further, the activity of citta is being variegated (citra) ... ; manas, going toward ...
(if~; gati [?]); vijiiiina, cognition (vi-.fjnii) ... ,
Furthermore, the activity of citta is increasing or nourishing (~ ¾; sarµcitatva);
manas, thinking; vijiiilna, cognizing.
According to Venerable Parsva: the activity of citta is increasing and severing; manas,
thinking and cont~plating, vijiiiina, distinguishing and comprehending. Herein, it is
t~be understood that what increases is the with-outflow citta, what severs is the
outflow-free citta; what thinks is the with-outflow manas, what contemplates is the
outflow-free manas; what distinguishes is the with-outflow vijiiilna, what compre-
hends is the outflow-free vijfiilna.
3. Waldro9°comments (BU.226): "In early Piili and Abhidharma Buddhist texts, citta,
vijiiilna, and manas were said to be synonymous, but different contexts of usage evinced
different ranges of meaning. [ ... ] For the Yogiicarins, however, these th~ee terms refer to
three distinct dharmas: citta refers to the iilaya-vijiiilna, which of course accumulates pure
and impure dharmas in the form of seeds; manas, from the Mahiiyilnasarµgraha on, refers
to the kli~ta-manas (as well as an antecedent vijiiiina as the support of a succeeding one,
~arpµimapi vljiiilnakiiyiiniiinanantaraniruddharµ), while vijiiilna itself refers to the traditional
classification of six forms of sensory and mental cognitive awareness (yadiilambanavijiiaptau
pratyupasthitarµ) (Yogiiciirabhami 11.4-8)."
416
LVP: Thought accumulates the wholesome and the unwholesome, such is the meaning
[WOG.141.lSf.]. -Tibetan: 'byed pas: because it distinguishes. -Atthasiilinf, 293: illambanarµ
cintetfti cittam.
417
LVP: manajiiiina ity asya au1Jildikapratyayal_z (Dhiitupii[ha, 4, 67).
LS: Waldron comments (BU.226) on manas (mentation): "Derived from the Sanskrit root man,
'to think, believe, imagine, suppose, conjecture', manas is related to the Latin mens, 'mind,
reason, intellect', and ultimately to the English 'mind, mentate', and 'to mean' (PED 515, 520;
SED783)."
418
LS: Dhammajoti remarks (ADCP.94): "This is emphasized by the Abhidharmikas as an
important epistemological principle: Where there is a consciousness, there necessarily is a
corresponding cognitive object (iilambana): Consciousness cannot arise simply by itself. The
Sarviistiviidins-and for that matter the Sautriintika as well as the Yogiiciira:...._in fact make
good use of this principle. In the case of the Sarviistiviida and the Yogiicilra, consciousness and
its object arise necessarily at the same time. The Sarviistiviida invokes [the epistemological
principle] to establish that past and future dharma-s exist; the Sautriintika, that external reality
exists; the Yogiiciira, that nothing exists apart from consciousness. A corollary of this principle
is that consciousness necessarily arises with a specific content, determined by the cognitive
object."
419
- LS: Gedun Drup attributes this position to the Sautriintikas.
420
LVP: citrarrz subhiisubhair dhiitubhir iti cittam [MSS.]. The Vyiikhyii adds [WOG.141.18]:
bhiivaniisaqmivesayogena Sautriintika-matena Y ogiiciira-matena vii.
Paramiirtha has read: citarrz subhiisubhair dhiitubhis tan vii cinotfti cittam. - In the same way,
the Tibetan translates as: "becau~e it is accumulated (~ags pas) of good and bad elements
(dhiitu)."
421
LS: AH 18, 217; SAH 56,450.
422
Gokhale: [34cdl] cittacaitasiilJ, IsiisrayiilambaniikiiriilJ, samprayuktiis ca
Tib.: [34cdl] sems dang sems byung dang I rten dang dmigs dang rnam bcas dang I mtshungs
par ldan pa' ang
LVP: Compare K'uei-chi, Twenty Verses, i, 14b.
LS: Since thought and thought-concomitants are in a reciprocal causal relationship as mutually
associated causes (sarrzprayuktaka-hetu; ii, F 267-68)-an exemplification of the co-existent
cause (sahabhu-hetu; ii, F 248-55)--they are always conascent; they also have the same basis,
share the same cognitive object, etc. Saqighabhadra states therefore,(Ny, 394c; EIP.VIIl.684)
that their distinction in essential nature is difficult to discern, but distinguishes them as
follows: (1) thought apprehends the nature of its object in general; (2) thought-concomitants
grasp the various particular characteristics of the object. See our endnote to i. 16a.
423
LVP: WOG.141.29-142.6: siikiiriilJ, tasyaiv' alambanasya prakiire,:ia iikararJiit. yena te
s'iilambanii tasyiih' inarrzbanasya prakiirerJa grahat_1iit. kathaqi. vijfiiinaqi hi nTiaqi pitaqi vii
vastu vijiiniiti upalabhata ity arthal,l. tad eva that' filambanaqi vastu vedanii 'nubhavati. saqijfiii
paricchinatti. cetanii 'bhisaip.skarofity evam-iidi. atha vii tasyaiv' iilambanasy~ vijfiiinaip. siimiinya-
rupeQ.a upalabhyatii-riipaqi filhQ.iiti. vise~a-riipeQ.a tu vedanii 'nubhavaniyatii-riipaqi grhQ.iiti.
saqijfiii paricchedyatii..:riipaqi grhQ.iiffty evam-iidi.
LS: 1. All citta-caittas are said to be "having a mode of activity" (sa-iikiira; SA.IV.225), i.e.,
"th_e mode of apprehending the percept must be the same; thus, if tµe citta apprehends green-
ness, the caitta-s too apprehend likewise". Yasomitra explains [WOG.141.29-142.6; cf.
ADCP.102]:
Because they grasp in accordance with the type of that very cognitive object. How?
Vijfiiina cognizes-that is, apperceives (upalabhate)--a blue or yellow entity. Like-
wise, vedanii feels that very object [as being pleasurable, etc.]; saf!!jfiii categorizes it;
cetanii acts on it volitionally; etc. Or rather, vijfiiina grasp~ that very object in a
generic manner as a perceptible. On the other hand, in a specific manner, vedanii
grasps it as a sensible; saf!!jfiii grasps it as a categorizable; etc;.
Dhammajoti adds (private communication): "When the Sarviistiviidiris say that the conjoined
citta and caitta, in cognizing a blue object, share the same iikiira, "blue", it does not mean that
blue as a color and prajfiii as a force of understanding are the sam¢, Of course they are dif-
ferent!"
2. Controversies and difficulties: In Sarviistiviida Abhidharma, al,i citta-caittas are described
as siikiira, "with an iikiira", but what this term means in this ·context becomes not only
controversial among scholars and schools but also presents diffictilties or needs interpretation:
How does siikiira apply to prajfiii itself, which is a caitta? W'1,at does siikiira mean in the
context of sensory coi:,sciousness which is devoid of iikiira? This can be seen or is implied, for
example, in Vasubanqlhu's discussion at vii. 13b:
13b. Tl:i'e "aspects" or "modes of activity" are understanding.
The aspect~ or modes of activity (iikiira) are mental understanding (prajfiii; ii. 24) by
nature.
We would isay: - But if this is so, understanding (prajfiii), [i.e.,] that which discerns
factors (dharma) [ii. 24], would not be "having an aspect or a mode of activity"
[siikiira; ii. 34bd], for understandlng cannot be associated (sa'!lprayukta) with
[anotherl understanding [prajfiiintariisaf!!yoga]. It is thus correct to say (with the
Sautriintikas) that the iikiira is the mode of "perception'' of cognitive objects or
cognitive~object-grasping-mode [iilambanagraha~aprakiira] by the thought and
thought-concomitants (cittacaitta).
This explanation takes into account the word iikiira (WOG.629.6-8): One takes from
iilambana the sound ii; one takes from prakiira the last syllable kiira, and one h11S~iikiira by
withholding -lambanagrahanapra.:.. But while all citta-caitta-s are said to be "sa-iikiira"
inasmuch as all equally can grasp the object and are thus said to be "having objects (sa-
iilambana)",, for the orthodox Sarviistiviida it is prajfiii alone that is "called" iikiira (vii. 13b)
on account of the fact that its mode of operation on the object is investigation or discrimination
(pravicaya, pratisaf!!khyii). The MVS, 409a, states (SA.IV.269):
Question: What is the intrinsic nature of the so-called iikiira?
Answer: Its intrinsic nature is prajftii. Herein it should be understood thus:
i. prajfiii is iikiira; it is also wh~t cognizes with a form (iikiirayati) and what is
cognized with a form (iikiiryate); ,
ii. the citta-caitta-dharma-s conjoined (saf!!prayukta) with prajfiii, while not being
iikiira, are what cognize with a fqtm as well as what are cognized with a form;
iii. those viprayukta-saf!!skiifa-s and other existent (sat) dharma-s, while being
neither iikiira nor what cognize with a form, are what are cognized with a form.
[Omitted: Discussion of alternate views.]
Question: What is the meaning of iikiira?
778 Exposition of the Faculties (ln{l,riyanirdesa)
Answer: Akiira means the operation in the manner of examination/disce.rnment

('lfi~ 1i'ii ~; pra-vi-v'ci) with regard to the nature of th~ object.
This is essentially the same as the definition given for prajnii at ii. 24: "the investigation or
discernment of factors" (dharma-pravicaya), but since, as Saqighabhadra states (Ny, 741b.
ADP.Sf.), "only a discriminative· (sa-vikalpaka) consciousness is capable of grasping the
specific characteristic of the object [in the form:] 'it is blue, not green', etc., ... the operation
of iikiira pertains to the domain of mental consciousness, not to that of a sensory consciousness
where prajiiii cannot properly function", not being a view (dr$fi), i.e., a judgment after con-
templation, though being cognition (jiiiina) (vii. 1).
Dhammajoti comments (ADP.15) th~t whereas the Sarvastiviida school consistently equates
iikiira with prajnii in its various texts, for the Sautrantika and Yogiiciira "iikiira connotes ho.th
an image/representation and a mental understanding arising in the mind--with the difference
that the Sautrantika would regard it as a correspondent to an external existent". Thus (ADP.8),
the Sautriintika stance is that "in direct perception the iikiira corresponds exactly to the
external object. It allows no possibility of a cognitive error in a genuine pratyak$a experience.
However, this iikiira is a resemblance (sadrsii) constructed by the mind." On the other hand
(ADP.11), "in the Sarviistiviida epistemological theory, the image arising in the sensory
consciousness is not an iikiira-a mental construction by prajiiii-but an image essentially
belonging to the object, not thought. And as Pu Guang says, it arises spontaneously like a
reflection in a mirror: The reflection does not beloqg to the mirror which is always clear by
nature."
3. i. Vasubandhu's proposal: As we have seen above, at' vii. 13b, Yasubandhu proposes
(SA.IY.274) "to avoid [the] apparent contradiction by defining iikiira as the 'object-grasping-
mode' (iilambana-graha,:,a-prakiira) of all the citta-caitta-s. In this way, prajiiii too, as a caitta
can be said to be 'with an iikiira'. Yasomitra states that this is a Sautriintika definition. How-
ever, if the sense of compound .means a 'mode of understanding' in the perceptual process, and
not an image, then it is essentially Sarviistiviida rather than Sautrantika. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that Yasubandhu here does not contest the MYS statement that iikiira is prajiiii
and, in fact, proceeds to conclude with the same threefold classification of dharma-s (iikiira,
iikiirayati, iikiiryate; see vii. 13d) as we have seen in the MYS passage quoted above. This
is, however, not to say that Yasubandhu's definition of iikiira is identical with that of the
Sarviistivada." Saqighabhadra challenges Yasubandhu's proposal (Ny, 741 b; SA.IY.275):
If [the "object-grasping-mode"] refers to the different modes/species of the form of
the object, then the notion that all [citta-caitta-s] can assume the image-form (~~1l)
[of the object] cannot be established at all, for an object has various forms, skillful,
permanent, etc. Or rather, the rilpa-dharma-s are to be subsumed under iikiira, since
rilpa-dharma-s can also assume the images of the forms of others.
If it refers to the ability to grasp the specific characteristic of the object, then iikiira
ought not to be possible for the five [sensory] consciousnesses, since they are not
capable of grasping the specific characteristic of the object-since only a discrimi-
native (sa-vikalpaka) consciousness is capable of grasping the specific character-
istic of the object [in the form]: "it is blue, not green", etc. However, this is not what
is conceded [by his definition]. Hence [his definition] is logically invalid.
I Endnotes to Chapter Two 779
ii. Sarµghabhadra's proposal: Thus even though the Sarviistiviida-when speaking of the
prajiiii which operates investigatively with regard to the object--consistently equates iikiira
with prajiiii, Sarpghabhadra also seems to acknowledge (ADP.12f.) that siikiira, in the context
of citta-caittas, needs interpretation in order to avoid the apparent contradiction pointed out by
Vasubandhu, and he himself proposes a few of them [Ny, 741ab].
a. One proposal is that the citta-caittas, including prajiiii, are all said to be siikiira because
they equally (sa = sama) can grasp the distinctive species of characteristic of the object, i.e.,
they are said to be "those which cognize with a form" (iikiirayanti), which is synonymous with
"those which grasp objects".
b. Another proposal-from the perspective that prajiiii alone can be called iikiira-is that all
the citta-caitta-dharmas "other than prajiiii" are "said to be siikiira in the sense that they
equally-Le., simultaneously; not earlier, not later-with iikiira (= prajiiii), operate on the
object".
See further comments on iikiira-samatii below.
4. In this context see also Dhammajoti's discussion of "The two aspects of the notion of
iikiira according to Pu Guang" (SA.IV.273-74). He comments (ADCP.179) that Pu Guang's
explanation that iikiira connotes both a mode of understanding and an image is likely to have
been influenced by the Sautriintika-Yogiiciira stance.
424
LS: AH 18, 217; SAH 56,450.
425
LS: Here, within the context of the fivefold equality or sameness (paiicadhii samatii)
among the citta and,caittas, association means simultaneous association, but, in a wider con-
text-from the point of view of the various psychological models within the Sarviistiviida,
Diir~tiintika, Sautriintika schools (see endnote to ii. 23a) and their various scholars-various
meanings were given to association/conjunction (saTJ1,prayoga) by the Sarviistiviida masters
themselves and others (see SA.IV.225ff; ESD.139f.). For example, Dharmatriita, "-together
with other Diiqtiintikas, asserts that the citta-caitta-s arise successively, and not simultane-
ously, like a group of merchants who pass through a narrow road one by one. For them, saTJ1,-
prayoga means not simultaneous association but the association or 'companionship' of two
mental dharma-s, one immediately following the other without anything else in between the
successive productions of the two." See in this context Vasubandhu's discussion of the episte-
mological ·model of SrTiiita, in iii. 32ab (F 101-7), where he also discusses the Sautriintika
notion of arising together (saha) and mingled (saTfl-sffta).
426
Gokhale: [34d2] paiicadhii I
Tib.; [34d2] rnam pc Inga II
427
LS: Dhammajoti comments (ADP.13):
A sensory consciousness, being free from intellectual judgment, can be said to be
devoid of iikiira, but this does not need to mean that in this case the condition of
akiira-samatii ["have the same iikiira"] is meaningless. Just as in the discussion
above on siikiira as a synonym applicable to all citta-caitta-s including prajiiii;
likewise in this case too, iikiira-samatii being applicable to all conjo1ned caitta-s,
cannot mean "equality in terms of prajiiii". But it is meaningfll.1.-when understood as
referring to the equality/sameness of the conjoined citta-caitta s _(including the
0
mahiibhiimika prajfiii) in respect of the mode of apprehending the object. E.g.: all
apprehend a patch of blue, etc. This is permissible by the Vaibhli!!ika-s, as can be
seen in Saqighabhadra's first alternative interpretation of siikiira [see endnote above].
428
LVP: nirdi~fiis cittacaittii/:1 savistaraprabhedii/:1 [WOG.142.16f.]. That is to say, saha
vistaraprabhediibhyam or saha vistaraprabhedena.
429
LS: AH 24, 220-21, 224; SAH 65-66, 453-55, 457,484.
430
Gokhale: [35-36a] viprayuktiis tu SaJ!lsktirii/:1 priiptyaprliptf sabhiigatii I iisa'J'ljfiika'J'l
samiipattfjfvita'J'l lak~alJlini ca I niimakiiyiidayas c eti
Tib.: [35-36a] mi ldan pa yi 'du byed rnams I thob dang ma thobskal mnyam dang I 'du shes
med snyoms 'jug pa dang I srog dang mtshan nyid rnams dang ni I ming gi tshogs la sogs pa
yang I
LVP: The word iti indicates that one must add to this list other dissociated factors (viprayukta)
such as schism (saTJ'lghabheda; iv. 98), etc.; see ii, F 304, iv, F 206; Siddhi, 71; according to
Saqighabhadra, add the houo-ho-sing. - The PrakaralJO says: ye 'py evaTJ'ljlitfyakiiJ:i: "The fac-
tors that are of this type are also 'dissociated from thought' (cittaviprayukta)." The same
formula in the Skandhapaficaka.
According to the PrakaralJa, the formations (saTJ'ISktira) "dissociated from thought" are:
(1) priipti, (2) asa1[1jfiisamiipatti, (3) nirodhasamiipatti, (4) iisqrrijnika, (5) jfvitendriya, (6) nikiiya-
sabhiiga, (7) iisrayapriipti, (8) dravyapriipti (?), (9) iiyatanapriipti, (10) jiiti; (11) jarii, (12) sthiti,
(13) anityatii, (14) niimakiiya, (15) padakiiya, (16) vyafijanakiiya and all the other factors of this
type dissociated from thought.
Possession (priipti) is defined as dharmiilJlil'fl priiptiJ:i; iisrayapriipti = iisrayiiyatanapriipti; dravya-
priipti (?) = skandhiiniirri priiptiJ:i; iiyatanapriipti = iidhyiitmikabiihyiiyatanapriipti (PrS, 694a;
SA.IV.287f. ):
[What is *upadhi(l*sthiina)-pratilambha? This is the obtaining of the abode/location
of support (f}f--#{_~).
What is *vastu-pratilambha? It is the obtainment of the aggregates (skandha).
What is *iiyatana-pratilambha? It is the obtainment of the internal and external
iiyatana-s.]
frakara1Japiida,694a14:
What is possession (priipti)? The possession of factors (dharma).
What is attainment of non-ideation (asarrij;iisamiipatti)? The cessation of thought and
thought-concomitants having for its antecedent the notion of departure attached to
the abandonment of the defilement of the Subhakrtsnas (on the third meditation
[dhyiina]) but not to the abandonment of the higher defilement.
What is attainment of cessation (nirodhasamapatti)? The cessation of thought and
thought-concomitants having for its antecedent the notion of calm attached to the
abandonment of the defilement of the perception-sphere of nothingness (akirricany-
iiyatana).
What is the state of non-ideation (iisarrijnika)? The cessation of thought and thought-
concomitants of sentient beings who are born among the gods without ideation
(asa1J'ljnisattva).
What is the vitality faculty (jfvitendriya)? The life-force (iiyus) of the three realms
(dhiitu).
What is the group homogeneity (nikiiyasabhaga)? The resemblance of sentient beings.
IS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka (2008) states:
4. sa,µskaraf:i katame I vedanasafijfiabhyam anye caitasika dharmas cittaviprayuktas
call
4.1 [ ... ]
4.2 cittaviprayuktii/:1 sa1f1skaraf:i katame Iye riipacittacaitasikiivasthiisu prajfiapyante
tattviinyatvatas ca na prajfiapyante 11 te punaf:i katame I priiptir asafijfiisamiipattir ni-
rodhasamiipattir iisafijfiika'!I jfvitendriya,µ nikiiyasabhiigatii jiitir jarii sthitir anityatii
niimakiiyiif:i padakiiy~ vyafijanakiiyiif:i prthagjanatvam ity evambhiigfyiif:i I
4.1 [ ... ]
4.2 What are the formations that do not accompany consciousness? They are [enti-
ties] that are nominally ascribed to a particular state of form, consciousness, or the
mental factors. They are not [entities that are] ascribed to [form, consciousness, or
the mental factors] themselves or to something distinct from them. What then are
they? Acquirement, the state of composure without conception, the state of compo-
sure that is !1 cessation, the quality of having no conception, the faculty of a life
force, class affiliation, birth, aging, duration, impermanence, the collection of names,
the collection of assertions, the collection of syllables, the state of an ordinary being,
as well as those [other entities] that are of the same kind. ISBP.231 and 237f.
Avatiira (ESD.81):
The disjoined conditionings are those which do not conform to the [five conditions:
(1) having the same basis, (2) having the same object, (3) having the same mode of
activity, (4) being simultaneous, and (5) each of them having only one substance, and
which belong to the category of neither material nor mental]. They are [fourteen in
numberJ, namely: acquisition (priipti), non-acquisition (apriipti), the ideationless
attainment (asa1f1jfii-samiipatti), the cessation attainment (nirodha-samtipatti), idea-
tionlessness (iis01f1jiiika), the vital faculty (jfvitendriya), the group-homogeneity (ni-
kiiyasabhiiga), production (jiiti), duration (sthiti), deterioration (jarii), impermanence
(aniyatii), the collection of wprds (niimakaya), the collection of complete phrases
(padakiiya), and the collection of syllables (vyafijanakiiya), etc.
2. As for the category of citta-viprayukta-sa1f1skara, modern scholarship has dealt with it
extensively; see in particular:
i. Collett Cox's Disputed Dharmas. Early Buddhist Theories on Existence, which in-
cludes an annotated translation of the "Section of factors dissociated from thought"
from Saqighabhadra' s Nyiiyiinusiira.
ii. Dhammajoti's Chapter 11: "The categories of conditionings disjoined from thought"
782 Exposition of the Faculties (Indriyanirde.fo)
(SA.IV.285-320).
iii. Jaini's article "The Origin and Development of the Viprayukta-sarriskiiras" (in his
CPBS.239-60) and the section "Citta-viprayukta-sarriskiira" in his Abhidharmadfpa with
Vibhii~iiprabhiivrtti, pp. 88-98.
iv. Kritzer's Chapter VI: "Pratftyasamutpiida and the Cittaviprayuktasarriskiiras" in his
Rebirth and Causation in the Yogiiclira Abhidharma, pp. 209-81, which discusses the
cittaviprayuktasarriskiiras within the Sarviistiviida as well as Yo~iiciira.
3. As for the doctrinal evolution of the category of citta-viprayukta-sarriskiira (SA.IV.285-91),
it is not traceable to the Buddha's teachings but they were considered by the orthodox
Sarviistivadins to be an advancement regarding the understanding of conditioned factors and to
be conditioned real entities themselves which are neither mental nor material in nature but
which can operate on both domains. Two of them-possession (priipti) and non-possession
(apriipti')-can operate on even the unconditioned dharmas. Dharnmajoti comments (p. 289):
However, it must be noted that from the beginning, even within the broad Sarviisti-
viida tradition itself, this newly articulated doctrinal category known _as "condition-
ings disjoined from thought" had not been unanimously accepted, either as regards
their reality (as a dravya having a svabhiiva) or as regards their total number. Thus,
in the MVS [730b and 198b], we find that Bhadanta Dharmatriita and the early
Diir~tiintika masters deny the reality of the whole viprayukta-sarriskiiraskandha.
Buddhadeva considers all the conditioned dharma-s to be subsumable under either
the Great Elements [mahiibhuta] (as in the case of the rupa) or thought [citta] (as in
the case of the mental factors [citta-caitta-s]), which, of course, is tantamount to the
denial of any such category as the "dharma-s disjoined from thought" which are con-
joined neither with matter nor thought.
It was probably in the Jniinaprasthiina (SA.IV.287, 290) that we find the citta-viprayukta-
sarriskiiras mentioned for the first time, but it provides neither "clear definitions nor a. definite
list of them, but only scattered descriptions of nikiiya-sabhiigatii, jfvitendriya, jiiti, sthiti, jarli,
anityatii, prthagjanatva, and prlipti'\ The Dharmaskandha-siistra and the Prakara,:ia-siistra, on
the other hand, both enumerate sixteen (see LVP's endnote above), and the Amrtarasa-siistra,
seventeen {adding prthagjanatva). But from the *Abhidharmahrdaya onward, the number
seems to become more or less fixed at fourteen. Thus (DD.71) Dharmasri's and Upasiinta's
*Abhidharmahrdayas as well as the *Sarriyuktiibhidarmahrdayaslistra propose fourteen factors
by omitting from the list of sixteen (see above) the three varieties of priiptilpratilambha and
adding "nature of an ordinary worldling" (prthagjanatva). The AKB enumerates also fourteen
but replaces prthagjanatva with aprlipti in its official list; the Avatiira gives the same fourteen,
although in a different order.
4. The number of the formations dissociated from thought, however, seems never to have
become absolutely fixed at fourteen in the Sarviistiviida tradition. Vasubandhu himself ends
our verse with -iidaytis ceti. He explains niimakiiyiidayas, at ii. 47ab, as collection of names
(niimakiiya), collection of phrases (padakiiya) and collection of syllables (vyafi.janakiiya). As
for ca iti, Yasomitra comments (WOG.142.29ff; SA.IV.290):
The word ca. [in the verse] is for the purpose of indicating those disjoined [con-
ditionings] of a similar type that have not been [explicitly] mentioned, for, sarrigha-
bheda, etc., are conceded as [dharma-s] disjoined from thought existing as real enti-
ties. This is because of the mention in the siistra "and also those [disjoined condition-
ings] of a similar type" (see PrS).
And Smpghabhadra, in the same context, states (SA.IV.290):
-iidaya is meant to include the phrase-group (pada-kiiya) and the syllable-group
(vyafljana-kiiya) as well as harmony/congruence (;fll½•li; siimagrl); ca iti indicates
the dharma-s speculated by others which are none other than those of the previously
[mentioned] categories: There are some who speculate that, apart from acquisition
[priipti], etc., there exist such [intrinsic] natures as the aggregate-acquisition(~ il;
*skandha-priipti), etc.
Thus Sa111ghabhadra recognizes siimagrf as a discrete factor, thus bringing his total number of
formations dissociated from thought to fifteen. As for sarrighabheda, it is asiimagrf in its
intrinsic nature.
For more detail, see SA.IV.290f. and DD.72f.
5. As for the definition and name of citta-viprayukta-sarriskiira, the Prakara1Ja-siistra states
(SA.IV.287):
What are the dharma-s disjoined from thought (citta-viprayukta-dharm~)? They are
the dharma-s which are not thought-concomitants [caitta] ... , i.e., [1] matter (rilpa),
[2] the unconditioned (asarriskrta), and [3] the conditionings disjoined from thought
(citta-viprayukta-sarriskiira).
Sa111ghabhadra explains that its three components together uniquely define it as a distinct
doctrinal category in the fivefold category classification of dharmas (Ny, 396c; SA.IV.292):
citta-to signify that like thought (citta), these dharmas are not matter (rilpa);
viprayukta-to. signify that the thought-concomitants (caitta), although also not of the
nature of rilpa, are to be excluded as they are conjoined (sarriprayukta);
sarriskiira-to signify that the unconditioned (asarriskrta), although not of the nature of
rilpa and not sarriprayukta with citta, are also to be excluded.
6. Yet despite their being a distinct doctrinal category, the activities of the formations dis-
sociated from thought are extremely varied, which raises the question of the rationale
.behind this category, particularly in the light of the severe criticism from the Sautriintikas and
Vasubandhu who denied the reality of these formations, although maintaining them as con-
ventional descriptions/designations (prajflapti) of phenomena. Cox comments (DD.73f.) that
"like all factors (dharma) enumerated by the Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ikas, the dissociated forces
were claimed to exist as real entities (dravya) by virtue of their own unique intrinsic nature
(svabhiiva). The existence of these factors is proven through inference from the particular
activity that each performs.· Each of the dissociated forces corresponds to some doctrinally
required or to some generally recognized, commonly experienced activity." Thus: "Given the
diversity of activities explained and doctrinal constraints satisfied, the category of dissociated
forces appears to be a derivative category with no single integrating principle. Instead, it is a
miscellany containing functionally unrelated factors that are unified only by their successful
operation demanding their separation from both form and thought."
As for extramural influences, in his section on the citta-viprayukta-sarriskiiras (AD.89ff.) Jaini
784 Exposition of the Facuities (Indriyanirdesa)
makes the general comment that "over a long period and particularly during the time of the
Mahavibhii,l'ii, the Abhidharmikas were engaged in studying and criticising the doctrines of
rival schools [i.e., their contemporary realists like the Sii.qikhya, Vaise~ika and Mimii.qisaka,
and also the Yoga school] .... A result of these criticisms and counter-criticisms was the accep-
tance of not only new theories but also of new dharmas and novel terms in the Vai'bhii.~ika
school." But as for specific influences, he refers only to the Vaise~ka category of siimiinya as
influencing the viprayuktasaf/1s kiira sabhiigatii (see also ii. F 198).
431
LS: phammajoti comments (SA.IV.293) that "among these, acquisition [priipti], non-
acquisition [apriipti] and the four characteracteristics [lak,l'a~a] may be said to be the ones
most important doctrinally".
432
LS: AH 220; SAH 453.
1. To give a first impression of priipti and apriipti, Dhammajoti provides the following illus-
tration (SA.IV.293):
When a person has jealousy in him, it is because-given the required assemblage of
conditions for inducing the arising of this dharma, jealousy-a force called acquisi-
tion [priipti] is also induced to arise at the same time, by virtue of which the jealousy
comes to be linked to him. TJ:ris force of acquisition will continue to link the jealousy
to him from moment to moment-even at those times when his mind is not occupied
with this defilement but with a skillful or non-defined thought-arising and ceasing
in a serial continuity of its own. It is only when he is able to develop a sufficiently
strong insight as the counteragent that it comes to be delinked from him: At this
moment, there arises another acquisition of another dharma, the acquisition of the
cessation (nirodha) of this defilement [i.e.: to be more specific (p. 295), in the first
moment known as t~e unhindered path (iinantarya-miirga), the acquisition of the de-
filement is severed; in the second moment known as the path of liberation (vimukti-
miirga), the acquisition of the corresponding cessation through deliberation (prati-
sa,rzkhyii-nirodha) arises]; and at the same time, the non-acquisition'[apriipti] of this
defilement is also induced to arise, effecting the delinking. The cessation and the
non-acquisition together ensure that the defilement will not arise in him any more."
We can see from this illustration that priipti is the sine qua non for the mechanism of defile-
ment as well· as purification for the Sarviistivii.dins. This is so because (SA.IV.299f.), according
to their theory of tri-temporal existence (sarviistitva), a defilement as a real dhamta exists
always (sarvadii asti) and cannot be destroyed, yet "its linkage with the practitioner effected
by the corresponding acquisition [priipti] can be severed by interrupting the acquisition-series.
Likewise a pure dharma can only come to be possessed by the practitioner through the opera-
tion of an acquisition that effects the linkage."
2. Saqighabhadra explains the two functions of priipti that uniquely qualify it as an onto-
logical entity as follows (Ny, 398b; WOG.148.22f; SA.IV.295):
... We know that the acquisition (priipti) as acknowledged [by us] definitely posses-
ses a [distinct] function [1] as it is the cause by virtue of which a dharma which has
been acquir~d is not lost, and [2] as it is the marker of the knowledge (jiiiina-cihna)
that "this beidrgs to that person" (idam asyeti).
3. As for apriipti, it 'is not mentioned in the official list of formations dissociated from
thought in Vasumitra's Paficavastuka and also not in DharmasrI's and Upasiinta's *Abhi-
dharmahrdayas as well as the *Sarµyuktiibhidarmahrdayasiistra. These texts, however, feature
pfthagjanatva. On the other hand, apriipti is part of the official list in the Avatiira.
433
LS: AH 220; SAH 453.
434
Gokhale: [36b] priiptir liibha/:1 samanvaya/:11
Tib.: [36b] thob pa rnyed dang ldan pa'o I
LVP: See i. 38cd; ii. 59b.
According to the Siistra: priipti/:1 katamii? ya/:1 pratilambho ya/:1 samanviigama/:1.
The terms liibha and samanviigama do not have the same meaning in the Abhidharma and in
Kathiivatthu, .ix. 12. - For the Theraviidin, liibha signifies "possession", for example, the
power that the noble ones possess to realize at their will such and such a meditative attain-
ment; samanviigama is understood as actual realization. - Elsewhere (iv. 4) _one distinguishes
pa{iliibhasamanniigama and samarigibhiivasamanniigama, possessing potentially (samanviigama
of the Abhidharma), possessing actually (sarµmukhibhiiva of the Abhidharma). - See moreover
xix, 4.
IS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.2.1 priipti/:1 katamii I pratilambha/:1 samanviigama/:11 sii punar bfjarµ vasitii sarµ-
mukhfbhiivas ca yathiiyogam I
4.2.1 What is acquirement? [It is] obtainment and possession; moreover, accord-
ing to circumstances, it is applied to [the states of] a seed, mastery, and actualiza-
tion. ISBP.238
The Paficaskandhaka does not have the category apriipti, but has prthagjanatva, which is in-
cluded in apriipti at ii. 40bc.
4.2.14 prthagjanatvarµ katamat Iiiryii~iirµ dharmii~m aliibha/:1 I
4.2.14 What is the state of an ordinary being? The condition of not having achieved
the qualities of an Arya. ISBP .239
Avatiira (ESD.108 and 11 lf.):
Acquisition (priipti) is the cause (kiira~a) which permits the affirmation: "One is
in possession of a certain dharma (dharmavat)". There are three kinds of dharma-s:
pure (subha), impure (asubha) and non-defined (avyiikrta). The pure dharma-s com-
prise faith, etc.; the impure, greeq, etc.; and the non-defined, the mind of transforma-
tion (nirmii~acitta), etc. One who possesses [any of] these dharma-s is said to be "in
possession of the dharma". The cause of certitude for such an ass~rtion is named
acquisition (priipti), obtainment (liibha, pratiliibhalpratilambha), and endowment
(samanviigama). [ ... ]
All non-acquisitions [apriipti] are of the non-veiled-non-defined nature only; unlike
the case of the acquisitions described above, which are differentiated in nature.
However, each of the past and future dharma-s has non-acquisitions belonging to the
three periods of time [past, present, future]. For the present dharma-s, they have no
present non-acquisitions, as acquisitions and non-acquisitions are contradictory to
each other in nature [and hence do not co-arise]; and as it is impossible that what can
be possessed in the present moment is not possessed. They have, however, past and
future non-acquisitions.
Dharma-s belonging to the sensuality, fine-material, and immaterial spheres, as well
as the outflow-free dharma-s, each has non-acquisitions belonging to the three
spheres. There can be no outflow-free non-acquisitions, as there is in a non-acquisi-
tion, the worldling-quality (prthagjanatva) [which is never outflow-free]. Thus it is
said, [in the Jfiiinaprasthana-siistra]: "What is the worldling-quality? It is the non-
obtainment
. (aliibha) of the 'dharma-s of the Noble Ones (iiryadharma)."
•,
Now, this \
non-obtainment is just a synonym for non-acquisition. Besides, all non-acquisitions
being of the non-defined nature only, cannot be outflow-free.
Since Dhammajoti translates priipti as acquisition and we translate pratilambha/liibha as
acquisition, in order to avoid confusion we will replace his English renderings with the
Sanskrit ones wherever it might lead to confusion.
2. As for the historical development of priipti, samanviigama, etc., Dhammajoti and Cox
point out (SA.IV.295f; DD.79) that at the early stage priipti was infrequently used in a general
sense to refer to the simple act of attaining or acquiring, as, for example, "to attain a particular
meditative state", and samanviigama and asamanviigama in the sense of continued possession
or non-possession, primarily with regard to wholesome or unwholesome qualities. It was at a
relatively later stage that priipti came to be defined as a formation dissociated from thought, a
dharma which effects the relation of any dharma to a living being (santiina). More specifi-
cally, it may have originated out of a pragmatic concern of the Sarvastiviidins (SA.IV.295): "It
seems to have originally referred to the priipti of iirya-dharma-s, on the basis of which the
iirya can be properly distinguished from the ordinary worldling [prthagjana]. This stage of
development may have taken place shortly after the compilation of the JPS and before the
MVS", where we find the first "systematic" definiti~ns of possession and non-possession.
"The argument that the unreality of endowment [samanviigama] (= priipti) entails the indistin-
guishability of an iirya and an ordinary worldling is already found in the MV,S [796c]. How-
ever, even in the later abhidharma texts like the AKB [ii, F 183, 191ff.], the Ab]iidharmadfpa,
the Nyiiyiinusiira and the Avatiira, we can still sense this central concern which forms the chief
argument for the necessary existence of acquisition [priipti] as a real entity." For more detail,
see DD.79ff.
3. As formation dissociated from thought, priipti was then also distinguished from two other
terms, namely, acquisition or obtainment (pratilambhalliibha) and accompaniment or endow-
ment (samanviigama), which were used not only as synonyms of priipti, but, at the same time,
also as two different cases of the latter, as can be seen in the following passage from MVS,
823a, which enumerates seven differences between priipti and samanviigama (SA.IV.296f;
DD.81):
i. Some say: The names themselves are different: one named priipti, the other
· samanviigama.
ii. Some say: The acquisition of what has not been acquired is named priipti; the
acquisition of what has already been acquired is samanviigama.
iii. Some say: the acquisition at the very first instance is named priipti; the sub-
sequent repeated acquisition is named samanviigama.
iv. Some say: the endowment (sam-anu-a-.f gam) of what has not been previously
endowed is named priipti; the endowment of what has already been endowed with is
named samanviigama.
v. Some say: What did not previously belong to one, now belongs to one-this is
named priipti; what has already belonged to one, now [continues to] belong to one-
this is named samanvagama.
vi. Some say: the acquisition at the first instance is named prapti; the non-interrup-
tion of what has already been acquired is named samanviigama.
vii. Some say: The initial obtaining (pratilambha, liibha) is named prapti; the not-
losing of what has already been acquired is named samanvagama. Hence, whereas
prapti applies to the first moment, samanviigama applies to both the first and sub-
sequent moments.
These seven opinions can be divided into two basic distinctions (SA.IV.297; DD.8lff.) which
either focus
a. on the stage in the temporal process of a given instance of priipti-first moment or
subsequently-at which a given dharma comes to be acquired by the individual; or
b. on the acquired dharma itself, i.e., on the status of a particular dharma vis-a-vis its prior
attainment or accompaniment-whether it is acquired or possessed by the individual for the
first time, or whether it is re-acquired or is being continuously possessed subsequently.
Dhammajoti comments that Vasubandhu essentially follows the first form, being based on the
sixth and seventh opinion above, inasmuch as the sixth is said to refer to the first moment of
pratilambha/liibha, "whether or not the given dharma is acquired for the very first time or re-
obtained after having been lost".
SaIµghabhadra (Ny, 396c), on the other hand, essentially follows the second form, being biised
on the secof\d opinion:
There are two types of prapti: that of what has not been previously acquired and that
of what has already been previously acquired. The priipti of what has not been
acquired is called obtainment. The priipti of what. has been acquired previously is
called endowment.
Non-acquisition [aprapt1l is to be understood as opposite to this: that of what has
not been previously acquired and that of what has been acquired and lost. The
0
non-acquisition of what has not been previously acquired is called non-obtainment

(apratilambha). The non-acquisition of what has been lost is called non-endowment
(asamanvagama). Thus, the nature of an ordinary worldling [prthagjanatva] is called
the non-obtainment of the iirya-dharma-s [since a prthagjana has never yet acquired
any iirya-dharma].
Cox comments (DD.83) that the compilers of the *Mahiivibha~ii do not choose one of the
seven opinions offered as the correct or favored one, and that neither Vasubandhu or Saxµgha-
bhadra provide reasons· for their support of different interpretations, but Cox then links up
the different interpretations by Vasubandhu or Saxµghabhadra with their different ontological
models (see DD.84).
435
LS: Cox states that Vasubandhu's explanation is not clear here since he does not specify
the various analogous stages in the process of non-possession. Yasomitra (WOG.143.34ff;

DD.82f.), however, spells out two interpretations:
Non-possession is of two types: (1) non-acquisition of that which has not yet been
attained and (2) non-accompaniment of that which has been attained and lost.
Or, (1) the first [moment] of non°possession of that which has not been attained
or has been lost is non-acquisition, (2) while the non-possession of that which has
not been acquired or has been lost in the second and subsequent moments is non-
accompaniment.
As for Sa:qighabhadra's definition of non-possession, it has been quoted above in the previous
endnote. Cox comments that-although Vasubandhu does not provide a specific definition of
non-possession-Yasomitra' s second definition conforms better to Vasubandhu' s definition of
possession and that Yasomitra's first definition resembles Sa:qighabhadra's definition of non-
possession.
436
Gokhale: [36cd] prliptyaprliptf svasarritlinapatitlinlil'fl nirodhayoJ:t I
Tib.: [36cd] thob dang ma thob rang rgyud du I gtogs pa rnams kyi'o 'gog gnyis kyi I
IS: 1. MVS, 801a, states (SA.IV.294):
There are three types of acquisition [prlipti]: (i) the acquisition of a conditioned
dharma; (ii) the acquisition of a cessation through deliberation; (iii) the acquisition of
a cessation independent of deliberation.
i. A particular species of the acquisition of a conditioned dharma is specified
according· to that of the dharma acquired. A conditioned dharma possesses its
activity that projects its own acquisition.
ii. A particular species of the acquisition of a cessation through deliberation is
specified according to that of the path through which [the cessation] is realized
(slik~at...f kr). This is because a cessation through deliberation, [being an uncondi-
tioned dharma,] does not possess its own activity. Its acquisition is projected through
the force of the path at the time when [the practitioner] is seeking its realization.
111. A particular species of the acquisition of a cessation independent of deliberation
is specified according to the [practitioner's] own supporting basis (lisraya). This is
because a cessation independent of deliberation does not possess its own activity that
projects its own acquisition, and it is not sought through a path; it is in dependence
on [the practitioner's] vital faculty Ufvitendriya] and group-homogeneity [nikliya-
sabhliga] alone that its acquisition arises.
2. Cox writes (DD:85f: "With the development of Sarviistiviidin ontology, wherein all fac-
tors that constitute experience are separately existing, discrete, and radically momentary,
accounting for the experience of connection presents a daunting challenge. Indeed, any
connection between these separately existing factors would seem to be a logical impossibility.
How can the apparent continuity of experience [which is not unified by any central force or
'possessing self', and our common sense notions of connection, or 'belonging to oneself'] be
explained? In what sense can qualities be said to characterize, or events be said to occur within
the locus of a given sentient being? And, how is the "locus of one s~ntient being" determined;
why do separately existing factors arising in the experience of one sentient being not capri-
ciously arise in the experience of another?"

According to Cox, in early Buddhism the solution to these problems was explained on the
basis of dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida) (see iii. 18-38c) and, in the developed
Sarviistiviidin. Abhidharma theory, on the basis of the intricate interrelationships among the six
causes, four conditions and five effects (see ii. 49-73). Thus why would there still be a need to
insist on possession and non-possession as separately existing real entities (dravya)? The
answer is that even though causes and conditions give rise to the particular momentary activity
(kliritra) of the real entities that exist in the three time periods of past, present and future
according to the Sarviistivadins, it is possession and non-possession that account for the con-
nection of a particular factor to a given life-stream (sa'!ltlina) and which thus serve to deliinit
the experience of each sentient being from that of other sentient beings as well as from
insentient matter (see our section here). As for how possession itself, as a separately existent
factor, is connected. to the life-stream, see Vasubandhu's discussion, ii, F 194f., of the secons
dary possession or "possession of possession" (prliptiprlipti).
Moreover, Cox states (DD.87) that the need to posit possession and non-possessiori is dpe-
.cially evident in the case of one's relationship to cessation due to deliberation (pratisa'!l-
khylinirodha) and cessation not du~ to deliberation (apratisa'!lkhylinirodha), since these two,
as unconditioned factors, "have no conditioned activity and thus cannot be said to arise in the
present dependent upon an assemblage of causes and conditions. Nevertheless, these two fac-
tors can be said to characterize or not characterize a given life-stream, but only insofar as they
are connected to a life-stream through possession or disconnected from it through non-posses-
sion. Since possession and non-possession are themselves conditioned factors, their activities
arise or pass away in dependence upon specific causes and conditions."
43
~ LVP: In myself there is possession (priipti) or non-possession (aprlipti) relative to my
defilement, to my action ... , that is to say, I possess or do not possess my future or past defile-
ment. ... But there is no relation of possession or of non-possession between myself and the
defilement of another.
438
LS: This refers to the possession of the five aggregates (including the aggregate of form)
that falls into and abides in one's own life-stream.
439 LVF''. Hairs should be regarded as "of a sentient being", since they are bound (sa'!lbaddha)
to the material organs.
440 LS: Cox comments (DD.210) that pure factors here refer to the truth of the path and the
three unconditioned factors.
441
LVP: The persons "bound by all the bondages" (sakalabandhana) are those who have not
attained, through the mundane (laukika) path, the abandonment(= pratisa'!lkhylinirodha) of
one of the nine categories of the defilements of the realm of desire. The noble ones (lirya), at
the first moment (iidik~a,:za = du[tkhe dharmajfilinak~linti), have not)'et attained the abandon-
ment of the defilements to be abandoned by the (noble) path (vi. 77). - The persons who have
obtained the abandonment of one category of defilement are called ekaprakiiropalikhita
(vi. 30a).
442 IS: The general principle is formulated by Saqighabhadra as follows (DD.186): "If there
is possession of a factor, there is also non-possession [of it]; if there is no possession of a
factor, non-possession [of it] is also impossible."
443
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautrantika here.
444
LVP: dravyadharmal;I = dravyato dharmal;I, or else dravyal'{I ca tad dharma§ ca.sa dravya-
dharma, that is to say, vidyamiinasvalak~a,:zo dharmal;I. - See below F 186.
445
LS: This is the seventh of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.50f.). He states that Sarp.ghabhadra (Ny, 397al2-398cl) attributes this question/challenge
of the reality of priipti to Vasubandhu and embarks on a long defense of the reality of priipti
and refutation of the bfja theory. He comments that the Vini§cayasal'{lgrahar:zi states that priipti
is only a provisional entity (prajfiapti) and explains priipti in terms of bfja.
MVS (479bc8ff., 796cl0ff.) defends (DD.89) the discrete existence of accompaniment (sam-
anviigama) as a real entity by first citing several siitra passages as scriptural authorities and
then by offering two logical reasonings: accompaniment clearly demarcates ordinary world-
lings from noble ones and provides the mechanism by which defilements can be abandoned.
44
~ LVP: These ten factors are the eight members of the (noble) path plus right liberation
(samyagvimukti) and right cognition (samyagjiiiina) (Aliguttara, v. 222); the five abandoned
members are not the group: (1) afflicted view of self (;atkiiyadr~fi), (2) overesteeming of
morality and certain types of spiritual practices (§flavratapariimar§a), (3) doubt (vicikitsii),
(4) predilection for the objects of desire (kiimacchanda), (5) malice (vyiipiida), for this group
has been abandoned with the acquisition of the fruit of non-returner (aniigiimin), but rather
the group relative to the higher spheres, (1) attachment to material form (riipariiga), (2) attach-
ment to the formless (iiriipyariiga), (3) restlessness (auddhatya), (4) conceit (miina), (5) igno-
rance (avidyii).
447
. LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, L VP rnentions the Sautrantika here.
448
LVP: Dig ha, iii. 59: Dalhanemi ... sattaratanasrmanniigato.
449
LVP: Acc.ording to Scripture, entities (vastu) are either (1) existing as a real entity
(dravyasat) or (2) existing as a provisional entity or existing as a provisional designation
{prajiiaptisat).
Sarp.ghabhadra refutes the Sautrantika, Ny, 397; Siddhi, 54-58. -Ten factors of a perfected
being, vi, F 295.
450
451
LS: 1. Notice that in the next section, the Sarvastivadins distance themselves from this
statement.
Cox comments (DD.189) that Sarp.ghabhadra omits this discussion and thus implicitly rejects
this generative causal activity as the activity of possession.
2. Saiµghabhadra explains the two functions of priipti that uniquely qualify it as an onto-
logical entity at Ny, 397b and 398b (see introductory endnote to priipti and apriipti at F 179).
452
LVP: The cause of the arising of a thought of desire is the "possession" of this future
thought of desire.
453
454
LVP: The pure factors (dharma), the receptivity to the cognition of the factors with regard
to unsatisfactoriness (dul;lkhe dharmajfiiina~iinti), etc.
455
LVP: Respectively, the (i) non-defiled and (ii) defiled factors of the realm of desire.
456
LS: Cox comments (DD.213): "There would be no distinction among the various grades
of defilements, since there is no distinction among grades of possession." ·
457
LS: The Avatara states (ESD.108):
[It is necessary that acquisition exists as a real entity (dravya)]. Were it non-existent,
when defilements like greed, etc., manifest (sammukhr--fbhu) in a trainee (saik~a),
he would not be an iirya, since he is then without an outflow-free mind. [Similarly],
when a wholesome or non-defined mind arises in a woildling (prthagjana), he
ought then to be known as one who is already detached (vftaraga), [i.e., an arya].
Moreover, in the absence of the acquisition of Nirvar,ia, the arya and the worldlings
would be mutually alike, and ought to be both named "worldlings" or "iirya".
458
LS: See in the Electronic Appendix my Notes on a Problem and on Two Attempts to Solve
it (2001). The problem addressed is the following (p. 3): "If the world exists only as .a
multitude of discrete dharmas which exist in the present for one fleeting shortest moment of
time only and then vanish out of the present existenc·e, then this view seems to abolish any
sense of continuity and thus seems to endanger the practice of the spiritual paths and the
doctrine of karma and seems as well to be completely counterintuitive to common experience.
How can dharmas cause an effect after they have vanished out of the present existence? How
can a tiny momentary dharma account for the complexities, connections and apparent con-
tinuities of our world? How do we explain our sense of individuality and distinctiveness from
other persons and our sense of responsibility for our own actions?"
The Notes attempt to briefly summarize how the problem is approached within the Vaibhii~ika
and Sautriintika system in general, but then focus mainly on the. important aspects of the
functions of possession (prapti) and of the theory of seeds. They are based on the chapter:
"Possession and Non-possession", in Collett Cox's Disputed Dharmas; on the chapters:
"Dharma and Dharmas", and "Doctrinal Disputes", in Edward Conze's Buddhist Thought
in India; on Padmanabh S. Jaini's The Sautrantika Theory of Bfja; on Louis de La Vallee
Poussin's Documents d'Abhidharma (1936-1937a); on Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakarar:ia.
459
460
LS: For the mechanism of defilement as well as purification within the Sarviistiviida
system, see our introductory endnote to prapti and apriipti (F 179). See also Cox's discussion
of the function of possession and non-possession in the abandonment of defile111ents (DD.89-92).
461
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautriintikas here.
462
LS: This is the eighth of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.52f.). He comments that this is one of several statements about bfja that Sarµghabhadra
identifies (Ny, 398b21) as the opinion of Vasubandhu and that the Viniscayasarrigrahar:ir
"compares seeds burned by fire, which are permanently rendered unproductive, with the seeds
of internal dharmas that have been destroyed by the arya".
463
LS: See Jaini's section Kusala-dharma-bfja (AD.111-17), where he makes the following
remarks pertinent to our passage here:
The statement of the Kosakiira that even a samucchinna-kusala-mula possesses a
subtle element of kusala is not free from contradiction .... The Dipakiira gives the
meaning of the term samucchinna-mula as understood in the Vaibhii~ika tradition,
and criticizes the theory of bfja as propounded by the Kosakara.

[I] According to the Vaibha~ikas, the mithya-dr~ti and the kusala-miilas each con-
sists of three basic grades, viz., mrdu (subtle or slight), madhya (of medium nature)
and adhimiitra (extreme). Each of these three grades is further divided into these
three, e.g., mrdu-mrdu ..• adhimiitra-adhimatra.
The kusala-miilas pertaining to the ariipiivacara and the riipiivacaia are destroyed
by the mrdu and madhya mithyii-dr~tis. The adhimiitra mithyii-dr~ti destroys the
prayogika kusala-miilas pertaining to the kiima world, leaving in such a person only
the innate or the upapatti-liibhika roots of good. But when a person (like Maskari
Gosfiliputra, for instance) comes to hold such extremely grave (adhimiitra-adhi-
miitra) wrong views as niistikaviida, ahetukaviida or akriyiiviida_, then he destroys
even these innate and the most subtle (upapatti-liibhika) kusala-miilas pertaining to
the kiima loka, whereupon he is called a samucchinna-kusala-mala.
[2] After stating this Vaibh~ika theory of the loss of kusala dharmas, the Dipakara
turns to the Kosakiira's definition of a samucchinna-kusala mala. This he condemns
as contrary to the Scriptures where it is specifically stated that the kusala-malas are
completely annihilated. He then criticizes the theory of bfja with the argument that
the kusala and akusala, being incompatible like light and darkness, cannot coexist at
one time. Even if they coexist, in the case of a samucchinna-kusala-mala, the kusala
elements are entirely lost. How can a new kusala arise in this person? If it arises from
the akusala then one may as well argue that rice is obtained from barley seeds or that
mithyii-dr~ti is produced by right thinking. Thus the Kosakiira's theory of bfja and
the consequent wrong definition& a samucchinna-kusala-mala do not stand the test
of either the Scriptures or of reasoning [according to the Dipakiira].
[3] The Kosakiira's clefinition of the term samucchinna-kusala-mala is identical
with the Y ogiicara definition of this term. In the M ahiiyiina-Satriilatikiira [III. 11]
only the imminent liberation of a samucchinna-kusala-mala is denied. This suggests
that he may attain parinirvii,:ia in the distant future. This would mean that according
to the Yogacaras such a person is not completely devoid of a kusala-mala. The
contention of the Kosakara that the innate kusala-malas are never entirely destroyed
marks a still further departure from the orthodox Hinayana. It implies that unlike
the akusala-bfjas which are completely annihilated, the elements of kusala persist
throughout the series of existence. This is a characteristically Mahayanist view
inasmuch as it holds an assurance of liberation even for a person like MaskarI
Gosii!Iputra who comes to hold the gravest of wrong views.
The Kosakiira does not give further details of this incorruptible element of kusala.
Unlike the elements of akusala which are only siisrava, the kusala elements are of
two kinds, viz., siisrava and aniisrava. The former pertains to the (kusala) kiima,
rapa and arupa bhavas. The aniisrava kusalas are those which produce the lokottara
(super-mundane) states like arhatship or Buddhahood. Is,it possible that the incor-
ruptible kusala-bfja spoken of by the Kosakara represents the aniisrava-kusala-bfja
leading to nirvii,:ia? [ ... ]
The theory of an innate, indestructible and pure (aniisrava) element existing in th~
midst of destructible, phenomenal and impure elements shows an affinity with the
Mahayana doctrine of prakrti-prabhiisvara-citta, according to which mind is essen-
tially and originally pure but becomes impure only by adventitious afflictions. This
prakrti-prabhiisvara-caitta is further described as identical with the dharmatii,
tathatii and, therefore, with the dharma-kiiya ofthe Buddha.
464
LS: This is the ninth of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.54f.). Here we have one of several statements about bfja that Sarp.ghabhadra identifies
(Ny, 398b21) as the opinion of Vasubandhu. As for parallels to the Yogiiciirabhiimi, Kritzer
states, in regard to samucchinnakusalamiila, that the Manobhiimi (281a22-28) specifies that
the. destruction of the kusalamiilas does not include the destruction of their seeds.
As to whether, from Vasubandhu's point of view, bfja and bfja-bhii,va are different or not, see
in the context of the definition of bfja our endnote below (F 185).
465
LVP: tair utpannais tadutpattivasitviivighiitiit samanviigamal:z.
LS: This is the tenth of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.56). Sarp.ghabhadra (Ny, 398a22-26) claims that Vasubandhu's statement is inconsistent
~ith his denial of the existence of ~uture dharmas. Kritzer comments that the Viniscayasa'(l-
graha~r (587a18-19) "defines *vasitvasamanviigama as follows: it is the grown (matured?)
seeds that are the cause comprising the condition (hetupratyaya?) for the arising of good
dhannflS produced by .effort and a portion of neutral dharmas".
466
LVP: ,;The see,ds teceive .the name of possession (priipti), at the time when tl).ey are not
uprooted or damaged, where their mastery is ripened" (anapoddhrta-anupahata:paripu~fa-
vasitva-kiile bfjiini priiptiniima labhante), Paramartha, 3, p. 18 lli. - Hsiian-tsang: "In the
per:son (iisraya)i there are seeds that are not uprooted, not damaged, that have a ripened
mast~ry: relativfto this state, one uses the word possession (prii,pti)." .
467
LS: My-translation here follows Collett Cox's translation of Vasubandhu in Sarp.gha-
bhadra's Nyiiyiinusiira (DD.189) and LVP's own correction.
468
LS: Yasomitra glosses (WOG.148.lf.):
yan niima,-;7upa,rt phalotpattau samartham. yat parp.ca-skandh'atmaka:rp. riiparp.
phalotpatti-samartharp. siik~iid anantara,rt pararp.paryeQa diiratal:z. -
This is the eleventh of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.58f.).
Sarp.ghabhadra identifies it (Ny, 537b13ff.) as the opinion of Vasubandhu.
469
LS: This is the twelfth of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.60f.). Sarp.ghabhadra identifies this (Ny, 398b) as the opinion ofVasubandhu.
The following longer endnote discusses the following topics: (1) historical development of the
seed theory; (2) the essential characteristics of the seed theory; (3) Sarp.ghabhadra's two main
strategies of refuting Vasubandhu's theory of seeds; (4) the relationship between bfja and
bfjabhiiva; (5) the relationship between Vasubandhu's bfja theory and Srijata's anudhiitu
theory; (6) further features, issues and discrepancies within the various seed theories; (7) the
broader function of the seed theory within the interpretative models of Vasubandhu and the
Dar~tantikas or Sautriintikas.
1. As for the historical development of the seed theory, Colle~t Cox explains (DD.103):
Though it is difficult to trace the development of the seed theory prior to its use by
Vasubandhu, it does appear in the *Mahiivibhii~ii and in the *Saf!lyuktiil:Jhidharma-

hrdayasiistra in contexts that would. appear to constitute incipient stages in its
development. The earliest sources that describe in detail the dynamics of the seed
theory are Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhii~ya, and Karmasiddhiprakara,:ia, and
SaJighabhadra's *Nyiiyiinusiira, which ascribes the seed theory to the Dii.r~~antikas.
2. As for the seed theory itself, Dhammajoti makes the following general comments in his
article "Srilii.ta's anudhiitu doctrine" (SAD):
The essential constituents of the seed theory are (i) perfuming (viisanii) and (ii) a
continuous process of progressive transformation in which the causal efficacy can be
transmitted up to the stage w;hen the corresponding effect is generated [i.e., saf!1tati-
pari,:iiima-vise~a].
i. As for the first essential constituent, i.e., perfuming (viisanii), he explains that "the
Dii.r~tii.p.tikas and Vibhajyavii.dins have transformed the original notion of its being a trace left
behind by a defilement ... but in itself not of the nature of defilement, to that of causal con-
ditioning: A dharma, X as the cause, 'perfumes' another dharma, Y as the effect, when X
partly or wholly transfers its characteristic to Y or brings about a corresponding change in the
latter."
ii. As for the second essential constituent, see Vasubandhu's discussion at ix, F 295f., and
Dhammajoti's section 7 in his SAD: "Retribution-born (vipiikaja) and retribution fruit (vipiika-
phala)".
When discussing Vasubandhu's definition of bfja and sarritatiparil}iima-vise~a in our passage
here, Dhammajoti first makes the general comments (section 4) (a) that, in Vasubandhu's doc-
trine of the seed in the AKB, we see the seed sometimes spoken of as if it is a single entity (in
which case one can speak of the "Seed"), and at other times, a plurality ("seeds"), and (b) that
·Vasubandhu's definition of bfja at ii, F 185, is rather similar to Srilii.ta's description of the
pursuant element (anudhiitu). As for the definition itself:
And what is this so-called seed? It is that psycho-physical complex (niima-riipa)
which is efficacious in generating a fruit, either directly or through a succession.
Dhammajoti comments that this definition clearly speaks of the whole causally efficacious
psycho-physical complex as the seed/Seed, just as the whole causally efficacious six iiyatanas
of. a person are called the pursuant element: He then quotes the following dialogue from
Ny, 397b:
[Saiµghabhadra:] What is this niima-riipa?
[Sautrii.ntikaNasubandhu:] The five skandha-s.
[Saiµghabhadra:] Why do you assert that this is of the seed-nature (11:-f 'ti; bfja-
bhiiva)?
[Sautrii.ntika:] It can serve as the cause generating dharma-s which are skilful, etc.
[Saiµghabhadra:] Do [the skandha-s exercise this seed-nature] [a] as a whole, or
[b] individually, or [c] with respect to the specific species? Your assertion entails
only these [options].
[a] If [they do so] as a whole, then the seed should be a non-real (since a whole is a
mere concept); it is illogical that a non-real serves as a truly existent cause.
[b] If [they do so] individually, then how can you assert that the non-defined
material seeds can be the generative cause for the skilful and unskilful dharma-s?
[c] If [they do so] with respect to the specific species (i.e., a material seed generates
a m~terial dharma, etc.), then when immediately after a skilful dharma an unskil-
ful dharma arises, or conversely-[in such a case] which serves as the seed?
[Sautriintika:] My dear! The seed-nature is not as it is understood by you. On account
of a specific volition (cetanii-vise~a) co-nascent with the preceding thought, there
arises [correspondingly] a specific efficacy in the succeeding thought. This very
specific efficacy in the succeeding thought is called seed. At a distinctive [culminat-
ing] point in the process of the [progressive] transformation of its serial continuity
(santati-pari,:iiima-vise~a), a future fruit is generated. The meaning here is as follows:
in an.unskilful thought, there exists a specific efficacy projected by a skilful [mental
factor, which is exercised] either directly or through a succession. This serves as the
seed, and immediately afterwards a skilful dharma comes to arise. [Likewise for the
arising of an unskilful immediately after a skilful].
Cox comments (DD.95): "Since [the] seed-state [bi]a-bhiiva] is a potentiality and not an
actualized event manifesting definite qualities, seed-states of any moral quality can coexist-in
one life-stream. Like all conditioned factors, these aggregates and their potential capability as
seed-states are momentary, and this potentiality is passed along through the contiguous
conditioning by which aggregates are produced in e·ach successive moment. Thus, the
actualization of a ~eed's potential at a later time is not the direct result of the original factor
or action by which the stream of that seed-state was initially implanted. Rather, the later
actualization is conditioned indirectly through the successive reproduction of the efficacy of
the original action in each consecutive moment in the form of a seed-state. At a certain
moment, when the appropriate causes and conditions coalesce, the seed's potential is actual-
ized. That moment is referred to as the distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the
life-stream (sarµtatipari,:iiimavise~a). By means of this process ·of successive transmission and
transformation through which a seed develops and sprouts, Vasubandhu attempts to explain
the causal efficacy of action, all varieties of causation whether homogeneous, heterogeneous,
remote or .immediate, and thereby all forms of apparent continuity within the life-stream."
3. Saqighabhadra attempts to refute Vasubandhu's theory of seeds asing mainly two strate-
gies.
i. Clarification of the relationship between the seed and the life-stream: The first strategy
we find in the continuation of the above dialogue (Ny, 397c; SAD), which goes as follows:
[Saqighabhadra:] Now, the seed asserted by you as a specific efficacy-does it or
does it not exist as an entity distinct from the skilful or unskilful thought?
[Sautriintika:] It does not exist as a distinct entity.
[Saqighabhadra:] [In addition to the various faults which I have puinted out regard-
ing your theory,] it has never been observed that dharma-s of different species, dif-
fering in their natures, are not distinct entities.
Cox comments (DD.95): "First, Saitghabhadra demands that the relationship between the
seed and the life-stream-specifically, a given moment of thought within the life-stream-be
clearly defined: that is to say, the mental and material seeds that lie dormant within the
796 Exposition of the Faculties ([ndriyanirdesa)
life-stream must be either identical to, or separate from, the mental and material factors con-
stituting the life-stream at any given moment."
According to Yasomitra (WOG.148.27'.""28; DD.215f.) (a) if the seed were admitted to be a
distinct entity from thought, this would be tantamount to admitting possession, the formation
dissociated from thought, for the dispute would then be merely a question of names, whereas
(b) if the seed were not admitted to be a distinct entity from thought then there would be the
fault of mixture (sa'!lkarya-do~a) (of the character of seed[= of the good, the bad, the impure,
the pure, etc.] and the character of thought); thus he maintains (c) "that seed must be said
to be neither an entity separate from thought nor an entity not separate from thought, since
it has the nature of a dependent provisional entity (upiidiiyaprajflaptiriipatviit)" (WOG.149.2-5;·
DD.216). .
But Yasomitra (WOG.149.4-16) also states (AD.109) that "even if a bfja is considered
identical with citta, there is no fault for, a kuiala citta which has arisen would in that case
implant its seed in a (subsequent) citta of its own santiina, the latter citta being either of the
same kind (kusala) or of the opposite kind (akusala). Thereafter (tatab) the (second) citta
would arise as qualified (determined) by the first only in accordance with the principle that a
specific effect arises from a specific cause (kiirarµz-vise~a) [i.e., if the second citta is anya-
jiitiya, the bfja lies dormant] .... Nor does the fact that a specific sakti is implanted by a
kusala-citta in an aku§ala-citta entail (iti) that the akuiala becomes kuiala or vice_versa, since
it is only a specific sakti [i.e., it cannot produce effects which, by its very nature, it is not
competent to produce] also called bfja or viisanii. These are all synonyms."
Saxµghabhadra, on the other hand, contends (Ny, 397c; DD.95) that (a) if the seed were not
admitted to be a distinct entity from thought or the life-stream, then it would not be possible to
explain. the succession of morally dissimilar moments of thought, whereas (b) when the _seeds
are considered to be merely provisional poteµtialities that are neither identical with nor
separate from the life-stream, that this would mean to divest these seeds of any real capability.
ii. The second strategy is .based on the fact that Vasubandhu does not recognize the existence
of factors in the past or future, and for that matter Saxµghabhadra attacks all schools who do
accept successive causation, but not sarviistitva. Here (DD.95f.) "Sailghabhadra points out
that causal interaction, even between two contiguous moments, is impossible. For any given
present moment, the previous moment is past and thus no longer exists; similarly, the succeed-
ing moment, as future, does not yet exist. Since, for both the Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ikas and
Vasubandhu, an entity that does not exist as a real entity cannot act as a cause, Sanghabhadra
argues that Vasubandhu cannot defend causal interaction even between contiguous moments
unless factors are admitted to exist in all three time periods. Thus, Sanghabhadra concludes,
Vasubandhu's theory cif the contiguous transmission of a seed's potential efficacy and its
eventual manifestation as a distinctive characteristic in the transformation of the life-stream
is unfounded." Saxµghabhadra can thus close his discussion of the seed theory by stating
(Ny, 398b15 and 398b25; DD.196f.):
[Without accepting the existence of past and future factors,] the Diir~~iintikas cannot
uphold change between prior and subsequent moments within a stream, conditioned
forces having the nature of cause and effect within the three time period,s, or the
capability of producing an effect immediately....
In the arguments among the various Abhidharmikas, the Diir~tantikas often appeal to
their own [theory] of seeds, and thereby, pervert the correct meaning and cause it to
become unclear. There are certain masters who give different names to these seeds,
each according to his own understanding. Some call them subsidiary elements (*anu-
dhiitu), others call them traces (viisana), still others call them capability (siimarthya),
or non-disappearance (avipra~iisa), or accumulation (upacaya). Therefore, through
extensive analysis of [the theory of seeds] we have [also] demolished these [other
theories] and have established the correct accepted doctrine.
4. As for the relationship of bfja and bfjabhiiva (see above ii, F 184), Vasubandhu considers
both priipti and bij'a not to be real entities (dravya), but see more on this below. He explains
seed-state (bfjabhiiva)-in the context of discussing the latent proclivity (anuiaya) and
envelopment (paryavasthiina) (v, F 6)-as "a specific power or potency (iakti) to produce
the defilement, an ability belonging to the person under consideration (iiiraya, iitmabhiiva)
and engendered by the previous defilement". Cox comments (DD.104) that Hyodo (1980),
pp, 69-73, "argues for a distinction in Vasubandhu's interpretation between_the seeds (bfja), or
the aggregates themselves, and the seed-state (bfjabhiiva), or the potential of those aggregates
to produce an effect, a distinction not explicitly recognized by Yasomitra or in Hsi.ian-tsang's
translation. This distinction, Hyodo contends, suggests that Vasubandhu recognized the actual
existence of seeds, but not of the seed-state. For those like Yasomitra who appear to identify
the seed and the seed-state, both would be merely provisional. Hyodo also suggests that this
distinction between bfja and bfjabhava does not reflect the original Sautrintika position, but
rather represents Vasubandhu's own innovation within the Abhidharmakoiabhii~a. an innova-
tion that results, Hyodo claims, from Vasubandhu's assumption that causes must be real
entities."
Dhammajoti reflects-on Hyodo's views and examines one of the examples put forth by Hyodo
to support his view. But while Dhammajoti acknowledges that bfja-bhiiva is an abstract noun
whereas bfja is a simple noun, he does not think that this necessarily must signify certain
implications .asserted by Hyodo. Therefore he concludes (SAD):
Xuan Zang and others have understood the bfja doctrine of the Sautrintika (and it
would seem also that of the early-Mahayana Yogicii.ras) correctly: bfja is the nature
of being efficacious in generating fruit, and this nature is· exhibited in a sentient
being's serial continuity-bfja is therefore interchangeable with bfja-bhiiva; and both
can be described in terms of the sentient being's psycho-physical complex.
As to their being real or not, he states that "from the Diir~tintika-Sautrintika perspective, bfja
is not a real entity in the ordinary sense, nor is bfja-bhiiva absolutely nothing more than a mere
concept. If bfja and bfja-bhiiva 'must be forcibly fitted into the Sarvii.stivida scheme of under-
standing the 'reals', then th~y must be said to be 'neither real nor unreal'. For this same
reason, one can speak of seed/Seed in: the singular when one refers to the efficacy as such,
possessed by the serial continuity, or seeds in the plural when one needs to differentiate among
the different specific species of efficacies."
5. As for the relationship between the bfja theory as expounded in the AKB and Srilita's
anudhiitu theory, Dhammajoti comments (ADCP.99) that the latter may be said to be a more
generalized form of the bfja theory, since it accounts for the continuous manifestation of the
totality of a sentient being's existence-the six iiyatanas-from one present moment to the
next, whereby the anudhiitu is the causal efficacy within the sentient being's present serial
continuity, and the next moment of the serial continuity is the effect.
6. To draw attention to further features, issues and discrepancies within the various seed
theories, in the following we translate pertinent excerpts from a Yogii.ciira text, which accepts
simultaneous causation, namely LVP's translation of Hsiian-tsang's Siddhi (Ch'eng wei-
shih Lun). The excerpts deal with the characteristics of (i) the bfjas and of (ii) the perfumable
and the perfumer, within Hsiian-tsang 's discµssion of the iilayavijfiiina. He states (F 96):
.a. [The iilayavijfiiina] is actively iilaya, store, for it stores the bfjas which are
passively ii!Bya, being stored.
b. It is passively iilaya, in the sense that it is "perfumed" by the dharmas called
sal'flklesa [= all the impure (siisrava) dharmas or all the dharmas of sal'flsiira (pravrtl),
i.e., not just the defiled (kli:jfa) dharmas].
Hsiian-tsang then asks (F lOOff.):
i. What kind of dharma is called bfja?
In the iilayavijfiiina, also called root-consciousness (malavijfiiina), there occur poten-
cies or capabilities (sakti or siimarthya) which give rise to their effect, i.e., a present
or manifest dharma. [The author considers the bfjas having come to maturity, not the
bfjas in their homogeneous generation, from their origin up to the state of maturity].
ii. Reality of the bfjas.
In relation to the vijfiiina, in relation to the effect, the bfjas are neither identical nor
different. Such is, in fact, the mode of relation between the thing or intrinsic nature
(svabhiiva), vijfiiina, and the activity (kiiritra), bfja; between the cause (hetu), bfja,
and the effect (phala), the present dharma.
However, although not identical with the vijfiiina and the effect, and not different
from the vijfiiina and the effect, the bfjas are real entities (dravyasat) . ...
This is not Sthiramati's doctrine for whom the bfjas, being neither identical to
present dharmas nor different from them, are of "nominal existence", like the pitcher,
and not real ... .
iii. Bhiigas . .. .
iv. Moral type of the bfjas.
The impure bijas-being integrated into the vipiikavijfiiina (i.e., not having a "nature"
distinct from the vijfiiina), consequently being of the same kind-are non-defined
(avyiikrta). Nevertheless, their causes (namely, the present vijfiiinas which perfume
the vipiikavijfiiina) and their effects (namely, the present vijfiiinas which arise from
the bfjas) are good, bad. Therefore it is said that the impure bfjas are good, bad.
The pure (aniisrava) bfjas-not being integrated into the viptikavijfitina, not being of
its kind, having arisen from good causes and producing good effects-are good.
As for th~ character~tics of the bfjas, Hsiian-~sang f ves the following six (F 116ff.):
- 1. The bvas are momentary (k:fa,:i1ka) . ...
ii. The bfjas are simultaneous (sahabha) with their effect~ ...
m. The bfjas give rise to a continuous series (sadii-anuprabaddha [?]). - The bfjas
are dharmas that-for a long period of time, of the same nature--continue in an un-
interrupted series until the final stage, until the moment when the path that counteracts
(pratipak~a) them arises.
This definition eliminates the Sautriintika doctrine for which the six vijiiiinas (the
pravrttivijiiiinas, the only vijiiiinas they accept) are bfjas: but these vijiiiinas are
variable (vikiirin) and discontinuous and thus are out of the question. [The rupa also
does not answer to the definition.] ...
iv. The bijas are determined as to their moral type (viniyata). - The bfja possesses
the capacity to give rise to a present dharma, good, bad, non-defined: this capacity is
determined by the caus: of the bfja, namely, the good, bad, non-defined dharma that
perfumed-created it. . . . ,
v. The bfjas depend on the complex of conditions (pratyayasiimagryapek~a). - In
order to actualize their capacity to produce a present dharma, the bfjas require the
support of conditions ....
vi. The bfjas "lead" (in) to their own effect (svaphaliiviihaka). - Each dharma leads
to the effect which is its own: a bfja of mind (citta) leads to mind, a bfja of rupa leads
to riipa . ...
These six characteristics belong only to the "potencies" (saktivise~a) of the mula-
vijiiiina or the iilayavijiiiina. These potencies alone are truly said to be the bfjas. - As
for external seeds, rice seeds, etc., they are but a development (paril:,iima) of the
vijiiiina due to the potencies (or bfjas) of the vijiiiina. They are called bfjas only
· metaphorically: they are not true bfjas.
The bfja, external or internal, insofar as it engenders the near effect, the major effect,
is called "generative cause" (janakahetu); insofar as it "projects" the distant effect,
the supplementary effect (ucche~a), (of such a kind that the effect does not cease
immediately), it is called "projecting cause" (iik~epakahetu).
As for that which is perfumable and that which perfumes, Hstian-tsang states (F 120ff.):
In other words, (i) that in which the bfjas can be created or nourished, (ii) that which
creates or nourishes the bfjas.
There is viisanii, perfuming, creation or nourishing of the bfjas when there is a
"perfumable" and a "perfumer".
i. The perfumable must have four characteristics.
a. It endures (iisthitasvabhiiva). -The dharma which, from beginning to end,
continues in a series of a single type, is capable of carrying the perfume
(viisanii) and is perfumable....
b. It is indeterminate (avyakrtasvabhiiva). - Only the unvarying dharma, non-
contradictory (aviruddha: which does not contradict either good or bad) is
capable of receiving the .perfume ....
c. It is perfumable (bhiivyasvabhiiva ?) -The autonomous dharma (svatantra),
the dharma that is not hard like a stone....
d. It is in strict relationship (sarµsma ?) with that which perfumes. - The
800 Exposition of the Faculties (Jndriyanirdesa)
dharma that is simultaneous with the perfumer, in the same place, neither
identical with nor separate from the perfumer ....
The eighth vijniina alone, when it is vipiika, shows these four characteristics, not the
five thought-concomitants of the eighth and not the pravrttivijniina.
ii. The perfumer must have four characteristics.
a. Arising and ceasing (sa-utpiidanirodha) . ...
b. Being endowed with an eminent action (adhimatrakriyii). - The dharma that
arises and ceases, that has great power, is capable Qf producing the perfume
(viisanii) or of perfuming (bhiivanii).
c. Increasing and decreasing. -The dharma of eminent power, able to increase
and decrease, is capable of planting the perfume (viisanii) . ...
d. Intimately connected with the perfumed. - Same explanation as above (i.d)
Only the seven pravrttivijniinas with their thought-concomitants have an eminent
action, are capable of increasing and decreasing. Having these four characteristics,
they are "perfumers".
There is perfuming (bhiivanii) when the vijniina that perfumes (= the darsanabhiiga
of one of the seven vijniinas) arises and ceases at the same time as the vijniina that is
perfumed(= the salJlvittibhiiga of the eighth vijnana). Indeed, at this moment, bfjas
(= viisanii) arise or increase in the perfumed vijnana in the same way as the odor of
the flower arises in the sesame seed, flower and seed arising and ceasing at the same
time.
7. Although in our passage Vasubandhu discusses the seed theory within the context of
possession, Cox comments _(DD.96f) that this theory "has a much broader function within the
interpretative models of Vasu~andhu and the Dii.r~tii.ntikas ot Sautrii.ntikas. The model of seeds
is appealed to in all instances of general causal production: for example, the efficacy of past
action; the retention and recollection of memories; the succession of dissimilar moments of
thought; the arising of defilements after an interval; and the abandonment ohlefilements. By
contrast, the Sarvii.stivii.da-Vaibhii.~ikas use several other models in addition to possession and
non-possession to account for these phenomena: namely, the six causes ·and four conditions;
the general causal efficacy of all past factors; and unmanifest action (avijnaptiriipa)."
470
LVP: These definitions answer the questions of the Vaibhii.~ika: "Is the seed a real entity
(dravya) different from thought or not different from thought?" "Is this series a permanent
(avasthita) real entity (dravya) within which different factors successively arise?" "Should the
transformation (pari,:iiima) be understood in the same way as the pari,:iiima of the Sii.Iµkhyas?"
See ii. 54cd. - The doctrine of the transformation of the stream is presented again iv, F 20-22;
ix, F 295f.
LS: Although a definition of the term "distinctive characteristic" (vise~a) is missing here in
Pradhan, both Hsiian-tsang and Paramii.rtha include it in their translation. Vasubandhu, how-
ever, gives the definition of vise~a at ix, F 296, when discussing salJltatipari,:iiimavise~a
(DD.215): "[It is that] which is capable in the production of an effect immediately" (yo
anantaralJl phalotpiidanasamarthal,t).
471
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, L VP mentions the Sautrii.ntika here.
472
LVP: Tibetan and Paramartha. - Hsiian-tsang: "The two paths (doctrine of the Sautrantikas,
doctrine of the Vaibha~ikas) are good. - How is that? - The first is not in contradiction with
reasoning; the second is our system."
473
LS: SAH 484.
474
LS: Ibid.
475
Gokhale: [37a) traiyadhvikiinaTJ1 trividha
Tib.: [37a) dus gsum pa yi rnam pa gsum I
LS: The Avatara (p. 109f; SA.IV.298) speaks of three kinds of prapti:
1. those that arise simultaneously (sahaja) with the acquired dharma and are thus compara-
ble to a shadow that follows the figure: this refers mostly to th?se of unobscured-non-defined
dharmas;
2. those that arise prior (agraja) to the dharma to be acquired by an individual series and are
thus comparable to a chief bull (vr~abha) that leads the herd, since it conduces to the arising of
the dharma: mostly those of the wholesome dharmas of the realm of desire at the moment
when one who has "fallen" from a highf"r stage and is about to be reborn (pratisaTJ1dhi) in the
realm of desire.
3: those that arise subsequent (pascatkalaja) to the acquired dharma and are comparable to a
calf that follows its mother, since it remains after the acquired dharma has ceased: mostly
.those of the understanding (prajna) produced by listening (srutamayi), by reflection (cinta-
mayi), etc., excluding the simultaneous acquisitions.
476
LVP: The possession (prapti) of past factors (dharma) is:
1. either past, that is to say: "that which has arisen and has perished": the possession
would be either previous to (agraja), or later than (pascatkalaja), or simultaneous
(sahaja) with these factors;
2. or else future, that is to say: "that which has not arisen": the possession would be
later than these factors;
3. or else present, that is to say: "that which has arisen and has not perished": the
possession is later than these factors. And so on.
No factor is susceptible to this threefold possession (prapti), for example, the possession
of factors "of retribution" is only simultaneous with these factors (ii. 38c). One does not
"possess" these factors before they have arisen, not after they have perished.
477
LS: AH 222; SAH 455.
478
Gokhale: [37b) subhadfnii,TJ'I subhadika I
Tib.: [37b) dge la sogs kyi dge la sogs I
479
Gokhale: [37c] svadhatuka tadaptanaTJ'I I
Tib.: [37c) der gtogs rnams kyi rang khams pa I
LVP: The impure factors are in the framework of existence, belong to the realms of existence,
dhatvapta, dhatupatita.
480
Gokhale: [37d) anaptanaTJ1 caturvidha I
Tib.: [37dJ ma gtogs rnams kyi rnam pa bzhi I
LVP: These are the apariyiipannas of the Abhidhamma.

481
LVP: The cessation due to deliberation (pratisarµkhyiinirodha) or "disconnection from
defilement" (visarµyoga, i. 6ab; ii. 57d) can be obtained (1) by ordinary worldlings (prthag-
jana) or (2) by noble ones (iirya).
In the first case, the possession (priipti) is (i) of the realm of fine-materiality or (ii) of the
realm of immateriality according to whether cessation (nirodha) is obtained by a (mundane)
- path of the realm of fine-materiality or of the realm of immateriality.
In the second case, the possession is (i) of the realm of fine-materiality and pure, whences-
sation is obtained by a (mundane) path of the realm of fine-materiality; (ii) of the realm of
immateriality and pure, when cessation is obtained by a path of the realm of immateriality;
(iii) pure, when cessation is obtained by the pure path (according to the formulated principle
vi. 46).
482
LS: Cox comments (DD:219) that "since the truth of the path is a conditioned factor, the
location of its possession is determined by its own location: that is, it is not connected to any
realm. Possession not connected to any realm is then, itself, also a factor not tending toward
the fluxes."
483
LVP: (1) The factors of those in training (saik~a) are the pure factors of those in training
(saik~a), of the noble ones who are not perfected beings (arhat); (2) the factors of those
beyond training (asaik~a) are the pure factors of perfected beings (arhat).
484
Gokhale: [38a] tridhii nasaik~ii'saik~a,:iam
Tib.: [38a] slob dang mi slob min gyi gsum I
485
LVP: Paramartha: "The same for the possession (priipti) obtained by non-noble-persons,
of the cessation not due to deliberation (apratisarµkhyiinirodha) and of the cessation due to
deliberation (pratisarrikhyiini~odha)." Hsilan-tsang: " ... the possession of the cessation due to
deliberation obtained by the path of the non-noble-persons".
486
Gokhale: [38b] aheyiiniirµ dvidhii matii
Tib.: [38b] spang bya min pa 'i rnam gnyis 'dod I
487
LVP: One case is not envisi.oned: the possession of the cessation due to deliberation, by
means of the mundane path, by noble ones (iirya). This possession is both pure and impure, as
we shall see at vi. 46.
488
Gokhale: [38cd] avyiikrtiipti/:t sahajii 'bhijniinairma,:iikiid rte I
Tib.: [38cd] lung bstan min thob lhan cig skye I mngon shes sprul pa ma gtogs pa II
489
LVP: durbalatviit: anabhisarµskiiravattvat [WOG.152.8], because it is not the result of an
effort.
490
LS: I here follow Collett Cox's translation (DD.200).
491
LVP: Vyiikhyii [WOG.152.16f.]: The Vaibha~ikas. - For example, Visvakarman, the
celestial artisan, possesses past, present and future skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthiinika); the
Sthavira Asvajit possesses the modes of proper deportment (airyiipathika).
LS: Cox comments (DD.221) that "Visvakarman is identified in the JJgveda as an abstract
creative deity, and in the later period, becomes the divine architect and patron of the decora-
tive and building arts" and that "Asvajit was one of the five original disciples of the Buddha.
He so impressed Siiriputra with his deportment in begging alms that Sariputra inquired about
the doctrine of his teacher, and as a result, went to study with the Buddha."
492
Gokhale: [39a] nivrtasya ca rupasya
Tib.: [39al] bsgribs pa'i gzugs kyi'ang
493
to
IS: According the Vaibhii~ikas (DD.221), all material form (rupa) is.non-defined with
the exception of (1) certain bodily or vocal informative actions (kiiyaviigvijiiaptirupa) and
(2) all non-informative actions (avijfiaptirupa) (i. 29f., iv. 7ab). Saiµghabhadra explains
(Ny, 399a; DD.201):
This refers only to the possession of the defiled, manifest, corporeal and vocal
actions (kli~favijfiaptirupa) within the first level of trance of the realm of form,
which, as in the case of [the possession of the obscured, indeterminate factors], arises
only simultaneously with [those actions]. Even though [these actions arise obscured
by] excessive (adhimiitra) defilements, since they cannot give rise to unmanifest
actions (avijfiaptirupa), they are weak and definitely without possession [that arises]
prior to or subsequent to them.
494
Gokhale: [39b] kiime rupasya nii 'grajii \
Tib.: [39a2-b] 'dod pa na \ gzugs kyi Ingar ni skye ba med\
495
IS: Pradhan.65.28 has "informative and non-informative" (vijfiaptyavijfiapti), but Hsiian-
.tsang uses kusaliikusala. Yasomitra glosses (WOG.152.28t): "wholesome and unwholesome,
informative and non-informative form [or action]" (kusaliikusalasya vijfiaptyavijfiaptirupasya).
496
IS: SAH 454,457,484.
491
Gokhale: [39c] akli~fa 'vyiikrtii 'priipti}:i
Tib.: [39c] ma thob ma bsgribs lung ma bstan \
LVP: The non-possession of the defilements is not obscured, for, in this hypothesis, it would
be absent in the persons liberated from defilements; it is not wholesome, for it would then
have to be absent in the persons who have cut the wholesome roots. (MVS, 799a21).
IS: Cox comments (DD.222) that unlike possession, the moral quality of non-possession is not
determined by the factors to which it is applied:
In general, the character of non-possession is not determined by the character of the
particular factor that is not possessed, because non-possession and the particular
factor with regard to which it operates are contradictory. Nor is the character of the
non-possession of cessation resulting from consideration determined by the path
through which that cessation is attained, because its non-possession is not attained by
that path. Rather, the charilcter of non-possession is determined by the corporeal
basis of rebirth (upapattyiisraya) or, where there is no corporeal basis, by the vitality
and the homogeneous character of the sentient being who experiences it. See MVS
158, p. 80la13ff.
But more specifically, since non-possession is "indeterminate" (avyiikrta), it is not included
among the factors belonging to those in training (saik~a) or those beyond training (asaiqa),
which are only wholesome (kusala); it is thus included with those fact<>rs belonging to those
neither in training nor beyond training. On the other hand, since it is "indeterminate", i.e., not
pure (aniisrava) or wholesome (kusala), and thus to be abandoned, but "unobscured" (anivrta),
it is to be abandoned1>y the path of cultivation, since all factors that are to be abandoned by the
path of insight are obscured (nivrta).
498
Gokhale: [39d] sii 'tftii'jiitayos tridhii II
Tib.: [39d] 'das ma skyes kyi de rnam gsum II
499
LS: It is not possible for non-possession and possession to operate on the same factor
simultaneously.
500
Gokhale: [40a] kiimiidyiiptii'maliinii,ri ca
Tib.: [49a] 'dod sogs gtogs dang dri med kyi'ang I
501
LS: AH 221; SAH 454,457.
502
LS: See ii. 39c.
503
Gokhale: [40bc 1] miirgasyii 'p riiptir i~yate Iprthagjanatva,ri
Tib.: [40bc] lam ma thob pa so so yi I skye bor 'dod do I
LVP: If a non-possession (apriipti) could be pure, this would have to be the non-possession of
pure factors; but the definition of the ordinary worldling (prthagjana) establishes that the non-
possession of pure factors is not pure.
On the ordinary worldling, see i. 40, 41a; ii. 9bd; iii. 41cd, 95a; vi. 26a, 28d, 45b.
504
LS: AH 221; SAH 454, 457.
505
LS: AH 221,224, SAH 454,457.
506
LS: Ibid.
501
LVP: The second masters of the Vibhii~ii.
508
LVP: Compare Kathii_vatthu, iv. 4._
509
LS: This is the second place in Pradhan (66.19) where the term Sautriintika is explicitly
mentioned.
510
LS: This is the 13 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in rel~tion to chapter 2
(VY.62f.). Sa:rµghabhadra (Ny, 39%10-11) identifies this passage as the opinion of Vasu-
bandhu, and since the life-stream as a composite entity cannot be real, Sa:rµghabhadra (Ny,
399bll-c7) criticizes him for denying the real existence of prthagjanatvam. The Viniscaya-
sa,rigrahal)f defines prthagjanatva as a designation for the state in which the lokottara iirya-
dharmas have not yet arisen. On the other hand, the denial of the prthagjanatva is already
attributed to the Dar~tiintikas in the MVS, 231b26-27.
511
Gokhale: [40c2-d) tatpriiptibhilsa,riciiriid vihfyate 11
Tib.: [40c2-d] de thob dang Isa 'phos nas ni mam nyams 'gyur II
512
LVP: The non-possession (apriipti) or non-acquisition (aliibha) belongs to the realm of
existence (dhiitu) to w_hich the person who is endowed with it belongs (ii, 10a). Thus a being of
the realm of desire is endowed only with the status of an ordinary worldling (which is non-
posses·sion [apriipti], ii. 40bc) of the realm of desire. Thus it cannot be said that, through the
acquisition of the (noble) path, this being loses the status of an ordinary worldling of the
sphere of the three realms. - Nevertheless, through the acquisition of the (noble) path, any
status of an ordinary worldling, of whatever realm this might be, becomes impossible. Thus it
can be said that this status, under its threefold form (of the realm of desire, etc.), is abandoned,
although a given being is endowed with one form only.
Two aspects of abandonment are distinguished, vihiini (loss) and praha,:ia (abandonment).
LS: The general principle here is that non-possession of a given factor is discarded by the
acquisition of that factor.
513
LVP: Ordinary worldlings (prthagjana), detaching themselves from the realm of desire,
pass into the first meditation (dhyana): they lose the status of the ordinary worldling of the
realm of desire, but .do not, in actual fact, become noble ones (arya): since another status of an
ordinary worldling, of the sphere of the first meditation, appears. The same for the other stages
that one ascends or descends.
LS: Sarp.ghabhadra states (Ny, 400a; DD.209) that "[non-possession can be discarded by
passing to another stage] because non-possession operates in dependence upon the power of
the corporeal basis [to which it is connected]".
514
'' LVP: By taking possession of the wholesome factors derived from listening and from
reflection of the realm of desire, one loses the non-possession of these factors; by taking
possession of the innate wholesome factors (ii. 71b), one loses the non-possession of the
wholesome roots that have been cut off (saniucchinnakusala). - When, dying in the realm of
desire, one is reborn in the first meditation (dhyana), one loses the non-possession of the
factors of the first meditation .... This theory raises .delicate problems which the Vyakhya
summarily examines.
515
LS: SAH 484.
516
~ : In other words, each of these possessions can only be associated with the life;\-stream
of a given sentient being through other possessions, these others through still others, and so on.
517
LS: Sarp.ghabhadra states (Ny, 400a; DD.209) in addition: "[The impossibility of infinite
regress in the case of] non-possession should also be considered in accordance~ [the
following] principle: that is, a non-possession of the non-possession [of a particular factor]
never arises.simultaneously with [that original non-possession]."
518
LVP: Compare ii. 45cd: the play (1) of origination (jati) and (2) of the origination-of-
origination (jatijati).
519
LVP: The case of the non-defined (avyakrta) fact~r is not examined here, because one
possesses this factor only at the moment when it exists (tasya sahajaiva prapti/:1): the numbers
differ.
520
LVP: The Japanese editor observes that four characteristics (lak~a,:ia) and four secondary
characteristics (anulak~a,:ia) must be added (ii. 46cd) for each of these three factors; thus there
are twenty~seven factors at the first moment.
521
LVP: At the fourth moment one possesses twenty-seven possessions (prapti), namely, the
possessions produced at the three preceding moments, three, six, eighteen, plus twenty-seven
secondary possessions (anuprapti), thus fifty-four factors. At the fifth moment, 81 [= 54 + 27]
possessions and as many secondary possessions.
522
LS: Hsiian-tsang, v, fol. la.
523
LS: AH 220; SAH 453.
524
LS: Ibid.
525
Gokhale: [41a] sabhiigatii sattvasiimyam
Tib.: [41a] skal mnyam sems ca.n 'dra ba'o I
LVP: Prakara,:ia, 694a23: "What is the group homogeneity (nikiiyasabhiiga)? - The common-
ality of nature of sentient beings."
Each sentient being possesses his or her own "sentient being" homogeneity (sattvasabhiigatii).
Nevertheless, the "sentient being" homogeneity is said to be general because it is not differ-
entiated. To conceive of it as unique and eternal is the error of the Vaise~ikas.
4.2. 6 nikiiyasabhiigatii katamii Iya sattviiniim iitmabhiivatulyatii I
4.2.6 What is class affiliation? The similarity in the composition of beings. ISBP.238
Avatlira (ESD.115):
The group-homogeneity is the cause for the similarities in striving and inclination
among sentient beings (sattviiniim ek_iirtharucilJ siidr~ahetubhuta). This is subdi-
vided into two: (i) non-differentiated [or general] (abhinnii) and (ii) differentiated [or
particular] (bhinnii).
Saiµghabhadra defines (SA.IV.300; Ny, 400a):
There is a distinct entity called sabhiigatii. It is the mutual similarity (sadrsya) among
sentient beings. The cause of similarity (siibhiigya-kiira,:ia) among various species of
sentient beings born in the same plane of existence (gati), with regard to the body
(sarfra), shape (sa'!lsthana), the [specific] functionalities of the faculties (indriya),
and food (iihiira), etc., as well as the cause for their mutually similar inclinations
(ruci), is called nikiiya-sabhiiga.
2. As for the historical development of group-homogeneity, Cox writes (DD.107f.) that the
Dharmaskandha, Sangftiparyiiya and Jniinaprasthiina discuss the role of homogeneity in refer-
ence to the rebirth process and list it among the causes that determine the specific rebirth state
of sentient beings, but that in the later texts the role of homogeneity is expanded and given the
function of determining, in addition to the specific rebirth state, also the realm, mode of birth,
region, family, and distinguishing physical attributes of sentient beings; each sentient being is
thus characterized by several types of homogeneous character.
3. In the Abhidharma taxonomy, group-homogeneity is included (DD.107f.) among the
"formations dissociated from thought and matter" (i) because it is applied to both mental and
material factors, (ii) because it cannot be assigned to more than one category.
4, As for the existential status of group-homogeneity, this is discussed by Vasubandhu in
five points below, including the point of whether group-homogeneity is really needed as a
distinct real entity (dravya) in light of the category of the nature of an ordinary worldling
(prthagjana). Saiµghabhadra, in this context, adds the discussion of whether group-homogene-
ity is really needed in the light of the doctrine of *arma as a cause of the similarities and dis-
similarities of appearances, functionalities, etc.
Dhammajoti explains (SA.IV.301) that "in the Sarviistiviida doctrine of karma, one's existence
is determined by two types of karma. (i) The projecting (iik~epaka) karma which results in
Endnotes to Cfvipter Two 807
one's being born in a particular plane of existence. This existence is designated principally by
one's nikaya-sabhiiga since 'it is only when one acquires the nikiiya-sabhiiga that one is said
to be born' [Ny, 585b]. (ii) A multiplicity of completing (paripiiraka) karma-s which together
determine the particularities of the existence so projected. Nikiiya-sabhiiga, in acting along
with the paripiiraka-karma-s to work out these particularities, contributes to the similarities so
described among members of the same species."
Sarµghabhadra therefore states (Ny, 400a; SA.IV.300):
Just as karma, the citta and the Great Elements are all the cause for the clear matter
[of which the sense organs are constituted], thus the body and shape, etc., are not
caused by karma alone, for it is observed that the bodies and shapes [of sentient
beings] are results projected (ii-{k!fipii) by mutually similar karma, [and yet] there
exist differences with regard to the faculties, functionalities and food, etc. If one says
that such differences result from those in the completing karma-s (paripiiraka-
karma), it is not reasonable, for there can be bodies and shapes which are projected
by similar projecting karma (iiksepaka-karma); [but] it is on account of there being
differences in the group-homogeneity that the functionalities become different. If the
bodies and shapes, etc., are no more than th<; r.~sult of karma, then it would not be
possible [for beings] to abandon or perform any function in accordance with their ,
inclination.
5. Vasubandhu discusses homogeneity briefly at various other places in the AKB, mainly in
regard to projecting and losing homogeneity, for example, in relation to losing restraint
(sa'!lvara; iv. 38) or projecting a new birth (janman; iv. 95a). But as already pointed out above
by Collett ~ox (see endnote at ii, F 105), Vasubandhu also uses the term nikiiyasabhiiga in a
non-technical sense; thus, Yasomitra-in the context of Vasubandhu's own definition of the
vitality faculty (ii, F 216}-glosses the term nikiiyasabhiiga as "conditioned forces of a certain
nature having the aggregate of form, and so on, as their intrinsic nature" and that Sarµgha-
bhadra replaces Vasubandhu's non-technical use of nikiiyasabhiiga with "the six sense organs
together with their basis".
For further references see our index.
526
LS: Sarµghabhadra explains the compound sabhiigatii as follows (Ny, 400a; SA.IV.301):
"sa (homogeneity) because of the mutual similarities in physical appearances, functionalities
and inclination. Bhiiga means cause (nimitta)." Cox adds (DD.235) that it "can also be inter-
preted as a descriptive determinative (karmadhiiraya): that is, simply as 'similar' or 'shared'
(sa) 'part' (bhiiga)."
As for the compound nikiiyasabhiiga, she states (DD.234) that it is subject to several inter-
pretations: "For example: (1) many similarities (*nikiiya-samiina) and distinctions (*bhiiga);
(2) the cause of similarity (*sabhiiga) among many factors or entities (*nikiiya), or among
many sentient beings (*nikiiya).:'
527
LS: SAH 453.
528
LS: Ibid.
529
LS: The general homogeneity determines one's status as distinct from insentient matter.
The Avatiira comments (ESD.115): "All sentient beings equally have self-attachment (iitma-
sneha), are similarly nourished by food, and have similar inclinations (rati)-this cause of
sameness (samya) is named the [general] group-homogeneity. Each [sentient being] has within
him his own group-homogeneity."
530
LVP: By et cetera, one should understand: Upiisikii, Bhi~m:u, Naivasaik~aniisaik~a. etc.
531
LS: The particular homogeneity determines the characteristic that defines the commonal-
'ity of a particular group and distinguishes that group from others. The A vatiira comments
(ESD.115): "Within each being [of a given category], there is a dharma which is the dis-
tinguishing cause (pratiniyama-hetu) for the similarity in striving and inclination [among
members of the same category]. This is named the group-homogeneity. If this were non-
existent, there would be confusion in all the conventional usages (loka-vyavahiira) such as_
'iirya', 'non-iirya', etc."
532
LS: 1. The homogeneity of factors is not found in earlier Sarviistivadin discussions of
group-homogeneity, where it is used only in reference to sentient beings, and is initiated by the
AKB and the *Nyiiyiinusiira (DD.235).
2. Pradhan and *Nyiiyiinusiira do not render "indicative of sentient beings". Cox therfore
comments (DD.111) that although Smpghabhadra's *Abhidharma-samaya-pradfpikii-siistra
(805c10ff.) suggests that the dharma-sabhiigatii refers only to those aggregates and so on, that
are included among factors constituting sentient beings (sattviikhya), it "could indicate an
extension of homogeneous character beyond the realm of sentient beings. It would no longer
function to explain the process of rebirth, but would refer to an abstract _notion of similarity
intersecting all entities, "lentient and insentient alike: Indeed, Vasubandhu's irtentions in sug-
gesting this second type of homogeneous character of factors_ [sabhiigatii] are not clear."
533
LVP: Two readings: evarµ skandhiidibuddhiprajiiaptayo 'pi yojyii}:t and evarµ dhiitviidi-
buddhiprajiiaptayo 'pi yojyii}:t: "It is because of the homogeneity of factors (dharmasabhiigatii)
that the elements are of the realm of desire ... ".
534
· _ LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, L VP mentions the Sautriintika here.
535
LS: As for the difference between prthagjana-sabhiigatii and prthajanatva, the Avatiira
states (ESD.115):
The cause for the homogeneity in inclination, etc., is said to be their homogeneity
(sabhiigatii). The worldling-quality [prthagjanatva], [on the other hand,] is that which
causes the doing of all unprofitable [-i.e., evil-] things (sarviinarthakarabhiita) .
... Now, [unlike the case of the homogeneity,] it is not the case that at the times
of birth and death there is the acquisition and relinquishment,' respectively of the
worldling-quality: [One remains a worldling in sa,r,siira until one becomes an
iirya]. Hence, there is a [vast] difference (sumahiirµstadvise~afJ) between the world-
ling-quality and the homogeneity.
536
LS: As for proofs of the sabhiigatii, Sa111ghabhadra replies (Ny, 400b; DD.232):
One knows that [homogeneous character] has that [activity], because one observes its
effect. [Thus, the activity of homogeneous character is proven through inference,]
just as one knows that there was an action performed in a former life, because one
observes a present effect attained through action. [The activity of homogeneous char-
acter is also proven through direct perception] because a yogic practitioner knows it
through direct perception.
537
LS: As for why insentient entities do not have a group-homogeneity, Sai:µghabhadra
presents five reasons (DD.232f.):
[First, the Lord] did not state that grass, and so on, has a homogeneous character,
because it is without the mutually respective similarity in modes of behavior [kriya]
and aspirations [ruci] [characteristic of sentient beings].
[Second,] because grass, and so on, is inevitably produced only so long as it has
sentient beings as its cause, it is claimed that there is homogeneous character only
with regard to sentient beings.
[Third, homogeneous character] is produced with actions from a previous life or
effort (prayatna) in the present life as its cause. Since grass, and so on, has neither of
these two causes-[neither action nor effort]-it is without homogeneous character.
It is precisely through the existence of these two causes that the existence [of homo-
geneous character] as a real entity is proven.
[Fourth: omitted.]
[Fifth,] due to previous statements, [it is known that homogeneous character is a
discrete real entity]. What was stated previously? Namely, it was stated that "even
though it is observed thanhe body and appearance are effects projected by [pre-
vious] similar action, since there are [also] distinctions among the controlling facul-
ties, the modes of behavior, sustenance, and so on, [one should acknowledge that
these distinctions are caused by homogeneous character]".
538
LS: Cox comments (DD.108f.): "In his definition of homogeneous character, Sangha-
bhadra does not include an appeal to a general homogeneous character as the basis for the
notion or provisional designation of the category of all sentient beings nor does he. accept the
need for an abstract universal concept of homogeneous character. Instead, Sanghabhadra
emph~sizes the discriminating function of homogeneous character as the cause for distinctions
among sentient beings. The existence of homogeneous character as a discrete factor is then
inferred from this causal activity and the notion of homogeneous character in the abstract
arises on the basis of its discriminating function or its observed activity as the cause of
similarity among things in the same category."
539
LS: 1. According to Radhakrishnan (IP), the Vaise~ika system takes its name from
"vise~a", individuator or particularity; it emphasizes the significance ofparti.culars or individu-
als and is decidedly pluralistic. It has been regarded as non-theistic. The legendary founder of
the system (IP.386), "Kai:iiida, the author of the Vaise~ika Siitra (much older than Nyiiya but
later than 300 B.C.), does not mention God, but later commentators felt that the immutable
atoms could not by themselves produce an ordered universe unless a presiding God regulated
their activities".
2. The Vaise~ika adopts a classification of six or seven categories (padiirtha):
i. real entity (dravya), comprising nine varieties: (J) earth (prthivl), (2) water (iipas),
(3) fire (tejas), (4) air or wind (viiyu), (5) space or ether (iikiisa), (6) time (kiila),
(7) spatial direction (dis or dik), (8) self or soul (iitman), (9) internal organ (manas);
ii. quality (gu~a), comprising seventeen or twenty-four varieties (J) color (riipa),
(2) taste (rasa), (3) odor (gandha), (4) touch (sparsa), (5) number (sarµkhyii),
(6) dimension or size (parimii~a), (7) separateness (prthaktva), (8) contact or con-
junction (saf!!yoga), (9) disjunction (vibhiiga), (JO) farness (paratva), (11) nearness
(aparatva), (12) knowledge (buddhi orjntina), (13) pleasure (sukha), (14) displeasure
(du}_lkha), (15) desire (icchii), (16) hatred (dve1a), (17) effort (icchii); (18) heaviness
(gurutva), (19) fluidity (dravatva), (20) viscidity (sneha), (21) dispositional tendency
or impetus (v~ga), (22) merit (dharma), (23) demerit (adharma), (24) sound (sabda);
iii. motion (karma);
iv. universal (stimtinya);
v. particularity (vi§e~a);
vi. inherence (samavtiya);
vii. absence (abhiiva).
3. As for stimtinya, Potter writes (EIP.II.133): "The fully developed Nyiiya-Vaise~ika view
of universal is that they are real, independent, timeless, ubiquitous entities which inhere in
individual substances, qualities, and motions and are repeatable, i.e., may inhere in several
distinct individuals at once or at different times and places. The general term used in
Vi:iise~ika for such an entity is stimtinya. However, the initial doctrine of the school as
found in the Vaise~ika-siitras and the early commentators is substantially different from the
notion just characterized."
4. In regard to the relation of the categories stimtinya and vise~a and t)le Vaibha~ika school,
Sa11].ghabhadra comments (Ny, 400c; DD.234):
If the Vaise~ika school maintained that these two categories [of generality and of
particular generalities] were not singular, w·ere momentary and imperinanent, were
without support, and were distinguished [from the object to which they apply], we
could accept their opinion and suffer no categorical fault (atiprasariga). The Buddha
did not reject the view that the visual sense organ is able to operate with form [as its
object] and suggest other interpretations, simply because the Vaise~ika [also] main-
tain [that view].
Dhammajoti adds (ESD.43) that "the concept of the Vaibha~ika sabhiigatti is quite different
from that of the Vaise~ika stimtinya. We must remember that sabhiigatti does not refer to
the concept of the reality of the whole as imposed on discrete, momentary dharma-s. The
Vaibha~ikas themselves regard only the smallest discrete components as paramtirthasat,
and not their combination. As clearly defined in Avattira, the Ny and the Abhidharmadfpa,
sabhiigatti is a real entity within each sentient being, an inner force which causes the similarity
in members of a group like sentient beings, human beings, etc. It is _not the generality
conceived as real."
540
LVP: The Vyakhyti cites the Siitra: priiQ.iitipatenasevitena bhavitena bahulilq-tena (comp.
Ariguttara, iv. 247, etc.) narake~iipapadyate Isa ced itthaf!!tvaf!! tigacchati manu~yti,:Ztif!! sabhii-
gatti'!I prtipnoti priiQ.iitipiitenfilpiiyur bhavati ... [WOG.159.6ff:]. The Dasabhiimaka replaces
the formula sa ced ... by atha cet punar manu~ye~iipapadyate.
Divya, 194, 30: manu~yti,:ztif!! sabhtigattiytim upapanna iti (Mahiivyutpatti, 245, 54); 122, 16:
brahmaloka-sabhtigattiytlf!l copapanno mahiibrahmti saf{lvr(ta(l. Sik~tisamuccaya, 176, 9:
sa[rva]niktiyasabhiige devaman~ytii:ztif!! priyo bhavati. ·
541
542
LS: Here I follow Collett Cox's translation based on Pradhan: AKB 2.41a, p. 68.9ff: kti
tarhi sa. ta eva hi tathabhutiih sal]'lskiirii ye.ru manu.ryiidiprajiiaptiJ:i siilyiidi.ru sabhiigatiivat.

LVP translates: Par les expressions "sabhiigatii des hommes", etc., le Siitra entend la simili-
tude dans la maniere d'etre: de meme, sabhiigatii du riz, du ble, des feves, etc.
Nikiiyasabhiiga can also have a non-technical meaning, namely, a homogeneous collection of
components or aggregates that constitutes a person. See DD.109f.
543
LVP: Hsi.ian-tsang translates: "This is not admissible, for this is in contradiction with
our system"; he omits the formula: "The Vaibha~ikas say" (The Vaibha~ikas say: "This is not
admissible ... ").
544
LS: AH 220; SAH 453.
1. The history of the next three formations dissociated from thought, which are states
without thought (acittaka), shows that they have deep roots within early Buddhist and non-
Buddhist meditative practice (see Bronkhorst. [2000], The Two Traditions of Meditation
Ancient India) and were elaborated within the later northern Indian Abhidharma treatises. In
regard to their treatment in the Abhidharmakosabhii.rya and *Nyiiyiinusiira, Cox explains
(DD.144) that they "are both adapted from the analysis presentedin the *Mahiivibhii.rii and
differ from it only in their dialogic style of explication and a lesser degree of comprehensive-
ness. The primary focus of these analyses is a detailed explication of the various qualities of
each state according to a standard Abhidharma taxonomy of characteristics."
2. To account for the apparent disappearance_ of thought experienced in meditative practice,
the Vaibhii~ikas enlist (i) the state of non-ideation (iisal]'ljiiika), (ii) the attainment of non-idea-
tion (asal]'ljfiisamiipatti) and (iii) the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti) as real entities
that induce states without-thought by means of their activity of obstrµcting the arising of both
the single thought factor (citta) and the simultaneous and associated thought-concomitants
(caitta).
3. These three discrete factors are classified within the category of factors dissociated from
both thought and material form since (DD.115) they induce states without thought, but are
themselves not thoughts, and since they pertain to the psychic stream, and are thus not material
form.
4. Whereas the state of non-ide,ation is an effect since it is attained through rebirth, the two
states of attainmen_t as meditative states are causes that produce an effect.
545
Gokhale: [41 be] iisal]'ljiiikam asal]'ljfii.ru Inirodha§ cittacaittiiniil]'l
Tib.: [41bdl] 'du s,hes med pa pa 'du shes Imed par sems dang sems byung rnams I 'gog pa'o
LVP: iisal]'ljiiikam asal]'ljfiisu I nirodha§ cittacaittiiniil]'l vipiikas tu brhatphale II - Prakara,:ia,
694al9. - Dfgha, iii. 263: sant 'iivuso sattii asafifiino appatisarµvedino seyyathiipi devii asafifia-
satta. - i. 28, iii. 33, ... saiifiuppiidii ca pana te devii tamhii kiiyii cavanti. - One of the nine
stages of sentient beings (sattviiviisa), Anguttara, iv. 401; Kosa, iii. 6c.
LS: 1. Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.2.4 iisafijiiikal]'l katamat I asaiijfiisamiipattiphalam I asaiijiiisattve.ru deve.rupa-
pannasyiisthiivarii,:iiil]'l cittacaitasikiiniil]'l dharmii,:iiil]'l yo nirodhal:z I
4.2.4 What is [the quality of] having no conception? [It is] a result of the state of
composure without conception; and the cessation of inconstant minds and mental fac-
tors of a being who has been born among the deities who lack conception. ISBP.238
Avatiira (ESD.113f.): "For those born among the deities who are ideationless beings (asaf/1-jiii-
sattve~u deve~iipapanniiniim) there is a dharma.named ideationlessness (iisaf!!jiiika) which
causes the cessation of the thought and thought-concomitants. It is a real entity (dravya). It is
said to be 'born of retribution' (vipiikaja), being the retribution-fruit (vipiikaphala) of the
ideationless-attainment, and [therefore] non-defined."
2. The state of non-ideation is also further discussed at iii. 6, where it is, for obvious
reasons, excluded from the stations of consciousness (vijiiiinasthiti) but included within the
nine types of abiding of sentient beings (sattviiviisa), planes of existence wherein sentient
beings abide as they wish, i.e., in contrast to the unfortunate or lower planes of existence,
I
546
LS: Cox comments (DD.241): "Yiian-yii (Yiian-yii 9 p. 242a4ff.) observes that beings are
referred to as 'sentient' because they have perceptual consciousness. Even though beings in.
this state of non-ideation do not have perceptual consciousness, they still have sense organs
that serve as the basis for perceptual consciousness. Therefore, because they are of the same
category as sentient beings insofar as they too possess this basis for perceptual consciousness,
they can be referred to as 'sentient'."
547
LS: MVS, 784a24ff., identifies this period of time as 500 great aeons (mahiikalpa).
548
LS: My translation here is adjusted in accord with Collett Cox's translation (DD.239).
549
LS SAH 453.
550
Gokhale: [41d2] vipiikas
Tib.: [41d2] rnam smin
LS: Beinig a ripened effect, the moral quality of the state of non-ideation is non-defined
(avyakrta) (ii, F 201).
551
LVP: MVS, 615a5, five opinions.
LS: However, Smµghabhadra explains (Ny, 400c) that the attainment of non-ideation has only
the state of non-ideation and the material form of those gods as its retribution but not their
group-homogeneity (nikiiyasabhiiga) and vitality (jfvita), which are retributed by the fourth
meditation (dhyiina), wherein thought exists, and also not their remaining aggregates (skandha)
which are retributed by both this attainment and the fourth meditation. During the phase where
those gods are without thought (see ii. 41d), "remaining aggregates" refers to (DD.242) certain
formations dissociated from thoughts· other than· nikiiyasabhiiga and jfvita-for example, since
asai{ljiiisattva is a conditioned factor, to the origination (jiiti), deterioration (jarii), etc.
552
Gokhale: [41d3] te brhatphalii/:i II
Tib.: [41d3] de 'bras che II
553
LVP: The Foreign Masters claim, on the contrary, that there are nine divisions in the
heaven of the fourth meditation (dhyiina). - On the Vrhatphalas (Vehapphala), see Burnouf,
Introduction, p. 614.
LS: On the specifics of the different views, see DD.242.
554
LVP: Opinion of the Andhakas, condemned in Kathiivatthu, iii. 11.
555
LS: AH 220; SAH 453, 455.
556
LVP: On the meaning of the term samiipatti, see F 213.
LS: 1. As for the history of the two attainments without thought, Cox states (DD.113):
Evidence for the practice of states of equipoise [without thought (acittakasamiipatti)]
within the non-Buddhist Indian religious milieu is found in the canonical reports
[where it is stated] that the Buddha, prior to his enlightenment, learned the medita-
tive practice of entering the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception (naiva-
sarrijfiiinasarrijfiiiyatana) from the wandering ascetic, Udraka Ramaputra. This sphere
of neither conception nor non-conception is also assimilated into several early
~uddhist cosmological and meditational taxonomies: for example, the nine stages of
beings (sattviiviisa) that include the state of non-conception as the fifth and the sphere
of neither conception nor non-conception as the ninth and final stage; or, the eight
liberations (vimok~a) that include the sphere of neither concepti_on nor non-concep-
tion as the seventh liberation followed by the cessation of conception and feelings
(sarrijfiiiveditanirodha) as the eighth. Perhaps the most frequently encountered schema
is that of the four spheres within the formless realm, which are incorporated into nine
successive meditative abodes (anuparvavihiira) also referred to as the nine succes-
sive states of equipoise (anuparvasamiipatti): these nine states combine the four
levels of trance of the realm of form, the four spheres of the formless realm,
including the sphere of neither conception nor non-conception, and the cessation of
conception and feelings as the ninth.
2. As for the AKB, Vasubandhu explains at iii. 6b that the two attainments and the state of
non-ideation are not part of the seven stations of consciousness (vijfiiinasthiti), and this for the
obvious reason that they are cut off therein. The above-mentioned nine abidings of sentient
beings (sattviiviisa), i.e., planes of existence wherein sentient beings abide as they wish, are
discussed at iii. 6cd. In regard to the above-mentioned eighth liberation, i.e., nirodhasamiipatti,
it is discussed at viii. 33, where its intrinsic nature as well as the thought of entry into it and
the thought of leaving it are explained.'
At vi. 43cd, Vasubandhu explains attainment of cessation in the context of the non-returner
(aniigiimin) called bodily witness or those who realize within their own body (kiiyasiik#n),
"since through. their body, in view of the absence of thought, they have directly realized
(siik~iitkaroti) a factor similar to nirviir:ia, i.e., the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti)".
There we also find the Sautrlintika view of attainment of cessation expressed as follows:
When the noble ones leave the.attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti), as soon as
they think: "Oh! this attainment of cessation is peaceful [siinta] like nirvar:ia!"-they
acquire a calmness [siintatva] of the conscious body (i.e., of the body in which the
consciousness has arisen again: savijfiiinakakiiya) never previously acquired. In this
way, they realize directly through the body the calmness [of cessation] by virtue of
two actions of realization (siik~iitkarar:ia): the first, the acquisition (priipti)-during
the attainment-of a body in accordance with cessation, the second, upon leaving the
attainment, the cognition (jfiiina) that becomes conscious of the state of the body. For
the fact of "manifesting" (pratyak~fkiira) is called realization (siik~iitkriyii). There is
realization when one notices the calmness of the body that has again become con-
scious; and, from this noticing, the result is that this calmness has been acquired
while the body was non-conscious.
At vi. 64ab, Vasubandhu explains attainment of cessation in the context of the perfected beings
(arhat) called those who are liberated through both parts (ubhayatobhiigavimukta).
3. As for the term samapatti, Dhammajoti explains (SA.IV.3025: "The word samapatti
(< sam-a--fpad) means attainment. In Buddhism, it means, in particular, the attainment of a
meditational state. For th'! abhidharma scholiasts, it connotes an attainment in which there is
complete evenness in mind and body-a connotation supposedly conveyed by the prefix sam
taken in the sense of samata ('evenness', 'equality') .... The ideationless attainment and cessa-
tion atta~nment are two meditative attainments in which there is completely no mental activity
at all."
Saxµghabhadra comments (Ny, 401a; DD.246):
[The term "equipoise" (samapatti) can be understood in the following way.] [The
second member -apatti of the compound should be understood as meaning] "to
accomplish" (ni~patii); [the first member sama or sam,] as "correctly" or "thoroughly".
Therefore, [the state of "accomplishing correctly" or "accomplishing thoroughly"] is
referred to as an equipoise. There are other masters who claim that the "appropriate"
or "equilibrated" (samata) "operation" [of the life-stream as a whole] is to be referred-
to as equipoise because that equipoise equilibrates (samatapadana) thought and the
four fundamental material elements (mahabhata).
MVS, 775b23ff., states (ESD.186):
There are two kinds of samapatti: (1) that which causes the thought to be even,
(2) that which causes the mahiibhuta-s to be even. Although the asarrijfii- and
nirodha-samapatti interrupt the even-ness of mind, causing it not to contim•,•, they
induce the even•ness of mahabhata-s, causing them to manifest Hence they are
called samapatti-s. ·
4. As for the possibility of meditative states without thought, Cox comments (DD. l 14f.) that
while the northern Indian Abhidharma schools generally accepted this possibility and shared
the enumeration of their specific qualities, "they disagreed concerning the character and func-
tioning of such states. These disagreements can be correlated with fundamental differences of
opinion on issues of ontology, causation, and psychological modeling. The primary partici-
pants in these arguments can be divided into two groups: on the one hand, the Sarviistiviida-
Vaibhii~ikas, represented by Sarighabhadra and, in the AbhidharmakosabhafYa, by Gho~aka;
on the other hand, the Diir~tantikas, who share the views of Vasumitra cited in the Abhi-
dharmakosabhafYa, the ancient masters, whom Yasomitra identifies as the Sautriintikas, and
finally Vasubandhu."
551
LVP: The complete name is sarrijfiaveditanirodhasamapatti (attainment of cessation of
ideation and sensation), see ii, F 211.
Prakaral)a (694a19): The attainment of non-ideation (asarrijnisamapatti) is an arresting of the
thought and thought-concomitants that has for its antecedent the notion of escape (ni[isaral)a-
manasikarapurvaka) and which is obtained by a person freed from the defilements of the
Subhalqtsnas and not from higher defilements.
The attainment of cessation (nirodhasamapatti) is an arresting of the thought and thought-
concomitants which has for its antecedent the notion of calmness and which is obtained by a
person freed from the defilements of the perception-sphere of nothingness (akificanyayatana).
Endnotes to Chaptrr Two 815
- Vasubandhu, in the Paflcaskandhaka, is inspired by these definitions.

558
LS: AH 220; SAH 453, 455.
559
Gokhale: [42a] tatha 'sal!ljflisamapattir
Tib.: [42a] de bzhin 'du shes med snyoms 'jug I
Ls: Vasubandhu's Paflcaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.2.2 asafljflisamapat~ katama I subhakrtsnavftaragasya nordhva;,i ni?isarar:ia-
saiijflupiirvaker:ia manasikarer:iasthiivarar:ial!I cittacaitasikanal!I dharmar:ial!I yo ni-
rodha?i I
4.2.2 What is the state of composure without conception? [It is] the cessation of
inc()nstant minds and mental factors that is preceded by a form of attention that
conceives of deliverance; and it is achieved by someone who has overcome desire for
Complete Virtue but not for the level above it. ISBP.238
Avatara (ESD.112):
When one has been detached with regard to the third, but not to the fourth dhyana,
there is a disjoined dharma, named the ideationless attainment, [which can cause] the
cessation of the thought and thought-concomitants of one in the stage of the fourth
dhyana. Although all thought and thought-concomitants have ceased when one pro-
duces this attainment; it [specifically] receives the name "Ideationless" as it is [prac-
tised] for the special purpose of eradicating ideations (sal!ljfla). It is like the name
"Knowledge of Others' Thought" [given to that knowledge specially concerned with
_the knowing of others' mind, even though it knows both the thought and the thought-
concomitants of others].
This Ideatioriless attainment is wholesome, and is subsumed under the fourth dhyana.
It is produced in the series of a non-iirya only, for it is produced with the thought of
seeking liberation [falsely conceived as the state of ideationlessness]. The iirya, [on
the other hand,] thinks of this sfate as an evil plane of existence (apiiya) and is deeply
disgusted with it. [From the point of view of retribution] it is necessarily retributed-
it is retributable in the following existence only (upapadya-vedanfya). It is acquired
by exerting effort (prayoga-labhya) and not by detachment (vairiigya-labhya).
560
LS: The compound asal!ljflisamapatti can be interpreteh yither as a dependent determina-
tive (tatpuru~a) or descriptive determinative (karmadharaya) (Dl).246). Saiµghabhadra adds
(Ny, 401a; DD. 246):
[One might claim that since, in this equipoise, thought and all thought concomitants
are extinguished, it should be referred to not simply as the equipoise of non-con-
ception, but rather as the equipoise of no thought or thought concomitants.] [This,
however, is unjustified.] [It is referred to as the equipoise of non-conception] because
one produces it through aversion [specifically] to conception. Ordinary persons are
not able [to produce this equipoise_ through] an aversion to feelings (vedana) because
they enter this equipoise attached to feelings.
561
Gokhale: [42bl] dhyane 'ntye
Tib.: [42bl] bsam gtan tha mar
562
Gokhale: [42b2] nif:isrtfcchaya I
Tib.: [42b2] 'byung 'dodpas I
563
LS: SAH 455.
564
Gokhale: [42cl] subh
Tib.: [42cl] dge ba'o
565
Gokhale: [42c2] opapadyavedy aiva
Tib.: [421,2] skyes nas myong 'gyur nyid I
566
LS: MVS, 774a6ff., states (DD.251) that the attainment of non-ideation (1) does not pr9duce
its effect in the present life, because this effect only takes the form of rebirth among the gods
who are without ideation; (2) nor is its effect received in the third lifetime or after, since this
attainment is strong and produces its effect quickly; (3) nor is its effect undetermined, because
retrogression from that effect is not possible.
567
LVP: One does not retrogress from the attainment of non-ideation, Vibha~ti, 152, p. 773c.
568
• LVP: Through entry into assurance (niylima), one obtains cessation not due to deliberation
(apratisa1!fkhyanirodha) or definitive disappearance (1) of unfortunate planes of existence,
(2) of the state of non-ideation (asal!fjfiika), (3) of arising among the Mahiibrahmas and among
the Kurus, (4) of an eighth rebirth.
LS: Sa~ghabhadra holds an alternative interpretation (DD.249), i.e., the effects of the attain-
ment of non-ideation are either received in the next lifetime or are undetermined. For details
see DD.249.
569
LS: SAH 453.
570
Gokhale: [4 2d 1] n liryasy_
Tib.: [42dl] 'phags pa'i ma yin
571
LS: Cox comments (DD.252) that the noble ones compare this attainment to a deep pit to
be avoided since it has as its effect the state of non-ideation and is thus said to lead to further
existence in the cycle of birth and death for a period of five hundred mahakalpas (see ii. 41 be).
572 LVP: Whoever enters into the fourth meditation (dhylina) obtains at the same time the
possession (prlipti) of all the fourth meditations that are practiced or will be practiced in the
course of cyclic existence.
573
LS: I.e., it is not attained through mere detachment (vairligya) (DD.250).
574
Gokhale: [42d2] aikadhvika 'pyate II
Tib.: [42d2] dus gcig 'thob I
575
LVP: The future wholesome thought is the object of a pre:vious possession (prapti).
576
LS: AH 220; SAH 453, 455.
577
LS: SAH 453.
578 LVP: On the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamlipatti), the attainment of cessation of
sensation and ideation (sal!fjfiliveditanirodhasamtipatti) (see below ii, F 211), see vi. 43cd,
viii. 33a (liberations [vimok,rn]); Kathavatthu, vi. 5, xv. 7. - In the MYS, 777al4, numerous
opinions on this attainm~nt: (1) for some, it is only one real entity (dravya), the realization of
cessation (nirodhasiik~iitkiira); (2) for others, eleven real entities: the ten generally permeating
factors (mahiibhumika) and cessation of thought (cittanirodha); (3) for others, twenty-one real
entities: the generally permeating factors, the wholesome permeating factors (kusalamahii-
bhiimika) and the cessation of thought (cittanirodha) ... .
LS: LVP writes in his Musfla and Niirada. The Path of Nirvii,:ia (see Electronic Appendix),
p. 212f:
"Attainment of cessation" according to the Abhidharma or Sarviistiviidin doctrine:
The "attainment of cessation" (nirodhasamiipatti) is a cataleptic crisis that usually
lasts for seven days. It is a state similar to death. But the life-force [iiyus] is not
exhausted, warmth [u~man] has not been dissipated, the sense-faculties are not
fully broken but only calmed down ... (Majjhima, I, 296 and elsewhere). - Thought
and all thought-concomitants have disappeared, although the attainment is called
"cessation of [two thought-concomitants, i.e., of] ideation (saTJ'ljiiii) and sensation
(veditii)": the Sarviistiviidins are in conflict with several other schools on this point.
It is on the level of the fourth formless meditative attainment, that is to say that the
meditators can only penetrate it by emerging from this fourth meditative attainment.
It therefore presupposes the prior acquisition of the eight meditative attainments.
It has great benefits, notably a very great happiness of mystical order and absolute
mastery over all the meditative attainments: it is the ornament and the happiness of
the status of a noble one. Only the never-returners (aniigiimin) and perfected beings
(arhat) have access to it. - But the formless meditative attainments and the '"attain-
.ment of cessation" (nirodhasamiipatti) have no place in the economy of salvation.
The meditators enter into the "attainment of cessation" not to enter into nirvii,:ia and
arrive at the "exit", but in order to obtain and taste the "peaceful abode" (siinta-
vihiira), or "peaceful concentration".
579
Gokhale: [43a] nirodhiikhyii tath aiv_ eyaTJ'I
Tib.: [43a] 'gog pa zhes pa'ang de bzhin nyid I
LVP: nirodhasamiipatti, Siddhi, 61,204, 211-14, 247,268,283, 405-9, 751.
4.2. 3 nirodhasamiipatti!J katamii I iikiiicanyiiyatanavftariigasya bhaviigriid uccalitasya
siintavihiirasaiijiiiipurvake,:ia manasikiire,:iiisthiivarii,:iiim ekatyiiniiTJ'I ca sthiivarii,:taTJ'I
cittacaitasikiiniiTJ'I dharmii,:tiiTJ'I yo·nirodha!J I
4.2.3 What is the state of composure that is a cessation? [It is] the cessation of
inconstant minds and mental factors, as well as a portion of the constant .minds, that
is preceded by a form of attention that conceives of abiding [in a state of ease]; and it
is achieved by someone who has overcome desire for the Sphere of Nothingness and
who has set out to rise above the Peak of Existence. ISBP .238
Avatiira (ESD.112f.):
When one has been detached with regard to the abode of no-thing-ness (iikiTJ'ICany-
iiyatana), there is a disjoined dharma [which can cause] the ce~sation of the thought
and thought-concomitants of one in [the stage of] the existence-peak. As it causes the
818 Exposition of the F acuities (lndriyanirdesa)
even (sama) continuation of the Great Elements, it is named !the cessation-attainment

(nirodha-samlipatti).
It belongs to the existence-peak stage, produced through exertion (prayogika), and is
wholesome. It is retributable in the following existence (upapadya-vedanfya), or in
the existence after the next (aparaparyliya-vedanfya), or not necessarily retributable
(aniyata-vedanfya). It is not necessarily retributable because [it is possiqle that]
having produced this attainment, one then attains Parinirviii:ia without having acquired
its retribution (viplika). This attainment can effect the retribution of the four [mental]
aggregates [only] in the existence-peak stage, as the latter is immaterial in nature.
Only the lirya-s are capable of producing this attainment, not the ordinary people, for
it is produced by virtue of the lirya-path. The lirya-s, in order to dwell in bliss in the
present life (dr:Jta-dharma-sukha-vihlirlitham), seek to produce this attainment. The
worldlings, [on the other _hand], dread it as [the state of] annihilation (ucchedabhfru-
tva); and, being without the strength of the lirya-path, are incapable of producing
it. The lirya-s. obtain it through exertion (prayoga), and not by detachment. It is
only in the case of a Buddha Bhagavat that its obtainment is said to be by [the mere
fact of] detachment: At the very moment of obtaining the Knowledge of Exhaustion,
He is already capable of producing this attainment at will-the qualities (gu~a) of a
Buddha are not through any exertion; they appear before Him as soon as He desires
them-it is [in this sense] that He is said to have obtained it.
580
Gokhale: [43bd] vihlirlirthalJI, bhavli'grajli I §ubhli dvivedyli 'niyati'i c liryasy lipyli pra-
yogatalz II
Tib.: [43bd] 'di gnas don du srid rtse s.kyes I dge ba'o gnyis su myong 'gyur dang I manges
'phags pa'i sbyor bas 'thob II
581
LVP: §lintavihlirasa1J1,jfilipiirvakena manasiklire~a. - vihlira = samlidhivise:Ja [compare
WOG.160.28f.].
LS: L VP translates and comments in his Musfla et Narada (p. 25; see Electronic Appendix):
"The noble ones (lirya) enter into this attainment by a mental application (manasi-
kara) that has the ideation of a peaceful abode (§i'intavihlira) as its antecedent": that is
to ~ay, with a view to enjoying the peaceful (santa) abode (vihlira) (i.e., "excellent
concentration" [sami'idhivise:Ja]).
582
LS: Sarpghabhadra (Ny, 401b) explains the term "bhavi'igra" (ESD.185):
Because the body retributed in the naiva-sa1J1,jfii'ini'isa1J1,jfii'iyatana is by virtue of the
karma of the highest grade, it is said to be the peak of existence or the edge of
existence; just as the edge of a tree is said to be the peak/top of the tree.
583
LS: SAH 455.
584 LVP: It is "to be experienced later", when an existence in the realm of fine-materiality is
interposed between the existence of the realm of desire in the course ?f which it is produced,
and the existence of the "summit of cyclic existence" (bhavi'igra) that is Its fruit.
585 LS: Sarpghabhadra (Ny, 401c; ESD.186; DD.257f.) ascribes this explanation to "certain
other masters", rejects it.and explains (Ny, 401c; DD.257) instead that ordinary worldlings are
not capable of giving rise to the attainment of cessation because they have not yet abandoned
the obstacle-pertaining to their own stage (bhiimi}--to the arising of the attainment of cessa-
tion, namely, the defilements of the summit of cyclic existence that are to be abandoned by the
path of insight.
586
LVP: This attainment takes place in the plane of the "summit of cyclic existence", from
which matter (riipa) is absent. Ordinary worldlings (prthagjana) fear that the arresting of the
thought and thought-concomitants is, under these conditions, annihilation. They do not have
the same fear with respect to the attainment of non-ideation (asa1]'1jflisamiipatti), which takes
place in the plane of the fourth meditation (dhyiina), where matter persists. In fact, the group
homogeneity (nik.iiyasabhiiga), the vitality faculty (jfvitendriya) and other formations (sal'Jlskiira)
dissociated from thought remain within the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti); but
ordinary worldlings do not see them.
587
LVP: dr~tanirviiJ;}asya tadadhimuktitas [WOG.161.19]. - According to a different reading,
followed by the Chinese translators: dr!ftadharmanirvii,:zasya . ... That is to say: "The noble
ones (iirya) intend to obtain, aim to obtain Nirva1_1a in the present life by means of this
attainment, within this attainment": dmadharmanirvii1J,asya tadadhimuktital:z I dr~te janmani
nirva1_1arµ dr:i(adharmanirviil},am I tasya tadadhimuktital:z I tad ity adhimuktil;l tadadhimuktil:z I
tena vii 'dhimuktis tadadhimuktil;l tadadhimuktes tadadhimuktital:z I df\!te janmany etan nir-
J
vii1_1am ity iiryas tam adhimucyate I [WOG.161.15ff.]

588
Gokhale: [44ab] bodhilabhya muner na priik catustril'JISatk!jalJ,iiptital:z I
Tib.: [44ac] thub pa'i byang chub kyis thob bya I dang por ma yin skad cig ma I sum cu rtsa
bzhis thob phyir ro I
LVP: bodhilabhyii muner [na priik catustrilµsatk!fapaptital:z IJ. See vi. 24ab. - Compare Kathii-
vatthu, i. 5, xviii. 5.
LS: See Sarµghabhadra's detailed discussion (DD.259-62) on the attainment of cessation by
the Lord Buddha.
589
LS: AKB vi. 67ab states that the cqgnition of exhaustion (~ayajfliina) with the cognition
of non-arising (anutpiidajfiiina) is enlightenment and that by these two cognitions "one com-
pletely abandons ignorance (ase!javidyii-prahii1J,iit); by the first, one knows in all truth (ava-
bodha) that the task is accomplished; by the second, one knows that the task will no longer
need to be accomplished again".
590
LVP: The Vyiikhyii [WOG.162.6f.] cites a stanza from the Stotrakiira, that is to say, of
Miitrceta (VaT1J,aniirhavar1J,ana, 118: F.W. Thomas, Indian Antiquary, 1905, t. 32, p. 345): na
te priiyogika1J1 ki1]'1cit kusalal'JI kusaliinuga j
591
LS: Liberation through both parts is defined as liberation of thought from both (1) the
obstacle of defik;ments (klesiivara1J,a) by means of insight (prajfiii) and (2) the obstacle to
the eight liberations (vimok!filvara1J,a) by means of concentration (samiidhi). Some say that
vimok!flivaral},a is the obstacle to meditative attainment (samiipatty-avarii1J,a).
592
LVP: The Japanese editor cites the various interpretations of the old commentaries on the
Kosa: The Westerners are the Sarviistivadins of Gandhiira, or Sautriintikas, or the masters of
the land of Indhu. They are called Westerners because they are to the west of Kasmir, and
Foreign Masters (bahirdesaka) because they are outside of Kasmir. - See below ii, F 206, note.
593
LVP: nirodhasamiipattim utpiidya k!fayajfliinam utpiidayatfti vaktavyam tathiigata iti
[WOG.162.19].
594
LVP; The Masters of the land of Indhu, of the same opinion as the Westerners.
595
LVP; vyutthiiniisaya = vyutthiiniibhipriiya; "having an intention that can be discarded, that
can be given up". According to another interpretation, iiiaya = kusala = kusalamula; thus:
"having wholesome roots that can be discarded, that can be broken off'. But the wholesome
roots of the Bodhisattvas are such that once they begin to actualize, they do not stop before
Bodhi has been obtained.
Vyutthiina also signifies "emerging from concentration (samiidhi)" (~arµ')lutta, iii. 265, etc.).
596
LVP: MYS, 204b3-::-e4: All the postures are good. Why does the Bodhisattva take up the
squatting position? ...
597
LVP: Hsiian-tsang adds.: "The first doctrine is the best, because this is our system."
598
Gokhale: [44c] kiimarupiisraye t ubhe
Tib.: [44d] gnyis ka 'dod dang gzugs rten can I
LVP: MVS, 773bll. -Three opinions: (1) only in the realm of desire, (2) also in the three
lower meditations (dhyiina), (3) also in the fourth meditation.
According to the Vibhii~ii, the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipatti) cannot be extended
beyond seven days-and-nights.
LS: Cox comments (DD.282) that the location of these two states of attainment and the region
in which one gives rise to them must be clearly distinguished. For example, the equipoise of
non-ideation is located in the fourth meditation (dhyiina) within the realm of fine-materiality.
However, it is produced by one whose corporeal basis (iisraya) is located either in the realm of
desire or in the realm of fine-materiality. Similarly, the attainment of cessation is located in the
perception-sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation within the realm of immateriality; one
enters it, however, supported by a corporeal basis in the realm of desire or in the realm of fine-
materiality.
Sarpghabhadra states (Ny, 402c):
One who has been reborn in the formless realm cannot enter the equipoise of
cessation, because there is no corporeal basis [in that realm to act as the support for
this equipoise]. Vitality (jfvita) necessarily occurs in conformity with [either] form
or thought. If one who had been reborn in the formless realm were to enter the
equipoise of cessation, since there would be neither form nor thought, vitality would
be abandoned.
599
LVP: The Jfiiinaprasthiina, 1024a8, asks a fourfold question: (1) Is there an existence in
the realm of fine-materiality that does not involve the five aggregates (skandha)? (2) Is there
an existence that involves the five aggregates and is not in the realm of fine-materiality? (3) Is
there an existence in the realm of fine-materiality that involves the five aggregates? (4) Is
there an existence that is not in the realm of fine-materiality and that d<?es not involve the five
aggregates?
600
LVP: The Jfiiinaprasthiina and the Kosa do not use the word skandha, but they use a
synonym, a word that the MSS of the Vyiikhyii [WOG.163.27] transcribes indiscriminately as
vyavahiira and vyavaciira. - Hsiian-tsang translates (Ch.) hsing, the equivalent of sarriskiira, as
viharar_za, etc.; Paramiirtha translates (Ch.) p'an, the equivalent of nfti, naya, a:s "to judge", "to
decide". -The reading of vyavakiira appears certain according to the Pali sources.
1. Pali Sources. - vakiira = khanda (Childers); Vibhiiliga, 137: safifiiibhava asafifiiibhava
nevasafifiiiniisafifiiibhava ekiivakiirabhava catuvakiirabhava paficavakiirabhava; Yamaka, ac-
cording to Kathiivatthu, trans. p. 38; Kathiivatthu, iii. 11: if "those without ideation" possess an
existence involving one vakiira or five vakiiras. (Buddhoghosa explains: vividhena visu'!l
visuf!l karfyati).
2. Vyiikhyii [WOG.163.27f.]. - vyavakiira is the name that the Buddha Kiisyapa gives to the
skandhas. - vyavakiira (viseser_ziivakiira) signifies savyavakiira according to Piil).ini, v. 2, 127;
thus: "that which disappoints, that which is contrary (visaf!1viidanf) through its imperma-
nence", a definition that suits the skandhas according to the stanza: "Material form (riipa) is
like a flake offoam ... " (Saf!lyutta, iii. 142).
3. MVS, 959bl 1. - The former Tathiigatas Samyaksaqibuddhas call the skandhas by the
name vyavakiiras; but the Tathiigata Samyaksaqibuddha Siikyamuni calls the vyavakiiras by
the name skandhas. The former speak of five vyavakiiras, Siikyamuni speaks of five upiidiina-
skandhas (appropriative aggregates). Here, in the Abhidharma, one speaks of an existence
"with five vyavakiiras" (pafica-) in order to show that the five skandhas of which Siikyamuni
speaks are the five vyavakiiras of which the former Buddhas speak. - Why do the former
Buddhas use the term vyavakiira, whereas the present Buddha uses the term skandha? Because
the Buddhas see that which is suitable to say to the faithful.. .. Why this expression
vyavakiira? Because of pravrtti (sa7!1ciira?): the previously arisen skandhas unfold because of
later skandhas, or else, the later .arisen skandhas unfold because of previous skandhas ... .
601
LS: Cox comments (DD.282): "The sentient beings referred to here have developed
moments of thought of a category dissimilar from those moments of thought characteristic of
the realm of form, which tend toward the fluxes and belong to the realm of form. These
dissimilar moments of thought would include, for example, thoughts that do not tend toward
the fluxes (aniisravacitta), or moments of thought that belong to another realm. Since these
dissimilar moments of thought do not belong to the realm of form, such sentient beings lack
the four mental aggregates characteristic of the realm of form."
602
L VP: These sentient beings-being by nature with ideation-are "placed in a thought
contrary to their nature" (visabhiigacitte sthita) when they become without ideation or non-
ideational in one of the two attainments.
603
LS: Cox comments (DD.282): "Sentient beings born among the gods without conception
have a corporeal basis within the realm of form, but lack thought and thought concomitants.
Like those practicing the equipoise of non-ideation or the equipoise of cessation, these gods
without conception possess only the form and the forces aggregate (or certain factors dissoci-
ated from thought)."
604
Gakhale: [44d] niradhiikhyiidita nr~u II
Tib.: [44e] 'gag pa dang par mi'i nang du 11
LS: The master Piirl).avardhana explains (Jampaiyang, p. 382):

[Niradhasamiipatti] is first generated only among humans because they have instruc-
tors and expositors and the strength of preparation. (Though) it later degenerates, it is
developed in the Form but not the Formless (Realm) because there is no support for
it (there).
[Asal'!ljnisamapatti] is first generated in the Form Realm where one is familiar with it
from beginningless sal'!lsiira.
605
LVP: This Siitra was taught by Sariputra: it bears the name Udiiyin because the adversary
of Sariputra is Udiiyin. -The Sanskrit edition is very close to the Piili text. - Madhyamiigama,
5, 4, andAnguttara, iii. 192.
srii~astyiizµ nidanam I tatriiyu~miin sariputro bhik~iin iimantrayate sma I ih' ayu~manto bhik~u~
sflasal'!lpanna§ ca bhavati samiidhisal'!lpannas ca prajfiiisal'!lpannas ca I so 'bhfk~,:tal'!I sal'!ljfiii-
veditanirodhal'!I samapadyate ca vyutti~thate ca I asti caitat sthiinam iti yathiibhiital'!I prajiinami
I sa nehaiva dr~ta eva dharme pratipattyaiviijfiiim iiriigayati napi mara,;asamaye bhediic ca
kayasyiitikramya deviin kavll{ifkarabhak~iin anyatamasmin divye manomaye kiiya upapadyate I
sa tatropapanno ... [cf. WOG.164.12ff.].
Vyiikhyii [cf. WOG.165.18f.]: pratipattyaiva = piirvam eva.
This Siitra is discussed at viii. 3c (thesis of the existence of material form [riipa] in the realm
of immateriality). - Compare Dfgha, i. 195; AKB viii, F 140; Siddhi, 407.
606
LVP: iijfiiim iiriigayati as in Mahiivastu, iii. 53, 9. - Paramiirtha: "They do not obtain the
faculty of final and perfect knowledge (iijfiiitiivfndriya)." Hsiian-tsang: "They do not apply
themselves so as to obtain the status of a perfected being (arhat) ... ".
607
L VP: It is called manomaya, mental or produced by the mind, because it arises inde-
pendently from the elements of generation; but this does not.mean that it is a body produced
by ideations (sal'!ljfiiimaya) (Dfgha, i. 195), and belonging to the realm of immateriality, as
Udayin thinks.
On the "mental body" of the Bodhisattva in the Mahiivastu, see Opinions sur l'histoire de la
dogmatique, p. 258.
LS: In his Hasting article MAHAVASTU (p. 329), LVP comments: "According to the Abhi-
dharmakosa, [the expression manomaya, 'mind-made'] means, not 'mental body', 'body
formed of mind', but 'body created by the mind', without intervention of seed and blood. Such
is the body of the creatures called aupapiiduka, 'apparitional', one of whose characteristics is
that, on dying, they leave no trace."
608
LVP: Note of the Japanese editor:
1. The gods with a "mental body" of whom the Siitra speaks, are (i) of the realm of fine-
materiality, for the Sarviistivadin (same opinion, Dfgha, i. 195); (ii) of the realm of fine-
materiality and of the realm of immateriality, for the Sautriintika, (iii) the gods without idea-
tion (Asazµjfiisattva), for Udiiyin.
2. Retrogressing from the attainment of cessation, according to the Sarviistivadin; no retro-
gressing, according to the Sautriintika and Udayin.
But according to the Vyiikhyii, the Sautriintika accepts the retrogressing from meditative attain-
mi;:nt; the Sautriintika denies, however, that the noble ones retrogress from the noble path
(iiryamiirga) (contra the Sarviistiviidin), from which difficulties arise that the Vyiikhya resolves.
609
LVP: The Mahiisiizµghikas, etc., according to P'u-kuang, TD 41, p. 99c15.
Endnotes to Chapter Two $23
610
LVP: Dfrgha, 17, 11; Dfgha, iii. 266; Mahiivyutpatti, 68, 1: naviinupurvasamiipattayas:
(1-4) the four meditations (dhyiina); (5-8) the four formless meditative attainments (iirupya);
and (9) the attainment of cessation.
611
LVP: priithamakalpikaJ:i = ii.dit~ samiipattividhiiyak~ [WOG.166.10].
612
LVP: One prepares oneself for the attainment of non-ideation (asarrijiiisamiipa-,tti) by,
thinking: "Ideation (sarrijiiii) is a sickness, a thorn, an abscess; this is peaceful, this is excellent,
namely, the cessation of ideation."
613
LS: The MYS, 775b9ff., states (DD.284): "Ideation and feelings are able to give rise
to two types of defilements: desires and [false] views. Desires arise through the power o,f
feelings, [false] views, through the power of conception. All defilements have these two as
their head." Cox comments that "the two categories-desires and false views-represent all
defilements; false views include all those defilements to be abandoned by the path of vision,
and desires, those to be abandoned by the path of cultivation".
According to Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 403a), the Diir~tiintikas disagree and maintain (DD.267):
In the equipoise of cessation, one only extinguishes conception and feelings [and not
all other varieties of thought]. [Four reasons are given for this.] [First,] it is deter-
mined that there are no sentient beings who are without thought. [Second,] there is a
distinction between the e'quipoise of cessation and death. [Third,] the satra states that
when one enters the equipoise of cessation, perceptual consciousness is not separated
from the body. [Finally,] it is said that one's life (iiyus), warmth (a~man), and per-
ceptual consciousness (vijiiiina) are never separated from one another.
See Sarµghabhadra's long refutation in Ny, 403a-c (DD.267-72), which Cox summarizes as
follows (EIP.VIII.692f.):
This interpretation is unreasonable because no awarenesses and mental factors occur
without identifications and feelings .... The successive model would contradict the
definitions of "awareness" and "associated mental factor".
Now in response to the four reasons offered by the Dar~tantika, first, the existence of
,sentient beings without awareness is verified by scriptural references. Second, those
who have entered cessation. trance are not dead because they still have vitality.
~entient beings may lack material form, as in the immaterial realm, or they may lack
awareness, as in these states of trance without awareness. Third; these scriptural
passages state that awareness is not separated from the body simply because aware-
ness will be produced again in the body that serves as the corporeal basis after
emerging from this trance. Fourth, the life-force, warmth, and perceptual conscious-
ness are indeed separated from one another only in certain cases. For example, in the
immaterial realm there is no warmth; similarly in the states of trance without aware-
ness there is no perceptual consciousness.
614
LVP: The preparation involves the resolution; "I will cognize the thought of another."
615
LVP: The tenets (siddhiinta) are in disagreement. (1) For the Vaibhii.~ikas, etc., the two
attainments and the state of non-ideation (asarrijiiika) are exempt of thought (acittakiiny
eva ... ); (2) for the Sthavira Vasumitra, etc., they are endowed with thought (sacittakiini) on
account of a non-manifested mental consciousness (aparisphut,amanovijiiiina); (3) for the
Yogiiciirins they are endowed with thought on account of the iilayavijiiiina. See WOG .167. 5ff.
LS: As for the duration of the attainment of cessation, Saiµghabhadra says (Ny, 403c; DD.272)
that it "is projected by the force [developed through] application (prayoga) [in practice before
entering equipoise], i.e., it depends on the extent of this force.
616
LVP: This question is ~ked by the Sautrlintikas. For them, the thought that has just
perished, and the thought that has perished a long time ago, are equally non-existent: however,
the thought that has just perished is the cause of the thought that immediately follows it:
compare the movement of the beams of a balance (tuliida,_uJonniimiivaniimavat, comp. Siili-
stamba in Bodhicaryiivatiira, 483, 3).
*
617
LS: For the Sarvlistivlidins, the arising of any consciousness depends upon the presence of
three requisite conditions: an appropriate sense-faculty, which serves as the basis (iisraya);
corresponding object-field (vi~aya), which serves as the cognitive object (iilambana); and the
condition as the equivalent and·immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya), that is, the prior
moment of thought.
As for the special case of the rearising in regard to the two attainments, the Sarvastivlida-
Vaibhii~ikas state that, although the activity (kiiritra) of the thought of the moment just prior to
the state without thought is past, the intrinsic nature (svabhiiva) of it continues to exist and is
capable of exerting conditioning capability (siimarthya). It can be spoken of as condition as the
equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantarapratyaya) because it produces a subsequent
factor without any similar intervening factor. Saiµghabhadra explains that samanantara refers
simply to the fact that a subsequent factor is produced directly, i.e., without any similar inter-
vening/actor, through the power of a prior moment of thought; by contrast, "immediate
succession" (anantara) refers to the fact that there are no intervening moments. Cf. DD.118.
618
LVP: Siddhi, 211, on the schools of the Sautriintikas.
,LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautriintikas here.
This is the 14u, of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.64f.).
Saqighabhadra (Ny, 404a2-3) identifies this passage as the opinion of Vasubandhu and criti-
cizes it (Ny, 404a3-20) along with the seed theory that underlies it.
As for parallels to the Yogiiciirabhiimi, the Viniscayasarrzgraha,:if states that, "if the indriyas
and the mahiibhiitas that support them did not contain the seeds of consciousness and of the
caittas, consciousness could not resume after the unconscious trances or birth in heaven".
Yasomitra too (WOG.167.16) identifies the ancient masters (piirviiciirya)-as the Sautrlintikas.
For the identity of the ancient masters (piirviiciirya) as early Yogliclira masters, see Schmit-
hausen (1987b), p. 286 (note 170); Hakamaya (1986).
As for the view presented here, Cox comments that (DD.119) "the body possessed of sense
organs and thought are claimed to contain each other's seeds; therefore, thought would arise
once again after an interval without thought from its own seeds latent within the corporeal
basis. Specifically, prior to the arising of the state without thought, a particular moment of
thought deposits its own seeds within the body; these seeds condition the body in such a way
that the arising of other moments of thought is temporarily prevented. At a later time, the
mental stream arises again from still other seeds of thought lying dormant within the body."
Cf. Ny, 404a; DD.273f.
619
LVP: The author indicates the name of the treatise because Vasumitra (termed indiscrimi-
nately as Sthavira or Bhadanta) wrote other books, the Paficavastuka, etc. (WOG.167.2lf.). _
There is a commentary on the Paficavastuka by Dharmatrata, Nanjio 1283.
The Japanese. editor comments that it does not refer to the Vasumitra of the Vibhii~ii, but to a
Sautrantika. - (See P'u-kuang, 16, 10).
LS: In our above endnote regarding the explanation of the name of the two attainments,
Saqighabhadra presented (Ny, 403a) the four Diir~tantika reasons for their view that attain-
ment of cessation only extinguishes ideation and sensation, but not all other varieties of
thought. Cox writes (DD.121) that this "would leave open the possibility either that some other
thought concomitants or that a subtle variety of thought remains in these states said to be
'without thought'. The latter possibility that subtle thought is not extinguished in the equipoise
of non-ideation or cessation is supported by the view attributed to the Diir~tantikas in the
*Mahiivibh.ii~ii (772c2lff., 774a14ff.). It also conforms to the view of the *Tattvasiddhisiistra
that thought and thought concomitants are subtle and difficult to perceive in these states, which
are, therefore, only provisionally described as 'without thought' .... Sriliita is cited [in
Ny, 420b17ff.] as suggesting that thought and thought concomitants do not arise in states
said to be without thought." Cox pomments (DD.119) that in the AKB these views of ~he
Dar~tantikas are represented by Vasumitra.
620
LVP: MVS, 774a14: The Dar~tantika and the Vibhajyavadin maintain that a subtle
thought is.not interrupted in the attainment of cessation. They say: "There are no sentient
beings who are at.the same time without thought and without material form (riipa); nor are
there persons in meditative attainment who are without thought. If the persons in meditative
attainment would be without thought, the vitality faculty would be cut off; one would call
these persons not established in attainment, but rather: dead."
LS: Hirakawa explains (HIB.164) that this subtle mental consciousness (siik~ma-manovijfiiina)
continually exists, has a minute degree of perception that makes it similar to the unconscious,
is not cut off by death and thus moves on to the next life. It is said to continue to function
behind man's grosser, everyday consciousness.
Schmithausen comments (AV.282f.): "Vasumitra's citta in nirodhasamiipatti is qualified as a
'not quit¢ clear (aparisphuta) manovijfiiina' at AKVy 167,6, but in view of the lack of any
specification in AKBh this may well be a statement expressis verbis of what was at best
implicit in Vasumitra's view .... [W]ithin the limits of the traditional vijniina system of the
Sarvastiviidins and Sautriintikas, the citta in nirodhasamiipatti could hardly be classified but as
a manovijfiiina."
621
LVP: SarµyuktJgama, 11, s; compare Sarµyutta, ii. 72 and the sources cited ad Kosa, iii. 30b.
LS: L VP translates "at the same time", which is missing in Pradhan. 72.27f: sparsapratyayii ca
vedanii sarµjfiii cetane 'ty uktarµ bhagavatii.
Saip.ghabhadra adds: "No siitra passage states that there is a seventh type of perceptual con-
sciousness, thereby allowing one to claim that [some type ofl. perceptual consciousness is
produced apart from conception and feelings." Cox comments (DD.285) that "this anticipates
the later controversies concerning the nature of thought and the Y ogiiciira theory of the store-
consciousness (iilayavijfiiina). See Schmithausen (1987) 1: 18ff., 34ff.
622
LVP: Sarµyuktiigama, 12, 14; Sarµyutta, iii. 96.
LS: According to Sarµghabhadra (DD.270), contact having ignorance (avidytisal'[lsparsaja)

indeed gives rise to sensation and craving, but "since arhats are without contact having igno-
rance, even though they have feelings, [those feeiings] do not produce craving".
623
LS: As for samtipatti, see 9ur ge,1eral endnote to the two attainments at ii, F 200.
624
LVP: mahtibhiitasamattiptidanam. -This formula has passed into the Mahtivyutpatti, 68, 9.
MVS, 782a22: Those who are in the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamtipatti) cannot be
burned by fire, drowned by water, wounded by the sword, or killed by another. (Compare the
legends of Sarµjiva, Kha~u-Ko1:u;laiiiia, in Visuddhi, xii, JPTS 1891, p. 112). Why do they
possess this quality? Vasumitra says: because this attainment (samtipatti) cannot be damaged;
thus they who are in it cannot be damaged. - Moreover: what one understands by samtipatti
is that which causes the thought to be even (sama). Here, there is no thought (acitta), how
can one speak of samiipatti? - Attainment (samiipatti) is of two types: (1) that which causes
thought to be even; (2) that which causes the fundamental material elements to be even. Even
though the two attainments interrupt the even-ness of thought, causing it not to continue, they
induce the even:ness of the fundamental material elements, [causing them to manifest]. [See
SA.413f.].
Also Vibhti~ii, 152, p. 775.
625
LS: As f01: the Vaibhii~ika rationale as to why they maintain the two attainments and the
state of non-ideation to be real entities·and why they classify them among the formations
dissociated from thought, see our introductory endnote to the state of non-ideation (ii, F 198).
As for them being conditioned factors (sal'[lskrta), Cox comments (DD.115) that "like all
conditioned factors, these discrete factors that induce states without thought arise and pass
away in each moment and obstruct only the arising of thought in that particular moment.
However, as long as the series of such factors projected by prior application continues within a
· given life-stream, thought will not arise." Sarµghabhadra adds (Ny, 404b; DD 275) that the
duration of the attainment of the cessation is projected by the intensity of the intention (cetanii)
of thought just prior to the attainment and that this intention determines the force of the
attainment of cessation, allowing it "to diminish gradually until it reaches a state of complete
extinction. When there is no [further] activity of obstruction, mental consciousness is produced
once again .... " Cf. DD.275.
626
This is the 15 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY .66f.).
Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 403c25-404al) identifies this view, i.e., that the thought just prior to the
state of attainment (samtipatticitta) obstructs the arising of thought, as the opinion of Vasu-
bandhu and criticizes (Ny, 404a21-27) Vasubandhu's statement that something can be sarrzskrta
while at the same time being merely provisional.
As for parallels to the Yogtictirabhiimi, the Viniscayasarrigrahar_if states that "asarrijiiisamiipatti
and nirodhasamiipatti are the mere suppression and pacification, the mere r.0n-operation, of
citta and the caittas, and that they are prajii<iptis, not real things".
627
LVP: Basis (ti.fraya) has been defined ii. 5-6; see also ii, F 183.
628
LVP: Hsiian-tsang translates: "This theory is not good, for it is in contradiction with our
system." - We add: "So say the Vaibhii~ikas." See above ii, F 198, note.
Endnotes to. Chapter Two 827
629
LS: AH 220; SAH 453.
630
LS: Ibid.
631
Gokhale: [45al] iiyur jfvitam
Tib.: [45al] srog ni tshe yin
LVP: Buddhaghosa attributes to the Pubbaseliyas and to the Sammitiyas the doctrine which is
that of the Abhidharma: the vitality faculty (jfvitendriya) is a cittavippayutta ariipadhamma.
See Kathiivatthu, viii. 10; Compendium, p. 156; Vibhiiliga, p. 123; Dhammasaligm:ii, 19, 635;
Atthasiilinf, 644.
4.2.5. jfvitendriyal!I katamat I nikiiyasabhiige~u piirvakarmiividdho ya?J sal!lskiirii1Jiil!I
sthitikiilaniyama?J I
4.2.5 What is the faculty of a life force? [It is] the fixed period of time for the co~-
tinued existence of the formations [that occur] within [various] class affiliates [of
different sentient beings] that is projected by past karma. ISBP.238
Avatiira (ESD.114): "[A real entity] projected by previous karma, serving as the cause for the
uninterrupted series of the six entrances (iiyatana) [of the human personality], and forming the
basis for the designation (prajiiapti) of the four births and the five planes of existences-this is
named the vital faculty Ufvitendriya]. It is also called the life-principle (iiyus).
Thus it is said in the abhidharma: 'What is the vital-faculty? It is the life-principle of the three
spheres of existence.' It has a substantial essence, and sustains heat (ii~ma) and consciousness
(vijfiiina)."
2: As for the history ofjfvita, Cox writes (DD.125f.):
Vitality first appears in Buddhist siitras as a controlling faculty (indriya) within a
group of three controlling faculties including also the controlling faculties of mascu-
linity (purisindriya) and femininity (itthindriya) [e.g:, SN 48.22 Jfvitindriyasutta 5:
204]. These three are also included within the established set of twenty-two control-
ling faculties subsequently accepted in both the northern and southern Indian
Buddhist scholastic traditions. The controlling faculty 1,of vitality appears frequently
fa siitra references to death and the termination of a given lifetime, but its specific
character and function are not examined [e.g., MA. 7 no. 29 p. 462.b18].
Early Abhidharma definitions [Dharmaskandha, 499a29ff., Saligftiparyiiya, 368c16ff.]
of the controlling faculty of vitality preserve this relation to the duration of a given
lifetime. They emphasize the function of vitality as the persistence, continuation,
maintenance, animation, and operation that characterize sentient beings.
Other early Abhidharma treatises [Prakara1Japiida, 628cl9, 654a3, 694a23, 723a29ff.
Jiiiinaprasthiina, 993b2ff., and Mahiivibhii~ii, 732b27ff.] adopt a more succinct defi-
nition, identifying the controlling faculty of vitality with the life that belongs to a
being in any of the three realms (traidhiitukal!I iiyu?i). This early Abhidharma defini-
tion becomes the basis for the definition of vitality as a dissociated factor adopted by
the later Abhidharma compendia.[ ... ]
3. The MVS, 731b23ff., gives two explanations for the character and function of the vitality
faculty within the context of the controlling faculties.

In the first explanation (SA.IV.303), the dominance of the vital faculty consists in (i) enabling
one to assert that a being is in possession of the faculties (sa-indriya), which implies that
sentience is defined by the presence of the vital faculty, and in (ii) sustaining the faculties,
which implies that it is the essential condition for being alive as opposed to being dead.
In the second explanation (SA.IV.317), the dominance of the vital faculty consists in (i) con-
necting up with the nikiiya-sabhiiga, (ii) sustaining the nikiiya-sabhiiga, (iii) fostering the
nikiiyasabhiiga and (iv) enabling the nikiiyasabhiiga to continue uninterrupted. See in this
context the Vaibha~ika explanation at ii, F 105, as well as the Sautriintika explanation at
i. 3, the latter stating that the vitality faculty does not exercise controlling power with regard to
the initial connection to the nikiiyasabhiiga but only with regard to the continuance of the
nikiiyasabhiiga from birth to death. Cox comments (DD.131) that in the Sarvastiviida-
Vaibhii~ika treatment of vitality, it is not clear whether nikiiyasabhiiga is used in the technical
sense of formation dissociated from thought or in the more general sense of nikiiyasabhiiga
(see our endnote to ii. 41a); but the Sautriintikas do not accept nikiiyasabhiiga as being a real
entity.
The definition of vitality as controlling faculty is further elaborated in the later Abhidharma
treatises [AKB, Ny and Avatiira], particularly in its technical use as being a formation dissoci-
ated from thought, where, based on certain sutra passages [e.g., Pher_iapir_uf,upamasutta 3: 143]
(DD.127), "a sentient being is characterized by the presence of three specific components
within its constitutive collocation: warmth [u,vman], perceptual consciousness [vijiiiina], and
life [iiyus]. These components distinguish, sentient beings from insentient matter and life from
death within the stream of one sentient being."
Sarµghabhadra states (Ny, 404c; SA.IV.305):
The life principle which exists as a distinct entity, capable of supporting warmth
(u,vman) and consciousness, is called the vital faculty. This vital faculty does not
operate with only the body as its supporting basis, since the vital faculty exists in the
immaterial sphere. Nor does it operate with only thought as its supporting basis,
since the vital faculty also exists in one who is in the state devoid of thought. If so,
with what as the supporting basis does the vital faculty operate? Its operation has the
projecting karma in a previous life and the group-homogeneity of the present life as
its supporting basis. ,
4. As can be seen from Sarµghabhadra's quote, these three components are discussed as
being present in the vast majority of sentient states, but not in all, for example, vitality exists in
sentient beings during the attainment of non-ideation, where thought and thought-concomitants
are absent; it also exists in sentient beings of the realm of immateriality, where matter, i.e.,
warmth, is absent. Being itself neither material nor mental, it is thus included in the formations
dissociated from thought.
5. As for references to vitality (jfvita) or life-force (iiyus) within the AKB, we have already
mentioned that Vasubandhu discussed the vitality faculty (jfvitendriya) within the context of
the twenty-two controlling faculties at ii, F 105, and ii. 3. In this context, the vital faculty is
also determined to be a ripened effect (ii. 10a), to which Vasubandhu links the discussion of:
i. the stabilization and rejection of the conditioning forces of the life-force (iiyu~sal!I-
skiira), F 120;
ii. the purpose, person, place, etc., of prolonging and rejecting them,,/J< 121;
iii. the difference between the conditioning forces of life (jfvita sarriskiira) and the
conditioning forces of the life-force (iiyus sarriskiira), F 122;
iv. the purpose for which the Fortunate One stabilizes and rejects the conditioning forces
of the life-force, F 123.
In chapter 3, Vasubandhu discusses the vitality faculty at iii. 3cd as the basis of the mental
stream in the realm of immateriality; at iii. 14 din the context of the life expectancy of inter-
mediate beings; and at iii. 78-85a he discusses the measurements of the life expectancy (iiyus)
of the five planes of existence, which also include a discussion (iii. 85a) of whether or not
there is premature death (antariimrtyu).
At iv. 73ab, he discusses the vitality faculty in the context of killing (prii,:iiitipiita) and the vital
breath (prii,:ia), and the life-force (iiyus), at viii. F 137f., in the context of the refutation of the
hypothesis that material form as material sense-faculties exists in the realm of immateriality.
6. As for its existential status, the Vaibhii~ikas affirm it to be a real entity, whereas the
Sautriintikas deny this. For the details, see the discussion in our present section.
7. Even though the above-mentioned three specific components of heat, consciousness and
life-force are central in the later Abhidharma treatises, we find (DD.127) three major issues
dealt with in the AKB, Ny and Avatiira in their treatments of vitality, namely, (i) the possibil-
ity of states without thought, (ii) the possibility of rebirth in the formless realm and (iii) the
discrimination of life from death within the stream of any given sentient being. Cox further
comments (DD.130) that the lengthy discussions of the varieties of death in the AKB and Ny
suggest "that the factor of vitality had become increasingly significant doctrinally as the qual-
ity that distinguishes life from death".
632
LVP: Jfiiinaprasthiina, 991b25 (Indriyaskandhaka, i), Prakara,:ia, 694a23.
633
Gokhale; [45a2-b] iidhiira u:;mavijfiiinayor hi yaJ:i I
Tib.: [45a2..:..b] drod dang ni I rnam shes rten gang yinpa'o I
LVP: Life-force (iiyus) and heat (u:;man), see AKB iii, F 107, viii, F 137; Vibhii:;ii, p. 771a.
634
LVP: iiyur u~miitha vijfiiina111 yadii kiiy~ jahaty amI I
apaviddha~ tadii sete yathii ka~tham acetana~ II [WOG.668.16f.]
Sarriyukta, 21, u; Madhyama, 58, 4; Sarriyutta, iii. 143 (different readings); compare Majjhima,
i. 296. - Cited below ad iv. 73ab.
635 LVP: MYS, 771a7: This Sutra is cited by the Vibhajyaviidins in order to establish that
these three factors, i.e., life-force, heat and consciousness, are always united and inseparable.
But Vasumitra observes that the Sutra refers to the life-stream of a certain basis (iisraya) ... .
(1) Life-force (iiyus) forms part of the aggregate of formations (sarriskiiraskandha), of the
element of factors (dharmadhiitu), of the sense-sphere of factors (dharmiiyatana); (2) heat
forms part of the aggregate of material form (riipaskandha) and of the sense-sphere of the
tangible (spra:;(avyiiyatana); (3) consciousness forms part of the aggregate of consciousness
(vijiiiinaskandha), of seven elements (dhiitu) and of the sense-sphere of the mental faculty
(maniiyatana): thus one should not take the Sutra literally.
Furthermore, if these three factors would be inextricably linked, (1) there would be heat in the
realm of immateriality, (2) there would be the life-force and consciousness among the non-
living entities, (3) there would be consciousness in the attainment of non-ideation.
636
637
LS: The same as above.
638
639
640
LS: As for warmth (DD.290, 298), even though it operates continuously for the period
of one lifetime, it is not exclusively a ripened effect, but rather is an effect of equal out-
flow (ni:jyandaphala) "and is produced through the purely physical.processes of accumulation
(aupacayika)".
641
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, L VP mentions the Sautrantika here.
642
643
LVP: Hstian-tsang: "Moreover, this is what we have said. - What have you said? - In
order to avoid this consequence .... "
644
LS: This is the 16 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.68f.).
Saiµghabhadra (Ny, 404b26-c3) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and criticizes it
(Ny, 404c3-22), "denying that the force referred to by Vasubandhu can continue without inter-
ruption and showing that the suggested similes are not apposite".
As for parallels to the Yogi'ici'irabhumi, the Viniscayasaf!lgrahafli" (587a21-23 and 616a6-7)
states tha.t jfvitendriya (I) is the force that, due to previous karma, determines the duration of
an i'itmabhi'iva born in a partic~lar place and (2) is explicitly stated to be a prajfiapti.
645
LS: Yasomitra glosses (WOG.169.2-3; DD.299) the compound sthitiki'ili'ivedha as "that
particular capability (-avedha), which is the cause through a succession of moments (-ki'ila-)
for the abiding (sthiti-), defined as a continuous series of aggregates" ( ... si'imarthyaviie:jaft. sa
hi skandhaprabandhalak:jaf!iiyi'ih sthiteft k:faf1aparaf!1parayi'i kiira,:iaf!l bhavati. ata eva sthiti-
ki'ili'ivedha ucyate ).
646
LS: As for the different meanings of niki'iyasabhi'iga, see our endnote to ii, F 105.
Cox comments (DD.299) that Pradhan's Sanskrit edition of the AKB and both Hstian-tsang's
and Paramartha's translations use the term niki'iyasabhiiga here. Hslian-tsang's translation of
Saiµghabhadra, on the other hand, chooses the phrase "the six sense organs together with their
basis", perhaps to avoid using the term niki'iyasabhi'iga in a non-technical sense and to reserve
it for its technical sense as the discrete real entity posited by the Sarvastivada-Vaibha~ikas.
647
I
LVP: sasyi'ini'if!I pi'ikaki'ili'ivedhavat [ ... ] k:jipte:justhitiki'ili'ivedhavac ca [see WOG.169.5ff.]
648
LVP: Vaise:jikadarsana, v. 1, 16; H. Ui, Vaise:fika philosophy, p. 163. -The example of the
arrow [as given above] is of no value in regard to the Vaise~ika wh~ takes vega (impetus) as a
real entity. Thus the author refutes the theory of the Vaise~ika.
649
LS: Potter remarks (EIP.11.129): "Inertia (veg a), sometimes rendered as 'impetus',
'velocity', or even 'speed', is the quality of a moving substance which is responsible for its
continuing in the same direction. There is a discrepancy between Vaise~ika and Nyaya on how
many such inertia~qualities occur in a body moving in a line of direct flight. Seal reports that
the Vaise~ikas hold that there is one inertia throughout, but that Uddyotakara and the other
Naiyayikas hold that inertia, like the other qualities, is momentary and produces another one at
the next moment. The Nyiiya view has the advantage that acceleration and deceleration can be
easily explained. The Vaise~ika posits that inertia loses its force as it expends energy and thus
the body eventually slows down and stops."
650
LVP: sfghrataratamaprti,ptikiilabhedtinupapattil:r [WOG .169.20].
651
LVP: Hsiian-tsang: "There is a real entity, the support of heat and of consciousness, called
life-force (iiyus): this doctrine is good." Note of the Japanese editor: The author falls into
line with the Sarviistiviidin. - But one may assume that Hsiian-tsang omits the words: "The
Vaibhii~ikas say: ... ", since Vasubandhu, in the Paiicaskandhaka, adopts the Sautriintika thesis.
LS: Cox summarizes (DD.128): "For Sanghabhadra, the activities of animation and support,
which he attributes to vitality, can be attributed to no other entity; therefore, the presence of
these activities constitutes sufficient reason to justify the existence of vitality as a discrete real
entity. Furthermore, vitality can function as the basis for a distinction between life and death.
The occurrence of animate states without perceptual consciousness and animate states without
warmth demands that death be explained, not through the termination of perceptual conscious-
ness or warmth, but through an interruption in the stream of vitality. This separate factor of
life, or vitality, whose existence is proven through its activity, characterizes all states of sentient
beings including states without thought and rebirth in the formless realm; as a result, vitality
must be a force dissociated from both thought and form."
652
LVP: Karmaprajiiiiptisiistra, chap. xi (Mdo 72, fol. 240b).
653
LVP: On the diverse effects of action, iv. 85ff. - On enjoyment (bhoga), Yogasatra, ii. 13.
654
LVP: Missing in Paramiirtha. See above ii, F 122. - MYS, 103b3.
LS: Sarµghabhadra comments (Ny, 405a; DD.293) that this example "should not be mentioned
[within the fourth alternative] because its sense is included within the first alternative".
655
LVP: Vibhii~ii, 151, p. 771.
656
LS: This case does not refer to sentient beings in the realms of fine-materiality and
immateriality for whom the life-span is predetermined, i.e., whose life is not subject to pre-
mature mortal injury or untimely death; it also does not refer to the two states of equipoise
without thought, the duration of which is determined by prior application and where untimely
death is thus not possible (DD.300).
657
LS: This passage elucidates the last alternative of the above-given tetralemma, i.e., death
through the inability to avoid unfavorable circumstances. The MYS, 771a23, states that un-
timely death is rejected by the Diir~~iintikas (DD.300).
As to whether or not there is a difference between the two interpretations, see DD.300-1.
658
LVP: [WOG.170.9ff:] This is the explanation of the Foreign Masters (Bahirdesaka). -The
explanation of the Kasmireans differs only in terms. Or else, the latter understand that the life-
force (iiyus) of the first category is "bound to its own stream (svasaf{ltatyupanibaddha), but
susceptible of being hindered".
659
LVP: According to Kathiivatthu, xvii, 2, the Rajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas deny
premature death for the perfected beings (arhat; Kosa, ii. 10). - According to Rockhill (Life of
Buddha, p. 189) and Wassilief, p. 244, the Prajfiaptivadins deny premature death. -The Bodhi-
caryiivatiira (ii. 55) accepts one "natural" death (kiilamara,:ia) and 100 premature deaths, due
to each of the three humors (wind [viita], bile [pitta], phlegm [sle~man]) and to the humors
joined together, which makes 404 deaths.
In addition to (1) samucchedamaraJJa, the death of the perfected being; (2) kha,:iikamara,:ia, the
ceaseless disappearance of factors (dharma) consumed by impermanence; (3) sammutimara,:ia,
the death that one attributes to a tree, etc., the Abhidharma distinguishes (1) kiilamara,:ia
(natural death) (i) through exhaustion of merit (pufi/ia), (ii) through exhaustion of one's
lifetime (iiyu), (iii) through exhaustion of both; (2) akiilamara,:ia (premature death) due to
an action· that cuts off existence (upacchedakakammar:ia), in the case of DiisI Mara, Kalabhil,
etc., in the case of persons assassinated through retribution of a previous action (Visuddhi-
magga, viii, see in Warren, p. 252; Commentaire de l'Anguttara, PTS, p. 111; Nettipakara,:ia,
p. 29; Milinda, p. 301). -Abhidhammasaflgaha, Compendium, p. 149.
Jaina doctrine, Umii.svati, Tattv.iirthiidhigamasiitra, ii. 52: dvidhiiny iiyul'[lsi ... .
660
LS: Yasomitra suggests (WOG.170.14ff.) that this siitra passage also supports the pos-
sibility of untimely deatq.
The translation of the following passage is based on Collett Cox's Pradhan-based translation
(DD.294).
661
LVP: Literally: acquisition of existence (iitmabhiivapratilambha).
Majjhima, iii. 53 distinguishes two types of acquiring modes of personal existence, the
savyiipajjha and the avyiipajjha.
662
LVP: Dfgha, ii.i. 231, Aflguttara, ii. 159: atth' iivu~o attabhiivapafiliibho yasmil'[l atta-
bhiivapafiliibhe attasal'[lcetanii yeva kamati no parasa1J1cetanii ... . - See Kosa, vi. 253, 255,
262. - Vyakhyii: iitmasa,ricetanii = iitmanii miirai:iam; parasal'[lcetanii = parei:ia miirai:iam
[WOG.170.15f.].
663
LVP: Digha, i. 19, iii. 31. - MVS, 997b9. There is no agreement: does this refer to the
Four Kings and the Thirty-three or to other categories of gods of the realm of desire?
664
LS: These beings are not capable of inflicting mortal injury through their own intention
(Ny, 405a).
665
LVP: jinadiita. - For example, a certain Suka was sent by the Fortunate One to AmrapiilI;
the Licchavis who were engaged in military exercises (yogyii), saw him and let loose a rain of
arrows on him. But the messengers of the Buddha cannot be killed before having fulfilled their
mission.
666
LVP:jinoddi~fa = iyantrup. kiilam anenajivitavyam iti ya iidi~to bhagavatii [WOG.170.24].
Perhaps one should understand: "The persons to whom the Buddha gives an order knowing
that they will live long enough [to fulfill their mission]." The notes that J. Przyluski kindly
gave to me on Yasas and Jivaka, make this version rather plausible:
"In Mahiivagga, L 7, paragraph 4 is nearly incomprehensible. Yasas cries out: 'What a danger!'
and we do not know to what danger he is alluding. In the corresponding passage of the Vinaya
of the Sarviistiviidins, everything is explained: At that time, Yaiias, having passed through the
gate of the town, arrived close to the river ViiriinasI. Then the Fortunate One was walking to
the bank of the river. Yasas, seeing the water, gave forth a cry as he.had previously done. The
Buddha, hearing this cry, said to the young man: 'This place has nothing to be afraid of. Cross
Endnotes ro Chapter Two 833
the stream and come.' (Tok. xvii. 3, 26")."

"The wife of Subhadra (comp. Divyiivadiina, 262-70) died before having given birth; the body
was cremated but the child was not burned. The Buddha told Jivaka to go and take the child
from the middle of the flames: .fivaka obeyed and returned without being harmed (xvii. 1, 6")."
667
LVP: Reading provided by the Vyakhyii [WOG.170.24]. -Tibetan: chos Zen.
668
LVP: Tibetan: mchog can.
669
LVP: Tibetan: gang ga Zen. -The Chinese transcriptions give Gafijila; see the failed suicide
attempts of Garigika, Avadanasataka, 98.
670
LVP: The fad that the expression tadyathii is absent in the answer of the Fortunate One
[ii, F 220] does not prove that this answer should be understood literally.
671
LS: AH 24; 221; SAH 65-66, 454.
672
LS: AH 24, 221; SAH 65,454.
673
LS: Ibid
674
Gokhale: [45cd] la"lcya,:iiini punar jiitir jarii sthitir anityatii I
Tib.: [45cd] mtshan nyid dag ni skye ba dang I rga dang gnas dang mi rtag nyid I
LVP: Paramiirtha: "Moreover, there are the characteristics (lak~a,:za) of the conditioned (saJ'!!-
skrta) ... ".
Hsiian-tsang: "The characteristics (lak~a,:za), namely, origination, duration, deterioration, imper-
manence of conditioned factors (saJ'!!skrta)."
MVS, 198a8; Abhidharmahrdaya (Nanjio, 1288), ii. 10.
A provisional definition of conditioned factors (sarriskrta) has been given i. 7ab.
Madhyamakavrtti, 546, Madhyamakiivatiira, 193: "according to the Abhidharma, the four are
simultaneous". - The $ar}darsanasarrigraha attributes to the Siirpmitiyas the thesis: catu/:i-
k~a,:zikarri vas~u,jiitir janayati, sthiti/:i sthiipayati,jariijarayati, viniiso viniisayati.
LS: The following longer endnote discusses the following topics: (1) the definitions of the four
characteristics in the Paficaskandhaka and the Avatiira; (2) the general position of the four
characteristics within the Sarviistiviida teachings; (3) the history of the four characteristics and
the doctrine of momentariness; (4) the reconstruction of the doctrine of momentariness via
related concepts; (5) the existential status of the sarriskrtalak~q.,:zas; (6) selected writings from
modem research.
1. The definitions of the four characteristics in the Paficaskandhaka and the Avatiira:
4.2. 7 jiifi/:i katamii I nikiiyasabhiige yal:i sal'!lskiirii,:ziim abhutvii bhiivaT:i I
4.2.7 What is birth? The origination of previously nonexistent formations in rela-
tion to a class affiliate.
4.2.9 sthiti/:i katamii I tathaiva te~iil'!l prabandhiinuvrttiT:i I
4.2.9 What is duration? The uninterrupted succession of [the] continuum [of the for-
mations] in relation to [a class affiliate].
4.2.8 jarii katamii I tathaiva te~iil'fl prabandhiinyathiitvam I
834 Exposition of the F acuities (Indriyanirdesa)
4.2.8 What is aging? The modification of [the] continuum [of the formations] in
relation to [a class affiliate].
4.2.10 anityatii katama I tathaiva te~iil'!I prabandhoparamaJ:, I
4.2.10 What is impermanence? The destruction of [the] continuum [of the forma-
tions] in relation to [a class affiliate]. ISBP.238-39
I
Avatiira (ESD.116f.):
When dharma-s are produced, there is a force of internal cause which makes them
achieve their specific functions (vrttilvyiipiiralsiimarthya). It is this internal cause that
is called the production-characteristic (jiiti-lak~aT_la). The causes of production of
dharma-s are two-fold: (i) internal and (ii) external. Th~ former is the production-
characteristic and the latter comprises the six causes (hetu) or the four conditions
(pratyaya). If the production-characteristic were non-existent, the conditioned dharma-s
would be just like the [unconditioned] Space, etc., which, in spite of the assemblage
of external causes and conditions, never arises. Or, [the unconditioned dharma-s] like
Space, etc., are also capable of arising and hence become conditioned in nature. This
indeed is a great incongruity. Thus, we can infer from this that there exists a distinct
production-characteristic.
The cause which enables [a dharma] to stay temporarily, so as to be able to project
a distinct fruit, is named the duration-characteristic (sthiti): When a conditioned
dharma is staying temporarily, it has the power of projecting a distinct fruit. This
internal cause, which enables [a dharma] to stay temporarily in this power of project-
ing a distinct fruit, is named the duration-characteristic. If this duration-characteristic
were non-existent, when the conditioned dharma-s are staying temporarily, they ought
not to be further able to project a distinct fruit. Hence, it can be inferred that there
exists a distinct duration characteristic.
Deterioration (jarii) is that which impairs (vi-..fhan) [a dharma's] efficacy of project-
ing fruit, rendering it incapable of further projecting another distinct fruit. If a
conditioned dharma did not have the change-[or deterioration-] characteristic
(anyathiitva-lak~a,:ta) which impairs its activity [function/efficacy?], how is it that
it. does not keep on projecting one distinct fruit after another, and thus leading to
ad infinitum? Besides, if this be, the case [a conditioned dharma] ought not be mo-
mentary (k~a1J,ika) in nature. Hence we can infer from this that there exists a dis-
tinct [dharma named] the deterioration-characteristic.
Impermanence (anityatii) is that which causes a present dharma, whose activity
having been impaired [by the deterioration-characteristic] to enter into the past:
There exists a distinct dharma named disappearance-[or impermanence-] charac-
teristic (vyaya-lak~a1J,a) which causes [a dharma] to go from the present into the past.
If this were non-existent, dharma-s ought not to disappear. Or, [the unconditioned
dharma-s like] Space, etc., would also disappear [just as do the conditioned ones].
2. The general position of the four characteristics within the Sarviistiviida teachings:
As for this topic, the Avatiira ends its discussion of them by stating (p. 118): "Thus, although
the intrinsic nature (svabhiiva) of a conditioned dharma always exists (sarvadiisti), its function
is not permanent (nitya). It a~hieves its function by the force of the four characteristics, the
internal causes, and the external causes." Here the four characteristics are placed within
(i) the wider context of causality (see AKB ii. 49-73) and (ii) the Sarvii.stivii.da doctrine of
existence within the three times, i.e., past, present and future entities (see AKB v. 25-27). As
for the latter, Collett Cox comments (DD.361):
Since, according to the Sarvii.stivii.da-Vaibhii.~ikas, factors exist as real entities
(dravya) in the three time periods, they exist even in the future time period when they
have not yet been produced. Production, therefore, refers not to a factor's coming
into existence, but to the arising of its activity, and when its activity arises, a factor is
referred to as present. Factors are then considered to be conditioned precisely
because their activity arises and passes away. Thus, for Sailghabhadra, birth [jati]
does not mark the existence of a conditioned factor. According to Vasubandhu,
however, factors can be said to exist only in the present time period when they
acquire their own nature, which is identified by V1<.subandhu with their particular
activity. The arising and passing away of this nature or activity determines their exis-
tence or nonexistence and constitutes their conditioned nature.
As for the relationship of the four characteristics to (iii) the doctrine of momentariness (see
ii, F 232, and further references/comments below), it is alluded to by the Avatiira only briefly
in its discussion of jarii (see above) but seems to be otherwise presupposed. Rospatt introduces
this doctrine at the beginning of his article Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness, p. 469-
without, however, at that point making the technical distinctions between the Sarvii.stivii.da
and Sautrii.ntikas schools-as follows:
Its fundamental proposition is that: everything passes out of existence as soon as it
has originated and in this sense is momentary.
As an entity vanishes, it gives rise to a new entity of almost the same nature which
originates immediately afterwards. Thus, there is an uninterrupted flow of causally
connected momentary entities of nearly the same nature, the so-called continuum
(santiina).
These entities succeed each other so fast that the process cannot be discerned by
ordinary perception. Because earlier and later entities within one continuum are
almost exactly alike, we come to conceive of something as a temporally extended
entity even though the fact that it is in truth nothing but a series of causally connected
momentary entities.
According to this doctrine, the w.orld (including the sentient beings inhabiting it) is at
every moment distinct from the world in the previous or next moment. It is, however,
linked to the past and future by the law of causality in so far as a phenomenon
usually engenders a phenomenon of its kind when it perishes, so that the world origi-
nating in the next moment reflects the world in the preceding moment.
3. The history of the four characteristics and the doctrine of momentariness:
i. As for the history of impermanence (anityatii), Rospatt comments (IT.69) that what
matters in the classical form of impermanence as old age, illness and death-as encountered
by the Buddha-to-be on an excursion to a pleasure grove-is not an abstract universal law of
impermanence, but the transience of life, and more concretely, that we ourselves are imper-
manent. Although clearly an awakening experience for the Buddha-to-be, it does not itself
constitute a supramundane realization of impermanence, an insight of a higher order that

liberates one from sa7!1siira and brings about nirva,:ia, but forms the starting point of the entire
Buddhist endeavour, i.e., right view (samyagdr~!i) and right thinking or resobe (samyagsal!I"
kalpa) (vi., F 246) to leave home and strive for release from the cycle of death and rebirth.
This is also reflected in the fact that, when the four noble truths are analyzed (see vi. 2-3;
vii. 13a), impermanence is dealt with first, followed by the unsatisfactory nature of existence
(duftkha) and the non-existence of something to be identified as "self" or "mine" (anatman).
But althoµgh anityata is rooted in the biological fact of the transience of life, it proved to be
flexible enough to accommodate further doctrinal developments, and the soteriological need to
induce a direct experience of impermanence in the present gave rise to different strategies. In
this context Rospatt identifies (IT.72) (a) the relocation of death in the immediate presence-
for example, when retiring to a chamel field where human corpses are discarded, so as to
observe the various states of decomposition, or in the prominent practice of recollecting death
(mara,:iasmrti; vi. 9-11)-and (b) "the shift of impermanence away from old age and death,
so that the analysis of i)11permanence came to focus on existence within time rather than on
the irreversible termination of existence", for example, when concentrating within the prac-
tice of the application of mindfulness of the body, etc. (smrtyupasthana; vi. 14-16) on the
impermanent nature of existence before death.
ii. As for the doctrine of momentariness, Rospatt discusses its history in detail in his The
Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. A Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of this Doctrine
up to Vasubandhu. Here is its outline:
I. Exposition of the Early Phase of the Doctrine of Momentariness
A. The Earliest Textual Evidence for the Doctrine of Momentariness
B. The Doctrine of _Momentariness in the Hinayana Schools
C. The sa7!1skrtalak~a,:ias
D. Momentariness in the Early Y ogacara School
E. The Various Definitions and Usages of the Term k~a,:ia in Buddhist Sources
II. The Origins of the Doctrine of Momentariness
A. The Momentariness of Mental Entities
B. The Deduction of the Momentariness of all Conditioned Entities from the
Momentariness of the Mind
C. The Deduction of Momentariness from Change
D. The Deduction of Momentariness from Destruction
E. The Experience of Momentariness
In regard to early Buddhism, Rospatt comments (BDM.15):
There can be no doubt that the theory of momentariness cannot be traced back to the
beginnings of Buddhism or even the Buddha himself.* It does not fit the practically
orientated teachings of early Buddhism and clearly bears the mark of later doctrinal
elaboration. Thus in the Nikayas/Agamas there are many passages which attribute
duration to material and even mental entities, whereas there is, at least to my knowl-
edge, no passage which testifies to the stance that all conditioned entities are momen-
tary.
*·LS: Yet see in this respect also Sarµghabhadra's discussion of the Trilak~a,:iasatra in our
endnote at ii, F 226.

But-with the exception of two possible passages in Hsiian-tsang's translation of the
Jiiiinaprasthiina, of which the second is rendered differently in Gautama Saipghadeva's
translation-Rospatt finds no relevant material regarding the doctrine of momentariness in the
canonical Abhidharma works of the Sarviistivadins either. On the other hand, since there is
clear evidence for the doctrine of momentariness in the Mahiivibhii:ja, where the momentari-
ness. of all conditioned entities seems to be taken for granted when dealing with other issues-
i.e., without treating it as a topic in its own right or without any explanation, justification or
even less proof of momentariness, which seem to occur for the first time in the AKB, probably
when required by the confrontation with other schools-Rospatt concludes that, even if it
had played. a marginal role in the Jiiiinaprasthiina, the doctrine of momentariness of all
conditioned entities should be mainly postcanonic, i.e., some time between the conclusion of
the Sarviistiviida Abhidharmapitaka and the redaction of the Mahavibhiiifii, and may have
originated in the first century A.D. in the milieu of the Sarviistiviidins.
iii. a. As for the doctrine of the safJ1skrtalak:ja,:ias within the Sarvastiviida, Rospatt comments
(BDM.46):
That the sal'[lskrtalakifai:ias, were originally correlated to existence over a span of time
follows, [LS: among other reasons,] from the fact that the Mahiivibhiiifii [cf.
119a2] not only treats the sal'[lskrtalak:ja,:ias in terms of momentariness but also in
terms of extended existence, though with the qualification that the safJ1skrtalakifai:ias
hi this context are only conceptually given and not to be identified with the causally
efficient sal'[lskrtalalqa,:ias which qualify momentary conditioned entities.
Moreover (BDM.49):
The Sarviistivadins did not give up their doctrine of the sal'[lskrtalak:ja,:ias when they
came to view all conditioned entities as momentary. This was impossible because the
four sal'[lskrtalakg,:ias had become the indispensable corollary of each conditioned
entity, once they had been hypostatized to causally efficient factors which account
for the origination, duration, decay and annihilation of these entities. Thus the
Sarviistiviidins had to carry on attributing the safJ1skrtalakifal}aS to discrete condi-
tioned entities even after the duration of these entities had been reduced to a bare
·moment. This meant that the operation of the four sal'[lskrtalakifai:ias which really
requires a certain stretch of time had to be squeezed into a moment once the momen-
tariness of all conditioned entities was espoused....
The teaching of the Sarviistiviidins that the safJ1skrtalakifai:ias of one entity all pertain
to one and the same moment was already repudiated by the Dar~tantikas in the
Mahiivibhiiifii [200a4-6; cf. ii, F 231] on the grounds that these marks are incompati-
ble with each other. This criticism was in tum rejected by the Sarviistiviidins who
held that the sal'[lskrtalak:ja,:ias are, despite their simultaneity, not causally efficient at
the same time [see ii, F 231, for details] .... This stiU invited the charge that the
qualified entity is all the same no longer momentary as it thus exists at two neces-
sarily distinct points of time. In order to preclude this, the moment was defined as the
time taken by the completion of origination and destruction [cf. ii, F 232].
b. As for the doctrine of the sal'[lskrtalakifai:ias within the Sautriintikas, Rospatt comments
(BDM.60, 62):
The Sautrantikas shared the Sarvastivadins' conception of the k~ar:ia as ~e smallest,
indivisible unit of time, but, in contrast to the latter, solved the probtem of how to
squeeze a conditio~ed entity into an indivisible moment by adapting the mode of
existence of conditioned entities to the theory of momentariness. 'J'he characteristic
features, which were attributed to conditioned entities when they were still regarded
as temporally extended, were not retained when their duration was. reduced to a
moment, but became instead assigned to chains of moments (santiina). This included
the assignment of the sarriskrtalak~ar:ias, so that origination, duration, transformation
and destruction were-in accordance with the original import of the siitra-related
to existence over a span of time and not crammed into a moment. To do so was
possible because, unlike the Sarviistiva4ins, the Sautrantikas did not accept tliat
origination, etc., are causally efficient entities in their own right that exist apart from
the thing that originates, etc. Rather than considering the marks of origination, etc.,
as the indispensable cause of origination, etc., they looked upon them as only con-
ceptually given terms (prajiiaptimiitra, AKB 79,28) which express the fact that some-
thing has originated, etc ....
This correlation of the sarriskrtalak~ar:ias to temporally extended phenomena accords
with.the original position of the Sarvastivadins before they adopted the doctrine of
momentariness.
(p. 62): However, Vasubandhu also shows that it is possible to attribute the sarriskrta-
lak~ar:ias to individual conditioned entities without accepting that these entities per-
sist beyond origination and are subject to change .... This characterization retains the
four sarriskrtalak~ar:ias only nominally (i.e:., without associating with them four dif-
ferent states or phases), while it reduces the states of conditioned entities factually to
that of existence and non-existence. It thus reflects a more radical (that is, more
radical than that of the Sarviistivadins) conception of momentariness, according to
which the discrete conditioned entities neither undergo a phase of duration nor of
transformation, but perish immediately after their origination. Since this destruction
was not viewed as a time-demanding process, but as the simple fact that something
having existed before has stopped to do so (bhiitviibhiiva), existence was reduced by
the Sautrantikas to mere acts of originating (to flashes into existence, one might say)
which do not allow for a temporal subdivision-a conception wtJich accords with the
understanding that the moment (k~ar:ia) is infinitesimBl.
iv. With this radicalization of the instantaneous nature of existence, the doctrine of mom::n-
tariness assumed its final form, presumably in the fourth century A.D.
Rospatt comments further (BM.47lf.):
Such a doctrine, fundamentally at odds with the appearance of the world, met great
opposition. Initially, it was rejected by large sections of the Buddhist community,
notably the Vatsiputriyas and related schools. Later, when .it had gained ground
among Buddhists, it was fervently opposed by the Brahmanical schools as it con-
tradicted their postulation of eternal entities of one sort or another (souls, atoms,
primary matter, a supreme deity). This rejection made it ~ecessary to defend the
doctrine by argumentation.
The oldest transmitted proofs of momentariness are recorded in early Yogiiciira
sources. They are still primarily directed against other Buddhists and derive the
momentariness of all phenomena in three different ways.
First, it is presupposed that the mind is momentary'-this stance is also shared by
Buddhist opponents who do not accept the momentariness of matter-and on this
basis it is concluded that matter, too, has to be momentary: proof from the momen-
tariness of mind. This conclusion is based on the demonstration that mind and matter
can only depend upon each other and interact as they do because they have the same
duration.
Second, by referring to ageing and similar processes it is proved that everything
changes all the time and thus undergoes origination and destruction at every moment.
This argument rests on the presupposition that any form of transformation implies
the substitution of one entity for another. This proof from change reflects the pre-
sumable doctrinal background underlying the formation of the doctrine of momen-
tariness.
Third, it is argued that everything has to perish as soon as it has originated becaus_e
otherwise it would persist eternally. This would be at odds with the law of imperma-
nence. The argument rests on the presupposition that destruction cannot be brought
about from without and that it is impossible for an entity to perish on its own account
after it has persisted, as this would require a change of nature. The latter presupposi-
tion reflects the view that self-identical entities cannot change.
Vasubandhu (fourth-fifth century) marks the gradual transition between the earlier
phase when the debate was still confined to Buddhism and the later phase when it
was carried out between Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Vasubandhu only adopted the
third type of proof, deducing momentariness from the spontaneity of destruction [see
AKB iv, F 4,-8]. He developed this idea further with the argument that destruction
cannot be caused since, as mere nonexistence, it does not qualify as an effect. Up to
the time of Dharmakirti (c. 600-60) and to a lesser extent thereafter, this proof of
momentariness, the so-called inference from perishability (vinasitvanumana), domi-
nated the controversy.
With Dharmakirti, the doctrine entered a new phase. He developed a new type of
proof, the so-called inference from existence (sattvanumana), that derives the momen-
tariness of all entities (without presupposing their impermanence) directly from
the fact that they exist. On the basis of the premise that existence entails causal
efficiency, Dharmakirti demonstrates that all existing things have to be momentary
as it is impossible for nonmomentary entities to function as efficient causes.
4. The reconstruction of the doctrine of momentariness via related concepts in the AKB:
Given that the conception of momentariness is not set forth explicitly as a topic in its own right
in any of its pertinent Hinayiina sources, it will be necessary to turn to related concepts in
order to be able to arrive at a detailed reconstruction of the Sarviistiviidin's conception of
momentariness.
As for the AKB, the following two references stand out (BDM.40):
i. Various definitions and usages of b;alJ,a (see iii. 85bc). Here is the outline related to it:
The units for calculating space (physical matter) and time; F 177
A. The smallest units of physical matter, words and time; F 177
1. Two non-computable definitions of the moment as a unit of time; F 177
1.1. Sautrantika/V asubandhu: Definition of the moment as a unit of "time based
on characterization of the factor"; F 177
1.2. Sautrantika/Vasubandhu: Definition of the moment as a unit of "time as an
infinitesimal"; F 177
2. Vaibha~ika: Comparison-based Computable definition of time; F 178
B. The various units that measure what has been combined; F 178
1. The various units of space: Vaibha~ika: computable definitions of the different
units of space up to one league; F 178
2. The various units of time: Sarvastivadins: computable definition of the different
units of time up to the great aeon; F 179-81
ii. The well-documented treatment of the four sai'{lskrtalakifulJaS and the controversy on
this point between the Sarvastivadins and Sautrantikas (i.e., our section here), which in turn
has to.be viewed against the background of the doctrine of sarvastitva (v. 25-27 [F 49-66]).
But there are further related concepts and passages in-the AKE, yet it should be kept in mind
that the same term can carry different meanings acc'.ording to context:
a. The mutual relationship between the four characteristics themselves as well as with the
factor they characterize is discussed within the context of the co-existent cause at ii. 50bd.
b. Birth (jiiti) and old-age-and-death (jaramara1J,a) is dis<;ussed at various places within the
context of dependent origination (pratftyasamutpiida), for example, at iii. 24cd.
c. For Vasubandhu's proof of momentariness based on the spontaneity of destruction, see
iv, F 4-8.
d. Change and impermanence are discussed within the context of the four truths (satya) at
vi. 2-3, in particular in relation to the truth of unsatisfactoriness and the three kinds of
unsatisfactoriness: ( a) unsatisfactoriness that is pain (duftkhaduftkhatii), (b) unsatisfactoriness
that is the fact of being conditioned (saf!lskrta) or the unsatisfactoriness of the conditioning
forces as such (sal'[lskaraduftkhatii), (c) unsatisfactoriness that is unfavorable transformation
(or change or decay) or the unsatisfactoriness based on unfavorable transformation (or change
or decay) (pari1J,iimaduftkhatii).
e. Impermanence is also discussed at i. 2b and vii. 13a within the context of understanding
(prajfiii) and the common characteristics (siimiinyalakija1J,a) or the four aspects or modes
of activity (akilra) of the truth of unsatisfactoriness (duftkhasatya): (i) impermanent (anitya),
(ii) unsatisfactory (duftkha), (iii) empty (siinya), (iv) nonself (aniitmaka). As such it is also re-
lated with the appeasement of defilements (i. 3).
f. As for the role of impermanence within the context of the Buddhist path, see our refer-
ences above ("history of impermanence") regarding the meditation.on the loathsome (asubhii),
the application of mindfulness (smrtyupasthiina) and the eightfold noble path.
g. As for whether or not momentariness can actually be experienced, see ii, F 227, and
vi. 14cd.
5. The existential status of the saf!1skrtalak~ar:111s:

The Sarviistiviidins consider the saf!1skrtalak~ar:111s to be truly existing entities and classify
them within the formations dissociated from thought, but since they themselves are condi-
tioned factors., they too have to possess their own saf!!skrtalak~a,;ias. On the other hand,
although the Sarviistiviidins do not contend that all conditioned entities only "exist" for a
moment as the Sautriintikas do, they consider them to be momentary in the sense that they are
only "present" for a moment, namely, when they are causally efficient, whereas before this
moment their intrinsic nature already exists in the future and thereafter in the past.
For the Sautriintika view, see above (part 3.iii.b).
See naturally also Vasubandhu's discussion on this topic: ii, F 226-38.
6. Selected writings from modern research:
For a brief overview of modem research regarding momentariness, see BDM.4-7.
As for LVP's writings, see in the Electronic Appendix: (i) "Notes sur le 'moment' ou k~a1J,a
des bouddhistes" (1934); (ii) "Documents d' Abhidharma: La controverse du temps" (1937),
pp. 7-158, which includes: "Notes sur le moment (k~a1J,a) des Vaibhii~ikas et des Sautriintikas",
pp. 134-58.
See in particular Alexander von Rospatt's (i) The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. A
Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of this Doctrine up to Vasubandhu (1995), (ii) "Buddhist
Doctrine of Momentariness" (1998), (iii) "Impermanence and Time. The Conteml)lation of
Impermanence (anjtyatii) in the Yogiiciira Tradition of Maitreya and Asail.ga" (2004).
675
LVP: viparyayiid asal!lskrta iti yatraitiini na bhavanti so 'sarriskrta iti.
But can one not say that duration is a characteristic of the unconditioned factor? No. By
char!lcteristics, one understands real entities (dravyiintarariipa) distinct from the characterized
factor that bring about arising, perduring, wasting away and perishing of this factor. The
unconditioned factor abides but does not possess the characteristic "duration", see ii, F 224,
top.
676
IS: AH 24; SAH 65.
677
LS: Sai:µghabhadra defines, in his *Nyiiyiinusiira (405c), origination or production (jiiti)
as follows (SA.IV.306):
Herein, production is a distinct dharma which is the dominant cause of non-obstruc-
tion at the stage of arising of the conditionings (saf!!skiira); for it induces them,
enabling the~ to aris~_"Inducing them" refers to the fact that at the time of their
arising. this dharma serves as their condition of dominance.
Sai:µghabhadra adds (DD.305): "Even though all arising of conditioned forces could be
referred to as birth Uiiti], this name 'birth' is given only to the predominant cause of non-
obstruction when conditioned forces are in a state of being produced." The MVS, 202c-203a,
explains further (SA.IV.318):
Question: When the saf!!skrta dharma-s arise, do they arise on account of the fact
that they are in themselves of the nature of arising ( ft ,l &. :;t. ;\k_ & ), or on account of
being joined withjiiti-la~ar:ia?
Answer: ... They arise on account of the fact that they are in themselves of the nature
of arising .... But, although they are in themselves of the nature of arising, they
cannot arise without being joined with jati-lak~a,:ia . ... At the time of their arising,
jiiti-lak~a,:ia is their predominant cause of production. Just as a destructible dharma is
destroyed by a cause of destruction and an abandonable dharma is abandoned by a
cause of abandonment; a producible dharma is produced by jiiti-la/cya,:ia.
Origination operates on the dharma when it is in the future period. Saip.ghabhadra elaborates
(Ny, 41 la; SA.IV.306):
The production-characteristic serves as the conascent proximate cause (iisanna-
kiira,:ia) and produces the produced, i.e., the conditioned dharma-s. But [their
production is not brought about by the production-characteristic alone]; this must
be assisted by the assemblage of the previous causes of their own species as well as
other external conditions.
See also our introductory note to the four characteristics (part 1) in regard to the consequences
that would ensue, from the Avatiira point of view, if the origination characteristic were non-
existent.
678
LS: Saip.ghabhadra defines duration (sthiti) as follows (Ny, 405c; ESD.191):
Sthiti is a distinct dharma which is the predominant cause of non-obstruction for the
sarriskrta-s, which have been produced but not yet destroyed, to project their own
fruit.
According to the Vaibha~ikas, if duration (sthiti) were non-existent, a conditioned dharma
could not exercise its kiiritra, i.e., its activity for projecting a dharma's own effect of equal
outflow (nifYanda-phala) (Ny, 409c, etc.), and the citta-caitta dharma-s could not have any
cognitive object (iilambana), but it is by the force of deterioration (jarii) and impermanence
(anityatii) that there is not more activity after one moment (lcya,:ia) (MYS, 210c).
-In regard to the term duration (sthiti), Saip.ghabhadra elaborates (Ny, 41 lc; ESD.191):
Nor do we say that the conditionings (saf!lskiira), having been produced, stay on
eternally. If so, why do you say that there is duration after the sarriskrta dharma-s
have been produced? By "there is duration" is mea11t "temporary staying": The
conditionings, at the time when they are disappearing, stay temporarily; they cannot
be said to stay at the time when they have disappeared or when they are being
produced, as [at these times] they are without activity (kiiritra). As we have men-
tioned earlier (cf. ibid., 411b), it is only at the time of disappe3:ring that the condi-
tionings possess the activity of projecting fruit (phaliilcyepa).
that would ensue, from the Avatiira point of view, if the duration characteristic were non-
existent.
679
LS: Saip.ghabhadra defines (Ny, 405c; SA.IV.307) deterioration/change (jarii/anyathiitva)
as "the cause for the conditioned (sarriskrta) to be different in the subsequent [moment] from
the previous [moment], in its continuation as a series". Later (Ny, 410b; DD.337) he also gives
an alternate definition as the cause of the deterioration of a factor's activity:
The Abhidharmikas apply the term "senescence" to _a factor in that state in which its
intrinsic nature [is connected with] its distinctive activity, and not [when it exists
only as] intrinsic nature. That is to say, the activity whereby a conditionyd factor is
able to project its own effect within its intrinsic nature is referred to as continuance;
precisely the deterioration of this activity is referred to as senescence.
Cox comments (DD.371) that this alternative definition that appeals to the deterioration, decay,
weakening, or injury of the activity of conditioned factors also appears in the MVS, 20lc24ff.
that would ensue, from the Avatiira point of view, if the deterioration characteristic would be
non-existent.
680
LS: 1. Saqighabhadra defines impermanence (aniyatii) as follows (Ny, 405c; ESD.192): ·
Aniyatii is a distinct dharma which is the predominant cause for the destruction of a
co-nascent sarµskrta [dharma].
Saqighabhadra adds (DD.306) that the suffix tii, or "nature", in the word anitya-tii has the
meaning of "real entity" (dravya).
that would ensue, from the Avatiira point of view, if the impermanence characteristic were
non-existent.
2. This impermanence (anityatii) should not be confused with "impermanence" (anityatii) as
one of the aspects or modes of activities (iikiira; vii. 13a) and also not with "impermanence" as
one of the four common characteristics (siimiinyalak~a,:ia) of all conditioned factors: imper-
manent, unsatisfactory, empty and non-self. This is implied, for example, in Saqighabhadra 's
following discussion (Ny, 412a; DD.349f.):
Another objection has been raised [to the characteristic of desinence (anityatii)]: "If
the characteristic of impermanence (anityatii) exists separately as a real entity apart
from the nature [of factors as] impermanence, why isn't there also a characteristic of
suffering (duJ:ikha) existing separately apart from suffering."
[Saqighabhadra's response:] Objections using examples such as these are not rea-
sonably established. If one were to claim that [factors] exist having a nature as
impermanent due to a [discrete] "characteristic of impermanence", then one could,
on the basis of this claim, raise the following objection: "[Factors] should likewise
exist having the nature of suffering due to a 'characteristic of suffering'." However,
conditioned factors that are impermanent by nature are simply destroyed with the
characteristic of desinence as their condition, just as conditioned factors that are
impermanent by nature are simply produced with the characteristic of birth as their
condition. What would be the use of proposing that the nature [of factors such as]
suffering? similarly, has yet another "characteristic of suffering" that acts as its
condition? Therefore, objections using such examples are not reasonably established.
Through this [argument, in the same way] objections [using examples of] voidness
and non-self are refuted.
681
LS: Rospatt (BDM.23) gives the following references: Trilak~a,:iasatra (AN I 152 = T 125
607cl5, SNIIl 36 =T 99 12a29-bl, Nidiinasarµyukta, p. 139,7-12 = T 99 83cl6, cf. MPPUL III
1163, n. 1).
LVP in his Documents d'Abhidharma: La Controverse du Temps (1937; F 151f.), writes:
The morr,ent (k~a~a) of the Sautriintikas-i.e., the factor (dharma), since time does
not exist in and of itself-is an infinitesimal. The factor, precisely, perishes on arising.
The moment of the Sarviistiviidins--(e., the factor of the Sarviistiviidin-differs. The
factor, once arisen, perdures for a very short time before disappearing. However, the
factor is momentary.
The Siitra, written at a time when factors were considered as impermanent (anitya)
and not as momentary (k~a~ika), says that "the conditioned factor (sal'[lskrta) has
three conditioned characteristics (la~a~a), namely (1) arising, (2) duration-change
(sthiti-anyathiitva), (3) impermanence (anityatii) or cessation (nirodha) [Kosa: pass-
ing away (vyaya)]".
The Sarviistiviida school teaches that the second characteristic is divided into tw:o:
duration (sthiti) and change (anyathiitva). Also, it considers the characteristics as
entities (dharma) that cause the factor to arise, perdure, perish. That is to say, the
arising causes the factor to pass from the future into the present; duration main-
tains it ....
Does this mean that the factor is "of four moments"? This is the doctrine that a Jain
source attributes to the Siirpmifiya and we know that the scholars of Ceylon put three
moments into one moment of mind. But the Sarviistivada doctrine, which distin-
guishes origination, duration and deterioration, has it that these three form only one
indivisible present, a present where the before and after cannot be distinguished.
682
LS: Vasubandhu and Sarµghabhadra disagree (DD.356) on the interpretation of the phrase:
sal'[lsk,rtasya sal'[lskrtalak~a~a. and LVP brings out this difference by providing two trans-
lations (pp. 223 and 227). Representing the Vaibhii~ika view, L VP renders: "Du conditionne, ii
y a, o bhik~us, trois caracteres qui sont eux-memes conditionnes (Of the conditioned, there are,
0 bhik~us, three characteristics which are themselves conditioned)", thus, for example, "the
origination, etc., of the conditio~ed" was taken as a genitive, entailing that origination, etc., are
something apart from the entity they refer to. Vasubandhu (ii, F 227, 234), on the other hand,
understands this phrase to mean: "The conditioned (i.e., the serial continuity of conditioned
factors) possesses three noticeable characteristics that indicate that it is conditioned, i.e., pro-
duced through successive causes." Thus, for him, the three characteristics that are possessed
by the factor determine the quality of the factor itself as being conditioned.
683
LVP: This is the Trilak~a,:ia~asatra (see below ii, F 227). - Sarriyuktiigama, 12, 21;
Aliguttara, i. 152: tf~ 'imiini bhikkhave asarµkhatassa samkhatalakkha~iini I katamiini tf~i I
uppiido paiiiiiiyati vayo paiiiitiyati fhitassa aiiiiathatttll!I paiiiiiiyati. -The Sanskrit redaction has:
sthityanyathiitva (Madhyamakavrtti, p. 145); Kathiivatthu, transl. p. 55: fhitiinam aiiiiathatta.
On anyathiibhiiva, Sal'[lyutta, ii. 274. - The Abhidhamma admits only three characteristics;
certain scholars omit even duration (sthiti) (Kathiivatthu, translation, note p. 374).
For the four characteristics (lak~a~a) of the Vijfianaviida, see Bodhisattvabhumi, I, xvii. § 15.
(Madhyamakavrtti, p. 546).
LS: The Vyiikhyii ~as [WOG. l 71.26ff.]: trf~f 'miini bhi~avafi sal'[ls/qtasya sa1J1skrtalak~a~iini.
katamiini trii:ii. saiµskrtasya bhik~ava utpiido 'pi prajfiayate. vyayo 'pi prajfiiiyate. sthity-
anyathiitvam apiti.
Saf!lghabhadra explains (Ny, 406a; DD.309) that "since the word 'also' (api) appears in con-
nection with each of these [primary] characteristics, the secondary characteristics are also
[implicitly] mentioned in the sutra passage".
684
LVP: abhiprayiko hi siitranirdeso na liik~at).ikal_l [WOG.172.3f.J.
685
LVP: The same comparison, with a different plot, Atthasiilinf, 655.
686
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, L VP mentions the Sautriintikas here.
Rospatt (BDM.42) attributes this position to the Sarvastivadins. He states that this position
"features in the Vibhii~ii (150b 18-22) as yet a further alternative to explain the deviation of the
Abhidharmic doctrine of four saY(lskrtalak~a,:ias from the sutra". Saf!lghabhadra (Ny, 405c;
DD.307) seems to be agreeing with this and explains: "The purpose of the compound is to
indicate that the continuance of conditioned factors necessarily involves change. Uncondi-
tioned factors are distinguished from conditioned factors because they have continuance
without change. . .. One might claim that the continuance of unconditioned factors is not
established, [and hence, the possibility of confusion between conditioned and unconditioned
factors cannot be used as a reason why continuance is not explicitly mentioned in this satra
passage]. This, however, would be unreasonable because [the continuance of unconditioned
factors] is necessarily established. The fact that unconditioned factors have continuance is
established precisely by establishing that there are three unconditioned factors."
687
LVP: sriyam iva kiilakan:ifsahitiim; compare Bumouf, Introduction, p. 255: "The name
Kiilakart).in is an epithet scornfully given by two [of the three] sons of [the very rich house-
holder] Bhava to PiirQa, the son of a slave [and Bhava]. As the [three] brothers were called
after their earrings, which were of wood (i.e., Diirukan:Jin), of lead (i.e., Stavaka~in), and of
lac (i.e., Trapuka~in)-[which at some point in their lives they had chosen to replace their
diamond earrings, as a sign to save themselves from falling into poverty], in order to impose
on PiirQa a name of bad omen-[the two brothers] call him "the one who has death a_s an
earring" (KiilakarQin). This is why the eldest brother defends him, answering that on the
contrary Pu~a is prosperity itself."
688
LS: Rospatt (BDM.42) comments that "the discrepancy between the number of sa'!'lskrta-
lalcya,:ias in the satra and in the Abhidharma suggests that the doctrine of the sa,,,skrtalalcya,:ias
cannot be traced back solely to the Trilak~a,:iasutra. This impression is confirmed by the fact
that the standard terms used for the saY(lskrtalak~a,:zas in the. Abhidharma tradition of the
Sarviistivadins differ significantly from those employed in the sutra. Jiiti (= birth) is used
instead of utpiida (= origination), jarii (= age) instead of anyathiitva (= change), anityatii
(= impermanence) instead of vyaya (= disappearance). The terms jiiti andjarii suggest that the
marks only qualify sentient existence and- not conditioned entities in general as is the case in
the Trilak~a,:zasatra. [ ... ] It may then be assumed that the terminology of the four saY(lskrta-
lalcya,:zas reflects two different currents, one relating them-in accordance with the Trilalcya,:za-
satra-to all conditioned entities, the other grasping them exclusively in terms of sentient life.
. . . Whereas there can be no doubt that the current relating to conditioned e~tities in general
has its root in the Trilak~a,:zasatra, it is likely that the current referring to sentient existence
can be traced back to the final clause of the causal nexus (pratftyasamutpiida), namely that
'depending upon birth (jiiti) there is old age (jarii) and death (mara,:za)' (jiitipratyayaY(I jarii-
mara,:zam)."
689
LS: AH 24; SAH 65-06.
690
LVP: jiitijiityiidayas te$iil'!I te '${adharmaikavrttayaf:i I
The theory of [primary] characteristics ·(lak$a,:ia) and of secondary characteristics (anulak$a,:ia)
is refuted by Nii.gii.rjuna, Madhyamaka, vii. lff. See Madhyamakavrtti, p. 148, on the theory of
Sii.qimifiyas who admit seven [primary] characteristics and seven secondary characteristics,
utpiida, utpiidotpiida, etc.
691
Gokhale: [46ab] jiitijiityiidayas tqtif!I te '${adharmaikavrttayaf:i I
Tib.: [46ab] de dag skye ba'i skyes la sogs I de chos brgyad dang gcig la 'jug I
692
LS: Dhammajoti comments (ESD.193) that, in our present AKB passage here, vrtti, ktiritra
and puru$akiira seem to be synonymous, whereas Saqighabhadra (Ny, 409a-c; ESD.193f.)
makes a distinction between vrtti (J'.},, ~t
gong neng) and kiiritra ( it Jfl; zuo yong):
If a saf!lskrta-dharma serve~ as a cause for the projection of its own fruit, it is saickto
be [exercising its] kiiritra. If it serves as a condition assisting [in the producing of the
fruit of] a different [series], it is said to be [exercising its] function .... Hence, there
is a difference 'between kiiritra and function/efficacy.
This distinction is central to Saqighabhadra's ontological model (see v. 25-27; also ii. 59: the
two stages of causing an effect). See also our endnote to ii. 231.
693
LS: The MVS, 201a, explains that origination and origination-of-origination function dif-
ferently due simply to their nature (dharmatii). Saqighabhadra maintains (Ny, 406a; DD.310)
that even though there is no difference in terms of their intrinsic nature, the distinction
between the primary and secondary characteristics. is based on their respective capabilities
(siimart/J,ya) and range of objects, stating that it is like the case of the five sensory conscious-
nesses and the mental consciousness, i.e., their intrinsic nature being the same while there is a
difference in the range of theit objects.
694
LVP: Ny, 406b16.
LS: This i_s the third place in Pradhan (76.23), where the term Sautrii.ntika is explicitly men-
tioned.
This is the 171h of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.70f.). He
comments that Saqighabhadra (Ny, 406b 16-20; DD.31 lf.) identifies this as the opinion of
Vasubandhn and criticizes it (Ny, 406b20-29). Kritzer considers the basic positions of the
Sautrii.ntika in the AKB and of the Yogiiciirabhiimi to be the same.
Rospatt writes that the MVS, 198a15-bl discusses the different views on the ontological status
of the saf!1skrtala~a,:ias (BDM.44):
As the Sautrii.ntikas in the AKB, the Dii.rHii.ntikas opine that the saf!1skrtalak$a,:ias are
not real entities in their own rights but only conceptually given, just like all other
entities which are classified by the Sarvii.stivii.dins as non-material factors dissociated
from thought (cittaviprayukta saf!lskiira).
To the Vibhajyavii.dins, by contrast, the position is attributed that all SQJJ1skrta-
lak$a,:ias are unconditioned (asaf!lskrta) because only as unconditioned entities can
they be potent enough to effect their function.
The Dharmaguptakas held the same view with regard to the mark of destruction but
considered the marks of origination and duration as conditioned.

According to yet another stance reported in Vibhii~ii. the nature of the saT{ls/q-ta-
lalqa,;as depends upon the entity they qualify. If they are attached to a material entity
they are material, if to an entity of consciousness they have the nature of conscious-
ness and so o\
Cox remarks (DD.148): "For Vasubandhu, the characteristics are abstractions, or provisional
designations, that have no independent function. The production of each conditioned factor
can be explained sufficiently through the collocation of external causes and conditions upon
which it depends. The first three provisional phases of birth, continuance and senescence,
V asubandhu suggests, need no internal cause and destruction needs no cause at all. Condi-
tioned factors are, by nature, disposed to arise and pass away and need no additional char-
acteristics to make them do so."
695
LVP: tad etad iikiisa1f1 patyate [WOG.173.22f.]: Space is a pure nothingness, a pure
absence of any matter susceptible of resistance Isapratighadravyiibhiivamlitram iikiisam]. One
cannot analyze it (vipatyate, vibhidyate).
696
- LS: It is not that clear what the reference ofyathii here is, but Yasomitra (WOG.173.26ff;
DD.358) identifies it as the previously described functions of the primary and secondary char-
acteristics as applying, respectively, to eight factors and one factor.
697
LVP: See Saqighabhadra's reply, Ny, 406b20 (DD.312ff.).
698
LVP: See F 223, note.
LS: Pradhan: sa,,,skrtasya bhik~ava utpiido 'pi prajniiyate. vyayo 'pi prajfliiyate. sthityanya-
thiitvam apfti.
699
LS: This is the 181h of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.72f.). He comments that Saqighabhadra (Ny, 406c2~07b5) identifies this as the opinion
of Vasubandhu and "argues at length that in fact the Buddha taught the three sa1f1skrtalak~a,;as
with respect to the moment and not to the stream".
Ny, 407a (DD. 315):
Now, this interpretation by [the sutra master] should not [be accepted as] the mean-
ing of the sutra. First, one should not allow that there is only one arising, one passing
away, and one change within the stream of conditioned forces. Further, if it were
admitted [that the characteristics are to be applied to the stream of conditioned forces
as a whole, and not to a single moment], it would not need to be expounded. Even if
those [fools] who grasp the self had never heard [this teaching] that there is arising
and passing away, and so on, -in the stream of conditioned forces, they would still be
capable of discerning it automatically. Since, even though they discern it, they still
grasp the self, the further expounding of this teaching would be superfluous.
Ny, 407b (DD.317):
Finally, the statement in the satra, "the arising of that which is conditioned also can
be discerned, the passing away, and change in continuance also can be discerned", is
made with regard to moments. The intention of this sutra passage is that when the
arising, and so on, of a moment is examined, it can be discerned. Therefore, the Lord
made this stateme"t-in order to motivate his disciples to examine [the arising, and so
on, of each moment].

700
LVP: catviirimiini bhik~av~ pratisar~iini I katamiini catviiri I dharma):i pratisar~aip. na
pudgala):i I arthal_l pratisarai:iaip. na vyafij anam I nitiirthasiltriintaip. pratisarai:iaip. na neyiirtham_ I
jfiiinaip. pratisar~atp. na vijfiiinam [WOG. l 74.8ff.].
See the sources cited in Madhyamakavrtti, 268, 598.
701
LS: Sanghabhadra writes (Ny, 407c; DD.320f.):
[S] What is specified by the term "stream of conditioned forces"?
[O-V] It refers to the uninterrupted flow of conditioned factors.
[S] Then, what factor constitutes its intrinsic nature?
[O-V] [The stream] is a provisional factor (prajfiaptidharma). How could one seek
intrinsic nature [in it]? Rather, moments are mutually similar; they are intercon-
nected [in a relation of] cause and effect; the conditioned forces produce effects,
which occur in succession without termination; this is referred to as the stream [of
conditioned forces].
702
LS: This is the 19th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.74f.), stating that the Buddha referred to the series and not to the moment since the
arising, etc., of a moment is impossible to discern. Saip.ghabhadra (Ny, 406c28-29) identifies
this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and disagrees with it (Ny, 407al 3-20).
But as we will see later (F 229), Vasubandhu accepts that the characteristics can also be
applied to each moment, provided that one does not consider them to be distinct real entities.
703
LS:_ L VP has: "Trois sarrikrtalak.rn,:tas du sarµskrta sont obj et de connaissance."
704
LS: 1. Saip.ghabhadra replies to Vasubandhu's statement as follows (Ny, 407bl; DD.317):
Further, [even though the characteristics of] birth, and so on, as applied to a single
moment [cannot be observed by ordinary direct perception], they can be discerned by
subtle discriminative intellect: that is to say, if one closely examines the immediate
succession of moments, one will be able to discern them. Subtle discriminative
intellect is produced as a result of the exposition of [the teaching], and it discerns the
impermanence of conditioned forces and is able to remove grasping of the self. Since
this [impermanence of conditioned forces] is discerned by subtle discriminative
intellect, it is unreasonable ·to claim that the three characteristics of arising, and so
on, as applied to a single moment cannot be discerned.
2. But Vasubandhu himself also states at vi. 14cd:
According to the School [kila], the application of mindfulness to the body (kiiya-
smrryupasthiina) is perfected [ni,Ypanna] when, being concentrated (samiihita), [the
practitioners] see [pasyatafi] the [conglomerate of] atoms [parama,:tu] and the suc-
cessive moments (k1a,:ia) in the body [or see the body as atomic and momentary].
Rospatt (BDM.216), on the other hand, translates kila in this passage a$ "reportedly" and takes
it to mean that "Vasubandhu indicates that his information is due to hearsay and that he
himself has no direct access to such an experience". But he then also refers to our section here
(F 226), commenting that "Vasubandhu even argues that the Trilak,Ya,:tasatra cannot refer to
momentary entities since their origination and so on are not cognized (according to Yasomitra,
WOG.174,18f., because of the difficulty to ascertain a /cya~ precisely, lcya~sya duravadhiira-

tvlit), whereas in the siitra the origination and so on are depicted as objects of knowledge
(utplido 'pi prajnayate)."
3. As for the MVS, it presents Bhadanta Vasumitra's view regarding "duration" (MVS,
201 b; see LVP's Documents d'Abhidharma: La Controverse du Temps, F 155ff.):
The characteristic "duration" during one moment is subtle, difficult to recognize,
difficult to conceive (prajnapyate). This is why the Sutra says that the conditioned
forces do not last: the measure of one moment is known to the Buddha, it is not the
domain of the Sriivakas and Pratyekabuddhas.
Regarding _the "experience, of momentariness" in general, Rospatt (BDM.216) points to the
paucity of pertinent textual material but then draws attention to a passage in the MVS,
840c21-841al l (BDM.210f.), which, addressing the notion of death (mara1Jasaf!1jna), teaches
how the experience of momentariness can be obtained by narrowing down the span of time
over which the arising and disintegration of the groups of factors constituting the person
(skandha) is observed:
[The yogin] contemplates that the skandhas (i.e., the groups of factors constituting
the person) of one's lifetime arise at the time .of conception (pratisandhi) [and] perish
when old age and death are reached. Now one lifetime has numerous stages [of life]
(i.e., infancy, adolescence etc.) in each of which the skandhas are different. Setting
aside the other [states], he sees the skandhas of one state arising earlier and perishing
later. Now one stage [of life] has numerous years in each of which the skandhas are
different. Setting aside the other [years], he sees the skandhas of one state arising
earlier and perishing later.
[Following this pattern, the envisaged period of time is reduced successively
from a year to a season, to a month, to a day, to an hour (muhiirta), to a minute
(lava), to a second (ta/cyalJa).]
Now one second (tatk~alJa) has numerous moments (k~al}a) in each of which the
skandhas are different. Because the k~al}as [within a second] are e)!.tremely numer-
ous, there is with regard to them a successively [more] subtle [summary] contempla-
tion [of several k~a~s] (i.e., the number of /cya1Jas: is gradually reduced over which
the rise and fall of the skandhas is observed) until the skandhas are seen to arise in
two and to perish in [the same] two k~alJaS. This is called the completion of the
[preparatory] practice of the viewing of origination and destruction (*udayavyayanu-
pasyanliprayogasamlipti). Immediately after this, one is able to see the skandhas arise
in one and to perish in [the same] one k~alJa. This is called the perfection of the
viewing of origination and destruction (*udayavyaylinupasyanlisiddhi). At such a
time, orie says that the notion of death (mara,:iasaf!ljiiii) (i.e., its contemplation) has
been brought to completion, because the destruction of states is nothing but death.
Rospatt takes this section to mean that the skandhas are really perceived to arise and vanish
every moment, and not just envisaged as doing so.
705
LS: na cii 'prajnliyamiinii ete lak~alJaf!I bhavitum arhanti. The above translation is influ-
enced by Collett Cox's Pradhan-based translation (DD.360).
This is the 20 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.78f.),
stating that that which is not discerned should not be called a lak~mJa. Saiµghabhadra (Ny,
407b5-6) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and disagrees (Ny, 407b6-8; DD.317):
Next, as for [the Sutra master's] statement, "that which cannot be discerned should
not be established as a characteristic", one cannot state unequivocally that an entity's
not being discerned constitutes a sufficient reason for its not being a characteristic.
Even though gross discriminative intellect cannot discern characteristics such as [the
aggregate of] feelings, and so on, it is not the case that they are not characteristics.
Therefore, [his] statement, "that which cannot be discerned is not a characteristic", is
not reasonable.
706
LS: This is the 21'' of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.80f.). He comments that Saqighabhadra (Ny, 407bl2-14) identifies this as the opinion
of Vasubandhu and disagrees with it (Ny, 407b14-24), stating that the word sar,iskrta is
used twice in order to indicate that the characteristics and that which is characterized exist
separately.
707
LS: This is the 22nd of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.82f.). Saqighabhadra (Ny, 407c9-11) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu, who,
according to Saqighabhadra, is conforming to the accepted doctrine of the school of the
Sthavira Srilii.ta. Saqighabhadra (Ny, 407c17-408b28) refutes Vasubandhu's definitions of
each of the four lalcya,:ias in tum.
Pradhan.77.6-8 gives: tatra praviihiisyiidir utpiido I nivrttir vyaya~ Isa eva praviiho 'nuvarta-
miina~ sthiti~ I tasya pilrviiparavise~a~ sthityanyathiitvam.
708
LS-· This is the 23 rd of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.84f.). Saqighabhadra (Ny, 408b2S--c5) says that the sutra passage quoted by Vasubandhu
does not suppo11 his view that the four characteristics are to be applied to the stream of con-
ditioned forces as a whole, and not to a moment, since the sutra passage suggests that Nanda
knows past and future dharmas, the existence of which Vasubandhu denies.
709
LVP: Sarµ,yukta, 11, 14. - pravii.hagatii. hi vedaniis tasya viditii evotpadyante I viditii ava-
ti~thante I viditii astar,i parilcyayar,i paryiidiinar,i gacchanti I na ~ai:iagatii.Q k~ai:iasya durava-
dhii.ratvii.t [cf. WOG. 175.6ff.].
Tibetan: The kulaputra Nanda (Comp. Ariguttara, iv. 166).
Compare Sar,iyutta, v. 180; Majjhima, iii. 25 (where the Fortunate One says of Sii.riputra what
he says here of Nanda):
dhammii viditii uppajjanti viditii upa{thahanti viditii abbhatthar,i gacchanti.
LS: Cox comments (DD.363): "Yasomitra (WOG.175.Sff.) explains that the feelings that are
known, as mentioned in this-sutra passage, are those in a stream, not those of a single moment.
Two reasons are given: first, a single moment is difficult to delimit (lcya,:iasya duravadhiira-
tvat:>---:..that is, it is difficult to distinguish one moment from the next, and thereby, establish the
limits of any given moment within the experience of feelings; second, feelings here must apply
to a stream, since it is impossible to establish a moment that is known (viditasya ca lcya,:iasyd
'vasthiiniisar,ibhaviit).
710
LVP: 'dir smras pa rgyun gyi dang po skye bani II chad pa 'jigpa gnas paste II de nyid sna
phyi'i bye brag ni II gnas pa gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid 11 yang 'dir smras pa sngon med las byung
skye ba ste I rgyun gnas de chad 'jig pa yin II rgyun gyis snga phyi 'i bye brag ni II gnas pa
gzhan du 'gyur bar 'dod I skad cig ma'i chos la ni I gnas pa med na 'jig par 'gyur II de yang
'jig 'gyur de yi phyir I de yi der rtag don med do I
jiitir iidifi praviihasya [ucchedo vyavafz] sthitis tu safz I
[sthityanyathatva1?1] tasyaiva [purviiparavisi~ratii] II
abhutvii bhiiva (!fpiidafz prabandhafz sthitir anityatii I
taducchedo Uar~tasya purviiparavisi$rata] II
k~a,:iikasya hi dharmasya [sthiti1?1 vinii,'l/haved vyayafz] I
sa ca vyeti [svayaf!ll tasmiid vrthii tatparikalpanii 11
Majjhima, iii. 25, contains the formula eval!l kila me dhammii ahutvii sambhonti that becomes
the thesis oJ the Sautriintikas abhutvii bhiiva utpiidafz (F 229, line 18), which we read in
Milinda, p. 51., ahutvii samblwti, and which is contradicted by the Sarviistiviidins and by Milinda,
p. 52: natthi keci saf!lkhiirii ye abhavantii jayanti. - Niigasena is a Vibhajyaviidin, p. 50.
LS: The verses are slightly different in Pradhan (77.11-14) (see RCY A.235):
jiitir iidifz praviihasya vyayas chedafz sthitis tu safz I sthityanyathiitva1?1 tasyaiva purva-
aparavisi~ratii 11
jiitir apurvo bhiivafz sthitifz prabandho vyayas taducchedafz I sthityanyathiitvam i~raf!l
prabandhapurviiparavise~a iti I
711
LVP: If one says: "It is due to duration (sthitisadbhiiviit) that the factor (dharma), once
· arisen, does not perish for a moment; lacking duration, even this moment would not exist"-
no, for the moment exists due the causes that produce it.
If one says: "Duration welcomes, embraces (upagrh,:iati) the factor engendered by causes", we
ask: ''If duration did not accomplish this function, what would happen?" - "The factor would
not exist (iitmasattii dharmasya na bhavet)." - "Then say that duration engenders, not that it
causes to endure."
If one says: "Duration causes the stream to continue (avasthiipayati)", one has to reserve the
name of duration for its causes.
712
LS: Rospatt comments (BDM.23f.) that there is ampther'version of the Jfiiinaprasthiina
(T 1544) which reads ekasmin k~a,:ie instead of ekasmif!ls citte [as well as anityatii instead of
mara,:ia] and that the Vibhii~ii understands this passage "to teach that the three saf!lskrta-
lak~a,:ias all occur in one moment, and explicates that this is t~ught in order to stop the view of
others, notably the Diir~rantikas, that the three saf!lskrtalak~a,:ias cannot exist in one moment".
713
LVP: Ny, 408c7.
LS: This is the 24 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.86f.).
Saiµghabhadra (Ny, 408c7-12) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and argues (Ny,
408c12-409a2) that it leads to contradictions.
714
LS: Rospatt writes (BDM.42f.) that "without assenting to the hypostatization of the
sal!lskrtalak~a1:ias to entities, the Sautriintikas (and Yogiiciiras) took over the Sarvastiviidins'
position that in addition to origination and destruction there are the marks of duration and
change. - On a doctrinally more advanced level, however, their radical conception of momen-
tariness according to which conditioned entities do not exist beyond origination and thus do
not endure or change, prompted the position that conditioned entities are only characterized by
non-existence and an existence (or: origination) which allows for no further differentiation.
This existence and non-existence are usually not identified with the canonical sal'f1skrta-
lak:far:tas, but are instead taught to underlie them."
715
LVP: k~iptiik~iptabalidurbalak~iptasya vajriides ciriisutarapiitakiilabhediit [cf. W0G.176.18ff.].
716
LVP: Smoke is momentary; when it "reproduces"/itself in a higher place than that which
it 6pcupies at first, people say that it rises (iirdhvag<;imaniikhyiil'f1 labhate) and view the rising
(iirdhvagamanatvam) as distinct from the smoke (s~e iv. 2b).
717
LVP: -na ca salJ'lskrtiiniil'f1 riipiidfniil'f1 tiivat Sal'f1skrtatval'!1 la~yate grh,:iatiipi svabhiival'f1
yiivat priigabhtivo na jniiyate pasciic ca sal'f1tate§ ca vise:fa (it!) na tenaiva sal'f1skrtatvena sal'f1-
skrtaivaf!1 lak~ate [cf. WOG.177.26ff.].
If, se\zing the intrinsic nature of visible form, one were to seize it as being conditioned
(sal'!1skrtam iti) before knowing of its pr,vious non-existence, one could say that the con-
ditioned is the mark of the co.nditioneC,,, that the conditioned is characterized by the con-
dition~d (tenaiva tal lak:jital'!1 syiit). But such is not the case.
718
L~: 1. This is the 25 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.88f.). Saiµghabhadra (Ny, 409a2-4) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and
disagrees with it (Ny, 409a4-c8).
2. Saip.ghabhadra, like the *Mahiivibhii:jii, maintains that the characteristics exert their capa-
bility (siimarthya) on a single factor and thus characterize each present moment, which pre-
sents the difficulty or seeming contradiction in our passage. Cox explains (DD.149):
The *Mahiivibhii:jii [200a9ff.] offers two solutions to this difficulty, both of which
attempt to evade the contradiction by proposing a sequence in the functioning of the
conditioned characteristics; that 1s to say, the four conditioned characteristics are said
to exert their activities f"kiiritra) at different times. The solutions also demand care-
ful consideration of th{ meaning of the term "momentary" [see ii, F 232).
According to the first solution," the characteristic of birth functions when both it and
the characterized factor are about to be produced, that is, when both are future. The
other three characteristics function when they and the characterized factor are about
to be destroyed, that is, when they are present. Since a moment is understood, not as
an al;>solute punctuality, but as the period from production to destruction pertaining
to a single factor, the conditioned characteristics could still function within "one
moment", and ~et there would be no contradiction of a single factor being produced·
an'd destroyed ~.t precisely the same time.
As a second solution,h the *Mahiivibhii~ii suggests that the states of production
and destruction as pertaining to one factor do not constitute a single moment, and
yet every moment contains all of the conditioned characteristics. That is to say,
birth functions in the future time period when the factor is about to be produced;
the remaining conditioned characteristics function in the present time period when
that factor is about to be destroyed Here, the *Mahiivibhii:jii summarizes a position
that would appear to suggest that each moment contains three characteristics-
continuance, senescence, and desinence-of one factor t9gether with the birth of
the subsequent factor. In this way, the production and destruction of a single factor
would not be simultaneous.
• MYS, 200a7-12 (BDM.50):

So as to stop this opinion (viz. the position of the Diir~tiintikas that the sarriskrtalak~ai:ias
refer to existence over a stretch of time, MVS, 200a6f), it is explicated (namely in the
version of the Jfiiinaprasthiina commented upon by the MVS, viz. T 1544, 926b20-22)
that the three marks co-exist in one moment.
Question: If so, then one qualified entity (dharma) would have to originate and decay and
perish at one time.
Answer: Because the time of their activity differs, [these marks] are not mutually exclu-
sive. That is to say, when the dharma originates, the [mark of] origination has its activity.
When the dharma undergoes destruction, then the [marks of] age and destruction have
their activity. Even though [as] entities [they exist] simultaneously, their activity is sooner
or later. That the operations of origination and destruction of one dharma have been com-
pleted is called ·"one moment". Therefore, there is no mistake [in our teaching].
b Rospatt translates (MVS, 200a12f.): "The states of origination and destruction do not occur
in one moment, and yet the own-beings of the three (sarriskrtala~ai:ias) exist simultane-
ously in one moment."
Saqi.ghabhadra follows the first solution (Ny, 409a5; DD.329f.), commenting that the fault' of
contradictory functions-in particular that of being .born and perishing-attributed to one
factor in one moment is avoided since the four characteristics exist as distinct entities with
their own distinctive functions quite apart from the factor that they ch ·acterize.
3. Collett Cox comments (DD.150f.):
Sailghabhadra can offer an explanation as to why production and destruction do not
apply to a single factor within a single moment. But what can be done about the three
characteristics of continuance, senescence, and desinence? A partial solution can be
found elsewhere in the *Nyiiyiinusiira [533b7ff.], where Salighabhadra discusses
at length various interpretations of the meaning of a: moment. He first states that a
moment is the shortest period of time that cannot be further analyzed into prior and
subsequent stages. He then adds that a moment refers to the briefest state of condi-
tioned factors and that the present moment refers to that state in which a factor has its
·activity. It would then appear that the limits of a moment are the limits of a factor
exerting its activity. We might then conclude that a moment does not refer to the
shortest possible period of time, but rather to the period it takes to exert activity-a
period that we might imagine occurs in various stages, that is, of continuance, and so
on [see Sasaki (1974), 126ff.].
Despite this attempted explanation, certain problems still remain. For example, how
can we account for the apparent sequence in the exertion of the capability of the three
conditioned characteristics? If we admit this sequence, are we not also admitting
distinctions of "prior and subsequent" within one moment and, thereby, contradicting
Sanghabhadra's own definition? [See Sasaki (1974), 129ff.].
Vasubandhu therefore continues this theme in subsection BAB.2.7.3 in the context of the last
three characteristics.
719
LS: 1. Saqi.ghabhadra comments (Ny, 410a; DD.335) that statements like "origination per-
forms its activity when it is still future" "merely provisionally apply the, term 'activity' to
[what are actually] 'capabilities' functioning .as immediate conditions". 1'bis might be the
reason why L VP translates here kiiritrarri hi karoti as "engenders" ("engendh() and not as
"performs its activity" ("exerce son activite") as with the other characteristics. Sarp.ghabhadra
explains, at Ny, 409b (DD.331), the distinction between activity (kiiritra) and capability
(siimarthya):
Moreover, the states (avasthii) of conditioned factors are not [all] the same. In brief,
there are three types: that is, distinguished [according to whether] the activity [of that
conditioned factor] of projecting its own effect is not yet attained, is just attained, or
has already been destroyed. Conditioned factors are, further, of two types: that is,
those that exist with activity (kiiritra) and those that..exist only with intrinsic nature
(svabhiiva). The former [category] refers to the present:•[that is, when a factor exists
as a real entity characterized by intrinsic nature with activity]. The latter [category]
refers to the past or future: [that is, when a factor exists only as a real entity char-
acterized by intrinsic nature alone, lacking activity]. Each of these [types of condi-
tioned factors] has two further types: that is, those whose capability (siimarthya) is
predominant or subordinate. That is to say, if conditioned factors are able to act as
the cause in projecting their own effect (phaliik~epa), this [capability is predominant
and] is referred to as activity (kiiritra); if they are able to act as conditions assisting
[factors] of a different category, this [capability is subordinate and] is referred to
[simply] as capability (siimarthya). These two types will be extensively considered
in the discussion of the three time periods [Ny, 62lc5ff., esp. 63 lcSff; AKB v. 26
(F 55ff.)].
2. But then again, Dhalllmajoti comments (SA.IV.129) that "activity" is not always used in
_the strict technical sense which uniquely defines "present-ness": "Sarp.ghabhadra also claims
that ... sometimes when the abhidharma siistra-s are referring to a function (e.g., that of
j{jti) that serves as a proximate condition, the term kiiritra is also used expediently". Thus this
should also apply in our context to the kiiritra as related to the other three characteristics,
which is why I render kiiritra here as "activity/capability".
Dhammajoti adds (SA.IV.129) that although in his translation of the *Nyiiyiinusiira Hstian-
tsang "very consistently renders kiiritra as zuo yong ('ft: Jr]) and as distinct from gong neng
(:r)/ ~~) used for the terms denoting activities other than kiiritra, it is important to observe that
in other contexts, both in the AKB(C) and MVS, he is unfortunately not so consistent".
720
LS: Rospatt translates (BDM.51) "because [if it did so wher. it was already present, the
dharma to which it is linked would be so, too, and] so~ething having '[already] originated is
not originated [again]".
721
LS: Pradhan. 78.15f. has: na yadii jiiyate tadii ti~(hati jfryati vinasyati vii. See DD.366.
Rospatt comments (BDM.50) that this view "invited the charge that the qualified entity is all
the same no longer momentary as it thus exists at two necessarily distinct points of time. In
order to preclude this, the moment was defined as the time taken 'by the completion of
origination and destruction" (see below, F 232).
722
LS: Sarp.ghabhadra accuses Vasubandhu of not understanding the distinction between
capability (siimarthya) and activity (kiiritra) (Ny, 409c; DD.334):
[S] Fool! You do not understand this activity (karitra). These [characteristics func-
tion as] capabilities (samarthya) and have no relation to activity. As has been pre-
viously discussed: "If conditioned factors are able to act as the cause in projecting
their own effect (phalak~epa), this [capability is predominant and] is referred to as
activity (karitra). If they are able to act as conditions assisting [factors] of a different
category, this [capability is subordinate and] is referred to [simply] as capability
(samarthya)." All present [factors] are able to act as the cause in projecting their own
effects-[that is, they must exert their own activity]-but not all present [factors] are
able to act as conditions assisting [factors] of a different category-[that is, they need
not exert capability]. For example, an eye in the dark or [an eye] whose capability [of
assisting] has been damaged is not capable of acting as a condition that assists in
enabling visual perceptual consciousness to arise. However, its activity [of projecting
its own effect] is not damaged by darkness because it is definitely able to act as a
cause in projecting a future eye. In this way, there is a distinction between activity
and capability.
723
LS: This is the 26 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.90f.). Sarµghabhadra (409cl7-18) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and replies
(Ny, 409c18-21; DD.333f.):
The three [characteristics] of continuance, seI1escence, and desinence each give rise
to their functions separately in the state in which the factor has already been pro-
duced and cause that characterized factor to have, at one time, points of dependence
that are not the same. Altogether there are three [such points of dependence]. What
contradiction to reason is there in an interpretation such as this?
Cox remarks (DD.368), however, that "the exact meaning of the key-phrase so-wang, 'points of
dependence' or possibly 'desires' or 'objectives', is unclear, and as a result, the meaning of
Saii.ghabhadra's response is obscure".
724
LVP: The Vaibha~ika is a "follower of momentariness" (k~a1Jikavadin): the factor abides
only a moment and perishes of itself. See iv. 2b; Wassilief, p. 325. - But what should one
understand by k~a1Ja? Here is the difficulty.
725
LVP: Other definitions, iii. 86a. See Index: k~alJa.
LS: 1. Pradhan has (78.24): e~a eva hi naf:i k~alJO yavatai 'tat sarvarrz samapyata iti.
LVP mentions (1937, p. 152) the version of Hiuan-tsang: lak~a1Jakiiryaparisamaptir e~a eva hi
naf:i k~a1Jaf:i, and the version of Paramartha: caturlak~a1Jakaryaparisamaptir ... , and points out
that Sarµghabhadra does not comment on this definition which Vasubandhu attributes to
the Vaibha~ika, the forerunner of which can be found in MYS, 200a7-12 (see our endnote
to section BAB.2.7.3.e).
Rospatt comments (BDM.51) "that this definition of the k~alJa is difficult to reconcile with
the conception of the moment as the shortest conceivable unit of time, even more so when
'duration', 'aging' and 'impermanence' are taken to occur successively".
Yasomitra glosses (WOG.178.18ff.): e~a eva hi naf:i k~a,:za iti. karyaparisamaptilak~a,:zo na
tiitpattyanantaravinasalak~a1,1a ity arthal_l, which Rospatt renders:
"Precisely this is the moment [according to] our [understanding]" is to say that [the
moment] is characterized by the completion of what is to be done [by the sal!lskrta-

lak~a!'l(ls], and that it is not characterized by [the entity's] destruction immediately
after its origination.
2. Alexander Rospatt translates parts of Sai:pghabhadra's exposition of k~alJ-a and k~al}ika
(Ny, 533b7-19, BDM.95; with inserts from LVP's translation in Documents d'Abhidharma:
La controverse du temps, 1937, p. 152f.):
What does k~al}a mean? It means the briefest [unit of] time, [a unit] that does not
allow for a division into earlier and later. [- L VP: What is time? - The different
states (avasthii) of being past, future or present. We know from that that time is a
specification or distinction (vise~a) of the conditioned forces (slll!lskiira). And the
briefest state of the conditioned forces is called moment.]
Because it is the most compressed [unit of] time it is called k~alJ-a. [L VP: The (word)
k~al}a designates only the state of the factor endowed with activity (sakiiritriivasthii):
thus the present]. The present entities (by contrast to past and future entities) which
have [this] measure of duration (i.e., the k.ya!'l[l) are called k~al}ika (momentary), as
[an infant of one month is called] miisika_(miisa = month and -ika).
Or [the moment] is called k.yal}a because it destroys ({k,ral} = to injure, break), that
is, it functions as the cause. destroying all entities (dharma). [K.yal}a] denotes the
mark of impermanence which destroys all entities. [Because] the conditioned factors
are endowed with this [mark], they are called k.ya1J,ika.
Or, k.ya1J,ika is commonly (lake) used in the sense of "empty" (siinyaka). This means
that [entities) in the state of being present (rather than being past or future) are called
k,ra1J,ika because they are devoid of something which would support them so that they
do not perish, and hence they necessarily do not persist.
Or, ak,ral}ika is commonly (lake) used in the sense of not having any leisure. This
means that [people] who busy themselves with other things and [thus] do not have
any time for themselves are called ak.ya1J,ika. Only when present (rather than past or
future) do [entities] necessarily have a little time to realize their own fruit (i.e., be
causally effective). Hence they are called k.yal}ika.
[L VP: In truth, all states of the stream of conditioned factors have different times,
"long minutes" (lava), etc. Of all times, the k.ym:,a is the smallest. The factor has it:
thus it is called k.ya,:tika or momentary.]
726
LS: 1. This is the 27 111 of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.92f.). Sai:pghabhadra (Ny, 410al9-25) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and
attempts to refute it (Ny, 410a25--c6) by relying on the doctrine of the tri-temporal existence
and the theory of activity and capability.
2. As for deterioration, Sai:pghabhadra gives two definitions (see above F 222), (1) as the
cause of the distinction between consecutive moments in a stream (Ny, 405c9); and (2) as the
cause of the deterioration.of a factor's activity (Ny, 410bl4).
As for transformation, the MYS, 200a29ff., distinguishes two types (DD.371):
Transformation in intrinsic nature and transformation in activity. If one speaks in
terms of transformation in intrinsic nature, one should say that the conditioned forces
are without transfoI"mation, because their intrinsic nature is without variation. If,
however, one speaks in terms of transformation in activity, one should say that
conditioned forces have transformation. That is to say, a factor in the future does not
yet perform its activity; when it enters the present, it performs its activity; when it
enters the past, its activity has ceased. Therefore, there is transformation of activity.
See BDM.55 for the discussion of various solutions offered in the *MahiivibhiiJli to reconcile
the attribution of the characteristic of change to individual momentary entities.
727
LVP: yadi sa eva nlisliv athiinyathii na sa eva [hi I
tasmlit;f, ekasya dharmasya nlinyathlitva'!I prasidhyati Ill
LS: The Sanskrit manuscript has a lacuna here. Rospatt (BDM.55) comments that Pradhan
took over the .wording from ADV 106,l0f. (Vibhii~iiprabhavnti on the Abhidharmadfpa) where
the following sloka is cited:
tathiitve na jarlisiddhir, anyathlitve 'nya eva sa?i I
tasmlin naikasya bhiivasya jarli nlimopapadyaie I
Rospatt translates (BDM.55):
In the case of being thus (i.~., as always), there is no ageing; in the case of differenc~,
this one is but another [thing]. Therefore, the so-called age is not reasonable [as
referring] to a single entity.
728
LVP: The Sarpmifiyas (see the long discussion at iv. 2c [F 4-8]).
LS: Chii-she-lun-ch( (T 1821) 201 b22-24 (BDM.38): "The Sarpmitiyas believe that among the
conditioned entities, thought-concomitants (citta) and mental factors (caitta), sound, flame,
etc. are momentary. Therefore, they are necessarily without movement. The conditioned fac-
tors dissociated [from the mind] (viprayuktasaf!1skiira), the karmic matter of manifest core
poreal actions (kiiyavijnaptirilpa), the body, mountains, wood, and so on, are not momentary
(kJa,:,ika), [but] abide for a long time."
729
LVP: evam etat satra'!I sunftam ... [WOG.179: 1_4].
730
LVP: We shall study the diverse theories relative to impermanence (anityatva) and to.
momentariness (kJa,:,ikatva) in [my Notes sur le moment (kJa,:,a) des VaibhiiJikas et des
Sautrlintikas (1937; pp. 134-158)].
731
LVP: See above ii, F 231. Any conditioned factor is engendered through its characteristic
"origination". "Origination" arises at the same time as the factor that it engenders; being
"future", origination engenders it before arising itself.
732 Gokhale: [46cd] janyasya janikli jatir na hetupratyayair vinli II
Tib.: [46cd] rgyu dang rkyen dag med par ni I skye bas bskyed bya skyed byed min II
LVP: janyasya janikii jlitir na hetupratyayair vinli I
The causes (hetu) and the conditions (prayaya) are defined at ii. 49, 61c.
733
LVP: The Vyiikhyli [WOG.l 79.19ff,] cites the answer that the Bhadanta Anantarvarman
gives to this objection: "The eye does not produce the visual consciousness without the help of .
light [iiloka], etc.; but, nevertheless, it is the c.ause of the visual consciousness." - Answer:
"We observe that the blind man does not see, that the non-blind man sees: we observe thus the
efficacy of the eye. The same does-not hold for origination."
Anantavarman i$ cited in Vyiikhyii ad ii. 71b-72, iii. 35d and vii. 32.
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautrii.ntikas ·here.
734
LS: iti hetupratyayii eva janakii santi.
735
· LVP: siilqmii hi dharmaprakrtayaf:t [cf. WOG.179.24ff.]: - The nature of thought-con-
comitants, i.e., of contact (sparsa), etc., is subtle and difficult to distinguish. - Without a
doubt, replies the Sautrii.ntika; but the Fortunate One explained the efficacy of contact, etc:
"All that which is sensation (vedanii), ideation (saf!?jiiii), formations (sa,iiskiira), exists because
of contact ... "; but he did not i;xplain the efficacy of "origination".
736
LS: LVP suggests this translation in his Additions et Corrections.
737
LVP: The notion "color" has the particular inherent characteristic (svalak~a,:ia) of color
for its object. But the notion "arisen": "the color.has arisen", does not bear on the color, since
one has the same notion of "origination" when it refers to sensation: "sensation has arisen".
Thus the notion "arisen" bears on the action produced by a certain factor, independent of
color, of sensation, and which is "origination".
738
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautrii.ntika here.
739
LVP: The Buddhists (bauddhasiddhiinta) believe that sandalwood is just the collection of
odors, etc. (gandhadisamiiha). The Vaise~ikas believe that sandalwood exists in and of itself;
this is why the author gives the example of the torso, the example that the Vaise~ikas admit. -
See Madhyamakavrtti, p. 66; Siif!?khyapravacanabhiirya, p. 84, 148; etc.
740
LVP: dharmii,:iiim aniidikiilikii saktif:t.
741
LVP: MVS, 198a15: Some maintain that the conditioned characteristics of the conditioned
factors (saf!?skrtalak~a,:ia) are not real factors, namely, the Dii.r~\ii.ntikas, who say: "The con-
ditioned characteristics of the conditioned factors are included in the aggregate of the forma-
tions dissociated from thought (viprayuktasaf!?skiiraskandha); the aggregate of the formations
dissociated from thought is not real; thus the conditioned characteristics of the conditioned
factors are not real." In order to refute their opinion ....
742
LVP: Hsilan-tsang: "This theory is best. Why?"
743
LVP: That is to say, the Abhidharmasii.stras.
744
LVP: We have four proverbs of the same meaning, i.e., one should not renounce a thing
that is good in nature because of the defects that it presents, because of the risks that it
involves.
l. Na hi bhik~ukiif:t santfti sthiilyo niidhisrfyante.
2. Na ca mrgiif:t santfti yavii (var. siilayo) nopyante.
These two proverbs, which often go hand in hand, are studied by Col. Jacob, in Second
Handful of Popular Maxims (Bombay, Nin:_1.ayasii.gar, 1909, p. 42, index sub voe. na hi
bhik~ukiif:t), with the references that follow: Mahiibhii~ya, i. 99, ii. 194, iii. 23 (Kielhorn), in
the same context (na hi do~af:t santfti paribhii~ii na kartavyii lak~a,:taf!? vii na pra,:ieyam I na hi
bhik~ukiif:t . .. ); Vii.caspatirnisra, Nyiiyaviirtikatiitparyatfkii, pp. 62, 441; Bhiimatf, p. 54; Sarva-
darsanasarr,.graha, p. 3 of Cowell's translation. - We have to add Kiimasiitra (see Cat. Oxford,
216b), where the two proverbs are attributed to Vii.tsyii.yana (indicated by Weber, Indi:,che
Studien, XIII, p. 326).
3. Ato 'jfrTJ,abhayan naharaparityago bhi!cyukabhayan na sthalya anadhisrayaTJ,al!I doffeffu

pratividhatavyam iti nyaya?z.
Col. Jacob cites, for this third proverb, Paiicapadika, p. 63 (of which the end doffeffu prati-
vidhatavyam occurs in Vasuba"1dhu), Jfvanmuktiviveka, p. 8 (which attributes the proverb to
Anandabodhaciiryiyf. and Hitopadesa, ii. 50, doffabhfter anarambha?z ... .
4. Na mak[fika?z' patantfti modaka na bhakffyante.
The proverb for which I have no other reference than Vasubandhu. It seems that ihe Buddhists,
being bhikffus, have substituted mendicant (bhikffuka) and sthiilf (vessel) in the proverb, making
it less biting than with flies and cakes.
745
LS: AH 220; SAH 453.
746
LS: Ibid.
747
Gokhale: [47ab] niimakiiyiidaya?z salJljniiviikyii'k[farasamuktaya?z I
Tib.: [47ab]ming gi tshogs la sags pa ni Iming dang ng12g dang yi ge'i tshigs I
LVP: Surendranath Dasgupta, Study of Patafijali (Calcutta, 1920), _summarizes (pp. 192-201)
the various theories of sphofa. - Siddhi, 68; on sphofa, Abegg, Melanges Windisch, 1914.
LS, 1. Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka (2008) states:
4.2.11 niimak~yii?z katame IdharmiiT}iilJl svabhiiviidhivacaniini I
4.2.11 What is\the collection of names? The expressions [that d~scribe] the essences
of entities. ISBP.239
4.2.12 p'adakiiyii?z katame IdharmiiTJ,iilJl viseffiidhivacaniini I
4.2.12 What is the collection of assertions? The expressions [that describe] the
distinguishing characteristics of entities. ISBP.239
4.2.13 vyafijanakiiyii~ katame I akffariiTJ,i tadubhayiibhivyaiijanatiim upiidii-ya I varTJ,ii
api te niimapadiisrayatveniirthasarµvarr;anatiim upiidiiya Iak[faratvalJl puna~ paryiiya-
alcyaraTJ,atiim upiidiiya I ·
4.2.13 What is the collection of syllables? [It is the collection of] phonemes, because
they are what allow both of them [i.e., the names and assertions] to become manifest.
.They are also the [basic] sounds [of spoken language], because meanings are com-
municated on the basis of names and assertions. Moreover, they are [called] "pho-
nemes" because they cannot be replaced by any alternative form. lSBP.239
TheAvatiira states (ESD.118f.):
Words, phrase~ and syllables are those ~hich_\are produced with the supp~rt o~sp~ech
(viic), and which cause the understandmg [1~ each case] of the respective s1grufied
(sviirtha-pratyiiyaka), in a similar manner as knowledge (jfiiina), manifesting with the
representation/image :!l?1l of the signified (artha). These are the synonyms, respec-
tively, for name (salJljfiii); sentence (viikya) and phoneme (akffara). Just as visual
consciousness, etc., are produced with eyes, etc., as their support; manifesting with
the representation of the signified (artha), the visible, etc., and [thus] comprehend the
respective objects ( § :lt; sviirtha). The same applies to words, etc.
It is not the case that vocal sound can directly manifest the signified; [for] it cannot
be that when one utters the word "fire", one's mouth is immediately burnt! Words
like fire etc., must rely on speech for their production. From these words, the signi-
fied, fire, etc., are then manifested.
By "manifesting" (dyotayat1) is meant producing in others a comprehension (buddhi)
of the signified to b(I illuminated (dyotita). It does not mean that [the word] unites
with the signified. As sound is resistant, and as the eternal sound falsely held by
the grammarians (vaiyakara,:iena parikalpita) is unreasonable, there cannot be any
dharma [such as sound], apart from these three-words, phrases and syllables-
which are capable of manifesting a corresponding signified. These four dharma-s-
sound, word, the signified and knowledge-however, are similar in form, [though
they are in fact distinct entities].
2. As for the history of the collections of names, of phrases and of syllables as real forces
that impart significance to names, phrases and syllables-in this way making human com-
munication possible-Jaini comments in his The Vaibha~ika Theory of Words and Meanings
(CPBS.202) that the Vaibhii.~ika theories of words and their meanings (artha) can be traced
back primarily to their speculations on the nature of the words of the Buddha (buddhavacana)
(see AKB i. 25-26). Thus the Sangftiparyiiya defines the teaching (dharma) as the three col-
lections of name, phrase and syllable, and that which is manifested, understood, indicated, and
so on, by these names, phrases and syllables is called the signified or referent (artha). But
the intrinsic nature of buddhavacana was also early on a controversial topic. Yasomitra quotes
[WOG.52.15ff.], two passages from the Jnanaprakara,:ia (SA.IV.309):
1
·
What is buddha-vacana? That which is the Tathiigata's speech, words, talk, voice,
explanation, vocal-path, vocal sound, vocal action, vocal expression (vagvijfiapti) ... .
What is this dharma which has just been spoken of as buddha-vacana? The sequen-
tial arrangement, sequential establishment and sequential combination of the nama-
kaya, pada-kaya and vyafijana-kaya.
The preferred view of the MVS, 658c and 659c (SA.IV.309), explains that the first passage
deals with the nature of buddhavacana, determining it to be vocal information (vag-vijfiapti),
whereas the second passage deals with the function of buddhavacana; but the MVS also
mentions, without rejecting it, the opinion of some who assert that buddhavacana has nama,
etc., as its nature.
Yasomitra himself [WOG.52. lOf( CPBS.202] comments (i) that the Sautriintikas determine
buddhavacana to be of the nature of vocal information and hence included it in the rapa-
skandha, (ii) that those who maintain the category of the viprayukta-sal!lskaras include it in the
sal!lskara-skandha, and (iii) that the A.bhidharmikas (but not naming them) accept both these
views. Jaini thinks (CPBS.203) that the Abhidharmikirsseem "to refer to certain Vaibhii~ikas
like our Dipakiira who favoured the view that while the Buddha lived, his vacanas are of the
nature of nama as well as of vak (albeit in a secondary sense) but after his death, they are only
of nama,svabhava".
Sarpghabhadra does not object to either of the first two views (see endnote to i. 25).
Although the collections of names, phrases and syllables are recognized in early Sarviistivii.din
Abhidharma treatises as discrete formations dissociated from thought, they are analyzed exten-
sively only from the period of the Vibhii~a compendia onward, where the focus then also
shifts from the explanation of buddhavacana to a more abstract analysis of the nature of
language and its operation. Cox comments (DD.163) that "the central problem becomes the
nature of the relation between language, thought, and the world of specified referents". But
even the AKB is still more concentrated on the refutation of the niimakiiya, etc., than on their
explanation. Jaini summarizes the Vaibhiieyika and Sautriintika positions as follows (CPBS.204):
The Vaibha~ika maintains that verbal sound alone is not capable of conveying any
meaning. A verbal sound (viik) operates on the niiman, and the latter conveys the
meaning. Thus it is the niiman which gives significance to the word, which is purely
material. This niiman is a viprayukta-sar!lskiira . ...
The· Sautriintika maintains that the niima-kiiyas do not play any part in conveying a
meaning. It is true that all sounds or sounds alone (gho~a-miitra) do not convey a
meaning. But verbal sounds (viik) which are agreed upon by convention to mean a
particular thing (krta-sariketa) do convey. their meanings. Since such a sariketa is
essential even in the assumption of the niima-kiiya, the latter is redundant and hence
useless.
These theories of words and their meanings seem to have been influenced by the contemporary
Mimiirp.sakas and the Grammarians (Vaiyakarlll).a), who had developed, respectively,. their
theories of eternal words and of sphofa. In this context Jaini comments that the Vaibhiieyika
exposition of the niima-kiiya offers several points of comparison with the sphofa theory of
early Grammarians (CPBS.211):
Sphofa is defined as "the abiding word, distinct from the letters and revealed by
them, which is the conveyor of the meaning" [Miidhava, Sarvadarsanasarigraha,
p. 300]. The niima-kiiya is also distinct from letters (i.e., sound), is revealed by them,
and is claimed as the conveyor of meanings. The Vaibhiieyika argument that sounds
on account of their seriality cannot convey a meaning, is identical with the argument
of the Sphotavadins against the Naiyayikas who, like the Sautriintika, maintained that
verbal sounds (with the help of sariketa) convey the artha. But whereas the sphofa is
called a sabda [although not in the ordinary sense of sound] and described as one and
eternal, the niima-kiiyas are nowhere designated as sabda and are declared to be
many and non-eternal.
As for the Mimiirp.saka, Cox comments (DD.160):
Language analysis in northern Indian Abhidharma Buddhist texts appears to have
originated with inquiries into the nature of the Buddha's teaching. One motive for
this analysis was undoubtedly a desire to resolve the apparent contradiction between
the belief in the nature of the Buddha's teaching as eternal doctrine and its pheno-
menal expression through speech. Early Mimiirp.saka investigations of language also
begin from a concern with the character of their basic text, specifically from a desire
to validate the Vedas as the infallible repository of eternal truth and ritual authority.
However, unlike the Buddhists, the Mimarp.sakas propose that the relation between
words and their referents is natural, ·or inborn (autpattika), and exists eternally quite
apart from either sound or human formation.
3. As for other language-related issues in the AKB, we have already mentioned Vasu-
bandhu's discussion of buddhavacana at i. 25-26, but he also discusses it briefly at i. 7cd,
862 Exposition of the Faculties (/ndriyanirdesa)
when explaining ground of discourse (kathtivastu) as one of the synonyms for conditioned
factors. The etymology of niiman as "that which bends" and the common meaning of ntiman,
i.e., as designation or ·"that which causes ideation to arise" (sa,rijntikara1,1a), is discussed at
iii. 30a in the context of explaining name-and-form, the fourth member of dependent origina-
tion (pratftyasamutptida), although in the latter context ntiman carries a different meaning
than in the context of niimaktiya. As the smallest unit of names or words (ntima), the syllable
(ak~ara) is briefly discussed at iii. 85bc, and as the object-field or basis of false speech,
maliciou.s speech and frivolous speech, nar.1e or word (ntima) is .discussed at iv. 72. The
collection of names, etc., are taken up again within the context of the qualities the Buddha
has in common with noble ones, namely, the four unhindered knowledges (pratisa,rtvid;
vii. 37b-40c):
i. unhindered knowledge of the (designation of the) factors (dharma-pratisa,rtvid);
ii. unhindered knowledge of the jesignated thing (artha-pratisa,rivid);
iii. unhindered knowledge of etymology (nirukti-pratisa,rivid);
iv. unhindered knowledge of eloquence (pratibhtina-pratisa,rivid).
There is also the important passage at iii. 30cd, ·where Vasubandhu discusses contact through
designation (adhivacanasa,rtsparsa) and explains adhivacana as name (ntima), specifying it to
be the additional cognitive object or the cognitive object (tilambana) par excellence (adhikam)
of contact associated with the mental consciousness.
Besides niimakiiya, etc., language is naturally also related to sound (sabda); for references see
our index, but also Vasubandhu's discussion of the eight types of sound, including sound of
vocal informative action, at i. IOb and his dis·cussion of sound as an atom (paramii1,1u), as being
part of the composite mole.cules involvipg sound (sa,righiitapiiramii1,1u) at ii. 22.
In the context of karma, vocal action is discussed in general as vocal action (viik-karman;
iv. 2, 3d), i.e., as vocal bodily action (viiag-vijiiapti-karma) and vocal non-informative action
(viig-avijiiapti-karma), and more specifically as false speech (mr~aviida), malicious speech
(paisunya), harsh speech (piirn~ya) and frivolous speech (saTJJbhinnapraliipa) at iv. 74c-76. As
for right speech (samyagviic), it is discussed within the context of the eightfold noble path
(iv, F 16f., 23ff; vi, F 246, 284, 291). As for voice (viik) not being a controlling faculty, see
ii, F 112.
At ii. 33ab '[F 174], initial inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (viciira) are discussed, from a
Sautriintika point of view, as "constituents for speech" (viiksa,riskiira).
As for the references to sa,rijiiii, which is closely related with niiman, see the references at
i. 14cd and also the comments below.
4. As for examinations of language in general, Cox writes (DD.159f.):
[The] early Buddhist and non-Buddhist investigations of language consider many
of the same issues and appear to be aware of the same range of possible solutions,
which were then developed in characteristic fashion within each tradition. Prominent
among the issues examined are the origin of language, the nature of language in
relation to sound and concept, the functional relationship among the components of
language, the character of the referent of language, the mechanism by which that
referent is suggested through language, and the dynamics of communication. The
treatment of language in Buddhist Abhidharma materials devotes particular attention
to the nature of language and to the relation between language and its referents. The
major topics in this investigation include the nature of language either as sound or as
name (nilman), the existential status of name, and the function of name with regard
to both concept [sar,njfiil] and sound [sabda], specifically in manifesting the object-
referent [artha].
5. As for nilmakilya, etc., being "formations dissociated from thought", Collett Cox explains
(DD.163f.) that even though nilmakilya, etc., are closely related to sound and thus material
form (riipa), they can also be communicated non-verbally, i.e., they cannot be included within
material form. On the other hand, even though-as objects of thought-nilmakilya, etc., are
closely related to ideations (sar,njfiil), since ideations are factors necessarily associated with
thought they are confined to the individual mental consciousness in which they arise.
Therefore, only a factor dissociated from both thought and material form could, in all these
varying circumstances, support the transmission of ideations from one _consciousness to
another.
748
LS: 1. Cox explains (DD.163) that names (i) are based upon syllables or phonemes
arranged in a specific order, (ii) function to manifest the signified (artha) or the intrinsic
nature of the signified, (iii) bear a close relation to ideation (sar,njfiil) and (iv) enable ideations
to .be communicated.
2. The MVS, 73b2ff., states (DD.401):
The.Buddha categorized conditioned factors generally in two groups: form and
not-form. Form is the form aggregate; not-form is precisely the four aggregates
_of feelings, and so on. The group that is not-form is referred to as name because
names, which are able to manifest all factors, are included within it.
The meaning of the term nilma, as used in this MYS passage, is not the same as the meaning of
the term nilma, as in nilmakilya.
749
LVP: [Yasomitra explains (WOG.181.30ff.):] The term sar,njfiilkara,:ia belongs to every-
day language (lokabhii~il); it is an equivalen~ for nilmadheya, name, appellation, for one says:
"Devadatta is a sar,njfiiikara,:ia sound." But, here, one should understand: "That which causes
ideation to arise." In fact sar,njfiil is a mental factor (dharma), "ideation", "idea", "notion", or
"concept" (i. 14cd); nilman is that which "causes", that which engenders this factor (dharma).
LS: 1. Cox comments (DD.164) that among the three collections, niimakilya receives the
greatest attention in the later Abhidharma language analyses due to its pivotal role in the
relation between thought or ideations and' the object-referent or meaning or signified (artha).
Vasubandhu identifies nilma simply as sa,µ.jfiiikilra,:ia: tatra sa,µ.jfiilkara,:ia,µ. nilma, without
giving much further explanation. In contrast to L VP who interprets sa,µ.jfiiikara,:ia as "that
which causes ideation to arise", Yasomitra interprets [WOG.181.32ff.] sar,njfiilkara,:ia in two
ways (DD.164):
It can be understood either as a dependent determinative compound (tatpuru~a): that
is, "[name is] the maker of concepts", or "that by which the mental factor, concept,
is made or produced" [yena saqijfia caitasiko dharmaQ kriyate janyate]. Or, the
compound can be interpreted as a descriptive determinative (karmadhiiraya) used
exocentrically (bahuvrfhi): that is, "[name is] that of which the maker is concepts"
[saqijfiaiva vii kara1,1aqi sar,njfiil-kara,:iar,n]. In other words, Yasomitra suggests a
reciprocal functioning, whereby name is either the cause of concepts, or concepts are
the cause of names. P'u-kuang cites both of these interpretations and adds a third,
whereby name and concept are identified with one another. However, Yasomitra
observes that name and. concept m!l_st be distinct "for if name were said to be pre-
cisely concept, it would be possible for [name] to be a mentat factor", and name is,
instead, classified among the dissociated factors.
Sanghabhadra explains (Ny, 413a18ff.; DD.378):
The characteristic, __ name, is manifested by articulated sound (gho~ahand is [then]
able_ to ~anife~t the object-~eferent. It is_ a ~pecification establ~shed . ~n common
(krtavadhi), which both mamfests that which ts produced by an mtentton (*iisaya)
and is able to represent the intrinsic nature of object-fields (vi~aya) that are\known, in
the same way as an echo.
2. Since Vasubandhu does not elaborak much here in our sections, things have tq be filled
in from other sources that circle around passages based on the ideation (sarrijiiii) s~ction at
i. ·14cd, the conceptualizing activity (vikalpa) section at i. 33 and the above m¢ntioned
"contact through designation" (adhivacanasarrisparsa) section at iii. 30cd. Dhammaj~ti sum-
marizes the pith of it (ADCP.107):
Besides prajiiii, sarrijiiii also is a contributing factor for the abhinirupar_zii[-vikalpa].
This is clear from the fact that its functioning is said to involve a synthetic com-
prehension of appearance (nimitta), name (niima) and signification (artha). Thus the
Avatiira defines it as [ESD.80]:
This is that which comprehends, by combining conceptually (sarri-.fjiiii) the
appearance, name and the signified [of a dhanna]. That is, with regard to matter
like blue, yellow, long and short [figures], etc.; ... dharma-s like males and
females, etc.-it comprehends them, [in each case], by conceptually combining
together (eka--{jfiii) their appearances, names and signification. It is the cause of
reasoning (vitarka) and investigation (viciira). Thus this is named ideation.
It is on account of the contribution from sarrijiiii that mental consciousness is able to
operate by means of name(= adhivacana) which is therefore said to be the additional
cognitive object (adhikam iilambanam) of mental contact (manab-sarrisparsa; iii. 30cd).
Saiµghabhadra comments that it is "additional" because mental consciousness takes
both niima and artha as its object, whereas the five sensory consciousnesses do not
take niima as their perceptual objects [Ny, 506c]. The functional difference that
results from this factor of name is explained in the Vijiiiina-kiiya-siistra as follows:
The visual consciousness can only apprehend a blue colour (nflam), but not "it is
blue" (no ti nilam iti). Mental consciousness can also apprehend a blue colour.
[But] so long as it is not yet able to apprehend its name, it cannot apprehend "it
is blue". When it can apprehend its name, then it can also apprehend "it is blue"
[T 26, 559b--c; cf. Ny, 342a].
Cox points out a circular process of name (niima) and ideation (sarrijiiii), and its connection
with understanding (prajiiii) (DD.165):
For Sanghabhadra, name and concept [sarrijiiii] function in"close connection with one
another. A concept functions as an associated thought concomitant and, by definition,
acts to grasp the defining mark (vi~ayanimittodgraha) of a perceived object-field:

that is, it discriminates or determines (pariccheda) the particular state (avasthii-
vise~a) of a given entity (vastu) as blue, yellow, long, and so on [see AKB L 14d;
Ny, 339a26ff; ESD.80]. This concept then applies a particular name in accordance
with the determined or discriminated mark of the object-field; one identifies the
object-field with a name through the operation of defining conceptual discrimination'
(abhinirapar:iavikalpa) [see AKB i. 33; MVS, 219b7ffi Ny, 339b29ff.]. Sanghabhadra
refers to this process of.identification of an object's defining marks in his description
of the activity of name as one of according with (Ch.: sui), summoning (Ch.: chao),
and joining with (Ch.: ho) the object-referent [Ny, 413a23ff., 414b24ff]. Name thus
functions bi-directionally-that is, both internally and externally: it is both held in
thought prior to speech and expressed outwardly to others through speech. When a
name is uttered, that name pr-oduces a concept in the consciousness of the listener.
Thus, depending upon the perspective, concepts elicit names, or conversely, names
elicit concepts; names and concepts, thus, function in a circular process of identifica~
tion and communication.
• This defining conceptual discrimination (abhinirupar:iavikalpa) is unconcentrated (asamiihita)
insight (prajiiii) that is associated with mental perceptual consciousness and is produced
through hearing (srutamayi) or through reflection (c.intiimayi), and not through cultivation
(bhiivaniimayi). It operates on an object-field in relative dependence upon its name
(niimiipek~ii). See MVB 42 p. 219b7ff.j
3. As for the term artha, Cox explains (DD.170) that it not only denotes the abstract mean-
ing of a -word, but a~so the object-referent to which the word refers, as, for example, when
Vasubandhu refers to the object-referents of the five externally directed sense-faculties. In the
context of the Avatiira's discussion of niimakiiya, Dhammajoti comments (ESD.195): "The
meaning of artha is as ambiguous as ever; ... we have therefore chosen the rendering 'the
signified' which perhaps could cover the sense of 'meaning' as well as 'object'."
As for the existential status of artha, ·ohammajoit comments in a private communication
related to niimakiiya and saf!ljiili: "One thing is clear: artha, whether in the sense of 'meaning'
or 'object-referent', is a relative real, and not an absolute real, ... unless it means 'the object
(of Reality)' .... I.e., if artha means just an object in the sense of 'an external thh1g' such as a
man, a tree, etc., that we are cognizing, then Sarvastivada w~mld say that it is t;eal-though a
relative real (because it ultimately has a real existent as an iisraya; otl)erwise, µo cognition at
all would be possible). But if by artha one refers to the object q9a a svabl/iiva which has
manifested in the present as the perceptual object, one could say that it refer~ to an absolute
real (svabhiiva). In AKB i. 9ab, [for example,] the objects are c\early stated t~ be the sensory
objects-rupa, sabda, etc.-these are 'objects (of Reality)', 1.e., real entitie!I> according to
Sarvastiviida.... In the Avatiira definition, artha does not mean so much 'the object per se' but
'what is signified by the object' .... Artha as signification is not an absolute real (not a sva-
bhiiva), hence one should not expect to find it among the seventy-five dhan;na-s."
750 LS: Sanghabhadra explains (Ny, 413a; DD.378f.): "The characteristic, phrase, is able to
explicate the object-field that is known from both a detailed and cursory perspective, [ ... ]from
the perspective of its distinctive characteristics."
751
LVP: This does not refer to pada = declined or conjugated form (Pii.Qini, i. 4, 14).
752
LVP: The entire stanza should be considered as apada [cf. WOG.182.lOff.]:
anitya vata saf!1skara utpadavyayadharmi,:iaf:z I
utpadya hi nirudhyante tefii,Tfl vyupasamaf:z sukhaf:z II
which can be explained in several ways:
1. Thesis (pratijna): "The conditioning forces (saf!1skiira) are impermanent." Reason (hetu):
"because their nature is to arise and perish". Example (drftanta): "those sentient beings, who
are born ;md die, are impermanent".
2. Reason: "Their nature is to arise and to perish", is established by the remark: "In fact,
being arisen, they die."
3. "The conditioning forces are impermanent, in other words, their nature is to arise and
perish"; "because, being arisen, they perish"; "being impermanent, they are unsatisfactory,
thus to stop them is happiness", this is what the Buddha wants to teach his followers.
°fl!is is the stanza that Sakra uttered at the death of the Fortunate One, Dfgha, ii. 157;
SaJ?1yutta, i. 158; Dialogues, ii. 176; Jataka, 94; Madhyamakvrtti, p. 39; Manuscript Dutreuil
de Rhins, J. As., 1898, ii. 300 (p. 108); Udanavarga, i. 1: Mdo, 26, Anityatasiitra; J. Przyluski,
Funerailles, p. 9.
753
LVP: A type of"nominal phrase".
754
LVP: [WOG.182.31ff:] Name (naman) makes one see (dyotaka) the particular inherent
characteristic (svalakfa,:ra); phrase (pada) makes one see the different relations [saf!1bandha-
visefa] in which thi, factor whose particular inherent characteristic is known, occurs.
755
LS; Cox comments (DD.163): "Syllables (vyanjana) are defined as the basic components
of language or as the smallest unit of articulation, and not, as the term vyanjana might suggest,
as the more limited category of consonants. Syllables are then identified as phonemes
(akfara), which is not to suggest that they are mere vowels, but rather that syllables include
consonants with an inherent vowel. These discrete syllables or phonemes then form the basis
of names and phrases, and enable sounds to convey meaning to another."
Saqighabhadra explains (Ny, 413a; DD.379):
A syllable is able to act as the basis of that which manifests [the object-referent],
because the [name and phr~se] that manifest [the object-referent] depend upon and
have their origin in this. [The word] "this" [in the previous sentence] is precisely this
phoneme: that is to say, it causes [an utterance to be] fixed in memory [such that]
there is no forgetting; or, further, it is able to preclude doubt because [name and
phrase] are preserved through this [phoneme]; or it is able to preserve that [name and
phrase] and transmit them to another.
He further explains (Ny, 751a10ff; DD.400): "A syllable is not able to relate directly to the
obJect-referent; it is merely the basis of name and phrase, which specify the object-referent."
756
LS: Pradhan. 80.19f. has efaf!I ca SllJ?1jnadfnam samuktayo namadikiiyaf:z.
757
This is the 28 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.94f.).
Saqighabhadra identifies (Ny, 413cll-13) this as the opinion of 'Vasubandhu and refutes it
(Ny, 413cl3-414all) based on both scriptural authority and reasoned arguments for nama
being distinct from sound. Here are his reasoned arguments (SA.IV.312f.):
Sometimes one gets the sound but not the phoneme; sometimes one gets the phoneme
but not the sound. Hence we know that they differ in substance.
The first case is that of hearing the sound and not comprehending the artha: n is
observed that some people listen to others' words vaguely and then ask, "what did
you say?" It is all because they have not comprehended the syllables uttered. How
then can one assert that the syllables are not different from the sound?
The second case is that of comprehending the artha without hearing the sound: It is
observed that some people, without hearing the actual words spoken by others, know
what they are saying by watching the movement of their lips, etc. This is all because
they have comprehended the syllables uttered. This proves that the syllables must be
different from the sounds.
Again, it is observed in the world that people recite mantra silently, hence we know
that the syllables of a mantra differ from the sound of the mantra.
Again it is observed in the world that, of two debaters whose articulation of the
sound is similar, one loses and the other wins. This cause of losing and.winning must
exist separately from the sound.
Again as the object-domains (vi~aya) of the "unhindered knowledge of dharma-s"
(dharma-pratisa,rivid) and "unhindered knowledge of etymological interpretation"
(nirukti-pratisa,rivid) are different, we know that the phonemes are distinct from
sound.
Hence, [we may conclude from all this that] sound is merely the articulation of a
language; and its form is not differentiated. The inflection therein must be made in
dependence on ka, ca, ta, ta, pa, etc. The phoneme must be uttered by means of vocal
sound. When the phonemes are joined together, niima is produced. Niima having
been produced, it can illuminate the artha. Hence, we assert the following [causal]
sequence: Vocal sound gives rise to niima; niima illuminates artha. Therefore, it is
universally established that niima is different from sabda. It should be understood
here that sabda is that which utters and ak~ara is that which is uttered; artha is
neither. Thus they are established without confusion.
758
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautrii.ntika here.
This is the 291h of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.96).
Saipghabhadra identifies (Ny, 414allff.) this as the opinion of Vasubandhu. He insists that
sound alone is not able to convey mean(ng but what is needed is (DD.165) the combinations of
the phonemes that constitute each particular name, being established specifications (krtiivadhi)
provisionally determined by consensus (sa,riketa). He states (Ny, 414a18ff.; DD.385):
It is precisely these names that are the specifications established [with regard to
object-referents]. When speakers are about to issue forth speech, they must first
reflect upon a certain specification. In this way, they are able to understand the
object-referent manifested in their own speech or in the speech of others. There-
fore, sound alone is not able to manifest the object-referent.
Cox comments (DD.166) that this position is in marked contrast to ''the Mimiqlsaka theory of
the eternal character of language-that is, that the relation between a word and its object-
referent or meaning (sabdiirthasa7!1bandha) is natural and infallible, not subject to human
invention or to the vicissitudes of human intention. This rejection of the Mimarµsaka position -
is indicated in the Abhidharma classification of the name, phrase, and syllable sets as
included among factors constituting sentient beings (sattviikhya) [see AKB iL 47cd]."
159
LVP: Compare Amarasi7!1ha, iii, Niiniirthavarga, 25.
760
This is the 30 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.98).
Sarµghabhadra identifies (Ny, 414a24-26) this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and rejects it,
insisting that without niima, the meaning of speech could not be understood. Sarµghabhadra
explains his own position as follows (Ny, 414b4-9; DD.386):
Speakers first hold the intended name in thought and only then form [the following]
intention: "I will issue forth such and such a word and express such and such an
object-referent to others." In this way, at a subsequent time speech is issued forth in
accordance with' one's intention, and phonemes are issued forth in dependence upon
speech. Phonemes, further, issue forth in names, [but] only names manifest the
object-referent. [The evolution of name, and so on], is reasonable, if established
relying upon the perspective of this principle of successive dependence such that
"speech issues forth in names and names manifest the object-referent". If name were
not first held in thought, even if one were to issue forth speech, there would be no
definite specification, and [this speech] would not enable others to understand the
object-referent.
Cox comments (DD.403): "In this explanation, Sailghabhadra attributes a double role to name.
First, one holds a name, or a name-concept, in thought, and only then is one capable of uttering
speech. Thereafter, one issues forth a verbal name. Sarµghabhadra does not explicitly propose
that there are two distinct types of names: one as spoken and one as mental concept. However,
the association between name and concept (sa7!1jfiii) coupled with the frequent provision that
name is issued forth from speech does lead to ambiguity as to the true nature of name."
761
LVP: That is to say: "given the voice, the word-a factor dissociated from thought-arises".
762
LVP: That is to say: "the word-a factor dissociated from thought-arises with the articu-
lated sound in the process of arising: the articulated sound manifests it with a view to the
designation of the object" (gho~ei:iotpadyamanena sa cittaviprayukto dharmas utpadyate I sa
tarµ prakiisayaty arthadyotanaya [WOG.183.26f.]).
763
LS: This is the 31 st of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.l0Of.). Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 415a25-b3; DD.393f.) identifies this as the opinion of Vasu-
bandhu and claims that, since Vasubandhu does not accept past and future factors, this leads to
various problems in regard to his appeal to a series of sounds as together constituting a
collocation by which the signified is specified. But Sarµghabhadra als_o offers arguments for
the existence of "name" as a "non-vocalized, meaning-bearing or object-referent-signifying
unit" (DD.168) by stating (Ny, 415b; DD.394):
Since, according to our accepted doctrine, no [factor] fails to exist in all three time
periods, the last·[moment (of sound)] is able to ·p~uce the name, and so on, in
dependence upon prior [moments that still exist]. Even though name, and so on,
are only [actually] produced in the last moment, one cannot apprehend the object-
referent by hearing only that [last moment]. This is due to the fact that one has not
heard all the [prior] sounds that were issued forth in accordance with an initial
consensus established in common with regard to the name, and so on ....
764
LS: Yasomitra explains (WOG.183.33ff; DD.405):
"When [speech] produces that [name], how would [speech] produce it at that time?"
Thus is the meaning of the sentence. For speech that produces name would produce it
[only when that speech] is present, but not all moments of the sound of speech are
present at one time. For in saying the word rupa, when the sound "r" is present, the
"a", "p", and "a" are, !It that time, [still] future. When the "a" is present, the sound
"r'.' has [already] been uttered at that time and the "p" and "a" are [still] future. In
this way, when the "p" and "a" are present successively, the others are not present at
that time. Thus, speech should not produce name.
765
LS: "Yasomitra (WOG.81.12ff; DD.405) explains:
When one undertakes the priitimok~a vows of discipline, the manifest actions of body
and speech operate, [or issue forth,] and there is no complete assemblage of those
[manifest actions in a given moment]. Then, the last moment of manifest action pro-
duces the unmanifest action imparted by the priitimok~ii vows in dependence upon
past [moments of] manifest action of body and speech. In the same way, the last
moment of the sounds of speech produces name in dependence upon past [moments]
of sound.
766
LS: Based on Pradhan, Cox translates (DD.406): "Since even those with special insight
and applied thought are not able to discriminate syllables and speech from the standpoint of
[their] characteristics, it is not reasonable that speech be either the producer or manifester of
syllables." vyafijanaJ?1 cii 'pi viig [iti] visi~(aprajfiii apy avahitacetaskii lak~aT}atalJ paricchettuJ?1,
no 'tsahanta iti vyafijanasyii 'pi viik nai 'vo 'tpiidikii na prakiisikii yujyate.
767
LS: Pradhan. 81.23 has niimasa1J1,nisritii giithii giithiiniiJ?1 kaviriisraya!J.
LVP: SaJ?1,yuktiigama, 36, 21. Saf!!yutta, i. 38: niimasa1J1,nisritii giithii. The giithii is a "phrase"
(viikya); it is based on the words, since it exists when the words have arisen. Therefore, word
and phrase exist in and of themselves.
768
769
LVP: arthe~u krtiivadhilJ sabdo niima [WOG.185.22]. - Mahiivyutpatti, 245, 319, repro-
duces the expression krtiivadhi, 'tshams bead pa.
770
LVP: paliktivat, "like the line of ants"; but, one would say, the ants that form the line
exist at the same time: we shall give a new example: cittiinupurvyavat, "like the succession of
thoughts".
771
LS: This is the 32 nd of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.102f.). Vasubandhu suggests that, for the Vaibhii~ikas, the syllables (vyafijana) alone
should suffice to be posited as real entities. Sarpghabhadra identifies (Ny, 414b9-11) this
as the opinion of Vasubandhu and replies that his position is unreasonable for three reasons
(Ny, 414bllff; DD. 387f.):
1
There is no [one moment of] time in which syllables operate simultaneously; a
870 Exposition of the Faculties (Irulriyanirdesa)
collocation [of syllables) is not reasonably established; and it is not the case that no
single syllable can manifest an object-referent.
[The dependence of name, a1;1d so on; upon a collocation of syllables is analogous to
the case of a tree and its shadow.] It is like a tree that is established through the
combination of fundamental (mahabhuta) and derived material elements (bhautika)
[and thus exists provisionally]. A shadow is not produced separately without
depending upon [the tree]. Even though that shadow is issued fol'th 1n dependence
upon a provisional entity, the nature of the shadow is not provisional. In the same
way, many syllables gather and produce a separate name and phrase. Even though
that name and phrase are issued forth in dependence upon a provisional entity-[that
is, the collocation of syllables]-their nature is not provisional ....
A single phoneme of the type [that is .also a name] does not specify anything [by
itself), just like a phoneme that is without an object-referent. A name arises sepa-
rately taking this [single phoneme] as its condition, and only then is [that name]
able to indicate the object-referent. However, just as it is difficult to distinguish two
patches of light on a wall, so also is it difficult to apprehend the separateness [of
two things that] are extremely close, [such as a phoneme and the name that it issues
forth].
772
LS: This section is missing in LVP. Pradhan.81.26f. has tatsamuhii eva niimakayiidayo
bhavi~anti 'ty apiirthikii tatprajiiaptil,I. See DD.404.
773
LVP: The factors which are of the domain of the consciousness of the Tathligatas (tathii-
gatajfliinagocarapatita) are not accessible through reasoning. (tarkagamya).
774
Gokhale: [47cdl] kamarupiiptasattviikhyii ni~andii 'vyiikrtiis
Tib.: [47cdl] ·'dod dang gzugs gtogs sems can ston I rgyu mthun lung bstan min
LVP: kiimarupiiptasattviikhyiini~andiivyiikrtii~
MVS, 71c25-72a29.
775
LVP: The phonemes, etc., are not "voice" by their nature. Nothing hinders their existdnce
in the realm of immateriality, but, since voice is absent in this realm of existence, one cannot
pronounce them there. -The Vaibhii~ika: How could you say that they exist there where they
are not pronounced?
LS: Cox comments (DD.406f.) that both views are presented in the *Mahiivibhii~ii, which
seems to prefer the first interpretation, i.e., that name, and so on, are limited to the first level
of meditation within the realm of fine-materiality (riipadhatu), which she further specifies:
According to this first interpretation, names, phrases, and syllables are limited to the
realm of desire and the first level of trance in the realm of form because the realm to
which they. are connected is determined in accordance with speech. Speech, as
described previously (Ny, 415a3), is produced only in dependence upon initial
inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (viciira), which are present only in the realm of
desire and the first level of trance within the realm of form. Thus, if the location of
name is determined in accordance with speech, it too must be limited to these two
regions.
776
LS: Sarµghabhadra remarks (Ny, 416a; DD.408): "When it is said that name, and so on,
are produced from action, it means that they are the sovereign effects (adhipatiphala) pro-
duced by action."
777
LVP: [Saqighabhadra comments (Ny, 416a):1 The words that designate the wholesome
factors are not wholesome: since a person who has cut off the wholesome roots speaking of
wholesome factors, possesses (prapti) the words 1 that designate these factors.
LS: Saqighabhadra adds (Ny, 416al 1; DD.399): "[When one utters a name], one is accom-
panied by the name, and so on, that is able to specify [a certain factor], and not by the factor
that is specified."
As for syllables, names and phrases being unobscured-non-defined, P'u-kuang (1 l lcl2ff.;
DD.408) discusses:
Why do name, and so on, not have three varieties [of moral quality-that is, virtuous,
unvirtuous, and indeterminate]-in accordance with the [moral quality of] the sound
[that expresses them]? One desires to issue forth verbal activity as a result of atten-
tion (manaskiira). Therefore, articulated sound is of three moral qualities in accor-
dance with the [moral quality of the moment of] thought that issues forth speech. But
proper attention does not project names, and so on. Therefore, they are only inde-
terminate.
778
Gokhale: [47d2-48bl] tatha I sabhagata vipako 'pi traidhatuky
Tib.: [47d2-48bl] de bzhin I skat mnyam rnam par smin pa'ang yin I khams gsum paste
779
Gokhale: [48b2] aptayo dvidha I
Tib.: [48b2] thob rnam gnyis I
LVP: Hstian-tsang corrects: The possessions (prapti) are of three types, i.e., "of a ino~ent"
(ic~a~ika; i. 38), "of equal outflow", "of retribution".
780
·Gokhale: [48cl] lalcya~ani ca
Tib.: [48cl] mtshan nyid rnams kyang
781
Gokhale: [48c2-d] ni~yandal:z samapattyasamanvayal:z II
Tib.: [48c2-d] snyoms 'jug dang I mi ldan pa dag rgyu mthun pa II
782
LS: Hstian-tsang, vi, fol. 1a.
783
LS: AH 25~31, 48, 230, 234; SAH25, 36, 68-88, 153-55, 232, 460-62, 465,469,478,
480, 525-46.
1. Dhammajoti introduces generally the topic and history of hetu,pratyaya and phala in the
following way (SA.IV.24):
All dharma-s in phenomenal existence are pratftya-samutpanna~ependently origi-
nated from an assemblage of conditions. In this respect, they are often called saf!l-
skrta-s, "the compounded/conditioned".
In the Sarviistiviida conception, dharma-s are distinct ontological entities which, in
their intrinsic nature, abide throughout time, totally unrelated to one another and
totally devoid of any activities [cf. MYS, 105c, 108c, 283b, 396a, etc.]. Given such
a theory, it is of fundamental importance that the school has an articulated causal
doctrine of accounting for the arising of dharma-s as phenotQ.ena and their dynamic
inter-relatedness in accordance with the Buddha's teaching of pratftya-samutpiida

[see AKB iii, F 56-119]. Moreover, for the establishment of each of the dharma-s as
a real entity, a conditioning force (saf!lskiira), its causal f.unction in each case must be
demonstrated. It is probably for this reason that the Sarviistiviida was also known as
Hetuviida ["the school that expounds the causes"]-a school specifically concerned
with the theory of causation....
The Sarviistiviidins eventually articulated a doctrine of four conditions, six causes
and five fruits. Significant portions of the Sarviistiviida canonical abhidharma trea-
tises are devoted specifically to these topics. Thus, the Vijiiiina-kiiya-siistra discusses
the four conditions (pratyaya) at length; the Jiiiina-prasthiina-siistra expounds on the
six causes; the chapter "On saf!lgraha, etc." of the Prakaraf}a-piida-siistra contains a
total of twenty doctrinal perspectives con.nected with hetu-pratyaya.
In terms of history, Saqighabhadra further maintains (Ny, 416b-c; SA.IV.143f; WOG.188f;
see below LVP's endnote) that the doctrine of the four conditions is found in the siitra-s of
their school and that the six causes were not only at one time in their Ekottariigama, although
no longer extant, but that indications of them are scattered in the various siitra-s. The MVS,
79a-c, states that the siitra-s speak only of the four conditions while at the same not repudiat-
ing the opinions of other masters, one of which is identical with Saqighabhadra's (ESD.200):
These six hetu-s are not mentioned in the siitra-s. The siitra-s speak of the four
pratyayatii-s only: viz: hetu-pratyayatii, etc., up to adhipati-pratyayatii. There are
again some who say that six hetu-s are also mentioned in the siitra-s; i.e., in the
Ekottariigama. A long time having passed, the particular siitra-s have now been lost
(antarhita). The Ven.erable Kiityiiyaniputra and others, by the power of their praf}idhi-
jiiiina, perceived the siitra passages which deal with the six hetu-s, and compiled
them in their abhidharma treatises. Other masters say that although not all the six
hetu-s as such are spoken of together in order, in any siitra, their mention is found
here and there scattered in the various siitra-s. Hence these six hetu-s are taught by
the Buddha.
Dhammajoti concludes that the doctrine of the four conditions most probably preceded that of
the six causes. He then raises the question of what is the doctrinal need and significance for the
six-hetu doctrine to be articulated in addition to the earlier four-pratyaya doctrine or for the
elaboration of the hetu-pratyaya into the five hetus (see Fig. 1). He answers (SA.IV.145 and
164) that this Sarviistiviida elaboration (i) shows that all real entities (dharma)-including both
the conditioned and the unconditioned-must be shown to be causal forces, (ii) accounts for
the dynamic arising and interaction of the distinct dharma-s that are totally unrelated in their
intrinsic natures, (iii) reflects their "need to highlight the co-existent cause which exemplifies
the school's fundamental principle of causality that cause and effect necessarily exist simulta-
neously, even though their modes (bhiiva) of existence may differ-either past, present or
future, and thus (iv) corroborates fundamentally their central doctrine of sarviistitva.
2. More specifically, in regard to dharmas as causal forces, etc., Dhammajoti comments
(SA.IV.148f.):
In the Sarviistiviida perspective, all dharma-s have always been existing. As a matter
of fact, time is an abstraction on our part derived from their activities [MVS, 393c].
A dharma exists throughout time and yet is not permanent as it "courses in time"
(adhva-sa1?1ciira). But as the MYS explains, "conditioned dharma-s are weak in their,
intrinsic nature, they can accomplish their activities only through mutual depend-
ence":
We declare that the causes have the activities as their fruits, not the entities in
themselves (svabhiiva/dravya). We further declare that the effects have the
activities as their causes, not the entities in themselves. The entities in them-
selves are without transformation throughout time, being neither causes nor
effects. [MYS, 105c]
Moreover,
'the tri-temporal dharma-s exist throughout time as entities in themselves; there
is neither increase nor decrease. It is ortly on the basis of their activities that they
are said to exist or not exist [as phenomena]. [MYS, 396a]
But, in tum, their activities necessarily depend on causes and conditions [MYS, 108c]:
Being feeble in their svabhava-s, they have no sovereignty (aisvarya). They are
dependent on others, they are without their own activity and unable to do as they
wish. [MYS, 283b]
3. In regard to whether causes and conditions are different or not, see endnote below (F 244,
bottom).
4. See Dhammajoti's detailed discussion in chapter 6: "Theory of Causality I. The Six
Causes", and chapter 7: "Theory of Causality II. The Four Conditions and the Five Fruits", in
his SA.IY.143-86, where he also deals in greater detail with the issue of simultaneous
causation and the doctrinal importance of the co-existent cause for the Sarviistiviida. See also
his ~rticles "The Sarviistiviida Doctrine of Simultaneous Causality" (2000); "Sahabhiihetu,
causality and sar:vastitva" (2002); likewise see the sections "The Middle Abhidharma Texts
and the Emergence of Causal Theory" and "Conclusion" iil Collett Cox's article Dependent
origination: its elaboration in early Sarviistivadin Abhidharma texts (1993).
784
LS: The Avatiira (ESD.116 and 120) states that the causes of origination are twofold,
namely, (1) internal, i.e., the origination-characteristic (jati), and (2) external, i.e., the six
causes or,four conditions. ,
But, whereas for the Sarviistiviidins the arising and ceasing of a dharma requires causes and
conditions, for the Diir~tiintikas it is ortly the arising, i.e., not the ceasing, that requires causes
and conditions.
785
LVP: The Vyakhya [WOG.188.13ff.] makes the following remarks:
1. There is no difference between hetu and pratyaya, for the Fortunate One said: dvau hetii
dvau pratyayau samyagdr~fer utpadaya I katamau dvau I paratas ca gho~o 'dhyiitma'!l ca yoniso
manasikiira}:t (Ariguttara, i. 87: dve 'me bhikkhave paccayii sammiiditthiya uppiidiiya ... parato
ca ghoso yoniso ca manasikaro).
2. hetu, pratyaya, nidana, kiira,:,a, nimitta, liriga, upani~ad are synonyms.
3. Why is a separate exposition of the causes (hetu) and the conditions (pratyaya) given? -
Because (i) the exposition of the causes involves the examination of the cause as cause "not
constituting an obstacle", co-existent cause, homogeneous cause, etc. (ii. 49); (ii) the exposi-
tion of the conditions involves the examination of the cause as causal (hetu), immediately
preceding, etc., (ii. 62).
4. On hetu and pratyaya, see Siddhi. - The opposition of hetu and pratyaya is clear in Kosa,
iv, F 100, 176.
I.s: Dhammajoti explains•(SAJV.176) that even though the terms "cause" and "condition"
were used more or less synonymously in the siitra-pifaka and there was no distinction between
them articulated in the early canonical treatises of the Sarviistivii.da, it is in the MVS, 109b-c,
that we come across various well-defined distinctions between the two:
What are the differences between a cause and a condition? According to Venerable
Vasurnitra: There is no difference-a cause is a condition, a condition is a cause ....
He further explains: If when this. existing that exists, then this is the cause as well \l.S
the condition of that. ...
In addition: [what pertains to] the same species is a cause; what pertains to a different
species is a condition, e.g., fire to fire, wheat to wheat.
In adc'.ition: what is proximate is a cause; what is remote is a condition. In addition:
what is unique is a cause; what is common is a condition....
In addition: what produces is a cause; what subsidiarily produces (Flt ii~ 1:-) _is a condi-
tion.
In addition: what fosters its own series is ~ cause; what fosters another's series is a
condition....
(Also cf. opinion of apare in the MVS, 663b: "Adhipati-pratyaya-s are either direct
or indirect, close or remote, united or not united, arising here or arising in another.
Those that are direct, close, united, arising here, are called hetu-s. Those that are
indirect, remote;·not united, arising in another, are called pratyaya-s.")
Thus, we know that although a cause and a condition do not differ in respect of sub-
stance, there is a difference in significance: a cause signifies what is proximate, a
condition sigmfies what is remote.
For further distinctions mentioned by SllfJlghabhadra, see Ny, 449c-450a (SA.IV.176f.).
786
I.s: Dhammajoti explains (private communication) that "adhipatiphala is the only fruit of
kiir(JT,lahetu, [although the other five causes .are part of the efficient cause]. But one must
look into the meaning of adhipatiphala". He glosses (SA.IV.512): "adh!pati-phala: 'fruit of
(pre)dominance'; this is the fruit of the kiira,:ia-hetu. The fruits of collective karma-s also
come under this category." He comments further (SA.IV.180): "This is the most generic type
of fruit, correlated to the most generic type of cause, the efficient .cause." See Vasubandhu's
discussion of the efficient cause (ii. 50a).
787
LS: In the chart note that the samanantara-pratyaya and iilambana-pratyaya have no
correlatives among the six causes. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.145) that "this suggests that
the,doctrine of the four pratyaya-s has a wider scope than that of the six hetu-s".
As f~ the mutual inclusion or subsumption (sa,rzgraha) between the causes and the conditions,
the~. 79a-b (SA.IV.171), mentions two opinions, of which the second is the one presented
in the Al\\B:
Question: Do the causes subsume the conditions, or do the conditions subsume the
causes?
Answer: They mutually subsume each other, accordingly as the case may be: The
first five causes constitute the condition qua cause; the efficient cause constitutes the
other three conditions.
According to some: the conditions subsume the causes, but the causes do not sub-
sume the conditions: The first five causes constitute condition qua cause; the efficient
cause constitutes the condition of dominance; the immediate condition and the condi-
tion qua object are not subsumed by any cause.
788
LS: AH 25, 48,234; SAH 68-72, 74-76, 78,469.
789
Gokhate: [49] kii~a,:zarri sahabhiis c aiva sabhiigal:z samprayuktakal:z I sarvatrago vipiika-
iikhyal:z ~a<J,vidho hetur i~yaJe I
Tib.: [49] byed rgyu than cig 'byung ba dang I skat mny(Jm mtshungs par than pa dang I kun tu
'gro dang mam smin dang I rgyu na rnam pa drug tu 'dod I
LVP: Abhidharmahrdaya (Nanjio, 1288), ii. 11.
LS: Saqighabhadra mentions (Ny, 416b; EIP.703f.) that the six causes are listed according t.o
the extent of their inclusiveness: (1) the efficient cause includes all co~ditioned and uncondi-
tioned factors, (2) the co-existent cause includes all conditioned factors, (3-6) the homogene-
ous cause, associated cause, pervasive cause and ripening cause each include a portion of
conditioned factors. However, an unconditioned factor is neither caused by another uncon-
ditioned factor nor by a conditioned factor, while a conditioned factor can be caused by con-
ditioned and unconditioned factors. Further, while the homogeneous cause, the pervasive
cause and the ripening cause arise prior to their effects, and the co-existent cause and the
associated cause arise simultaneously with their effects, the efficient cause can atjse either
prior to or simultaneously with its effect.
790
LVP: In what Sutra are the six types of cause (hetu) promulgated? In fact the Abhidharma
only explains, assesses, comments on the Sutra (sarvo hy abhidharmai). sutriirthai). sfitranika~aJ:i
sutravyiikhyiinam [WOG.188.23f.]).
The Vaibhii~ikas say that the Sutra that dealt with this aspect has disappeared (antarhita). The
Ekottariig~ma enumerated the factors (dharma) up to the categories of 100 factors, but it no
longer contains the categories above ten up to the decades (iidasakiit). (See Introduction by La
Vallee Poussin.)
But the Sutras that characterize each type of cause (hetu) are not absent and the Vyiikhyii
[WOG.188f; see SA.IV.143f.] provides examples borrowed, as it seems, from Saqighabhadra
(79b16).
1. kiira,:iahetu (efficient cause): "The visual consciousness arises due to the eye sense-faculty
and visible forms" (Sarriyutta, iv. 87, etc.). '
2. sahabhuhetu (co-existent cause): "These three members of the path accompany (anuvart)
right view." "Contact is the collocation or coming together of the three, [i.e., sense-faculty,
object-referent, consciousness]; sensation, ideation and intention arise together."
3. sabhiigahetu (homogeneous cause): "This person (pudgata) is endowed with wholesome
factors, with unwholesome factors; his wholesome factors perish, his unwholesome factors
unfold, but there exists an accompanying (anusahagata) wholesome root that has not been cut
off (asti ciisyiinusahagata,ri k_usalamulam asamucchinnam), on account of _which there is the
possibility of the arising of another wholesome root: this person, in the future, will become
pure" (visuddhidharmii. bhavi,ryati; cp. Anguttara, iii. 315).
In a similar context, Sa,riyutta, iii. 131 (compare Kathiivatthu, p. 215), has anusahagata, which
Sarpghabhadra here translates exactly (sui chu hsing ); it refers to a strong wholesome root,
identified (Sarpghabhadra, 99b19) with purii,:ia-anu-dhiitu (?) (chiu sui chieh) of the school of
the Sthavira.
But the MSS of the Vyiikhyii [WOG.188.31] has a,:iusahagata and we shall see that, in the
Bhii,rya of iv. 79d, the Chinese version of Jfiiinaprasthiina gives the exact equivalent: wei chu
hsing. To. this passage a,:iusahagata is the .equivalent of weak-weak (mrdumrdu): "Which are
the wholesome roots called a,:iusahagata? -Those which are abandoned last when the whole-
some roots are broken; those through the absence of which the wholesome roots are said to be
broken." [We have seen above (ii, F 184) that, strictly speaking, the wholesome roots are
never broken.]
'4. sa,riprayuktakahetu (associated cause): "That which is called faith (sraddhii), having
insight (darsana) for its rciot, associated with perfect cognition (avetyajfiiina; vi. 74c): that
which those persons cognize (vijiiniiti), they penetrate it through understanding (prajfiii;
prajiiniit1)."
5. sarvatragahetu (pervasive cause): "For the persons who have false' view (mithyiidr~fi;
v. 7) the bodily actions, the vocal actions, intention, resolution (pra,:iidhiina), the sa,riskiiras
that follow these actions, etc., all these factors have ,for 'their consequence unhappiness,
hideousness. -- Why? - Because they have a view-of-transgression (piipikii), namely, false
view." (Compare Anguttara, v. 212) .
. 6. vipiikahetu (ripening cause): "From the action done here ... they savor there the retribu-
tion."
791
LS: AH 25; SAH 69, 78.
792
LS: Ibid.
793
Gokhale: [50a] svato 'nye kiira,:ia,ri hetu~
Tib.: [50a] rang las gzhan pa byed rgyu'i rgyu 1.
LVP: svato 'nye kiira,:iahetufi.

LS: The MVS, 104a (SA.IV.149f; ESD.199):
What is the efficient cause?
Answer: Conditioned by eye and a visible, visual consciousness arises. This visual
consciousness has as its efficient cause the eye, the visible, the dharma-s conjoined
with it, the dharma-s co-existent with it, as well as the ear, sound, auditory con-
sciousness, ... the mental organ (manas), the mental objects (dharma), mental con-
sciousness, [i.e.,] all the dharma-s which are material (rupin), immaterial (arupin),
visible (sanidarsana), invisible (anidarsana), resistant (sapratigha), non-resistant
(apratigha), with-outflow (siisrava), outflow-free (aniisrava), conditioned (sal'[lskrta),
unconditioned (asa,riskrta), etc.-'-all dharma-s excepting itself.... Efficient (kiira,:ia)
[here] means "being non-obstructive", "accomplishing something" (i'i ?Jr~).
Avatiira (ESD.122):
When dharma-s are produced, they have all dharma-s, excluding themselves, as their
efficient causes. They are [efficient causes] either [in the sense of being] non-ob-
structive [to their arising] (avighnabhiiva) or [in the sense of being] capable of pro-
ducing [the dhanna-s].
794
LS: Saqighabhadra comments (Ny, 417a; EIP.VIII.704): "This is due to the fact that a
factor is always an obstruction to itself, no entity is self-caused, and no entity functions with
regard to itself, just as a sword does not cut itself and so on."
795
LS: WOG.189.17f: sarvadhanniifi saiµslqtiisarµslqtii~. - SAH 78 also has: "All factors-
conditioned and unconditioned ones-are said to be the efficient cause."
796
ii
LS: SAH 78.
797
LS: For this and the next section, cf. WOG.189.18ff.
798
MW: kiiraTJ,a: cause, reason, the cause of anything; instrument, means; motive, origin,
principle.
799
LVP: As soon as knowledge of the truths takes place, the causes of defilements are no
longer complete; since the possession (priipti) of the defilements is cut off through this knowl-
edge.
800
LVP: Montaigne, iii. 9: Princes give me sufficiently if they take nothing from me, and do
· me much good if they do me no hurt; it is all I require of them. (Translation: John Florio)
801
LS: Even though the unconditioned transcend space-time and therefore are not directly
involved _in the cause-effect processes in phenomenal existence, they can be regarded as causes
in the sense that they too function as objects of thought (see SA.IV .147).
802
LS: Cox summarizes Sanghabhadra (Ny, 417a; EIP.VIlI.704): "Efficient causes are of two
types: (1) those that act as causes of another factor simply because they do not obstruct its
arising, and (2) those that act as productive causes of another factor."
803
MW: pradhiina = chief thing or person, the most important or essential part of anything,
the principal or first, chief, head of.
apradhiina = not principal, subordinate, secondary.
804
LVP: According to the text [WOG.190.29.): iihiirasamudaylit kiiyasya samudayafi. Com-
pare Sarr,.yutta, iii. 62.
805 LVP: Any cause should have an effect; kiirai:ie sati karyei:ia bhavitavyam [WOG.190.32].
806
LS: AH 25, 234; SAH 70, 469.
807
LS: AH 25; SAH 70.
808
Gokhale: [50bcl] sahabhar ye mithafiphaliifi I bhutavac cittacittii'nuvartila/cyaTJ,alalcyyavat I
Tib.: [50bd] lhan cig 'byung gang phan tshun 'bras I 'byung bzhin sems kyi rjes 'jug dang I
sems dang mtshan nyid mtshan gzhi bzhin I
LVP: The suffix vat in the sense of tadyathii;
See discussion in AKB iii, F 102.
LS: Dhammajoti comments: "This is a new causal category innovated by the Sarviistiviida....
It is of central importance in the causal theory of the school. It became an indispensable
doctrinal tool for the Yogiiciira theory of cognition only (vijfiaptimiitratii)."

1. The MVS, 85b, states:
Question: What is the intrinsic nature of the co-existent cause?
Answer: All the conditioned dharma-s ... .
Question: What is the meaning of "co-existent" (sahabha)?
Answer: "Co-existent" means [i] "not mutually separated (avinii-bhiiva)", [ii] "shar-
_ing the same effect", [iii] "mutually accordant with one apother". This co-existent
·cause is definitely f~und in the three periods of times and produces the virile effect
(puru~akiira-phala).
According to Sarpghabhadra (Ny, 417c;~.IV.155):
The co-existent [causes] are those that are reciprocally virile effects, on account of
the fact that they can arise by virtue of mutual support .... For example: the four
Great Elements are co-existent cause mutually among themselves, ... for it is only
when the four •different kinds of Great Elements assemble together that they can be
efficacious in producing the derived matter (upiidiiya rupa); so also thought and the
dharma-s which are thought-accompaniments; so also the [four] characteristics of the
conditioned and the characterized [conditioned dharma]. In this way, the whole of the
conditioned, where applicable (i.e., where a mutual causal relationship obtains) are
co-existent causes. (The italicized words are those also found in the AKB).
Herein, the scope of the characteristics of the causes [as described by Vasubandhu]
is too narrow-the thought-accompaniments and the characteristics [of the condi-
tioned] should in .each case be. mentioned as co-existent causes amongst themselves.
Thus, he should not have said that only those that are reciprocally the effect of one
another are co-existent causes. A dharma and its secondary characteristics are not
reciprocally effects, yet it is a [co-existent] cause of the latter [although the latter are
not its co-existent cause] .... Therefore, the characteristics [of this cause] should be
explained thus: Those conditioned dharma-s that share the same effect can [also] be
considered as co-existent causes; there is,no fault [in explaining thus], as it is so
explained in the fundamental treatises (mala-siistra) ....
Avatiira (ESD.121):
The conditioned dharma-s which are the fruits of one another, or which together
bring about a common fruit are named co-existenf causes--e.g., the mahiibhuta-s; the
[conditioned dha~a--s, which are] characterized (lalqya) and the [four] conditioned
characteristics; the thought and the thought-accompaniments (cittiinuvartin). These
are [in each case co-existe~auses] for one another.
2. At AKB iii, F 102, the Vaibhii~ika also mentions the important example of the co-existent
cause in the perceptual process (which is also discussed at Ny, 420c-42la and WOG.197.28ff.;
cf. also i. 44cd [F 94f.]). The AKB states:
The Vaibhii~ika: We do not deny that a cause [kiira~] sometimes precedes its effect
[kiirya]; but we affirm that the cause and the effect can be simultaneous [sahabhiiva]:
[for example,] .(i) the visual sense-faculty and color, and the visual consciousness;
(ii) the fundamental material elements (mahiibhuta) and the derived material ele-
ments (bhautika).
3. Dhammajoti "introduces the doctrinal importance of the co-existent cause within the con-
text of Sarvastivada realism and as the only valid paradigm for causation. See the following
longer discussion of this important topic (SA.IV.161-64):
The doctrine of simultaneous causation lends support to the Sarvastivada doctrine of
direct perception which, in tum, again reinforced their doctrine of pluralistic realism.
This is in coi;itrast to the Sautrantika theory of indirect perception which eventually
paves the way for the idealistic Yogacara theory of vijnaptimlitratii. For the Sarviisti-
viidins, one can be absolutely certain about the existence of external objects because
our five senses directly perceive them. Thus, within a single moment of visual per-
ception, the visual faculty, the object and the corresponding visual consciousness all
arise simultaneously. All three function as co-existent causes. This is, in fact, one of
Sa111ghabhadra's arguments [Ny, 420c-421a] for the co-existent cause: ...
But more importantly, this doctrine is indispensable for the fundamental thesis of
sarvlistitva. Of the four major arguments put forward for the thesis-(a) uktatviit,
(b) dvayiit, (c) sadvi~aylit, (d) phaliit [AKB v. 25ab]-the first is simply an inference
from the Buddha's mention of past and future objects. (c) and (d) are the only two
logical arguments (yuktitaft), and (b) essentially has the same stress as (c), supported
by the Buddha's own statement. (c) argues that since the object of any perception
must be existent, the fact that the mind can think of past and future objects then
proves the reality/existence of past and future dharma-s. (d) argues that past dharma-s
must exist since a past karma is causally efficacious in generating a present vipiika.
Now it must be noted that these two logical arguments cannot stand unless the
simultaneous causality-in the sense that the cause and the effect must be existent at
the same time-as exemplified by the sahabhii-hetu is conceded: Both require that
the cause and the effect exist simultaneously. But ~t should be borne in mind that,
in .the Sarviistivada, "existing _simultaneously" does not necessarily mean "arising
simultaneously". When the cause and the arising effect do arise simultaneously-
i.e., co-exist (saha-bha) in the present moment-we have the case of the sahabha-
hetu . ...
In general, if A causes B, both A and B must be existent at the same time--although
they may belong to different time periods with respect to their own temporal frame
of reference. That is: A may be past or present or future, and B may also be past or
present or future--but they musi co-exist, although not necessarily be conascent. To
borrow Dharmatrata's terminology, they are both existent, but not necessarily of the
same "mode of existence" (bhiiva); or in Gho~aka's terminology, they do not nec-
essarily have the same "time-characteristic". Where A and B are necessarily conas-
cent, i.e., both existing at the same present moment, we have the category known as
the co-existent cause. In fact, in the Sarviistivada conception, all dharma-s in. their
essential nature have always been existent; it is only a matter of inducing their aris-
ing through causes and conditio~s. This is the fundamental principle underlining
the Sarviistiviida doctrine of causality. Past and future dharma-s are also endowed.
with efficacies including that of actually giving an effect, although it is only a present
dharma that has kliritra-the efficacy of establishing the specific causal relationship
with the dharma to be produced as its effect. ...

[For Saiµghab_hadra] the co-existent cause is simply a special case of simultaneous
causation obtaining among the necessarily conascent dharma-s. The co-existent cause
then actually exemplifies the general case of simultaneous causation in which a
distinct A generates a distinct B-both existing simultaneously ....
The case of a homogeneous cause generating an emanation fruit as its own next
moment of existence is an exception, as it involves not two ontologically distinct
entities but simply the arising of a given entity itself in the next moment of its series.
The Yogiicara not only accepts the Sarviistiviida position as regards causation, but is
more explicit in stating that there is no other real causality -outside that represented
by the co-existent and conjoined causes.
4. As can be seen from Saiµghabhadra's previously noted definition and criticism, he states
that Vasubandhu's explanation is too narrow and should also include those dharmas that share
the same effect, and in this way he is in agreement with the definition (see above) of the MVS.
He turther states (Ny, 419c; SA.IV.158):
We do not concede that cause-effect relationship obtains reciprocally in all cases of
the conascent: ... It obtains only [i] among those that share the same effect; or [ii] that
are reciprocally effects; or [iii] where by the force of this, that dharina can arise.
Such conascent [dharma-s] have a cause-effect relationship, [i.e., are co-existent
causes].
These three cases find expression also in the three possible cases of the coexistent cause as
presented in Dhammajoti's summary to his article The Sarviistiviida Doctrine of Simultaneous
Causality (notice: the order of the first two members is reversed):
i. The co-nascent dharmas are both causes as well as effects to one another; the
new dharmas produced in this case being these very members themselves in the reci-
procal causal relationship. The co-arising of thought and mental concomitants exem-
plifies this situation, with the lamp-light metaphor as the typical illustration.
ii. Not all the co-nascent members are reciprocally co-produced. Thus, given three
(or more) members A, B, C, constituting the sahabhu-hetu, A and B, being causally
coordinated, co-produce C simultaneously. The classical exemplification is the pro-
duction of visual consciousness, conditioned by the visual faculty and visual object.
iii. Two co-nascent dharmas may also be said to be in a sahabha-heiu relationship
if one is necessarily-though not reciprocally-produced by the other. Thus, a dharma
is a sahabhu-hetu of the secondary characteristics, but not vice versa. This is because
in the Sarviistiviida system, a secondary characteristic is causally efficacious with
regard to its corresponding primary characteristic (mula-lak$a,:ia) only, not to the
_dharma.
5. The Sautriintika rejects the Sarviistiviida category of the co-exis.tent cause (see ii, F 252-
55). For them, a cause necessarily precedes an effect-a principle that has great signi[cance
for their theory of perception. Here Dhammajoti points out (SA.IV.159ff.) the interesting fact
that even though the Sautriintika was one of the precursors of the fylahiiyiina Yogiiciira, the
Yogiiciira itself-although holding the standpoint that only the present exists and thus
opposing the tri-temporal existence-not only takes over, without hesitation, the co-existent
cause together with its subset, the associated cause (sarriprayuktakahetu), but considers simul-
taneous causation to be causality in the true sense, for apart from this simultaneous causation
the other hetu-pratyayas are not apperceived (na upalabhyante). The Yogiiciira considers the
sahabhiihetu to be an indispensable doctrinal category in their theory of bfja.
6. As for Vasubandhu, he seemingly accepts simultaneous causation. Dharnmajoti comments
(ADCP.26):
In the AKB, Vasubandhu himself seems to be generally partisan to [the] Hinayiina-
[Sautriintika] group. But, he too was evidently open-minded, of which fact the AKB
is a testimony, and accordingly did not seem to have become exclusively partisan to
the. tenets of any group as such-be it those of Hinayana or Yogiiciira Sautriintika or
Sarviistiviida. Thus, in the context of the "what sees" debate, he seems to basically
side [with] the view of Dharrnatriita; and yet at the same time probably senses the
meaningfulness of the Yogiiciira-Sautriintika's concluding remark. As another illus-
tration, Vasubandhu is known to accept some of the Sarviistiviida caitta-s, and the
notion of sarriprayoga of citta-caitta-s-differing from SrTiiita. This also necessarily
means that he accepts the sahabhii-hetu doctrine which SrTiiita rejects ....
809
LVP: One does not say that all co-existing factors (sahabhii) are a co-existent cause
(sahabhiihetu). For example, derivative (bhautika) material form (riipa), blue, etc., coexists
with the fundamental material elements: but it is not a co-existent cause with them (see
ii, F 253).
810
LVP: See i. 24; ii. 22, 65.
811
LVP: Any conditioned factor and its characteristics are co-existent causes (sahabhiihetu)
among themselves; a factor is not a co-existent cause with the charac.teristics of another factor.
812
LS: AH 234; SAH 70, 469.
813
LVP: upasaqikhyiinakara1_1aqi ca mahiisiistratiipradarsaniirthaqi sopasaqikhyiinaqi hi vy-
iikara1_1iidi mahiisiistraqi drsyate [WOG.191.2 1 f.].
814
LS: AH 234; SAH 70, 469.
815
LS: Ibid.
816
Gokhale: [51acl] caittii dvau sarrivarau te~iirri [cetaso] lak~a,:1iini ca Icittii'nuvartinaJ;.
LS: Correction based on Pradhan.83.26: ... teflif!I cetaso ... . Gokhale has ... teflif!I sarrivarau ....
Tib.: [51acl] sems las byung dang sdom gnyis dang I sems dang de dag gi mtshan nyid I sems
kyi rjes 'jug
817
LS: See ii. 65c: "The· actions of body and of speech [kiiyaviikkarma] of the category des-
cribed in ii. 51a, [i.e., the two restraints of·the thought-associates (cittiinuparivartin),] which
are derivative material elements, are a co-existent cause. [Other derivative forms are not co-
existent causes (niinyadupiidiiyariiparri)]."
818
LS: SAH 70, 469.
819
· Gokhale: [5lc2-d] kiilaphaliidisubhatiidibhilJ II
Tib.: [5 lc2-d] 'dus dang ni I 'bras sogs dge la sogs pas so II
820
LS: SAH 70,469.
821
LVP: The first part of this paragraph is translated according to the Vyiikhyii.
812
IS:,SAH 70, 469.
823
LS: The Vyiikhyii states (WOG.192.9f.): adhipati-phalam tu sarva-siidhiirai;iatviit na gai;iyate
("the effect of dominance, however, is not counted because it is common to all factors").
824
LS: SAH 70,469.
825
LVP: The ten reasons are never gathered together. For example, in the case of the non-
defined thought not destined to arise, the concomitants are concomitants due to four reasons:
(1) sam~ time, (2) same effect (i.e., of human action; pUTU$akiira)·, (3) same effect of equal
outflow (ni$yanda), (4) same status of being non-defined.
826
LS: SAH 70.
827
LVP: That is to say, the unobscured-non-defined thought (anivrtiivyiikrta) after the second
meditation (dhyiina); initial inquiry (vitarka), investigation (viciira), the wholesome permeat-
ing factors (kusalamahiibhiimika) are absent from it.
8211
LVP: Thought reigns (riijayate) over its secondary characteristics (anulak$a~); the latter
have not acted (vytipiira) on thought, as we have seen ii. 46.
829
LVP: The Japanese editor refers to the Prakara,:,a, 745a25. - See below ii, F 259 and 269
where the same text is referred to.
The Prakara,:,a examines the relations between the four truths and the afflicted view of self
(satkiiyadmi). The Vyiikhyii gives an extract that is translated here [WOG.193.12ff.]:
A. There are four truths. Among the truths, (1) how many have the afflicted view of self for
their c~use without being the cause of the afflicted view of self, (2) how many are the cause
of the afflicted view of self without having the afflicted view of self for their cause, (3) how
many have the afflicted view of self- for their cause and are at the same time a cause of the
afflicted view of self, (4) how many do not have the afflicted view of self for their cause and
are not the afflicted view of self?
To this question he answers: two truths do not have the afflicted view of self for their cause
and are not a cause of the afflicted view of self, namely, tlte truth of cessation and the truth of
the path; in regard to the other two truths, we have reason to distinguish.
B. The truth of unsatisfactoriness can (1) have the afflicted view of self for its cause without
being a cause of the afflicted view of self, (2) have the afflicted view of self for its cause and
be a cause of the afflicted view of self, (3) not have the afflicted view of self for its cause and
not be a cause of the afflicted view of self: there are only three alternatives; the second (being
a cause of the afflicted view of self without having the afflicted view of self for its cause) is
absent.
1. Having the afflicted view of self for its cause without being a cause of the afflicted view
of self_: the whole truth of defiled unsatisfactoriness (i.e., all factors that are unsatisfactory and
that are defiled [kli$(a]) with the exception:
i. (a) of the past and present proclivities (anusaya) that can be abandoned by insight
into unsatisfactoriness, and (b) of the truth of unsatisfactoriness associated with these
proclivities (for example, sensation associated with the afflicted view of self that is
abandoned by the insight into unsatisfactoriness); ·
ii. of the future truth of unsatisfactoriness that is associated with the afflicted view of
.self (see ii, F 259 line 11);
iii. of the origination-duration-deterioration-impermanence of the afflicted view of self
and of the factors associated with this afflicted view of self (tatsarµprayuktiintirµ ca
dharmii,:iiim: these last words are omitted in certain recensions).
2. Having the afflicted view of self for its cause and being a cause of the afflicted view of
self: the truth of unsatisfactoriness that has been excluded in the preceding paragraph.
3. Not having the afflicted view of self for its cause and not being a cause of the afflicted
view of self: the truth of undefiled unsatisfactoriness [i.e., the factors that are unsatisfactory
but that are wholesome].
The Chinese versions, Nanjio 1292 (xxiii. 11, 38b10) and 1277 (10, 58b4), correspond to
the preceding text. Some omissions (the phrases: "To this question, he answers" [iti prasne
visarjanar,i karoti] and "There are only three alternatives; the second is absent" [trikofikam,
dvitfyii kofir niisti], are absent in them). There are significant variations in the definition of
factors that have the afflicted view of self for their cause and are a cause of the afflicted view
of self:
i. past and present proclivities that can be abandoned by insight into unsatisfactoriness,
and the truth of unsatisfactoriness associated with these proclivities (1277: and the
truth of unsatisfactoriness associated, coexistent, etc., with these proclivities);
ii. past_ and present pervasive (sarvatraga) proclivities that can be abandoned by insight
into the origin, and the truth of unsatisfactoriness that is associated (1277: associated,
coexistent, etc.) with them;
iii. future truth of unsatisfactoriness that is associated with the afflicted view of self;
iv. origination, etc., of the future afflicted view of self and of associated factors.
830
LS: See in this context Dhammajoti's article The Sarviistiviida Doctrine of Simultaneous
Causality (SDS), which includes translations of the definitions of the co-existent cause and
associated cause of the MYS, AKB, Avatiira and the Nyiiyiinusiira. In regard to the latter it
also includes a translation of the most important sections of its debate about the existential
status of the co-existent cause.
831
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautriintika ·here.
As for Vasubandhu's position in regard to the co-existent cause, see our introductory note to
the co-existent cause (above).
In the *Nyiiyiinusiira, 418c, Sriliita-the Sautriintika leader in Sruµghabhadra's time-presents
four objections in regard to the possibility of simultaneous causality (SDS.lOf.):
1. Causality among co-nascent dharmas cannot be established since before they
arise, they have not yet come into existence; one cannot specify which dharmas give
rise (cause) to which (effect). This would also mean that the present dharmas are
without cause, and that we need to seek two other dharmas for the two co-nascent
dharmas.
2. It is taught that where there is a cause, there is an effect. If dharmas in the future
period can function as causes for other dharmas to arise, there would be the fallacy
of dharmas arising perpetually.
3. Among two co-nascent dharmas-as in the case of the two horns of an ox-one
cannot prove legitimately which is the cause [and] which is the effect.
4. In the world, among cases where a cause-effect relationship is universally ac-
knowledged-such as the production of a sprout from a seed-such a simultaneous
causality has nevet been observed.
Sarµghabhadra's detailed reply (see SDS.11-16) is primarily directed at establishing the co-
existent cause: He begins with a discussion of the general characteristics or nature of causality,
invoking. the first part of the ..Buddha's statement of the principle of. conditionality (see AKB
iii. 81-83): "This being, that exists; from the arising of this, that arises." He then continues to
answer Sriliita's objections one by one.
832
LS: Yasomitra glosses (WOG.197.11): sarvam apy etad syiid iti. yat ta.vat sahabhu-hetunii
hetur iti vi~tarei:ia yad uktam. See F 252.
833
I.S: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions the Sautrantika here.
834
LS: The Vaibhii.~ika replies (Ny; SDS.15):
This is not reasonable. For it is not perceived (upa-,/"labh) that when the lamp first
· · arises, there is the lamp without the light. It has never been observed that a lamp
exists without light [-a lamp is always that which has light]. Neither is it reasonable
· to claim that it is not perceived owing to the brevity of time, as it is not universally
established (prasiddha) to be so....
It ought not be the case that the lamp and its light are arisen by one and the same
cause, as in the case of the skin, the kernel and the oil in a sesame. No [reciprocal]
cause-effect relationship is observed in the combination of the skin, the kernel and
the oil born of a sesame born of a common cause. In the case of the pair of the lamp
and the light, it is observed in the present moment that they serve as causes which
equally accord with each other, which proves the presence of causality. Hence one
cannot claim that they are born of one common cause....
If a lamp and its light were born of a common cause, then when someone covers up
the lamp with something, its light-like the lamp-ought not to cease to continue.
The lamp-being on a par with its light-likewise ought not to arise [anymore] ....
Hence the metaphor of the la_mp and its light is universally established.
See SDS.14-16 for a translation of Sarµghabhadra's defense (presented in dialogue form by
Dhammajoti) of the example of the co-nascent lamp and light.
835
LVP: Where one fundamental material element (mahiibhuta) occurs, the other fundamen-
tal material elements also occur, etc.
836
837
LVP: I understand: "one moment (k~a~a) of the eye sense-faculty is the cause of the
simultaneous visual consciousness".
838
LS: In this paragraph-although the AKB does later at iii, F 102-Pradhan does not
mention the important example of the co-existent cause in the perceptual process (visual sense-
faculty, visual object and visual consciousness), on the other hand, it occurs in both the
Vyiikhyii (WOG.197.30f.) and the *Nyiiyiinusiira (420c-421a; SDS.17). Sarµghabhadra argues:
It contradicts the principle of Conditioned Co-arising (pratftya-samutpiida) [to hold

that there are no co-nascent causes]. Thus the satra says:
Conditioned by the visual faculty and the visual object, there arises visual con-
sciousness.
[Ifthe visual faculty, the visual object and the visual consciousness were not simul-
taneous,] then th~1visual faculty and visual object produced in the preceding moment
ought not to be th~ supporting basis and the perceptual object, [respectively,] for
the visual consciou~ness of the succeeding moment; for [in that case, the latter]
exists and [the forme.r are] non-existent. One cannot call an absolute non-existeflt
(atyantiibhiiva) a supporting basis or a perceptual object. The same applies here: At
the time when the visual consciousness arises, the visual faculty and the visual object
have already ceased. This would mean that without any conditions assisting, the
visual consciousness arises by itself! This is due to the fact that non-existent dharmas
cannot serve as suppbrting basis, and that visual consciousness can only take a
present object.
If the visual faculty, the visual object and the visual consciousness do not arise simul-
taneously, it would entail-th~t the visual faculty and visual objects do not serve as
conditions for visual conscio¥sness. Or, the auditory faculty and sound, etc., would
also serve as conditions for visual consciousness, being equally unrelated to visual
consciousness.
If the Bhagavat says only that conditioned by the previously arisen visual faculty and
the visual object, the visual consciousness arises, then he ought to say that the visual
consciousness has only consciousness as its condition; because a condition of the
same species [-in this case consciousness-] is a strong one, like a seed, and because
a preceding consciousness serves as the equal-immediate condition (samanantara-
pratyaya) for a succeeding consciousness. Since he. does not say that visual con-
sciousness is conditioned by consciousness, we know accordingly that in this context
he speaks only of the simultaneously arisen visual faculty and visual object as the
conditions for the visual consciousness.
As within the same body, no two consciousnesses arise together, he does not speak of
consciousness as the condition for visual consciousness ....
839
840
LS: AH 25; SAH 71.
841
LS: Ibid.
842
Gokhale: [52a] sabhiigahetuJ:i sadrsii/:t
Tib.: [52a] skal mnyam rgyu ni 'dra ba'o \
LVP: See ii. 59.
LS: 1. Avatiira (ESD.121):
The dharma-s born anteriorily (agraja) and belonging to a given stage (bhami) and
class (nikiiya) are-in a similar manner to seed dharma-s-the homogeneous causes
for the similar posterior dharma-s, [belonging to the same stage and class]. [Thus, a
dharma in the sense-sphere and abandonable by insight into the truth of suffering is
the homogeneous cause only for a later dharrna in the sense-sphere and similarily
abandonable].
Sarµghabhadra defines the homogeneous cause as follows (Ny, 422a; SA.IV.152.):
Those that can nourish and produce the emanation (nifyanda) fruits, whether remote
or near, are called ho111ogeneous causes. It is to be understood that this cause obtains
in the case of similar dharrna-s with regard to similar dharrna-s, not with regard to
those of a different species.
As for "different species1', Dhammajoti comments (private communication) that Sarµgha-
bhadra proceeds to giv(?/the same examples as AKB, i.e., the five wholesome (kusala) aggre-
gates (skandha) are the homogeneous causes (sabhiigahetu) of the five wholesome aggregates,
among themselves (anyonya), i.e., not of unskillful, etc., aggregates.
2. Cox summarizes Sanghabhadra (EIP.VIII.706): "Homogeneous causes act to produce
similar factors either immediately or remotely. 'Similar' means of the same moral quality, the
same category in terms of method of abandonment, anl the same stage."
3. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.150f.) that Sarµghabhadra does not have any objections to
Vasubandhu's explanations of this cause, but that-besides the fact that the "western masters"
and the Diir~tiintikas denied that rupa-dharrna-s can have a homogeneous cause--there were
"other disagreements among the various Sarviistiviida masters in terms· of details concerning
the nature and scope of this causal category" (see F 255), which were mostly tolerated.
843
LS: SAH 71.
844
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.192) that "this suggests. that there were various interpre-
tations in the Sarviistiviida system on this cause, which were mostly tolerated". He mentions.
that Sarµghabhadra criticizes only the next views, i.e., "the one related to the embryonic series
and the Diir~tantika view that there is no homogeneous cause among the rupa-s".
845
' LVP: According to the rule "[the noble path is the homogeneous cause] to an equal or
superior [noble path]" (samavisif{ayo/:t; ii. 52d). -The four non-material aggregates (skandha)
are "superior" (visi${a); material form (rupa) is "inferior" (nyuna).
846
LS: Following Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 422a; SA.IV.151).
847
LS: Dhammajoti (SA.IV.151): "(Four are the homogeneous cause of five); [that is,]
matter-being inferior in strength,~ jJ 5l;·lt<.)-:-is [only] the homogeneous cause of the four
other aggregates." He comments that this view is not found in Pradhan, but in Hsilan-tsang's
Chinese translation of the AKB. LVP, however, has: "but material form is·not a homogeneous
cause of four aggregates".
848
LS: Again, this view is not found in Pradhan. Dhammajoti translates based on Saiµgha-
bhadra (Ny, 422a; SA.IV.151): "According to some masters: matter on the one hand, and the
other four aggregates on the other, are not mutually homogeneous cause. This is because
matter is 'inferior and of a different species (from the four mental aggregates)' (9, JHJii\l)."
849
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, LVP mentions tht::_Diir~tiintika here.
Dhammajoti comments (ESD.63): "In AKB, Ny and ADV, the appellations 'Diir~tiintikas' and
'Sautriintikas' are used interchangeably. The early Diir~tiintika in the time of MVS, however,
were Sarviistiviidins. They broke away from the Sarviistiviida and evolved into the Sautriintikas
around the 3rd century A.O."
According to MVS, 682c, both the "western masters" and the Damantikas deny that material
form c'an have a homogeneous cause, but no reason for the denial is given.
Cox summarizes Saqighabhadra (EIP.VIII.706): "The Dar~tantikas claim that material form
cannot act as a homogeneous cause because material form is produced and accumulated
through the assistance of sufficient conditions; but this is to be rejected."
850
IS: See WOG.199.llff.
851
is: SAH 71.
852
Gokhale; [52bl] svanikiiyabhuvo
Tib.: [52bl] rang rigs sa pa'o
853
IS: SAH 71.
854
LS: SAH 71.
855
Gokhale; [52b2] · 'grajiil:z I
Tib.: [52b2] sngar skyes mams I
856
LVP: According to Paramiirtha. -Absent in Hsiian-tsang; absent in the original.
LS: Saqighabhadra explains (Ny, 422a; EIP.VIII.706f.) that this is so because there is no
sequential ordering among future factors, that is to say: the future factor (dharma) has not yet
performed its activity (kiiritra), i.e., projected its own effect, but whether or not a factor has
performed its activity determines the factor's.state, which in tum determines.the sequential
ordering among factors.
857
LS: This is the 33 rd of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.104). Saqighabhadra (Ny, 422c23-25) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and
criticizes it (Ny, 422c25-423a4) on the grounds that sabhiigahetu actually does not resemble
samantarapratyaya.
858
(VY.106). Vasubandhu accuses the author of the Jfiiinaprasthiinasiistra of being bad with
words. Saqighabhadra (Ny, 423a8-9) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and defends
the Jfiiinaprasthiina (Ny, 423a9-18).
859
LVP:. According to the opponent 6f the Vaibha~ika, the Prakara,:,a teaches that the future
afflicted view of self and the factors (dharma) that are associated with it are at the same time
the effect and the cause of the afflicted view of self. But the future afflicted view of self is
neither a reciprocal (sahabha) cause, nor an associated (sa,riprayuktaka) cause, nor a ripening
(vipiika) cause; it remains, when one does not take into account the efficient cause (kiira,:ia-
hetu), that it is a homogeneous yabhiiga) cause and a pervasive (sarvaga) cause.
For the Vaibha~ika, the Prakara,:ia speaks here, not of the future afflicted view of self, but of
factors (sensation, etc.) associated with this afflicted view of self: they are a cause of the
afflicted view of self as a simultaneous and associated cause (sahabha, sa,riprayuktaka), and an
effect of the afflicted view of self considered as simultaneous and associated cause.
We have three readings; in addition to the two readings cited here, the text: aniigata,rt ca
satkiiyadr~fisa,riprayukta,rt dul:zkhasatya,ri sthiipayitvii: "with the exception, moreover, of the
truth of future unsatisfactoriness that is associated with the afflicted view of self' (see ii, F 251
[note, part B.1.b]).
860
LVP: See below ii, F 270, note.
861
LVP: That is to say: "(1) The factor (dharma) that is a cause of a certain factor is never
not a cause of this factor; (2) the factor that is the effect of a certain factor. .. ; (3) the factor
(eye sense-faculty, etc.) that is the basis of a certain factor (visual consciousness, etc.) ... ;
(4) the factor (visible form, etc.) that is the cognitive object of a certain factor (visual con-
sciousness) is never not a cognitive object of this factor."
862
LVP: According to Hsiian-tsang: "By cause, one should understand the efficient cause
(kiira!lllhetu), co-existent cause (sahabhuhetu), associated cause (saf!!prayuktakahetu) and rip-
ening cause (vipiikahetu); by effect, the effect of dominance (adhipatiphala), effect of human
action (puru~akiira) and ripened effect (vipiikaphala)." - Paramartha: "By cause, one should
undenitand the associated cause; by effect, the effect of dominance and the effect of human
action."
863
LS: SAR 71.
864
Gokhale: [52cdl] anyonyaf!! navabhumis tu miirgati
Tib.: [52c] sa dgu 'i lam ni phan tshun du /
LS: WOG.203.14f: miirga iti marga-satyarµ vivak~itarµ. s'asravan marga-satyarµ visi~yate.
865
LS: SAH 71-72.
866
LS: Ibid.
867
Gokhale: [52d2] samavisi~{ayoti II
Tib.: [52d] mnyam dang khyad par can gyi yin I
868
LVP: The paths of pursuers through faith (sraddhanusiirin), of those who are freed through
predominance of faith (sraddhiidhimukta) and of those who are circumstantially liberated
(samayavimukta) are the paths of insight (darsana), of cultivation (bhiivanii) (= those in train-
ing [saik~a]) and of those beyond training (asaik~a) of the practitioners of weak (praxis-
oriented) faculties; the paths of pursuers through doctrines (dharmanusarin), of those who have
attained through views (dr~{ipriipta) and of those non-circumstantially liberated (asamaya-
vimukta) are, respectively, the same paths of the practitioners of sharp (praxis-oriented) facul-
ties.
869
LVP: (1) When considering the first fifteen moments (darsanamiirga; vi. 26), the second
moment, produced in an inferior stage, is superior to the first moment produced in a superior
stage, because it has for its causes: (i) the causes of the first moment, ~ii) its own particular
causes; and so on; (2) the path of cultivation (bhiivaniimarga) has for its causes: (i) the causes
of the path of insight (darsanamiirga), (ii) its own particular causes; (3) the path of those
beyond training (asaik~amarga) has for its causes: (i) the causes of the path of insight and of
the path of cultivation, (ii) its own particular causes.
Moreover, in the path of cultivation and the path of those beyond training, the path destroys
nine categories of defilements, strong-strong, strong-medium, etc.; it is successively weak-
weak, weak-medium, weak-strong, medium-weak, etc. - Now the weak-medium path has for
its causes: (1) the cause of the weak-weak path, (2) its own particular causes.
870
LVP: Thus one can say that the path of pursuers through faith (sraddhiinusiirin) is the
homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu) of six paths: This thesis gives rise to a discussion in which
the master Vasumitra wrongly maintains that pursuers through faith are capable of making
their (praxis-oriented) faculties sharp (WOG.206.19).
871
Gokhale: [53a] prayogajiis tayor eva
Tib.: [53a] sbyor byung de gnyis kho na'i yin I
872
LS: SAH 72.
873
Gokhale: [53b] srutacintiimayiidikiif:i I
Tib.: [53b] thos dang bsams byung la sogs pa I,
874
LS: SAH 72.
875
LS: Ibid.
876
LS: They are ninefold: from weak-weak up to strong-strong.
877
LS: Ibid.
878
LS: I.e., the unwholesome factor and the obscured-non-defined factor.
879
LS: Ibid.
880
LS: The defiled, wholesome-impure and unobscured-non-defined factors are said to be
impure.
881
LVP: abhisamskiirikasya sabhagahetor hiyamanaiµ phalaiµ na bhavati [WOG.208.2f.].
882
LS: SAH 72.
883
LVP: Paramartha: The masters say. - MVS, 89b5.
884
(VY.108). Saiµghabhadra identifies (Ny, 424c25-26) this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and
criticizes. it saying that Vasubandhu should have simply stated that sabhiigahetu is unlike
vipiikahetu. Cox summarizes Saiµghabhadra (Ny, 424c26-425a15a; EIP.Vlll.707): ."Unlike
causes of karmic maturation [vipiikahetu]; homogeneous causes [sabhiigahetu] do not neces-
S_!irily give, or complete the production of, their effects. For example, a perfected being may_
attain nirvii1Ja without receiving the effect of previous homogeneous causes. All causes
function in a two-stage process: first, they project or take their effect, and then they produce or
give their effect. No cause may produce its effect without having first projected it; but some
causes, like the homogeneous cause, may project their effects without then producing it. -
Unlike the directly antecedent condition [samanantarapratyaya], homogeneous causes may
produce their effect [l] immediately, [2] remotely, or [3] not at all."
885
LS: AH 48; SAH 56, 75.
886
LS: AH 48; SAH 75.
887
Gokhale: [53cdl] samprayuktakahetus tu cittacaittiif:i
Tib.: [53cdl] mtshungs ldan rgyu ni sems dag dang Isems byung
LVP: Vyiikhyii [WOG.209.5]: tu-sabdo 'vadhanu;ie bhi~nakramas ca.
~S, 8lb9. - Kathiivatthu, vii. 2 on the sa7f1payuttas.
LS: I. MVS, 80a-b (SA.IV.155f.):
Question: What are the conjoined causes? Answer: Dharma-s that are thought and
thought-concomitants .... Question: Why ar'e--.thought and the thought-concomitants
mutually conjoined causes to one another? Answer: Because they are reciprocally
causes, arisen through their mutual strength, mutually induced, mutually nourished;
mutually strengthened, mutually dependent. This is like two bundles of straw which
stay in position through mutual dependence. [Likewise,] when many ropes are
combined, a huge log can be dragged; and many people can cross a big river by
joining hands together. Because conditioned dharma-s are weak in their intrinsic
nature, they can accomplish their activities only through mutual dependence. If we
were to ask sensation: "Without ideation, can you [alone] sense/experience an
object?" The answer would be: "No." The same questions [and answers] apply to the
other thoughts and thought-concomitants as well.
*Nyiiyiinusiira, 416c (SA.IV.156):
This [conjoined] cause is established because thought and thought concomitants,
being conjoined, accomplish the same deed by grasping the same object.
Avatiira (ESD.121):
The thought and thought-concomitants which are mutually conjoined with one
another and which apprehend a common object, are named conjoined causes--e.g.,
thought with sensation,_etc.; sensation, etc., with [ideation], etc., sensations, etc., with
thought; in each case [the-mental dhanna] cannot be [a conjoined cause] for itself.
2. As for the relationship between associated causes and co-existent causes, all associated
causes are necessarily co-existent causes, but not all co-existent causes are· necessarily associ-
ated causes. Or, all associated causes necessarily have the five equivalences (samatii; ii. 34d),
but not all co-existent causes have them. For example, the fundamental material elements
(bhuta) and the characteristics (lak~a,;ia), i.e., origination, etc., do not have the five equiva,-
lences and are not associated causes.
3. As for the difference between associated causes and co-existent causes-when a factor is
both of these causes-see Vasubandhu' s discussion and the quotes in our endnote to it.
88 8
. LS: SAH 56, 75.
889
LVP: Sama can be understood as tulya (similar, comparable, like); this is why the author
specifies.
890
LS: SAH 75.
891
LVP: MVS, 8lb9, indicates six opinions on this point.
LS: MVS, 88b (SA.IV.156):
Question: What is the difference between the conjoined and the co-existent causes?
Some say that there is no difference, as in one [and the same] moment, the sensation
and ideation, etc., are both types of causes. Therefore, in this regard, one should say
thus: Whichever are conjoined causes are also co-existent causes; some co-existent
causes exist which are not conjoined causes, viz., the disjoined co-existent causes.
Thus there are differences between the two causes ....
[Their differences]: conjoined causes have the sense of companionship; co-existent
causes have the sense of having a common fruit.
The first means having the same supporting basis, mode of understanding and object.
The second means having the same production (jiiti), deterioration (Jara), duration
(sthiti), impermanence (anityatii), fruit, emanation and retribution.
The first is like holding a stick; the second is like performing an action having held
the stick.
The first is like [a group of people] joining hands together; the second is like crossing
a torrent having held hands together.
The first means' mutually accordant with one another; the second means not being
mutually apart.
*Nyiiyiinusiira, 425c (SA.IV.157):
What is the difference between these two causes, i.e., the co-existent and the con-
joined? To begin with, dharma-s that are conjoined causes are also co-existent
causes. There exist dharma-s that are co-existent causes but not conjoined causes-
viz., the [thought-]accompanying matter; jiiti, etc.; the Great Elements. If a conjoined
cause is also a co-existent cause, what, in this case, is the difference in significance
between these two causes? It is not the case that the conjoined causes are none other
than the co-existent causes, for these two causes differ in their significance.
However, in the case where one and the same dharma is a conjoined cause as well ~s
a co-existent cause, this is the difference in significance: conjoined causes signify
"not mutually apart"; co-existent causes signify "having the same fruit".
Again, having the same production (jiiti), duration (sthiti), etc., by virtue of the
mutual str,ength-these are co-existent causes; grasping the same object by virtue of
the mutual strength-these are conjoined causes.
According to some masters: On account of the meaning of being reciprocally fruits,
the co-existent causes are established; this is like the case of fellow merchants who,
mutually supported, traverse a risky road together. On account of the meaning of the
fivefold equality, the conjoined cause is established; ,this is like those same fellow
merchants having the same experience, same activities of eating, etc. Herein, they are
not conjoined even when one is missing, and thus is the fact of their being recipro-
cally causes universally established
892
LVP:'yathii te~iim ... samiinnapiinasnii.nasayanii.diparibhogakriyiiyiif!! prayogal:i. tadvat
samaprayogatvam e~am anyonyaqi bhavati I ata evaha I ekeniipi hi vinii na sarve saf!!pra-
yujyante [cf. WOG.209.26ff.].
893
LS: AH 25; SAH 74.
894
LS: Ibid.
895
Gokhale: [54ab] sarvatragiikhya~ kli~(iiniif!! svabhiimau piirvasarvagii~ I
Tib.: [54ab] kun 'gro zhes bya nyon mongs can Imams kyi rang sa kun 'gro snga I
LS: 1. MVS, 80a (ESD.198):
What is sarvatraga-hetu? It is all the past and present sarvatraga anusaya-s and their
conjoined and co-existent dharma-s.
Avatiira (ESD.121):
The universal dharma-s (sarvatraga-dharma) born anteriorily, in a given stage, are
the universal causes to the posterior, defiled dharma-s belonging to the same stage.
2. As for the scope of the pervasive cause, MYS, 90c, first presents various differing views
but then specifies for the Dar~tantikas, Vibhajyavadins and Vaibha~ikas the following views
(SA.IV.152f; cf. Ny, 416c):
The Dar~tantikas hold that the two defilements, i.e., ignorance (avidyii) and craving
(tr~~), are universal. Their explanation is as follows: "The root of conditioned co-
arising is said to be universal; ignorance is the root of the earlier part (piirviinta-koti)
of conditioned co-arising, and existence-craving (bhava-tr~,:iii) is the root of the later
part (apariinta-ko{i) of conditioned co-arising. Thus, they are universal."
The Vibhajyavadins hold that five are universal: ignorance, craving, view, conceit
and thought (citta).
The Vaibha~ika view is that thr.ee are universal: doubt (vicikitsii), view and igno-
rance, which are abaridonable by vision into unsatisfactoriness, the cause of unsatis-
factoriness, together with their conjoined and co-existent dharma-s.
AKB v. 12, states eleven pervasive proclivities: "(1-5) the five afflicted views (dr~ti) that are
abandoned by insight [into the truth] of unsatisfactoriness; (6-7) the false view (mithyiidmi)
and the esteeming of (such things as bad) views (dr~tipariimarsa), abandoned by insight [into
the truth] of the origin; (8-11) two doubts (vicikitsii) and two ignorances (avidyii) abandoned
by insight [into the truth] of unsatisfactoriness, by insight [into the truth] of the origin".
3. As for the relationship with the homogeneous ·cause (sabhiigahetu), Dhammajoti com-
ments (SA.IV.152); "Like the homogeneous cause, this cause as well generates an emanation
fruit. From this perspective, the universal cause may. be considered to be a subset of the
homogeneous causes, pertaining to the defiled dharma-s alone. There is homogeneity between
this cause and its effect in terms of stage (sense sphere, etc.) and of moral speci~ (both are
,defiled). However, ... it is to be made a cause distinct from the homogeneous cause,pecause
there is no necessary homogeneity in terms of category of abandonability (nikiiya/prakiira)."
Saqighabhadra adds (Ny, 426a) that the power of pervasive causes exceeds that of homogene-
ous causes since the former are able to effect factors of a category of abandonment ciifferent
from their own.
896
LS: SAH 74.
897
LS: Pradhan.89.4f. has kli~fadharmasiimany(!kiira,:iatveniiya,rt.
898
. LVP: (1) From the pervasives susceptible o1,being abandoned by insight into unsatis-
factoriness proceed defilements susceptible of being apandoned by insight into the origin, of
cessation and of the path, and by ctlltivation. (2) From the pervasives susceptible of being
abandoned by insight into the origin proceed defilements susceptible of being abandoned by
insight into unsatisfactoriness, of cessation and of the path, and by cultivation.
899
LVP: They are called pervasives (sarvaga) because they go toward (gacchanti), "occupy"
(bhajante), have for their object (iilambante) all [five] categories of defilements; or because
they are a cause (hetubhiiva'!I gacchanti) of all [five] categories of defilements.
900
LS: To the objection: "The afflictions of iirya persons are .not generated from that cause
because having abandoned those which are omnipresent, they do not exist", Jaimpaiyang
answers: "The Vaibha~ikas assert thos~ are generated from the past. Thus the Prakara,:ia
states: ... "

901
LVP: See above ii, F 251.
902
LVP: As the text has: "the defiled factors", without specifying otherwise, this refers to
defiled factors of ordinary worldlings (prthagjana) and of noble ones (iirya).
903
LVP: This refers to the non-defined conditioned phenomena (saf!1skrta), obscured-non-
defined (nivrtiivyiikrta) or unobscured-non-defined (anivrtiivyiikrta), not to the two non-
defined unconditioned phenomena (asa1J1skrta), space and cessation not due to deliberation
(apratisa1J1khyiinirodha ).
904
LVP: The word "future" is absent in Paramartha, and without doubt also in the original.
See above ii; F 252.
905
LVP: According to the Vyiikhyii [WOG.211.2ff.], the text has: ida1J1 tarhi prajiiapti-
bhiif)'am ... . - Hsi.ian-tsang translates very well: "How should one explain the Prajiiapti-
piidasiistra?" since "this commentary (bhii~ya) of the Prajfiapti" signifies "this explanation
that one reads in the Prajiiapti". - See the Tibetan version of the Karmaprajiiapti, chap. ix.
(Mdo. 63, fol. 229b-236a): "§ 1. Does a past intention exist that arises from a past cause, not
from a future cause, not from a present cause? ... § 2. Do wholesome factors (dharma) exist
that arise from wholesome causes? ... Do non-defined. factors exist that arise froin unwhole-
some causes? Yes: (1) the factors that are the retribution of unwholesome action; (2) the
factors of the realm of desire associated with the afflicted view of self and with the afflicted
view of holding to an extreme. § 3. Do wholesome factors exist that arise only from whole-
some causes? Yes: the intention associated with the members of enlightenment.. .. Do un-
wholesom.e factors exist that arise only from unwholesome causes? ... "
We know from J. Takakusu (JPTS 1905, p. 77) that the Karmaprajfiapti no longer exists in
Chinese. The Nanjio 1317 contains the Kiira1Japrajiiapti; the Nanjjo 1297 contains a treatise
analogous to the Lokaprajfiapti: a summary of these two Prajiiaptis may be found in Cosmo-
logie bouddhique, pp. 295-350 (see Electronic Appendix).
906
LVP: syiit I iiryapudgalalJ kiimavairiigyiit parihfyamiif}O yiif!I tatprathamatalJ kli~fiif!I
cetanii1J1 saf!!mukhfkaroti. - "At the moment when one retrogresses from detachment, the
unw~lesome intention of the nobie ones (iirya) has only the unwholesome factors for its
cause, the causes in the quality of the co-existent cause (sahabhiihetu) and of associated cause
(sa1J1prayuktakahetu); the unwholesome intention does not have non-defined factors for its
cause since the noble ones have abandoned the afflicted view of self and the afflicted view of
holding on to an extreme" [cf. WOG.211.4ff.]: such is the interpretation of the objector.
907
LS: AH 25; SAH 76.
908
LS: Ibid.
909
Gokhale: [54cd] vipiikahetur asubhiilJ kusalas C aiva sasraviilJ I
Tib.: [54cd] rnam smin rgyu ni midge dang I dge ba zag bcas mams kho na I
LVP: Self-power (svasakti) is absent in non-defined fac:tors; the co-factor (sahakiirikiira,:ia) is
absent in pure factors. - See iii. 36b.
All unwholesome dharma-s and the wholesome dharma-s which are with-outflow are
the retributive causes for-their retribution.

2. As for the views of the different schools and the scope of the ripening cause, Dhammajoti
explains (SA.IV.153):
According to the Dii.reytii.ntikas in the MYS, "there is no retriburion cause apart from
volition (cetana), and no retribution fruit apart from sensation (vedana)".
According to others, such as the Mahii.Sii.J:Tlghikas, retribution causes and fruits are
confined to thought, and the thought-concomita~ts.
Against these opinions, the Sarvii.stivii.da holds that retribution causes and fruits
comprise all five skandha-s, that is, not only thought and the thought-concomitants
but also the matter accompanying thought (cittanuvartaka-rupa) and the condition-
ings disjoined from thought-the ideationless attainment (asarrijfif-samapatti), the
cessation attainment (nirodha-sa>napatti), all acquisitions which are akusala and
kusala-sasrava, and the accompanying characteristics of the conditioned (sarriskrta-
lak~a~a-s)--<;an constitute retribution causes [MYS, 96a-c]. The retributive rapa-s
are the bodily and vocal karma-both informative (vijfiapti) and non-informative
(avijfiapti). The ideationless attainment can effect the asarrijfi.ika, that is, it can result
in an existence in the ideationless realm. However, the vital faculty (jfvitendriya),
the group-homogeneity (nikaya-sabhaga) and the five material faculties pertaining
therein are not its retributions, but those of the karma in the fourth dhyana. Similar-
ly, the cessation attainment can effect the four skandha-s of the sphere of neither
ideation-nor-non-ideati_on (naiva-saf!ljfia-nasa'!ljfia-ayatana)-excepting the vital fac-
ulty and the group-homogeneity therein which are exclusively karmic fruits-as its
retributions [cf. MYS, 15a-b]. Acquisition can effect the following as retributions:
(a) mat\er-visuar objects, sound, smell, taste; (b) thought and thought-concomi-
tants-the three types of sensation (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral; (c) conditionings
disjoined from thought-acquisition and the four characteristics of the conditioned
[MYS, 97a, 263c].
For SrTiii.ta's view of karmic retribution, see Dhammajoti's article Srflata 's anudhatu doctrine.
3. As for the relationship of the ripening cause and action according to the Yaibhii.eyikas, we
could formulate the following tetralemrna:
i. there are factors _that are only action ,but not a ripening cause, for example, non-
defined actions;
ii. there are factors that are only a ripening cause but not action, for example, sensation
associated with a wholesome intention;
iii. there are factors that are both a ripening cause and action, for example, wholesome
intention (cetana) or.wholesome bodily and vocal action;
iv. there are factors that, are neither, for example, space (akasa) or sensation associated
with a non-defined intention.
4. As for further references regarding vipakahetu in the AKB; see in particular its entire
chapter 4: Karmanirde§a.
910
LS: The Vyakhya states (WOG.21 l.14f.) that wholesome factors are of two modes, i.e.,
impure and pure: kusaias tu dvi-prakaraI:i s'ii.sravii. anii.sravii.s ceti.
911
LVP: Mahiivyutpatti, 245, 181; Siddhi, 488.
912
LS: Saiµghabhadra comments (Ny, 427b; SA.IV.154): "[Vipiika] may refer to the fact that
the karma that has been done, on reaching the stage of the acquisition of the fruit, can be
transformed into being capable of maturing-this [explanation] pertains to the cause [aspect of
the process]."
913
LVP: Hsi.ian-tsang places some remarks here that are absent in Paramiirtha:
According to the Vaibhii.~ikas, the prefix vi indicates difference: vipiika signifies "a dissimilar
(visadrsa) effect (piika)" (Mahiivyutpatti, 245, 1s2). That is to say:
1. the ripening cause (vipiikahetu) alone gives forth only a piika (effect) that is not
similar to itself;
2. the co~existing (sahabhii), associated (sa,rzprayuktaka), homogeneous (sabhiiga) and
pervasive (sarvatraga) causes (hetu) give forth only an effect similar (sadrsalJ pakii?z)
to themselves (wholesome, unwholesome, non-defined);
3. the efficient cause (kiira,:iahetu) gives forth a similar or dissimilar effect.
It is only the ripening cause (vipiikahetu) that always gives forth a dissimilar effect: for the
ripening cause is never non-defined and its effect is always non-defined.
[According to the Sautrii.ntikas,] an effect receives the name of vipiika under two conditions:
1. it should be produced by the last state or culminating point [i.e., distinctive character-
istic_] of the transformation of a stream (sarrztiinapari,:iiimavise~a; see above ii, F 185);
2. it should abide more or less long [i.e., only for a limited time], because of the more
or less great strength of the cause.·
But the effects issued from the two causes, i.e., the co-existent cause (sahabhuhetu) and
associated cause (sa,rzprayuktakahetu), do not show the first characteristic, for these causes
project and realize their effect at the same time (ii. 59); and the effects that have issued from
the three causes, i.e., efficient (kiira,:ia), homogeneous (sabhiiga), and pervasive (sarvat~aga),
do not show· the second characteristic, for there is no limit to the repeated arising (punalJ
puna?z) of these effects during the length of their cyclic existence. - Therefore the sole expla-
nation of vipiika is the following: "transformation (vipari,:iiima ?) and maturation".
LS: Pradhan has (89.26-90.4): atha vipiika iti ko 'rthalJ I visadrsal; piiko vipiikal; I anye~iirrz tu
hetuniirrz sadrsalJ piikalJ I ekasyobhayatheti vaibhii#kiilJ I naiva tu te~iirrz pako yuktalJ I pako hi
nama santatipari,:iamavi§e~ajalJ phalaparyantalJ I na ca sahlibhasa,rzprayuktahetvolJ santati-
pari,:ia,rzaviie~ajarrz phalamasti Ina capi sabhiigahetvadfnlif!! phalaparyanto 'sti I punalJ punalJ
kusaladyasarrzsiiraphalatvat I
This is the 36th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.110).
In a discussion of the meaning of vipakahetu, Vasubandhu criticizes the Vaibhii.~ika
understanding, which, according to him, states that any cause that produces a result
that is necessarily morally different from it (i.e., a good or bad cause that produces
a neutral result) is vipakahetu. He says that this implies that the other causes give
result, albeit result that is not necessarily morally different But Vasubandhu insists
that vipaka must be produced by sa,rztatipari,:iamavise~a and it must be 'result-
bound', which Hsi.ian-tsang explains as limited in duration according to the strength
or weakness of the cause. [ ... ]
Saipghabhadra [Ny, 427b18-22] identifies this as the opinion of the sutra-master and
criticizes [Ny, 427b22-24] Vasubandhu's representation of the Vaibha~ika position,
saying that the Vaibhii~ikas do not say that everything resulting from the six causes is
piika; even if they did, piika would not be a synonym for phala, and it would not
imply vipiika.
914
LS: SAH 76.
915
LS: Ibid.
916
LVP: asti karma yasyaikam eva dharmiiyatanaqi vipiiko vipacyate [WOG.213.33]. - MVS,
97c7. (Hsilan-tsang: "the action that produces the vitality faculty, etc." By et cetera, one should
understand either the group homogeneity (nikiiyasabhtiga) or the characteristic~-
Acarya Vasumitra does not accept this proposition. Vitality faculty or vitality (jfvitendriya) is
the effect of an action that projects an existence (iik~epakakarman; iv. 95). (1) If retribution,
which constitutes this faculty, matures (vipacyate) in the realm of desire, one necessarily has
the body sense-faculty (ktiya-indriya) and the vitality faculty (jfvita-indriya) in the first stages
~f embryonic life; in the last stages five other faculties (indriya) are added. (2) If the vitality
faculty matures in the realm of fine-materiality, one has seven sense-spheres (iiyatana); (3) in
the realm of immateriality, one has the sense-sphere of the mental faculty (mana-iiyatana)
and sense-sphere of factors (dharmtiyatana). - Yasomitra discusses these comments and cites
Saiµghabhadra [WOG.213.33ff.]. The proposition _combated by Vasumitra refers to the realm
of immateriality: at a certain moment, in order to be born in this realm, there is no thought
(mana-iiyatana) that is retribution.
917
LVP: Never twelve, for the sense-sphere of sound (sabdiiyatana) is never retribution
(i. 37be).
918
LS: Yasomitra glosses (WOG.215;9ff.): padma-dar;lima-nyagrodh'iidfniirµ bijiini vicitra-
phaliini. mjilatµkura-nfila-pattra-kesarii-kiiµjalka-kan_ukarais ca riipyaiµ hi padma-bij'adinaiµ.
aneka-skaqidha-siikhii-vi~apa-pattra-pallaviiqikura-pu~pa-phala-samrddhiis ca nyagrodh'adayal)
piidapii jala-dhariiyamii1_1a drsyaiµte. kanicid avicitra-phaliini. tad-yathti yava godhum 'iidfniirµ
bijiini. eka-riipa-phalatviit. bija-dharmatai~ii.
919
LS: SAH 76.
920
LVP: The retribution of a former action can have begun in the present moment, can con-
tinue in the present moment, can proiong itself i~ the future.
921
LVP: The Japanese editor gives the heroic career of the Bodhisattva as an example of a
prolonged action.
922
LVP: na ca karma,:,,ii saha vipiiko vipacyate [WOG.215.17].
923
LS: SAH 78.
924
Gokhale: [55ab] sarvatragaf:i sabhtigas ca dvyadhvagau tryadhvagiis trayaf:i I
Tib.: [55ab] kun 'gro ska[ mnyam dus gnyis pa I gsum po dag ni dus gsum pa I
LVP: Compare ii. 59.
925
LS: AH 226-27; SAH 73, 77-78, 153-55, 460-62, 478, 480.
Explanatory endnotes _to each of the five effects will be given mainly in section CBB: "The
defining characteristics of the five effects", F 289.
See also Vasubandhu's discussion as to how many of the five effects the various actions have
(iv. 87-94).
926
LS: SAR 78, 153-55, 478.
921
Gokhale: [55cd] sarµskrtalJ'I savisalJ'lyogarµ phalalJ'I
Tib.: [55c] 'dusbyasbralbcas 'brasbuyinl
LVP: Disconnection (visarµyoga), i.e., the effect of disconnection (visarrzyogaphala; ii. 57d,
vi. 46), is the.cessation due to deliberation (pratisaYfikhyiinirodha) or NirviiJ:ia (i. 6), one of the
unconditioned factors (asaYfiskrta). It does "not have" a cause, and it does "not have" an effi!ct;
but it "is" a cause (kiira,:iahetu; ii. 50a) and it "is" an effect (visaYfiyogaphala; ii. 57d).
928
LVP: )iiiinaprasthiina, 5, 4; Prakara,:ia, 716b9; which we can reconstruct: phaladharmiif:i
katame I sarve saYfiskrtiif:i pratisaYfikhyiinirodhas ca Ina phaladharmiif:i katame I iikiisam aprati-
saYfikhyiinirodhaf:i I saphaladhahnaf:i katame I sarve salJ'lskrtiif:i I aphaladharmiif:i katame I sarve
'saYfiskrtiif:i: "What factors are an effect? All conditioned factors and cessation due to delibera-
tion. Whatfactors are not an effect? Space and cessation not due to deliberation. What factors
have an effect? All conditioned factors. What factors do not have an effect? All unconditioned
factors."
.LS: The Vyiikhyii has [WOG.216.22f.]: akii.siipratisaiµkhyii.-nirodha-varjyii.~ sarva-dharmii~
phalam ity uktam bhavati.
929
LS: In regard to why disconnection does not have a cause, Saiµghabbadra answers
(Ny, 429a; EIP.VID.708f.) that disconnection is not an effect that is "produced", but rather an
effect that is "attained" through the noble path that acts as homogeneous or co-existent cause
for the •~production" of the "possession" of this disconnection and is thus the cause of attaining
this disconnection. But it is "disconnection" that is the end of the noble path and not "posses-
sion".
In regard to why disconnection does not have an effect, he answers (Ny, 429a; EIP.VID.709)
that unconditioned dharmas act as effie:ient causes (kiira,:iahetu), however, not in the sense of
"producing", but only in the sense of "non-obstructing". Future dharmas and unconditioned
dharmas do not "have" an effect because they do not, like the present and past conditioned
dharmas, have the capability of (1) taking or (2) giving forth their effects (see AKB ii. 59).
Further, in the case where the unconditioned dharmas serve as the cognitive object of mental
consciousness, they are not a productive cause.
930
Gokhale: (55d2] nii 'saYfiskrtasya te II,
Tib.: [55d] 'dus ma byas la de dag med II
LVP: Milinda, 268-71.
931
LS: SAR 154.
932
LS: Dhammajoti summarizes his discussion of cessation due to deliberation (pratisalJ'l-
khyiinirodha) as follows (SA.IV.484f.):
In the Sarvii.stivii.da perspective, there are as many nirvii,:ia-s or pratisarµ,khyii-
nirodha-s as there are with-outflow dharma-s. These are ontologically distinct real
entities. Their reality is not even dependent on the criterion of causal efficacy in the
space-time dimension but on the fact that they can impact on the mental streams of
beings. Each nirvii~a-via priipti-acts to ensure the absolute non-arising of the

defilement counteracted J,y the iirya-miirga by virtue of which the priipti of the nir-
vii~a is induced, and each is experiencible by the iirya as having distinct character-
istics.
Nirvii~a in the sense of the ultimate spiritual realization of the Buddhist practitioner
refers to the pratisarµ.khyii-nirodha realized when all the klesa-s and dul,ikha-s per-
taining to the three periods of time are completely abandoned (Ny, 430b). Although
all practitioners acquire the same nirvii~a corresponding to a given impure dharma,
each individual's experience of nirvii~a is unique by virtue of the priipti that links
the nirvii~ to him. Acquisition (priipti)-although conditioned in itself but neither
mental nor material in nature--in fact plays the important role of relating the uncon-
ditioned to the conditioned. It is the sine qua non for man's experience of nirvii~a.
933
LVP: The unhindered path (iinantaryamiirga) cuts off defilement and is followed by the
path of liberation (vimuktimiirga), "the path in which defilement is already cut off', in which
the practitioners take possession (priipti) of disconnection, vi. 28.
934
LVP: Certain masters maintain that there are five types of causes:
1. kiiraka, efficacious cause, the seed for the bud;
2. jniipaka, indicating cause, smoke for fire;
3. vyanjaka, revealing cause, the lamp for the pot;
4.. dhva7J1saka, destructive cause, the hammer for the pot;
5. prapaka, leading cause, chariot for a place.
On this point see Vibhii~ii, 16, p. 79, 2: The Ekottara enumerated the factors of 1 to 100; it
Stops now at 10; and, within 1-10, much is lost, little remains. At the nirvii~a of Ananda,
77,000 Avadanas and Sutras, 10,000 Siistras were lost ....
935
LVP: (Paramiirtha differs noticeably).
Reply by the Sautriintika: - The Siitra SPIJaks only of that which produces; thus the uncondi-
tioned [although non-impermanent] can b~a cognitive object condition (iilambanapratyaya).
In fact, it only says that the causal conditions (hetupratyaya) that produce the consciousness.
are impermanent; it does not say that all conditions (pratyaya) of the consciousness are imper-
manent.
Reply by the Sarviistiviidin: - Does the Siitra nqt say that only the hetu producer is imper-
manent? Thus it does not deny that the unconditioned-and this by the simple fact that it does
not constitute an obstacle-is the efficient cause (kiira~ahetu).
Reply by the Sautriintika: - The Siitra says that the unconditioned is a cognitive object condi-
1
tion; and it does not say that it is an efficient cause (kiira~ahetu); thus one should not define it
as "cause not constituting an obstacle".
LS: This is the fourth place in Pradhan (91.15), where the term Sautriintika is explicitly men-
tioned.
936
LVP: ye hetavo ye pratyayii riipasya ... vijniinasyotpiidiiya te py anityii/:1 (Saviyukta, 1, s).
937
938
LVP: satrii~i ca bahuny antarhitiini miilasarp.grtibhrarp.siit [WOG.218.29f.].
939
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, L VP mentions the Sautriintika here.
940
LS: This is the fifth place in Pradhan (92.4), where the term Sautriintika is explicitly men-
tioned.
This is the 37 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.114).
Sa111ghabhadra (Ny, 429a21-23) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and attempts to
refute it (Ny, 429a20-21).
The denial of the asaf!1skrtas is already attributed to the Diir~tantikas in MVS, 198a.
941
LVP: We may think that, in the pages that follow, Vasubandhu does not do full justice to
the arguments of the Sarviistiviidin-Vaibhii~ika; he does not point out the texts, for example,
Udiina, viii. 3 (Itivuttaka, 43, Udiinavarga" xxvi. 21), which at least render the reality of
Nirvii1_1a probable. - Sa111ghabhadra refutes Vasubandhu and the other masters who deny the
unconditioned factors (Nyiiyiinusiira, 431 bl 7-c2). His exposition is too long to be included
here: we have provided the translation of it, at least partially, in Docume.nts d'Abhidharma:
Textes relatifs au nirvii~a et aux asal'[lskrtas en general (1930) (see Electronic Appendix).
942 th
LS: 1. This is the 38 of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.116f.). Sa111ghabhadra identifies (Ny, 429a23-25) this as the opinion of Vasubandhu. Cox
. summarizes Sa111ghabhadra (Ny, 429a27-430a7; EIP.VIIl.709): "Space exists as a distinct
actual entity that acts to support wind and is manifested by light. The existence of space can be
inferred from these activities. Its characteristic is the nonobstruction of others, and
nonobstruction by others. Further, precisely because space can serve as the supporting
object in the production of the concept 'space', it can be said to exist as an actual entity.
Cognition is not produced without an existent supporting object."
2. As for space, see AKB i. Sd and our endnote to it. See in particular Dhammajoti's discus-
sion of space at SA.IV.491-96, where he also summarizes his discussion as follows:
Not all the canonical Abhidharma treatises mention Space as an unconditioned
dharma. [It is noteworthy thl;lt even in the Jniinaprasthiina-siistra ... only the two
nirodha-s are mentioned, but not iikiisa]. In the MVS, too, some of the Sarviistiviidin
masters, like Dharmatriita, do not accept Space as a real existent. The orthodox
Sarviistiviidins, however, consistently maintain that it is a real existent, and not
the mere absence of tangibles. Starting from the MVS, we see various arguments
for and against the position that it is a real entity. A clear distinction is made in
this text between the unconditioned Space on the one hand, and the conditioned
space element, on the other. Vasumitra and other Abhidharmas in the MVS argue
that the reality of Space can not only be inferred, but actually is directly perceived
since the events observed in our experience necessarily have a real causal basis-
when we perceive that material things can be accommodated or that people can
move about, we are actually directly perceiving a distinctive function of Space;
and this distinctive function necessarily proves the existence of a distinct existent.
Although Samghabhadra does not go so far as to assert that Space is actually
directly perceived, he too argues that we can infer its reality from its observable
distinctive function and characteristic (lak1a~a); and that which possesses a unique
function and a unique characteristic is a uniquely real: Its function is manifested
through the fact that it accommodates resistant things; its characteristic-Le., its
900 Exposition of the Faculties (/ndriyanirdesa)
observable aspect-is manifested through light. To further distinguish it as a unique

existent from the space element, Sarµghabhadra articulates that whereas the space
element is non-obstructive but is obstructed, Space is neither obstructive nor ob_-
structed by other things.
943
LVP: utpannanusayajanmanirodhe pratisarrikhyabalenanyasyanusayasya janmanas ca anut-
padal:i pratisa1J1khya-nirodhal:i [cf. WOG219.3ff.].
1. Cessation of the proclivity (anusaya) is the cessation of the origin of unsatisfactoriness
(samudayasatyanirodha, cessation of that which, in truth, is the origin of unsatisfactoriness), is
nirva,;a ~ith remainder (sopadhise~anirva,;a).
Cessation of arising or existence (janman) is the cessation of unsatisfactoriness (du/:ikhasatya-
nirodha, cessation of that which, in truth, is unsatisfactoriness), is nirva,;a without remainder
(nirupadhise~anirva,;a).
2. By proclivity (anusaya) one should understand the traceg__~ii,sana) of the ninety-eight
proclivities described in chapter 5.
LS: 1. This is the 39 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.118f.). Sarµghabhadra identifies (Ny, 429a25-26) this as the opinion of Vasubandhu. Cox
summarizes Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 430a18-434b6; EIP.VIII.709): "[Cessation due to delibera-
tion] does exist as an actual entity constituting the abandonment of all defilements of a par-
ticular category in all three time periods. Through the practice of the noble path, one first
severs one's possession of a particular category of defilements; then one acquires posses-
sion of the cessation, or disconnection from this category of defilements. Therefore, one
acquires possessiori of this cessation for each particular category of defilements that are to be
abandoned."
2. As for pratisa1J1khyanirodha, see AKB i. 6ab and our endnote to it. See also in particular
Dhammajoti's discussion of pratisa1J1khyanirodha at SA.IV.474-85 and the summary of his
discussion of pratisa1J1khyanirodha (SA.IV.484f.) in our endnote to ii. 55d [F 276].
944
LS: 1. This is the 40 th of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.120f.). Sarµghabhadra identifies (Ny, 429a25-26) this as the opinion of Vasubandhu. Cox
summarizes Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 430a18-434b6; EIP.VIII.710): "A mere absence is not cap-
able of preventing the arising of a factor. Rather, cessation [not due to deliberation] must be a
distinct facto~ attained due to a deficiency of conditions, which then itself prevents a factor
from ever arising."
2. As for apratisa1J1khyanirodha, see AKB i. 6cd and our endnote to it. See also in particular
Dhammajoti's discussion of apratisa1J1khyanirodha at SA.IV.485-91, where he also summa-
rizes his discussion as follows:
Little more than the mere mention of this cessation is found in the earlier canonical
texts. Starting from the Jiianaprasthana, however, we begin to find doctrinal articu-
lations on it. This text, besides offering a definition of the cessation independent of
deliberation, also distinguishes between with-outflow and outflow-free cessations
independent of deliberation. In the MYS, [we find an] elaborate analysis-utiliz-
ing the Abhidharmic doctrinal perspectives--of its nature in comparison to those of
the cessation thi:ough deliberation and the cessation of imper.manence.
Moreover, already in the Jiianaprasthiina, we see the implication that such cessations
do not exclusively pertain to mundane human experiences wherein the cognitions of
certain objects are commonly missed out in the absence of the required conditions.
The specific separation of such experiences from the type which are described in the
Jiianaprasthiina as cessations of "the dharma-s of unsatisfactoriness in the temporal
process", and specified as those of outflow-free dharma-s, suggests that this type of
cessation can be of spiritual significance as well. This point becomes more explicit in
the MYS which distinctly discuss~s the type of cessations independent of delibera-
tion occurring every moment, of objects not cognizable by us, and also the type
effecting the non-arising of the unfortunate planes of existence as a result of spiritual
praxis like giving, ethical observances, etc.
Finally, whereas-in the earlier canonical texts, this cessation is explained simply as
being the result of the deficiency in conditions; since the MYS, it has been further
asserted that the cessation independent of deliberation is itself a necessary contribu-
tory factor: It is a positive force-a real existent-which helps to bring about the non-
arising of the object concerned. This aspect is articulately expounded by SaJP-gha-
bhadra.
945
LVP: The Sthaviras, according to the Japanese editor.
946
LVP: anusayapratyayavaikalyiit pasciid duJ:ikhiijiitil:z Ina prajiiabalat.
947
948
LVP: According to the Japanese editor, the MahiisiiJP-ghikas.
949
LVP: svarasanirodhiit, not through the force of understanding (prajfiii), as is the case for
cessation due to deliberation (pratisal'Jlkhyiinirodha).
950
LS: The last sentence is an addition from LVP's Additions et Corrections, F 145._
951
952
LVP: atftiiniigatapratyutpannasya duJ:ikhasya prahii,:iiiya SGl'JlVGrtate [WOG.219.29f.].
Compare Kathiivatthu, xix. 1.
953
954
LVP; That is to say, chanda (predilection for future factors: aniigate priirthanii) and riiga
(attachment to what one possesses: priipte 'rthe 'dhyavasiinam).
955
LVP: yo rape chandariigas tal'Jl prajahfta I chandariige prahf,:ie eVGl'Jl vas tad rupal'Jl
prahflJGl'Jl bhavi$yati [cf. WOG.219f.].
Abandonment (prahii,:ia) of material form (rupa) is to be understood as unhindered path
(iinantaryamiirga); complete knowledge (parijfiii) is to be understood as path of liberation
(vimuktimiirga; vi. 30). (Gloss by the Japanese editor).
Compare, for its doctrine, Sal'Jlyutta, iii. 8.
956
LVP: Paramiirtha, 5, p. 192a.
957
LVP: Sal'Jlyukta, 31, 12: ye kecid bhik$avo dharmiiJ:i sal'Jlskrtii vii asal'Jlskrtii vii viriigas
fe$iim agra iikhyiiyate (cited in Vyiikhyii, iv, 127); Aliguttara, ii. 34; ltivuttaka, § 90; yiivatii
Cundi dhammii salikhatii vii asalikhatii vii viriigo tesal'Jl aggam akkhiiyati.
Detachment (viriiga) = exhaustion of attachment (riigak$aya), cessation due to deliberation
(pratisal!lkhyanirodha), nirva,:za. - Nirvai:ia is better than cessation not due to deliberation

(apratisa1?1khyiinirodha) and space (iv. 127d).
958
959
LVP: We can reconstruct: abhiivo bhavatfti na sidhyati. - Hslian-tsang differs: One cannot
say of non-existence that it exists. The value of the verb "to be" is thus established (i.e., this
verb does not signify "to exist"). It is in this way that Scripture says there are unconditioned
factors.
960
LVP: vastuno (=riigiidivastuno) [nirodhasya ca] hetuphaliidibhiiviisarribhaviit [WOG.221.7f.].
961
LVP: BhiifYa: tasya tarhi priiptiniyame [ko hetulJ]. - Vyiikhyii [WOG.221.l0ff.]: tasya
nirodhasya yo 'yaxµ priipter niyamaJ.i I asyaiva nirodhasya priiptir niinyasyeti 11 tasmixµ priipti-
niyame ko hetulJ 11 na hi nirodhasya priiptyii siirdhaxµ kascit saxµbandho 'sti hetuphaliidi.-
bhiiviisaxµbhaviit.
962
LVP: drij!adharmanirvii,:iaprapta [WOG.221.12f.], that is to say, "who is in Nirvai:ia with
remainder" (sopadhise:janirva,:iastha).
963
964
LVP: sdug bsngal 'di ma lus_par spangs pa 'byang bar 'gyur ba (M. Vyut. 245, 1259) zad
pad 'dod chags dang bral ba 'gog pa rnam par zhi ba (1260) nub pa (70, 4) sdug bsngal gzhan
dang nying mtshams sbyor ba med pa len pa med pa 'byung ba med pa gang yin pa 'di lta ste I
phung po thams cad nges par spangs pa (245, 1258) sred pa zad pa I 'dod chags dang 'bral ba I
'gog pa dang mya ngan las 'daspa 'di ni zhi ba'o I 'di ni g.ya nom pa'o I
A variant of the end in Mahiivastu, ii. 285: etal!I siintam etal!I pra,:iftam etal!I yathiivad etam
aviparftam yam idal!I sarvopadhipratinilJsargo sarvasamskiirasamatho vartmopacchedo trif,:zii-
kijayo virago nirodho nirva,:zam. Same text iii, 200.
Mahiivagga, third truth, 1, 6, 21.
The Vyiikhyii [WOG.221.17] provides the first few words of the text, i.e: yat khalv asya
[dulJkhasya ... ], and the two terms prahii,:ia (abandonment) and apriidurbhiiva (non-appear-
ance). We have, Anguttara, i. 100: parikkhaya pahii,:za khaya vaya viriiga nirodha ciiga pa{i-
nissagga; v. 421: asesaviriiga nirodha ciiga pafinissagga mutti aniilaya; Sal!lyutta, i. 136:
sabbasal!lkhiirasamatha ... ; ltivuttaka, 51: upadhippafinissagga. -See also the Sanskrit versions
of Majjhima, i. 497 in Pischel, Fra1;ments d'ld;ikutsari, p. 8 (vyantibhiiva) and Avadiinasataka,
ii.187 (viintibhiiva).
965
LS: Saxµghabhadra (Ny, 433a; ESD.207) replies to the Sautriintikas as'follows:
The siitra quoted cannot be used to prove that nirvii,:ia is abhavamiitra. This siitra
speaks only with reference to the time when one enters into nirupadhise:ja-nirvii,:ia:
At this stage, all upadhi-s are completely abandoned, relinquished, etc.
966 LVP: [WOG .22 l.17ff:] In other words, apriidurbhiiva = niismin priidurbhiivalJ. This is
the adMkara,:iasiidhana etymology. The Sautrantika understands apriidurbhiiva = apradurbhiiti
(bhiivasiidhana). · '
Th~ explanation of the Sarvii.stivadin is reproduced in Madhyamakvrtti, p. 525, and attributed
to the philosophy which considers Nirvai:ia as a bhiiva (mode of existence), a padiirtha (thing)
similar to a dike, which arrests the process of defilement, of action and of rebirth.
967
968
LVP: In fact, the path destroys the production of unsatisfactoriness (dul:,khasa"mudaya).
What is the use of imagining, in regard to the path, a thing in itself called nirodha?
969
LVP: Dfgha, ii. 157; Sarriyutta, i. 159; Theragiithii, 906.
pajjotasseva nibbiinaf!I vimokho cetaso ahii.
The Sanskrit redaction (Avadiinasataka, 99; Madhyamakavrtti, 520; Culva, Nanjio, 118, apud
J. Przyluski, J. As., 1918, ii. 490, 509):
pradyotasyeva nirva1:iaf!1 vimo~as tasya cetasal:,.
This happens at the moment of Nirvai;ia-without-remainder (nirupadhise~a-nirva,:ia-kiile). - Tlie
definition bhavanirodho nibbiinam, Aliguttara, v. 9; Sarriyutta, ii. 116, etc.
LS: Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.478) that the Vaibhii~ika "argues that this simile does not
contradict their viewpoint: The extinction referred therein is the anityatii-lak~a,:ia which exists
as a real viprayukta-saf!!skiiradharma, distinct from the flame. Besides, this simile is made
with reference to the time of entering into the nirupadhise~a-nirvii,:ia when all remaining
upadhi-s are completely cut off."
970
971
LS: SAH 478.
972
LVP: MVS, 161a10. - We read in Prakara_lJG, 716a3, a definition that we can reconstruct;
avastukii apratyayii dharmiil:, katame? asaf!1skrta dharmiil:, (see i. 7).
973
LS: Tib.: ldan pa'i dngos po.
974
LVP: This is the text cited ad i. 7.
975 LVP: The Vy{ikhyq ad i. 7 (Petrograd edition, p. 22) reproduces all these explanations.
976
is: SAR 78, 153-55.
977
LS: SAR 78, 153.
978
Gokhale: [56a] vipiikaphalam antyasya
Tib.: [56a] rnam smin 'bras bu tha ma'i yin I
LVP: The Japanese editor cites the MVS, 629c4.
The effects are of five types: 1. effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala)i 2. ripened effect
(vipiikaphala), 3. effect of disconnection (visaf!!yogaphala), 4. effect of human action (puru~a-
kiiraphala) and 5. effect of dominance (adhipatiphala).
1. Effect of uniform outflow: the wholesome produced by the wholesome, the unwholesome
produced by the unwholesome, the non-defined by the non-defined.
\
2. Ripened effect: the retribution (vipiika) is produced by wholesome or good-impure fac-

. tors; the cause b,eing wholesome or unwholesome, the effect is always non-defined. Since this
effect is different from its cause and has "matured" (piika), it is called vipiika (visadrsa piika).
3. Effect of disconnection. The unhindered paths (iinantaryamiirga) sever defilement; they
have the severing of defilement for their effect of disconnection and effect of human action;
they have the path of liberation (vimuktimiirga) for their effect of equal outflow and effect of
human action; they have all the later paths, equal and superior, of their type as their effect of
equal outflow.
See also the Abhidharmiivatiira,fiistra (Nanjio, 1291) ii. 14, where the n~mes of the effects are
explained [see below].
979
LS: SAH 78, 155.
980
Gokhale: [56a] piirvasya 'dhipataf{I phalam I
Tib.: [56a] bdag po'i 'bras bu dang po'i yin I
LVP: piirvasyiidhipajaf{I phalam or piirvasyiidhipataf{I phalam (Piil).ini, iv. l, 85). - iv. 85ab,
110a.
981
LS: See ii, F 247, where not making an obstacle is described as the proper activity of a
sovereign or lord.
982
LVP: The receptacle world (bhiijanaloka; iii. 45, iv. 1) is produced 1:iy wholesome and
unwholesome actions of the totality of sentient beings; it is non-defined; however it is not
retribution (vipiika), because retribution is a factor "indicative of sentient beings" (ii, F 290);
therefore, it is the effect of dominance (adhipatiphala) of actions considered as efficient cause
(kiira,:zahetu ).
983
LS: SAH 78, 153.
984
Gokhale: [56cdl] sabhiigasarvatragayor niryandaJ:i
Tib.: [56c] rgyu mthun skat mnyam kun 'gro ba'i I
985
LS: SAH 78, 154.
986
LS: Ibid.
987
Gokhale: [56d2] pauru~affl dvayoJ:i II
Tib.: [56d] skyes bu pa ni gnyis kyi yin 11
988
LS: This is the 41 st of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.122f.). Saiµghabhadra identifies (Ny, 436a7-8) this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and
criticizes it at length (Ny, 436a8-26). Saiµghabhadra's o)Jjection is based on the Vaibhii~ika
definition of kiiritra as phala-iikar~a,:za (?) or phala-iik~epa, i.e., the dragging out or project-
ing/inducing of an effect, as opposed to the actual "giving" (phala-diina) or producing of an
effect. However, since the types of simultaneous causes (saTflprayuktahetu and sahabhahetu)
that "produce" puru~akiiraphala do not "project" .a result, the usage of kiiritra is not appropri-
ate in the context of the present discussion of: wtiat causes produce what fru_its? Saiµghabhadra
then explains (SA.IV.168):
Herein, puru~a-kiira, puru~a-bala, pur~a-siimarthya ( ± i~ ), puru~a-sakti ( ±.:t."'11'-)-
all these have the same meaning: As the efficacies (rJJ ~~) of dharma-s are like virile
actions, they are called virile action (puru~akiira); just as a strong man is called a lion
because he is like a lion.
989
LVP: Absent in Paramiirtha.
990
LS: AH 226-27; SAH 154, 460-62.
991
LS: AH 227; SAH 461.
992
Gokhale: [57ab] vipiiko 'vyiikrto dharmaJ:i sattviikhyo vyiikrtodbhava/:1 I
Tib.: [57ab] rnam smin lung du ma bstan chos Isems can brjod lung bstan phyis 'byung I
LS: l.Avatilra (ESD.122):

The retributive causes acquire the retribution fruits (vipilka-phala). [The word vipiika
is explained thus:] "vi" because the fruit is dissimilar to the cause; and "pac" bl)cause
it is matured and fit for being experienced. The fruit itself being the retribution, it is
named the retribution fruit. It pertains to sentient beings (sattviikhya) only, and is
non-defined in nature.
2. Dhammajoti explains (SA.IV.182):
This fruit, pertaining to sentient beings (sattviikhyii) only, correlates with the retri-
bution cause. The causal relationship between this fruit and its cause pertains to
the domain of karma which is twofold, personal and collective. Personal karma
results in an individual retribution. Collective karma-s are actions done collectively
by a group of beings, resulting in collective experiences. Thus, the physical world-
the bhajana-loka-inhabited by living beings is the result of the moral actions of the
totality of beings. However, it is not named a retribution, which, by definition, is
unique to the individual. Instead, such a collective result is considered as a fruit of
dominance.
Being a result of a process of maturation (vi-Vpac; pac meaning cook/mature), a
retribution fruit is neither simultaneous with its cause nor produced immediately .... ·
The retribution cause depends on the development or maturation of the series for
the realization of its fruit. Its moral nature is indefinable as being either kusala or
akusala, i.e., it is non-defined (avyakrta). Moreover, it is described as "non-veiled/
non-covered" (anivrta), since it does not constitute a hindrance to the noble path.
3. As for further references in the AKB, see i. 37-:38a, which discusses and defines the
effect of retribution (vipilkaja) in the context of the eighteen elements (dhatu), which includes
an explanation of the meaning of the term vipakaja and also determines "sound" not _to be an
effect of retribution.
See iv. 57 [F 124-28], which discusses "sensation" (vedanil) not only as an element of retri-
bution of action, but as the "essential or predominant" element of retribution, on the other
hand, see ii. lOac and iv. 57d which argue that dissatisfaction (daurmanasya) is never a
ripened effect for the Vaibhii~ikas (and seemingly also for Vasubandhu), whereas the other
four of the five sensations are of two types, i.e., sometimes a ripened effect and sometimes not.
Further, see iv. 85, which in the context of discussing the ripened effect of unwholesome paths
of action (karmapatha) states that "through each unwholesome path of action that is practiced
assiduously (ilsevita), cultivated (bhiivita), and developed or much practiced (bahulfkrta), the
culprit is reborn in hell", and iv. 87-94, which discusses the five effects in the context of the
effects of various actions.
Moreover, ix, F 297, distinguishes the ripened effect (vipiikaphala) and the effect of equal out-
flow (ni,D>andaphala), stating: "When the capability (silmarthya) that produces the ripened
effect, a capability projected by the ripening cause [vipiikahetu], has produced its effect, this
capability is abolished. On the contrary, the capability that produces an effect of equal outflow,
a capability projected by a homogeneous cause (sabhiighetu), does not perish by the produc-
tion of its effect."
993
LVP: [WOG.223.31ff:] The prefix ud in udbhava signifies "later", "belatedly" (uttara-
kiila). - Concentration (samiidhi) produces an increase of the fundamental material ele-
. menfs ,of the body: these fundamental material elements are called an effect of accumulation
(aupacayika) because they arise either at the same time as the concentration, or immediately
after; they are not an effect of retribution. - In the same way, the thought of emanation (nir-
mii~acitta; i. 37, vii. 48) is non-defined, constituting a sentient being, created by a determinate
action (concentration); but, arising immediately after the concentration, it is not an effect of
retribution. Furthermore, the ripened effect always belongs to the same stage as the action
from whence it proceeds.
994
LS: AH 226; SAH 460.
995
Gokhale: [57c] ni~yando hetusadrso
Tib.: [57c] rgyu mthun rgyu dang 'dra ba'o I
The homogeneous causes and the universal causes acquire the uniform-emanation
fruits (ni~anda-phala; ~hWE.:lll:). It is said to be "uniform"($) because the fruit is
similar to the cause. It is further said to be an "emanation" (~) because it is pro-
duced from the cause. The fruit itself being the uniform-emanation, it is named a
uniform-emanation fruit.
2. The Sanskrit word ni~yanda (ni--f syand) literally means "flowing forth, issuing" and
Sarµghabhadra explains (Ny; 435c; EIP.VIIl.710) that this effect is produced by either the
homogeneous cause or the pervasive cause and that it is always similar to its causes (i) in
moral quality and (ii) often in essential nature.
3. As for further references in the AKB, see i. 37-38a, which discusses and defines the
effect of equal outflow (nai~yandika) in the context of the eighteen elements (dhiitu), which
. includes an explanation of the meaning of the term nai~yandika and also determines the five
sense-faculties not to be an effect of equal outflow. Further see iv. 85, which lists the various
effects of equal outflow as related to each of the ten unwholesome paths of action (karma-
patha), and iv. 87-94, which discusses the five effects in the context of the effects of various
actions.
Moreover, vi. Sld discusses that "eighty-nine paths of liberation (vimuktimiirga) are the
conditioned fruits of the way of virtuous endeavor, being an effect of equal outflow (ni~yanda-
phala) ani an effect of human action (puru~akiiraphala) of llie way of virtuous endeavor".
Again, as just mentioned in more detail in our endnote to the ripened effect, Vasubandhu
distinguishes (ix, F 297) the ripened effect (vipiikaphala) and the effect of equal outflow
(ni~yandaphala).
996
LVP: The wholesome factors are not the homogeneous cause (sabhiigahetu) of defiled
factors, etc.
997
LS: AH 227; SAH 462.
998
Gokhale: [57d] visa,µyogal_t k~ayo dhiyii I
Tib.: [57d] bral ba blo yis zad pa'o I
The cessation through deliberation (pratisarrikhyti-nirodha), an unconditioned, is

named disconnection fruit (visarriyoga-phala). [Although) it is not produced by the
Path, [it is still said to be a fruit because) it is acquired by virtue of the Path, [i.e., by
means of the Path, the practitioner obtains the acquisition (prtipti) of the disconnec-
tion). The fruit itself being the disconnection, it is named the disconnection fruit.
Disconnection means disconnection from defilements. This fruit refers to the cessa-
tion through deliberation (pratisal!l.khyti-nirodha). However, this is not in the sense
that the unconditioned pratisarrikhyti-nirodha (= nirvti~a), transcending temporality
as it does, can be produced as an effect through a space-time causal process. It _is
called a "fruit" of disconnection only because it is acquired as a result of following
the noble path-the path does not function as a cause as such, producing it as the
effect; it only induces the arising of the acquisition (prtipti) of it.
3. As for further references in the AKB, see iv. 87-94, which discusses the five effects in the
context of the effects of various actions.
999
LS: AH 227; SAH 461.
1000
Gokhale: [58ab] yadbaltij jtiyate yat tat phalarri puru~aktirajam I
Tib.: [58ab) gang gi stabs kyis gang skyes pa'i I 'bras de skyes bu byed las skyes I
LS: 1. Avattira (ESD.122):
These conjoined causes and the co-existent causes acquire the fruits of manly action
(puru~akara-phala). [This fruit is so named) because by the force of this [-the
manly or virile action (puru~akara)-], that [-the fruit-) is produced.
2.- Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.178) that this fruit has a rather wide scope, but that it is
partkularly correlated to the co-existent cause (sabhabhahetu) and the associated cause
(sarriprayuktakahetu) (see ii, F 289). AKB ii. 56d explains the terms "human" (pau'ru~a) and
"human action" (puru~akara). Saiµghabhadra distinguishes four types of effect of human
action (SA.IV.178):
i. conascent-produced by virtue of the dharma-s being simultaneously causes to one
another;
ii. immediate-produced in the subsequent moment by virtue of the preceding thought
as the cause; e.g., the dulJkha-dharmajfitina, produced by the laukikagra-dharma-s.
iii. separated in time--produced mediately by virtue of successive causes in a series-
e.g., a crop produced by a farmer etc.
iv. not produced [i.e., nirvii~a; see AKB ii, F 292).
3. As for further references in the AKB, see iv. 87-94, which discusses the.five effects in the
context of the effects of various actions, and vi. 51d, which discusses that "eighty-nine paths of
liberation (vimuktimiirga) are the conditioned fruits of the way of virtuous endeavor, being an
effect of equal outflow (ni~yandaphala) and an effect of human action (puru~akiiraphala) of
the way of virtuous endeavor".
1001
LVP: The thought at death (mara~acitta) in the realm of desire, i.e., the thought of the
being who dies in the realm of desire, can have, for the effect of human action, the first
moment of an intermediary being in the realm of fine-materiality. - These examples show the
difference between the effect of human action (puru~akiiraphala) and the effect of equal
outflow (ni~yandaphala). Four alternatives (tetralemma):
1. effect of human action that is not effect of equal outflow: examples as above;
2. effect of equal outflow, the effect of the homogeneous and pervasive causes that does
not immediately follow;
3. effect of equal outflow and effect of human action, parallel effect, of the same stage,
follow immediately;
4. ndther of the two: the ripened effect.
1002
LS: See Saiµghabhadra's explanations regarding this fourth type at Ny, 437a (SA.IV.179).
1003
LS: AH 227; SAH 461.
1004
Gokhale: [58cd] apurva~ sarµslq-tasy aiva sarfiskrto 'dhipate~ phalarµ II
Tib.: [58cd] sngon byung ma yin 'dus byas ni I 'dus byas kho na'i bdag po'i 'bras II
LVP: See ii. 56b and iv. 85.
The efficient causes acquire the fruits of dominance (adhipati-phala). [The word
"fruit of dominance" is explained thus:] by force of this dominance (adhipati), that is
produced. For example; the visual faculty, etc., with regard to visual consciousness,
etc.; the farmer, etc., with regard to the crops, etc.-from the anterior dominance, the
posterior dharma i:s produced. Being the fruit of the dominance, it is named a "fruit
of dominance".
2. In the Chinese as well as in the Sanskrit, the root-verse is followed by a rephrasing of the
root-verse but LVP does not translate it and instead seems to combine the two. The omitted
sentence in Pradhan.96.8: purvotpanniidanya~ sarµskrto dharma~ sarµskrtasyaiva sarvasyiidhi-
patiphalam.
This is the most generic type of fruit, correlated to the most generic type of cause, the
efficient cause. In terms of the karma doctrine of the Sarviistiviida, the fruits com-
monly shared by a collection of beings by virtue of their collective karma-s belong to
this category. Thus, the whole universe with all its planets, mountains and oceans,
etc., is the result-the fruit of dominance--of the collective karma-s of the totality of
beings inhabiting therein.
4. As for further references in the AKB, see iii. 45, which discusses adhipatiphala in the
context of the arising of the three supporting circles (ma,:i<Jala) of_ the receptacle world
(bhiijanaloka) and states that due to the dominance of the collective actions or the actions of all
sentient beings (as effect of), there arises the circle of wind (viiyuma,:i<Jala) that rests on space
(iikiisa).
See also iv. 1, which states that the variety of the world arises from (individual and collective)
action because the "world or universe" (lokadhiitu), which includes the bhiijanaloka, is varie-
gated in accordance with the beings' individual and collective karma. Expressed differently, it
can be said that the various actions (karma) of sentient beings "as an efficient cause" (kiira,:ia-
hetu), i.e., the collective karma, lead to an effect of dominance (adhipatiphala), that is shared,
though not necessarily by all beings; and that the action of an individual being "as a ripening
cause" (vipiikahetu) results, if the necessary conditions are present, in a ripened effect (vipiika-
phala) that is not shared, but individual. Moreover, see iv. 85, which lists the various effects of
dominance as related to each of the ten unwholesome paths of action (karmapatha), and
iv. 87-94, which discusses the five effects in the context of the effects of various actions.
1005
LS: SAH 154.
1006
LS: MYS, 106c, states (SA.IV.181):
Question: What is the difference between a virile fruit and a fruit of dominance?
Answer: That which is acquired through the exercise of an effort is a virile fruit. That
which is ·acquired on account of non-obstruction is a fruit of dominance .... More-
over, wealth is a virile fruit in respect of the doer, and a fruit of dominance in respect
of the enjoyer. Thus the fruits [of a plant] are both virile fruits and fruits of domi-
nance in respect of the planter; [but] only fruits of dominance in respect of the
enjoyer ....
1007
LS: SAB 73, 77.
1008
LS: Sruµghabhadra explains (Ny, 437c; EIP.VIIl.710f.) that the six causes function caus-
ally in two stages:
1. Through "taking/projecting/inducing of the effect" (ii-Vk#p) or "grasping of an effect"
(graha,:zalpratigraha,:za), which occurs only in the present time period, the cause draws out a
future dharma preparing it for its "production" and this present activity alone is referred to
as the cause's· "activity" (kiiritra). For the Vaibhii.~ikas, this activity of dharma of grasping
or projecting its own fruit--causing the arising of its following moment in its serial continu-
ity-uniquely defines its presentness. All six causes take or draw out their effects only when
they themselves are in the present time period. This step properly determines that the particu-
lar cause is causally related to its corresponding effect. Yasomitra also explains similarly
[WOG.226.12f.]:
By "[the causes] grasp" is meant "they project". It means that they abide in the state
of being a cause (pratigrh,:zantiiti. ii.k~ipanti hetu-bhii.venii.vati~thanta ity arthaJ:i).
2. Through "giving/producing of the effect" (phala-diina), which can occur in the present
or past time period, the effect is made to enter into the present whereby the cause gives the
effect power enabling it to arise. This is referred to as a cause's "capability" (siimarthya). As
this second stage cap.not occur without the first stage, "this"· capability cannot occur in the
future time period.
1009
LVP: vartamii,:ziil; phala,ri paiica grh,:zanti dvau prayacchatal; I
vartamiiniibhyatrtau dviiv eko 'tftal; prayacchati I 59
Compare ii. 55ab.
1010
LVP: These definitions are given later (vi. fol. 22a7) in the original [Chinese edition].
They are placed here for the convenience of the reader.
10
u LVP: tasya bfjabhiivopagamaniit [WOG.230.21]. -The factor always exists, whether it is
future, present or past. We say that it seizes or projects an effect at the moment when, becom-
ing present, it becomes the cause or seed of an effect. - The Vyiikhyii observes that the
comparison of the seed belongs to the theory of the Sautrii.ntikas. Also "this text is absent in
certain manuscripts" (kvacit pustake niisty efa pii{hal;; WOG.230.22).
1012
LS: SAH 77.
1013
LS: Ibid.
1014
Gokhale: [59abl] vartamiina?z phalarri pafica grhnanti
Tib.: [59a] Inga po da ltar 'bras bu 'dzin I
1015
LS: The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.226.14ff.]: sa tu niivasyarri saphala iti nocyate. tatha hy
asa111skrta111 karai:ia-hetur i~yate. na casya phalam asti. anagatas ca kara1_1a-hetuI:i. na ca purvam
utpadya111anena dharme1_1a sa-.phalaI:i.
1016
LS: SAH 77.
1017
Gokhale: [59b2] dvau prayacchata?z I
Tib.: [59b] gnyis ni rab tu 'byin par byed I
1018
LS: SAH 73, 77.
1019
Gokhale: [59c] vartamiinii'bhyatftau dviiv
Tib.: [59c] da ltar gyi dang 'das pa dag I
1020
LVP: On this subtle point, Sa111ghabhadra, Nyiiyiivatiira, 98a3.
1021
LS: SAH 73.
1022
LS: Ibid.
1023
LVP: asti kusala?z sabhiigahetu?z phalarri pratigrh!Jiiti na dadiiti. - According to the MYS,
89b13.
1024
LVP: The last possessions (priipti) of the wholesome that are cut off, namely, the weak-
weak (mrdumrdu) possessions of the wholesome roots, project their effect (phalaparigraharri
kurvanti), but do not give forth their effect (ni~yandaphala), since the "wholesome" moment,
which they should give forth or engender (janya), is absent.
1025
LVP: Vasubandhu criticizes the doctrine of the Vaibha~ikas. In fact, this paragraph is
poorly composed (siivadya): when persons take up again the wholesome roots, they acquire,
tritemporally, the possession of the wholesome roots: the past possessions acquired at this
moment give forth their effect, but do not seize it: for they have already seized it; but how can
one say that the present possessions do not seize their effect? The proposed definition thus
lacks precision. - Sa111ghabhadra defends the composition of the Vibhii~ii.
LS: This is the 42 nd of Kritzer's forty-four passages' discussed in relation to chapter 2 (VY.126f.).
Sa111ghabhadra identifies (Ny, 438a19-20) this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and defends the
Vaibha~ika position (Ny, 438a20-25).
1026
LS: SAH 73.
1027
LS: This is the 43 rd of Kritzer's forty-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY .128f.). Sa111ghabhadra identifies (Ny, 438c29-b 1) this as the statement of Vasubandhu
and defends the Vaibha~ika position (Ny, 438bl-2).
1028
LS: SAH 73.
1029
LS: Ibid.
1030
LVP: anivrtavyakrtasya pasciitpiidaka iti pascatpadakalak~a1_1a111 vyakhyatam iti na punar
ucyate [WOG.229.24ff.].
1031
LS: SAH 77.
1032
Gokhale: [59d] eko 'tftal;i prayacchati I
Tib.: [59d] gcig ni 'das pas 'byin par 'gyur II
LVP: Vasumitra, Mahii.sarp.ghikas, thesis 44.
1033
LS: SAH480.
1034
LS: AH 26-29; SAH 79-82.
1035
LS: Ibid
1036
LS: Cox summarizes Sarµghabhadra (Ny, 436b26; EIP.VIII.711): "No factor is produced
by one cause alone. The number of causes that produce any given factor is determined by that
factor's essential nature as thought, material form, or dissociated from thought and material
form, its moral quality, and so on. Further, although certain categories of factors may not
function as certain types of causes, all classes of factors, with the exception of unconditioned
factors, may function causally in more than one way. Unconditioned factors can only be
comprehensive causes."
1037
LS: AH 26; SAH 79.
1038
· Gokhale: [6(}-6lal] kli~tii vipiikajii}_i se~ii}_i prathamiiryii yathiikramam \ vipiikal!I sarva-
gal!I hitvii tau sabhiigal!I ca se~ajii}_i I cittacaittiis
Tib.: [6(}-6~a] nyon mongs can dang rnam smin skyes I lhag dang dang po 'phags rim bzhin I
rnam smin kun 'gro de gnyis dang I skal mnyam ma gtogs lhag las skyes I sems dang sems las
byung ba yin \
LVP: kli~tii vipiikajii}_i se~ii}_i prathamaryii yathiikramam I
vipiikal!I sarvagal!I hitvii tau sabhiigal!I ca se~ajii}_i II 60
cittacaittiis [tathiinye ca sa,rtprayuktakavarjitii}_i] I
Compare AfJhidharmahrdaya, ii. 12-15.
1039
LS: AH 27-29; SAH 80-82.
1040
Gokhale: [6la2-b] tathii 'nye 'pi samprayuktakavarjitii}_i I
Tib.: [61b] mtshangs ldan ma gtogs gzhan de bzhin I
1041
LS: Sarµghabhadra comments (Ny, 61c; EIP.VIII.711) that unconditioned factors can only
be efficient causes.
1042
LS: Hstian-tsang, vii, fol. 1a.
1043
LS: Dharmasri remarks (AH 29): "We have explained all the causes. Such causes were
explained by the Tathii.gata in order to make conversions by teaching with his power of
awakenment, knowing the characteristics of all factors with certainty." See also SAH.131.
1044
LS: AH 30, 230; SAH 36, 83-88, 232, 465, 525-46.
1045
Gokhale: [6 lc] catviira}_i pratyayii uktii
Tib.: [61c] rkyen ni bzhi po dag tu gsungs I
LVP: MVS, 79a26: "It is true that these six causes (hetu) are not mentioned in the Siitra; the
Siitra just says that there are four pratyayatiis (conditions)."
The Japanese editor cites the sources of the Great Vehicle, ~he Nanjio 141 (transl. Dharma-
gupta), Ghanavyuha, the Nanjio 140 (transl. Hsiian-tsang), the Madhyamaka (see Madhyamaka-
vrtti, p. 76).
With respect to the relation of the causes (hetu) and the conditions (pratyaya), the first masters
of the MVS, 79ab [see SA.IV.171], say that [the four conditions and the five causes mutually
subsume each other:] (1) the causal condition (hetupratyaya) consists of the five causes (hetu),
with the exception of the efficient cause (kara,:iahetu), (2) the efficient cause consists of the
other three conditions.
The second masters of the MVS, 79ab, say that [the conditions subsume the causes, but the
causes do not subsume the conditions:] (1) the causal condition consists of five causes, and
(2) the\enabling cause corresponds to only the condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya) [but
the immediately preceding condition and the cognitive object condition are not subsumed by
any cause]: this is the system adopted by Vasubandhu. [See SA.220f.].
In respect to the masters of the Great Vehicle, the homogeneous cause (sabhagahetu) is at one
and the same time the causal condition and the condition of dominance, whereas the other five
causes are the condition of dominance.
Prakara,:ia, 712bl2, enumerates four conditions (pratyaya). [In Devasarman's] Vijfianakaya,
547b22, [ca. first century C.E., we first come across an elaborative exposition of the four
conditions, when] defining them as functions of the consciousnesses (vijfiana) [see also
Dhammajoti's translation in SA.IV.170]:
What is the causal condition (hetupratyaya) of a visual consciousness? The co-
existent (sahabhu) and associated (sa'!lprayukta) factors.
What is its immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya)? The thought
and thought-concomitants to which it is equivalent and immediate antecedent, i.e.,
the visual consciousness that has arisen or will arise.
What is its cognitive object condition (alambanapratyaya)? [All the] visible forms.
What is its condition of dominance (adhipatipratyaya)? All factors, with the excep-
tion of itself.
[These are said to be the four conditions for visual consciousness .... ]
Of-what is the visual consciqusness the causal condition? Of co-existent and associ-
ated factors.
Of what is it the immediately preceding condition? Of the thoughts and thought-
concomitants that are equivalent and have arisen or will arise immediately after this
visual consciousness.
Of what is it the cognitive object condition? Of the thoughts and thought-concomi-
tants that seize it for their object.
Of what is it the condition of dominance? Of all the factors, with the exception of
itself.
[Just as in the case of visual consciousness, likewise are those of auditory, olfactory,
gustatory, tactile and mental consciousnesses.]
The four conditions (pratyaya) are defined in the Abhidharmahrdaya, ii. 16, as in our book:
the causal condition consists of five causes; the condition of dominance corresponds to the
efficient cause (karalJ.ahetu:,

For the paccayas of the Abhidhamma, the Dukapa,rhtina appears as the main authority. The
points of contact with the Abhidharma are numerous; the nomenclature differs; for example,
the sahajatadhipatipaccaya is our homogeneous cause (sahabhiihetu). See also Kathiiviltthu,
xv. 1-2.
LS: 1. The Avatiira states (ESD.123):
There are four conditions (pratyaya): condition qua cause (hetu-pratyaya), uniform-
immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya), condition qua object (alambana-
pratyaya), and condition of dominance (adhipati-pratyaya).
Excluding the efficient cause, the other five causes are named the conditions qua
cause:
All past and present thought and thought-concomitants, excluding the last thought
(carama,ri cittam), etc., of an arhat, are named the uniform-immediate conditions.
All dharma-s receive the name conditions qua object.
Those [dharma-s] of the nature of efficient cause (kiiralJ.a·hetutii) are named con-
ditions of dominance.
2. As for the general history of the conditions, see our introductory note to causes, effects
and conditions at F 244.
3. In regard to whether causes and conditions are different or not, see endnote above (F 244,
bottom).
4. As for the existential status of the conditions, Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.146 andl71)
that not all Sarviistiviidins would recognize the reality of the conditions and that according to
the MVS (47b, 283a-b, 680b, 680c, 975a, 982b) the early Diir~!iintikas and others deny their
reality, for example, the Bhadiinta Dharmatriita declares that they are unreal, being nothing
more than terminologies conceptually designated by the Abhidharma masters. On the other
hand, the MYS compilers defend the .Abhidharmika position that they are real entities (see
MVS 283b; SA.IV.17i).
5. As for the scope of the conditions, the MVS, 283b, states (SA.IV.171):
All four conditions completely subsume all dharma-s:
the condition qua cause subsumes. alt conditioned dharma-s;
the equal-immediate condition subsumes all past and present dharma-s other than the
very last thought and thought-concomitant dharma-s of the past and present arhat-s;
the condition qua object and the condition of dominance [each] subsumes the totality
of dharma-s.
6. As for illustrations of the distinct functions of the four coqditions, the MVS, 109a, states
(SA.IV.175):
The condition qua cause is like the seed-dharma.
The equal-immediate condition is like a dharma that gives way (!Ul~; "gives way
and guides").
The condition qua object is like a dharma walking-stick that supports.
The condition of dominance is like a dharma that is non-obstructive.

7. As for which of the four conditions is superior, which are inferior, the MVS, 703b, states:
Answer: According to some: the condition qua cause is superior, the others are infe-
rior, for it is when there is an increase in cause that arising or ceasing occurs.
According to some: the equal-immediate condition is superior, the others are inferior,
for it can give way t,o the gateway of the noble path.
According to some•: the condition qua cause is superior, th.e others are inferior, for it
is the support for the [arising of] thought and thought-concomitants.
According to some: the condition of dominance is superior, the others are inferior,
for it does not hinder the arising and ceasing of dharma-s.
The correct position (:itP¾tlt,t): All are superior, all are inferior, for the efficacies
are distinctive ....
1 6
1)4 LVP: [WOG.232.9.:] That is to say, pratyayaprakiira, as one says gotii, a type of cow.
1047
LS: AH 30; SAH 84-87, 525.
1048
LS: AH 30; SAH 87.
1049
LS: Ibid.
1050
Gokhale: [61d] hetviikhyaJ:i paiica hetavaJ:i II
Tib.: {61d] rgyu zhes bya ba rgyu Inga yin II
LS: 1. Dhammajciti comments (SA.IV.173): "This is the condition in its capacity as direct
cause in the production .of an effect:--it is the cause functioning as the condition. In the
example of the growth of a. fruit plant: the condition qua cause is comparable to the seed.
However, it is a common tenet of all schools of Buddhism that nothing is produced by a single
cause, even though in the analysis of the causal complex, the main cause can be singled out.
Of the six causes, all except the efficient cause are conditions qua cause. Strictly speaking,
however, some of the efficient causes should also come under this category if they make some
positive contribution in the causal process."
2. As for the scope of the causal condition, the MVS (283b; SA.IV .171) states that "the con-
dition q,!la ·cause subsumes all conditioned dharma-s". The causal condition or condition qua
cause, i.e., factors which can produce an effect,, cannot include the entire category of kiira,:ia-
hetu, which also includes the unconditioned factors which cannot produce an effect, although
being themselves a cause, namely, kiira,:iahetu (see ii, F 277f.).
3. As for dissenting views, Saqighabhadra states (Ny, 440b; Srfliita's anudhiitu doctrine,
p. 5):
[i] The Sthavii:a (= SrTiata) states that the nature of the condition qua cause (hetu-
pratyayatii) is the old pursuant element [*purli,:ta-anudhiitu]: the nature of being the
caus~ successively, in the serial continuity of a sentient.being. [ ... ]
[iii] [Saqighabhadra:] This old pursuant element is just il.nJ>~ame for bfja . ...
When we examine this pursuant element, we see that it is onir an empty word and
[that] its intrinsic nature (ft) cannot be apperceived. Thus, he (=•the Sthavira) cannot
claim that it is of the nature of being the cause, successively, in the·serial continuity.
1051
LS: AH 30; SAH 84; 525.
1052
LS: AH 30; SAH 84.
1053
Gokhale: [62ab] cittacaitta acaramii utpanniil_i samanantaral_i I
Tib.: [62ab] sems dang sems byung skyes ba rnams I tha ma min mtshungs de ma thag I
LS: l. According to Dhammajoti (SA.IV.173): "A citta or caitta serves as a condition for the
arising of the succeeding citta or caitta: It both gives way to and induces the arising of the m;xt
citta-caitta in the series .... Moreover, Saip.ghabhadra insists [Ny, 445b; see also MVS, 51a-b]
that the notion of an equal-immediate condition necessarily entails that a subsequent thought
moment can only arise upon the cessation of the preceding thought moment which thereby
"makes room" for the arising of the former. ... The view of the A.bhidharmikas is given in the
MVS [50b] as follows:
The characteristic of the equal-immediate condition consists in its enabling the dharma-s
that are having unique self-characteristics to arise immediately. The dharma-s having
unique self-characteristics are the caitta-s, vedanii, sa'!ljnii, etc., and citta. Their self-
characteristics are, different individually; when they co-arise, there cannot be two
[instances of them in each case].
Saip.ghabhadra mentions (EIP.VIII.712) that, on the one hand, '.'equivalent" (see ii, F 300ff.)
refers to factors of the same general category, such as sensations, ideations, and so on, and
does not excJude a conditioning relationship between morally different accompanying factors
of the same category, however, not in the same moment; on the other hand, "immediate ante-
cedent" (see ii, F 303ff.) indicates that no factor of the same general category, like sensation,
ideation,· etc., can arise between this condition and its effect, yet factors dissociated from
thought, for example, attainment of cessation (nirodhasamiipattl), can arise in between (see
ii, F 211).
2. As for the scope of the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent, the Sarviisti-
viidins main-tain that this homogeneous· causality applies only to citta-caittas, although not
to the final citta-caittas of a perfected being (arhat; see ii, F 305); thus, it does not apply to
the domain of material form (riipa), since there is no equivalence or sameness in the serial
continuity of material form (see ii, F 300ff.); it also does not apply to formations dissociated
from thought (see ii, F 303). The MYS, 52a, among other reasons mentions also the following
(SA.IV.174):
If a dharma is conjoined (sa'!lprayuktaka), has a supporting basis (siisraya), has a
mode of activity (siikiira), is alertive (abhogiitmaka) and has an object (siilambana);
then it can be established as an equal-immediate condition. This is not the case with
material dharma-s.
In the context of citta-caittas and the condition as the equivalent and immediate antecedent,
see also Vasubandhu's discussion of the mental faculty (manas) at i. 17ab.
3. As for dissenting views, the Diir~tiintikas maintain (Ny, 445b and 447a; SA.IV.174) that
"this category also obtains among the material dhannas, since the principle of the arising of
the succeeding upon the ceasing of the preceding also applies-a preceding seed gives rise to a
succeeding sprout; a flower gives rise to a fruit; etc. Sthavira SrTiiita, a Sautriintika leader also
holds a similar view". See also SAD.22.
1054
LVP: MVS, 52a8ff., second masters.
1055
LVP: This refers to the non-informative form (avijfiaptiriipa). When, after having under-
taken the priitimok:ja restraint (priitimok:jasarµvara) (a non-informative form in the realm of
desire), persons enter into the impure meditation (dhyiina), they produce the meditation
restraint (dhyi'irasarµvara) (the unmanifest form in the realm of fine-materiality), whereas the
non-informative form in the realm of desire continues to reproduce itself (see iv. 17bc). [Cf.
WOG.232.18ff.].
I
1056
LVP: In the case where th,e persons who have undertaken the priiJimok:ja restraint (priiti-
mok:jasarµvara) enter into the pure meditation (dhyiina).
1051
L VP: This is .the second opinion presented in the Vibhii:jii. - When, after having eaten, the
persons go to sleep or enter into concentration, the material form (riipa) of accumulation pro-
duced by food and the material form of accumulation produced by sleep or by concentration
(see i. 37) arise at the same time.
1058
LVP: On the Bhadanta, the Sautrantika Sthavira (WOG.232.28), see i, F 36. - Fourth opin-
ion of the Vibhii:jii.
1059
LS: SAH 84, 52i5.
1060
LS: Ibid.
1061
LVP: MVS, 5'.U\21, two opinions. Vasubandhu presents the second.
LS: See also SAH.133.
1062
LS: SAH 84.
1063
LVP: The simultaneous factors presenting neither anteriority nor posteriority cannot be
among themselves the condition as the ·equivalent and immediate antecedent (samanantara-
pratyaya).
1064
LVP: Sarp.ghabhadra, 19, p. 444.
1065
LVP: The first masters of the MVS, 5lbl5. - atftasiimpratiinumiiniit [WOG.234.4]. -
Hsiian-tsang: "He infers from the past and from the present, but sees in an immediate manner."
1066
LVP: atftarµ kiliidhviinarµ pasyati ... [WOG.234.5]. MVS, ibid., and 897b26.
1061
LVP: Hsiian-tsa'ng: The Fortunate One sees that from such a past action arises such an
effect: from such a factor arises immediately such a factor; that, from such a present action
arises such an effect: from such a factor arises immediately such a factor. Having thus seen, he
is capable of knowing with regard to confounded factors of the future that such a factor will
arise immediately after such a factor. Although he cognizes in this manner, it is not the cogni-
tion of inference, for the Fortunate One, inferring according to the order of arising of past and
present.causes and effects, then knows by direct vision of the confounded factors of the future
and says: "In. the future, such a being will accomplish such an action, will receive such retri-
bution." .This is the cognition resulting from a resolve (pra,:iidhijfiiina), not cognition resulting
from inference (anumiinajfiiina).
1068 LVP: Second opinion of the MVS, 897b26; third opinion pres~nted in Nyiiyiivatiira,
444b23.
Paramartha (194bl0) differs: "There is, in the series of sentient beings, a certain factor associ-
ated with thought that is the indication of a future effect."
Nyiiyiivatiira: "There is at the present time, in sentient beings, an indication of causes and
future effects, similar to a prediction sign (chiiyii-nimitta), or else, a material form (rupa), or
else a formation (saf!!skiira) dissociated from thought.''
"Mark, spot, stamp, sign, characteristic, symptom" (MW), indication, (Tib.) rtags, (Skt.) cihna
= litiga; Paramiirtha and Nyiiyiivatiira: hsien-hsiang = purvalak~a,:ia; Hsiian-tsang: hsien-chao,
presage or omen.
1069
LVP: Japanese editor: by means of the mundane conventional cognition (lokadhiitu-
saf!!vrtijfiiina; vii. 3).
1070
LS: Although not explicitly mentioned in Pradhan, L VP mentions the Sautriintika here ..
1071
LVP: Tib.: mtshan mkhan. - Sarad Candra suggests ga,:iaka (= rtsis mkhan); rather
naimittika (ltas mkhan) MVyut., 186, 123, naimittaka, Divya. - Hsiian-tsang: If that were so,
the Buddha would know the future because of indications (chan-hsiang) ... .
1072
LS: This is the sixth place in Pradhan (99.11), where the term Sautriintika is explicitly
mentioned.
1073
LS: SAH 84.
1074
LS: SAH 85.
1075
LVP: According to the MVS,52c12; compare Prakara,:ia, 764a28ff.
1076
LS: Vasubandhu then proceeds to describe a second tetralemma (Pradhan.99.26-100.1):
ye dharmascittasamanantariil:z samiipattinirantarii api te .... See SAH.135f.
1077
LS: SAH 86, 525.
1078
LS: SAH 86.
1079
Verdu: EBP.77.
1080
Gokhale: [62c] iilambanaf!! sarvadharmii/:i
Tib.: [62c] dmigs pa chos mams thams cad do I
LS: 1. Dhammajoti explains (SA.IV.174f.): "According to the Sarviistiviida, cognition is cog-
nition of an object. A cognition cannot arise by itself, without taking an object. In fact, the
very possibility of a cognition presupposes a real/existent as its object. In this sense, the object
serves as a condition for the cognition.'' That the nature of iilambana-pratyaya-s is determinrd
as objects of perception even when they are not being perceived (see Ny, 448b and AKB
ii, F 307), may be considered (SA.IV.175) as a definite assertion of objective realism on the
part of the Sarviistiviidins. Dhammajoti adds (SA.IV.147): "In fact, the Sarviistiviidins argue
they are real because they can fun~tion as objects for the generation of cognition. Indeed, it is
this causal efficacy that constitutei the very mark of the existent (sal-lak~a,:ia) [see Ny, 621c-
622a]. All existent dharma-s have such an efficacy, but only the present dharma-s have kiiritra
which is the efficacy of projecting their own fruits. - The same principle applies even in the
case of the unconditioned dharma-s."
2. As for the scope of the cognitive object condition, since the mind can think of anything
and thought can take any object, all dharmas-whether conditioned and unconditioned, past,
present or future-can become cognitive object conditions (see our section, ii. 62c). Saqt~ha-
bhadra explains why the totality of dharma-s are called cognitive object condition (iilambana-
pratyaya; Ny, 447b, SA.IV.174f.):
The condition qua object is none other than the totality of dharma-s. Outside the
cognitive objects of thought and thought-concomitants, there is definitely no other·
dharma that can be apperceived (upa-v'labh). That is to say, the totality of dharma-s
is called condition qua object because thought and thought-concomitants hold onto
(ii-v'lamb) them for their arising. Because these very cognitive objects serve as the
condition for their generation, they are called conditions qua object.
As for the totality of dharmas, the MYS, 42c-43a, asks:
If the question is posed: ... "[Among the ten knowledges,] is there one that knows all
dharma-s?" The answer is: "Yes. The conventional knowledge."
If with regard to this conventional knowledge, the question is posed: "Is there a case
that within two moments [of thought], all dharma-s are known?" The answer is:
"Yes. In the first ~oment, this knowledge knows all [the dharma-s] excepting itself
and those that are co_njoined or co-existent with it. In the second moment, it also
knows [what has existed] in the first moment, [namely] itself as well as those
dharma-s that were conjoined or co-existent with it."
Vasubandhu further asks at vii. 1Scd:
Can one, through a single cognition, know all [individual] factors (dharma)? - No.
However, one conventional cognition, by excluding its own complex, cognizes the
rest as nonself.
See in this context also Vasubandhu's comment (F 308) that "the factors coexisting (sahabhu)
with a certain thought are not the cognitive object of this thought, whereas they are the
efficient cause (klira,:iahetu) of it. ... [However,] a factor is not any of the conditions of itself."
Thus in regard to one moment and one factor (dharma), the scope of the condition of domi-
nance is wider than the scope of the cognitive object condition.
0
3. As for the difference and relation between cognitive object (iilambana), object-field
(vi~aya) and object-referent (artha), see Vasubandlm's discussion and our endnotes at i. 9ab,
29bc, 34ab, 48a. As for Vasubandhu's. presentation of the underlying atomic_ structure of
the object-fields, see ii. 22. As for a discussion of epistemological, ontological and language
related issues regarding cognitive objects (iilambana), see Vasubandhu's discussion and our
endnotes at ii. 47ab and iii, F 102-7. But as already mentioned in our endnote to ii. 61c, the
ontological status of the iilambanapratyaya is contentious among Buddhists. For example,
Srnata states in the *Nyayanusara (EIP.VIII.713):
Srilata: The external objects corresponding to the five externally directed types of
perceptual consciousness cannot be their supporting object conditions, because this
supporting object cannot be simultaneous with the perceptual .consciousness that it
produces. Mental perceptual consciousness would also be incapable of being sup-
ported by a .present object. Instead, mental perceptual consciousness takes the
previous objects of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness as
its supporting object. Since this prior supporting object has already passed away, it
no longer exists; nonetheless, it still may serve as a supporting object for perceptual
consciousness. However, the cause for the arising of a present moment of perceptual
consciousness is the prior moment of perceptual consciousness within the same
stream; this causal relation between a prior and successive moment is one of recipro-
cal succession within the same stream.

Answer: Since SrTiata does not allow that the supporting objects of the five externally
directed types of perceptual consciousness are simultaneous with their corresponding
perceptual consciousness, mental perceptual consciousness cannot depend upon the
supporting object of a prior moment of the five externally directed types of percep-
tual consciousness. Further, it is absurd to claim that even though this past object
does not exist it _can still serve as the supporting object for present mental perceptual
consciousness; perceptual consciousness can only be supported by an existent object.
Indeed, since the Dar~tantikas accept the existence only of present factors and reject
those of the past and future, one cannot speak of reciprocal succession. How can
there be a causal relation between a nonexistent past factor and an existent present
one? Therefore, supporting objects of perceptual consciousness must exist, and those
of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness are simultaneous
with their corresponding perceptual consciousness.
See in this context also Collett Cox's article On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of
Consciousness: Sarvastivadin und Dar~tantika theories.
1081
LS: SAH 525.
1082
LVP: om ity aha. - MYS, 983b13.
1083
LVP: The first two opinions of the MYS, 57al4. - Third opinion: When present, past,
future, thought is bound to its basis.
1084
LS: SAH 87.
1085
LS: Ibid.
1086
Gokhale: [62d] kiira'}iikhyo 'dhipaJ:i smrtaJ:i II
Tib.: [62d] byed rgyu zhes bya bdag por bshad II
LVP: This quarter-verse (pada) is difficult to reconstruct: kiira'}iikhyo 'dhipaJ:i smrtaJ:i.
LS: 1. Dhammajoti comments (SA.IV.175): "This is the most comprehensive or generic con-
dition, corresponding to efficient cause: It is whatever that serves as a condition, either in the
sense of directly contributing to the arising of a dharma, or indirectly through not hindering
its arising, From the latter perspective, the unconditioned dharma-s-although transcending
space and time altogether-are also said to serve as conditions of dominance.
2. As for the scope of adhipatipratyaya, it is the same as that of the efficient cause (ii. 50a):
"All [conditioned and unconditioned] factors are an efficient cause with regard to any [(other)
conditioned factor], with the exception of themselves." This is also addressed in our section
here (F 308).
1087
LS: syaddharmo dharmasya caturbhirapi pratyayairna pratyayaJ:i I
1088
LS: L VP differs here: "Le dharma (sa'f!lskrta) n'est pas condition du dharma incon-
ditionne, et reciproquement."
1089
LS: SAH 525-26.
1090
LS: Sarpghabhadra comments (Ny, 450a; EIP.VIII.714) that here Vasubandhu confuses a
factor's activity, "which only occurs in the present and only refers to that factor's projecting
-its own effect, with its capability, which occurs in all three time periods and may assist in
the arising of the effect of another factor". To indicate this "confusion" we will put "activity/
capability" here and in the following sections in quotation marks.
1091
LS: SAH 526.
1092
Gokhale: [63abl] nirudhyamane kiiritrarri dvau heta kurutas
Tib.: [63abl] rgyu gnyis po dag 'gag pa la I bya ba byed do
LVP: According to the MYS, 703a3ff.
1093
LVP: Hsiian-tsang: "because they bring about an effect arisen at the same time as they
possess the operation".
1094
LS: SAH 526.
1095
Gokhale: [63b2-cl] trayalJ liayamane
Tib.: [63b2-cl] gsum po ni I skye la'o
1096
i.S: SAH 525.
1097
Gokhale: [63c2-d] tato 'nyau tu pratyayau tadviparyayiit II
Tib.: [63c2-d] las gzhan pa yi I rkyen dag de las bzlog pa yin 11
1098
LS: AH 31, 230; SAH 36, 88.
1099
LS: AH 31; SAH 88.
1100
LS: Ibid.
1101
LS: Ibid.
1102
Gokhale: [64a] caturbhis cittacaitta hi
Tib.: [64a] bzhi yis sems dang sems byung rnams I
LVP: CompareAbhidharmahrdaya, ii. 17,
1103
LS: AH 31; SAH 88.
n 04 Gokhale: [64b] samapattidvayarri tribhi/:1 I
Tib.: [64b] gsum gyis snyoms par 'jug pa gnyis I
1105
LS: AH 31; SAH 88.
1106
Gokhale: [64c] dyiibhyiim anye tu jayante
Tib.: [64c] gzhan ni gnyis po dag las skye I
1107
. LVP: Vyiikhyii [WOG.237.12f.f isvara, Puru~a, Pradhan.a, time (kiila), intrinsic nature
(svabhiiva), atoms (parama!lu), etc.

LS: Siddhi.30f. states: "[Besides the opinion that there is a God, Mahesvaradeva, seven nther
doctrines of non-Buddhist schools] maintain that there is one Great Brahma (Mahiibrahmii),
one Time (kiila), one Space (dis'), one Starting Point (parvako{i), one Intrinsic Nature (sva-
bhiiva; ?), one Ether (akasa), one Self (atman). Each of these is alleged to be single, eternal,
real, endowed with powers and capabilities, and able to produce all the factors (dharma)."
1108
Gokhale: [64d] n esvaradelJ kramadihilJ I
Tib.: [64d] dbang phyug sogs min rim sogs phyir 11
LVP: Compare Bodhicaryiivatpa, ix. 119; $cuf,darsanasarrigraha, p. 11; Suhrllekha (JPTS.
1886), 50, etc. -Ariguttara, i1173; Carpenter, Theism, 50.
In this Siddhi, F 30, Hsiian-tsang writes:

According to one opinion, there is a God, Mahesvaradeva, whose nature is real,
omnipresent and eternal, engendering factors (dharma).
But, we would say: that which engenders is not eternal (e.g., earth, water, etc.); that
which is not eternal is not omnipresent (vibhu) (e.g., a pitcher); that which is not
omnipresent is not real (e.g., a pot).
If Mahesvara is eternally and omnipresently endowed with powers (iakti, or capabili-
ties, siimarthya), he should, at all times, in all places and at the same time, produce
all factors (dharma). If they say that Mahesvara, in .order to produce the factors,
depends on a desire to produce or on certain conditions, they are contradicting their
doctrine of a single cause. Or else, we may say that, because Mahesvara is the eternal
cause, it is false that at the time when the desire and conditions are present, that
desire and conditions produce [the factors].
1109
LS: Burnouf (p. '573): "The Mahiideva of the Sivaites, the Viisudeva of the Vi~I).uites, the
Self (Puru~a) or Primal Source (Pradhiina) of the Siiiµkhya."
1110
LS: Burnouf translates (p. 572f.) sections from Yasomitra's Vyiikhyii [WOG.237.21ff.]:
Entities are neither creat~d by God (Isvara), or the Self (Puru~a), or the Primal
Source (Pradhiina). If, in fact, God were the single cause, whether this God were
Mahiideva, Viisudeva, or any other principle, like the Self or the Primal Source, it
would be necessary, by the very fact of the existence of this cause, that the world
would be created in its totality, all at once; for one cannot admit that the cause exists
without it's effect existing. But we see that entities come into this world successively,
some from a womb, others from a sprout; from this we should conclude that there is
a succession of causes, and the God is not a single cause.
But, it is objected, this variety of causes is the effect of the desire of God, who has
said: May this entity arise now, so that this other entity may arise later; it is in this
way that the succession of entities is explained, and that it is established that God is
the cause of them. To this, one replies that admitting several actions· to the desire is
to admit several causes; and that this destroys the first thesis, namely, that there is
only a single cause.
·Furthermore: this plurality of causes cannot have been produced in one go, since
God, the source of the distinct actions of the desire that have produced this variety of
causes, is single and indivisible. Here again the objection that has been made pre-
viously reappears, namely, that it would be necessary to admit that the world has
been created all at once. But the sons of the Siikya,s hold to the maxim that the cycle
of existence of the world has no beginning.
1111
LVP: Stanza (iloka) of Vyiisa in the Satarudrfya (WOG.238.25f.). - Mahabharata, vii. 203,
140; xiii. 161, 1: yan nirdahati yat tfk~,:io yad ugro yat pratiipaviin I mii'Jlsaio,:iitamajjiido yat
tato rudra ucyate. - Burnouf refers to the Satarudrfya in his Introduction, p. 568.
1112
LVP: akrtabuddhayaJ:i = paramiirthasiistrair asaqislqtabuddhayal:_i [WOG.239.26f.].
1113
LVP: Ripened effect (vipiikaphala) and effect of human action (pur~~akiiraphala).
1114
LVP: Addition of Hsiian-tsang.
IIIS
LS: SAH 36.
Hl6
LS: Ibid.
1117
Gokhale: [65a] dvidhii bhiitiini taddhetur
Tib.: [65a] de 'i rgyu '.byung ba rnam pa gnyis I
LVP: On the elements (bhuta; i. 12, ii. 22).
1118
LS: SAH 36.
1119
Gokhale: [65b] bhautikasya tu paftcadhii I
Tib.: [65b] 'byung las gyur pa'i rnam pa lnga I
LVP: See AKB ii, 277,297, Siddhi, 448.
1120
LVP: Hstian-tsang adds that these five causes are varieties of the efficient cause (kiiral}ll-
hetu). [LS: Pradhan.102.26 has: so 'yal'!l kiira,:iahetureva puna~ paftcadhii bhinna~.]
See Vyiikhyii [WOG.29.24ff.] -to AKB i. 11, where the causal relationslrip between the ele-
ments (bhata) which form part of the person (iisraya) and that type of the derivative material
elements (bhautika) which is the non-informative (avijftapti) is explained.
LS: MVS, 663a, states (ESD.131):
Question: In what sense [is the derived matter] dependent (upiidiiya) [on the mahii-
b~uta-s] (mahiibhutiini upiidiiya)? Is it in the sense of [having the mahiibhiita-s as]
cause (hetu), or in the sense of [having them as] conditions (pratyaya)? ...
Answer: It should be said thus: it is in the sense of [having them as] cause.
Question: These [mahiibhata-s], with regard to the .secondary riipa-s (upiidiiyariipa),
do not have [the functions of] any of the five hetu-s [besides being kiira,:ta-hetu in as
much as they do not hinder the arising of the bhautika-s], how are they the cause?
Answer: Although [the meaning of] any of the five~etu-s, sabhiiga-hetu, etc., are
lacking, they are hetu in five other senses: i.e., janana-hetu, nisraya-hetu, prati~(hii-
hetu, upastambha-hetu, upab~hal}ll-hetu.
Sthiramati's Paiicaskandhaprakara,:ravibhii~am states (ISBP.250):
[The great. elements] are the generating cause [jananahetu] [of derivative form],
because [derivative form] cannot occur if [the"great elements] are absent.
[The great elements] are~ dependence cause [nisrayahetu], because whatever modi-
fication [the great elements] undergo, the derivative form that is dependent on the
elements undergoes a similar modification.
[The great elements] are a foundation cause [prati~fhahetu], because when the· ele-
ments arise as a uniform continuum, derivative form continues to exist uninterrupt-
edly as well.
[The great elements] are a supporting cause [upastambhat~etu] in that, by their power,
derivative form does not cease to exist.
They are a strengthening cause [upabr,µhaflahetu] in that when the elements become
strengthened, the derivative form that is dependent on them becomes strengthened as
well.
1121
LVP: These definitions according to MVS, 663a28. - Sa1p.ghabhadra, 452a19ff., presents
other explanations, gives other examples.
1122
LVP: See above ii. 59d, the effect of the base (prati.yfhaphala).
1123
Gokhale: [65c] tridha bhautikam anyonyaf!I
Tib.: [65c] 'byung gyur rnam gsum phan tshun du I
1124
LS: The Vyakhya glosses [WOG.240.4ff.]: kaya-karma cittanuparivarti dhyiiniinasriiva-
sa1p.vilra-sa1p.gfhita1p. trividham priii:iiitipiitadiitt'iidiina-kiima-mithy'iiciira-virati-bhedena. vak-
karmapi cittanuparivarti dhyiiniiniisrava-sa1p.vara-sa1p.grhitam eva caturvidha1p.. mr~ii-viida-
paisunya-paru~ya-sa:rpbhinna-praliipa-virati-bhedena. tad eva:rp sapta-vidha:rp kiiya-viik-
karmiinyonyaip sahabhii-hetulJ. priii:iatipii.ta-viratir upiidiiya-riipa1p. itare~iiip ~ai:ii:ia1p. sahabha-
hetulJ. tiiny api ~at tasya sahabhii-hetur iti sarvaip yojyam. nanyad iti. cak~ur-iidika1p. sarvam
upadaya-ri1paf!1 priitimok~a-saipvar'iidi-saipgfhitam api ya.van niinyonya1p. sahabhii-hetul).
pfthak-kaliipatvat.
1125
LS: The Vyakhya glosses [WOG.240.1 lf.]: sabhagasyeti. kusala1p.'kusalasya sviisa1p.-
tiinikasya kli~ta1p. kli~tasyety-iidi.
1126
LS: The Vyiikhya glosses [WOG .240.12f.]: yasya kiiya-viik-karma,:ia iti. vijfiapty-avijfiapti-
svabhiivasya samii.hitasyiisamahitasya vii yathiiyoga1p..
1127
Gokhale: [65d] bhiitanam ekadh aiva tat I
Tib.: [65c] 'byung ba rnams kyi de rnam gcig 11
1128
LS: SAH 232, 528--46.
1129
LS: SAH 528.
1130
Gokhale: [66] kusala'kusalarri kame nivrta'nivrtarri mana/:t I ruparupye.yv akusalad anyatra
'nasravllf!I dvidha II
Tib.: [66] 'dod yid dge dang midge dang I bsgribs pa dang_ ni ma bsgribs pa I gzugs dang gzugs
med pa dag na I mi dge las gzhan zag med gnyis I
LVP: The doctrine of twelve thoughts is presented in Vijfianakaya, vi (fol. 54b) and in the
work of Dharmatriita, Nanjio, 1287, fol. 95b and following, x. 29-34: "In the realm of desire,
four thoughts; in the realm of fine-materiality and the realm of immateriality, each three
thoughts, also 'of those in training' (saik.ya) and 'of those beyond training' (asaik.ya). We will
see their order of arising. In the realm of desire, the wholesome (kusala) (hought engenders
nine thoughts and it is produced by eight thoughts .... " There follows (verses 35-46) the
doctrine of twenty thoughts (Kosa, ii. 71b-72) that involves the presentation, in verses
(karika), of the rules of the succession of thoughts. Vasubandhu contents himself below, as we
shall see, to give a commentary (bha.yya), but Yasomitra, under the name of saf!1grahaslokas
(summary stanzas) [WOG.245.17ff.], provides a versified redaction that perhaps preserves for
us a fragment of the original text of Dharmatriita.
1131
LS: SAH 529-34.
1132
LS: SAH 529-33.
1133
LS: SAH 529-30.
1134
Gokhale: [67-68b] kame nava subhac cittac cittany a.yfabhya eva tat I dasabhyo 'kusalarri
tyasmac catvari nivrtaf!1 tatha I paficabhyo nivrtarri tasmiit sapta cittany anantaram I
Tib.: [67-68b] 'dad sems dge ba las sems dgu I de ni brgyad po kho na las I midge bani bcu
dag las I de las bzhi ste bsgribs de bzhin 11 ma bsgribs pa ni lnga dag las I de las mjug thog sems
bdunno I
LVP: Compare Kathi:ivatthu, xiv. 1, where the Theraviidin maintains, against the Mahii-
siilµghika, that the wholesome thought cannot follow the unwholesome thought, etc.
1135
LS: SAH 529.
1136
LVP: 1. The four kinds of distancing (diiratii) are (i) basis (iifraya), (ii) aspect (iikiira),
(iii) cognitive object (iilambana), (iv) counteragent (pratipak(fa):
i. The bases (or persons) (iisraya) of the realm of immateriality cannot "manifest" (sarrz-
mukhfkar), assimilate, any factor (dharma) of the realm of desire, whereas sentient beings in
the realm of fine-materiality can manifest, assimjlate, a thought of supernormal emanation
(nirmii,:zacitta) of the realm of desire (ii. 53b).
ii. The thought of the realm ()f immateriality does not apply the aspects or categories (iikiira)
of "gross" (audiirika), etc., (vi. 49) to the realm of desire as does the thought of the realm of
fine-materiality.
iii. In the same way, it does not seize the realm of desire as a cognitive object (iilambana).
iv. In the same way, it does not counteract the defilements of the realm of desire as do the
meditations (dhJiina ).
2. See v. 62, for a different set of four kinds of distancing: distancing (diiratii): (1) through
difference of nature (vailak(fa,:zya); (2) through opposition (vipak~atvci = pratipak(fatva);
(3) through local separation (desaviccheda); (4) through time (kiila).
See AKB iv, F 31; v, F 106.
1137
LS: SAH 529.
1138
LS: SAH 530.
1139
LS: SAH 530-31.
1140
Gokhale: [68c-69cl] riipe das aikarrz ca subhi:in navabhyas tad anantaram 11 a(ffiibhyo
nivrtarrz tasmiit (faf tribhyo 'nivrtarrz puria}:i I tasmiit (fa<}
Tib.: [68c-69cl] gzugs na dag las bcu gcig go I de ni dgu yi mjug thogs su I bsgribs pa brgyad
las de las drug Ima bsgribs pa ni gsum las so Ide las dr~g ste
1141
LS: SAH 530.
1142
LS: LVP has Riipadhiitu, but Pradhan.204.20f., WOG.241.25, Jampaiyang and Wangchuk
Dorje have Ariipyadhiitu.
1143
LS: SAH 531.
1144
LS: Ibid.
1145
LS: SAH 532-33.
1146
Gokhale: [69c2-70b] evam iin7pye tasya nfti}:i subhi:it puna}:i 11 nava cittiini tat (fafkiin
nivrtat sapta tat tathi:i I ·
Tib.: [69c2-70b] gzugs med pa'ang I de yi tshul lodge ba las I sems dgu dag go de drug gi I
bsgribs pa las bdun de de bzhin I
1147
LS: SAH 533.
1148
LS: SAH 532.
1149
LS: Ibid.
1150
LS: SAH 533-34.
1151
Gokhale: [70c-71a] caturbhyaJ:i saik~am asmiit tu paficii 'saik~alJl tu paficakiit II tasmiic
catviiri cittiini
Tib.: [70c-71 a] slob pa bzhi las de las Inga I mi slob pa ni Inga las so 11 de las sems ni bzhi dag
go I .
1152
LS: SAH 533.
1153
LS: SAH 534.
1154
LS: SAH 534-37.
1155
LVP: Skill in the art of riding on the head of an elephant, on the back of a horse; skill in
the art of archery, etc.
1156
Gokhale: [71 b-72] dviidas aitiini vif(lsatiJ:i I priiyogikopapattyiiptaf(l subhaf(l bhittvii tri~u
dvidhii I vipiikajairyiipathikasailpasthiinikanairmitam I caturdhii 'vyiikrtaf(l kiime riipe ~ilpa-
vivarjitam 11
Tib.: [7lb-72] bcu gnyis de dag nyi shur yang I gsum du skyes nas thob pa dang I sbyor byung
dge rnam gnyis phye nas 11 rnam smin skyes dang spyod lam pa I bzo yi gnas dang sprul pa dang
I 'dod na lung bstan min rnam bzhir I gzugs na bzo ma gtogs pa'o I
1157
LS: SAH 535-36.
1158
LVP: That is to say, 1. derived from listening (srutamaya), 2. derived from reflection
(cintiimaya), 3. derived from cultivation (bhiivaniimaya). - In the realm of desire, (1.) and. (2.);
in the realm of fine-materiality, (1.) and (3.); in the realm of immateriality, (3.), as we have
seen above at ii, F 265; compare ii, F 328. ·
1159
LVP: This is the wholesome thought (kusala) of which the sentient being who has arisen
in the realm of desire and the realm of fine-materiality obtains the possession (priipti) at the
moment of the origin of the intermediate existence (antariibhavapratisalJldhik~afle); at the mo-
ment of the arising, when the sentient being is reborn in the realm of immateriality.
1160
LS: SAH 535-36.
1161
LVP: A list of silpasthiinakarmasthiina (Mahiivyutpatti, 76, s) is cited in the Divyavadiina,
pp. 58, 100: the art of riding on the head of an elephant, on the back of a horse, the art of
archery, etc.
1162
LS: SAH 537.
1163
LVP: The visible forms, etc., (1) of the bed and of the body, etc., (2) of instruments (bow,
arrow, etc.), (3) of the entity that one wants to create.
1164
LVP: For one apprehends the arts by listening to instruction. - The effect of retribution
(vipiikaja) is not mentioned here; thus one has the five derivative material elements (bhautika),
visible form, etc., for one's object.
1165
LVP: In fact, the thought relative to walking, etc., takes place after one has seen, felt, etc.
- Hsiian-tsang corrects the Bhii~ya: "four or five sensory consciousnesses are preparatory to
the thoughts associated with the proper deportments (airyiipathika) and the thoughts associated
with skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthiinika) respectively". One should understand that the
auditory consciousness is absent for the thoughts associated with the proper deportments.
n 66 LVP: MYS, 661al6. - The Bhadanta Anantavarman (Vyiikhyii ad ii. 46cd), in the Expla-
nation of the Vibhii~ii (Vibhii~iivyiikhyiina) presents this opinion according to which one should
admit the unobscured-non-defined thoughts (anivrtavyakrta) not included in the above-
mentioned (F 320) four non-defined thoughts (avyakrta), namely, the unobscured-non-defined
thought~ defined vii. 51.
n 67 LVP: Hstian-tsang: "by thoughts associated with the proper deportments (airyiipathika)
and thoughts associated with skill in arts and crafts (sailpasthiinika)".
ll68
LS: SAH 537-46.
69
ll IS: SAH 538-40.
1170
IS: L VP has unobscured-non-defined thought of the realm of fine-materiality, but. both
Pradhan.106.20 and WOG.243.34 have defiled (kli~fa) thought, i.e., obscured-non-defined
thought, of the realm of fine-materiality.
1171
IS: Again, L VP has unobscured-non-defined thought.
ll72
IS: Again, LVP has unobscured-non-defined thought.
1173
IS: Again, LVP has unobscured-non-defined thought.
1174
IS: SAH 541-43.
1175
LVP: First thought of the intermediate existence (antariibhava) of the realm of fine-
materiality.
1176
IS: SAH 544-45.
1177
IS: SAH 546.
1178
IS: Ibid.
ll79
IS: Ibid.
ll80
IS: Ibid.
1181
IS: SAH 232.
1182
IS: Ibid.
83
n LVP: By an effort of resolution-due to a decision-the practitioners see the body as the
body really is not, namely, as being made up only of rotten bones, etc: this is the meditation on
the loathsome (asubha). In the same way, in the supernormal powers (rddhi; vii. 48), the
practitioners imagine that the earth element is small, and that the water element is great (com-
pare Dfgha, ii. 108).
IS: In the *Nyiiyiinusiira, 622aff., we find a lengthy debate between the Vai~ha~ika and the
Sautra~tika, represented by SrTiata, who claims that the following cases are examples of per-
ception of non-existent objects (see ADCP.46f.):
1. Optical illusion of a fire-wheel (aliita-cakra) resulting from a whirling firebrand.
2. The cognition of the non-existent Self (iitman).
3. The meditational experiences, such as the all pervasiveness of a meditational object
(the so-called "base of entirety", krtsniiyatana), e.g., a primary colour, that results
from resolute mental application (a<lhimukti-manaskiira). [ ... ]

1184
LVP: Sarriyuktiigama 21, 1s: asubhiisa~agatarri smrtisarribodhyangarri bhiivayati. - "Mind-
fulness" forms a part of the (noble) path; ·sahagata (together with) signifies "immediately fol-
lowing".
1185
LS: AH 230; SAH 465.
1186
LS: Ibid.
1187
Gokhale: [73abp kli$fe traidhiifuke liibhafi $ai:ii:iarri $ai:ii:iarri dvayofi
Tib.: [73abJ khams gsum pa yi nyon mongs can Idrug dang drug dang gnyis rnyed do I
1188
LS: The Vyiikhyii glosses [WOG.248.16f.]: iha kusala-pratisarridhiinarri samyag-dr~tya vii
vicikitsayii va.
1189
LVP: The Vibhii~ii discusses whether the wholesome (kusala) thought of which one takes
possession is innate or acquired at birth (upapattipratilambhika) only or acquired also through
preparatory effort (priiyogika):
1190
LS: AH 230; SAH 465.
1191
Gokhale: [73b2-cl] iubhe I trayii,:iarri rupaje
Tib.: [73c] gzugs skyes dge la gsum dag go I
1192
LS: AH 230; SAH 465.
1193
Gokhale: T73c2dl] saikfe catun:,.iirµ
Tib.: [73dl] slob pa la bzhi
1194
LS: AH 230; SAH 465.
1195
'
Gokhale: '[73d2] tasya fe$ite
Tib.: '[73d2] /hag la de 11
1196
LS: This'is the 44 th of 1'ritzer's fony-four passages discussed in relation to chapter 2
(VY.130). Vasubandhu comments that the wholesome thought should be presented as seven
thoughts. Saqighabhadra (Ny, 456al) identifies this as the opinion of Vasubandhu and explains
(Ny, 456al-2) that the sixth and-seventh thought are mentioned as one since they are both pure
(aniisrava).
1197
LVP: This is a verse (kiirikii) in the work ofDharmatriita, Nanjio 1287, fol. 86a17: "If one
acquires nine types. of factors, one should know that it is with a defiled (kli$fa) thought; the
wholesome (kusala) thought acquires six types; the non-defined (avyakrta) thought acquires
the non-defined thought (transl. of Saqighavarman). Paramiirtha: "When the defiled thought is
produced, one acquires, it is said, nine types of thought; with the wholesome thought ... ".
The Vyiikhyii [WOG.251.17] provides the third quarter-verse (piida):
[liibhafi syiin navacittiiniif!I kli$fe citta iti smrtam I]
$a,:i,:iiirµ tu kusale citte [tasyaiviivyakrtodbhave II]
1198
LVP: upapattisamiipattivairiigyaparihii1Jisu I
kusalapratisaf!ldhau ca cittaliibho [hy] atadvatafi 11
ABOUT THE AUTHOR/TRANSLATORS
Vasubandhu (ca. 35o.:-430 A.D.) was born in Puru~apura in Gandhara and is, next
to Asaiiga (ca. ,330-405 A.D.), his half-brother, the most famous personage of the
Yogacara school.
He originally belonged to the Sravakayana school of the Sarvastivadins arid had
already made a name for himself through the composition of numerous treatises
when he was won over to the Mahayana by Asanga, sometime in his forties. He then
with great enthusiasm put his talents to work in the service of the Mahiiyal1a, for
which he wrote so many works that he received the name "master of a thousand
doctrinal treatises". Vasubandhu counts as the great systematizer of Buddhism
and is one of the six great ornaments-six great commentators of the Buddha's
teaching.
Even though in the Kosa, Vasubandhu seems to be generally partisan to the
"Hinayana" -Sautrantikas, he too was evidently open-minded, of which fact the
Kosa is a testimony, and accordingly he did not seem to have become exclusively
partisan to the tenets of any group as such-be it those of Hinayana- or Yogacara-
Sautrantika or Sarvastivada.
Vasubandhu's personage, life and dates have been a matter of great debate in modem
Buddhist scholarship.
Hsilan-tsang or Xuanzang (600-664 A.D.), renowned for his sixteen-year pilgrimage
to India and his career as a translator of Buddhist scriptures, is one of the most
illustrious figures in the history of scholastic Chinese Buddhism.
Upon his return to China in 645, Hsilan-tsang brought back with him a great number
of Sanskrit texts. In addition to his translations of the Abhidharmakosabha:jya
(651-654), the* Nyayanustfra (653-654), as well as the* Mahavibha:ja (656-659),
Jiianaprasthpna (657-660), * Abhidharmavatara (658), Prakara,:iapada (660) and
I
other important Abhidharma texts; he also translated many Mahayana scriptures,
e.g., the Yogacarabhiimisastra (646-648) anct' Mahaprajnaparamitasutra (660-663),
and authored the Records of the Western Regions (646). It is through Hsilan-tsang
and his chief disciple K'uei-chi that the Fa-hsiang or Yogacara School was initiated
in China; the most important book of the school being Hsilan-tsang's Ch' eng wei-shi
lun (Vijnaptimatratasiddhi; in 659).
Louis de La Vallee Poussin (1869-1938), born in Liege (Belgium), was an indologist
and specialist in Buddhist philosophy. Educated in Liege, Louvain, Paris (S. Levy)
and Leiden (H. Kem), he was a master in many languages, including Sanskrit, Pali,
Chinese, Tibetan, Greek, Latin, etc., and became professor at the University of Ghent
(Belgium) in 1893, a position he-held until his retirement in 1929.
Hubert Durt (in Encyclopedia of Relgion) elaborates:
La Vallee Poussin dedicated all the strength of his philological genius to
his field and contrib1.1:ted to a reorientation of Buddhist studies toward the
languages of northern Buddhism (Sanskrit and Tibetan) and toward Buddhist
philosophy considered in its historical perspective. He produced two main types
of studies: (1) scholarly editions [of Tantric texts; Madhyamika texts; etc.] and
(2) translations with exegeses. These correspond roughly to the two periods of
his activity, that before and that after World War I.
After World War I, La Vallee Poussin, who had in the meantime mastered
the languages of the Chinese Buddhist translations, undertook the enormous
enterprise of translating and critically annotating two summae of Buddhist
scholastics: Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa, the masterwork ·of the northern
Hinayana Abhidharma school, and Hsilan-tsang's Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi, the best
compendium of the tenets of the Yogliclira, or Idealist, current of the Mahayana.
For his Abhidharmakosa (1923-1931), La Vallee Poussin had to master the
huge Kashmirian Mahiivibhii~a, .... With his Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi: La Siddhi
de Hiuan-tsang (1928-1929), he took the lead in the study of Idealist Buddhism,
a field in which Sylvain Levi had laid the foundation and which Paul Demieville
and La Vallee Poussin's pupil Etienne Lamotte were to continue.
Besides these two main types of studies, La Vallee Poussin produced many other
writings, see our Bibliography. Sylvain Levi wrote: "His work is of unrivalled
magnitude." More modestly, La Vallee Poussin himself said: "Je suis l'homme du
Kosa."
Gelong Lodro Sangpo (Jurgen Balzer) - the translator - is a student of the late
Ven. Trungpa Rinpoche. Born 1952 in Germany, he received his first ordination in
the Karma Kagyii Sangha in 1984, France, and then moved to Gampo Abbey,
Canada. From 1985-2002 he served as Secretary of International Kagyii Sangha
Association of Buddhist Monks and Nuns and published its magazine The Profound
Path of Peace.
He completed the traditional three year retreat in 1996 and a four year study retreat
in 2003. He also served for a few years as Actin$ Director of Gampo Abbey. He was
one of the co-founders of Nitartha Institute and is a senior teacher at the Vidyadhara
Institute, the monastic college of Gampo Abbey, since its inception.
His focus of study is in the systematic traditions of Buddhist Abhidharma. In
recent years, he has translated and published - under the supervision of Prof. Ernst
Steinkellner - Erich Frauwallner's The Philosophy of Buddhism (Motilal). At
present he is finalizing a translation of various books and articles by La Vallee
Poussin and is also engaged in the project of translating the collected writings of
Prof. Lambert Schmithausen from German into English.

Abhi Hu

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Abhi<Jharmakosa-Bha~ya

Translated into French by

Annotated English Translation byi

With a New Introduction by

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS

© GELONG LODRO SANGPO

ISBN : 978-81-208-3608-2 (Vol. I)

• Summary and Discussion of the Abhidharmakosa-bhii~ya

A. Abhidharma as primarily a soteriology ................................................................................ 1

A. Abhidharma as primarily a soteriology

prajna are defined as "investigation/discernment of dharma-s" (dharma-pravicaya).

The signification of "abhisamaya" is in fact explicitly shown in one of the Abhi-

It is called abhidharma because it can directly realize the dharma-s. 4

It is true that in the coutse of development of the Abhidharmika exegetical meth-

B. The predecessors of the Abhidharmakosa-bha~ya as a manual

3. The Mahavibha~ii, in contrast, encyclopedic as it is, in respect of organiza-

Prakara,:za-piida is particularly visible in the chapter on the sa1?1,skiira-s which

apparently the same title as *Abhidharmahrdaya, or forl!~,t'~~ (T no. 1551),

iv. The *Abhidharmahrdaya-vytikhya (or *Misra-abhidharmahrdaya lltllHtl:,t'~,

Dharmatrata's definition, on the other hand, is more articulate:

v .. FQllowing the style of Dharmatrata, Vasubandhu (ca. fourth_ century C.E.),

c. The organizational structure of the Abhidhar,,.akosa-bhii~ya

Causes for the realization of expositions on

n. The affiliation of the Abhidharmakosa-bha~ya

On the whole, therefore, concerning Vasubandhu's affiliation, the description by the

E. Summaries and discussion on the chapters

1. Firstly, "abhidharma" is stated to be the outflow-free prajfiii. In fact, both "abhi-

2. The definitional identification of "abhidharma" with "prajfi,ii," spells out the·

Understanding (prajiiii) is the discernment of dharma-s. It is the exami-

For instance, the visual faculty is subsumed under the matter-aggregate, by

4. The totality of dhanna-s is subsumed as those that are with-outflow ("impure")

growth or intensification of a defilement. Even a skillful act, such as giving, however

5. The conditioned dharma-s are etymologically defined as those "compounded by

8. The dharma-s-the eighteen elements-are further investigated from various

EB. Chapter two: Indriya-nirdesa

EBA. On the indriya-s

dharma-s too exercise a dominant influence in the arising or functioning of other

EBB. On lhe co-nascence of material atoms

EBc. On the citta-caitta-s

3. At the start of the enumeration of the ten universal (mahabhiimika) dharma-s,

No doubt, subsequently, he does cite the Sautrantika questioning some of the

EBD. On.the disjoined conditionings

2. We may consider the example of the disjoined conditioning called "acqui-

practitioner, through spiritual practice, is transformed into an arya, his whql.e

This is obviously a sarcastic remark meant to ridicule the Vaibha~ikas: it is meant

3. Another important controversy concerns the two disjoined conditionings called

EBE. On causes, conditions and fruits

4 CONDITIONS 6CAUSES 5 EFFECTS

Nirviil}a is said to have been attained as a result of the obtaining-by virtue

Ee. Chapter three: Loka-nirdesa

ECA. Constitution of the physical universe and its inhabitants

2. A question arises: In a material sphere, thought exists/operates (pra--fvrt) with

3. The whole of saqisaric existence is characterized by greed (riiga). The greed of

sensuality sphere" (kamadhatu-pratisal'J'lyukta), "connected with the fine-materiality

ECB. Formation anddissolu-Uon-of the universe

Ecc. CondiHoned co-arising

An interesting _point to note in Vasubandhu's discussion on the individual limbs

2. In the MVS, a question is posed: In the twelve-limbed exposition,' there is no

Defilement => defilement

Since craving is conditioned by sensation, it is to be understood that ignorance

sciousness, volition, ignorance, contact, sensation, the enwrapment which

ED. Chapter four: Karma-nirdesa

Information kanna is so called because it is an action that informs others of the

iv. The Abhidharmahrdaya-vytikhya (or Misra-abhidharmahrdaya lltllHtl:,t'~,