RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order.

o G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order. Acting on that motion, the lower
court in its order of March 31, 1975 appointed Baluyut and Jose Espino as special administrators.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition of September 2, 1975 asked that Espino, former
Manila governor of Nueva Vizcaya and an alleged acknowledged natural child of Sotero Baluyut, be
appointed administrator should she not be named administratrix.
SECOND DIVISION
On November 12, 1975 Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be appointed
G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976 administratrix. She reasoned out that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no more interest in the decedent's
estate because as a collateral relative he was excluded by Espino and other supposed
descendants of the deceased who had intervened in the proceeding, and, therefore, it was not
ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner, necessary to continue with the reception of his evidence.
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and
CORAZON ESPINO, respondents. Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a natural child of
Sotero Baluyut because Espino's parents were the spouses Elino Espino and Josefa de Guzman.
Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared an incompetent by the Juvenile and
Mary Concepcion-Bautista for petitioner. Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in its order of September 25, 1975 in Special
Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut. That proceeding was instituted by
Santiago, Salunat and Agbayani for respondent Encarnaci5on Lopez Vda. de Baluyut. her sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez-Viray.

At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion on November 17, 1975 no oral and documentary
evidence was presented. The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut as follows:
AQUINO, J.:
Court: We want also to hear her testimony.
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six, leaving an estate
allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos. xxx xxx xxx

A few weeks later, or on February 20, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Atty. Salunat: We are now therefore presenting the widow, your
Instance of Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the Honor, to take the witness stand for examination by the court.
deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting
as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. xxx xxx xxx
He prayed that he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special
administrator.
Court to witness: Can you testify in English?-No, your Honor,
Pampango.
The lower court in its order of February 24, 1975 appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrator with a bond of P100,000.
Q. Ilocano? — A. No, your Honor.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition of March 8, 1975 alleged that she was unaware that her
deceased husband executed a will. She characterized as libelous the allegation as to her mental Atty. Salunat: She can testify in Tagalog your Honor, which
incapacity. She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G. comprehensible.
Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.
Court: Your remember when you were born, Mrs. Baluyut? — A.
The lower court in its order of March 24, 1975 cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special March 25, 1901.
administrator. In that same order the lower court noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of
questions while on the witness stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally qualified". Q. Where did you graduate? — Madres Dominicas.
 Q. When did you get married to Sec. Baluyut? — A. I cannot The Espino's in their comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut is aware that Jose Espino was
remember the date but this was in Lingayen. acknowledged in a notarial instrument by Sotero Baluyut as his natural child.

Q. What church? — A. A Catholic. Mrs. Baluyut in her comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut instituted the administration
proceeding after he had failed to get from her a cheek for P500,000 belonging to the decedent's
Court: You want to ask more questions Attorney? estate and that he grossly misrepresented that she was mentally incompetent. She further alleged
that the order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declaring her an incompetent was
issued in a blitzkrieg manner because it was based on the report of Doctor Lourdes V. Lapuz
Atty. Salunat: Just a few clarificatory questions, your Honor. which was filed in court just one day before the order was issued.

Q. Do you know Gov. Espino? — A. Yes. Mrs. Baluyut's main contention is that it is the probate court and not the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court that should decide the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix.
Q. Why do you know him? — A. Because he is like a son to me.
Alfredo G. Baluyut in his manifestation of February 2, 1976 disclosed that Sotero Baluyut executed
Q. Do you know whether Gov. Espino has any relationship with a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in
the late Don Sotero Baluyut? — A. Yes, why not. certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The remaining three-fourths
were bequeated to his collateral relatives named Irene, Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all
Q. Will you please tell us what is the relationship if there is any? surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin, all surnamed Miranda. The testator
— A. He is his son, sir. designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not mentioned in that will.

Atty. Salunat: I think that would be all, your Honor. In this Court's resolution of May 7, 1976 respondents' comments were treated as their answers.
The case was deemed submitted for decision.
Court: Submitted?
The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs.
Atty. Salunat: We will ask the Court to (be allowed to) submit a Baluyut as administratrix.
rejoinder, your Honor.
We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving spouse
The probate court in its order of November 27, 1975 terminated the appointments of Espino and enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it
Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix does not follow that she should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on
with a bond of P20,000. The order was based on the fact that as surviving spouse she has a her competency to discharge that trust.
preferential right to be appointed as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and that she
is entitled to three-fourths of the conjugal estate: one-half in her own right and one-fourth as heir of Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as
the deceased. The lower court said it was convinced of the widow's capacity and that her executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance
"sufficient understanding" justified her appointment. of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as
executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening
Letters of administration were issued to Mrs. Baluyut after she posted her bond. She took her oath circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position.
of office on November 29, 1975.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to
On December 13, 1975 Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent Judge, Mrs. Baluyut and the be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording
Espino spouses this special civil action of certiorari in order to set aside the order of November 27 oppositors a chance to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, L-26106, January 31,
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix. 1969, 26 SCRA 768, 791).

This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order of In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in order to satisfy
November 27 and from disposing of the funds or assets of the estate in their possession or itself on her mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her
deposited in certain banks. qualifications. He had squarely raised the issue as to her competency. The probate court assumed
that
Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the decedent's estate. As it now turned out, he is one of the
legatees named in the decedent's alleged will.

Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy (Art.
838, Civil Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil.
249).

After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for
the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be conducted (Sec.
1, Rule 82, Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco and Zaballa, 38 Phil. 620; Rodriguez vs. De
Borja, L-21993, 64 O.G. 754, 17 SCRA 418).

Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as
executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an adequate
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily appointing
Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested
party. That irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the
decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that development when he articulated in his petition
his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.

Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed by the lower court or if the
petitioner's contention is clearly tenable or when the broader interests of justice or public policy
justify the nullification of the questioned order (Manila Electric Company and Sheriff of Quezon
City vs. Hon. Enriquez and Espinosa, 110 Phil. 499, 503; Pacheco vs. Tumangday and Fernando,
108 Phil. 238; Raneses vs. Teves, L-26854, March 4, 1976).

Before closing, a pending incident herein should be resolved. Alfredo G. Baluyut in his motion of
January 15, 1976 prayed that respondent Judge be enjoined from acting on Mrs. Baluyut's motion
for the appointment of Espino as special administrator. In view of Alfredo G. Baluyut's
manifestation of

April 2, 1976 that his motion had become moot, the same is hereby denied.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as
administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate
court is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in
this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL Na ako, CANUTO SIOSON, mamamayang Pilipino, may katampatang gulang, kasal kay
Raymunda San Diego, at naninirahan sa Tanza, Navotas, Rizal, sa bisa at pamamagitan
ng kasulatang ito ay nagpapatunay at nagpapatibay:
FIRST DIVISION
1. Na ako ang lubos at tunay na may-ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70
G.R. No. 115925            August 15, 2003 porcion pro-indiviso) ng isang lagay na lupa (Lote No. 2, Plano Psu-13245), na
nasa sa nayon ng Tanza, Municipio ng Navotas, Provincia ng Rizal, at ang
descripcion o pagkakakilanlan ng nasabing lote ay nakasaad sa Certificado
SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and CONSOLACION SIOSON, petitioners, Original, de Titulo No. 4207 ng Oficina ng Registrador de Titulos ng Rizal, gaya
vs. ng sumusunod:
COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS S. EUGENIO-GINO, respondents.
xxxx
CARPIO, J.:
2. Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang Dalawang Libo Dalawang Daan at
The Case Limampung Piso (P2,250.00), salaping Pilipino, na sa akin ay ibinayad ni
CONSOLACION SIOSON, kasal kay Ricardo S. Pascual, may sapat na gulang,
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated 31 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals mamamayang Pilipino, at naninirahan sa Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal at ang
ordering the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III, to place TCT No. (232252) 1321 in the pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga ay aking inaamin at pinatutunayan, ay
name of respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino. The Decision ordered the Register of Deeds to aking ipinagbili, inilipat at isinalin, sa pamamagitan ng bilihang tuluyan at walang
cancel the names of petitioners Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson ("petitioners") in TCT pasubali a favor [sic] sa nasabing si CONSOLACION SIOSON, sa kanyang
No. (232252) 1321. The Decision also directed petitioners to pay respondent moral and exemplary tagapagmana at mapaglilipatan ang lahat ng aking titulo, karapatan at kaparti na
damages and attorney’s fees. binubuo ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70 porcion pro-indiviso) ng loteng
descrito or tinutukoy sa itaas nito. (Emphasis supplied)
The Facts
CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later
Petitioner Consolacion Sioson ("CONSOLACION") and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes. 5
("REMEDIOS") are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson
("CANUTO"). CANUTO and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina Sioson On 23 October 1968, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz, executed
("CATALINA") and his brother Victoriano Sioson ("VICTORIANO"), were co-owners of a parcel of a joint affidavit6 ("JOINT AFFIDAVIT") affirming the KASULATAN in favor of CONSOLACION .
land in Tanza, Navotas, Metro Manila. The property, known as Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245, had an They also attested that the lots their father had sold to CONSOLACION were Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-
area of 9,347 square meters and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4207 issued by E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713. The JOINT AFFIDAVIT reads:
the Register of Deeds of Rizal. CATALINA, CANUTO, and VICTORIANO each owned an aliquot
10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot 2.2 KAMING sina FELICIDAD SIOSON at BEATRIZ SIOSON, pawang mga Pilipino, kapuwa
may sapat na gulang at naninirahan, ang una sa Tanza, Navotas at ang ikalawa sa
On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots (Lot Nos. 2-A Concepcion, Malabon, lalawigan ng Rizal, sa ilalim ng isang ganap na panunumpa
to 2-H) through Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 which the Director of Lands approved on 30 May alinsunod sa batas, ay malayang nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod:
1952. Lot No. 2-A, with an area of 670 square meters, and Lot No. 2-E, with an area of 2,000
square meters, were placed under CANUTO’s name. Three other individuals took the remaining Na kami ang mga buhay na anak na naiwan ni CANUTO SIOSON na
lots.3 nagmamay-ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70 porcion pro-indiviso) ng isang
lagay na lupa (Lote No. 2, plano Psu-13245), na nasa Nayon ng Tanza, Navotas,
On 26 September 1956, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Rizal, at ang mga palatandaan nito ay nasasaad sa Certificado Original de Titulo
Tuluyan4 ("KASULATAN"). Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in No. 4207 ng Tanggapan ng Registrador de Titulos ng Rizal;
favor of CONSOLACION for  P2,250.00. The KASULATAN, notarized by Notary Public Jose T. de
los Santos of Navotas, provides: Na sa lubos naming kaalaman, ay ipinagbili ng aming Ama na si Canuto Sioson
ang kaniyang buong bahagi na 10/70 sa nasabing Lote No. 2, kay
CONSOLACION SIOSON, may-bahay ni Ricardo S. Pascual, na taga Dampalit,
Malabon, Rizal, sa halagang P2,250.00, salaping pilipino, noong ika 16 [sic] ng
 Septiembre, 1956, sa pamamagitan ng isang KASULATAN NG BILIHANG On 26 November 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and ordering
TULUYAN na pinagtibay sa harap ng Notario Publico Jose T. de los Santos nang REMEDIOS to pay petitioners P10,000 as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit. The trial court held
pechang nabanggit, sa Navotas, Rizal, (Doc. No. 194, Page No. 84; Book No. IV; that the action filed by REMEDIOS is based on fraud, covered by the four-year prescriptive period.
Series of 1956); The trial court also held that REMEDIOS knew of petitioners’ adverse title on 19 November 1982
when REMEDIOS testified against petitioners in an ejectment suit petitioners had filed against
Na ang nasabing lupa na ipinagbili ng aming Ama kay Consolacion Sioson ni their tenants in Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Thus, the complaint of REMEDIOS had already prescribed
Pascual, ay nakikilala ngayong mga Lote No. 2-A at Lote 2-E ng Plano de when she filed it on 4 February 1988.
Subdivision Psd-34713; na pinagtibay ng Assistant Director of Lands noong
Mayo 30, 1952; The trial court further ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action against petitioners because
CATALINA’s LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to derive her title has not been admitted
Na aming ngayong pinatitibayan ang pagka-pagbili ng bahagi ng aming Ama kay to probate. Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, no will passes real or personal property unless it is
Consolacion Sioson ni Pascual ng ngayo’y nakikilalang Lote No. 2-A at Lote No. allowed in probate in accordance with the Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
2-E ng Plano de Subdivision Psd-34713. (Emphasis supplied) decision provides:

On 28 October 1968, CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against
with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal ("Register of Deeds"). Based on these plaintiff, ordering:
documents, the Register of Deeds issued to CONSOLACION Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(232252) 1321 covering Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 with a total area of 1. The dismissal of this case;
2,670 square meters.
2. The plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
On 4 February 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Pesos as and for attorney’s fees; and
Ricardo Pascual in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for "Annulment or
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages." REMEDIOS claimed that she is the 3. The plaintiff to pay the costs of suit.9
owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINA’s last
will and testament7 ("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION
obtained title to these lots through fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) REMEDIOS appealed to the Court of Appeals.
1321 is twice the size of CANUTO’s share in Lot 2. REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of
CONSOLACION’s title, the issuance of another title in her name, and the payment to her of The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
damages.
On 31 January 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the trial
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed that court. The appellate court held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied trust
the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within four years from allegedly created in her favor when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered her title over Lot Nos.
the registration of CONSOLACION’s title on 28 October 1968 and not some 19 years later on 4 2-A and 2-E. Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is ten years, not four.
February 1988. REMEDIOS opposed the motion, claiming that she became aware of The Court of Appeals counted this ten-year period from 19 November 1982. Thus, when
CONSOLACION’s adverse title only in February 1987. CONSOLACION maintained that she had REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988, the ten-year prescriptive period had not yet
timely filed her complaint within the four-year prescriptive on 4 February 1988. expired.

In its order of 28 April 1988, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss. The trial court The appellate court held that CATALINA’s unprobated LAST WILL does not preclude REMEDIOS
held that the reckoning of the prescriptive period for filing REMEDIOS’ complaint is evidentiary in from seeking reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the LAST WILL may subsequently be
nature and must await the presentation of the parties’ evidence during the trial. During the pre-trial admitted to probate. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s ruling provides:
stage, REMEDIOS clarified that she was claiming only CATALINA’s 10/70 share in Lot 2, or 1,335
square meters, which constitute ½ of the area of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. 8 The trial of the case then WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Registry
ensued. of Deeds of Rizal or Metro Manila, District III, is ordered to place Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (232252) 1321 under the name of Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino as executor of the
The Ruling of the Trial Court will of Catalina Sioson and cancel the names of the Spouses Ricardo Pascual and
Consolacion Sioson inscribed over said title as owners of the covered lot. Defendants-
appellees spouses Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson are ordered to pay plaintiff-
 appellant Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, The trial court held that the action filed by REMEDIOS is one based on fraud. REMEDIOS’ action
exemplary damages of P20,000[.00] and attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 and P500.00 per seeks to recover real property that petitioners allegedly acquired through fraud. Consequently, the
appearance.10 trial court held that the action prescribes in four years counted from REMEDIOS’ actual discovery
of petitioners’ adverse title. The trial court concluded that REMEDIOS belatedly filed her suit on 4
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the ruling. However, the Court of Appeals denied their February 1988 because she actually knew of petitioners’ adverse title since 19 November 1982.
motion in its order dated 15 June 1994.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an
Hence, this petition. implied trust. REMEDIOS had ten years counted from actual notice of the breach of trust, that is,
the assertion of adverse title, within which to bring her action. The appellate court held that
REMEDIOS seasonably filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 because she allegedly discovered
The Issues petitioners’ adverse title only on 19 November 1982.

Petitioners allege the following assignment of errors: What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is already barred by
prescription.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION WHICH FINDING IS Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted
MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
From Registration of Adverse Title
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DOES NOT HAVE ANY TITLE AND HAS UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not
ANY TITLE TO THE LOTS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND IN ORDERING THE give rise to an implied trust, and the action is to annul a voidable contract under Article 1390 12 of
CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PETITIONERS. the Civil Code. In such a case, the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1391 13 begins to run
from the time of discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE In the present case, REMEDIOS does not seek to annul the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS does not
RULES OF COURT IN ORDERING THE ENTIRE PROPERTY COVERED BY assail the KASULATAN as a voidable contract. In fact, REMEDIOS admits the validity of the sale
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. (232252) 1321 TO BE PLACED IN THE of 1,335 square meters of land under the KASULATAN. However, REMEDIOS alleges that the
NAME OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, BECAUSE THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE excess area of 1,335 meters is not part of the sale under the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS seeks the
RESPONDENT IS LIMITED ONLY TO ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF THE PROPERTY, removal of this excess area from TCT No. (232252) 1321 that was issued to CONSOLACION.
AND THE OTHER HALF THEREOF UNQUESTIONABLY BELONGS TO PETITIONERS. Consequently, REMEDIOS’ action is for "Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of
Title] and Damages."14
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ACTED
FRAUDULENTLY AND IN BAD FAITH IN SECURING THEIR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE REMEDIOS’ action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the
TO THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND IN ORDERING PETITIONERS inclusion of the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was without basis. In
TO PAY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND effect, REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335 square meters
ATTORNEY’S FEES.115-g through mistake or fraud and thus CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period
is ten years under Article 1144 and not four years under Articles 1389 and 1391.
The pivotal questions are: (1) whether prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS, and (2)
whether REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake,
giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 15 of the Civil Code, is ten years pursuant to Article
The Ruling of the Court 1144.16 This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates
the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. 17
The petition has merit.
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than 19 years after CONSOLACION
The Action is Barred by Prescription registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October 1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS
filed the complaint late thus warranting its dismissal. As the Court recently declared in Spouses Plainly, the increase in the area sold from 1,335 square meters to 2,670 square meters is a glaring
Alfredo v. Spouses Borras,18 — mistake. There is, however, no proof whatsoever that this increase in area was the result of fraud.
Allegations of fraud in actions to enforce implied trusts must be proved by clear and convincing
Following Caro,19 we have consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied evidence.23 Adille, which is anchored on fraud,24 cannot apply to the present case.
trust prescribes in ten years. We went further by specifying the reference point of the ten-year
prescriptive period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. At any rate, even if we apply Adille to this case, prescription still bars REMEDIOS’ complaint. As
executrix of CATALINA’s LAST WILL, REMEDIOS submitted to the then Court of First Instance of
The Court of Appeals’ Reckoning of Caloocan in Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 the inventory of all the property comprising
CATALINA’s estate, which included Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. In a motion dated 7 November 1977,
CONSOLACION sought the exclusion of these lots from the inventory, invoking her title over them.
Prescriptive Period from Actual Notice REMEDIOS was served a copy of the motion on 8 November 1977 against which she filed an
opposition. Nevertheless, the trial court overruled REMEDIOS’ objection. In its order of 3 January
of Adverse Title Not Justified 1978, the trial court granted CONSOLACION’s motion and ordered the exclusion of Lot Nos. 2-A
and 2-E from the estate of CATALINA. REMEDIOS did not appeal from this ruling.
In holding that the action filed by REMEDIOS has not prescribed, the Court of Appeals invoked
this Court’s ruling in Adille v. Court of Appeals. 20 In Adille, the Court reckoned the ten-year REMEDIOS thus had actual notice of petitioners’ adverse title on 8 November 1977. Even if, for
prescriptive period for enforcing implied trusts not from registration of the adverse title but from the sake of argument, the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run upon actual notice of the
actual notice of the adverse title by the cestui que trust. However, the Court, in justifying its adverse title, still REMEDIOS’ right to file this suit has prescribed. REMEDIOS had until 11
deviation from the general rule, explained: November 1987 within which to file her complaint. When she did so on 4 February 1988, the
prescriptive period had already lapsed.
[W]hile actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes (sic) in ten years, reckoned from the date
of the registration of the property, we x x x are not prepared to count the period from such date in Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest
this case. We note the petitioner’s sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for
himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS’ complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real party-in-
settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother Feliza["] with the consequence that he interest who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled.
was able to secure title in his name also. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
Such commission of specific fraudulent conduct is absent in the present case. Other than the name of the real party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or suffer from the
asserting that petitioners are guilty of fraud because they secured title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E judgment in the suit.25 If one who is not a real party-in-interest brings the action, the suit is
with an area twice bigger than what CANUTO allegedly sold to CONSOLACION, REMEDIOS did dismissible for lack of cause of action.26
not present any other proof of petitioners’ fraudulent conduct akin to Adille.
REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or over its one-half portion) on the
CONSOLACION obtained title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E through the KASULATAN executed by devise of these lots to her under CATALINA’s LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the
CANUTO and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT executed by his surviving children, one of whom, Felicidad, probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not
is the mother of REMEDIOS. The KASULATAN referred to the sale of CANUTO’s 10/70 share in contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case
Lot 2 without specifying the area of the lot sold. The JOINT AFFIDAVIT referred to the "Plano de No. C-208 is still pending.27
Subdivision Psd-34713" without also specifying the area of the lot sold. However, Subdivision Plan
Psd 34713, as certified by the Assistant Director of Lands on 30 May 1952, showed an area of
2,670 square meters in the name of CANUTO. Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless
issued TCT No. (232252) 1321 to CONSOLACION covering an area of 2,670 square meters. it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." This Court has interpreted this
provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder."28 REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of
REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN or the JOINT AFFIDAVIT as fictitious or forged. CATALINA’s LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINA’s LAST
REMEDIOS even admits the authenticity of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 as certified by the WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without
Assistant Director of Lands.21 Moreover, REMEDIOS has not contested petitioners’ claim that any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied
CANUTO doubled his share in Lot 2 by acquiring VICTORIANO’s share. 22 trust over these lots.
The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering the reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2- 12. Because of the defendants’ fraudulent actuations on this matter, plaintiff suffered and
A and 2-E to REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix of CATALINA’s LAST WILL. This is continious [sic] to suffer moral damages arising from anxiety, shock and wounded feelings.
inappropriate because REMEDIOS sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged owner Defendants should also be assessed exemplary damages by way of a lesson to deter them from
of the disputed lots. Thus, REMEDIOS alleged in her complaint: again committing the fraudulent acts, or acts of similar nature, by virtue of which they were able to
obtain title to the parcels of land involved in this case x x x.29 (Emphasis supplied)
3. The plaintiff is a niece and compulsory heir of the late CATALINA SIOSON who died single and
without any child of her own and who, during her lifetime, was the owner of those two (2) parcels Indeed, all throughout the proceedings below and even in her Comment to this petition,
of land located at Tanza, Navotas, Rizal (now Metro Manila), formerly covered by Original REMEDIOS continued to pursue her claim as the alleged owner of one-half of the disputed lots.
Certificate of Title No. 4207 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, x x x.
Other Matters Raised in the Petition
4. The plaintiff, aside from being the compulsory heir of the deceased CATALINA SIOSON, has
sole and exclusive claim of ownership over the above-mentioned two (2) parcels of land by virtue The Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors petitioners assigned concerning
of a will or "Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya" executed by Catalina Sioson on May 19, 1964 before the award of damages and attorneys fees to REMEDIOS. Such award assumes that REMEDIOS
Notary Public Efren Y. Angeles at Navotas, Rizal, in which document the deceased Catalina is a real party-in-interest and that she timely filed her complaint. As earlier shown, this is not the
Sioson specifically and exclusively bequeathed to the plaintiff the above-mentioned Lots 2-A and case.
2-E of Psd-34713 approved by the Bureau of Lands on May 30, 1952. Copy of the "Huling Habilin
at Pagpapasiya" consisting of four (4) pages is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof
as Annex "A;" WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January
1994 and its Resolution dated 15 June 1994 are SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent
Remedios Eugenio-Gino, dated 2 February 1988 is DISMISSED.
5. Sometime on or about February, 1987, plaintiff discovered that the above-mentioned Lots 2-A
and 2-E of subdivision plan Psd-34713 are now registered or titled in the name of the defendants
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, now Metro- SO ORDERED.
Manila District III. Copy of the title is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex
"B;"

6. Upon further inquiry and investigation, plaintiff discovered that the defendants were able to
obtain title in their name of the said parcels of land by virtue of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan"
allegedly executed by Canuto Sioson on September 26, 1956 before Notary Public Jose [T.] de
los Santos of Navotas, Metro-Manila. Copy of the said document is hereto attached and forms an
integral part hereof as Annex "C;"

7. The plaintiff also discovered that although x x x the original sale did not specify the parcels of
land sold by Canuto Sioson, the defendants submitted an alleged Affidavit executed by Felicidad
Sioson and Beatriz Sioson identifying the lots sold by Canuto Sioson to the defendants as Lots 2-
A and 2-E of subdivision plan Psd-34713. Copy of the Affidavit dated October 3, 1968 on the basis
of which the present Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 was issued to the defendants
is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex "D;"

8. The defendants are clearly guilty of fraud in presenting the aforementioned Affidavit (Annex "D")
to the Register of Deeds as the basis of their claim to Lots 2-A and 2-E in view of the fact that the
parcels sold to them by Canuto Sioson, assuming there was such a sale, were different parcels of
land, Lots 2-A and 2-E being the properties of the late Catalina Sioson who bequeathed the same
to the plaintiff.

xxxx
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the
decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304,
Republic of the Philippines hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).
SUPREME COURT
Manila On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the
sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First
FIRST DIVISION Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case" for
brevity).
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before
Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge.
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents. holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and,
therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited
the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs.
Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878). 1

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in
a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and
A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively
12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove, Judge disinherited by the decedent. 2
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta".
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case in this wise:
Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:
For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Bernardo S.
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. Aseneta which the Court finds meritorious, the petition for probate of will filed by
She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: Soledad L. Maninang and which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
xxx xxx xxx
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit and in the same
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia
Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited upon Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang
my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform
continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband the duties of the trust. "
Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness with them
even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals alleging
am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate
incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I Case (September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsideration (December 19, 1980).
can decide for myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made
me do things against my will. On April 28, 1981, respondent Court 3 denied certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of
dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was
xxx xxx xxx the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of. Continuing, it said that even granting that
the lower Court committed errors in issuing the questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment
reviewable only by appeal and not by Certiorari. 'Thus, this Petition before us.
We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid  case, the "meat of the
Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the
question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity
in accordance with the Rules of Court. 4 of the Will demanded.

The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is Moreover, in the Nuguid  case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is
property by Will may be rendered nugatory. 5 whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance
are two diverse concepts.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
... Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
... The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary
nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a
these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of
authentication. The que0stions relating to these points remain entirely Philippine Civil Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated .... 6 always "voluntary", preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volume
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be 2.o p. 1131). 10
entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
the law. 7
... The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in Nuguid vs. Nuguid  8, reading: disinheritance. Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the
institution of heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of
normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172).
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. 11
meet that issue. (Emphasis supplied)
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez  9 had a similar thrust: been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its
conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso  12
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. ... it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied
legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
The Nuguid  and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity succession will be shaken to its foundation, ...
of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that respondent
Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper
remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected
by Certiorari. 13 And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule
that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly
where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.

WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court of First Instance-
Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980, are nullified. Special
Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal,
therein to be reinstated and consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further
proceedings.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and
his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the
Republic of the Philippines properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and
SUPREME COURT his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights,
Manila and not by inheritance. The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.
FIRST DIVISION
On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for
probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.
G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate.
SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners, Appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52961- R, the order was affirmed in a decision
vs. dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST petition in a minute resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the same to the PROBATE
INSTANCE OF CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents. COURT after denying reconsideration on January 11, 1978.

Pelaez, Pelaez, & Pelaez Law Office for petitioners. For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after
pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy.
Ceniza, Rama & Associates for private respondents. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained
unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.

PLANA, J.: On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for
March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of
the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT
I. FACTS: required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance
QUEMADA was entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant thereto, PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA
This is a case of hereditary succession. submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in effect showed that
determination of how much QUEMADA should receive was still premature. QUEMADA submitted
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived his Position paper dated April 20, 1980. ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn
by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group of tsn from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to
Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, February 1980. The statement revealed that of the mining claims being operated by ATLAS, 60%
not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine pertained to the Pastor Group distributed as follows:
citizen, having been naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by
his mother's citizenship. 1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%

On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged 2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%
holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE
COURT), docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a 3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%
legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-
Barot, Cebu. On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and
Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in
On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious. [There was absolutely no statement or
hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not claim in the Order that the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 had previously resolved the issue
covered or affected by the holographic will. He assumed office as such on December 4, 1970 after of ownership of the mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic
filing a bond of P 5,000.00. will.]
The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and a written acknowledgment Court dated August 20, 1980, November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, Med by petitioners on
of PASTOR, JR. dated June 17, 1962, of the above 60% interest in the mining claims belonging to March 26, 1981, followed by a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
the Pastor Group, 42% belonged to PASTOR, SR. and only 33% belonged to PASTOR, JR. The
remaining 25% belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the Pastor Group. The PROBATE COURT thus In April 1981, the Court (First Division) issued a writ of preliminary injunction, the lifting of which
directed ATLAS to remit directly to QUEMADA the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of which was denied in the Resolution of the same Division dated October 18, 1982, although the bond of
QUEMADA was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a petitioners was increased from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00.
reputable banking institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate.
The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the
accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR, SR.'s death, which amounted to Between December 21, 1981 and October 12, 1982, private respondent filed seven successive
over two million pesos. motions for early resolution. Five of these motions expressly prayed for the resolution of the
question as to whether or not the petition should be given due course.
The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution
and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. On October 18, 1982, the Court (First Division) adopted a resolution stating that "the petition in
Notified of the Order on September 6, 1980, the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the fact and in effect was given due course when this case was heard on the merits on September 7,
same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when (should be October 21, 1981) and concise memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments on
it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's the merits of the case were filed by the parties pursuant to the resolution of October 21, 1981 . . . "
legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime, the and denied in a resolution dated December 13, 1982, private respondent's "Omnibus motion to set
PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his aside resolution dated October 18, 1982 and to submit the matter of due course to the present
assignees until after resolution of oppositors' motion for reconsideration. membership of the Division; and to reassign the case to another ponente."

Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, PASTOR, JR., this time joined Upon Motion for Reconsideration of the October 18, 1982 and December 13, 1982 Resolutions,
by his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for the Court en banc resolved to CONFIRM the questioned resolutions insofar as hey resolved that
certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No. SP- 11373- the petition in fact and in effect had been given due course.
R). They assailed the Order dated August 20, 1980 and the writ of execution and garnishment
issued pursuant thereto. The petition was denied on November 18, 1980 on the grounds (1) that II. ISSUES:
its filing was premature because the Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order was still
pending determination by the PROBATE COURT; and (2) that although "the rule that a motion for Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the Order of execution and
reconsideration is prerequisite for an action for certiorari is never an absolute rule," the Order garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well as the Orders subsequently issued allegedly to
assailed is "legally valid. " implement the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, to wit: the Order of November 11, 1980
declaring that the Probate Order of 1972 indeed resolved the issues of ownership and intrinsic
On December 9, 1980, PASTOR, JR. and his wife moved for reconsideration of the Court of validity of the will, and reiterating the Order of Execution dated August 20, 1980; and the Order of
Appeal's decision of November 18, 1980, calling the attention of the appellate court to another December 17, 1980 reducing to P2,251,516.74 the amount payable to QUEMADA representing
order of the Probate Court dated November 11, 1980 (i.e., while their petition for certiorari was the royalties he should have received from the death of PASTOR, SR. in 1966 up to February
pending decision in the appellate court), by which the oppositors' motion for reconsideration of the 1980.
Probate Court's Order of August 20, 1980 was denied. [The November 11 Order declared that the
questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over the mining claims (not the royalties The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the holographic will in probate, is not
alone) had been finally adjudicated by the final and executory Order of December 5, 1972, as questioned. But petitioners denounce the Probate Court for having acted beyond its jurisdiction or
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and academic with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Orders. Their argument runs this way:
the suit for reconveyance then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX. It Before the provisions of the holographic win can be implemented, the questions of ownership of
clarified that only the 33% share of PASTOR, JR. in the royalties (less than 7.5% share which he the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with
had assigned to QUEMADA before PASTOR, SR. died) was to be garnished and that as regards finality. Now, contrary to the position taken by the Probate Court in 1980 — i.e., almost eight years
PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share, what was ordered was just the transfer of its possession to the after the probate of the will in 1972 — the Probate Order did not resolve the two said issues.
custody of the PROBATE COURT through the special administrator. Further, the Order granted Therefore, the Probate Order could not have resolved and actually did not decide QUEMADA's
QUEMADA 6% interest on his unpaid legacy from August 1980 until fully paid.] Nonetheless, the entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy in alleged
Court of Appeals denied reconsideration. implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are unwarranted for lack of basis.

Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of pre y injunction, assailing the Closely related to the foregoing is the issue raised by QUEMADA The Probate Order of 1972
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 18, 1980 as well as the orders of the Probate having become final and executory, how can its implementation (payment of legacy) be
restrained? Of course, the question assumes that QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy was Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate proceedings are: (a)
finally adjudged in the Probate Order. whether or not the holographic will (Exhibit "J") has lost its efficacy as the last will
and testament upon the death of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. on June 5, 1966, in Cebu
On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 City, Philippines; (b) Whether or not the said will has been executed with all the
resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity. A negative finding will formalities required by law; and (c) Did the late presentation of the holographic
necessarily render moot and academic the other issues raised by the parties, such as the will affect the validity of the same?
jurisdiction of the Probate Court to conclusively resolve title to property, and the constitutionality
and repercussions of a ruling that the mining properties in dispute, although in the name of Issues In the Administration Proceedings are as follows: (1) Was the ex- parte
PASTOR, JR. and his wife, really belonged to the decedent despite the latter's constitutional appointment of the petitioner as special administrator valid and proper? (2) Is
disqualification as an alien. there any indispensable necessity for the estate of the decedent to be placed
under administration? (3) Whether or not petition is qualified to be a special
On the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the administrator of the estate; and (4) Whether or not the properties listed in the
validity of the order of execution and the implementing writ. inventory (submitted by the special administrator but not approved by the
Probate Court) are to be excluded.
III. DISCUSSION:
Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion:
1. Issue of Ownership —
Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and resolves some of the
problems and issues presented in these proceedings, as follows:
(a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, (a) The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings as it hereby
Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court allows and approves the so-called holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr.,
cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should executed on July 31, 1961 with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having
or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final law. Let, therefore, a certificate of its allowance be prepared by the Branch Clerk
decision in a separate action to resolve title. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1980 of this Court to be signed by this Presiding Judge, and attested by the seal of the
ed.), p. 458; Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540.] Court, and thereafter attached to the will, and the will and certificate filed and
recorded by the clerk. Let attested copies of the will and of the certificate of
allowance thereof be sent to Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development
(b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of Corporation, Goodrich Bldg., Cebu City, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu or of
the decision. (Philippine-American Insurance Co. vs. Honorable Flores, 97 SCRA 811.) However, Toledo City, as the case may be, for recording.
in case of ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be scanned for guidance in
construing the judgment. (Heirs of Presto vs. Galang, 78 SCRA 534; Fabular vs. Court of Appeals,
119 SCRA 329; Robles vs. Timario. 107 Phil. 809.) (b) There was a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary or of
administration for as a matter of fact, no regular executor and/or administrator
has been appointed up to this time and - the appointment of a special
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order of administrator was, and still is, justified under the circumstances to take
December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining possession and charge of the estate of the deceased in the Philippines
properties. The said Probate Order enumerated the issues before the Probate Court, thus: (particularly in Cebu) until the problems causing the delay are decided and the
regular executor and/or administrator appointed.
Unmistakably, there are three aspects in these proceedings: (1) the probate of
the holographic will (2) the intestate estate aspect; and (3) the administration (c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator and later on an
proceedings for the purported estate of the decedent in the Philippines. executor and/or administrator in these proceedings, in spite of this Court's
declaration that the oppositors are the forced heirs and the petitioner is merely
In its broad and total perspective the whole proceedings are being impugned by vested with the character of a voluntary heir to the extent of the bounty given to
the oppositors on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., that the fact of the decedent's him (under) the will insofar as the same will not prejudice the legitimes of the
residence and existence of properties in the Philippines have not been oppositor for the following reasons:
established.
 1. To submit a complete inventory of the estate does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate
of the decedent-testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr. administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and
delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which
2. To administer and to continue to put to clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact
prolific utilization of the properties of the not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to
decedent; remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will,
"considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on
the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. "
3. To keep and maintain the houses and other
structures and belonging to the estate, since
the forced heirs are residing in Spain, and (c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the
prepare them for delivery to the heirs in good estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of
order after partition and when directed by the controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First
Court, but only after the payment of estate and Instance of Cebu.
inheritance taxes;
(d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en toto when
(d) Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and they reviewed the Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order.
possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case No. 274-T before Branch
IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the intestate estate administration (e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of execution dated August 20, 1980, the
aspect must proceed, unless, however, it is duly proven by the oppositors that Probate Court in its Order of November 11, 1980 explained that the basis for its conclusion that
debts of the decedent have already been paid, that there had been an the question of ownership had been formally resolved by the Probate Order of 1972 are the
extrajudicial partition or summary one between the forced heirs, that the legacy findings in the latter Order that (1) during the lifetime of the decedent, he was receiving royalties
to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the from ATLAS; (2) he had resided in the Philippines since pre-war days and was engaged in the
estate of the testator, that the respective shares of the forced heirs have been mine prospecting business since 1937 particularly in the City of Toledo; and (3) PASTOR, JR. was
fairly apportioned, distributed and delivered to the two forced heirs of Alvaro only acting as dummy for his father because the latter was a Spaniard.
Pastor, Sr., after deducting the property willed to the petitioner, and the estate
and inheritance taxes have already been paid to the Government thru the Bureau Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously far-fetched.
of Internal Revenue.
(f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order
The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as special adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that,
administrator or administrator of the other properties of the estate of the premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special
decedent, which properties are not directly or indirectly affected by the provisions administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
of the holographic will (such as bank deposits, land in Mactan etc.), will be
resolved in another order as separate incident, considering that this order should
have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not 2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will -
to allow and approve the aforestated will. (Emphasis supplied.)
(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from his two legitimate
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership
contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the
question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the
administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic determination of the extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her death. * When
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities the disputed Probate order was issued on December 5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of the
prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and
personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, (b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the assets of
although the statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the
by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes special administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was
of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the
property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it name of PASTOR, SR. was still being litigated in another court.
(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and and expenses, before apportionment and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
his estate. Indeed, it was only in the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 where the Probate Court (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.)
ordered that-
(c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR. Payment therefore of the
... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions of Rule 86 of the legacy to QUEMADA would collide with the provision of the National Internal Revenue Code
Rules of Court, requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent requiring payment of estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary of his distributive share of the
to file them in the office of the Branch Clerk of this Court." estate (Section 107 [c])

(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided for, as of December 5, (d) The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued purportedly under Rule
1972. 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:

(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or heirs have
concrete figures could not be ascertained. been in possession. — Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into
possession of portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have been
(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine whether the legacy of settled and paid and have become liable to contribute for the payment of such
QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for
of the deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs. that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order
how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue
execution as circumstances require.
(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other respects.
It was obviously for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7 years after the Probate
Order was issued the Probate Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A legacy
the intrinsic validity of the will. is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom execution is
authorized to be issued.
3. Propriety of certiorari —
... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally
cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution
Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of the because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate
disputed Order of execution. He contends that the error, if any, is one of judgment, not jurisdiction, which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting
and properly correctible only by appeal, not certiorari. to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment
enforceable by execution.
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations of the probate The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate
court to be overlooked or condoned. court may issue execution (a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the
contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties compose the estate decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of
of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for
ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the
of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no basis for the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that those are the only instances
Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not, that private respondent is when it can issue a writ of execution. (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96,
entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of August 20, 108.)
1980 and the subsequent implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged
implementation of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack (d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment; but to order the
of basis. execution of a final order (which is not even meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are
not there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion
(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation of the tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be invoked to
estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all debts defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable.
For when an order of execution is issued with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the
judgment sought to be enforced (PVTA vs. Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie
to abate the order of execution.

(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of execution which varies
the terms of the judgment sought to be executed or does not find support in the dispositive part of
the latter, there are circumstances in the instant case which justify the remedy applied for.

Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the holder in her own
right of three mining claims which are one of the objects of conflicting claims of ownership. She is
not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and was not a party to the probate proceedings. Therefore, she could
not appeal from the Order of execution issued by the Probate Court. On the other hand, after the
issuance of the execution order, the urgency of the relief she and her co-petitioner husband seek
in the petition for certiorari states against requiring her to go through the cumbersome procedure
of asking for leave to intervene in the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is granted, to
appeal from the challenged order of execution which has ordered the immediate transfer and/or
garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral properties of which she is the duly registered
owner and/or grantee together with her husband. She could not have intervened before the
issuance of the assailed orders because she had no valid ground to intervene. The matter of
ownership over the properties subject of the execution was then still being litigated in another
court in a reconveyance suit filed by the special administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.

Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, appeal was not available to him since his motion for reconsideration of the execution
order was still pending resolution by the Probate Court. But in the face of actual garnishment of
their major source of income, petitioners could no longer wait for the resolution of their motion for
reconsideration. They needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of the execution order. Under
the circumstances, recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-11373-R is reversed. The
Order of execution issued by the probate Court dated August 20, 1980, as well as all the Orders
issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order dated December 5,
1972, particularly the Orders dated November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, are hereby set
aside; and this case is remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings,
subject to the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL 1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate
of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on,
Republic of the Philippines the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity,
SUPREME COURT and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the
Manila questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of
the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1
EN BANC
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or
G.R. No. L-23445             June 23, 1966 not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the
will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on
vs. the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained.
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees. event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of
SANCHEZ, J.: time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to
a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, 2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable
statute.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years Reproduced hereunder is the will:
before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her. Nov. 17, 1951

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain
mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have
therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In
deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and
were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void. fifty-one.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, (Sgd.) Illegible
oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will
perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
without costs. direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal. insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is
Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus — complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa
institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments 4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del
inofficious. ... deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este
articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity.
On this point Manresa comments: The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de
siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion
deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese
de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima. dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos
instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion
el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la de heredero." ... 11
herencia forzosa.
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the
sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento. will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any other
testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point,
before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul: Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which
in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204
Pa. 484.6 ... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de
heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos
decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho
out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto,
2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132. 7 y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los
herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada
to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774. 8 esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene
declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria,
oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese
They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una
Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la
ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one- testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y
anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, 5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their
"the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition —
would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case
must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or heretofore cited, viz:
legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the
two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the
heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children
subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must
heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution
donacion. 14 of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the
bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial
nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the
universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues. reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they
would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one integral provisions of the Civil Code.
of preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the
case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish
disinheritance. institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision.
With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not
heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property
Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or
privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand,
is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of
supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20 the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will
before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits result is the same. The entire will is null.
their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in
which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby
affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution
of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the
same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it
may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in
commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and
legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a
todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL court in its September 29, 1995 Order denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted
respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, to wit:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The petition for the issuance
Manila of Letters Testamentary, being in order, is GRANTED.

SECOND DIVISION Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides "when a will has been proved
and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as
G.R. No. 160530             November 20, 2007 executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust and gives a bond as required by
these rules." In the case at bar, petitioner Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales of the R.P. Nogales
Law Offices has been named executor under the Holographic Will of Dr. Werner J.
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner, Nittscher. As prayed for, let Letters Testamentary be issued to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales,
vs. the executor named in the Will, without a bond.
DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.
SO ORDERED.5
DECISION
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. On May 9, 1996,
Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the issuance of
For review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution2 dated October 21, letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the Order 3 dated subject matter and that she was denied due process.
September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-
2330 for the probate of a will.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal, thus:
The facts are as follows.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Order is AFFIRMED in toto. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with dispatch
On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition in the proceedings below.
for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein
respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
SO ORDERED.6
On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate
court issued an order allowing the said holographic will, thus: Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Holographic Will of the petitioner-testator Dr.
Werner J. Nittscher executed pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Article I.
838 of the Civil Code of the Philippines on January 25, 1990 in Manila, Philippines, and
proved in accordance with the provision of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court is BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT
hereby allowed. THE PETITION FOR LETTERS … TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES
WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-
SO ORDERED.4 91 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters II.
testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse,
herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition . However, the THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT SUIT.
 III. In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a
resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY ISSUED TO supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and again we have said
THE PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE PROBATE OF THE that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DR. NITTSCHER. the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze
or weigh evidence all over again.10
IV.
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which
then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF of letters testamentary to respondent.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER COURT.7
Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his
Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:
certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines; neither
did he leave real properties in the country. Petitioner claims that the properties listed for SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. – …
disposition in her husband’s will actually belong to her. She insists she was denied due process of
law because she did not receive by personal service the notices of the proceedings. If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his
compulsory heirs.
Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real properties
in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified of the probate In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher’s
proceedings. Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in court to oppose the petition children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate
for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also filed a motion to dismiss the said proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of
petition. Respondent maintains that the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary need not letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a
contain a certification against forum-shopping as it is merely a continuation of the original motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her
proceeding for the probate of the will. motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her
cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate
We resolve to deny the petition. proceedings is without basis.

As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-91 8 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 9 of the As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is conclusive only
Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. as to its due execution.11 The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the
However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. prescribed by law.12 Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the properties forming part of her husband’s
Hence, respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts.
issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2003
Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides: and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which
affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City,
in SP Proc. No. M-2330 are AFFIRMED.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in No pronouncement as to costs.
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court SO ORDERED.
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. …
(Emphasis supplied.)
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL pieces of jewelry valued at ₱15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth
₱6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱22,708.25. 2
G.R. No. 156407               January 15, 2014
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The
vs. RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND,
RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting
MERCADO, Respondents. her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares
of stock;4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real
DECISION properties with the market value of ₱4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of
stock with total par value of ₱4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30,
1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱30,000.00. 6
BERSAMIN, J.:
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or
their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of
the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the the inventory.7
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
Antecedents examine Teresita on the inventory.

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what
Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing
Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and on that issue.8
his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner
Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma). Ruling of the RTC

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an
Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that
Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and should be included, and accordingly ruled:
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252)
to Mervir Realty. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby denies
the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094- the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in the last five
CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60)
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992. days from notice of this order.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the
1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must render such
of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth accounting within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
₱6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of ₱32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth ₱20,000.00;
SO ORDERED.9 On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows: 13

On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially. The
of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an
covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9,
name of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion. 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February
17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, 11 stating that there was no concerned and affirmed in all other respects.
cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the
RTC the issue of what properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already SO ORDERED.
estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of
Decision of the CA the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of
the Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold "shall be transferred to the
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the vendee" upon its "actual and constructive delivery," and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the
inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties that had been transferred effect that the sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of
to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir
adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized;
certiorari, stating: that Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had
assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose of
saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10,
I 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included"; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of
assignment, Mervir Realty had been "even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land,
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING consideration through shares of stock"; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed
THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) "considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning scheme"; that
BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO. the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue
of title to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation; that a property covered
II by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC,
by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to
THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be included in the inventory.
REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE The CA further opined as follows:
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from
III questioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its
jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court clearly shows that
PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which
UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12 amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated
March 14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties
which were already titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a
private corporation, which under the law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
undisturbed.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to determine the injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The
applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
court was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action
nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on
veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot be unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are
presumed.14 incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the
lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al. 15 been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the
judgment itself.
Issue
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory resorted to.
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory
and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This
Ruling of the Court is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the
The appeal is meritorious. ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to
revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
I
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to
Was certiorari the proper recourse the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC? was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil order "in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots."
action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not The Court observed there that:
proper.
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained. should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court,
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 16 the 266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 19 where the Court declared that a "probate
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing provisionally," and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the "patent reason is the
more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the
action." Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out: instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.

All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or II
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator.
If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the in directing the inclusion of the properties
probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied) in the estate of the decedent?

On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for
the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty
Rules of Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of
judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that completely disposes of the case, or Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may be the subject
of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution
(interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion,
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at
appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz: the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the
person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months
after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession
the estate to which such person is entitled; or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the
inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. 22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be
known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the their being in the possession of another person or entity.
appointment of a special administrator; and
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor
the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
for reconsideration. otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." 23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should
be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, 24 the CA cannot impose its judgment In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of the
in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of
excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided
administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the counsel for
and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of
unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." 25 As long as the RTC Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of
performance of its judicial duty. properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court
The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in
claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by her name and which were paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of
properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the
be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. inventory of the estate of her husband.
As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate she had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one-
estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting as estate of her
that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely husband.
exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, 657-D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title. Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu
should be included in the inventory in this case.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was
final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A
to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has not
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section
the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of
exclusive property of the deceased spouse. 27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied) death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should still include the said properties of
Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten
inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz: (10) months after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s
Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the
relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
explanations indicated that the directive to include the properties in question in the inventory
rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious. It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real
properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be of assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested party
included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having
inherited by Emigdio. been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time. 34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly
characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family the facts to be established in court.
Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. 29 For
purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty
shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property acquired could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the
during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:
of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical,
and convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration
conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the of titles to lands.1âwphi1 However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be
real owners of the affected properties were, 31 and which of the properties should form part of the made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the
estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real
inventory. purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to
the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be
the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed
involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and to have regularly performed their duties.35

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10,
name.1âwphi1 Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, 1991, such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and
that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio. with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the
assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have constricted the
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692. Such lack of determination of the rights to the properties arising from that deed, 36 but it does not prevent the
interest in Civil Case No. CEB-12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that
the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences with the deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited
assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, jurisdiction, was still "deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to
whose business was managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its make it effective."37
President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of
notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to
involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from
execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by
of Appeals:33 the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on
the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of
regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent. 38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of
estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In
making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding
policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were
known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn
out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse
of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.39

In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
was unwarranted and erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in
Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of
the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Roxas City a Complaint, 8 for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot
G.R. No. 176943              October 17, 2008 Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent, alleging:

DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-described until January 1991
ALUAD, petitioners, when defendant entered and possessed the two (2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of
vs. Crispin Aluad who refused to give back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then
ZENAIDO ALUAD, respondent. retained the possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of the
enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;
DECISION
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by inheritance by right of
representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole and only daughter of
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Matilde Aluad[.]9

Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.10
childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).
That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last Will and
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Testament of Matilde Aluad x x x while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These
Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself. 1 two lots are in his possession as true owners thereof. 11 (Underscoring supplied)

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to Conform to
Inter Vivos"2 (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria3 covering all the six lots which Evidence12 to which it annexed an Amended Complaint 13 which cited the donation of the six lots
Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided: via Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the motion and
admitted the Amended Complaint.14
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE
[Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR , by Respondent filed an Amended Answer15 contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged
these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property and falsified and petitioners’ change of theory showed that "said document was not existing at the
above-described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the time they filed their complaint and was concocted by them after realizing that their false claim that
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded  and their mother was the only daughter of Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by
[of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR them";16 and that if ever said document does exist, the same was already revoked by
or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even Matilde "when [she] exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to
all of the parcels of land herein donated.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) defendant and until her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria
Aluad."17
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in
Matilde’s name. The trial court, by Decision18 of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted
any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real via the Deed of Donation. Thus it disposed:
Property.5
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, 6 devising Lot
Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to 1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar
respondent. Cadastre;

Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year. 7 2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to the plaintiffs;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:

a. Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees; While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so
declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been
b. Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income from subject Lot 676, a year probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
from 1991 up to the time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at
the legal rate until fully paid; WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is hereby GRANTED and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil
c. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income from the subject Lot No. 674, a Case No. V-6686 for declaration of ownership, recovery of ownership and possession, and
year from 1991 up to the time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the damages is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
legal rate until fully paid; and
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant as the lawful owner of Lot [No.]
d. The costs of the suit. 676 of the Pilar Cadastre. Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellees are directed to return the possession of
the said lot to the defendant-appellant.
Defendant’s counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to defendant-appellant as attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.19
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
On petitioners’ motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal.20 Possession of the subject lots appears to have in fact been taken by petitioners.
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
By Decision21 of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it
holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as Their Motion for Reconsideration23 having been denied,24 petitioners filed the present Petition for
such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Review,25 contending that the Court of Appeals erred
Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in
accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, reading: I

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW (RTC, Branch 15, Roxas
testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS’
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
presence of the testator and of one another.
II
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last on the left X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 676 AS
margin and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR WHO HAD
each page. NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact III
that that testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO.
of one another. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED
OWNER THEREOF.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them. IV

X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2, RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF COURT
(AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO RESPONDENT) arrival of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a
AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST[S] OF SUIT. 26 donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what donation is there to be
rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, period if there was no donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died?
32
it having the following characteristics:  (Underscoring supplied)

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee  before the death of the transferor ; or what A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive; x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners [donee] die ahead
of [donor] Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at vivos.
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit.33

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.27 (Emphasis and xxxx
underscoring supplied)
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the [donees] the petitioners predecease [the donor] Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v.
DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation  mortis causa is that the transfer
ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime. 28 should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan
provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or independently of, and not
anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even by reason of her death, she would not have expressed such proviso in the subject
all the parcels of land herein donated"29 means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and deeds.34 (Underscoring supplied)
reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. 30 The phrase in the Deed of As the Court of Appeals observed, "x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is fortified by Matilde’s
Donation "or anyone of them who should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained under
Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued
could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase under her name."35
does not refer to the donee, thus:
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed 36 but
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph should only they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805
refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the of the Civil Code.37
donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband – Crispin Aluad [–] had long been
dead as early as 1975.31 Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause 38 the execution of which clause is a
requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned: hand margins of the pages of the will. So the Court has emphasized:

x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor provides in x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each
the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the page of the will from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental
present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two classes of signature[s] are distinct from each
provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that
deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the logical construction thereof is that  after the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand,
the execution of the subject donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
"deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from
period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if
the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the
clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different
avowal.

x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will
and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have
stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public, 40 which is not in
accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed. 41

The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed
the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming
arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674
and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by
her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be
probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde
to respondent on August 26, 1991.

Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of their
mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot should
nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription,
they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good
faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.43

Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts, however,
they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points
of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.44 For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no
opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it
been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 45

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September 20, 2005. 8 Hence, the petition was
dismissed.
G.R. No. 176831               January 15, 2010
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the CA initially
UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner, denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue only in
vs. instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule
NIXON LEE, Respondent. 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent could ask for
the presentation or production and for the approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA
further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient
DECISION evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will. 91avvphi1

NACHURA, J.: Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23, 2006
Amended Decision,10 granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was
the August 23, 2006 Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
and the February 23, 2007 Resolution,2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate
The relevant facts and proceedings follow. court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution. 11

Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main
is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by
28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.12
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs
their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.3
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that—
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited
that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit. 4 commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do
the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. 13
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence,
petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
petition—they did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. 14 This definition
to issue the writ of mandamus.5 recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be
resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.15 The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. 6 In its February 4, 2005 Order, 7 however, it compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for mandated by the Constitution. 16 As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. 17 original holographic will. Thus—

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty
duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction,
entitled by law.18 Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to or to the executor named in the will.
which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. 19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a will
the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days
whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in
person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of
which he is entitled.20 On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of the trust or his refusal to accept it.
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. 21
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the
duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
contractual obligations.22 Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights,
and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public
duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. 24 The SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will after the
writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers
hence, it is called a prerogative writ. 25 To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not the will.30
used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. 26
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
mandamus being invoked.27 In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the
usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. 28 Although classified WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
equitable principles.29 Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 01100939 before the
court. Regional Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSE 8vD.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved SO ORDERED.
here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty,
rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76,
Section 1 relevantly provides:

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee named
in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL either possess or control the properties comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed for the
probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the properties subject of the proceedings;
2) direct the tenants of the estate, namely, Mercury Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose
Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court; 3) direct Metro bank, P. Burgos Branch, to freeze the
G.R. No. 203770 accounts in the name of Rosario, Primrose Development Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios;
and 4) lock up the Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until final disposition by the
MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR, Petitioner court.
vs.
EDWIN TIU and DAMIANA CHARITO MARTY, Respondents On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their Comment/Opposition 10 to the urgent
manifestation averring that Marty was not an adopted child of the Villasins based on a certification
DECISION issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tacloban City, attesting that no record of any adoption
proceedings involving Marty existed in their records. They also argued that the probate court had
no jurisdiction over the properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of Rosario's estate because
MENDOZA, J.:
these properties were actually owned by, and titled in the name of, Primrose. Anent the prayer to
direct the tenants to deposit the rentals to the probate court, Remedios and Manuela countered
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the that the probate court had no jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons, particularly by
October 5, 20111 and September 24, 20122 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. Primrose, the latter having a separate and distinct personality from the decedent's estate.
SP No. 06256, which dismissed the petition filed by Remedios Tiu (Remedios) and Manuela
Azucena Mayor (Manuela)  for procedural infirmities. The said CA petition challenged the January
In her Reply,11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an order of the Court of First Instance of
20, 20113 and June 10, 20114 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City (RTC-
Leyte (CF! Leyte)  in SP No. 1239,12 claiming that as early as March 3, 1981, the veil of corporate
Br. 6), in Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30, a case for Probate of Last Will and Testament and Issuance
entity of Primrose was pierced on the ground that it was a closed family corporation controlled by
of Letters of Testamentary.
Rosario after Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that "piercing" was proper in the case of
Rosario's estate because the incorporation of Primrose was founded on a fraudulent
The Antecedents: consideration, having been done in contemplation of Primo's death.

On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan (Rosario), the widow of the late Primo Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the Approval of the Will of the Late
Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a holographic Last Will and Testament, 5 wherein she Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan,13 Marty impugned the authenticity of her holographic will.
named her sister, Remedios Tiu (Remedios),  and her niece, Manuela Azucena
Mayor (Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for
Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin),  a son of Remedios, also filed his Opposition, 14 dated June 13,
the probate of Rosario's holographic will 6 with prayer for the issuance of letters
2008.
testamentary (probate proceedings).  The petition was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
9, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 9)  and docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that
Rosario left properties valued at approximately ₱2.5 million. After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty (Marty) claiming to be the adopted daughter The January 14, 2009 Order
of Rosario, filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban
City (RTC- Br. 34),  docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-32, but it was not given due course In its January 14, 2009 Order, 15 the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of Marty and appointed the OIC
because of the probate proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject of a separate Clerk of Court as special administrator of the Estate. The Probate Court also ordered Mercury
proceeding filed by Marty with the CA Cebu City, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 04003. 7 Drug and Chowking to deposit the rental income to the court and Metrobank to freeze the bank
accounts mentioned in the motion of Marty. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was applied
On June 12, 2008, in its Order, 8 the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for probate of will filed by in the case considering that Rosario had no other properties that comprised her estate other than
Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form and substance and set the case for hearing. Primrose. According to the probate court, for the best interest of whoever would be adjudged as
the legal heirs of the Estate, it was best to preserve the properties from dissipation.
Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and Motion, 9 dated June 23, 2008,
stating that Remedios kept the decedent Rosario a virtual hostage for the past ten (10) years and On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion for Inhibition 16 on the ground of
her family was financially dependent on her which led to the wastage and disposal of the their loss of trust and confidence in RTC-Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C. Sescon (Judge
properties owned by her and her husband, Primo. Marty averred that until the alleged will of the Sescon) to dispense justice. Later, they also filed their Motion for Reconsideration Ad
decedent could be probated and admitted, Remedios and her ten (10) children had no standing to Cautelam,17 dated February 3, 2009, arguing that Rosario's estate consisted only of shares of
stock in Primrose and not the corporation itself. Thus, the probate court could not order the In its Order,22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-Br. 6 partially granted the motion as it revoked
lessees of the corporation to remit the rentals to the Estate's administrator. With regard to the the power of the special administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of Primrose. It also
appointment of a special administrator, Remedios and Manuela insisted that it be recalled. They revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug and Chowking, reasoning out that the said
claimed that if ever there was a need to appoint one, it should be the two of them because it was establishments dealt with Primrose, which had a personality distinct and separate from the estate
the desire of the decedent in the will subject of the probation proceedings. of the decedent. In the said order, Atty. Blanche A. Salino nominated by oppositors Marty and
Edwin, was appointed special administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of the estate.
In its Order,18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9 denied the motion for reconsideration for lack The same order also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as to the conduct and inventory of all the
of merit and affirmed its January 14, 2009 Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also properties comprising the estate.
granted the motion for inhibition and ordered that the records of the case be referred to the RTC
Executive Judge for reraffling. The case was later re-raffled to RTC-Br.6, Judge Alphinor C. This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties.
Serrano, presiding judge.
Omnibus Motion
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition
for certiorari  with the CA in Cebu City, docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04254, assailing the January On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months after the November 17, 2009 Order of the
14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.19 probate court was issued, Marty, together with her new counsel, filed her Omnibus
Motion,23 praying for the probate court to: 1) order Remedios and Manuela to render an accounting
Ruling of the CA of all the properties and assets comprising the estate of the decedent; 2) deposit or consign all
rental payments or other passive income derived from the properties comprising the estate; and 3)
In its October 16, 2009 Decision, 20 the CA reversed the assailed orders of the RTC Br. 9, except prohibit the disbursement of funds comprising the estate of the decedent without formal motion
as to the appointment of a special administrator insofar as this relates to properties specifically and approval by the probate court.
belonging to the "Estate." It held that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from
the estate of the decedent and that the probate court had no jurisdiction to apply the Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted Marty's Omnibus Motion. Although it agreed
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the probate court was it stated that its with the October 16, 2009 CA Decision reversing the January 14, 2009 Order of the RTC-Br. 9,
determination of the title of the questioned properties was only for the purpose of determining nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency and necessity of appointing a special administrator.
whether such properties ought to be included in the inventory. When the probate court applied the According to the probate court, considering that there was clear evidence of a significant decrease
doctrine of "piercing," in effect, it adjudicated with finality the ownership of the properties in favor of of Rosario's shares in the outstanding capital stock of Primrose, 24 prudence dictated that an
the Estate. The CA stated that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a property inquiry into the validity of the transfers should be made. A final determination of this matter would
claimed by another based on adverse title; and that questions like this must be submitted to a be outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court, but it was likewise settled that the power to
court of general jurisdiction and not to a probate court. institute an action for the recovery of a property claimed to be part of the estate was normally
lodged with the executor or administrator. Thus, the probate court disposed:
The CA added that assuming that the probate court's determination on the issue of ownership was
merely intended to be provisional, Marty's contentions still had no merit. The properties, which she WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to render moot any action that the
claimed to be part of the estate of Rosario and over which she claimed co-ownership, comprised special administrator, or the regular administrator upon the latter's qualification and appointment,
of real properties registered under the Torrens system. As such, Primrose was considered the may deem appropriate to take on the matter (i.e. Whether or not to institute in the name of the
owner until the titles to those properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. The CA estate the appropriate action for the recovery of the shares of stock), this Court
further stated that the RTC erroneously relied on the order issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty's Omnibus Motion, dated September 24, 2010, and thus
probate proceedings involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination the CFI made at the hereby:
time regarding the title of the properties was merely provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the
ownership. 1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to: (a) RENDER AN ACCOUNTING of all the
properties and assets comprising the estate of the decedent that may have come into their
By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion to possession; and, (b) DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the rentals payments or such other passive
Partially Revoke the Writ of Execution Enforcing the January 14, 2009 Order of the Honorable incomes from the properties and assets registered in the name of Primrose Development
Court and Manifestation in Compliance with the October 21, 2009 Order (Ad Cautelam),21 dated Corporation, including all income derived from the Primrose Hotel and the lease contracts with
October 27, 2009. Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order;
2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and charge of the properties comprising THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
the decedent's estate, specially those pertaining to the sharesholding of the decedent in Primrose IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT
Development Corporation, to determine whether or not action for the recovery of the shares of MISAPPLIED JURISPRUDENCE AND RULE 65 AND IT HELD THAT PETITIONER MAYOR
stock supposedly transferred from the decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu, Manuela Azucena DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MATERIAL DATE RULE.
Mayor should be instituted in the name of the estate against the said transferees and to submit a
Report on the foregoing matters to this Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order; III.
and,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent shall be disbursed without formal IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT
Motion therefor, with the conformity of the Special Administrator, duly approved by this Court. DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF
SECTION 1, RULE 65 FOR FAILING TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER
SO ORDERED.25 [Underscoring supplied] OF THE TRIAL COURT.

The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by Remedios and Manuela was IV.
denied in the other assailed order of the RTC-Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011. 26
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT
and filed a petition before the CA. DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
Action by the CA
V.
27
The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011 Resolution,  dismissed the same based on the following
infirmities: 1) there was no proper proof of service of a copy of the petition on the respondents THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
which was sent by registered mail; 2) petitioners failed to indicate on the petition the material date IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT
when the motion for reconsideration was filed; 3) the copy of the assailed order was not certified ALLOWED TECHNICALITIES TO BE USED TO DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE
true and correct by the officer having custody of the original copy; and 4) the serial number of the PARTIES.
commission of the notary public, the province-city where he was commissioned, the office address
of the notary public and the roll of attorney's number were not properly indicated on the verification VI.
and certification of non-forum shopping.
PETITIONERS HA VE GOOD CAUSE AND A MERITORIOUS CASE AGAINST HEREIN
Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of the assailed CA resolution, but to no avail, RESPONDENTS AS PARAGRAPH l(B) OF THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE FIRST
as the appellate court denied the motion in its September 24, 2012 Resolution. ASSAILED ORDER  SHOULD HA VE BEEN REVERSED BECAUSE IT OVERTURNS THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED 16 OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG
Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as Remedios had also passed away, BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.28
and anchored on the following
Petitioner Manuela argued that:
GROUNDS
1) There was actual compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The CA
I. petition was accompanied by a notarized affidavit of service and filing of registered mail.
At the time the petition was filed, this was the best evidence of the service. The other
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR registry receipts for the other parties were also attached to the petition. Further, the
IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT available registry return card was furnished the CA in the motion for reconsideration. 29
MISAPPLIED SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND DECLARED THAT
THERE WAS NO PROPER PROOF OF SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL. 2) The failure of the petition to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates could
be excused because the dates were evident from the records. 30
II.
 3) The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban to secure certified true copies of the decedent in Primrose and her share in the corporation's income corresponding to her
assailed orders. Only the stamped name of the Clerk of Court, however, appeared shareholdings.
thereon, because the particular branch had no stamp pad which had the phrase for
certification. The branch did not even have a typewriter in order to affix the phrase on the Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were present, 43 the Court issued the
copies. These inadequacies could not be attributed to the petitioners. 31 TRO44 in favor of Manuela on October 14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was convinced that the
rights of Primrose sought to be protected by the grant of injunctive relief were material and
4) The lack of information pertaining to the notary public in the verification and certification substantial and the TRO was issued in order to prevent any irreparable damage to a corporate
against forum-shopping should not invalidate the same because, again, it was not entity that could arise from the conduct of an accounting by the court-appointed inventory.
attributable to the parties.32
The Court's Ruling
5) Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of a party. 33
The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance of a permanent injunction, as prayed for
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution 34 the Court ordered the respondents to file their respective by petitioner Manuela. This position is supported by law and jurisprudence, as follows:
comments. Marty, in her Comment, insisted that the petitioner failed to comply with the procedural
requirements as stated by the CA.35 First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a
corporation; and (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights
In her Reply to Comment,36 petitioner Manuela clarified that the affidavit of service was executed and duties. This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law.
on August 31, 2011, which was after the petition was signed by the lawyers and after it was Example is the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person. 45 From this pronouncement, it can be
verified by the petitioner herself. After contesting Marty's arguments on the alleged procedural gleaned that the estate of the deceased person is a juridical person separate and distinct from the
infirmities of the petitions with the CA and this Court, Manuela asserted that the final and person of the decedent and any other corporation. This status of an estate comes about by
executory October 16, 2009 Decision of the CA already held that Primrose had a personality operation of law. This is in consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law that a
separate and distinct from the estate of decedent Rosario. corporation has a separate personality distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to
which it may be connected.46
Meanwhile, in his Manifestation, 37 dated May 29, 2013, Edwin affirmed that he and Manuela
decided to patch up their differences and agreed to settle amicably. Accordingly, he manifested Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no relevant application in this case. Under
that he was withdrawing from the case pursuant to their agreement. this doctrine, the court looks at the corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an
aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate juridical
On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that when
Writ of Preliminary Injunction38 on the ground that a flurry of orders had been issued by the RTC- two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and
Br. 6 in the implementation of the assailed January 20, 2011 Order, such as the Order, 39 dated equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two
May 27, 2013, wherein the probate court vaguely ordered "the inventory of the exact extent of the corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or as one and the same. 47 The
'decedent's estate."' Then another order was issued appointing an auditing firm to conduct an purpose behind piercing a corporation's identity is to remove the barrier between the corporation
inventory/audit of the Estate including the rentals and earnings derived from the lease of Mercury and the persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the
Drug and Chowking Restaurant, as tenants of Primrose. 40 According to petitioner Manuela, corporate personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities. 48
although an inventory of the assets of the decedent was proper, the probate court ordered an
inventory of the assets of Primrose, a separate and distinct entity. Manuela asserts that it was Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the corporation separately as a stockholder, the
clearly in error. situation was reversed. Instead, the probate court ordered the lessees of the corporation to remit
rentals to the estate's administrator without taking note of the fact that the decedent was not the
In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of absolute owner of Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single
Preliminary Injunction,41 dated June 17, 2013, Manuela informed the Court that the inventory and stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not
accounting of Primrose would already commence on June 19, 2013. of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
personalities.49 Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing cannot be presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly established. 50
Marty filed her Opposition,42 dated July 3, 2013, stating that the petition of Manuela had been
rendered moot and academic as the probate court had declared her as the sole heir of Rosario
and appointed her administrator of the estate. She argued that an injunctive relief would work Third.  A probate court is not without limits in the determination of the scope of property covered in
injustice to the estate because of the total assimilation by petitioner of the shareholdings of the probate proceedings. In a litany of cases, the Court had defined the parameters by which a
probate court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate
proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 51 the Court explained that, as a rule, the question modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of
of ownership was an extraneous matter which the probate court could not resolve with finality. the property itself is in the persons named in the title." 55
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should, or should not, be included
in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.)  No. 152956 proscribes a collateral attack on a Torrens title:
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings,
whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to
the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine collateral attack.1âwphi1 It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
whether they should, or should not, be included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen in accordance with law.
by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination In Cuizon vs. Ramolete,57 the property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. 52 Torrens system. To this, Court categorically stated:

In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject properties and the parcel of land on which Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third
these were erected should be included in the inventory of Rosario's estate. More so, the arrears parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such
from the rental of these properties were later on ordered to be remitted to the administrator of the third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
estate grounded on the allegation that Rosario had no other properties other than her interests in administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of
Primrose. To the Court's mind, this holding of the probate court was in utter disregard of the the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and
undisputed fact the subject land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of Primrose, a ownership of the property. 58 xxx [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
third person who may be prejudiced by the orders of the probate court. In  Valera vs. Inserto:53 the
Court stated: A perusal of the records of this case would show that that no compelling evidence was ever
presented to substantiate the position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one and the same,
xxx, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the inventory of the decedent's properties. This
court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and has remained a vacant assertion. At most, what Rosario owned were shares of stock in Primrose.
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless In turn, this boldly underscores the fact that Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from
the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or the estate of the decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of of Rosario are in the possession of, and are registered in the name of, Primrose, Marty's claims
third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of are bereft of any logical reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.
whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in Fourth.  The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction over Primrose and its
reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which properties. Piercing the veil of corporate entity applies to determination of liability not of
may be waived. jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine established liability. It is not available to confer
on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a
xxxx case.59 This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only
during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the corporation.
xxx These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the Hence, before this doctrine can be even applied, based on the evidence presented, it is imperative
property is not in the decedent's names but in others, a situation on which this Court has that the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation. 60
already had occasion to rule.54 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court's process of piercing
Thus, the probate court should have recognized the incontestability accorded to the Torrens title of the veil of its corporate fiction. Resultantly, any proceedings taken against the corporation and its
Primrose over Marty's arguments of possible dissipation of properties. In fact, in the given setting, properties would infringe on its right to due process.
even evidence purporting to support a claim of ownership has to yield to the incontestability of a
Torrens title, until after the same has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself. In In the case at bench, the probate court applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
other words, the existence of a Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere incident in special ratiocinating that Rosario had no other properties that comprise her estate other than her shares in
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Put clearly, if a property Primrose. Although the probate court's intention to protect the decedent's shares of stock in
covered by Torrens title is involved, "the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given Primrose from dissipation is laudable, it is still an error to order the corporation's tenants to remit
due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof their rental payments to the estate of Rosario.
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a permanent and final injunction is in
order in accordance with Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]f after the
trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or
person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the
preliminary mandatory injunction." Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer an irreparable injury
from the subject order of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order, dated June 14,

2013, is hereby made PERMANENT, effective immediately. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
Tacloban City, is ENJOINED from enforcing and implementing its January 20, 2011 and June 10,
2011 Orders, insofar as the corporate properties of Primrose Development Corporation are
concerned, to avert irreparable damage to a corporate entity, separate and distinct from the Estate
of Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL The Order was predicated upon the Court's factual findings mainly derived from the testimony of
the two administrators that:
G.R. No. L-56504 May 7, 1987
1. the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease to Rafael
POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, petitioners, Valera in his lifetime;
vs.
HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First 2. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his daughter, Teresa
Instance of Iloilo, Branch 1, and MANUEL R. FABIANA, respondents. Garin; but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to merely so that she might use the
property to provide for her children's support and education, and was subject to the resolutory
Nos. L-59867-68 May 7, 1987 term that the fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of Teresa
Garin's Children; and
EUMELIA V. CABADO, POMPILLO VALERA and HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, petitioners-
appellants, 3. with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually purchased from the
vs. Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin, collectively named as such in the Original Certificate of
MANUEL FABIANA, JOSE GARIN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth Title issued in their favor.
Division), respondents-appellants.
Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating Teresa
NARVASA, J.: Garin's heirs to restore the property to the Valera Spouses' Estate, in accordance with Articles
1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate of deceased
spouses, on the one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and their lessee, on the Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his
other, have given rise to the proceedings now docketed in this Court as (1) G.R. No. 56504 and declared intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is
(2) G.R. Nos. 59867-68. an implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit it is contemplated.

Sp. Proc. No. 2223, CFI, Iloilo Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary
relationship uses trust funds for the purchase of property and causes a
conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, a trust is established by
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael operation of law in favor of the person to whom the fund belongs.
Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa 1 — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been
appointed administrators 2 — the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed
a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet
an accounting of her administration. 3 Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted prescribed, Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to the estate having been filed well within
unless Jose Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator ten (10) years from June 30, 1980, the date on which Teresa Garin's heirs allegedly acquired title
an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn over it. 8
moved for the return thereof to the estate, 4 so that it might be partitioned among the decedents'
heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement regarding the estate's title to
property was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included in any inventory the fishpond was merely provisional in character, made solely to determine whether or not the
of the estate. fishpond should be included in the inventory of estate assets. So it was evidently understood by
the administrators who have more than once asserted that "the probate court has jurisdiction to
The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for determine the ownership of the fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the
contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise properties. 9 So it was made clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated that the
to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the hearing on the matter 10 was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be
Rules of Court. 5 It accordingly set said incidents for hearing during which the parties presentee included as part of the estate and whether or not the person holding it should be made to deliver
evidence in substantiation of their positions. 6 Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated and/or return ** (it) to the estate. 11 And so it was emphasized in another Order, denying
September 17, 1980 commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980, which states that:
fishpond in question * * to the intestate Estate of the Spouses. 7
 **(i)t is never the intendment of this court to write a finish to the issue of Adil, presiding) in the legitimate exercise of its j jurisdiction over the proceedings for the
ownership of the fishpond in dispute. The movants may pursue their claim of Settlement of the estate of the Valera Spouses.
ownership over the same in an ordinary civil action. Meanwhile, however, it is the
finding of this probate court that the fishpond must be delivered to the estate. G.R. Nos. 59867-68

Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the power of this In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above mentioned
probate court under Section 6 in relation to Section 7, both of Rule 87, and the order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in which he asserted
contention of the movants that the proper forum to settle the issue of ownership that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership of
should be in a court of general jurisdiction. 12 the fishpond,22 which motion had been denied 23-filed a notice of appeal from said Order. 24 But he
quickly abandoned the appeal when, as aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the
Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order pending order pending appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus
appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the )with prayer for preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as CA-G. R. No.
fishpond to the estate. 13 The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the SP-1154-R.
supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff that
he was a mere lessee, 14 Fabiana voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the Fabiana followed suit. He instituted in the same Court of Appeals his own action for certiorari and
sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators. 15 injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-11577-R; this, notwithstanding the pendency in judge
Inserto's sala  of the case he had earlier filed. 26
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking
vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease between These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The Court granted the
himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But Judge Adil dismissed his complaint on the petitions and ruled in substance that:
following grounds, to wit:
1. The Probate Court indeed possessed no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership based
(1) it was filed out of time because not only had judgment been rendered, but execution as merely on evidence adduced at the hearing of a "counter-motion" conducted under Section 6, Rule
regards transfer of possession had already taken place; and 87;

(2) the lease contract had not been registered and hence was not binding as against the 2. The original and transfer certificates of title covering the fishpond stand in the names of the
estate. 17 Heirs of Teresa Garin as registered owners, and therefore no presumption that the estate owns
the fishpond is warranted to justify return of the property on the theory that it had merely been
G.R. No. 56504 borrowed; and

Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a 3. Even assuming the Probate Court's competence to resolve the ownership question, the estate
preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 13742 and assigned to Branch I of the administrators would have to recover possession of the fishpond by separate action, in view of the
Iloilo CFI, Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto, presiding. 18 Judge Inserto issued a temporary restraining lessee's claim of right to superior possession, as lessee thereof.
order enjoining estate administrators from disturbing Fabiana in the possession of the fishpond, as
lessee. 19 From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken separate appeals to this Court
by certiorari,27 docketed as G.R. Nos. 59867 and 59868. They ascribe to the Appellate Court the
The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the temporary following errors, viz: Page 542
restraining order, averring that the action was barred by the Probate Court's prior judgment which
had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of the lease, and that the act sought to be restrained had 1) in holding that the Probate Court (Judge Adil, Presiding) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
already been accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond to of and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir adversely to the
the sheriff. 20 When Judge Inserto failed to act on their motion within what the administrators decedent spouses;
believed to be a reasonable time, considering the circumstances of the Case, the administrators
filed with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for
Preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order, which was docketed as G.R. 2) in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a separate action for the recovery of the
No. 56504. 21 In their petition, the administrators contended that Branch I of the Iloilo CFI (Judge possession of the fishpond then in the hands of a third person; and
Inserto, presiding) could not and should not interfere with the Probate Court (Branch I I, Judge
3) in sanctioning the act of a CFI Branch in interfering with and overruling the final judgment of Determination of Title Thereto
another branch, acting as probate Court, and otherwise frustrating and inhibiting the enforcement
and implementation of said judgment. Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely
provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or
Jurisdiction of Probate Court permanence, having been made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon
evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as
As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and
Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, 28 and thus has no power to whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These
take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in
to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to
consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for rule.
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, 29 the reason for the
exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
probate, land registration, etc., is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to
involving a mode of practice which may be waived. 30 the contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the owner of the property
in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is
rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that in the persons named in the title. 35
if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose
of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being Primary Jurisdiction over Title issue in
explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it
should or should not be included in the inventory. 31 This function of resolving whether or not Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action
property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate
Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the
parties. 32 proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately determined in a
separate action, 36 the actual firing of such a separate action should have been anticipated, and
should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, recognition is also the acknowledge judgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in
expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising which the separate action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be
from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond. 33 The examination provided in the cited heard to complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily
section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent from persons involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any sense
suspected of having possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the
conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests exercise of primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by
willingness to tum it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the the estate, they must be deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate
appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if the third Court in the exercise of what may be, regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction
person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no over the same question.
authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover
the property. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56504 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The petitions in
G.R. No. 59867 and G.R. No. 59868 are DENIED, and the judgment of the Appellate Court,
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and subject thereof, is affirmed in toto. The temporary restraining order dated April 1, 1981 is lifted.
taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent of all Costs against petitioners.
interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or
ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in
intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.

Possession of Fishpond Pending

RULE 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL/ALLOWANCE OF WILL Respondents then submitted documents to BPI for the release of half of the funds deposited in
said joint account.9

January 31, 2018 BPI withheld the release of the funds because of the conflicting claims between Anita and
respondents. 10
G.R. No. 230404
In 2011, Anita filed before the trial court a petition for the: (a) settlement of the Intestate Estate of
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF REYNALDO GUZMAN RODRIGUEZ; the late Reynaldo; and (b) issuance of letters of administration to any competent neutral willing
ANITA ONG TAN, Petitioner person, other than any of the heirs of Reynaldo.
vs.
ROLANDO C. RODRIGUEZ, RACQUELR. GEGAJO*, ROSALINDA R. LANDON, REYNALDO Anita alleged that the funds used to open the BPI joint account were her exclusive funds , which
C. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ESTER R. FULGENCIO, RAFAEL C. RODRIGUEZ and REYNEST C. came from her East West Bank (East West) account. To prove her claim, she presented as
RODRIGUEZ, Respondents evidence a Debit Memo from East West Bank, which was used for the issuance of a Manager's
Check in the amount of One Million Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred SixtyEight and 30/100
DECISION Pesos (₱1,021,868.30), which exact amount was deposited to the BPI joint account. 11 Anita
presented the testimony of Mineleo Serrano, Branch Manager of East West in Tomas Morato, to
corroborate her testimony that the subject amount came from her East West account. 12
TIJAM, J.:
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the funds deposited in the BPI joint account
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 assailing the Decision2 dated June 13, 2016 and belonged exclusively to Reynaldo.
Resolution3 dated March 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 105665 filed by
petitioner Anita Ong Tan (Anita).
In 2014, Rolando Rodriguez was appointed and took his oath as an administrator of the subject
estate.
The Facts of the Case
In an Order13 dated March 13, 2015, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Anita. The
Respondents Rolando Rodriguez, Racquel Gegajo, Rosalinda Landon, Reynaldo Rodriguez, Jr., RTC held that Anita sufficiently adduced evidence to rebut the presumption that the funds
Ester Fulgencio, Rafael Rodriguez and Reynest Rodriguez are children of Reynaldo Rodriguez deposited under the BPI joint account of Anita and Reynaldo were owned by them in common.
(Reynaldo) and Ester Rodriguez (Ester), who died on August 27, 2008 and September 11, 2004 The fallo reads:
respectively. 4
WHEREFORE, petitioner's claim against the estate of deceased Reynaldo G. Rodriguez is hereby
Reynaldo and Ester left several properties to their surviving children. On February 13, 2009, GRANTED. Accordingly, Rolando Rodriguez, in his capacity as the appointed Administrator of the
respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Reynaldo and Ester. 5 intestate estate of Reynaldo G. Rodriguez, is hereby directed to withdraw, together with the
petitioner, the funds under Joint Account No. 003149-0718-56 deposited with the Bank of the
On the other hand, Anita is a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the name Anita Ong Tan and Philippine Islands, Kamuning Branch, Quezon City and the entire proceeds thereof be given to
Reynaldo with account number 003149-0718-56 in the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). When petitioner.
Reynaldo passed away, said joint account continued to be in active status. 6
SO ORDERED.14
On August 31, 2009, BPI sent a letter to Anita and informed her that her joint account with
Reynaldo would become dormant if no transaction will be made. As such, Anita decided to Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated May 25, 2015.
withdraw her funds. BPI, however, required her to submit additional requirements, one of which is
the extrajudicial settlement of the heirs of Reynaldo. 7 To comply with the same, Anita approached
respondents and asked them to sign a waiver of rights to the said joint account. Respondents Undaunted, respondents filed an appeal before the CA.
refused to sign the waiver as they believed that the funds in the said joint account belonged to
their father. 8 In a Decision15 dated June 13, 2016, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. In giving credence to
respondents' contention, the CA maintained that the presumption of co-ownership as regards the
nature of joint accounts was not sufficiently overturned, as Anita failed to prove that she is indeed
the sole owner of the funds therein. The CA disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Order dated death of either of them, the share pertaining to the deceased shall accrue to the surviving co-
March 13, 2015 and Order dated May 25, 2015 of the Region[ al] Trial Court[,] Branch 74, depositor or he can withdraw the entire deposit. 20
Malabon City is hereby MODIFIED.
It must be noted that there exists no survivorship agreement between Anita and Reynaldo. Hence,
The bank deposit under the Joint Account number 003149-0718-56 is to be divided in equal it is but rightful to determine their respective shares based on evidence presented during trial.
shares between Petitioner-appellee on one hand and the Respondents-appellants on the other on
a 50-50 proposition. On this note, the Court agrees with the findings of the lower court that Anita sufficiently proved that
she owns the funds in the BPI joint account exclusively.
SO ORDERED. 16
It can be gleaned from the records that the money in the BPI joint account amounts to One Million
Anita filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied m a Resolution 17 dated March 3, 2017, Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos and Thirty Centavos (₱1,021,868.30),
thus: and it is undisputed that said amount came from Anita's personal account with East West. In East
West, Anita opened a Trust Placement in August 2007 with the amount of Two Million Fourteen
WHEREFORE, petitioner-appellee's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of Thousand Twenty-Four Pesos and Twenty-Five Centavos (₱2,014,024.25). Based on East West's
merit.1âwphi1 records, as testified to by· its Branch Manager, two withdrawals were subsequently made: first, in
the amount of One Million Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos and 30
Centavos (₱1,021,868.30); and second, in the amount of One Million Three Thousand One
SO ORDERED.18 Hundred Eleven Pesos and Eleven Centavos (₱1,003,111.11 ). In all such withdrawals, manager's
checks were issued.
The Issue
The exact amount which was first withdrawn from the East West account, i.e., One Million Twenty-
In sum, the sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in declaring Anita and Reynaldo One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos and Thirty Centavos (₱1,021,868.30), was the
as co-owners of the subject bank deposits despite the evidence submitted by Anita to prove exact amount used to open the BPI joint account. Notable is the fact that these transactions
otherwise. occurred within the same day on November 14, 2007. 21 It is also significant to consider that no
further transaction in said joint account was made after the same was opened until the death of
The Ruling of the Court Reynaldo.

A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical With all these, it is apparent that Anita owned the funds exclusively as she sufficiently overturned
persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said the presumption under the law. It bears stressing that despite the evidence shown by Anita,
account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is respondents failed to refute her evidence, other than their bare allegations that Anita and
proved. 19 The nature of joint accounts is governed by the rule on co-ownership embodied in Reynaldo had an amorous relationship and that Anita had no source of income to sustain the
Article 485 of the Civil Code, to wit: funds in a bank. 22

Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be The Court also takes note of the fact that respondents admitted that they knew the existence of
proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. the joint account, yet they still failed to include the same in the list of included properties in the
inventory when they executed an extrajudicial settlement. Their failure to include said joint account
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the in the list of the items owned by Reynaldo for the purposes of determining his estate obviously
contrary is proved. refutes their claim that Reynaldo was the sole owner of the funds in said joint account.

While the rule is that the shares of the owners of the joint account holders are equal, the same Taken together, the Court finds the ruling of the trial court that Anita is the sole owner of the funds
may be overturned by evidence to the contrary. Hence, the mere fact that an account is joint is not in question proper.1âwphi1
conclusive of the fact that the owners thereof have equal claims over the funds in question.
Lastly, noteworthy is the fact that even if the probing arms of an intestate court is limited, it is
In line with this, it is also indispensable to consider whether or not there exists a survivorship equally important to consider the call of the exercise of its power of adjudication especially so
agreement between the co-depositors. In said agreement, the co-depositors agree that upon the when the case calls for the same, to wit:
While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising
limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion
of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit,
provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred
upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and
caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.23

The facts obtaining in this case call for the determination of the ownership of the funds contained
in the BPI joint account; for the intestate estate of Reynaldo has already been extrajudicially
settled by his heirs. The trial court, in this case, exercised sound judiciousness when it ruled out
the inclusion of the BPI joint account in the estate of the decedent.

Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional
question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be
waived."24

Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises
limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of
the question to the probate court for adjudgment. 25

Such waiver was evident from the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative relief before the
court a quo as they claimed ownership over the funds in the joint account of their father to the
exclusion of his co-depositor.

In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the· jurisdiction of the intestate court in
settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss, which hypothetically admitted all the allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise
sought affirmative relief from the intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in respondents'
claim of ownership over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita, when in fact said
funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the inventory of the intestate
estate of the late Reynaldo. Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed to submit the issue of
ownership before the trial court, acting as an intestate court, when they raised an affirmative relief
before it. To reiterate, the exercise of the trial court of its limited jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but
procedural; hence, waivable.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 13,

2016 and Resolution dated March 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105665
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order dated March 13, 2015 of the Regional
Trial' Court of Malabon City, Branch 74 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL The case reached the former Court of Appeals in due course and was decided in Rosario
Guevara’s favor (Exhibit E); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut upon certiorari, the Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION modified the judgment in December, 1943, as follows (Exhibit F);
[G.R. No. L-5405.  January 31, 1956.] ‘Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in effect that
notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of original certificate of title No. 51691 in the name of
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, Petitioner, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C. Ernesto M. Guevara, one-half of the land described in said certificate of title belongs to the estate
QUINTO, Respondents. of Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter’s
assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, is hereby affirmed; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut the judgment of said court insofar as it awarded any relief to
DECISION the Respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby reversed and set aside, and the parties
CONCEPCION, J.: are hereby ordered to present the document Exhibit A to the proper court for probate in
accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may
This is a petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The pertinent facts take against the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document is
are set forth in said decision, from which we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary approved and allowed by the court as the last will and testament of the deceased Victorino L.
“This case being the sequel to, and aftermath of, a previous litigation between the parties that Guevara, the heirs and legatees herein named may take such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as
reached the Supreme Court, through the former Court of Appeals, it becomes necessary to restate may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator, taking into consideration the
the essential antecedent facts to view the issues in proper perspective. For this purpose, it is pronouncements made in part II of this opinion. No finding as to costs in any of the three
important to recall that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara, a resident of Bayambang, instances.’ (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 13-14.)
Pangasinan, executed a will (Exhibit A), distributing assorted movables and a residential lot Claiming to act pursuant to the foregoing decision, Rosario Guevara commenced on October 5,
among his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara, and his stepchildren, Vivencio, Eduvigis, 1945, special proceedings No. 2646 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the probate of
Dionista, Candida, and Pio Guevara. To his second wife Augustia Posadas, the testator the will of Victorino Guevara. In paragraph 10 of the petition, it was
bequeathed, in addition to various movables, a portion of 25 hectares to be taken out of a 259 odd alleged:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
hectare parcel outlined in Plan Psu-68618, plus another five (5) hectares in settlement of her
widow’s usufruct. The balance of the 259 odd hectares he distributed as ‘10.  Que dicho testamento, o sus disposiciones testamentarias, ha sido de jure revocado, o
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary revocados, en cuanto a la parcela de terreno de 259 hectareas descrita en dicho testamento, por
haber el testador enajenado o dispuesto intervivos de la misma en la forma mencionada en las
100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testator’s lifetime and for payment of his debts and tres decisiones supra-mencionadas; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy que la solicitante pide la
family expenses; legalizacion de dicho testamento tan solo para los efectos del reconocimiento de hija natural
108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein 43.2342 hectares by hecha en dicho testamento a favor de la demandante y en obediencia al mandato de la Corte
way of mejora; Suprema en su decision supra.’ (Record on Appeal, p. 5.)

21.6171 hectares to ‘mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guevara.’ Notice of the petition having been duly published pursuant to Rule of Court 77, section 4, Ernesto
Guevara appeared and opposed the probate. Pedro L. Quinto, counsel for Rosario in the former
Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond. litigation, was allowed to intervene in view of his duly recorded attorney’s lien.
On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara, On January 31, 1946, Ernesto Guevara, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on
conveying to the latter the southern half of the 259-hectare lot heretofore mentioned, and the grounds that (a) the petition itself alleged that the will was revoked; chan
expressly recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northern half. roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) that ‘whatever right to probate the parties may have has already
prescribed’ (Record on Appeal, p. 14); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (c) that the purpose of the
Prior to this sale, on November 1, 1932, Victorino and his son Ernesto had jointly applied for
probate was solely to have Petitioner Rosario declared an acknowledged natural child of the
registration of the big parcel (case No. 15174), but in view of the sale from the former to the latter,
deceased.
the decree was issued in the name of Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract, a
certificate of title (No. 51691 of Pangasinan) being issued in his sole name on October 12, 1933. By order of December 9, 1946, Judge Sotero Rodas denied the motion to dismiss; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut upon motion of reconsideration, Judge Mañalac of the same court, on
Fifteen days previously, i.e., on September 27, 1933, Victorino Guevara died, but his will was not
June 23, 1937, reconsidered and set aside the previous resolution and ordered the petition
filed for probate. About four years later, Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized natural
dismissed on the ground that Rosario Guevara’s petition did not ask for the probate in toto of the
child of the deceased Victorino, and on the assumption that he had died intestate, brought suit
will, contrary to the order of the Supreme Court; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat her right to petition
against Ernesto Guevara to recover 423,492 square meters of the tract covered by certificate of
for the probate of the testament of Victorino L. Guevara had prescribed; chan
title No. 51691 as the portion that should correspond to her (Rosario) by way of legitime.
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that her action for judicial declaration of acknowledgment had likewise
prescribed.
An amended petition for the probate of the will in toto and another petition to reconsider the Memorandum for Appellants submitted.
previous order were subsequently denied; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe former on the ground
October 7, 1947 —
that there was a radical change of theory from that embodied in the original petition, and the
second for the same reasons stated in the order of June 23, 1947. Rosario L. Guevara and Pedro Memorandum for Appellee submitted.
L. Quinto thereupon brought the case on appeal to this Court, assigning no less than twenty (20)
alleged errors committed by the court below.” (Guevara vs. Guevara, C.A. — G. R. No. 5416-R, October 14, 1947 —
promulgated December 26, 1951; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysee Appendix to brief for Appellants’ petition for ten (10) days to file reply memorandum.
the Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 1-6.)
November 1, 1947 —
The dispositive part of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Appellants’ petition to file reply memorandum on or before November 9, 1947.

“The order of dismissal of the petition for probate is reversed and the court of origin ordered to November 8, 1947 —
reinstate the petition, and to hear and decide whether the will of Victorino Guevara, deceased, Appellants’ petition for extension to file reply memorandum.
should be allowed to probate. Costs against Appellees in both instances.” (Ibid.)
November 18, 1947 —
In his appeal therefrom, Petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara raises the following questions, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) Did Respondents herein duly perfect their appeal from the Verified reply of Appellant Rosario Guevara.
decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan? (b) Did the Court of Appeals have November 24, 1947 —
jurisdiction to entertain said appeal? (c) Is the petition for probate of the alleged will of the
deceased Victorino L. Guevara barred by the statute of limitations? Reply memorandum of Pedro C. Quinto filed.
(1)  With reference to the first question, Petitioner has submitted the following statement 1 of the January 12, 1948 —
steps taken since June 23, 1947, date of the resolution of Judge Mañalac, dismissing the petition
Court denies both petitions of July 14 and 25, 1947.
for probate of the last will and testament of Victoriano L. Guevara:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
January 24, 1948 —
“June 23, 1947 —
Notice of appeal to Supreme Court and petition for thirty (30) days’ extension by Appellant Rosario
Date of Resolution appealed from.
Guevara.
July 14, 1947 —
January 29, 1948 —
Date of Joint Petition for Reconsideration filed by Appellants.
Order granting petition for extension.
July 25, 1947 —
February 1, 1948 —
Date of Amended petition for probate of will.
Another notice of appeal to Supreme Court and motion for thirty (30) days extension
July 25, 1947 — by Appellant Rosario Guevara.
Motion for admission of Amended Petition. February 28, 1948 —
August 2, 1947 — Appellants’ ex-parte petition for further extension.
Appellants’ motion to postpone hearing on petition for reconsideration and motion for admission of March 6, 1948 —
Amended Petition.
Original joint Record on Appeal filed. (This was so defective and incomplete it consisted of mere
August 10, 1947 — disjointed sheets of paper intercalated with one another and was a mere token record on appeal.)
Appellants’ urgent motion for continuance of hearing on joint petition for Reconsideration as well March 8, 1948 —
as Motion to Admit Amended Petition.
Another joint petition for reconsideration of Appellants.
August 25, 1947 —
March 11, 1948 —
Motion for extension of time to file memorandum.
Appellee’s objection to record on appeal.
September 1, 1947 —
March 17, 1948 —
Verified reply of Appellants to objection. November 22, 1948 —
March 18, 1948 — Appellee objected to approval of re-amended joint record on appeal and prayed that order
appealed from be declared final.
Appellee’s objection to joint petition for reconsideration.
March 22, 1949 —
June 19, 1948 —
Court sustains Appellee’s objection to record on appeal denying petition for reconsideration
Appellants’ memorandum in support of the joint petition for reconsideration.
and Appellants given fifteen (15) days from notice to satisfy requirements of court’s previous
July 23, 1948 — order.
Order of denial of Joint Petition and disapproving original record on appeal as incomplete and April 8, 1949 —
giving Appellants within 10 days from notice.
Appellants file in Supreme Court petition for certiorari and mandamus attacking order of June 23,
July 26, 1948 — 1947.
Amended Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals instead of to the Supreme Court. April 11, 1949 —
July 28 and 29, 1948 — Appellant Quinto’s petition for fifteen (15) days extension to file Re-amended Record on Appeal.
Appellants received copy of order of July 23, 1948. April 12, 1949 —
August 1, 1948 — Supreme Court denies petition off-hand.
Petition for five (5) days extension to file amended Record on Appeal filed by Appellant Pedro C. April 16, 1949 —
Quinto.
Appellant Rosario Guevara’s motion for fifteen (15) days extension for the same purpose.
August 10, 1948 —
April 21, 1949 —
Appellants’ Joint Petition for last extension of two (2) days.
Court granted extension prayed for to expire May 1, 1948.
August 10, 1948 —
April 21, 1949 —
Filing of amended joint record on appeal. (This is also again so defective and incomplete as to
Second Re-Amended Record on Appeal filed.
constitute another mere token record on appeal as required by the Rules.)
June 11, 1949 —
August 24, 1948 —
Appellee’s opposition to ‘Second Re-Amended Record on Appeal’.
Appellants’ petition for ten (10) days period to reply to objection, if any was to be filed.
June 29, 1949 —
August 27, 1948 —
Appellants’ joint notice of hearing on Second Re-Amended Record on Appeal for July 12, 1949.
Appellee’s objection to amended record on appeal.
July 10, 1949 —
September 8, 1948 —
Appellants’ joint reply to opposition.
Appellants’ reply to objection.
July 12, 1949 —
October 20, 1948 —
Action on record on appeal deferred on petition of Atty. Quinto.
Court order sustaining objection and gives Appellants fifteen (15) days from notice to redraft
record on appeal. September 3, 1949 —
November 3, 1948 — Appellant Quinto’s notice of hearing on Second Re-Amended Record on Appeal for September
28, 1949.
Appellants’ joint petition to reconsider order of disapproval of Amended Record on Appeal.
September 28, 1949 —
November 3, 1948 —
Order of court approving same.
Appellants file re-amended joint record on appeal. (This again disregarded the orders of the court
regarding the contents of the record on appeal.). December 8, 1949 —
Clerk of lower court sends records to appellate court. extensions of time within which to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and
that Respondents eventually did so. There being no question about the authority of the court of
December 10, 1949 —
first instance to grant said extensions of time, it is clear that the first ground, relied upon
Appellant Quinto’s motion ex-parte to have records sent up to appellate court.” by Petitioner herein, is untenable.
(Petitioner-Appellant’s Brief, pp. 41-47.) In support of the second ground, it is alleged:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) that the original record
on appeal was filed by Pedro C. Quinto only, and does not inure to the benefit of Rosario
Based upon the foregoing, Oppositor and Appellee Ernesto M. Guevara filed, with the Court of Guevara; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (b) that Respondents had lost their right to appeal by the
Appeals, a motion praying that the appeal be dismissed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary lapse of the reglementary period. As regards the first proposition, Petitioner asserts
“(a)  Because due to the Appellant’s many and repeated dilatory tactics, the prosecution of their that Respondent Pedro C. Quinto had withdrawn his appearance as counsel
appeal has been unduly and unreasonably delayed for a period which should strike anyone as for Respondent Rosario Guevara; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat Quinto had, thereafter,
totally without justification. The resolution appealed from was dictated by the lower court on June intervened in the case in his own behalf, in order to enforce his attorney’s lien, as former counsel
23, 1947, so that a period of over two (2) years and nine (9) months until the date of this writing for Rosario Guevara; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat, consequently, the original record on appeal
has elapsed, thus establishing a record-holding delay which should not be sanctioned by the and the petitions for extension of time to file an amended record on appeal, filed by Pedro C.
Courts as prejudicial to the administration of justice. Quinto, were good only insofar as he is concerned, and cannot profit Rosario Guevara, she having
ceased to be his client long before the filing of said original record on appeal and petitions for
“(b)  Because Appellants, in violation of Rule 48, section 3, did not diligently prosecute their appeal extension of time; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat this interest in the case arises from his rights as
by failing to have the record sent up to this Honorable Court within thirty (30) days from the time former attorney for Respondent Rosario Guevara, and, as such, is subordinate to, and dependent
their Second Re-amended Record on Appeal was approved on September 28, 1949; chan upon, the interest therein of said Rosario Guevara and the success of her claim therein; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand it was only so transmitted on December 8, 1949, that is after the lapse of roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, her appeal not having been duly perfected, his appeal must be
two (2) months and ten (10) days. deemed to have no legal effect. There is no merit in this pretense, for it appears, at the foot of said
“(c)  Because, at any rate, the first Amended Joint Record on Appeal was filed beyond the record on appeal, that Pedro C. Quinto had filed the same, “for himself as Appellant and in behalf
extension granted by the Court and, consequently, the Appellants’ right to appeal has lapsed.” of Rosario Guevara, who authorized him to perfect the appeal for both Appellants,” and that
(Exhibit A, pp. 1-2). similar statements were made in the body and at the foot of said petitions for extension of time. It
is clear, therefore, that the aforementioned record on appeal and motions should be deemed
The Court of Appeals denied said motion to dismiss for the following submitted, also, by Respondent Rosario Guevara. The position then held by Pedro C. Quinto, as
reasons:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary special prosecutor in the office of the Solicitor General, did not nullify his aforesaid acts on behalf
“A preliminary question was posed by the Appellee who prayed for the dismissal of the appeal on of Rosario Guevara. Besides, said acts would seem to have been performed by him, more as
the ground that Petitioners-Appellants had unreasonably delayed the perfection of the appeal, as attorney-in- fact than as counsel for Rosario Guevara, and this merely in connection with the
the Second Re-amended Joint Record on Appeal was not certified to this Court until December, perfection of her appeal. We do not find therein anything objectionable, either legally or morally, in
1949. After considering the voluminous record, and the arguments of both parties, we are of the the light of the circumstances surrounding the case.
opinion that both parties have contributed to the delay with lengthy memoranda, and repeated The second proposition is based upon the following reasons:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
motions and objections. Moreover, the points in question are important enough to deserve
adequate consideration upon the merits. Wherefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal should be (a)  The aforementioned record on appeal and motions for extension of time filed by Quinto on
and is hereby, overruled and denied.” (Appendix to Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 6- 7.) behalf of Rosario Guevara did not inure to her benefit, for which reason the reglementary period to
appeal had expired before the perfection of her appeal. For the reasons already adverted to, this
It is urged by Petitioner herein that Respondents’ appeal from the decision of the Court of First argument is clearly untenable.
Instance of Pangasinan had not been duly perfected because:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) the
original of the record on appeal did not comply with the Rules of Court; chan (b)  The petition for reconsideration filed by Respondents on July 14, 1947, did not suspend the
roblesvirtualawlibrary(b) the record on appeal was filed after the lapse of the reglementary running of the period to perfect the record on appeal, because said petition did not comply with the
period; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(c) there has been an unprecedented delay in the filing of a provisions of Rule 37, section 1, of the Rules of Court, reading as
satisfactory record on appeal; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (d) the appeal should be deemed follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
abandoned for violation of Rule 48, section 3, of the Rules of Court. “Within thirty days after notice of the judgment in an action, the aggrieved party may move the trial
The first ground is predicated upon the fact that, instead of transcribing the motions, petitions, court to set aside the judgment end grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes
orders and resolutions incorporated in the original record on appeal, Respondents herein merely materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
attached to the original copy of said record on appeal, filed with the Court of First Instance of (a)  Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
Pangasinan, their own copies of said motions, petitions, orders and resolutions. Accordingly, the guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
copy of said record on appeal furnished to Petitioner herein did not contain or enclose the rights;
aforementioned parts of the record. It appears, however, that the Respondents were given several
(b)  Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, “We are of the opinion that the Court below was in error when it declared that the petition for
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result; probate of the will of Victorino Guevara was barred by prescription. The provision of Article 756 of
the old Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, reiterating those of the
(c)  Because excessive damages have been awarded, or the evidence was insufficient to justify
old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), point out that the presentation of a decedent’s will to the
the decision, or it is against the law.”
competent court has always been deemed by our law as more of a duty than a right, and the
Said petition for reconsideration appears, however, to be predicated, in effect, upon the ground neglect of such obligation carries with it the corresponding penalty and it is inconsistent with that
that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision of the court of first instance, and that said policy that the court should refuse to admit wills to probate, without inquiry into their validity. The
decision is contrary to law. It partakes, therefore, of the nature of a motion for new trial, stating authority given to testators to dispose freely of a portion of their estate would be imperfectly
specifically the reasons in support thereof, and, hence, it suspended the period to appeal until the safeguarded, unless adequate measures were provided by the state to assure that the wishes of
determination of said motion. the deceased would be carried out. Because the decedent may no longer act to have his
testamentary dispositions duly executed, the state authority must take over the opposite vigilance
Relative to the alleged unprecedented delay in the filing of a satisfactory record on appeal, we and supervision, so that free testamentary disposition does not remain a delusion and a dream.
agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals to the effect that the delay was due to the acts of This was expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in its previous decision, G. R. No. 48840
the Respondents, as well as of the Petitioner herein, for both had asked several postponements (Exhibit E) when it said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and extensions of time, filed memoranda and reply memoranda, and raised or provoked a number
of other issues or incidents which necessarily delayed the perfection of the appeal. ‘ cralaw We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will
Obviously, Petitioner should not be allowed to profit by said delay, to which he had actively and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate,
contributed. 1 they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with
the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to
Lastly, Petitioner maintains that, although the record on appeal had been approved on September law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because
28, 1949, it was not forwarded to the Court of Appeals until December 8, 1949. Section 3 of Rule such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the
48 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the
“If the record on appeal is not received by the Court of Appeals within thirty days after the approval whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as
thereof, the Appellee may, upon notice to the Appellant, move the court to grant an order directing is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as
the clerk of the lower court forthwith to transmit such record on appeal or to declare the same may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of
abandoned for failure to prosecute.” some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the
exclusion of others.’ (Italics supplied)
Considering that Respondents herein were not notified of the approval of the record on appeal
until December 8, 1949, on which date the record on appeal was forwarded to the Court of “In holding the statute of limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the court below failed to
Appeals, and that the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court does impose upon said court notice that its doctrine was destructive of the right of testamentary disposition and violative of the
the mandatory duty to declare the appeal abandoned for failure to prosecute, we believe that no owner’s right to control his property within the legal limits. The appealed order in fact leaves wills
error was committed in giving due course to the appeal and that the same has been duly at the mercy and whim of custodians and heirs interested in their suppression. The lower court
perfected. would in effect abdicate the tutelary power that passed to the Republic from the former
sovereigns, that ‘potestad suprema que en mi reside para velar por el puntual cumplimiento de las
(2)  Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to try the case, on appeal from the decision of the ultimas voluntades’, asserted as one of the royal prerogatives in the ‘Real Cedula’ of March 18,
court of first instance? Petitioner maintains the negative, upon the ground that the appeal involved 1776.
only questions of law. This is not correct, for the very motion for reconsideration adverted to
above, indicated that the appeal raised some issues of fact, such as, for instance, whether or not “It is not without purpose that Rule of Court 77 prescribes that any ‘person interested in the estate
the will in question was in the possession of Respondent Rosario Guevara and may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
whether Respondent Quinto had been authorized by her to perfect the appeal on her behalf. At allowed’. Taken from the Code of Procedure of California, this provision has been interpreted as
any rate, the case is now before us and, upon examination of the record and consideration of all meaning that the statute of limitations has no application to probate of wills. In the case of In re
the issues therein raised, we are of the opinion that, had the appeal been forwarded directly to this Hume’s Estate, 179 Calif. 338, 176 Pac. 681, the California Supreme Court ruled
Court, we would have disposed of it in the manner set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the review of which is sought by herein Appellant. ‘The chapter of the Code relating to the probate of wills does not provide for opposition to such
(3)  The last question for determination in this case is whether or not the petition for probate of the probate on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations, but, in effect, excludes it from the
will of Victorino L. Guevara is barred by the statute of limitations, considering that the testator died category of grounds allowed as a basis for such opposition. Section 1299 declares that any
on September 27, 1933, and that the petition for probate of said will was filed twelve (12) years person interested in the estate ‘may at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
later, or, to be exact, on October 5, 1945. The Court of Appeals resolved the question in the having jurisdiction to have the will proved.’ This implies that there is no arbitrary time limit.’
negative, upon the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary As additional reasons, the same Court stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘ cralaw Section 1317 declares:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary If the court is satisfied, upon the proof ‘The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of the right of any living
taken or from the facts found by the jury that the will was duly executed and that the will testator at person, but to determine whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the
the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress menace pertinent statutes which are the essential prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of
fraud, or undue influence, a certificate of the proof and the facts found, signed by the judge and devolution of his property on death. There is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a
attested by the seal of the court, must be attached to the will.’ proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and frequently does
receive no personal benefit from the performance of the act.
‘This excludes the bar of the statute of limitation from consideration as one of the matters which
may be shown in opposition to the probate. This is further emphasized by section 1341, which, in ‘One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to
substance, declares that, if upon the verdict of the jury the facts mentioned in section 1317 as effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a
aforesaid appear to be established, the court ‘must’ admit the will to probate. Section 1314 thus deceased person (Matter of Watson’s Will, 262 N.Y. 284, 294, 186 N.E. 787; chan
makes it imperative that the court shall admit the will to probate if the execution is proven and the roblesvirtualawlibraryMatter of Marriman’s Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208 N.Y.S. 672; chan
grounds of opposition authorized by section 1312 are not established. This clearly implies that no roblesvirtualawlibraryFoley, S. affirmed 217 App. Div. 733, 216 N.Y.S. 842; chan
grounds of opposition other than those enumerated in section 1312 may be set up, and it leaves roblesvirtualawlibraryMatter of Lensman’s Estate, 137 Misc. 77, 78, 243 N.Y.S. 126, Henderson,
no place for the application of the statute of limitations. S., Matter of Drake’s Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 598, 290 N.Y.S. 581). To that end, the court is, in
effect, an additional party to every litigation affecting the disposal of the assets of the deceased.
‘It is further to be observed that, notwithstanding the positive and comprehensive language of
Matter of Van Valkenburgh’s Estate, 164 Misc. 295, 296, 298 N.Y.S. 219. A determination,
sections 343 and 369, if taken literally, there can be no doubt that they cannot apply to all special
therefore, that the mere non-action of a person upon whom no legal duty rested in this regard,
proceedings of a civil nature. Proceedings for a change of name, or in arbitration, or for voluntary
could have the effect of subverting the wishes of one who was no longer able to protect his own
dissolution of a corporation, or for guardianship, or for a married woman to become a sole trader,
unquestionable rights, would strike at the very foundation of all conceptions of justice as
are all within the definition of the phrase, and each is enumerated, classed, and defined as such
administered in probate courts.’
proceeding by the Code. If the statute of limitations applied, it would begin to run against such
proceedings as soon as the right to institute them accrued. Yet from the very nature of these “These decisions are of high persuasive value (Cu vs. Republic, G. R. L-3018, July 18,
proceedings it is obvious that neither of them could be subject to such limitation. 1951); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythey represent the trend of authority (57 Am. Jur. 585), and
enable us to conclude that reason and precedent reject the applicability of the Statute of
‘This construction of these Code provisions is confirmed by the long-continued and uniform
Limitations to probate proceedings, because these are not exclusively established in the interest
practice and the universal understanding of the bench and bar of the state on the subject.’
of the surviving heirs, but primarily for the protection of the testator’s expressed wishes, that are
x x x                    x x x                    x x x entitled to respect as an effect of his ownership and right of disposition. If the probate of validly
executed wills is required by public policy, as declared by the Supreme Court in the previous case,
‘Action to quiet title frequently involve wills of persons who have died many years before the action G.R. 48840 (Exhibit E), the state could not have intended the statute of limitations to defeat that
was begun. The section contemplates that such a will, although not yet probated, may be policy.
construed in the action and may be afterwards probated, and it clearly shows that the Legislature
did not understand that the right to probate such will would be barred if the testator had died more “It is true, as ruled by the trial court, that the rights of parties ‘should not be left hanging in
than four years before the petition for probate was filed. uncertainty for periods of time far in excess of the maximum period of ten years allowed by
law’; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut the obvious remedy is for the other interested persons to
‘This uniform practice and understanding of the bench and bar, and of the legislative department petition for the production of the will and for its probate, or to inflict upon the guilty party the
of the state also, is a strong argument to the effect that the statute of limitations does not apply to penalties prescribed by Rule 76 or declare the unworthiness of the heir under the Civil Code for
such proceedings. The authorities on the effect of such long acquiescence are numerous.’ concealing or suppressing the testament; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut not to dismiss the petition
“The Statute of Limitations upon which the court below has relied, sections 38 to 50 of the old for probate, however belatedly submitted, and thereby refuse sanction to testamentary
Code of Civil Procedure, Act 190, undertakes to fix limits for the filing of ‘civil actions’, but none for dispositions executed with all the formalities prescribed by law, incidentally prejudicing also those
‘special proceedings’ of which probate is admittedly one. The distinction is not purely verbal, but testamentary heirs who do not happen to be successors ab intestato. That in this particular case
based on differences that make the limitation to ‘actions’ inapplicable to ‘special proceedings’. In the appealed rule may not work injustice would not excuse its adoption as a general norm
this regard, the Supreme Court of New York has adequately remarked (In re Canfield’s Will, 300 applicable to all cases.
NYS 502):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “It is likewise reasonable to assume that if the Supreme Court had considered the ten-year
‘A Respondent in a private proceeding owes no legal duty or obligation to the proponent as such, limitation applicable to probate proceedings, it would not have ordered the parties on December
wherefore it is impossible for him to violate such non-existent obligation. Furthermore such a 29, 1943 ‘to present the document Exhibit A to the proper court for probate in accordance with
proceeding is not instituted for the vindication of any personal right to the proponent. The subject- law’, because the ten years from the death of the testator expired in September of that same year,
matter is therefore wholly absent which could give rise to any ‘cause of action’ against two months before the decision. It is safe to assume that the high Court would not order a useless
any Respondent therein. step. The reasoning that the phrase ‘in accordance with law’ was a qualification signifying ‘if still
legally possible’, appears to be far-fetched and unjustified. The plain import of the words employed
by the high Court is that the probate should follow the procedure provided for the purpose.”
x x x                    x x x                    x x x which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens
system of the land involved in an ordinary action for revindicacion or partition.’
“The other reasons advanced by the court a quo in support of its order dismissing the petition are
also untenable. The allegation contained in paragraph 10 of the original petition, that ‘the will, or its “From whatever angle the case is viewed, a hearing on the allowance of the will is unavoidable.
testamentary dispositions, had been de jure revoked in so far as the parcel of 259 hectares The persistent, albeit obnoxious, attempts of Rosario Guevara to sidetrack the will are not
described in said will’ is concerned, does not justify the finding that the probate would be pointless. remedied by dismissing the petition for probate of will, and allowing Ernesto to retain a greater
What is alleged is a partial revocation, only as to the parcel of land affected; chan interest than that intended by the testator.” (Appendix to brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, pp. 7-15,
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut as previously shown, the will disposed of other property besides that one. 17-20.)
And even granting that the next allegation to the effect that Plaintiff sought to probate ‘only for the
We are fully in accord with these findings which we adopt as ours.
purposes of her acknowledgment as natural child in said will’, constitutes an averment that the will
had been fully revoked, the same would at the most constitute a conclusion or inference that the In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this
lower court was not bound to admit. Because the Appellant claimed or believed that the revocation instance against the Petitioner.
of the will as to the large parcel of land, constituted a total revocation of the testament is no reason
why the court should concur in the same belief or conclusion, especially when the will itself,
appended to the petition, showed that there were other properties and other heirs or legatees, and
the trial court had before it the decision of the Supreme Court ordering the filing of the will for its
probate because, as stated in its decision, such a step was enjoined by law and public policy.
Moreover, the defect, if any, incurred in failing to ask for the probate in toto of the will, was
subsequently cured and corrected in the amended petition, where not only the objectionable
statements were eliminated, but others added indicating the existence of a partible estate.
“Assuming that the original petition violated the order of the Supreme Court in so far as it did not
ask for the allowance of the entire will, the court below erred in dismissing the petition, for it
thereby sanctioned further disobedience to the order of the superior court. Once again, it must be
repeated that the order of dismissal failed to take into account that the case involved not only the
interests of Rosario Guevara, and those of the Appellee Ernesto Guevara and the other legatees,
but specially the express desires of the testator; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the protection
and defense of the latter developed upon the court itself, since no one else made any move to
enforce them.
“Even if the other heirs had failed to show interest in the case (a fact not properly inferable from
their non-intervention in the case, because the order of publication of the petition only called for
those interested to ‘appear to contest the allowance’ and not to support it) (Rec. on App., p. 7),
and even if the other heirs had already received their shares, the order refusing the probate
remains indefensible. If the other heirs were not interested, there remained the wishes of the
testator to be supported and protected, if validly expressed. If the heirs had distributed the estate,
the distribution was illegal and improper unless the will be first probated. The Supreme Court so
ruled in its previous decision (G. R. 48840) heretofore quoted.
‘Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due
execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with
that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary  first,
because the law expressly provides that ‘no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it
is proved and allowed in the proper court; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand, second, because the
probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any
other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to
effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to
protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among
which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor
may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition,
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL 2. To faithfully execute the duties of her trust, to manage and dispose of the estate
according to the rules for the best interest of the deceased.

3. To render a true and just account of all the estate of the deceased in her hands and of all
[ G.R. No. 203923, October 08, 2018 ] proceeds and interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same,
IONA LERIOU, ELEPTHERIOS L. LONGA, AND STEPHEN L. LONGA, PETITIONERS, V. at the time designated by the rules and such other times as the Court directs, and at the
YOHANNA FRENESI S. LONGA (MINOR) AND VICTORIA PONCIANA S. LONGA (MINOR), expiration of her trust, to settle her account with the Court and to deliver and pay over all the
REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER MARY JANE B. STA. CRUZ, RESPONDENTS. estate, effects, and moneys remaining in her hands, or due from her on such settlement, to the
person lawfully entitled thereto.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, CJ.: 4. To perform all orders of the Court by her to be performed .
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners Iona Leriou (Iona), Eleptherios The RTC issued the Letters of Administrator [10] on December 19, 2007. On March 18, 2008,
L. Longa (Eleptherios), and Stephen L. Longa (Stephen) assailing the Decision [1] dated June 28, respondent-administratrix submitted a Report of the Inventory and Appraisal [11] of the real and
2012 and Resolution[2] dated October 8, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92497, personal properties of the decedent, which was duly noted by the RTC in its Order [12] dated March
affirming the Orders[3] dated July 18, 2008 and November 3, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court 27, 2008.
(RTC) of Muntinlupa City Branch 276, which denied petitioners' Omnibus Motion to remove On May 20, 2008, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion 1. To Remove Jane Sta. Cruz as
respondent Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix; and to appoint petitioner Eleptherios or his Administratrix; and 2. Appoint Eleptherios L. Longa or His Nominee as Administrator (Omnibus
nominee as administrator of the estate of deceased Enrique Longa (Enrique). Motion).[13] Petitioners alleged that they were denied due process of law because they did not
The factual antecedents are as follows: receive any notice about respondents' Petition for Letters Administration. Petitioners accuse
respondent-administratrix of: 1) neglect for failing to abide by the order of the RTC for her to
coordinate with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) for the proper service of the Petition and
Respondent-minors Yohanna Frenesi S. Longa [4] (Yohanna) and Victoria Ponciana S. Order dated July 4, 2007 to petitioners; and 2) two acts of misrepresentation for not disclosing all
Longa[5] (Victoria), represented by their mother, Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz, instituted a special the assets of the decedent and for pretending to be a pauper litigant. Petitioners also averred that
proceeding entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Enrique T. Longa Petition for Letters of respondent-administratrix did not post a bond as required by Administrative Matter No. 03-02-05-
Administration,"[6] docketed as SP Proc. No. 07-035, with the RTC in Muntinlupa City on June 19, SC, or the "Rule on Guardianship of Minors." Petitioners assert that each of them, being the
2007. Respondents alleged that Enrique died intestate, survived by petitioners Eleptherios and surviving spouse and legitimate children of Enrique, has a preferential right over respondents to
Stephen and respondents Yohanna and Victoria, his legitimate and illegitimate children, act as administrator of the estate, or to designate somebody else to administer the estate in their
respectively; and that Enrique left several properties[7] with no creditors. In the meantime, behalf, pursuant to the order of preference under Rule 78, Section 6.
respondents were deemed as pauper litigants and exempt from paying the filing fee, subject to the On June 6, 2008, respondent-administratrix filed her Opposition to the Omnibus Motion, [14] alleging
payment thereof once a final judgment is rendered in their favor. [8] that she mailed the Petition for Letters of Administration and the RTC Order dated July 4, 2007 to
On November 5, 2007, Acting Presiding Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva of the RTC issued an petitioners in the addresses that the latter gave her, and that she coordinated with the Department
Order,[9] appointing Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz (respondent-administratrix) as the administratrix of of Foreign Affairs (DFA) for the service of the Petition for Letters of Administration to petitioners as
Enrique's estate, thus: evidenced by the RTC Order bearing the stamp [15] "RECEIVED" by the DFA Records Division on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz, being the mother, representative, July 27, 2007. Respondent-administratrix also exchanged correspondences with petitioners and
and legal guardian of minor children Yohanna Frenesi S. Longa and Victoria Ponciana S. Longa, their counsels about her decision to let the court settle Enrique's estate, as shown by her letter
is hereby appointed Administratrix of the properties or estate of deceased Enrique T. Longa . Let a dated June 22, 2007 addressed to petitioners' counsels, and her electronic mails (e-mails) with
Letter of Administration be issued in her favor upon posting of a bond in the amount of FOUR petitioner Eleptherios.[16]
HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (Php480,000.00) pesos, and after taking the required Oath of Respondent-administratrix denied committing any act of misrepresentation. With regard to the
Office, she may discharge the rights, duties and responsibilities of her trust. non-disclosure of some assets of the decedent, respondent-administratrix explained that she did
not include those properties which were not declared or registered in Enrique's name, and that it
As such Administratrix, she is hereby directed to do the following: was only after. the Petition was filed with the RTC that respondent-administratrix learned about a
certain real property in Carmona, Cavite. Likewise, respondent-administratrix maintained that she
1. To make and return to the Court within three (3) months from assumption of her office, is a pauper litigant since she has no capacity to pay the P480,000.00 bond and she had to borrow
subject to such reasonable extension as may be approved by the Court, a true and complete money from a friend to pay the P25,000.00 premium [17] to Travellers Insurance Surety Corporation
inventory of all the property, real and personal, of the deceased which shall come to her so that she may post a surety bond.
possession or knowledge or to the knowledge of any other person for her. Respondent-administratrix also said that Administrative Matter No. 03-02-05-SC or the "Rule on
Guardianship of Minors" does not apply to her as she is merely representing her children in the
administration and preservation of the estate of respondents' father.
In opposing petitioners' preferential right to administer the estate, respondent-administratrix true value and properties would be known later on, the same should be reported and made known
averred that petitioners are disqualified to act as administrators because petitioner Iona, a Greek to the Court, just as what the Administratrix did in the instant case .when she submitted to the
national, is already divorced from Enrique and has already remarried as shown by her name Iona Court the true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal properties of the estate after her
Leriou Regala in the Omnibus Motion, and petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen are non-residents appointment as Administratrix.
of the Philippines.
The mere imputation of misrepresentation on the alleged financial capacity of the Administratrix as
Respondent-administratrix recognizes that respondents Yohanna and Victoria's shares in the a pauper litigant without any concrete and categorical. proof is not also a sufficient ground for the
decedent's estate are significantly less than the shares of petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen who removal of the Administratrix. The record shows that Ms. Sta. Cruz' petition to litigate as pauper
are Enrique's legitimate children. However, respondent-administratrix sensed that petitioner underwent the required hearing and compliance of all the requirements as provided by law before
Eleptherios is slowly depleting the estate by charging his plane fares to and from the United States she was allowed to do so. The mere fact that Ms. Sta. Cruz resides in the posh Ayala Alabang
of America (USA) and huge phone bills against the estate. In addition, petitioner Eleptherios Village does not necessarily disqualify her as a pauper litigant. There must be a showing that she
ordered respondent-administratrix to transfer all of the estate to him so that he could personally is the owner of the said property.
partition the properties to Enrique's heirs. Thus, respondent-administratrix was forced to seek the
help of the courts for the proper settlement of Enrique's estate. Anent the ground that Ms. Sta. Cruz is disqualified to represent the minors in this instant
proceedings for her failure to post the required guardian's bond, it should be stressed that this is a
After the filing of petitioners' Reply and respondent-administratrix's Rejoinder, the Omnibus Motion proceeding for the settlement of estate of the late Enrique T. Longa, not the estate of the minor
was submitted for decision. children-[respondents], where the rights of ownership of the children over the properties of their
deceased father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled. [Salvador vs.
On June 18, 2008, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioners' Omnibus Motion. The Sta. Maria, 20 SCRA 603 (1967)]. Unless there is partition of the estate of the deceased, the
RTC ratiocinated: minors cannot yet be considered owners of properties, hence, the requirement of guardian bond is
immaterial in this case. Needless to state, in instituting this proceedings (sic) in behalf of her minor
children, Ms. Sta. Cruz is just exercising her legal, moral and natural right and duty as the mother
Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds by which an administrator may be in order to protect her children's right and claim over the estate of their deceased father.
removed by the court:
While it may be true that the [petitioners], (except for Iona) being the legitimate children of the late
Section 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings Enrique Longa, have a superior right over the Court appointed Administratrix, it must be stressed
upon death, resignation, or removal. - If an executor or administrator neglects to render his that Ms. Sta. Cruz was appointed as the Administratrix, being the representative and biological
account and settle the estate according to law, to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a parent of the minors Yohanna Frenesi and Victoria Ponciana, who are equally considered
duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable surviving heirs of the late Enrique Longa, albeit, illegitimate children of the latter. As the
or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him representative and biological parent of the minor heirs, Ms. Sta. Cruz has all the right to protect
to resign. x x x. the property for the benefit of her children. Indeed, if the properties will be properly managed and
The Court, after going over all the evidence submitted by the parties in support of their respective taken cared of, this will definitely redound to the benefit of Yohanna and Victoria Ponciana, whose
positions, finds and so holds that the [petitioners] in their instant Omnibus Motion has not shown future will therefor be protected.
any circumstance as sufficient grounds for the removal of Ms. Jane Sta. Cruz as the court-
appointed Administratrix of the estate of the late Enrique Longa.
Moreover, the appointment of Elepheriosis (sic) L. Longa as Administrator is not allowed under
Rule 78 Section 1(b) which provided that "No person is competent to serve as executor or
Records show that Ms. Sta. Cruz has substantially complied with the Court's Order and administrator who is not a resident of the Philippines."
coordinated with the Department of Foreign Affairs for the service of the Petition and the Order to
the [petitioners] in the address/es furnished by her, as shown by the stamp receipt on the Order. x
x x. There was any showing that she deliberately or maliciously neglected her duty. Nonetheless, In fine, the grounds relied upon by the [petitioners] are not sufficient to remove the duly court
the record would show that Ms. Sta. Cruz never intended to hide the filing of the Petition from the appointed Administratrix.
[petitioners] as she was in constant communication with them, particularly with Eleptherios,
through e-mails and this fact was never denied by the latter in his pleadings. The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court "lies within the discretion of the Court appointing him/her. As aptly expressed by the
Neither will the non-disclosure of Ms. Sta. Cruz of all the assets of the decedent in her initiatory Supreme Court in the case of Degala vs. Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, 'the sufficiency of any
pleading affects her appointment as administrator. Section 2 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court ground for removal should thus be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first
requires only an allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the estate . If the place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court. [18]
The RTC, ultimately, decreed: the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and
the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Omnibus Motion (1) to remove Jane Sta. Cruz as clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution
Administratrix; and (2) Appoint Eleptherios L. Longa or his Nominee as Administrator" is hereby certified by the clerk of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such
DENIED.[19] material portions of the record as would support the petition; and (e)  contain a sworn
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [20] which the trial court denied in an Order [21] dated certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.
November 3, 2008. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 92497. It should be emphasized that it is the party-pleader who must sign the sworn certification against
forum shopping for the reason that he/she has personal knowledge of whether or not another
action or proceeding was commenced involving the same parties and causes of action. If the
In a Decision dated June 28, 2012, the appellate court affirmed the Orders dated July 18, 2003 party-pleader is unable to personally sign the certification, he/she must execute a special power of
and November 3, 2008 of the trial court. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration [22] but it was attorney (SPA) authorizing his/her counsel to sign in his/her behalf. In Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr.,
denied in a Resolution dated October 8, 2012. [25]
 the Court elucidated:
Hence, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] raising the following issues: It is true, as petitioner asserts, that if for reasonable or justifiable reasons he is unable to sign the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A verification and certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition, he may execute a special
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, VIZ: power of attorney designating his counsel of record to sign the Petition on his behalf. In Altres v.
A. IT DISPENSED WITH THE MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF Empleo, this view was taken:
SECTION 3, RULE 79, IN RELATION TO SECTIONS 3 & 4, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
COURT, AND THE COURT A QUO'S OWN ORDER DATED 04 JULY 2007, WHEN IT pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
CONSIDERED THE MERE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE ORDER DATED 04 JULY 2007 ON submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPLIANT WITH THE SAID LEGAL
REQURIEMENTS.
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
B. IT CONSIDERED THE EXCHANGE OF ELECTRONIC MAILS BETWEEN RESPONDENT certification against forum shopping.
STA. CRUZ AND PETITIONER ELEPTHERIOS AS A POSITIVE INDICATION THAT
PETITIONERS HEIRS LONGA WERE ALLEGEDLY OFFICIALLY SERVED AND HAD
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PETITION DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID ELECTRONIC 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
MAILS WERE ONLY BETWEEN RESPONDENT STA. CRUZ AND PETITIONER ELEPTHERIOS. pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading
if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with
in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
C. IT DISREGARDED THE PREFERENTIAL AND SUPERIOR RIGHTS OF THE LEGITIMATE
CHILDREN OVER THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN OF THE DECEDENT.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when
D. IT DISREGARDED THE SUBSTANTIATED GROUNDS RAISED BY PETITIONERS HEIRS matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
LONGA, SHOWING THE UNFITNESS OF RESPONDENT STA. CRUZ TO DISCHARGE HER
DUTIES AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT.[24]
The Court's Ruling 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non compliance therewith or a defect therein,
A perusal of the Petition for Review on Certiorari reveals that it contains the same issues and unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
arguments raised by petitioners in their Omnibus Motion and Appellants' Brief. thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance"
The Petition Suffers a Technical Infirmity. or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
Rule 45, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court requires the petition to contain a sworn 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
certification against forum shopping. Section 4 provides: case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
SECTION 4. Contents of petition. - The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state
the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of known heirs of the decedent, all proceedings before the RTC relative to the Petition for Letters
record to sign on his behalf. (Emphases supplied, citation omitted.) Administration are null and void.
In the instant case, it was not petitioners but Atty. Joseph Lemuel B. Baquiran (Baquiran) of
Sianghio Lozada and Cabantac Law Offices who signed the certification against forum shopping We are not convinced. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
despite the absence of any showing that petitioners executed an SPA authorizing Atty. Baquiran
to sign in their behalf. By Atty. Baquiran's own revelation, their law firm had lost communication
and they could not locate any of the petitioners who are apparently residing in the United States of SECTION 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will
America (USA). Atty. Baquiran, in the verification and certification portion of the Petition, stated: is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the court having jurisdiction, such
court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks
5. Considering that our law Firm has lost communication with petitioners and has yet to re- successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
establish communication with petitioners who are residing in the United States of America, I But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the
executed this Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping pursuant to my duty as a testator himself.
lawyer in order to protect the rights and interest of petitioners by availing of and exhausting all
available legal reliefs.[26]
The Petition should be dismissed pursuant to our ruling in Anderson v. Ho[27] where the Court SECTION 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally . — The
clarified that a certification signed by a counsel without an SPA is a valid cause for the dismissal of court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
the Petition, thus: addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non- in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage
forum shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is a peculiar personal representation on the thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be
part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action." "Obviously, it is be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of
the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day
particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she] actually filed or caused the filing of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
of a petition in that case." Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory
certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her heirs.
counsel of record to sign on her behalf. "[A] certification which had been signed by counsel without
the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition." Contrary to petitioners' argument that personal notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 is a jurisdictional
requirement, the Court, in Alaban v. Court of Appeals,[28] explained that it is just a matter of
In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed Anderson's Petition for Review on the personal convenience. Thus:
ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
her behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir
error by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules.
that a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction. And while it is Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to
true that in some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial personally notify them of the same.
compliance, it "did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach
while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping." (Citations Besides, assuming  arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported
omitted.) infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs
The Petition is Not Meritorious. is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite . (Emphasis supplied,
Even if we brush aside the technical defect, the instant Petition must fail just the same. citations omitted.)
Moreover, it should be emphasized that a testate or intestate settlement of a deceased's estate is
Petitioners allege that respondents failed to adduce evidence, i.e., Return of Service, to show that a proceeding in rem,[29] such that the publication under Section 3 of the same Rule, vests the court
petitioners were furnished with the Petition for Letters Administration and the RTC Order dated with jurisdiction over all persons who are interested therein.
July 4, 2007. Petitioners assert that the e-mails between respondent-administratrix and petitioner In the instant case, the Order dated July 4, 2007 was published for three consecutive weeks
Elephterios, and the stamp "RECEIVED" of the DFA Records Division, do not prove that they in Balita, a newspaper of general circulation, on the following dates: July 27, 2007, August 3,
actually received the Petition for Letters of Administration and the RTC Order dated July 4, 2007 . 2007, and August 10, 2007. [30] By such publication which constitutes notice to the whole world,
Petitioners contend that, without the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement on notice to the petitioners are deemed notified about the intestate proceedings of their father's estate. As the
Court elucidated in Alaban v. Court of Appeals[31]:
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become not absolute, and that the appointment of an administrator greatly depends on the attendant facts
parties to the probate proceedings. and circumstances of each case. In Uy v. Court of Appeals,[34] the Court decreed:
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person circumstances. In Sioca v. Garcia, this Court set aside the order of preference, to wit:
interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the
jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased
published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint
as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the another person. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a
testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such
such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below
to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. was in error. (Citation omitted.)
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right In the instant case, petitioners are non-residents of the Philippines, which disqualify them from
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world administering the decedent's estate pursuant to Rule 78, Section 1 [35] of the Rules of Court. We
as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even are mindful that respondents are also disqualified by reason of their minority. In view of the evident
though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties disqualification of petitioners and respondents and the lack of any known creditors, the parties
thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. (Emphasis supplied, citations have no choice but to have somebody else administer the estate for them. Petitioners nominated
omitted.) Juan Manuel Elizalde (Elizalde) but failed to give adequate justification as to why Letters of
The instant case is analogous to Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones[32] where some of the heirs Administration should be issued in Elizalde's favor. [36] We fully agree with the ruling of the trial and
did not receive any personal notice about the intestate proceedings, yet they were deemed appellate courts in choosing respondent-administratrix over Elizalde. Compared to Elizalde whose
notified through publication since the intestate proceeding is in rem. The Court in Pilapil adjudged: interest over the decedent's estate is unclear, respondent-administratrix's interest is to protect the
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings estate for the benefit of her children with Enrique. Indeed, it is respondents who would directly
and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the benefit from an orderly and efficient management by the respondent-administratrix. In the absence
intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether of any indication that respondent-administratrix would jeopardize her children's interest, or that of
testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of petitioners in the subject estate, petitioners' attempts to remove her as administratrix of Enrique's
the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner estate must fail.
prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of Notably, the trial and appellate courts did not find any factual or legal ground to remove Mary Jane
the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix of Enrique's estate. Both courts cleared respondent-administratrix of
of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties the charges of misrepresentation of being a pauper and concealment of assets of Enrique's
in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most estate. We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals:
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of
whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made. (Emphasis supplied.) While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
As to whom the Letters of Administration should be issued, the Court, in Gabriel v. Court of administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal.
Appeals,[33] gave emphasis on the extent of one's interest in the decedent's estate as the There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to
paramount consideration for appointing him/her as the administrator. The Court pronounced: or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal warrant the removal of the administrator. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. [37]
administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in Likewise, respondent-administratrix is not required to pay a guardianship bond under Section 16,
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The [38]
 A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, also known as the Rule on Guardianship of Minors, before she could
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy discharge her functions as administratrix of Enrique's estate. This is self-explanatory and needs no
and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of further elaboration.
waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to All told, the Court sustains the above findings especially so that petitioners did not present any
administer the estate correctly. new persuasive argument in their Petition. It is well-settled that the findings of fact of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive and may not be re-
Here, petitioners cannot assert their preferential right to administer the estate or that their choice examined by this Court.[39] Although this rule admits of exceptions, none of the exceptional
of administrator should be preferred because they are the nearest of kin of the decedent. It is circumstances applies herein.
worth emphasizing that the preference given to the surviving spouse, next of kin, and creditors is
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and
assailed Decision dated June 28, 2012 and Resolution dated October 8, 2012 of the Court of money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92497 are AFFIRMED. me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently
SO ORDERED. residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo
Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in
Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores,
Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming
to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors
FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents. (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the
latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for
the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir
and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was
denied by the trial judge.
PARAS, J.:
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals in AC- with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which
G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated
petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
(Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows: trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial
Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the
to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents'
pronouncement is made as to costs. Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).

The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153).
Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows: Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum
for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
(Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were
preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was
written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner
without objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, (B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic
payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic
of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided: validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
 (C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private
respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the
not annul the institution of heirs; entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado
mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law; 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and
devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that are concerned.
mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a
share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance
the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and should of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
be in violable. universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to
petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be,
necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
unconstitutional and ineffectual.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited. proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by
it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor
(Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an
in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious. Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of
law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No.
591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is
nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308
may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of
heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some
even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the  direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction
however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a
legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded
Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the
that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress
the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters
will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]). effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the
probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the
motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a
costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not
considerations. The Court said: dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the
existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the
will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity
of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable SO ORDERED.
controversy crying for solution.

In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving
spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was
fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The
Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.

In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals
with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The
Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent
judge should have denied its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved,
the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra).

In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings
No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no
legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and
the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an
order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are
matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits
of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
 Petitioners would also have this Court nullify all other actions of respondent Judge in said
Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R; restore the status quo therein prior to the issuance of the foregoing
orders; and permanently enjoin respondent Judge from reopening said proceedings.

The following facts are not controverted:

Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu City with neither
descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal properties located in Cebu City, Ormoc
City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. Earlier, on 23 April 1972, she executed a last will and
testament 3 wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as
executor to serve without bond. Instrumental witnesses to the will were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL Demerre and Primo Miro.

G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992 On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition with the Court of First instance of Cebu for the
probate of Remedios' last will and testament. 4 The case was raffled to the original Branch VIII
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN and CARMEN MEJIA RODRIGUEZ, petitioners, thereof which was then presided over by Judge Antonio D. Cinco. The petition alleged that
vs. Rosario Tan is not physically well and, therefore, will not be assuming the position of
HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, CONCEPCION MEJIA ESPINA and MARIA MEJIA administratrix. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Jesus Fran on the third page of the said petition.
GANDIONGCO, respondents. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 18 September 1972.
Meanwhile, on 31 July 1972, the court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 10 August 1972, the private respondents, who are sisters of the deceased, filed a
manifestation 5 alleging that they needed time to study the petition because some heirs who are
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with
entitled to receive their respective shares have been intentionally omitted therein, and praying that
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside, for having been issued without
they be given ample time to file their opposition, after which the hearing be reset to another date.
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the following Orders
of the respondent Judge in Special Proceedings No. 3309-R of Branch VIII of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu entitled "In The Matter of the Petition for Probate Private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed on 18 September 1972 a
of the Last Will and Testament of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo:" "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will" wherein they expressly
manifested, with their "full knowledge and consent that . . . they have no objection of (sic) the
allowance of the . . . will of the late Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo," and that they have "no
1. The Order of 26 February 1980 setting for hearing private respondents'
objection to the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of petitioner, Dr. Jesus Fran." 6
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration 1 which was filed six (6) years, ten (10)
months and eighteen (18) days after the probate judgment was rendered and six
(6) years and twenty-one (21) days after the testate proceedings was declared No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested.
closed and terminated; and
During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the requisite evidence to establish the
2. The Order of 2 June 1980 finding the signature of the testatrix in the last will jurisdictional facts.
and testament to be a forgery and (a) declaring the testatrix as having died
intestate; (b) declaring the testamentary dispositions in said last will and Upon a determination that the court had duly acquired jurisdiction over the uncontested petition for
testament as null and void; (c) setting aside the order dated 10 September 1973 probate, Judge Cinco issued in open court an order directing counsel for petitioner to present
declaring the testate proceedings closed and terminated; (d) revoking the evidence proving the authenticity and due execution of the will before the Clerk of Court who was,
appointment of Jesus Fran as executor while appointing respondent Concepcion accordingly, so authorized to receive the same.
M. Espina as administratrix; and (e) ordering the conversion of the proceedings
to one of intestacy. 2 This Order effectively annulled and set aside the probate The reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court immediately followed. Petitioner Fran's first
judgment of 13 November 1972. witness was Atty. Nazario R. Pacquiao, one at the subscribing witnesses to the will. The original of
the will, marked as Exhibit "F", and its English translation, marked as Exhibit "F-Translation", were
submitted to the Clerk of Court. 7 Petitioner Fran was the second and also the last witness. He SO ORDERED.
enumerated the names of the surviving heirs of the deceased.
Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu was converted to a
On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On November 1978, by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
testatrix, Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing petitioner Fran as executor 1439, Branch XVII (Davao City) of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided over by herein
thereof. 8 The dispositive portion of the decision reads: respondent Judge, was officially transferred to Cebu City and renumbered as Branch VIII.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered On 1 October 1979, private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion for
declaring the last will and testament of the deceased Remedios Mejia Vda. de Reconsideration of the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and the Order of partition of 10
Tiosejo marked as Exhibit F as admitted to probate. Dr. Jesus Fran is hereby September 1973, in said motion, they ask the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit
appointed as executor of the will. Let letters testamentary be issued in favor of their opposition to the allowance of the will, 14 which they filed on 1 October 1979. They allege
Dr. Jesus Fran. The special administrator's bond put up by Dr. Jesus Fran as that: (a) they were not furnished with a copy of the will; (b) the will is a forgery; (c) they were not
special administrator duly approved by this Court shall serve and be considered notified of any resolution or order on their manifestation requesting time within which to file their
as the executor's bond considering that the special administrator and executor opposition, or of the order authorizing the clerk of court to receive the evidence for the petitioner,
are one and the same person. or of the order closing the proceedings; (d) the reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void
per the ruling in  Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete; 15 (e) the project of partition contains no notice of
The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite the expiration of the period therein fixed, hearing and they were not notified thereof; (f) the petitioner signed the project of partition as
no claim was presented against the estate. administrator and not as executor, thereby proving that the cdecedent died intestate; (g) the
petitioner did not submit any accounting as required by law; and (h) the petitioner never distributed
the estate to the devisees and legatees.
On 4 January 1973, petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate;  9 copies thereof were
furnished each of the private respondents.
In a detailed opposition 16 to the above Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Fran
refuted all the protestations of private respondents. Among other reasons, he stresses therein
Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all that: (a) private respondents are in estoppel to question the will because they filed their
the devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Withdrawal Of Opposition To The Allowance of Will which states that after thoroughly studying the
Concepcion M. Espina, was submitted by the executor for the court's approval. 10 Said legatees petition, to which was attached a copy of the English translation of the will, they have no objection
and devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit receipt of a copy of the Project of to its allowance; the order directing the clerk of court to receive the evidence was dictated in open
Partition together with the notice of hearing, and state that they had no objection to its court in the presence of private respondents; private respondent Maria M. Gandiongco signed the
approval. 11 Project of Partition and private respondent Concepcion M. Espina submitted a certification stating
therein that she received the notice of hearing therefor and has no objection to its approval; (b)
The notice of hearing referred to in these certifications is the 6 August 1973 notice issued by the except for some properties, either covered by a usufruct under the will or agreed upon by the
Clerk of Court setting the hearing on the Project of Partition for 29 August 1973. 12 parties to be held in common by reason of its special circumstance, there was an actual
distribution of the estate in accordance with the Project of Partition; insofar as private respondents
After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10 September are concerned, they not only received their respective shares, they even purchased the shares of
1973 13 approving the same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs entitled to the estate of the other devisees. To top it all, private respondents' children, namely Rodrigo M. Gandiongco, Jr.
Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the administrator to deliver to the said parties their and Victor Espina, mortgaged their respective shares in favor of a bank
respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, respondent Judge issued on 26 February 1980 an Order
WHEREFORE, the signers (sic) to the project of partition are declared the only, setting for hearing the said Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration on 8 April 1980 so that "the
heirs entitled to the estate; the project of partition submitted is ordered approved witnesses and the exhibits (may be) properly ventilated." 17
and the administrator is ordered to deliver to each one of them their respective
aliquot parts as distributed in the said project of partition. It is understood that if On 25 March 1980, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus and to Reconsider the 26
there are expenses incurred or to be incurred as expenses of partition, Section 3 February 1980 Order setting it for hearing on 17 April 1980, 18 but the respondent Judge
of Rule 90 shall be followed. prematurely denied it for lack of merit in his Order of 31 March 1980. 19

Let this proceedings be now declared closed. Consequently, on 8 April 1980, the instant petition was filed challenging the jurisdiction of the
lower court in taking cognizance of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration considering that the
probate judgment and the order approving the Project of Partition and terminating the proceedings In the Resolution dated 2 June 1980, We issued a restraining order enjoining respondent Judge
had long become final and had in fact been executed. Private respondents had long lost their right from reopening Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R. 22
to appeal therefrom. The Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration cannot likewise be treated as a
petition for relief from judgment for under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must However, on the same date, before the restraining order was served on him; respondent Judge
be filed within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of the judgment/order and within six (6) months issued the impugned order declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void, finding the
from the date of said judgment. Therefore, this remedy can no longer be availed of. signature of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo to be a forgery, decreeing the reopening of Sp.
Proc. No. 3309-R and converting the same into an intestate proceeding. 23
On 8 April 1980, the date the instant petition was filed, respondent Judge proceeded with the
hearing of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. He received the testimonies of private Hence, on 6 June 1980, petitioners filed their Second Supplemental Petition  24 asking this Court
respondents and one Romeo O. Varena, an alleged handwriting expert from the Philippine to declare as null and void the Order of 2 June 1980 and, pending such declaration, to restrain
Constabulary, who averred that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery. The respondent Judge from enforcing the same. Private respondents filed their Comment and
respondent Judge likewise issued an Order on the same date stating that unless he received a Opposition to the Second Supplemental Petition on 9 July 1980.
restraining order from this Court within twenty (20) days therefrom, he will reopen Sp. Proc. No.
3309-R.
Thereafter, as mandated in the resolution of 30 June 1980, 25 this Court gave due course to this
case and required the parties to file their respective Memoranda, which private respondents
On 14 April 1980, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to restrain respondent complied with on 16 August 1980; 26 petitioners filed theirs on 27 August 1980. 27 Consequently,
Judge from reopening the case. 20 the parties continued to file several pleadings reiterating substantially the same allegations and
arguments earlier submitted to this Court.
In their voluminous Comments and Opposition to the petition and Supplemental
Petition, 21 private respondents not only amplify in great detail the grounds raised in their On 22 March 1984, counsel for petitioners filed a manifestation informing this Court of the death of
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, they also squarely raise for the first time the following petitioner Fran on 29 February 1984 and enumerating therein his surviving heirs. On 2 April 1984,
issues. this Court resolved to have said heirs substitute him in this case.

(a) The probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case since petitioner Over a year later, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco filed an affidavit,  28 sworn to before
Jesus Fran failed to submit to the court the original of the will. the acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City, disclosing the following material
facts: (a) she signed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration dated 1 October 1979 without
(b) They were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will as petitioner Jesus knowing or reading the contents thereof; (b) she saw the will of the late Remedios M. Vda. de
Fran did not attach it to the petition; what was attached was only the English Tiosejo written in the Cebuano dialect after the same was executed by the latter; the said will
translation of the will. bearing the authentic signature of Remedios was the very one presented to the probate court by
petitioner's counsel; (c) she received the notice of hearing of the petition for probate and because
(c) Even assuming that the probate judge could validly delegate the reception of she was convinced that the signature of the testatrix was genuine, she, together with Concepcion
evidence to the Clerk of Court, the proceeding before the latter would still be void M. Espina, withdrew her opposition; (d) she received her share of the estate of the late Remedios
as he failed to take an oath of office before entering upon his duties as M. Vda. de Tiosejo which was distributed in accordance with the provisions of the latter's will; and
commissioner and failed to render a report on the matters submitted to him. (e) she did not authorize Atty. Numeriano Estenzo or other lawyers to present a motion to this
Court after 25 February 1981 when Estenzo withdrew as counsel for private respondents. She
then asks this Court to consider as withdrawn her Opposition to the Allowance of the Will, her
(d) Respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco was defrauded into (sic) signing participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and her Opposition to this petition.
the Project of Partition and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, her certification,
when they were misled by petitioner Fran into believing that the Agreement of
Petition to be submitted to the court is the Extra Judicial Partition they signed on Due to this development, We required private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to comment on
7 May 1973. the affidavit of private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco.

(e) Petitioner Fran is guilty of fraud in urdervaluing the estate of the late On 17 August 1985, private respondents filed a joint manifestation 29 wherein they claim that
Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo by reporting properties worth only P400,000.00 Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco does not remember, executing the affidavit. A few weeks before the
when in truth and in fact the estate has an aggregate value of P2,094,333.00. affidavit was filed, particularly on 17 June 1985, Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco was confined in the
hospital; she could not recall having signed, during this period, any affidavit or recognized her
sisters and other relatives.
On 19 September 1985, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco, through special counsel, filed authorized the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for the petitioner in this case. A month prior
a Manifestation/Motion with a second Affidavit attached thereto30 confessing that she signed the to Lim Tanhu, or on 30 July 1975, this Court, in Laluan vs. Malpaya, 32 recognized and upheld the
Joint Manifestation dated 16 August 1985 "without knowing or being informed of its contents, and practice of delegating the reception of evidence to Clerks of Court. Thus:
only upon Mrs. Concepcion Espina's request." She reiterated her desire to withdraw from the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration filed in Sp. Proc. No, 3309-R as well as from the instant No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing
petition. its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception
of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking
Despite the valiant attempt of private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to influence and control down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of
the action of Maria Gandiongco, there is nothing in the records that would cast any doubt on the documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of
irrevocability of the latter's decision to withdraw her participation in the Omnibus Motion for receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court the exercise of
Reconsideration and Opposition to this case. That decision, however, is not a ground for dropping judicial discretion usually called for when the other party who is present objects
her as a private respondent as the respondent Judge had already issued the abovementioned to questions propounded and to the admission of the documentary evidence
Order of 2 June 1980. proffered. 33 More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the
case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare
The petition and the supplemental petitions are impressed with merit. the decision based upon the evidence reported. 34

We do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant result
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the court based on the evidence
thereafter set aside the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared presented in such limited proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the
the subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary dispositions therein and ordered aggrieved party, then there exists, sufficient justification to grant the latter
the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court. 35

It is not disputed that private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of the petition their Monserrate vs. Court of Appeals, 36 decided on 29 September 1989, reiterated this rule. Lim
"Withdrawal of Opposition To Allowance of Probate (sic) Will" wherein they unequivocally state Tanhu then cannot be used as authority to nullify the order of the probate court authorizing the
that they have no objection to the allowance of the will. For all legal intents and purposes, they Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for the rule is settled that "when a doctrine of this Court is
became proponents of the same. overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof." 37 It
may also be emphasized in this connection that  Lim Tanhu did not live long; it was subsequently
After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having been no overruled in Gochangco vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 38 wherein this
claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted a Project of Court, en banc, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, in reference to what the
Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which trial court termed as "the doctrinal rule laid down in the recent case of Lim Tan Hu (sic) vs.
private respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a certification filed with the probate Ramolete," ruled:
court. Assuming for the sake of argument that private respondents did not receive a formal notice
of the decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless
constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would Now, that declaration does not reflect long observed and established judicial
have been an idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of practice with respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the
partition, which is normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to several explicitly authorized instances under the Rules where the function of
terminate the proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, receiving evidence and even of making recommendatory findings of facts on the
they should have desisted from performing the above acts and instead demanded from petitioner basis thereof may be delegated to commissioners, inclusive of the Clerk of Court.
Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the will. The same conclusion refutes and These instances are set out in Rule 33, . . . ; Rule 67 and 69, . . . ; Rule 86, . . . ;
defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive Rule 136, . . . . In all these instances, the competence of the clerk of court is
the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify them of the date of the reception of assumed. Indeed, there would seem, to be sure, nothing intrinsically wrong in
evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because private respondents were present when the court allowing presentation of evidence ex parte before a Clerk of Court. Such a
dictated the said order. procedure certainly does not foreclose relief to the party adversely affected who,
for valid cause and upon appropriate and seasonable application, may bring
about the undoing thereof or the elimination of prejudice thereby caused to him;
Neither do We give any weight to the contention that the reception of evidence by the Clerk of and it is, after all, the Court itself which is duty bound and has the ultimate
Court is null and void per the doctrine laid, down in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete.  31 In the first responsibility to pass upon the evidence received in this manner, discarding in
place, Lim Tanhu was decided on 29 August 1975, nearly four (4) years after the probate court the process such proofs as are incompetent and then declare what facts have
 thereby been established. In considering and analyzing the evidence preparatory attached to the petition. In the first, it ruled: "The original of said document [the will] must be
to rendition of judgment on the merits, it may not unreasonably be assumed that presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the nonpresentation of said original and the
any serious error in the ex-parte presentation of evidence, prejudicial to any acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof." 41 In the second case, this Court was more
absent party, will be detected and duly remedied by the Court, and/or may emphatic in holding that:
always, in any event, be drawn to its attention by any interested party.
The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the jurisdictional allegations
xxx xxx xxx before the court, but practice and jurisprudence have established that they
should be made in the form of an application and filed with the original of the will
It was therefore error for the Court a quo to have declared the judgment by attached thereto. It has been the practice in some courts to permit attachment of
default to be fatally flawed by the fact that the plaintiff's evidence had been a mere copy of the will to the application, without prejudice to producing the
received not by the Judge himself but by the clerk of court. original thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has
been adopted by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken
place in certain cases. 42
The alternative claim that the proceedings before the Clerk of Court were likewise void because
said official did not take an oath is likewise untenable. The Clerk of Court acted as such when he
performed the delegated task of receiving evidence. It was not necessary for him to take an oath That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly
for that purpose; he was bound by his oath of office as a Clerk of Court. Private respondents are evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate
obviously of the impression that by the delegation of the reception of evidence to the Clerk of by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the
Court, the latter became a commissioner as defined under Rule 33 of the Rules of Court entitled same is lost or destroyed. The section reads in full as follows:
Trial by Commissioner. This is not correct; as this Court said in Laluan:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or
The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties properly legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
relate to the reference by a court of any or all of the issues in a case to a person time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
so commissioned to act or report thereon. These provisions explicitly spell out the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
the rules governing the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties destroyed.
before, during, and after the reference proceedings. Compliance with these rules
of conduct becomes imperative only when the court formally orders a reference In the instant case, a copy of the original will and its English translation were attached to the
of the case to a commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 petition as Annex "A" and Annex "A-1", respectively, and made integral parts of the same. It is to
find no application to the case at bar where the court a quo merely directed the be presumed that upon the filing of the petition the Clerk of Court, or his duly authorized
clerk of court to take down the testimony of the witnesses presented and to mark subordinate, examined the petition and found that the annexes mentioned were in fact attached
the documentary evidence proferred on a date previously set for hearing. thereto. If they were not, the petition cannot be said to have been properly presented and the
Clerk of Court would not have accepted it for docketing. Under Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Belatedly realizing the absence of substance of the above grounds, private respondents now claim Court, the Clerk of Court shall receive and file all pleadings and other papers properly presented,
in their Comments to the Petition and the Supplemental Petition that the trial court never acquired endorsing on each such paper the time when it was filed. The presumption of regularity in the
jurisdiction over the petition because only the English translation of the will — and not a copy of performance of official duty militates against private respondents' claim that Annex "A" of the
the same — was attached to the petition; the will was not even submitted to the court for their petition was not in fact attached thereto.
examination within twenty (20) days after the death of the testatrix; and that there was fraud in the
procurement of the probate judgment principally because they were not given any chance to The certification of the Assistant Clerk of Court issued on 8 April
examine the signature of the testatrix and were misled into signing the withdrawal of their 1980, 43 or SIX (6) months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, to the effect that as
opposition on the assurance of petitioner Fran and their sister, Rosario M. Tan, that the will would per examination of the records of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, "the copy of the Will mentioned in the
be shown to them during the trial. These two grounds easily serve as the bases for the postulation petition as Annex "A" is not found to be attached as of this date in the said petition; only the
that the decision is null and void and so, therefore, their omnibus motion became all the more English Translation of said Will is attached thereof (sic) as Annex "A-1" does not even save the
timely and proper. day for private respondents. It is not conclusive because it fails to state the fact that as hereafter
shown, the pages of the records which correspond to the four (4) pages of Annex "A" were
The contentions do not impress this Court. missing or were detached therefrom. As emphatically asserted by the petitioners in their Reply to
the Comments of private respondents, 44 duly supported by a certification of the former Clerk of
Court of the original Branch VIII of the court below, 45 and which private respondents merely
In Santos vs. Castillo 39 and Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 40 decided six (6) generally denied in their motion for reconsideration with comments and opposition to consolidated
months apart in 1937, this Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the original of the will be reply, 46 the four-page xerox copy of will, marked as Annex "A" of the petition, became, as
properly marked by the personnel of the original Branch VIII of the court below upon the filing of ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days after the rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one
the petition, pages 5, 6, 7 and 8 while the translation thereof, marked as Annex "A-1", became (1) month and thirteen (13) days after the court issued the order approving the Project of Partition,
pages 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the records. The markings were done in long hand. The records of the to which they voluntarily expressed their conformity through their respective certifications, and
case were thereafter sent to the Clerk of Court, 14th Judicial District, Cebu City on 9 February closing the testate proceedings.
1978. These records, now in the possession of the respondent Judge, show that said pages 5, 6,
7 and 8 in long are missing. As a consequence thereof, petitioners filed with the Executive Judge Private respondents did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack.
of the court below an administrative complaint.
The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle
It is not likewise disputed that the original of the will was submitted in evidence and marked as it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the same aside, by
Exhibit "F". It forms part of the records of the special proceedings — a fact which private mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of probate
respondents admit in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, thus: is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on any of the
grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
9. That an examination of the alleged will of our deceased sister has revealed proceeding. 50 We wish also to advert to the related doctrine which holds that final judgments are
that the signatures at the left hand margin of Exhibit "F", are written by (sic) entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there would be a wavering of trust in
different person than the signature appearing at the bottom of said alleged the courts. 51 In Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen, 52 this Court had the occasion to state the rationale of
will . . . 47 this doctrine, thus:

The availability of the will since 18 September 1972 for their examination renders completely Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the
baseless the private respondents' claim of fraud on petitioner Fran's part in securing the interests of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that
withdrawal of their opposition to the probate of the will. If indeed such withdrawal was conditioned stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of
upon Fran's promise that the private respondents would be shown the will during the trial, why competent jurisdiction.
weren't the appropriate steps taken by the latter to confront Fran about this promise before
certifications of conformity to the project of partition were filed? This is so even if the decision is incorrect 53 or, in criminal cases, the penalty imposed is
erroneous. 54
Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of said promise constitutes fraud, such
fraud is not of the kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion for reconsideration or a Equally baseless and unmeritorious is private respondents' contention that the order approving the
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 37 and Rule 38, respectively, of the Rules of Court, or Project of Partition and closing the proceedings is null and void because the Project of Partition
even a separate action for annulment of judgment. It is settled that for fraud to be invested with, did not contain a notice of hearing and that they were not notified of the hearing thereon. In truth,
sufficiency, it must be extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised during the in her own certification 55 dated 5 September 1973, private respondent Concepcion M. Espina
trial which resulted in such judgment. 48 admitted that she "received a copy of the Project of Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the
above-entitled proceeding, and that she has no objection to the approval of the said Project of
In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to set aside or Partition." The notice of hearing she referred to is the Notice of Hearing For Approval of Project of
attack the validity of a final judgment: Partition issued on 6 August 1973 by the Clerk of Court. 56 Private respondent Espina was lying
through her teeth when she claimed otherwise.
(1) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be filed
within sixty (60) days after learning of the decision, but not more than six (6) The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not a ground for
months after such decision is entered; the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution should have been
filed. In De Jesus vs.
(2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by collateral attack, Daza, 57 this Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has possession of the share to be
assuming that the decision is void for want of jurisdiction; delivered, the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order
him to transfer that possession to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary
(3) By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code, assuming period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in order. As We see it, the attack
that the decision was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 can not be applied. 49 of 10 September 1973 on the Order was just a clever ploy to give asemblance of strength and
substance to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting therein a probate court
It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their right to file a petition for relief from committing a series of fatal, substantive and procedural blunders, which We find to be imaginary, if
judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed exactly six (6) years, not deliberately fabricated.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition and supplemental petitions are GRANTED. The Order of SANTOS Construction are listed in Annex "E;" (7) the compulsory heirs of the decedent are the as
respondent Judge of 2 June 1980 and all other orders issued by him in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, as the surviving spouse and their two (2) minor children namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman 11
well as all other proceedings had therein in connection with or in relation to the Omnibus Motion years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years old; (8) after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain
for Reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. whether the decedent left a last will and testament, none has been found and according to the
best knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died intestate; and
The restraining order issued on 2 June 1980 is hereby made PERMANENT. (9) the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the decedent, is most qualified and entitled to
the grant of letters of administration.
Costs against private respondent Concepcion M. Espina.
On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) —
vehicles registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of
SO ORDERED. the de Guzman's but which are at present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in-
law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private
respondent must have the possession of said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late
husband. On the same day, the lower court issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May
27, 1987 directing the deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of the
private respondent.

The scheduled May 27, 1987 hearing was postponed on motion of petitioner's counsel, Atty.
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL Ricardo Fojas. The petitioner was also given three (3) days from May 27, 1987 to give his
comment on the motion for a writ of possession. The hearing was reset to June 5, 1987 at 3:00
G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988 p.m.

PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, On May 29, 1987, the petitioner's counsel filed a notice of appearance and an "Urgent Motion For
vs. Extension of Time to File an Opposition and for Resetting of the Hearing."
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO,
MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE The motion was granted and the petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt of the order within
GUZMAN, respondents. which to file his opposition to the motion for a writ of possession. The hearing was reset to June
15, 1987 at 2:00 in the afternoon.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint
May a probate court act on and/or grant motions for the appointment of a special administrator, for Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman."
the issuance of a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person, and for
assistance to preserve the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate even before In an order dated May 28,1987, the aforesaid motion was set for hearing on June 5, 1987. In this
the court has caused notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 same order, the lower court directed that all parties in the case be notified. However, no notice of
of the Revised Rules of Court? the order was given to the petitioner.

On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the settlement of the In an order dated June 5, 1987, the lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be
intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. appointed as special administratrix, to wit:
The case was docketed as Special Proceedings .No. M-1436.
Finding the motion for appointment of special administratrix, on the ground
The petition alleges that: (1) on March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro alleged therein to be well-founded, and finding further that it is to be the best
Manila; (2) at the time of his death, the decedent was a resident of Makati, Metro Manila; (3) interest of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman that petitioner-movant Elaine G. de
decedent left personal and real properties as part of his estate, listed in Annexes "A," "B," "C" and Guzman, be appointed as Special Administratrix in this case, said motion is
"D;" (4) the properties were acquired after the marriage of the petitioner to the decedent and granted.
therefore are included in their conjugal partnership; (5) the estate of -the decedent has a probable
net value which may be provisionally assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less; (6) the possible
creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable. and existing claims against the firm — C.
 WHEREFORE, Elaine G. de Guzman, petitioner-movant, is hereby appointed as Anent the June 8, 1987 order, the petitioner alleges that the immediate grant of the motion praying
Special Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman, for the court's assistance in the preservation of the estate of the deceased, "without notice to the
pending appointment of a regular administrator. The bond for the said special petitioner Pedro de Guzman, and its immediate implementation on the very same day by
administratrix is hereby fixed in the amount of P200,000.00. (Rollo, p. 40) respondent Elaine G. de Guzman with the assistance of respondents deputy sheriffs, at no other
place but at the home of the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, are eloquent proofs that all the
On June 8, 1987, the lower court issued another order, to wit: antecedent events were intended solely to deprive petitioner de Guzman of his property without
due process of law." He also prays that the respondent Judge be disqualified from further
continuing the case.
Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Assistance" filed by Petitioner-Special
Administratrix Elaine de Guzman for appointment of Deputy Sheriffs Honorio
Santos and Jose B. Flora together with some military men and/or policemen to As stated earlier, the pivotal issue in the instant petition hinges on whether or not a probate court
assist her in preserving the estate of Manolito de Guzman, the motion is granted may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a
and the Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora are hereby appointed decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
for that purpose, provided that the subject matter of the motion for writ of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all
possession pending before this Court shall not be affected. (Rollo, p. 41) interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above order. The petitioner resisted As early as March 18, 1937, in the case of Santos v. Castillo (64 Phil. 211) we ruled that before a
when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject vehicles on the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of the
ground that they were his personal properties. According to the petitioner, this resulted in a "near properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased
shoot-out between members of the Makati Police, who were to maintain peace and order, and the and other indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the
CAPCOM soldiers who were ostensibly aiding respondent sheriffs and Elaine G. de Guzman" and will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated.
that "the timely arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati defused the very volatile situation which
resulted in an agreement between the parties that the bulldozer, sought to be taken, be In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
temporarily placed in the custody of Mayor Binay, while the parties seek clarification of the order proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private
from respondent Judge Zosimo Angeles the next day, June 9, 1981 at 10:30 a.m." respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased
person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased
In the conference held before the respondent court attended by the counsels for both parties, the Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
June 8, 1987 order was clarified to the effect that the order "must be merely to take and preserve
assets admittedly belonging to the estate, but not properties, the ownership of which is claimed by We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings
third persons." for the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in the
settlement of the estate of the deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the
The petitioner then filed a manifestation listing properties which he claimed to be his own. "estate" of the deceased person but the determination of the properties comprising that estate
must follow established rules.
Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's orders dated June 5, 1987 and
June 8, 1987. Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

In a resolution dated June 10, 1987, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a petition for letters of
respondent court from enforcing the two questioned orders. In another resolution dated October administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time
28, 1987, we gave due course to the petition. and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to
the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed
to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of
The petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent nullity, the respondent court not Rule 76.
having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the
settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three
consecutive weeks, as mandated by the Rules of Court. The petitioner also stresses that the It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of
appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion for having been made the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested
without giving petitioner and other parties an opportunity to oppose said appointment. persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the
world. (Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court Volume 3,1980
Edition) Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given
to persons believed to have an interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for The position of special administrator, by the very nature of the powers granted
the settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is thereby, is one of trust and confidence. It is a fiduciary position and, therefore,
essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived of his right to property requires a comprehensive determination of the suitability of the applicant to such
without due process of law. (Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163). position. Hence, under Philippine jurisprudence, it has been settled that the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased should be taken in choosing the special administrator (Francisco, Vol. VB, page
person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, 46 citing the cases of Ozaeta v. Pecson, Ibid. and Roxas v. Pecson, Ibid.)
subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment. (See Eusebio v. Valmores, supra)
In order to fully and correctly ascertain the suitability of the applicant to the trust,
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court a hearing is obviously necessary wherein the applicant can prove his
was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private qualifications and at the same time affording oppositors, given notice of such
respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged hearing and application, the opportunity to oppose or contest such application.
properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to
preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman. The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all the
known heirs and other interested parties as to the date thereof
The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for his apparent haste in issuing the is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the appointment
questioned orders, states: of an administrator "in order that no person may be deprived of
his right or property without due process of law" (Eusebio v.
Valmores, 97 Phil. 163). Moreover, a hearing is necessary in
xxx xxx xxx order to fully determine the suitability of the applicant to the
trust, by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications
10. In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned acted in the honest conviction that and affording oppositors, if any, to contest the said application.
it would be to the best interest of the estate without unduly prejudicing any (Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 770; emphasis supplied).
interested party or third person. Any delay in issuing the said Orders might have
prejudiced the estate for the properties may be lost, wasted or dissipated in the Since the position of special administrator is a very sensitive one which requires
meantime. (Rollo, p. 86) trust and confidence, it is essential that the suitability of the applicant be
ascertained in a hearing with due notice to all oppositors who may object
xxx xxx xxx precisely to the applicant's suitability to the trust. (Rollo, pp. 103-104)

This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the disregard of the Rule. If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate justify a court's
If indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both the estate and the person who have immediately taking some kind of temporary action even without the required notice, no such
interest in the estate, then it could have caused notice to be given immediately as mandated by emergency is shown in this case. The need for the proper notice even for the appointment of a
the Revised Rules of Court. All interested persons including herein petitioner who is the biggest special administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case.
creditor of the estate listed in the Petition (P850,240.80) could have participated in the
proceedings especially so, because the respondent immediately filed a motion to have herself The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the preservation of the estate was limited
appointed as administratrix. A special administrator has been defined as the "representative of to properties not claimed by  third parties. If certain properties are already in the possession of the
decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or applicant for special administratrix and are not claimed by other persons, we see no need to hurry
general administrator is appointed." (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R. Co. 1965 ed., at 106 cited in up and take special action to preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs took advantage of the
Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189). The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar questioned order to seize by force, properties found in the residence of the petitioner which he
interest in the preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be the widow vehemently claims are owned by him and not by the estate of the deceased person.
of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of
Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued if the
appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were given The petitioner also asks that the respondent Judge be disqualified from continuing with the
notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator proceedings of the case on the ground that he is partial to the private respondent.
is apparent from the records.
In view of the fact that the respondent Judge in his "Explanation" requests that he be inhibited
As argued by the petitioner: from further active on the case, this issue has now become academic. We accept Judge Angeles"
voluntary inhibition in line with our ruling in Pimentel v. Salanga (21 SCRA 160). As we stated
in Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan on the
conflicting views of Regional Trial Court—Judges Manalo and Elisaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954
— M Administrative Matter No. 87-9-3918-RTC, October 26, 1987:

xxx xxx xxx

... A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party
or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in
the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the
probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought
that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is
a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great
care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit Where
that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where
that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice
would be occasioned to others involved thereon. On the result of his decisions to
sit or not sit may depend to a great extent that all-important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily
desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously
impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who
forestalls miscarriage of justice.

Considering the foregoing, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 58 of Makati are hereby set aside. The case is ordered remanded to the lower court
for the hearing of the petition with previous notice to all interested parties as required by law. In
view of the voluntary inhibition of the respondent Judge, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati is directed to re-raffle the case to another branch of the court. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated June 10, 1987 is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of sound
and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and testament.

1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance
with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named provide and erect at the
expose of my state a suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.

xxx xxx xxx

The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole
heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in
substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the
proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil
Code reading:

Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a

holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated
so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3, reading in
ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner, part:
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa
City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents. The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation
for examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the
insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one and the same
. person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent,
Natividad K. Kalaw. The only question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be
admitted to probate although the alterations and/or insertions or additions above-
mentioned were not authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix pursuant to
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner contends that the oppositors are
estopped to assert the provision of Art. 814 on the ground that they themselves
agreed thru their counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The parties did not agree, nor was it
his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be in estoppel.
Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24,
1968.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code is
applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in
The holographic Will reads in full as follows: Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad
K. Kalaw, the Court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".
My Last will and Testament
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the holographic will of
In the name of God, Amen. Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or que no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro no el documento que las contenga,
insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will would be contrary to her y con mayor motivo cuando las palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o
right of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del
1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros accidentes de ortografia o de
necessity for interpretation." purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia alguna(l).

From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated November 2, Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en este ultimo
1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari on the sole legal fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin salvar
question of whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions saan de pala bras que no afecter4 alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la
were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should express voluntad del testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la
be probated or not, with her as sole heir. sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento olografo
por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo del año en
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a que fue extendido3 (Emphasis ours).
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as
a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated
interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
1895." 2 SO ORDERED.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry
the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that
which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be
given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature,

The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but
not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and
alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude. As
Manresa had stated in his commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article
814 of the new Civil Code was derived:

... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que
no declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo que contenga palabras
tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no salvadas por el testador bajo su
firnia segun previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal
omision solo puede afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al
testamento mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que
determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez del testamento olografo, ya
porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que pequefias
enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva
del testamento, vinieran a anular este, y ya porque el precepto contenido en
dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia con el art. 26
de la ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones apostillas
entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras matrices, siempre
 purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26, 1973,
respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21,
1973.

Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a
notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24
thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of
the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my
win which I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer. ...

The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus
and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the
holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting
of their mother and positively Identified her signature. They further testified that their deceased
mother understood English, the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date
"FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother.

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the
purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance
with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could
have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.
G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA the holographic Will which he found to have been duly executed in accordance with law.
ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs. Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia that the
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent. alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as required by Article
810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day,
month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed
the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to
include the month, day, and year. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco,
Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will of Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for not having been executed as required
by the law. The order of August 24, 1973 is hereby set aside.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.

The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code
No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas
which reads:
de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus.
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After Letters of
Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document
 other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard
witnessed. against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary
privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed in substantial
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise
Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,
execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase Año mes y dia and simply requires that the
holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the xxx xxx xxx
holographic Will should prevail.
... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic Will is void for considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances
non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must contain the year, point to a regular execution of the wilt and the instrument appears to have been
month, and day of its execution. The respondent contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the
patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud,
whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that the required date includes the year, month, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from
and day, and that if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. ... (Leynez v.
contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil Code Leynez 68 Phil. 745).
because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills
are strictly construed. If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance
is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite
We agree with the petitioner. is actually attained by the form followed by the testator.

This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been expounded by this
statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We should not overlook the liberal Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt
is to prevent intestacy — The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
on wigs in this Project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
his last wishes, but with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent the competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
influence upon the testator.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect to the in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that
formalities in the execution of wills. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 103) the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and
signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos  (27 SCRA 327) genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the
he emphasized that: holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that
xxx xxx xxx the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic
Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to
be entertained.
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in his last will
and testament on the ground that any disposition made by the testator is better
than that which the law can make. For this reason, intestate succession is As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
nothing more than a disposition based upon the presumed will of the decedent. execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether
or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810
of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's
substantial compliance. holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing
mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and dispose of her estate by will.
SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is reinstated. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which
SO ORDERED. were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested
the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed
that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate.
It found, inter alia:

Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the
question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of
the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the
will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the
oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix
which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix
other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced,
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, the identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will
vs. submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents. testatrix.

PUNO, J.: xxx xxx xxx

This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads; the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily
shown in Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written entirely,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who
the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been
is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with
which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting
and signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc.
of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the
No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.

xxx xxx xxx

In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero,
private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe
Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
 As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was dispositions.
completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration
in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic
the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
making the will, knew the value  of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper object of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act . . . The
will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but
her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not
had conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. been authenticated by decedent.
And considering that she had even written a nursing book which contained the
law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the following cases:
testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance
of probate of the will submitted herein. (a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at
disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was the time of its execution;
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix.
(Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert
at the time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth (d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part
anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a very of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and
to some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all (e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not
show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature
make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper thereto.
pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the
specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of another In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing
reason for the disallowance of the will herein.
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied
that in case of doubt, testate succession should be preferred over intestate
with;
succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven
for the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid
will submitted herein must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.) (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of
making a will, at the time of its execution;
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the
its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil influence of fear, or threats;
Code, which read, as follows:
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date,
 (5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
signature thereto.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with
5
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.    Thus, in a petition to the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this
admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument Court held:
submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . .
and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6 the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento,
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
This is erroneous.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs.  Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that: the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating
to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be and with the requisites required in Article 688.
disregarded.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription,
attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding
to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.
that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article
810 of the New Civil Code, thus: If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must
identify them over his signature.
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of
Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house turn opposed by Jose Rivera, who reiterated that he was the sole heir of Venancio's intestate
and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be estate. 2
affirmed.
On November 11, 1975, the two cases were consolidated. Adelaido J. Rivera was later appointed
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity special administrator. After joint trial, Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the
of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to son of the decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The
do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will.  11 In the Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had
case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran seven children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera had no claim to this estate because the decedent
property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to was not his father. The holographic wills were also admitted to probate. 3
question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court,
she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court. 4 Its decision is now the subject of this petition, which urges the reversal of the respondent
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in court.
CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with
respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del In support of his claim that he was the sole heir of the late Venancio Rivera, Jose sought to show
Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q- that the said person was married in 1928 to Maria Vital, who was his mother. He submitted for this
37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie purpose Exhibit A, the marriage certificate of the couple, and Exhibit B, his own baptismal
Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. certificate where the couple was indicated as his parents. The petitioner also presented Domingo
No costs. Santos, who testified that Jose was indeed the son of the couple and that he saw Venancio and
Jose together several times. 5 Jose himself stressed that Adelaido considered him a half-brother
SO ORDERED. and kissed his hand as a sign of respect whenever they met. He insisted that Adelaido and his
brothers and sisters were illegitimate children, sired by Venancio with Maria Jocson. 6
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
Adelaido, for his part, maintained that he and his brothers and sisters were born to Venancio
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990 Rivera and Maria Jocson, who were legally married and lived as such for many years. He
explained that he could not present his parents' marriage certificate because the record of
marriages for 1942 in Mabalacat were destroyed when the town was burned during the war, as
JOSE RIVERA petitioner, certified by Exhibit 6. 7 He also submitted his own birth certificate and those of his sisters Zenaida
vs. and Yolanda Rivera, who were each described therein as the legimitate children of Venancio
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents. Rivera and Maria Jocson. 8 Atty. Regalado P. Morales, then 71 years of age, affirmed that he
knew the deceased and his parents, Magno Rivera and Gertrudes de los Reyes, and it was during
the Japanese occupation that Venancio introduced to him Maria Jocson as his wife.  9 To prove
that there were in fact two persons by the same name of Venancio Rivera, Adelaido offered
CRUZ, J.: Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate showing that his parents were Magno Rivera and
Gertrudes de los Reyes, 10 as contrasted with the marriage certificate submitted by Jose, which
indicated that the Venancio Rivera subject thereof was the son of Florencio Rivera and Estrudez
Was there only one Venancio Rivera in Mabalacat, Pampanga, or were there two? Reyes. 11 He also denied kissing Jose's hand or recognizing him as a brother. 12

On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On We find in favor of Adelaido J. Rivera.
July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No.
1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents' marriage certificate because, as he explained
decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die intestate but in fact left it, the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat civil registry were burned during the war. Even
two holographic wills.1 so, he could still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera
and Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting seven children in
all during that time.
On November 7, 1975, Adelaido J. Rivera filed, also with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
a petition for the probate of the holographic wills. Docketed as SP No. 1091, this petition was in
According to Article 220 of the Civil Code:
 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every Maria Jocson, the alleged partners in crime and sin. Maria Vital was completely passive and
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the complaisant.
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, ... .
Significantly, as noted by the respondent court, Maria Vital was not even presented at the trial to
The Rules of Court, in Rule 131, provides: support her son's allegations that she was the decedent's lawful wife. Jose says this was not done
because she was already old and bedridden then. But there was no impediment to the taking of
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions.  — The following presumptions are satisfactory her deposition in her own house. No effort was made toward this end although her testimony was
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: vital to the petitioner's cause. Jose dismisses such testimony as merely "cumulative," but this
Court does not agree. Having alleged that Maria Jocson's marriage to Venancio Rivera was null
and void, Jose had the burden of proving that serious allegation.
xxx xxx xxx
We find from the evidence of record that the respondent court did not err in holding that the
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have Venancio Rivera who married Maria Jocson in 1942 was not the same person who married Maria
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Vital, Jose's legitimate mother, in 1928. Jose belonged to a humbler family which had no relation
whatsoever with the family of Venancio Rivera and Maria Vital. This was more prosperous and
By contrast, although Jose did present his parents' marriage certificate, Venancio was described prominent. Except for the curious Identity of names of the head of each, there is no evidence
therein as the son of Florencio Rivera. Presumably, he was not the same Venancio Rivera linking the two families or showing that the deceased Venancio Rivera was the head of both.
described in Exhibit 4, his baptismal certificate, as the son of Magno Rivera. While we realize that
such baptismal certificate is not conclusive evidence of Venancio's filiation (which is not the issue Now for the holographic wills. The respondent court considered them valid because it found them
here) it may nonetheless be considered to determine his real identity. Jose insists that Magno and to have been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of
Florencio are one and the same person, arguing that it is not uncommon for a person to be called the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required
by different names. The Court is not convinced. There is no evidence that Venancio's father was under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.
called either Magno or Florencio. What is more likely is that two or more persons may live at the
same time and bear the same name, even in the same community. That is what the courts below
found in the cases at bar. The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose
Rivera. In his own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in
SP No. 1091, he denied the existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for
What this Court considers particularly intriguing is why, if it is true that he was the legitimate son of probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido
Venancio Rivera, Jose did not assert his right as such when his father was still alive. By his own Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent
account, Jose supported himself — and presumably also his mother Maria Vital — as a gasoline court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
attendant and driver for many years. All the time, his father was residing in the same town — and
obviously prospering — and available for support. His alleged father was openly living with
another woman and raising another family, but this was apparently accepted by Jose without In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
protest, taking no step whatsoever to invoke his status. If, as he insists, he and Venancio Rivera who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
were on cordial terms, there is no reason why the father did not help the son and instead left Jose will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested,
to fend for himself as a humble worker while his other children by Maria Jocson enjoyed a at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
comfortable life. Such paternal discrimination is difficult to understand, especially if it is considered
— assuming the claims to be true — that Jose was the oldest and, by his own account, the only The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the
legitimate child of Venancio Rivera. deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring
And there is also Maria Vital, whose attitude is no less incomprehensible. As Venancio's legitimate the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the
wife — if indeed she was — she should have objected when her husband abandoned her and wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
founded another family by another woman, and in the same town at that. Seeing that the children
of Maria Jocson were being raised well while her own son Jose was practically ignored and WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs
neglected, she nevertheless did not demand for him at least support, if not better treatment, from against the petitioner.
his legitimate father. It is unnatural for a lawful wife to say nothing if she is deserted in favor of
another woman and for a caring mother not to protect her son's interests from his wayward father's SO ORDERED.
neglect. The fact is that this forsaken wife never demanded support from her wealthy if errant
husband. She did not file a complaint for bigamy or concubinage against Venancio Rivera and
 issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine
Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following
grounds:

(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing
to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by
Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition
of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and
therefore it was not a will

(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be
produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil.
509; and

(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and
attested as required by law.

The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case
Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated
April 4, 1977.
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees
moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent
deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence
unlike ordinary wills.
.

Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court
in its order of February 23, 1979.

RELOVA, J.:
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order
was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the
probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the
 In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for
the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to
document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills. approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on SO ORDERED.
January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the
lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death
of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to
our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Holographic Will.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in
which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled
jurisprudence.

On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal
does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned
errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC

WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS
DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.

The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be
proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of
holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved.
The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required
and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other
copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox
copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented;
otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
can be determined by the probate court.
 Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing the
probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. 2

The facts are as follows:

On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for probate of the holographic will of
the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.

In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of
sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no
fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and will was written
voluntarily.

The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal property was about
P400,000.00, at the time of her death.4

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition 5 to the
petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even
illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true
hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.

RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition
is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the
dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and
G.R. No. 123486           August 12, 1999
not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the
deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners, beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.1âwphi1.nêt
vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead
of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer 6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to
PARDO, J.: establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 and its
resolution denying reconsideration, ruling: On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence having
Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been established and being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for probate of the document (Exhibit
the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will. "S") on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, is
Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.7
question be called for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his
evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in support of their appeal, the
ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the motion is
respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto
granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to
Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo
present evidence in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may,
Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant case.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of their Instruction
testimonies.
August 30, 1978
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the special
proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed. He produced and 1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear the signature of the deceased,
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the
handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the party against (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
whom the evidence is offered.
August 30, 1978
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produced and identify
the voter's affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters' affidavit was not produced for the same 2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.
was already destroyed and no longer available.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal was her
aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's husband, the latter lived with her in her parent's house August 30, 1978
for eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of close association the
deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to accompany 3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:
her (deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various tenants of
commercial buildings, and deceased always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness
Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried 1. Eufemia Patigas
personal letters of the deceased to her creditors.
2. Josefina Salcedo
Matilde Ramonal Binanay  further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda. de
Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was personally and entirely 3. Evangeline Calugay
written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and the
signatures in said will, were that of the deceased. (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro, he was August 30, 1978
a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed by the deceased in
connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a result of which he is familiar with the
4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R. Calugay
handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will was
similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
The fifth witness presented was Mrs.  Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the application August 30, 1978
of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the
signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit. 5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline R.
Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no longer around.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the
deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period of time she (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the signature appearing in
the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. August 30, 1978

The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows: 6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.
 (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be
present (art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed
August 30, 1978 merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Gene and Manuel: Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the
court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the court
should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses
Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully. is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent
Mama witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the court may still, and in
fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all
Matilde Vda de Ramonal available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true
intention of the testator be carried into effect.
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision 9 ruling that the appeal was
meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs.  Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held: contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of
. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the
that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as to require the holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity
under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much
the execution of the holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, new civil interested in the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. And
code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses. 10
know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not express) "that the will and the signature are in the According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and other
handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness acquainted with the witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and signature in the
testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness maybe unwilling to give a positive holographic will were those of the testator herself.
opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an
impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of article 811 Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde
prescribes that — Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the
handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if
the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. Hence, this petition.

As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma be found (or The petitioners raise the following issues:
what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the
authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the (1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied upon
deficiency. by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if (2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had
the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule been able to present credible evidence to that the date, text, and signature on the
established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v. holographic will written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.
Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be
considered mandatory only in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the
presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law
 (3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the Q.   Who sometime accompany her?
holographic will of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
A.   I sometimes accompany her.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are
permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested Q.   In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?
holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator.1âwphi1.nêt
A.   Yes, sir.13
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory.
The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly xxx     xxx     xxx
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory. 11 Q.   Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are referring to
as one of the receipts which she issued to them?
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to
prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and A.   Yes, sir.
the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. Q.   Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that Mrs.
Binanay?
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true
intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to A.   Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
establish the true intent of the testator.
Q.   Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they
were familiar with the handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of A.   I am familiar with her signature.
First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427
before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic was that of the deceased. Q.   Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de Ramonal kept
records of the accounts of her tenants?
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to identify the
signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no longer A.   Yes, sir.
available.
Q.   Why do you say so?
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:
A.   Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De
Q.   And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your Ramonal.
parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the court what was your
occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy that time? Q.   How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?

A.   Collecting rentals. A.   In handwritten.14

Q.   From where? xxx     xxx     xxx

A.   From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets. 12 Q.   In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and deed of
sale which you said what else did you do to acquire familiarity of the signature of Matilde
xxx     xxx     xxx Vda De Ramonal?
 A.   Posting records. A.   I.

Q.   Aside from that? Q.   Since when did you have the possession of the will?

A.   Carrying letters. A.   It was in my mother's possession.

Q.   Letters of whom? Q.   So, it was not in your possession?

A.   Matilde. A.   Sorry, yes.

Q.   To whom? Q.   And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally in the
possession of your mother?
A.   To her creditors.15
A.   1985.17
xxx     xxx     xxx
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q.   You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a document
with its title "tugon" is this the document you are referring to? Q.   Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that will to
you and therefore you have that in your possession?
A.   Yes, sir.
A.   It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.
Q.   Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose handwriting
is this? Q.   After taking that document you kept it with you?

A.   My Aunt. A.   I presented it to the fiscal.

Q.   Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt? Q.   For what purpose?

A.   Because I am familiar with her signature.16 A.   Just to seek advice.

What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either Q.   Advice of what?
mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or
write a note. A.   About the will.18

Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that the will was In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from petitioners,
not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the
She testified that: will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

Q.   Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late Matilde In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?
Q.   Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is that
A.   Yes, sir. correct?

Q.   Who was in possession of that will? A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she Q.   Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the alleged
could go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct? holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no retracing; there is no hesitancy
and the signature was written on a fluid movement. . . . And in fact, the name Eufemia R.
A.   Yes, sir.19 Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners?

xxx     xxx     xxx A.   Yes, sir.

Q.   Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that there are Q.   You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned signature
retracings in the word Vda.? appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting
themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?
A.   Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.
A.   Yes, sir.21
Q.   And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testator. She testified that:
A.   Yes, sir.
Q.   You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo
Q.   Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the services if any which you
continued towards letter D. rendered to Matilde Ramonal?

A.   Yes, sir. A.   During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then to her
transactions.
Q.   And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
Q.   What else? What services that you rendered?
A.   Yes, sir.20
A.   After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to her
xxx     xxx     xxx lawyer.

Q.   Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will. Now, you Q.   What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?
identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated January 8, 1978 which is only
about eight months from August 30, 1978. Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda A.   I used to be her personal driver.
de Ramonal is beautifully written and legible?
Q.   In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the handwriting of
A.   Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted. Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

Q.   You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy was not A.   Yes, sir.
sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was exhausted?
Q.   How come that you acquired familiarity?
A.   In writing.
A.   Because I lived with her since birth.22
Q.   How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and you just
tried to explain yourself out because of the apparent inconsistencies?
xxx     xxx     xxx
A.   That was I think. (sic).
 Q.   Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated Agosto 30, A.   It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the court
1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this court whose signature is before.26
this?
xxx     xxx     xxx
A.   Yes, sir, that is her signature.
Q.   Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is marked
Q.   Why do you say that is her signature? as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there appears a signature over the type
written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
A.   I am familiar with her signature.23
A.   That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the handwriting of
the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never declared that she saw the Q.   Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?
deceased write a note or sign a document.
A.   This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal. 27
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q.   Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
Q.   Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were
A.   Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather. the other assistance wherein you were rendering professional service to the deceased
Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity. Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

Q.   Can you tell the name of the husband? A.   I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents
to show that I have assisted then I can recall.28
A.   The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24
xxx     xxx     xxx
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q.   Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go over this
Q.   Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar with the handwriting
have legitimate children? contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"?

A.   As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25 A.   I am not familiar with the handwriting.

xxx     xxx     xxx Q.   This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

Q.   You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where? A.   I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de
Ramonal.
A.   Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
Q.   Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you
tell the court whose signature is this?
Q.   Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A.   Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.
A.   I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
Q.   Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the
Q.   When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what court whose signature is that?
case is that, Fiscal?
 A.   As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance
Q.   Why do you say that? at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners
asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with
that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the
A.   Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written. deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

Q.   How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature is this? A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of
A.   The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar. 29 the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.

xxx     xxx     xxx Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33 and the signatures in
several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30,
Q.   Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda de 1980,34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978, 35 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are
Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal? continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the
holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the
A.   Yes, it is similar to the project of partition. handwriting by the deceased.

Q.   So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered
merely supposing that it seems to be her signature because it is similar to the signature of remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support
the project of partition which you have made? of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño vda. de
Ramonal.1âwphi1.nêt
A.   That is true.30
No costs.
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and
disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the SO ORDERED.
decision in Azaola vs.  Singson,31 ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not
mandatory.

In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding
the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills
and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will.

However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay,
she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of
the deceased.
 This is a petition for review of the Resolutions1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69221, 2 dismissing petitioners’ petition for annulment of
judgment.

On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, docketed as SP

Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of the Last Will and Testament 3 of the late Soledad Provido
Elevencionado ("decedent"), who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. 4 Respondent alleged
that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered
its Decision,5 allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent.6

More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings.7 Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the
will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, 8 claiming that
they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication,
and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been
probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in
accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by
force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at
the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of,
having included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the
letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed
of under intestate succession.9

On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order10 denying petitioners’ motion for being
unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were deemed
notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a
ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay the
deficiency.11 Moreover, the RTC’s Decision was already final and executory even before
RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen.12

G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005 Petitioners thereafter filed a petition 13 with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA,
seeking the annulment of the RTC’s Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January
2002. They claimed that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent,
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE P. COLLADO, JUDITH PROVIDO, held several conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with
CLARITA PROVIDO, ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA E. respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a
PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO ARENGA, CAROL compromise agreement to implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the agreement,
ARENGA, RUTH BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO MARIN, respondent refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned
JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and MATHILDE MARIN, Petitioners, interest in participating in the compromise agreement so that they would not suspect his intention
vs. to secure the probate of the will. 14 They claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO, Respondent. July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their
opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the
DECISION RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.15
Tinga, J.:
In its Resolution16 promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s
there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new judgment.31
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of
their own.17 Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners’ claim that the proceedings in the The petition is devoid of merit.
RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this
ground in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA
added.18 Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the
for lack of merit.19 ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same

Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to show that damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final
they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from order is contrary to law.32 Both motions should be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or
judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
their day in court during the proceedings before the RTC. 20 In addition, they assert that this Court
has yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant petition Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a
should be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar. 21 judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies provided in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be
in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for new trial. 22 Moreover, they filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after
could have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment since they learned of the RTC’s judgment entry thereof.33
only three and a half months after its promulgation. 23 Respondent likewise maintains that no
extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the annulment of the RTC’s Decision, since there was no showing A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies
that they were denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to the probate available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed
proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs. 24 Besides,
assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of notice to them is not a fatal judgment is rendered.34 In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case,
defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment. 35
jurisdictional requisite.25 Finally, respondent charges petitioners of forum–shopping, since the latter
have a pending suit involving the same issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that is SP No. However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become
118126 filed before Branch 23, RTC of General Santos City and subsequently pending on appeal parties to the probate proceedings.
before the CA in CA-G.R. No.74924.27
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores ("Flores"), who is a niece of the interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC of General Santos City, claiming jurisdiction to have the will allowed. 36 Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be
that the decedent died intestate without any issue, survived by five groups of collateral heirs. published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Flores, armed with a Special Power of Attorney from most of the other petitioners, prayed for her province,37 as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the testator.38 Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one  in rem, such
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
since the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where the interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. 39
decedent died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the first court acquiring jurisdiction
shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC added. 28 On 9 January
2002, Flores filed a Notice of Appeal 29 and on 28 January 2002, the case was ordered forwarded Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
to the CA.30 who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 40 Thus, even though petitioners were not
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of
annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new the publication of the notice of hearing.
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling
of the CA. They aver that respondent’s offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of nor testate heirs49 who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules.
motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to
a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the personally notify them of the same.
reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for
having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is
cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of
Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. 50
have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen.
Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or almost four (4) The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify
months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy. them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in
court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, before the probate court.
petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would
benefit from their own inaction or negligence.41 One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-shopping consists
of filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, involving the same
Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled. substantially same reliefs,51 on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.52 Obviously, the parties in the instant case, as well as in the appealed case before the
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the existence and validity of the alleged will of the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. 42 The purpose of such action is to have the final decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy. In the probate
and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in proceedings, petitioners’ position has always been that the decedent left no will and if she did, the
cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other will does not comply with the requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, 43 and is based on present petition. Of course, respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the
only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. 44 A person need petition for letters of administration, petitioner Flores prayed for her appointment as administratrix
not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his of the
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby.45 estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal which is the subject of review in CA-G.R. No.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or 74924. Clearly, therefore, there is forum-shopping.
collateral in character.46 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial
or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their certification
the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when against forum- shopping. Neither have they done so at any time thereafter. The Court notes that
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party even in the petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency
from having his day in court.47 of their appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though the notice of appeal was filed way before the
petition for annulment of judgment was instituted.
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondent’s
deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and
thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondent’s offer of a false SO ORDERED.
compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the
petition for probate.

The Court is not convinced.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator.48 A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole
heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory
 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order
dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent
Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.

We grant the petition.

II

Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens,
established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896
Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and
Josephine, 14.

On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all
the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated"
(Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children
and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix
of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of
his will states:

If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such

circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our
deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be
administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption (Rollo, p. 41).

Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament
containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states:

RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF PH AND ADMINISTRATION OF If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances
ESTATE THEREUNDER that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it
shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered
and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p.
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
31).

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,

On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire
vs.
that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the
Bulacan, respondent.
County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor.
.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner
herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate
QUIASON, J.: proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and
J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr.
petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father,
took her oath as special administration. Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is
qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life Insurance belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1)
Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner
policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the
as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion. regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.

Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or
that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan. In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her daughter, Dr.
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have
deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was
Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52. prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate
court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the
allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself
F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came
Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and
before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully
testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and
proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motions of May 19, irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
1983.
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the Cunanan
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide equally the estates,"
collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause
"no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-
F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in 185).
accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this
jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under
Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to comply
"the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She
heirship is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate
112-113). Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets
are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1
subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21,
the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or
to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that they were
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of
and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement
for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated
to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as
them of their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and
(2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was monies which she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the American incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute
court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21,
July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed
proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and
spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken
manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as part and decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19, 1985,
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of
petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion for
pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the
prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and
whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a
evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and
law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills
Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not in question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New
signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law. York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381).

On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 21, On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign
1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein
of last wills and testaments. he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was
curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for the that effect.
suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act
on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second portion of the second order However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled
left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March
reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the
pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court. testator" (Records, p. 391).

On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for reconsideration
which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New
testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the
issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the
proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302). On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a
single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where
one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records,
and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion p. 395).
praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21,
1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the
denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986,
the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985. citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may institute more than
one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the
spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a motion beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy
praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, (g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly
citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken
adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that (Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her
motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421). (h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary
were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons (i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a
even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376- decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G.
378). Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
"I-10");
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing of
April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and (j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held
that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings. and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");

II (k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly executed,
genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to probate and
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before respondent established as wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-
Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills: 5"); and

(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by (l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and
the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G"); authenticity of each other’s signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of
probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6"
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the
Country of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court’s Decision of
office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984.
respective wills of Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1"); The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in
this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating
that they have in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2"); made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides,
or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" — which this Code prescribes.
"G-6");
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the Philippine laws is imperative.
genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-
7" and "F-7"); The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside
of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will
in New York (Exh. "H" and "F"). has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran
Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500
[1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines"
petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to
country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
(Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]). Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the the testator, . . . "
pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just
glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the
before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all
SCRA 393 [1978]). notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be SO ORDERED.
probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in
singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate
proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such
view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise
that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."

A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the
administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v.
Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at
bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the
same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical
considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact — petitioner
has always considered herself the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the
instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is
being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876
[1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to
be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27,
Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it
were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or
 The records show that the administrator has presented his final report in which it appears
that he has paid all the debts and expenses of the administration and which report was
approved by this court.

It appears of record that Mr. B. E. Johannes is the lawful husband of the deceased
Carmen D'Almeida Johannes and the legally appointed administrator of the estate of
Carmen D'Almeida Johannes in Singapore, Strait Settlements; that the said B. E.
Johannes is actually within the jurisdiction of this court and by request of his attorney of
record asks the court to direct the administrator here (the ancillary administrator) to turn
over to him as the domicile administrator appointed in the residence of the deceased all
the cash money, liberty bonds and Spanish shares pertaining to said estate.

Ordinarily the court would have been justified in transmitting the funds of this estate to the
probate court of the last residence of the deceased for distribution in accordance with the
laws of said jurisdiction, but in this case the administrator B. E. Johannes is temporarily
within this jurisdiction and ask the court, through his attorney, to deliver to him the
balance of the funds of the estate in his capacity as administrator appointed by the court
of the last residence of the deceased and the court is of the opinion that it is proper to
deliver the funds to said administrator.

By virtue of which, the administrator Alfred D'Almeida is authorized to withdraw the

deposit slips and all the money deposited in the bank and, after payment of the
corresponding inheritance tax, make delivery of same to the referred B. E. Johannes in
his capacity as administrator of the estate of Carmen D'Almeida Johannes, together with
RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF PH AND ADMINISTRATION OF the liberty bonds and Casino Espanol shares, and after making the delivery of the funds
ESTATE THEREUNDER and the payment of the tax, administrator Alfred D'Almeida shall be relieved of his duties
and responsibilities.
G.R. No. L-19759 December 20, 1922
The appellant contends that the court erred in considering the application of B. E. Johannes, the
principals administrator, and the motion of August 25, 1922, for the reason that it was not
B. E. JOHANNES, principal administrator, CARLOS D'ALMEIDA, JOHN E. JOHANNES and
presented within the rules of the court; in ordering the ancillary administrator to pay the inheritance
IDA D'ALMEIDA, petitioners-appellees,
tax; and in ordering him to deliver the property of the estate to B. E. Johannes, as administrator,
vs.
and in denying the motion of reconsideration.
ALFRED D'ALMEIDA, ancillary administrator, opponent-appellant.

 
STATEMENT

JOHNS, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant from the following decision of Judge Harvey of the Court of
First Instance:
In different forms this is the third time this case has been before this court. The proceedings had
their origin in the death of Carmen D'Almeida, who was then a resident of Singapore, Straits
This refers to a petition presented by B. E. Johannes in his capacity as administrator
Settlements. The plaintiff B. E. Johannes, her surviving husband, was duly appointed
appointed by the Supreme Court of Singapore, Straits Settlements, where the deceased
administrator of her estate by the Supreme Court of Singapore, qualified and entered upon the
Carmen D'Almeida resided on the date of her death, to order the delivery to him of the
discharge of his duties.
balance of the funds of this estate.

At the time of her death Carmen D'Almeida left an estate in the Philippine Islands, consisting of
liquid assets of about P100,000, over which Alfred D'Almeida was appointed ancillary
administrator by the Court of First Instance of Manila. It appears that the deceased left few, if any,
debts or claims in the Philippine Islands, and that all of the duties of the defendant were simple,
and that there was nothing to do but to comply with the formalities of law. It also appears that the
administrator in the Philippine Islands has been completed, and that any and all debts and
expenses of administration have been paid, and that the only remaining thing to be done is to turn
over the remaining assets to someone that is legally authorized to receive them. Apparently, about
the only question involved on this appeal is as to whether the defendant should turn over the
assets in Manila, or whether they should be forwarded to the Supreme Court of Singapore for
distribution.lawphil.net

The record is conclusive that the plaintiff is the surviving husband of Carmen D'Almeida, and in the
absence of any will, it is very apparent that, under the laws of Singapore, as such, he is entitled to
have and receive all the proceeds of her estate. The defendant is a resident of the Philippine
Islands, and claims or asserts that he is an heir of the deceased and is entitled to share in the
distribution of the estate.

Be that as it may, that question is not before this court, and under the law and the decisions of this
court, after the administrator has been completed, it is the duty of the defendant to deliver the
assets to the plaintiff as domiciliary administrator of the Supreme Court of Singapore, and, in legal
effect, that was the decision of the Court of First Instance.

It is the inherent duty of courts to protect property rights of its own citizens in so far as it can
legally be done.

The record before us clearly indicated that the defendant Alfred D'Almeida is not an heir of
Carmen D'Almeida, and is not entitled to share in her estate. But no harm or injustice will be done
in retaining a sufficient amount of the assets of the estate in custodia legis within the Philippine
Islands pending a final decision of the question as to whether or not he is entitled to share in the
estate. To that extent and for that purpose, the decision of the lower court will be modified, so that
P40,000 of the estate of the deceased now within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands shall be
and remain here in custodia legis pending the final decision as to who is entitled to share in the
estate of the deceased Carmen D'Almeida, and subject to the control and jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance in which the probate proceedings were instituted. Such money to be placed as a
special deposit in some good bank in the city of Manila to be selected by the Judge presiding over
the probate proceedings in the city of Manila, and to remain there subject to the approval and
order of such Judge. The bank so selected shall receipt the defendant for the money, and such
receipt shall be a full and complete voucher to the defendant for the amount in the settlement of
the estate. It is further ordered that at any time pending the final decision of such heirship when
the plaintiff shall file a good bond to be approved by the Judge presiding in the branch of the Court
of First Instance to which probate matters are assigned, that he shall then be entitled to have and
receive any and all of the proceeds of the estate. In all other things and respects the decision of
the lower court is affirmed, with costs in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant is peremptorily
ordered to turn over and deliver all other assets to the plaintiff, as the principal administrator of
Carmen D'Almeida, or his order. So ordered.
 In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death
and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the
testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament on
July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined
and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.

On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner
alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent
American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they
would work injustice and injury to him.

On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to
RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF PH AND ADMINISTRATION OF
verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of
ESTATE THEREUNDER his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an  ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the
questioned will was made.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs. At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos,
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent
Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents. residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when
alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to
E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of the died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines and
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late
the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court
herein private respondent. Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration
were issued in favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10);
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. and that the petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which would
Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he Adoracion C. Campos.
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos
a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let
for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
 Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned 1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice
under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or
interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of way for the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by
the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured way of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the
through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted law especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented,
among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in
executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also accordance with the rules of Court.
alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in
the special proceedings case. 3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a
decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to
Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition — a denial of the due process
notice of hearing provided: and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at
in the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently
Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja
case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed. vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent
for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's
adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order opposition to the reprobate of the will.
dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent
means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he
incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the
patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long
and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the
case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982. motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record
was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes opposition to the same.
Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining
children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
excess of his jurisdiction when: prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet xxx xxx xxx
the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount
the law for him. of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law
on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
This contention is without merit.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig bear
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980
judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979.
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly
Civil Code which respectively provide: set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future
setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate
would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request
Art. 16 par. (2). should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.

xxx xxx xxx Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Art. 1039. Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete appears on the record.
stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the
sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of
Law. First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion
at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is
by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled: settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against
his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
(See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. SO ORDERED.
 administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the
following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28
Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a
current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland,
U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty.
William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as
ancillary administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888. 7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary
administrator on July 24, 1986.8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard
RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF PH AND ADMINISTRATION OF and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. 9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of
ESTATE THEREUNDER Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property,
48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle,
the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
G.R. No. 139868             June 8, 2006 and P3,104.49 in cash.10

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated
vs. February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent. Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the
joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided
interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W.
DECISION Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount
of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs. 12
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill
(Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of
Richard, who was also designated as executor. 1 The will was admitted to probate before the partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by
Richard’s renunciation of his appointment. 2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since
administrator.3 Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two respondent.
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent. 15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT
the annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
Special Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S
fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS. 20
entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon
respondent. the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all
time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in determined," and the same has already been executed. 21
good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No.
9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not
children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in
alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with
aside. regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent
of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided. 22
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The dispositive portion of Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of
the assailed Decision provides: Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound
to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to
ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering: know the relevant laws.

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition
W. Richard Guersey; and because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing
entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.
and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate
SO ORDERED. 18 in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes
final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. 23 However, in exceptional cases, a final
decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. 24 Further, in
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
August 27, 1999.19 final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 26
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that
the CA gravely erred in not holding that: The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P.
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129
PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment
THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, was obtained by extrinsic fraud. 27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. 29
BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN
NO LONGER BE ANNULLED. In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and
found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set
good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. 34
the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed
Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 35
benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire
1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will, 30 and the complaint was good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety
filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and
that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of
Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged. 36
Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to
seek another counsel to protect her interest. 31
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms
of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s
knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud
complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.
State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that
committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland,
time of respondent’s discovery thereof. U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before
the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by
the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was
thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine
No. M-888 were all done in 1991. 32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to Embassy.
lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to
comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse
under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are
1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed. her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in
Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
new schemes to fool the unwary." situated.

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by the nation of the decedent."
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility
the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey
to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without
inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied) saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the
matter.
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey
was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland. 38 O’Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith
in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the
Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws xxx
and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair
submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented. It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was
prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply
when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have
brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While
respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the
upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to resultant frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is
discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national
fiduciary duties. laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the
subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case. 41 (Emphasis
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to supplied)
consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of
the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest
her of her full successional right to the Makati property. upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances.
His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc., 40 the Court held that when the rule that the through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She
negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly
becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of
thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties
case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. who are deprived of their rights.42

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the
Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati
property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus: Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall
Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that
"unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All
interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.
Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such
he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail
the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis: 46
value as is reasonable under the circumstances".43
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. 47
Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When
Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American
This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how
legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may
take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan. 44 Therein, the Court took Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit
judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.: lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public
utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v.
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public
P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the
introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution
for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1). succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in
Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution
explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are natural-born citizen.
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been
offered at the hearing of the project of partition. In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. 49 In this case, since the Makati
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that
before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the
same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity
of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective
wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution
Makati property belongs to respondent. dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, 45 wrote: Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official
of the court.
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the No pronouncement as to costs.
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law
in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after SO ORDERED.
 Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate
occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for
leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to
submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in
and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: 2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF PH AND ADMINISTRATION OF Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of
ESTATE THEREUNDER Appeals (CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot
be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
G.R. No. 169144               January 26, 2011
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 4 affirming the assailed order of the RTC, 5 holding
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission
PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners, bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior
vs. probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent. Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will
already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
DECISION
The Issue Presented
ABAD, J.:
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
although it has not been probated in its place of execution. country where it was executed.

The Facts and the Case The Court’s Ruling

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be
United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they
in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They
for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the
testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e)
and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. 1 On October 15, 2003, however, the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin),
nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can
that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien
having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
the estate. country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate
may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state
that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to
the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will
has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate
he left in such province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a
will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as
binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.

Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically.1âwphi1 If the instituted heirs do not have
the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their
inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless
the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court. 8

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the
court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will and that, in the meantime, it
was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present
evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testator’s state of mind at the time of the
execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This
explains the trial court’s directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s
will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-
G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.
 directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar
Casa in order that the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased.

On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator" signed by
Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed
Casa, on February 24, 2003, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as
administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased.

NOW THEREFORE, in compliance with the ORDER of the Probate Court, cited above,
we, the legal heirs of the deceased OSCAR CASA, unanimously designate and appoint
RULE 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION WHEN AND TO WHOM FEDERICO CASA, JR., as the ADMINISTRATOR of the property to be inherited by the
ISSUED deceased OSCAR CASA, in the WILL of the late LORETO SAMIA SAN
JUAN, considering that FEDERICO CASA, JR., is the nearest accessible heir to attend
the hearing of the probate of the will and is most competent to assume the responsibilities
G.R. No. 167321             July 31, 2006 and the duties of the ADMINISTRATOR. We authorize him to represent us the heirs of
the deceased OSCAR CASA, on the hearing of the probate of the will of the testatrix and
to perform such duties as might be required by the Probate Court; to take possession of
EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., petitioner, the properties designated in the WILL upon distribution by the appointed
vs. ADMINISTRATOR of the Estate of LORETO SAMIA SAN JUAN. (emphasis supplied) 3
JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 224, QUEZON CITY and
ATTY. TEODORICO A. AQUINO, respondents.
In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare
Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient." 4 He maintained that the heirs should
DECISION present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the estate in the
case.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the heirs of Oscar
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87458 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a executor of the estate. He also claimed that the court is enjoined to require the representative to
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Epifanio San Juan, appear before the court and be substituted within the prescribed period.
Jr., as well as its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. Contrary to its
The Antecedents Order dated November 22, 2002, the court held that there was, after all, no need for the
appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased devisee. It is enough,
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the the court declared, that a representative be appointed as provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the
devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a Rules of Court.5
petition for the probate of the will in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The case was
raffled to Branch 224 of the court and was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 98-36118. San Juan received a copy of the December 2, 2003 Order on December 15, 2003 and filed, on
December 30, 2003, a motion for reconsideration thereof. Citing the ruling of this Court in Lawas
While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999. The firm of Aquino, v. Court of Appeals,6 he averred that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, while the
Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as counsel of Federico court may allow the heirs of the deceased to be substituted in cases of unreasonable delay in the
Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative. appointment of an executor or administrator, or where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, priority is still given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is,
the executor or administrator of the estate. Moreover, in case the heirs of the deceased will be
On August 14, 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of said
substituted, there must be a prior determination by the probate court of who the rightful heirs are.
law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of
He opined that this doctrine is in line with Article 1058 of the New Civil Code, and the provisions of
the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his representative as required by
Section 6, Rule 78 and Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. In this case, however, the alleged
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On November 22, 2002, the court issued an order
heirs of Oscar Casa did not file any petition for the appointment of an administrator of his estate;
hence, Federico Casa, Jr. is not qualified to be appointed as substitute for the deceased devisee. proceedings since a legatee is not considered either as an indispensable or necessary party in the
San Juan pointed out that the December 2, 2003 Order of the probate court contravened its probate of a will.17
August 14, 2002 and November 22, 2002 Orders.7
When San Juan received a copy of the June 11, 2004 Order of the trial court, he filed, on July 23,
The motion for reconsideration was denied on February 27, 2004 where the probate court 2004, a motion for reconsideration thereof. He took exception to the probate court's reliance in
declared that it had carefully evaluated the arguments raised by the parties and found no the Montañano and Riera cases, as claiming that said rulings were not relevant to the issue of the
compelling ground or cogent reason to set aside its December 2, 2003 Order. 8 Petitioner received validity of the appointment of Federico Casa Jr., by the alleged heirs of Oscar Casa, as
a copy of the Order on March 18, 2004. administrator and substitute for the deceased devisee. He insisted that the cases dealt only with
the question of whether or not the probate court can rule on the validity of the provisions of the
On May 7, 2004, San Juan filed a Motion to Admit his second motion for reconsideration dated will; they do not involve the same issue presented by the oppositor, namely, whether or not a
May 6, 2004, appending thereto the December 2, 2003 Order of the RTC. 9 He cited Torres, Jr. v. substitution of a legatee under the will who died during the probate proceedings may be done by
Court of Appeals,10 where it was held that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is simply submitting an "Appointment of Administrator," or whether or not there is a need for a
the protection of the right of every party to due process, to ensure that the deceased party would deceased legatee to be substituted by his/her duly appointed legal representative or administrator
continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of of his estate.
his estate. The need for substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process accruing to every
party in any proceeding, and the exercise of judicial power to hear and determine a cause San Juan further posited that the estate court, sitting as a probate court, does not only decide on
presupposes that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. the questions of identity and testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution of the
will; it is likewise charged with the settlement of the estate of the testator after the will has been
San Juan emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or administrator that the heirs approved. Thus, the probate court must not only determine the validity of the will, but also the
may be allowed by the court to substitute the deceased party. He averred that the purported heirs rightful heirs, legatees and devisees for the purpose of settling the estate of the testator. 18
simply agreed among themselves to appoint a representative to be substituted for the deceased,
which is contrary to the requirement of a prior hearing for the court to ascertain who the rightful Aquino opposed the motion, contending that it was, in fact, a third motion for reconsideration, a
heirs are. The Orders of the Court dated December 2, 2003 and February 27, 2004 may be used prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 19
by purported heirs in order to "inherit" properties from estates of deceased parties, which will then
allow the rules of procedure to be used as an instrument for fraud and undermining due On September 8, 2004, the probate court issued an Order sustaining Aquino's argument and
process.11 San Juan reiterated the rulings of this Court in Dela Cruz v. Court of denied the motion for reconsideration of San Juan. 20
Appeals12 and Lawas v. Court of Appeals,13 that court proceedings conducted or continued without
a valid substitution of a deceased party cannot be accorded validity and binding effect. He prayed
that the February 27, 2004 Order be reconsidered and a new order be issued as follows: San Juan, now petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 22, 2004 for the
nullification of the orders issued by the probate court on the following grounds:
(a) declaring the "Appointment of Administrator" dated February 14, 2003 insufficient or
inadequate compliance with the rules of procedure on substitution of a deceased party; A. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE "APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR" DATED
(b) directing petitioner to secure from the appropriate court the appointment of an FEBRUARY 14, 2003 MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar Casa; and THE RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ON PROPER SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.

(c) directing that further proceedings in the case be deferred until after the substitution of B. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY
the deceased Oscar Casa by the court-appointed administrator or executor of his estate. ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
Oppositor prays for other and further reliefs which may be just and equitable. 14 RECONSIDERATION ON THE GROUND THAT SAID MOTION IS A THIRD MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING UNDER SEC. 5,
On June 11, 2004, the probate court issued an order denying the second motion for RULE 37 OF THE RULES OF COURT.21
reconsideration of San Juan. It noted that the motion merely reiterated the same arguments in his
first motion for reconsideration which had already been passed upon. Citing the rulings On December 1, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the
in Montañano v. Suesa15 and Riera v. Palmanori,16 it concluded that there was no need for the 60-day period counted from notice to petitioner of the trial court's February 27, 2004 Order. The
appointment of an administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar Casa at that stage of the appellate court declared that the May 6, 2004 motion for reconsideration of petitioner was a  pro
forma motion because it was a second motion for reconsideration which sought the same relief as
the first motion, hence, did not toll the running of the 60-day period. 22 The appellate court cited the devisees and legatees named in the purported will of the testatrix, Loreto San Juan, which is the
ruling of this Court in University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and subject matter of the probate proceedings pending with the respondent court. Said orders did not
Employment.23 terminate or finally dispose of the case but left something to be done by the respondent court
before the case is finally decided on the merits. The assailed orders do not go into the merits of
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the CA, contending that the orders the probate case, particularly on the due execution and validity of the will. It pertains only to the
sought to be reconsidered by him were interlocutory, hence, cannot be considered pro forma or proper substitution of the parties. Thus, the orders are not final orders from which no second or
forbidden by the Rules of Court. He cited the rulings of this Court in Dizon v. Court of third motion for reconsideration may be filed. 29 It cannot also be said that the second motion for
Appeals,24 Philgreen Trading Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,25 and the cases cited reconsideration did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari,
in the latter decision.26 However, on February 24, 2005, the CA resolved to deny the motion of considering that there is no prohibition in the filing of a second motion for reconsideration of an
petitioner.27 interlocutory order. Furthermore, there is no intention on the part of petitioner to delay proceedings
before the lower court when he filed the third motion for reconsideration, as he only sought to
correct the probate court's patently erroneous application of the law. Petitioner emphasizes that he
Petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari, for the reversal of filed the petition for certiorari with the CA in view of the grave abuse of discretion which amounted
the resolutions of the appellate court. He raises the following issues: to lack of or excess of jurisdiction committed by respondent trial court when it wrongfully assumed
in its Order denying the third motion for reconsideration that the order sought to be reconsidered is
(A) a final order on the merits of the case and that the motion for reconsideration is a third motion for
reconsideration of a final order.30
WHETHER OR NOT THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS RECKONED FROM The petition is denied for lack of merit.
NOTICE OF DENIAL OF THE FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER EVEN THOUGH A SECOND AND THIRD MOTION FOR We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the appellate
RECONSIDERATION (WHICH ARE NOT PROHIBITED MOTIONS) OF THE SAME court was time-barred. However, the raison d'etre for its ruling is incorrect.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER HAD BEEN FILED AND WERE LATER DENIED.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the proscription against a pro forma motion applies only to a final
(B) resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one. The ruling of this Court in University of
Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment 31 involved a final order of the
WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON NOMINATED AS "ADMINISTRATOR" BY NLRC and not an interlocutory order.
PURPORTED HEIRS OF A DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN A WILL UNDER PROBATE MAY
VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN THE PROBATE In this case, the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court denying the motion of petitioner to
PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH "ADMINISTRATOR" IS NOT THE consider insufficient or inadequate respondent's compliance with its November 22, 2002 Order is
COURT-APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED interlocutory. The order does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the task of the court
DEVISEE OR LEGATEE.28 of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done. Such order may not be
On the first issue, petitioner avers that the reckoning of the 60-day period for filing a petition questioned except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the notice of denial of the first motion for rendered in the case.32 It bears stressing however that while the motion for reconsideration filed by
reconsideration is applicable only if the subject of the petition is a judgment, final resolution, or petitioner assailing the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court based on the same grounds as
order. It does not apply if the subject of the petition is merely an interlocutory order. He points out those alleged in his first motion is not pro forma, such second motion for reconsideration can
that the reason for this is that only one motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order is nevertheless be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of grounds
allowed under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. A second motion for reconsideration of a and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court. Such a motion cannot be rejected
judgment or final order is a prohibited pleading; hence, the period for filing a petition on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by
for certiorari may not be reckoned from notice of denial of such second and prohibited motion for law or by the Rules of Court.33
reconsideration. Petitioner asserts that a second (or even a third) motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order is not prohibited; hence, the 60-day period for filing a petition for  certiorari may Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by the resolution of the Court in
be reckoned from notice of denial of subsequent motions for reconsideration. Bar Matter No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads:

Petitioner further claims that the Orders dated December 2, 2003, February 27, 2004, June 11, Sec. 4. Where and when petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
2004 and September 8, 2004 issued by the RTC are only interlocutory orders. They deal solely days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration
with the issue concerning the proper substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa who is one of the
 or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion. and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so
Thus, there are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order: (1) the date party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator
when notice of the judgment, resolution or order was received; (2) when a motion for a new trial or for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and (3) when notice of the the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
denial thereof was received by petitioner. opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the The rule is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Rules of Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is
required to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought Death of party. – After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
to be nullified.34 shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to
be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the CA on may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the 60-day period therefor. Petitioner received, on March 18, order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
2004, the February 27, 2004 Order of the court denying his motion for reconsideration of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall
December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18, 2004 or until May 17, 2004 within immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with the CA involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
only on November 22, 2004. recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on June 11, 2004 of the denial may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. 36
of his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from
the trial court's denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted
ensue.35 for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if
within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing
We note that the parties articulated their stance in their respective pleadings not only on the counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who
timeliness of the petition for certiorari in the CA but also on the validity of the assailed December shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased. 37 The pronouncement of this Court
2, 2003 Order of the trial court. Ordinarily, in view of the dismissal of the petition because it was in Lawas v. Court of Appeals 38 (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal
time-barred, the Court will no longer delve into and resolve the other issues raised in the petition. representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of
However, in this case, we find it appropriate and necessary to resolve once and for all the issue of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the
whether there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa, or heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of
whether it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs. allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer
true.39 In Gochan v. Young,40 a case of fairly recent vintage, the Court ruled as follows:
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
 The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to
bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the
deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special
proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no
administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait
for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator
appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the
decedent are violated or dissipated.

The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be
interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the
protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances
recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is
already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been
appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the
proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them
from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at
the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the
fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the case
filed before the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)41

The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an
administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his
shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan . Thus, a prior
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his
heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. 42 Said heirs may
designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.

Hence, even on the threshold issue raised in the RTC and in the petition for certiorari in the CA,
the assailed order of the RTC is correct.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents.

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the spouses
Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio
II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I
and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in
domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I.
RULE 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION WHEN AND TO WHOM Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
ISSUED
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among
G.R. No. 183053               October 10, 2012 others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of
Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
vs. From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent. Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was
already out of the hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.
RESOLUTION
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as
schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
PEREZ, J.:
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic)
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate of understanding of right and wrong.
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter
Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years
after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
(respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the
issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing at the
respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
time of the marriage:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
xxxx
No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, (3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare
the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition
by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in
settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs. 3 this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that
plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic). 4
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a complaint
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and
ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits (2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the
caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety. 5 same, or dividends thereon;

On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his (3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. the court, and

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, (4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor. 6
the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s
estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be
accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the
was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even subject estate:
before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is
better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the estate WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of
as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and
properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue. SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if
any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be
Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱
of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in 200,000.00) Pesos.7
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been
born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the
Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving
legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina. weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on Isabel, we considered that:
his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an
Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that 1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband,
Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina,
On 13 November 2000, Federico died. as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing
Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate: 3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in- and unliquidated; and
Intervention is GRANTED.
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation
estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory; sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she
seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent
of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. 9 This is the same consideration which
the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of
thereof. a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of
of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not
interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically
demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of a
of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or
factions to be represented." community property forming part of the decedent’s estate. 11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent 12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute
better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering community property.
merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise
administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator. In the context It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of
of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010. administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed,
but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted: In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the
benefit of the estate and those interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the office
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have power of appointment.14
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; 15 (2) where justice
(30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
competent and willing to serve; perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to
work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; 17 and when a person entitled to the
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the
person as the court may select. office.18

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special co-
an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will. Pending
next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal
jurisprudence.8 heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the administration
thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-
compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs
(respondents thereat), should be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate. 19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as petitioner- constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two
wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises
husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound
will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." 20 discretion.

Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura 21 where we allowed Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances
the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as co- other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case.
administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the
nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus: applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered
to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one
the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring
kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special administrator.
decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest
in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members of In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,
a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix
between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted) in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest
from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs therein was
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this fact was
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to
Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the
aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-
administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-
nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive
Court, in order to represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied) her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to
her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 we maintained that the order of preference in the appointment an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow would
of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since
the legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular she possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower court found decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad administration of
unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia 24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in
appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as
immediately interested in the estate. regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that
"there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over the
estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was
special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that
and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the probate court were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)
part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda.
de Dayrit, we clarified, thus: In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule on
the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals,
and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance
cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co- of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a
grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of,
that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27 Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;

Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of a 2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working
"next of kin," thus: harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate,
ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law 3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate, has
speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate
as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the
letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has
to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after
of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the
passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles. 29 welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as
evidenced by the following:
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the
estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that where 1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory,
the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of omitted in the partial inventories 34 he filed therewith properties of the estate 35 including
co-administrators may be sanctioned by law. several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and
other personal properties, contrary to Section 1, 36 paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the Court.
estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio
III’s demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts 2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s settlement of the
and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position by decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging
the foregoing survey of cases. to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration that the
decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not to her estate.37
ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling
among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the following
forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased imputations of Isabel that:
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the
decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of 1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left
entirely to the sound discretion of the Court 32 and depends on the facts and the attendant 2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;
circumstances of the case.33
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and
reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified documents; 38
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing the
other. functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, 1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her
and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office,
 arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to
judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without
executed;" remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals, 39 we
mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or "any persons
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s vociferous objections interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to
the Court of Appeals; xxxx

3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and 4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to
one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the
it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties; and decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"

4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private 5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and
complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"
Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a
possible motu propio dismissal of the cases. 6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of an the estate; and
inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of
the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation that 7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order
Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either
existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about. satisfied or provided for.44

The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82
his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact of the Rules of Court, to wit:
when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two
occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her
siblings, from the list of heirs. Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon
death, resignation, or removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and
settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to
heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with
demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any
Cristina. suitable person.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the
the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil
other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to
as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of administer the estate of the decedent.
Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were
estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co- Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those,
such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final
declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited
long deceased couple has yet to be settled. himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be
replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of the
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law: Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who concurred
therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the
decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently
shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened,
and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution has
after the inheritance is liquidated. retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from
acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle
by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a new Justice is
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition: appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or
she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.
ordinary cases.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed Resolution
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of the
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. 45 Division to which he or she belongs.

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment 46 of Emilio III If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for
questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the
asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said
void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June 2010 on pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
the petition filed by him:
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the Supreme
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from the Court's summer session held last April.48
Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the
Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second
Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila. 47 WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R.
No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
division created by the Supreme Court. Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is
likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by costs.
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of Justice
Nachura’s retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme SO ORDERED.
Court provides:

Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed

resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. –
Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and all other
motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the
other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution.
 On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela,9 praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the
Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that
the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory
of the decedent’s estate. 10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC,
alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing
RULE 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION WHEN AND TO WHOM the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
ISSUED
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
G.R. No. 164108               May 8, 2009
intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
CORPORATION, Petitioners, Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 12 dismissing the petition and
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to
BENEDICTO, Respondents.
intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene,
according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of
DECISION Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or
expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
TINGA, J.:
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings. 13
civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First,
Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the
the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said
Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2 court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. 15 Third, petitioners moved that the
the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual
Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be ₱5 account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and
respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of disposition of the estate.16
administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the
Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of
the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate. 8 intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest
required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
contingent and expectant."17 do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86.20 These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, 18 not the Rules on impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case 21 was already pending review
Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings." Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate.
Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, 22 and it does provide us
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the
also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to
declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to
necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
intervene is not one of those reliefs. claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be
appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be
closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate
focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings. proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the
estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.
persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to
recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said
to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and
hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a
interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking
allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and
decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6)
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it
may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule
an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action
either satisfied or provided for. pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule
88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from
the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be
creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling
appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate
but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court,
to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised
we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a
the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted] petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that
they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in- had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records
intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this interested person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to
court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed
to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action." 24 Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with
the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against
creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate.
capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x 26
based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that
by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is
been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings
against it. upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the
in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The
be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners. instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and;
estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the
alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate
court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate,
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be
counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court
respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon
and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due
otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims,
would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal
guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases. of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while
Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that
there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose
claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets
of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of
those with contingent claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is
to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not
doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After
all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to
answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to
fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as
we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on
Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as
provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons
under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing
private respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond
of P30,000.00. 4

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of the decedent was
published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private
RULE 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION WHEN AND TO WHOM respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel"
ISSUED alleging that the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and
that she thereby had an interest in said estate. 5
G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory
and Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which
NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE
incident was set for hearing on January 16, 1989. 6
GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO
GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-
GABRIEL, petitioners, On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed
vs. Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration
HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel,
Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents. as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein
petitioners. 7 After some exchanges and on order of the court, petitioners filed an "Opposition to
the Petition and Motion," dated May 20, 1989, alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by
personal notice of the petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate
daughter, should be preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting
REGALADO, J.: and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and
(4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of
In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797 promulgated on August 23, 1991, 1 respondent Court of ownership to petitioners and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioners assailing the orders of the administered by private respondent. 8
lower court in Special Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively sustained the
appointment of private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator of the estate of the late On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners
Domingo Gabriel. on the ground that they had not shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8,
1988, in that (1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a
Petitioners' present appeal by certiorari would have this Court set aside that decision of legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who was
respondent court, hence the need to examine the chronology of antecedent facts, as found by appointed administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make
respondent court and detailed hereunder, pertinent to and which culminated in their recourse now his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by
before us. petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated December 22, 1989. 10

On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, private From said orders, herein petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, a petition for letters of Appeals, on the following grounds:
administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate,
engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. 1. The orders of September 21, 1989 and December 22, 1989 are null and void,
Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of being contrary to the facts, law and jurisprudence on the matter;
the decedent. 2
2. Respondent judge, in rendering the aforesaid orders, gravely acted with abuse
On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order 3 setting the hearing of the petition on June 29, of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction, hence said orders
1988, on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why the petition should not be are null and void ab initio; and
granted. The court further directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of
general circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed
despite such publication of the notice of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his
 3. Private respondent is morally incompetent and unsuitable to perform the duties next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
of an administrator as he would give prior preference to the claims of his mother administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person,
against the estate itself. 11 it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing that petition
for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused; that the fact that there to such other person as the court may select. (Emphases ours.)
was no personal notice served on petitioners is not a denial of due process as such service is not
a jurisdictional requisite and petitioners were heard on their opposition; and that the alleged Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance
violation of the order of preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
correctible by appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari. 12 creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a
grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that under Section 6, Rule that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.
78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the
appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over private consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant. Aida Valencia. administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in
Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The
appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy
petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of
who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is contended that the non-observance or violation   per se of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to
the order of preference already constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of administer the estate correctly. 13
jurisdiction.
This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not commit a grave abuse of preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death, because
discretion in not following the order of preference because the same is not absolute and the she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership.  14 Under the
choice of who to appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court. He calls attention to the fact law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
that petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never applied for appointment despite the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as
lapse of more than nine (9) months from the death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
for the probate court to have considered them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied that kin. 15 On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo
several properties of the deceased have already been relinquished to herein petitioners, hence Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her
they would have no interest in applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private respondent husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less. 16
submits that it has not been shown that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified from being
appointed or serving as administrator.
Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed
administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides: from the death of her husband, as required under the rules.

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion
that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or  both, husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or administration. 17
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the
opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all
under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the
an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors." direction and supervision of the probate court.

On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the
administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special
and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.
error. 19 Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust
as would entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 SO ORDERED.
provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal.
There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to
or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to
warrant the removal of the administrator. 20 In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the
heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate
ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the
estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where
those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. 21

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of
the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since
that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically
states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of
kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there is only
one administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit:
"When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a
recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services
rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been
upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;  25
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;  26 (4) to
have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate; 27 and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires
to have another competent person associated with him in the office. 28

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a
co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private
respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to
have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented,
especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and
 informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction involving the subject properties,
giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to the subject
properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They
were not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement
of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called  Balita. Because of this, they caused
the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of
RULE 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION WHEN AND TO WHOM Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
ISSUED conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto.8redarclaw
THIRD DIVISION
In their Answer,9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of
personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his
G.R. No. 187524, August 05, 2015
testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only
the resort.10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG AND FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA, SUBSTITUTED BY DR. RUEL B. Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the
VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, v. MA. GRACIA RIÑOZA PLAZO AND MA. FE RIÑOZA family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of
ALARAS, Respondents. Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,000.00. 11redarclaw

DECISION On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and
spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners.as
well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial
PERALTA, J.:
Settlement was notarized by a notary public who was not duly commissioned as such on the date
it was executed.12 The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left
Before the-Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro Riñoza, Husband" on the left side of the document was
to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution,2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009, not signed.13 The trial court also observed that both documents were never presented to the Office
respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the of the Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the subject properties were still in the
Judgment3 dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the
Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217. subject properties were not even presented as witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing
and execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On the basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor
The antecedent facts are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw of respondents, in its Judgment, the pertinent portions of its fallo provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No.
51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which it stands is x x x x
covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4redarclaw
4. a) Declaring as a nullity the Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiation and
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Exh. "1", Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public
Possession5 dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they Antonio G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII, Series of 1991.
discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold
the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "2", Villafria), purportedly executed by
deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. Benita T. Riñoza in favor of spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, purportedly notarized
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a by one Alfredo de Guzman, marked Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, Book No. XXX, Series of 1991.
document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to
any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank. 6 The document c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements introduced by defendants Francisco Villafria
actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87,352.62 releasing her and dnd Maria Butiong in the properties covered by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354 and 51355 of the
her late husband's indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu Register of Deeds for Nasugbu, Batangas.
 4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the purported buyer, the
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose occupancy within the premises of Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were presented as witnesses.
the four (4) parcels of land described in par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest of
defendant Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all improvements Concededly, the absence of notarization in the resort deed and/or the lacking details in the
existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate of decedent Pedro L. Riñoza. settlement/family home deed did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by the said
documents. However, since the said deeds are private documents, perforce, their due
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended Complaint to be the legitimate execution and authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of proof under the Rules on
heirs of decedent Pedro L. RifSoza, each in the capacity and degree established, as well as their Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
direct successors-in-interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to issue the Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received
corresponding titles in their names in the proportion established by law, pro indiviso, in TCT Nos. in evidence, its due execution aijd .authenticity must be proved either:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after restoration) within ten (10) days from finality of this
Decision, upon payment of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt from all (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
expenses for its restoration. (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.The Complaining
Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the resort deed are void as their signatures
With no costs. thereon are forgeries as opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. After the
Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that their signatures were
SO ORDERED.15 forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to disprove the same, or conversely, to
prove the authenticity and due execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's Judgment in its Decision16 dated October 31, 2006 in regard.
the following wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
As aforestated, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary public who
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo de Guzman, was not purportedly notarized the questioned instrument, (b) the witnesses who appeared] in the
commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to July 3, 1991, the date the certification was instruments as eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity and
issued. Such being the case, the resort deed is not a public document and the presumption genuineness of all the signatures appearing o,n the said instruments. Verily, the rule that,
of- regularity accorded to public documents will n ot apply to the same . As laid proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the
down in Tigno, el al. v. Aquino, et al.:LawlibraryofCRAlaw identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a prerequisite
to its admission, was prudently observed by the lower court when it refused to admit the
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer.  If settlement/family home and the resort deeds as their veracity are doubtful.17
the notary public does net have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
then the document should be treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the
perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred authority of the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed,
notary public or the person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was
officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial there an identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the
commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly-appointed notary settlement of the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was for
public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in Judicial Partition. Considering that the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate,
pretense. the trial court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon
the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that said ruling is void and has no
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration was, however,
document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court denied by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the
contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for
requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from submitting a verification of the petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of
imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.Parenthetically, the service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent
settlement/family home deed cannot be considered a public document. This is because the evidence of affiant's identities.18 In its Resolution19 dated September 26, 2007, this Court also
following cast doubt on the document's authenticity, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the absence of any compelling reason to warrant
a modification of the previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final and
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated; executory on October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment issued by the
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed; Court.20redarclaw
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas for annotation; and
On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner's motion for leave to admit a second deception, practiced on them by Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept
motion for reconsideration of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that the same is a away from the court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthermore, petitioner's letter dated December 18, 2007 pleading We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what We deduced as We carefully delved into the
the Court to take a second, look at his petition for review on certiorari and that a decision thereon evidentiary facts surrounding the instant case as well as the proceedings below as shown
be rendered based purely on its merits was noted without action. 21redarclaw in the 36-page Decision of the Court a quo, is that the Petitioners were given ample time to
rebut the allegations of the Respondents and had in fact addressed every detail of
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice Respondent's cause of action against them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation of the Court a
Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case be rendered based on the .merits and not on quo's lack of jurisdiction is misplaced.
formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything his parents had left him just because the
verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective." However, in view of the Entry of Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of the Supreme Court in   Sps.
Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said letter without Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
action.22redarclaw It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before
a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Partial Writ of Execution of its the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the court's
October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed jurisdiction.In fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are stopped
by the CA. from assailing the Court a quo's lack of jurisdiction.

The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 2009, a Petition for Annulment of Too, We do not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra.
Judgment and Order before the CA assailing the October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the
November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In As mentioned earlier, entry of judgment had already been made on the assailed Decision and
its Decision dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the Order as early as 31 October 2007.
rulings of the trial court in the following wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x x
Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has already become final and executory and in
fact entry of judgment was issued on 31 October 2007, supra, nevertheless, to put the issues to It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain equitable remedies such
rest, We deem it apropos to tackle the same. as a petition for annulment. But the rules are clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals
of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts is
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a  quo, supra, should be resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
annulled and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, supra.

We are not persuaded, If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate remedies or appeal
before the Supreme Court, that is their own look out. The High Tribunal has emphatically
x x x x pointed out in Mercado, et al. v. Security Bank Corporation, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment of a judgment may "be based not a substitute for the lost remedy of-appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a
only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho Magdato, motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its
the High Tribunal stressed that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence.
There is extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting Also, the action for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or
fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Having failed to avail of the remedies and
away from court, ... or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in there being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; ..."Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition
such fraud which prevents the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the unacceptable.23When the appellate court denied Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its
court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This refers to Resolution dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on
acts intended to keep the unsuccessful party away from the courts as when there is a false June 10, 2009, invoking the following ground:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
promise of compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit.
I.
The pivotal issues before Us are: (1) whether there was a time during the proceedings
below that the Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT 17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will be to the best interest of all
JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF heirs that same be partitioned judicially.26
ESTATE OF PEDRO RIÑOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE
HEIRS AND THIRD PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24 Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading
the cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein,
settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction and the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions recovery of possession.
cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining
the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
found in the Rules on the joinder of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions. 25 Thus,
petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having been rendered RULE 74
in without jurisdiction. Summary Settlement of Estate

Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court that since the finding of Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.  — If the decedent left no will
forgery relates only to the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs who assented to the and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies the representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
findings of the courts below that his parents are builders in bad faith for they only took possession administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
of the subject properties after the execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,  they may do so in
consideration on the sale. an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an
The petition is bereft of merit. extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall
Petitioner maintains that since respondents' complaint alleged the following causes of action, the file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or
same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition:LawlibraryofCRAlaw stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond
with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of
any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent
1. That Pedro L. Riñoza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu, Batangas at the time of his death, left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the
died intestate on November 16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto attached as Annex death of the decedent.
"A";
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
only known heirs of the above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando, settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
Rafael, Antonio, Angelito, Lorna all surnamed Riñoza, and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, thereof.27
Epifanio Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are the decedent's legitimate children with his first
wife, while Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedent's widow and Bernadette Riñoza, the decedent's In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
daughter with said widow. As such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an intestate
inheritance from the decedent, of the properties enumerated in the succeeding paragraph; Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel
the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in Nasugbu, nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
Batangas:LawlibraryofCRAlaw partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the
property.28
x x x x
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their complaint
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Riñoza has no known legal indebtedness; are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the
complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs,
are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial representative duly
authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone. 34 In fact, a complete
that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the
has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent's estate, estate has no debts.35 Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the
pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings, dispensing of the
that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated. 36redarclaw
complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate,
and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate. Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint al$o prayed for the annulment of title and recovery
of possession does not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to for the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved in an action for
name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. fails partition,37 as can be seen in cases where courts determine the parties' rights arising from
to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order recovery of ownership and possession of property. 38 In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas,39 wherein a
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this rule, however, is complaint for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the
found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and impropriety of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title
no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action of the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to be improper in the following
for partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the manner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
appointment of an administrator by the court. 30 The reason is that where the deceased dies
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically
immediately entitled.31redarclaw pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As pronounced
without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner'.s in Lacbayan:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit me subject properties of the
estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is
have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by Pereira v. Court of Appeals:32redarclaw not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no" debts or obligations, if they do not more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with
desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. (Emphases supplied)
for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for annulment of sale on the
the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and
action for partition. Where' partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should Orlando's title to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the same.
not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact,
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending the determination as to the existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the partition, as held in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia:40redarclaw
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise
unnecessary proceedings.33 legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on ¦ the
proceeding for the settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law. That the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the
complaint contained allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not mean that premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
there was a prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to the estate's properties as question is in order, x x x
well as a determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also subject Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [cjourt after the- parties have petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial
been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial  and
parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question, x x render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. 48
x.41redarclaw
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes of action alleged therein, as
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more than ample
between the parties.42 Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction
be premature to effect a partition of an estate. 43redarclaw just because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To repeat, the action filed herein is one
for judicial partition and not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that respondents also
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession in the same proceeding does not strip
entertaining -the action of settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could
clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of very well be achieved in an action for partition.
title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable law and jurisprudence.
Under Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid as to the heirs who assented
RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the to the conveyance as well as their allegation of good faith, this Court does not find any Compelling
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by both courts below,
and recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of the authenticity and due execution of the documents on which petitioner's claims are based were
pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the trial court inadequately proven. They were undated, forged, and acknowledged before a notary public who
clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the instant petition for annulment Sf judgment was not commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They were never presented to
must necessarily fail. the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither were the supposed notaries and buyers of the
subject properties presented as witnesses.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone, without the prayer for
judicial partition, the requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding for the determination While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate, actually acknowledged the
of the status and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the sale of the resort, the circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact of its
fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and had already presented occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita undated and unsigned
evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,47 the Court by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt of her share in the
explained:LawlibraryofCRAlaw sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a
bank.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court's observations as to petitioners'
under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is actuations insofar as the transactions alleged herein are concerned. First,  they were seemingly
an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be uncertain as to the number and/or identity of the properties bought by them. 49 In their Answer, they
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in gave the impression that" they bought both the resort and the family home and yet, during trial,
the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he Francisco Villafria claimed they only bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they presented
failed to name an executor therein. the subject Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale. 50Second, they never presented any other
document which would evidence their actual payment of consideration to the selling
x x x x heirs.51Third, in spite of the blatant legal infirmities of the subject documents of conveyance,
petitioners still took possession of the properties, demolished several cottages, and introduced
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of permanent improvements thereon.
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioners failed to adequately substantiate,
the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact,
the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of purchased the subject properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported transfers cast
the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and had doubt on whether they actually took place. In substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely on
already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly failed to prove their authenticity and
the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. due execution. They cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim absolute ownership of the subject
lands based on the same.

Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith. Good
faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land the latter is building on is one's own without
knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's title. 52 However, in view of the manifest defects in the
instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been placed on guard. Yet, they still
demolished several cottages and constructed improvement on the properties. Thus, their claim of
good faith cannot be given credence.

Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may
no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues
between the parties being deemed resolved and. laid to rest. 53 It is a fundamental principle in our
judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict.54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment are allowed only under the
most extraordinary of circumstances.55 Yet, when petitioner is given more than ample opportunity
to be heard, unbridled access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments rendered
after a consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, the Court shall
refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below in the absence of any showing that the same
were rendered with fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it concerns the resort
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 51354 and No. 51355, and family home covered by
TCT No. 40807 and 40808, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 may consider most advantageous in the circumstances existing. Since the said Mercedes
de Leon is not of sound judgment, and discretion in the handling of money, it is not my
wish that she be given any sums of money other than for her current needs, except as my
executors in their judgment deem advantageous to her. In case the amount available for
this bequest be sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their
discretion may do so. And I attest and direct that I do not wish to intend that the action of
my executors upon their discretion in this matter be questioned by anyone whatsoever.

RULE 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION WHEN AND TO WHOM For the purpose of carrying out that testamentary provision, James Madison Ross was appointed
ISSUED trustee by the New York County Surrogate's Court on February 4, 1948. Once appointed, and with
the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's
life Insurance Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada, paying in advance $17,091.03 as the
G.R. No. L-3677            November 29, 1951
combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz
during her lifetime, with the proviso that in the event of her death, the residue, if any, of the capital
In the Matter of the Testate Estate of BASIL GORDON BUTLER; MERCEDES sum shall be paid in one sum to James Madison Ross or his successor as trustee. And beginning
LEON, petitioner-appellant, and ADA LOGGEY GHEZZI, administratrix-appellant, May 27, 1948, Mercedes de Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance through
vs. the Insurance Company's Manila Office.
MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO., thru Philippine Branch, oppositor-appellee.
With the object, so it would seem, of getting hold at once of the entire amount invested in the
Juan S. Rustia for petitioner and appellant. annuity, Mercedes de Leon on September 4, 1948, presented Butler's will for probate in the Court
Peralta & Agrava for oppositor and appellee. of First Instance of Manila, and secured the appointment of Ada Loggey Ghezzi as administratrix
with the will annexed early in 1949. (James Madison Ross and Ewald E. Selph had expressly
TUASON, J.: declined appointment as executors "on the ground that the probate proceedings of the above
estate were terminated by the Surrogate's Court of the County of New York, New York City, U. S.
This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila which denied a motion of the A., and that there are no properties of the estate left to be administered.") After having qualified,
administratrix in the matter of the testate estate of Basil Gordon Butler (Special Proceedings No. the administratrix filed the motion which Judge Amparo has denied; and as the party most if not
6218). The motion prayed for the citation of the Manager of the Manila Branch of the solely interested in that motion, Mercedes de Leon has joined Ghezzi in this appeal.
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. of Toronto, Canada, to appear and under a complete accounting
of certain funds the said Branch allegedly has in its possession and claimed to belong to the The administration of Butler's estate granted in New York was the principal or domiciliary
estate. His Honor, Judge Rafael Amparo of the court below, held that these funds "came into the administration (Johannes vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 175), while the administration taken out in the
possession of the Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., Inc., regularly and in due course and, Philippines is ancillary. However, the distinction serves only to distinguish one administration from
therefore, sees no justifiable ground to require said company to render an accounting thereon." the other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent. (34 C.J.S. 1232,1233).

The essential facts are that Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines, died in The important thing to inquire into is the Manila court's authority with respect to the assets herein
Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly probated in the Surrogate's Court involved. The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets
of New York County on August 3 of the same year, and of which James Ross, Sr., James of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator
Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate having been settled, appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country .
the proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947. (Keenan vs. Toury, 132 A.L.R. 1362; Nash vs. Benari, 3 A.L.R. 61; Michigan Trust Co. vs.
Chaffee, 149 A.L.R. 1078).This principle is specifically embodied in section 4 of Rule 78 of the
The will contained this residuary clause: Rules of Court:

After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral expenses, I devise, Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
give and bequeath all of my remaining estate and personal effects of which I may die testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
possessed to Mercedes de Leon, of Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to wit: the personal effects testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
to be delivered to her for her use and profit; the moneys, securities and other valuable Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
property, not personal effects, to be held in trust for her benefit by my executors, at their shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and
absolute discretion, to be administered for her permanent benefit in whatever way they the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of
the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract
executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance the
appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the funds in its
possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made
out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been
transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.

Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of butler's
estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the hands of the
company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed. Whether considered as a
trust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed obligation, which it has been
religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale
can not be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the
annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary
or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of
these funds beyond the amounts and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for
annuity.

In the third place, the power of the court to cite a person for the purpose stated in the
administratrix's motion is defined in section 7 of Rule 88, which provides.

Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account.—The court, on complaint of

an executor or administrator, with any part the estate of the deceased to appear before it,
and may require such person to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods,
chattels, bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such estate as came to his
possession in trust for such executor or administrator, and for his proceedings thereon;
and if the person so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish
him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court.

The appellant administratrix did not entrust to the appellee the money she wants the latter to
account for, nor did the said money come to the appellee's possession in trust for the
administratrix. In other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the subject of the motion
and to the appellee. There being no creditors, the only subject of the motion, we incline to believe,
is to enable Mercedes de Leon to get the legacy in a lump sum in complete disregard of the
wishes of the testator, who showed deep concern for her welfare, and of the annuity contract
which the annuitant herself applied for in conjunction with the trustee.

All in all, from every standpoint, including that of the annuitant's financial well-being, the motion
and the appeal are utterly groundless and ill-advised.

The appealed order therefore is affirmed with costs against the appellants.
 Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons
having an interest in the estate for them to lay their claim against the Estate or forever hold their
peace.

SO ORDERED.5

RULE 78 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION WHEN AND TO WHOM On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
ISSUED Reconsideration6 in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters testamentary to
respondents. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855               August 4, 2009 and validity.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already
vs. filed a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that
FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS, Respondents. he took his oath as named executor of the will on January 30, 1996.

DECISION On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration 7 to BIR Commissioner Liwayway
Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Special Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of
seeking to set aside the March 13, 1997 Decision 2 and August 27, 1997 Resolution 3 of the Court Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450.
On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order 8 denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by
The facts of the case are as follows: petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos, the
penultimate portion of which reads:szz
On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a
probate court, in Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order 4 granting letters testamentary in Under the Rules, a decedent’s testamentary privilege must be accorded utmost respect. Guided
solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as by this legal precept, therefore, in resolving the two (2) motions at hand, the Court is constrained
executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. to DENY both.

The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads: Examining the arguments poised by the movants, the Court observed that these are but a mere
rehash of issues already raised and passed upon by the Court.
WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos to have been
duly executed in accordance with law, the same is hereby ALLOWED AND ADMITTED TO One has to review the previous orders issued by the Court in this case, e.g., the orders dated
PROBATE. September 9, 1994, November 25, 1994, as well as October 3, 1995, to see that even as far back
then, the Court has considered the matter of competency of the oppositors and of Commissioner
Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as having been settled.
in solidum to Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II,
named executors therein. It cannot be overstressed that the assailed January 11, 1996 Orders of the Court was arrived at
only after extensive consideration of every legal facet available on the question of validity of the
Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the Will.
Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration filed separately by petitioner
Republic and oppositor Imelda R. Marcos are both DENIED.
SO ORDERED.9 THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT
RESPONDENTS IMELDA R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND R. MARCOS II SHOULD BE
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 DISQUALIFIED TO ACT AND SERVE AS EXECUTORS.
of the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to
respondents. III.

On February 5, 1997, the First Division of this Court issued a Resolution referring the petition to THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT SAID
the CA, to wit: PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE DENIED AND DISCLAIMED THE VERY EXISTENCE
AND VALIDITY OF THE MARCOS WILL.
xxxx
IV.
The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED
to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT ITS
as it may deem appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the ORDER OF JANUARY 11, 1996, WHICH ADMITTED THE MARCOS WILL TO
Case, and this Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take PROBATE AND WHICH DIRECTED THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY
cognizance of said case in the first instance.10 (Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied) IN SOLIDUM TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS EXECUTORS OF SAID MARCOS
WILL, WAS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC ALONE.
On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision, 11 dismissing the referred petition for having taken
the wrong mode of appeal, the pertinent portions of which reads: V.

Consequently, for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the present petition should be THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT BOTH
dismissed in accordance with the same Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which expressly PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE OBSTRUCTED THE TRANSFER TO THE
provides that: PHILIPPINES OF THE MARCOS ASSETS DEPOSITED IN THE SWISS BANKS. 15

4. Erroneous Appeals – An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of In the meantime, on October 9, 2002, the RTC, acting on the pending unresolved motions before
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. it, issued an Order16 which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints as joint special administrators of the estate of the
late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of the Republic of the Philippines (the Undersecretary of
SO ORDERED.12 the Department of Justice whom the Secretary of Justice will designate for this purpose) and Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R. Marcos II, to serve as such until an executor is
finally appointed.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 13 which was, however denied by the CA in a
Resolution14 dated August 27, 1997.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The petition is without merit.
I.
When the assailed Orders granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents were issued by
the RTC, petitioner sought to question them by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON 45 of the Rules of Court.
TECHNICAL GROUNDS DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION
SPECIFICALLY REFERRING SAID PETITION FOR A DECISION ON THE MERITS.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,17 which was then in effect, reads:
II.
2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. – Except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts
may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the
of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in
"(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied) perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition
for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both questions of fact and law must
The pertinent portions of Section 1718 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 read: first be brought before the Court of Appeals.21

The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or Also, in Southern Negros Development Bank v. Court of Appeals,22  this Court ruled:
affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in – It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of the
decisions of trial courts to the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or blame no one but themselves (Jocson v. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550 [1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v.
executive order or regulation is in question; National Labor Union, 101 Phil. 409 [1957]).

(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty xxxx
imposed in relation thereto;
Pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, which provides that "[a]n appeal taken to either
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue; the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall
be dismissed," the only course of action of the Court to which an erroneous appeal is made
is to dismiss the same. There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of
(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, erroneous appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869,
however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases November 12, 1990, First Division, Minute Resolution). 23
mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and
the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified Based on the foregoing, petitioner cannot deny that the determination of whether or not
or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and respondents should be disqualified to act as executors is a question of fact. Hence, the proper
remedy was to appeal to the CA, not to this Court.
(5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of
Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Petitioner is adamant, however, that notwithstanding the improper remedy, the CA should not
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. have dismissed therein petition. Petitioner argues in the wise:

A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, However, as can be seen in the Resolution of February 5, 1997, (Annex "H") this Honorable Court
clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters deemed it more proper to transmit the first Petition for Review to respondent appellate court for
testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct the reason that:
appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do
not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court This Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said
should take cognizance of the instant case." 19 case in the first instance. x x x

Moreover, the Court’s pronouncement in Suarez v. Judge Villarama20 is instructive: It would appear then that even though this Honorable Court apparently considers the Republic’s
petition as deserving to be given due course, it deemed it in the best interest of the parties
Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the antecedents, provides that an concerned if the Court of Appeals would first take cognizance of said case, thereby preserving its
appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or stance as a court of last resort.
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, this Honorable Court itself plainly stated that the case under review is:
….REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits…. The Section 1. Orders of judgments from which appeals taken. – An interested person may appeal
latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the case…… 24 in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
Petitioner’s arguments are misplaced. To stress, the February 5, 1997 Resolution reads:
(a) allows or disallows a will;
The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED
to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits  or any other action as it Because of the preceding discussion, herein petition must necessarily fail. However, even if this
may deem appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the Case, Court were to set aside petitioners’ procedural lapses, a careful review of the records of the case
and this Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of reveal that herein petition is without merit.
said case in the first instance.25
At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether or not respondents are incompetent to
Based thereon, this Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that said resolution gave the CA serve as executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos.
discretion and latitude to decide the petition as it may deem proper. The resolution is clear that the
petition was referred to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action Ozeata v. Pecson28  is instructive:
as it may deem appropriate. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when the action it deemed
appropriate was to dismiss the petition for having availed of an improper remedy. More
importantly, the action of the CA was sanctioned under Section 4 of Supreme Court Circular 2-90 The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his
which provides that "an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire
wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed." to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of
the estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose.
And as the rights granted by will take effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code of the
Moreover, petitioner mistakenly relies in Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,26 in which this Philippines), the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as
Court made the following pronouncements: soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be
interposed any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is
In the case at bar, there was no urgency or need for Oriental to resort to the extraordinary the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon
remedy of certiorari for when it learned of the case and the judgment against it on July 25, 1986, his application (23 C.J. 1023).
due to its receipt of a copy of the decision by default; no execution had as yet been ordered by the
trial court. As aforementioned, Oriental had still the time and the opportunity to file a motion for xxxx
reconsideration, as was actually done. Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration in the
first case, or at the latest upon the denial of its petition for relief from judgment, Oriental
should have appealed. Oriental should have followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of The case of In re Erlanger's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 249, also reiterates the same principle.
Court for —
The courts have always respected the right to which a testator enjoys to determine who is most
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection suitable to settle his testamentary affairs, and his solemn selection should not lightly be
of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to purpose that disregarded. After the admission of a will to probate, the courts will not name a better
substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow or friend or other
that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the person selected in the will, except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As incompetency. Matter of Leland's Will, 219 N.Y. 387, 393, 114 N.E. 854. x x x29
a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing
each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as executors, to
both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process whatever the source of such rights, wit:
be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.27
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No person is
In the case at bar, as found by this Court in its February 5, 1997 Resolution, therein petition competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
offered no important or special reason for the Court to take cognizance of it at the first instance.
Petitioner offered no plausible reason why it went straight to this Court when an adequate and xxxx
proper remedy was still available. The CA was thus correct that the remedy that petitioner should
have availed of was to file an appeal under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court which states:
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness, respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense admitted by petitioner,37 said decision is still pending appeal.
involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)
Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to four
In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be
respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming  arguendo that
offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the "failure to file
number of cases30 and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
with questionable integrity.31
In Villaber v. Commision on Elections,38 this Court held:
The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following findings:
As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law
However, except for petitioner Republic’s allegation of want of integrity on the part of Imelda Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule
and testament, so as to render them "incompetent" to serve as executors, the Court sees at this of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
time, no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the said modesty, or good morals."
allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)
In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything which is
Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is disinclined to interfere with done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."
the action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an executor or administrator
unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. 32 The Rules of Court gives the lower xxxx
court the duty and discretion to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as
an executor. The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said
court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections  that "not every criminal act
administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules of orders of the court. 33 involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the
Supreme Court to determine."39
Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must evaluate the evidence
presented or alleged by petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification. However, after a Moreover, In De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces:40
painstaking review of the records and evidence on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed
no error or gross abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate its Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which
allegation. denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are
looked on as involving moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).
Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have
already been reversed by this Court. Her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 was reversed by The "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere
this Court in Dans, Jr. v. People.34 Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17450 was omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual.
reversed by this Court in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan.35 Hence, the so-called "convictions" against This conclusion is supported by the provisions of the NIRC as well as previous Court decisions
respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax return, the NIRC considers three distinct
executor. violations: (1) a false return, (2) a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and (3) failure to file a
return.
On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four
charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation The same is illustrated in Section 51(b) of the NIRC which reads:
of Section 50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977
(NIRC). (b) Assessment and payment of deficiency tax – xxx

It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569, 36 the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand In case a person fails to make and file a return or list at the time prescribed by law, or makes
Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the willfully or otherwise, false or fraudulent return or list x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)
four charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered
Likewise, in Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals,41 this Court observed: Petitioner contends that respondents have strongly objected to the transfer to the Philippines of
the Marcos assets deposited in the Swiss Banks 44 and thus the same should serve as a ground for
To our minds we can dispense with these controversial arguments on facts, although we do not their disqualification to act as executors. This Court does not agree. In the first place, the same
deny that the findings of facts by the Court of Tax Appeals, supported as they are by very are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve scant consideration. Time and again, this Court
substantial evidence, carry great weight, by resorting to a proper interpretation of Section 332 of has stressed that this Court is a court of law and not a court of public opinion. Moreover, petitioner
the NIRC. We believe that the proper and reasonable interpretation of said provision should be had already raised the same argument in its motion for partial reconsideration before the
that in the three different cases of (1) false return, (2) fraudulent return with intent to evade RTC.1avvphi1 Said court, however, still did not find the same as a sufficient ground to disqualify
tax, (3) failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the respondents. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will
collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten years after the not interfere with the RTC’s discretion.
discovery of the (1) falsity, (2) fraud, and (3) omission. Our stand that the law should be
interpreted to mean a separation of the three different situations of false return, fraudulent Lastly, petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based solely on their own evidence
return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a return is strengthened immeasurably by and that respondents offered no evidence to show that they were qualified to serve as
the last portion of the provision which segregates the situations into three different executors.45 It is basic that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
classes, namely, "falsity," "fraud" and "omission." 42 (Emphasis Supplied) allegation is not evidence.46 Consequently, it was the burden of petitioner (not respondents) to
substantiate the grounds upon which it claims that respondents should be disqualified to serve as
Applying the foregoing considerations to the case at bar, the filing of a "fraudulent return with executors, and having failed in doing so, its petition must necessarily fail.
intent to evade tax" is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and fraudulent
intent on the part of the individual. The same, however, cannot be said for "failure to file a return" WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 13, 1997 Decision and August 27, 1997
where the mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450 are hereby AFFIRMED.
conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral
turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, acting as a probate court in Special
Proceeding No. 10279, is hereby ORDERED to issue letters testamentary, in solidum, to Imelda
Anent the third error raised by petitioner, the same has no merit. Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II.

Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will, and are, SO ORDERED.
therefore, estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors thereof. Petitioner further claims that
said actions clearly show that respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as officers
of the court.

This Court does not agree with the posture taken by petitioner, and instead, accepts the
explanation given by respondents, to wit:

Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because they are disclaiming the existence of
the will, but because of certain legal grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not have the requisite
interest to institute it; (b) the original copy of the will was not attached to the petition for probate as
required by the rules; and (c) the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is not qualified
to be appointed as administrator of the estate. 43

Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition, respondents cannot be held
guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within their rights when they put in issue legal grounds in
opposing the probate proceedings. More importantly, even if said grounds were later on overruled
by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents were fit to serve as executors
notwithstanding their earlier opposition. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of
discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTC’s discretion.

As for the remaining errors assigned by petitioner, the same are bereft of merit.
 6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344,
supra, and failing to declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed
in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in
failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof
of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.

The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24,
1963.

RULE 79 OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, PETITION AND CONTEST On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 —
praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970 the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record
on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said
court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for
vs. certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents. On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's
contention that the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the
matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
DIZON, J.:
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari — docketed as settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344)
G.R. L-21938 — against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during
of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for
as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively — praying: his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be
April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another,
dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.
of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying
petitioner's omnibus  motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan
settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy
all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt
Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction. thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate
proceeding.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings,
petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special
respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will
proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No.
Court. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows: intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest
to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special
A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss. Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the
last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. It
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963
to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Annulment of said proceedings.

On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the
dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y
said order having been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost
appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte
questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of
December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order: The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros
Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b)
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by this Court, the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original
Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al ., G.R. exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the
No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or intestate. While their
of law which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court. jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular
Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
the petitioner is hereby disapproved. Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which
he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that
mentioned heretofore. of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in
provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts
pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city where the deceased
and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the
said court in its order of July 1 of the same year. Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same
Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in
Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing
Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396.
the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan
Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered. It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for
Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify. the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that
stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special
account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear was not the proper venue  therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have
filed the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court — In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the
particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled to commence the corresponding Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that
separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court. inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory
acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the
should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an
Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his
inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."
would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the
Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case
Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila
Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to
requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased
filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the
copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his
he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13
proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs.
person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will
for probate to the Negros Court. Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, and academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court
petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue  therefor. dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's
motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable  procedural defect, and, been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than
in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to
that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders.
It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed
by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the
initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari  filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the
of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition supplemental petition for mandamus  docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The
for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.
motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on
April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus
motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings
had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator
with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
 but suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister Rizalina, offering to help. After
Christmas of 1954, the administrator informed Adela that he was able to secure the conformity of
Rizalina to give her a loan of P10,000.00 instead of only P2,000.00. When Adela expressed
surprise over the amount, the administrator replied that he only wanted to help her get started in
business. On January 12, 1955, Adela was brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the office of their
lawyer, where she was made to sign a document she could not read. On January 13, 1955, the
lawyer asked Adela to sign another document, which he said was to be presented in Court and
explained the contents of the document signed the day before. It was only then that Adela came to
know that said document was a deed of sale. 1 When Adela protested, Villegas told her that the
matter could be discussed better in his house in Malabon. On arriving at Malabon, Villegas
informed Adela that the amount of P50,000.00 which Rizalina was paying for her share in the
inheritance, was probably more than what she would get in the estate, because the estate is not
valuable and had plenty of debts. Villegas handed to Adela P6,800.00 in cash and a check drawn,
by Rizalina on the Prudential Bank for P3,200.00. Although Adela did not want to accept the
RULE 79 OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, PETITION AND CONTEST
money, Villegas refused to take them back. When she was made to sign the deed of assignment,
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION Adela did not know the true value of the estate, which she now estimates to be no less than
P1,000.000.00. In the same manifestation, Adela stated that a complaint for annulment of the
G.R. No. L-11848             May 31, 1962 Deed of Assignment was being prepared; that she was tendering the full amount of P10,000.00 to
Villegas or Rizalina; that she was placing the above facts within the knowledge of the Court so that
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED IRENE SANTOS. no action be taken giving value to the alleged deed of assignment and  in order that she (Adela)
JOSE D. VILLEGAS, Administrator, ADELA SANTOS GUTIERREZ, movant-appellee, might be notified of each and all pleadings or orders connected with the proceedings. The
vs. administrator Villegas and Rizalina filed exceptions and/or objections to the Manifestation, denying
JOSE D. VILLEGAS, and RIZALINA SANTOS RIVERA, oppositors-appellants. the allegations of fraud, undue influence and the like.

PAREDES, J.: In a motion dated September 7, 1955, filed with the CFI of Pasay, Adela asked the Court to
transfer Special Proceedings No. 2100, to Branch I (Pasig), alleging that the complaint for the
nullity of the Deed of Assignment filed with the Rizal CFI had been assigned to said Branch I; and
On November 11, 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her surviving that the transfer would save time and effort on the part of all concerned. The motion was strongly
spouse Jose D. Villegas and two nieces — daughters of a deceased brother, Rizalina Santos opposed by the administrator who stated, among others —
Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. Thereafter, the surviving spouse filed with the Rizal CFI,
Pasay City Branch, a petition for Letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 2100), and was
appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named as intestate heirs, besides himself, That in the final distribution of the estate to the heirs, the share corresponding to the
Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. Under date of January 15, 1955, in the movant Adela Santos Gutierrez may be ordered withheld by this Court (if due motion
above-mentioned Special Proceedings, an unverified manifestation signed by Adela Gutierrez, therefor shall have been presented to this Court) until the validity of the deed of
accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan", dated January 12, assignment shall have been resolved by Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
1955, was presented to the Probate Court, stating among others, the following —
On September 16, 1955, the motion to transfer was denied.
The undersigned hereby solemnly manifests . . . that all her rights, interests and
participation in the estate subject of this proceeding now belong to her sister, Rizalina On February 9, 1956, Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying that the
Santos Rivera, and that hereafter she will not take part in the above-entitled proceedings administrator and/or his attorneys be required to furnish her all copies of pleadings filed or to be
and is not entitled to the service of any pleadings, motion, order or decision filed or filed in the intestate proceedings, it appearing that the administrator presented pleadings in Court
promulgated therein. without serving her copies thereof.

In a verified manifestation presented before the probate Court on January 25, 1955, Adela averred An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged that the movant, although
that the deed of assignment of her rights, participation and interest in the estate of Irene Santos originally a party to the probate proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so,
and the first manifestation were obtained thru fraud practiced by the administrator upon her and and that having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and participations in the estate, she has
were vitiated by mistake or undue influence. Therein, she narrated that sometime in December, no longer any legal standing in the case. On March 12, 1956, the Court (Judge Emilio Rilloraza,
1954, due to stringent financial conditions, she (Adela) requested the administrator for an advance presiding) promulgated the following order —
of P2,000.00 from the estate. The administrator refused on the ground that it is against the law,
 . . ., the Court is of the opinion that the said motion should be, as it is hereby, granted and Adela Santos Gutierrez, on June 26, 1956, moved for the reconsideration of the above Order,
the said administrator and/or his attorneys are hereby directed to furnish Adela Santos contending that her motion on February 8, 1956, was not a leave for intervention (Rule 13). At
Gutierrez, through counsel, all copies of the pleadings filed and to be filed in this case, most, the rule on transfer of interest pendente lite (Sec. 20, Rule 3), should be applicable, not that
except those mentioned in said motion within a reasonable time upon notice hereof. of intervention. On August 10, 1956, Judge Rilloraza, who had already returned from vacation, set
aside the order of Judge Perez, stating —
The Clerk of Court should see to it that before receiving for filing by the administrator or
the other legal heir, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and/or their respective counsel, any ..., this Court is of the opinion that the order of this Court dated June 2, 1956 should be,
pleadings, motion, etc., that copies thereof have been furnished Adela Santos Gutierrez as it is hereby set aside.
through counsel.
Let the administrator and/or his attorney furnish henceforth Adela Santos Gutierrez,
A series of long pleadings were presented by the parties, following a motion of reconsideration, through counsel, copies of all pleadings, motions, etc., to be filed in this case.
containing arguments and authorities sustaining their respective theories. On June 2, 1956,
vacation Judge Jesus Y. Perez, handed down an Order, the material portions of which follow — The above Order is now the subject of the instant appeal, the administrator and Rizalina Santos
Rivera assigning three (3) errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, all of which pose a
xxx     xxx     xxx singular issue, viz., whether Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be furnished with pleadings
filed by the administrator in the probate proceedings and orders therein issue by the lower court.
The only question for determination in this incident is whether or not Adela Santos
Gutierrez has a right to intervene in this probate proceeding. The Administrator contends The order appealed from being interlocutory, cannot be the subject of an appeal. Even on this
that she has no such right because she had already assigned all her rights to her sister, plane alone, the appeal should be dismissed. Of course, appellants cited the case of Tengco v.
Rizalina Santos Rivera. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8162, Aug. 30, 1955, wherein We considered the appeal as petition
for certiorari. That case, however, has no parallel to the one now under consideration. It was one
Although at the outset, Adela Santos Gutierrez bad the right to intervene herein as one of for mandamus for the purpose of compelling the Judge to give due course to an appeal.
the legal heirs of the deceased Irene Santos, yet, when she filed her manifestation, Considering that in order for certiorari and mandamus to prosper, allegations to the effect that the
accompanied by the Deed of Sale and Assignment, informing this Court that she had court has no jurisdiction, or it acted in excess thereof or with grave abuse of discretion, must
assigned all her rights and interest as such heir to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, said appear, which is not obtaining in the instant case (because it is an ordinary appeal), it becomes
Adela Santos Gutierrez had ceased to have any interest in this estate and without such peremptory that the present appeal is not in order.
interest, she could no longer intervene in this proceeding. The assignment, it copy of
which is attached to the record, is in the form of a public deed which is entitled to be Moreover, it cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party
accorded the presumption of validity so that until the same is annulled in the to the proceedings in question. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was established at the
corresponding action filed by Adela Santos Gutierrez in the Pasig Branch of this Court, time of death of Irene Santos on November 11, 1954. While it is true that she executed a deed of
her interest would merely be a contingent one, that is, depending upon the contingency of assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled , which action is now pending
a decision declaring such annulment of the deed of assignment. This contingent interest before the Rizal CFI, Pasig Branch. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself
of Adela Santos Gutierrez is not sufficient to make her an interested party in this from the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record,
proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest required in order that a nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every act
person may be a party, must be material and direct, and not indirect or contingent (II intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
Moran's Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., pp. 391-92). We quote the following from Moran's partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
Rules of Court: transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny the co-heirship of
appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of the Deed of
xxx     xxx     xxx Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over
their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance. Thus, in the case of  Sandoval v.
In the same way, since the interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez to be considered as heir is Santiago, G.R. No. L-1723, May 30, 1949, this Court said: ". . . and the heirs of the deceased
dependent upon the contingency that she would succeed in her case for annulment of the Marquez could not divest the Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere
Deed of Assignment in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, her contingent interest is not fact of dividing and distributing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among themselves". But
sufficient to make her an interested party in this proceeding. even if the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment,
an aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sustains the motion for reconsideration filed by the
administrator and hereby sets aside the order of March 12, 1956.1äwphï1.ñët
 In our opinion, the court that approved the partition and the agreement in ratification
thereof may annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the approval was obtained by
deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed in the courts of the intestate proceedings, for
it is generally admitted that probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or
judgment procured by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it was
issued are pending, but even, as in this case, within a reasonable time thereafter .
(Trillana v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, Aug. 22, 1951; Espinosa v. Barrios. 70 Phil.
311).

We agree with appellee that the motion in question is not one of  intervention, but solely a plea to
enforce a right and that is to receive pleadings and orders related to the case. Evidently, the use
of the word "intervention" in the manifestation and pleadings presented by Adela was resorted to
for want of another appropriate word. In effect, all she wanted to convey was that she should
participate or continue taking part in the case for being an original party therein . It was her belief
that in filing the manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings (but which she later informed
the court to have been secured thru fraud), her standing might have been affected. Intervention as
contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a  third person is permitted
by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the
complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something
adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit
pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to
pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some
right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings (Judge of Camarines Sur, et al.
vs. David, et al., G.R. No. 45454, April 12, 1939, cited in Francisco's Rules of Court, Vol. I, Part I,
p. 639, emphasis supplied). The circumstances stated above do not fit the status of Adela in the
probate proceedings; she was not a third person; she was an original party therein.

We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator and Rizalina, if they are required to
furnish copies of their pleadings to appellee. On the contrary, doing so, will give appellee her day
in court and provide protection to the administrator himself.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the Order appealed from to be in conformity with the law
and jurisprudence. The same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
the appellants Jose D. Villegas and Rizalina Santos Rivera, in both instances.
 Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to turn
possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina, namely: Norman S. Mesina (Norman), Victor
S. Mesina (Victor), Maria Divina S. Mesina (Maria) and Lorna Mesina-Barte (Lorna). Thus, on
August 8, 2005, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna, filed an action
for quieting of title and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay,
Leyte against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as the representative of
RULE 79 OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, PETITION AND CONTEST the Heirs of Fian. The case, entitled Heirs of Sps. Faustino S. Mesina & Genoveva S. Mesina,
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION represented by Norman Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., represented by Theresa Fian Yray,
was docketed as Civil Case No. B-05-08-20. The allegations of the Complaint on the parties read:

G.R. No. 201816               April 8, 2013

1. Plaintiffs are the HEIRS OF SPS. FAUSTINO S. MESINO and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, and
represented in this instance by NORMAN MESINA as shown by the Special Power of Attorneys x
HEIRS OFF AUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN x x, of legal age, married, Filipino, and a resident of Poblacion Albuera, Leyte, where he may be
MESINA, Petitioners, served with court orders, notices, and other processes, while defendants are the HEIRS OF
vs. DOMINGO FIAN, SR., likewise of legal ages, Filipinos, and residents of Poblacion Albuera, Leyte,
HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, ET AL., Respondents. and respresented in this instance of THERESA FIAN YRAY, where she may be served with
summons, court orders, notices, and other processes.3
DECISION
Thereafter, or on September 5, 2005, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint,
VELASCO, JR. J.: arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and that the case should be dismissed for
gross violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which state in part:
The Case
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. – Only natural or juridical persons, or
1
Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Decision  dated April 29, 2011 of the Court entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. x x x
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01366 and its Resolution dated April 12, 2012 denying
reconsideration. Section 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. x x x
The Facts
She claims that the "Heirs of Mesina" could not be considered as a juridical person or entity
The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina), during their lifetime, bought authorized by law to file a civil action. Neither could the "Heirs of Fian" be made as defendant, not
from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and MariaFian (spouses Fian) two parcels of land on being a juridical person as well. She added that since the names of all the heirs of the late
installment. The properties maybe described as follows: spouses Mesina and spouses Fian were not individually named, the complaint is infirmed,
warranting its dismissal.
Parcel 1 – A parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 6791-Rem. situated in the Brgy. Of Gungab,
Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte. x x x Containing an area of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY On November 24, 2005, petitioners filed their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
TWO (1,632) SQUARE METERS x x x.
Ruling of the RTC
Parcel 2 – A parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 6737-Rem, situated in the Brgy. of Gungab,
Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte. x x x Containing an area of THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED Finding merit in the motion to dismiss, the RTC, on November 22, 2005, granted the motion and
THIRTY (3,730) SQUARE METERS x x x.2 dismissed the complaint, ruling that the Rules of Court is explicit that only natural or juridical
persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Also, nowhere in the
Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs––whose names do not appear on the records, complaint are the Heirs of Fian individually named. The RTC Order reads:
claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of them––refused to acknowledge
the payments for the lots and denied that their late parents sold the property to the spouses Anent the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant, Theresa Fian Yray through counsel, finding merit
Mesina. Meanwhile, the spouses Mesina passed away. in such motion, the same is granted.
The Rules of Court is explicit that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law Assignment of Errors
may be parties in a civil action (Section 1, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court). Certainly, the Heirs of
Faurstino s. Mesina and Genoveva S. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina as plaintiffs as well Petitioner now comes before this Court, presenting the following assigned errors, to wit:
as Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. represented by Theresa Fian Yray as defendants, do not fall within
the category as natural or juridical persons as contemplated by law to institute or defend civil
actions. Said heirs not having been individually named could not be the real parties in interest. A. THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER AND RESOLUTION X X X OF RTC, BAYBAY,
Hence, the complaint states no cause of action. LEYTE IN DISMISSING THE CASE ON THE GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION;
Accordingly, the case is hereby dismissed.
B. PETITIONERS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE RULE ON VERIFICATION
AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING; AND
SO ORDERED.4
C. CASES SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE MERITS AND NOT ON MERE TECHNICALITIES. 7
On December 27, 2005, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the November 22, 2005 Order of
the RTC. The next day, or on December 28, 2005, respondent Theresa filed her Vehement
Opposition to the motion for reconsideration. The Court’s Ruling

On February 29, 2006, the RTC issued its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The The petition is meritorious.
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
As regards the issue on failure to state a cause of action, the CA ruled that the complaint states no
WHEREFORE, the motion prayed for must necessary fail. cause of action because all the heirs of the spouses Fian are indispensable parties; hence, they
should have been impleaded in the complaint.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA, affirming the RTC, held that the dismissal of the complaint is called for in view of its
failure to state a cause of action. The CA reasoned that:
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.
Without the presence of all the heirs of spouses Fian as defendants, the trial court could not
Ruling of the CA validly render judgment and grant relief to petitioners. x x x The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
In affirming the RTC, the CA, on April 29, 2011, rendered its Decision, ruling that all the heirs of the absent parties but even as to those present. Hence, the court a quo correctly ordered for the
the spouses Fian are indispensable parties and should have been impleaded in the complaint. dismissal of the action on the ground that the complaint failed to name or implead all the heirs of
The appellate court explained that this failure to implead the other heirs of the late spouses Fian is the late spouses Fian.8
a legal obstacle to the trial court’s exercise of judicial power over the case and any order or
judgment that would be rendered is a nullity in view of the absence of indispensable parties. The Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a
CA further held that the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for being improperly verified. The cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action,
CA disposed of the appeal in this wise: namely:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal of petitioners is DENIED for lack of merit. (a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
The assailed November 22, 2005 Order and February 28, 2006 Resolution both issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Baybay, Leyte are AFFIRMED.
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
SO ORDERED.6
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. 9
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated April 12, 2012. By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it can be readily seen
that the inclusion of Theresa’s co-heirs does not fall under any of the above elements. The
infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder of an indispensable
Hence, this petition. party.
Non-joinder means the "failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case an Both the RTC and the CA found said verification defective, since the phrase "or based on
indispensable party into a lawsuit." 10 An indispensable party, on the other hand, is a party-in- authentic records," as indicated under the second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 7 as afore-quoted,
interest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and who shall be joined was omitted.
either as plaintiff or defendant.11
We do not agree.
As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were
not included in the complaint being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on authentic records"
state a cause of action. does not make the verification defective. Notably, the provision used the disjunctive word "or." The
word "or" is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. 14 As such, "personal knowledge" and
Having settled that, Our pronouncement in Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil is "authentic records" need not concur in a verification as they are to be taken separately.
instructive as regards the proper course of action on the part of the courts in cases of non-joinder
of indispensable parties, viz: Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal requirement,
not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus, when circumstances
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order the correction of unverified
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the may thereby be served."15
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.12 x x x (Emphasis Ours.) WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed April 29, 2011
Decision and April 12, 2012 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 01366, and the November
Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What the trial 22, 2005 Order and February 29,2006 Resolution of the RTC, Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte,
court should have done is to direct petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 8-05-08-20, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a warning that his failure to do Petitioner Norman Mesina is ORDERED to implead all the Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as
so shall mean dismissal of the complaint. defendants in said civil case within thirty (30) days from notice of finality of this Decision. Failure
on the part of petitioner Mesina to comply with this directive shall result in the dismissal of Civil
Anent the issue on defective verification, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides as Case No. B-05-08-20. Upon compliance by petitioner Mesina with this directive, the RTC, Branch
follows: 14 in Baybay, Leyte is ORDERED to undertake appropriate steps and proceedings to expedite
adjudication of the case.
Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need
not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. SO ORDERED.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. (Emphasis
Ours.)

The alleged defective verification states that:

I, NORMAN S. MESINA, legal age, married, Filipino, and a resident of Poblacion, Albuera, Leyte,
after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and say that:

xxxx

2. The allegations herein are true and correct to the best of our knowledge; 13 x x x
 worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
RULE 79 OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, PETITION AND CONTEST Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his
G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013 death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to
their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent. In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
DECISION Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision
reads:
PEREZ, J.:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states: approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of
Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2 the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived
together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
The Facts Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon
(Jennifer). The Issues

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on
the following grounds:
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR
she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS
were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to PIÑAS;
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous
for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
(Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties
 III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC
NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as
ADMINISTRATION.12 husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the
fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the
The Court’s Ruling RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts
of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac
We find the petition bereft of merit. with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the
lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and
estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the binding upon this Court.21
time of his death:
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties
Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo
foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or voidable marriages, to wit:
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. 13 Even where the statute party may attack a void marriage.24
uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. 17 Venue for ordinary
civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. 18 As thus defined, Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 19 after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 extinguish such cause of action.
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be
settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between (c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued
by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and
the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists
does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of
marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as
completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings,
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio. 27 entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration. Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
to the issuance of letters of administration, thus: reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory
heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, AFFIRMED in toto.
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
SO ORDERED.
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
 and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and
administered the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving
his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the
estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of
RULE 79 OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, PETITION AND CONTEST the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an
administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the
decedents.
G.R. No. 164108               May 8, 2009
Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7, 2004, 6 contending that
Hilado v. CA the petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding.
They argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the same being
REPEAT CASE FROM RULE 78 dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the settlement of his parents’
estate. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint
administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima.

RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR In an Order dated March 4, 2005,7 the RTC denied respondents’ opposition to the settlement
proceedings but admitted their counter-petition. The trial court also clarified that the judicial
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 187879               July 5, 2010 settlement referred only to the properties of Vicente and Maxima.

DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special Administrators dated October 11,
E. OCAMPO, JR., Petitioners, 2005,8 respondents reiterated their prayer for appointment as special joint administrators of the
vs. estate, and to serve as such without posting a bond.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, Respondents.
In their Comment dated November 3, 2005, 9 petitioners argued that, since April 2002, they had
D E C I S I O N NACHURA, J.: been deprived of their fair share of the income of the estate, and that the appointment of
respondents as special joint administrators would further cause injustice to them. Thus, they
prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of administration to serve as joint administrators
This petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set
of the subject estate be issued to respondents and Dalisay.
aside the Decision2 dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution 3 dated April 30, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683. The Decision annulled and set aside the Order
dated March 13, 20084 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, in Sp. Proc. In another Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator dated December 5,
No. B-3089; while the Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of the Decision. 2005,10 petitioners nominated the Biñan Rural Bank to serve as special administrator pending
resolution of the motion for the issuance of the letters of administration.
The Antecedents
In its June 15, 2006 Order,11 the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators
of the estate of the deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond of ₱200,000.00 each. 12
Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo
(Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the children of
Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 1, 2006 13 of the Order, insisting that
respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed as administrator of the estate, considering that
children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on she even failed to take care of her husband Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997. They also
December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several contended that petitioners’ prayer for Dalisay’s appointment as special administrator was already
properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. deemed abandoned upon their nomination of the Biñan Rural Bank to act as special administrator
of the estate.
On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for
intestate proceedings, entitled "In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo In their Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, 14 respondents asserted their priority in right
and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo," in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay
Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089.5 The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente
was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a legal heir by right of representation estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the estate being identified and undisputed,
from her late husband Leonardo. and not involved in any litigation necessitating the representation of special administrators.
Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents had been resorting to the mode of special
Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a Motion to Submit administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due them. Petitioners
Inventory and Accounting dated November 20, 2006, 15 praying that the RTC issue an order cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property for ₱2,700,000.00, which the
directing respondents to submit a true inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to latter represented to petitioners to have been sold only for ₱1,500,000.00, and respondents’
render an accounting thereof from the time they took over the collection of the income of the alleged misrepresentation that petitioners owed the estate for the advances to cover the hospital
estate. expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid.

Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated January 15, 2007, 16 claiming that they Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment 22 on March 10, 2008, to which, in turn,
could not yet be compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the income and petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition/Comment23 on March 17, 2008.
assets of the estate inasmuch as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration of the June
15, 2006 Order appointing Dalisay as co-special administratrix with Renato. In its Order dated March 13, 2008, 24 the RTC granted petitioners’ Motion, revoking and terminating
the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to
In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and
administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the fact that responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the submission of an inventory of the properties and
respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order of an income statement of the estate. The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix,
and even manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate. subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00, and directed her to submit an
inventory of the properties and an income statement of the subject estate. The RTC likewise found
that judicial partition may proceed after Melinda had assumed her duties and responsibilities as
On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents’ appointment as joint special regular administratrix.
administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the
Estate,17 reiterating their stance that respondents, as joint special administrators, should be
directed to submit a true inventory of the income and assets of the estate. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari 25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a) declaring them to have
failed to enter the office of special administration despite lapse of reasonable time, when in truth
Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond 18 on May 22, 2007, they had not entered the office because they were waiting for the resolution of their motion for
praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without the need to file exemption from bond; (b) appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of
an administrators’ bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, Vicente and Maxima, instead of them who, being the surviving children of the deceased spouses,
since petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object to the appointment of were the next of kin; and (c) declaring them to have been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of
respondents as special co-administrators, it would be to the best interest of all the heirs that the hearing and evidence against them.
estate be spared from incurring unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They
also assured the RTC that they would faithfully exercise their duties as special administrators
under pain of contempt should they violate any undertaking in the performance of the trust of their Petitioners filed their Comment to the Petition and Opposition to Application for temporary
office. restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, 26 reiterating their arguments in their Motion
for the revocation of respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators. Respondents filed
their Reply.27
In an Order dated June 29, 2007, 19 the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective
comments or oppositions to the pending incidents, i.e., petitioners’ Motion for Inventory and to
Render Account, and respondents’ Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond. On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on the
finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as joint
special administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond, and for
Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition, 20 stating that they have already filed a appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her
comment on petitioners’ Motion for Inventory and to Render Account. They asserted that the RTC competency to assume as such. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite
should, in the meantime, hold in abeyance the resolution of this Motion, pending the resolution of before respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators,
their Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond. particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate and an income
statement thereon.
On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order appointing
respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the
Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular
Administrator.21 Petitioners contended that the special administration was not necessary as the
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision. 28 The CA, however, denied it. him when required by the court, and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or
Hence, this petition, ascribing to the CA errors of law and grave abuse of discretion for annulling administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them. 32
and setting aside the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008.
Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator of the
Our Ruling estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint
special administrators pending the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of
The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the decedents’ estate under the administration may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such
Rules of Court provide— disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section
1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and
Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon each of them the obligation to post an
Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. – When there is delay in granting letters administrator’s bond of ₱200,000.00. However, taking into account the arguments of respondents
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a special administratrix and that
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners nominated Biñan Rural Bank as
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisay’s appointment and
executors or administrators appointed.29 substituted her with Erlinda.

Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. – Such special administrator shall take A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control,
possession and charge of goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration
preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose and speedy settlement.33 When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other of the parties suggesting the appointment. 34 The principal object of the appointment of a temporary
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to
deceased unless so ordered by the court. 30 administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court.35
Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. – Before an executor or
administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in
issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows: their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.36 The probate
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him; enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the
issues of fitness or unfitness37 and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of
(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the will of the Rule 78,38 as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the
testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal
possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and from the proceeds to principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.39 The appointment or removal
pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed by the court; of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.40
(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within one (1) year,
and at any other time when required by the court; Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking
respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators, and for failing to first resolve the pending
(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.31 Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond, ratiocinating that the posting of the
administrators’ bond is a pre-requisite to respondents’ entering into the duties and responsibilities
Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. – A special administrator before entering upon the duties of of their designated office. This Court disagrees.
his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that he will make and
return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion for Appointment as Joint
come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as are received by Special Administrators, respondents already prayed for their exemption to post bond should they
be assigned as joint special administrators. However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer when
it issued its June 15, 2006 Order, designating Renato and Dalisay as special administrators and latter cash advance was questioned by petitioners in their motion for revocation of special
enjoining them to post bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00 each. This denial was, in effect, administration on account of the demand letter 45 dated June 20, 2007 of Asian Hospital and
reiterated when the RTC rendered its February 16, 2007 Order substituting Dalisay with Erlinda as Medical Center addressed to Dalisay, stating that there still remained unpaid hospital bills in the
special administratrix. amount of ₱2,087,380.49 since January 2004. Undeniably, respondents had already been
distributing the incomes or fruits generated from the properties of the decedents’ estate, yet they
Undeterred by the RTC’s resolve to require them to post their respective administrators’ bonds, still failed to post their respective administrators’ bonds despite collection of the advances from
respondents filed anew a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond on May 22, 2007, their supposed shares. This state of affairs continued even after a considerable lapse of time from
positing that it would be to the best interest of the estate of their deceased parents and all the the appointment of Renato as a special administrator of the estate on June 15, 2006 and from
heirs to spare the estate from incurring the unnecessary expense of paying for their bond February 16, 2007 when the RTC substituted Erlinda, for Dalisay, as special administratrix.
premiums since they could not raise the money themselves. To note, this Motion was filed only
after petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate on April 23, What is more, respondents’ insincerity in administering the estate was betrayed by the Deed of
2007. Respondents then argued that they could not enter into their duties and responsibilities as Conditional Sale dated January 12, 2004 46 discovered by petitioners. This Deed was executed
special administrators in light of the pendency of their motion for exemption. In other words, they between respondents, as the only heirs of Maxima, as vendors, thus excluding the representing
could not yet submit an inventory and render an account of the income of the estate since they heirs of Leonardo, and Spouses Marcus Jose B. Brillantes and Amelita Catalan-Brillantes,
had not yet posted their bonds. incumbent lessors, as vendees, over a real property situated in Biñan, Laguna, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-332305 of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, for a total purchase
Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special administrators for failing to price of ₱2,700,000.00. The Deed stipulated for a payment of ₱1,500,000.00 upon the signing of
post their administrators’ bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them, the contract, and the balance of ₱1,200,000.00 to be paid within one (1) month from the receipt of
tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of title of the vendees. The contract also stated that the previous contract of lease between the
respondents’ plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did so. vendors and the vendees shall no longer be effective; hence, the vendees were no longer
obligated to pay the monthly rentals on the property. And yet there is a purported Deed of
Absolute Sale47 over the same realty between respondents, and including Leonardo as
Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations represented by Dalisay, as vendors, and the same spouses, as vendees, for a purchase price of
of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all only ₱1,500,000.00. Notably, this Deed of Absolute Sale already had the signatures of
judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the respondents and vendee-spouses. Petitioners claimed that respondents were coaxing Dalisay into
probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section signing the same, while respondents said that Dalisay already got a share from this transaction in
4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the the amount of ₱500,000.00. It may also be observed that the time of the execution of this Deed of
decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the Absolute Sale, although not notarized as the Deed of Conditional Sale, might not have been
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or distant from the execution of the latter Deed, considering the similar Community Tax Certificate
knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) Numbers of the parties appearing in both contracts.
deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other
person as may be authorized to receive them.
Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
when it revoked the appointment of respondents as joint special administrators, the removal being
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the grounded on reason, equity, justice, and legal principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had
administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its
obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.48
decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses
chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care,
management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature On the other hand, the Court finds the RTC’s designation of Melinda as regular administratrix
of a qualification for the office of administration.41 improper and abusive of its discretion.

Hence, the RTC revoked respondents’ designation as joint special administrators, especially In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the following
considering that respondents never denied that they have been in possession, charge, and actual provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state –
administration of the estate of Vicente and Maxima since 2002 up to the present, despite the
assumption of Melinda as regular administratrix. In fact, respondents also admitted that, allegedly Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No person is competent to
out of good faith and sincerity to observe transparency, they had submitted a Statement of Cash serve as executor or administrator who:
Distribution42 for the period covering April 2002 to June 2006, 43 where they indicated that Renato
had received ₱4,241,676.00, Erlinda ₱4,164,526.96, and petitioners ₱2,486,656.60, and that the (a) Is a minor;
estate had advanced ₱2,700,000.00 for the hospital and funeral expenses of Leonardo. 44 The
 (b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76.
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. – Any interested person may, by filing a written
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency of the person for whom letters
are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant’s own right to the administration, and may
xxxx pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. – At the hearing of the petition, it must first be shown
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person that notice has been given as herein-above required, and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs
dies intestate, administration shall be granted: of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no
will, or that there is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance of letters of
administration to the party best entitled thereto.1avvphi1
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as the prayer
for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the termination of the
special administration. Although there was a hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007, the
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person same was canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the absence of the parties’ counsels.
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, The February 8, 2008 hearing was again deferred to March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to renovation of the Hall of Justice. Despite the resetting, petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or dated February 29, 2008,49 reiterating their prayer for partition or for the appointment of Melinda as
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; regular administrator and for the revocation of the special administration. It may be mentioned
that, despite the filing by respondents of their Opposition and Comment to the motion to revoke
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such the special administration, the prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of
other person as the court may select. the estate was not specifically traversed in the said pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency, and
legality of Melinda’s appointment as such was not properly objected to by respondents despite
Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of administration, the following being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a
provisions of Rule 79 are pertinent – probate court in accordance with the above mentioned Rules.

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner: Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into account the fact
that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond
(a) The jurisdictional facts; of ₱200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of Administration were issued to her
the following day, and that she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15,
2008.50 These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the decedents’ estate, but her appointment should be converted into one of special administration,
creditors, of the decedent; pending the proceedings for regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only
unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardo’s estate, which is not subject of this case,
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate; judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch.

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2008
and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the special administration in
favor of Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of
Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. – When a petition for letters of administration
Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead
is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition,
as special administratrix of the estate under the same administrator’s bond she had posted. The
and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to
trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings for the appointment of the regular Serapia's appeal requires but little discussion. The burden of the argument of her counsel is that a
administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No costs. special administrator cannot be removed except for one or more of the causes stated in section
653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section can only apply to executors and regular
SO ORDERED. administrators, and the office of a special administrator is quite different from that of regular
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of
the court; the function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any
debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special
Republic of the Philippines administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, and we
SUPREME COURT cannot find that the court below abused its discretion in the present case. In removing Serapia de
Manila Gala and appointing the present possessor of the property pending the final determination of the
validity of the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.
EN BANC
The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that the will in question was not
G.R. No. L-30289             March 26, 1929 executed in the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act
No. 2645. That section reads as follows:
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant,
vs. No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real
APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants. or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
OSTRAND, J.: three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin,
Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will
probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the
estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made presence of the testator and of each other.
several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery to
her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession. The principal points raised by the appeal are (1) that the person requested to sign the name of the
testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that the attestation clause does not
On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the will
de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the property as ordered, had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only
Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be in the last paragraph of the body of the will.
cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by both
Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this court in the case of the Estate
Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally of Maria Salva, G. R. No. 26881:1
on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would
simplify the proceedings.
An examination of the will in question disclosed that it contains five pages. The name of
the old woman, Maria Salva, was written on the left hand margin of the first four pages
In the meantime and after various continuances and delays, the court below in an order dated and at the end of the will. About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark.
January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and admitted it to probate. All of the parties appealed, About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. The three witnesses likewise
Serapia de Gala from the order removing her from the office of special administratrix, and signed on the left-hand margin and at the end of the will.
Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order probating the will.
 On these facts, the theory of the trial judge was that under the provisions of section 618 of (Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD
the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it was essential to the validity JUAN SUMULONG
of the will that the person writing the name of the maker of the will also sign. Under the FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
law prior to the amendment, it had been held by this court that where a testator is unable
to write and his name is signed by another at his request, in his presence and in that of The translation in English of the clauses quoted reads as follows:
the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is
concerned, whether the person who writes the name of the testator signs his own or not.
(Barut vs. Cabacungan (1912), 21 Phil., 461). But his Honor, the trial judge emphasizes In virtue of this will, consisting of six pages, that contains my last wish, and because of
that the amendment introduced into the law the following sentence: 'The testator or the the fact that I cannot sign my name, I request my niece Serapia de Gala to write my
person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, name, and above this I placed my right thumb-mark at the end of this will and to each of
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin . . ..' This the six pages of this document, and this was done at my direction and in the presence of
requirement, it is said, was not lived up to in this instance. three attesting witnesses, this 23rd of November, 1920.

There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of the situation. This is (Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
that the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore,
the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not We certify that this document, which is composed of six (6) sheets and was signed in our
only by the customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The presence by Serapia de Gala at the request of Severina Gonzales at the end and on the
construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a margins of each of the six (6) sheets and was declared to contain the last will and
signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A testament of Severina Gonzales, was signed by us as witnesses at the end and on the
statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's margins of each sheet in the presence and at the request of said testatrix, and each of us
mark. (28 R. C. L., pp. 116-117). signed in the presence of all and each of us, this 23rd day of November of the year 1920.

The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the center of her name (Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD
as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will. JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
The second and third points raised by Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales are sufficiently
refuted by quoting the last clause of the body of the will together with the attestation clause, both As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-
of which are written in the Tagalog dialect. These clauses read as follows: mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and
the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of
Sa katunayang ang kasulatang ito, na may anim na dahon, ay siyang naglalaman ng the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing
aking huling tagubilin, at sa hindi ko kaalamang lumagda ng aking pangalan, ipinamanhik alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last
ko sa aking pamankin na si Serapia de Gala na isulat ang aking pangalan at apellido, at clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it
sa tapat ay inilagda ko ang titik ng kanang daliri kong hinlalaki, sa walkas at sa bawat isa leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.
sa anim (6) na dahon ng kasulatang ito, at ito's ginawa niya sa kautusan at sa harap ko at
ng tatlong saksing nagpapatutuo sa huli ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng Nobiembre ng The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the will
1920. had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is
without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.
(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed without costs. So
Pinatutunayan namin na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng anim (6) na dahon na ordered.
pinirmahan sa harap namin ni Serapia de Gala sa kahilingan ni Severina Gonzales sa
wakas at sa mga gilid ng bawa't isa sa anim (6) na dahon at isinaysay na ang kasulatang
ito ay siyang huling habilin o testamento ni Severina Gonzales, ay pinirmahan namin,
bilang mga saksi sa wakas at sa gilid ng bawa't dahon sa harap at sa kahilingan ng
tinurang testadora, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay pumirma sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa
sa amin, ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng noviembre ng taong 1920 ng taong 1920.
 disposition. When the motion was heard on September 25, 1958, the court required the
administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in compliance
therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted to the court, in place of a
specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate with the
items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were
too voluminous to enumerate.

On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposetion to the proposed sale. Reasons, for the
RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of
herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture
Republic of the Philippines belonging to the estate had been made.
SUPREME COURT
Manila The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the proposed
sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins
EN BANC moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the special
administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2.
Rules of Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels
G.R. No. L-15388             January 31, 1961 sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the
personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) that
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee, there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate,
vs. and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant. removed; and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial
part of the personal estate.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration. Whereupon,
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceedings No. 29636 oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to this court.
authorizing the special administrator of the testate estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell
at public auction certain personal properties left by the deceased. Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the
special administrator has no legal authority to sell them. This argument is untenable, because
It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956, by a petition section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special administrator "may
presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold ", which shows that the special
late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April 28, 1956 allegedly possessed of personal administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only.
and real properties with a probable value of P5,000,000. On the same date of the filing of the
aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of
of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed (sec. 2, Rule 81; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53
issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting of Phil. 104; Collins v. Henry, 118 S.E. 729, 155 Ga. 886; Sqydelko v. Smith's Estate, 244 N.W. 149,
a bond in the amount of P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the 259 Mich. 519). But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but
deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of
Anderson. On September 28, 1956 the special administrator submitted an inventory of all the perishable property (Cao vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 109 66 Mont. 488). It is in
assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the property of the
the time of his death. estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other
proerty as the court ordered sold;" .
About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator submitted to the court a
petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous opposition
institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, presented thereto the appellant, the surviving spouse of the deceased, on the ground that she is
electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order allegedly entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in question, either because the were
to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value migh be obtained in their conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because they are her own, exclusive, personal
property. Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and
judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the
alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left
by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and
the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is
heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached
with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold
to preserve their value the proposed sale I s clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought
to be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget
and books — can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in
either or both of two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City left by the deceased, so that
no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition
and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of
the personal estate in question.

The special administrator claims in his brief that t oppositor-appellant should have indicated the
alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of
her unmeritorious claim. But it does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity
to point out which items in the inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the
proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were
overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition
were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of
the grounds of her opposition.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special administrator
to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs against the special
administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petition-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.
 of Manila. On January 9, 1962 respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such
special administratrix, Civil Case No. 50897 of the same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag, during his lifetime. On July 18, 1962,
herein petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado’s complaint, upon the ground that as special
administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased. In an order dated August 1,
1962, respondent, Hon. Jesus de Veyra, as Judge of said court, denied the motion, whereupon
petitioner filed case CA-G.R. No. 31168-R of the Court of Appeals, against respondent Judge and
Agregado, to annul said order by writ of certiorari and enjoin said Judge from entertaining said
RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR Case No. 50897. Upon petitioner’s motion, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction directing respondent Judge to refrain from proceeding with the trial of that case, until
EN BANC further orders. However, subsequently, or on December 3, 1962, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision denying the writ prayed for and dissolving said writ of preliminary injunction, with costs
[G.R. No. L-20735. August 14, 1965.] against the petitioner. Hence this appeal taken by petitioner upon the theory that, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old) Rules of Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay
GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the Estate of PIO D. LIWANAG, Petitioner, any debts of the deceased", and that, accordingly, Agregado has no cause of action against her
v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, as Judge of the Court of First as a special administratrix.
Instance of Manila and MANUEL AGREGADO, Respondents.
Inasmuch, however, as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not affect respondent’s
C. M. Baltazar and A. P. Narvasa for Petitioner. jurisdiction to hear Case No. 50897, it follows that the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
same, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ of certiorari, but by appeal, after the
Manuel P. Calanog for Respondents. rendition of judgment on the merits. Moreover, the theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an action
for foreclosure against the special administrator of the estate of a deceased person has already
been rejected by this Court. In Liwanag v. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, G. R. No. L-19159 (September 29,
SYLLABUS 1964), involving the same petitioner herein, the same estate of the deceased Pio D. Liwanag, a
similar action for foreclosure, although of another mortgage, and an identical motion to dismiss
and issue, we expressed ourselves as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
1. CERTIORARI; ERROR NOT AFFECTING JURISDICTION NOT REVIEWABLE BY
"The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for foreclosure, on the
CERTIORARI. — Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not affect a trial
theory that she may not be sued as special administratrix.
court’s jurisdiction to hear a case, it follows that the denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss a
case based on that ground, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ of  certiorari, but by
appeal, after the rendition of judgment on the merits. x          x          x

2. MORTGAGES; MORTGAGEE MAY BRING ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR OF

ESTATE. — A mortgagee may bring action against the special administrator of the estate of a "Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against
deceased person. the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these
remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim in the testate or intestate proceeding
and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or
realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove the
DECISION same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and
foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the
mortgage, he shall not . . . share in the distribution of the assets.
CONCEPCION, J.:
"Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action for
foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
"Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special administratrix .
Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag, the The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a
settlement of which is the subject of Special Proceeding No. 46599 of the Court of First Instance suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of
limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was
delayed. So that if We are now to deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and the already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.
appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage
was constituted will be defeated."cralaw virtua1aw library On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued
directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It
is so ordered.
b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary account
of the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully
belong to the estate of the decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof;
RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all
G.R. No. 166520               March 14, 2008 sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the past or is presently harvesting
or about to undertake, which belong to the estate of the decedent;
VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY
EDUARDO NIERRAS, Petitioners, b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to submit a
vs. financial report to the Commission as regards the background of the cash at hand or
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE deposited in bank(s), if any, the expenses incurred in course of her administration and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN other relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which
TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents. submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as above-required. 3

DECISION More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents’ Urgent Ex-
parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order 4 appointing
of the Decision1 dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate, the fallo of which states:
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order 2 dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby
dated 12 June 2003 whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and shall
of the late Gerardo Tan. immediately take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows: filing of a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court. 5

Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming
respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly
the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. next of kin of the deceased.
4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan,
filed an Opposition to the Petition. On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC
Executive Judge, issued an Order6 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.1avvphi1
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need
for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the
be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their 17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilma’s right to be appointed as special
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. administratix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as
of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not special administrator thereof.
residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same
On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners’ Petition. On 6 As regards the denial of petitioners’ plea for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
December 2004, the Court of Appeals similarly denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration TRO, petitioners argue that such denial would leave Romualdo, private respondents’ attorney-in-
filed by petitioners, to wit: fact, free to enter Gerardo’s estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the prejudice of
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DENYING and DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in The appeal is devoid of merit.
Special Proceeding No. 4014-0.7
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning the which provides:
following errors:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in the will,
I. or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
OF THEIR FATHER’S ESTATE. discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
II.
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA FOR selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A TEMPORARY neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY- request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
IN-FACT.8 more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution 9 denying the Petition on the ground of late (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
filing, failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and other person as the court may select.
proof of such service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay the deposit for the
Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriff’s fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a
filed by petitioners, however, this Court issued on 18 July 2005 a Resolution 10 reinstating the regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a
Petition. special administrator.13 The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next
of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as
Petitioners contend11 that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who appealable.14
are purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it is
the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is
administrator of the decedent’s estate. Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which
Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their attorney-in- implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or
fact to administer Gerardo’s estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo "Jake" Tan (Jake) claim to have lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
lived for a long time and continue to reside on Gerardo’s estate, while respondents are not even in evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
the Philippines, having long established residence abroad. contemplation of law.15

Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix of the We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
estate since Gerardo’s death on 14 October 2000 and is thus "well steeped in the actual respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special
management and operation of the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special
landholdings)."12 administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:
Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
Tan in the latter’s capacity as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
court all money and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to the estate directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were
within five days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about
in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the
decedent. She was likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with
cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The directive was the court the income of Gerardo’s estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact
issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002 or more than a year ago. On May 23, 2003, this Court, that Gerardo’s estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification
acting on the urgent ex parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another ten days for petitioner Vilma’s non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners
to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made. should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the
court’s orders.
This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs
be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no longer any
not satisfy the requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer need to discuss petitioners’ arguments regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer
the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs. 16 (Emphases supplied.) for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29
special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July
special administrator of Gerardo’s estate, the latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying
mere error of judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as
is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable special administrator of the estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of
was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with SO ORDERED.
grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 The Court of
Appeals could not have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.

Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner
Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to serve as the special
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions, both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
reportorial requirements after the lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against
her appointment.

We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as
regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as
special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus,
personally administer Gerardo’s estate.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late
Gerardo may take over administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the
appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the
appointment of a special administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only
when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or
administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar)
occasioned by any cause.18 The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is
to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it
for the benefit of creditors and heirs.19
 Respondent filed her Reply 8 stating that her filiation had been conclusively proven by her record of
birth which was duly authenticated by the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics
Office (NSO), and only the late Mariano or his wife had the right to impugn her legitimacy; that
petitioner had no right to oppose her appointment as Special Administratrix of Mariano's estate
since the former is not the latter's heir; that in her capacity as the Special Administratrix of
Mariano's estate, she had filed several cases against Norma and her husband; and thus, Norma is
not qualified to act as an administratrix because she has an interest antagonistic to the estate.
RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
Spouses Robert and Norma Bernardino filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene as
Oppositors which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated June 2, 2010.
SECOND DIVISION
Petitioner also filed a Motion to Recall Order 9 appointing respondent as Special Administratrix on
G.R. No. 221684, July 30, 2018 the ground that she has been collecting rentals from the properties of the decedent for her
personal gain and that she has been filing malicious suits against the Spouses Bernardino.
MARIA T. CALMA, Petitioner, v. MARILU C. TURLA, Respondent. Respondent filed her Opposition 10 thereto stating, among others, that she has all the right to be
appointed as Special Administratrix since she is the legitimate daughter of the deceased Mariano
and that she is able to protect and preserve the estate from Norma, the one being recommended
DECISION
by petitioner.

PERALTA, J.: Petitioner filed an undated Rejoinder claiming that the case filed against Norma before the RTC
Makati, Branch 59, related to two promissory notes where the payee was Mariano Turla ITF:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated November 27, 2015 of the Norma C. Bernardino, hence, a trust account was created which did not belong to the estate of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 131032. deceased. Respondent filed her Reply to Rejoinder contending that in case Norma is appointed as
Regular Administrator of the estate, she will succeed in taking all the assets of the estate for her
The antecedent facts are as follows: own use and benefit.

On March 12, 2009, respondent Marilu C. Turla filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch On June 29, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion to Order DNA Testing as respondent's blood relation to
22, Quezon City a Petition 2 for Letters of Administration alleging, among others, that her father, Mariano is in issue. Respondent opposed the same on the ground that petitioner lacked the legal
Mariano C. Turla, died3 intestate on February 5, 2009, leaving real properties located in Quezon right or personality to request for a DNA test as she has no legal interest in the matter in litigation.
City and Caloocan City, bank deposits and other personal properties, all with an estimated value
of P3,000,000.00; that she is the sole legal heir entitled to inherit and succeed to the estate of her On May 12, 2010, respondent filed her initial Accounting 11 of the funds that have come to her
deceased father who did not leave any other descendant or other heir entitled to the estate as his possession.
wife, Rufina de Castro, had predeceased him; and that she is entitled to be issued letters of
administration. She presented her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed and registered by the deceased In an Order dated June 25, 2010, the RTC granted petitioner's motion for an order for DNA
himself with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. testing,12 the dispositive portion of which reads:

As the petition was sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to it and set the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above incidents are disposed in the following manner.
petition for hearing. On April 21, 2009, the Letter of Special Administration 5 was issued to x x x x
respondent.
(4) The motion for DNA testing filed by the oppositor is GRANTED, and accordingly, the parties
Petitioner Maria Turla Calma,6 claiming to be the surviving youngest half-sister of Mariano as he are directed to make arrangements for DNA testing and analysis for the purpose of determining
was her mother's illegitimate son before her marriage to her father, filed an Opposition 7 to the the paternity of Marilu Turla, upon consultation and coordination with laboratories and experts on
petition for administration and alleged that respondent is not a daughter of Mariano; that the the field of DNA analysis at the expense of oppositor.13
information recited in her two birth certificates are false, the truth being that Mariano and his wife
Rufina did not have any child. She argued that she is entitled to the administration of the estate of
her half-brother and nominated Norma Bernardino, who has been managing the business and
Petitioner filed a motion to remove respondent as Special Administratrix on grounds that she had
other financial affairs of the decedent, to take charge of the management and preservation of the
incurred expenses mostly legal without proper receipts which cannot be returned if the same is
estate pending its distribution to the heirs.
disallowed since it is not guaranteed that she will be declared as one of the heirs. Respondent Branch 76 of the same court, in Special Proceedings No. Q-09-64479, are ANNULLED AND SET
opposed the same arguing that the grounds raised in the motion are not sufficient for her removal ASIDE.
and are highly speculative; that she has made an honest and truthful accounting for the approval
of the intestate court; and that the said motion was filed for the purpose of stopping her from SO ORDERED.18
prosecuting the various actions she had filed against the Bernardino spouses to recover properties
belonging to the estate.
Hence this petition for review.
On August 28, 2012, the RTC received the Report of Dr. Maria Corazon A. de Ungria, Head of the
DNA Analysis Laboratory, UP Natural Sciences Research Institute (NSRI), on the DNA test on the Petitioner contends that respondent had petitioned the RTC to be appointed as Special
blood samples from Rufina's alleged siblings and respondent, with the following conclusion: Administratrix of the intestate estate of Mariano on the basis of her birth certificate showing that
she is the daughter of Rufina, wife of Mariano; that in 1994, however, Mariano executed an
Based on the results of mitochondrial DNA analysis there is no possibility that Mr. Ireneo S. de affidavit of adjudication for the extrajudicial settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina
Castro and Ms. Basilia de Castro Maningas are maternal relatives of Ms. Marilu de Castro Turla. 14 wherein he stated that "being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to
and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any
other heir entitled in her estate"; that while respondent's birth certificate states her father to be
On September 11, 2012, the RTC issued an Order, 15 the decretal portion of which reads: Mariano Turla and her mother Rufina de Castro, the DNA results conclusively showed that she is
not Rufina's daughter, so her own birth certificate stating Rufina as her mother was fraudulent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Remove Marilu Turla as Special Administratrix She avers that she had put in issue the blood relationship of the respondent with the deceased
filed by oppositor Maria Calma Turla is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, petitioner Marilu C. Turla Mariano.
is REMOVED as Special Administratrix in this case. Petitioner is hereby ordered to submit an
inventory of all the assets of the deceased that came into her possession and knowledge and for Petitioner also argues that respondent had violated her duties as Special Administratrix as the
her to render an accounting thereof within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. latter failed to submit an inventory and to render an accounting thereof, hence there was a good
reason for the RTC to remove her. Moreover, she failed to comply with the Order to submit
In the meantime, let Letters of Special Administration issue in favor of Norma Bernardino who is inventory and render accounting and to turn over possession to the new administrator; and that
hereby APPOINTED as Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Mariano C. Turla, the appointment of Norma Bernardino as the new Special Administratrix is in accordance with the
effective upon the filing of a bond in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and the rules.
taking of the corresponding Oath of Office.
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner Marilu Turla is hereby ordered to turn-over possession of all the assets of the deceased
Mariano Turla which came into her possession to Norma Bernardino within thirty (30) days from Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of  special administrators is not governed by the
the time the latter formally takes her Oath of Office. rules regarding the selection or removal of  regular  administrators.19 Courts may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at
SO ORDERED.16 their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will
not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such
In finding merit to petitioner's motion to remove respondent as Special Administratix, the RTC discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.20
ruled that while respondent's birth certificate stated her father to be Mariano and her mother to be
Rufina, the DNA test results conclusively showed that she is not Rufina's daughter. We agree with the CA when it found that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
removing respondent as Special Administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla on the basis of the
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied m an Order 17 dated May 9, 2013. DNA result showing that she is not maternally related to Rufina, Mariano's wife.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. After the submission of the parties' respective Respondent had filed with the RTC a Petition for Letter of Administration in the matter of the
pleadings, the case was submitted for decision. intestate estate of the late Mariano Turla. Petitioner filed her opposition thereto based on the
ground that respondent is not the daughter of the deceased Mariano Turla; that the spouses
On November 27, 2015, the CA issued the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which Mariano and Rufina Turla did not have any child; that she had not been legally adopted and no
reads: right arise from a falsified birth certificate. In respondent's Opposition to petitioner's motion to
recall order appointing her as Special Administratrix, she claimed that she has the right to be
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The [Order] dated September 11, appointed as such since she is the legitimate child of the late Mariano, hence, respondent's blood
2012 issued by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, [and] the Order dated May 9, 2013 issued by
relationship with the decedent had been put in issue. Subsequently, petitioner asked for a DNA x x x the DNA Test results used as a basis by the Respondent Judge in removing petitioner was
test on respondent which the RTC granted as follows: not, at the very least, presented and offered as evidence. The rule is that after the DNA analysis is
obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results
x x x Amidst the protestation of the petitioner (herein respondent) against the DNA analysis, the in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC, in evaluating the DNA results upon
Court finds it prudent to allow the conduct of the DNA testing considering its definitive presentation shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rule on
result will decisively lay to rest the issue of filiation of the petitioner with the deceased DNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC). At that point when the RTC used it as basis for the removal
Mariano Turla for purposes of determining the issues on the other hand in this proceeding for the of petitioner, the DNA Test Result is not yet considered evidence, depriving petitioner the
settlement of the estate of the said deceased and persons to whom the same should be opportunity to contest the same. In its Order dated May 9, 2013, the RTC backtracked a little and
distributed. The filiation issue will secure a legal right associated with paternity such as support or stated that the DNA Test Result was merely persuasively considered in the resolution of the issue.
even inheritance as in the present case. The presumption of legitimacy is not conclusive and A perusal of the Order dated September 11, 2012 shows otherwise because it was evidently the
consequently may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. To reject the conduct of the same only basis considered by the RTC in its ruling. As we already determined, the DNA Test Result is
and result that may be obtained therefrom is to deny progress in proceedings of this case. 21 not even material and relevant evidence in this case. Petitioner's filiation with Rufina Turla is not
material in the resolution of the right of petitioner to the estate of Mariano Turla and/or to
x x x x administer the same, whether as a regular or as a special administratrix. 23

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above incidents are disposed in the following manner:
Mariano's execution of an affidavit of adjudication in 1994 for the extrajudicial settlement of the
x x x x intestate estate of his late wife Rufina stating among others, "that she did not leave any
descendant", would not also prove that respondent is not a daughter of Mariano whose estate is
(4) The motion for DNA testing filed by the oppositor is GRANTED, and accordingly, the parties under consideration.
are directed to make arrangements for DNA testing and analysis for the purpose of
determining the paternity of petitioner Marilu Turla, upon consultation and coordination with Petitioner argues that respondent had violated her duties as the court-appointed Special
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, at the expense of the oppositor. 22 Administratrix.

We do not agree.
Clearly, the DNA test was ordered to prove respondent's paternity, but surprisingly, the test was
conducted with the alleged siblings of Rufina, which showed that respondent is not related to Records show that respondent had submitted with the RTC an accounting of the funds that had
Rufina. While respondent was shown to be not blood related to Rufina, however, the DNA result come to her possession during the initial year of her administration. While she was directed by the
did not at all prove that she is not a daughter of Mariano, as petitioner claims and which the RTC's RTC to submit an inventory of all the assets of the deceased that came into her possession and
order of DNA testing wanted to establish. Notably, petitioner alleges that she is Mariano's half- knowledge and for her to render an accounting thereof, such directive was only embodied in the
sister, but it baffles us why she was not the one who underwent the DNA testing when such RTC's Order dated September 11, 2012 removing her as Special Administratrix which she
procedure could satisfactorily prove her contention that respondent is not Mariano's daughter. assailed by filing a petition for certiorari  with the CA, which reversed the same and now the
subject of the instant petition.
Moreover, Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Rule on DNA evidence, provides that the grant of
DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any Considering the above-discussion, we find no need to discuss the issue of whether the
component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof. Here, the DNA result appointment of Norma Bernardino as the new Special Administratrix is in accordance with the
was not offered in accordance with the Rules on Evidence. Therefore, we do not find the DNA test rules.
results as a valid ground for the revocation of respondent's appointment as Special Administratrix
and her removal as such. Respondent's removal was not grounded on reason, justice and legal WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 27, 2015 of the Court of
principle. We find apropos the CA disquisition in this wise: Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131032 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The estate to be administered is that of decedent Mariano Turla, hence, it is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Respondent Judge to remove petitioner on the ground that she is not
related to Rufina Turla. True, that she claims to be the daughter of the Spouses Mariano Turla and
Rufina Turla. However, a finding that she is not the daughter of Rufina Turla does not
automatically mean that she is not the daughter of Mariano Turla as well, especially since in the
two versions of her birth certificate, it was Mariano Turla who reported her birth and who signed
the same as the father of the child.
 Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There,
she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for
herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino
Manungas.5 Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on October
29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia
Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon
RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR Manungas, the surviving heirs.6

Republic of the Philippines On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreño, the niece of
SUPREME COURT Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent
Manila aunt.7

THIRD DIVISION Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses
Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that
G.R. No. 193161               August 22, 2011 Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond
the reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus, the MTC issued a summary
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner, judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to
vs. restore possession to Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREÑO, Respondents. the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC. 8 On appeal to this
Court, defendants’ petition was denied for having been filed out of time in a Resolution which
DECISION became final on April 20, 1998.9

VELASCO, JR., J.: Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the
RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino
The Case
Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. 10 The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto
(Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the April 30, 2009 Manungas claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas,
Decision1 and July 21, 2010 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531- he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a debtor of the
MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreño v. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, Acting estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a Decision
Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado Salinas (Manungas). The CA issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated November 4, 2002 3 of the Regional Trial Court appointing Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the dispositive portion of
(RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao del Norte, in Special Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the which reads:
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Engracia N. Vda de Manungas, Diosdado
Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of respondent Florencia Avila
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreño is hereby appointed as Special
Parreño (Parreño) as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas and appointed
Administrator of the property of the late Engracia N. Vda. de Manungas. The Special Administrator
petitioner Diosdado Salinas Manungas (Diosdado) in her stead.
is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 81.

The Facts
SO ORDERED.11

Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Instead, they
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on
Preliminary Injunction.12 In his motion, Diosdado argued that Parreño’s appointment as special
May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. 4 Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the
Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas’ death, concluding that her appointment
as special administrator was without basis. He added that Parreño was not fit to become a special The Court’s Ruling
administrator having already been fined by the court for failing to render a timely accounting of
Engracia Manungas’ property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also reasoned that Parreño is a The petition must be denied.
mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he is the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of its
earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether the RTC Order dated
Diosdado as the Special Administrator.13 November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.

Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued its assailed April 30, Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari cannot be the substitute for
2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier a lost appeal, Parreño should have appealed the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 to the CA
appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado contends
instead. The CA further reinstated Parreño as the special administrator of the estate. The that the Order dated November 4, 2002 became final and executory, Parreño having failed to file
dispositive portion reads: the petition within the reglementary period; thus, the Order cannot be the subject of review even
by this Court. However, Diosdado’s position assumes that the RTC Order dated November 4,
2002 is a final order instead of an interlocutory order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated November 4,
2002 setting aside the appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator of the estate of
the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas, and denying the property bond posted by Florencia Parreño In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,20 the Court stated what an interlocutory order is:
[is] hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by Public
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del Norte with grave Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory",
SO ORDERED.14 e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 15, 2009 15 which judgment rendered in the case.
the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or
Hence, We have this petition. preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate
proceeding. In Ocampo v. Ocampo, 21 the Court succinctly held, "The appointment or removal of
The Issues special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court."
Diosdado raises the following issues:
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002 is clearly an
The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari cannot be a substitute for an interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the subject of an appeal under Rule 45 of the
appeal where the latter remedy is available. 16 Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. Thus, Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:
The Court a Quo in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration grossly violated the rule that
once a decision or order is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. 17 Section 1. Subject of appeal.

The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment of petitioner, An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of
Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of Florencia Parreño a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
as special administrator.18
No appeal may be taken from:
19
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to oppositors’ petition that is flawed.
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order; The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:

xxxx After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both petitioner and oppositors,
this Court finds merit in the contention of petitioner. In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals,
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court ruled:
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral relatives to his estate;
Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the petition well within the prescribed period under this Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas inherits the latter’s
rule. property by operation of law;

There was no necessity to file a motion for reconsideration WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing Florencia Parreño as special
administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas is ordered set aside.
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is required
before a decision may be appealed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule, Such reasoning is a non sequitur.
there must be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as
a motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioner argues The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is
that respondent’s failure to move for the reconsideration of the Order dated November 4, 2002 is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
fatal to an appeal from it. Such general rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained in Delos
Reyes v. Flores:22
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion
of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, 24 it was stated that:
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus are
available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, such as a motion for reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to
adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there are several the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as
exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a motion for to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now
reconsideration, to wit: Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the
law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
xxxx appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis
supplied.) This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:

The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination of the issues raised by While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in
respondents in appealing the Order dated November 4, 2002, reveals that the issues are only their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
questions of law. Ergo, there is no need for a motion for reconsideration. appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari despite the existence of court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
an appeal or other appropriate remedy in several instances, including when the court a quo acted enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule
assailed order.23 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the
discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the November 4, 2002 Order of principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. 25 (Emphasis supplied.)
the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still prosper, as in this case.
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate,
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal
principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the trial court, reversing its
preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia Manungas’
Rules: estate, the May 15, 2002 Order is necessarily reinstated and Parreño’s appointment as special
administrator is revived.
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CA’s April 30, 2009 Decision and July 21,
preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN declaring as null and void the November 4, 2002
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other Order of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Order dated
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the May 15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreño is REINSTATED
deceased unless so ordered by the court.1avvphi1 as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and SO ORDERED.
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to
the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from
such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate
and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.

Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia
Manungas’ estate:

In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as Special
Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention that he is the illegitimate
child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related
to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On the other hand,
Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also
the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt
Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s
estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as
special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power
in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 26 (Emphasis
supplied.)

To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must
be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. 27 With the termination of the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is
still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its
value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF The inventory submitted by Aniceto Dalisay shows that a promissory note was
EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS executed by Facundo Dalisay on August 18, 1973 with the information that there
is no record of payment.
G.R. No. L-44702 July 30, 1979
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Facundo Dalisay is hereby directed to appear before this
Court on June 10, 1976 at 8:30 A.M. to explain and produce receipts of payment
FACUNDO A. DALISAY, Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late AMADO B. of said promissory note if there is any in his possession.
DALISAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO Z . CONSOLACION, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance SO ORDERED. (Annex "H", p. 36, Record).
of Davao, Branch II, and ANICETO S. DALISAY, respondents.
Then on June 14, 1976, H-is Honor issued another order, which is self- explanatory, thus: têñ.
BARREDO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët £îhqwâ£

Petition for certiorari and prohibition impugning the order of respondent court of August 16,1976 This refers to the Order of the Court dated May 31, 1976, requiring Facundo
removing petitioner as judicial administrator in Special Proceeding No. 1986, Court of First Dalisay to appear, and explain or produce receipts of payment for the promissory
Instance of Davao Branch II, the Instestate Estate of Amado Dalisay y Bangoy, and the order note in the amount of P10,000.00 which he executed in favor of the late Amado
denying reconsideration thereof. Dalisay on August 18, 1973, which appeared in the reports submitted by Aniceto
Dalisay per Order of this Court.
According to the allegation of the petition filed below, Amado Dalisay y Bangoy died on September
1, 1975 in Davao City; he was a bachelor without descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate In the hearing, Facundo Dalisay admitted that he signed the promissory note
or otherwise apparently, without any forced heir; he left personal and real properties worth about (Exhibit "C" — Motion-Facundo Dalisay) after the execution of the Deed of Sale
One Million (P1,000,000) Pesos; and he died intestate. The petition prayed for the issuance of (Exhibit "A" — Motion-Facundo Dalisay) of 2 motor vehicles in his favor. Facundo
letters of administration to the Clerk of Court Atty. Eriberto A. Unson. Dalisay further admitted that he was not able to pay the installments in the
manner set forth in the promissory note but he was able to pay it all.
After due notice and hearing, respondent judge selected and appointed petitioner from among
several nominees of the parties, as the judicial administrator of the estate. Aniceto S. Dalisay, When asked to produce any receipt of the payments he made, Facundo Dalisay
herein private respondent, claiming to be the nearest of kin of the deceased, moved for claimed that he did not get any receipt, because he and the late Amado Dalisay
reconsideration, but His Honor denied said motion holding inter alia that:têñ.£îhqw⣠are like brothers. If this is so, then why did the late Amado Dalisay require him to
sign a promissory note?
... upon its finding that, of all the would be administrators herein recommended,
Facundo Dalisay appears to be the most qualified and suitable in that he not only Again, if the claim of Facundo Dalisay is true since the Deed of Sale stated that
enjoyed the confidence of the decedent, but also because up to the death of the the consideration was already paid, why did not the late Dalisay return the
latter, he appeared to have been managing and overseeing the affairs of the promissory note to him, gratis et amore, or after he (Facundo Dalisay), had fully
estate and therefore is in a position to better handle the preservation of the entire paid the same,
estate for the estate. (Annex "B", Order, March 8, 1976)
In the face of the, record, the explanation of Facundo Dalisay does not merit any
Corresponding letters of administration were accordingly issued to petitioner on March 15, 1976. serious consideration.
An attempt of private respondent to appeal from said appointment was later withdrawn.
WHEREFORE, Facundo Dalisay is hereby directed to pay the intestate estate of
Because certain properties happened to be in the possession of herein private respondent, Amado Dalisay the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos within a period of
petitioner moved for delivery thereof to him but this motion was denied by the vacation judge then sixty (60) days from receipt of this order.
acting in place of herein respondent judge. Apparently, respondent Aniceto Dalisay must have
submitted some kind of inventory at least of the properties in his possession, for on May 31, 1976, SO ORDERED. (Annex "1", pp. 37-38, Record).
respondent judge issued the following order: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the foregoing order, explaining that he had already paid the
amount in question but since he "was precluded from testifying" thereon under the prohibition
against testimony of survivors, he proposed that he be allowed to pay the same in monthly On the other hand, respondent posits that petitioner, not being in any way related to the deceased,
installments of P500.00. To this motion, respondent countered with a motion asking that petitioner was appointed merely in the exercise of the court's discretion and cannot therefore claim any
"be removed or allowed to resign" because his failure to pay "may be considered as evidence of "proprietary and/or pecuniary right to insist in administering the properties now under custodia
abuse of trust and confidence." (Annex K of petition). Petitioner filed a rejoinder, Annex L of the legis." In other words, the point raised is that respondent judge should also have wide discretion in
petition, contending that there was no legal ground for his removal. Resolving the incident, His removing him.
Honor relieved petitioner as judicial administrator reasoning out thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Before passing on such conflicting claims of the parties, it may be mentioned here that in a motion
The deceased Amado Dalisay as the preliminary record of the case will show, left dated May 10, 1979, private respondent prays that he "be allowed to file a motion with the probate
a considerable estate, consisting principally of income-producing urban and court for removal of Facundo A. Dalisay as administrator on grounds different from the ground
agricultural lands, with some personal properties. upon which he was relieved by the probate court." It is alleged in said motion that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

In considering the appointment of a judicial administrator, this Court took into III
account that the said person must be a man of utmost integrity. Primarily cause
of the full trust and confidence that the deceased had apparently shown on the Private respondent Aniceto S. Dalisay would like to file a motion with the Probate
face of the Special Power of Attorney dated August 15, 1963 to Facundo Dalisay Court for removal of Facundo A. Dalisay as administrator for acts committed prior
and of the Affidavit dated June 2, 1974, he was appointed by this Court as and subsequent to his relief as administrator by the Probate Court, grounds
judicial administrator. different from the ground upon which he was removed by the Probate Court,
hoping that with two cases pending against him, the termination of one will bring
It is sad to state that administrator Facundo Dalisay did not measure up to the about his early removal as Administrator. But because of the temporary
standard of integrity and character the Court required and expected of him. restraining order issued by this Honorable Court enjoining the respondent Judge
from further proceeding with Special Case No. 1986, leave of this Honorable
Due to the sizeable and valuable estate with considerable income, the judicial Court is necessary. The following are some of the grounds upon which he will
administrator must have a character to resist temptation for personal gain which predicate the motion.
is open to him in such a position. He must therefore be, "like Ceasar's Wife
above suspicion." IV

His explanation stated in the aforestated motion for reconsideration that he Facundo A. Dalisay neglected to perform an order of the Court and duties
"never denied his obligation under the promissory note but claimed payment," is expressly provided by the Rules of Court. These are grounds for removal of
a posture, under the circumstances shown during the hearing, that does not administrator pursuant to Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court. In the order of the
speak well of the character expected of a judicial administrator. Probate Court dated June 27, 1977, the last paragraph thereof states: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
Thus, under the said circumstances as shown during the hearing, administrator
Facundo Dalisay appears to be unsuitable for the position as judicial "The judicial administrator is hereby warned that disbursement
administrator and his continuance in the position would work to the disadvantage of any nature without prior approval of the Court shall be
of the said estate. Coupled with his account with the estate in the Amount of chargeable on his personal account."
P10,000.00, his relief from the position is necessary. (Annex "N", pp. 47-48,
Record). A xerox copy of the order of the Probate Court dated October 13, 1977, quoting
the order dated June 27, 1977, is enclosed herewith.
It is the position of petitioner that in so relieving him of his position as judicial administrator,
respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion. He points out that it was actually he who revealed V
the existence of the promissory note — and this allegation is not denied by respondents — and
that if his claim that he has already paid the amount in question has not convinced the court, it
cannot be said that it is so entirely and totally incredible that it could be considered as justifying From the above-quoted order, leave of court is necessary before Facundo A.
His Honor's conclusion that petitioner has not lived or measured up to the standard of integrity and Dalisay makes any disbursement, otherwise the same is chargeable to him.
character of a judicial administrator.
VI
It appears from the account of administrator Facundo A. Dalisay from March 16, The Court is of the considered view that if the foregoing allegations are sufficiently substantiated,
197 7 to March 15, 1978, and March 16, 1978 to March 15, 1979, submitted to after appropriate proceedings, the removal of petitioner would be legally justified. Therefore, rather
the Probate Court, that he gave cash advances to himself, his bookkeeper and than insist on the ground relied upon by His Honor in his order under review, which to Us appears
Atty. Primo O. Orellan, his counsel. in the total amount of P22,064. 10 without to be quite flimsy, considering that the mere fact that an administrator happens to owe money to
authority from the Probate Court and although no fees have yet been allowed the decedent is not in itself a ground for his removal, and in tills case the evidence does not seem
them by the said court. He gave himself a monthly allowance of P500.00 and indubitable that petitioner's claim of payment was made in bad faith or in an obvious attempt to
Atty. Orellan P300.00. defraud the estate, it would be fairer for all concerned for respondents to proceed against
petitioner on the basis of the above-quoted charges against him. in this connection, it is to be
VII noted that in the considerations of His Honor's order of June 14, 1976 herein above earlier quoted,
it is not definite that petitioner's explanation was malicious and inherently unfounded. In any event,
the petitioner has not refused to pay; he only asked for some liberality so he could pay in
Under Section 1, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator is accountable for installments. Surely, such proposal could not have converted him into a debtor in bad faith. The
the. income of the estate. Facundo A. Dalisay failed to collect P21,755.03 from point of integrity raised by respondent court appears a little harsh. Otherwise stated, We find the
five (5) tenants from Coronon, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, representing the shares ground for which petitioner has been removed to be rather precipitate. From which, it results that
of the estate from copra; P8,917.11 from two (2) lessees from Panabo, Davao the orders herein assailed constitute grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
del Norte, and Barrio Lasang Licanan, Davao City, representing the share of the
estate from ramie, and P33,600.00 from two (2) lessees at Binatan, Digos,
Davao del Sur, and Sirawan, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, representing unpaid Accordingly, the petition is granted and the orders mentioned at the outset of this decision are
rentals from 35-1/2 hectares of agricultural lands as shown in his annual hereby set aside, without prejudice to respondent court acting, as the facts and the law may
accounts from March 16, 1977 to March 15, 1978, and March 16, 1978 to March warrant, on the new move of private respondent for the removal of petitioner. The restraining order
15, 1979 submitted to the Probate Court. heretofore issued is hereby lifted and respondent court is now free to act on all the incidents for
which leave of this Court is being sought in various motions to that end. Costs against respondent.
VIII

As also shown in the said annual accounts, Facundo A. Dalisay has not been
collecting rentals from the residential and/or commercial lots situated at Claro M.
Recto Street, Davao City, belonging to the estate, occupied by him, his counsel
Atty. Primo O. Orellan, his brother and relatives-in-laws of the latter, and his
sister.

IX

Facundo A. Dalisay failed to protect the estate from spurious claims. In fact, he
was biased in favor of, if not in connivance with, some claimants.

Facundo A. Dalisay padded his expenses for travel and inspection as shown in
his annual accounts from March 15, 1977 to .March 16, 1979.

XI

Facundo A. Dalisay committed perjury when he testified in court on March 29,

1979, during the hearing of the claims of Desiderio Dalisay that he does not know
Aniceto S. Dalisay. (Pp. 5154, Vol. II, Record),
RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF
EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS
 G.R. No. L-27657 August 30, 1992 this Court in an order issued directed the parties to show cause why this case
should not be set for hearing for the appointment of a regular administrator.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA REYES, PAULINA Because of the length of time that had already elapsed since the filing or
SANTOS DE PARREÑO, special adminstratrix, institution of this proceeding on November 25, 1957, without a regular
vs. administrator having been appointed, this Court issued an order on October 4,
GREGORIA ARANZANSO, appellant. 1965, ordering the setting of the case for hearing on October 11, 1965, for the
appointment of the regular administrator or administratrix.
&
On October 9, 1965, Paulina Santos filed a motion praying that she be appointed
as regular administratrix, but in the interim apparently because she is out of the
ABAD SANTOS, J.:1äwphï1.ñët country, asked that the special administratrix Araceli A. Pilapil be appointed in
the meantime. On October 9, 1965, the surviving spouse of the late Simplicio
This case is about the all-too-familiar problem as to who shall administer the estate of the Santos, Zenaida Diaz Vda. de Santos, and her son, Simplicio Santos, Jr., filed a
deceased. It exposes human nature in its most naked form — acquisitive. motion praying the Court that Atty. Olimpio Capalungan be appointed as the
regular administrator. In the hearing on October 11, 1965, the oppositors
Juliana Reyes died intestate. Her substantial estate is still being settled in Special Proceedings Consuelo and Pacita Pasion proposed the appointment of the former as the
No. 34354 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV. The settlement has spawned a regular administratrix although in subsequent hearings withdrew in favor of
number of litigation which has reached this Court and includes not only the instant case but also Gregorio Aranzanso. On October 12, 1965, oppositor Gregorio Aranzanso
other cases with the following docket numbers: 23828, 26940 and 27130. proposed that she or her son-in-law Manuel Cariaga be appointed as the regular
administrator or administratrix, as the case may be. The oppositors are the
The estate had only special administrators until Gregoria Aranzanso who claims to be a first nearest surviving relatives of the decedent Juliana Reyes who died without issue,
cousin of the decedent asked that she be appointed regular administrator. Her motion provoked being first cousin. In the hearing of October 15, 1965, persons claiming to be the
counter motions, oppositions, replies, rebuttal and rejoinder which take up 120 pages of the children of Simplicio Santos proposed the appointment of Dominador Santos as
printed record on appeal and which demonstrate the zeal of the various counsel in espousing their the regular administrator.
clients claims to the estate which as aforesaid is substantial.
Hearings were held and the parties adduced their respective evidence to support
On January 29, 1966, the Court issued an order appointing Gregoria Aranzanso as regular their contentions, but only the oppositors presented oral evidence to show that
administrator and relieving Araceli A. Pilapil as special administrator. The order the properties under administration are the paraphernal or exclusive properties of
reads: 1äwphï1.ñët the decedent Juliana Reyes. To further support their contention the oppositors
presented numerous exhibits consisting of certified true copies of torrens titles
issued in the name of the decedent Juliana Reyes. Paulina Santos adopted most
This incident refers to the appointment of the regular administrator or of these exhibits presented by the oppositors and objected to some, while the
administratrix of this intestate of the late Juliana Reyes de Santos. heirs of Simplicio Santos adopted also some of the exhibits presented by the
oppositors and adduced four (4) exhibits, to support their contention.
This proceeding was instituted upon petition of the late Simplicio Santos on
November 25, 1957, after the death of the decedent on October 21, same year. It appears from the evidence presented that the properties under administration
On August 22, 1959, Simplicio Santos was appointed as Special Administrator are the paraphernal properties of Juliana Reyes, but there are also evidence that
with the bond of P5,000.00, and acted as such until his death on July 1, 1962. A the late Simplicio Santos, through a general power of attorney, allegedly sold
special proceeding was likewise instituted for the settlement of his estate (Sp. some lots owned by the decedent Juliana Reyes Santos to Paulina Santos,
Proc. No. 50994, of this Court) by persons claiming to be the children of Simplicio Dominador Santos, Eduvigis Santos, and a certain Jose F. Sugay. All these lots
Santos, in which Dominador Santos and Zenaida Diaz Vda, de Santos were numbering six in all were later on reconveyed by the aforementioned alleged
appointed as administrator and administratrix, respectively. On August 1, 1962, vendees to Simplicio Santos. The evidence further shows that Paulina Santos
Araceli Pilapil was appointed special administratrix of this intestate upon petition and the late Simplicio Santos, while this proceeding had already been instituted
of the late Aurora Santos and Paulina Santos. It appears that Araceli A. Pilapil and in utter disregard of the law, executed on May 12, 1958, "Extra-Judicial
has no relation to the decedent, except as attorney-in-fact of Paulina Santos. Partition with Sale" covering a property of the decedent in Baguio City. The
oppositors claim that these sales are fictitious and would, together with the said
On August 3, 1963, Filomena Santos de Lagunera through counsel, filed a extra-judicial partition, automatically disqualify Paulina Santos, Dominador
motion for the appointment of a regular administrator. On December 13, 1963, Santos and Atty. Olimpio Kapalungan to be appointed as regular administrator or
 administratrix of this intestate as obviously they have adverse interests against Gregoria Aranzanso, et al,' which decision declared that the oppositors Gregoria
the estate. If appointed as regular administrator or administratrix, naturally they Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo Pasion and Pacita Pasion are without
will not institute proceedings to recover those properties which were illegally right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the estate in question and that said
transferred or sold. This leaves only oppositor Gregoria Aranzanso as the person oppositors were enjoined permanently from withdrawing any sum from the estate
most qualified to be appointed regular administratrix. in the concept of the heirs and from intervening in this proceeding, and which
judgment of the Supreme Court has already become final and executory, the
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints Gregoria Aranzanso as the regular oppositors aforementioned, more specially the administratrix Gregoria
administratrix of this intestate estate with a bond of P15,000.00, and upon Aranzanso, have lost their right to intervene in this case and the latter to perform
submission and approval thereof, let letters of administration issue. .... any act of administration in the present proceeding. As a matter of fact, if we
have to construe strictly the mandate of the aforementioned judgment of the
appellate Court, it would seem that the oppositors never had any right at all to
Motions for reconsideration of the order were filed but the presiding judge held firm "considering intervene in this case. Such being the case, the Court after weighing carefully the
that most of the movants have adverse interests against this intestate estate." (Order of February circumstances surrounding this case, has arrived at the conclusion that the
16,1966, pp- 140-141, Record on Appeal.) aforementioned decision of the appellate Court has stripped off the oppositors of
any semblance of personality which they may have acquired in this instant
But the opposition was persistent; it refused to give in. And so on June 20, 1966, the court which proceeding.
incidentally was presided by a different judge issued an order which reads as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
WHEREFORE, and finding the omnibus motion filed by Paulina R. Santos de
On May 26, 1966, the petitioner Paulina R. Santos de Parreño filed an omnibus Parreño on May 26, 1966 to be well- taken, the same is hereby granted.
motion for an order: 1äwphï1.ñët
The oppositors Gregorio Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo Pasion and
(1) Declaring that the oppositors Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Pacita Pasion are declared to be without any right to intervene in this intestate
Ventura, Consuelo Pasion and Pacita Pasion have no right to proceeding and, henceforth they should not be allowed to take part therein.
intervene in this intestate estate proceeding;
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and Demetria Ventura are ordered to return to the
(2) Ordering Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura to estate the sum of P14,000.00 which they received by virtue of the order of this
return to the estate the sum of P14,000.00 received by them Court dated October 2, 1965.
with the authority of this Court;
The appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as regular administratrix pursuant to the
(3) Revoking the appointment of Gregoria Aranzanso as regular order of this Court dated January 29, 1966 is revoked and she is ordered to
administratrix and ordering her to render an accounting of her render a final account of her administration within ten (10) days from receipt
administration; hereof.

(4) Appointing the petitioner Paulina R. Santos de Parreno Paulina R. Santos de Parreno is appointed special administratrix of the intestate
special administratrix of the intestate estate of her late mother, estate of the late Juliana Reyes de Santos and upon her filing a bond in the
Juliana Reyes de Santos; and amount of P2,000.00 and the corresponding oath of office, letters of special
administration be issued to her. ....
(5) Revoking the previous order of May 9, 1966 allowing the
regular administratrix to make extensive repairs on the building A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied which prompted Gregoria Aranzanso to
belonging to the estate situated at the corners of Barbosa and appeal the order to this Court with a lone assignment of error, to wit: 1äwphï1.ñët
R. Hidalgo Streets, Quiapo, Manila, and ordering her to return to
the estate the sum of P28,040.00 which she was authorized to THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REMOVING THE APPELLANT AS REGULAR
withdraw from the funds of the estate deposited with the ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA
Philippine Trust Company. REYES AND THE REVOCATION OF HER APPOINTMENT IS CONTRARY TO
LAW.
In view of the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court rendered on February
28, 1966 in S.C. G.R. No. L-23828, 'Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos vs.
There is merit in the appeal, As indicated in the lone assignment of error, the only issue in this The Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and
appeal, is whether or not the lower court was justified in revoking the appointment of Gregoria void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the minor children,
Aranzanso as the administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. Alien to the issue is the which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack.
question of preference — whether it should be Gregoria Aranzanso who is a first cousin of the
decedent or Paulina Santos de Parreño who is an adopted child of the decedent — in receiving Stating that, "The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors
letters of administration. Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of
Paulina and Aurora Santos," this Court gave a negative answer.
It stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed regular administrator of the intestate
estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed from her office but only for a cause or causes provided Thereafter, this Court rendered judgment which insofar as relevant reads as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
by law. What is the law on removal? It is found in Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which
reads as follows: 1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the
order of the probate court a quo  sustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. affirmed. Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as
Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal.— If an executor or Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to intervene as heirs in
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. ....
law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided
by these rules, or absconds or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, The decision denied to Gregoria Aranzanso the right to intervene in the settlement proceedings as
may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is an heir of Juliana Reyes. But an administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger
removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, to the deceased. In fact, in one of her motions Paulina Santos de Parreno proposed the
unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no appointment of the Philippine National Bank as special administrator. (Record on Appeal, pp. 144-
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any 146.) We hold that the intervention of Gregoria Aranzanso in the settlement proceedings is not in
suitable person. the capacity of heir although she might be one if her direct attack on the adoption of the two girls
should succeed. We have authorized such direct attack in G.R. No. L-26940.
It is obvious that the decision of this Court, cited in the appealed order, that Gregoria Aranzanso,
among other persons, is without right to intervene as heir in the settlement of the estate in WHEREFORE, the order of June 20, 1966, removing Gregoria Aranzanso as administrator is
question is not one of the grounds provided by the Rules of Court. hereby set aside and she is reinstated as administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.
Cost against the appellee.
Let it be recalled that in G.R. No. L-23828, Paulina Santos, et al. vs. Gregoria Aranzanso, et al.,
123 Phil. 160 (1966), a collateral attack on the adoption of the two girls was not allowed under the SO ORDERED.
following facts:

When Juliana Reyes died intestate, Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for the settlement of her estate. In said petition he stated among other things that the
surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos,
27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed
administrator of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed an opposition to the
petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos'
marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void; and that the adoption of Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their
parents who were then living and had not abandoned them.

The Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that the validity of the adoption in
question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). The
order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF intestate proceeding No. 442, from which decision or order the petitioner Manuel Eugenio had not
EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS appealed. In view thereof, respondent Benito Cruz asked for the dismissal of the petition for
probate. To said petition for dismissal the respondent attached the pleadings, the transcript of the
evidence, and the order of Judge Castelo in intestate proceeding No. 442.
G.R. No. L-2804            September 20, 1949
After considering the written arguments of both parties on the motion for dismissal, Judge
In re Petition for probate and administration of the will of Paula Tiangco, deceased. Ambrosio Santos entered an order sustaining said motion and dismissing the petition for probate.
MANUEL EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant, The case is now before us on appeal from said order.
vs.
JOSE TIANGCO, oppositor-appellee. OZAETA, J.:
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for probate, and cites section
1 of Rule 83, which reads as follows:
Paula Tiangco died in Malabon, Rizal, on September 27, 1947, leaving properties allegedly worth
less than P30,000. She is survived by her husband Dr. Benito Cruz, a sister, and nine nephews
and nieces. SECTION 1. Administration revoked if will discovered. Proceedings thereupon. — If after
letters of administration have been granted on the estate of decedent as if he had died
intestate, his will is proved and allowed by the court, the letters of administration shall be
In or about October, 1947, Jose Tiangeo, one of the surviving nephews, instituted intestate revoked and all powers thereunder cease, and the administrator shall forthwith surrender
proceeding No. 442 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and applied for letters of administration the letters to the court, and render his account within such time as the court directs.
of the estate of the deceased. Manuel Eugenio, Purificacion Eugenia, Abelardo Eugenia and Proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will
Milagros Eugenio, other nephews and nieces of the deceased, opposed Tiangco's petition for shall be as hereinbefore provided.
letters of administration, alleging that the deceased in her lifetime had executed a will which,
according to their knowledge, information, and belief, was then in the possession of the surviving
husband, Dr. Benito, Cruz, and prayed that the latter be required to produce the last will and There can be no question that under the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, if the
testament of the deceased for probate by the court. appellant had found the alleged will and had proved its due execution, the letters of administration
issued to the herein appellee Jose Tiangco in intestate proceedings No. 442 would have been
revoked and said intestate proceeding would have been converted into a testamentary
In view of that allegation, Judge Oscar Castelo ordered Dr. Benito Cruz to appear before the court proceeding. But appellant had not done so. He did not even allege that he had found the
on November 27, 1947, at nine a. m., and to produce the last will and testament of Paula Tiangco. supposed will. In his petition for probate he merely repeated and sought to litigate anew his
In compliance with that order Dr. Benito Cruz appeared before the court and manifested that he contention in intestate proceeding No. 442 that the surviving husband, Benito Cruz, had the
had no knowledge of the existence of the alleged will and that he never had it in his possession. In alleged will in his possession and again asked the court to order him to produce it.
view of that manifestation the court ordered the oppositor Manuel Eugenio to present evidence of
the existence and due execution of the alleged will.
Having been raised in issue and finally decided adversely to the herein appellant in intestate
proceeding No. 442, that same question of whether or not Benito Cruz had the alleged will in his
After hearing the evidence adduced by the oppositor, Judge Castelo entered an order on possession cannot be litigated anew. To countenance the procedure adopted by the appellant
December 20, 1947, declaring that it had not been proven that the deceased Paula Tiangco had would be to permit him to trifle with the court and harass his opponent.
left a will and appointing Jose Tiangco administrator of the properties left by her.
There is no analogy between the present case and that of Cartajena vs. Lijauco and Zaballa, 38
Instead of appealing from said order Manuel Eugenio, on January 24, 1948, filed a petition in the Phil., 620, cited and relied upon by the appellant. The question presented in that case, as stated
same court for the "probate and administration of the will of Paula Tiangco," alleging that the by the Court, was: "May an administrator of an estate of a deceased person continue to administer
deceased executed a last will and testament sometime in the year 1943 and that said last will and the estate after a will of such deceased is proved and allowed?" In that case, pending petition by
testament "has been and still is in the possession of her surviving husband, Dr. Benito Cruz," and Lijauco and Zaballa for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the deceased Tomasa
praying that the latter be ordered to produce and present to the court the last will and testament of Nepomuceno, Cartajena presented a will in the court and asked that it be admitted to probate.
the deceased Paula Tiangco so that it might be probated, and that letters testamentary be issued Lijauco and Zaballa were appointed administrators, but after the will was admitted to probate the
to the petitioner, In view of that petition Judge Ambrosio Santos ordered Dr. Benito Cruz to deliver letters of administration theretofore granted to Lijauco and Zaballa were revoked, in conformity
said last will and testament to the clerk of court within five days. with section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now section 1 of Rule 83.

The respondent Dr. Benito Cruz informed the court in writing that he had no knowledge of the Counsel for the appellant has misunderstood the abovecited rule. Applied to this case, it clearly
existence of the alleged will and that he never had it in his custody; that the nonexistence of said means that notwithstanding the letters of administration issued in intestate proceedings No. 442, if
will was res judicata, the same question having been submitted to and decided by the court in the appellant or any other interested party could produce a will of the deceased and could prove
its due execution, letters testamentary or of administration would be issued and the appointment
of appellee Jose Tiangco as administrator would be revoked. The order appealed from is affirmed,
with costs.
RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF
EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul and
set aside the decision dated December 27, 1985 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court 1
[G.R. No. 74618. September 2, 1992.] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 in Special Proceeding No.
84520 removing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as administratrix and appointing private respondent
ANA LIM KALAW, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Rosa Lim Kalaw in her stead as the administratrix of the estate of their late father Carlos Lim
THE HONORABLE RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA LIM KALAW, Respondents. Kalaw.

Alberto R. De Joya for Petitioner. It appears on record that Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8,
1970.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Cheng, Martinez & Associates for Private Respondent.
On June 8, 1972, Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the issuance of Letters of
Administration with the then Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 84520
SYLLABUS naming Ana Lim Kalaw (63 years old), Victoria Lim Kalaw (57 years old), Pura Lim Kalaw (53
years old) and Rosa Lim Kalaw (43 years old) as the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ACCOUNTABILITY OF ADMINISTRATOR, On April 25, 1974, the trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as special
WHEN TO RENDER ACCOUNTS; RULE AND EXCEPTION. — The rendering of an accounting administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a preliminary inventory of all the properties which
by an administrator of his administration within one year from his appointment is mandatory, as came into her possession as special administratrix of the estate of her late father on June 3, 1974.
shown by the use of the word "shall" in said rule. The only exception is when the Court otherwise
directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate or for paying the On October 6, 1977, the trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial
debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case at bar. administratrix of said estate and a Letter of Administration was issued to the petitioner after the
latter took her oath of office on November 11, 1977.
2. ID.; ID.; REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATOR; JUSTIFIED, FOR NEGLIGENCE TO RENDER AN
ACCOUNTING OF HIS ADMINISTRATION AS REQUIRED BY LAW. — subsequent compliance Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render an accounting of her
in rendering an accounting report did not purge her of her negligence in not rendering an administration of said estate which was granted by respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz in an order
accounting for more than six years, which justifies petitioner’s removal as administratrix and the dated December 8, 1982.chanrobles law library
appointment of private respondent in her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules
of Court. As correctly stated by the appellate court: "The settled rule is that the removal of an On July 1, 1983, respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an
administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court appointing him. As accounting of her administration with the express instruction that said order be personally served
aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala v. Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, upon the petitioner since the order dated December 8, 1982 was returned to the Court unserved.
‘the sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by said court, whose However, said order was also not received by the petitioner.
sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator
not comfortable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.’ Consequently, appellate On January 31, 1984, private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and
tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of the Pura Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their father’s estate and to
removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is appoint instead private respondent on the ground of negligence on the part of petitioner in her
shown. (Borromeo v. Borromeo, 97 Phil. 549; Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768.) In the duties for failing to render an accounting of her administration since her appointment as
case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground of her failure for 6 years administratrix more than six years ago in violation of Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of
and 3 months from the time she was appointed as administratrix to render an accounting of her Court. The motion was set for hearing on February 10, 1984.
administration as required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court."
On February 21, 1984, respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an
accounting within 30 days from receipt thereof which she did on March 22, 1984. She likewise
filed on the same date, her Opposition to the motion praying for her removal as administratrix
DECISION alleging that the delay in rendering said accounting was due to the fact that Judge Carlos
Sundiam, who was the judge where the intestate proceeding was assigned, had then been
promoted to the Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a considerable length of
time, while newly-appointed Judge Joel Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after his appointment
NOCON, J.:
to said vacancy, so much so that she did not know to whom to render an accounting report.
 sustaining respondent Judge Diaz’ order removing her as judicial administratrix considering that
In their Rejoinder and Manifestation, private respondent and her co-movant alleged that the she had already submitted an accounting report covering the period from December, 1977 to
ground relied upon for petitioner’s removal was not the delay but her failure or neglect to render an December, 1983 in compliance with respondent’s Judge order.
accounting of all the properties which came into her possession as required under Section 1 of
Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court.chanrobles.com : virtual law library Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

On January 4, 1985, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which "SEC. 8. When executor or administrator to render account. — Every executor or administrator
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters
testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time
"From the foregoing, the Court finds that Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw violated the provisions of for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate; and
Section 8, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court for not rendering an account of her administration within he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly
one (1) year from date of receipt of the letters of administration and this constitutes negligence on settled." chanrobles law library
her part to perform her duty as Administratrix and under Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court,
neglect on the part of the administratrix to render her account is a ground for her removal as an The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one year from his
administratrix. Finding the instant motion to remove Administratrix to be meritorious and well- appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall" in said rule. The only exception
taken, the same is, as it is hereby, GRANTED. is when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against
the estate or for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the
WHEREFORE, Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw is hereby REMOVED as such Administratrix of the case at bar.
Estate of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw." 2
Furthermore, petitioner’s excuse that the sala where the intestate proceeding was pending was
On September 2, 1985, Petitioner, without waiting for the resolution of the motion for vacant most of the time deserves scant consideration since petitioner never attempted to file with
reconsideration with the trial court, filed a Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction or said court an accounting report of her administration despite the fact that at one time or another,
Restraining Order with the then Intermediate Appellate Court to annul and set aside the following Judge Sundiam and Judge Tiongco were presiding over said sala during their incumbency.
Orders issued by respondent Judge Diaz, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge her of her
"a. Order dated January 4, 1985 removing the Petitioner as Administratrix of the estate of the late negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six years, which justifies petitioner’s
Carlos Lim Kalaw; removal as administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in her place as mandated by
Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. 5
b. Order dated April 30, 1985 denying Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
January 4, 1985; As correctly stated by the appellate court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

c. Order dated May 13, 1985 appointing private Respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw, as Administratrix of "The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the
said Estate;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary discretion of the Court appointing him. As aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Degala v. Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, ‘the sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus
d. Order dated June 19, 1985 directing the tenants and/or lessees of the Carlos Lim Kalaw be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or
building to deposit the rentals in court and authorizing private respondent to break open the omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to or in disregard of the rules or the
premises in said building." 3 orders of the court.’ Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action
taken by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless
On December 27, 1985, the appellate court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. (Borromeo v. Borromeo, 97 Phil. 549; Matute
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768.)chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. However, respondent Judge is directed to In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground of her failure for 6
require private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw to post the appropriate administrator’s bond within ten years and 3 months from the time she was appointed as administratrix to render an accounting of
(10) days from notice hereof. With costs against petitioner." 4 her administration as required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court." 6

On January 21, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision which was As to petitioner’s contention that she was denied due process when she was removed as
however denied for lack of merit on May 12, 1986. administratrix since no hearing was held on the motion for her removal, this does not deserve
serious consideration. The appellate court’s disposal of this issue is in accordance with the law
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in and evidence. Said the Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Petitioner’s contention that her removal was without due process is certainly not borne out by the
records. There has been a hearing and, in fact, several pleadings had been filed by the parties on
the issue before the order of removal was issued. Thus, the motion to remove petitioner as
administratrix was filed on January 3, 1984, which motion was set for hearing on February 10,
1984. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion on March 22, 1984. This was followed by a
Rejoinder and Manifestation filed on April 6, 1984 by private Respondent. The order for
petitioner’s removal was issued on January 4, 1985, or after almost a year from the time the
motion to remove her was filed. Not satisfied with this order, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 1985, to which motion private respondent filed an opposition on
January 25, 1985. Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the opposition on February 18, 1985. Respondent
Judge issued his order denying the motion for reconsideration on April 30, 1985. This recital of
events indubitably disproves petitioner’s allegation that she was not afforded due process." 7

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction, the same is hereby DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF their opposition, if any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of Beatriz F. Gonzales as
EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS co-administratrix, as the latter was still in the United States attending to her ailing husband.

Republic of the Philippines In an Order dated 15 January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration
SUPREME COURT granted to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the
Manila late Ramona Gonzales. The Court, in explaining its action, stated:

SECOND DIVISION . . . In appointing them, the court was of the opinion that it would be to the best
interest of the estate if two administrators who are the children of the deceased
would jointly administer the same. Unfortunately, as events have shown, the two
G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990 administrators have not seen eye to eye with each other and most of the time
they have been at loggerheads with each other to the prejudice of the estate.
BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner, Beatriz F. Gonzales has been absent from the country since October, 1984 as
vs. she is in the United States as stated in the motion and opposition of Asterio Favis
HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro Manila dated December 11, 1984, and she has not returned even up to this date so that
and TERESA F. OLBES, respondents. Teresa F. Olbes has been left alone to administer the estate. Under these
circumstances, and in order that the estate will be administered in an orderly and
PADILLA, J.: efficient manner, the court believes that there should be now only one
administrator of the estate. 2
This is a petition for certiorari  which seeks to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
the Order of the respondent Judge, dated 15 January 1985, cancelling the appointment of the Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of 15 January 1985. Her motion was opposed separately
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as a co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021 entitled "In by private respondent Teresa Olbes and another co-heir Cecilia Gomez. In her manifestation and
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis," Branch 143, RTC, Makati, opposition to petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Cecilia Gomez stated that it would be
Metro Manila; and the Order of 15 May 1985 denying reconsideration of the same. pointless to re-appoint Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of Teresa Olbes, as the former
would be leaving soon for the United States to attend to unfinished business. Moreover, she
The facts are: expressed satisfaction with the manner respondent Teresa Olbes had been managing and
administering the estate.
Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the court a quo, is an intestate proceeding involving
the estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis. Doña Ramona is survived by In his Order dated 7 May 1986, a part of which is hereunder quoted, respondent Judge denied
her four (4) children who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. He said:
Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private
respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate. After a consideration of the motion for reconsideration and the oppositions
thereto, the court believes and so holds that it should be denied. The court in its
On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States discretion has issued its order dated January 15, 1985 cancelling the
accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country, private appointment and the letters of administration issued to Beatriz F. Gonzales and it
respondent Teresa Olbes filed a motion, dated 26 November 1984, to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales reiterates the same for the best interest of the estate of the deceased. It is
as co-administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and noteworthy that of the four heirs of the deceased, one of them being the movant
had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs. Copy of Beatriz F. Gonzales, two of them, namely, Cecilia F. Gomez and Teresa F.
said motion was served upon petitioner's then counsel of record, Atty. Manuel Castro who, since 2 Olbes, opposed the motion. The other heir Asterio Favis, did not file or make any
June 1984, had been suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law throughout the comment to the motion. As can be gathered from the oppositions of Cecilia F.
Philippines. 1 Gomez and Teresa F. Olbes, the reappointment of Beatriz F. Gonzales as a co-
administratrix would not be conducive to the efficient and orderly administration
of the estate of the deceased Ramona Gonzales vda. de Favis. 3
After the filing of private respondent's aforesaid motion, respondent Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo issued
an Order dated 4 December 1984 which required Beatriz F. Gonzales and the other parties to file
Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's Order dated 15 January 1985 court based the removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the estate,
should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown by conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes
respondents to be anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that petitioner had been
Court, which states: absent from the country since October 1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the
questioned order.
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator.
Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal — If an executor or Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between such joint
law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. 12 Conflicts of opinion and judgment
by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same
unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-administrators, can be resolved by the probate court
may permit him to resign. . . . to the best interest of the estate and its heirs.

While appellate courts are generally disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that the court a quo failed to find hard facts
court in the matter of removal of an administrator, 4 we find, in the case at bar, sufficient cause to showing that the conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices were unjustly
reverse the order of the probate court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. caused by petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or
prevented the management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or
The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or executors are omission showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, the court must interests of the estate. Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and the
appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased 5 who shall act as representative not only of other heirs in that the properties of the estate be duly administered and conserved for the benefit
the court appointing him but also of the heirs and the creditors of the estate.  6 In the exercise of its of the heirs; and there is as yet no ground to believe that she has prejudiced or is out to prejudice
discretion, the probate court may appoint one, two or more co-administrators to have the benefit of said estate to warrant the probate court into removing petitioner as co-administratrix.
their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented. 7
Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the estate also
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal on the ground that she had been absent from the country since October 1984 and had not
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as returned as of 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone
administrator. 8 This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in to administer the estate.
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The
underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, In her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January 1985, petitioner explained to the
economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, court a quo that her absence from the country was due to the fact that she had to accompany her
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to ailing husband to the United States for medical treatment. 13 It appears too that petitioner's
administer the estate correctly.9 absence from the country was known to respondent Olbes, and that the latter and petitioner
Gonzales had continually maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection administration of the estate during the petitioner's absence from the country. 14 As a matter of fact,
from removal without just cause. 10 Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the petitioner, while in the United States, sent respondent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank
legal and specific causes authorizing the court to remove an administrator. 11 of the Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in
San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests accruing from the Land
Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment of accounts necessary for
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an the operation of the administration. 15
administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There
must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant The above facts, we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix
the removal of the administrator. In making such a determination, the court must exercise good of the estate nor had she been remiss in the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary
judgment, guided by law and precedents. absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. Thus, as held  in
re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the
health of the executors' family, is not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal
In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix as executor.
on any of the causes specified in respondent's motion for relief of the petitioner. Neither did it dwell
on, nor determine the validity of the charges brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The
 . . . It seems quite clear that a temporary absence from the state on account of ill
health, or on account of business or for purposes of travel or pleasure, would not
necessarily establish the fact that an executor "has removed" from the estate,
within the intent of the statute. The learned surrogate was evidently satisfied that
the sojourn of these executors in New Jersey was nothing more than a departure
from the state for the benefit of relatives, not designed to constitute a permanent
change of abode, and contemplating a return to New York as soon as the
purpose of their absence should be accomplished. In this view, I am inclined to
think that he was right in refusing to hold that he was constrained to revoke the
letters by the provisions of the Code to which I have referred. I therefore advise
an affirmance of the order. 16

Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other three (3)
heirs of the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the
retention or re-appointment of petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that
the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient
administration. In re William's Adm'r.,  the court held:

A county court having appointed a stranger administrator as expressly authorized

by Ky. St. 3897, after the relatives of decedent had lost their right of precedence,
could not remove the appointee merely because of the request of relatives and
the belief upon the part of the court that the best interest of deceased would be
thereby subserved, since the administrator had such an interest as entitled him to
protection from removal without cause. 17

As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her
removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her. Stated
differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her removal was
therefore improper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo dated 15 January 1985
removing petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021,
entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis" and the Order of
the same Court dated 15 May 1985 denying reconsideration of said Order, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of said estate.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF On July 17, 1945, the Court upon hearing of the true facts that are contrary to the allegations
EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS made by the applicant in its application and in its urgent motion, issued an order revoking that of
July 5, 1945, appointing Magdalena Cobarrubias special administrator , and July 6, 1945,
authorizing her to withdraw the jewelry from the bank.
EN BANC
On July 19, the applicant submitted a brief alleging that since the Court "has rendered its order
TRANSLATION (NOT SURE IF ACCURATE): dated 5 of that month and year," it requested that the Court order the cancellation of the P200
bond and its return to the attorney for the applicant
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT On July 20, the applicant filed an amended - and duly sworn - application in which she claimed
Manila "That the only heirs of the late Pilar Leyba and Cobarrubias, are her daughters named Rosario
and Carmencita" and to "record that she waives in favor of these two minors Rosario and Carmen,
IN BANC every right, interest and participation that they have or could have in the property left by the late
Pilar Leyba. "
GR No. L-225 February 26, 1946
At the hearing held on July 28, 1945, the lawyer of the applicant requested that this file of
MAGDALENA COBARRUBIAS, recurring, intestacy No. 70686 be converted into a file of guardianship of minors Rosario and Carmen,
vs. adding that
ARSENIO P. DIZON, BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, and LA PHILIPPINE TRUST
COMPANY, appealed. This petition is based on the fact that the referred minors Rosario and Carmen are the
absolute owners of all the properties described in the application of this file.  . . and I ask
Mr. Mariano A. Aguilar on behalf of the appellant. that he be appointed guardian of these minors. . . (tnt, page 3).
The appealed Judge Dizon in his own representation.
Mr. Agustin M. Tolentino on behalf of the other appeals. Acting in accordance with the evidence presented at the aforementioned hearing, with the
declaration of the applicant in its amended motion and with the petitioner's request, Judge Dizon
PAUL, J .: issued his order of August 28, 1945, declaring that all properties mentioned in the request of July
5, 1945 as amended, belong to the minors Rosario and Carmen, nine and six years of age; that
In the special action No. 70686, entitled Intestado de la Finada Pilar Leyba y Cobarrubias, initiated the plot of land with a house of strong materials has already been transferred in the name of said
on July 5, 1945, the applicant Magdalena Cobarrubias filed an urgent motion on the same date, minors; that the furniture corresponding to items 2, 3 and 7 have already been sold by the
alleging that the founding Pilar Leyba had deposited sys jewelry they are worth P4,500 in the deceased; that there is no other property that should be administered in the name of said
security section of the Bank of the Philippine Islands; That said bank notified all interested parties deceased; and to protect the interests of said minors, I order, in accordance with the request of
to withdraw the contents of their section within the shortest possible time, so she asked to be the applicant's lawyer,
appointed special administrator, and that she be authorized to withdraw said jewelry from the
bank. In her request Magdalena Cobarrubias stated that she was the only forced heiress of the On August 29, the applicant requested the reconsideration of said order, and after several
late Pilar Leyba. Accepting these allegations as good, the Honorable Judge Dizon on the same transfers requested by the parties, Judge Ocampo on January 2, 1946, denied it.
date, July 5, 1945,
Go before this Magdalena Cobarrubias Court with a request for certiorari against Judges Dizon
On July 6, 1945, I authorize the special administrator to withdraw from the bank's security section and Ocampo and the Philippine Trust Company, requesting the annulment of the orders of July
the jewels deposited with instructions to report to the Court within the term of forty-eight hours of 17, 1945, August 28, 1945 and January 2, 1946.
the result of its management.
Regarding the order of July 17, revoking the appellant's appointment as a special administrator
On July 13, the applicant asked the Court to order "the suspension of the publication and the and revoking the order authorizing her to withdraw deposited jewelry from the bank, the Court
postponement of the hearing of the application for a car, indicated for July 28, 1945, until further does not abuse its discretion, nor does it work outside its jurisdiction. The power of the Court of
notice," because she "wishes to have time for fix an extra-judicial partition with your heirs. " First Instance to annul the appointment of an administrator, when the appointment has been
obtained through false or incorrect representations, is indisputable. When the Court appointed the
appellant special administrator with authorization to withdraw from the bank jewels valued at
P4,500 on a bond of P200, he took into account his essential claim that "she was the only heir to
the deceased." There was no danger of possible embezzlement; They could even name her
without bail. But upon receiving a report that this allegation was inaccurate. report confirmed by
the motion of the same applicant requesting the "suspension of the publication and postponement
of the hearing" because he wished "to have time to arrange with his co-heirs an extrajudicial
partition," the Court had plenty of reasons to revoke those orders even without notification to the
administrator: the intestate is not initiated for the benefit of the administrators but of the heirs. The
Court should act immediately and not endanger. With his indifference, the jewelry. If he allowed a
few hours to pass, without taking drastic action, the jewels valued at P4,500 could be withdrawn
by the special administrator who was only consolidated in P200 to the detriment of the interests of
the minors. The zeal demonstrated by the Court was well founded. The position of special
administrator is one of trust. As soon as he lost his confidence in the integrity of the applicant, the
Court was fully justified in revoking his appointment as special administrator and voiding his
authorization to withdraw the jewelry from the bank.

When the Court declared in its order of August 28, 1945, that all the properties mentioned in the
request of July 5, 1945 as amended, belong to the minors Rosario and Carmen, took into account
all the statements made by the appellant under oath in his motion of July 20, 1945 and I approve
"the resignation in favor of them by Magdalena Cobarrubias of all their right, interest and
participation that they have and could have in the property left by the late Pilar Leyba"; and any
attempt to withdraw said resignation after approved by the Court is inadmissible. The judicial
action is not Penelope fabric that is woven and weaned, to the taste of one of the parties. The
judicial declaration of heirs requested by the appellant in her supplementary report is no longer
valid. If the applicant "

The petition is denied with the costs against the appellant.

RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF way of certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 31882-R) but her petition was dismissed by that Court on March 7,
EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS 1967.8

G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973 Suffering from these series of legal reverses, the petitioner entered into a compromise agreement
on July 29, 1964, with private respondent Laguda relative to Civil Case No. 6823. 9 Said
agreement inter alia, provides as follows:
NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner,
vs.
HECTOR LAGUNA, HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First Instance and HON. 1. Defendant (petitioner herein) agreed to vacate the premises and remove ... the
JUDGE ROSENDO BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, respondents. residential house therefrom ... before December 31, 1966;

2. For the use and occupation ... of the said premises ... from June 1964 to
December 31, 1969, the said defendant will pay plaintiff a monthly rent ... of
Eighty (P80.00) Pesos per calendar month ...;
ESGUERRA, J.:
3. Upon failure of defendant to comply with any ... provision of the amicable
I. settlement within ... fifty (50) days ... the plaintiff shall be entitled to "immediate
execution to restore plaintiff in possession of the premises and to recover all the
Nature of the Case unpaid monthly rents from June 1, 1964 until said premises are vacated" by
defendant;
The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul an Order of Hon.
Rosendo Baltazar, as Judge of the City Court of Iloilo, dated June 30, 1966, ordering the 4. Defendant "waive her right, under Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court, to bar
demolition of the residential house of petitioner. 1 Assailed likewise is an Order, dated August 25, enforcement of the execution of the judgment in the case at anytime within one
1966, of Hon. Valerio V. Rovira, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, stationed at Iloilo year from December 31, 1969".
City, approving said demolition.2
In a decision dated July 30, 1964, the City Court of Iloilo City approved the amicable settlement
II. and enjoined the parties to comply with its terms. For failure of the petitioner to satisfy the
conditions of the settlement within the 50-day period, private respondent Laguda moved for
Facts of the Case execution which the Court granted on July 7, 1965. 10

The record of this case discloses the following facts: On July 14, 1965, petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash the writ of execution, but before
the Court could resolve the motion, petitioner on July 19, 1965, served notice of her intention to
take the case to the Court of Appeals. 11 Meanwhile on July 23, 1965, respondent Laguda filed an
Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land known as lot No. opposition to the petitioner's July 14, 1965, motion, alleging that as judicial administratrix as of July
3508 situated at La Paz, Iloilo City3 many years back, petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon 29, 1964, she was legally authorized to enter into the amicable settlement which was the basis of
Bacaling, with the acquiescence of private respondent Laguda, constructed a residential house on the decision dated July 30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo sought to be executed and, therefore,
a portion of said lot fronting Huevana Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00. 4 Unable to pay the her act was binding upon the present judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who replaced
lease rental from July 1959 to September 1961, totalling P2,160.00, an action for ejectment (Civil petitioner upon her discharge as such on November 28, 1964. 12
Case No. 6823) was filed by private respondent Laguda against petitioner in her capacity as
judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Bacaling, in the City Court of Iloilo
City.5 The filing of said case spawned various court suits. Denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution on September
30, 1965, the City Court however, held in abeyance the enforcement of the alias writ of execution
until the Court of First Instance of Iloilo stamped its imprimatur considering the pendency of
Petitioner on July 23, 1962, filed certiorari proceedings in this Court (G.R. No. Special Proceedings No. 1469 and of the fact that the properties involved therein are in  custodia
L-20061) but was dismissed for lack of merit on August 3, 1962. 6 With this setback, petitioner on legis. 13 Thereafter, on October 25, 1965, private respondent Laguda moved the Court of First
November 12, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for certiorari with Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469 for the approval of the City Court's order of
preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 6162) but the same was dismissed on December 1, execution which was granted despite petitioner's opposition. 14 With the denial of petitioner's
1962.7 Unsuccessful in her motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by motion for reconsideration on December 4, 1965, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
was brought before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 36939-R) which dismissed the same on 1. Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial administratrix prior to her
January 18, 1966. 15 discharge or removal are valid and binding upon her successor;

On April 14, 1966, the respondent City Judge of Iloilo City issued an alias writ of execution upon 2. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to
representations of private respondent Laguda, copies of which were served sheriff upon the reimbursement, and/or reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring
petitioner and Atty. Roberto Dineros in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of the the house to another place;
deceased, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 16
3. Whether or not due process was denied to the minor children of deceased
On June 30, 1966, a Special Order of Demolition was issued by the respondent City Judge upon Ramon Bacaling, and petitioner in connection with the motion for the issuance of
motion of private respondent Laguda and over petitioner's opposition, subject, however, to the the order of demolition.
approval of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 17 Upon the denial
of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, respondent Laguda on July 12, 1966, filed a IV.
manifestation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469, praying for
the confirmation of the Order to demolish the house under custodia legis. 18
Discussion
On August 4, 1966, petitioner interposed an opposition alleging:
Petitioner claims before this Court that since she was no longer the judicial administratrix of the
estate of her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, and was no longer in control of estate funds
1. That she was no longer in control of the estate funds when the stipulated when the stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement became due and payable, the special
obligations in the amicable settlement became due and payable; order of demolition could not be enforced.

2. That the residential house to be demolished is worth P35,000.00 for which she Such a view is not tenable. Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioner's lawful acts
is entitled to reimbursement as a builder in good faith, in addition to reasonable before the revocation of her letters of administration or before her removal shall have the same
expenses they may incur in transferring the same to another place; and validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation
of letters testamentary or of administration is to terminate the authority of the executor or
3. That the guardian ad litem of the minor children was not notified of the motion administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the
for the issuance of an order of demolition; 19 revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights
acquired under a previous grant of administration. 25
On August 25, 1966, respondent Laguda by way of reply disputed petitioner's claim and supported
the legality of the court's ruling. 20 On the same date, the probate court in Special Proceedings No. In connection with the petitioner's contention that she be considered a builder in good faith and,
1469 approved the order of demolition of the house in controversy. 21 Impugning the said Order as therefore, entitled to reimbursement in addition to reasonable expenses that may be incurred in
violative of the provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, and of the constitutional transferring the house to another place, the same cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-
mandate on due process, petitioner moved to reconsider the same but the motion was denied by settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their
the Court on September 26, 1966. 22 Frustrated in her effort to set aside the Order of Demolition, occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter
petitioner brought this present action of certiorari with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due of right, recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises
course to the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 21, 1966, to until they are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows
prevent the enforcement of the order of demolition in Special Proceedings No. 1469 of the Court reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements if the lessor so
of First Instance of Iloilo, but when served upon the respondents, the building in question was elects. 26
already partially demolished. 23 Upon petitioner's posting a bond of P1,000.00, this Court on
November 10, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the herein respondents from It is next urged by petitioner that there was a denial of process for failure of private respondent to
proceeding with the order of demolition, until further orders. 24 notify the guardian ad litem of the minor children of the deceased Ramon Bacaling, of the motion
for execution.
III.
A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of
Issues of the Case demonstrating that there was denial of due process. On the contrary, there is evidence to show
that Acting Fiscal Alfonso Illemberger guardian ad litem of the minor children of the late Ramon
The issues raised in the instant petition boil down to the following: Bacaling, has been duly apprised of the issuance of the assailed special order to demolish, as
shown by the certification of the counsel for petitioner at the foot of his opposition dated August 4,
1966, 27 filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and as also shown by the certification of
private respondent's counsel at the foot of his opposition dated September 15, 1966, 28 likewise
filed with the same Court.

V.

Conclusion

The petitioner is not entitled to the writ of certiorari. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no
showing that the respondent courts acted so "arbitrarily", "despotically" or "capriciously" as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders.

"Grave abuse of discretion" which is a ground for certiorari means "such capricious and arbitrary
exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction." 29 Even mere
abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For that
purpose the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that it was
exercised arbitrarily or despotically, which is not the case made out by the present petition. 30

There is something more to be said about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has
its genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City
Court. What transpired therein presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was
deliberately protracted and made to suffer undue delay in its disposal. It was originally filed on
September 13, 1960; 31 it reached the appellate courts five (5) times, twice before the Court of
Appeals 32, Once before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo 33, and twice before this Court. 34 The
present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to
frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily.
Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of
this Court, 35 because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should only be
resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by a inferior court. A recourse
of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time
that they could well devote to really meritorious cases.

VI. \

Judgment

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition should be, as it is
hereby, dismissed.

The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 10, 1966, is immediately set
aside. 36

Treble costs against the petitioner for the reasons above set forth. 37
RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL OF Articles 231 to 240, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the Courts of First
EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS Instance both when they exercise general jurisdiction and when they function as testamentry
courts. Article 611 of the same Code of Civil Procedure does not deprive the Courts of First
TRANSLATION (NOT SURE IF ACCURATE): Instance who are aware of matters relating to the property of the deceased from their inherent
power to punish for contempt in accordance with the provisions of articles 231 to 240, but rather
extends and ratifies That power.
GR No. L-46945 January 20, 1940
The circumstance that the appellant had already been removed from her position of administrator
Intestate of the late Juan Oronce. and that another had been appointed in her place, did not deprive the Court of her faculty of
CALIXTO ORONCE, administrator-appealed, requiring her to present the account of the products of the real estate that she continued
vs. administered even after Having ceased his job.
ANSELMA LAPUZ, appealed-appellant.
It appears that the appellant had presented his last account on October 24, 1931, which was
IMPERIAL, J .: amended on December 16 of the same year and on May 11, 1932, and was approved by the
Court on August 1, 1932 ; but having continued to manage the properties during the years 1932
Due to irregularities that he committed during the performance of his position as judicial and 1933, it is undoubted that she was obliged to account for the fruits she received during that
administrator of the Intestate of the late Juan Oronce, the appellant Anselma Lapuz was removed period of time. During the time that I continue to manage the properties until I deliver them to the
from his position on August 30, 1932 and in his place the Calixto Oronce distress was new administrator, the appellant continued to be de facto administratorand it was subject to the
appointed. At the request of the new administrator, the appellant was required by order dated direct orders of the Court in accordance with article 677 of the Code of Civil Procedure that
March 19, 1934, to account within twenty days of the fruits of the real estate that he continued to requires the administrator to account for all the products of the properties that he had
administer since 1932, he said that he should understand the period of time since the referred to administered.
the year 1932 until the date on which he delivered to the new administrator of the mentioned
goods. The appellant was notified of the car, but did not comply or present the account. The The claims of the appellant not being meritorious and the appeals filed in accordance with the law,
appellant then asked the Court to request it from the appellant to explain why he should not be we confirm, with the costs to the appellant. That's how it is ordered.
punished for contempt. The appellant opposed the motion alleging that she had already rendered
her account, that it was approved; that she had already ceased to be an administrator, and that
the Court no longer had jurisdiction over her. By order of January 11, 1937, the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, which understood the Intestate, dismissed the objections of the appellant
and found him guilty of contempt and imposed the fine of P50 with a subsidiary prison in case of
insolvency, with the warning, moreover, that if he continued to disobey the order he would be
reduced to prison until he complied with it. The appellant was exempted from this last order and
filed the present appeal. By order of January 11, 1937, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
which understood the Intestate, dismissed the objections of the appellant and found him guilty of
contempt and imposed the fine of P50 with a subsidiary prison in case of insolvency, with the
warning, moreover, that if he continued to disobey the order he would be reduced to prison until
he complied with it. The appellant was exempted from this last order and filed the present
appeal. By order of January 11, 1937, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, which understood
the Intestate, dismissed the objections of the appellant and found him guilty of contempt and
imposed the fine of P50 with a subsidiary prison in case of insolvency, with the warning, moreover,
that if he continued to disobey the order he would be reduced to prison until he complied with
it. The appellant was exempted from this last order and filed the present appeal.

The appellant submits that the Court erred in declaring her guilty of contempt for the following
reasons: because article 232, paragraph 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable and
under article 611 the Court had no power to punish her for contempt for not having submitted the
required account; because the Court lacked jurisdiction over its person for having ceased to be an
administrator; and because she already presented her account that was amended several times
and finally approved on August 1, 1932.
RULE 83 INVENTORY AND APPRAISAL, PROVISION FOR SUPPORT OF FAMILY On April 27, 1961 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate
allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of land, covered by Tax Declarations Nos.
  04477, 04478, 04490, 04491, 04492, 04493 and 04500, with a total value of nine thousand pesos,
all located at Barrio Guimbawian, Pinamungajan. The oppositors registered their opposition to the
inventory on the ground that the seven parcels of land enumerated in the inventory no longer
G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975 formed part of the decedent's estate.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO SEBIAL. BENJAMINA On May 6, 1961, the administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo
SEBIAL, petitioner-appellee, and the spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her the parcels of land covered
vs. by Tax Declarations Nos. 04478, 04490,04491 and 04493.
ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL, oppositors-
appellants.
On June 24, 1961 the probate court issued an order suspending action on the pending incidents in
view of the possibility of an amicable settlement. It ordered the parties to prepare a complete list of
AQUINO, J.: the properties belonging to the decedent, with a segregation of the properties belonging to each
marriage. Orders of the same tenor were issued by the lower court on July 8 and October 28,
Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to the appellants, Gelacio 1961.
Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919, begot three children named
Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in On November 11, 1961 the oppositors, Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial and the heirs of Balbina
1927, he supposedly begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Sebial, submitted their own inventory of the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia
Esperanza and Luciano. Manikis, consisting of two parcels of land acquired in 1912 and 1915. They alleged that the
conjugal estate of Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted of only one parcel of land,
On June 17, 1960 Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu a verified petition containing an area of seven hectares, allegedly purchased with money coming from the conjugal
for the settlement of Gelacio Sebial's estate. She prayed that she be appointed administratrix assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis. They further alleged that the said seven- hectare
thereof (Spec. Proc. No. 2049-R). Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the land was sold by the children of the second marriage to Eduardo Cortado (Tax Declaration No.
estate of Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his children and that, if an 2591).1äwphï1.ñët
administration proceeding was necessary, she, Roberta Sebial, a resident of Guimbawian, a
remote mountain barrio of Pinamungajan, where the decedent's estate was supposedly located, The oppositors claimed that the aforementioned two parcels of land acquired during the first
should be the one appointed administratrix and not Benjamina Sebial, a housemaid working at marriage were partitioned in 1945 among (1) Roberta Sebial, (2) Juliano Sebial, (3) Francisco
Talisay, Cebu which is about seventy kilometers away from Pinamungajan. In a supplemental Sebial as the representative of the estate of Balbina Sebial and (4) Valentina Sebial as the
opposition the children of the first marriage contended that the remedy of Benjamina Sebial was representative of the six children of the second marriage, some of whom were minors. They
an action to rescind the partition. clarified that under that partition the three children of the first marriage received a three-fourths
share while the six children of second marriage received a one-fourth share (Tax Declaration No.
After hearing, the lower court in its order of January 16, 1961 appointed Benjamina Sebial as 06500). They also alleged that Eduardo Cortado, Emilio Sialongo, Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro
administratrix. It found that the decedent left an estate consisting of lands with an area of twenty- Recuelo were the third persons involved in the transfer of the lands pertaining to the estate of
one hectares, valued at more than six thousand pesos, and that the alleged partition of the Gelacio Sebial (Tax Declarations Nos. 04493, 06571 and 04471). To the inventory submitted by
decedent's estate was invalid and ineffective. the oppositors, the administratrix filed an opposition dated November 18, 1961.

Letters of administration were issued to Benjamina Sebial on January 19, 1961. On the same In an order dated November 11, 1961 the lower court inexplicably required the administratrix to
date, a notice to creditors was issued. The oppositors moved for the reconsideration of the order submit another inventory. In compliance with that order she submitted an inventory dated
appointing Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. They insisted that the decedent's estate had been November 17, 1961, wherein she reproduced her inventory dated April 17, 1961 and added two
partitioned on August 29, 1945, as shown in Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and I, and that the action to rescind other items, namely, two houses allegedly valued at P8,000 and the fruits of the properties
the partition had already prescribed. The lower court denied the motion in its order of February 11, amounting to P5,000 allegedly received by the children of the first marriage. The oppositor
1961. interposed an opposition to the said inventory.

The oppositors filed on March 16, 1961 a motion to terminate the administration proceeding on the On November 24, 1961 the oppositors filed a "motion for revision of partition" which was based on
grounds that the decedent's estate was valued at less than six thousand pesos and that it had their own inventory dated November 7, 1961.
already been partitioned and, therefore, there was no necessity for the administration proceeding.
The lower court in its order of December 11, 1961 approved the second inventory dated Oppositors' contention in their motion for reconsideration (not in their brief) that the probate court
November, 7, 1961 because there was allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven had no jurisdiction to approve the inventory dated November 17, 1961 because the administratrix
parcels of land and two houses listed therein belonged to the decedent's estate. In another order filed it after three months from the date of her appointment is not well-taken. The three-month
also dated December 11, 1961 the lower court granted the motion of the administratrix dated May period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory.
4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain parcels of land and it directed that the heirs of Gelacio After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and the publication of the
Sebial, who are in possession of the parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04493, notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's estate
04491, 04490 and 04478, should deliver those properties to the administratrix and should not and retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after
disturb her in her possession and administration of the same. The lower court denied the the three-month period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it. However,
oppositors' motion dated November 20, 1961 for "revision of partition". an administrator's unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec.
2, Rule 82, Rules of Court).
On December 29, 1961 Roberta Sebial moved for the reconsideration of the two orders on the
grounds (1) that the court had no jurisdiction to approve an inventory filed beyond the three-month The other contention of the oppositors that inasmuch as the value of the decedent's estate is less
period fixed in section 1, Rule 84 of the Rules of Court; (2) that the said inventory is not supported than five thousand pesos and he had no debts, the estate could be settled summarily under
by any documentary evidence because there is no tax declaration at all in Gelacio Sebial's name; section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court or that an administration proceeding was not necessary
(3) that the two houses mentioned in the inventory were nonexistent because they were (the limit of six thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand pesos in section 2, Rule 74
demolished by the Japanese soldiers in 1943 and the materials thereof were appropriated by the effective on January 1, 1964) rests on a controversial basis. While in the verified petition for the
administratrix and her brothers and sisters; (4) that the valuation of P17,000 indicated in the issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged that the gross value of the decedent's estate
inventory was fake, fictitious and fantastic since the total value of the seven parcels of land was "not more than five thousand pesos", in the amended inventory the valuation was P17,000.
amounted only to P3,080; (5) that Gelacio Sebial's estate should be settled summarily because of Indeed, one of the lower court's omissions was its failure to ascertain by preponderance of
its small value as provided in section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and (6) that an ordinary evidence the actual value of the estate, if there was still an estate to be administered. The
action is necessary to recover the lands in the possession of third persons. approval of the amended inventory was not such a determination.

The oppositors without awaiting the resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed a notice of Anyway, in the present posture of the proceeding, no useful purpose would be served by
appeal from the two orders both dated December 11, 1961. The notice of appeal was filed "without dismissing the petition herein and ordering that a new petition for summary settlement be filed.
prejudice to the motion for reconsideration". Benjamina Sebial opposed the motion for Inasmuch as a regular administrator had been appointed and a notice to creditors had been
reconsideration. The lower court in its order of January 18, 1962 denied oppositors' motion for issued and no claims were filed, the probate court could still proceed summarily and expeditiously
reconsideration. It approved Roberta Sebial's amended record on appeal. The case was elevated to terminate the proceeding. With the cooperation of the lawyers of the parties, it should strive to
to the Court of Appeals. effect an amicable settlement of the case (See arts. 222 and 2029, Civil Code).

The Court of Appeals in its resolution of July 31, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 31978.-R certified the case If the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement prove fruitless, then the probate court should
to this Court because in its opinion the appeal involves only the legal issues of (1) the construction ascertain what assets constituted the estate of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to those assets
to be given to section 2, Rule 74 and section 1, Rule 84 (now Rule 83) of the Rules of Court and and whether the children of the second marriage (the petitioner was a child of the second
(2) whether an ordinary civil action for recovery of property and not an administration proceeding marriage and the principal oppositor was a child of first marriage) could still have a share,
is the proper remedy, considering oppositors' allegation that the estate of Gelacio Sebial was howsoever small, in the decedent's estate.
partitioned in 1945 and that some of his heirs had already sold their respective shares
(Per Angeles, Gatmaitan and Concepcion Jr., JJ.) The lower court's order of December 11, 1961, approving the amended inventory of November 11,
1961, is not a conclusive determination of what assets constituted the decedent's estate and of the
The Clerk of Court of the lower court in his letter of January 15, 1963, transmitting the amended valuations thereof. Such a determination is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to
record on appeal, said "there was no presentation of evidence by either parties concerning the two a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or ownership (3 Moran's Comments on the
orders appealed from". Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., 448-449).1äwphï1.ñët

This case involves the conflicting claims of some humble folks from a remote rural area in Cebu The other order dated December 11, 1961 requires the delivery to the administratrix of (1) two
regarding some unregistered farm lands. Because of her poverty Roberta Sebial wanted to appeal parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04491 and 04493 in the possession of the
in forma pauperis. Her husband Lazaro Recuelo and her nephew, Candelario Carrillo, in order to spouses Lazaro Recuelo and Roberta Sebial, an oppositor-appellant; (2) the parcel of land
justify the filing of a mimeographed brief, swore that their families subsisted on root crops because covered by Tax Declaration No. 04490 in the possession of Lorenzo Rematado and (3) the parcel
they could not afford to buy corn grit or rice. of land described under Tax Declaration No. 04478 in the possession of Demetrio Camillo
(Canillo), a child of the deceased Balbina Sebial, one of the three children of the first marriage.
We hold that the said order is erroneous and should be set aside because the probate court failed remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines laid down in
to receive evidence as to the ownership of the said parcels of land. The general rule is that this decision. No costs.
questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However,
when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate SO ORDERED.
court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely
pass judgment thereon (3 Moran's Comment's on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 448, 473;
Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892).

Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They are third persons.
The rule is that matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of by the
probate court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided that the interests of third persons
are not prejudiced (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Ibid, 3 Moran 473).

However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be
cited to appear in court and be examined under oath as to how they came into the possession of
the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of Court) but a separate action would be necessary
to recover the said assets (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 12 Phil. 543; Guanco vs. Philippine National
Bank, 54 Phil. 244).

The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the
assets of decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the
assets. The issue of prescription should also be considered (see p. 84, Record on Appeal).
Generally prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the coownership (Art. 494, Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët  But from the moment that a coheir
claims absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary properties and denies the others any
share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but that of ownership (Bargayo
vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857).

At the hearing of the petition for letters of administration some evidence was already introduced on
the assets constituting the estate of Gelacio Sebial. The petitioner testified and presented Exhibits
A to J and X to Y-3. The oppositor also testified and presented Exhibits 2 to 10-A. The
stenographic notes for the said hearing should be transcribed. In addition to that evidence. The
probate court should require the parties to present further proofs on the ownership of the seven
parcels of land and the materials of the two houses enumerated in the amended inventory of
November 17, 1961, on the alleged partition effected in 1945 and on the allegations in oppositors'
inventory dated November 7, 1961.

After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide once and for all whether there are still
any assets of the estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the requisite partition and
distribution. If the estate has no more assets and if a partition had really been made or the action
to recover the lands transferred to third person had prescribed, it should dismiss the intestate
proceeding.

WHEREFORE, (a) the probate court's order of December 11, 1961, granting the administratrix's
motion of May 4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain properties is set aside; (b) its other order of
December 11, 1961 approving the amended inventory should not be considered as a final
adjudication on the ownership of the properties listed in the inventory and (c) this case is
RULE 83 INVENTORY AND APPRAISAL, PROVISION FOR SUPPORT OF FAMILY Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties, including several
businesses.6
G.R. No. 114217               October 13, 2009
During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it was agreed that the
HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY,  Petitioners, 1 management, supervision or administration of the common properties and/or the entire estate of
vs. the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in the hands of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as
ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE SY, ROSAURO SY, BARTOLOME SY, trustee, with authority to delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or private
FLORECITA SY, LOURDES SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY, Respondents. respondents. Thus, the function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated by Jose Sy Bang to his co-
petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty or function of management and operation of the business of
cinema of the common ownership was delegated by petitioner Jose Sy Bang to respondent
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Rosauro Sy.7

G.R. No. 150797 Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three cinema houses,
namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively pertain to respondents for their
ILUMINADA TAN, SPOUSES JULIAN SY AND ROSA TAN, ZENAIDA TAN, and MA. EMMA support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil Case No. 8578, for Judicial Partition, and
SY, Petitioners, the income from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses of their common father, to
vs. pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year 1980, private respondents, through
BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO SY, FLORECITA SY, ROLANDO SY, LOURDES SY, ROSAURO respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of the operation and management of the three cinema
SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY, Respondents. houses, with the income derived therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their support and
maintenance.8
DECISION
On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the Compromise
NACHURA, J.: Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil Case No. 8578 by plaintiff Rolando Sy
and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. On April 2, 1981, the Judge rendered a Second
Partial Decision based on the pretrial order of the court, dated March 25, 1981, entered into by
Before this Court are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. and between respondent Renato Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First Partial Decision and
The first Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the Decision 2 dated May 6, 1993 and the Second Partial Decision had long become final, without an appeal having been interposed by any
Resolution3 dated February 28, 1994 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686. On of the parties.9
the other hand, the second Petition, G.R. No. 150797, questions the Decision dated February 28,
2001 and the Resolution dated November 5, 2001 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 46244.
On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision, 10 the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
The factual antecedents are as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third Partial Decision:
G.R. No. 114217
(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their income, produce and
On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against spouses Jose Sy improvements, as well as all the rights, interests or participations (sic) in the names of
Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, defendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan and their children, defendants
Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Zenaida and Ma. Emma; both surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian Sy and his wife Rosa
Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch Tan, as belonging to the estate of Sy Bang, including the properties in the names of said
2, docketed as Civil Case No. 8578.4 defendants which are enumerated in the Complaints in this case and all those properties,
rights and interests which said defendants may have concealed or fraudulently
Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Julieta transferred in the names of other persons, their agents or representatives;
Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang by his second marriage to
respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the (b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his surviving widow, Maria
children of Sy Bang from his first marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, Rolando, Rosauro,
Sy are the children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan. 5 Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all surnamed Sy, and his children by his first wife,
namely: Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato Sy;
 (c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs entitled thereto after The CA rendered the assailed Decision 17 on May 6, 1993, denying due course to and dismissing
the extent thereof shall have been determined at the conclusion of the proper accounting the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge Puno acted correctly in issuing the assailed Third
which the parties in this case, their agents and representatives, shall render and after Partial Decision. The CA said that the act of Judge Puno in rendering a partial decision was in
segregating and delivering to Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy her one-half (1/2) share in the accord with then Rule 36, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, which stated that in an action against
conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband Sy Bang; several defendants, the court may, when a judgment is proper, render judgment against one or
more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. It found that the judge’s decision to
(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for partition of properties defer resolution on the properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique
in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy. would not affect the resolution on the properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada, Julian,
Rosa, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma, since the properties were separable and distinct from one another
such that the claim that the same formed part of the Sy Bang estate could be the subject of
SO ORDERED. separate suits.

On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for Inhibition, alleging, The CA also upheld the judge’s appointment of a receiver, saying that the judge did so after both
among others, that the Judge had patently shown partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the parties had presented their evidence and upon verified petition filed by respondents, and in order
case. This motion was denied on August 16, 1982. 11 to preserve the properties under litigation. Further, the CA found proper the order to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of title in the names of Rosalino, Rolando and
On July 4, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition (Disqualification) and Bartolome.
Mandamus with Restraining Order with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 60957. The
Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition was denied, and the Petition for Mandamus with The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 1994. 18
Restraining Order was Noted.12
On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules
On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first Order, 13 Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento of Court.
was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners’ Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration, dated
July 9, 1982 and their Supplemental Motion, dated July 12, 1982, were denied for lack of merit;
and (2) in the second Order, 14 the Judge ordered the immediate cancellation of the lis pendens The Court denied the Petition for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and 19-91 for failure of
annotated at the back of the certificates of title in the names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and petitioners to attach the registry receipt. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, and the Petition
Rolando Sy. was reinstated on July 13, 1994.

On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the receiver, Mrs. Lucita L. In this Petition for Review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-
Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy. 15 G.R. SP No. 17686 and, consequently, the nullification of the Third Partial Decision and orders of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 8578. They also pray for the Court to direct the trial court to
proceed with the reception of further evidence in Civil Case No. 8578. 19 In particular, petitioners
While the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending before the First Division of allege that the CA decided questions of substance not in accord with law when it upheld the trial
the Supreme Court, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme court’s Third Partial Decision which, they alleged, was rendered in violation of their rights to due
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 61519. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued on August 31, process.
1982, to enjoin the Judge from taking any action in Civil Case No. 8578 and, likewise, restraining
the effectivity of and compliance with the Resolution dated August 16, 1982, the two Orders dated
August 17, 1982, and the Order dated August 18, 1982. Petitioners narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial days – May 26 and 27, 1982 – to
present their evidence. However, at the hearing on May 26, the judge forced them to terminate the
presentation of their evidence. On June 2, 1982, following petitioners’ submission of additional
On September 2, 1982, petitioners withdrew their Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order, documentary evidence, the trial court scheduled the case for hearing on June 8 and 9, 1982, at 2
docketed as G.R. No. 60957. o’clock in the afternoon "in view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the
properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their
On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed by Mrs. Lucita L. respective wives (as well as those in the names of other party-litigants in this case) shall be
Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by petitioners on September 24, 1982. 16 declared or included as part of the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary
evidences (sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan." At the June 8 hearing, petitioners
After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the petition to the CA for presented additional evidence. Unknown to them, however, the trial court had already rendered its
proper determination and disposition. Third Partial Decision at 11 o’clock that morning. Thus, petitioners argue that said Third Partial
Decision is void.20
They also question the trial court’s First Order dated August 17, 1982 and Order dated August 18, notarized, it was a public document and presumed valid. They, likewise, alleged that the Counter-
1982 granting the prayer for receivership and appointing a receiver, respectively, both allegedly Manifestation was filed without Rosita’s authorization as, in fact, she had written her counsel with
issued without a hearing and without showing the necessity to appoint a receiver. Lastly, they instructions to withdraw said pleading. 29 Further, they averred that Rosita executed the
question the Second Order dated August 17, 1982 canceling the notice of lis pendens ex parte Sinumpaang Salaysay while in full possession of her faculties. They alleged that Rosita intended
and without any showing that the notice was for the purpose of molesting the adverse parties, or to oppose the petition for guardianship and they presented a copy of a sworn certification from
that it was not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. 21 Rosita’s physician that "she (Rosita) is physically fit and mentally competent to attend to her
personal or business transactions."30
On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance. She alleged
that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive estate. The properties of the estate were On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s September 23,
found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties. From the time of Sy Bang’s death in 1971 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique executed their Sinumpaang Salaysay on
until the filing of the motion, Rosita was not given any widow’s allowance as provided in Section 3, August 29, 1996. However, this development was made known to the Court only on October 1,
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court by the parties in possession and control of her husband’s estate, or 1996; hence, the Court was not aware of this when it issued its Resolution. Petitioners prayed for
her share in the conjugal partnership.22 the reconsideration of the September 23, 1996 Resolution and dropping Rosita and Enrique as
parties to the case.31
In their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance, petitioners argued that
Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the same is granted only "during In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents maintained that the Court
the settlement of the estate" of the decedent, and this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil should not consider the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents alleged that Rosita
Code (now Article 133 of the Family Code), shall be taken from the "common mass of property" thumbmarked the Sinumpaang Salaysay without understanding the contents of the document or
during the liquidation of the inventoried properties. 23 Considering that the case before the trial the implications of her acts. Respondents also tried to demonstrate that their mother would
court is a special civil action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is not entitled thumbmark any document that their children asked her to by exhibiting four documents each
to widow’s allowance. denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay and thumbmarked by Rosita. One purported to disown the
earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay. The second was a reproduction of the earlier Sinumpaang
On September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance and Salaysay with the amount changed to ₱100.00, the Transfer Certificate of Title number changed to
ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita ₱25,000.00 as the widow’s allowance to be 12343567, and the size of the property to "as big as the entire Lucena City." The third purported to
taken from the estate of Sy Bang, effective September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until bequeath her shares in the conjugal partnership of gains to Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and
the estate is finally settled or until further orders from the Court. 24 Rosalino, while refusing to give any inheritance to Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique. Lastly,
the fourth contradicted the third in that it was in favor of Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique,
while disinheriting Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino. These, respondents assert,
In a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court that Rosita and co- clearly show that their mother would sign any document, no matter the contents, upon the request
petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present and future claims against petitioners of any of her children.32
and, thus, should be dropped as parties to the case. 25 Attached thereto was a Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein Rosita and Enrique stated that they were given ₱1 million and a 229-square
meter parcel of land, for which reason they were withdrawing as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8578. 26 The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 18, 1996. 33

Respondents, except Enrique Sy, filed a Counter-Manifestation and Opposition to Drop Rosita Sy Petitioners filed a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing that the Third Partial
as a Party.27 They said that it would be ridiculous for Rosita to give up her share in Sy Bang’s Decision did not only unduly bind the properties without due process, but also ignored the
estate, amounting to hundreds of millions of pesos, which had already been ordered partitioned by fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles. 34
the trial court, to the prejudice of her seven full-blooded children. They alleged that Rosita was not
in possession of her full faculties when she affixed her thumbmark on the Sinumpaang Salaysay G.R. No. 150797
considering her age, her frequent illness, and her lack of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City for guardianship over her person and Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents filed a Joint Petition for the Guardianship of the
properties. They also alleged that Enrique and some of Jose Sy Bang’s children would stealthily Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58 (Guardianship court),
visit Rosita in Rosauro’s house while the latter was away. On one of those occasions, she was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 96-34. On May 19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, who sought to be
asked to affix her thumbmark on some documents she could not read and knew nothing about. named as the special guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion to Order Court
They claim that Rosita has never received a single centavo of the ₱1 million allegedly given her. Deposit of Widow’s Allowance Ordered by the Supreme Court. 35 Then, he filed a Motion before
this Court seeking an Order for petitioners to pay Rosita ₱2,150,000.00 in widow’s allowance and
In their Reply to Counter-Manifestation,28 petitioners countered that respondents failed to present ₱25,000.00 every month thereafter, as ordered by this Court in its September 23, 1996
any concrete evidence to challenge the Sinumpaang Salaysay. Since the same was duly Resolution. He also prayed for petitioners’ imprisonment should they fail to comply therewith. 36
On July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads: II

WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan; and their children, Zenaida Sy and The payment of widow’s allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present because the estate of
Ma. Emma Sy; and Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, are hereby ordered to deposit to this Court, Sy Bang – the source from which payment is to be taken – has not been determined with finality.
jointly and severally, the amount of ₱250,000.00 representing the widow’s allowance of the
incompetent Rosita Ferrera Sy corresponding the (sic) periods from September 1, 1996 to June III
30, 1997, and additional amount of ₱25,000.00 per month and every month thereafter, within the
first ten (10) days of each month.37
The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of widow’s allowance unduly modified
the express terms of this Honorable Court’s Resolution granting it. 45
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Rosauro, the appointed guardian, then asked
the Guardianship court to issue a writ of execution. Meanwhile, on December 10, 1997, petitioners
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46244 to annul the July 8, Petitioners, likewise, question the Guardianship court’s omission of the phrase "to be taken from
1997 Order and October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Guardianship court. 38 the estate of Sy Bang" from the July 8, 1997 Order. They interpreted this to mean that the
Guardianship court was ordering that the widow’s allowance be taken from their own properties
and not from the estate of Sy Bang – an "undue modification" of this Court’s September 23, 1996
In a Decision39 dated February 28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents’ favor, finding "nothing Resolution.46
legally objectionable in private respondent Rosauro Sy’s filing of the motion to order the deposit of
the widow’s allowance ordered by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 114217 or, for that matter, in the
public respondent’s grant thereof in the order herein assailed. More so, when the public On January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 114217 and G.R. No. 150797.
respondent’s actions are viewed in the light of the Supreme Court’s denial of petitioners’ motion The parties submitted their respective Memoranda on May 21, 2003 and June 19, 2003, both of
for reconsideration of its resolution dated September 23, 1996." 40 Thus it held: which were noted by this Court in its August 11, 2003 Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed resolution dated Pending the issuance of this Court’s Decision in the two cases, respondent Rosauro Sy filed, on
September 23, 1996 (sic) is AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs. November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in Court of Supreme Court’s Ordered Widow’s
Allowance Effective September 23, 1996 and Upon Failure of Petitioners Julian Sy, et al. to
Comply Therewith to Order Their Imprisonment Until Compliance. He alleged that his mother had
SO ORDERED. been ill and had no means to support herself except through his financial assistance, and that
respondents had not complied with this Court’s September 23, 1996 Resolution, promulgated
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5, 2001, 41 petitioners filed this seven years earlier.47 He argued that respondents’ defiance constituted indirect contempt of court.
Petition for Review42 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying for this Court to reverse the CA’s That the Guardianship court had found them guilty of indirect contempt did not help his mother
February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to because she was still unable to collect her widow’s allowance. 48
declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the
widow’s allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34. 43 They argued that the Guardianship court’s Petitioners opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the widow’s allowance is to be
jurisdiction is limited to determining whether Rosita was incompetent and, upon finding in the taken has not been settled. They also reiterated that Rosita, together with son Enrique, had
affirmative, appointing a guardian. Moreover, under Rule 83, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, a executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving all claims against petitioners. Hence, there was no
widow’s allowance can only be paid in an estate proceeding. Even if the complaint for partition legal ground to cite them in contempt.49
were to be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition case had the
exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the widow’s allowance. 44
On April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauro’s Motion, to wit:
They raised the following issues:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds petitioner Iluminada Tan (widow of deceased
petitioner Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Julian Sy
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Guardianship Court’s Order dated 8 July 1997, and and the latter’s wife Rosa Tan, GUILTY of contempt of this Court and are collectively sentenced to
Resolution dated 9 October 1997, in that: pay a FINE equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due and unpaid to Rosita Ferrera-
Sy by way of a widow’s allowance pursuant to this Court’s Resolution of September 13, 1996, and
I accordingly ORDERS their immediate imprisonment until they shall have complied with said
Resolution by paying Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED
The trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited jurisdiction, had no authority to enforce THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (₱2,600,100.00), representing her total accumulated
payment of widow’s allowance. unpaid widow’s allowance from September, 1996 to April, 2005 at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (₱25,000.00) a month, plus six (6%) percent interest thereon. The Court asked the Court to adjudicate the liability for the widow’s allowance to be equally divided between
further DIRECTS petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly widow’s allowance for them and the other set of petitioners, the heirs of Julian Sy.
the succeeding months as they fall due, under pain of imprisonment.
On August 30, 2005, respondents filed a motion asking this Court to issue an Order for the
This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY. immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to comply with the Court’s resolution. 60 They
aver that the period within which petitioners were to comply with the Court’s Resolution had now
SO ORDERED.50 lapsed, and thus, petitioners must now be incarcerated for failure to abide by said Resolution.
They likewise asked the Court to refer petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas, to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violations of the Canons of Professional Responsibility
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine of ₱260,010.00 on April 5, 2005. 51 or to declare him in contempt of court. They alleged that despite the finality of the Court’s denial of
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, Atty. Joyas still filed a Manifestation with compliance
Respondents, except Rosauro Sy (who had died), filed a Motion for Execution 52 before this Court arguing the same points. Further, Atty. Joyas is not petitioners’ counsel of record in this case since
on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration with he never formally entered his appearance before the Court. 61
Prayer for Clarification.53 She alleged that, in accordance with Chinese culture, she had no
participation in the management of the family business or Sy Bang’s estate. After her husband’s In a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to refer Atty. Joyas to the
death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts and liabilities, and, having no income of her own, IBP for being a wrong remedy.62
was now in a quandary on how these can be paid. She asked the Court to consider that she had
not disobeyed its Resolution and to consider her motion.
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then filed an Omnibus Motion, 63 seeking an
extension of time to comply with the Court’s Resolution and Motion to delete the penalty of "fine"
Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma, also filed a Motion for Reconsideration with as a consequence of voluntary compliance. They insist that their compliance with the order to pay
Prayer for Clarification.54 They stressed that the ₱1 million and the piece of land Rosita had the widow’s allowance should "obliterate, expunge, and blot out" the penalty of fine and
already received from Jose Sy Bang in 1996 should form part of the widow’s allowance. They also imprisonment. They alleged that for their failure to comply with this Court’s Resolution, the RTC,
argued that whatever allowance Rosita may be entitled to should come from the estate of Sy Lucena City, found them guilty of indirect contempt and imposed on them a fine of ₱30,000.00.
Bang. They further argued the unfairness of being made to pay the allowance when none of them They had appealed said order to the CA.
participated in the management of Sy Bang’s estate; Zenaida and Ma. Emma being minors at the
time of his death, while Iluminada and Rosa had no significant role in the family business.
They also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms "joint and several" in the September 23
Resolution, and "collectively" in the April 5, 2005 Resolution. They argued that "joint and several"
Respondents then filed a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring Respondents to Deposit with the creates individual liability for each of the parties for the full amount of the obligation, while
Supreme Court’s Cashier its Ordered Widow’s Allowance 55 and a Motion for Execution of "collectively" means that all members of the group are responsible together for the action of the
Resolution dated April 4, 2005.56 Petitioners opposed the same.57 group. Hence, "collectively" would mean that the liability belongs equally to the two groups of
petitioners. They requested for an additional 60 days to raise the necessary amount. They also
On July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of respondents’ motions and asked the Court to hold their imprisonment in abeyance until their "just and reasonable
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.58 compliance" with the Court’s orders.

Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed, on August 15, 2005, a Manifestation of Barely a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed another Manifestation stressing
Compliance and Motion for Clarification. 59 They maintained that the issues they had raised in the that Sy Bang’s marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void. They claimed that respondents have falsified
motion for reconsideration had not been duly resolved. They argued that when this Court issued documents to lead the courts into believing that Rosita’s marriage to Sy Bang is valid.
its September 23, 1996 Resolution, it was not yet aware that Rosita had executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay, wherein she waived her claims and causes of action against petitioners. They also The Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005. Thereafter, respondents
informed this Court that, on April 17, 1998, the Guardianship court had issued an Order which filed a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration of Petitioners,64 which petitioners opposed.65
recognized a "temporary agreement" based on the voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a financial
assistance of ₱5,000.00 per month to Rosita while the case was pending. Moreover, as a
manifestation of good faith, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the ₱430,000.00 In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005, 66 the Court issued a Warrant of Arrest 67 against
out of their own funds in partial compliance with the Court’s Resolution. However, the same did petitioners and directed the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to detain them until they
not in any way constitute a waiver of their rights or defenses in the present case. They complied with this Court’s April 4, 2005 and July 25, 2005 Resolutions.
underscored the fact that the allowance must come from the estate of Sy Bang, and not from Jose
Sy Bang or any of the latter’s heirs, the extent of which remained undetermined. They further Petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion. 68 She informed the Court that, to show that
she was not obstinate and contumacious of the Court and its orders, she had begged and pleaded
with her relatives to raise money to comply, but concedes that she was only able to raise a further alleged that respondents Rolando, Maria Lourdes, Florecita, Rosalino, Enrique, and Rosita
minimal amount since she has no source of income herself and needs financial support to buy her Ferrera-Sy have executed separate waivers and quitclaims over their shares in the estate of Sy
food and medicines. She obtained her brother’s help and the latter issued six checks in the total Bang for certain considerations. However, out of respect for the Court and their fear of
amount of ₱650,000.00. She also alleged that she was not informed by her husband’s counsel of incarceration, they complied with the Court’s orders using their personal funds which they claim is
the developments in the case, and remained unconsulted on any of the matters or incidents of the unfair because they have never participated in the management of the properties of Sy Bang.
case. She reiterated that she had no participation in the management of the Sy Bang estate and They prayed that the Court pronounce that the liability for the widow’s allowance be divided
received nothing of value upon her husband’s death. She prayed that the Court would not proportionately among the following groups: Iluminada, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma; Rosa Tan;
consider her failure to raise any further amount as contempt or defiance of it’s orders. Rosalino Sy and wife Helen Loo; Bartolome Sy and wife Virginia Lim; Rolando Sy and wife
Anacorita Rioflorido; and the heirs of Enrique Sy, namely, Elaine Destura and Edwin Maceda.
The motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.
On March 23, 2006, petitioners filed an Urgent Reply to respondents’ Comment on the
In an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions with Payment of manifestation of compliance with Opposition74 to the motion filed by respondents for the Court to
Widow’s Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting of Warrant of Arrest on Humanitarian reiterate its order for the NBI to arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006
Grounds,69 petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma asked the Court to delete the penalty of Resolution. They argued that they had fully complied with the Court’s orders. They alleged that on
indefinite imprisonment considering their partial compliance and the partial compliance of Rosa three occasions within the period, they had tried to submit 12 postdated checks to the Court’s
Tan. They expressed willingness to deposit the widow’s allowance with the Supreme Court’s cashiers, but the same were refused due to the policy of the Court not to issue receipts on
Cashier pending the determination of Sy Bang’s estate. They reasoned that the money to be postdated checks. They then filed a motion before the RTC of Lucena City praying for authority to
deposited is their own and does not belong to Sy Bang’s estate. The deposit is made for the sole deposit the checks with the trial court. The motion was denied but, on reconsideration, was later
purpose of deleting the penalty of indefinite imprisonment. They claim that they are not willfully granted. The checks are now in the custody of the RTC. The only issue respondents raise, they
disobeying the Court’s order but are merely hesitating to comply because of pending incidents claim, is the amount of the checks. Hence, there is no basis for the Court to direct the NBI to effect
such as the falsification charges against Rosita, the resolution of the partition case, the their arrest.
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Rosita, and the pendency of Rosita’s guardianship
proceedings, as well as humanitarian considerations. Thus, they prayed for the Court to The Court, in a Resolution dated March 29, 2006, required respondents to comment on the motion
reconsider the order of contempt and to recall the warrant of arrest. to include some of them in the payment of widow’s allowance. Petitioners, on the other hand, were
required to comment on a motion filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order to the NBI
On February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution 70 lifting the warrant of arrest on petitioners to arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution. 75
Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and Rosa Tan on the condition that they issue the corresponding
checks to settle the accrued widow’s allowance of Rosita Ferrera-Sy. They were also directed to Petitioners filed their Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the March 29, 2006
submit proof of their compliance to the Court within ten (10) days from notice. Resolution.76 They reiterated their arguments in their Urgent Reply to respondents’ Comment on
the manifestation of compliance with Opposition. They further alleged that there is now a
In a Manifestation71 dated February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma Resolution by the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, San Pablo City, finding probable cause to
informed the Court that they had deposited the checks in favor of Rosita with the RTC, Lucena charge respondents with falsification of three marriage contracts between Sy Bang and Rosita
City, Branch 58, during the proceedings on February 28, 2006. 72 Ferrera. According to them, this development now constitutes a "highly prejudicial question" on
whether they should comply with the order to pay widow’s allowance. They claim that, while the
filing of the information is merely the first step in the criminal prosecution of respondents, it already
Respondents filed a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit of said checks, casts doubt on whether Rosita is legally entitled to the widow’s allowance. They now seek partial
amounting to ₱1,073,053.00, does not amount to full compliance with the Court’s order reconsideration of the Resolution inasmuch as it requires them to deposit with the Clerk of Court,
considering that the accrued widow’s allowance now amounted to ₱4,528,125.00.1avvph!1 RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58, new checks payable to Rosita Ferrera.

Then, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Respondents, on the other hand, filed a Comment and Manifestation 77 on why they should not be
Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of made to pay the widow’s allowance. They argued that the RTC had already decided that the
Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang as they may also hold Assets-Properties of the Estate of estate of Sy Bang was comprised of properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada Tan,
Sy Bang.73 They argued that it is denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single out Zenaida, Ma. Emma, Julian Sy, and Rosa Tan, and the same was affirmed by the CA. Pending
only the two children of the first marriage – Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy – and their heirs, as the the resolution of the appeal before this Court, this Decision stands. Thus, petitioners’ claim that
ones responsible for the widow’s allowance. This ruling, they aver, does not take into the estate of Sy Bang is yet undetermined is false. They also claim that, contrary to petitioners’
consideration the numerous and valuable properties from the estate of Sy Bang being held in the claims of being poor, they still hold enormous properties of the Sy Bang estate, which had been
names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. They alleged that two compromise transferred in their names through falsification of public documents, now subject of several cases
agreements, both approved by the trial court, transferred properties to Rolando and Renato. They which respondents filed against them before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondents
further claim that the validity of their mother’s marriage to Sy Bang has been recognized by the To review, the CA held, to wit:
courts in several cases where the issue had been raised, including the case for recognition of
Rosita’s Filipino citizenship, the guardianship proceedings, and the partition proceedings. The respondent Judge acted correctly inasmuch as his decision to defer the resolution on the
question concerning the properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all
On June 23, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of Parties. 78 They averred that Jose surnamed Sy, will not necessarily affect the decision he rendered concerning the properties in the
Sy Bang died on September 11, 2001, leaving behind his widow Iluminada and 14 children, while names of Jose Sy Bang and wife, Julian Sy and wife, Zenaida Sy and Maria Sy, considering that
Julian Sy died on August 28, 2004, leaving behind his widow Rosa and eight children. The claims the properties mentioned were separable and distinct from each other, such that the claim that
against Jose and Julian were not extinguished by their deaths. It was the duty of petitioners’ said properties were not their own, but properties of the late Sy Bang, could have been the subject
counsel, under Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, to inform the Court of these deaths within of separate suits.83
30 days thereof. Petitioners’ counsel failed to so inform this Court, which should be a ground for
disciplinary action. Hence, respondents prayed that the Court order the heirs of the two deceased We agree with the CA.
to appear and be substituted in these cases within 30 days from notice.
Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states:
In a Resolution79 dated July 5, 2006, the Court granted the motion for substitution and noted the
Comment and Manifestation on the Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and
Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy SEC. 4. Several judgments. – In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a
Bang. several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to
proceed against the others.
Respondents then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implement the Supreme Court’s Resolutions
of September 23, 1996, April 4, 2005, July 25, 2005, December 12, 2005, and February 15, The trial court’s Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several judgment as contemplated by
2006.80 They prayed that petitioners be given a last period of five days within which to deposit with the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on the status of the properties in the names of
the Supreme Court Cashier all the accrued widow’s allowances as of June 2006. petitioners (defendants below) while deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of
respondents pending the presentation of evidence.
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma opposed respondents’ manifestation and
motion.81 They argued that the resolutions sought to be implemented were all issued prior to the A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from
DOJ Resolution finding probable cause to file the falsification charges against respondents. They that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of
contended that the criminal cases for falsification expose Rosita as a mere common-law wife and separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. 84
not a "widow"; hence, there is no legal justification to give her the widow’s allowance. They also
reiterated their earlier arguments against the grant of widow’s allowance. Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable interest in the
properties of the Sy Bang estate.
Meanwhile, Rosa Tan filed a Comment on the Substitution of Parties with Motion for
Reconsideration.82 She argued that since the trial court had already appointed a judicial The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not affect the determination
administrator for the estate of Sy Bang, which includes Julian Sy’s estate, the proper party to be of the obligations of the others. That the properties in the names of petitioners were found to be
substituted should be the administrator and not Julian’s heirs who never exercised ownership part of the Sy Bang estate did not preclude any further findings or judgment on the status or
rights over the properties thereof. nature of the properties in the names of the other heirs.

The Court denied the motion for reconsideration to the Resolution granting substitution of parties The trial court’s June 2, 1982 Order reads:
for lack of merit on November 20, 2006.
IN view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the properties in the name (sic) of
The Court’s Ruling Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as
those in the names of the other parties litigants in this case), (sic) shall be declared or included as
G.R. No. 114217 part of the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic)
presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan after the said question was agreed to be submitted for
resolution on May 26, 1982, the Court hereby sets for the reception or for the resolution of said
Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA Decision. issue in this case on June 8 and 9, 1982, both at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon; notify all parties
litigants in this case of these settings.85
The Third Partial Decision of the RTC
It is obvious from the trial court’s order 86 that the June 8, 1982 hearing is for the purpose of Moreover, the Third Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating the proceedings for
determining whether properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and partition. By its very nature, the Third Partial Decision is but a determination based on the
Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives are also part of the Sy Bang estate. evidence presented thus far. There remained issues to be resolved by the court. There would be
no final determination of the extent of the Sy Bang estate until the court’s examination of the
Hence, in the assailed Decision, the trial court said: properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. Based on the evidence
presented, the trial court will have to make a pronouncement whether the properties in the names
of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique indeed belong to the Sy Bang estate. Only after the
[I]n fact, the Court will require further evidence for or against any of the parties in this case in the full extent of the Sy Bang estate has been determined can the trial court finally order the partition
matter of whatever sums of money, property or asset belonging to the estate of Sy Bang that of each of the heirs’ share.
came into their possession in order that the Court may be properly guided in the partition and
adjudication of the rightful share and interest of the heirs of Sy Bang over the latter’s estate; this
becomes imperative in view of new matters shown in the Submission and Formal Offer of Reserve Appointment of Receiver
Exhibits and the Offer of Additional Documentary Evidence filed respectively by Oscar Sy and
Jose Sy Bang, et al., thru their respective counsels after the question of whether or not the As to the issue of the judge’s appointment of a receiver, suffice it to say that the CA conclusively
properties in the names of Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, and Rolando, all surnamed Sy, should found thus:
form part or be included as part of the estate of Sy Bang, had been submitted for resolution as of
May 26, 1982; the Court deems it proper to receive additional evidence on the part of any of the The records show that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in court. Upon Order of the
parties litigants in this case if only to determine the true extent of the estate belonging to Sy respondent Judge, counsel for the petitioners submitted their opposition to [the] petition for
Bang.87 appointment of a receiver filed by private respondents. x x x.

The trial court painstakingly examined the evidence on record and narrated the details, then Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the receiver after both
carefully laid out the particulars in the assailed Decision. The evidence that formed the basis for parties have presented their evidence and after the Third Partial Decision has been promulgated.
the trial court’s conclusion is embodied in the Decision itself – evidence presented by the parties Such appointment was made upon verified petition of herein private respondents, alleging that
themselves, including petitioners. petitioners are mismanaging the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing the
same, hence, the said properties are in danger of being lost, wasted, dissipated, misused, or
However, notwithstanding the trial court’s pronouncement, the Sy Bang estate cannot be disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the appointment of a receiver in
partitioned or distributed until the final determination of the extent of the estate and only until it is Civil Case No. 8578, in order to preserve the properties in litis pendentia and neither did he abuse
shown that the obligations under Rule 90, Section 1,88 have been settled.89 his discretion nor acted arbitrarily in doing s. On the contrary, We find that it was the petitioners
who violated the status quo sought to be maintained by the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 61519, by
In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: their intrusion and unwarranted seizures of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the litigation, and
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and which are admittedly under the exclusive management and operation of private respondent,
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any Rosauro Sy.93
of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. 90 Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens

Settling the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition. 91 As this Court has ruled: Next, petitioners question the trial court’s Order canceling the notice of lis pendens. 94

The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order to Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, provides:
effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition itself. As held in the
case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals: SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition
issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for of the party who caused the registration thereof.
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section
1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent of At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action such as
his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case
be premature to effect a partition of the properties x x x." 92
in which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to
section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of certificate of enforce payment of the widow’s allowance ordered by this Court.
the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal
thereof. Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widow’s allowance was made before the
Supreme Court in a case that did not arise from the guardianship proceedings. The case subject
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the of the Supreme Court petition (Civil Case No. 8578) is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the
final judgment from being defeated by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states:
fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.95
SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. – The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction
While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power is to be of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
exercised within the express confines of the law. As provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the
annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states:
annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. 96
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to
This Court has interpreted the notice as: the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is
delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the
fruits or rents pertaining to them.
The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the
merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the
property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is the court hearing the
property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the provision of the law that the widow’s allowance is
inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The to be taken from the common mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent.
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may
be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal- Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the settlement of the estate
like the continuance or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the that should effect the payment of widow’s allowance considering that the properties of the estate
existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof. 97 are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts.99

The CA found, and we affirm, that Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were able to prove that the In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this Court has pronounced that:
notice was intended merely to molest and harass the owners of the property, some of whom were
not parties to the case. It was also proven that the interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order
be annotated, was only 1/14 of the assessed value of the property. Moreover, Rosalino, Bartolome the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a
and Rolando were ordered to post a ₱50,000.00 bond to protect whatever rights or interest Oscar categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the
Sy may have in the properties under litis pendentia.98 ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery
to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or
G.R. No. 150797 conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable.
However, where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, x
In G.R. No. 150797, petitioners are asking this Court to reverse the CA’s February 28, 2001 x x the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled,
Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to declare the concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a
Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widow’s guardianship proceedings.100
allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34.
Further, this Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased
We find merit in petitioners’ contention. incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another
proceeding in which the heirs are at liberty to initiate. 101

Other Unresolved Incidents

Payment of Widow’s Allowance That the full extent of Sy Bang’s estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from complying
with this Court’s order. Properties of the estate have been identified – i.e., those in the names of
It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly petitioners – thus, these properties should be made to answer for the widow’s allowance of Rosita.
widow’s allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma have since fought tooth and In any case, the amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to
nail against paying the said allowance, grudgingly complying only upon threat of incarceration. her, will be deducted from her share of the estate. 103
Then, they again argued against the grant of widow’s allowance after the DOJ issued its
Resolution finding probable cause in the falsification charges against respondents. They A Final Note
contended that the criminal cases for falsification proved that Rosita is a mere common-law wife
and not a "widow" and, therefore, not entitled to widow’s allowance. We are appalled by the delay in the disposition of this case brought about by petitioners’
propensity to challenge the Court’s every directive. That the petitioners would go to extreme
This argument deserves scant consideration. lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the orders of this Court is truly
deplorable. Not even a citation for contempt and the threat of imprisonment seemed to deter them.
A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of falsification against Their contumacious attitude and actions have dragged this case for far too long with practically no
respondents. end in sight. Their abuse of legal and court processes is shameful, and they must not be allowed
to continue with their atrocious behavior. Petitioners deserve to be sanctioned, and ordered to pay
the Court treble costs.
In a preliminary investigation, probable cause has been defined as "the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No. 150797 is GRANTED,
prosecuted." It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause needs to rest only on evidence while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217 is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena City is
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the directed to hear and decide Civil Case No. 8578 with dispatch. The Motion to include Rosalino Sy,
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang is DENIED. Treble costs against petitioners.
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.102
SO ORDERED.
Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same is presumed valid and
Rosita is entitled to receive her widow’s allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang.

We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with whatever the courts, in
relation to the properties under litigation, may order.

Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise
Liable for the Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang

On March 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy,
and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow’s Allowance as Heirs of Sy
Bang.

The Motion is denied.

The widow’s allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bang’s estate. It must be

stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando,
and Enrique Sy form part of Sy Bang’s estate remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the
trial court’s Third Partial Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there has been a
categorical pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties belonging to Sy Bang’s estate.
RULE 84 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the
probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters
G.R. No. 118671             January 29, 1996 testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The
letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,
vs. On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited
MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents. "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties,
DECISION specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the
provisions of the holographic will.
PUNO, J.:
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated November 10, respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of
1994 and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045. the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the
titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz 1 executed a holographic will naming as his Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent
Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial Montes's motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider.
cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. 2 Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.

On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. motion for release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle Verde property
For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of had been renewed for another year.7
his father's holographic will.
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to
approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance
Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six
undue influence. months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. 8 The court stated thus:

On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva xxx       xxx       xxx
Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline4 — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties the court resolves to
allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may
the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of Maria
Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are subject to collation
P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and and deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed
maintenance expenses on the estate.5 the fruits or rents pertaining to them.

In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the
real properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00. 6
 As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the proceedings. He contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance
above-named heirs, the same is hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance  until the because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and
lapse of six (6) months from the date of first publication of Notice to Creditors. gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which
excludes the latter's grandchildren.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting
of the expenses necessary for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the
Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
amount required can be withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation
creditors with reasonable dispatch.9 of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their
age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to
the part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. 15
court's order in a decision dated November 10, 1994 10 and a resolution dated January 5, 1995.11
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
Hence, this petition. decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not
extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 16 It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the
Petitioner claims that: grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors.
AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the
PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE
EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO
TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending
ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in
AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part
PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among
PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these
HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND Rules.17
OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
And Rule 90 provides that:
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before
payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges,
funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the and expenses of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any,
titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
the will. application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
after hearing upon notice shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has
of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum
 to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had
as the court directs.18 been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance
expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously
after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary
estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. 19 It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of
the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property rents after renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the
date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. 30 As executor, he is a
but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is
one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. 31 He cannot unilaterally
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. 20 Notably, at the time the order submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised. rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months veracity, propriety and justness.32
after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and
extrinsic validity21 and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 22 Questions as to the intrinsic 33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order
even after the will has been authenticated.23 granting an allowance to the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the
private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate
court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds 24 and his motion for Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court. 25 Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of SO ORDERED.
his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules
provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their
distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in
ordinary cases.26

Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to
take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and expenses of administration," 27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court
explicitly provides:

Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer
estate not willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession
and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it
is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.28
RULE 84 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS Leong when he allowed the renewal of contracts of lease for properties involved in the testate
proceedings to be undertaken in favor of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS without notifying and
A.M. No. 2430 August 30, 1990 securing the approval of the probate court. However, the Solicitor General opined that there was
no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that respondent had allowed the properties to be leased
in favor of his family partnership at a very low rental or in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the
MAURO P. MANANQUIL, complainant, new Civil Code. Thus, the Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the
vs. practice of law for a period of THREE (3) months with a warning that future misconduct on
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS, respondent. respondent's part will be more severely dealt with [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 1-10; Rollo, pp. 37-46.  Also, Complaint of the Solicitor General, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp.
Geminiano M. Eleccion for complainant. 47-49].

RESOLUTION As gleaned from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the following facts are uncontroverted:

That as early as March 21, 1961, respondent was retained as counsel of record
CORTES,  J.: for Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the late Felomina Zerna, who was appointed
as administrator of the Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna in Special No. 460
on May 22, 1961;
In a verified complaint for disbarment dated July 5, 1982, Mauro P. Mananquil charged respondent
Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas with gross misconduct or malpractice committed while acting as
counsel of record of one Felix Leong in the latter's capacity as administrator of the Testate Estate That, a lease contract dated August 13, 1963 was executed between Felix Leong
of the late Felomina Zerna in Special Proceedings No. 460 before then Court of First Instance of and the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" represented by respondent's brother-in-law
Negros Occidental. The complainant was appointed special administrator after Felix Leong died. Marcelo Pastrano involving, among others, sugar lands of the estate designated
as Lot Nos. 1124, 1228, 2221, 2402, 3939, 3942 and 3957 of the Tanjay
Cadastre;
In compliance with a resolution of this Court, respondent filed his comment to the complaint on
January 20, 1983. After complainant filed his reply, the Court resolved to refer the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. That Felix Leong was designated therein as administrator and "owner, by
testamentary disposition, of 5/6 of all said parcels of land";
In a hearing conducted on May 15, 1985 by the investigating officer assigned to the case, counsel
for the complainant proposed that the case be considered on the basis of position papers and That, the lifetime of the lease contract was FOUR (4) sugar crop years, with a
memoranda to be submitted by the parties. Respondent agreed. Thus, the investigating officer yearly rental of TEN PERCENT (10%) of the value of the sugar produced from
required the parties to submit their respective position papers and memoranda, with the the leased parcels of land;
understanding that with or without the memoranda, the case will be deemed submitted for
resolution after the expiration of 30 days. In compliance, both parties submitted their respective That, on April 20, 1965, the formal partnership of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS
position papers; but no memorandum was filed by either party. Thereafter, the case was deemed was formed amongst the heirs of Jose Villegas, of which respondent was a
submitted. member;

In the pleadings submitted before the Court and the Office of the Solicitor General, complainant That, on October 18, 1965, another lease contract was executed between Felix
alleges that over a period of 20 years, respondent allowed lease contracts to be executed Leong and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, containing basically the
between his client Felix Leong and a partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which same terms and conditions as the first contract, with Marcelo Pastrano signing
respondent is one of the partners, covering several parcels of land of the estate, i.e. Lots Nos. once again as representative of the lessee;
1124, 1228, 2221, 2402, 3939, 3942 and 3957 of the Tanjay Cadastre, under iniquitous terms and
conditions. Moreover, complainant charges that these contracts were made without the approval That, on March 14, 1968, after the demise of Marcelo Pastrano, respondent was
of the probate court and in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code. appointed manager of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS by the majority of partners;

On the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties, and other pertinent records of the
investigation, the Solicitor General submitted his report dated February 21, 1990, finding that
respondent committed a breach in the performance of his duties as counsel of administrator Felix
 That, renewals of the lease contract were executed between Felix Leong and (3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration
HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS on January 13, 1975 and on December 4, 1978,
with respondent signing therein as representative of the lessee; and, (4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
That, in the later part of 1980, respondent was replaced by his nephew Geronimo administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
H. Villegas as manager of the family partnership. judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;
Under the above circumstances, the Court finds absolutely no merit to complainant's charge, and
the Solicitor General's finding, that respondent committed acts of misconduct in failing to secure (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
the approval of the court in Special Proceedings No. 460 to the various lease contracts executed and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice,
between Felix Leong and respondent's family partnership. the property or rights in litigation or levied upon on execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from
the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an (6) Any others specially disqualified by law
administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate
even without prior judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); xxx xxx xxx
Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1 (1939); San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29,
1964, 11 SCRA 165].
[Article 1491 of the new Civil Code; Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not required under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties The above disqualification imposed on public and judicial officers and lawyers is grounded on
of the estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify public policy considerations which disallow the transactions entered into by them, whether directly
the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval or indirectly, in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, or the peculiar control exercised by
thereto. these individuals over the properties or rights covered [See Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. No. L-35702,
May 29, 1973, 51 SCRA 120; Maharlika Publishing Corporation v. Tagle, G.R. No. 65594, July 9,
1986, 142 SCRA 553; Fornilda v. The Branch 164, RTC Fourth Judicial Region, Pasig, G.R. No.
Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor General, the Court finds sufficient evidence to 72306, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 281 and January 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 351].
hold respondent subject to disciplinary sanction for having, as counsel of record for the
administrator in Special Proceedings No. 460, participated in the execution in 1975 and 1978 of
renewals of the lease agreement involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of
HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which respondent is a member and in 1968 was appointed Jose Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as
managing partner. an agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition
against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes
part. To rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in
By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons referred to in Article 1491 are effect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through the legal fiction of
prohibited from leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or separate juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as
things mentioned in that article, to wit: one of the heirs of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS
stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix Leong and his
xxx xxx xxx family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings.

(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his In his defense, respondent claims that he was neither aware of, nor participated in, the execution
guardianship; of the original lease contract entered into between his client and his family partnership, which was
then represented by his brother-in-law Marcelo Pastrano. And although he admits that he
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to participated in the execution of subsequent renewals of the lease contract as managing partner of
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given; HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, he argues that he acted in good faith considering that the heirs of
Filomena Zerna consented or acquiesced to the terms and conditions stipulated in the original
lease contract. He further contends that pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Tuason WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas committed acts of gross
v.  Tuason [88 Phil. 428 (1951)] the renewal contracts do not fall within the prohibition of Articles misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for four (4)
1491 and 1646 since he signed the same as a mere agent of the partnership. months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that future
misconduct on respondent's part will be more severely dealt with. Let copies of this Resolution be
Respondent's contentions do not provide sufficient basis to escape disciplinary action from this circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
Court. personal record of Atty. Villegas.

It taxes this Courts imagination that respondent disclaims any knowledge in the execution of the SO ORDERED.
original lease contract between his client and his family partnership represented by his brother-in-
law. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and allowed
the subsequent renewals of the lease contract. In fact, he actively participated in the lease
contracts dated January 13, 1975 and December 4, 1978 by signing on behalf of the lessee
HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS.

Moreover, the claim that the heirs of Filomena Zerna have acquiesced and consented to the
assailed lease contracts does not militate against respondent's liability under the rules of
professional ethics. The prohibition referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code, as
far as lawyers are concerned, is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his
client on account of his fiduciary and confidential association [Sotto v. Samson, G.R. No. L-16917,
July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 733]. Thus, the law makes the prohibition absolute and permanent [Rubias
v. Batiller, supra]. And in view of Canon 1 of the new Code of Professional Responsibility and
Sections 3 & 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, whereby lawyers are duty-bound to
obey and uphold the laws of the land, participation in the execution of the prohibited contracts
such as those referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code has been held to
constitute breach of professional ethics on the part of the lawyer for which disciplinary action may
be brought against him [See Bautista v. Gonzalez, Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990).
Accordingly, the Court must reiterate the rule that the claim of good faith is no defense to a lawyer
who has failed to adhere faithfully to the legal disqualifications imposed upon him, designed to
protect the interests of his client [See In re Ruste, 70 Phil. 243 (1940); Also, Severino v. Severino,
44 Phil. 343 (1923)].

Neither is there merit in respondent's reliance on the case of Tuason v. Tuason  [supra.] It cannot
be inferred from the statements made by the Court in that case that contracts of sale or lease
where the vendee or lessee is a partnership, of which a lawyer is a member, over a property
involved in a litigation in which he takes part by virtue of his profession, are not covered by the
prohibition under Articles 1491 and 1646.

However, the Court sustains the Solicitor General's holding that there is no sufficient evidence on
record to warrant a finding that respondent allowed the properties of the estate of Filomena Zerna
involved herein to be leased to his family partnership at very low rental payments. At any rate, it is
a matter for the court presiding over Special Proceedings No. 460 to determine whether or not the
agreed rental payments made by respondent's family partnership is reasonable compensation for
the use and occupancy of the estate properties.

Considering thus the nature of the acts of misconduct committed by respondent, and the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court finds sufficient grounds to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
RULE 84 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS and costs. The Court of Appeals issued the injunctive writ and required respondents therein to
Answer. Campillanos insisted on the invalidity of the contract in favor of Escanlar; the lower court
G.R. No. L-19265             May 29, 1964 alleged that it did not exactly annul or invalidate the lease in his questioned orders but suggested
merely that Escanlar "may file a separate ordinary action in the Court of general jurisdiction."
MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR., petitioner,
vs. The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition for certiorari, among others said —
ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR, respondents.
The controlling issue in this case is the legality of the contract of lease entered into by the
PAREDES, J.: former administrator Nombre, and Pedro Escanlar on May 1, 1960.

The case at bar had its origin in Special Proceedings No. 7279 of the CFI of Negros Occidental Respondents contend that this contract, not having been authorized or approved by the
wherein respondent Adelo Nombre was the duly constituted judicial administrator. On May 1, Court, is null and void and cannot be an obstacle to the execution of another of lease by
1960, Nombre, in his capacity was judicial administrator of the intestate estate subject of the Sp. the new administrator, Campillanos. This contention is without merit. ... . It has been held
Proc. stated above, leased one of the properties of the estate (a fishpond identified as Lot No. that even in the absence of such special powers, a contract or lease for more than 6
1617 of the cadastral survey of Kabankaban, Negros Occidental), to Pedro Escanlar, the other years is not entirely invalid; it is invalid only in so far as it exceeds the six-year limit
respondent. The terms of the lease was for three (3) years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.00 to (Enrique v. Watson Company, et al., 6 Phil. 84). 1
expire on May 1, 1963, the transaction having been done, admittedly, without previous authority or
approval of the Court where the proceedings was pending. On January 17, 1961, Nombre was No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a lease of property
removed as administrator by Order of the court and one Sofronio Campillanos was appointed in placed under his custody is provided for in the present law. Under Article 1647 of the
his stead. The appeal on the Order of Nombre's removal is supposedly pending with the Court of present Civil Code, it is only when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of
Appeals. Respondent Escanlar was cited for contempt, allegedly for his refusal to surrender the Property that it cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus, regardless of the
fishpond to the newly appointed administrator. On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed a motion period of lease, there is no need of special authority unless the contract is to be recorded
asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner herein, in the Registry of Property. As to whether the contract in favor of Escanlar is to be so
Moises San Diego, Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00. Escanlar was not recorded is not material to our inquiry. 1äwphï1.ñët
notified of such motion. Nombre, the deposed administrator, presented a written opposition to the
motion of Campillanos on April 11, 1964, pointing out that the fishpond had been leased by him to On the contrary, Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial
Escanlar for 3 years, the period of which was going to expire on May 1, 1963. In a supplemental administrator, among other things, to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed
opposition, he also invited the attention of the Court that to grant the motion of the new of by will. Commenting on this Section in the light of several Supreme Court decisions
administrator would in effect nullify the contract in favor of Escanlar, a person on whom the Court (Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1; Gamboa v. Gamboa, 68 Phil. 304; Ferraris v.
had no jurisdiction. He also intimated that the validity of the lease contract entered into by a Rodas, 65 Phil. 732; Rodriguez v. Borromeo, 43 Phil. 479), Moran says: "Under this
judicial administrator, must be recognized unless so declared void in a separate action. The provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate of the
opposition notwithstanding, the Court on April 8, 1961, in effect declared that the contract in favor deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts
of Escanlar was null and void, for want of judicial authority and that unless he would offer the of administration without special authority of the Court. For instance, he may lease the
same as or better conditions than the prospective lessee, San Diego, there was no good reason property without securing previously any permission from the court. And where the lease
why the motion for authority to lease the property to San Diego should not be granted. Nombre has formally been entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the
moved to reconsider the Order of April 8, stating that Escanlar was willing to increase the rental of same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The proper
P5,000.00, but only after the termination of his original contract. The motion for reconsideration remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the
was denied on April 24, 1961, the trial judge stating that the contract in favor of Escanlar was lease. ... .
executed in bad faith and was fraudulent because of the imminence of Nombre's removal as
administrator, one of the causes of which was his indiscriminate pleasant, of the property with On September 13, 1961, petitioner herein Moises San Diego, Sr., who was not a party in the case,
inadequate rentals. intervened and moved for a reconsideration of the above judgment. The original parties (the new
administrator and respondent judge) also filed Motions for reconsideration, but we do not find
From this Order, a petition for Certiorari asking for the annulment of the Orders of April 8 and 24, them in the record. On November 18, 1961, the Court of Appeals denied the motions for
1961 was presented by Nombre and Escanlar with the Court of Appeals. A Writ of preliminary reconsideration. With the denial of the said motions, only San Diego, appealed therefrom, raising
injunction was likewise prayed for to restrain the new administrator Campillanos from possessing legal questions, which center on "Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the
the fishpond and from executing a new lease contract covering it; requiring him to return the estate without prior judicial authority and approval", and "whether the provisions of the New Civil
possession thereof to Escanlar, plus damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 Code on Agency should apply to judicial administrators."
The Rules of Court provide that — Nombre in favor of Escanlar, a new contract in favor of said Escanlar, was executed on May 1,
1963, by the new administrator Campillanos. who, incidentally, did not take any active participation
An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well as in the present appeal, the right of petitioner to the fishpond becomes a moot and academic issue,
the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the which We need not pass upon.
debts and the expenses of administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased
not disposed of by his will. (Sec. 3, Rule 85, old Rules). WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with
costs against petitioner Moises San Diego, Sr.
Lease has been considered an act of administration (Jocson v. Nava; Gamboa v. Gamboa;
Rodriguez v. Borromeo; Ferraris v. Rodas, supra).

The Civil Code, on lease, provides:

If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property, the following persons cannot

constitute the same without proper authority, the husband with respect to the wife's
paraphernal real estate, the father or guardian as to the property of the minor or ward,
and the manager without special power. (Art. 1647).

The same Code, on Agency, states:

Special powers of attorneys are necessary in the following cases:

(8) To lease any real property to another person for more than one year. (Art. 1878)

Petitioner contends, that No. 8, Art. 1878 is the limitation to the right of a judicial administrator to
lease real property without prior court authority and approval, if it exceeds one year. The lease
contract in favor of Escanlar being for 3 years and without such court approval and authority is,
therefore, null and void. Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that there is no limitation of
such right; and that Article 1878 does not apply in the instant case.

We believe that the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease
in favor of Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of prior authority and approval. The law and
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter militates in favor of this view. While it may be admitted that
the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative
capacity), are in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not
apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only
the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua Tan v. Del
Rosario, 57 Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file a
bond. These circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his
principal. The protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an
agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the
acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing
court. The observation of former Chief Justice Moran, as quoted in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, is indeed sound, and We are not prone to alter the same, at the moment.

We, likewise, seriously doubt petitioner's legal standing to pursue this appeal. And, if We consider
the fact that after the expiration of the original period of the lease contract executed by respondent
RULE 84 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as required by Article 1620 in
connection with Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
G.R. No. L-46001 March 25, 1982
On the other hand, petitioner presented during the hearing of the case secondary evidence of the
LUZ CARO, petitioner, service of written notice of the intended sale to possible redemptioners in as much as the best
vs. thereof, the written notices itself sent to and Saturnino Benito, could not be presented for the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA LAHORRA VDA. DE BENITO, AS reason that said notices were sent to persons who were already dead when the complaint for legal
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARIO BENITO, respondents. redemption was brought. Instead, the affidavit of Benjamin Benito, executed ante litem
motam, attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his
intention to sell his undivided share, was presented in evidence. The deposition of Saturnino's
widow was likewise taken and introduced in evidence, wherein she testified that she received and
gave to her husband the written notice of the intended sale but that the latter expressed disinterest
GUERRERO, J.: in buying the property.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking a review of the After hearing the evidence, the trial judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (a) private
decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 promulgated on February 11, 1977, in CA-G.R. No. 52570-R respondent, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the power to
entitled "Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito exercise the right of legal redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his
vs. Luz Caro", as well as the resolution of the respondent Court, dated May 13, 1977, denying obligation of furnishing written notice of the sale of his one-third undivided portion to possible
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. redemptioners.

The facts of the case are as follows: Private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision having been denied,
she appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals contending that the trial Judge erred in
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 of the Registry of Deeds of I. . . not inhibiting himself from trying and deciding the case because his son is an
Sorsogon. Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his associate or member of the law office of Atty. Rodolfo A. Madrid, the attorney of
father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed in Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court record of defendant-appellee in the instant case;
of First Instance of Sorsogon as joint administrators of Mario's estate.
II. . contending that Benjamin Benito complied with the provisions of Article 1623
On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of absolute sale of of the Revised Civil Code that before a co-owner could sell his share of the
his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro, for property owned in common with the other co-heirs, he must first give written
the sum of P10,000.00. This was registered on September 29, 1959. Subsequently, with the notice of his desire to his co-heirs; (p. 49, R.A.)
consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito as shown in their affidavits both dated September
15, 1960, Exhibits G and F respectively, a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over III. concluding that the fact that one of the administrators who was actively
Lot I-C, under T.C.T. No. T-4978. managing the estate was furnished a written notice by the co-owner of his desire
to sell his share was enough compliance of the provisions of Article 1623 of the
Sometime in the month of May, 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito learned Civil Code for the reason that the intention of the law is only to give a chance to
from an allegation in a pleading presented by petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 508 that the the new co-owner to buy the share intended to be sold if he desires to buy the
latter acquired by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided share in each same; (p. 50, R.A.)
of the two parcels of land. After further verification, she sent to petitioner thru her counsel, a
written offer to redeem the said one-third undivided share dated August 25, 1966. Inasmuch as IV. . refusing to allow plaintiff to redeem the subject property upon authority of
petitioner ignored said offer, private respondent sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 2105 entitled Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, L-15499, Feb. 28, 1962 (p. 51, R.A.) and in
"Rosa Amador Vda. de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation consequently dismissing the complaint (p. 52, R.A.).
of the annotation of the sale and mortgage involving the same parcels of land, but did not succeed
as the principal case was dismissed on a technicality, that is, for failure to prosecute and the
proposed intervenor failed to pay the docketing fees. Private respondent, thus, filed the present In disposing of the aforesaid errors, the Court of Appeals finding for plaintiff (herein private
case as an independent one and in the trial sought to prove that as a joint administrator of the respondent) held:
1. That it is not clear that Atty. Arcangel, son of the trial Judge, was legally associated as 1. Respondent Court erred in allowing the exercise of the right of legal redemption with respect to
practitioner with counsel for Luz Caro; that it is not shown at any rate that plaintiff had asked for the lots in question.
Judge Arcangel's disqualification and that at any rate also, in such factual situation, an optional
ground for disqualification is addressed to his sound discretion with which it would not be correct 2. Respondent Court erred when it made the finding that there was no notice in law from which to
for appellate court to interfere or overrule. count the tolling of the period of redemption and that the sale was not made known at all to private
respondent.
2. That since the right of the co-owner to redeem in case his share be sold to a stranger arose
after the death of Mario Benito, such right did not form part of the hereditary estate of Mario but The alleged first error of respondent Court is premised on the fact that the lot in question sought to
instead was the personal right of the heirs, one of whom is Mario's widow. Thus, it behooved be redeemed is no longer owned in common. Petitioner contends that the right sought to be
either the vendor, Benjamin, or his vendee, Luz Caro, to have made a written notice of the exercised by private respondent in the case assumes that the land in question is under co-
intended or consummated sale under Article 1620 of the Civil Code. ownership, the action being based on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code which provides:

3. That the recital in the deed of sale that the vendor notified his co-owners of his desire to A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of
dispose of his share, who all declined to buy, was but a unilateral statement and could not be all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
proof of the notice required by the law. alienation is grossly excessive, the petitioner shall pay only a reasonable price.

4. That the registration of the deed of sale did not erase that right. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they
may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing
5. That the affidavit of notice executed on January 20, 1960 of Benjamin Benito declaring that owned in common.
written notices of the sale as required by law were duly sent to Alfredo Benito and Saturnino
Benito, the latter in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, as well as the However, the fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land covered by
sworn statement of Saturnino Benito's widow dated November 18, 1968 confirming that her Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 was terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro
husband received the written notice of the sale referred to in Benjamin Benito's affidavit of notice and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino Benito, as
would not satisfy that there was clear notice in writing of the specific term of the intended sale. trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property.
Worse, Saturnino was only a co-administrator and hence, his unilateral act could not bind the
principal because there was no less than a renunciation of a right pertaining to the heirs, under
Article 1818, NCC, apart from the fact that the right of redemption is not within their administration. An agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and consequently binding upon
the parties. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196)
6. That the further claim of defendant that offer to redeem was filed out of time and that there was
no actual tender loses all importance, there being no date from which to count the 30-day period A petition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. This was accompanied by the affidavits of
to redeem because there was no notice given. Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, both dated September 15, 1960 to the effect that they agree
to the segregation of the land formerly owned in common by Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito and
Benjamin Benito. A subdivision plan was made and by common agreement Lot I-C thereof, with
The dispositive part of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads as follows: an area of 163 hectares, more or less, was ceded to petitioner. Thereafter, the co-owners took
actual and exclusive possession of the specific portions respectively assigned to them. A
IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court is constrained to reverse, as it now reverses, subdivision title was subsequently issued on the lot assigned to petitioner, to wit, Transfer
judgment appealed from, upon payment by plaintiff or deposit in Court, within 30 Certificate of Title No. T-4978.
days after this judgment should have become final, of the sum of P10,000.00,
defendant is ordered to execute a deed of redemption over the one-third share of In Caram, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 315, a case squarely in point, this Court
BENJAMIN BENITO in favor of plaintiff for herself and as representative of the held:
children of Mario Benito and therefrom, to deliver said one-third share of
BENJAMIN BENITO, costs against defendant-appellee.
Inasmuch as the purpose of the law in establishing the right of legal redemption
between co-owners is to reduce the number of participants until the community is
SO ORDERED. done away with (Viola vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 808), once the property is subdivided
and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner brought this petition for review raising the no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption.
following errors:
Although the foregoing pronouncement has reference to the sale made after partition, this Court Private respondent cannot be considered to have brought this action in her behalf and in behalf of
therein saw no difference with respect to a conveyance which took place before the the heirs of Mario Benito because the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint specifically stated
partition agreement and approval by the court. Thus, it held: that she brought the action in her capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito.

Nevertheless, the result is the same, because We held in Saturnino vs. Paulino, It is petitioner's contention that, assuming that private respondent may exercise the right of
97 Phil. 50, that the right of redemption under Article 1067 may be exercised redemption, there was no compliance with the conditions precedent for the valid exercise thereof.
only before partition. In this case the right was asserted not only after
partition but after the property inherited had actually been subdivided into several In Conejero et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,  16 SCRA 775, this Court explained the nature of the
parcels which were assigned by lot to the several heirs. right of redemption in this wise:

In refutation, private respondent argues that petitioner Luz Caro acted in bad faith and in fraud of While the co-owner's right of legal redemption is a substantive right, it is
the rights of the heirs of a deceased Mario Benito in obtaining a subdivision title over a one-third exceptional in nature, limited in its duration and subject to strict compliance with
portion of the land in question which she brought from Benjamin Benito, and for this reason, she is the legal requirements. One of these is that the redemptioner should tender
deemed to hold said property in trust for said heirs. The rule, however, is it fraud in securing the payment of the redemption money within thirty (30) days from written notice of
registration of titles to the land should be supported by clear and convincing evidence. (Jaramil vs. the sale by the co-owner.
Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 420). As private respondent has not shown and proved the
circumstances constituting fraud, it cannot be held to exist in this case.
It has been held that this thirty-day period is peremptory because the policy of the law is not to
leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period. (Butte vs. Manuel
As aforesaid, a subdivision title has been issued in the name petitioner on the lot ceded to her. Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526). It is not a prescriptive period but is more a requisite or condition
Upon the expiration of the term of one year from the date of the entry of the subdivision title, the precedent to the exercise of the right of legal redemption.
Certificate of Title shall be incontrovertible (Section 38, Act 496). Since the title of petitioner is now
indefeasible, private respondent cannot, by means of the present action, directly attack the validity
thereof. In the case at bar, private respondent alleged in her complaint that she learned of the sale
sometime in May, 1966 upon receipt of a pleading in Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon. She likewise alleged that she gave a letter informing petitioner of her
Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right of legal desire to redeem the land on August 25, 1966. Clearly, three months have elapsed since the
redemption exists, private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right notice of the sale. Hence, petitioner claims that the thirty-day period of redemption has already
for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co- expired. In addition, petitioner makes capital of the admission of private respondent that she
administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one-third portion to already knew of the said transaction even before receipt of the said pleading (t.s.n., p. 16) as well
petitioner cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of as of the evidence presented that Saturnino Benito, the admittedly active administrator until 1966,
redemption was not within the powers of administration, in the same manner, private respondent duly received a written notice of the intended sale of Benjamin Benito's share. Said evidence
as co-administrator has no power exercise the right of redemption — the very power which the consists of the affidavit of the vendor stating that the required notice had been duly given to
Court of Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of administration. possible redemptioners, the statement in the deed of sale itself and the deposition of Saturnino
Benito's widow with respect to her receipt of the written notice. Finally, petitioner points to the
While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the records which disclose that private respondent knew of the subdivision (t.s.n., p. 25) and hence,
possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for rationalized that private respondent should have known also of the previous sale.
the payment of the expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring
and defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the Since We have ruled that the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case
deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not because admittedly a subdivision title (T.C.T. No. T-4978) has already been issued in the name of
include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by the petitioner on Lot I-C sold to her, it becomes moot and academic, if not unnecessary to decide
one of the co-owners after the death of another, because in such case, the right whether private respondent complied with the notice requirements for the exercise of the right of
of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was legal redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
perfected and formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that
right cannot be transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte vs.
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526). WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 84 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS to SAMCO in payment of its claim for only P19,952.11; and, that if the said Order of respondent
dated November 10, 1967 is not set aside, the same will operate as a judgment that "conveys
G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983 illegally and unfairly, the property of petitioner-estate without the requisite approval of the probate
court of Manila, which has the sole jurisdiction to convey this property in custodia legis of the
estate. (par. 16, Petition).
ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented by JOSE S. MATUTE, Judicial Co-
Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, Court of First Instance of Manila, petitioner,
vs. Made to answer, herein respondent SAMCO and respondent judge, among others, contend that
HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First Instance of the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, "the same having been
Davao, Davao City; SOUTHWEST AGRICULTURAL MARKETING CORPORATION also entered into in another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank. Article 2032 of
known as (SAMCO); CARLOS V. MATUTE, as another Administrator of the Estate of the Civil Code applies only to extrajudicial compromise entered into by the administrators of the
Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876 CFI, Manila; and MATIAS S. MATUTE, as former estate. In the alternative, lack of approval of the probate court of the Amicable Settlement does not
Co-Administrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876, CFI, render it null and void, but at most voidable, which must be the subject matter of a direct
Manila, respondents. proceeding in the proper Court of First Instance." (p. 60, Rollo)

RELOVA, J.: In said Civil Case No. 4623 for sum of money, plaintiff SAMCO and defendants Carlos V. Matute
and Matias S. Matute, in their capacities as judicial administrators of the estate of Amado Matute
Olave in Special Proceeding No. 25876, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, submitted
In this petition for certiorari, the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, represented by Jose S. Matute, the following Amicable Settlement:
Judicial Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, assails
the Order, dated November 10, 1967, of the respondent judge, approving the "Amicable
Settlement" submitted by the parties in Civil Case No. 4623 of the then Court of First Instance of 1. That defendants in their capacity as judicial administrators of the Estate of
Davao, 16th Judicial District, Branch III, and prays that the said Order be set aside. Amadeo Matute, hereby submit and acknowledge that the said Estate of Amadeo
Matute is justly indebted to plaintiff in the total sum of P28,403.02 representing
the principal account of P19,952.11 and in the sum of P8,450.91 as attorney's
The petition alleged that the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee simple of a parcel fees, damages, interest and costs;
of land containing an area of 293,578 square meters, situated in sitio Tibambam, barrio
Tibambam, municipality of Sigaboy (now Governor Generoso), province of Davao, and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-27 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao Province; that in April 1965 2. That at present the defendant estate is devoid of or does not have any funds
herein private respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO), as plaintiff, with which to pay or settle the aforestated obligation in favor of the plaintiff, and
filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the respondent Court of First Instance of Davao against that being so, the defendant estate through the undersigned administrators,
respondents, Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their capacities as co- decides to pay the plaintiff by way of conveying and ceding unto the plaintiff the
administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness ownership of a certain real property owned by the defendant estate now under
of P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02; that on May 8, 1965, defendants Carlos V. the administration of the said undersigned administrators;
Matute and Matias S. Matute in said Civil Case No. 4623, filed an answer denying their lack of
knowledge and questioning the legality of the claim of SAMCO; that on October 25, 1966 in Sp. 3. That plaintiff hereby accepts the offer of defendants of conveying, transferring
Proc. No. 25876, the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, issued an order directing and ceding the ownership of the above described property as full and complete
the administrators to secure the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction payment and satisfaction of the total obligation of P28,403.02;
involving the seventeen (17) titles of the estate, of which the property described in OCT No. 0-27
is one of them; that on October 20, 1967, the parties (plaintiff and defendants) in Civil Case No. 4. That the defendant estate, through the undersigned administrators hereby
4623 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, submitted to the respondent court an Amicable agree and bind the defendant estate to pay their counsel Atty. Dominador Zuho,
Settlement whereby the property of the estate covered by OCT No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed of the Zufio Law Offices the sum of Eight Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos by way of
and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim; that the said Amicable Settlement signed by the Attorney's Fee;
herein respondents was not submitted to and approved by the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch IV, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs 5. That the parties herein waive an other claims which they might have against
in said special proceedings; that on November 10, 1967, respondent court, despite the opposition one another.
of the other parties who sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 4623 and despite the utter lack of
approval of the probate court in Manila, approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the
same the enforceability of a court decision which, in effect, ceded the property covered by OCT WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable
No. 0-27, containing an area of 293,578 square meters and with an assessed value of P31,700.00 Court approves the foregoing settlement and that judgment be rendered
transferring the said real property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-27
 to plaintiff Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation and that a new transfer
certificate of title be issued to said plaintiff. (pp. 25-26, Rollo)

Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; ..."
The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only
by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Sp.
Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave; and the
claim must be filed within the period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred
forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court).

The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to
protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to
examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further,
the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the
probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made
for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as
upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and
no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the liquidation
of the estate of the deceased.

It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the
then Court of First Instance of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which
eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of land
belonging to the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in payment of its claim, without
prior authority of the probate court of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the exclusive
jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. It was a mistake on the part of respondent
court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order,
dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion  of all other
courts." (Emphasis supplied). The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is
already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the Order, dated November 10, 1967,
of the respondent court approving the Amicable Settlement of the parties in Civil Case No. 4623 of
the then Court of First Instance of Davao, is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 85 ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND II. Living expenses of Librada de Guzman while occupying the family home without paying rent:
ADMINISTRATORS
1. For house helper — P1,170.00
G.R. No. L-29276 May 18, 1978
2. Light bills — 227.41
Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE GUZMAN, administrator-
appellee, 3. Water bills — 150.80
vs.
CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and HONORATA DE GUZMAN- 4. Gas oil, floor wax
MENDIOLA, oppositors-appellants.
and switch nail — 54.90 — P 1,603.11

III. Other expenses:

AQUINO, J.:
1. Lawyer's subsistence — P 19.30
This case is about the propriety of allowing as administration expenses certain disbursements
made by the administrator of the testate estate of the late Felix J. de Guzman of Gapan, Nueva
2. Gratuity pay in lieu
Ecija.

of medical fee — 144.00

The deceased testator was survived by eight children named Victorino, Librada, Severino,
Margarita, Josefina, Honorata, Arsenio and Crispina. His will was duly probated. Letters of
administration were issued to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman, pursuant to the order dated 3. For stenographic notes — 100.00
September 17, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Special Proceeding No. 1431.
4. For food served on
One of the properties left by the dent was a residential house located in the poblacion. In
conformity with his last will, that house and the lot on which it stands were adjudicated to his eight decedent's first
children, each being given a one-eighth proindiviso  share in the project of partition dated March
19, 1966, which was signed by the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower court's order death anniversary — 166.65
of April 14, 1967 but without prejudice to the final outcome of the accounting.
5. Cost of publication of
The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the period from June 16, 1964 to
September, 1967. Three heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola and
Arsenio de Guzman interposed objections to the administrator's disbursements in the total sum of death anniversary
P13,610.48, broken down as follows:
of decedent — 102.00
I. Expense for the improvement and renovation of the decedent's residential house.
6. Representation
1. Construction of fence — P3,082.07
expenses — 26.25 — P558.20
2. Renovation of bathroom — P1,389.52
IV. Irrigation fee P1.049.58
3. Repair of terrace and
TOTAL P13,610.48
interior of house — P5,928.00 — P10,399.59
It should be noted that the probate court in its order of August 29, 1966 directed the administrator the property and managing it until the debts are paid and the estate is partitioned and distributed
"to refrain from spending the assets of the estate for reconstructing and remodeling the house of among the heirs (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil. 124).
the deceased and to stop spending (sic) any asset of the estate without first during authority of the
court to do so" (pp. 26-27, Record on Appeal). As clarified in the Lizarraga case, administration expenses should be those which are necessary
for the management of the estate, for protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and,
The lower court in its order of April 29, 1968 allowed the d items as legitimate expenses of possibly, for the production of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and
administration. From that order, the three oppositors appealed to this Court. Their contention is productivity of the estate and its management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and
that the probate court erred in approving the utilization of the income of the estate (from rice distribution of the residue among the persons entitled thereto.
harvests) to defray those expenditures which allegedly are not allowable under the Rules of Court.
It should be noted that the family residence was partitioned proindiviso among the decedent's
An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and eight children. Each one of them was given a one-eighth share in conformity with the testator's
settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's real and personal will. Five of the eight co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for repair and
estate as long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. improvement of the family home. It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to
He is accountable for the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the preserve the family home and to maintain the family's social standing in the community.
interest, profit, and income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is sold by
him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court). Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the co- owners. They were necessary
for the preservation and use of the family residence. As a result of those expenses, the co-owners,
One of the Conditions of the administrator's bond is that he should render a true and just account including the three oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort, convenience and
of his administration to the court. The court may examine him upon oath With respect to every security.
matter relating to his accounting 't and shall so examine him as to the correctness of his account
before the same is allowed, except when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and We hold that the probate court did not err in approving the use of the income of the estate to
its correctness is satisfactorily established by competent proof. The heirs, legatees, distributes, defray those ex
and creditors of the estate shall have the same privilege as the executor or administrator of being
examined on oath on any matter relating to an administration account." (Sec. 1[c] Rule 81 and
secs. 8 and 9, Rule 85, Rules of Court). II. Expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of the family residence without paying
rent — P1 603.11  — The probate court allowed the income of the estate to be used for those
expenses on the theory that the occupancy of the house by one heir did not deprive the other
A hearing is usually held before an administrator's account is approved, especially if an interested seven heirs from living in it. Those expenses consist of the salaries of the house helper, light and
Party raises objections to certain items in the accounting report (Sec. 10, Rule 85). water bills, and the cost of gas, oil floor wax and switch nail

At that hearing, the practice is for the administrator to take the witness stand, testify under oath on We are of the opinion that those expenses were personal expenses of Librada de Guzman,
his accounts and Identify the receipts, vouchers and documents evidencing his disbursements inuring y to her benefit. Those expenses, not being reasonable administration expenses incurred
which are offered as exhibits. He may be interrogated by the court and crossed by the oppositors's by the administrator, should not be charged against the income of the estate.
counsel. The oppositors may present proofs to rebut the ad. administrator's evidence in support of
his accounts.
Librada de Guzman, as an heir, is entitled to share in the net income of the estate. She occupied
the house without paying rent. She should use her income for her living expenses while occupying
I. Expenses for the renovation and improvement of the family residence — P10,399.59. — As the family residence.
already shown above, these expenses consisted of disbursements for the repair of the terrace and
interior of the family home, the renovation of the bathroom, and the construction of a fence. The
probate court allowed those expenses because an administrator has the duty to "maintain in The trial court erred in approving those expenses in the administrator's accounts. They should be,
tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver as they are hereby, disallowed (See 33 C.J.S 1239-40).
the same in such repair to the heirs or devises" when directed to do so by the court (Sec. 2, Rule
84, Rules of Court). III. Other expenses — P558.20. — Among these expenses is the sum of P100 for stenographic
notes which, as admitted by the administrator on page 24 of his brief, should be disallowed.
On the other hand, the oppositors-appellants contend that the trial court erred in allowing those Another item, "representation expenses" in the sum of P26.25 (2nd accounting), was not
expenses because the same did not come within the category of necessary expenses of explained. it should likewise be disallowed.
administration which are understood to be the reasonable and necessary expenses of caring for
The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of ad. administration the sum of P268.65 which
was incurred during the celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased. Those
expenses are disallowed because they have no connection with the care, management and
settlement of the decedent's estate (Nicolas vs. Nicolas 63 Phil 332).

The other expenses, namely, P19.30 for the lawyer's subsistence and P144 as the cost of the gift
to the physician who attended to the testator during his last s are allowable expenses.

IV. Irrigation fee  — P1,049.58. —The appellants question the deductibility of that expense on the
ground that it seems to be a duplication of the item of P1,320 as irrigation fee for the same 1966-
67 crop-year.

The administrator in his comment filed on February 28, 1978 explained that the item of P1,320
represented the "allotments" for irrigation fees to eight tenants who cultivated the Intan crop, which
allotments were treated as "assumed expenses" deducted as farming expenses from the value of
the net harvests.

The explanation is not quite clear but it was not disputed by the appellants. The fact is that the
said sum of P1,049.58 was paid by the administrator to the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown
in Official Receipt No. 3596378 dated April 28, 1967. It was included in his accounting as part of
the farming expenses. The amount was properly allowed as a legitimate expense of
administration.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of April 29, 1968 is affirmed with the modifications that the
sum of (a) P1,603.11 as the living expenses of Librada de Guzman. (b) P100 for stenographic
notes, (c) P26.25 as representation expenses, and (d) P268.65 as expenses for the celebration of
the first anniversary of the decedent's death are disallowed in the administrator's accounts. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 85 ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND surviving spouse had renewed the contract, but instead they had engaged the services of other
ADMINISTRATORS lawyers in the intestate proceedings.

SECOND DIVISION Notwithstanding the manifestation of the former counsels of the deceased defendant, the
respondent trial judge set the case for hearing on January 13, 1976 and sent the notice of hearing
[G.R. No. 74618. September 2, 1992.] to said counsels.

ANA LIM KALAW, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, On January 13, 1976, the respondent trial judge issued three orders. The first order substituted
THE HONORABLE RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA LIM KALAW, Respondents. the heirs of the deceased defendant, namely, his thirteen children and surviving spouse, as
defendants; the second order authorized Atty. Teodoro Almase, counsel for the plaintiff, to present
his evidence in the absence of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela and the third order treated the case
submitted for decision, after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case, and
REPEAT CASE FROM RULE 82 directed that said counsels and the fourteen heirs of the deceased defendant be furnished copies
thereof.

On January 28, 1976, the respondent trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the
RULE 86 CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE deceased defendant.

G.R. No. L-45809 December 12, 1986 On February 19, 1976, ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not
know that a decision had already been rendered, filed an Answer in-substitution of the deceased
SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, petitioner, defendant through their counsel Atty. Jesus Yray. This was denied admission by the respondent
vs. trial judge for being already moot and academic because of the earlier decision.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, [as Judge, CFI, Cebu, Branch VIII],
and PACIFICO PELAEZ, respondents. On March 9, 1976, the widow and two other children of the deceased defendant, through their
counsel Atty. Delfin Quijano, filed a motion for substitution and for reconsideration of the decision
FERIA, J.: dated January 28, 1976. On April 7, 1976, the respondent trial judge issued an order setting aside
his decision and setting the case in the calendar for cross-examination of the plaintiff, Pacifico
Pelaez, with a proviso that said order was applicable only to the three heirs who had filed the
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of
motion. On July 14, 1976, the respondent trial judge lifted the order setting aside his decision,
the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari under, Rule 65 of said Rules
despite the verbal petition for postponement of the hearing made by one of the three heirs on the
against respondent Judge Bernardo L. Salas of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
ground of the absence of their counsel.
antecedent facts are briefly as follows:

On July 9, 1976, petitioner, who had been appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of the
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a Complaint on December 6, 1972 against petitioner's
deceased defendant and who was one of the heirs who had filed an Answer on February 19,
father, Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. Defendant Pedro
1976, filed a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant. On August 25, 1976,
Sepulveda filed his Answer dated December 31, 1972 resisting the claim and raising the special
the respondent trial judge denied the motion for the reason that the decision had already become
defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in a previous special proceeding. During
final.
the presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, the defendant died on March 25, 1975. On May 21,
1975, counsels for the deceased defendant filed a notice of death wherein were enumerated the
thirteen children and surviving spouse of the deceased. Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the
proceedings in the respondent trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari. Hence, the present appeal.
On May 5, 1975, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed
judicial administratrix of the estate of her late father in July, 1976.
The appeal is meritorious.
At the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, Attys. Domingo Antigua and Serafin Branzuela,
former counsels for the deceased defendant, manifested in open court that with the death of their Section 16 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
client, their contract with him was also terminated and none of the thirteen children nor the
 Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. — Whenever a party to necessary steps to safeguard the decedent's rights in the case. (Vda. de Haberer vs.
a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his Court of Appeals, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA 534, 540)
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal Moreover, as above stated, petitioner had as early as May 5, 1975 filed a petition for letters of
representative. administration, and the same was granted in July, 1975.

The former counsels for the deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda, complied with this rule by Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
filing a notice of death on May 21, 1975. They also correctly manifested in open court at the
hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of their client their contract with
him was also terminated and none of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the contract, and the Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shag
heirs had instead engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate proceedings. order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in considering the former counsels order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
of the deceased defendant as counsels for the heirs of the deceased. The statement in the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall
decision of the Court of Appeals that "the appearance of the lawyers of their deceased father in immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
court on January 13, 1976 (Annex K) carries the presumption that they were authorized by the involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
heirs of the deceased defendant" is erroneous. As this Court held in People vs. Florendo (77 Phil. recovered as costs. The heirs of the de ceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
16), "the attorneys for the offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
death of the latter, the principal. " Moreover, such a presumption was not warranted in view of the may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
manifestation of said lawyers in open court on November 27, 1975 that they were not representing
the heirs of the deceased defendant.
As this Court has held:
Consequently, when on the same date, November 27, 1975, the respondent trial judge issued an
order setting the continuation of the trial of the case on January 13, 1976, with notices sent to Atty. ... Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's death and the
Almase for the plaintiff and Attys. Antigua and Branzuela for the deceased defendant, he acted claim is not thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant. Since no
administrator of the estate of the deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same
was still pending determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion of
It was only at the hearing on January 13, 1976 that the respondent trial judge issued an order the deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within which to file
substituting the deceased defendant with his fourteen heirs. This was followed with an order appellant's brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule, it should have set a period for the
authorizing counsel for the plaintiff to present his evidence in the absence of Attys. Antigua and substitution of the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs, failing which, the
Branzuela, and lastly, an order treating the case as submitted for decision. court is called upon to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased at the cost of the deceased's estate, and such
In the order of the respondent trial judge dated November 10, 1976, denying petitioner's motion for representative shall then 'immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
reconsideration of the order denying her motion for intervention (Annex 1 of the Comment), deceased.
mention was made of the delayed arrival of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela at the hearing on
January 13, 1976 and of their being allowed to cross-examine the plaintiff himself. Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the appearance of
the legal representative of the deceased and instead dismissing the appeal of the
The refusal of said former counsels of the deceased defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff was deceased who yet had to be substituted in the pending appeal Thus, it has been held that
justified — when a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the court for the
appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of
... in view of the intervening event of appellant's death and the interposition of the equally the deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the
established principle that the relationship of attorney and client is terminated by the death trial held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment
of the client, as acknowledged by respondent court itself as well as respondents. In the rendered after such trial are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over
absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives of his deceased the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the
defendant the attorney would have no further power or authority to appear or take any judgment would be binding. (Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil 275 [1936]; Obut vs. Court
further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the of Appeals, et al., 70 SCRA 546) (Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 541.
Under the said Rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the
executor or administrator of his estate. It is only in cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment
of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate, that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be
substituted for the deceased.

In the case at bar, in view of the pendency of Special Proceeding No. 37-SF Intestate Estate of
Pedro Sepulveda, and the pending application of petitioner to be appointed judicial administratrix
of the estate, the respondent trial judge should have awaited the appointment of petitioner and
granted her motion to substitute the deceased defendant.

While the lower courts correctly held that the death of Pedro Sepulveda did not obliterate his
verified Answer to the Complaint filed by private respondent and that the Answer filed by the ten
heirs and the Answer filed by the Administratrix were both unnecessary, the said heirs or the
administratrix could, with leave of court, file an Amended Answer.

In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the proceedings conducted by the respondent trial
judge after the death of the deceased defendant are null and void.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the petition for certiorari is
granted; petitioner is ordered substituted for the deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda; and the
proceedings conducted by the respondent trial judge after the death of the deceased defendant,
including the decision rendered by him on January 28, 1976, are set aside; with costs against
private respondent.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 86 CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE "On May 23, 1989, [respondent] paid to x x x JDS seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos
(P795,000.00) by way of downpayment.

FIRST DIVISION "Two progress billings dated August 14, 1989 and September 15, 1989, for the total amount of two
hundred seventy four thousand six hundred twenty one pesos and one centavo (P274,621.01)
G.R. No. 147561             June 22, 2006 were submitted by x x x JDS to [respondent], which the latter paid. According to [respondent],
these two progress billings accounted for only 7.301% of the work supposed to be undertaken by
x x x JDS under the terms of the contract.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION, Respondent. "Several times prior to November of 1989, [respondent’s] engineers called the attention of x x x
JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the
construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders
DECISION went unheeded by x x x JDS.

PANGANIBAN, CJ: "On November 24, 1989, dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by x x x JDS,
[respondent] Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract pursuant to Article XIII of said
Asurety company’s liability under the performance bond it issues is solidary. The death of the contract, and wrote a letter to x x x JDS informing the latter of such rescission. Such rescission,
principal obligor does not, as a rule, extinguish the obligation and the solidary nature of that according to Article XV of the contract shall not be construed as a waiver of [respondent’s] right to
liability. recover damages from x x x JDS and the latter’s sureties.

The Case "[Respondent] alleged that, as a result of x x x JDS’s failure to comply with the provisions of the
contract, which resulted in the said contract’s rescission, it had to hire another contractor to finish
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the the project, for which it incurred an additional expense of three million two hundred fifty six
March 13, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41630. The assailed thousand, eight hundred seventy four pesos (P3,256,874.00).
Decision disposed as follows:
"On January 6, 1990, [respondent] sent a letter to [petitioner] SICI filing its claim under the bond
"WHEREFORE, the Order dated January 28, 1993 issued by the lower court is REVERSED and for not less than P795,000.00. On March 22, 1991, [respondent] again sent another letter
SET ASIDE. Let the records of the instant case be REMANDED to the lower court for the reiterating its demand for payment under the aforementioned bond. Both letters allegedly went
reception of evidence of all parties."3 unheeded.

The Facts "[Respondent] then filed [a] complaint against x x x JDS and SICI. It sought from x x x JDS
payment of P3,256,874.00 representing the additional expenses incurred by [respondent] for the
completion of the project using another contractor, and from x x x JDS and SICI, jointly and
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise: severally, payment of P750,000.00 as damages in accordance with the performance bond;
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of at
"On May 24, 1989, [respondent] Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Republic-Asahi) entered into a least P100,000.00.
contract with x x x Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the
construction of roadways and a drainage system in Republic-Asahi’s compound in Barrio "According to the Sheriff’s Return dated June 14, 1991, submitted to the lower court by Deputy
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City, where [respondent] was to pay x x x JDS five million three hundred Sheriff Rene R. Salvador, summons were duly served on defendant-appellee SICI. However, x x x
thousand pesos (P5,300,000.00) inclusive of value added tax for said construction, which was Jose D. Santos, Jr. died the previous year (1990), and x x x JDS Construction was no longer at its
supposed to be completed within a period of two hundred forty (240) days beginning May 8, 1989. address at 2nd Floor, Room 208-A, San Buena Bldg. Cor. Pioneer St., Pasig, Metro Manila, and
In order ‘to guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings’ x x x JDS, shall its whereabouts were unknown.
post a performance bond of seven hundred ninety five thousand pesos ( P795,000.00). x x x JDS
executed, jointly and severally with [petitioner] Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI) Performance
Bond No. SICI-25849/g(13)9769. "On July 10, 1991, [petitioner] SICI filed its answer, alleging that the [respondent’s] money claims
against [petitioner and JDS] have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Even if
this were not the case, [petitioner] SICI had been released from its liability under the performance
bond because there was no liquidation, with the active participation and/or involvement, pursuant
to procedural due process, of herein surety and contractor Jose D. Santos, Jr., hence, there was "On June 4, 1992, [petitioner] SICI filed its ‘Memorandum for Bondsman/Defendant SICI (Re:
no ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and SICI under the performance bond. Effect of Death of defendant Jose D. Santos, Jr.)’ reiterating its prayer for the dismissal of
At this point in time, said liquidation was impossible because of the death of Santos, who as such [respondent’s] complaint.
can no longer participate in any liquidation. The unilateral liquidation on the party (sic) of
[respondent] of the work accomplishments did not bind SICI for being violative of procedural due "On January 28, 1993, the lower court issued the assailed Order reconsidering its Order dated
process. The claim of [respondent] for the forfeiture of the performance bond in the amount October 15, 1991, and ordered the case, insofar as SICI is concerned, dismissed. [Respondent]
of P795,000.00 had no factual and legal basis, as payment of said bond was conditioned on the filed its motion for reconsideration which was opposed by [petitioner] SICI. On April 16, 1993, the
payment of damages which [respondent] may sustain in the event x x x JDS failed to complete the lower court denied [respondent’s] motion for reconsideration. x x x." 4
contracted works. [Respondent] can no longer prove its claim for damages in view of the death of
Santos. SICI was not informed by [respondent] of the death of Santos. SICI was not informed by
[respondent] of the unilateral rescission of its contract with JDS, thus SICI was deprived of its right Ruling of the Court of Appeals
to protect its interests as surety under the performance bond, and therefore it was released from
all liability. SICI was likewise denied due process when it was not notified of plaintiff-appellant’s The CA ruled that SICI’s obligation under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the death
process of determining and fixing the amount to be spent in the completion of the unfinished of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.
project. The procedure contained in Article XV of the contract is against public policy in that it
denies SICI the right to procedural due process. Finally, SICI alleged that [respondent] deviated The appellate court also found that the lower court had erred in pronouncing that the performance
from the terms and conditions of the contract without the written consent of SICI, thus the latter of the Contract in question had become impossible by respondent’s act of rescission. The
was released from all liability. SICI also prayed for the award of P59,750.00 as attorney’s fees, Contract was rescinded because of the dissatisfaction of respondent with the slow pace of work
and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses. and pursuant to Article XIII of its Contract with JDS.

"On August 16, 1991, the lower court issued an order dismissing the complaint of [respondent] The CA ruled that "[p]erformance of the [C]ontract was impossible, not because of [respondent’s]
against x x x JDS and SICI, on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of fault, but because of the fault of JDS Construction and Jose D. Santos, Jr. for failure on their part
its sole proprietor, Jose D. Santos, Jr. The dispositive portion of the [O]rder reads as follows: to make satisfactory progress on the project, which amounted to non-performance of the same. x
x x [P]ursuant to the [S]urety [C]ontract, SICI is liable for the non-performance of said [C]ontract
‘ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against the defendants Jose D. Santos, Jr., doing business under on the part of JDS Construction."5
trade and style, ‘JDS Construction’ and Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. is ordered
DISMISSED. Hence, this Petition.6

‘SO ORDERED.’ Issue

"On September 4, 1991, [respondent] filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking reconsideration Petitioner states the issue for the Court’s consideration in the following manner:
of the lower court’s August 16, 1991 order dismissing its complaint. [Petitioner] SICI field its
‘Comment and/or Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.’ On October 15, 1991, the lower "Death is a defense of Santos’ heirs which Stronghold could also adopt as its defense against
court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: obligee’s claim."7

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby given due course. More precisely, the issue is whether petitioner’s liability under the performance bond was
The Order dated 16 August 1991 for the dismissal of the case against Stronghold Insurance automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal.
Company, Inc., is reconsidered and hereby reinstated (sic). However, the case against defendant
Jose D. Santos, Jr. (deceased) remains undisturbed.
The Court’s Ruling
‘Motion for Preliminary hearing and Manifestation with Motion filed by [Stronghold] Insurance
Company Inc., are set for hearing on November 7, 1991 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. The Petition has no merit.

‘SO ORDERED.’ Sole Issue:

Effect of Death on the Surety’s Liability

Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished his liability under the "WHEREAS, said contract requires the said principal to give a good and sufficient bond in the
surety bond. Consequently, it says, it is automatically released from any liability under the bond. above-stated sum to secure the full and faithfull performance on its part of said contract, and the
satisfaction of obligations for materials used and labor employed upon the work;
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation.8 Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented "NOW THEREFORE, if the principal shall perform well and truly and fulfill all the undertakings,
by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. 9 Only obligations that are covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of said contract during the original term of said
personal10 or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. 11 contract and any extension thereof that may be granted by the obligee, with notice to the surety
and during the life of any guaranty required under the contract, and shall also perform well and
Section 5 of Rule 8612 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims truly and fulfill all the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of any and all
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not duly authorized modifications of said contract that may hereinafter be made, without notice to the
actually extinguished.13 What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the surety except when such modifications increase the contract price; and such principal contractor
court, which is not then acting as a probate court. 14 or his or its sub-contractors shall promptly make payment to any individual, firm, partnership,
corporation or association supplying the principal of its sub-contractors with labor and materials in
the prosecution of the work provided for in the said contract, then, this obligation shall be null and
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts void; otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. Any extension of the period of time which
with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. may be granted by the obligee to the contractor shall be considered as given, and any
Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which modifications of said contract shall be considered as authorized, with the express consent of the
merely passed on to his estate.15 Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe Surety.
out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his
death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.
"The right of any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the contractor
with labor or materials for the prosecution of the work hereinbefore stated, to institute action on the
The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance bond worded penal bond, pursuant to the provision of Act No. 3688, is hereby acknowledge and confirmed." 16
as follows:
As a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code, which
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: provides as follows:

"That we, JDS CONSTRUCTION of 208-A San Buena Building, contractor, of Shaw Blvd., Pasig, "Art. 2047. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
MM Philippines, as principal and the STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. a corporation obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.
duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with head office at
Makati, as Surety, are held and firmly bound unto the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION
and to any individual, firm, partnership, corporation or association supplying the principal with "If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, 17 Chapter
labor or materials in the penal sum of SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND 3, Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship."
(P795,000.00), Philippine Currency, for the payment of which sum, well and truly to be made, we
bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally, xxxxxxxxx
firmly by these presents.
"Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of
"The CONDITIONS OF THIS OBLIGATION are as follows; them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those
which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully
"WHEREAS the above bounden principal on the ___ day of __________, 19__ entered into a collected."
contract with the REPUBLIC ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION represented by
_________________, to fully and faithfully. Comply with the site preparation works road and Elucidating on these provisions, the Court in Garcia v. Court of Appeals 18 stated thus:
drainage system of Philippine Float Plant at Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila.
"x x x. The surety’s obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act,
"WHEREAS, the liability of the Surety Company under this bond shall in no case exceed the sum but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless,
of PESOS SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND (P795,000.00) Philippine Currency, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his
inclusive of interest, attorney’s fee, and other damages, and shall not be liable for any advances of liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in
the obligee to the principal. other words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal. x x x." 19
Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor
and the petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal
debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor.
Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in
accordance with the solidary nature of the latter’s liability under the performance bond.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 86 CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claims,
plaintiff states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that
G.R. No. L-8235            March 19, 1914 it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized
them and directed that they should be paid. The inference is that had plaintiff's claims not been
mentioned in the will he would have presented to the committee as a matter of course; that plaintiff
ISIDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, was held to believe by this express mention of his claims in the will that it would be unnecessary to
vs. present them to the committee; and that he did not become aware of the necessity of presenting
LEANDRA MANARANG, administratrix, defendant-appellee. them to the committee until after the committee had made its final report.

TRENT, J.: Under these facts and circumstances, did the court err in refusing to reconvene the committee for
the purpose of considering plaintiff's claim? The first step towards the solution of this question is to
Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal determine whether plaintiff's claims were such as a committee appointed to hear claims against an
property which, by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The estate is, by law, authorized to pass upon. Unless it was such a claim plaintiff's argument has no
fourth clause of this will reads as follows: foundation. Section 686 empowers the committee to try and decide claims which survive against
the executors and administrators, even though they be demandable at a future day "except claims
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they for the possession of or title to real estate." Section 700 provides that all actions commenced
may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon against the deceased person for the recovery of money, debt, or damages, pending at the time the
with my creditors. committee is appointed, shall be discontinued, and the claims embraced within such actions
presented to the committee. Section 703 provides that actions to recover title or possession of real
property, actions to recover damages for injury to person or property, real and personal, and
Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; actions to recover the possession of specified articles of personal property, shall survive, and may
one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates be commenced and prosecuted against the executor or administrator; "but all other actions
(the dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a commenced against the deceased before his death shall be discontinued and the claims therein
committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might involved presented before the committee as herein provided." Section 708 provides that a claim
be presented. This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security may be abandoned and the claim prosecuted
1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be before the committee, or the mortgage may be foreclosed or the security be relied upon, and in
required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the the event of a deficiency judgment, the creditor may, after the sale of mortgage or upon the
will of testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff insufficiency of the security, prove such deficiency before the committee on claims. There are also
instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover the sums certain provisions in section 746 et seq., with reference to the presentation of contingent claims to
mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court below, and now appeals to this the committee after the expiration of the time allowed for the presentation of claims not contingent.
court. Do plaintiff's claims fall within any of these sections? They are described in the will as debts.
There is nothing in the will to indicate that any or all of them are contingent claims, claims for the
In his first assignment of error, the appellant takes exception to the action of the court in denying possession of or title to real property, damages for injury to person or property, real or personal, or
his petition asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claim. In support of this for the possession of specified articles of personal property. Nor is it asserted by the plaintiff that
alleged error counsel say that it does not appear in the committee's report that the publications they do. The conclusion is that they were claims proper to be considered by the committee.
required by section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been duly made. With reference to this
point the record affirmatively shows that the committee did make the publications required by law. This being true, the next point to determine is, when and under what circumstances may the
It is further alleged that at the time the appellant presented his petition the court had not approved committee be recalled to consider belated claims? Section 689 provides:
the report of the committee. If this were necessary we might say that, although the record does not
contain a formal approval of the committee's report, such approval must undoubtedly have been
made, as will appear from an inspection of the various orders of the court approving the annual That court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case require for the creditors
accounts of the administratrix, in which claims allowed against the estate by the committee were to present their claims the committee for examination and allowance; but not, in the first
written off in accordance with its report. This is shown very clearly from the court's order of August instance, more than twelve months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be
1, 1912, in which the account of the administratrix was approved after reducing final payments of stated in the commission. The court may extend the time as circumstances require, but
some of the claims against the estate to agree with the amounts allowed by the committee. It is not so that the whole time shall exceed eighteen months.
further alleged that at the time this petition was presented the administration proceedings had not
been terminated. This is correct. It cannot be questioned that thus section supersedes the ordinary limitation of actions provided for
in chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims against the estate of
deceased persons, and has been almost universally adopted as part of the probate law of the
United States. It is commonly termed the statute of nonclaims, and its purpose is to settle the error in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claims
affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto against the estate.
without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the
ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed. In his second assignment of error the appellant insists that the court erred in dismissing his
petition filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay
The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him. We concede all that is implied in
insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the the maxim, dicat testor et erit lex. But the law imposes certain restrictions upon the testator, not
property of the estate in the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. (Estate of De Dios, only as to the disposition of his estate, but also as to the manner in which he may make such
24 Phil. Rep., 573.) disposition. As stated in Rood on Wills, sec. 412: "Some general rules have been irrevocably
established by the policy of the law, which cannot be exceeded or transgressed by any intention of
Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation applying to such claims as the testator, be it ever so clearly expressed."
compared with the ordinary statute of limitations, the statute of nonclaims has not the finality of the
ordinary statute of limitations. It may be safely said that a saving provision, more or less liberal, is It may be safely asserted that no respectable authority can be found which holds that the will of
annexed to the statute of nonclaims in every jurisdiction where is found. In this country its saving the testator may override positive provisions of law and imperative requirements of public policy.
clause is found in section 690, which reads as follows: (Page on Wills, sec. 461.)

On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if made within six months Impossible conditions and those contrary to law and good morals shall be considered as
after the time previously limited, or, if a committee fails to give the notice required by this not imposed, . . . (Art. 792, Civil Code.)
chapter, and such application is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court
may, for cause shown, and on such terms as are equitable, renew the commission and Conceding for the moment that it was the testator's desire in the present case that the debts listed
allow further time, not exceeding one month, for the committee to examine such claim, in by him in his will should be paid without referring them to a committee appointed by the court, can
which case it shall personally notify the parties of the time and place of hearing, and as such a provision be enforced? May the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the
soon as may be make the return of their doings to the court. settlement of claims against an estate by a committee appointed by the court be superseded by
the contents of a will?
If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for
further consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure
submitted to the court. But, as stated above, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the has established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are
committee did give the notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been given the right to at least two restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property,
have the committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim appears to rest first upon the and which pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for
condition that it is presented within six months after the time previously limited for the presentation all legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion
of claims. In the present case the time previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This due his heirs by force of law. The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ,
allowed the plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is
this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the court. (Estate of De Dios, supra.) In insolvent they must be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a
other words, the court could extend this time and recall the committee for a consideration of the provision in an insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid would not entitle it to preference over
plaintiff's claims against the estate of justice required it, at any time within the six months after other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will requires the administrator to pay it
January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908. Plaintiff's petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the case of an insolvent estate,
The bar of the statute of nonclaims is an conclusive under these circumstances as the bar of the that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?
ordinary statute of limitations would be. It is generally held that claims are not barred as to
property not included in the inventory. (Waughop vs. Bartlett, 165 III., 124; Estate of Reyes, 17
Phil. Rep., 188.) So also, as indicated by this court in the case last cited, fraud would undoubtedly If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not
have the same effect. These exceptions to the operation of the statute are, of course, founded applicable. It is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of
upon the highest principles of equity. But what is the plea of the plaintiff in this case? Simply this: the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances,
That he was laboring under a mistake of law — a mistake which could easily have been corrected when then the legal portion is determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been distributed,
had he sought to inform himself; a lack of information as to the law governing the allowance of what security have the differences against the interruption of their possession? Is the administrator
claims against estate of the deceased persons which, by proper diligence, could have been required to pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what
remedied in ample to present the claims to the committee. Plaintiff finally discovered his mistake authority has he to vise the claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an
and now seeks to assert his right when they have been lost through his own executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due
negligence. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We conclude that the learned trial court made no the estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the
contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power with the law will compel that construction which is consistent with the law to be adopted.
to determine the amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust (Page on Wills, sec. 465.)
the amounts due. The administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear
before this body as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the Aside from this legal presumption, which we believe should apply in the present case as against
court is their remedy. To allow the administrator to examine and approve a claim against the any construction of the will tending to show an intention of the testator that the ordinary legal
estate would put him in the dual role of a claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has method of probating claims should be dispensed with, it must be remembered that the testator
been so framed that this may not occur. The most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the knows that the execution of his will in no way affects his control over his property. The dates of his
disposition of property by will are those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation will and of his death may be separated by a period of time more or less appreciable. In the
of the legal portions due to heirs by force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force meantime, as the testator well knows, he may acquire or dispose of property, pay or assume
by sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized additional debts, etc. In the absence of anything to the contrary, it is only proper to presume that
in the will must be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or total the testator, in his will, is treating of his estate at the time and in the condition it is in at his death.
alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of a debt, since all of the latter Especially is this true of his debts. Debts may accrue and be paid in whole or in part between the
must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined. time the will is made and the death of the testator. To allow a debt mentioned in the will in the
amount expressed therein on the ground that such was the desire of the testator, when, in fact,
We are aware that in some jurisdictions executors and administrators are, by law, obligated to the debt had been wholly or partly paid, would be not only unjust to the residuary heirs, but a
perform the duties which, in this jurisdiction, are assign to the committee on claims; that in some reflection upon the good sense of the testator himself. Take the present case for example. It would
other jurisdictions it is the probate court itself that performs these duties; that in some jurisdictions be absurd to say that the testator knew what the amount of his just debt would be at a future and
the limitation upon the presentment of claims for allowance is longer and, possibly, in some uncertain date. A mere comparison of the list of the creditors of the testator and the amounts due
shorter; and that there is a great divergence in the classification of actions which survive and them as described in his will, with the same list and amounts allowed by the committee on claims,
actions which do not survive the death of the testator. It must be further remembered that there shows that the testator had creditors at the time of his death not mention in the will at all. In other
are but few of the United States which provide for heirs by force of law. These differences render instances the amounts due this creditors were either greater or less than the amounts mentioned
useless as authorities in this jurisdiction many of the cases coming from the United States. The as due them in the will. In fact, of those debts listed in the will, not a single one was allowed by the
restriction imposed upon the testator's power to dispose of his property when they are heirs by committee in the amount named in the will. This show that the testator either failed to list in his will
force of law is especially important. The rights of these heirs by force law pass immediately upon all his creditors and that, as to those he did include, he set down an erroneous amount opposite
the death of the testator. (Art. 657, Civil Code.) The state intervenes and guarantees their rights by their names; or else, which is the only reasonable view of the matter, he overlooked some debts or
many stringent provisions of law to the extent mentioned in article 818 of the Civil Code. Having contracted new ones after the will was made and that as to others he did include he made a partial
undertaken the responsibility to deliver the legal portion of the net assets of the estate to the heirs payments on some and incurred additional indebtedness as to others.
by force of law, it is idle to talk of substituting for the procedure provided by law for determining the
legal portion, some other procedure provided in the will of the testator. The state cannot afford to While the testator expresses the desire that his debts be paid, he also expressly leaves the
allow the performance of its obligations to be directed by the will of an individual. There is but one residue of his estate, in equal parts, to his children. Is it to be presumed that he desired to overpay
instance in which the settlement of the estate according to the probate procedure provided in the some of his creditors notwithstanding his express instructions that his own children should enjoy
Code of Civil Procedure may be dispense with, and it applies only to intestate estates. (Sec. 596, the net assets of his estate after the debts were paid? Again, is the net statement of the amount
Code Civ. Proc.) A partial exemption from the lawful procedure is also contained in section 644, due some of his creditors and the omission all together of some of his creditors compatible with
when the executor or administrator is the sole residuary legatee. Even in such case, and although his honorable and commendable desire, so clearly expressed in his will, that all his debts be
the testator directs that no bond be given, the executor is required to give a bond for the payment punctually paid? We cannot conceive that such conflicting ideas were present in the testator's
of the debts of the testator. The facts of the present case do not bring it within either of this mind when he made his will.
sections. We conclude that the claims against the estate in the case at bar were enforceable only
when the prescribed legal procedure was followed.
Again, suppose the testator erroneously charged himself with a debt which he was under no legal
or even moral obligation to pay. The present case suggests, if it does not actually present, such a
But we are not disposed to rest our conclusion upon this phase of the case entirely upon legal state of affairs. Among the assets of the estate mentioned in the will is a parcel of land valued at
grounds. On the contrary we are strongly of the opinion that the application of the maxim, "The will P6,500; while in the inventory of the administratrix the right to repurchase this land from one Isidro
of the testator is the law of the case," but strengthens our position so far as the present case is Santos is listed as an asset. Counsel for the administratrix alleges that he is prepared to prove
concerned. that this is the identical plaintiff in the case at bar; that the testator erroneously claimed the fee of
this land in his last will and stated Santos' rights in the same as a mere debt due him of P5,000;
It will ordinarily be presumed in construing a will that the testator is acquainted with the that in reality, the only asset of the testator regard to this land was the value of the right to
rules of law, and that he intended to comply with them accordingly. If two constructions of repurchase, while the ownership of the land, subject only to that right of redemption, belonged to
a will or a part thereof are possible, and one of these constructions is consistent with the Santos; that the right to repurchase this land expired in 1907, after the testator's death. Assuming,
law, and the other is inconsistent, the presumption that the testator intended to comply without in the least asserting, that such are the underlying facts of this case, the unjust
consequences of holding that a debt expressly mentioned in the will may be recovered without collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact
being presented to the committee on claims, is at once apparent. In this supposed case, plaintiff a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt, it is
needed only wait until the time for redemption of the land had expired, when he would acquired an an anomaly to urge now it is a legacy.
absolute title to the land, and could also have exacted the redemption price. Upon such a state of
facts, the one item of P5,000 would be a mere fictitious debt, and as the total net value of the Was it the intention of the testator to leave the plaintiff a legacy of P7,454? We have already
estate was less than P15,000, the legal portion of the testator's children would be consumed in touched upon this question. Plaintiff's claim is described by the testator as a debt. It must be
part in the payment of this item. Such a case cannot occur if the prescribed procedure is followed presumed that he used this expression in its ordinary and common acceptation; that is, a legal
of requiring of such claims be viseed by the committee on claims. liability existing in favor of the plaintiff at the time the will was made, and demandable and payable
in legal tender. Had the testator desired to leave a legacy to the plaintiff, he would have done so in
The direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not mean that he shall appropriate language instead of including it in a statement of what he owed the plaintiff. The
pay them without probate. There is nothing in the will to indicate that the testator in decedent's purpose in listing his debts in his will is set forth in the fourth clause of the will, quoted
tended that his estate should be administered in any other than the regular way under the above. There is nothing contained in that clause which indicates, even remotely, a desire to pay
statute, which requires "all demands against the estates of the deceased persons," "all his creditors more than was legally due them.
such demands as may be exhibited," etc. The statute provides the very means for
ascertaining whether the claims against the estate or just debts. (Kaufman vs. Redwine, A construction leading to a legal, just and sensible result is presumed to be correct, as
97 Ark., 546.) against one leading to an illegal, unnatural, or absurd effect. (Rood on Wills, sec. 426.)

See also Collamore vs. Wilder (19 Kan., 67); O'Neil vs. Freeman (45 N. J. L., 208). The testator, in so many words, left the total net assets of his estate, without reservation of any
kind, to his children per capita. There is no indication that he desired to leave anything by way of
The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be legacy to any other person. These considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator
compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be intended to leave plaintiff any thing by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having been a
nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the simple debt, the present action was improperly instituted against the administratrix. (Sec. 699,
recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real Code Civ. Proc.)
property or specific articles of personal property.
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy
When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall be commenced and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all
or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of
recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to
real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing,
(Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.) in the first instance, can not be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such
debtors must present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
The sum of money prayed for in the complaint must be due the plaintiff either as a debt of a
legacy. If it is a debt, the action was erroneously instituted against the administratrix. Is it a For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
legacy?

Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of
error he alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his
claim against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true
that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a
release), or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is an asset of the estate.
It would be absurd to speak of a testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878,
Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure
beneficence, has no binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the
mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by
law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner.
(Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often
do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to
RULE 86 CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE At the hearing of the case, the parties submitted the following agreed statement of facts to the
court:
G.R. No. L-35925             November 10, 1932
1. That plaintiff and defendant are both of age, the former are residing in the municipality
RICARDO SIKAT, Judicial Administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Mariano P. of Malinao, and the latter in the municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, P. I.; that the
Villanueva, plaintiff-appellant, plaintiff, Ricardo Sikat, instituted the present action as judicial administrator of the estate
vs. of Mariano P. Villanueva, duly appointed in place of the former administrator, Enrique V.
QUITERIA VIUDA DE VILLANUEVA, Judicial Administratrix of the intestate estate of the Kare, by the Court of Firts Instance of Albay; and the defendant is the judicial
deceased Pedro Villanueva, defendant-appellee. administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, duly appointed by the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila.

2. That the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva were instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Albay, and Julio V. Quijano was appointed administrator;
that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, were
VILLA-REAL, J.: also commenced therein as civil case No. 3011, upon application of Julio V. Quijano, for
the purpose mentioned in the order of the court, dated August 14, 1919, a copy of which
The plaintiff Ricardo Sikat, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. is attached and made a part of this agreed statement of facts, as Exhibit A.
Villanueva, appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows: 3. That by an order dated August 19, 1919, the Court of First Instance of Albay appointed
Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and on
In view of the foregoing considerations, let judgment be entered absolving the defendant September 11, 1919 Tomas Almonte and Pablo Rocha were appointed commissioners to
from the complaint, and, no evidence having been adduced in support of the compose the committee on claims and appraisal.
counterclaim, the plaintiff is also absolved therefrom, without special pronouncement as
to costs. 4. That on September 16, 1919 the then administrator of the estate of Mariano P.
Villanueva, Julio V. Quijano, filed with said committee a written claim for the same sums
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the as now claimed, according to Exhibit B, attached to and made a part of this agreed
court a quo in its judgment, to wit: statement of facts, and adduced evidence in support thereof before the committee.

1. The lower court erred in holding that the claim of the administrator of the estate of 5. That in view of the fact that Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva questioned the jurisdiction of
Mariano P. Villanueva against the estate of Pedro Villanueva has already prescribed. the Court of First Instance of Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro
Villanueva, and upon appeal the Supreme Court decided (see decision of October 21,
1921, a copy of which is attached to and made a part hereof as Exhibit C) that said Court
2. The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint.
of First Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said intestate proceedings,
at the instance of both parties, the committee composed of Tomas Almonte and Pablo
The present case was commenced by virtue of a complaint filed by Ricardo Sikat, as judicial Rocha abstained from making any report on the aforementioned claim to the Court of
administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, against Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, First Instance of Albay.
as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva, praying that the decision of
the committee on claims and appraisal in the intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro
6. That in view of this decision of the Supreme Court holding the Court of First Instance of
Villanueva with regard to the credit of the late Mariano P. Villanueva be confirmed by the court,
Albay incompetent to take cognizance of the intestate proceedings in the estate of Pedro
and the defendant as judicial administratrix, be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of
Villanueva, these proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila
P10,192.92, with legal interest from July 15, 1919 until fully paid, and the costs.
through the application of Enrique Kare, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva in case No. 28244, filed on June 18, 1925, upon the ground that
In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof, and set up a when Pedro Villanueva died he owed the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva the sum of
special defense of prescription, and a counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the estate of P10,192.92, with legal interest from June 15, 1919.
Mariano P. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed for judgment
absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said amount with interest
7. That after the Court of First Instance of Manila had appointed Quiteria Vda. de
and costs.
Villanueva, administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and Mamerto Roxas and
 Nicanor Roxas as commissioners to compose the committee on claims and appraisal, The amounts stated above are written as they appear in my father's books.
Enrique Kare, as administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filed his claim with
the committee on September 22, 1925, and that the same claim appears in the present (Sgd.) PED. VILLANUEVA.                   
complaint.
The sole question to decide in this appeal, raised in the first assignment of error, is whether the
8. That the said committee on claims and appraisal, composed of Mamerto Roxas and trial court erred in holding that the aforesaid claim of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate against Pedro
Nicanor Roxas, admitted the claim and decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva estate has already prescribed.
Villanueva, filing their report with the court accordingly.
There is no question that at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the right of Mariano P.
9. That the defendant administratrix, Quiteria Vda. de Villanueva, took a timely appeal Villanueva's estate to collect the credit against him by virtue of the abovequoted acknowledgment
from this report, and so the present complaint has been filed. of indebtedness had not yet prescribed.

10. That the evidence presented to this committee on claims and appraisal by the parties Section 703 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
to the present case, and the rulings and decisions of said committee upon all the claims
and counterclaims filed with it, are contained in the record entitled "Report of the
Committee on Claims and Appraisal" of the intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva, SEC. 703. CERTAIN ACTIONS SURVIVE. — Actions to recover the title or possession of
No. 28244 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. real estate, buildings, or any interest therein, actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, and actions to recover the possession of specific
articles of personal property, shall survive, and may be commenced and prosecuted by or
Manila, December 18, 1930. against the executor or administrator; but all other actions commenced against the
deceased before his death shall be discontinued, and the claims therein involved
In addition to the agreed statement of facts quoted above, there was adduced in evidence the presented before the committee as herein provided.
document dated September 22, 1909, executed by the late Pedro Villanueva in favor of his father,
the late Mariano P. Villanueva, which literally reads as follows: If in pursuance of the legal provision just quoted, all actions commenced against a debtor shall be
discontinued upon his death, and the claims involved filed with the committee on claims and
I owe my father, Mariano P. Villanueva, the following amounts: appraisal appointed in the testate or intestate proceedings unless they are actions to recover the
title or possession of real estate, buildings, or any interest therein, damages for an injury to person
For the balance account, three thousand five hundred thirty-nine pesos and eight or property, real or personal, or the possession of specific articles of personal property, which
centavos, Philippine currency. actions shall survive and may be commenced and prosecuted by or against the executor or
administrator, then with a greater reason should credits that have not prescribed at the debtor's
death, and upon which no action had been brought, be presented before the committee on claims
For the capital invested by Mariano P. Villanueva in said bazaar, three thousand pesos, and appraisal for collection.
Philippine currency.
Section 689 of the same Code provides:
For the debt of the late Sulpicio Briznela, six hundred forty-nine pesos and seventy-seven
centavos, Philippine currency.
SEC. 689. COURT TO LIMIT TIME FOR PRESENTING CLAIMS. — The court shall allow
such time as the circumstances of the case requires for the creditors to present their
For salary accruing to me during the months of January, February, March, and April, claims to the committee for examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more
1907, unduly withheld, having worked in his office during that time, four hundred pesos, than twelve months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be stated in the
Philippine currency. commission. The court may extend the time as circumstances require, but not so that the
whole time shall exceed eighteen months.
For the entry in the book, dated October 31, 1904, but if it is thereafter discovered to have
been paid, it shall be null and void, two thousand four hundred forty pesos and seven The questions arises as to which of these two prescriptions should govern the case: ordinary
centavos, Philippine currency. prescription, established in chapter III, or extraordinary prescription, created in section 689
aforecited, both of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is a rule of statutory construction that when there
For the cost of a horse from Muñoz y Cia., Manila, one hundred sixty-four pesos, are two different provisions upon one subject matter, one of them general and the other specific,
Philippine currency. the latter should prevail, if both cannot stand together. In the present case according to the law,
Mariano P. Villanueva's credit cannot be judicially collected from Pedro Villanueva although the The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be
right of action has not prescribed, because the latter is dead; and it cannot be collected from his presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the
estate because the action is not one of those that survive upon his death. To remedy this situation early delivery of the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.
the law established a new prescriptive period for such cases, which being incompatible with the
ordinary period of prescription both in commencement and in duration, must be deemed to have The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
superseded the latter. entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
This court has so held in Santos vs. Manarang (27 Phil., 209, 213.), in treating of the period of
prescription established in section 689 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as follows: Thus section 642, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

It cannot be questioned that this section supersedes the ordinary limitation of actions SEC. 642. TO WHOM ADMINISTRATION GRANTED. — If no executor is named in the
provided for in chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
against the estates of deceased persons, and has been almost universally adopted as
part of the probate law of the United States. It is commonly termed the statute of non-
claims, and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with dispatch, so that the xxx     xxx     xxx
residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards
called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of 2. If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
limitations, have not yet prescribed.lawphil.net selected by them, be unsuitable, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin neglect thirty
days after the death of the person to apply for administration, or to request that
Now then, with reference to the extraordinary prescription established for claims against deceased administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
persons, has the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate against Pedro Villanueva's estate principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve. . . .
prescribed?
We have seen that under section 689 of the Code, the maximum period for the presentation of
The trial court decided the question in the affirmative, citing section 49 of the aforecited Act No. claims against the estate of a deceased person is eighteen months from the time fixed by the
190, which reads: committee on claims and appraisal in its notice, and this period may be extended one month if a
creditor applies for it within six months after the first term, according to section 690. lawphil.net
SEC. 49. SAVING IN OTHER CASES. — If, in an action commenced, or attempted to be
commenced, in due time, a judgment for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the persons entitled to be appointed
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such administrators or to apply for the appointment of an administrator have taken any step in that
action has, at the date of such reversal or failure, expired, the plaintiff, or, if he die and the direction, and since no administrator or committee on claims and appraisal has been appointed to
cause of action survive, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year fix the time for filing claims, the right of the plaintiff, as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's
after such date, and this provision shall apply to any claim asserted in any pleading by a estate, to present the latter's claim against Pedro Villanueva's estate could not prescribe.
defendant.
If as we have stated, the object of the law in fixing short special periods for the presentation of
This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to section 1 of Act No. 190, "means claims against the estate of a deceased person is to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or possible in order to pay off the debts and distribute the residue; and if a creditor having knowledge
protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong". According to this definition, the of the death of his debtor is interested in collecting his credit as soon as possible; and if according
proceeding here in question is not an action but a special proceeding, which, according to the to law the persons entitled to the administration or to propose another person for administrator
same section, is any other remedy provided by law. The very reference in section 49 to actions have thirty days from the death within which to claim that right, after which time the court may
brought against debtors before their death clearly means ordinary actions and not special appoint any creditor of the intestate debtor: then the plaintiff herein as administrator of Mariano P.
proceedings. Villanueva's estate, was guilty of laches in not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro
Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of Manila until after the lapse of three years after this court
had set aside the intestate proceedings begun in the Court of First Instance of Albay for lack of
The saving clause, then, in section 49 of Act No. 190 does not directly apply to special jurisdiction over the place where the decedent had died, that is, from October 21, 1921, to June
proceedings. 18, 1925. Wherefore, taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of
estates, and the fact that the administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of
In re  Estate of De Dios (24 Phil., 573), cited in the aforementioned case of Santos vs. Manarang, Pedro Villanueva's death, and instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's
this court laid down the following doctrine: estate in the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim against it,
which was not allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction, the
estate of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the same proceedings in the
competent court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, until after three years had elapsed, and
applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure by analogy, we declare the
claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to permit a creditor
having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not
instituting either testate or intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the prejudice of
the heirs and legatees. Even in the case of the summary settlement of an estate under section
598, as amended by Act No. 2331, the Code of Civil Procedure limits the time within which a
creditor may file his claim to two years after the settlement and distribution of the estate.

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold that whenever a creditor's
claim presented in the intestate proceedings of the estate of his debtor is not allowed because the
court has no jurisdiction, and such creditor permits more than three years to elapse before
instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the claim is barred by laches, applying
the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by analogy.

By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
RULE 86 CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities 9 was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
G.R. No. 149926             February 23, 2005 February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint 11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
vs. served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents. of his return to the Philippines. 12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent
Florence S. Ariola.
DECISION
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer 13 and alleged that the loan
CALLEJO, SR., J.: documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was
null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which
seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63. 63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the
court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
The antecedent facts are as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. 15
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended for the The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was,
every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985. in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void,
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, 4 this time in
to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had
the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling that the joint agreement
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action
a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.

Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. 6 Subsequently in March 1981,
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA),
testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special
assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate of the decedent. 7 During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a 1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT
Joint Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, 2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
 3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
PROCEEDING.16
IV.
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT
heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate UNION BANK.
court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in
the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to V.
re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF ₱128,000.00 AND
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED
petitioner should have been presented before the probate court. 17 THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION
BANK.19
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should
have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as
valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve
paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed
when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The
RTC decision, viz.: petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any
of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The
active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the petitioner’s claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the
City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to
escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing
SO ORDERED.18 the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.

In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA: The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to
consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
I. documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim
Santibañez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory
Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibañez,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT. the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions
of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named
II. respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no
need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as
AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS heirs of the deceased.
BEEN PROBATED.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying
III. to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have
been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the obligation, the embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time
petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.1a\^/phi1.net he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement not valid. The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even
stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel. properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without
the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father. any other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature
of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs
cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
The petition is bereft of merit. jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. 28 In the
instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and
executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and
deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a
deceased.1awphi1.nét premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim
against the estate of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. 20 The said court is primarily concerned with the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. 21 heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use
the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The
has been probated: assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall
take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question be given any force and effect.
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements
or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 22 The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic provides:
will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. — All claims
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children. and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the
deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint,
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor and the CA in affirming the same.
of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the
estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value. Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. 30 As SO ORDERED.
we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31

… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. 32

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is
the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned
its assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit
Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines…"34 However, the documentary evidence 35 clearly
reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC,
and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings,
Inc. Nowhere can the petitioner’s participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no
documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared
in its decision:

… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS unserved with the notation "Party–Deceased" while the order sent to defendant Valeria Saligumba
was returned with the notation "Party in Manila." 5
G.R. No. 143365             December 4, 2008
At the hearing on 15 August 1984, spouses Palanogs’ direct examination was suspended and the
GENEROSO SALIGUMBA, ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and HEIRS OF SPOUSES VALERIA continuation of the hearing was set on 25 October 1984. The trial court stated that Atty. Miralles,
SALIGUMBA AND ELISEO SALIGUMBA, SR., petitioners, who had not withdrawn as counsel for spouses Saligumbas despite his appointment as Municipal
vs. Circuit Trial Court judge, would be held responsible for the case of spouses Saligumbas until he
MONICA PALANOG, respondent. formally withdrew as counsel. The trial court reminded Atty. Miralles to secure the consent of
spouses Saligumbas for his withdrawal. 6 A copy of this order was sent to Valeria Saligumba but
the same was returned unserved with the notation "Party in Manila." 7
DECISION
The hearing set on 25 October 1984 was reset to 25 January 1985 and the trial court directed that
CARPIO, J.: a copy of this order be sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila. 8

The Case The presentation of evidence for spouses Palanogs resumed on 25 January 1985 despite the
motion of Atty. Miralles for postponement on the ground that his client was sick. The exhibits were
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch admitted and plaintiffs spouses Palanogs rested their case. Reception of evidence for the
5, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 5) in Civil Case No. 5288 for Revival of Judgment. The case is an defendants spouses Saligumbas was scheduled on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985. 9
offshoot of the action for Quieting of Title with Damages in Civil Case No. 2570.
On 3 June 1985, only spouses Palanogs and counsel appeared. Upon motion of the spouses
The Facts Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the presentation of their evidence.

Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs), filed a complaint On 3 August 1987, after a lapse of more than two years, the trial court considered the case
dated 28 February 1977 for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria submitted for decision.
Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 3). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2570. In the On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 declaring spouses
complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas, their agents,
possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. representatives and all persons acting in privity with them to vacate the premises and restore
The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject possession to spouses Palanogs.
premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. Spouses Palanogs prayed that
they be declared the true and rightful owners of the land in question.
The trial court, in a separate Order dated 7 August 1987, directed that a copy of the court’s
decision be furnished plaintiff Monica Palanog and defendant Valeria Saligumba.
When the case was called for pre-trial on 22 September 1977, Atty. Edilberto Miralles (Atty.
Miralles), counsel for spouses Saligumbas, verbally moved for the appointment of a commissioner
to delimit the land in question. Rizalino Go, Deputy Sheriff of Aklan, was appointed commissioner Thereafter, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the
and was directed to submit his report and sketch within 30 days. 1 Present during the delimitation trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after
were spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas, and Ernesto Saligumba, son of spouses the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion.
Saligumbas.2
Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to
After submission of the Commissioner’s Report, spouses Palanogs, upon motion, were granted 10 revive and enforce the Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 which she claimed
days to amend their complaint to conform with the items mentioned in the report. 3 has not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba
and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5288 before the RTC-Branch 5.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. At the hearing on 1 June 1984, only the counsel for
spouses Palanogs appeared. The trial court issued an order resetting the hearing to 15 August
1984 and likewise directed spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of another counsel who Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of his brother Ernesto who was
should be ready on that date. 4 The order sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was returned to the court out of the country working as a seaman, engaged the services of the Public Attorney’s Office,
Kalibo, Aklan which filed a motion for time to allow them to file a responsive pleading. Petitioner
Generoso Saligumba filed his Answer 10 alleging that: (1) respondent had no cause of action; (2) filed. While it may be true that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 may be revived and its
the spouses Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending and no order of substitution execution may be had, the issue now before us is whether or not execution of judgment can be
was issued and hence, the trial was null and void; and (3) the court did not acquire jurisdiction issued against petitioners who claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated
over the heirs of the spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the judgment was not binding on them. 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570.

Meanwhile, on 19 December 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to implead Petitioners contend that the RTC-Branch 3 Decision of 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 is
additional defendants namely, Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba, who are also the null and void since there was no proper substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite
heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas. 11 They were, however, declared in default on 1 October the trial court’s knowledge that the deceased spouses Saligumbas were no longer represented by
1999 for failure to file any responsive pleading.12 counsel. They argue that they were deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on
them.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
Petitioners argue that the trial court even acknowledged the fact of death of spouses Saligumbas
On 24 May 2000, the RTC-Branch 5 rendered a decision in favor of respondent ordering the but justified the validity of the decision rendered in that case despite lack of substitution because
revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. The trial court ruled that the non-substitution of the of the negligence or fault of their counsel. Petitioners contend that the duty of counsel for the
deceased spouses did not have any legal significance. The land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 deceased spouses Saligumbas to inform the court of the death of his clients and to furnish the
was the exclusive property of defendant Valeria Saligumba who inherited the same from her name and address of the executor, administrator, heir or legal representative of the decedent
deceased parents. The death of her husband, Eliseo Saligumba, Sr., did not change the under Rule 3 presupposes adequate or active representation by counsel. However, the relation of
complexion of the ownership of the property that would require his substitution. The spouses attorney and client was already terminated by the appointment of counsel on record, Atty. Miralles,
Saligumbas’ children, who are the petitioners in this case, had no right to the property while as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge even before the deaths of the spouses Saligumbas were
Valeria Saligumba was still alive. The trial court further found that when defendant Valeria known. Petitioners invoke the Order of 1 June 1984 directing the spouses Saligumbas to secure
Saligumba died, her lawyer, Atty. Miralles, did not inform the court of the death of his client. The the services of another lawyer to replace Atty. Miralles. The registered mail containing that order
trial court thus ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased defendant was solely due to the was returned to the trial court with the notation that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was "deceased."
negligence of counsel. Moreover, petitioner Ernesto Saligumba could not feign ignorance of Civil Petitioners thus question the decision in Civil Case No. 2570 as being void and of no legal effect
Case No. 2570 as he was present during the delimitation of the subject land. The trial court because their parents were not duly represented by counsel of record. Petitioners further argue
likewise held that the decision in Civil Case No. 2570 could not be the subject of a collateral that they have never taken part in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2570 nor did they voluntarily
attack. There must be a direct action for the annulment of the said decision. appear or participate in the case. It is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their
deceased parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect on
petitioners.
Petitioners elevated the matter directly to this Court. Hence, the present petition.
Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real
The Court’s Ruling property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 16 as the claim is not
extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17
The instant case is an action for revival of judgment and the judgment sought to be revived in this of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court17 provides for the procedure, thus:
case is the decision in the action for quieting of title with damages in Civil Case No. 2570. This is
not one for annulment of judgment. Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time,
executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. 13 An representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased.
the recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
rendered.14 Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory. 15 administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis
supplied)
The RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 had been rendered final
and executory by the lapse of time with no motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been
Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better
the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform
deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of the court of the name and address of his legal representative. 22
death by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal
representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order for deceased’s legal Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even after the latter’s demise. Acting
representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be on their behalf, Atty. Miralles even asked for postponement of the hearings and did not even
substituted for the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such confirm the death of his clients nor his appointment as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge. These
legal representative, nor did the heirs ever ask to be substituted. clearly negate petitioners’ contention that Atty. Miralles ceased to be spouses Saligumbas’
counsel.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria Saligumba died on 2
February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the Atty. Miralles still remained the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas despite the alleged
substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and appointment as judge. Records show that when Civil Case No. 2570 was called for trial on 25
petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death October 1984, Atty. Miralles appeared and moved for a postponement. The 25 October 1984
of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence proving the Order reads:
death of the spouses, except the mere notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial court’s orders
which were returned unserved.
ORDER
Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir to appear
arises only "upon proper notice." The notation "Party-Deceased" on the unserved notices could Upon petition of Judge Miralles who is still the counsel on record of this case and who is
not be the "proper notice" contemplated by the rule. As the trial court could not be expected to held responsible for anything that will happen in this case, postpone the hearing of this
know or take judicial notice of the death of a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, case to JANUARY 25, 1985 AT 8:30 in the morning. x x x23
the trial court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is
no showing that the court’s proceedings were tainted with irregularities. 18 The trial court issued an Order dated 1 June 1984 directing the defendants to secure the services
of another counsel. This order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. by registered mail but the same
Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death was returned with the notation "Party-Deceased" while the notice to Valeria Saligumba was
of the defendant if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or his returned with the notation "Party in Manila."24 Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984.
attorney of such death as required by the rules. 19 The judge cannot be blamed for sending copies When Atty. Miralles appeared in court on 25 October 1984, he did not affirm nor inform the court
of the orders and notices to defendants spouses in the absence of proof of death or manifestation of the death of his client. There was no formal substitution. The trial court issued an order resetting
to that effect from counsel.20 the hearing to 25 January 1985 and directed that a copy of the order be furnished petitioner Eliseo
Saligumba, Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila by registered mail. 25 When the case was called on 25
January 1985, Atty. Miralles sought for another postponement on the ground that his client was
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court likewise expressly provides: sick and under medical treatment in Manila. 26 Again, there was no manifestation from counsel
about the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. The trial court issued an Order dated 25 January 1985
SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. - Whenever a setting the reception of evidence for the defendants on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985. A copy of this order
party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. by registered mail. Nonetheless, as the trial court in Civil Case
of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, No. 5288 declared, the non-substitution of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. did not have any legal
and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal significance as the land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was the exclusive property of Valeria
representative. Saligumba who inherited it from her deceased parents.

It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client. The failure of This notwithstanding, when Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985, Atty. Miralles again did
counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to not inform the trial court of the death of Valeria Saligumba. There was no formal substitution nor
submission of proof of death of Valeria Saligumba. Atty. Miralles was remiss in his duty under
inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party will not invalidate Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The counsel of record is obligated to protect his
the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The client’s interest until he is released from his professional relationship with his client. For its part,
decision rendered shall bind the party’s successor-in-interest. 21 the court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of
record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.27
An attorney must make an application to the court to withdraw as counsel, for the relation does not
terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least, so far as the opposite party is
concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the litigation. 28 Unless properly
relieved, the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case. 29 Until his withdrawal shall have
been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by
the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing
for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. 30

Petitioners should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings absent any formal
substitution. Yet, despite the court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners,
petitioners never bothered to challenge the same, and in fact allowed the proceedings to go on
until the trial court rendered its decision. There was no motion for reconsideration, appeal or even
an action to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. Petitioners themselves could not feign
ignorance of the case since during the pendency of Civil Case No. 2570, petitioner Ernesto
Saligumba, son of the deceased spouses, was among the persons present during the delimitation
of the land in question before the Commissioner held on 5 November 1977. 31 Petitioner Eliseo
Saligumba, Jr. was likewise furnished a copy of the trial court’s orders and notices. It was only the
Answer filed by petitioner Generoso Saligumba in Civil Case No. 5288 that confirmed the dates
when the spouses Saligumbas died and named the latter’s children. Consequently, Atty. Miralles
was responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not been properly relieved as counsel of
record. His acts bind his clients and the latter’s successors-in-interest.

In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have not shown much interest in
the case. Petitioners Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba were declared in default for
failure to file their answer. Petitioner Ernesto Saligumba was out of the country working as a
seaman. Only petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed an Answer to the complaint. The petition filed
in this Court was signed only by petitioner Generoso Saligumba as someone signed on behalf of
petitioner Ernesto Saligumba without the latter’s authority to do so.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5288. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage  over the properties subject of the extra-
judicial settlement.7

SECOND DIVISION On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration  docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
G.R. No. 129008             January 13, 2004 praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued
to him.8
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra
BEDA UNGOS, petitioners, Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and
vs. Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register
ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City. 9
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,  respondents.
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the
DECISION defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to
the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero 10 and that the titles thereof
were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them
TINGA, J.: in his name.11 Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real
parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administration proceedings.12 On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative
administrator is the issue in this case. Defenses for Hearing13 on the aforesaid ground.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator
as its Resolution2 dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration 15 but
the motion was likewise denied.16
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several
personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. 3 He also This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule
left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053. 17 Petitioners averred that the RTC
whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of
Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, the case on the ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the
Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada. 4 extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the
respondents.18
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their
children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision19 dated January 31, 1997, stating that it
an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public
sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica5, Alberto and Rowena.6 respondent judge when he denied petitioners’ motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in
view of its discretionary nature.
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on
June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement A Motion for Reconsideration  was filed by petitioners but it was denied. 20 Hence, the petition
of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the before this Court.
decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued
Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio, The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal standing
Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the
found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of administration proceedings.21
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for preliminary alleged to have participated in the act complained of 31 and he is made a party
hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate of the defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the
decedent and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an
an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus: appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties
himself.
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal
provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property
defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third
been filed.22 (Emphasis supplied.) being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.

Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court,
character of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as recourse to this Court is not warranted.
having a mandatory effect. 23 Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond
cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in the discretion of the WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court", apart from the retention of the word "may" in Section 6, 24 in Rule 16 thereof. Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower court’s doorstep for not hearing SO ORDERED.
petitioners’ affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of
the respondents as heirs to bring the suit.

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of
the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights
and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. 25

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total
lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 26 and
Section 2, Rule 8727 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28  this Court
recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent
under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:

The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to

bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the
deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which
special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted,
yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be
expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the
properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the
executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; 30 and (2) when the administrator is
RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS Meantime, on March 25, 2005 administrator Eleuterio moved for the joint settlement in the same
case of the estates of Rosita and her husband, Adolfo 6 considering that the spouses’ properties
G.R. No. 189697               June 27, 2012 were conjugal. Eleuterio expressed willingness to co-administer the late spouses’ estate with
Adolfo’s heirs, namely, Raymond, Robert, and Lydia Ramirez. Robert agreed to the joint
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses but insisted that the court also probate the
ELEUTERIO RIVERA, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Rosita L. Rivera- deceased Adolfo’s will of October 10, 1990 which Robert presented.
Ramirez, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT RAMIREZ and RAYMOND RAMIREZ, Respondents. As a side issue, Robert initially retained the services of Atty. Antonio Pacheo to represent him in
the estate case. The lawyer had previously counseled for the late Adolfo and the hospital. But
Robert and Atty. Pacheo soon had a parting of ways, resulting in the dismissal of the lawyer.
DECISION Raymond, who did not see eye to eye with his brother Robert, subsequently retained the services
of Atty. Pacheo to represent him in the case. This created an issue because Robert wanted the
ABAD, J.: lawyer inhibited from the case considering that the latter would be working against the interest of a
former client.
This case is about a court’s adjudication of non-issues and the authority of the administrator to
examine and secure evidence from persons having knowledge of properties allegedly belonging to On July 17, 2006 Eleuterio, as administrator of Rosita’s estate, reiterated his motion to compel
the decedent’s estate. examination and production of the hospital’s documents in Robert’s possession. On February 12,
2007 the RTC granted the administrator’s motion and ordered Robert to bring to court the books of
The Facts and the Case account, financial statements, and other documents relating to the operations of the Sta. Teresita
General Hospital. The RTC also declined to inhibit Atty. Pacheo as Raymond’s counsel. Robert
moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that the documents belonged to the hospital, which
The spouses Adolfo Ramirez (Adolfo) and Rosita Rivera (Rosita) were married in 1942. Their only had a distinct personality; that the hospital did not form part of Rosita’s estate; and that Eleuterio,
child died in infancy. They acquired during their lifetime the Sta. Teresita General Hospital and as administrator only of Rosita’s estate, had no right to inspect and have access to Adolfo’s
other properties. Rosita died in September 1990, followed by her husband Adolfo in December estate. But the RTC denied Robert’s motion on June 19, 2007.
1993.
Robert filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 imputing grave
On February 7, 1995 petitioner Eleuterio P. Rivera (Eleuterio) filed a petition for issuance of letters abuse of discretion by the RTC for allowing the production and examination of the subject
of administration with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City covering the estate of Rosita, documents and for not inhibiting Atty. Pacheo from the case. On February 17, 2009 the CA
who allegedly died without a will and with no direct ascendants or descendants. 1 Eleuterio rendered judgment,8 annulling the RTC’s orders insofar as they granted the production and
claimed2 that he was Rosita’s nephew, being the son of her brother Federico. Eleuterio submitted examination of the hospital’s documents. Essentially, the CA ruled that Eleuterio and Rosita’s
to the intestate court a list of the names of the decedent’s other nephews and nieces all of whom other collateral relatives were not her heirs since she had an adopted child in Raymond and that,
expressed conformity to Eleuterio’s appointment as administrator of her estate. consequently, Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to request production of the hospital’s documents
or to institute the petition for the settlement of her estate. The CA affirmed, however, the non-
On March 28, 1995 the RTC issued letters of administration appointing Eleuterio as Rosita’s inhibition of Atty. Pacheo from the case. Eleuterio’s motion for reconsideration having been
estate administrator.3 On September 6, 1995 Eleuterio submitted an initial inventory of her denied, he filed the present petition for review.
properties. On April 18, 1996 he filed in his capacity as administrator a motion with the court to
compel the examination and production of documents relating to properties believed to be a part Issues Presented
of her estate, foremost of which was the Sta. Teresita General Hospital that respondent Robert
Ramirez (Robert) had been managing. 4 Robert claims, together with Raymond Ramirez
(Raymond) and Lydia Ramirez (Lydia), that they were children of Adolfo by another woman. The case presents two issues:
Robert opposed the issuance of the subpoena.
1. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Eleuterio and his relatives were not Rosita’s heirs
On joint motion of the parties, however, the RTC issued an order on March 26, 1998, suspending and, therefore, had no right to institute the petition for the settlement of her estate or to seek the
the proceedings in the case pending the resolution of a separate case involving the properties of production and examination of the hospital’s documents; and
the estate.5 Four years later or on May 16, 2002 Eleuterio, as administrator of Rosita’s estate,
moved for the revival of the proceedings and requested anew the production and examination of 2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Eleuterio, et al. had no standing to subpoena the
documents in Robert’s possession relating to Rosita’s estate. The RTC apparently never got to act specified documents in Robert’s possession.
on the motion.
Ruling of the Court The production and examination is nothing to be afraid of since the intestate court has no authority
to decide who the decedent’s heirs are in connection with such incident which is confined to the
One. The CA held that based on the article Women Physicians of the World 9 found in the record of examination of documents which may aid the administrator in determining properties believed to
the case before it, the late Rosita, a physician, had adopted Raymond as her child. An adopted belong to the decedent’s estate. What is more, that court has no authority to decide the question
child, said the CA, is deemed a legitimate child of the adopter. This being the case, Raymond’s of whether certain properties belong to the estate or to the person sought to be examined. 11
presence barred Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives from inheriting intestate from
her.10 A further consequence is that they also did not have the right to seek the production and In fact, if after the examination the court has good reason to believe that the person examined is in
examination of the documents allegedly in Robert’s possession. possession of properties that belong to the deceased, the administrator cannot detain the
property. He has to file an ordinary action for recovery of the properties. 12 The purpose of the
But, whether or not the late Rosita had judicially adopted Raymond as her child is a question of production and examination of documents is to elicit information or secure evidence from persons
fact that had neither been considered nor passed upon by the RTC in a direct challenge to the suspected of having possession of, or knowledge of properties suspected of belonging to the
claim of Eleuterio and Rosita’s other collateral relatives that they have the right to inherit from her. estate of the deceased. The procedure is inquisitorial in nature, designed as an economical and
The relevant issue before the RTC was only whether or not the duly appointed administrator of efficient mode of discovering properties of the estate. 13
Rosita’s estate had the right to the production and examination of the documents believed to be in
Robert’s possession. Indeed, one of the reasons Robert brought the special civil action of WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals
certiorari before the CA is that Eleuterio had no right to inspect the requested documents and in CA-G.R. SP 100203 dated February 17, 2009, and REINSTATES the February 12, 2007 order
have access to Adolfo’s estate when Eleuterio’s authority as administrator extended only to of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Special Proceedings Q-95-22919 granting petitioner
Rosita’s estate. Eleuterio P. Rivera’s motion to compel examination and production of document dated July 17,
2006.
The Court understands the CA’s commendable desire to minimize multiple appeals. But the issues
regarding the late Rosita’s supposed judicial adoption of Raymond as her child and the SO ORDERED.
consequent absence of right on the part of Eleuterio, et al. to file a petition for the settlement of
Rosita’s estate were never raised and properly tried before the RTC. Consequently, the CA
gravely abused its discretion in adjudicating such issues and denying Eleuterio and his relatives
their right to be heard on them.

Two. As for the right of the administrator of Rosita’s estate to the production and examination of
the specified documents believed to be in Robert’s possession, Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court provides that these can be allowed based on the administrator’s belief that the person
named in the request for subpoena has documents in his possession that tend to show the
decedent’s right to real or personal property. Thus:

Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. – If an

executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the
deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of
having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods or chattels of the
deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance,
bond, contract or other writing which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title,
interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the last will and testament of the
deceased, the Court may cite such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on
oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on
such examination or such interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for
contempt, and may commit him to prison until he submits to the order of the court. The
interrogatories put to any such person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be
filed in the clerk’s office. (Emphasis supplied)
RULE 87 ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 13 in
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005 Portugal’s name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813 14 was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila
Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent. Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by
respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of
Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint 15 against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of
DECISION Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.

CARPIO MORALES, J.: In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 1242 which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name
failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in
respondent’s name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual,
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations  claims of the moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence  during the trial of the
case: Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling,
among other things, the issues as follows:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. 3
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. 4
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.5
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, 6 later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, plaintiffs.
herein respondent.7
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. 16 (Underscoring
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition supplied)
and Waiver of Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on
November 2, 1964.9 In the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, 17 after giving an account of the
over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor. 10 testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence,  without
resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title the ground that petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a
(TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel
to Paz C. Lazo."11 Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18

On February 18, 1984, Paz died. In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:

On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate. The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.

xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased
(sic)  and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, — herein plaintiffs-appellants
determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is and defendant-appellee, — both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x
ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated
the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish", in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues
while in the latter, it is "to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The
not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action. institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it
is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly . To
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ cause to permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought
Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis and for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x 21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring
underscoring supplied). supplied).

Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court’s ratio The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, 22 thus affirmed the trial court’s dismissal
decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Court’s following ruling of the case.
in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have erred
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked when
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked I.
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo . . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of
v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no action.
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon II.
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is  essential to the determination . . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a
of the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence later and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court  failed to
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the  issues raised during pre-trial,
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment . . .24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied). Petitioners thus prayed as follows:

Conceding that the ruling in Cariño  was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay  (in 1999), the appellate court found Cariño to be inapplicable, decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the
however, to the case in this wise: instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the
court a quo.
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño  case was the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements
bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and in Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the
Susan Yee Cariño) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cariño issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of
contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name
which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the of Leonila.
deceased Cariño was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was
valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for. 25 (Underscoring While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil
supplied). case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and
Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the
reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and decedent and Marcosa.
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case;
and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, they had established their status as compulsory Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special
heirs. proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the
civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name. On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was
whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners executed
on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in
Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially
August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein correct" the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the
to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs  thus filed a complaint for persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael
annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other
petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove
granted the motion to dismiss in this wise: the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged
status . . . as children of said decedent."
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay  have
not shown any proof or even a semblance of it—except the allegations that they are the legal heirs This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not have declared, in
of the aforementioned Yaptinchays—that they have been declared the legal heirs of the the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is
deceased  couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance [p]roceeding."
of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . 27 (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied). In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the
recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedent‘s
Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera28 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the court’s order declaring Celedonia Solivio
of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion
the establishment of a status or right." on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil
case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in
letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived
by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues,
to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines "whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition
another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate]
thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this Court held that  "[i]n
of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co- or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
equal court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32 court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of
(Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107,
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil.,
but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her
claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent. This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case
for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue  because it "involves no longer" the two
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein lots adjudicated to Juanita.
petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in
the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs
which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived. to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement  is that if the
special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,
on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had
deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition . She subsequently filed a been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost
motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask
things, the same two lots allotted to her. for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’ agreement to suspend
action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of
the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s
for trial. estate, executed on February 15, 1988 35 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. 36 Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6,
that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which therein.37
she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the
civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no
by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion. doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court. It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal
is the Caloocan parcel of land, 38 to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners
The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case
been "legally terminated" as Juanita’s share under the project of partition had not been delivered – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
to her. Explained this Court: court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, 39 the trial court should proceed to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon
Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings  if it had already
been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court 1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by
plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. 40

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a
decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 88 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE Street, Bangued, Abra, bounded as follows: N. Alejandro Lizards; E. Partelo
Street (now Virgilio Valera Street); S. Taft Street; W'Consiliman Brook, with an
G.R. No. L-27526 September 12, 1974 area of 1,775 square meters, and assessed at P1,420.00 for the residential lot,
and P9,500.00 for the improvements.
ANGELITA G. VDA. DE VALERA, AMANDA G. VALERA, OSCAR G. VALERA, DIONISIO G.
VALERA, FELIXBERTO G. VALERA, BENITO G. VALERA, EVA G. VALERA, LITA G. Appraised value — P45,600.00, 1/3 of which is P15,200.00. (p. 5 of
VALERA, TONIETTE VALERA, ANGEL V. COLET, NORMAN PE BENITO and ROMEO PE Respondents' Memorandum)
BENITO, petitioners,
vs. The petition was not served on the widow and ten children of Virgilio Valera. Celso Valera
HON. MACARIO M. OFILADA, as Probate Judge, Court of First Instance of Abra; interposed an opposition to it on the ground that Francisco Valera had no interest in the Valera
ADORACION VALERA-BRINGAS, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Francisco residence, that the property was never leased and that the remedy of Mrs. Bringas was "in a
Valera; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of Abra; DOMINGO V. BANEZ as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of appropriate remedy and/or procedure" and not in the intestate proceeding. 2
Abra, and CELSO VALERA, respondents.
The lower court granted the petition in an order dated July 10, 1964 which reads: 3
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
ORDER
Had the Court of First Instance of Abra been more cognizant of the limitations on its prerogative as
a probate court, it would not have committed the jurisdictional and procedural errors pointed out in The administratrix, through counsel, has petitioned for an order to pay rental on
this certiorari case by the petitioners, the heirs of the late Virgilio Valera. the property (Item 1-B, 23 of the Inventory submitted i)v the administratrix, pp.
415-416, rec.) owned in common by the estate of the deceased Francisco Valera
The record discloses that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing its orders of July 10, y Versoza and the late Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera, corresponding to one-
1964, April 15, 1966 and January 4, 1967 as well as the writ of execution against the assets of the third (1/3) interest pertaining to the estate of the deceased Francisco Valera to be
deceased Virgilio Valera. The jurisdictional and procedural errors committed by the lower court paid by the family of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera and family who have been
justify the writ of certiorari. Hence, We find the petition to be meritorious. We have to set aside the occupying the property since April, 1945 in the amount of P100.00 a month, plus
said orders and writ of execution insofar as the heirs or estate of Virgilio Valera are concerned. legal interest, the same to be paid to the Administratrix.

Civil Case No. 64, R-1 of the Court of First Instance of Abra is a special proceeding for the WHEREFORE, finding the said motion to be well-founded and meritorious, the
settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Valera. Virgilio Valera was the administrator of the same is hereby granted. It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court shall furnish
estate, He died on March 21, 1961. He was survived by his widow, Angelita Garduque Vda. de Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera with a copy of this order by registered mail.
Valera and their ten (10) children, named Amanda, Oscar, Dionisio, Benito, Felixberto, Eva, Lita,
Toniette, Vicenta and Teresita, all petitioners herein, except Vicenta and Teresita, who were SO ORDERED.
abroad.
Done at Bangued, Abra, this 10th day of July, 1964.
Later (the exact date is not shown in the record), Adoracion Valera Bringas, who claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Francisco Valera, was appointed administratrix. She filed on April (Sgd.) ALFONSO P. DONESA J u d g e
16, 1964 in the intestate proceeding a petition to require "Celso Valera and family and Angelita de
Valera and family to pay P100.00" as monthly rental for the one-third pro-indiviso  portion of the
Valera residence located in Bangued, Abra.1 The directive of Judge Donesa to the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of the order by registered mail
on Mrs. Valera implies that the heirs of Virgilio Valera were not served with a copy of the petition.
The said heirs, through Atty. Angel V. Colet, a son-in-law of Mrs. Valera, filed a motion for the
That residence is item 3 of the original inventory dated April 10, 1964 submitted by Mrs. Bringas. It reconsideration of that order. They contended that the Valera residence "should be excluded from
is described as follows: the inventory," because that was their "absolute property of which they have been in complete
possession and occupation".4 Mrs. Bringas replied that Francisco Valera's estate had "already
Residential land & Improvements. — Covered by Tax Declaration No. 16922, consolidated" its ownership over that one-third partition "through the submission of the inventory
declared in 1948 in the names of Virgilio  & Celso Valera; cancelled by Tax and its approval" by the probate court.5
Declaration No. 21571 in the name of Virgilio Valera; cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 29338, in 1962, in the name of Virgilio Valera, located in Partelo
It was only nearly two years later that respondent Judge Macario Ofilada in his order of April 15, the order of January 27, 1966, none complied. Considering that this case is
1966 denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera. 6 already more than 20 years old, the Court can not, in the interest of justice,
further hold or suspend the resolutions on these incidents. They must as they
On February 17, 1965 (before the motion for reconsideration was resolved) Mrs. Bringas filed in should now, be resolved.
the intestate proceeding a pleading known as "Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing
Delivery of the Fruits of the Properties or Value and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix." 7 The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio Valera and
his subsequent 'Motion'. appearing to be unfounded, is hereby denied.
She prayed in that motion that Judge Donesa's order for the payment of rentals be executed
against the heirs of Virgilio Valera; that the heirs be ordered to deliver to her the fruits of the The motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for Celso Valera is a mere
properties of the estate of Francisco Valera, which, according to her calculation, amounted to repetition of the 'Opposition to Petition for an Order to Pay Rental dated May 8,
P100,000 for twenty years, plus legal interest supposedly amounting to P5,000; that the heirs be 1964. This motion is merely intended to delay the proceedings and it is hereby
ordered to deliver the sum of P4,684.98 representing the insurance and war damage monies denied for lack of merit.
collected by Virgilio Valera; and that the Sheriff be ordered to "to seize such  properties of Virgilio
Valera and his heirs" "to be sold according to law for the payment of double the value of the fruits Finding the 'Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing the Delivery of Fruits
and the amount of monies alienated and embezzled". of the Properties or Value thereof and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix'
well-founded and meritorious, it is hereby directed:
As already stated, in an order dated April 15, 1966, respondent Judge Macario M. Ofilada denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of Virgilio Valera and granted the motion of Mrs. 1. That a writ of execution issue against the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso
Bringas for execution and for the delivery of certain funds and properties. (Note that the execution Valera insofar as the collectible rents pertaining t the estate are concerned;
was granted although the order was not yet final). That order, which is being assailed in this case,
is quoted as follows (pp. 7-9 of the Petition):
2. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera deliver to the administratrix
properties still in their possession which are among those listed in the
Pending resolution before the court are the following motions: 'Incomplete Inventory and Appraisal of the Real and Personal Estate of the
Deceased, Francisco Valera y Versoza' filed by the administratrix on September
1. Unsigned 'Motion for leave of Court to Intervene and Motion for 17, 1965;
Reconsideration of the Order dated July 10, 1964', filed by counsel for the heirs
of Virgilio Valera; 3. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera and family account to the
Administratrix the fruits of the properties of the estate listed in the said amended
2. 'Motion' without any notice of hearing filed by counsel for the heirs of Virgilio inventory;
Valera;
4. That the heirs of Virgilio Valera deliver to the administratrix the sum of
3. 'Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 10, 1965,' filed by counsel P4,784.98 representing the insurance and war damage monies collected by
for petitioner Celso Valera; and Virgilio Valera;

4. 'Motion for Execution and for an Order Directing Delivery of the Fruits of the 5. That Celso Valera account to the administratrix the war damage monies
Properties or Value thereof and Monies of the Estate to the Administratrix', filed received by him for the destroyed Valera family residence and deliver 1/3 of the
by counsel for the administratrix. same to the administratrix; and

Also pending is the examination of persons regarding the properties of the estate 6. That failure to render a satisfactory account as hereby required within 15 days
as ordered by the court also on July 10, 1964. from receipt of this order shall, conformably with See. 8 of Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court, make the heirs of Virgilio Valera and Celso Valera liable to double the
On January 27, 1966, the court directed the movants seeking a reconsideration value of the fruits and monies unaccounted for.
of the order directing the payment of rentals to the estate to submit their
respective memoranda within 15 days from receipt of the order and the It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court immediately set 2 days for the
administratrix 5 days from receipt of adverse parties memoranda to submit her examination of the persons required to appear in the order dated July 10, 1964.
reply if she so desires. Despite the fact that the parties had received copies of
 SO ORDERED. And considering the motion of the administratrix dated September 15, 1966 to be
meritorious, the same, as prayed for, is hereby GRANTED.
Bangued, Abra, this 15th day of April, 1966.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby directed that:
(Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA
Judge (1) The orders of November 14 and 25, 1966 staying the execution of the order
of April 15, 1966 are hereby lifted and let another writ of execution immediately
On January 5. 1967 Judge Ofilada directed the execution of his aforequoted order of April 15, issue to effect the order of April 15, 1966.
1966. That directive reads as follows:8
(2) A writ of execution issue against said heirs of Virgilio Valera  for the
ORDER satisfaction of the amounts due the estate;

Pending resolution before this Court are: (1) Omnibus Motion filed by the (3) A writ of execution issue against the properties of Celso Valera for the
Administratrix dated September 15, 1966; and, (2) Omnibus Motion filed by the satisfaction of the amount due to estate; and,
heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966.
(4) The heirs of Virgilio Valera deliver to the administratrix the possession of the
The parties, by the order of this Court dated December 12, 1966 after the hearing properties listed in paragraph 6 and 7 of her Omnibus Motion dated September
on said date at which counsel discussed their respective motions, were given 15, 1966 and the fruits or value thereof from April, 1945 until time of delivery,
three days time within which to submit their written memoranda. No such and, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 87, of the New Rules of Court, to pay double the
memoranda have been filed by any of the parties, and the Court took time and value of said fruits upon failure to account and deliver same within thirty days
efforts in considering the said motions, oppositions, affidavit and counter- from receipt of this order.
affidavits.
SO ORDERED.
The Omnibus Motion of the heirs of Virgilio Valera dated October 13, 1966 seeks
to stay the writ of execution issued by this Court pursuant to the order dated April Bangued, Abra, January 4, 1967.
15, 1966 and relies upon an alleged compromise agreement entered into
between said heirs and the administratrix on May 21, 1966. (Sgd.) MACARIO M. OFILADA Judge

The Court is aware of attempts to a compromise agreement between the The heirs of Virgilio Valera filed a motion dated February 6, 1967 for the reconsideration of Judge
aforementioned parties. There is nothing however in the record of any amicable Ofilada's order of January 4, 1967. 9 The motion was denied in the order dated February 13,
settlement such as that required by the Court in its order dated June 26, 1965, 1967. 10 judge Ofilada in his order dated February 27, 1967 ordered another execution. 11
which required the parties 'to inform the court as soon as possible what
arrangement or settlement have been taken and arrived at by them.' The Court
has given the parties long time to agree and settle their differences, even taking The Deputy Provincial Sheriff levied upon the properties of the deceased Virgilio Valera and
time on Sundays to meet with them for this purpose and, until the present time, caused to be published a notice of auction sale also dated February 27, 1967 which reads in part
no such agreement by all the parties has been presented for the approval of the as follows: 12
Court. Certainly the alleged compromise agreement is not such agreement
especially when the administratrix takes vigorous exception citing facts of record 1. Of the goods and chattels of Celso Valera and the heirs of Virgilio Valera
and valid points of law which have not been sufficiently answered and explained. — the sum of Forty Thousand Three Hundred Twenty (P40,320.00) Pesos for
To allow the alleged oral compromise agreement in violation of fundamental rent due the estate together with interest thereon from April, 1945 (P25,200.00)
principles of law such as the time limit within which to file a petition for relief and for the principal at P1,200.00 per annum from April, 1945 to March, 1966, and
unsupported by the facts on record as cited by counsel for and administratrix P15,120.00 for interest due at six (6) per centum per annum), plus P100.00 a
would be to trifle with the administration of justice especially in this case which is month from April, 1966 with interest at six (6) per centum until date of payment
the oldest in this court and which has been pending for more than twenty years and delivery of the interest, of the estate in the property to the administratrix;
now. For these basic reasons, the Omnibus Motion of the heirs of Virgilio Valera
dated October 13, 1966 must be, as it is hereby, DENIED. 2. Of the goods and chattels of the heirs of Virgilio Valera —  the sum of Sixty
Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos representing double the value of undelivered
 fruits of the properties of the estate for 20 years from April, 1945 to October, As to the execution sale, the petitioners contend: (a) that the orders sought to be executed are
1965 or One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos per year, and the sum void; (b) that the probate court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution and that
of Nine Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Ninety Six Centavos the instant case is not among the exceptional cases wherein the probate court can authorize an
(P9,569.96), respresenting double the value of the undelivered insurance and execution, and (c) that execution for a money claim cannot be had against a decedent's estate.
war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera.
After a careful study of the arguments of the parties in their memoranda, reply, rejoinder and
The petitioners filed a motion dated March 15, 1967 to quash the writ of execution and for the surrejoinder, We find that, for the resolution of the case, it is not necessary to pass upon all those
suspension of the auction sale. 13 Judge Ofilada denied it in his order of April 1967. 14 The issues. The crucial issue in the last analysis is whether the lower court, sitting as a probate court
petitioners filed a motion dated March 31, 1967 to set aside the lower court's orders of April 15, in the intestate proceeding for the estate of Francisco Valera, could hold the heirs of Virgilio Valera
1966 and February 27, 1967 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process. 15 answerable for certain supposed monetary liabilities of the latter to the estate and enforce said
liabilities against the properties of the deceased Virgilio Valera.
On April 3, 1967, the dated when Judge Ofilada denied petitioners' motion to quash the writ of
execution, respondent Deputy Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale and sold to the estate of We hold that the trial court, as a probate court, erred in adjudging in the said intestate proceeding
Francisco Valera eighteen (18) parcels of land supposedly belonging to the deceased Virgilio the monetary liabilities of the late Virgilio Valera to the estate of Francisco Valera and in issuing a
Valera. The price was P92,337.00. 16 writ of execution against his properties to enforce the supposed liabilities.

The petitioners filed a motion dated April 11, 1967 for the reconsideration of the order of April 3, The controlling principle, which should govern this case, was announced by Justice Torres in 1907
1967. 17 Judge Ofilada denied it in his order of April 21, 1967. 18 in Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, a case which is on all fours with the instant case. This Court
ruled in that case:
On May 8, 1967 the petitioners, the heirs of Virgilio Valera (except two children who were abroad)
filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Ofilada, Mrs. Administrators or executors; Code of Civil Procedure; Heirs. — The heir legally
Bringas, the Provincial Sheriff and the Deputy Provincial Sheriff. Celso Valera was joined as a succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title but only after the
nominal party. The respondents were required to answer the petition. The Court directed that a liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication
writ of preliminary injunction should issue upon petitioners' posting a bond of P5,000.00. of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person
in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor
The petitioners assail the brief, three-sentence order of July 10, 1964 on the following grounds: (a) is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court. (Syllabus based
that it decided the issue of ownership as to the one-third pro-indiviso share of Francisco Valera in on page 77).
the Valera residence, an issue, which according to them, is beyond the court's probate jurisdiction;
(b) that it was issued without the benefit of a trial on the merits and without hearing all the parties In the Pavia  case, an action for damages was brought by Rafaela Pavia against Bibiana de la
involved; (c) that it does not contain findings of fact and law; (d) that it is a judgment for a money Rosa and Salud de la Rosa, as the only heirs of the deceased Jose de la Rosa. Rafaela Pavia
claim which should have been filed in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the claimed that she empowered Jose de la Rosa to administer the estate of Pablo Linart and that, as
deceased debtor, Virgilio Valera, and (e) that the order has no basis in substantive law. administrator, De la Rosa caused damages to the estate through his negligence. The De la Rosa
sisters contended that they could not be held liable for the negligent acts of their brother, Jose de
The petitioners attack Judge Ofilada's order of April 15, 1966 on the following grounds: (a) that, as la Rosa.
a probate judge, he had no jurisdiction to require the heirs of Virgilio Valera to account for the
fruits of the six parcels of land administered by him and that a separate action should be filed or This Court held that the action was not maintainable against the De la Rosa sisters and that it
the proper claim should be made against his estate; (b) that he had no jurisdiction to order the should be prosecuted against the executor or administrator of the estate of Jose de la Rosa.
heirs of Virgilio Valera to deliver to Mrs. Bringas the sum of P4,784.98 as "insurance and war Hence, the action was dismissed, reserving to Rafaela Pavia "the right to institute proper action
damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera"; (c) that Section 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court against the executor or administrator of the properties of the estate of the deceased Jose de la
contemplates that "double the value of the fruits and monies" should be recovered in an "action" Rosa".
and not in an intestate proceeding, and (d) that the order was issued without any trial on the merits
and it does not contain findings of fact and law. In the instant case, Mrs. Bringas sought to hold the heirs of the deceased Virgilio Valera liable for
his obligations to pay rentals and to account for the fruits of the properties forming part of the
The petitioners further contend that the orders of July 10, 1964 and April 15, 1966 are not estate of Francisco Valera and the war damage and insurance monies collected by Virgilio Valera.
enforceable by execution because they are incomplete and not precise as to the amounts The heirs of Virgilio Valera were dragged into the intestate proceeding for the purpose of holding
supposedly due from the judgment debtors. them liable for the amounts supposedly due from the deceased. As already noted, Mrs. Bringas
prayed for "an order directing the Sheriff to seize such properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs ...
as may be sufficient, to be sold according to law for the payment of double the value of the fruits The record reveals that there is a dispute between Mrs. Bringas and the heirs of Virgilio Valera as
and the amount of monies alienated and embezzled" (Annex "E" of Petition). Judge Ofilada to whether one-third of the Valera residence and the six parcels of land listed in the "Amended
specifically directed that the execution be issued "against the heirs of Virgilio Valera". The Deputy Incomplete Inventory, etc." dated August 31, 1965 20 belong to the estate of Francisco Valera. The
Sheriff literally followed that directive by levying upon "the goods and chattels of the heirs of tax declarations for those properties are in the name of the deceased Virgilio Valera.
Virgilio Valera".
Their inclusion in the inventory is not conclusive as to the ownership. "Questions on title to real
The procedure followed by the Sheriff was erroneous. The decedent's heirs are not liable property cannot be determined in testate or intestate proceedings. It has, however, been held that
personally for the debts of his debts. Thus, it was held: for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is not
It happens, however, that the plaintiffs are not under obligation to pay the debts conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to he instituted between the
of their late father, such as items (a), (f) and (h) of the counterclaim. It does not parties." 21 As stressed by Mr. Justice Zaldivar in Mangaliman vs. Gonzales, L-21033, December
appear that they personally bound themselves to pay them, and the mere fact 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462, the probate court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction.
that they are the deceased's heirs does not make them answerable for such
credits against their predecessor in interest, inasmuch as article 1003 of the Civil We have studied carefully respondents' memorandum and rejoinder. We have not found therein
Code is no longer in force, having been abrogated by certain provisions of the any citation of a rule or precedent which would justify the arbitrary and irregular procedure
Code of Civil Procedure (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, cited in Calma vs. followed by the lower court in determining the liability of a dead person without hearing the legal
Calma, 56 Phil. 102, 105). representative of his estate and in holding his heirs answerable for his supposed liabilities and
then enforcing those liabilities against his estate. Section 6(b), Rule 78 and Section 2, Rule 79 of
The error becomes more glaring in the light of Section 7, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which the Rules of Court assume that a creditor, as an interested person, may cause a debtor's estate to
allows execution in case of the death of a party only "where a party dies after the entry of the be placed under administration.
judgment or order". The implication is that if a person, before his death, or the legal representative
of his estate was never a party to a case, no execution can be issued against his properties after The cases of Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 and Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 62 O.G. 2621
his death. In this case, the Sheriff seems to have proceeded on the assumption that the properties cited by the respondents in page 19 of their rejoinder, refer to a living party, not to a decedent.
levied upon belonged to the deceased Virgilio Valera and that the said properties were in the
possession of his heirs. Without going into a more extensive and detailed discussion of the other irregularities committed
by the lower court, We believe that the jurisdictional errors already pointed out suffice to show that
Furthermore, there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot it acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the issuance of the writ
issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually of certiorari is warranted.
refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may
satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does WHEREFORE, the writ of execution and the Sheriff's execution sale on April 3, 1967 and all
not render any judgment enforceable by execution. proceedings relative thereto as well as the orders of July 10, 1964, April 15, 1966, January 4, April
3 and May 2, 1967 of the lower court, are declared void and are set aside, insofar as the heirs of
The circumstance that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue Virgilio Valera or his estate are concerned, without prejudice to the right of Adoracion Valera
execution (a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the Bringas to institute the proper action against the administrator of the estate of the estate of the late
decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Virgilio Valera and to file the appropriate claims in the proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
Rule 90), and (e) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate No pronouncement as to costs.
proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion
alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution. SO ORDERED.

With particular reference to the sum of P4,784.96, which represents the insurance and war
damage monies allegedly embezzled by Virgilio Valera, the lower court, sitting as a probate court,
had no jurisdiction to enforce, by execution, the payment of double the value of that amount. The
alleged embezzler was dead. Execution was not warranted under Sections 7 and 8, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court, which both refer, to a living person, meaning a person entrusted with a part of the
decedent's estate "by an executor or administrator", and to a person who committed
"embezzlement before letters (were) issued". Section 8 explicitly provides that the embezzler's
liability shall be determined in "an action", and not in the intestate proceeding. 19
RULE 88 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., the eldest son, as the judicial administrator without bond instead of
Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, the widow and ordered the issuance to him of letters of administration.
G.R. No. L-50526 December 4, 1991 In the same order, the Court of First Instance allowed him one year within which to dispose of the
estate and to pay the debts of the deceased. The letters of administration issued on April 11, 1977
gives Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., petitioner herein, full authority as Administrator of the estate of
CASIMIRO V. ARKONCEL, JR., in his capacity as the Administrator of the ESTATE OF Casimiro F. Arkoncel, to take possession of all the property of said deceased and to perform all
CASIMIRO F. ARKONCEL, petitioners, other acts necessary for the preservation of said property.
vs.
HON. ALFREDO J. LAGAMON, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Davao City, Branch I and
INVESTORS' FINANCE CORPORATION (FNCB), respondents. On July 5, 1977, the intestate court issued an order giving notice to all persons having money
claims against the decedent Casimiro F. Arkoncel, "arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses of
the last sickness of the said decedent, and judgment for money against him to file them in the
Office of the Clerk of Court within six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice"
in the Mindanao Mail, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Davao,
BIDIN, J.: wherein the notice wis to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks.

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking that the orders of respondent In compliance with the order of the intestate court, FNCB Finance, respondent herein, filed on
judge dated December 13, 1978 and January 12, 1979 in Special Case No. 2079, Court of First October 7, 1977 with the court a quo its claim against the estate for the payment of certain debts
Instance of Davao City, be declared null and void and set aside, with costs against the respondent incurred by the decedent during his lifetime, in the following amounts:
Investors' Finance Corporation (FNCB Finance).
Principal sum ..........................P44,438.00
The order dated December 13, 1978 reads:
Interests .....................................(to be
The Compromise Agreement forged between the Intestate of Casimiro F. Arkoncel, Sr., computed later at 14% p.a.)
represented by its administrator, Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., and the FNCB Finance
Corporation, having become final and executory, the motion for execution filed by the Attorney's fees ..........................11,109.50
plaintiff thru counsel should be, as it is hereby, granted.
Liquidated damages ...................4,443.38
WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution issue forthwith.
 
The order of January 12, 1979 denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner for lack of
merit. On January 9, 1978, petitioner herein, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Casimiro F.
Arkoncel and the claimant FNCB Finance, assisted by their respective counsels, entered into an
The antecedents of the case are as follows: amicable settlement, under the following terms and conditions:

The late Casimiro F. Arkoncel died intestate on July 20, 1976 at Davao City (his residence at the 1. That the Judicial Administrator admits the claim of herein claimant against the estate,
time of his death), leaving behind an estate with a probable value of about P241,020.00. On as follows:
November 24, 1976, a petition for letters of administration seeking, among others, for the
appointment of the widow Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel as administrator over the intestate estate of a) P44,438.00 — representing the outstanding principal balance of the Torana car
the deceased, was filed by one of the heirs, Nenita C. Valdez, and docketed as Special Case No. purchased for the use and benefit of the decedent Casimiro F. Arkoncel and financed by
2079 in the Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch I. All the other heirs manifested their herein claimant;
conformity to the appointment of the surviving spouse, Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel.
b) Interest on the outstanding principal balance from the date of default in the payment of
In the order dated April 1, 1977, the intestate Court * identified the heirs of the deceased Casimiro the latter on April 12, 1977 until fully paid at the rate of 14% per annum;
F. Arkoncel as Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, widow; Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., son; Florencio V.
Arkoncel, son; Maria V. Arkoncel, daughter; and Nenita Carpio Valdez, daughter, but appointed
c) Pll,109.50 or 25% of the outstanding principal balance as and for attomey's fees;
 d) Costs of and expenses in this suit in the amount of P200.00; The Third Division of the Court to which the case was transferred on May 30, 1988 (Rollo, p. 109)
resolved to note the manifestations of both parties in its Resolution of June 22, 1988.
2 That the claimant, with the conformity of its counsel, is willing to reduce, as it hereby
reduces, its claims for attorney's fees to 15% of the principal balance or to P6,665.70. The sole issue of the case is:
(Rollo, p. 35)
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
The intestate Court approved the amicable settlement in an order dated May 17, 1978, directing JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR THE
the parties to strictly comply with the terms thereof and the Judicial Administrator, "to pay the PAYMENT OF A DEBT IN AN ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. (Rollo, p. 76).
amounts agreed upon out of the estate finds and/or properties within 30 days from receipt" of the
said order (Rollo, p. 37). What transpired after the case was elevated to the Court in this instant  certiorari case is described
by the appellate Court in its decision in AC-G.R. No, 04426, as follows:
It appears that the Judicial Administrator, petitioner herein, was served thru counsel a copy of the
aforementioned order on September 17, 1978 but the claim of private respondent had remained ... Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, the administrator elevated the issue as
unpaid thirty (30) days after. Thus, on November 26, 1978 private respondent filed with the G.R. No. 50526, Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr. etc. v. Hon. Judge Alfredo G. Lagamon, etc. et
intestate court a motion for execution praying for the issuance of a writ of execution to satisfy its al., on certiorari with preliminary injunction to the Supreme Court which initially required
claims (Rollo, p. 39) which was opposed by petitioner (Rollo, p. 42). comments. Prior to the elevation, appellee filed motion for alias writ of execution. The
Supreme Court required comments, thereafter, the intestate court granted the motion for
Acting on the motion, respondent judge issued the questioned order of December 13, 1978 alias writ which was issued over the signature of the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a writ of execution. The motion for Davao of First Instance Clerk of Court.
reconsideration filed by petitioner on December 28, 1978 was denied by respondent judge for lack
of merit in an order dated January 12, 1979 holding that "the order of this Court dated May 17, Pursuant to the alias writ, the Davao Provincial Sheriff caused levy to be made on a piece
1979 approving the amicable settlement voluntarily entered into by the parties ... is a perfectly of property with an area of 1,136 square meters under TCT No. 2436 (T-1 339) which
valid order which was a decision in itself based on the compromise agreement" (Rollo, p. 57). forms part of the estate.
Hence, this petition filed with the Court by petitioner on May 15, 1979.
The Supreme Court gave due course but did not issue an injunction.
On July 9, 1979, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
The Provincial Sheriff thereafter sold the property at public auction at which the appellee
After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the Court declared the case was the highest bidder.
submitted for decision on September 28, 1979.
Before expiry of the redemption, the administrator filed this case for the declaration of
On March 7, 1988, the Court resolved to require the parties to move in the premises within 30 nullity of certain proceedings, damages and preliminary injunction ...
days from notice; otherwise the case shall be considered terminated and closed. In compliance
with the same Resolution, petitioner, on May 13, 1988, manifested that there exists no
supervening events (that have taken place in the interim) that may have rendered the case moot The aforementioned supervening events form the bases of the appeal made to the appellate court
and academic (Rollo, p. 96). Private respondent manifested that as matters stand, as between the but the third assigned error which is "that the trial court erred in not finding that a writ of execution
petitioner and the private respondent, the instant case is now ripe for disposition. It also brought to is not the property remedy/procedure to satisfy money claims or for the payment of debts before
the attention of the Court the fact that the issue in the instant case is one of the errors assigned by an intestate court in an administration proceedings" (Rollo, p. 104), is the same issue brought
the petitioner in his appeal from the decision in Civil Case No. 2079 to the Court of Appeals, which before the Court in this instant case. The appellate court, however, aware of the pending issue
was docketed and considered by the latter Court under AC-G.R. CV No. 04426, the two other before the Court, made no ruling on this issue. It simply declared:
issues being (a) that the trial court erred in not finding that the Officer-inCharge of the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Court a quo (formerly Davao Court of First Instance, Branch I) is not The issue in this error (sic) is squarely raised in G.R. No. 50526, supra, where decision
authorized by law to cause to be issued the controversial ahas writ of execution; and (b) that the still pends. Carefully mindful of the fact that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of
trial court erred in not finding that when a subject matter is pending before the Supreme Court, dispute, we refrain from passing judgment upon the issue brought up by this assigrunent.
such as the present petition for certiorari, the court a quo should refrain from issuing implementing As a matter of practice, it is more advisable in a situation like this one to defer to the
orders on the questioned subject-matter (Rollo, p. 99). Supreme Court. It is not inconceivable that our appreciation may run counter to the
Supreme Court decision in which event it will be for naught anyway. And, in any case,
whatever may be the ruling from this Court on the issue will provide no comfort to either
 the appellant or the appellees both of whom must await the Supreme Court decision on Conformably, the Judicial Administrator is hereby directed to pay out of the estate funds
the matter. (Rollo, p. 106). and/or properties the amounts agreed upon within 30 days from receipt hereof.

There is indeed a need for the Court to rule squarely on the issue. Nevertheless, petitioner Judicial Administrator chose not to comply with said order. Inasmuch as
the compromise agreement is part and parcel of the judgment and may, therefore, be enforced as
The Judicial Administrator voluntarily entered into an amicable settlement with the claimant FNCB such by a writ of execution, the respondent judge committed no reversible error in issuing the
Finance. He was not only assisted by counsel but the agreement itself was confirmed by the other questioned writ of execution.
heirs, the widow Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, Florencio V. Arkoncel and Maria V. Arkoncel
(Mesias). The other heir, Nenita C. Valdez, was represented by her Attorneyin-Fact David O. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
Montano who is at the same time counsel for the other heirs and the judicial administrator. The
agreement was submitted to the intestate court for approval and it was duly approved by the SO ORDERED.
court a quo in an order dated May l7, 1978 which incorporated the conditions therein. The court
approves a compromise agreement when not contrary to law, morals or public policy and renders
judgment in accordance therewith (Jose v. Cham Samco and Sons, Inc., 125 SCRA 142 [1983];
Alejandro v. Philippine Airlines, 127 SCRA 660 [1984]). In the instant case, judgment was
rendered in consonance with the compromise agreement and the parties were enjoined to comply
with and abide by its terms and conditions (Gravador v. Elbiuias, 126 SCRA 205 [1983]; G & S
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 212 [1983]; National Housing Authority v. Abaya, 129
SCRA 412 [19841).

There is no merit to the petition.

The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately
executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of fraud, mistake or
duress in which case an appeal may be taken against the order denying the motion (De Guzman
v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 730 [1985]; Zagata v. Jimenez, 152 SCRA 148 [1987]). It then
becomes ministerial for the lower court to order the execution of its final executory judgment.
(Service Specialists Incorporated v. Sheriff of Manila, 145 SCRA 139 [1986]; Landicho v.
Tensuan, 151 SCRA 410 [1987])

Even more than a contract which may be enforced by ordinary action for specific performance, the
compromise agreement is part and parcel of the judgment, and may therefore be enforced as
such by a writ of execution (Tria v, Lirag, 1 SC 1207 [1961]; Osmena v. Court of Agrarian
Relations, 17 SC 828 [1966]; Paredes v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 501 [1984])

Finally, when the terms of an amicable settlement are violated, as in the case at bar, the remedy
of the aggrieved party is to move for its execution (Valdez v. Octaviano, 1 SCRA 74 [961]; Parede
s v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 501 [1984]).

Petitioners claim that properties in custodia legis may not be the proper subject of a writ of
execution to satisfy a claim; that what private respondent could have done was to ask the Court a
quo for an order requiring the administrator to pay the debt and only if there are no sufficient funds
on hand to pay the debt may the court order the sale of the properties and out of the proceeds, to
pay the debt. This argument is untenable inasmuch as the dispositive portion of the very order
approving the amicable settlement directs the judicial administrator to pay the claim of FNCB
Finance out of the funds and/or properties of the estate, to wit:
RULE 88 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE subsequent pleadings. They pray that the Misericordia lot be turned over to said administratrices,
so that the charges which burden the estate (Estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando)
G.R. No. L-8235            March 19, 1914 "corresponding to the heir Dr. Jose L. Elchico may be satisfied therefrom, the balance to be
returned to his heirs." The administratrices claim that the obligations of the estate — consisting of
approved and pending claims in round figures, amount to almost P400,000.00 (which includes a
ISIDRO SANTOS, plaintiff-appellant, claim of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the balance of the estate and inheritance taxes, more
vs. or less in the sum of P135,000.00 as of February 13, 1961); that of the amount of P230,000.00,
LEANDRA MANARANG, administratrix, defendant-appellee. proceeds of the sale of the Angat transportation business, nothing was turned over to the estate of
Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando for the payment of Jose L. Elchico's obligations in said
REPEAT CASE FROM RULE 86 estate; that Jose L. Elchico had no other property except the Misericordia lot; that should the sale
of said lot be finally effected, the proceeds thereof could be hidden and dissipated and the estate
of Jose L. Elchico would not then be in a position to comply with the latter's commitment in
paragraph 3 of the partial partition and distribution of March 19, 1958, approved by the court as
RULE 88 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE aforesaid, viz:

G.R. No. L-18937             May 16, 1967 Par. 30. — That the above distribution shall not in any manner affect the sufficiency or
insufficiency for the payment of any outstanding and/or future obligations and/or
expenses of the remaining estate and which are not, in any manner, related to the above
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ENCARNACION ELCHICO VDA. DE FERNANDO deceased
enumerated properties to be distributed. However, in the remote event that such
NATIVIDAD E. IGNACIO and LEONOR E. ALMAZAN, administratrices-appellants,
contingencies will arise, the heirs shall all be bound to contribute equally in the payment
vs.
of said obligations and/or expenses of the estate;
EDUARDO ELCHICO and FLORENCIO ELCHICO, co-administrators of the Estate of the
Deceased Jose L. Elchico, oppositors-appellees.
but that the two other heirs of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando are solvent "and can meet
their respective shares of the obligations as they arise."
SANCHEZ, J.:
The administrators of Jose L. Elchico opposed the motion. They say that the proper procedure to
Major heirs, so-called, of the deceased Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, are: Jose Elchico,
be followed in the premises is outlined in Section 6, Rule 89 of the 1940 Rules of Court. They aver
Salud Elchico Reyes and Natividad Elchico Ignacio. On March 19, 1956, in the intestate
that the Manila probate court has no jurisdiction over the Misericordia lot which is under the control
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the said deceased Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de
of the Rizal probate court in two special proceedings, testate and intestate, of the deceased Jose
Fernando,1 the three (3) heirs submitted a "joint petition for partial partition and distribution" of the
L. Elchico. They point to the surety bond of P150,000.00, claim at that time that the same was
estate. This was approved by the Manila probate court on April 3, 1956, upon a bond of
sufficient to meet the obligations of the estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando.
P150,000.00 to answer for the obligations of the estate. This bond was filed on May 11, 1956. In
consequence, the three (3) heirs entered into the possession of their corresponding shares set
forth in the partial partition. To Jose L. Elchico went the Angat transportation business as well as a On May 12, 1961, the Manila probate court (Sp. Proc. 25256), acting upon the motion and
parcel of land located on Misericordia Street, Manila. oppositions, issued the following order:

Thereafter, Jose L. Elchico, one of the heirs, died. Settlement of his estate is pending in a  different After considering the motion filed on March 16, 1961, by the administratrices and it
court, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in two special proceedings, one testate and the other appearing that the opposition filed on April 5, 1961, by Eduardo Elchico, the opposition
intestate.2 filed on April 13, 1961, by Florencio Elchico, and the supplemental opposition filed on
April 13, 1961, by Eduardo Elchico are well-taken the Court hereby denies the motion
under consideration.
In June, 1959, the Angat transportation business was sold by appellees Eduardo Elchico and
Florencio Elchico, the co-administrators of Jose L. Elchico, upon the authority of the Rizal probate
court given in an order of April 29, 1959. The Misericordia property remains under the This proceeding is hereby set for hearing on June 1, 1961, at 8:30 a.m. for the purpose of
administration of Jose L. Elchico's co-administrators. In the court order just mentioned, the Rizal determining how much and in what manner heir Jose L. Elchico (now deceased) shall
probate court also granted authority to sell the Misericordia property. contribute for the payment of the unsettled and unpaid creditors' claims and taxes.

Came the motion of appellants-administratrices of the intestate estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. The move to reconsider was rejected by the said court in its order of June 29, 1961.
de Fernando of March 16, 1961, filed with the Manila probate court, which was supplemented by
The case is now before us on the administratrices' appeal from the last two named orders. Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando, deceased). The Misericordia property is now  in custodia
legis of another court, namely, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, acting as a probate court in two
1. Section 6, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court, 3 reads: special proceedings (2598, In re Testate Estate of Jose L. Elchico, deceased, and 2600, In
re Intestate Estate of Jose L. Elchico, deceased). The Rizal and Manila courts are coordinate.
They stand on the same level. The Manila court then may not take that property out of the
SEC. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or heirs have been in administration proceedings in the Rizal court, without leave or consent of the latter. Should such
possession. — Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into possession of interference be sanctioned, confusion may ensue; the administration of justice may be seriously
portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid, and impaired. At least out of respect for the prerogatives of the Rizal court, the Manila court should not
have become liable to contribute for the payment of such debts and expenses, the court intermeddle with the authority of the former. This is especially true here because the Rizal probate
having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the court had already directed the sale of the very same Misericordia property to satisfy amongst
amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person others the payment of Jose L. Elchico's share in the estate and inheritance taxes due from the
shall contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require. estate of the deceased Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando. The Manila probate court may not
nullify this order of the Rizal probate court — directly or indirectly. 7
Concededly, in the situation here presented, where partial partition and distribution were effected,
it is within the power of the Manila probate court to issue the order of May 12, 1961 heretofore Upon the record, we vote to affirm the orders appealed from. Costs against appellants. So
transcribed. In fact, said disputed order of May 12, 1961 closely hewed the line set forth in Section ordered.
6 of Rule 88. For, the court in denying the motion to have the Misericordia property turned over to
the estate, set the proceedings for hearing precisely "for the purpose of determining how much
and in what manner heir Jose L. Elchico (now deceased) shall contribute  for the payment of the
unsettled and unpaid creditors' claims and taxes."

The court's statutory authority conceded, we next look into the question of whether there was
reversible abuse of discretion. The record of this case discloses that there is nothing definite as to
the total liabilities of the estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando. And, naturally, Jose L.
Elchico's share in those obligations is unknown, indefinite. Again, while it is true that the
administratrices aver that the only remaining property of the estate is a "piece of unsurveyed and
untitled mineral land the value of which is unknown and on the security of which no one is willing
to advance a loan," this remains but an allegation. And then, too, there is the P150,000.00-bond to
answer for the debts of Encarnacion's estate. On the assumption that the share in the obligation
corresponding to Jose L. Elchico is finally cleared up after the projected hearing, 4 then the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 88, once again comes into focus, because his obligation to contribute
becomes definite. The probate court, under this statute, may then order that a writ of execution
issue to compel the three (3) heirs to pay their respective shares in the obligation thus apportioned
to the extent, of course, of the properties that they received from the estate. 5 And, such execution
is an expedient remedy.6 Furthermore, once the total, obligation of Jose L. Elchico is known after
hearing, the Manila probate court is not precluded from taking other steps towards the satisfaction
of his said obligation. Without such hearing, any order for the return of property distributed may
appear to be premature. More, the administratrices, could easily go to the Rizal probate court for
the protection of Encarnacion's estate's claim against the estate of the deceased Jose L. Elchico
pending there.

In the posture thus presented, we are unprepared to say that the Manila probate court committed
a grave abuse of discretion, which is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Citation of jurisprudence is unnecessary to show that this Court
should not interfere with the disputed order of May 12.

2. Another roadblock will prevent the grant of the administratrices motion. That motion was filed in
Special Proceedings 25256 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Intestate Estate of
RULE 88 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y 1287-C del Catastrado de Talisay, Negros
Occidental), situadas en el Municipio de Talisay, Provincia de Negros Occidental,
G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992 I.F., el resto de mis acciones en la Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (unas
2,860 acciones) y de la Financing Corporation of the Philippines (unas 53,636
acciones), registradas a mi nombre y no heredadas de mi difunta madre Dña.
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS L. Enrica A. Vda. de Lizares, mis acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia Milling
VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners, Co., Inc., Negros Navigation Co. y otras Compañas Mineras, y todos los demas
vs. bienes no mencionados en este testamento y que me pertenezcan en la fecha
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, de mi muerte, se adjudiquen, como por el presente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta.
Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Eusaquia Lizares, hija de mi difunto hermano Don Simplicio Lizares cuidados
Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents. que mi citada sobrina me ha prestado y signe prestandome hasta ahora.
Ordeno, sin embargo, a mi referida sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992 haga cargo de pagar todas las obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre las
propriedades adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi citada sobrina que
ROLDOFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the ESTATE OF ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada año en sufragio de mi alma, y
EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners, misas ordinarias en sufragio de las almas de mi difunto Padre y de mi difunta
vs. Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 de Deciembre de cada año, respectivamente, y
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. mande celebrar todos los años la fiesta de San Jose en Talisay como lo hago
DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE GUINTO, respondents. hasta ahora. En el caso de que mi citada sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares,
falleciere sin dejar descendientes legitimos, ordeno y dispongo que mi
participacion consistente en una sexta parte (1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang, con su
ROMERO, J.: correspondiente cuota de azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas
y hermano antes mencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied)
These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders 1 dated September 20, 1976, January 7, 1977
and January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch, IV On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving said "testamento" in
respectively, cancelling the notice of lis pendens filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. with the the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares. 3 On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated a petition for the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of
September 20, 1976 filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., and holding in abeyance the First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452. 4
resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss.
The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been made, in due course,
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: the probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and appointing Eustaquia as the
executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. 5
On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento" 2 which contains
among its provisions, the following: On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6 which was granted by the probate court in
an order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees
DECIMA — Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and
una tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14) avas partes proindivisas de la Hda. usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to each and
Minuluan, que he adquirido mediante permuta de mi hermano Dr. Antonio A. every one of them, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and Bacolod City to
Lizares, se adjudique, como por el presente se adjudica, a mi sobrina Eustaquia effect the corresponding transfer of the real properties to said heirs as well as the transfer of
Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE, sin embargo, que en el caso de que mi citada shares, stocks, and dividends in different corporations, companies and partnerships in the name
sobrina Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera o sin descendientes legitimos, mi of Maria Lizares to the heirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria
referida participacion en la Hda. Minuluan se adjudicara a mi hermano Antonio Lizares. 7
A. Lizares que me sobrevivan.
Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some
UNDECIMA — Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de todas mis properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her.  8 The
propiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones, derechos e intereses (no Court granted the motion and correspondingly reopened the testate proceedings. It adjudicated to
dispuestos mas arriba) an las Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439, 403, 1273, Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota
1274, 1278, 1279 y 1280 del Catastro de Talisay, Negros Occidental), y "Matab-
allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any their rights under Rule 14, Section 24 of Rules of Court
other person in her last will and testament. 9 by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. 17

On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio, As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo
Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint administrators for brevity), filed a motion to dismiss alleging
Lizares executed an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co- that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case; the cause of action
ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of plan SWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral was barred by prior judgment, and the complaint stated no cause of action. 18 This motion was
Survey of Talisay covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005; T-65006, T- opposed by the plaintiffs.
65007, and T-65008. 10
On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation of the notice of  lis
A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without any descendant. 11 In pendens on the contentions that there existed exceptional circumstances which justified the
due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint administrators of Eustquia's cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and that no prejudice would be caused to the
intestate estate. plaintiffs. 19 The latter opposed said motion. The defendants having filed a reply thereto, the
plaintiffs filed a rejoinder reiterating their arguments in their opposition to the motion for
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of cancellation of notice of lis pendens.  20
Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko,
Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter collectively referred to as On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion for cancellation of
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once notice of lis pendens.  21 The court simultaneously held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to
again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute dismiss the complaint.
administrator be appointed; that the order dated January 8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended
by declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639. 22 Thereafter,
which form an aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. 23 Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et
after such amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective certificates of title, the al. vigorously opposed said motion. 24
order of probate and a "declaration" that movants are the heirs of said properties, and
correspondingly issue new certificates of title in their names. 12
On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying for the
reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976. 25 The joint administrators having filed an
Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely: Socorro L. Vda. de opposition thereto, 26 on January 7, 1977 the lower court denied the aforesaid motion for
Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo, and Aurora Lizares Wagner opposed reconsideration. 27 It held that while a notice of lis pendens would serve as notice to strangers that
the aforesaid motion. They alleged that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate a particular property was under litigation, its annotation upon the certificates of title to the
estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the properties involved was not necessary because such properties, being in custodia legis, could not
testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and void. 13 just be alienated without the approval of the court. Moreover, the court added, a notice of lis
pendens would prejudice any effort of the estate to secure crop loans which were necessary for
On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate proceedings the viable cultivation and production of sugar to which the properties were planted.
and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem, the judgment
therein is binding against the whole world. It observed that inspite of the fact that the movants Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in this Court a motion for
knew that the court had jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. Docketed as G.R No. L-45425, the
they appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the court concluded, even if the said order was petition contends that the grounds of lis pendens, namely, that the properties are in custodia
erroneous, and since the error was not jurisdictional, the same could have been corrected only by legis and the lending institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are not the legal
a regular appeal. The period for filing a motion for reconsideration having expired, the court opined grounds provided for under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court for the cancellation of a notice
that the movants could have sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but of lis pendens.
unfortunately for the movants, the period for filing such remedy had also elapsed. 14
Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that since on September
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. It was denied 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss, it was also proper to
on June 17, 1974. 15 Hence, on October 14, 1974, the said movants filed a complaint for recovery suspend the resolution of the affirmative defenses interposed by the defendants until after trial on
of ownership and possession of real property against the joining administrators of the estate of the merits of the case. Accordingly, the court set the date of pre-trial for March 24, 1977. 28
Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 11639 with the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV. 16 On the same date, they availed of
On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition for  certiorari, prohibition them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment
and/or mandamus  with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L- of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
45965. Petitioners contend that the lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it
involves the interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the adjudication of Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza,  33 and Torres v. Encarnacion,  34 the Court
her properties. They assert that the matter had been settled in Special Proceedings No. become said:
final and unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had become final
and unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and therefore, the
cause of action in the latter case was barred by the principle of res judicata. They aver that the . . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the
claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares, over the properties left by most logical authority to effectuate this provision, within the estate proceeding,
their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function
because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring
claim, conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said the parties to undergo the incovenience and litigate an entirely different action.
provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil code, they constitute an
invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the jurisdiction to
settle the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of the properties, are worth
On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the lower court from mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v. Gerona,  35 and Benedicto v. Javellana, 36 this Court said:
further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 11639. 29 After both G.R. Nos. L-45425 and L-
45965 had been given due course and submitted for decision, on January 20, 1986, the two cases . . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication
were consolidated. thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in
a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided
The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit. within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same
judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance
of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties. . . .
probated. 30 The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is (Emphasis supplied)
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. 31 The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 32 determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled . . .. 37 A project of partition is
merely a proposal for the distribution of the heredity estate which the court may accept or reject. It
is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled
Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is Section 1, Rule 90 of thereto. 38
the Rules of Court which reads:
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. —  When the debts, funeral Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January 8, 1971, a project of partition in
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and which the parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included as
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have property of the estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In
been paid, the court, on application of the executor or administrator, or of a accordance with said project of partition which was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on
proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand November 28, 1972, whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550,
and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any 514, 553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-
other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before 65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts taken altogether show that the Lizares sisters
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy thereof.
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above- guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed
mentioned has been made or  provided  for, unless the distributees, or any of to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit
him. 39 Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that that there is a similarity of parties in Special Proceedings No. 8452 and Civil Case No. 11639, the
the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition judicial administrators of Eustaquia being privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.; there is identity
barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and of subject matter involved in both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is
jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition.  40 The identity of causes of action because in the first action there was a declaration of the probate court
question of private respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the partition in its order dated April 6, 1974 that although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution
and became a closed matter. in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for
it to be valid, had not been satisfied. 45
The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint, Civil Case No. 11639,
that Eustaquia had been in possession of the questioned lots since March 2, 1971 up to the time Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No. 11639, the contention of
of her death indicates that the distribution pursuant to the decree of partition has already been Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate
carried out. Moreover, it cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the estate of Maria Lizares 46 is not meritorious. While the allegation of the joint administrators that
reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary
order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory, then reglementary period of substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose
thirty (30) days having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et
filed by them. Therefore, they cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of the al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.
properties left by will of Maria Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of the
very same properties subject of such partition. It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir
should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the
estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. 47 In this case, the
for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem,  unless properly set instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution
aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon
and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes Eustaquia. Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of
irrelevant. 41 Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy.

It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of public policy, that at With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties involved, there is no
the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., that the lower court acted contrary to law
by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object of which the courts were constituted and/or gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The cancellation of
was to put an end to controversies." 42 The only instance where a party interested in a probate such a precautionary notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by the court
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances having jurisdiction over it at any given time. 48 Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper motion within the molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be caused it to be recorded." 49 In this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on
for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle the principal reason that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the
properties long ago distributed and disposed of. 43 supervision of the court and the said properties are under custodia legis. Therefore, such notice
was not necessary to protect the rights of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this case
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to where it turned out that their claim to the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal basis.
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari  in L-45425 is hereby DENIED but the petition
has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive for certiorari  and prohibition and/or mandamus  in L-45965 is GRANTED. The temporary
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 44 restraining order of April 26, 1977 which was issued by the Court in L-45965 is made
PERMANENT. Costs against the petitioners in L-45425.
All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order approving the
distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in said will has become final and SO ORDERED.
unappealable; the probate court that rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the parties; the judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a proceeding in rem that was
directed against the whole world including Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., so that it can be said
RULE 88 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE writs of execution issued against them by virtue of said order; and (c) to order the
suspension of the execution of the said order of November 4, 1932, until this case is
G.R. No. 43351             February 26, 1937 finally decide.

Intestate estate of the deceased Baldomero Cosme. In the discussion of the foregoing assignment of error in their brief (pp. 9-23), the appellants take
ROSARIO COSME DE MENDOZA, administratrix-appellee, in six propositions. One question, however, — that of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
vs. Laguna to order the execution of the administrator's bond — is decisive of this appeal. Appellants,
JANUARIO PACHECO and RAYMUNDO CORDERO, sureties-appellants. sureties upon the bond, press the point that the order in suit is an absolute nullity for lack of power
in the issuing court. "In vain," they tell us, "have we searched our statute books, especially the part
of our Code of Civil Procedure regarding probate jurisdiction, to find whether our Courts of First
LAUREL, J.: Instance, acting as probate courts, have the power to order the execution of an administrator's
bond." Neither their failure to assail that jurisdiction when they ought nor the subsequent
The facts in this case are not disputed. Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of affirmance of the order by this court, they say, could revive an order dead from its inception.
Baldomero Cosme in civil case No. 5494, Court of First Instance of Laguna. To assure faithful
performance of his duties as such administrator, he filed a bond for P5,000, with the herein To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to select an administrator of the estate of a
appellants, Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero, as sureties. Soriano's account, upon deceased person (Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 46 Phil., 726, 727). Before an administrator, or an
approval, showed him indebted to the estate in the sum of P23,603.21. Unable to turn this amount executor, enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration are
over to the estate upon demand of Rosario Cosme, the new administratrix, the lower court ordered issued, the person to whom they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as
the execution of his bond on November 4, 1932, after notice duly served upon the sureties. the court directs, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of
Sometime later, the court approved a settlement had between the adminstratrix and the ex- his trust (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 643, 662). The administrator is accountable on his bond
administrator, whereby the latter ceded certain real properties to the estate reducing on that along with the sureties for the performance of certain legal obligations. (Tan vs. Go Chiong Lee,
account his indebtedness to the estate from P23,603.21 to P5,000. As to this last amount, "La 46 Phil., 200, 205. See also, Stovall vs. Banks, 10 Wall., 583, 588; 19 Law. ed., 1036;
administradora se atiene a la orden de ejecucion de la fianza suscrita por los fiadores Januario Long vs. O'Fallon, 19 How., 116; 15 Law. ed., 550.)
Pacheco y Raymundo Cordero" (Record on Appeal, p. 2). Subsequently, the administratrix had
the public sale thereof to collect this amount of P5,000. Separate motions to he discharged from
the bond were filed by sureties Pacheco and Cordero. Both motions were denied. A motion by It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require
Cordero to reconsider the order of denial met a like fate. Brought on appeal to this court, the the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any
appeal was dismissed. The dispositive part of the decision of this court (G. R. No. 40998, Cosme breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the
de Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero [60 Phil., 1057]) reads as follows: administrator's bond and over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate
proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the
very purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so many
The motion of October 1, 1933, was filed only on behalf of Raymundo Cordero who filed words that such court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and
no motion for reconsideration of the order of execution of November 4, 1932, and took no logical implication, the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term.
appeal therefrom. Being of the opinion that the trial court correctly held that said order When the accountability of an administrator's bond is spoken of in the very provisions dealing with
had become final, the motion of October 31, 1933, for reconsideration (if such it may be and bearing directly on administration proceedings, it would involve a strained construction to
called) came too late. The judgment is therefore affirmed with costs against the hold, as appellants would have us do, that where an administrator is held liable for a devastravit
appellants. for having squandered and misapplied property which he was in duty bound to marshal and
conserve, the estate is without a remedy to go against the administrator's bond in the same
When the case was remanded to the lower court, the sureties filed a motion challenging, for the probate proceedings, but in an action outside of and separate from it. In this connection, it should
first time, the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order of November 4, 1932, executing the be observed that section 683 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of
bond. The trial court denied the motion in view of the decision of this court. The case is elevated the account of an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable as surety in
here for the second time on appeal. respect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting, and
may have the right to appeal as hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a person who may
Appellants assign the following error: be held liable as surety in respect to an administrator's account the right, upon application, to be
admitted as a party to their accounting, from which we may not unreasonably infer that a surety,
like the appellants in the case before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond during the
The lower court erred in refusing: (a) To declare null and void its order of execution of the process of accounting, that is, within the recognized confines of probate proceedings, and not in
ex-administrator's bond of November 4, 1932, as well as the writs of execution issued in an action apart and distinct from such proceedings.
virtue thereof; (b) to accordingly vacate said order of November 4, 1932, and order the
release of the properties of the herein sureties-appellants attached in pursuance of the
Appellants in their brief direct our attention to several cases decided by this court holding that in the case referred to. We cannot encourage a practice that trenches violently upon the settled
Courts of First Instance, as probate courts, have no power to adjudicate on claims of other jurisprudence of this court that the policy and purpose of administration proceedings is ". . . to
persons on property forming part of the estate, by title adverse to the deceased (Guzman vs. Anog close up, and not to continue an estate . . ." (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil., 124, 133),
and Anog, 37 Phil., 61, 62); on the legal usufruct of the widow (Sahagun vs. De Gorosita, 7 Phil., and that ". . . the State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for
347, 351), and on the validity of testamentary dispositions (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, the division and distribution of the property of a decedent is so cumbersome, unwidely and
428). We have carefully examined these cases in relation to the facts and circumstances of the expensive that a considerable portion of the sate is absorbed in the process of such division.
case at bar. We take the view, however, that the execution of an administrator's bond, unlike the Where administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished consumes any considerable
questions involved in the cited cases, clearly stands upon a different footing, and is as necessary portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure. . . ." (McMicking vs. Sy
a part and incident of the administration proceeding as the filing of such bond or the fixing of its Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211, 220.)
amount. Particularly is this true in the present case where Soriano's indebtedness to the sate in
the amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to P5,000, is conceded on all sides, and all that The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
the trial court had to do was to see that said amount was turned over to the estate.

It is the duty of courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estates of the deceased person
by intervening in the administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury that may be
done thereto (Dariano vs. Fernandez Fidalgo, 14 Phil., 62, 67; Sison vs. Azarraga, 30 Phil., 129,
134). "Probate and like courts have a special jurisdiction only, and their powers as to ancillary or
incidental questions must of necessity to exercise within certain limitations; but such powers
include the right to try questions which arise incidentally in a cause over which such courts have
jurisdiction and the determination of which are necessary to a lawful exercise of the powers
expressly conferred in arriving at a decision. . . . There seems, however, to be a general tendency,
in the absence of express and specific restrictions to the contrary, to uphold the exercise by these
court of such incidental powers as are, within the purview of their grant of authority, reasonably
necessary to enable them to accomplish the objects for which they were invested with jurisdiction
and to perfect the same. And it has been held that statutes conferring jurisdiction on such courts,
being remedial and for the advancement of justice, should receive a favorable construction, such
as will give them the force and efficiency intended by the legislature." (15 C. J., 813, 814.) The
tendency in the United States indeed has been towards the enlargement of the powers of probate
courts. In the beginning these courts were possessed but limited powers. Having originated from
the ecclesiastical courts of England, their jurisdiction, following their English patterns was
practically limited to the probate of wills, the granting of administrators, and the suing for legacies
(Plant vs. Harrion, 74 N. Y. Sup., 411, 441; 36 Misc. Rep., 649; Chadwick vs. Chadwick, 13 Pac.,
385, 388; 6 Mont., 566; 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 95-98). But, though they still are often unadvisedly
described, particularly in Connecticut (Griffin vs. Pratt, 3 Conn., 513), as courts of limited, inferior
or special jurisdiction, they have outgrown their limitations and have become courts with
considerably increased powers (Woerner, The American Law of Administration [2d], sec. 145;
Plant vs. Harrison, supra).

What has been said sufficiently determinative of the appeal before us. We wish, however, to say a
word on a salutary consideration of policy which has been invariably followed by this court in
cases of this nature. We refer to the dispatch and economy with which administration of the
estates of deceased persons should be terminated and settled. It will be recalled that the
appellants could have raised the question of jurisdiction now pressed upon us in civil case No.
5494 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and on appeal of that case to this court once before
(G. R. No. 40998 [60 Phil., 1057]). They not failed to avail of that right but failed to appeal from the
order complained of (Vide, Decision of this court in G. R. No. 40998, Cosme de
Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero). The questions raised in the appeal at bar, appellant's second
attempt to go about and frustrate the order in question, could have been passed upon once for all
RULE 88 PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his objections to the motions.
Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to
G.R. No. L-15445             April 29, 1961 him and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under
express authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold
summarily upon a simple petition.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES CANO.
FLORANTE C. TIMBOL, administrator-appellee,
vs. The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling the objections of Jose Cano, in the
JOSE CANO, oppositor-appellant. order now subject of appeal, which reads:

LABRADOR, J.: The said contract of lease is on all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, — a new provision, — "the persons disqualified to buy referred to in
articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Hon. Arsenio Santos, presiding, therein," and under article 1491 (3) o the same Code, executors and administrators
dated August 25, 1958, approving petitions of the administrator Florante C. Timbol dated January cannot acquire by purchase the property of the estate under administration.
6 and 8, 1958. The order appealed from authorizes the administrator to increase the area of a
subdivision to be formed out of the lands under administration from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and approves the plan of such increased area. If, as already stated, Florante C. Timbol was only pointed administrator on June 6, 1957
and the said contract of lease having been executed on July 9, 1956, the same fall within
the prohibition provided by law. However, Jose C. Cano avers that this Court, in the
The intestate Mercedes Cano died in August, 1945, leaving as her only heir her son Florante C. instant proceedings, cannot pass upon the legality of the aforesaid lease contract, but in
Timbol then only 11 years old. On September 27, 1946, Jose Cano, brother of the intestate, was its general jurisdiction. There is no need for the court to declare such contract illegal and,
appointed administrator. On April 13, 1951 Jose Cano, filed a petition, thru his counsel Atty. therefore, null and void as the law so expressly provides.
Filemon Cajator, also an uncle of the minor Florante C. Timbol, proposing that the agricultural
lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this
rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues to the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations the court hereby grants Florante
government. Judge Edilberto Barot, then presiding the court, approved the motion in an order C. Timbol's petitions date January 6 and 8, 1958, approving the amended plan for sub
dated April 27, 1951, which reads: division, attached thereto, and overrules Jose C. Cano's motion for reconsideration dated
May 9, same year. (pp. 151-152 Record on Appeal) The above is the subject of the
present appeal.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the administrator and his lawyer dated April 13,1951, is
hereby granted under the conditions therein set forth and the further condition that all
previous obligations of the administration including the previous deficits are assumed by The above is the subject of the present appeal.
said administrator, and that the arrangement will continue only as long as, in the judgment
of contageous to the heir, the Court, the same continues to be advantageous to the heir, In the first assignment of error appellant claims that the consideration of the motions of the
Florante C. Timbol. (p. 27, Rec. on Appeal) administrator July 6 and 8, 1958, without due notice to him, who is lessee is a violation of the
Rules of Court. This objection lost its force when the court, motu proprio set aside it first order of
On January 14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the conformity of the minor approval and furnished copy of the motion to appellant and gave him all the opportunity to present
heir and his uncles, approved the reduction of the annual rental of the agricultural lands of the his objections thereto.
intestate leased to the administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of
the agricultural lands into a subdivision. In the second and third assignments of error appellant argues that the court below, as a probate
court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his rights under the lease, because these
On April 2, 1957, upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was approved, rights may be annulled or modified only by a court of general jurisdiction. The above arguments
designating Florante C. Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all the properties of the intestate. are without merit. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent
(Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any
qualified applicant (Id., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and
On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano and on approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful
January 6, 1958 he presented a motion, which he modified ina subsequent one of January 8, debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90,
1958, alleging among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision be Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been
increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. The held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and
motions were approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside to give opportunity
see that it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose, court, to take steps to get back the lands leased from the appellant herein, or so much thereof as
G.R. No. L-8152.) . is needed in the course of administration.

Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the intestate The court order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the probate court
has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of
the lease. The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to
the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the
contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on
appeal; but not because the court may make an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to
control acts of administration of the administrator.

In the fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the effect of the reduction of the area
under lease would be to deprive the tenants of appellant of their landholdings. In the first place,
the tenants know ought to know that the lands leased are lands under administration, subject to be
sold, divided or finally delivered to the heir, according to the progress of the administration of the
lands of the intestate. The order appealed from does not have the effect of immediately depriving
them of their landholdings; the order does not state so, it only states that the lands leased shall be
reduced and subdivided. If they refuse to leave their landholdings, the administrator will certainly
proceed as the law provides. But in the meanwhile, the lessee cannot allege the rights of his
tenants as an excuse for refusing the reduction ordered by the court.

In the fifth assignment of error, appellant claims that his rights as lessee would be prejudiced
because the land leased would be reduced without a corresponding reduction in the rentals. This
would be a matter to be litigate between the administrator and himself before the probate court.
But the fact of the prejudice alone cannot bar reduction of the land leased, because such
reduction is necessary to raise funds with which to pay and liquidate the debts of the estate under
administration.

The sixth assignment of error merits no attention on our part; it is appellant himself who, as
administrator since 1945, has delayed the settlement of the estate.

In the seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of partition had already
been approved and had become final, the lower court has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new
administrator or to authorize the enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision. This
assignment of error needs but a passing mention. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the
estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as such heir.

We have taken pains to answer all the arguments adduced by the appellant on this appeal. But all
said arguments are squarely laid to naught by the declaration of the court that the lease of the
agricultural lands of the estate to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the
lease was granted, is null and void not only because it is immoral but also because the lease by
the administrator to himself is prohibited by law.(See Arts. 1646 and 1491, Civil Code of the
Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the court below that the lease is null and void, which
declaration we hereby affirm, it would seem proper for the administrator under the direction of the
RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF of the hearing of the motion, her codefendants who had themselves authorized her by means of a
DECEDENT power of attorney, opposed the motion through their attorneys, Francisco and Lualhati, on the
ground that there were higher bidders and the best thing to do was to sell it at public auction; ( e)
that in view of this opposition, the administratrix asked the court that it be sold at public auction,
G.R. No. L-16584             November 17, 1921 and the court authorized said defendant to sell it at public auction, advertising the sale in
newspapers of general circulation, and the aforesaid dredge was sold for P10,000, accordingly;
EUSEBIO A. GODOY, plaintiff-appellee, ( f ) that the defendant did not at any time refuse to make delivery of the dredge to the plaintiff, but
vs. that it was the court that would not give her the authority to do so; and (g) that she is all times
GUILLERMO ORELLANO, ET AL., defendants. ready to return the P1,000 received from the plaintiff and that she has tendered it several times,
FELISA PAÑGILINAN, PAZ ORELLANO assisted by her husband FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, but that the plaintiff refused to accept it.
JOSE ORELLANO, and DEMETRIO ORELLANO, defendants-appellants.
The judge a quo  rendered judgment, ordering the defendants to pay Eusebio A. Godoy the sum of
P2,000 with legal interest thereon from February 13, 1919, and the cost and dismissing the
complaint as against the defendants Guillermo Orellano and Alfredo Orellano.
VILLAMOR, J.:
From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this court by bill of exceptions.
On January 13, 1919, in consideration of the amount of P1,000 received by the appellant, Felisa
Pañgilinan, a document was executed by her giving the appellee, Eusebio A. Godoy, an option to By a resolution of this court of September 14, 1920, the appeal of the defendants Paz Orellano,
buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appears from that document that the dredge is the Jose Orellano and Demetrio Orellano was declared abandoned for failure to file their brief within
common property of the vendor and of the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo, and Paz, the period prescribed by the rules of the court. Wherefore, this decision concerns only the appeal
all surnamed Orellano; that the condition was that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge taken by Felisa Pañgilinan.lawphil.net
within twenty days; and that said option was granted in accordance with the power of attorney
executed by her coowners who reserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, or option It appears from the evidence that the dredge in question belongs to the intestate estate of Julio
granted by Pañgilinan, their attorney-in-fact. The latter's coowners did not ratify the option Orellano, father of the defendants, which was pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, of
contract. Before the expiration of twenty days, the appelle was ready to make complete payment which the judicial administratrix is the defendant herein, Felisa Pañgilinan; that when this
of the price, but the appellant failed to deliver the dredge. Then the appellee brought suit in the defendant contracted with the plaintiff Godoy the sale of the aforesaid dredge, she had no
Court of First Instance against Feliza Pañgilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, Demetrio Orellano, authority of the court; and that the plaintiff knew that the dredge, which was the subject-matter of
Guillermo Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying that they be ordered to deliver the dredge, upon that contract, belonged to the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, under the control of the court.
payment by him of the sum of P9,000; to pay him the sum of P10,000 as damages, and to return
to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 should the carrying out of the sale become impossible.
In the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is necessary to
comply with the provisions of sections 717, 718, and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said
The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a general denial of the facts alleged in the sections prescribed the proceedings to be had before an administrator of an intestate or testate
complaint and, as a special defense, alleged that the dredge in question was the property of the estate may sell personal or real property and also the conditions under which the personal or real
intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and under the property pertaining to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. Unless
administration of Felisa Pangilinan; that the plaintiff perfectly knows that said dredge is under compliance is had with the provisions of these sections, the sale of the aforesaid dredge by the
judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that the court has never administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and void.
authorized the sale mentioned in the complaint filed herein; and that the defendants Jose,
Guillermo, and Alfredo surnamed Orellano are at present under age, and the defendant Paz
Orellano is a married woman who had not obtained the consent of her husband before executing A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under a will
the power of attorney in favor of the administratrix. devising property to them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise
than by a direction to pay the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the
purchase. (Huse  vs.  Den, 85 Cal., 390.)
The defendant Felisa Pañgilinan filed a separate answer, and a defense alleges: ( a) That the
dredge which was the subject-matter of the option is property of the intestate estate of Julio
Orellano, of which she is the administratrix; (b) that the plaintiff, as well as the defendants, and the A sale by an administrator of the personal property of the estate, without the authority of
notary who prepared the aforesaid option sale, were all aware of these facts, and they led her to an order of court, or of a will, or under an order of court which is void for want of
believe that she had the authority to dispose of the dredge in her name and by themselves; ( c) jurisdiction, does not confer on the purchaser a title which is available against a
that believing herself to be under obligation to comply with the aforesaid option deed, she applied succeeding administrator. (Wyatt's Adm'r vs. Rambo, 29 Ala., 510.)
to the court of probate for permission to sell the dredge in the sum of P10,000; ( d) that on the day
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one
under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the
administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of
the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the
aforesaid power of attorney.

It is not necessary to dwell longer upon this point, as the appellee himself admits in his brief "that
the dredge in question being a part of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, it cannot be disposed
of by any person without the proper authority of the court, in accordance with the existing
laws."lawphil.net

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the appellant was not, in her
capacity as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell,
or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate without the authority of the court, and the
contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint against the appellant Felisa Pañgilinan
is hereby dismissed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF thereof was given to the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo
DECEDENT Guadiz, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.

  On 9 September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued an
Order "authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the properties of the estate for
the purposes (sic) of paying off the obligations" referred to in the petition.
G.R. No. L-27876 April 22, 1992
Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator of the intestate estate, executed
ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the on 4 October 1952 a deed of sale1 in favor of the City of Dagupan, represented by its mayor,
late Margarita Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee, Angel B. Fernandez, of a portion consisting of 4,415 square meters of the aforementioned Lot No.
vs. 203 for and in consideration of P11,687.50. This sale was approved by the intestate court on 15
JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., defendants. CITY OF DAGUPAN, defendant- March 1954.
appellant.
The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and constructed thereon a public
  market, known as the Perez Boulevard Public Market, at a cost of P100,00.00, more or less. It has
been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property since the construction of the
DAVIDE, JR., J.: market. 2

The issue presented in this case is the validity of a sale of a parcel of land by the administrator of Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the administrator
an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition for authority to sell and an order granting it which pursuant of the same authority granted by the 9 September 1949 Order. 3
were filed and entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the decedents.
On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S.
The records disclose that on 12 June 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. She was Maneclang, daughter of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the Court of First Instance of
survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and nine (9) children. On 30 July 1947, a petition for Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the sales made by the previous administrator pursuant
the settlement of her estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with to the order of 9 September 1949, cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and damages
the Court of First Instance at Dagupan City, Pangasinan; the case was docketed as Special Proc. against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun, Marcelo Operaña and Aurora Pagurayan,
No. 3028. At the time of the filing of the petition, the ages of her children were as follows: Crispino Tandoc and Brigida Tandoc, Jose Infante and Mercedes Uy Santos, Roberto Cabugao,
Basilisa Callanta and Fe Callanta, Ricardo Bravo and Francisca Estrada, the City of Dagupan, and
Hector Maneclang –– 21 years old Constantino Daroya and Marciana Caramat. 4 The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. D-
Cesar Maneclang –– 19 1785. The cause of action against the City of Dagupan centers around the deed of sale executed
Oscar Maneclang –– 17 in its favor on 4 October 1952 by former judicial administrator Oscar S. Maneclang. In its Answer
Amanda Maneclang –– 16 filed on 5 November 1965, 5 the City of Dagupan interposed the following affirmative defenses: (a)
Adelaida Meneclang –– 13 the sale in its favor is valid, legal and above board; (b) plaintiff has no cause of action against it, or
Linda Maneclang –– 7 that the same, if any, had prescribed since the complaint was filed thirteen (13) years after the
Priscila Maneclang –– 6 execution of the sale; (c) plaintiff is barred by estoppel and laches; (d) it is a buyer in good faith;
Natividad Maneclang –– 3 and (e) it has introduced necessary and useful improvements and contructed a supermarket worth
Teresita Maneclang –– 2 P200,000.00; hence, assuming arguendo that the sale was illegal, it has the right to retain the land
and the improvements until it is reimbursed for the said improvements.
No guardian ad litem was appointed by the court for the minor children.
On 30 March 1966, plaintiff and the City of Dagupan entered into a Stipulation of Facts wherein
Margarita left several parcels of land, among which is Lot No. 203 of the Cadastral Survey of they agreed on the facts earlier adverted to. They, however, agreed: (a) to adduce evidence
Dagupan City containing an area of 7, 401 square meters, more or less , and covered by Transfer concerning the reasonable rental of the property in question and other facts not embodied therein
Certificate of Title No. 1393. but which are material and vital to the final determination of the case, and (b) to request the court
to take judicial notice of SP Proc. No. 3028.
On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate estate of Margarita,
filed a petition in SP Proc. No. 3028 asking the court to give him "the authority to dispose of so The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang was induced by its then
much of the estate that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated" in the petition. While notice incumbent Mayor, Atty. Angel B. Fernandez, to sell the property to the City of Dagupan and that
the said City has been leasing the premises out to numerous tenants at the rate of P0.83 per held in the early case of Estate of Gamboa vs. Floranza,  9 an order issued by a
square meter per month, or a total monthly rental of P3,747.45, since 4 October 1952. 6 probate court for the sale of real property belonging to the estate of a deceased
person would be void if no notice for the hearing of the petition for such sale is
On 9 November 1966, the trial court rendered a partial decision in Civil Case No. D-1785 against given as required by said Section 722. Under this section, when such a petition is
the City of Dagupan, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: made, the court shall designate a time and place for the hearing and shall require
notice of such hearing to be given in a newspaper of general circulation;
moreover, the court may require the giving of such further notice as it deems
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders proper.
judgment:
In the instant case, no notice of the application was given to the heirs; hence,
(a) Annulling (sic) the Deed of Sale executed by the Administrator on October 4, both the order granting authority to sell and the deed of sale executed in favor of
1952 (Exh. F) being null and void ab initio; the City of Dagupan pursuant thereto, are null and void.

(b) Ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Title issued in favor of the (b) Estoppel does not lie against plaintiff as no estoppel can be predicated on an
defendant City of Dagupan by virtue of said Deed of Sale, and directing the illegal act and estoppel is founded on ignorance. In the instant case, the nullity is
Register of Deeds of said City to issue a new Certificate of Title in favor of the by reason of the non-observance of the requirements of law regarding notice; this
plaintiff as Administratrix covering the property in question; legal defect or deficiency deprived the probate court of its jurisdiction to dispose
of the property of the estate. Besides, the City of Dagupan was represented in
(c) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to restore the possession to the the transaction by lawyers who are presumed to know the law. This being the
plaintiff in her capacity as Judicial Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of case, they should not be allowed to plead estoppel; finally, estoppel cannot give
Margarita Suri Santos of the parcel of land in question, together with all the validity to an act which is prohibited by law or is against public policy. 10
improvements thereon existing;
(c) Laches and prescription do not apply. The deed of sale being void ab initio,  it
(d) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan City to pay the plaintiff the sum of is in contemplation of law inexistent and therefore the right of the plaintiff to bring
P584,602.20 as accumulated rentals or reasonable value of the use of the the action for the declaration of inexistence of such contract does not
property in question from October 4, 1952 up to the filing of the complaint in prescribe. 11
1985, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from the later date;
(d) The City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and for value as the
(e) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay a monthly rental or former judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang, testified that he was induced by
reasonable value of its occupation of the premises in the amount of P3,747.45 then incumbent Mayor of the City Councilor Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, Sr. to sell the
from October 9, 1985 up to the date the possession of the premises is delivered property; moreover, the City Fiscal signed as witness to the deed of sale. These
(sic) the plaintiff by said defendant, and lawyers are presumed to know the law.

(f) Ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant City of Dagupan the sums of Not satisfied with the decision, the City of Dagupan appealed to this Court 12 alleging that said
P100,000.00 and P11,687.50 both amounts to be deducted from the amount due decision is contrary to law, the facts and the evidence on record, and that the amount involved
the plaintiff from said defendant. exceeds P500,000.00.

Defendant shall also pay the costs. In its Brief, the City of Dagupan submits the following assigned errors:

SO ORDERED. 7 FIRST ERROR

In arriving at the said disposition, the trial court held that: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE EXECUTED BY
THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR TO THE CITY OF DAGUPAN IS NULL AND
(a) Under Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, 8 which is similar to the provisions of VOID AB INITIO.
Section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is essential and mandatory that the
interested parties be given notices of the application for authority to sell the SECOND ERROR
estate or any portion thereof which is pending settlement in a probate court. As
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN the time of the filing of the petition was Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain which provides as
ESTOPPEL FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF THE SALE. follows:

THIRD ERROR The father, or in his default, the mother, shall be the legal administrator of the
property of the children who are subject to parental authority.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS
NOT BARRED BY LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION. However, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on guardianship impliedly repealed those
of the Civil Code relating to that portion of the patria potestad (parental authority) which gave to
FOURTH ERROR the parents the administration and usufruct of their minor children's property; said parents were
however entitled, under normal conditions, to the custody and care of the persons of their minor
children. 17
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT DEFENDANT CITY OF
DAGUPAN IS NOT A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.
Article 320 of the present Civil Code, taken from the aforesaid Article 159, incorporates the
amendment that if the property under administration is worth more than two thousand pesos
FIFTH ERROR (P2,000.00), the father or the mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance. This provision then restores the old rule 18 which made the father or mother, as such, the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT CITY OF administrator of the child's property. Be that as it may, it does not follow that for purposes of
DAGUPAN TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF P584,602.20 AS complying with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of the Court, notice to the
ACCUMULATED RENTALS OR REASONABLE VALUE OF (sic) THE USE OF father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said Rule state explicitly that the notice,
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION FROM OCTOBER 4, 1952 UP TO THE FILING which must be in be writing, must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court
OF THE COMPLAINT IN 1965, PLUS INTEREST THEREON AT THE RATE OF shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause notice to be given to the interested
6% PER ANNUM FROM THE LATER DATE. parties.

SIXTH ERROR There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by a guardian  ad
litem in the case of the minors, the notice may be given to such counsel or guardian  ad litem.  In
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT CITY OF this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his
DAGUPAN TO PAY A MONTHLY RENTAL OR REASONABLE VALUE OF (sic) counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age,
ITS OCCUPATION OF THE PREMISES IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,747,45 FROM were not represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children were still minors with no
OCTOBER 9, 1965 UP TO THE DATE THE POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of
IS DELIVERED TO THE PLAINTIFF BY SAID DEFENDANT. notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory
and essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would
We shall consider these assigned errors sequentially. be null and void ab initio.  19 The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs, as the
presumptive owners 20 since they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the deceased from
the moment of the latter's death, 21 are the persons directly affected by the sale or mortage and
1. In support of the first, appellant maintains that notice of the application for authority to sell was therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law.
given to Severo Maneclang, surviving spouse of Margarita. As the designated legal representative
of the minor children in accordance with Article 320 of the Civil Code, notice to him is deemed
sufficient notice to the latter; moreover, after Oscar Maneclang signed the deed of sale 13 in his Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order of 9 September 1949 granting the
capacity as judicial administrator, he "sent copies of his annual report and the deed of sale to application, the sale in question of 4 October 1952 and the Order of 15 March 1954 approving the
Severo Maneclang, and his brothers Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang and sister Amanda sale are all void ab initio  as against said children. Severo Maneclang, however, stands on different
Maneclang, all of legal ages (sic), while the other minor heirs received theirs through his ground altogether. Having been duly notified of the application, he was bound by the said order,
lawyer." 14 Besides, per Flores vs. Ang Bansing, 15 the sale of property by the judicial administrator sale and approval of the latter. However, the only interest which Severino Maneclang would have
cannot be set aside on the sole ground of lack of notice. over the property is his right of usufruct which is equal to that corresponding by way of legitime
pertaining to each of the surviving children pursuant to Article 834 of the Civil Code of Spain, the
governing law at that time since Margarita Suri Santos died before the effectivity of the Civil Code
These contentions are without merit. of the Philippines.

Article 320 of the Civil Code does not apply. While the petition for authority to sell was filed on 2
September 1949, the Civil Code took effect only on 30 August 1950. 16 Thus, the governing law at
2 Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against the administratrix of the estate and against the injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
children. not held barred. 27

As to the former, this Court, in Boñaga vs. Soler, supra, reiterated the rule "that a decedent's In the instant case, from time the deed of sale in favor of the City of Dagupan was executed on 4
representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey October 1952, up to the time of the filing of the complaint for annulment on 28 September 1965,
land; 22 and if this be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-four (24) days had elapsed.
be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor are not conformable to law." 23 Not being the
party who petitioned the court for authority to sell and who executed the sale, she cannot be held The respective ages of the children of Margarita Suri Santos on these two dates were, more or
liable for any act or omission which could give rise to estoppel. Under Article 1431 of the Civil less, as follows:
Code, through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. In estoppel
by pais, as related to the party sought to be estopped, it is necessary that there be a concurrence Upon execution At the filing
of the following requisites: (a) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of of the deed of sale of the complaint
material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and
inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least Hector Maneclang 26 39
expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other party; and (c) Cesar Maneclang 24 37
knowledge, actual or constructive of the actual facts. 24 In estoppel by conduct, on the other hand, Oscar Maneclang 22 35
(a) there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts; (c) the party to whom Amanda Maneclang 21 34
it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and (d) it must have been made Adelaida Maneclang 18 31
with the intention that the other party would act upon it. 25 Linda Maneclang 12 25
Priscila Maneclang 11 24
As to the latter, considering that, except as to Oscar Maneclang who executed the deed of sale in Natividad Maneclang 8 20
his capacity as judicial administrator, the rest of the heirs did not participate in such sale, and Teresita Maneclang 7 20
considering further that the action was filed solely by the administratrix without the children being
impleaded as parties plaintiffs or intervenors, there is neither rhyme nor reason to hold these heirs It is an undisputed fact that the City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the property and
in estoppel. For having executed the deed of sale, Oscar Maneclang is deemed to have assented constructed thereon a public market; such possession was open, uninterrupted and continuous.
to both the motion for and the actual order granting the authority to sell. Estoppel operates solely Obviously, Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda were already of legal age when the deed of sale
against him. was executed. As it was Oscar who executed the deed of sale, he cannot be expected to
renounce his own act. With respect to Hector, Cesar and Amanda, they should have taken
3 As to prescription, this Court ruled in the Boñaga case that "[a]ctions to declare the inexsistence immediate steps to protect their rights. Their failure to do so for thirteen (13) years amounted to
of contracts do not prescribe (Art. 1410, N.C.C.), a principle applied even before the effectivity of such inaction and delay as to constitute laches. This conclusion, however, cannot apply to the rest
the new Civil Code (Eugenio, et al. vs. Perdido, et al., supra, citing Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67, of the children — who were then minors and not represented by any legal representative. They
and Sabas vs. Germa , 66 Phil. 471 )." could not have filed an action to protect their interests; hence, neither delay nor negligence could
be attributed to them as a basis for laches. Accordingly, the estate is entitled to recover 5/9 of the
questioned property.
4. Laches is different from prescription. As the court held in Nielsen & Co. Inc . vs. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co.,26 the defense of laches applies independently of prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. 5. In ruling out good faith, the trial court took into account the testimony of Oscar Maneclang to the
Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to effect that it was Mayor Fernandez of Dagupan City and Councilor Teofilo Guadiz, Sr., both
be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the lawyers, who induced him to sell the property and that the execution of the sale was witnessed by
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas the City Fiscal.
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not.
We are unable to agree.
The essential elements of laches are the following: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of
one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was actually issued on 9 September 1949,
the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant the same was secured during the incumbency of the then judicial administrator Pedro Feliciano.
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang
of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) to sell the property, the fact remains that there was already the order authorizing the sale. Having
been issued by a Judge who was lawfully appointed to his position, he was disputably presumed
to have acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly the use of the property should be fixed at P1,000.00 a month. Taking into account the fact that
performed. 28 It was not incumbent upon them to go beyond the order to find out if indeed there Severo Maneclang, insofar as his usufructuary right is concerned, but only until his death, is
was a valid motion for authority to sell. Otherwise, no order of any court can be relied upon by the precluded from assailing the sale, having been properly notified of the motion for authority to sell
parties. Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that and considering further that the heirs, Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda, all surnamed
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; furthermore, mistake Maneclang, are, as discussed above, barred by laches, only those portions of the monthly rentals
upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. It implies freedom from which correspond to the presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita,
knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. 29 We find no circumstance all surnamed Maneclang, to the extent untouched by the usufructuary right of Severo Maneclang,
in this case to have alerted the vendee, the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or defect in the should be paid by the City of Dagupan. There is no showing as to when Severo Maneclang died;
authority of the judicial administrator to sell the property. Since good faith is always presumed, and this date of death is necessary to be able to determine the cessation of his usufructuary right and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof, 30 it was the commencement of the full enjoyment of the fruits of the property by the unaffected heirs.
incumbent upon the administrator to established such proof, which We find to be wanting. Under the circumstances, and for facility of computation, We hereby fix the presumptive shares in
However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that: "Possession acquired in good faith does not the rentals of the aforenamed unaffected heirs at P500.00 a month, or at P100.00 each, effective
lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the 5 November 1965 until the City of Dagupan shall have effectively delivered to the intestate estate
possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully." The filing of a 5/9 of the property in question. The latter, however, shall reimburse the City of Dagupan of that
case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith. portion of the real estate taxes it had paid on the land corresponding to 5/9 of the lot commencing
from taxable year 1965 until said 5/9 part is effectively delivered to the intestate estate.
In Tacas vs. Tobon,  31 this Court held that if there are no other facts from which the interruption of
good faith may be determined, and an action is filed to recover possession, good faith ceases Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City of Dagupan may retain possession of the
from the date of receipt of the summons to appear at the trial and if such date does not appear in property until it shall have been fully reimbursed the value of the building in the amount of
the record, that of the filing of the answer would control. 32 P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price amounting to P6,493.05

The date of service of summons to the City of Dagupan in Civil Case No. D-1785 is not clear from WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision in all respects, except to
the record. Its Answer, however, was filed on 5 November 1965. Accordingly, its possession in the extent as above modified. As modified, (a) the sale in favor of the City of Dagupan, executed
good faith must be considered to have lasted up to that date. As a possessor in good faith, it was on 4 October 1952 (Exhibit "F"), is hereby declared null and void; however, by reason of estoppel
entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation to pay rental to the intestate of and laches as abovestated, only 5/9 of the subject property representing the presumptive shares
Margarita for the use thereof. Under Article 544 of the Civil Code, a possessor in good faith is of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang, may be recovered;
entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted. Thus, the trial court (b) subject, however, to its right to retain the property until it shall have been refunded the
committed an error when it ordered the City of Dagupan to pay accumulated rentals in the amount amounts of P100,000.00 and P6,493.05, the City of Dagupan is hereby ordered to reconvey to the
of P584,602.20 from 4 October 1952 up to the filing of the complaint. intestate estate of Margarita Suri Santos 5/9 of the property in question, for which purpose said
parties shall cause the appropriate partition thereof, expenses for which shall be borne by them
6. However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already became a possessor in proportionately; and (c) the City of Dagupan is further ordered to pay reasonable compensation for
bad faith. This brings Us to the issue of reasonable rentals, which the trial court fixed at P3,747.45 the use of 5/9 of the property in question at the rate of P500.00 a month from 5 November 1965
a month. The basis thereof is the monthly earnings of the city from the lessees of the market stalls until it shall have effectively delivered the possession of the property to the intestate estate of
inside the Perez Boulevard Supermarket. The lesses were paying rental at the rate of P0.83 per Margarita Suri Santos. Upon the other hand, said intestate estate is hereby ordered to refund to
square meter. Appellant maintains that this is both unfair and unjust. The property in question is the City of Dagupan that portion of the real estate taxes the latter had paid for the lot
located near the Chinese cemetery and at the time of the questioned sale, it had no access to the corresponding to 5/9 thereof effective taxable year 1965 and until the latter shall have delivered to
national road, was located "in the hinterland" and, as admitted by the former judicial administrator, said intestate estate.
Oscar Maneclang, the persons who built houses thereon prior to the sale paid only P6.00 to P8.00
as monthly rentals and the total income from them amounted only to P40.00 a month. Appellant SO ORDERED.
contends that it is this income which should be made the basis for determining the reasonable
rental for the use of the property.

There is merit in this contention since indeed, if the rental value of the property had increased, it
would be because of the construction by the City of Dagupan of the public market and not as a
consequence of any act imputable to the intestate estate. It cannot, however, be denied that
considering that the property is located within the city, its value would never decrease; neither can
it be asserted that its price remained constant. On the contrary, the land appreciated in value at
least annually, if not monthly. It is the opinion of this Court that the reasonable compensation for
RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF said Motion that respondents-heirs have already received their proportionate share of the six (6)
DECEDENT million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of
P6,000,000.00 is more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they
prayed for the Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-
administrator hereafter):

G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993 1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;

HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO, petitioners, 2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the Estate; and
vs.
HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO, NAPOLEON
ACEBEDO, RIZALINO ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA ACEBEDO, FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU 3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the Estate.
HWA PING, respondents.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to Approval of
. Sale", to wit:

1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold some real estate
property of the Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon City, without the knowledge
of the herein administrator, without the approval of this Honorable Court and of
CAMPOS, JR., J.: some heirs, and at a shockingly low price;

The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents- 2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection to the
heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining approval of the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even render the
portions of said properties, despite the absence of its prior approval as a probate court, is being proponents of the sale liable for punishment for contempt of this Honorable
challenged in the case at bar. Court;

The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in 3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable Court to
Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of about P30 million. Said authorize the sale of the above mentioned property of the Estate to generate
estate allegedly has only the following unsettled claims: funds to pay certain liabilities of the Estate and with the approval of this
Honorable Court if warranted, to give the heirs some advances chargeable
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City; against theirs (sic) respective shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein
Administrator, and the other heirs to help the Administrator personally or through
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City; a broker, to look for a buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject always to
the approval of this Honorable Court.1
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel Acebedo, and
the incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45) days within
which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price higher than
P12,000,000.00.
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date, petitioners have not
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and the found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked the Court, on February 8, 1990, for an in
others are the private respondents. extendible period of thirty days to look for a buyer.

Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen years, Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document against
respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989. The said sale involved Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26, 1990. He initiated this complaint
the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of Conditional
of which are registered in Quezon City, and form part of the estate. The consideration for said lots Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-administrator's signature was made to appear. He also learned
was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time, they already had a buyer. It was further stated in
that after he confronted the notary public of the questioned document, the latter revoked his WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted, reconsidered
notarial act on the same. and set aside, and another one is hereby issued as follows:

On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration by the 1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989, executed by the
Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale. heirs-movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their respective shares in
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer, petitioner Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several periods within which to
look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon. 2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions
of the said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the same price as the sale
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner-administrator executed by the herein heirs-movants;
filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10, 1990, maintaining that the sale
should wait for the country to recover from the effects of the coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the 3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total remaining balance of
properties should be divided among the heirs. the purchase price for the said lots within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice
hereof;
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease some of
the Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed an Opposition on the following 4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in contempt of court,
grounds : that the motion is not proper because of the pending motion to approve the sale of the resulting from his failure to submit the owner's copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and
same properties; that said conditional sale was initiated by petitioner-administrator who had earlier 120145 is hereby denied.3
signed a receipt for P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval of the sale would mean Yu
Hwa Ping's assumption of payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts and Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price for the
thus, the intestate administrator may be terminated. properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of P6,500,000.00.

On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which, stated, Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21) days
among others, to wit:2 thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reinstate its Order of
August 17, 1990. To this, private respondents filed their Opposition. 4
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989, praying that the
new administrator be directed to sell the properties covered by TCT Nos. Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The
155569, 120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by the respondent Court on August
23, 1991.
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some properties of
the estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to the approval of the Court. On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, hoping for
the last time that they would be able to convince the Court that its Order dated March 29, 1991 in
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the parties to a effect approving the conditional sale is erroneous and beyond its jurisdiction.
conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the parties were unable to
arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was continued, wherein the parties actually On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration for "lack
agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price of merit".
already agreed upon, while herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu Hwa Ping.
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order dated March
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the Deed of 29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari.
Conditional Sale.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the jurisdiction of the
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the dispositive portion of lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale
which states, to wit: executed by respondents-heirs without prior court approval and to order herein Administrator to
sell the remaining portion of said properties?
We answer in the positive? left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided'."
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which is
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents' right to alienate
threshed out in a separate action. the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale
of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a
probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its SO ORDERED.
jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.

We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said conditional sale is
null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was made conditional, the
condition being that the same should first be approved by the probate court.

Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. 6 It is settled that
court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent's estate. However,
reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose
of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs. 7

This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,
interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter which
comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court. 8

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under administration,
is based on the Civil Code provision 9 stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. 10

The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right. 11 Although it is
mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.12 In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from
selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. 13

As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property under
administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al.,14 it was said that the sale
made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration,
in no wise, stands in the way of such administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the
Old Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 339 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493,
respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa:
"Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate
RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF 2. Arcadio Mendoza and Trinidad Manuel were married on April 22, 1923, in the Catholic
DECEDENT Church, Parish of Bulacan, Bulacan;

G.R. No. L-44664             July 31, 1991 3. Areadio Mendoza died in the Barrio of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, on November 4,
1944;
BERNARDO MENDOZA I, BERNARDO MENDOZA II, GUADALUPE M. MANGALE, JULIANA
M. SAMONTE, PACITA M. SAMONTE, RICARDO MENDOZA, FRANCISCO MENDOZA, 4. The late Arcadio Mendoza left properties, real and personal, among which is the
PATRICIA MENDOZA, OLYMPIA M. DIZON, ROMEO MENDOZA, REYNALDO MENDOZA, property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 12192 of the Register of Deeds of
REMEDIOS M. BERNABE and TRINIDAD MANUEL MENDOZA, petitioners, Bulacan, situated at Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, consisting of nine (9) parcels of land, with
vs. an aggregate area of 33,398 square meters; . . .;
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RENATO SAMONTE and LUCIA DELA CRUZ
SAMONTE, respondents. 5. The property in question is Lot 3-A, which is a portion of Lot 3, which Lot 3-A is more
particularly described as follows:

(A parcel of land (Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd17370, being a
portion of Lot 3, described on plan Psu-51078, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 32994),
situated in the Barrio of Taliptip, Municipality of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan.
MEDIALDEA, J.: Bounded on the NE., points 1 to 2 by (Lot 8, Psu-51078, Road Widening)
Bulacan-Obando Provincial Road (15-00 m. wide); on the SE., points 2 to 3 by
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals property of Faustino Samonte; on the SW., points 3 to 4 by property of Faustino
dated June 23, 1976, in C.A G.R. No. 56049-R entitled "Bernardo Mendoza I, et al. v. Renato Samonte; and on the NW., points 4 to 1 by Lot 3-B of the Subdivision plan.
Samonte, et al.," which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan; and its Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S, 30 deg. 52'E., 3794.82 m. from
resolution dated September 15, 1976, which denied the motion for reconsideration. BLLM 1, Mp. of Bulacan,

The antecedent facts are, as follows: thence S. 49 deg. 38'E., 46.93 m. to point 2;

On February 18, 1969, petitioners Bernardo Mendoza I, Bernardo Mendoza II, Guadalupe M. thence S. 42 deg. 21 'W 49.94 m. to point 3;
Mangale, Juliana M. Samonte, Pacita M. Samonte, Ricardo Mendoza, Francisco Mendoza,
Patricia Mendoza, Olympia M. Dizon, Romeo Mendoza, Reynaldo Mendoza, Remedios M. thence N. 43 deg. 47'W., 47.33 m. to point 4;
Bernabe and Trinidad Manuel Mendoza instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an
action for reconveyance of real property against private respondents spouses Renato Samonte thence N. 42 deg. 46'E., 45.14 m. to the point
and Lucia de la Cruz Samonte. On October 27, 1970, petitioners filed a First Amended Complaint
wherein they alleged that in the event that the sale of the real property by petitioner Trinidad
Manuel Mendoza to private respondents is declared valid, they are nonetheless entitled to legal of beginning containing an area of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND
redemption. THIRTY EIGHT (2,238) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to
are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: points 1 and
4 by PS. Cyl. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm., and the rest of Old PLS. Stone Mons.
During the pre-trial on June 28, 1971, the parties, through their respective counsel, submitted the 20x20x60 cm., bearings true; declination O deg. 48'E date of the original survey,
following partial stipulation of facts (pp. 48-51, Record on Appeal): April 27, 1926 and that of the subdivision survey, July 21, 1961.

x x x           x x x          x x x 6. Arcadio Mendoza acquired ownership over the above-mentioned nine (9) parcels of
land, including Lot 3, through donation from the late Jose Samonte, which mode of
1. Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the late Arcadio Mendoza of Barrio Taliptip, Bulacan, acquisition was recognized and adjudicated by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated
Bulacan; plaintiff Trinidad Manuel being the surviving spouse of said Arcadio Mendoza September 23, 1964, in the case entitled "Victor Samonte, et al. v. Maria Samonte, et al.";
and the rest of the plaintiffs being the legitimate children of spouses Arcadio Mendoza GR No. 22891-R; . . .;
(deceased) and Trinidad Manuel;
7. In the case decided by the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. No. 22891-R the plaintiffs were:
 VICTOR SAMONTE, AGATONA SAMONTE, ARTEMIO VILLANUEVA, Na alang-alang (sic) sa halagang TATLONG LIBO AT LIMANG DAANG PISO
CELESTINO VILLANUEVA, RAMON VILLANUEVA, MERCEDES VILLANUEVA, (P3,500.00), Salaping Pilipino (sic), na aking ng (sic) tinanggap na may mga
SANTOS VILLANUEVA, MAXIMO VILLANUEVA, ALIPIO VILLANUEVA, SIXTO dalawang taon na sa magasawang (sic) RENATO SAMONTE at LUCIA DE LA
DE LOS REYES, JOSE DE LOS REYES, LIGAYA DE LOS REYES, ELINO CRUZ, mga Pilipino (sic), may sapat na gulang at naninirahan sa Taliptip,
VILLANUEVA, CRISANTA VILLANUEVA, PEDRO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS Bulacan, Bulacan, ay aking ipinagbibili, isinasalin at inililipat sa nasabing
VILLANUEVA, ARSENIO VILLANUEVA, BALTAZAR VILLANUEVA, OTILLA magasawang Renato Samonte at Lucia de la Cruz, sa kanilang mga anak at
VILLANUEVA, ENRIQUE VILLANUEVA, JOSE VILLANUEVA, ROLANDO tagapagmana ang Lot 3-A ng Lote 3, na binabanggit sa itaas nito, pati ng
VILLANUEVA, MARTA MENDOZA, MARIA MENDOZA, FELIPA VILLENA, pagkamayari at possesion (sic) ng nasabing Lote 3-A, na walang pinanagutan
ADELA ANDAYA, and MATIAS VILLANUEVA. (sic) (sic) kahit ano hanggang sa petsang ito, at aking ipagtatangol sa ano mang
habol sa Lote 3-A ang mga bumiling magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia
while the defendants were: de la Cruz sa sarili kong pananagot. (See last paragraph, page 2, Dokumento ng
Bilihan, supra).
FAUSTINO SAMONTE, MARIA SAMONTE, BERNARDO MENDOZA,
GUADALUPE M. VDA. DE MANGALI, JULIANA MENDOZA, RAUL SAMONTE, 12. All the improvements in said Lot 3-A were placed therein by defendant spouses
BERNARDO MENDOZA II, RICARDO MENDOZA, FRANCISCO MENDOZA, Renato Samonte and Lucia de la Cruz Samonte.
PACITA MENDOZA, CAYETANO SAMONTE and TRINIDAD MANUEL, in her
own right and as guardian-ad-litem for the minors, OLIMPIA, PATRICIA, WHEREFORE, parties herein respectfully pray that the foregoing partial stipulation of
REYNALDO, REMEDIOS and ROMEO all surnamed MENDOZA; facts be admitted, and that the above-entitled case be set for hearing for purposes of
receiving evidence insofar as the contorverted (sic) facts are concerned.
8. The aforementioned Lot 3 was subsequently subdivided into two (2) lots, namely: Lot
3-A with an area of 2238 square meters and Lot 3-B with an area of 2115 square meters, Malolos, Bulacan, June 18, 1971.
as shown in the Subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-17370, dated September 7, 1961, duly
approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; (SGD.) ERNESTO M. TOMANENG

9. One June 26,1962, plaintiff Trinidad Manuel Mendoza sold to defendants, Renato Counsel for the plaintiffs
Samonte and Lucia de la Cruz Samonte, Lot 3-A . . .;
Suite 507 Marvel Bldg. I
10. The said "Dokumento ng Bilihan:" is written in Tagalog, signed by plaintiff Trinidad
Manuel Mendoza, as vendor, witnessed by plaintiffs Juliana Mendoza and Pacita
Mendoza Samonte, and notarized by Atty. Pedro Magsalin; 258 Juan Luna, Manila

11. In said "Dokumento ng Bilihan," plaintiff Trinidad Manuel Mendoza declared the (SGD.) FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR.
following:
Counsel for the defendants
Na sa aming kasunduan ng aking mga anak at ako, ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay
siyang aking kalahati sa nasabing Lot 3, na may kaunting lamang, at ang Lot 3-B 54 Dona (sic) Juana Rodriguez, St.
ay siyang nauukol sa aking mga anak na tunay nilang pag-aari. ( See first
paragraph, page 3, Dokumento ng Bilihan, (Annex "C"); Quezon City

Na sa aking pakikpagkasundo (sic) sa aking mga anak at sa kanilang On October 15, 1973, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs against
kapasiyahan at kapahintulutan ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay siyang aking ipinagbili sa petitioners, based on the following grounds (pp. 51-53, Record on Appeal):
magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia de la Cruz, alang-alang sa aming
pangako na ipagbili sa nasabing magasawa ang kalahati ng naturang Lot 3, na There are several issues raised by the plaintiffs in their pre-trial brief as well as
ang halaga ay matagal ng tinanggap namin sa mga nakabiling magasawa. memorandum and foremost among them is the question regarding the validity of
(see second paragraph, page 3, Dokumento ng Bilihan, supra); the sale. According to the plaintiffs, the sale of the disputed property in favor of
the defendants was null and void because as a mere co-owner of an undivided
estate, Trinidad Mendoza had no right to divided (sic) the estate into parts and It bears emphasis that according to the fourth paragraph of the "Dokumento ng
then convey a part thereof by metes and bounds to a third person. Such was the Bilihan" quoted above, the sale made by plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza of Lot 3-A to
case, according to the plaintiffs, since there had never been any partition, judicial the defendants had the prior consent and approval of her children, the other
or extrajudicial, of the estate among the heirs of the late Arcadio Mendoza. plaintiffs herein.

It is apparent that the resolution of this issue will depend on whether or not the In the opinion of the Court, the paragraphs cited above constitute clear
heirs of Arcadio Mendoza had already partitioned his estate and in pursuance admissions on the part of plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza, who executed said deed of
thereto, adjudicated the lot in question to the plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza. sale, and on the part of plaintiffs Pacita Samonte and Juliana Samonte, who
signed the same as witnesses, regarding the existence of the partition agreement
After examining the "Dokumento ng Bilihan," evidencing the sale of the lot in adjudicating to plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza the land in question before it was sold
question to the defendants, the Court is convinced that there was such an to the defendants.
agreement to partition the properties, including the one involved in this case, left
by the deceased Arcadio Mendoza. From paragraphs 4 and 5 of said document, . Of course, plaintiffs Trinidad Manuel, Pacita Samonte and Juliana Samonte, who
. . it can readily be seen that the partition had been accomplished by the heirs of all took the stand, vehemently denied having read and understood the contents
Arcadio Mendoza. . . . Said paragraphs, which read as follows, clearly stated that of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" which they admittedly signed. According to plaintiff
it was the agreement among the surviving children and wife of Arcadio Mendoza Trinidad Manuel, she affixed her thumbmark on the document when her sister
that Lot 3-A, which was the other half of Lot 3, was to be the share of plaintiff Lourdes Manuel, the mother of defendant Renato Samonte, asked her to do so
Trinidad Mendoza while Lot 3-B would belong to the children: and promised to take care of the "interests" of her children. On her part, Pacita
Samonte claimed that although she was able to read the title of the document,
Na sa aming kasunduan ng aking mga anak at ako, ang nasabing Lot 3- she did not read the contents thereof, however, since she signed the same only
A ay siyang aking kalahati sa nasabing Lot 3, na may kaunting lamang, upon the assurance of her aunt that her mother Trinidad Mendoza, had already
at ang Lot 3-B ay siyang nauukol sa aking mga anak na tunay nilang given her conformity. Juliana Samonte also denied having read the document but
pagaari (sic). alleged that her failure to do so was due to her illness then.

Na sa aking pakikipagkasundo sa aking mga anak at sa kanilang But in the opinion of the Court, all these deals cannot prevail over the
kapasiyahan at kapahintulutan ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay siyang aking presumption that the said plaintiffs understood the contents of the deed of sale
ipinagbili sa magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia dela Cruz, whtn (sic) they signed the same. For following the ordinary course of human
alang-alang sa aming pangako na ipagbili sa nasabing magasawa (sic) nature, one does not affix his signature on a legal document if he does not
ang kalahati ng naturang Lot 3, na ang halaga ay matagal ng (sic) understand the same. Besides, it appears that the "document (sic) ng Bilihan"
tinanggap (sic) namin sa mga nakabiling magasawa (sic). was written in a dialect spoken by and known to the said plaintiffs who while on
the stand all testified in the Tagalog dialect.
Indeed, it must habe (sic) been because of this agreement to partition the estate,
that Lot 3, from which the land in question came, was subdivided on September Moreover, according to plaintiff Romeo Mendoza, the son of plaintiff Trinidad
7, 1961 by a surveyor as stated in the second paragraph of said deed of sale. Mendoza, the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" was prepared by their lawyer, Atty. Pedro
Magsalin who according to the defendant Renato Samonte read the same to the
plaintiffs Trinidad Mendoza, Juliana and Pacita Samonte before the latter affixed
Na upang mahati humigit kumulang sa dalawang bahagi ang nasabing their respective signatures, a fact which is not improbable.
Lote No. 3, ang isa ay para sa mga anak ng namatay na aking asawang
Arcadio Mendoza, at ang pangalawa ay para sa akin na tunay kong
pagaari (sic), ay ipinagawa namin ang ang (sic) plano de subdivision Indeed, there is another circumstance showing why the denials of plaintiffs
(LRC) PSD-17370 petsa Sept. 7, 1961, aprobado ni G. Antonio H. Trinidad Mendoza, Juliana and Pacita Samonte cannot be given much credit.
Noblejas, Comisionado ng Land Registration, at ang kinalabasan ay ang These three plaintiffs testified that they did not know the contents of the deed of
mga sumusunod: sale not only at the time they signed it but also after they had executed the same.
Yet, the undeniable fact remains that after the execution of said deed of sale in
1962, the defendants started building their house on the lot in question in barrio
Lote 3-AArea 2238 sq. m.: Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. The failure of said plaintiffs and of the other plaintiffs
to stop or even question the defendants regarding the construction of their house
x x x           x x x          x x x on the lot in question, which was being built openly in the vicinity where they all
 resided, can only mean that the plaintiffs knew that the defendants had a right to consented to and/or benefited from the sale, petitioners are estopped from impugning the validity
build on the disputed property. and enforcesbility thereof.

Considering the finding of the Court that Lot 3-A, the property in question, was Likewise, We affirm.
the subject of a partition agreement and was adjudicated to plaintiff Trinidad
Mendoza, it follows that said property was no longer held in co-ownership by the In resolving the first issue, We have to settle two (2) sub-issues: (1) has Lot 3 been partitioned;
plaintiffs at the time that it was sold to the defendants. Such being the case, the and (2) if so, has the subject lot been adjudicated to petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza? In this
provisions of Article 1620 of the Civil Code, allowing a co-owner to exercise the case, the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Where there are two
right of redemption, cannot be applied. or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs (Article 1078 of the Civil Code). Petitioners' co-ownership over Lot 3 was extinguished when
To summarize, the trial court took into account the following in dismissing petitioners' it was subdivided into Lot 3-A and Lot 3-B, which portions were concretely determined and
complaint: (1) the pertinent provisions of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" to prove that Lot 3 technically described (see de la Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-27759, April 17, 1970, 32 SCRA 307).
has been subdivided and that Lot 3-A has been adjudicated to petitioner Trinidad Manuel Against the impetuous denial of petitioners that Lot 3 has been partitioned (pp. 19, 96, 121, Rollo)
Mendoza; (2) the presumption that petitioners Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, Pacita Samonte is Exhibit A which is the Subdivision Plan of Lot 3, (LRC) PSD-17370, dated September 7, 1961,
and Juliana Mendoza understood the contents of the document when they signed it; (3) duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration. It is also Our finding that Lot 3-A has
estoppel on the part of petitioners; and (4) non-applicability of Article 1620 of the Civil been adjudicated to petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza. We take into account the pertinent
Code. provisions of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" and estoppel on the part of petitioners (pp. 6-8, supra).
Therefore, the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is a valid document.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court (p.
40, Rollo).1âwphi1 The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 70, Rollo) Hence, the present We resolve the second issue based on the previous discussion that the co-ownership has been
petition. extinguished. Article 1620 of the Civil Code applies only if the co-ownership still exists. If the
property has been partitioned or an identified share has been sold, there is no longer any right of
The issues are whether or not: (1) the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is valid; and (2) petitioners can still legal redemption (see Umengan v. Butucan, et al., 117 Phil. 325; Caro v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
exercise the right of legal redemption. G.R. No. L-46001, March 25, 1982, 113 SCRA 10).

According to petitioners, on June 26, 1962, when the alleged "Dokumento ng Bilihan" was ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision dated June 23, 1976 and the
executed by Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, Lot 3-A was still under litigation for it was only on resolution dated September 15, 1976 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
September 23, 1964, that C.A.-G.R. No. 22891-R was decided by the respondent court. This
being the case, petitioners have not executed any agreement of partition, judicial or extrajudicial. SO ORDERED.
As held by the respondent court in C.A.-G.R. No. 22891-R, Lot 3-A (and other lots) was donated
by Jose Samonte to Arcadio Mendoza for which reason, petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza is
not entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot 3 but only to the share of one (1) legitimate child or 1/13 rights
and interests, citing Article 996 of the Civil Code.1 The "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is null and void
insofar as it affects the rights and interests of the other petitioners because petitioner Trinidad
Manuel Mendoza can only sell her 1/13 rights and interests over Lot 3-A and not more than that.
Corollarily, the remaining petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption, conformably
with Article 1620 of the Civil Code.2

Disputing these allegations of petitioners, private respondents contend that petitioner Trinidad
Manuel Mendoza declared under oath in the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" that Lot 3-A was given to her
by virtue of an agreement of partition between her and her children. She declared further that the
land in question was sold by her to private respondents with the knowledge and consent of her
children. The amount paid therefor was known to her and her children. The document was written
in Tagalog, the dialect in Bulacan. It was signed by petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, as
vendor, witnessed by petitioners Pacita Samonte and Juliana Mendoza and prepared and
notarized by Atty. Pedro Magsalin, the family lawyer of petitioners. Having participated in,
RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF 4. That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written notice from the
DECEDENT defendants and the intervenor that the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION had offered to buy the latter's share in the
properties listed in the complaint subject to the following terms:
G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990
1. The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100 (P12.50)
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners, PESOS per square meter, or a total price of NINE MILLION
vs. (P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total area of SEVENTY TWO (72)
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite, Tagaytay, HECTARES ONLY;
Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO M.
ZABALLERO, and ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO, respondents.
2. A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%) PERCENT of
the selling price, or a minimum downpayment of TWO MILLION
CORTÉS, J.: SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,700,000.00) PESOS;

On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and damages, 3. The balance of the purchase price to be payable within
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-572, seeking to enjoin private respondents Socorro Marquez Vda. THREE (3) YEARS from the date of downpayment in THREE
De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party their pro- (3) EQUAL, ANNUAL PAYMENTS with interest at the legal rate
indiviso shares as co-owners in eight parcels of registered land (covered by TCT Nos. A-1316 to prevailing at the time of payment;
A-1322) located in the province of Cavite, with an aggregate area of about 96 hectares. Petitioner
claimed that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners, had a preferential right
to purchase these shares from private respondents for a reasonable price. 4. The balance shall be covered by a BANK GUARANTEE of
payments and shall not be governed by Art. 1250 of the Civil
Code.
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex parte application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, on the ground that petitioners' registered notice of lis pendens was ample protection of
their rights. (Cf. Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)

On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the summons and copies of the complaint. 5. That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the plaintiffs were
Private respondents then filed their answer with counterclaim, praying for the partition of the requested:
subject properties. Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero filed a motion for intervention dated
April 29, 1980, adopting therein her co-respondents answer with counterclaim. a) To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase defendants'
and intervenor's shares under the above-quoted terms; or
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
b) To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or
xxx xxx xxx
c) To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the
1. That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor are the pro-indiviso co- intervenor, to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
owners of the properties cited and described in the complaint; AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION at the price and under the
terms aforequoted.
2. That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land covered by TCT No. T-
1319; approximately twelve (12) hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-1320; 6. That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
and the entire parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject of expropriation CORPORATION is ready, willing and able to purchase not only the aliquot
proceedings instituted by the National Housing Authority (NHA) now pending shares of the defendants and the intervenor, but also that of the plaintiffs, in and
before this Court in Civil Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417; to all the properties subject of this case, for and in consideration of the net
amount of TWELVE and 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square meter and under
the afore-quoted terms;
3. That based on the evidence presented by the herein parties in the aforecited
expropriation cases, the current valuation of the land and the improvements
thereon is at P95,132.00 per hectare; xxx xxx xxx
 [Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.] On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent to the counsel for petitioners a letter
enclosed with a subdivision plan.
The parties laid down their respective positions, as follows:
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to the pre-trial order, contending that the
PLAINTIFFS question of reasonable value of the subject properties remains a contentious issue of fact
ascertainable only after a full trial. Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre- emptive right to
purchase private respondents' shares in the co-ownership after due determination of the
1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical partition; reasonable price thereof.

2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive; Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for petitioners another subdivision
plan prepared by a geodetic engineer. Still, no definite communication was sent by petitioners
3. That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right for an amount of not signifying their approval or disapproval to the subdivision plans.
more that P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value of said
properties; In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties, private respondents filed a
motion dated December 16, 1980 requesting that petitioners be required to formally specify which
4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive right was suspended of the two options under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: that petitioners'
upon the filing of the complaint; shares in the subject properties be sold to private respondents, at the rate of P12.50 per square
meter; or that the subject properties be sold to a third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS,
DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR INC. (claimed to have been erroneously referred to in the pre-trial as VOLCANO SECURITIES
TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION) and its proceeds thereof distributed among
1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is P12.50 per square the parties.
meter;
Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for the purpose of determining the
2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon their failure to applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued an order dated
exercise the same within the period prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of February 4, 1981 which directed the parties to signify whether or not they agree to the scheme of
the Philippines; allotting the subject properties to one of the co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, or
whether or not they know of a third party who is able and willing to buy the subject properties at
terms and conditions more favorable than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the price of P12.50 per The order contained a series of questions addressed to all the parties, who were thereupon
square meter is grossly excessive, it would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs required to submit their answers thereto.
to sell their shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond
question, as the same was admitted by the parties herein; Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were willing to allot their shares in
the subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per square
meter, and that they did not know of any other party who was willing and able to purchase the
4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95 hectares may be subject properties under more favorable conditions than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
physically partitioned without difficulty in the manner suggested by them to RESORTS, INC.
plaintiffs, and as graphically represented in the subdivision plan, which will be
furnished in due course to plaintiffs' counsel.
However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries posed by respondent trial judge,
petitioners filed a motion for clarification as to the true identity of the third party allegedly willing to
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.] purchase the subject properties.

Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered a pre-trial order dated July 9, 1980 On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected petitioners' motion on the ground that it was
granting petitioners a period of ten days from receipt of the subdivision plan to be prepared by a irrelevant.
competent geodetic engineer within which to express their approval or disapproval of the said
plan, or to submit within the same period, if they so desire, an alternative subdivision plan.
Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a pleading captioned "Compliance and Motion",
(1) reiterating the relevance of ascertaining the true identity of the third party buyer, VOLCANO
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
RESORTS, INC., (2) expressing their view that there is actually no bona fide and financially able Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they
third party willing to purchase the subject properties at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and, may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing
(3) once again insisting on their pre-emptive right to purchase the shares of private respondents in owned in common [Emphasis supplied].
the co-ownership at a "reasonable price", which is less than that computed excessively by the
latter at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Petitioners therein prayed that further proceedings Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his  pro-indiviso shares to
be conducted in order to settle the factual issue regarding the reasonable value of the subject a stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is
properties. invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the co-
ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time
On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion. The judge petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and damages against private respondents, no sale of
ruled that petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares the latter's  pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New
in the co-ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties were essentially indivisible, Civil Code finds no application to the case at bar.
respondent trial judge ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to
Article 498 of the New Civil Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date of public bidding for There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private respondents had acknowledged
the subject properties on April 13, 1981. the pre-emptive right of petitioners to purchase their shares at a "reasonable price". Although it
appears that private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order. Respondent trial judge offer was made at a fixed rate of P12.50 per square meter [ See Pre-trial Order dated July 9, 1980,
reset the hearing on petitioners' motion for reconsideration to April 6, 1981, and moved the Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that private respondents had agreed,
scheduled public sale to April 14, 1981. without qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to
purchase the shares at a price lower than the selling price of private respondents.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition
for certiorari, alleging that the respondent trial judge acted without jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents from alienating their pro-
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing his order dated March 16, 1981 which indiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of a property are clearly specified in
denied petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents'  pro- Article 493 of the New Civil Code, thus:
indiviso shares and which, peremptorily ordered the public sale of the subject properties. On April
8, 1981, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the sale of the subject properties Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
at public auction. and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
With the comment and reply, the Court considered the issues joined and the case submitted for personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with
decision. respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the
The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's order dated March 16, 1981 is ultimately property held in common. The law merely provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be limited
premised on petitioners' claim that they had a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro- only to the portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-
indiviso shares of their co-owners, private respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is this ownership [See Mercado v. Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472; PNB v. The
same claim which forms the basis of their complaint for injunction and damages filed against Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v. The
private respondents in the court a quo. Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as
earlier discussed, that the remaining co-owners have the right to redeem, within a specified
period, the shares which may have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the
This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do not New Civil Code.]
grant to any of the owners of a property held in common a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-
indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is
misplaced. Article 1620 provides: Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse
of discretion when he denied petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private
respondents'  pro-indiviso shares.
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of
all the co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial judge's order for the holding of a
one. public sale of the subject properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code. After a careful examination of the proceedings before respondent trial judge, the Court finds Art. 498 provides that:
that respondent trial judge's order was issued in accordance with the laws pertaining to the legal
or juridical dissolution of co-ownerships. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
it be alloted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, proceeds distributed.
the partition of the subject properties in the event that the petitioners refused to purchase
their  pro-indiviso shares at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre- The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article is resorted to when (1) the
emptive right to purchase the other co-owners' pro-indiviso  shares, private respondents' right to partition the property among the co-owners is invoked by any of them but because of the
counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties is recognized by law, specifically Article 494 nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [ See Article 495 of the New Civil
of the New Civil Code which lays down the general rule that no co-owner is obliged to remain in Code] would prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Revised
the co-ownership. Article 494 reads as follows: Rules of Court) and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be
allotted or assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners.
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the queries posed by respondent trial
is concerned. judge and to insist that hearings be conducted in order to ascertain the reasonable price at which
they could purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of Motion" dated February 27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].
time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a
new agreement. Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to respondent trial judge that the
parties could not agree on who among them would be allotted the subject properties, the Court
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed finds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the holding of
twenty years. a public sale for the subject properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per square meter),
and the distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the co-owners, as provided under Article 498
Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by law. of the New Civil Code.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need for further hearings in the case because it is
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. apparent from the various allegations and admissions of the parties made during the pre-trial
proceedings, and in their respective pleadings, that the legal requisites for the application of Article
498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case. No factual issues remained to be litigated
None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at bar. Private respondents' upon.
counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties was therefore entirely proper. However,
during the pre-trial proceedings, petitioners adopted the position that the subject properties were
incapable of physical partition. Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But after WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining
petitioners inexplicably refused to abide by the pretrial order issued by respondent trial judge, and order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED.
stubbornly insisted on exercising an alleged pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents'
shares at a "reasonable price", private respondents relented and adopted petitioner's position that SO ORDERED.
the partition of the subject properties was not economically feasible, and, consequently, invoked
the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code [Private respondents' "Motion To Allot
Properties To Defendants Or To Sell the Same Pursuant To Article 498 Of The Civil Code", Annex
"D" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 46-49].

Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the subject properties should
not be partitioned, and private respondents continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-
ownership arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge acted within
his jurisdiction when he issued his order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to answer
certain questions for the purpose of determining whether or not the legal conditions for the
applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case.
RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of 1) the decision ** dated February
DECEDENT 14, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-G.R. No. 01483
entitled: "People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Trinidad," affirming the decision of the Regional
(not sure if correct case) Trial Court of Manila dated January 5, 1984, which convicted herein petitioner of violation of
Section 25 in relation to Section 39 of PD 957 sentencing him to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and to
SECOND DIVISION suffer the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs, and 2) the resolution of said
appellate court dated May 9, 1986, denying the motion for reconsideration of herein
[G.R. No. 75579. September 30, 1991.] petitioner.chanrobles law library : red

TOMAS TRINIDAD, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent. In an information that was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial
Court), herein petitioner, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, was charged with violation of PD 957 for non-
Tomas Trinidad for himself. delivery of title allegedly committed in this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about February 20, 1978 and continuously up to the present, in Manila, Philippines,
SYLLABUS and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the administrator of the
estate of the late NICOLAI DREPIN, President and General Manager of the Mother Earth Realty
Development Corporation, owner-developer of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision, located at
Antipolo, Rizal, and having knowledge of the sale of Lot No. 19, Block No. 51 of the said
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; CLAIM FOR DELIVERY OF TITLE NOT DUTY
Subdivision to FRANCISCA T. DIMABUYO for the purchase price of P14,000,00, did then and
OF THE BUYER TO FILE AGAINST THE ESTATE BUT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR TO DELIVER
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the title of said subdivision lot to the said lot
THE SAME TO THE BUYER; REASONS THEREFOR. — It should not be the obligation of the
buyer upon full payment thereof in violation of the aforementioned P.D. No. 957." (Rollo, p. 25).
buyer to file before the Probate Court her claim for delivery of the title against the estate of the
decedent. That was petitioner’s obligation as the administrator not only of the estate of the
After the accused had been arraigned, pleading not guilty, the prosecution presented only one
decedent but also as administrator/manager of the development corporation. Article 1495 of the
witness namely Francisca T. Dimabuyu, who is 49 years old, married, public school teacher,
Civil Code mandates that the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as
residing at 311 Poblacion, Mabalacat, Pampanga. In her direct and cross examination she testified
warrant the thing which is the object of the sale. The vendee has the right to receive, and the
to the following: that she filed a case against the accused Tomas Trinidad with the Task Force of
vendor the corresponding obligation to transfer to the former, not only the possession and
the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for Violation of P.D. No. 957 for non-delivery of title and
enjoyment of the land but also the certificate of title (Gabila v. Perez, G.R. No. 29541, 27 January
she executed an affidavit in support of her complaint before the Task Force of the Ministry (now
1989, 169 SCRA 517).
Department) of Justice. She identified the Affidavit, Exhibit A in her complaint. She filed this
complaint against Tomas Trinidad for the non-issuance of title wherein there was a contract
2. CIVIL LAW; REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISION LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS (P.D.
executed by her with the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, and that the accused
NO. 957); OBLIGATION TO PAY THE TAXES OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT THEREOF;
Tomas Trinidad was the administrator of the estate of the late Nicolai Drepin. She identified the
RULE. — Petitioner was not devoid of criminal intent in not immediately delivering the certificate of
contract executed by her presented and marked as Exhibit B and the total price of the lot bought
title to the buyer as held by the majority. He had reasons of his own for not delivering. During his
by her was FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00). She was paying Thirty Eight Pesos and Sixty
cross examination as a defense witness, he testified that the buyer had not actually paid all her
Eight Centavos (P38.68) monthly until she made the full payment. She was given receipts and
obligations when in fact, she had already fully paid, on the pretext that said buyer had not paid
entered in her booklet presented and marked as Exhibit C. She was able to pay SEVEN
taxes and that no adjustments had been made for the devaluation of the. The payment of taxes by
THOUSAND (P7,000.00) PESOS including amortization, and this lot which she bought is located
the buyer, however, is not required by Pres. Decree No. 957; nor was there any contractual
at Antipolo, Rizal. She had visited the place before she bought the same. She identified Exhibit D,
provision for price escalation.
which is the certification of the secretary of the accused. She has also receipts to prove her
payments to the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, of which the accused is the
President and General Manager and owner developer of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision
located at Antipolo, Rizal. She identified these receipts of payment paid by her. Exhibits E, E-1 to
DECISION E-3 inclusive. She also identified a passbook wherein the payments made by her were posted by
the employee of the said corporation, Exhibits F to F-1. She further stated that she never met the
accused in his office. She called him by phone and he promised her to deliver the title after she
PARAS, J.: had made the full payment. She waited for several months but no title was issued to her. She
dropped in the office of the accused and she never saw him there, only a clerk told her that he is
busy. Two months after she paid the last payment she made inquiries of her title. She was able to
talk with the accused in 1978, and the accused told her that she should be patient for her title
would arrive. She went to the office of the accused for so many, many times and inquired about
her title and the office of the accused is situated at Escolta, Regina Building, Manila. She was able In the cross examination of this witness he admitted that he was not able to deliver any title to the
to talk with the accused two times using the telephone in his office and the accused told her that complainant for according to hi n the complainant had not actually paid all her obligations because
she must not worry for her title would be forthcoming. Her son was able to talk with the accused there is no adjustment considering the value of the peso which has declined these days. The
but the accused told her son that her title was coming. She went to the National Housing Authority complainant has not even paid the taxes of the land so that the contract has not been duly
and inquired if the corporation of the accused is fake. Atty. Lagunsag of the National Housing complied with.
Authority set a hearing between her and the accused but the accused did not appear. She
received the notification (marked as Exhibit G) from the National Housing Authority about the On January 5, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
hearing. The hearing was about the title she was claiming from the accused. A hearing was also of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
held at the Ministry (now Department) of Justice on March 7, 1981 but the accused did not appear.
The Ministry (now Department) of Justice handled the case to help her and it was Fiscal Rodrigo "WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the guilt of the accused
Cosico, state Prosecutor of the Ministry (now Department) of Justice who handled the case. There having been proven beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 25 in relation to Section 39 of
was a resolution of the Ministry (now Department) of Justice in her favor, marked and presented P.D. 957 hereby sentences him to pay a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.) and to
as Exhibit H and H-1. She did not approach any lawyer for she could not afford to pay a lawyer. suffer the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs." (Ibid., p. 62).
Whenever she comes to Manila to claim her title and confront Tomas Trinidad she used to spend
FIFTY PESOS (P50.00) per day. She felt frustrated and was mad with the accused. Not satisfied with the foregoing decision, herein petitioner elevated the case to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, which rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
In the cross-examination of this witness she said she had been teaching Grade IV at Pampanga reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
for 20 years then. She admitted that she is a signatory to the contract, Exhibit B. She admitted that
she did not pay the real estate taxes of this land. She admitted that she did not go to the Probate "WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against Accused-
Court.cralawnad Appellant." (Ibid., p. 34).

In the re-direct, she said that she has not paid the taxes because she was not notified about the The motion for reconsideration having been denied (Ibid., p. 39), herein petitioner filed the instant
demand of payment. She paid the installment as evidenced by receipts Exhibits E, E-1 to E-30 of petition, raising the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Lots Nos. 19 and 51 of said subdivision managed by the accused. She said that the accused was
the administrator of the land wherein the portion was bought by her. I

After the testimony of the complainant Francisca Dimabuyu, the prosecution rested its case and
offered Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, E-1 to E-30, inclusive, F, F-1 to F-5, inclusive, and H, and H-1, IT IS AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION TO
which were all admitted by the court. (Ibid., pp. 27-29). EXPAND THE TERM IN A PENAL PROVISION OF PD 957 TO INCLUDE THAT WHICH IS NOT
SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED FOR THEREIN. (Ibid., p. 10).
On the other hand, herein petitioner, in his direct testimony and cross, testified to the fact that in
the Intestate Proceedings of the estate of the late Nicolai Drepin, he became the Judicial II
Administrator appointed in the year 1976, and he presented his appointment and marked as
Exhibit 3. He testified that he took hold of the property of the deceased including the Mother Earth
Realty Development Corporation, and also the unregistered property situated at Antipolo, Rizal. THE CONCLUSION OF THE I.A.C. THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE MOTHER REALTY
The whole lot is titled in the name of testator. He admitted that he is the administrator of the DEV. CORP. (sic) FINDS NO SANCTION IN REASON AND LOGIC AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF
Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, and that said corporation has lots for sale. He DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. (Ibid., p. 13).
continued to receive payments of lots for sale in installment. In 1978 the National Housing
Authority stopped the sale of lots, and his corporation was told to stop operating the property now III
the place being under control of the Ministry of Human Settlements. According to him the
complainant (Ms. Francisca T. Dimabuyu) had not complied with all the requirements for the
complainant had not paid the taxes. He asked the Probate Court as administrator to allow him to IT IS A SERIOUS ERROR OF THE I.A.C. NOT TO COUNTENANCE THE SPECIFIC PROVISION
execute a Deed of Sale to his lot buyers and he was allowed in November 1982, the authority was OF LAW ON THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT IN REFERENCE TO
presented and marked as Exhibit 5. The Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, according THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT OF WHICH A DELIVERY OF TITLE TO
to him, is not in business now, and he is not the administrator. He was appointed by the Court as A LOT IS ONE SUCH. (Ibid., p. 15).chanrobles law library : red
administrator in place of Atty. Guico, and he has letters of administration presented and marked as
Exhibit 3. His duties as administrator are with the full authority to take possession of all properties IV
of the deceased.
 before the National Housing Authority (NHA) for non-issuance of title, herein petitioner appeared
as the administrator of said corporation and appealed to the Minister (now Secretary) of Justice
ENFORCING PD 957 TO RETROACT TO A CONTRACT LONG BEFORE ESTABLISHED VALID from the resolution of the Task Force Division of said Ministry (now Department) in the same
AND LEGAL THEN, VIOLATES THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, HENCE IT capacity. In his appeal he did not deny that he is the administrator of the said corporation and
IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. (Ibid., p. 17). property in behalf of the deceased. What he claims is that the title was not issued due to the
failure of the proper government agency to approve the technical description of the lot preparatory
V to the issuance of the corresponding torrens title and that PD 957 cannot be given retroactive
effect to apply to contracts entered into ten years before its passage. Again, in his letter of
December 7, 1982 to Ms. Dimabuyu delineating the procedure to secure the title of ownership of
YOUR PETITIONER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF NICOLAI DREPIN IS the property in question, herein petitioner signed as administrator not only of the testate estate of
CAUGHT IN THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA AND A NO WIN POSITION AT THAT. (Ibid., p. 18). Nicolai Drepin but also of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation. (Ibid., pp. 31-32).

Under the first two assigned errors, herein petitioner assails the judgment of the respondent Under the third assigned error, herein petitioner contends that the trial court and the respondent
appellate court for having expanded the term in a penal provision of PD 957, i.e., Section 19, to appellate court had exceeded their jurisdiction by totally disregarding the law and penalizing an act
include that which is not specifically provided for therein. Moreover, he assails respondent when the law shows the manner of performing the same.
appellate court’s finding that he is also the administrator of Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation as non sequitur. The contention is without merit.

The contentions are without merit. Section 41 of Presidential Decree 957 provides, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Sections 25 and 39 of Presidential Decree 957 provide, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Section 41. Other Remedies. — The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws."cralaw
"Sec. 25. Issuance of Title. — The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the virtua1aw library
buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the
deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event From the foregoing, it is apparent that whatever rights or remedies accruing to a lot buyer, Ms.
a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, Dimabuyu in this case, under other laws do not foreclose the application of PD 957.
the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six
months from such issuance in order that the title over fully paid lot or unit may be secured and In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Ms. Dimabuyu has fully paid in monthly installments the
delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith."cralaw virtua1aw library agreed purchase price for the lot. Notwithstanding full payment, herein petitioner has failed and
refused to deliver to Ms. Dimabuyu the certificate of title corresponding to the lot despite
"Sec. 39. Penalties. — Any person who shall violate any of the provision of this decree and or any numerous demands.chanrobles law library : red
rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall upon conviction, be punished
by a fine of not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more Under the fourth assigned error, herein petitioner maintains that PD 957 impairs the obligations of
than ten years: Provided, that in the case of corporations, partnerships, cooperatives, or the vendee (Ms. Dimabuyu) in the contract to sell and that it is an ex post facto law as the
associations, the President, Manager or Administrator or the person who has charge with the provision thereof provides retroactive effect.
administration of the business shall be criminally responsible for any violation of this Decree
and/or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto."cralaw virtua1aw library The contention is likewise without merit.

From the foregoing, it is clear that any person who violates Section 25 thereof by non-delivery of Quoting the Solicitor General, the respondent appellate court aptly rebutted this argument,
the title upon full payment of the lot or in case of a corporation, partnership, cooperative, or thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
association, the president, manager or administrator or the person who has charge of the
administration of the business shall be criminally responsible. "Under P.D. 957, after the complainant had fully paid for the lot in question, appellant (herein
petitioner) as administrator of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, was legally
In the case at bar, Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation is the developer of the property bound to cause the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificate of title in the name of the
in question which belongs to the deceased, Nicolai Drepin. As administrator of the estate of the buyer. The failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to do so is punishable under the penal provisions
said decedent, herein petitioner took over the administration of all the properties of said deceased of Section 39 of said decree.
including the property in question. Thus undeniably he is also the administrator of the Mother
Earth Realty Development Corporation which is handling the development and disposition of said Likewise, under P.D. 957, it is not required that the buyer should pay the taxes. The buyer is only
property. This is demonstrated by the fact that when said corporation was sued by Ms. Dimabuyu required to pay for the registration of the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds for the issuance
of the title but it does not mention the payment of taxes. With respect to the alleged devaluation of of the lot she has purchased. If on the other hand, said probate proceedings are already closed
the peso, suffice it to state that at the time the contract was executed, the full price of the lot was and terminated, the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation through its present President
already agreed upon by the complainant and the corporation. or General Manager is hereby ordered to cause the delivery of said title to Ms. Dimabuyu, within
the shortest possible time, as soon as all the requirements therefore have been complied with. We
Lastly, appellant (herein petitioner) asserts that P.D. 957 is an ex post facto law as the penal are giving this remedy to prevent Ms. Dimabuyu from being prejudiced.
provision thereof provides retroactive effect.
SO ORDERED.
P.D. 957 cannot be assailed as an ex post facto law. The act made punishable thereunder is the
failure of the owner-developer or administrator to deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon
full payment, not the execution of a deed of sale or contract to sell over such lot or unit before the
passage of the law. In the instant case, although the contract to sell was executed long before the
enactment of P.D. 957, the failure of appellant (herein petitioner) to deliver the title over the lot
upon full payment transpired when the decree was already in effect. Such law is not ex post facto
for the simple reason that what is being punished is the failure to deliver such title after the
enactment of the Decree on July 12, 1976." (Ibid., pp. 33-34).

We however find that the fifth or last issue to be meritorious and the same deserves Our careful
consideration.

In said issue, herein petitioner maintains that to proceed to execute the deed of absolute sale
without the go-signal of the Probate Court is to be recreant to his sworn duty as administrator, as
well as to render void his actuations done without the permission of the Probate Court.

This contention is correct and is impressed with merit. Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the
property was already deceased and there were proceedings in the Probate Court, it was
incumbent for the Probate Court to first give authorization to the administrator of the estate to
deliver times of lots which had previously been sold. The decedent after all, might be considered
the alter ego of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation. The private complainant had
been duly instructed by the accused herein to file the proper petition or motion with the Probate
Court for delivery of said title but said complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said
instructions. If at all anybody should be blamed, it should be private complainant herself for her
failure to obtain the needed authorization from the court. Indeed, questions of title to any property
apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court,
with consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons such as the herein private
complainant. In fact, third persons may even intervene in the testate or intestate proceedings to
protect their interest [See Cunanan v. Amparo, 45 O.G. (No. 9), 3796]. Just as ordinary claimants
against the estate of the deceased are duty bound to present a claim before the Probate Court so
was private complainant herein required to file her claim for redress in said Probate Court. This is
so because in the ascertainment of claims against the estate of the decedent, the Probate Court
must weigh the extent of the liability of the estate when compared vis-a-vis its solvency. We
uphold petitioner’s contention therefore that if he had proceeded to immediately cause the delivery
of the title of private complainant herein, he could have been held liable for a blatant disregard of
the jurisdiction and functions of the Probate Court. Truly, he was caught between the horns of a
dilemma which was not of his own making. We therefore see no criminal intent whatsoever on his
part and accordingly the judgment of the appellate court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
with costs de oficio.

If the probate proceedings referred to in this case are still going on, the proper remedy of the
private complainant herein is to file before said Probate Court her claim for the delivery of the title
RULE 89 SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF The principal issue here is whether or not the stipulations in question are void and ineffective,
DECEDENT either for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on them, or for lack of notice of
their approval to the heirs of the deceased.
G.R. No. L-16553           November 29, 1961
On the question of jurisdiction, we think the probate court had jurisdiction to act on and approve of
the stipulations in question, not only as an incident to its power to exclude any property from the
LEON DE JESUS, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, inventory of the estate of the deceased, but under section 9, Rule 90, Rules of Court, which
vs. permits the probate court, whenever the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for
EUSEBIA DE JESUS, ET AL., defendants-appellees. another person, to authorize the executor or administrator to deed such property to the person or
persons for whose use and benefit it was so held. There being no controversy between the former
REYES, J.B.L., J.: administratrix and the defendants that the latter and the deceased Melecio de Jesus own the lot in
question in common and that it was registered in the deceased's name only in trust for all the co-
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bataan dismissing the owners, there was no need to file a separate action to an ordinary court to establish the common
complaint in its civil case No. 2563. ownership of the parties over said property; and the probate court could approve, as it did
approve, the agreement wherein the parties expressly recognized their common ownership of the
In the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Melecio de Jesus (Sp. Proc. property in question and the trust character of the exclusive title held by the deceased over the
No. 1960 of the court below), the widow Ines Alejandrino, administratrix, filed on March 10, 1948 same, especially since the parties themselves state that such agreement was entered into in order
an inventory of the estate, including therein Lot No. 931 of the Cadastral Survey of Hermosa, to forestall future litigation between them and to foster family relations, and in addition, the
Bataan, containing an area of 155.9334 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. defendant Eusebia de Jesus had agreed, in consideration of the court's approval of said
1044 in the name of the deceased. agreement, to waive a money claim against the estate, so that court approval of said agreement
would really redound to the benefit of the estate and the heirs.
Subsequently, on May 22, 1948, Eusebia de Jesus, the deceased's sister, filed a verified claim
against the estate for the amount of P7,585.84. This claim was never heard. Instead, the Section 9, Rule 90, however, provides that authority can be given by the probate court to the
administratrix Ines Alejandrino, claimant Eusebia de Jesus, and the heirs of Cirilo de Jesus, administrator to convey property held in trust by the deceased to the beneficiaries of the trust only
another brother also deceased, entered, on May 24, 1948, into a Stipulation of Facts wherein "after notice given as required in the last preceding section"; i.e., that. "no such conveyance shall
administratrix Alejandrino recognized that Eusebia de Jesus and Cirilo de Jesus are co-owners be authorized until notice of the application for that purpose has been given personally or by mail
with the deceased Melecio de Jesus of Lot No. 931, and that said parcel was registered in the sole to all persons interested, and such further notice has been given, by publication or otherwise, as
name of the deceased only in trust for all the co-owners. On the same day, administratrix Ines the court deems proper" (sec. 8, Rule 90). This rule makes it mandatory that notice be served on
Alejandrino and claimant Eusebia de Jesus entered into another agreement called the heirs and other interested persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of
"Supplementary Stipulation of Facts" wherein the latter agreed to waive and renounce her money property held in trust by the deceased, and where no such notice is given, the order authorizing
claim for P7,585.84 against the estate upon the approval and becoming final of the the conveyance, as well as the conveyance itself, is completely void. 1 Here, plaintiffs claim that
aforementioned Stipulation of Facts. Both agreements were, on the very day of their execution, no such notice was given the heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus of the petition for the
presented to the court for approval, on the ground that they "will conserve the family filiation and approval of the stipulations in question, and it is quite probable that the claim is true, because said
attachment and will forestall any litigation between them"; and on the day following, May 25, 1948, heirs were all minors when the proceedings in question took place. It would have been necessary,
the probate court entered an order approving both agreements. therefore, to appoint a guardian  ad litem for them before they could be validly served said notice,
yet the records here do not show that such appointment of guardian was obtained. In fact, any
such appointment appears improbable, considering that the stipulations in question were
Years later, in July, 1955, Ines Alejandrino was replaced by her son Leon de Jesus in the approved the very next day following their execution and submission for approval. It must be
administration of the estate of Melecio de Jesus. As such administrator, and joining as plaintiff his observed that in 1948, before the promulgation of the Civil Code of the Philippines, parents as
mother, Ines Alejandrino, former administratrix, Leon de Jesus filed on October 11, 1958 in the such were not the legal representatives of their children before the courts and could not dispose of
lower court the present action (Civil Case No. 2563), seeking to annul the stipulations entered by their property without judicial authorization (Palet vs. Aldecoa & Co., 15 Phil. 232; Siman vs. Leus,
the former administratrix Ines Alejandrino with the defendants Eusebia de Jesus and the heirs of 37 Phil. 969; Rosario vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil. 140).
Cirilo de Jesus on May 24, 1948, on the theory that they are null and void for lack jurisdiction on
the part of the probate court to act on them, as well as for lack of the requisite notices to all the
interested parties, specifically the heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus. Defendants moved to As this question or notice would ultimately decide the validity or invalidity of the entire proceedings
dismiss the complaint, claiming res judicataand prescription, and on December 16, 1958, the trial in the probate court leading to the approval of the contested stipulations, plaintiffs-appellants
court sustained the motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. From this order, the should be given the opportunity to prove their claim that no such notice was given them. It proved,
plaintiffs appealed to this Court. the claim would likewise dispose of the defense of prescription put up by defendants in their
motion to dismiss, for an action to set aside completely void proceedings is imprescriptible and
can not be barred by lapse of time.

As for the ruling of the trial court that the present a administrator Leon de Jesus is estopped from
questioning the agreements voluntarily entered into by the former administratrix Ines Alejandrino,
suffice it to repeat what we said in the recent case of Boñaga vs. Soler, G.R. No. L-15717, June
30, 1961, that:

a decedent's representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed
purporting to convey land (Chase vs. Cartwright, 22 Am. St. Rep. 207, and cases cited;
Mocks v. Olpherts, 25 L. Ed. (U.S.) 735; 21 Am. Jur. 756, s. 667); and if this be true of the
administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori, his successor can not be estopped to question
the acts of his predecessor that are not conformable to law (cf. Walker vs. Portland
Savings Bank, LRA 1915 E, p. 840; 21 Am. Jur. p. 820, s. 785.).

The appealed order dismissing the complaint is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court
below for answer and trial on the merits. Costs against defendants-appellees.
RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE   He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in
December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo
VILLANUEVA, respondents. covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's
first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage
. to Esteban, Sr.

MEDIALDEA,  J.: On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due
time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA
GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on
February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against
defendant:
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent
(2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was
shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which
expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Memorial Foundation;'
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding
paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the
including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the
receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff; estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other
due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs. supplied.)

SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo) Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post- March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the
war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that
aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to
the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban her (p. 115, Rollo).
Javellana, Sr.
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for
three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation
(2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.
the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional
the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings
on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo). (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same
court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because (p. 31, Record).
she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons
(or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration
Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367,
possession, ownership and damages. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA
266).
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The
required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had
already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana 2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia
Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration. Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that
despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant
On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir
decision of the trial court in toto. Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
legal issues:
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue,
No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with
No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court; whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.

2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. xxxxxxxxx
No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on
Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
had inherited them; and
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and
(now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89
of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24,
properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107
court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action
for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly In Litam et al., v. Rivera,  100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for
filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a
the estate. civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the
deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question
court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On
January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the
of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071,  it being within the exclusive competence of the
of her mother: court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated
entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue.
probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless,
determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have
power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the
inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the
that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and
avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering
(Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388) the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is the exclusive competence of the probate court.
exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not
properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364) II. The question of extrinsic fraud—

A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic
5 Phil. 436) fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's
original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6,
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.
Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil.
pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy
terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters
share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment
83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his was procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the controversy.
share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment was
action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
 obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of
no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of. the same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
(Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary,
1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248) ... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after
Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as
executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated required by law, despite which the present movant only came to court now, then
party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v.
Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323) The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:

The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons: Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court
and proceeding was in rem  no subsequent errors or irregularities are available
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed
that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree
obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged: on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief
that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have
Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that
defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do
everything else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat
between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed to one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require
partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622;
(p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied) First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v.
Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by
choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by
Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not
planned to do. preclude Concordia from filing her own.

2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place III. On the question of reserva troncal—
of hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to
Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject
petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
(Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads
of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, as follows:
published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10,
1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings was ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
 operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
who belong to the line from which said property came.
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the
The persons involved in reserva troncal are: foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate
came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor  (reservista)—the ascendant who Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the foundation,  besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came. the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far
away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died
without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her
Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.) inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to
honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom
he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v.
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986,
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
Article 891.
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively
distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide: participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia,
but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half,
of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and
duly registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the
following principal purposes:
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers
or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such
deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the
reason of relationship by the whole blood. University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that: 2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements
Redemptorist Community for a deserving student who has the religious vocation
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent to become a priest.
within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the
subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of 3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement
relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share and enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors, especially in
alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
 literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after its The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be
benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions. ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at
Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to
community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs. become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative
writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the
Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose
and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana has likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
which has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents
will be offered every February and October, and Requiem masses every Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is
February 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as part of this obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
provision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban
aids or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement
income thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be
determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and
the objectives of the Foundation. the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number
of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit
exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to
permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and description or terminating the proceedings therein.
any interest herein.
SO ORDERED.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the
accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any
time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation, including
the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon
domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)

As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:

The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight
Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated
Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum
Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being
the most outstanding student teacher.

The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High
School, the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The School has been
selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.
RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Sometime in January 1997, Teresa also leased the properties located at Loakan Road, Baguio
City covered by TCT Nos. T-26770 and T-26772 (Loakan and Military Cut-off properties), in favor
July 12, 2017 of ATC Wonderland, Inc. and, subsequently, to Gloria de Guzman and Sonshine Pre-School for a
period often years, effective September 1, 1996 to August 31, 2006. 12
G.R. No. 213192
On September 25, 2001, herein respondents Ramon, Florencio Jr., Rosario and Carmelita, and
the Heirs of Amparo, Intestate Estate of Soledad, Jose and Intestate Estate of
TERESA R. IGNACIO, Petitioner Angel (plaintiffs) filed before the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 3 (Baguio RTC), three complaints for
vs. partition, annulment of lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
RAMON REYES, FLORENCIO REYES, JR., ROSARIO R. DU and CARMELITA R. PASTOR, writ of preliminary injunction against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio properties. 13
Respondents
The plaintiffs alleged in their Complaints 14 that, with the exception of the lessees, the parties and
DECISION the Florencio Sr. estate own one-tenth (1/10) of each of the Session Road, Loakan and Military
Cut-off, and Magsaysay properties. They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio
PERALTA, J.: Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased the same to the other parties without their
conformity. They also asserted in one of their complaints that the Florencio Sr. estate is different
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresa R. from the Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of Salud.
Ignacio (Teresa)  challenging the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated March 27, 2014 and June 27,
2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), which annulled and set aside the Orders dated They averred that, as co-owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the
April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)  of Pasig City, Branch 151. properties aforementioned due to Teresa's failure to duly account for the same. Thus, they are
asking for the partition of the properties, for the accounting of all the rentals, income or profits
The facts follow: derived, and deliver the same to the plaintiffs, for the annulment of the lease contracts and order
the lessees to vacate the premises, and for the payment of damages. 15
On July 11, 1967, Angel Reyes (Angel) and Oliva3 R. Arevalo (Oliva) filed before the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal (now RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151) (intestate court) a Petition4 for Letters Thereafter, the Baguio RTC directed and commissioned a team of auditors with Leticia Clemente
of Administration of the Estate of their father Florencio Reyes, Sr. (Florencio Sr.)  who died on as the head accountant to conduct an accounting of the properties. Based on the
June 23, 1967, and enumerated therein the surviving heirs, namely: Oliva, Francisca Vda. de Report,16 Teresa, as administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate, had a total cash accountability
Justiniani (Francisca),  Angel, Amparo R. Avecilla (Amparo),  Ramon Reyes (Ramon), Teresa, amounting to Fifteen Million Two Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand Sixty-Six Pesos and Fifty-One
Rosario R. Du (Rosario),  Jose Reyes (Reyes), Soledad Reyes (Soledad), Carmelita5 R. Centavos (₱15,238,066.51). In an Order 17 dated August 27, 2003, the Baguio RTC manifested
Pastor (Carmelita), and Florencio Reyes, Jr. (Florencio Jr.).  On July 15, 1967, the intestate court that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution of
appointed Oliva as the special administratrix of the estate of Florencio Sr. (Florencio Sr. the subject properties.18
estate),  and then as the regular administratrix in an Order dated November 23, 1967. 6 Florencio,
Jr. replaced Oliva in 1982. Thereafter, Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. Subsequently, on January 19, 2004, respondents and the others filed a motion 19 before the
estate on August 8, 1994.7 intestate court praying for the issuance of an order allowing the distribution of the heirs' aliquot
shares in the co-owned properties' net income, and the partition of the said properties by the
On December 5, 1994, Teresa executed a lease contract over a 398 square meters (sq. Baguio RTC. However, the intestate court denied the motion in an Order 20 dated April 13, 2004, a
m.) parcel of land located at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City covered by Transfer Certificate of portion of which reads:
Title (TCT)  No. T-59201 (Magsaysay property)  in favor of Gonzalo Ong, Virginia Lim, Nino Yu,
Francisco Lim and Simona Go.8 In an Order9 dated July 15, 1996, the intestate court approved the x x x This Court cannot allow the Baguio Court to partition the property of the estate because this
lease contract upon Teresa's motion dated June 4, 1996. Court already has jurisdiction over the matter. In fact, this Court is wondering why actions for
partition are being entertained in other jurisdictions when such can be readily addressed by this
Likewise, on September 26, 1996, the intestate court allowed Teresa to enter into a lease contract Court as an estate court.
over the parcel of land located at ·session Road, Baguio City with a total area of 646 sq. m.
covered by TCT No. T-26769 (Session Road property) to Famous Realty WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the instant motion, the Court hereby DENIES the same.
Corporation (FRC).10Thus, on October 29, 1996, Teresa leased the Session Road property to FRC
for the period of July 1, 1996 to June 30, 2003, with a monthly rental of ₱135,000.00. 11 SO ORDERED.21
In an Order dated June 14, 2012, the intestate court denied respondents' motion for The Court finds the instant petition without merit.
reconsideration dated May 12, 2004, thus:
Teresa argues that there is an appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
Thus finding no sufficient reasons to reverse and set aside this court's Order dated April 13, 2004 course of law available. She maintains that the intestate court asserted its jurisdiction and
considering the pendency before this court of the other incidents involving the Baguio properties authority over the subject properties and proceeded to conduct hearings to resolve the issues of
including the sale of Session Road property covered by TCT No. 26769 and even the distribution accounting, payment of advances, and distribution of assets and the proceeds of the sale of the
of the proceeds of the sale thereof with hearings conducted on the Financial Report (Re: Proceeds estate properties. The Baguio R TC opted to defer and not to proceed with the cases. Thus, it is
of the Sale of the Property at Session Road in Baguio City), and recently with the filing of the logical and proper that the respondents ask the Baguio RTC to proceed with the case and then
Proposed Project of Partition/ Amended Proposed Project of Partition, as such, the Motion for appeal the same if denied. 24 Teresa further avers that it is not disputed that the obligations
Reconsideration dated May 12, 2004 is DENIED. enumerated in Section 1,25 Rule 90 of the Rules of Court has not yet been fully paid. Thus, it would
be premature for the trial court to allow the advance distribution of the estate. A partial and
The continuation of presentation of evidence for the ·Heirs of Carmelita Clara Pastor et. (sic) al. premature distribution of the estate may only be done upon posting of a bond, conditioned upon
re: Removal of Adminstratix/ Motion to Liquidate and Reimburse Cash Advances is previously set the full payment of the obligations, which was not done in the present case.
on August 15, 2012 at 1:30 in the afternoon.
We note, however, that in her Partial Motion to Dismiss 26 dated July 1, 2016 before this Court,
SO ORDERED. 22 Teresa now agrees with the findings of the CA that the Magsaysay property is co-owned by the
parties, and should not be covered by the estate proceedings. 27
Thereafter, the respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders dated
April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 of the intestate court disallowing the partition of the Baguio As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is valid only when the
properties. question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial functions.28 In this case, the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy
In a Decision dated March 27, 2014, the CA granted the petition and annulled and set aside the depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. 29 This
assailed Orders of the intestate court. The dispositive portion of the Decision states: Court has distinguished the interlocutory and final orders, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done
of Pasig City, Branch 151, dated April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 are ANNULLED and SET by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
ASIDE. Petitioners' motion to allow partition and distribution of shares over properties Co-Owned evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
by the Estate and the Heirs [l]ocated in Baguio City, is GRANTED. are and which party is in the right~ or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground,
for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far
On the other hand, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, before which court Special as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned.
Civil Actions Nos. 5055-R, 5056-R, and 5057-R are pending, is DIRECTED to partition the Baguio Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which
Properties among the registered co-owners thereof. among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of
an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
SO ORDERED.23 "final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final and executory."

Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, Teresa filed before this Court the instant petition x x x           x x x          x x x
raising the following issues:
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task
I. THERE IS AN APPEAL OR OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND [ADEQUATE] REMEDY IN THE of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW [AVAILABLE] TO THE RESPONDENTS. other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory"
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for
II. RESPONDENTS ARE, IN EFFECT, ASKING THE TRIAL COURT TO VIOLATE THE RULES extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying
OF COURT. applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a
"final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may
not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from
III. IN LEGAL CONTEMPLATION, THE CHALLENGED ORDERS WERE NOT ISSUED WITH the final judgment rendered in the case.30
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The assailed April 13, 2004 and June 14, 2012 Orders denying respondents' motion to allow the We note that respondents presented certificates of title of the properties registered under their
distribution of the estate's and co-owners' shares in the subject properties were interlocutory. This names and the Florencio Sr. estate, and their respective shares. 36 As pronounced in Bolisay v.
is because such denial was not a final determination of their alleged co-ownership. In fact, the Judge Alcid:37
intestate court merely asserted its jurisdiction over the properties which were allegedly co-owned
with the Florencio Sr. estate. In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens
Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in
Jurisprudence teaches that jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
as it relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property
arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the itself is in the persons named in the title.38
estate.31
As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in
Furthermore, the doctrine that "in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of an appropriate ordinary action. The co-ownership of the said properties by virtue of the certificates
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality" applies of title is a common issue in the complaints for partition filed before the Baguio RTC. Thus, the
with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar. 32 Thus: intestate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction over the subject
properties since its jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate estate of deceased persons. Any decision that the intestate court would render on the title of the
or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong properties would at best be merely provisional in character, and would yield to a final
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine determination in a separate action.
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the An action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is typically brought by a person claiming
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final to be the owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so." 33 recognizes to be his co-owners,39 and is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-
ownership between the parties.40 As discussed in Lim De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, 41the
Corollarily, in the case of Agtarap v. Agtarap, et al.  34 the Court enumerated the instances when determination of the existence of co-ownership is the first stage to accord with the remedy of
the intestate court may pass upon the issue of ownership, to wit: judicial partition, thus:

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is
not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the interested in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to desired partition either because a co-ownership does nut exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It
the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, that
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they
the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be
exclusive property of the deceased spouse. 35 appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.

From the foregoing, this Court holds that the general rule on the limited jurisdiction of the RTC as In this regard, the Baguio RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial to await a request
intestate court is applicable in Special Civil Action Nos. 5.055-R and 5056-R. As to the Magsaysay order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution. In fact, it has not yet made a
property in Special Civil Action No. 5057-R, it is evident from the certificate of title that the rights of definite ruling on the existence of co-ownership. There was no declaration of entitlement to the
parties other than the heirs of Florencio Sr. will be impaired should the intestate court decide on desired partition either because a co-ownership exists or a partition is not legally prohibited. As
the ownership of the property. this Court is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to proceed and determine once and for all if
there is co-ownership and to partition the subject properties if there is no legal prohibition. It is also
best for the Baguio RTC to settle whether the respondents are claiming ownership over the
properties by virtue of their title adverse to that of their late father and his estate and not by any
right of inheritance.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresa R. Ignacio is

hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution; dated March 27, 2014 and June 27, 2014,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127151 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, such that the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 is DIRECTED to
RESUME trial on the merits in Special Civil Action Nos. 5055-R, 5056-R, and 5057-R to determine
the ownership of the subject properties and to partition as co-owners, if proper.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE neither verbal nor written agreement between petitioners and respondents that the latter shall
reimburse whatever payment was made by the former or their predecessor-in-interest; (3) Jean
February 29, 2016 was only a minor during the execution of the alleged agreement and is not a party thereto; (4) that
whatever liability or obligation of respondents is already barred by prescription, laches and
estoppel; (5) that the complaint states no cause of action as respondents are not duty-bound to
G.R. No. 198434 reimburse whatever alleged payments were made by petitioners; and (6) there is no contract
between the parties to the effect that respondents are under obligation to transfer ownership in
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD AND JULIANA V. NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, petitioners' favor as reimbursement for the alleged payments made by petitioners to DBP.
vs.
JUANA MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD, and SPOUSES JEAN NATIVIDAD CRUZ AND JERRY Respondents waived their right to present evidence arid they merely filed their memorandum.
CRUZ, Respondents. Also, during pendency" of the trial, Leandro died and was substituted by his heirs, herein
petitioners.
DECISION
On November. 4, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, the dispositive
PERALTA, J.: portion of which reads as follows:

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari  are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 7, 2011 and August 25, 2011, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 92840. The assailed CA Decision modified the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)  of 1. Defendants Juana Mauricio [Vda.] de Natividad and Jean Natividad-Cruz are ordered
San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75, in Civil Case No. 1637-02-SM, while the CA Resolution denied to effect the transfer of title in OCT No. 5980 with respect to the undivided share of the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. late Sergio Natividad; and in OCT No. 10271 both of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal in favor of plaintiff Juliana [V da.] de Natividad and the Heirs of the late
The present petition arose from an action for specific performance and/or recovery of sum of Leandro Natividad.
money filed against herein respondents by the spouses Leandro Natividad (Leandro)  and Juliana
Natividad (Juliana), who are the predecessors of herein petitioners. 2. Defendants to pay jointly and severally, attorney's fees in the sum of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00); and cost of suit.
In their Complaint, Leandro and Juliana alleged that sometime in 1974, Sergio
Natividad (Sergio),  husband of respondent Juana Mauricio-Natividad (Juana) and father of SO ORDERED.3
respondent Jean Natividad-Cruz (Jean),  obtained a loan from the Development Bank of t.he
Philippines (DBP).  As security for the loan, Sergio mortgaged two parcels of land, one of which is
co-owned and registered in his name and that of his siblings namely, Leandro, Domingo and Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, respondents filed an Appeal with the CA.
Adoracion. This property is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5980. Sergio's
siblings executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to mortgage the said property. The On February 7, 2011, the CA promulgated its questioned Decision, disposing as follows:
other mortgaged parcel of land, covered by OCT No. 10271, was registered in the name of Sergio
and Juana. Subsequently, Sergio died without being able to pay his obligations with DBP. Since WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 4, 2008 is
the loan was nearing its maturity and the mortgaged properties were in danger of being hereby MODIFIED in that defendants-appellants Juana Mauricio-Natividad and Jean Natividad-
foreclosed, Leandro paid Sergio's loan obligations. Considering that respondents were unable to Cruz are ordered instead to reimburse plaintiffs-appellees Juliana Natividad and the heirs of the
reimburse Leandro for the advances he made in Sergio's favor, respondents agreed that Sergio's late Leandro Natividad the amount of P162,514.88 representing the amount of the loan obligation
share in the lot which he co-owned with his siblings and the other parcel of land in the name of paid to the Development Bank of the Philippines, plus legal interest of 12% per annum computed
Sergio and Juana, shall be assigned in favor of Leandro ahd Juliana. Leandro's and Sergio's from June 23, 2001 until finality of the judgment, the total amount of which shall be to the extent
brother, Domingo, was tasked to facilitate the transfer of ownership of the subject properties in only of defendants-appellants' successional rights in the mortgaged properties and Juana's
favor of Leandro ·and Juliana. However, Domingo died without being able to cause such transfer. conjugal share in [the] property covered by OCT No. 10271. The award of attorney's fees and cost
Subsequently, despite demands and several follow-ups made by petitioners, respondents failed of suit are AFFIRMED.
and refused to honor their undertaking.
SO ORDERED.4
Respondents filed their Answer denying the allegations in the complaint and raising the following
defenses: (1) respondents are not parties to the contract between Sergio and DBP; (2) there is
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, while respondents filed their own Motion for Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE
Reconsideration, both of which, however, were denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution dated METERS, more or less, and covered by OCT NO. 10271.
August 25, 2011.
b. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal,
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds: containing an area of 2,742 square meters, covered by OCT No. 10493.

I. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING THAT THE c. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in San Jose, Montalban, Rizal,
VERBAL AGREEMENT TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY SHARES OF SERGIO containing an area of 4,775 square meters, and covered by OCT No. ON-403.
NATIVIDAD IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS OBLIGATION IS COVERED BY THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN PARTIALLY EXECUTED, IS d. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in Cambal, San Mateo, Rizal,
CONTRARY TO'EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE. containing an area of 13,456 square meters, and covered by OCT No. 5980.

II. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING That no other personal properties are involved in this extrajudicial settlement.
THAT THE INTEREST ON THE UNPAID LOAN .OBLIGATION SHOULD BE IMPOSED
ONLY ON JUNE 23, 2001, DATE OF THE DEMAND FOR PAYMENT INSTEAD OF
SEPTEMBER 23, 1994, WHEN THE PARTIES VERBALLY AGREED TO CONVEY That to the best knowledge and information of the parties hereto, the said deceased left certain
THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL obligations amounting to P175,000.00 representing loan obligations with the Development Bank of
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF SERGIO NATIVIDAD.5 the Philippines.

Petitioners, insist that there was a verbal agreement between respondents and Leandro, their That a notice of this extrajudicial settlement had been published once a week for three
predecessor-in-interest, wherein the subject properties shall be assigned to the latter as consecutive weeks in ___________ a newspaper of general circulation in_______, as certified by
reimbursement for the payments he made in Sergio's favor. To support this contention, petitioners the said newspaper hereto attached as Annex "A";
relied heavily on the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, which was executed by respondents to
prove that there was indeed such an agreement and that such a Settlement is evidence of the That the parties hereto being all of legal age and with full civil capacity to contract, hereby by
partial execution of the said agreement. The provisions of the said Settlement are as follows: these presents agree to divide and adjudicate, as they hereby divide and adjudicate, among
themselves the above-described real estate property in equal shares and interest.
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AMONG HEIRS
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this document on this 2nd day of September,
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 1994 in San Mateo, Rizal, Philippines.

This EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, made and entered into by and among: x x x6

JUAN M. NATIVIDAD, widow; JEAN N. CRUZ, married to JERRY CRUZ; JOSELITO M. After a careful reading of the abovequoted Extra judicial Settlement Among Heirs, the Court
NATIVIDAD, single, all of legal age, Filipino citizens, and residents of Malanday, San Mateo, Rizal agrees with the CA that there is nothing in the said document which would indicate that
respondents agreed to the effect that the subject properties shall be transferred in the name of
Leandro as reimbursement for his payment of Syrgio's loan obligations with the DBP. On the
WITNESSETH contrary, the second to the last paragraph of the said Settlement clearly shows that herein
respondents, as heirs of Sergio, have divided the subject properties exclusively among
That the above-named parties, is the legitimate wife and children and sole heirs of the deceased themselves.
SERGIO NATIVIDAD, who died in San Mateo, Rizal on May 31, 1981;
There is no competent evidence to prove the verbal agreement being claimed by respondents.
That the said deceased, at the time of his death, left certain real estate properties located at San Aside from the subject Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, the self-serving claims of Leandro
Mateo, Rizal, and Montalban, Rizal, more particularly described as follows: on the witness stand, as well as the cash voucher, 7 which supposedly represented payment of
P8,000.00 given to Atty. Domingo Natividad for the expenses in transferring the title of the subject
a. A whole portion of a parcel of land (Plan Psu-295655, L.R. Case No. Q-29, L.R.C. properties in Leandro's favor, would hardly count as competent evidence in the eyes of the law.
Record No. N-295___ , situated in the Barrio of Malanday, Municipality of San Mateo, Respondents' claim of the existence of a verbal agreement between them, on one hand, and
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, on the other, remains to be mere allegation. It is an age-old
rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
not evidence. 8 to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by will or by operation of law.
In relation to petitioners' contention that the subject verbal agreement actually existed, they
reiterate their contention that the conveyance of the subject properties in their favor is not covered Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
by the Statute of Frauds because they claim that respondents' execution of the Extrajudicial extinguished by his death.
Settlement Among Heirs constitutes partial execution of their alleged agreement.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights
The Court does not agree. and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since
the opening of the succession.
Suffice it to say that there is no partial execution of any contract, whatsoever, because petitioners
failed to prove, in the first place, that there was a verbal agreement that was entered into. In the present case, respondents, being heirs of Sergio, are now liable to settle his transmissible
obligations, which include the amount due to petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder
Even granting that such an agreement existed, the CA did not commit any en-or in ruling that the of Sergio's estate to them, in accordance with Section 1, 10 Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
assignment of the shares of Sergio in the subject properties in petitioners' favor as payment of
Sergio's obligation cannot be enforced if there is no written contract to such effect. Under the As to when the interest on the sum due from respondents should be reckoned, the Court finds no
Statute of Frauds9, an agreement to convey real properties shall be unenforceable by action in the error in the ruling of the CA that such interest should be computed from June 23, 2001, the date
absence of a written note or memorandum thereof and subscribed by the party charged or by his when petitioners made a written demand for the payment of respondents' obligation. 11 There is no
agent. As earlier discussed, the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners, consisting of merit in petitioners' contention that the reckoning date should have been September 23, 1994, the
respondents' acknowledgment of Sergio's loan obligations with DBP as embodied in the date when respondents executed the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, because there is
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, as well as the cash voucher which allegedly represents nothing therein to prove that petitioners, at that time, made a demand for reimbursement.
payment for taxes and transfer of title in petitioners' name do not serve as written notes or
memoranda of the alleged verbal agreement. However, the rate of interest should be modified in view of the issuance of Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013 by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB).  The said Circular
The foregoing, notwithstanding, the Court finds it proper to reiterate the CA ruling that, in any reduced the "rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
case, since respondents had already acknowledged that Sergio had, in fact, incurred loan rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest," from
obligations with the DBP, they are liable to reimburse the amount paid by Leandro for the payment twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum.  The Circular was made effective on July 1,
of the said obligation even if such payment was made without their knowledge or consent. 2013. Hence, under the modified guidelines in the imposition of interest, as laid down in the case
of Nacar v. Gallery Frames,  12 this Court held that:
Article 1236 of the Civil Code clearly provides that:
xxxx
The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest
in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he
paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
the payment has been beneficial to the debtor. (Emphasis supplied) money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
Neither can respondents evade liability by arguing that they were not parties to the contract legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
between Sergio and the DBP. As earlier stated, the fact remains that, in the Extrajudicial the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,  from
Settlement Among Heirs, respondents clearly acknowledged Sergio's loan obligations with the judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
DBP. Being Sergio's heirs, they succeed not only to the rights of Sergio but also to his obligations. of the Civil Code.

The following provisions of the Civil Code are clear on this matter, to wit: 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
 unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may
be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of
legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x13

The Court explained that:

[F]rom the foregoing, in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that would
govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%)  per annum  - as
reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations
for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 - but will
now be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that
the new rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve
percent (12%) per annum  legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013,
the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when
applicable.  14

Thus, in accordance with the above ruling, the rate of interest on the principal amount due to
petitioners shall be 12% from June 23, 2001, the date when petitioners made a demand for
payment, to June 30, 2013. From July 1, 2013, the effective date of BSP-MB Circular No. 799,
until full satisfaction of the monetary award, the rate of interest shall be 6%.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals, dated February 7, 2011 and August 25, 2011, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92840
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by ORDERING respondents to pay petitioners, in addition to
the principal amount of P162,514.88, interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum,  computed from June 23, 2001 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from
July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction of the judgment award.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any
Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late
G.R. No. 178933               September 16, 2009 Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court. 3

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner, Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order 4 affirming its Order dated January 3,
vs. 2005 and denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC
COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE, Respondents. also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties
as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to
vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt
DECISION of the order.

VELASCO, JR., J.: Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005.

The Case On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2005 5 of
the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005,
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the May 4, 2007 which was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005.
Resolution1 and July 6, 2007 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764,
entitled Nelia S. Silverio-Dee and Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (impleaded as necessary party) v. Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005 6 also recalled its previous order granting
Reinato G. Quilala, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 57, Ricardo Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and
S. Silverio, Jr., Edmundo S. Silverio, represented by Nestor Dela Merced II, and Sheriff Villamor R. reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.
Villegas.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration
The assailed resolution granted private respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a Temporary which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC
Restraining Order against public respondent Judge Quilala. On the other hand, the assailed also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to
decision set aside the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007 and the Notice to Vacate dated April partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among the
19, 2007 while directing the respondent lower court to give due course to the appeal of herein properties authorized to be sold was the one located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati
private respondent. City.7

The Facts Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5,
20068 from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20,
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. 20069 was filed on January 23, 2006.
After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitled In Re: Estate Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for
of the Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al. pending Issuance of a Writ of Execution 10 against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC). Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to
remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November 22, 2004, Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order 11 denying the appeal on the ground that it was
Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator. enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises
of the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of execution was later
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, issued on April 17, 200712 and a Notice to Vacate13 was issued on April 19, 2007 ordering private
Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. respondent to leave the premises of the subject property within ten (10) days.

On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for
January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders. TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated May 2, 200714 with the CA.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a The Court’s Ruling
TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary
period provided by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in This petition is meritorious.
Neypes v. Court of Appeals15 as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank.16
The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC Is an Interlocutory Order, Not Subject to an Appeal
Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of private
respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE. Accordingly, the Order, dated April 2, 2007, the writ of execution, dated April 17, 2007, On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the
and the Notice to Vacate, dated April 19, 2007, are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Further, the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a
court a quo is hereby directed to give due course to the appeal of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee. copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal,
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration
was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent
SO ORDERED. on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while
she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.1avvphi1
Hence, the instant petition.
Thus, in denying due course to the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its Order dated April 2,
The Issues 2007, ruled:

-A- Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court dated
December 12, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be
The Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order dated December taken from the order denying the motion for reconsideration (see Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997
12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41; Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court). Furthermore,
assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the
appeal cannot be given due course as the Record on Appeal had been filed beyond the thirty-day
-B- period to appeal (see Section 3 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)

The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Nelia Silverio is hereby DENIED due course.
lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in deliberately failing to decide that the basis of the occupancy of
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee are fraudulent documents, without any authority from the Intestate Court;
Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the Order dated May 31, 2005 against Nelia Silverio-Dee
requiring her to vacate the premises at No. 3 Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City.
-C-
SO ORDERED.
The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing precipitately the temporary restraining order (TRO) in its
Resolution dated May 4, 2007 (Annex A-1); Thus, the denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-
Dee’s appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under
Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dee’s Record on Appeal was
-D- filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.

The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
lack of or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Order dated April 2, 2007, the Writ of Execution
dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 because the respondent
Silverio-Dee’s occupancy of the Intestate property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, RULE 41
Makati City (Annex N of Annex C) will prevent the sale authorized by the Order dated October 31, APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
2006 to secure funds for the payment of taxes due which are now high and rapidly increasing
payment of which must not be enjoined.17
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999 Order denying his
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to Omnibus Motion—Motion for Reconsideration should thus be deemed to refer to the January 17,
be appealable. 1999 Order which declared him non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.

No appeal may be taken from: If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is applied to
any order, then there would have been no need to specifically mention in both above-quoted
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; sections of the Rules "final orders or judgments" as subject to appeal. In other words, from the
entire provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that what is proscribed is to appeal
from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an interlocutory
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party order.
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
On this aspect, the CA ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was a final order, to wit:
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated
December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May
31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges We note that the Order, dated December 12, 2005, is an offshoot of the Omnibus Order, dated
that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have May 31, 2005. In the Omnibus Order, the court a quo ruled that the petitioner, as an heir of the
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead. late Beatriz S. Silverio, had no right to use and occupy the property in question despite authority
given to her by Ricardo Silverio, Sr. when it said, thus:
The CA, however, ruled that the filing of the Notice of Appeal in this case was proper saying that
the appeal pertained to the earlier Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005. The CA, citing Apuyan v. x x x In the first place, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee cannot occupy the property in Intsia, Forbes Park,
Haldeman,18 argued that an order denying a motion for reconsideration may be appealed as such admittedly belonging to the conjugal estate and subject to their proceedings without authority of
order is the "final order" which disposes of the case. In that case, we stated: the Court. Based on the pretenses of Nelia Silverio-Dee in her memorandum, it is clear that she
would use and maintain the premises in the concept of a distributee. Under her perception,
Section 1 Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court is violated. x x x
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., We held, thus:
xxxx
… [T]his Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order, and not to a final order or judgment. That that was
the intention of the above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971), For the property at Intsia, Forbes Park cannot be occupied or appropriated by, nor distributed to
cited in above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which this Court held that an order Nelia S. Silverio-Dee, since no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
denying a motion to dismiss an action is interlocutory, hence, not appealable. mentioned in the aforestated Rule is made. In fact, the said property may still be sold to pay the
taxes and/or other obligations owned by the estate, which will be difficult to do if she is allowed to
stay in the property.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order is to
prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having
to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single Moreover, the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the
appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and property dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is
assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal. null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by
virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules
of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary
interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other of Court). With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-
than to execute the order. Dee of the property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy
cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not to mention the fact that it will also
Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the purpose of
dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself. settling the estate’s legitimate obligations.
In the belated Memorandum of Nelia Silverio-Dee, she enclosed a statement of the expenses she Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
incurred pertaining to the house renovation covering the period from May 26, 2004 to February 28, pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
2005 in the total amount of Php12,434,749.55, which supports this Court’s conclusion that she is another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
already the final distributee of the property. Repairs of such magnitude require notice, hearing of alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
the parties and approval of the Court under the Rules. Without following this process, the acts of be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 22 (Emphasis supplied.)
Nelia Silverio-Dee are absolutely without legal sanction.
Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of
To our mind, the court a quo’s ruling clearly constitutes a final determination of the rights of the an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in
petitioner as the appealing party. As such, the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2002 (the Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to
predecessor of the Order dated December 12, 2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the
appealed, for the said matter is clearly declared by the rules as appealable and the proscription properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges,
does not apply.19 (Emphasis supplied.) and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.

An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v. Republic: 20 Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included
therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from
completely but leaves something to be decided upon. (Emphasis supplied.) Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real
interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such,
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not
appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The subject to an appeal.1avvphi1
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when
such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to. 21 RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. 23

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary
that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case.
Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005
of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in Order of the RTC.
mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the
estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, Therefore, there is no longer any need to consider the other issues raised in the petition.
we succinctly ruled:
WHEREFORE, the May 4, 2007 Resolution and July 6, 2007 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of No. 98764 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus, the Decision dated April 2, 2007 of the RTC
the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the denying due course to the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee; the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007;
debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 are hereby REINSTATED.
belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his
rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that
he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is No costs.
made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together
with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and SO ORDERED.
enjoyment of the same.

Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been transferred during the lifetime
of the decedent, they were ordered to submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support
G.R. No. 185226               February 11, 2010 the allegation. Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared that one
of the six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of Donation executed in August
1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr. 6
CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as administratrix of the estate litigated in the case below,
RAMIRO T. MADARANG, and the heirs of CASIMIRO R. MADARANG, JR., namely: Estrelita
L. Madarang, Consuelo P. Madarang, Casimiro Madarang IV, and Jane Margaret Madarang- It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the provisional inclusion of
Crabtree, Petitioners, the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG and VICENTE R. MADARANG, Respondents. The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003, 7 thus modified its April 5, 2002 Order as follows:

DECISION Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be excluded . The
administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to submit a revised inventory in accordance
CARPIO MORALES, J.: with the Order dated April 5, 2002, as here modified; and (2) to render an accounting of her
administration of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring supplied),
Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on June 3, 1995, leaving
real and personal properties with an estimated value of ₱200,000.00. 1 He was survived by his wife Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that since the title to Lot 829-
Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon. B-4-B remained registered in the name of his parents, it should not be excluded from the
Inventory; and that the Deed of Donation in Vicente’s favor was not notarized nor registered with
the Register of Deeds. Jose’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order of February
In the intestate proceedings filed by the couple’s son Jose which was lodged before the Regional 5, 2003, he filed a Notice of Appeal.
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was appointed as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr.2
In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC erred in excluding Lot
829-B-4-B from the Inventory as "what the lower court should have done was to . . . maintain the
Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedent’s estate. Jose filed order including said lot in the inventory of the estate so Vicente can file an ordinary action where
his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B located in its ownership can be threshed out."
Cebu City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125429.
Jose later filed before the appellate court a "Motion to Withdraw Petition" which his co-heirs-
A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part of the estate of the oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground that, inter alia, a grant thereof would "end"
decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002, 3 the RTC, noting the following: the administration proceedings. The appellate court, by Resolution of January 18, 2008, 8 granted
the withdrawal on the ground that it would "not prejudice the rights of the oppositors."
x x x The said properties appear to have been acquired by the spouses after [their marriage on]
December 27, 1931 and during their marriage or coverture. Article 160 of the New Civil Code of Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s Motion to Withdraw
the Philippines (which is the governing law in this particular case) is very explicit in providing Petition was, by Resolution of November 6, 2008,9 denied in this wise:
that all properties of the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership . This
presumption, to the mind of the Court, has not been sufficiently rebutted by the special
administratrix. [Dolores] This presumption applies and holds even if the land is registered under xxxx
the wife’s name as long as it was acquired during marriage  (De Guinoo vs. Court of Appeals. G.R.
No. L-5541, June 26, 1955) or even if the wife purchased the land alone  (Flores, et.al. Vs. In the instant case, the Probate Court found that the parties of the case interposed no objection to
Escudero, et.al., G.R. No. L-5302, March 11, 1953).4 (underscoring supplied), the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in
effect, they have consented thereto. x x x
instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.
xxxx
Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be referred to as
"oppositors,"5 questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six lots via motion for reconsideration Moreover, [herein petitioners] in their appeal brief, ha[ve] extensively argued that . . . Vicente
during the pendency of which motion the court appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co- Madarang [to whom the questioned lot was donated] and his family have been in continuous,
administratrix of her mother Dolores. actual and physical possession of the donated lot  for over twenty (20) years, even before the
execution of the so called donation inter vivos in 1992. . . . Vicente Madarang has his residential As earlier reflected, Vicente’s claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-4-B rests upon a deed of
house thereon and that his ownership over the donated lot has been fully recognized by the entire donation by his father (decedent) and his mother.
Madarang Clan, including all his brothers and sisters, except the much belated objection by the
appellant (Jose), allegedly resorted to as an act of harassment. 10 (emphasis and underscoring Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
supplied),
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into
thus affirming the RTC order of exclusion of the questioned lot. the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may
Hence, the present petition for review filed by the oppositors-herein petitioners. Casimiro, Jr. be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.
having died during the pendency of the case, he was substituted by his wife petitioner Estrelita (underscoring supplied)
and co-petitioners children Consuelo, Casimiro IV, and Jane Margaret.
in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the appellate court was the merit
of Jose’s "Motion to Withdraw Petition," it exceeded its jurisdiction when it passed upon the merits Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as to advancement made, or
of Jose’s appeal from the RTC order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory. alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
Petitioners’ contention does not lie. binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s grant of Jose’s "Motion to Withdraw By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by the
Petition," petitioners, oddly denying the existence of a "petition," raised the issue of the propriety of decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory
the RTC Order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory. Their prayer in their Motion clearly of the properties of the decedent.
states so:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Oppositors-Appellees [petitioners] respectfully PRAY for this of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Corazon M. Gregorio and her co-administratrix Dolores
Honorable Court to RECONSIDER its questioned Resolution and rendering [sic], forthwith, a Madarang are DIRECTED to include Lot 829-B-4-B in the Inventory of the properties of the
decision resolving the merits of the Partial Appeal of petitioner-appellant Jose intestate estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr.
Madarang.11 (capitalization in the original; emphasis supplied)
Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue. City, Branch 57, which is DIRECTED to proceed with the disposition of the case with dispatch.

More specifically, petitioners question the appellate court’s finding that as the parties "interposed SO ORDERED.
no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V.
Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto." 12

A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was no accord among
the parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.

While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on questions of title and
ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of properties of a
decedent, make a provisional determination of ownership, without prejudice to a final
determination through a separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.1avvphil

The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to make a
provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears stress that the question is one
of collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over which the question of title and
ownership can be passed upon by a probate court. 13
RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in her name
under Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-1908, located in Bambang, Bulacan (subject
G.R. No. L-15445             April 29, 1961 property).

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES CANO. By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos 5 dated May 7, 1986 (Huling
FLORANTE C. TIMBOL, administrator-appellee, Habilin), the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion, as a devisee.
vs. The pertinent provision of the Huling Habilin provides:
JOSE CANO, oppositor-appellant.
Sa aking pamangkin nasi RESURRECCION MARTINEZ-FELIX, 'RESY', ay aking inaaboy ang
REPEAT CASE FROM RULE 88 apat (4) na parselang lupang palayan na napapaloob sa mga titulong sumusunod:

x x x x6

RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed a document entitled
Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa7 dated November 10, 1998, which transferred ownership over the parcel
of land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical possession of the
subject property.
SECOND DIVISION April 10, 2019 G.R. No. 240199
Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was undertaken before the RTC,
SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO, Petitioners Branch 22 (Probate Court). Respondent Recaredo was appointed as the executor of the Huling
vs. Habilin. The latter then filed and presented the Huling Habilin before the Probate Court, which
HEIRS OF RESURRECCION* MARTINEZ FELIX, NAMELY: LUCIANO, CORAZON AND approved it on February 6, 2008. The Probate Court likewise issued a Certificate of Allowance on
CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED FELIX, RECAREDO P. HERNANDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS January 12, 2009.
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF AMANDA H. BURGOS, AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS, Respondents
On March 9, 2010, the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate
the subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondents heirs. To protect their
D E C I S I O N CAGUIOA, J.: interest over the subject property, the petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim dated March 17, 2009, which was however denied registration by the respondent RD on
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of November 3, 2009.
Court filed by petitioners Spouses Isidro R. Salitico (Isidro) and Conrada C. Salitico (Conrada)
(collectively referred to as the petitioners Sps. Salitico), assailing the Decision 2 dated October 19, In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery and return in
2017 (assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated June 7, 2018 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of their favor of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 and the execution of the corresponding
Appeals (CA) Twelfth Division and Special Former Twelfth Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV Deed of Absolute Sale by way of confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed
No. 105166. that OCT P-1908 be cancelled and a new one be issued in their names. Lastly, they also
demanded payment of attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages, and reimbursement for
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings litigation expenses.

As narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision and based on the records of the instant case, the On February 11, 2013, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Summary
essential facts and antecedent proceedings of the case are as follows: Judgment,8 which was, however, denied by the RTC in its Order 9 dated June 5, 2013. The
petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was partially granted by the
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint4 for Specific Performance with Damages (Complaint) RTC in its Order dated September 18, 2013.10 The RTC issued a partial summary judgment in
filed on February 15, 2011 by the petitioners Sps. Salitico against the respondents Heirs of favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico, ordering the respondent RD to register the petitioners'
Resurreccion Martinez Felix (Resurreccion); namely: Luciano, Corazon, and Concepcion, all Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated March 17, 2009. The Pre-Trial of the case was concluded on
surnamed Felix (collectively referred to as the respondents heirs); Recaredo P. Hernandez September 26, 2013. Thereafter, trial ensued.
(Recaredo), in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Amanda H. Burgos (Amanda); and
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan (RD). The case was heard before the Regional Trial Comt of The Ruling of the RTC
Malolos City (RTC), Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 73-M-2011.
On June 6, 2014, the RTC rendered its Decision 11 dismissing the Complaint for lack of cause of The instant Petition is partly meritorious.1âшphi1
action. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
It is not disputed that by virtue of the decedent Amanda's will, i.e., Huling Habilin, Resurreccion
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Complaint dated 7 February 2011 is hereby dismissed inherited the subject property as the designated devisee. The respondents heirs themselves admit
for lack of cause of action. that Resurreccion is a testamentary heir of Amanda.17

SO ORDERED.12 It is likewise not disputed that Resurreccion sold her interest over the subject property by
executing a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico
In its Decision, the RTC found that Resurreccion had indeed validly sold the subject property who then proceeded to take physical possession of the subject property. In fact, in the assailed
which she inherited from Amanda to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Nevertheless, the RTC held that Decision, the CA recognized that the RTC itselfhad held that "Resurreccion validly sold to [the
the action filed by the petitioners Sps. Salitico is premature on the ground that it was not shown petitioners Sps. Salitico] all her rights in the [subject property] which she inherited from Amanda H.
that the Probate Court had already fully settled the Estate of Amanda, even as it was not disputed Burgos as part of her undivided share in the estate of the latter." 18
that the Huling Habilin had already been allowed and certified. Hence, the RTC dismissed the
Complaint for the sole reason that the petitioners Sps. Salitico's cause of action had supposedly Article 777 of the Civil Code, which is substantive law, states that the rights of the inheritance are
not yet accrued, as the Estate of Amanda has not yet been fully settled by the Probate Court. transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Article 777 operates at the very
moment of the decedent's death meaning that the transmission by succession occurs at the
The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the RTC's precise moment of death and, therefore, at that precise time, the heir is already legally deemed to
Order dated May 26, 2015.13 have acquired ownership of his/her share in the inheritance, "and not at the time of declaration of
heirs, or partition, or distribution." 19 Thus, there is no legal bar to an heir disposing of his/her
hereditary share immediately after such death. 20 The Court, early on in Teves de Jakosalem v.
Hence, on June 16, 2015, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Notice of Appeal, which was Rafols, et al.,21 explained that a sale made by a legal or intestate heir of his share in an inheritance
granted by the RTC on June 18, 2015. The appeal was given due course by the CA. does not interfere with the administration of the estate.

The Ruling of the CA As applied to the instant case, upon the death of Amanda, Resurreccion became the absolute
owner of the devised subject property, subject to a resolutory condition that upon settlement of
In the assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of the probate Amanda's Estate, the devise is not declared inofficious or excessive. Hence, there was no legal
proceedings before the Probate Court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which bar preventing Resurreccion from entering into a contract of sale with the petitioners Sps. Salitico
states that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the with respect to the former's share or interest over the subject property.
proper court. The CA also cited Rule 90, Section 1, which states that no distribution shall be
allowed until the payment of debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, allowance to In a contract of sale, the parties' obligations are plain and simple. The law obliges the vendor to
the widow, and inheritance tax have been made, unless the distributees or any of them give a transfer the ownership of and to deliver the thing that is the object of sale to the
bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned on the payment of the said obligations. vendee.22 Therefore, as a consequence of the valid contract of sale entered into by the parties,
Resurreccion had the obligation to deliver the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. In
The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration dated November 9, fact, it is not disputed that the physical delivery of the subject property to the petitioners Sps.
2017,14 which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution. Salitico had been done, with the latter immediately entering into possession of the subject property
after the execution of the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. Therefore, considering that a valid sale has
Hence, this appeal via Petition for Review on Certiorari15 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The been entered into in the instant case, there is no reason for the respondents heirs to withhold from
respondents heirs filed their Comment16 dated November 9, 2018. the petitioners Sps. Salitico the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908. To reiterate, Resurreccion
already sold all of her interest over the subject property to the petitioners Sps. Salitico. Therefore,
Issue the respondents heirs have absolutely no rhyme nor reason to continue possessing the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT P-1908.
Stripped to its core, the Court is asked to rule on whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's
Decision dated June 6, 2014 and Order dated May 26, 2015, which dismissed the petitioners Sps. Nevertheless, the existence of a valid sale in the instant case does not necessarily mean that the
Salitico's Complaint for Specific Performance due to lack of cause of action. RD may already be compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the
petitioners Sps. Salitico.
The Court's Ruling
According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate of
Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of testate or intestate Amanda, the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a
proceedings, a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee shall be issued by the Register final distribution, both of which the law deems as requirements before the RD can issue a new
of Deeds only upon the submission of a certified copy of the partition and distribution, together certificate of title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise making final
distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case To clarify, this holding does not go against Article 777 of the Civil Code whatsoever. What the
may be. The said provision provides: aforesaid Civil Code provision signifies is that there is no legal bar preventing an heir from
disposing his/her hereditary share and transferring such share to another person, inasmuch as the
Section 92. Registration of final distribution of estate. A certified copy of the partition and right thereto is vested or transmitted to the heir from the moment of the death of the decedent or
distribution, together with the final judgment or order of the court approving the same or otherwise testator. The rule, however, does not state that the transferee may already compel the issuance of
making final distribution, supported by evidence of payment of estate tax or exemption therefrom, a new certificate of title covering the specific property in his/her name.
as the case may be, shall be tiled with the Register of Deeds, and upon the presentation of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, new certificates of title shall be issued to the parties severally Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and
entitled thereto in accordance with the approved partition and distribution. the Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another
person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering
Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final distribution from the specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in
testate/intestate court and in anticipation of a final distribution of a portion or the whole of the anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.
property, the Register of Deeds may be compelled to issue the corresponding certificate of title to
the transferee only when the executor/administrator of the estate submits a certified copy of an Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion and the
order from the court having jurisdiction of the testate or intestate proceedings directing the petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy
executor/administrator to transfer the property to the transferees. The said provision provides: of OCT P-1908 in favor of the latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and
absent any order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from the
Section 91. Transfer in anticipation of final distribution. Whenever the court having jurisdiction of Probate Court, the RD cannot be compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new
the testate or intestate proceedings directs the executor or administrator to take over and transfer certificate of title in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
to the devisees or heirs, or any of them, in anticipation of final distribution a portion or the whole of
the registered land to which they might be entitled on final distribution, upon the filing of a certified WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 19,
copy of such order in the office of the Register of Deeds, the executor or administrator may cause 2017 and Resolution dated June 7, 2018 of the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division and Former
such transfer to be made upon the register in like manner as in case of a sale, and upon the Special Twelfth Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 105166 are PARTIALLY REVERSED.
presentation of the owner's duplicate certificate to the Register of Deeds, the devisees or heirs Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents Heirs of Resurreccion Martinez Felix
concerned shall be entitled to the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title. to DELIVER the owner's duplicate copy of Owner's Certificate of Title No. P-1908 to the petitioners
Sps. Salitico.
The aforementioned sections of PD 1529 are in perfect conjunction with Rule 90, Section 1 23 of the
Rules of Court, which states that the actual distribution of property subject to testate or intestate With respect to the petitioners Sps. Salitico's prayer compelling the Register of Deeds to cancel
proceedings, i.e., the issuance of a new title in the name of the distributee, shall occur only when OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in their favor, for the reasons stated above, the
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and said prayer is DENIED.
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate, have been paid. Only then can the testate or
intestate court assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same. Under Rule 90,
Section 1, the testate or intestate court may also order the distribution of the property pending the SO ORDERED.
final order of distribution if the distributees give a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned
upon the payment of the aforesaid said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.

Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the
RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE
issuance by the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the order
in anticipation of the final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may
be issued in the name of the distributees. G.R. No. 174835               March 22, 2010
 ANITA REYES-MESUGAS, Petitioner, Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in addition to the compromise
vs. agreement, executed "side agreements" which had yet to be fulfilled. One such agreement was
ALEJANDRO AQUINO REYES, Respondent. executed between petitioner7 and respondent granting respondent a one-meter right of way on the
lot covered by TCT No. 24475. However, petitioner refused to give the right of way and threatened
DECISION to build a concrete structure to prevent access. He argued that, unless petitioner permitted the
inscription of the right of way on the certificate of title pursuant to their agreement, the notice of lis
pendens in TCT No. 24475 must remain.
CORONA, J.:
In its order8 dated January 26, 2006, the RTC denied the motion to cancel the notice of lis
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse the June 23, 2006 and September 21, pendens annotation for lack of sufficient merit. It found that the cancellation of the notice of lis
2006 orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC), Branch 62 denying the petitioner’s pendens was unnecessary as there were reasons for maintaining it in view of petitioner's non-
motion to cancel a notice of lis pendens. compliance with the alleged right of way agreement between the parties. It stated that:

Petitioner Anita Reyes-Mesugas and respondent Alejandro A. Reyes are the children of Lourdes A careful perusal of the compromise agreement dated September 13, 2000 revealed that one of
Aquino Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes. Lourdes died intestate, leaving to her heirs, among others, the properties mentioned is a parcel of land with improvements consisting [of] two hundred nine
three parcels of land, including a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 24475. (209) square meters situated in Makati covered under TCT No. 24475 of the Registry of Deeds [of]
Rizal in the name of Pedro N. Reyes married to Lourdes Aquino Reyes and form[s] part of the
On February 3, 2000, respondent filed a petition for settlement of the estate of Lourdes, 3 praying notarized right of way agreement on TCT No. 24475, considering that the movant Anita Reyes is
for his appointment as administrator due to alleged irregularities and fraudulent transactions by the still bound by the right of way agreement, the same should be complied with before the
other heirs. Petitioner, her father Pedro and Arturo, a sibling of the petitioner, opposed the petition. cancellation of the subject annotation.9 (Citations omitted)

On August 30, 2000, a compromise agreement 4 was entered into by the parties whereby the Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. 10 Because the denial of a motion to cancel the notice of lis
estate of Lourdes was partitioned. A decision 5 dated September 13, 2000 was rendered by the pendens annotation was an interlocutory order, the RTC denied the notice of appeal as it could
RTC pursuant to the said compromise agreement. The compromise agreement with respect to not be appealed until the judgment on the main case was rendered. 11 A motion for reconsideration
TCT No. 24475 is reproduced below: was filed by petitioner but the same was also denied. 12

5. That the parties hereto hereby agree to recognize, acknowledge and respect: Hence, this petition.

5.1. the improvements found on the parcel of land covered under TCT No. 24475 We find for petitioner.
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal consisting of two lots namely Lot 4-A and Lot 4-
B of the new survey with two (2) residential houses presently occupied and A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation
possessed as owners thereof by Antonio Reyes and Anita Reyes-Mesugas to or put an end to one already commenced. 13 Once submitted to the court and stamped with judicial
constitute part of their shares in the estate of Lourdes Aquino Reyes; approval, it becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon the parties; having the
sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and
5.2 further, the improvement consisting of a bakery-store under lease to a third effect of any judgment.14
party. The proceeds thereof shall be shared by Antonio Reyes and Pedro N.
Reyes; Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately
executory as there is no appeal from such judgment. 15 When both parties enter into an agreement
5.3 that the expenses for the partition and titling of the property between Antonio to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement,
Reyes and Anita Reyes-Mesugas shall be equally shared by them. such action constitutes an implied waiver of the right to appeal against the said decision. 16

On December 7, 2004, petitioner filed a motion to cancel lis pendens annotation for TCT No. In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the settlement of the
244756 in the RTC in view of the finality of judgment in the settlement of the estate. Petitioner estate of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the case as a probate court.
argued that the settlement of the estate proceeding had terminated; hence, the annotation of lis
pendens could already be cancelled since it had served its purpose. Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters
pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to property arising from the contract. 17 It approves
contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
of Court.18 It is apparent therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement on Makati, Branch 62 dated June 23, 2006 and September 21, 2006 are SET ASIDE. The notice
September 13, 2000, the settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end. of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. 24475 is hereby declared CANCELLED pursuant to Section
77 of the PD No. 1529 in relation to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not necessary to
protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. 19 The compromise agreement did not SO ORDERED.
mention the grant of a right of way to respondent. Any agreement other than the judicially
approved compromise agreement between the parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of the
probate court. Thus, any other agreement entered into by the petitioner and respondent with
regard to a grant of a right of way was not within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate
court. Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not to cancel the notice of lis pendens on TCT
No. 24475 as respondent had no right which needed to be protected. Any alleged right arising
from the "side agreement" on the right of way can be fully protected by filing an ordinary action for
specific performance in a court of general jurisdiction.1avvphi1

More importantly, the order of the probate court approving the compromise had the effect of
directing the delivery of the residue of the estate of Lourdes to the persons entitled thereto under
the compromise agreement. As such, it brought to a close the intestate proceedings 20 and the
probate court lost jurisdiction over the case, except only as regards to the compliance and the
fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations under the compromise agreement.

Having established that the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Lourdes came to an
end upon the RTC’s promulgation of a decision based on the compromise agreement, Section 4,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. - Certified copies of final orders and judgments
of the court relating to the real estate or the partition thereof shall be recorded in the registry of
deeds of the province where the property is situated.

In line with the recording of the order for the partition of the estate, paragraph 2, Section 77 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152921 provides:

Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens – xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx

At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action
such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings
involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as
provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon
the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending RULE 90 DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE
stating the manner of disposal thereof. (emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005

Thus, when the September 13, 2000 decision was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis pendens inscribed on TCT
No. 24475 was deemed cancelled by virtue of Section 77 of PD No. 1529. EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
 vs. In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent. act as special administrator.

DECISION On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint
regular administrators of the estate. 10 Both were issued letters of administration after taking their
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: oath and posting the requisite bond.

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on
behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the
the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s
This is a petition for review on certiorari  filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated
September 25, 1996 and Resolution 2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571. 3 The On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only
Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of
his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration. On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion 13 praying, among
others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and
The facts are undisputed. distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the
₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination "whether the
and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint
two minor children. venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and
co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition 4 for the
settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and
and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs. attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding
that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to
petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is "On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the declared heirs, the
incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s
estate is composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the
administration be issued to her instead. 5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the
special administratrix.6 paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the
petitioner in their partnership venture.’"
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and
material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law. 7
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave aside the intestate court’s Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which
half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them " would undertake denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating
whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8 that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may
Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely
The Appellate Court ruled: incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in "x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should
is no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass
inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject
these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private
respondent’s claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the
act is not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion." intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under
the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a
on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error: property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the
purpose of the intestate court.
"I
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition 18 dated
September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS
A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND
POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY. "6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated
October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously
asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low
II valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate
and realistic pricing on each."
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE
COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific
THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she
INTESTATE COURT. expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real
estate properties.
III
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita’s
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within
AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS." estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge." 19 He could have
submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he
and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
estate?
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e.,  to
relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over
deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court went along with
arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution 20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:
special and limited jurisdiction.16
"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone
Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until their title is
distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement
for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be mentioned in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:
that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly
placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a "It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of
material and direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court." ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the
law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
court was actually to "determine the propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x
to the intestate court, "if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of
(Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in the x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by
estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended "day in court" or Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight,
hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the true and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be
owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified
in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"
purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear
that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes
review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention. collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course "Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership
of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course
of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:
general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot yours which I quote:" In accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take full
is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having
to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, stated that in your sworn statement?
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
cannot do so."22
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The
intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was
over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate. given to Emmanuel.

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?
facie determination of the issue of ownership, still respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears
stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall? Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioner’s
inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any document to prove her claim of ownership.
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she
insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties. 26 Sensing that
such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission
xxxxxx and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that she gave to the latter most
of her properties to be used in a joint business venture. 27 Respondent must have realized early on
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the that if the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the
estate of Miguelita, is that right? absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to
her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children. 28
A: Yes, sir.
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We
Miguelita with respect to the estate of your late husband? reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be
submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. 29
A: If I only knew that this will happen…
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento? Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.

A: Wala po."24 SO ORDERED.

She further testified as follows:

"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank
accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure,
Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be done with
these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of the said
properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?

A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.

Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in
Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock.
Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?

A: Kung ano ang sa akin…

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po
ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?

A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir." 25