Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 8, No.

1, 2008

Interview with Professor Gi-Wook

Shin
Discussing Shin’s book: Shin, Gi-Wook. 2006. Ethnic National-
ism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.

Conducted by John Kojiro Yasuda

SEN’s John Kojiro Yasuda sat down with Gi-Wook Shin to discuss his
recent book, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and
Legacy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), which explores
the origins of that particular form of nationalism and how it is affecting
current political and social issues, such as the possibility of North and
South Korean reunification. In the interview, Shin discusses the traditional
civic/ethnic dichotomy in nationalism studies, North Korea’s nationalist
brand of socialism, civic elements of Korean nationalism, and what he has
dubbed the ‘prize and price’ of nationalism.

SEN: East Asian cases have often been portrayed as ‘deviant’ or special
cases in the literature on nationalism. How do you feel about this and what
do you think that East Asian cases, specifically Korea, can contribute to the
field in general?

Shin: Let me use two examples. One is historically based, the other more
contemporary. If you look at the history of Europe and then of East Asia
and Korea, I think there are substantial differences because in Europe –
Western Europe – the conception of the modern, or the central state, did not
really exist until the eighteenth/nineteenth centuries. . . . The rise of the
modern, centralised state was fairly late and then nation building occurred
at the same time. . . . Now if you look at Korea, it is very different because,
obviously, the notion of ‘‘nation’’ in the modern sense didn’t exist in Korea
until the late nineteenth century. However, a central state existed in Korea
for a long time, at least for a thousand years. Furthermore, if you look at the
geographical boundary of Korea, the Korean Peninsula has been fairly
consistent for the last thousand years. In other words, clearly there was no
‘nation’ in the modern sense, but there was an essential state. Now all of the

165
John Kojiro Yasuda: Interview with Professor Gi-Wook Shin

concepts that we are using today like ‘‘nation’’ and class, are Western
conceptions. Because Korea is so different than, let’s say, Germany,
France, or Britain in the pre-modern era, you don’t know how to describe
what existed in Korea because it’s not really ‘nation’, but it’s clearly a state.
But it’s not really a nation-state either. This is the main challenge that
people working on non-Western societies must contend with today.

My second example centers on the idea of ‘‘ethnic conflict.’’ Now, most

literature on ethnic conflict deals with multi-ethnic societies, so they
describe inter-ethnic conflict, as opposed to intra-ethnic conflict – the
former Yugoslavia and so on. People are saying that ethnic cleavages are
more fundamental and more difficult, and leave little room for compro-
mise. But if you look at Korea, Korea represents a very different type of
ethnic conflict because there is a very strong sense of ethnic unity, but it
remains politically divided into two different political systems. So it’s more
like intra-ethnic conflict, not inter-ethnic conflict. Now, if the prevailing
theory is that ethnic identity or ethnic cleavages . . . are more fundamental
or more difficult to compromise, they hardly explain intra-ethnic conflict in
Korea. The Korean War lasted for three years, killing about ten per cent of
the Korean population.

We talk about ethnic conflict and civil war in multi-ethnic societies, but the
Korean case is very different, almost the opposite. Still, the outcome is
equally destructive, divisive, and tragic. So, the Korean case is certainly
very different than Europe. How we can draw philosophical implications
from the Korean case is the main challenge that I’m trying to address.

SEN: Do you feel that East Asia should be studied separately? How would
you integrate Korea with the Western literature? What could Western
political scientists and sociologists glean from your study of Korea?

Shin: I think that’s a major challenge not only with regard to studying the
nation, but also when studying non-European countries in general. If you just
use Western concepts like ‘‘nation’’, for instance, it doesn’t really capture
what existed in Korea. At the same time, if you don’t use those concepts, then
it’s very hard to engage in a lot of literature developed in the Western context.
So that’s a dilemma. What are you going to do? Are you going to still use
Western concepts? If you don’t use them, it’s very hard to engage. So I think
that’s a fundamental problem . . . the hegemonic power of Western discourse.
That’s a challenge that I struggle with all of the time when I study Korea.

SEN: So then would you suggest tweaking the concepts – [creating] a

more nuanced conception to analyse the Korean case?

166
 Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008

Shin: Yes. You have to qualify the use of these concepts when using them
out of the Western context. Still, I use the concept of nation but I have to
qualify this concept when I analyse the Korean case.

SEN: With regard to your book, you adopt a very interesting methodology.
You use both a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research methods – a
mixed method framework. How do you think your quantitative data
contributes to the study of nationalism and do you think your approach
will change the more historical, qualitative approaches that others have
used before you?

Shin: My short answer is not necessarily short. I was trained as a historical

sociologist. If you look at my book, there are elements from history and
also from sociology. Certainly, historians mostly use qualitative data. . . .
Most studies of Korean nationalism were done by historians using very
qualitative research methods. But surveys are a very common tool
for sociologists. Nations, nationalism – these are all about identity,
perceptions, and consciousness. I think surveys can be good at capturing
those dimensions of identity, perception, and consciousness. I think
that those research projects can benefit from more diversity in their method
and approach. [With] my study as a whole, not only in the study of
nationalism but also with other studies, I try to combine methods. But it
really depends on what kind of data you have available. I don’t have any
particular preference, but it depends on your question and it depends on
your data.

SEN: In this case, your data was readily available to you?

Shin: That’s right. I used polls.

SEN: This next question is a longer one about Hans Kohn’s traditional
ethnic/civic dichotomy in nationalism studies. . . . Do you believe that this
is still relevant, this ethnic/civic dichotomy? Kohn also identified ethnic
nationalism with the East and civic nationalism with the West. Do you
think this is an accurate distinction? Is the dominant form of nationalism in
Korea ethnic because it is from the ‘East’? Also, your book focuses on
ethnic nationalism in Korea – are there important examples of civic
nationalism in Korea as well?

Shin: Those are good questions. In my view, this dichotomy as . . . a

conceptual tool or a variable in studying nationalism can still be useful.
But, I think its utility only goes so far. I think often times people make a
mistake about imposing this conceptual distinction into reality without

167
John Kojiro Yasuda: Interview with Professor Gi-Wook Shin

thinking it through. That’s why people say that nationalism in the West is
civic and very good and that nationalism in the East is very ethnic and
quite destructive. I think when you go there then there’s a problem because
you are imposing conceptual distinctions into empirical reality. That’s
when we have to be very careful because in any nationalism, in my view,
there are ethnic and civic components. Let’s take a look at the United
States. No one argues that ethnic nationalism is the dominant form of
nationalism in the United States. But if you look at what happened after
September 11th, certainly the voice of civic nationalism became even
more marginalised. In times of crisis, in times of external threat, these
ethnic elements can become more dominant than at other times. In other
words, even in the West ethnic elements can be dominant under certain
circumstances.

Why did Korea develop its ethnic variant of nationalism? A main factor
was the existence of a threat from the outside world because, since the late
nineteenth century, Korea had to deal with imperialism, especially
Japanese imperialism. In order to promote internal solidarity, they
emphasized ethnic elements in their nationalist discourse. In a sense, that
is why I was using the example of the post-September 11th situation in the
United States. Those elements can and do exist in both the East and West.
In the Korean case, in regard to your last questions, in the late nineteenth
century Koreans were entertaining both civic and ethnic elements. But why
ethnic elements came to dominate civic elements was again due to the
threats from the outside.

If you look at what’s going on right now, you may know Korea is becoming
quite multi-ethnic. There is a lot of migrant labour and also more
international or inter-ethnic marriage – like Korean men marrying
Vietnamese women. I think right now, as for international marriage, the
rate is almost at fifteen per cent of all marriages in Korea. If you look at
rural areas, it’s almost thirty per cent. . . . In order to deal with this now,
Korean NGO groups are trying to promote a more civic version of Korean
nationalism in order to integrate these different ethnic groups into Korean
society. That’s a fairly new development, but it shows that there is certainly
a civic version of nationalism in contemporary Korea.

SEN: Let’s talk about what you call the ‘‘competing identities’’ in Korea.
You said there was Pan-Asianism, a socialist notion of nationalism, a type
of nationalism linked to fighting Japanese imperialism, and also civic
nationalism. Why did these other alternatives of Korean identity fail to take
hold?

168
 Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008

Shin: Let me bring up one example to highlight the issues at stake with
regards to the development of a Pan-Asian identity. Right now, in Europe
they are promoting European identity with the formation of the EU. In the
Korean case, in the nineteenth century – a time when western imperialism
was coming into East Asia – many leaders and intellectuals, not only in
Korea, but also in Japan and China, were struggling to figure out ways to
defend their nation from imperialism. So, one argument was that if Asians,
mainly Japanese, Korean and Chinese, developed a collective identity and
worked together to defend, not only their own nation, but the whole region
together against western imperialism then they thought they could perhaps
defeat the encroaching Western powers. So certainly, Pan-Asianism was a
very important source of collective identity among Korean people in the
late nineteenth century.
Why then does it fail? You know Japan itself became an imperial power
and then went on to colonise Korea and so on. Many Korean intellectuals
who were sympathetic to these Pan-Asian ideals felt betrayed by Japan,
and as a result they went on to develop an alternative national identity
instead of Pan-Asian identity. So that is why history is still very important
to help explain what happened in Korea. Now I think this also explains the
current situation in East Asia. . . . Europe has created the European Union –
a Pan-European institution, and perhaps it will forge an identity in the
coming years. But East Asia is far from achieving that. East Asia is still
very different from Western Europe and I don’t expect any formation of an
East Asian or Northeast Asian political community, let alone an identity, in
the near future. Part of the reason is history. We must remember when they
were entertaining or thinking about Pan-Asian unity and identity, they
became colonised by the Japanese. The legacy of history is very important
to explain what is going on today.
SEN: What about Koreans living abroad? How do they deal with this
ethnic nationalism in Korea?
Shin: I think I can make a few points. First of all . . . Koreans inside Korea
both North and South, and those living overseas in the United States and
China still share a very strong sense of an ethnic identity. So, if you go to
Korea Town in Los Angeles and ask ethnic Koreans about their country . . .
they have a very strong attachment to their home country. At least at the
level of perception there is a very strong sense of a unified ethnic identity.
Having said that, in reality, things are much more complicated because
when Korean people living inside Korea are told about Koreans living
outside of Korea, there is a certain sense of ambivalence because there is an
element of envy, especially towards Korean-Americans. Also, they tend to

169
John Kojiro Yasuda: Interview with Professor Gi-Wook Shin

look down on those people . . . who are ethnic Koreans in China. [At the]
level of perception, we are all Korean people, all belong to the Korean
nation. But in reality, there is a certain hierarchy in the ethnic community of
Koreans. So probably South Koreans and Korean-Americans may be seen
as the first class. North Koreans and ethnic Koreans in China – they are
almost like a second class. This is a big issue because there is [a] gap
between perception and reality. I mentioned about Korea becoming more
multi-ethnic in reality, even though the perception is that there is a strong
sense of ethnic homogeneity and identity. That’s a gap between perception
and reality. . . . It’s the same as when one talks about the reunification issue
as well. How to manage or how to narrow down the gap between
perception and reality is a major policy question for the Korean
government.

SEN: You also talked about the notion of nationalism as tied to

development – the idea of nationalism as helping Korean people, or to
enable them to enter into modernity. What is the link?

Shin: I can give you some examples. . . . Certainly nationalism was the
glue or ethic for Korean people to work hard for modernisation. The slogan
at the time was modernisation of the Fatherland. Most people argue for the
importance of a Protestant ethic in the development of Western capitalism.
In the Korean case, nationalism is a sort of equivalent to the Protestant
ethic. Not only in Korea, but also in Meiji Japan, and maybe also in China
these days. So, certainly nationalism was instrumental in developing the
economy in Korea. At the same time, it was an instrument of authoritarian
politics because the autocratic state in Korea used nationalism in
legitimising authoritarian politics in Korea for a long time.

SEN: You argue that ‘the dominance of collectivistic ethnic nationalism

constrained space for liberalism in the public sphere’ (Shin 2006: 132).
What have been the consequences of this?

Shin: Here it’s also maybe best to give some examples. Let’s just
mention . . . the authoritarian years. I grew up in Korea, and the ’70s were
very harsh politically because it was highly autocratic. You just couldn’t
say anything against the government. In order to keep Korea under
authoritarian control they used military power, but they also used the
rhetorical power of nationalism. An argument was made that we had to
endure the current state of politics to make our nation competitive in
the world. In other words, they legitimised their authoritarian politics in
the name of the nation, and therefore the state monopolised the notion
of nation, and any discourse that went against it was suppressed. So

170
 Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008

certainly this collectivistic nationalism suppressed any sort of diversity in

South Korea.

The same thing goes on in North Korea these days. Obviously, it’s a
totalitarian society. They have a very powerful military intelligence
network and also employ the rhetorical power of nationalism. I’m sure
North Koreans are saying that they are fighting against American
imperialism. So, certainly nationalism is being used, but the outcome or
consequence is a lack of diversity in North Korean society.

Now, if you look at South Korea these days . . . there still exists a very
strong anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea whenever there are disputes
over history or a territory, like an island for instance. And then almost
everyone has to say the same thing . . . you basically have to blame Japan,
right? If you say something other than that, you are going against your
nation. So even today, sometimes on those touchy issues there’s not much
diversity of views – not much of a difference of opinion on this particular
issue. Nationalism is very powerful in Korea and the same goes for Japan
and China. Yes, Korea has become a more democratic society and Korea
has been globalising quite fast, but neither democratisation nor globalisa-
tion has weakened the power of nationalism.

SEN: So let’s go on and talk about the North Korean variant

of socialism. You wrote that ‘the socialism that developed in North
Korea is more in line with fervent nationalism than with the pure
transnational vision of international socialism as imagined by Karl Marx’
(Shin 2006: 23). Could you elaborate on this and discuss the relationship
between socialism and nationalism, especially in regard to juche (self-
reliance)?

Shin: Let’s talk about two different periods. The first one is before 1945
when Marxism was introduced to Korea. Then let me go on to North
Korea. Communism was introduced to Korea in the 1920s and it was very
popular among Korean intellectuals. If you didn’t know about Marxism,
you weren’t really an intellectual at the time. It was a very fancy ideology.
Certainly some people really liked Marx’s idea of a classless society, and
I’m sure some of them embraced such an idea. . . . I think most Korean
intellectuals and leaders embraced or accepted Marxism because they
hoped and believed that Marxism could be an ideology to liberate their
nation from colonial domination. In other words, a motivation for
accepting Marxism was very much nationalistic. I say in my book that
they had a very instrumentalist understanding of Marxism. In other words,
Marxism was an instrument; the goal was national liberation.

171
John Kojiro Yasuda: Interview with Professor Gi-Wook Shin

The same thing occurs in North Korea. I think after 1925, Kim Il Sung was
both a nationalist and socialist. He was trying to use the power of socialism,
the power of the socialist bloc (China, the Soviet Union, and so on). . . . to
advance national liberation or national development. With regard to juche,
North Korea was becoming more confident in the 1960s. In the 1950s and
’60s there was a conflict between the Soviet Union and China. So North
Korea became more independent . . . that’s when juche ideology began to
be more formalised. Juche ideology is a nationalist ideology and it has
become the dominant ideology in North Korea. So today the main ideology
of North Korea is not communism or socialism, but nationalism. Over time
they came to emphasise how great the Korean nation was and really
promoted this ethnic notion of Korean nationalism.
That’s why I was saying in my book that socialism, civilisation,
modernisation, globalisation were all transnational forces coming out of
the West. If you look at the origins of the civilisation discourse,
modernisation, globalisation, socialism, they all came from the West –
either from Germany, England, or the United States. Koreans were willing
to accept these transnational ideological currents but only as a means, not
as a goal in and of itself. Even today Koreans are globalising their society
and economy . . . because they want to improve their national competitive-
ness in a globalising world. So globalisation is not an end, it’s not the main
goal to achieve. These are just means. Its the same with socialism and with
civilisation. Why do we need to civilise? In order to defend our nation.
Why do we have to modernise? Because we have to defend our nation. The
goal was nationalistic and all of these transnational forces like socialism,
modernisation, globalisation are all taken as a means to realize Korea’s
nationalist ambitions.
SEN: This question is about the notion of ethnic-homogeneity and how it
deals with the national unification thesis. Can you talk about this
assumption and what your quantitative research has taught you about it,
the implications of this thesis, and your sense of how ethnic nationalism
straddling the two Koreas could lead to reunification?
Shin: First of all, if you do surveys asking whether Koreans belong to the
same nation, over ninety per cent will say yes. This is a politically charged
question. So if you are Korean, you must say you believe in unification
even if you do not necessarily believe in it. There’s pressure to say that. But
if you talk over a drink – a personal conversation – that’s not the case.
Some people say that unification is a myth, but still in public you have to
say that you believe in it because that’s the politically correct response. Still
this sense of being one family, one ethnic community, that can be a

172
 Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008

compelling reason for unification. On that [level] it can be useful. But if

you look at reality, things are quite different because North and South
Korea are fairly different societies. They can communicate in terms of
language, but still for the last sixty years they’ve developed different
political systems, different cultures, and the economic stages of the two
countries are very different – far more developed in the South than in the
North. If Korea, let’s say, becomes reunified today based on this sense of
ethnic unity or ethnic identity there would be a lot of practical problems.
We know what happened in Germany. In Germany, East Germans almost
became like second citizens right after unification . . . It could be much
worse in Korea because there is so much of a gap between North and
South. That’s a reality. So, if North and South Korea become unified, then
North Koreans will become second citizens, basically. So as I said earlier,
the perception level – ‘Sure we are all Korean people. We are all brothers
and sisters’ – but in reality that may not be the picture. So, the hardest
question is how you can develop social and political institutions to prevent
this type of discrimination against North Koreans, against migrant
labourers, against ethnic Koreans living in China, and so on. So that’s
why once again addressing the gap between perception and reality is a
major policy question and policy challenge for the Korean government.

SEN: So the final question relates to the ‘price and prize’ of nationalism.
Are the prizes worth the price?

Shin: Well, we already talked about some of them. But whether I think the
prize is worth the price . . . actually my answer is yes. Why is it yes?
Because without ethnic nationalism I don’t know whether Korea would’ve
been able to hold itself together throughout the twentieth century with
colonialism, national division, and civil war. These events happened
against the will of the Korean people, but because of a strong sense of
solidarity, Korea was able to hold itself together. I think I should give
nationalism some credit for that. That’s why it’s wrong to just say that
ethnic nationalism is bad. That’s not necessarily true because there is a
certain prize that comes with ethnic nationalism. . . . The bad parts – I’m
not so sure, I’m more sceptical of ethic nationalism/s place given how
reality has changed so much for Korea. Korea is becoming more
multi-ethnic and there is more communication between Koreans living in
Korea and overseas Koreans, and also the issue of reunification looms
large. That’s why now it’s time to be more open, more diverse. It’s time to
develop a more civic version of nationalism, and more specifically, develop
social and civic institutions to address any discrimination against ethnic
minorities or possibly North Koreans in the case of reunification. So

173
John Kojiro Yasuda: Interview with Professor Gi-Wook Shin

that’s why in my view it’s time to think hard and maybe move on. At the
same time, I don’t think the power of ethnic nationalism will disappear
anytime soon.

SEN: Thank you very much Professor Shin.

Gi-Wook Shin, professor of sociology, is the director of

the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford
University. Educated at Yonsei University and the
University of Washington, Shin taught at the University
of Iowa and the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA), before arriving at Stanford and becoming the
founding director of its Korean Studies Program.

174