Shaftesbury, The Moralists

The Moralists
a Philosophical Rhapsody
a recital of certain conversations on natural and moral subjects
Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury
Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as
though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations,
are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four point ellipsis . . . . indicates the
omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Longer omissions are reported
between brackets in normal sized type.—This work is the last of the five Treatises in Shaftesbury’s Characteristics
of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times.—Starting at page 13 each speech will be prefaced by the speaker’s name in
small bold type. This replaces Shaftesbury’s uses of ‘said he’ and ‘replied I’ etc. When there are paragraph breaks
within a speech, each paragraph starts with the speaker’s initial in small bold type. The only exceptions are
five speeches by Theocles—on pages 26–31, 31–35, 40–42, 51–52, and 70–72.—When an editorial note speaks
of Shaftesbury’s words, it is referring to the very lightly modernised text given in the edition of the work by
Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge U.P. 1999), except for the Addendum starting at page 72.—The division into Parts
and Sections is Shaftesbury’s; their titles are not.
First launched: July 2011
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury
Contents
Part I: Why the conversations are being reported 1
Section 1: A warning against philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Section 2: Why is mankind so defective? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Section 3: Philocles pulls himself together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Part II: First day: Conversations among four 13

Section 1: Pleasure, love, suicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Section 2: Temperance, moderation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Section 3: Defending Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Section 4: Order and purpose in nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Section 5: Believing in miracles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Part III: Second day: Conversation between two 49

Section 1: Nature as evidence of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Section 2: Beauty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Section 3: Goodness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Addendum: Two flowery passages, undoctored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Glossary
amiable: This meant ‘likable’, ‘lovable’, ‘very attractive’. A gallantry: Conduct and literature marked by elaborately
good deal stronger than the word’s normal meaning today. refined courtesy towards women.
art: In Shaftesbury’s time an ‘art’ was any human activity in- generous: It had today’s sense of ‘free in giving’ but also
volving techniques or rules of procedure. ‘Arts’ in this sense the sense of ‘noble-minded, magnanimous, rich in positive
include medicine, farming, and painting. The art/nature emotions’ etc.
contrast is the artifical/natural contrast, with ‘art’ being knight errant: Medieval knight wandering through the
taken to cover anything that is man-made. world in search of chivalrous adventures.
contemn: This was and still is a standard English verb luxury: This meant something like: extreme or inordinate
meaning ‘have contempt for’. indulbence in sensual pleasures. A ‘luxurious’ person was
someone wholly given to the pleasures of the senses—mostly
disinterested: What this meant in early modern times is but not exclusively the pleasures of eating and drinking.
what it still means when used by literate people, namely ‘not
magistrate: In this work, as in general in early modern
self -interested’.
times, a magistrate is anyone with an official role in gov-
distributive justice: Fairness in the sharing out of benefits. ernment; and ‘the magistrate’ (as on page 25) refers to the
It contrasts with retributive justice = fairness in the assigning executive power of the government, not necessarily to any
of punishments and rewards. one person.
dogmatic: Confident, free from doubt, perhaps intellectually mandrake: A plant with a forked root (comparable with a
bullying. human’s two legs). According to a persistent and popular
fable, the plant shrieks when it is uprooted.
empiric: An empiric relies on facts about observed regulari-
motion: ‘An inner prompting or impulse; a desire, an
ties in the world while having no interest in what explains
inclination; a stirring of the soul, an emotion.’ (OED)
them. Shaftesbury’s use of the word on page 2 is puzzling.
polite: Our meaning for this word came in fairly late in the
enthusiasm: The word can here be roughly equated with early modern period. What it usually meant back then was
‘fanaticism’. That is why on page 12 Palemon takes ‘My ‘polished, cultivated, elegant, civilised’.
friend is an enthusiast’ to be an insult.
principle: Shaftesbury here uses this word mainly in our
fancy: This can mean ‘liking’, with a suggestion of ‘whimsi- sense, in which a principle is a certain kind of proposition.
cally thoughtless liking’; it can just mean ‘whim’; and it was But some occurrences involve the sense—common back then
also a standard word for imagination’. In a passage starting but now obsolete—of ‘source’, ‘cause’, ‘driver’, ‘energizer’, or
at page 69 Shaftesbury seems to have all three meanings at the like; for example in the phrase ‘the principle, source, and
work simultaneously or in quick succession. fountain of all beauty’ on page 61.
prodigy: ‘Something extraordinary regarded as an omen’ sympathy: Literally ‘feeling with’, as applied to any feeling.
(OED). Sympathy is at work not only when your sadness saddens
Prometheus: A Greek demi-god who was credited with, me but also when your happiness makes me happpy.
among other things, making the first man and woman out of
clay. ugly: Neither this word nor the cognate noun occurs in
this work; in the present version they replace ‘deformed’
retirement: Withdrawal—perhaps for only a brief period—
and ‘deformity’, which have a stronger and nastier sense
from the busy world of everyday affairs.
today than they did in early modern times. In just one place
sagacity: It can mean ‘intelligence’ or even ‘wisdom’; but (page 60) it has seemed better to leave ‘deformity’ untouched.
what Shaftesbury is attributing to the lower animals under
this label is what we might loosely call ‘know-how’, and it virtuoso: This word had two very sifferent meanings in early
could be regarded as instinctive. modern times. In one of them a ‘virtuoso’ is a research
simple: The uses of this word and its cognates on pages 49– scientist, and Shaftesbury uses the word in that sense in
50 and later all express the idea of •not having parts or this work. But on pages 1 and 59 he uses it in its other
of •being able to stay in existence through any amount of sense, in which a ‘virtuoso’ is someone who has an informed
exchange of parts. and strenuous love for the fine arts.
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury I/1: A warning against philosophy
Part I: Why the conversations are being reported
Philocles is writing to his friend Palemon For

by philosophy, i.e. by one’s failure to solve philosophical problems.]
•these seemed to me to be things one would not willingly
Section 1: A warning against philosophy part with in order to have a fine romantic passion of the sort
had by one of those gentlemen called ‘virtuosi’ [see Glossary].
Someone who hadn’t been told about your character,
Palemon, would never think that an intellect fitted for the I used that word as a label for lovers and philosophers
greatest affairs, and formed in courts and military camps, and anyone else who is in some way ·besottedly· in love
could have such a violent turn towards philosophy and with. . . well, anything: poetry, music, philosophy, pretty
the universities ·as you have· ! Who could possibly expect women. They are all in the same condition. You can see it, as
someone of your rank and standing in the •fashionable I told you, in their looks, their dazed wonder, their profound
world to be so thoroughly at home in the •learned world, thoughtfulness, their frequently waking up as though out
and so deeply interested in the affairs of a people ·namely, of a dream, their always talking about one thing and hardly
philosophers· who are so much at odds with people in general caring what they said about anything else. Sad symptoms!
and with the mood of our times? But this warning didn’t deter you because you, Palemon,
I really believe that you are the only well bred man who are one of the adventurous people whom danger animates
would have had a whim to talk philosophy in such a circle of rather than discourages. And now you are insisting on
good company as we had around us yesterday, when we were having our philosophical adventures recorded. All must be
in your coach together in the park. [The ‘good company’ evidently laid before you and summed in one complete account , appar-
included attractive women; this is confirmed in the next section.] How ently to serve as a lasting monument to that unfashionable
you could reconcile what you had before you in the coach conversation, so opposite to the reigning spirit of gallantry
with such topics as these was unaccountable. I could only [see Glossary] and pleasure.
conclude that either you had an extravagant passion for I must admit that it has become fashionable in our nation
philosophy, leaving so many charms in order to pursue it, or to talk •politics in every company, and mix discussions of
that some of those tender charms had an extravagant effect state affairs with conversations of pleasure and entertain-
on you and that you went to philosophy for relief! ment. But we certainly don’t approve of any such freedom
Either way, I pitied you, because I thought it better to be, with •philosophy. And we don’t regard politics as falling
like me, a more tepid lover of philosophy. As I said to you, it is within philosophy or as being in any way related to her.
better to admire ·intellectual and moral· beauty and wisdom That’s a measure of how much we moderns have degraded
a little more moderately; to engage so cautiously as to be philosophy and stripped her of her chief rights.
sure of coming away with a whole heart, and as much taste You must allow me, Palemon, to bemoan philosophy in
as ever for all the pretty •entertainments and •diversions of this way, because you have forced me to engage with her
the world. [‘. . . with a whole heart’ = ‘. . . not heartbroken if one is jilted at a time when her credit runs so low. She is no longer
1
active in the world, and can hardly get any benefit from and talk in an effeminate way. Our sense, language, and
being brought onto the public stage. We have walled her up, style, as well as our voice and body, should have something
poor lady! in colleges and ·monastic· cells; and have set her of the male feature and natural roughness that are marks
to work on tasks as low-down and menial as those in the of our sex. And whatever claim we make to being polite [see
mines. Empirics [see Glossary] and pedantic logic choppers are Glossary], making our discourse delicate in this way is more a
her chief pupils. The scholastic syllogism and essences are disfigurement of it than any real refinement.
the choicest of her products. She is so far from producing No work of wit can be judged to be perfect without
statesmen, as she used to do, that hardly any man with the strength and boldness of hand that gives it body and
a public reputation cares to acknowledge the least debt to proportions. A good piece, the painters say, must have good
her. . . . •muscling as well as •colouring and •drapery. And surely no
But low as philosophy has been brought, if morals is writing or discourse of any great significance can seem other
allowed to belong to her then politics must also be hers. than slack and passive if it isn’t accompanied by
For to understand the manners and constitutions of men in •strong reason,
common, it is necessary to study man as an individual, to •antiquity,
know the creature as he is in himself before we consider him •the records of things,
in company through his involvement with the state or with •the natural history of man, or
some city or community. Plenty of people reason concerning •anything that can be called knowledge
man in his terms of how he relates to this or that state or except perhaps in some ridiculous garb that may give it an
society by birth or naturalization; but to consider him as air of play and dalliance.
a citizen or commoner of the world, to trace his pedigree This brings to my mind a reason I have often looked for to
a step higher and view his relations to nature itself, ·is explain why we moderns, who pour out treatises and essays,
something that is hardly ever done·; apparently it is regarded are so sparing with dialogues, which used to be regarded as
as involving intricate or over-refined theorising. the most civilised and best way of managing even the more
[Shaftesbury now has a paragraph saying that there’s solemn subjects. The reason is this: to present an hour-long
an excuse for the neglect of philosophy: those who have conversation as proceeding steadily and coherently and full
philosophised in public have done it in a way that repels the of good sense, until some one subject had been rationally
listeners or readers.] examined, would be an abominable falsehood, a lie about
But it must be admitted that our modern conversations the age in which we live!
suffer from one real disadvantage, namely that by fussing so To draw or describe against the appearance of nature
much over fine details they lose the masculine helps of learn- and truth is a liberty that neither the painter nor the poet is
ing and sound reason. Even the fair sex, on whose behalf permitted to take. Much less can the philosopher have such
we claim to be talking down in this way, could reasonably a privilege, especially on his own behalf. If he represents his
despise us for this and laugh at us for aiming at their special philosophy as showing well in conversation—if he triumphs
softness. It’s no compliment to them to adopt their manners in the debate, and gives his own wisdom the victory over
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that of the world—he may be laying himself open to justified aim at only •in theorising our alchemists aim to achieve •in
mockery, and may possibly be made a fable of. practice. (Some alchemists have actually thought about how
[Shaftesbury now tells a fable about a lion claiming to be to make a man artificially!) Every sect has a recipe. When
stronger than a man, and refusing to back down when shown you know it, you are master of nature; you explain all her
sculptures and pictures of men triumphing over lions.] events; you see all her designs, and can account for all her
So we needn’t wonder that the sort of moral painting operations. . . .
that dialogue performs is so much out of fashion, and that So there are good reasons for our being thus superficial,
these days we don’t see any more of these philosophical and consequently thus dogmatic [see Glossary] in philosophy.
portraitures. For where are the originals? And even if you or We are too lazy and effeminate, and also a little too cowardly
I, Palemon, happen to have come upon one and been pleased to risk doubt. The decisive ·doubt free· way fits best with our
with the real thing, can you imagine it would make a good style. It suits our vices as well as it does our superstition.
picture? Whatever we are fond of is secured by it. If in favour of
You know too that in this academic philosophy that I am religion we have adopted an hypothesis on which we think
to present you with there’s a certain way of questioning and our faith depends, we are superstitiously careful not to be
doubting that doesn’t at all suit the spirit of our age. Men loosened in it. If through our bad morals we have broken
love to take sides instantly. They can’t bear being kept in with religion, it’s still the same situation: we are just as
suspense. The examination, ·the inquiry·, torments them. afraid of doubting. We must be sure to say ‘It can’t be’ and
They want to be rid of it as cheaply as possible. Whenever ‘It’s demonstrable’, for otherwise ·we might have to say· ‘Who
men dare trust to the current of reason they act as though knows?’ and not to know is to yield!
they imagined they were drowning. They seem to be hurrying So we’ll need to •know everything and not have the labour
away, they don’t know where to, and are ready to catch at of •examining anything. Of all ·varieties of· philosophy, the
the first twig. And they choose to continue hanging onto absolutely most disagreeable must the one that goes upon
that, however insecurely, rather than trust their strength to no established hypothesis, doesn’t offer us any attractive
hold them up in the water. Anyone who has grabbed hold and intellectually soothing theory, and talks only of
of an hypothesis, however slight it may be, is satisfied. He •probabilities,
can quickly answer every objection, and with the help of a •suspense of judgment,
few technical terms give an account of everything without •inquiry,
trouble. •search, and
It’s no wonder that in this age the philosophy of the •caution not to be imposed on, i.e. deceived.
alchemists prevails so much, because it promises such This is the academic discipline in which the youth of Athens
wonders and requires the labour of hands more than of were once trained, when not only horsemanship and military
brains. We have a strange ambition to be creators, a violent arts had their public places of exercise, but philosophy
desire at least to know the knack or secret by which nature also had its renowned wrestlers. Reason and wit had their
does everything. Something that our other philosophers academy, and underwent this trial not in a formal way apart
3
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury I/2: Why is mankind so defective?
from the world, but openly, among the better sort, and as ‘kind’ itself (I thought) never looked better?
an exercise of a genteel kind. The greatest men weren’t You weren’t quarrelling with the whole creation, and you
ashamed to practise this in the intervals of public affairs, weren’t so completely displeased by all beauty. The green
in the highest stations and employments, right through to of the field, the distant view, the gilded horizon and purple
the last years of their lives. That is what gave rise to the sky formed by a setting sun, had charms in abundance and
method of dialogue—the method of patience in debate and made an impression on you. You allowed me, Palemon, to
reasoning—of which there is hardly a trace left in any of our admire these things as much as I pleased, while at the same
conversations at this stage in the world’s history. time you couldn’t stand my talking to you about the nearer
Thus, Palemon, consider what our picture is likely to beauties of our own kind, which I thought more natural
be, and how it will appear, especially in the light you have for men at our age to admire. But your severity couldn’t
unluckily chosen for it. Who ·but you· would thus have silence me on this subject. I continued to plead the cause of
brought philosophy up against the gaiety, wit, and humour the fair, and to advance their charms above all those other
of the age? However, if you can come out of this with credit, natural beauties. And when you took my opposition as an
I am content. It’s your project; it’s you who have matched opportunity to argue that there was very little of •nature and
philosophy thus unequally [i. e. against a much stronger opponent, a great deal of •art [see Glossary] in what I admired, I made
namely fashionable wit and humour.] Leaving you to answer for its the best defence I could; and, fighting for beauty, I kept up
success, I begin this unpromising work that my evil stars the fight for as long as there was one fair one present. [The
and you have assigned to me. . . . ‘nearer beauties’, ‘the fair’, are pretty women. ]
Considering how your mind has been inclined to poetry, I
Section 2: Why is mankind so defective? was very puzzled to find you suddenly displeased with our
modern poets and gallant writers. I quoted them to you, as
O wretched state of mankind! Hapless nature, thus to have better authorities than any ancient writer, on behalf of the
erred in your chief workmanship! What was the source fair sex and their privileges, but you brushed this off. You
of this fatal weakness? What chance or destiny shall we agreed with some recent critics that gallantry [see Glossary] is
accuse? Or shall we listen to the poets, when they sing of a modern growth; and you thought that this didn’t bring any
your tragedy, Prometheus! [see Glossary]—you who with your dishonour to the ancients, who understood truth and nature
stolen celestial fire mixed with vile clay •mocked heaven’s too well to permit such a ridiculous invention.
countenance, and in abusive likeness to the immortals •made So I achieved nothing by holding up this shield in my
the compound man, that wretched mortal, evil to himself defence. When on behalf of the fair ·sex· I pleaded all the fine
and a cause of evil to all. things that are usually said in this romantic kind of praise
What do you say now, on second thoughts, about this of them, I did my cause no service! You attacked the very
rant? Or have you forgotten, Palemon, that it was in just fortress of gallantry, ridiculed the notion of honour, with all
such a romantic tone that you broke out against human those fussy sentiments and ceremonials belonging to it. You
kind, on a day when everything looked pleasing, and the damned even our favourite novels—those dear sweet natural
4
pieces, most of them written by the fair sex themselves. In of the heavenly luminaries, the circles of the planets, and
short, you absolutely condemned—as false, monstrous, and their attendant satellites. And you, who wouldn’t concede
gothic—this whole literary scheme of things in which wit anything to the fair earthly luminaries in the circles that
looms large. Quite out of the way of nature, you said, and we had just been moving in; you, Palemon, who seemed to
sprung from the mere dregs of chivalry or knight errantry overlook the pride of that ·earthly· theatre, ·i.e. the social
[see Glossary]. You preferred knight errantry itself, as being scene of which we were a part·, now began to look out with
in better taste than what now reigns in place of it. At a ecstasy at the other ·theatre· and to triumph in the new
time when •this mystery of gallantry carried along with it the philosophical scene of unknown worlds. When you had
notion of resolute knighthood, when •the fair ·sex· pretty well spent the first fire of your imagination, I wanted
•were made witnesses to (and in a way participants in) to get you to reason more calmly with me about that other
feats of arms, part of the creation, your own kind; to which, I told you, you
•entered into all the points of war and combat, and revealed so much aversion that one might think you to be a
•were won by means of lance and manly strength and complete. . . . man-hater.
skill, ‘Can you then, O Philocles,’ you said in a high strain,
it wasn’t altogether absurd, you thought, to pay women and with a moving air of passion, ‘can you believe me to be
homage and adoration, make them the standard of wit and like that? Can you seriously think that I who am a man
manners, and bring mankind under their laws. But in a and conscious of my nature would have so little humanity
country where no female saints were worshipped with any that I don’t feel the affections of a man? Or that I have
authority from religion, it was as •impertinent and senseless natural feelings towards my kind but don’t care about their
as it was •profane to deify the sex, raise them to a height interests, and am not much interested in what affects or
above what nature had allowed, and treat them in a manner seriously concerns them? Am I such a bad lover of my
that. . . .they themselves were the most apt to complain of. . . . country? Or do you find me to be such a bad friend? For. . . .
In the meanwhile our companions began to leave us. The what do the ties of private friendship amount to if the tie to
beau monde, whom you had been thus severely censuring, mankind doesn’t bind?. . . . O Philocles, believe me when I
left quickly, for it was growing late. I noticed that the say that I feel my bond to mankind, and am fully aware of
approaching objects of the night were made more agreeable its power within me. [In the rest of this speech, every occurrence
to you by the solitude they introduced; and that the moon of—–is Shaftesbury’s.] Don’t think that I would willingly break
and planets which began now to appear were really the only that chain. Don’t regard me as so degenerate or unnatural
proper company for a man in your mood. For now you that while I have human form and wear [Shaftesbury’s word] a
began to talk with much satisfaction of natural things, and human heart, I would throw off love, compassion, kindness,
of all orders of beauties—with one exception, man. [In what and not befriend mankind.—–But oh! what treacheries!
follows, ‘luminaries’ are things that beam light onto us: heavenly ones what disorders! and how corrupt everything is!. . . .—–What
I have never
are stars and planets, earthly ones are pretty women.] charms there are in public companies! What harmony in
heard a finer description than the one you gave of the order courts and courtly places! How pleased is every face! How
5
courteous and humane the general way of behaving!—–What ·the human part·, as you placed it; but that everything
creature capable of reflection, if he saw these aspects of our had its share of drawbacks. Pleasure and pain, beauty
behaviour and didn’t see anything else, wouldn’t believe our and ugliness, good and evil, seemed to me to be interwoven
earth to be a very heaven? What foreigner (the inhabitant, everywhere; and the resultant mixture seemed to me to be
suppose, of some nearby planet) when he had travelled here agreeable enough, in the main. I likened this to some of
and seen this outward face of things, would think of what those rich fabrics where the flowers and background were
was hidden beneath the mask?—–But let him stay a while. oddly put together, with irregular work and contrary colours
Give him time to get a closer view, and to follow the members that looked •bad in the pattern but •excellent and natural in
of our assemblies to their individual lairs so that he can see the fabric.
them in this new aspect.—–Here he may see great men of But you wouldn’t have it. Nothing would serve to excuse
the ministry, who not an hour ago in public appeared to be the faults or blemishes of this part of the creation, mankind,
such friends, now craftily plotting each other’s ruin, with the even if everything else was beautiful and without a blemish.
ruin of the state itself as a sacrifice to their ambition. Here On your account of things, even storms and tempests had
he may also see those of a softer kind, who aren’t ambitious their beauty—except for the ones that occurred in human
and follow only love. But, Philocles, who would think it? breasts! It was only for this turbulent race of mortals that
[Philocles reports that he laughed at this, because he you offered to accuse nature. And I now discovered why you
began to suspect that his friend was in love and had been had been so carried away by the story of Prometheus [see
jilted. After he had explained his laughter, and been for- Glossary]. You wanted someone like him to be responsible for
given:] We naturally began coolly reasoning about the nature making mankind; and you were tempted to wish that the
and cause of evil in general: through what story could be confirmed in modern theology, thus clearing
•contingency, the supreme powers of any part in the poor workmanship
•chance, and leaving you free to rail against it without offending God.
•fatal necessity, But this, I told you, was only a flimsy evasion by the
•will, or ancient religious poets. It was easy to answer every objection
•permission by a Prometheus:
it came upon the world; and given that it had once come, •Why did mankind have so much basic folly and per-
why it should still persist. . . . This gradually led us into a verseness?
delicately searching criticism of nature, whom you sharply •Why did it have so much pride, such ambition, such
accused of many absurdities that you thought her guilty of, strange appetites?
in relation to mankind in particular. •Why so many plagues, and curses on the first man
and his posterity?
I wanted to persuade you to think more even-handedly The answer was always ‘Prometheus’. The sculptor with
about nature, and to proportion her defects a little better. his unlucky hand solved everything. . . . They—·the religious
I thought that the trouble didn’t lie entirely in one part, poets·—thought they had won something if they could. . . .
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put the evil cause one step further off. If the people asked whatever Prometheus did, and whether ‘Prometheus’
a question, they answered them with a tale and sent them was a name for chance, destiny, some creative agent,
away satisfied. They thought that no-one apart from a few or an evil daemon.
philosophers would be such busy-bodies as to look further You admitted that it wasn’t wise or right for such a
or ask a second question. hazardous affair as creation to be undertaken by those didn’t
And in reality, I continued, it’s incredible how well a tale have perfect foresight as well as perfect command. But you
works to amuse adults as well as mere children; and how stuck by foresight: you accepted that the consequences were
much easier it is to pay most men with this paper money understood by the creating powers when they undertook
than with sterling·-silver· reason. We oughtn’t to laugh so their work; and you denied that it would have been better
readily at the Indian philosophers who tell their people that for them not to have done that work, even though they knew
this huge frame of the world is supported ‘by an elephant’. what the outcome would be.
And how is the elephant supported? A shrewd question! It was better that the project should be carried out,
but one that shouldn’t be answered. It’s only here that our whatever might become of mankind and however hard such
Indian philosophers are to blame. They should be contented a creation was like to be for most members of this miserable
with the elephant, and go no further. But they have in race. For it was impossible, you thought, that heaven should
reserve a tortoise whose back, they think, is broad enough. have acted in any way except for the best; so that even from
So the tortoise must bear the new load, and the whole thing this misery and evil of man something good undoubtedly
is worse than before. arose—something that outweighed all the rest and made full
The heathen story of Prometheus was, I told you, much amends.
the same as this Indian one, except that the heathen mythol- I wondered how I came to draw this confession from
ogists were wise enough not to go beyond the first step. you; and soon afterwards I found you somewhat uneasy
A single Prometheus was enough to take the weight from with it. For here I took up your ·previous· side against you:
Jove. They really made Jove a mere onlooker. He decided, presenting all those villainies and corruptions of mankind
it seems, to be neutral and to see what would come of this in the same light that you had done a few minutes earlier, I
notable experiment; how the dangerous man-maker would challenged you to say what advantage or good could possibly
proceed; and what the outcome would be of his tampering. arise from this, or what excellence or beauty could result
An excellent account, to satisfy the heathen vulgar! But how from the horrible pictures you yourself had drawn so realis-
do you think a philosopher would take this? It wouldn’t take tically. Perhaps there’s a very strong philosophical faith to
him long to come up with this: persuade one that those dismal parts that you exhibited were
Either the gods could have hindered Prometheus’s only the necessary shades in a fine picture, to be reckoned
creation, or they could not. If they could, they were among the beauties of the creation. Or perhaps a maxim
answerable for the consequences; if they couldn’t, they that I was sure you didn’t at all approve •in mankind seemed
were no longer gods because they were thus limited to you to be very fit •for heaven—I mean the maxim ‘Do evil
and controlled. And their omnipotence was broken, so that good may follow’.
7
This, I said, made me think of the manner of our modern exactly to what men happen to call ‘the truth’—something
Prometheuses, the hucksters who perform such wonders of that seems very unfixed and hard to ascertain. Besides, my
many kinds here on our earthly stages. They could create way hurt nobody. . . . In matters of religion I was further
diseases and do harm, in order to heal and to restore. But from profaneness and erroneous doctrine than anyone. I
should we assign such a practice as this to heaven? Should could never have the competence to shock my spiritual and
we dare to represent the gods as quack ‘doctors’ of that sort, intellectual superiors. I was the furthest from relying on my
and poor nature as their patient? Was this a reason for own understanding; and I didn’t exalt reason above faith, or
nature’s sickliness? If not, then how did she come—poor insist much on what the dogmatic men •call ‘demonstration’
innocent!—to fall ill or go awry? If she had been created and •dare oppose to the sacred mysteries of religion. And to
healthy from the outset, she would have continued so. It show you how impossible it is for us sceptics ever to stray
was no credit to the gods to leave her destitute, or with a from the universal catholic and established faith, I pointed
flaw that would be expensive to mend and would make them out that whereas others pretend to see with their own eyes
sufferers for their own work [Shaftesbury’s phrase]. what is best and most proper for them in religion, we don’t
I was going to bring Homer to witness for Jove’s many claim to see with any eyes except those of our spiritual guides.
troubles: the death of ·his son· Sarpedon, and the frequent And we don’t take it upon ourselves to judge those guides
interference with heaven’s plans by the fatal sisters—·the ourselves; they are appointed for us by our lawful superiors,
Fates·. But I saw that this discourse displeased you. I had so we submit to them. In short, you who are rationalists and
by this time openly revealed my inclination to scepticism. are guided by reason in everything, claim to know everything,
[He goes on to say that Palemon objected to his (Philocles’s) while you believe little or nothing; we sceptics know nothing
way of defending first one thing and then its opposite.] This, and believe everything.
you said, was my constant way in all debates: I was as At that I stopped; and your only response was to ask me
well pleased with one side’s case as with the other’s; I never coldly: ‘With that fine scepticism of yours, is your failure
troubled myself about the outcome of the argument, but still to distinguish truth from falsehood and right from wrong
laughed, whichever way it went; and even when I convinced in arguments matched by a refusal to distinguish sincerity
others, I seemed never to be convinced myself. from insincerity in actions?’
I admitted to you, Palemon, there was truth enough in I didn’t dare ask what you were driving at, because I was
your accusation. Above all things (I explained) I loved •ease afraid I saw that all too clearly. By my loose way of talking,
and •the philosophers who in reasoning were most at their which I had learned in some fashionable conversations in the
ease and never angry or disturbed; and you agreed that this ·social· world, I had led you to suspect me of the worst sort
was true of the ones called sceptics. I regarded this kind of of scepticism—the sort that spares nothing and overthrows
philosophy as the prettiest and most agreeable exercise of the all principles, moral and divine.
mind that could be imagined. The other kind of philosophy, ‘Forgive me, good Palemon’, I said. ‘You are offended, I
I thought, was painful and laborious: to keep always in the see, and not without reason. But what if I try to compensate
limits of one path, to drive always at a point, and to stick for my sceptical misbehaviour by using a known sceptical
8
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury I/3: Philocles pulls himself together
privilege in strenuously defending the cause I previously or the most serious discussion.’
opposed? Don’t think that I dare to aim as high as defending Thus, Palemon, you continued to urge me, until I
revealed religion or the holy mysteries of the Christian faith! was forcibly drawn into the following vein of philosophical
I am unworthy of such a task, and would profane the subject enthusiasm [see Glossary].
if I tried. I’ll be talking of mere philosophy: my idea is only to
see what I can get from that source to help me •oppose the
Section 3: Philocles pulls himself together
chief arguments for atheism and •re-establish what I have
offered to dismantle in the system of theism. ‘You’ll find then’, I said (adopting a grave air), ‘that I can be
‘Your project’, you said, ‘looks likely to reconcile me to serious, and that I am probably becoming permanently so.
your character, which I was beginning to distrust. Much as I Your over-seriousness a while ago, at such an inappropriate
dislike •the cause of theism, and •the name ‘deist’ when used time, may have driven me to a contrary extreme in opposition
in a sense that excludes revelation, I do nevertheless consider to your melancholy mood. But now I have a better idea of
that strictly speaking theism is the root of everything, and the melancholy that you exhibited; and. . . .I’m convinced
that one can’t be a settled Christian without first being a that it has a different foundation from any of those fanciful
good theist—i. e. without being opposed to polytheism and causes that I assigned to it this afternoon. No doubt love is
to atheism. And I can’t stand hearing the label ‘deist’ (the at the bottom of it, but it’s a nobler love than any that can
highest of all names ·when properly understood·) decried and be inspired by ordinary beautiful women.’
set in opposition to Christianity. As if our religion were a kind I now began to raise my voice and imitate the solemn way
of magic that didn’t depend on believing in a single supreme ·of speaking that· you had been teaching me. [Everything from
being. Or as if the firm and rational belief in such a being here to the asterisks on page 11 is being said by Philocles.] Knowledge-
on philosophical grounds were an improper qualification for able and experienced as you are in all the degrees and orders
believing anything further. Excellent assumption for •those of beauty, in all the mysterious charms of the different forms
who are naturally inclined to disbelieve revelation and •those of it, you rise to a more general level; and with a larger heart
who through vanity affect a freedom of this kind! and a more capacious mind you generously [see Glossary] seek
‘But let me hear’, you went on, ‘whether soberly and the very highest beauty in mankind. Not captivated by •the
sincerely you intend to advance anything in favour of that features of a pretty face or •the well-drawn proportions of a
opinion that is fundamental to all religion; or whether you human body, you view •the life itself, and embrace •the mind
are planning only to amuse yourself with the subject, as you that adds the lustre and provides the biggest contribution to
did previously. Whatever your thoughts are, Philocles, I’m the person’s being lovable.
determined to force them from you. You can no longer plead But the enjoyment of such a single beauty doesn’t satisfy
that the time or place is unsuitable for such grave subjects. an aspiring soul such as yours. It wants to know how to
The gaudy scene has closed down with the sun; our company combine a number of such beauties and to know how to
have long since left the field; and the solemn majesty of such bring them together to form a beautiful society. It views
a night as this may very well suit the profoundest meditation communities, friendships, relations, duties; and it considers
9
what harmony of particular minds constitutes the general [see Glossary], the government of the world is put on trial, and
harmony and establishes the commonwealth. God is abolished.
Then, not satisfied even with public good in •one commu- Much has been said to show why nature errs, and how
nity of men, your soul conceives a nobler object and with she came impotent and erring from an unerring hand. But
enlarged affection seeks the good of •mankind. . . . I deny that she errs; and when she seems most ignorant or
•Laws, constitutions, civil and religious rites (whatever perverse in her productions, I say that even in those she is as
civilizes or polishes raw mankind!); wise and provident as she is in her best works. ·Let us look at
•the sciences and arts, philosophy, morals, virtue; what does go on in nature’s operations·. Various interests get
•the flourishing state of human affairs, and mixed together and interfere with one another; various kinds
•the perfection of human nature of subordinate natures oppose one another, and in their
—these are its delightful prospects, and this is the charm of different operations the higher ones are sometimes subjected
beauty that attracts it. to the lower. But this isn’t what men complain of the world’s
Still eager in this pursuit (such is its love of order and order. . . . On the contrary, it’s from this order of inferior and
perfection), it doesn’t stop here, settling for the beauty of a superior things that we admire the world’s beauty, based as
part ·of the universe·. . . . It seeks the good of all, and has an it is on oppositions, while from such various and disagreeing
affection towards the interest and prosperity of the whole. . . . principles a universal harmony is established.
It seeks order and perfection ·at this level of generality·, Thus at the various levels of terrestrial forms, a
wishing for the best and hoping still to find a just and wise •resignation is required, a •sacrifice and mutual yielding
administration. of natures one to another. Plants by their death sustain
And since all hope of this would be pointless and idle if the animals; and animal bodies decay and enrich the earth,
no universal mind presided; since without such a supreme enabling plants to rise again. The numbers of insects are
intelligence and providential care, the chaotic universe is kept down by the superior kinds of birds and beasts; and
condemned to suffer infinite calamities; it’s here that the these again are checked by man, who in his turn submits
generous mind works to discover the healing cause by which to other natures and resigns his body as a sacrifice, just as
the interests of the whole are securely established, and all the other organisms do. And if the sacrifice of interests
the beauty of things and the universal order are happily can appear so right in natures that are so low-down and so
sustained. little above each other, how much more reasonable it is for
This, Palemon, is the work of your soul. And this its all lower natures be subjected to the superior nature of the
melancholy when, unsuccessfully pursuing the supreme world! That world, Palemon, which you were recently carried
beauty, it meets with darkening clouds that block its sight. away by when the sun’s fading light gave way to these bright
Monsters arise, not from Libyan deserts but from the more stars and left you this wide system to contemplate.
fertile heart of man; and with their ferocious faces cast Here are the laws that can’t and oughtn’t to submit to
an unseemly reflection on nature. She, helpless (as she is anything below. The central powers that hold the lasting orbs
thought to be), and working thus absurdly, is contemned in their right positions and movements mustn’t be interfered
10
with to save a fleeting form—e.g. to rescue from the precipice merely yielding to some better ·nature·; and all ·subordinate
a puny animal whose brittle body will soon dissolve, however natures· yield to the best and highest nature, which is
it is protected. . . . Anything that helps to nourish or preserve incorruptible and immortal.
this earth must operate in its natural course, and other
constitutions must submit to the good habit and constitution ******
of the all sustaining globe.
So we shouldn’t wonder if earthquakes, storms, pestilen- I had hardly ended these words when you broke out in
tial blasts, nether or upper fires, or floods often afflict animal astonishment, asking what had come over me to produce
kinds and may sometimes bring ruin to whole species. Much such a sudden change of character, and to draw me into
less should we think it strange if—either by outward shock, thoughts which you supposed must have some foundation in
or by some interior wound from hostile matter—particular me since I could express them with such seeming affection
animals are deformed even in their first conception, when as I had done.
disease invades the places of generation, and seminal parts ‘O Palemon!’, I said. ‘If only it had been my fortune to
are injured and obstructed in their precise labours. It’s have met you the other day, when I had just come back
only then that monstrous [here = ‘deformed’] shapes are seen: to town after a conversation with a friend who lives in the
nature is still working as before, and not perversely or country—a conversation that had, in one day or two, made
erroneously; not faintly, or with feeble endeavours; but such an impression on me that I would have suited you
overpowered by a superior rival and by another nature’s miraculously well. You would have thought that I had indeed
justly conquering force. [That is a tricky sentence. Shaftesbury is been cured of my scepticism and levity, so as never again to
saying that nature—‘she’, the whole great big thing—is behaving as she have gone in for teasing at that wild rate on any subject, let
ought to do; and that when something goes wrong with some smaller alone subjects as serious as these are.
item (which he is thinking of as a nature, though he doesn’t say so), ‘Truly,’ you said, ‘I too wish I had met you at that time,
that’s because it has been overcome by some other small item, another or that the good and serious impressions of your friend had
nature. You’ll see this double use of ‘nature’ more clearly at work just stayed with you without interruption until this moment. ’
And it shouldn’t surprise us that the
before the asterisks below.] ‘Whatever they were, I wouldn’t have lost touch with them,
interior form—the soul and temperament—shares in this so as to find it hard (as you saw) to revive them on occasion,
occasional deformity and often sympathizes [see Glossary] with if I hadn’t been afraid. ’ ‘Afraid!’ you said. ‘Afraid for whose
its close partner. No-one can be surprised at the sicknesses sake—mine or yours?’ ‘For both,’ I replied. ’For although I
of sense or the depravity of minds enclosed in such frail seemed to be perfectly cured of my •scepticism, it was by
bodies and dependent on such vulnerable organs. what I thought worse, downright •enthusiasm. ·My friend in
This, then, is the solution you require. This is the source the country·—you never knew a more agreeable enthusiast!
of the seeming blemishes in nature; and everything in it is [see Glossary]
natural and good. Good is what predominates; and every ‘If he were my friend,’ you said, ‘I wouldn’t be apt to
corruptible and mortal nature, when it dies or is corrupted, is talk about him in such an outspoken way; and perhaps I
11
wouldn’t classify as “enthusiasm” the attitude that you so other ·than liberty·; and I’m especially afraid of this love
freely describe in that way. I have a strong suspicion that that had such a power with my poor friend that it made him
you are unfair to your friend. But I can’t know for sure until seem to be the most perfect example of enthusiast in the
I hear more about that serious conversation for which you world—except for the bad temper, ·which he doesn’t have·.
accuse him of being enthusiastic. ’ This was remarkable in him: he had •all of the enthusiast
‘I must admit’, I said, ‘that he had nothing of the savage and •nothing of the bigot. He heard everything with mildness
air of the common run of enthusiasts. All was serene, soft, and delight, and put up with me when I treated all his
and harmonious. The manner of his discourse was more like thoughts as visionary [= roughly ‘as intellectual day-dreams’] and
•the pleasing raptures of the ancient poets that you are often when, sceptic-like, I unravelled all his systems.’
charmed with than like •the fierce unsociable way of modern
This is the character and description that pleased you so
zealots—those starched gruff gentlemen who guard religion
much that you would hardly let me finish. I found that it
as a lover guards his mistress, adoring something that he
was impossible to give you satisfaction without reciting the
won’t allow others to inspect and doesn’t care to inspect for
gist of what happened in those two days between my friend
himself in a good light, so that he gives us a low opinion
and me in our country retreat. I warned you repeatedly:
of his lady’s merit and of his intelligence!. . . . There was
you didn’t know the danger of this philosophical passion;
nothing in the way of disguise or paint. Everything was fair,
you hadn’t considered what you might be pulling down on
open, and genuine, as is nature herself. It was nature that
yourself, making me the cause of it! I had gone far enough
he was in love with; it was nature that he sang. If anyone
already, and it was at your own risk that you were pushing
could be said to have a natural mistress my friend certainly
me further.
could; that is how engaged his heart was. But I found that
although the object was different, this was still love—like Nothing I could say made the least impression on you.
any other love. And although the object here was very fine, But rather than proceed any further at that time I promised
and the passion it created very noble, I still thought that for your sake to turn writer, and put down a record of those
liberty was finer than anything else (·my difficulty about two philosophical days. I was to begin with yesterday’s
love being precisely that it robs one of liberty·). I never conversation between you and me; and you see that I have
cared to engage in more than a momentary love of anything done that, by way of introduction to my story. . . .
12
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury II/1: Pleasure, love, suicide
Part II: First day: Conversations among four
Philocles is still writing to Palemon advantages, pleasures, and favour of an ·imperial· court.
But I’m willing to go further in defence of retirement. It’s
Section 1: Pleasure, love, suicide not only the best authors that require this seasoning; so
does the best company. Society itself can’t be rightly enjoyed
[He begins with a flowery and mildly tiresome account of
without some abstinence and separate thought. Everything
a dream that freshened his memory of the conversation he
becomes insipid, dull, and tiresome without the help of
has promised Palemon to report in detail. Then:] I went to
some intervals of retirement. Haven’t you, Philocles, often
the home of Theocles, the companion and guide of my first
found this to be so? Lovers who don’t want to be parted
thoughts on these deep subjects, and was told that he was
for a moment—do they understand their own interests? A
roving in the fields, reading. And that is where I found him.
couple who chose to live together on such terms—would they
The moment he saw me, his book vanished and he came
be courteous friends, do you think? Then what pleasure
with friendly haste to meet me. After we had embraced, I
would the world have (that common world of mixed and
revealed my curiosity to know what he was reading, and
undistinguished company) without a little solitude, without
asked if it was a secret to which I couldn’t be admitted. On
occasionally stepping aside,. . . .away from the tedious circle
this he showed me: he was reading the poet Virgil. He said
of noise and show that forces wearied mankind to look to
with a smile: ‘Now tell me truly, Philocles, didn’t you expect
every poor diversion for relief?
some more mysterious book than this?’ I admitted that I
did, considering his character, which I took to be of such a Philocles: By your rule there should be no such thing as
contemplative kind. happiness or good in life, since every enjoyment wears out so
soon and, growing painful, is diverted by some other thing,
Theocles: And do you think that without being contemplative
and that again by some other, and so on. I’m sure that if
one can truly enjoy these more divine poets?
solitude serves as a remedy or diversion to anything in the
Philocles: Indeed, I never thought that to read Virgil or world, then there’s nothing that can’t serve as a diversion to
Horace one needed to become contemplative or retire [see solitude, which needs it more than anything else. So there
Glossary] from the world. can’t be anything good that is regular or constant. Happiness
Theocles: You have named two poets who can hardly be is a remote thing that can be found only in wandering.
thought to be much alike, though they were friends, and Theocles: O Philocles, I rejoice to find you in the pursuit of
equally good poets. . . . Do you think there’s any frame of ‘happiness and good’, however you may ‘wander’! Although
mind so fitted for reading them as that in which they wrote? you doubt whether there is any such thing, you are at least
I am sure they both joined heartily in love for retirement, reasoning, and that’s enough—there is still hope. But see
given that for the sake of a life and habit of the sort you what you have unknowingly committed yourself to! You can’t
call ‘contemplative’ they were willing to sacrifice the highest think of anything that is •constantly good, from which you
13
have inferred that there isn’t anything •good; so you must be and ‘We are pleased with what delights
think is worth having’]
accepting as a maxim (a true one in my opinion) that nothing or pleases us’. The question is Are we rightly pleased? and
can be good but what is constant. Do we choose as we should do? Children are highly pleased
with trinkets, or with whatever affects their tender senses;
Philocles: I admit that the only worldly satisfactions that I
but we can’t sincerely admire their enjoyment or see them
know of are inconstant. The things that provide it never stay;
as possessing some extraordinary good. Yet we know that
and the good itself, whatever it may be, depends as much on
their senses are as keen and as susceptible of pleasure as
mood as on fortune. A satisfaction that isn’t wiped out by
•chance will often be wiped out by •time. [This contrast between our own. The same thought holds for mere animals, many
of whom surpass us in the liveliness and delicacy of their
chance and time is not well worded. What Shaftesbury is talking about
sensations. ·And another point·: some of mankind’s low
is the contrast between •events in the outside world and •changes within
and sordid pleasures I would never label as ‘happiness’ or
the person.] Aging, change of temperament, other thoughts,
‘good’, however long they lasted and however much they were
a different passion, new engagements, a new turn of life or
valued by their enjoyers.
conversation—the least of these can be fatal, sufficient on
its own to destroy enjoyment. Though the object remains Theocles: Would you then appeal from the immediate feeling
the same, the enjoyment of it changes, and the short-lived and experience of someone who is pleased and satisfied with
good expires. Can you tell me of anything in life that isn’t so what he enjoys?
•changeable and •subject to the same common fate of satiety
and disgust? Philocles (continuing the same zeal that Theocles had stirred in
me against those dogmatisers on pleasure): Most certainly I
Theocles: I gather that the current notion of good isn’t
would appeal! Is there any creature on earth, however
good enough for you. You can afford to be sceptical about
sordid, who doesn’t prize his own enjoyment?. . . . Isn’t
something over which no-one else will even hesitate. Almost
malice and cruelty extremely enjoyable for some natures?
every one philosophises dogmatically on this topic. All are
Isn’t a hoggish life the height of some men’s wishes? You
positive that our real good is pleasure.
surely won’t ask me to list all the species of sensations what
Philocles: I might be better satisfied with that if they would men of certain tastes have adopted as their chief pleasure
tell us which or what sort, pinning down the species and and delight. Some men have even found diseases to be
distinct kind ·of pleasure· that must constantly remain the valuable and worth preserving, merely for the pleasure found
same and be equally satisfying at all times. ·This pinning in soothing the burning of an irritating sensation. And these
down is needed, because the ordinary meaning of ‘pleasure’ absurd epicures are like those who arrange to be in states of
is useless here. In everyday speech· •‘will’ and •‘pleasure’ are unnatural thirst and appetite and clear the way for further
synonymous, everything that pleases us is called ‘pleasure’, intake by preparing emetics to swallow as the last dessert. . . .
and in every choice we make we choose what we please; so I know that it’s proverbially said that tastes are different,
it is trivial to say ‘Pleasure is our good’, because this means and mustn’t be disputed, and I remember seeing some such
no more than ‘We choose what we think eligible’ [= ‘what we motto on a picture illustrating it—a drawing of a fly feeding
14
on a certain lump. The food, however vile, was natural to the the unbiased state in which we are fittest to pronounce. [In
fly, and there was no absurdity in this. But if you show me this paragraph, ‘frame of mind’ replaces ‘situation of mind’. ]
•a brutish or a barbarous man getting pleasure in such Theocles: O Philocles, if this is sincerely your sentiment; if
a way, or you can have the courage to withhold your assent in this
•a sot in his solitary debauch, or matter, and go in search of what the lowest of mankind
•a tyrant exercising his cruelty, think they already know so certainly, you have a nobler
with this motto over him forbidding me to object, this turn of thought than what you have observed in any of
wouldn’t make me think better of his enjoyment. And I the modern sceptics you have conversed with. For these
can’t possibly suppose that a mere sordid wretch with a days there seem to be hardly any people anywhere who •are
base abject soul and the best fortune in the world was ever more dogmatically confident and •less thoughtful concerning
capable of any real enjoyment. the choice of good. Those who claim to be making such a
scrutiny of other evidences are the readiest to accept the
Theocles: This zeal that you show in the refuting a wrong
evidence of the greatest deceivers in the world, namely their
hypothesis leads me to suspect that you really do have some
own passions. Having been liberated (they think) from some
notion of a right, and that you are starting to think that there
seeming constraints of religion, they think they are making
might possibly be such a thing as good after all.
a perfect use of this liberty by following the first motion
Philocles: I’m free to admit that one thing may be nearer [see Glossary] of their will, and assenting to the first dictate
to good, more like good, than another, while still waiting or report of any enticing fancy [see Glossary], any dominant
to be told what real good is. All I know is this: either all opinion or conception of good. So that their privilege is
pleasure is good, or only some; if all, then every kind of merely that of being perpetually confused, and their liberty
sensuality must be precious and desirable; if only some, is that of being imposed on in their most important choice! I
then it’s for us to try to discover what kind of pleasure think it’s safe to say that
is good—what it is that distinguishes one pleasure from the greatest fool is the one who •deceives himself, and
another, making one pleasure indifferent, sorry, low-down, on the topic that’s greatest importance to him •thinks
mean and another valuable and worthy. And it’s by this he certainly knows that which he has least studied,
stamp, this ·demarcating· character, if there is one, that we that of which he is most profoundly ignorant.
must define good, and not by pleasure itself, which may be He who is ignorant and knows his ignorance is much wiser.
very great and yet very contemptible. And no-one can truly And to do justice to these fashionable men of wit—·these
judge the value of any immediate sensation without first modern sceptics·—they aren’t all so dim as not to perceive
judging regarding his own frame of mind. What we regard as something of their own blindness and absurdity. For often
a happiness in one frame of mind is regarded differently in when they seriously reflect on their past pursuits and en-
another. So we have to think about which frame of mind is gagements they freely admit that they don’t know whether in
the soundest: how to achieve the viewpoint from which we the rest of their lives they will be of a piece with themselves
have the best chance to see clearly; how to get ourselves into [Shaftesbury’s phrase], or whether their whim, mood, or passion
15
won’t lead them to a quite different choice of pleasures and includes everything that is generous, honest, and beautiful
to disapproval of everything they have enjoyed until now. A in human life. But when the •attack is over and the objection
comfortable reflection! removed, the spectre vanishes and pleasure returns again to
T: To bring the satisfactions of the mind and the enjoy- her former shape. . . . If this rational sort of enjoyment were
ments of reason and judgment under the label ‘pleasure’ is admitted into the notion of good, how could that notion also
merely fraudulent—an obvious retreat from the common include the kind of sensation whose effect is opposite to this
meaning of the word. Those who in their philosophical enjoyment? ·Opposite? Yes, because· it’s certain that for
hour classify as ‘pleasure’ something that at an ordinary (b) the mind and its enjoyments the thrusting excitement of
time and in everyday life is so little regarded as a pleasure (a) mere •pleasure is as disturbing as the insistent vexation
are not dealing not fairly with us. The mathematician who of •pain. . . .
labours at his problem, the bookish man who toils, the Philocles (interrupting): By the way, sincere as I am in ques-
artist who voluntarily endures the greatest hardships and tioning whether pleasure is really good, I’m not such a sceptic
fatigues—none of these are said to ‘follow pleasure’, and as to doubt whether all pain is really bad.
the men of pleasure wouldn’t admit them into their ranks.
Theocles: Whatever is •grievous can’t be other than bad.
Satisfactions that are purely mental and depend only on the
But what is grievous to one person is not so much as
motion of a thought are very probably too refined for the
•troublesome to another—let sportsmen, soldiers, and other
understandings of our modern epicures, who are so taken
such hardy folk be witnesses to this. Indeed, what is pain
up with pleasure of a more substantial kind. Those who
to one person is outright pleasure to another, as. . . .we very
are full of the idea of (a) such a sensible [here = ‘perceptible’]
well know, from the fact that men vary in their apprehension
solid good can’t have more than a vanishingly thin idea
of these sensations, and quite often confuse them with one
of (b) the ‘merely’ spiritual and intellectual sort. But it’s
another. Hasn’t even nature herself in some respects blended
(b) the latter that they set up and magnify at times when
them together, so to speak? A wise man once said that nature
they are trying to avoid the disgrace that may come to them
has joined the extremity of one so neatly into the other that
from (a) the former. Once this ·lip-service· has been done,
it absolutely runs into it and is indistinguishable.
(b) can take its chance: its use is immediately at an end.
When men of this sort have recommended the enjoyments Philocles: Thus, if
of the mind under the title of ‘pleasure’—when they have •pleasure and pain are thus convertible and mixed, if
thus dignified the word by bringing under it whatever is (as your account says)
mentally good or excellent—they can then comfortably allow •what is now pleasure becomes pain when it is strained
it to slide down again into its own genuine and vulgar sense, a little too far, if
from which they raised it only to serve a turn. The next •pain, when carried far, creates again the highest
time pleasure is called in question and •attacked, reason pleasure merely by ceasing, and if
and virtue are again called in to her aid and made principal •some pleasures are pains to some people, and some
parts of her constitution. There arises a complex affair that pains are pleasure to others,
16
this all supports my opinion, showing that there’s nothing concern. It has often happened in the past that we have
you can point to that can really stand as good. For pleasure formed intentions of which we now have no memory or
is good if anything is. And if pain is bad (as I’m forced to awareness. For all we know to the contrary, this could
take for granted) then we have go on happening—for ever! All is revolution in us [meaning,
the rest of the sentence: a shrewd chance on the ill side perhaps: ‘We are not things; we are processes’]. We aren’t the very
indeed, but none at all on the better. same matter or system of matter from one day to the next; we
live by succession, and only perish and are renewed. What
apparently meaning: we have an excellent chance of having
successiveness there may be in the after-life, we don’t know.
more bad experiences than good ones, and no chance of We soothe ourselves with the assurance that our interests
having more good ones than bad. will come to an end when a certain shape or form does so;
So we can reasonably suspect that life itself is mere misery, but that is silly. What interested us at first in it—·i.e. what
since we can never be gainers by it and are likely to be initially made us care about the continuance of that shape
losers every hour of our lives. Accordingly, what our English or form·—we don’t know, any more than we know how we
poetess says of good should be true: It is good not to be born. have since held on ·to that interest or concern· and continue
[Katherine Philips; that line is now famous from its occurrence in a work still to care about this assemblage of fleeting particles. As
by Epicurus—as something he is criticising.] For any good we can for what concerns we will come to have—in addition to that
expect in life, we might as well beg pardon of nature and one or instead of it—we don’t know either; and we can’t tell
return her gift without waiting for her to send for it. What how chance or providence may some day dispose of us. And
should hinder us? How are we the better for living? if Providence is involved in this, we have still more reason to
Theocles: That’s a good question; but why be in such a consider how we undertake to dispose of ourselves. A sceptic,
hurry if the issue is doubtful? This, my good Philocles, is of all people, should hesitate over decisions to exchange
surely a plain transgression of your sceptical boundaries. one condition for another. Although he acknowledges no
We must be pretty dogmatic to arrive confidently at your present good or enjoyment in life, he shouldn’t try to alter
conclusion! It involves deciding about death as much as his condition unless he is sure of bettering it. But so far,
about life—deciding what might be the case with us after Philocles, you and I haven’t even settled between us whether
death and what couldn’t be. To be assured that we can’t in this present life there is any such thing as real good.
ever be concerned in anything •after our death we need to Philocles: Then you be my instructor, wise Theocles, and
understand perfectly what it is that concerns or engages us inform me:
in anything •now. We must truly know ourselves, knowing The good that can provide contentment and satisfac-
what this self of ours consists in. We must settle the tion always alike, without changing or fading—what
question of pre-existence with a negative answer; and ·for is it? where is it?
that· we need a better reason for believing We were never Sometimes in some contexts the mind may be so engaged and
concerned in anything before our birth than merely the fact the passion so worked up that just then no bodily suffering
that We don’t remember—or are not conscious of—any such or pain can alter it; but this can’t happen often, and is
17
unlikely to last long; because in the absence of pain and Theocles: Can any friendship be as heroic as friendship
inconvenience the passion itself soon does the job: the mind towards mankind? Do you think the love of friends in general,
disengages, and the temperament, tired of repetition, finds and of one’s country, to be nothing? Or that friendship
no more enjoyment and turns to something new. between individuals can flourish in the absence of such an
enlarged affection and a sense of obligation to society? Try
Theocles: Hear then! I don’t claim to tell you right now
saying that you are a friend but hate your country. Try
the nature of what I call ‘good’; but I would like to show saying that you are true to the interests of a companion but
you something of it in yourself. It’s something that you false to the interests of society. Can you believe yourself? Or
will acknowledge to be naturally more fixed and constant will you. . . .refuse to be called the ‘friend’ since you renounce
than anything you have thought of so far. Tell me, my the man? [From ‘refuse. . . ’ onwards that is verbatim Shaftesbury.]
friend: did you ever grow weary of doing good to those you
loved? Tell me when you ever found it unpleasing to serve a Philocles: I don’t think that anyone who claims the name
friend? Or is it rather the case that now, after such a long ‘friend’ will deny that there is something due to mankind.
experience, you feel this generous [see Glossary] pleasure as Indeed, I would hardly allow the name ‘man’ to anyone who
much as you ever did? Believe me, Philocles, this pleasure wasn’t anyone’s friend. But someone who really is a •friend
is more corrupting than any other. No soul has ever done is •man enough; a single friendship can acquit him. He has
good without •becoming readier to do the same again and deserved a friend, and is man’s friend—though not strictly,
•enjoying doing it more. . . . Answer me, Philocles, you who or according to your high moral sense, the friend of mankind.
•are such a judge of beauty and •have such good taste in As for this latter sort of friendship: wiser people may see
·matters of· pleasure: is anything you admire as fair as it as more than ordinarily manly, and even as heroic, as
friendship? Is anything as charming as a generous action? you say it is; but I have to say that I see so little worth in
Then what would it be like if all life were in reality nothing •mankind, and have such an indifferent opinion of [here =
but one continued friendship and could be made one such ‘such a ho-hum attitude towards’] •the public, that I can’t expect
entire act? [From ‘but one. . . ’ onwards that sentence is verbatim much satisfaction to myself in loving •either.
Shaftesbury.] That would surely be the fixed and constant Theocles: Do you take bounty and gratitude to be among the
good you were looking for. Or would you look for anything acts of friendship and good nature?
more?
Philocles: Undoubtedly—they are the chief ones.
Philocles: [His opening words rather obscurely convey the Theocles: Suppose then that the obliged person discovers
suggestion that:] this ‘good’ of yours is chimerical, ·a mere several failings in the obliger, ·the benefactor·—does this
fantasy·. Perhaps a poet might work up such a single action exclude the gratitude of the beneficiary?
so as to make a stage-play hold together; but I can’t have a
Philocles: Not in the least.
robust conception of how this high strain of friendship could
be so managed as to fill a life. And I can’t imagine what Theocles: Or does it make the exercise of gratitude less
could be the object of such a sublime heroic passion. pleasing?
18
Philocles: I think rather the contrary. For when I ·as help. . . .all who require it, in the most hospitable, kind,
beneficiary· don’t have any other way of making a return, I and friendly manner? And can your country—or, what
might rejoice in having one sure way of showing my gratitude is more, your species—require less kindness from you, or
to my benefactor, namely putting up with his failings as a deserve less to be considered, than even one of these chance
friend. beneficiaries? O Philocles! How little do you know the extent
Theocles: And as for bounty: should we do good only to those and power of good nature, and to what an heroic pitch it can
who deserve it? Is it only to a good neighbour, or relative, raise a soul. . . .
a good father, child, or brother? Or do nature, reason, and Just as he had ended these words, a servant came to us
humanity teach us to do good to one’s father because he is in the field, to announce that some people who had come to
one’s father, to one’s child because he is one’s child, and so dine with us were waiting for us to join them. So we walked
on with every relation in human life? homewards. On the way I told Theocles that I was afraid that
I would never be a good friend or lover by his standards. As
Philocles: I think this last is the most right.
for a plain natural love of one single person of either sex, I
Theocles: Then consider, Philocles, what you said when you could manage that well enough, I thought; but this complex
•objected against the love of mankind because of human universal sort ·of affection· was beyond my reach. I could
frailty and •seemed to scorn the public because of its misfor- love the individual, but not the species. A species was too
tunes. See if this attitude is consistent with the humanity mysterious—too metaphysical—an object for me. In short, I
that you have and practise in other contexts. ·It pretty clearly couldn’t love anything of which I didn’t have some sensible
isn’t·. material image—·that I couldn’t see in my mind’s eye·.
•Where can generosity exist if not here?
Theocles: What? Can you never love except in that manner?
•Where can we ever exert friendship if not in this ‘chief’
But I know that you admired and loved a friend long before
subject?
you knew him in person. Or was Palemon’s character not at
•What should we be true or grateful to if not to
work when it engaged you in the long correspondence that
•mankind and •the society to which we are so deeply
preceded your recent meetings with him?
indebted?
•What are the faults or blemishes that can •excuse Philocles: I have to admit that. And now I think I understand
such an omission or •lessen a grateful mind’s satis- your mystery and see how I must prepare for it. When I first
faction in making a grateful kind return? began to love Palemon, I was forced to form a certain image
Can you then, merely out of good breeding and your natural of him as a kind of material object, having this ready drawn
temperament, •rejoice to show civility, courtesy, and obliging- in my mind whenever I thought of him; and that’s what I
ness, •seek objects of compassion, and •be pleased with every must try to do in the case before us. I have to see whether
occurrence where you have power to do some service even I can, perhaps with your help, raise ·in my mind· an image
to people you don’t know? Can you delight in such episodes or spectre that could represent this odd being that you want
in foreign countries or with strangers here in England—to me to love.
19
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury II/2: Temperance, moderation
Theocles: I think you might have the same indulgence for Section 2: Temperance, moderation
nature or mankind as you do for the people of ancient Rome.
Despite their blemishes I have known you to love them in You see here, Palemon, what a foundation is laid for the
many ways, especially when represented by ·a sculpture of· enthusiasms I told you of [page 12]—ones that I thought (and
a beautiful youth called ‘the genius ·or spirit· of the people’. I told you this) were all the more dangerous because so very
I remember an occasion when we were viewing some pieces odd and out of the way. But curiosity had seized you, I
of antiquity where the people were represented in that way perceived, as it had earlier seized me. For after this first
and you thought well of them. conversation, I must admit, I longed for nothing as much as
the next day and the appointed morning walk in the woods.
[The walk in the woods will begin on page 49.]
Philocles: Indeed, if I could stamp on my mind a figure of We had only a couple of friends at dinner with us; and
the kind you speak of—whether it stood for •mankind or for a good while we talked about news and things that don’t
•nature—it might well have its effect, so that I could perhaps matter; until I, with my mind still running on the topics I had
become a lover in your fashion; more especially if you could been discussing with Theocles, gladly picked up on some
arrange for things to be reciprocal between us, bringing me chance remark about friendship, and said that for my part,
into the imagination of this genius, so that it could be aware truly, though I used to think I had known friendship, and
of my love and capable of returning it. Without that, I would really regarded myself as a good friend during my whole life,
be a poor love, even of the most perfect beauty in the world. I was now persuaded to believe that I was no better than a
learner, because Theocles had almost convinced me that to
be a friend to anyone in particular I had first to be a friend
Theocles: That is enough. I accept the terms: if you promise
to mankind. And how to qualify myself for such a friendship
to love, I’ll try to show you the beauty that I regard as the was, I thought, a considerable difficulty.
most perfect and most deserving of love; and it won’t fail Theocles: In saying this you have given us a very poor idea
to make a return. [In flowery language he proposes that of your character. If you had spoken in this way about
they meet in the woods tomorrow morning and see whether, the ‘difficulty’ of having a friendship with a great man at
after invoking first the genius of that place they can get] at court—or perhaps of a court itself—and had complained
least some faint and distant view of the sovereign genius about how hard it was for you to attract the attention
and first beauty. If you can bring yourself to contemplate of people like those who governed there, we would have
this, I assure you that all those forbidding features and inferred (in your defence) that the courtier or the court had
uglinesses—whether of nature or of mankind—will vanish set •conditions that were unworthy of you. But to deserve
in an instant, and leave you the lover I want you to be. But well of the public, and to be rightly recognised as a ‘friend of
now, enough! Let us go to our friends, and change the topic mankind’, requires no more than to be good and virtuous;
of conversation to something more suitable for them and for and that is a •condition that one would naturally want to
our dinner-table. satisfy.
20
Philocles: How does it come about, then, that even these Or does temperance put a man into worse relationships
good conditions themselves are so poorly received and hardly with his friends or with mankind? Is a gentleman of this
ever accepted except on further conditions? For virtue by kind to be pitied, as someone who is burdensome to himself,
itself is thought to be a poor bargain: and I know few, even whom all men will naturally shun as a bad friend and a
among religious and devout people, who take up with it in corrupter of society and good manners? Shall we think
any way except as children do with nasty medicine—where about our gentleman in a public trust, and see whether
the potent motives are the rod and the sweetmeat. he is likely to succeed best with this restraining quality,
·this moderateness·, or whether he may be more relied on
Theocles: Those who need force or persuasion to do what is
and thought more uncorrupt if his appetites are high and
conducive to their health and welfare are children indeed,
his taste strong for that which we call pleasure? Shall we
and should be treated as such. But where, please, are those
consider him as a soldier in a campaign or siege and think
forbidding circumstances that would make virtue so hard to
about how we might be best defended if we had need for the
swallow? Perhaps one of them is this: you think that virtue
service of such a one? Which officer would be best for the
would keep you away from the fine tables and expensive food
soldiers; which soldier best for the officers; which army best
of our modern epicures, reducing you to always eating as
for their country? What do you think of our gentleman as a
badly as you are doing now, on a plain dish or two and no
travelling companion? Would his temperance make him a
more!
bad choice? Would it be better and more delightful to have
I protested that this was unfair to me. I didn’t want ever a companion who at any difficult time would be the most
to eat otherwise than I was doing right then at his table. . . . ravenous and eager to provide first for himself and his own
For, if we could go by the opinion of Epicurus, the highest delicate sensations? I don’t know what to say where beauty
pleasures in the world were provided by temperance and is concerned. Perhaps the amorous ladies’ men and refiners
moderate use. on this sort of pleasure may have so refined their minds and
Theocles: If then the merest pursuer of pleasure, even temperaments that, despite their accustomed indulgence,
Epicurus himself, made that favourable report of temper- they can, when need be, renounce their enjoyment rather
ance (so different from his modern disciples!), if he could than violate honour, faith, or justice. So the bottom line
boldly say that with such food as a lowly garden provides is that little virtue or worth will be ascribed to this patient
he could compete even with the gods for happiness, how sober character. The dull temperate man is no fitter to be
can we say of this part of virtue—·i.e. of temperance and trusted than the elegant luxurious one. Innocence, youth,
moderation·—that it can’t be accepted except on conditions? and fortune may be as well committed to the care of this
If the practice of temperance is so harmless in itself, are latter gentleman. He would prove as good an executor, as
its consequences harmful? Does it sap the mind’s vigour, good a trustee, as good a guardian, as he would a friend. The
consume the body, and make both mind and body less fit family that trusted him would be secure; and very probably
for their proper uses—the ·mind’s· enjoyment of reason or no dishonour would come from the honest man of pleasure.
sense and the ·body’s· employments and offices of civil life?
21
Theocles said all this with a straight face, which made it temperance? Let us once achieve this simple plain-looking
all the funnier; and it got the guests going, saying a great virtue, and see whether the more shining virtues won’t follow.
many good things on the same subject, in commendation See what that country of the mind will produce when by
of a temperate life. So that our dinner by this time being the wholesome laws of this legislatress it has obtained its
ended, and the wine (according to custom) placed before liberty! [‘legislatress’ = ‘female legislator’ = virtue, personified]. You,
us, I found that we were still not likely to proceed to a Philocles, who are such an admirer of civil liberty, and can
debauch! Everyone drank only as he fancied, in no order represent it to yourself with a thousand different graces and
or proportion, and with no regard to circular healths or advantages—can’t you imagine a grace or beauty in that
pledges [i.e. taking turns around the table in proposing (and drinking) original native liberty which
toasts]—something that the sociable men with a different •sets us free from so many in-born tyrannies,
scheme of morals would have condemned as a dreadful •gives us the privilege of ourselves, and
irregularity and corruption of good fellowship! •makes us our own, and independent?
Having this property, I think, matters to us as completely
Philocles: I admit that I’m far from thinking that temperance
as does having the sort of property that consists in lands or
is so disagreeable. As for this part of virtue, I think there is income.
no need to take it on any ‘conditions’ except the advantage [Theocles continues with an elaborate and slightly jokey
of its saving one from intemperance and from the desire for account of ‘this moral dame’ Virtue and ‘her political sister‘
things one doesn’t need. Liberty, in terms of how each would appear in an ancient
Theocles: What! Have you advanced this far? And can you Roman painting of her triumph—her formal victory parade—
carry this temperance to estates and honours, by opposing it with •allied abstractions alongside her in her chariot and
to avarice and ambition? Well, then, you really have made a •defeated ones ‘at the chariot wheels as captives’. This
good start on this journey: you have passed the channel and colourful passage is hard to grasp, but we don’t need it
are more than half way to the destination. There remains no for what follows. Philocles reports that the other two in the
further reason for hesitation about espousing virtue—unless group picked up where Theocles had left off, ‘designing upon
you will declare yourself a coward or conclude that being a the same subject after the ancient manner’. Then:]
born coward is a happiness! For if you can be temperate Philocles: Gentlemen, the descriptions you have been mak-
towards life, and think it not so great a business whether ing are no doubt the finest in the world; but after you have
your life is long or short and are satisfied with what you made Virtue as glorious and triumphant as you please, I will
have lived—rising as a thankful guest from a full liberal bring you an authentic picture of another kind, showing
entertainment—isn’t this the sum of all? the finishing stroke this triumph in reverse: Virtue herself a captive, and by a
and very accomplishment of virtue? In this frame of mind, proud conqueror triumphed over, degraded, stripped of all
what can block us from forming for ourselves as heroic a her honours, and defaced, so as to retain hardly one single
character as we please? What is there that is good, generous, feature of real beauty.
or great and doesn’t naturally flow from such a modest
22
I couldn’t carry on with this because I was so violently recall that virtue is often treated in this way—innocently,
denounced by my two fellow guests. They protested that they with no treacherous design—by people who want to magnify
would never be brought to admit such a detestable picture: to the utmost the corruption of man’s heart, and who think
and one of them (a formal sort of gentleman, somewhat they are praising religion when they talk about the falsehood
advanced in years) looked at me earnestly and said angrily of human virtue. How many religious authors and sacred
that until now he had had some hopes of me, despite orators turn their swords this way and strike at moral virtue
observing my freedom of thought and hearing me quoted as a kind of step-dame or rival to religion! ·According
as a passionate lover of liberty; but he was sorry to find to them·: Morality mustn’t be spoken of; nature has no
that my principle of liberty ended up as a ‘liberty from all legitimate claims; reason is an enemy; common justice is
principles’. He thought it would take a libertine in principle folly; and virtue is misery. Who wouldn’t be vicious if he
to approve of such a picture of virtue as only an atheist could had a choice? who would refrain from bad conduct for any
have the impudence to make. reason except that he must? Who would value virtue if it
Theocles sat silent through all this; but he saw that I weren’t for ·the prospect of rewards or punishments in· the
didn’t care about my antagonists, and kept my eye fixed hereafter?
steadily on him, waiting to hear what he would say. At last,
the old gentleman (interrupting him): If this is the triumph of
with a deep sigh, he said. . .
religion, it’s a triumph that her greatest enemy, I believe,
Theocles: O Philocles, how well you are master of the cause
would hardly deny her! I still think, with Philocles’s leave,
you have chosen to defend! How well you know the way to that it’s no great sign of tenderness for religion to be so
gain advantage for the worst of causes from the imprudent zealous in honouring her at the cost of virtue.
management of those who defend the best! Speaking for
myself, I dare not say as my worthy friends have done that Philocles: Perhaps so; but you’ll admit that there are many
only the atheist can lay this load on virtue, and picture her such zealots in the world; and you have heard Theocles
thus disgracefully. No. There are other less suspect hands accepting that there is a certain harmony between •this
that may do her more injury though with more plausibility. zeal and •what you call ‘atheism’. But let us hear him out,
T: (turning towards his guests) It must have appeared if he will be so good as to tell us what he thinks of the
strange to you to hear asserted with such assurance as has general run of our religious writers and of their method of
been done by Philocles that virtue could with any show of encountering their common enemy, the atheist. This is a
reason be made a victim. You couldn’t conceive of any tolera- subject that needs to be clarified. It’s a notorious fact that
ble ground for such a spectacle. In this reversed triumph you the chief opposers of atheism disagree with one another in
expected perhaps to see some foreign conqueror exalted ·as the principles they are arguing from, so that in a way they
the conqueror, with virtue at his chariot wheel·—perhaps vice confute themselves. Some of them zealously defend virtue,
itself, or pleasure, wit, spurious philosophy, or some false and are realists about this [i.e. they hold that there are objective
image of truth or nature. It didn’t occur to you that the cruel real-world facts about what is right and what wrong]. Others can be
enemy opposed to virtue should be religion itself! But you’ll called ‘nominal moralists’: they hold that virtue is nothing
23
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury II/3: Shaftesbury’s Inquiry
in itself; it’s a mere creature of our wills, or a mere name against atheism knows that his opponent won’t dare to come
of fashion. (It’s the same in natural science: some take one out in the open; he can be challenged, but he won’t show up
hypothesis and some another.) I would be glad to discover on the field of battle. So the defender of religion congratulates
the true foundation, and identify those who effectively refute himself on his ‘imaginary triumph’; but he may have written
their other antagonists as well as the atheists, and rightly things that are actually harmful to religion, and his atheist
assert the joint cause of virtue and religion. adversary may in a more private and indirect way inflict hits
Here, Palemon, I had my wish. For I gradually led on religion.]
Theocles to express himself fully on these subjects. This Philocles (interrupting): Perhaps then there was truth in what
served as a prelude to the conversation we were to have the was once said by a person who seemed zealous for religion,
next morning—the conversation I so impatiently longed for. namely that no-one wrote well against the atheists except
If •his speculations the next day were of a rational kind, this the clerk who drew up the warrant for their execution.
previous discourse would help me to understand them; and
Theocles: If that joke were the sober truth, that would put
if •they turned out to be only pleasing fancies this would
help me to get more pleasure from them. an end to all dispute or reasoning about religion, for there’s
no work for reason to do where force is necessary. And, on
Here, then, began his criticism of authors. It gradually
the other hand, if reason is needed then force must be laid
turned into a continued discourse; so that if this had been
aside in the meantime, for the only way of forcing reason is
at a university, Theocles might very well have passed for
through reason. If atheists are to be reasoned with at all,
some grave divinity Professor or teacher of ethics reading an
then, they should be reasoned with like other men; there’s
afternoon lecture to his pupils.
no other way in nature to convince them.
Philocles: I admit that this seems rational and right; but
Section 3: Defending Shaftesbury’s Inquiry
I’m afraid that most of the devout people are ready to
concerning Virtue or Merit
abandon the •patient way of going about things in favour
Theocles: It would undoubtedly be a happy cause that could of the more •concise method. Force without reason may be
have the benefit of managers who would never give their thought somewhat hard, but I’m inclined to think that your
adversaries any handle of advantage against it! I could approach—reason without force—would meet with fewer
wish that the cause of religion had such defenders. But it’s admirers.
possible to write badly even in the best of causes, and I’m Theocles: Perhaps it’s a mere sound that troubles us. The
inclined to think that this great cause of religion may have word ‘atheist’ may create some disturbance ·in our thought·
been at least as much at risk as any other. Why? Because by being made to describe two very different characters—one
those who write in defence of religion have no reason to fear who absolutely •denies, and one who only •doubts. The
personal censure or criticism, and this encourages them to one who •doubts may lament his own unhappiness, and
write without much caution. [The rest of this paragraph is wish to be convinced. The one who •denies is daringly
hard to follow. Its gist is this. Someone defending religion presumptuous, and defends an opinion that goes against the
24
interests of mankind and existence of society. It’s easy to Philocles: Nothing. But will the world have the same opinion?
see that one of these two may have a proper respect for the And can one get away with this kind of writing in the world?
magistrate [see Glossary] and laws; but the other won’t, and Theocles: Undoubtedly one can, and we can produce many
because he is obnoxious to them he is therefore punishable. examples from the ancient world in proof of this. Freedom
[In Shaftesbury’s day ‘he is obnoxious to them’ (i.e. to the magistrate and understood in this philosophical way was never regarded
laws) could mean ‘he is subject to their rule’ or ‘he is open to criticism or as harmful to religion, or in any way bad for the common
punishment by them’ or ‘from their point of view he is odious’. None of man. We find it to have been a practice both in writing and
It’s hard to say how
these makes very good sense of the sentence.] conversation among the great men of a virtuous and religious
the former man—the one who merely doubts—is punishable people; and even the magistrates who officiated at the altars
by man, unless the magistrate has authority over minds as and were the guardians of the public worship took part in
well as over actions and behaviour, and has the power to these free debates.
conduct an inquiry into the innermost bosoms and secret
Philocles: But this doesn’t reach the matter we are dis-
thoughts of men.
cussing. We are to consider Christian times, such as today.
Philocles: I follow you. And by your account just as there You know the common fate of those who dare to write as fair
are two sorts of people who are called ‘atheists’, so there authors. What was that pious and learned man’s case—the
are two ways of writing against them—ways that may be one who wrote The True Intellectual System of the Universe?
fitly used separately but not so well jointly. You want to [It was Ralph Cudworth.] I confess to being amused by the fact
set aside mere threats, and separate the philosopher’s work that although everyone was satisfied with his ability and
from the magistrate’s; taking it for granted that the more learning, and equally with his sincerity in the cause of deity,
discreet and sober unbelievers, ·who doubt but don’t deny, he was still accused of giving the upper hand to the atheists
and· who don’t come under the decisive sentencing pen of by stating their reasons and those of their adversaries fairly
the magistrate, can be affected only by the more deliberate together! And among other writings of this kind you may
and gentle pen of philosophy. Well, I have to agree that the remember how a certain fair Inquiry. . . .was received, and
language of the magistrate has little in common with the what offence was taken at it. [This refers to Shaftesbury’s Inquiry
language of philosophy. Nothing can be more unsuitable to Concerning Virtue or Merit, which had been published separately, a few
magisterial authority than a philosophical style; and nothing years before it appeared along with the present work under the title
can be more unphilosophical than a magisterial style. Any Characteristics of. . . etc. Theocles will describe it as written by ‘a friend’
mixture of these must spoil both. And therefore if anyone of his.]
besides the magistrate can be said to write well on the topic Theocles: I am sorry that it proved so. But now indeed you
of religion, it is (according to your account) the person who have found a way of forcing me to talk at length with you on
writes in a manner suitable to philosophy, with freedom of this topic, by entering the fray in defence of a friend who was
debate and fairness towards his adversary. unfairly censured for this philosophical liberty.
Theocles: Allow it, for what can be more fair?
25
I confessed to Theocles and the others that this had really (a) For trying to cure atheism, the remedies that have
been my aim, and that for this reason alone I made myself been tried in the past are also appropriate for the
the accuser of this author. I accused him and all the other present time and this country.
moderate calm writers of nothing less than profaneness, for (b) Some other approach should be preferred—one that
reasoning so unconcernedly and patiently, without the least is more suitable to times of less strictness in matters
show of zeal or passion, on the subject of a deity and a future of religion and in places less subject to ·religious·
state. authority.
Theocles: And I am in favour of this patient way of reasoning; Which?
and I’ll try to clear my friend of this accusation, if you can This ·question· might be enough to start an author on
have patience enough to hear me out, on a topic of such a search for some way of reasoning with these deluded
breadth. persons that he thinks might be more effective for their
We all answered for ourselves, and he began thus. [This benefit than the repeated exclamations and invectives that
speech ends on page 31]. usually accompany most of the arguments used against
them. It wasn’t so absurd for my friend to imagine that
Theocles: It seems to me that most of the writers engaged
a quite different approach might be tried—one in which a
in the defence of religion are engaged either in •supporting
writer might have more success in offering reason to these
the truth of the Christian faith in general or in •refuting
men if he appeared unprejudiced and willing to examine
particular doctrines that are thought to be innovations in the
everything with the greatest unconcern and indifference.
Christian church. There aren’t thought to be many people
That’s because to people like these atheists it will always
who are sceptical about the very grounds and principles
seem that
of all religion; and we don’t find many writers who set •what has never been questioned has never been
out to confront them. Perhaps the other writers—·the vast
proved, and
majority·—think that it would be low-level work and beneath •whatever subject has never been examined with per-
their dignity to argue calmly with people who are almost
fect indifference has never been rightly examined and
universally treated with detestation and horror. But we are
can’t rightly be believed.
required by our religion to have charity for all men, so we
And in a treatise of this kind, offered as an essay or inquiry
surely can’t avoid having a real concern for those whom
only, they would be far from finding the required impartiality
•we think to be caught in the worst of errors, and whom
and indifference if the author, instead of a readiness to follow
•we find by experience to be the hardest to reclaim. And
the arguments wherever they led, showed a prior liking for
there is also a prudential reason to pay attention to them:
the consequences on only one side and an abhorrence of any
there aren’t many of them, but their number is thought to
conclusion on the other.
be growing, especially among highly placed people. So it may
Other writers in different circumstances may have found
be worthwhile for us to consider this:
it necessary—and suitable to their characters—to express
their detestation of the persons and the principles of these
26
men. But our author, whose character doesn’t exceed that but I do venture to assert this:
of a layman, tries to show civility and favour by dealing with Anyone who sincerely defends virtue and is a realist
the men of this ·atheist· sort as fairly as he possibly can, in morality must. . . .by the same scheme of reasoning
and arguing with perfect indifference, even on the subject of be a realist also in theology.
a deity. He doesn’t offer any positive results, but leaves it I regard all pretence as unpardonable, especially in phi-
to others to draw conclusions from his principles. His chief losophy. And you, Philocles, who have no mercy on bad
aim and intention was this: To reconcile these people to reasoning and can’t endure any unsound or inconsistent
the principles of •virtue, which might then clear the way for hypothesis—I think you will be so honest as to •reject our
them to come to •religion. ·How?· By removing the greatest modern deism, and •challenge those who give themselves a
if not the only obstacles to it, which arise from the vices and name to which their philosophy can never in the least entitle
passions of men. them.
That is why he tries to establish virtue on principles that My compliments to honest Epicurus, who raises his
he can use in argument with people who don’t yet believe in deities aloft in the imaginary spaces and, setting them apart
a god or a future state. If he can’t do that much, he thinks, from the universe and the nature of things, makes nothing
he can’t do anything. For how can supreme goodness be of them except a word. This is honest and plain dealing,
intelligible to those who don’t know what goodness itself because anyone who philosophises can easily understand
is? Or how can someone who doesn’t know the merit and ·what is going on here·.
excellence of virtue understand its deserving reward? When The same honesty belongs to the philosophers whom you
we try to prove merit by ·God’s· favour, and order by a seem inclined to favour, Philocles. When a sceptic questions
deity, we are surely beginning at the wrong end! Our friend whether a real theology can be constructed out of philosophy
tries to correct this. He is what you call a realist about alone, with no help from revelation, all he is doing is paying a
virtue: he tries to show that virtue really is something in handsome compliment to authority and the received religion.
itself, something in the nature of things, not man-made, not He can’t mislead anyone who reasons deeply, because any
constituted from without or dependent on custom, fancy [see such person will easily see that if he is right then theology
Glossary], or will. He holds that virtue doesn’t depend even on can’t have any foundation at all. For revelation itself, as we
God’s will, which can’t govern it but, being necessarily good, know, is based on the acknowledgment of God’s existence,
is governed by it and always conforms to it. Thus, although and it’s the business of philosophy alone to •prove what
he has made virtue his chief subject and in some measure revelation only presupposes.
independent of religion, I think he may eventually appear as So I regard it as a most unfair procedure when those
high a •divine as he is a •moralist. who want to be builders, and to undertake this task of
I am not willing to affirm this: •proving, lay a foundation that is insufficient to carry the
Anyone for whom virtue is only a name will regard load. Supplanting and undermining may be fair war in other
God as only a name also, and can’t without pretence contexts, but in philosophical disputes it’s not permissible
defend the principles of religion; to work underground. . . . Nothing can be more unbecoming
27
than to talk magisterially and in solemn terms of a ‘supreme The first thing he would want to tell you is precautionary.
nature’, an ‘infinite being’, and a ‘deity’, without meaning although the disinterested [see Glossary] love of God is the
anything about a providence and without accepting anything most excellent principle, ·it has to be protected on two
like order or the government of a mind. For when these are flanks·. (a) The indiscreet zeal of some devout and well-
understood and real divinity is acknowledged, the notion ·of meaning people has stretched it too far, perhaps even to
a deity· is not dry and barren; on the contrary, consequences extravagance and enthusiasm, as did the mystics of the
are necessarily drawn from it that must set us in action ancient church. . . . (b) Others who have opposed this devout
and find employment for our strongest affections. All the mystic way, and everything they call ‘enthusiasm’, have so
duties of religion evidently follow from this, and no objection completely exploded everything of this ecstatic kind that
remains against any of the great maxims that revelation has they have in a way given up devotion, and have left so little
established. zeal, affection, or warmth in their ‘rational religion’, as they
Is our friend straightforwardly and sincerely a theologian call it, they are often suspected of not sincerely having any
of this latter sort? You can answer that best by looking religion. It may be natural enough (•my friend would tell
at the consequences of his hypothesis. You will see that you) for a mere political writer to base his great argument
instead of ending in mere •speculation his hypothesis leads for religion on the need for some belief like that of a future
to •practice; and that will surely satisfy you, when you reward and punishment; but •he thinks that it’s a very
see a structure raised that most people would regard as poor sign of sincerity in religion—especially in the Christian
at least •high religion and some would probably regard it as religion—to reduce it to a philosophy that •makes no place
downright enthusiasm [see Glossary]. for the principle of love, and •treats as ‘enthusiasm’ anything
For I appeal to you, Philocles, whether there’s anything in aiming at disinterestedness or teaching the love of God or
divinity that you think has more the air of enthusiasm than virtue for God’s or virtue’s sake.
that notion of divine love? It is love that So here we have two sorts of people (according to my
•separates ·itself· from everything worldly, sensual, or friend’s account) who at these opposite extremes expose
meanly ·self·-interested; religion to the insults of its adversaries. On one hand, (a) it
•is simple, pure, and unmixed; will be found difficult to defend the notion of that high-raised
•has as its only object the excellency of the loved being love that is espoused with such warmth by devout mystics;
itself; and and on the other hand (b) it will be found equally difficult,
•has as its only thought of happiness ·the thought of· on the principles of these cooler men, to guard religion from
the enjoyment of that being. the charge of being mercenary and slavish. For how can
I think you’ll take it as a substantial proof of my friend’s we deny that to serve God by compulsion, or merely out
being far enough from irreligion if I can show that he has of ·self·-interest, is servile and mercenary? Isn’t it obvious
espoused this notion ·of divine love·, and aims to base this that the only true and liberal service paid to that supreme
high point of divinity on arguments that are familiar even to being—or to any other superior—is service that comes from
those who oppose religion.
28
that is regarded as such a great paradox of faith. If there

•an esteem or love of the person one serves, is in nature any such service as that of affection and love,
•a sense of duty or gratitude, and the only remaining question concerns the object ·of such
•a love of the path of duty and gratitude as good and service·, whether there really is the supreme One that we
amiable [see Glossary] in itself? believe in. If there is divine excellence in things—if there is
And what harm does religion suffer from making such a in nature a supreme mind or deity—then we have a perfect
concession as this? And how does it detract from the belief object, which includes all that is good or excellent. And this
in reward and punishment in the after-life to admit that the object must be the most amiable, the most engaging, and
service caused by this belief isn’t equal to service that is ·productive· of the highest satisfaction and enjoyment. That
willingly rendered but is insincere and slavish? Isn’t it still there is such a principal object as this in the world is proved
for the good of mankind and of the world that obedience to by the world through its wise and perfect order. If this order
the rule of right should be rewarded in one way or another, is indeed perfect then it excludes everything bad. And that
if not in the better way then at least in this imperfect one? it really does so is what our author so earnestly maintains
And can’t it be shown that however low or base this service by explaining as well as he can those awkward phenomena
of fear is admitted to be, because religion is a discipline to and signs of something bad. . . .in the seemingly unfair lot
bring the soul towards perfection (i) the motive of reward and [see Glossary] of virtue in this world.
punishment is primary and of the greatest importance for us It’s true that however strongly the appearances hold
until we are capable of learning better and are led from this against virtue and in favour of vice, the argument from that
servile state to (ii) the generous service of affection and love? to the non-existence of God can easily be removed. . . .by the
In our friend’s opinion we ought all to aim at the (ii) kind supposition of an after-life. To a Christian, or to anyone
of service, so as to be motivated by the excellence of the already convinced of that great point, it is sufficient to
object and not the reward or punishment; but where the clear every dark cloud away from providence, for someone
corruption of our nature prevents affection and love from who is sure of the after-life doesn’t need to be specially
having enough power to arouse us to virtue, the (i) motive solicitous about the fate of virtue in this world. But that’s
should be brought in to help, and should on no account be not how things stand with the people we are confronting here.
undervalued or neglected. They’re at a loss for providence, and look for it in the world.
Once this has been established, how can religion still They’ll hardly be helped to see it in •the seeming disorders
be accused of being mercenary? But we know that this in worldly affairs and •the blackest representation of society
accusation is often made. Godliness, say they, is a great and human nature! From such an unhandsome face of
gain, and God isn’t devoutly served for nothing. Is this a things here below they’ll presume to think unfavourably
reproach? Is it claimed that there may be a better service, of everything above—judging the cause by the effects that
a more generous love? Enough! There’s no need to say they see, and judging whether there is a providence by how
any more about this. On this basis our friend thinks it is virtue fares in the world. But once they are convinced that
easy to defend religion, including even the devoutest part this world is orderly, and indeed ordered by a providence,
29
perhaps they’ll soon be satisfied even regarding a future we must defend the thesis that there is order·—especially
state. For if virtue is in itself a considerable reward, and where virtue is concerned. It won’t do to relegate the whole
vice is to a large extent its own punishment, we have solid virtue matter to a hereafter. Why not? Because a disordered
ground under our feet. The plain foundations of distributive state in which all present care of things is given up, vice
[see Glossary] justice and proper order in this world may lead uncontrolled and virtue neglected, represents a downright
us to conceive of a further building. We intellectually see chaos, and reduces us to the atoms, chance, and confusion
a larger system, and can easily explain for ourselves why so beloved by the atheists.
things weren’t completed in this state ·of things here below·, Some zealous people exaggerate the misfortunes of virtue,
their completion being reserved for later on. If the good and representing it as an unhappy choice with respect to this
virtuous people had been wholly prosperous in this life, if world; their plan is to turn men to thoughts of a better world
goodness had never met with opposition,. . . .where would ·after death· by making them think poorly of this one. What
virtue have had a trial, a victory, a ·winner’s· crown?. . . . strategy on behalf of a deity could be worse than this? If
Where would temperance or self denial have been? Where in addressing people whose faith is loose you declaim in
patience, meekness, magnanimity? What could have brought this way against virtue ·in this state·, wanting to make them
these ·virtues· into existence except hardship? What could believe in a future state ·where all this will be put right·, what
have given them merit except hardship? What virtue could you will actually achieve is to weaken their belief in a deity
there be without a conflict?. . . . ·in our present state· ! And it can’t be sincerely thought that
Virtue has to encounter many difficulties in this world, any man, by having the most elevated opinion of virtue and
but her force is superior to them. Exposed though she is of the happiness it creates, was ever less inclined to believe
here ·below·, she isn’t abandoned or left miserable. She does in a future state. It will always be found that those who
well enough to raise herself above our pity, though not so favour vice are the least willing to hear of a future existence;
well as to leave us no room to hope that she will eventually while those who love virtue are the readiest to accept that
do better. Her present welfare is good enough to show that opinion that makes virtue so illustrious and makes its cause
providence is already engaged on her side. And since she triumphant.
is so well provided for here, with so much happiness and That was the situation among the ancients: many of
so many advantages even in this life, doesn’t it seem very the wisest of them were led to believe this doctrine ·about
probably this providential care will carry through into an an after-life·, a doctrine that hadn’t been revealed to them,
after-life and be perfected there? purely by the love of virtue in their great men—the founders
This is what our friend thinks can be said on behalf of a and preservers of societies, the legislators, patriots, deliv-
future state, to those who question revelation. This is what erers, heroes—whose virtues they wanted to live and be
is needed to make revelation probable, and to secure that immortalized. And in our own time there’s nothing that
first step to it—namely the belief in a deity and providence. can make this doctrine more attractive to good and virtuous
A providence must be proved from whatever order we see people than the love of •friendship, which gives them a desire
in things in this world. We must contend for order—·i.e. not to be wholly separated by death and rather to enjoy the
30
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury II/4: Order and purpose in nature
same •blessed society hereafter. So how could an author I assured our companions that if they would back me up
be regarded as an enemy to a future state merely because heartily when I pressured him we would easily get the better.
he exalts virtue? How could our friend be judged false to Theocles: In revenge then, I’ll comply. But there’s a con-
religion because he defends a principle on which the very dition: since I am to play the part of the theologian and
notion of God and goodness depends? What he says is just preacher, this will be at Philocles’s cost—he must play the
this: By building a future state on the ruins of virtue you part of the infidel who is being preached to.
betray religion in general and the cause of a deity; and by
making rewards and punishments the principal motives for the old gentleman: The role you have proposed for him is so
duty, you overthrow the Christian religion, and reject and natural and suitable that I’m sure he won’t have any trouble
leave undefended its greatest principle [see Glossary], that of acting it. I’d have liked it better if you had spared yourself the
love. . . . trouble of telling him what part he was to play, because even
Thus I have made my friend’s defence. Perhaps I have without that he would have been apt enough to interrupt
shown you that he is a good moralist and—I hope—no enemy your discourse by his perpetual complaints. Therefore, since
to religion. If you still think that the divine hasn’t appeared we have now entertained ourselves enough with dialogue,
in his character as much as I promised it would, I don’t think I ask that the law of sermon be strictly observed, with no
I can satisfy you in conversation. If I offered to go further, I answering whatever is argued or proposed. . . .
might be engaged deeply in spiritual affairs, and be forced Theocles then proposed we should walk outside, because
to make some new kind of sermon on his system of divinity! the evening was fine, and the free air would suit our topic
But now that things have come—and they really have—so better than a room.
close to preaching, I hope you’ll let me off and be satisfied Accordingly we took our evening walk in the fields, from
with what I have already performed. which the weary farm-hands were now retiring. We fell
naturally into the praises of country life, and talked for a
while about farming and the nature of the soil. Our friends
Section 4: Order and purpose in nature began to admire some of the plants that grew here to great
Just as he finished speaking, some visitors arrived. . . . When perfection; and I, relying on my having some knowledge of
they had gone (all except the old gentleman and his ·young· herbal remedies, said something about this that they mightily
friend, who had dined with us) we laid claim to Theocles’s approved of. Theocles immediately turned to me, and said:
‘sermon’, urging him again and again to let us hear his [This speech by Theocles ends on page page 35.]
theological ideas in full. Theocles: O my ingenious friend! whose reason is in other
He complained that we were persecuting him—‘as you ways so clear and satisfactory: how is it possible that with
have often seen people persecute a reputed singer, not •out such insight and precise judgment regarding •the details of
of any liking for the music but •to satisfy a malicious sort natural things and operations you aren’t a better judge of
of curiosity that often ends in censure and dislike.’ Be that •the structure of things in general and of the order and frame
as it may, we told him, we were resolved to persist. And of nature? Who better than yourself can show the structure
31
of each plant and animal body, describe the function of sense of •order and •proportion. That’s why there is so much
every part and organ, saying what their uses, ends, and force in numbers, and in the powerful arts [see Glossary] based
advantages are? So how can you turn out to be such a poor on their management and use. What a difference there is
naturalist of this whole, with so little understanding of the •between harmony and discord,
anatomy of the world and nature that you don’t see the same •between rhythm and a jerky sequence of violent
relation of parts, the same consistency and uniformity •in sounds,
the universe, ·as you see •in individual animals· ! •between composed and orderly motion and motion
There may be some men whose thought is so confused— that is ungoverned and accidental,
who have something so seriously wrong with them—that it’s •between the regular and uniform work of some noble
merely natural for them to find fault and imagine a thousand architect and a heap of sand or stones,
inconsistencies and defects in this wider constitution. We •between an organic body and a mist or cloud driven
can assume that it wasn’t the absolute aim or interest of by the wind!
universal nature to make every individual person infallible This difference is immediately perceived by a plain internal
and free of every defect. It wasn’t nature’s intention to leave •sensation, and in •reason we find this explanation of it:
us without some pattern of imperfection such as we see in Anything that has order and has (or contributes to) a unified
minds like these, tangled in perverse thoughts. But your design is a constituent part of one whole (or is itself ·a whole·,
mind, my friend, is nobler than that. You are conscious of an entire system). For example, a tree with all its branches;
a better order within ·yourself·, and can see workmanship an animal with all its limbs and organs; a building with all
and exactness in yourself and in countless other parts of the its exterior and interior ornaments. Indeed, what is. . . .any
creation. Can you justify to yourself allowing this much but excellent piece of music but a certain system of proportioned
not allowing all? Can you get yourself to believe that although sounds?
there are parts so variously united and working together, the Now in this ·thing· that we call ‘the universe’, whatever
whole itself has no union or coherence; and that although perfection particular systems have, and however many single
smaller individual natures are often found to be perfect, the parts have proportion, unity, or form within themselves, if
universal nature lacks perfection and should be likened to they aren’t all united in one general system—but relate to
whatever can be thought of that is most monstrous, crude, one another like wind-driven sands or clouds or breaking
and imperfect? waves—then there’s no coherence in the universe as a whole,
Strange that there should be in nature the idea of an so there’s no basis for inferring that
order and perfection that nature herself doesn’t have! That •the universe manifests order and proportion,
beings arising from nature should be so perfect that they and therefore there’s no basis for inferring that
can discover imperfection in her constitution, and be wise •the universe was created deliberately, with a design.
enough to correct the wisdom by which they were made! But if none of these parts is independent of the rest—and all
Surely nothing is more strongly imprinted on our minds, are apparently united—then the whole system is complete,
or more closely interwoven with our souls, than the idea or and conforms to one simple, consistent, and uniform design.
32
Here then is our main subject, insisted on: that however nature. ·I emphasize that I’m talking about someone who has
complete a system of parts a man or other animal is, consid- surveyed the facts·, because someone who hadn’t yet done
ered just in itself, it’s a further question whether it is in the so would hardly believe in ·the existence of· this union that
same way complete considered in relation to things outside is so clearly demonstrable by such numerous and powerful
it—starting with instances of mutual correspondence and relation, from the
•the man’s or animal’s relation to the system of his tiniest ranks and orders of beings to the remotest stars.
species. It isn’t surprising that in this mighty union some relations
And then there is between parts aren’t easily discovered, so that the goal and
•the relation of this species to the system of the animal role of things isn’t everywhere apparent. This was bound to
kingdom, be the case; supreme wisdom couldn’t have ordered things
•the relation of the animal kingdom to the earth, and differently. For in an infinity of inter-related things, a mind
•the relation of the earth to the universe. that doesn’t see infinitely can’t see anything fully, because
All things in this world are united. Just as the branch is each particular thing is related to all the others.
united with the tree, so is the tree immediately united with It’s like that with any dissected animal, plant, or flower:
the earth, air, and water that feed it. The fertile mould is someone who isn’t an anatomist or knowledgeable in natural
fitted to the tree ·it grows on·, the strong and upright trunk history can see that the many parts have a relation to the
of the oak or elm is fitted to the twining branches of the vine whole, for even a quick view shows that much; but it’s only
or ivy ·that grow on it·, the leaves, seeds, and fruits of these someone like you, my friend, who has explored the works
trees are fitted to the various animals ·that eat them·; the of nature and has been admitted to a knowledge of the
animals are fitted to one another ·as predators and prey· animal and vegetable worlds, who can accurately describe
and to the elements in which they live and to which they the relations of all these parts to one another, and describe
are. . . .fitted and joined—by wings for the air, fins for the their various functions.
water, feet for the earth, and by other corresponding inner [He illustrates the point by supposing someone who
parts that are even more intricately structured. Thus, when knows nothing about ships, the sea, or the movements of
we are thinking about everything on earth, we are forced to water, and is suddenly placed on a ship lying at anchor in a
regard them all as one, as belonging to one common stock. calm sea. He would think he saw a great tangle and confu-
And in the system of the bigger world: see there the mutual sion of ‘useless and cumbersome’ stuff. Theocles compares
dependence of things! The relation of one to another, of •that man in the ship with •us in the universe:] Instead of
the sun to this inhabited earth, and of the earth and other seeing to the highest pendants, we see only some lower deck,
planets to the sun! The order, union, and coherence of the and are in this dark case of flesh—·our bodies·—confined
whole! And know, my ingenious friend, that this survey will even to the hold, the lowest place in the vessel.
require you to admit that the universal system and coherent Now having recognized this uniform consistent fabric and
scheme of things has been established on abundant proof accepted ·the existence of· the •universal system, we must
that could convince any fair contemplator of the works of in consequence of this accept also that there is a •universal
33
mind. No intelligent man can be tempted to deny this unless factory and unfair state of man and of •how few advantages
he imagines that there in some disorder in the universe he is allowed above what the beasts have? What claims can
where the mind resides. Think about this: be made by a creature differing so little from the beasts,
Someone is in a desert far from men. He hears there with not much merit above the beasts except in wisdom and
a perfect symphony of music, or sees a good building virtue, which very few men have. Man can be virtuous, and
arising gradually from the earth in all its orders and his being so makes him happy. . . . He deserves a reward
proportions. for being virtuous, and he gets his reward—happiness—in
Would anyone in the world, in that situation, think that being virtuous. But if even virtue itself isn’t provided for,
there was no design accompanying this, no secret spring of and vice is more prosperous and thus the better choice—if
thought, no active mind? Would anyone, just because he saw this is, as you suppose, in the nature of things—then all
no hand, deny the handiwork and suppose that each of these order in reality is inverted, and supreme wisdom vanishes,
complete and perfect systems was brought about—with its because the picture you have drawn makes imperfection and
unity, symmetry, and order—by the accidental blowing of irregularity all too apparent in the moral world.
the winds or rolling of the sands? Have you before pronouncing this sentence thought about
[When in this paragraph Theocles speaks of something’s being de- the state of virtue and of vice in this life (leave out the
stroyed, ruined or overthrown he means that it is ruined etc. in our after-life) so as to say confidently
minds.] Then what is it that disturbs our view of nature •when,
so much that it destroys the unity of design and order of •to what extent,
a mind that otherwise would be so obvious? All we can •in what respects, and
see of the heavens and the earth demonstrates order and •in what situations
perfection, offering the noblest subjects of contemplation either of them is good or bad? You are skilled in other
to minds that are enriched with sciences and learning, as structures and compositions, both of art and of nature, but
yours is. Everything is delightful, amiable, rejoicing, except have you thought about
in relation to man and his circumstances, which seem •the structure of the mind,
unfair and unsatisfactory. This is where the trouble—the •the constitution of the soul, and
calamity—has its source; it’s this that leads to the ruin •how its passions and affections are inter-related.
of this handsome structure. For this reason everything so as to know •the order and symmetry of the part [i.e. of a
perishes, and the whole order of the universe—elsewhere human being, this little part of the universe], •what makes it better
so firm, entire, and immovable—is here overthrown by this or worse, •what powers it has when naturally preserved in
one view in which we relate everything to ourselves, putting its sound state, and •what becomes of it when it is corrupted
the interests of this little part ·of the universe, namely the and abused? Until this is examined and understood, how
human race· ahead of the interests of the universe as a can we judge either the force of virtue or power of vice, or
whole. how each can contribute to our happiness or our undoing?
But what’s the basis for your complaining of •the unsatis- So this is the inquiry we should make first, but who
34
can afford to make it as he ought? If we are born with a admire, ·Maximus Tyrius·. He says:
good nature, if a liberal education has given us a generous ‘Divinity itself is surely beautiful, and the brightest of
temperament and disposition, well-regulated appetites and all beauties. Though not itself a beautiful body, it is
worthy inclinations, that is all good and is generally regarded that from which the beauty of bodies is derived; not a
as being so. But who tries to give these to himself, or to beautiful plain, but that from which the plain looks
increase his share of happiness of this kind? Who thinks beautiful. The beauty of the river, the sea, the stars,
of improving—or even merely preserving—his share in a all flow from this, as from an eternal and incorruptible
world where it is bound to be greatly at risk, and where spring. As beings partake of this ·divinity· they are
we know that an honest nature is easily corrupted? All fair and flourishing and happy; as they are lost to it,
other things relating to us are preserved with care; we have they are ugly, dead, and lost.’
rules and procedures for taking care of them. But this, When Theocles had said all this he was formally com-
which is the most closely related to us and on which our plimented by our two companions. I was going to add a
happiness depends, is the only thing we leave to chance. compliment of my own, but he immediately stopped me by
Our temperament is the only thing left ungoverned, while it saying that he would be scandalised if I commended him
governs all the rest. rather than—according to the character I had been assigned
Thus we inquire into what is good and suitable for our to play—criticising some part or other of his long discourse.
appetites, but we don’t look into what appetites are good Philocles: If I must, then let me start by expressing surprise
and suitable for us. We investigate what is in accordance that instead of the •many arguments commonly brought to
with interests, policy, fashion, vogue, but it seems wholly prove the existence of God you make your whole case on the
strange and off-centre to investigate what is in accordance basis of just •one. I expected to hear from you in the usual
with nature. The balance of Europe, of trade, of power, is order about
strictly sought after, but few people have even heard of the •a first cause, a first being, and a beginning of motion;
balance of their passions, or thought of holding these scales •how clear the idea is of an immaterial substance; and
even. . . . If we paid more attention to these matters we would •how obvious it is that at some time matter must have
then see beauty and fittingness here ·in human nature· as been created.
well as elsewhere in nature, and the order of the moral [here But you are silent about all this. As for the popular thesis
= ‘human’] world would equal that of the natural world. In that a material unthinking substance couldn’t produce an
this way the beauty of virtue would become apparent, and immaterial thinking one: I readily grant this, but only on the
that would make apparent (as I said before) the supreme condition that I am allowed, as my adversary is, to appeal to
and sovereign beauty—·the beauty of the deity·—which is the great maxim about nothing ever being made from nothing.
the source of everything good or amiable. And then I suppose that while the world endures he’ll be at
I don’t want to appear as too like an enthusiast, so I shall a loss to say how matter began or how it can be annihilated.
express my view and conclude this philosophical sermon The spiritual men [a sarcastic reference to the defenders of religion]
in the words of one of the ancient philologists whom you can go on as long as they like eloquently defending the thesis
35
that have you even tried to present beyond bare probability? A

matter considered in a thousand different shapes, measure of how far you are from demonstrating anything is
joined and disjoined, varied and modified to eternity, the fact that if this uniting thesis is the chief argument for
can never on its own provide one single thought, deity (as you tacitly admit ·by not presenting any others·),
can never occasion or cause anything like sense or you seem to have demonstrated only that the question can’t
knowledge. be answered by demonstration. You say [page 33 ]How can a
Their argument will hold good against a Democritus, an narrow mind see everything? But if it doesn’t see everything,
Epicurus, or any of the atomists, early or late. But it will be it might as well see nothing. . . . Even if you are right in
turned against them by a critical academist [= ‘follower of Plato’], supposing that all that lies within our view or knowledge
·who will say·: ‘When the two ·kinds of· substances are fairly is orderly and united, this mighty all is a mere point—a very
set aside and considered separately as different kinds, it will nothing compared with what lies outside it. We can say: ‘This
be just as good an argument to say of the immaterial kind is only a separate by-world—·one small world·—there may
as of the material kind that in the wide waste be millions of other by-worlds that are as
Do with it what you please—modify it in a thousand horrible and ugly as ours is regular and proportioned. It may
ways, purify it, exalt it, sublime it, torture it ever so be that in the course of time, amidst the infinite hurry and
much, or rack it (as they say) with thinking—you’ll shock of beings,
never be able to produce or force the contrary sub- •this single odd-world-out of ours was banged into
stance (·matter·) out of it. The poor dregs of sorry existence and given some form (anything may happen,
matter can no more be made out of the simple pure given infinite chances), whereas
substance of immaterial thought than the high spirits •the rest of matter is of a different colour; old Father
of thought or reason can be extracted from the gross Chaos (as the poets call him) reigns absolute in those
substance of heavy matter. wild spaces, and upholds his realms of darkness.
Let the ·pro-religion· dogmatists make what they can of this He presses hard on our frontier, and it may happen that
argument. some day he will by a furious invasion recover his lost
P: But your way of stating the issue isn’t about •what right, conquer his rebel State, and bring us back to primitive
came first but •what is the case now. For if God does really discord and confusion.
exist, if any good evidence shows that there is right now a P: This is all I dare offer in opposition to your philosophy,
universal mind, everyone will agree that there always was Theocles. I had expected you to give me more scope [i.e. given
one. This is your argument. You base your argument on fact: me more to criticise]: but you have pulled back into narrower
you want to prove that things actually are now in a state and territory. To tell you truth, I see your theology as less fair and
condition such that, if you were right about it, there would open than that of our theologians in general. It’s true that
be no dispute left ·about the existence of a universal mind·. they are strict about •names, but they are more permissive
Your main support is ·your thesis about· union. But how about •things. They will hardly tolerate a central attack,
do you prove it? What demonstration have you given? What a downright questioning of the existence of God; but they
36
give always fair play against •nature and allow •her to be In infancy, more vigorous in age, with more alert senses
challenged for her failings: she may freely err, and we as and more natural sagacity [see Glossary], they pursue their
freely may criticise. God, they think, is not responsible for interests, joys, recreations; They cheaply purchase their food
nature; she is answerable for herself. But you are tighter and accommodation, clothed and armed by nature herself,
and more precise on this point. You have unnecessarily who provides them with a bed and a roof over their head.
brought nature into the controversy, and taken it on yourself That is what nature has arranged for other creatures, such
to defend her honour so highly that I don’t know whether it’s is their hardiness, robustness and vigour. Why not the same
safe for me to question her. for man?
Theocles: Don’t let that trouble you; be free to censure Theocles: Do you stop there in your protest? Once you
nature, whatever the consequences may be. The only thing have started in this way, I’d have thought it was easy to go
that may be harmed is my hypothesis. If I defend it badly, further: as well as laying claim to a few advantages that other
my friends needn’t be scandalised. No doubt they are armed creatures have, you might as well strengthen the attack and
with stronger arguments than mine for a deity, and can make complain that man is anything less than a consummation
good use of those metaphysical weapons whose edge you of all the advantages and privileges that nature can provide.
seem so unafraid of. I leave them to dispute this ground with Don’t stop at asking
you, whenever they think fit. As for my own arguments, if Why is man naked? Why is he unhoofed? Why is he
they are to be regarded as making any part of this defence, it slower-footed than the beasts?
could be as distant lines or outworks—defensive posts that Go on and ask:
may be easy to conquer but without any danger to the body Why doesn’t man have wings for the air, fins for the
of the place. water, and so on, so that he could take possession of
each element and reign in all of them?
Philocles: Although you are willing for me to launch a frontal
Philocles: Oh no—this would be to rate man high indeed! As
attack on nature, I choose to spare her in all subjects
if he were, by nature, lord of all; which is more than I could
except man. How does it come about that in this noblest
willingly allow.
of creatures—the one most worthy of her care—she should
appear so very weak and impotent, whereas in mere brutes Theocles: If you concede that much, your attack fails. . . . If
and the unthinking species she acts with so much strength nature herself is not for man—if man is for nature—then
and exerts such hardy vigour? Why does she run out of man must politely submit to the elements of nature, and not
energy so soon in feeble man, who has more diseases and ·expect· the elements to submit to him. Few of them are at
lives less long than many of the wild creatures? They move all fitted to him, and none fit perfectly. If he is left in the air,
around safely, proof against all the injuries of seasons and he falls headlong, because he wasn’t provided with wings. In
weather; they don’t need help from art [see Glossary], but live water he soon sinks. In fire he is burned up. Within earth
in carefree ease, freed from the need for labour, and from the he suffocates.
cumbersome baggage of a needy human life. More helpful Philocles: As for what dominion man can naturally have in
37
elements other than air I’m not greatly concerned on his both ways·: what shall we say of our fine-bred athletic
behalf, because by art [see Glossary] he can even exceed the gentlemen—our riders, fencers, dancers, tennis players, and
advantages nature has given to other creatures—except in such like? It’s the body surely that is the starver here; and if
the air! It would have been wonderfully obliging in nature to the brain is such a terrible devourer in the philosophers and
have given man wings. virtuosos, the body and bodily parts seem to have had their
revenge in the athletes!
Theocles: And what would he have gained by that? Think
about what an alteration of form it would have involved. Theocles: If that’s how things stand between man and man,
Observe in one of those winged creatures how the whole how must they stand between man and a creature of a
structure is made subservient to this purpose, and all other quite different species? If the balance is so delicate that
advantages sacrificed to this single operation ·of flying·. The the least thing breaks it, even in creatures of the same
anatomy of the creature shows it to be—in a way—all wing: frame and order—·e.g. even between philosophers and tennis
its main bulk is a pair of enormous muscles, which exhaust players·—what fatal effects there would have to be if nature
the strength of all the other muscles and take over the made some change in the order itself, making some essential
whole economy of the bird’s body. That is how the aerial alteration in the frame? Consider, then, what we are doing
racers are capable of such rapid and strong motions, beyond in censuring nature in such matters. ‘Why wasn’t I made by
comparison with any other kind ·of animal· and far exceeding nature strong as a horse? as hardy and robust as this brute
the small strength of the rest of their bodies, because their creature? as nimble and active as that other?’ And yet when
flying mechanism has been made on such a scale that it uncommon strength, agility, and feats of body are combined,
starves the body’s other parts. Man’s architecture is of a even in our own species, see what the results are! A person
different order from this. If the flying mechanism were added who is in love with an athletic constitution ought to voice
to it, wouldn’t the other members have to suffer, and the his complaint by saying ‘Why wasn’t I made a brute animal?’
multiplied parts starve one another? How do you think That would be better, more modest, more suitable.
the brain would fare in this partition [i.e. in this distribution [Philocles agrees, and decorates the point a little. Theo-
of energy to the different parts of the body]? Wouldn’t it be likely cles compliments him on his courage and intelligence in
to be starved along with the rest? Or would want it to being willing to ‘improve’ what his opponent says. Then:]
be maintained at the same high rate, and draw the chief Theocles: So that is the admirable distribution of nature.
nourishment to itself and away from all the rest. . . She adapts and adjusts
Philocles (interrupting him): I understand you, Theocles. The •the stuff or matter to the shape and form,
brain certainly is a great starver, where it abounds; and the •the shape and form to the circumstances—time, place,
thinking people of the world—the philosophers and virtuosos and element [i.e. whether earth, air, fire or water], and also
especially—must be contented, I find, with a moderate share •the affections, appetites and sensations to each other
of bodily advantages, for the sake of what they call parts and to the matter, form, action, and everything else.
[see Glossary] capacity in another sense. . . . ·But this cuts All managed for the best, with no waste, and a sensible
38
amount kept in •reserve; generous to all but not overdoing weak, and infirm of all. Why shouldn’t things have been
it with any; pulling back when something is superfluous, ordered in this way?. . . . How is man the worse for this
and adding force to what is principal in a thing. And aren’t defect when he has such large supplies? Doesn’t this defect
thought and reason principal in man? Would he have no draw him the more strongly to society, and force him to
•reserve for these? No saving for this part of his engine? Or accept that •it’s no accident that he is rational and sociable,
would he have the same stuff or matter, the same instru- and that •he can’t. . . .survive except in the social intercourse
ments or organs, serving alike for different purposes?. . . . and community that is his natural state? Isn’t it the case
[This paragraph is given exactly as Shaftesbury wrote it.] It cannot that
be. What wonders, then, can he expect from a few ounces of •conjugal affection,
blood in such a narrow vessel, fitted for so small a district of •natural affection to parents,
nature? Will he not rather think highly of that nature which •duty to magistrates [see Glossary],
has thus managed his portion for him to best advantage with •love of a common city, community, or country, and
this happy reserve (happy indeed for him, if he knows and •all the other duties and social parts of life
uses it!) by which he has so much a better use of organs are based on these lacks [i.e. on man’s not having the kind of
than any other creature, by which he holds his reason, is a ‘sagacity’ that lower animals have]? What can be better than
man and not a beast? such a ‘deficiency’ when it leads to so much good?. . . . [In
a difficult sentence, Theocles refers to people who coolly
Philocles: But beasts have instincts that man lacks.
declare that they aren’t naturally sociable; if nature had
Theocles: True: they have indeed perceptions, sensations, provided them with something that served them in the way
and pre-sensations (if I may use the expression) which man that lower animals are served by intincts, they would be even
doesn’t have to anything like the same extent. Their females, further from any sense of duty or obligation.] What respect
newly pregnant for the first time, have a clear prospect or or reverence would they have for parents, magistrates, their
pre-sensation of what is going to happen to them; they know country, or their species? Wouldn’t their full and self suffi-
what to provide, and how, knowing all this in detail without cient state have determined them more strongly than ever to
having had any relevant experience. . . . ‘Why not this in throw off nature, and deny the purposes and the Author of
human kind?’ you ask. I prefer a different question: ‘Why their creation?
this?’ What need is there for men to have this sagacity? Don’t While Theocles argued in this way about nature, the
they have something different and better? Don’t they have old gentleman—my adversary—expressed great satisfaction
reason and speech? Doesn’t this instruct them? What need, in hearing me (as he thought) refuted, and my opinions
then, for the other? Where would the prudent management exposed (he insisted on believing that propositions that I
be at this rate?. . . . had presented on one side of the debate expressed my own
T: The young of most other species are instantly helpful strong opinions). He tried to reinforce Theocles’s argument
to themselves, sensible, vigorous, known to shun danger with many details from the common topics of the scholastics
and seek their good; a human infant is the most helpless, and scholars of Roman civil law. He added that it would be
39
better if I would declare my sentiments openly; for he was allowed them to live out of society, with so little affection
sure that I had completely swallowed the principle that the for one another’s company, it’s not likely that they would
state of nature was a state of war. spare one another’s persons if the question came up. If they
Philocles: You agree that it wasn’t a state of government or were so solitary and anti-social that they didn’t meet for love,
public rule. it’s highly likely that they would fight for ·self·-interest. So
your own reasoning leads to the conclusion that the state of
the old gentleman: I do so.
nature must in all likelihood have been little different from a
Philocles: Was it then a state of fellowship or society? state of war.
the old gentleman: No: for when men entered first into I could see from his looks that he was going to answer me
society they passed from the state of nature into the new one with some sharpness; but Theocles intervened. As he had
based on a contract. occasioned this dispute, he said, he would like to be allowed
Philocles: And was the previous state a tolerable one? to try to end it by putting the question in a better light.
the old gentleman: If it had been absolutely intolerable, it Theocles: (to the old gentleman) You see how skillfully Philo-
couldn’t have existed. We can’t properly label as a ‘state’ cles went about getting you to agree that the state of nature
something that couldn’t last for even a short period of time. was perfectly distinct from that of society. But now let us
question him in his turn, and see whether he can demon-
Philocles: Well, then, if man could endure to live without
strate to us that there can be naturally any human state
society, and if he actually did live in that way when in the
that isn’t social.
state of nature, how can it be said that he is by nature
sociable? the old gentleman: What is it then that we call ‘the state of
The old gentleman seemed a little disturbed at my ques- nature’?
tion. But then he recovered himself: Theocles: Not the imperfect rough condition of mankind that
the old gentleman: It may indeed have been •some particular some imagine. If anything like that ever existed in nature, it
circumstances that led man into society, rather than •his couldn’t have •continued for any length of time, or •been any
own natural inclination. way tolerable, or •been sufficient for the support of human
race. Such a condition cannot indeed properly be called a
Philocles: His nature then wasn’t very good, it seems. Having
‘state’. Suppose I speak of the ‘state’ of a newborn baby, at
no natural affection or friendly inclination of his own, he was
the moment of its birth—would that be proper?
forced into a social state against his will. And what forced
him was not any necessity involving external things (for the old gentleman: Hardly so, I confess.
you have allowed him a tolerable subsistence), but probably [Theocles’s next speech ends on page 42.]
from difficulties that arose chiefly from himself and his own Theocles: Well, that is the kind of ‘state’ that we suppose man
malignant temperament and principles. It’s no wonder if to have been in before he entered into society and became
creatures who were in this way naturally unsociable were in truth a human creature. Before societies were formed,
also naturally mischievous and troublesome. If their nature there was the rough draught ·or preliminary sketch· of man,
40
nature’s trial run or first effort; a species just newborn, a For instance, suppose he sprang from a big-bellied oak
kind still unformed—not in its natural state but restless and (as the old poets used to say); in that case he might at first
violent until it achieved its natural perfection. be more like a mandrake [see Glossary] than a man. Let’s
That’s what must have been the case if men were ever in suppose that at first he has little more life than we find in
a condition or state in which they were not yet associated or the so-called ‘sensitive’ plants ·such as the Venus flytrap’·.
acquainted, and consequently had no language or form of art. The mother oak gave birth; through some odd accident it was
That it was their natural state to live thus separately—that a false birth ·in that the offspring wasn’t an oak·; and over
is simply absurd! You have a better chance of •divesting the a period of time the false-birth offspring was shaped into a
creature of any other feeling or affection than of •divesting human form. The limbs were then fully displayed, and the
him of his feeling towards society and his species. Supposing organs of sense began to unfold themselves. Here sprang an
that you could,. . . .would you transform him in that way— ear; there peeped an eye. Perhaps a tail too,. . . .though we
enclosing him like some solitary insect in a shell—and still can’t tell what superfluous parts nature may have provided
call him a man? You might as well call a human egg or at first. Whatever they were, they seem to have dropped off,
embryo a man. The bug that breeds the butterfly is more leaving things, at last in a good shape and (to a wonder!) just
properly a wingless fly than this imaginary creature is a as they should be.
man. His outward shape may be human, but his passions, This surely is the lowest view of the original affairs of
appetites, and organs must be wholly different. . . . human kind. If man came into existence through Providence
To explain this a little further, let us examine this pre- rather than chance, that strengthens the argument for his
tended state of nature to see what its foundation must be. social nature. But if his origin was as I have described
•If man has existed from eternity, there can’t have been any it—which is what a certain sort of philosophers, ·the Epicure-
primitive or original state, any state of nature, except the ans·, insist that it was—then nature then had no intention
state we see at present before our eyes. ·Why not? Because at all, no meaning or design in this whole matter. In that
the state of nature is by definition first or early, and there case, I can’t see how anything can be called ‘natural’, how
is no first or early state of something that didn’t ever begin.· any state can be picked out from other states as ‘a state of
•If man hasn’t existed from eternity, and arose all at once nature’ or ‘according to nature’.
·rather than in a series of steps·, then he was at the very first However, let us continue with their hypothesis and con-
as he is now, ·so that again he was never in a state of nature sider which state we can best call nature’s own ·if Epicure-
different from his present state·. So we are left with this: anism is right·. Nature has by accident, through many
•man hasn’t existed from eternity but came into existence changes and chances, raised a creature which sprang at
by degrees, ·stepwise·, going through several stages and first from rough seeds of matter and •proceeded until it
conditions to reach the condition he is now settled in and became what it is now—a state that it has been in for many
has been in for many generations. generations. I ask: Where in this long •procession (for I
allow it any length whatever) did the state of nature begin?
The creature must have endured many changes, and each
41
change while he was thus growing up was as natural as any To conclude, I’ll venture to add a word on behalf of
other. So either •there were a hundred different states of Philocles. Since learned people have such a fancy for this
nature or •there was just one, the state in which nature was notion, and love to talk of this imaginary ‘state of nature’,
perfect and her growth complete. Where she rested, having I think it is downright charitable to speak as ill of it as we
achieved her end—that must be her state, or nothing is. possibly can. Let it be a state of war, plundering and injustice.
Do you think she could rest in that desolate state before Because it is unsocial, let it be as uncomfortable and as
society? Could she maintain and propagate the ·human· frightful as possible. To speak well of it is to make it inviting
species, such as it now is, without fellowship or community? and tempt men to become hermits. At least let it be seen as
[Theocles repeats at some length his theme about how many degrees worse than the worst government in existence.
humans’ individual weakness requires them to associate The greater dread we have of anarchy, the better citizens
for mutual help. He mentions] . . . man’s long and helpless we’ll be, and the more we’ll value the laws and constitution
infancy, his feeble and defenceless body which fits him more under which we live and by which we are protected from
to be a prey himself than live by preying on others. But the outrageous violences of such an unnatural state ·as the
he can’t live like any of the grazing species. He must have so-called ‘state of nature’·. In this I agree heartily with
better. . . .food than the raw herbage; a better couch and the transformers of •human nature who, considering •it
covering than the bare earth and open sky. . . . Is it possible abstractedly and apart from government or society, represent
that man should pair, and live in love and fellowship with it through monstrous visages of dragons, leviathans, and
his partner and offspring, while still being wholly wild and I don’t know what other devouring creatures. But their
speechless, and without the arts of storing, building, and great maxim that man is naturally to man as a wolf fails
other life-arrangements that are. surely, as natural to him absurdly to express their disparagement of man. Wolves
as they are to the beaver, the ant, or the bee?. . . . Given are very kind and loving to wolves; the sexes strictly join
that he began on society by forming a household, where and in the care and nurture of the young; and this union is
how would he stop this from going any further? Mustn’t his continued still between them. They howl to one another to
household soon have grown soon a tribe? And this tribe into bring company—to hunt, or attack their prey, or come to
a nation? And even if it remained merely as a tribe, wasn’t share in a good carcass. . . . If this famous sentence means
that a society for mutual defence and common interest? [This anything it must be that man is naturally to man as a
passage, which Shaftesbury italicised, is given in his undoctored words.] wolf is to a sheep. But it’s impossible to assent to this
In short, if generation be natural, if natural affection and the ill-natured proposition even when we have done our best to
care and nurture of the offspring be natural, things standing make tolerable sense of it. All we get from it is this: there
as they do with man, and the creature being of that form and are different kinds or characters of men; they don’t all have
constitution he now is; it follows, That society must be also this wolfish nature, and at least half of them are naturally
natural to him; and That out of society and community he innocent and mild. . . .
never did, nor ever can subsist.
42
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury II/5: Believing in miracles
Section 5: Believing in miracles report of the most considerable part of mankind.
. . . .We returned home from our walk. At supper and Philocles: That is far from being my case. You have never
afterwards for the rest of the evening Theocles said little, yet heard me deny anything, though I have questioned many
the conversation being now managed chiefly by the two things. If I suspend my judgment, it’s because I have less
companions, who directed it to a new sort of philosophy. confidence than others. There are people, I know, who have
Forgive me, Palemon, if I deal with it more quickly. so much regard for every fancy [see Glossary] of their own that
They spoke learnedly and at length about the nature of they can believe their dreams. I could never pay any such
spirits and apparitions. . . . Nothing was so charming with deference to my sleeping fancies, and I’m apt sometimes to
them as what was out of line and odd; nothing so soothing question even my waking thoughts and consider whether
as what produced horror. They had no taste for anything they aren’t dreams too, because men have a capacity for
rational, plain, and easy, and they welcomed everything that dreaming sometimes with their eyes open. You’ll admit
was contrary to nature, in no proportion or harmony with that it’s a great pleasure for mankind to make their dreams
the rest of things. Monstrous births, prodigies [see Glossary], pass for realities; and that the love of truth is really much
enchantments, wars between the elements, and convulsions less prevalent than this passion for novelty and surprise,
were our chief entertainment. One would have thought that joined with a desire to make an impression and be admired.
in a rivalry between •Providence and •Nature •the latter lady Still, I’m charitable enough to think there’s more •innocent
was made to appear as homely as possible so that her ugly delusion than •deliberate imposture [= ‘deceit’] in the world;
features might recommend and set off the beauties of •the and that those who have most imposed on mankind have
former. To do our friends justice, I thought their intention to had the advantage of being able to impose on themselves
be sincerely religious, but this wasn’t a face of religion I was first. This provides a kind of salve for their consciences, and
likely to be enamoured with. It wasn’t from this direction makes them more successful in imposing on others because
that I risked becoming enthusiastic or superstitious. If ever it lets them act their part more naturally. There’s nothing
I became so, it would be in Theocles’s way. The monuments puzzling in the fact that men’s dreams sometimes have the
and churchyards weren’t such powerful scenes with me as good fortune of being taken to be truth, when we bear in
the mountains, the plains, the solemn woods and groves. . . . mind that sometimes something that was never so much
as dreamed of or reported as truth eventually comes to be
You may imagine, Palemon, that the scepticism with
believed by someone who has often told it.
which you so often reproach me couldn’t forsake me here;
nor could it fail to upset our companions, especially the the old gentleman: So that on your account the greatest
grave gentleman who had clashed with me some time before. impostor in the world can be regarded as sincere.
He put up with me for a while, till having lost all patience. . . Philocles: As regards his main imposture, perhaps he can;
the old gentleman: You must certainly have command of a despite some pious frauds that he perpetrates from time
large share of assurance, to hold out against the common to time on behalf of a belief that he thinks to be good and
opinion of the world, and deny things that are known by the wholesome. And I take this to be so very natural that in all
43
religions except the true one I see the greatest zeal being never to believe amiss [= ‘wrongly’].
accompanied by the strongest inclination to deceive. When the old gentleman: But is this something you can promise?
the design and •end is the truth, it’s not usual to hesitate
or be scrupulous about the choice of •means. For the truth Philocles: If it isn’t, because my belief doesn’t wholly depend
of this, look at the experience of the last age, in which it upon myself, how am I accountable for what I believe? I can
won’t be hard to find very remarkable examples of imposture justly be punished for actions in which my will is free; but
and zeal, bigotry and hypocrisy, living together in a single what justice is there in challenging me over my belief if I
character. am not at my liberty about what to believe? If credulity and
incredulity are defects only in the •judgment, and the best-
the old gentleman: Be that as it may, I am sorry on the whole
meaning person in the world may err on either side while
to find you with such an incredulous temperament. a much worse man—by having a better •intellect—makes
Philocles: It’s fair that you should pity me for losing the much better judgments concerning the evidence of things,
pleasure that I see others enjoy. What stronger pleasure how can you punish the one who errs. Or are you willing to
is there for mankind, and what do they learn earlier or punish weakness, and to say that it’s just for men to suffer
retain longer than the love of hearing and passing on strange for defects that aren’t their fault?
and incredible things? What a wonderful thing the love [The old gentleman says something that unclearly intro-
of wondering and of creating wonder is! It’s a delight for duces ‘weakness’ into the conversation. Philocles unclearly
children to hear tales they shiver at, and the vice of old age sets that aside and then returns to his theme.]
to be full of strange stories of times past. We come into the
Philocles: If we can’t command our own belief, how are
world wondering at everything; and when our wonder about
we secure against the false prophets—with their deluding
common things is over, we look for something new to wonder
miracles—that we have been so sternly warned against? How
at. Our last scene [on our death-beds?] is to tell wonders of our
are we safe from heresy and false religion? Credulity is what
own to anyone who will believe them. Given all this, it’s well
delivers us up to all impostures of this sort, and what right
if truth escapes only moderately tainted!
now imprisons the pagan and Moslem world in error and
the old gentleman: It’s well if with this ‘moderate’ faith of blind superstition. So, either
yours you can believe in any miracles whatever. •there is no punishment for wrong belief because we
Philocles: It doesn’t matter how incredulous I am about can’t choose what to believe, or
modern miracles if I have a proper faith in miracles of •we can choose what to believe, in which case why
former times by paying the deference due to •the Bible. It’s shouldn’t we promise never to believe amiss?
•there that I am warned so strongly against credulity, and Now in respect of future miracles the surest way never to
instructed never to believe even the greatest miracles that believe amiss is never to believe at all. If we are satisfied
may be performed in opposition to what I have already been by past miracles of the truth of our religion, the belief in a
taught. And I am so well fitted to obey this command that I new one may do us harm and can’t do us any good. So the
can safely •undertake to stay in the same faith and •promise truest mark of a believing Christian is to seek after no future
44
sign or miracle; the safest position in Christianity is that of a and diabolical transactions! There was no need, he thought,
person who can’t be moved by anything of this kind, and is for such news from hell to prove the power of heaven and
thus miracle-proof. For if a miracle is on the side of his faith, the existence of a god. And now at last he began to see how
it’s superfluous, and he doesn’t need it; and if it’s against ridiculous it was to lay so much stress on these matters,
his faith, he won’t pay it any attention or believe it to be as if when any of these wild feats were questioned religion
anything but an imposture—even if it’s very powerful and is was at stake. He was aware that many good Christians
performed by an angel. So: with all the ‘incredulity’ for which were strong partisans in this cause ·of attending to hellish
you reproach me so severely, I think I’m a better and more apparitions etc.·, but he couldn’t help wondering why, once
orthodox Christian than you are. At least I am more sure of he had begun to think about it and to look back.
remaining a Christian than you are, because your credulity
the younger gentleman: The heathens, who lacked scripture,
exposes you to being imposed on by people who are far short
of angels! Given your ready-to-believe disposition, the odds might appeal to miracles, and Providence may have allowed
are that you will some day come to believe in miracles by one them their oracles and prodigies as an imperfect kind of
or more of the different sects—we know that they all claim revelation. The Jews, with their hard hearts and harder
to produce miracles! I’m convinced that the best maxim to understandings, were also allowed miracles when they stub-
go by is the common one that Miracles have ceased; and bornly asked for signs and wonders. But Christians had a
I’m ready to defend this opinion of mine as being the most far better and truer revelation; they had their plainer oracles,
probable in itself as well as the most suitable to Christianity. a more rational law, and clearer scripture that carried its
own force and was so well attested as to admit of no dispute.
As the discussion continued, the issue divided our two
If I were asked to assign the exact time when miracles ceased,
companions.
I would be tempted to imagine it was when the Bible was
the old gentleman: Giving up miracles for the time present completed.
would be a great help to the atheists.
the old gentleman: This is imagination indeed! And one that
the younger gentleman: Mightn’t allowing them be as much is very dangerous to the scripture that you claim is of itself
of a help to the enthusiasts and cult-followers against the so well attested. The testimony of •men who are dead and
national church? And that threat, I think, is the greatest gone concerning •miracles that are past and at an end surely
danger both to religion and the state. I have decided from can’t have as much force as miracles that are present; and I
now on to be as cautious in examining these modern miracles maintain that there are quite enough contemporary miracles
as I used to be eager in seeking them. to show the existence of God. If there were no miracles
He gave us an amusing account of what an adventurer he nowadays people would be apt to think that there never were
had been in pursuit of miracles. . . . Eventually he found that any. The present must answer for the credibility of the past.
he had had enough of this visionary chase, and would give This is God witnessing for himself, not men witnessing for
up rambling in blind corners of the world in the company of God. For who will witness for men if on religious matters
spirit-hunters, witch-finders, and buyers of hellish stories they have no testimony from Heaven on their behalf?
45
the younger gentleman: What is to make men’s reports The contemplation of the universe, its laws and government,
credible is another question. But as for miracles, it seems to was the only thing that could solidly establish the belief
me that they can’t properly be said to witness either for God in a deity. Suppose that innumerable miracles from all
or for men. For who will witness for the miracles themselves? directions assailed our senses and gave the trembling soul
And even if a miracle is ever so certain, what guarantee do no rest; suppose that the sky suddenly opened and all kinds
we have that it isn’t produced by daemons or by magic? How of prodigies [see Glossary] appeared, voices were heard or
can we trust anything—above or below—if the signs are only characters read; this would show only that there are certain
of power and not of goodness? powers that can do all this. But
‘And are you so far improved then’, replied his severe •what powers?
companion, ’under your new sceptical master (pointing to me) •one or more?
that you can thus readily discard all miracles as useless?’ •superior or subordinate?
The young gentleman, I saw, was somewhat daunted by •mortal or immortal?
this rough usage from his friend, who was going on with his •wise or foolish?
invective until I interrupted. •just or unjust?
•good or bad?
Philocles: I’m the one who should answer for this young
gentleman, whom you regard as my disciple. And since his All this would remain a mystery, as would the true intention
modesty, I see, won’t allow him to pursue what he has so of these powers, the trustworthiness of whatever they said.
handsomely begun, I will try to take over if he’ll allow me to. Their word couldn’t be taken on their own behalf! They
might •silence men indeed, but not •convince them, because
The young gentleman agreed; and I went on, presenting
power can never serve as proof of goodness, and goodness is
his fair intention of establishing a rational and sound foun-
the only guarantee of truth. It’s only through goodness
dation for our faith, so as to protect it from the reproach of
that trust is created; superior powers can win belief by
having no immediate miracles to support it.
goodness. They must allow their works to be examined,
Philocles: He would have continued his argument, no doubt, their actions criticized; the only way they can be trusted is
by showing what •good proof we already have for our sacred by giving repeated signs of their benevolence, establishing
oracles, namely •the testimony of the dead, whose characters their character of sincerity and truthfulness. To anyone
and lives are reasons to accept the truth of what they re- to whom the laws and government of this universe appear
ported to us from God. But this was by no means ‘witnessing just and orderly—they speak to him of the government of
for God’, as the zealous gentleman hastily put it. For this was a single Just One; to him they reveal and witness a god;
above the reach of men and of miracles. And God couldn’t and by laying in him the foundation of this first faith, they
‘witness for himself’ or assert his existence to men except by fit him to accept a subsequent one. He can then listen to
•revealing himself to their reason, historical revelation [i.e. to a revelation that occurs at some particular
•appealing to their judgment, and time, rather than the non-historical ‘revelation’ of God in the excellence of
•submitting his ways to their cool evaluation. the natural world]. It is then and only then that he is equipped
46
to receive any message or miraculous notice from above, amazing way; as if atheism were the most natural inference
knowing in advance •that whatever comes from above is just that could be drawn from a regular and orderly state of
and true. But •that knowledge can’t be given to him by any things! But it often happens that after all this mangling
power of miracles, or by any power besides his reason. and disfigurement of nature the amazed disciple comes to
P: But having been the defendant for so long, I want himself, searches slowly and carefully into nature’s ways,
now to take up offensive arms and be aggressor in my and finds more order, uniformity, and constancy in things
turn—provided Theocles isn’t angry with me for borrowing than he suspected. When he does so, he is of course driven
material from his scheme of things. into atheism—merely by the impressions he received from
the preposterous system that taught him to •look for deity
the old gentleman: Whatever you borrow from him you are
in confusion and to •discover providence in an irregular
pretty sure to spoil. As it passes through your hands, you
disjointed world.
had better beware of seeming to reflect on him rather than
on me. the old gentleman: And when you with your newly espoused
system have brought all things to be as uniform, plain,
Philocles: I’ll risk it while I am maintaining that most of the regular, and simple as you could wish—I suppose you’ll
maxims you build upon are no good for anything except to send your disciple to seek for deity in •mechanism, i.e. in
betray your own cause. For while you are some •exquisite system of self-governed matter. For don’t
•labouring to unhinge nature, you naturalists see the world as a mere machine?
•searching heaven and earth for prodigies, and
Philocles: Nothing else, if you allow the machine to have a
•studying how to miraculize [Shaftesbury’s word] every-
mind. For in that case it’s not a self-governed machine, but
thing,
a God-governed one.
you bring confusion on the world, break its uniformity, and
destroy the admirable simplicity of order from which we know the old gentleman: And what are the indications that should
the one infinite and perfect principle [see Glossary]. Perpetual convince us? What signs should this speechless machine
strifes, convulsions, violences, breach of laws, variation and give of its being thus governed?
unsteadiness of order—all this shows that either •there is Philocles: The present ·signs· are sufficient. It—·the world-
no control in nature or •there are several uncontrolled and machine·—can’t possibly give stronger signs of life and
unsubordinate powers in nature. We have before our eyes steady thought ·than it does already·. Compare •our own
either the chaos and atoms of the atheists, or the magic machines with this great one, and see whether •their order,
and daemons of the polytheists. Yet this tumultuous system management and motions indicate as perfect a life or as
of the universe is asserted with the greatest zeal by some complete an intelligence. [By ‘ our own machines’ he means ‘our
people who want to maintain that there is a god. They own bodies’. He is comparing •my bodily behaviour as evidence for you
represent divinity by this face of things, by these features. about my mind with •nature’s behaviour as evidence for you about a
The eyes of our more curious and honest youth are carefully universal mind. His emphasis is less on •how strong the evidences are
steered so that they’ll see everything in this tangled and than on •how good the minds are.]
47
•One is regular, steady, permanent; the others are unrolls in an orderly way, but it’s an effect of wisdom if it
irregular, variable, inconstant. runs mad!
•In one there are signs of wisdom and determination; So I took upon me the part of a convinced theist while
in the others signs of whimsy and conceit. trying to refute my antagonist and show that his principles
•In one judgment appears, in the other only imagina- favour atheism. The zealous gentleman was highly offended,
tion. and we continued debating heatedly until late at night. But
•In one ·we see evidence of· will, in the other merely Theocles moderated the tone, and we retired at last to our
whims. beds all calm and friendly. Still, I was glad to hear that our
•In one truth, certainty, and knowledge, in the other, companions were to leave early the next morning, leaving
error, folly, and madness. Theocles to me alone.
But to be convinced that there is something above us that My narrative is now approaching the morning for which
thinks and acts, we seem to want the ‘in-the-other’ signs, as I so much longed. I’m not sure what you will be longing for
though we held that there can’t be thought or intelligence by now! You may well have had enough to blunt the edge of
except what is like our own. We get tired and bored with the your curiosity about this matter. Could it be that after my
orderly and regular course of things;. . . .it doesn’t work on recital of two such days already past—·the one with you and
us or fill us with amazement. We demand riddles, prodigies, the one with Theocles and his friends·—you can patiently
matter for surprise and horror! Harmony, order and concord put up with a third that is more philosophical than either of
turn us into atheists; irregularity and discord convince us the other two? But you made me promise, so now you have
that God exists! The world is a mere chance happening if it to listen, whatever it costs you!
48
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury III/1: Nature as evidence of God
Part III: Second day: Conversation between two
Philocles is still writing to his friend Palemon can indeed be said of the world that it is simply [see Glossary]
one, there should be something about it that makes it one.
Section 1: Nature as evidence of God ‘Make it one’—how? In the same way as everything else you
see as having unity. For instance: I know you look on the
[Early in the morning Philocles finds Theocles walking in
trees of this vast wood as different from one another; and
the woods; there are lengthy jokes about Philocles jealously
this tall oak—a different thing from all the other trees in the
suspecting his friend of preferring wood-nymphs to him; and
wood—is one single tree, despite the fact that its numerous
then Theocles, invited by Philocles to express himself freely
spreading branches look like so many different trees. . . . You
(‘as if I weren’t here’) about the natural scene, launches
may want to ask:
theatrically into a florid prose-poem in praise of nature. [The
‘What do you think it is that makes this oneness or
whole thing is given, undoctored, on pages 72–73.] He addresses
sameness in •the tree or in •any other plant? How
‘Nature’ as though it (or ‘she’) were an individual thing, and
does it differ from a wax effigy of the tree and from
indeed a divine thing: ‘O mighty Nature! Wise substitute
any tree-like figure accidentally made in the clouds or
of Providence! Empowered creatress! Or thou empowering
on the sand by the seashore?’
deity, supreme creator!’ Eventually he breaks off, as though
‘coming out of a dream’, and appeals to his friend:] I answer that neither the wax, nor the sand, nor the cloud
thus pieced together by our hand or imagination, has any
Theocles: Tell me, Philocles, how have I appeared to you in •real relation within itself, or •any nature by which its parts
my fit? Did it seem like a sensible kind of madness, like correspond with one another, any more than they would if
the raptures that are permitted to our poets? Or was it they were scattered over a wide area. But I would affirm this:
downright raving?
If a thing’s parts work together as the parts of our tree
Philocles: I only wish that you had been carried away a do—all aiming at a common end of providing support,
little more and had continued as you began, without ever nourishment, and propagation for such a handsome
attending to me. I was beginning to see wonders in Nature, form—we can’t be mistaken in saying that there’s a
and was coming to know the hand of your divine workman. special nature belonging to this form and to all other
But if you stop here I’ll lose the enjoyment of the pleasing of the same kind.
vision. Already I begin to find a thousand difficulties in That’s what makes our tree a real tree that lives, flourishes,
imagining such a universal spirit as you describe. and remains one and the same tree even when through
Theocles: Why is there any difficulty in thinking of the biological processes not one particle in it remains the same.
universe as one entire thing? Given what we can see of [Philocles comments coyly on what this implies about the
it, how can we not think of it as all hanging together as a unity or identity of the nymphs etc. that live among the trees,
single piece? If you accept that, what follows? Only this: if it and Theocles responds appropriately. Then:]
49
Theocles: Let us now look into the personhood that you and Philocles might deny this if he became a dedicated believer
I share, consider how you are you and I am myself. It’s in atoms, these being by definition simple = having no parts.]
empirically obvious that in each of us there’s a collaboration T: But whatever be thought about uncompounded matter
of parts that you don’t find in any marble sculpture. But (a difficult thing to conceive), our concern is with com-
our own ‘marble’—our own stuff, whatever it is that we are pounded matter made of a number of parts that are put
made up of—wears out ·and is replaced· in seven or at most together in such a way that they unite and work together in
fourteen years; even the most dense anatomist will tell us these bodies of ours and others like them. If compounded
that much. Tell me, then, if that continuing same one lies in matter gives us countless examples of particular forms that
the stuff itself or in any part of it, where exactly is it? ·It’s a share this simple principle [see Glossary] by which they
challenging question· because when our stuff is wholly spent •are really one,
and not one particle of it remains, you are still yourself and •live, act, and have a nature or spirit unique to them-
I am still myself just as much as before. selves, and
•provide for their own welfare,
Philocles (joking): It may be hard to determine what you
how could we at the same time overlook this ·pattern· in
philosophers are! But as for the rest of mankind, few are the whole, ·the universe·, and deny the great and general
themselves for as long as half of seven years. A man is One of the world? How can we be so unnatural as to disown
lucky if he can be one and the same for as much as a day divine nature, our common parent, and refuse to recognize
or two; a year involves him in more revolutions than can be the universal and sovereign Spirit?
numbered.
Philocles: Sovereigns don’t require that notice be taken of
Theocles: It’s true that such revolutions may occur in a them when they pass incognito. . . . They might even be
man—especially one whose conflicting vices often set him displeased with us for busily trying to discover them when
at odds with himself—but when he comes to suffer or be they are keeping themselves either wholly invisible or in very
punished for those vices he finds himself still one and the dark disguise. As for the notice we take of these •invisible
same. [In an elaborate and mildly joking way he says that powers in our ordinary religious ceremonies, our •visible
if Philocles undergoes a radical change in his philosophical sovereigns are responsible for that. Our lawful superiors
opinions he will still be ‘the self-same Philocles’.] You see, teach us what we are to accept and to do in worship; and we
therefore, that there’s a strange simplicity [see Glossary] in dutifully obey and follow their example. But I can’t find any
this you and me, so that they can still be one and the philosophical warrant for our being such earnest recogniz-
same when no one atom of body, no passion, no thought ers of a controverted title [i.e. for insisting that we are honouring
remains the same. As for the poor attempt to get this the so-called sovereign Spirit when it’s a controversial question whether
sameness or identity-of-being from some self-same matter there is any such thing].
Anyway, at least let me understand the
that is supposed to remain with us when everything else controversy, and know the nature of these powers that are
is changed—this is negligible if only because matter isn’t talked about. Isn’t it all right for me to ask what substance
capable of such simplicity. [Then the joking remark that they are composed of—is it material or immaterial?
50
Theocles: Well then, isn’t it all right for me to ask you what in the world. Let Pyrrho [the earliest radical sceptic] contradict
substance—or which of these two kinds of substance—you me if he pleases; but if he does so, he is relying on another
regard as your real individual self? Or would you rather not such mind, ·his own· ! He and I have our different under-
be substance, and prefer to call yourself a mode or accident? standings and thoughts, however we came by them. Each
[= ‘If you don’t think you are a thing perhaps you would rather be a of us understands and thinks as well as he can for his own
property of a thing’.] purpose—he for himself, I for another self. And who thinks
Philocles: My life may be an accident ·or property·, and so for the whole?—No-one? Nothing at all?—You may think that
may the random temperament that governs it; but I don’t the world is mere •body, a mass of matter with its properties.
know anything as real or substantial as myself. So if there So the bodies of men are part of this •body. Men’s imaginings,
is any such thing as what you call ‘a substance’, I take it for sensations and understandings are included in this body
granted that I am one. As for further details—you know my and inherent in it, produced out of it and brought back again
sceptic principles: I have no firm opinion. into it; though the body, it seems, never dreams of it! The
world itself is none the wiser for all the wit and wisdom it
[From here until ‘. . . simplicity and excellence’ on page 52, Theocles is breeds! It has no grasp at all of what it is doing; no thought
the only speaker, though he invents contributions by Philocles.] kept to itself for its own particular use or purpose; not a
Theocles: [He starts by saying that any substance/mode single imagining or reflection through which to discover or
difficulties about God are equally substance/mode difficul- be conscious of the various imaginings and inventions that it
ties about ourselves, so that:] when you have been led by sets going and hands around with such an open hand! The
philosophical arguments to conclude that there can’t be any generous great big lump that is so prolific, kind, and yielding
such •universal One as this, you must conclude by the same for everyone else has nothing left at last for its own share;
arguments that there can’t be any such •particular one as having unhappily given it all away!
yourself. But I hope that your own mind satisfies you that I would like to understand what brings this about. How
there is actually such a one as yourself. Regarding the does it happen? By what necessity? Who gives the law? Who
nature of this mind, it’s enough to say that it orders and distributes things in this way?
•is something that acts on a body, and has something ‘Nature’, you say.
passive under it and subject to it; And what is nature? Is it sense? Is it a person? Does
•brings itself to bear not only on body or mere matter she have reason or understanding? [The ‘it’/‘she’ switch is
but on some aspects of itself as well; Shaftesbury’s.]
•superintends and manages its own imaginations, ap- ‘No.’
pearances, fancies; correcting, working, and mod- Then who understands for her, or is interested or con-
elling these as it finds good; and cerned in her behalf?
•adorns and accomplishes as well as it can this com- ‘No-one; not a soul. It’s everyone for himself.’
posite structure of body and understanding. Come on then. let us hear further: isn’t this nature still
I know that there is such a mind and governing somewhere a self? Please tell me what makes you a self? What are the
51
signs that you are a self? By virtue of what are you a self? convinced that the order of the universe is much better than
‘By a principle [see Glossary] that joins certain parts, and mine. Let Epicurus think that his is better; and believing
that thinks and acts harmoniously for the use and purpose that no intelligence or wisdom is above his own, let him tell
of those parts.’ us •by what chance it was given to him and •how atoms
Tell me, then, what is your whole system a part of? Or came to be so wise!
is it indeed not a part ·of anything· but a whole—by itself, Thus, the effect of scepticism itself is to convince me even
absolute, independent, and unrelated to anything else? If it more of my own existence and of this self of mine—that it
is a part and is really related to something else, what can is a real self, copied from another principal and original self
that ‘something else’ be except the whole of nature? Then (the great one of the world); so I try to be really united with
is there such a uniting principle in nature? If there is, how it—·i.e. with the great self of the world·—and in conformity
is that you are a self while nature isn’t? How is it that with it as far as I can. ·My train of thought on this matter
you have something to understand and act for you while goes as follows·: (a) There is one general mass, one body of
nature—who gave you this understanding—has nothing at the whole ·universe·; and (b) this body is ordered in some
all to understand for her, advise her, or help her out—poor way; and (c) this order is the work of a mind, ·the mind of
thing!—on any occasion, whatever need she may have? Is the the universe or of its governor·; and (d) each particular mind
world as a whole so badly off? Are there so many particular must resemble this general mind in several respects. What
understanding active principles everywhere, and yet nothing respects? Well, they are
that thinks, acts, or understands for all? Nothing that •of like substance (as far as we can understand sub-
administers or looks after all? stance);
‘No’, says a modern philosopher, ‘because the world has •alike in acting on body and being the source of motion
existed from eternity in the condition it is in now; there’s no and order;
more to it than what you see: matter with qualities, a lump •alike in being simple, uncompounded, individual;
in motion, with here and there a thought, i.e. a scattered •alike in energy, effect, and operation;
portion of dissoluble intelligence.’ and a particular mind is even more like the general mind if
‘No’, says a more ancient philosopher, ‘because the world it co-operates with it in working for the general good, and
was once without any intelligence or thought at all: mere tries to will according to the best of wills, ·namely that of
matter, chaos, and a play of atoms, until thought came into the general mind·. So that it’s only natural that a particular
play by chance and made up a harmony that was never mind should •seek its happiness in conformity with the
designed, or thought of.’ general one, and •try to resemble it in its highest simplicity
What an admirable theory! Believe it if you can. For and excellence.
my own share (thank Providence) I have in my possession Philocles: Well, then, good Theocles, return to being the
a mind that serves, such as it is, to keep my body and enthusiast by letting me hear anew the divine song that you
its affections—and also my passions, appetites, imaginings charmed me with not long ago. [This refers to the prose poem that
and the rest—in tolerable harmony and order. But I’m still this version mercifully omitted on page 49]. I have already recovered
52
from my qualms and am starting to get a better sense of the comes from and what perfection it is contributing to.
nature that you speak of; I find myself very much on its side Philocles: Bless me! Theocles, what superstition you are
and concerned that all should go well with it. Though it likely to lead me into! I thought it was the mark of a
often goes so fast that I can hardly help being anxious on its superstitious mind to search for providence in the common
account. mishaps of life, and ascribe to divine power the common dis-
Theocles: Don’t be afraid, my friend. Every particular nature asters and calamities that nature has inflicted on mankind.
certainly and constantly produces what is good for itself un- But now you tell me that I must. . . .•view things through
less something disturbs or hinders it either by •overpowering a kind of magical glass that will show me the worst of
and corrupting it within, or by •violence from outside. Thus, evils transformed into good, and •admire equally everything
nature in a sick person struggles to the last, trying to throw that comes from that one perfect hand. Never mind—I can
off the disease. And even in the plants we see around us, surmount all this. So go on, Theocles, now: having rekindled
every particular nature thrives and reaches its perfection me, you shouldn’t delay and give me time to cool again.
unless something from outside it obstructs it or something Theocles: Listen: I’m not willing to sink to the level of •taking
foreign has already impaired or wounded it (and even then it advantage of a warm fit and •getting your assent through
does its utmost still to recover). All weaknesses, distortions, appeals to your temperament or imagination. So I’m not
sicknesses, imperfect births, and the seeming contradictions willing to a step further until I have entered again into cool
and perversities of nature are of this sort. You’d have to reason with you. Do you accept as proof what I advanced
be very ignorant about natural causes and operations to yesterday concerning a universal union, and the coherence
think that any of these disorders came from a mishap in the or sympathizing [see Glossary] of things?
particular nature rather than by the force of some foreign
nature that overpowers it. Therefore: if every particular Philocles: You won me over by force of probability. Being
nature is thus constantly and unerringly true to itself, and convinced of a sympathy and correspondence in everything
certain to produce only what is good for itself,. . . .the general we can see of things, I thought it would be unreasonable not
one, the nature of the whole ·universe·, will surely do as to allow the same throughout!
much. Could it be the only nature that goes wrong or fails? Theocles: Unreasonable indeed! For if there were no prin-
Is there anything external to it that might do violence to it ciple of union in the infinite part of the universe that we
or force it off its natural path? If not, then everything it don’t see, it would seem next to impossible for things within
produces is to its own advantage and good—the good of all our sphere to keep their order. What was infinite would be
in general—and what is for the good of all in general is just predominant.
and good.
Philocles: It seems so.
Philocles: I admit that that is right.
Theocles: Well, then, after accepting this union how can you
Theocles: Then you ought to be satisfied. and indeed to refuse the label ‘demonstration’ for the remaining arguments,
be pleased and rejoice at what happens, knowing where it the ones that establish the government of a perfect mind?
53
Philocles: Your explanations of the bad appearances are not Theocles: So what they represent may possibly be good
perfect enough to qualify as demonstration. And whatever Philocles: It may.
seems vicious or imperfect in the creation has to be explained
before we can move on to any further conclusions. Theocles: And therefore it’s possible that there’s no real evil
in things; it may be that everything perfectly tends towards
Theocles: Didn’t you then agree with me when I said that
one interest—the interest of the universal one.
the appearances must be as they are and things must seem
as imperfect as they do, even on the supposition that there Philocles: It may be so.
exists a perfect supreme mind? Theocles: If it may be so then it must be so. That’s because of
Philocles: I did so. that great and simple self principle [see Glossary] that you have
Theocles: And isn’t the same reason still good, namely that agreed is at work in the whole ·universe·. ·This principle,
in an infinity of inter-related things a mind that doesn’t see namely· the nature or mind of the whole, will take anything
infinitely can’t see anything fully, and must therefore often that •possible in the whole and •put it into operation for the
see as imperfect things that are really perfect. whole’s good; and it will exclude any evil that it’s possible
to exclude. Therefore, since despite the appearances it’s
Philocles: The reason is still good.
•possible that evil may be excluded, depend on it that it
Theocles: Are the appearances, then, any objection to my •actually is excluded. Nothing merely passive can oppose
hypothesis? this universally active principle. If anything active opposes
Philocles: None, while they remain appearances only. it, it’s another principle.
Theocles: Can you prove them to be any more? If you can’t, Philocles: I accept that.
you don’t prove anything; and you must see that the onus
Theocles: And this is impossible. If there were two or more
of proof is on you, not on me. The appearances don’t merely
principles in nature, either they agree or they don’t. If they
agree with my hypothesis—they’re a necessary consequence
don’t agree, all must be confusion until one comes to be
of it. So in this situation to demand proof from me is, in a
predominant. If they do agree, there must be some natural
way, to demand that I be infinite, for only what is infinite
reason for their agreement; and this natural reason can’t be
can see infinite connections.
chance, and must be •some particular design, contrivance,
Philocles: I have to agree that this argument shows that the or thought. And that brings us again to •one principle, with
presumption is wholly on your side. But, still, it’s only a the other two subordinate to it. So there it is. When we lay
presumption. out each of the three opinions—
Theocles: Take demonstration then, if you can stand my rea- •that there is no designing active principle,
soning in that abstract and dry manner. The appearances of •that there is more than one,
evil, you say, are not necessarily the evil that they represent •that there is only one,
to you. we’ll see that the only consistent opinion is the third; and
Philocles: I accept that. since one of the three must be true, that proves the third. . . .
54
Philocles: Enough, Theocles! My doubts are vanished. Mal- come from motion but it’s so different that we can’t conceive
ice and chance (vain phantoms!) have capitulated to the how motion could cause thought or vice versa. Our thought
all-prevalent wisdom that you have established. You have it is in some way copied from the thought of God—‘you have
conquered in the cool manner of reason, and can now with communicated yourself more immediately to us, so as in a
honour grow warm again in your poetic [Shaftesbury’s word] way to inhabit our souls’.
vein. So please return to that perfect Being, addressing it 7 [Nature’s marvels arouse our idea of God, their author,
as you did before. . . . I shan’t now be in danger of imagining and perfect it. It’s through them that he enables us to see
either magic or superstition in the case, because you invoke him, and even have conversation with him.
only one power, the single One that seems so natural. 8 [We can see countless stars, and don’t know how many
Theocles: Thus I continue then, addressing myself—as you more there may be. It may be that each of them is, like our
requested—to the guardian Deity and inspirer whom we are sun, the centre of a planetary system—our sun that each
to imagine as being present here: ‘O mighty Genius! Sole morning ‘gives us new life, exalts our spirits, and makes us
animating and inspiring Power!’. . . . [The rest of this Section feel divinity more present’.
is an even more exhausting prose poem, with occasional 9 [Our beautiful sun produces heat and light in enor-
interruptions. What will be given here is a greatly com- mous quantities; we don’t know what fuels it, enabling it to
pressed version of each paragraph. [The whole thing, undoctored, maintain its ‘continual expense of vital treasures’.
is given on pages 73–79, along with brief reports on the interruptions. 10 [The planets move around the sun, as though wanting
Paragraphs are numbered to aid comparisons.]] to join up with it, but something keeps them at their proper
1 [God is addressed as the power behind everything. distances.
Lesser beings such as humans come and go; when they go, 11 [God in some wonderful way keeps the planets in their
the materials they were made of are taken up and re-used in regular motions. We may guess that he gives them •spirits
other creatures. Some kinds of decay and death strike us as or souls, or •an in-built bias towards movement, or. . . But
horrible, but if we knew enough we might realize that they we don’t know.
were very good. 12 [More of the same.
2 [It’s pointless for us to try to discover how big the 13 [Our own globe is small compared with other planets
material world is, or how small its smallest parts are. in our system, let alone with the sun. And yet it is enormous
3 [Motion is wonderful. A body can get it only from compared with our human bodies, which are made up of
another body, and can lose it only to another body. stuff from its surface, though with a spirit that lets us relate
4 [We can’t properly comprehend time: it is too vast to and think about God. We relate to God somewhat as
and its smallest parts are too small for our grasp. God is the planets do to the sun, but not in such an orderly way.
addressed as ‘thou ancient cause! older than time yet young But God can use our disorders in such a way that they
with fresh eternity’. ‘contribute to the good and perfection of the universe’.
5 [Space is too much for us also. There is no empty space. 14 [Interruption. What follows is structured in terms of
6 [We can’t understand what causes thought: it seems to the four ‘elements’ in ancient Greek physics.
55
15 [Earth is cultivated by farmers. It was a bad thing life, beautiful, productive of ‘subtle threads’ with which we
when men rejected these ‘gentle rural tasks’, preferring lives make beautiful clothing. How beautiful the plants are, ‘from
of luxury and using the earth only to mine for minerals. the triumphant palm down to the humble moss’.
16 [The simplicity of some minerals testify to ‘the divine 24 [Then countries where precious gums and balsams
art’ as well as do complex organisms. Minerals differ greatly flow from trees, which also bear delicious fruits. And there’s
from one another, and some of their properties are surprising. the camel, which is so well fitted to serve men’s needs.
But no-one can stay long in a mineral-mine because of the One could become more aware of one’s needs and of God’s
poisonous fumes that the earth gives off. generosity in meeting them—by thinking of camels.
17 [Air: It’s a good experience to come up from a mine 25 [The most fertile land [apparently meaning Egypt] is served
into the open air and daylight. When the noxious fumes come by a river which breaks up into a delta so as to spread its
out, the sun transforms them into materials that are good ‘rich and nitrous manure’ over a wider area. The slimy depths
for life-processes. And the earth, though always breeding, contain ‘dubious forms and unknown species’, perhaps
goes on looking as fresh and charming as a new bride. escaped from the desert, perhaps engendered there in the
18 [Water plays a number of helpful roles in our earth— slime by the sun’s heat. The terrifying crocodile is ‘cruel
clouds, rain, rivers etc. and deceitful’, using hypocritical tears to bring people within
19 [Fire: We don’t know where light comes, or where reach. It’s a symbol of the superstition that grew in this soil,
in the scheme of things to fit fire. The sun’s fire gives us the first where religion bred enmity and hatred and then
warmth, keeps living things alive, and pleases and cheers carried them to other nations.
us; unless it gets out control, and then it is powerfully 26 [The deserts seem hideous at first sight, but they are
destructive. beautiful in their own special way. We have no good reason
20 [Interruption to doubt that the fierce mammals, snakes and insects that
21 [In winter in the far north the sun brings little warmth, they contain have a good place in God’s benevolent plans.
and everything is nasty and dangerous. But in time the 27 [High mountains fill us with awe, and even fear; but
sun melts the snow and releases everything from its ‘icy they cause even thoughtless people to think about the earth’s
fetters’—another evidence of God’s power and wisdom. age and current state of disrepair, a ‘noble ruin’; and when
22 [Near the tropics the problem is the other way around: one is high on a mountain ‘various forms of deity seem to
dangerously intense light and heat. But God sometimes present themselves’ in real or imagined voices.—And now we
sends gentle cooling breezes, clouds, or dews and showers; rejoin Philocles’s narrative.]
these refresh men and beasts and plants, making them fit Here he paused awhile, and began to look around (his
for the next bout of high heat. eyes had seemed fixed during his speech). He looked calmer,
23 [As we move around the world, new wonders open with an open countenance and an air of freedom, and it was
up: gems, spices. . . . and elephants! These can be tamed, clear to me that we had reached the end of our descriptions
and fight alongside us in our battles, as allies rather than and that Theocles had decided to take his leave of the
slaves. Then there are insects—complex in structure and sublime [Shaftesbury’s word], whether or not I wanted him to.
56
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury III/2: Beauty
Section 2: Beauty woods, the rivers, or sea-shores are ordinary run-of-the-mill

lovers?
Theocles (changing to a familiar voice): I think we had better
Theocles: Don’t say this only of lovers. Isn’t it the same with
leave these unsociable places that our imagination has taken
poets, and with all the others who occupy themselves with
us to, and return to our more friendly woods and temperate
nature and the arts that copy nature? In short, isn’t this
climates. . . .
how things stand with anyone who loves either the Muses
Philocles: [Yet another joke about wood-nymphs. Then:] I or the Graces [i.e. the goddesses of literature and of visual beauty and
can’t help being concerned for your breaking off just when nature].
we were half-way around the world and needed only to
Philocles: But you know that all those who are deep in this
take in America on our way home. I can excuse you from
romantic way are looked on as either •out of their wits or
making any great tour of Europe: it wouldn’t offer us much
•overwhelmed by melancholy and enthusiasm [see Glossary].
variety; and also it would be hard for us to get a view of it
We always try to recall them from these solitary places. And
that didn’t include political matters that would disturb us
I have to admit that often when I have found my own mind
in our philosophical flights. But I can’t imagine why you
running in this direction and have been passionately struck
should neglect such noble subjects as the western world
by objects of this kind, I have pulled myself up, not knowing
provides—unless you were scared off by a place whose soil
what had come over me.
is so full of the gold and silver to which you seem to be such
a bitter enemy! If those ·western· countries had been as Theocles: It’s not surprising that we are at a loss when
bare of those metals as ancient Sparta was, we might have we pursue the •shadow instead of the •substance. If we
heard more of the Perus and the Mexicos than of all Asia can trust what our reasoning has taught us: whatever is
and Africa. We might have had creatures, plants, woods, beautiful or charming in nature is only the faint shadow
mountains, rivers, more extraordinary than any of those of that first beauty, ·the beauty of God·. . . . How can the
we have looked at so far. How sorry am I to lose the noble rational mind be satisfied with the absurd enjoyment of
Amazon! How sorry. . . beauty that reaches the sense alone?
[He interrupts himself because he sees Theocles smiling. Philocles: So from now on I’ll shan’t have any reason to fear
Theocles asked him to continue, remarking that ‘Philocles, the beauties that create a sort of melancholy, like the places
the cold indifferent Philocles, has become a pursuer of the you have been talking about, or like the solemn forest that
same mysterious beauty ·that I was concerned with·’.] we are in now. I shan’t again avoid the moving accents of
Philocles: It’s true, Theocles. . . . I shall no longer resist the soft music, or fly from the enchanting features of the fairest
passion growing in me for things of a natural kind; where human face.
neither art nor men’s ideas or whims have spoiled their gen- Theocles: If you’re so proficient in this new kind of love that
uine order by breaking in on that primeval state. . . . But how you are sure never •to admire representative beauty except
does it come about that—apart from a few philosophers of for the sake of the original, or •to aim at any enjoyment
your sort—the only people who love in this way and seek the except the rational kind, you can be sure of yourself.
57
Philocles: I am so. . . . But I would like it if you explained a Philocles: This would be sordidly luxurious [see Glossary]; I
little further what this mistake of mine is that you seem to think it would be as absurd as either of the former [i.e. as the
fear. desire to rule the sea or own the valley].
Theocles: Would it be any help to tell you that the absurdity Theocles: Then can’t you now call to mind some other forms
lay in seeking the enjoyment elsewhere than in the subject of a fair kind among us, where the admiration of beauty is
loved? apt to lead to as irregular a consequence? [He is talking about
Philocles: I must say that the matter is still a mystery to me. pretty women and the male behaviour they elicit. The ‘living architecture’
of the next paragraph is a beautiful female body.]
Theocles: Well then, good Philocles, suppose you were taken
with the beauty of the ocean that you see yonder at a Philocles: I was afraid this was where you were heading,
distance, and it came into your head to wonder how you and that you were going to force me to think about cer-
could command it and, like some mighty admiral, ride master tain powerful human forms that draw after them a set of
of the sea—wouldn’t that thought be a little absurd?. . . . eager desires, wishes, and hopes—none of which, I must
The enjoyment it involved would be very different from the confess, are in harmony with your rational and refined
enjoyment that would naturally follow from contemplating contemplation of beauty. The proportions of this living
the ocean’s beauty. The Venetian leader who each year architecture, wonderful as they are, don’t inspire anything of
ceremonially ‘weds’ the sea by throwing a consecrated ring a studious or contemplative kind. The more they are viewed,
into it is further from possessing it than is the poor shepherd the further they are from satisfying by mere view! Perhaps
who relaxes on a cliff-top and forgets his flocks while he what does satisfy is out of proportion to its cause; censure it
admires the sea’s beauty. But to come nearer home and as you please; but you must agree that it’s natural. So that
make the question even more familiar: suppose that when you, Theocles, as far as I can see, are accusing nature by
viewing a tract of country like the lovely valley we see down condemning a natural enjoyment.
there, you wanted to •enjoy the view by •owning the land.
Theocles: Far be it from each of us to condemn a joy that
Philocles: That covetous fancy would be just as absurd as comes from nature. But when we spoke of the enjoyment of
the ambitious one. these woods and views, we were talking about a very different
Theocles: Will you again follow me as I bring this a little kind of enjoyment from that of the lower animals who prowl
nearer still? Suppose that being charmed (as you seem to through these places looking for their favourite food. Yet we
be) with the beauty of these trees under whose shade we too live by tasty food; and we feel those other sensual joys in
are resting, you were to long for nothing as much as to common with the animals. But, Philocles, this isn’t where ·in
taste some delicious fruit of theirs; and having obtained from ourselves· we had agreed to place our good or, therefore, our
nature a certain taste for these acorns or berries of the woods enjoyment. We who are rational and have minds, I thought,
so that they became as palatable as the figs or peaches of the should place it rather in those minds, which were indeed
garden; and every time you revisited this place you wanted abused and cheated of their real good when drawn into an
to satiate yourself with these new delights. absurd search for the enjoyment of their good in the objects
58
of sense rather than in what could properly be called objects which all those other graces and perfections are perceived yet
of the mind. And I think I remember that we included among none by which this higher perfection and grace is grasped?
those everything that is truly fair, generous, or good. Is it so preposterous to bring that enthusiasm over to where
Philocles: So I see, Theocles, that for you beauty and good we are now, transferring it from •those secondary and narrow
are still one and the same. objects to •this basic and comprehensive one? Notice how
things stand in all those other subjects of art or science.
Theocles: That is so, and this brings us back to the topic of
How hard it is to be even slightly knowledgeable! How long it
our conversation yesterday morning. I don’t know whether I takes to achieve a true taste! How many things are initially
have kept my promise to show you the true good [see page 20]. shocking and offensive but come in time to be known and
But I would have had good success in that if I had been acknowledged as the highest beauties! We don’t instantly
able—through my poetic ecstasies or in some other way—to acquire the sense by which these beauties are discoverable;
lead you to look deeply into •nature and •the sovereign Spirit. it takes hard work and trouble, even if we start with a
Then we would have seen the force of divine beauty, and precocious natural talent for such things. But who ever gives
formed in ourselves an object capable of producing real a single thought to •cultivating this soil—the soil from which
enjoyment and worthy of it. mature moral judgments grow—or to •improving any sense
Philocles: I remember now the terms we agreed on when you or faculty that nature may have given us for this purpose?
undertook to make me love this mysterious beauty. You have ·Hardly anyone!· So it’s not surprising that we should be so
indeed kept your side of the bargain, and can now claim me dull, confused and at a loss in these ·moral· affairs, blind
as a convert. If this ever seems to involve me in extravagance to this higher scene, these nobler representations. How
[= ‘in overdoing it’], I must comfort myself as best I can with the can we come to understand better? How can we become
thought that all sound love and admiration is enthusiasm knowledgeable about these beauties? Can it really be the
[see Glossary]. The transports of poets, the sublime of orators, case that study, science, or learning is needed to understand
the rapture of musicians, the high strains of the virtuosi; every other kind of beauty while no skill or science is needed
all are mere enthusiasm! Even learning itself—the love of for the sovereign beauty, ·the beauty of right conduct and
arts and curiosities, the spirit of travellers and adventurers, virtue·? In the fine arts there are many things that the vulgar
gallantry, war, heroism—all, all enthusiasm! It’s enough: I don’t understand and don’t like: in painting there are dark
am content to be this new enthusiast of a kind I didn’t know passages and skillful brush-work; in architecture there’s
before. the rustic ·style, with rough surfaces·; in music there’s the
Theocles: And I am content that you should call this love chromatic kind and the skillful mixing of dissonances. Is
of ours ‘enthusiasm’, allowing it the privilege of its fellow- there nothing corresponding to these in the ·universe as a·
passions. We allow that enthusiasm, ecstasy, being-carried- whole?
away can be fair, plausible, reasonable when their object Philocles: I must confess that until now I have been one of
is architecture, painting, music or the like; are we going to the vulgar, who could never enjoy the dark passages, the
deny the same thing here? Can it be that there are senses by rustic style, or the dissonances that you speak of. I have
59
never dreamed of such masterpieces in nature. It was my it—·not the gold disc but the form that its face has been
way to censure freely on the first view. But I now see that given by the engraver·. That’s because the thing that is
I’m obliged to go far in the pursuit of beauty, which lies beautified [the disc] is beautiful only by the addition to it of
deeply hidden; and if that’s right, then my enjoyments until something beautifying, ·namely the engraving·; and if that
now must have been very shallow. It seems that all these is withdrawn the thing stops being beautiful. In respect of
years I have dwelt on the surface, and enjoyed only slight bodies, therefore, beauty comes and goes. And it’s not the
superficial beauties, having never gone in search of beauty body itself that causes the coming or the staying of what
itself, but only of what I fancied to be such. Like the rest beautifies it. So that there is no principle of beauty in ·any·
of the unthinking world, I took for granted that what I liked body. For ·a· body can’t be the cause of beauty to itself.
was beautiful, and what I rejoiced in was my good. I had no Or govern or regulate itself. Or mean or intend itself. So
worries about loving what I fancied; and, aiming only at the mustn’t its principle of beauty be whatever it is that means
enjoyment of what I loved, I never bothered to examine what and intends for it, regulates and orders it? And what must
the fancied things were and never hesitated to choose them. that be?
Theocles: Begin then, and choose. See what the subjects Philocles: Mind, I suppose; for what else could it be?
are, and which you would prefer—which of them you would
Theocles: Well, then, here’s the whole of what I was trying
honour with your admiration, love and esteem. For by these
to explain to you before. It is that the beautiful, the fair, the
you will be honoured in return. [He develops this at some
comely, were never in the matter, but in the art and design;
length, in flowery language, until Philocles protests, and
never in body itself, but in the form or forming power. Doesn’t
asks him to ‘talk in a more familiar way’. Then:]
the beautiful form tell you this, speaking of the beauty of the
Theocles (smiling): Thus then: Whatever passion you may design every time you look at it?. . . . What you admiring each
have for other beauties, Philocles, I know that you don’t time is mind, or an effect of mind; mind is the only thing that
admire wealth of any sort kind enough to credit it with much gives something form. Take away mind and what you are left
beauty, especially when it’s in a rough heap or lump. [He with is rough and crude; formless matter is deformity itself.
is thinking of gold.] But in medals, coins, engravings, statues,
Philocles: On your view, then, most amiable [see Glossary]
and well-made pieces of any sort you can discover beauty
and admire the kind. forms—and the ones in the top rank of beauty—are the
forms that have the power to make other forms themselves;
Philocles: True, but not for the metal’s sake. I suppose we could call them the ‘forming forms’. [In this
[We now have a single paragraph that Shaftesbury wrote as thirteen short context, ‘form’ is being used to mean ‘thing that has a form (or structure
statements, each agreed to by Philocles in one to three words.] or ordered complexity)’. So when (for example) a mind designs a medal,
Theocles: So it’s not the metal or matter that you find Up to this point I can
this is a case of a form making another form.]
beautiful, but the art. So the art is the beauty. And the easily go along with you, and gladly put the human form on
art is that which beautifies. So what is really beautiful in a higher level than the beauties that man has formed. The
all this is not the beautified thing but the beautifying of palaces, uniforms, carriages and estates will never in my
60
account be brought in competition with—·i.e. placed on a Philocles: I could easily have added that these forms of ours
level with·—the original living forms of flesh and blood. As for had a virtue [= ‘power] of producing other living forms like
the other forms—the dead forms—of nature, the metals and themselves ·by begetting or bearing children·. But I saw this
stones: I am resolved •to resist their splendour, however virtue of theirs as coming from another form above them; it
precious and dazzling they are, and to •regard them as couldn’t properly be called their virtue or art, I thought, if
low-down things when in their highest pride they claim to a superior art or something artist-like is what guided their
enhance human beauty. . . . hand and made tools of them in this glittering work.
Theocles: Don’t you see then that you have established three Theocles: Happily thought! You have prevented a criticism
degrees or orders of beauty? that I thought you could hardly escape. Without being aware
Philocles: How? of it, you have discovered the third order of beauty, which
forms not only •mere ‘dead’ forms but also •the forms
Theocles: Why first, the dead forms, as you properly have
that form. For we ourselves are notable architects in matter,
called them, which. . . .are formed by man or nature but have
and can show lifeless bodies given form and fashioned by our
no forming power, no action, or intelligence.
own hands; but that which fashions even minds themselves
Philocles: Right. contains in itself all the beauties fashioned by those minds
Theocles: Then the second kind, the forms which form, i.e. and is consequently the principle, source, and fountain of
which have intelligence, action, and operation. all beauty.
Philocles: Right again. Philocles: It seems so.
Theocles: So here is double beauty: •the form that is the Theocles: So any beauty that appears in our second order of
effect of mind and •mind itself; the first kind low and forms, and any beauty that is derived or produced from that,
despicable by comparison with the other, from which the is all basically derived from this last order of supreme and
dead form receives its lustre and force of beauty. For what sovereign beauty.
is a mere body, even a perfectly fashioned human body, if it Philocles: True.
doesn’t have inward form because its mind is monstrous or Theocles: Thus architecture, music, and everything that
imperfect, as in an idiot or a savage? humans invent, resolves itself into [Shaftesbury’s phrase] this
Philocles: This too I can grasp; but where is the third order last order.
·of beauty·? Philocles: Right, and thus all the enthusiasms of other kinds
Theocles: Be patient! See first whether you have discovered resolve themselves into ours. The fashionable kinds borrow
the whole force of this second beauty. . . . When you first from us, and are nothing without us: we undoubtedly have
named these the ‘forming forms’, were you thinking only of the honour of being originals.
their production of dead forms—palaces, coins, bronze or [In a tiresomely teasing passage, Theocles gets his friend
marble figures of men—or did you think of something nearer to think about items that he forms and that are superior to
to life? the ‘dead forms’ spoken about earlier. Eventually:]
61
Philocles: You mean my sentiments? Theocles: Anatomists tell us that the eggs that are principles
Theocles: Certainly, and also [see Glossary] in body are innate, being formed already in the
•your resolutions, principles, decisions, actions— fetus before the birth. But as for
whatever is handsome and noble of that kind; •the principles we are discussing now, and
•whatever flows from your good understanding, sense, •our organs of sensation, and indeed
knowledge and will; •our sensations themselves,
•whatever is engendered in your heart, or derives itself whether they are first formed in us before, or at, or after our
from your parent-mind, which is unlike other parents birth—and if after, how long after—is no doubt an interesting
in never being worn out or exhausted, but gains question to theorize about, but it’s of no great importance.
strength and vigor by producing. The ·important· question is whether these principles are
You have illustrated that, my friend, by many works and by from art [see Glossary] or from nature? If purely from nature,
not allowing that fertile part to remain idle and inactive. . . . it doesn’t matter when. If you were to deny that life is
[He adds that he expects the output of his friend’s mind innate because you thought it followed rather than preceded
always to be beautiful.] the moment of birth, you would get no argument from me.
I took the compliment, and told him that I wished I What I am sure of is that life and the sensations that come
really were as he had described me, so that I might deserve with it, no matter when they come, are from mere nature
his esteem and love. From then on (I told him) I would and nothing else. So if you dislike the word ‘innate’, let us
work to become beautiful by his standard of beauty, and to change it for ‘instinctive’, and call anything ‘instinct’ if nature
propagate a lovely race of mental children, the offspring of teaches it with no input from art, culture, or discipline.
high enjoyment and a union with what was fairest and best. Philocles: Content.
I continued:
Theocles: Leaving those other questions to the various ex-
Philocles: But it is you, Theocles, who must help my labour- perts, we can safely say—with no dissent from them—that
ing mind, and be as it were the midwife to those conceptions. the various organs, especially the organs of generation, are
Otherwise I am afraid they’ll turn out to be abortive. formed by nature. Does nature provide us with any instinct
Theocles: You do well to give me only the midwife’s role; for for using them later on? Or must learning and experience
the mind can only be helped in the birth. Its pregnancy is show us the use of them?
from its nature. It couldn’t have been thus impregnated by Philocles: . . . .In the case of generation, the impression or
any mind except the one that formed it at the beginning—the instinct is so strong that it would be absurd not to think
one we have already shown to be origin of all beauty, mental it natural, in our own species and in others. Many other
and otherwise. creatures, as you have taught me, know in advance ·of
Philocles: Do you maintain then that these mental children— experience· not only •how to engender their young but also
the notions and principles of fair, just, honest and so on are •the various and almost infinite means and methods of
innate? providing for them. We can see this in the preparatory
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labours and arts of these wild creatures, which demonstrate figures—

their anticipating fancies, pre-conceptions or pre-sensations, •a sphere and a cube,
if I may use a word you taught me yesterday [page 39]. •a ball or a die.
Theocles: I allow your expression, and will try to show you Why is even an infant pleased with its first view of these
that the same pre-conceptions, at a higher level, occur in proportions? Why is a sphere or globe (or a cylinder or
human kind. obelisk) preferred to irregular shapes?
Philocles: Please do! I’m so far from finding these pre- Philocles: I admit that there is in certain shapes a natural
conceptions of fair and beautiful in myself (in your sense beauty that the eye finds as soon as the object is presented
of these terms) that until recently I have hardly known of to it.
anything like them in nature. Theocles: So there’s a natural beauty of figures; isn’t there
Theocles: ·If you really didn’t have any such pre- also an equally natural beauty of actions? No sooner does
conceptions·, how would you have recognized any human the eye open on shapes, the ear to sounds, than right away
beings as outwardly fair and beautiful? If such an object (a the beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and
beautiful woman) had for the first time appeared to you this acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner are
morning in these woods, how would you have recognised the human affections and passions discerned (and they are
her as beautiful? Or do you think that if you hadn’t had most of them as soon discerned as felt), than right away
instruction about this you would have been unmoved, and an inward eye sees the fair and shapely, the amiable and
have found no difference between this form and any other? admirable, setting them apart from the foul, the odious, or
Philocles: I have hardly any right to offer this last opinion, the despicable. So how can one possibly deny that as these
after what I have owned just before. distinctions have their foundation in nature the discernment
itself is natural and comes from nature alone?
Theocles: Well then, so that I don’t seem to take advantage
of you I’ll leave the dazzling form of the beautiful woman, Philocles: If this were as you represent it, I don’t think there
which is such a complex array of simpler beauties, and settle could ever be any disagreement among men concerning
for considering each of those simple beauties separately. I actions and behaviour—which was base and which wor-
take it that you’ll agree that in respect of bodies—whatever thy, which handsome and which ugly. But we find that
is commonly said of the ‘inexpressible’, the ‘unintelligible’, there is perpetual disagreement among mankind, with their
the I-know-not-what of beauty—there can’t be any mystery differences arising mainly from this disagreement in ·moral·
here that doesn’t plainly belong to •shape, •colour, •motion opinion, one affirming and another denying that such-and-
or •sound. Let’s set aside the last three of those along with such was fit or decent.
the charms that depend on them, and attend to the charm Theocles: Even this brings out the fact that there is fitness
in what is the simplest of all, namely shape. And we don’t and decency in actions, because the fit and decent is always
need to rise to the heights of sculpture, architecture, or the presupposed in this controversy; the thing [i.e. the moral quality]
other fine arts. It’s enough if we consider the simplest of itself is universally agreed, and men disagree only about
63
which actions have it. There are also disagreements about honourable. Someone who claims to value Philocles and to
other beauties. It’s a matter of controversy Which is the finest be valued by him says:
building? . . . the loveliest shape? . . . the loveliest face? But ‘Listen! There can’t be any such thing as real valu-
it is uncontroversially agreed that there is a beauty of each ableness or worth; nothing is in itself estimable or
kind. No-one teaches this; no-one learns it; but everyone amiable, odious or shameful. It’s all a matter of
accepts it. Everyone accepts the standard (the rule, the opinion; it’s opinion that makes beauty and unmakes
measure) for beauty; but when we apply it to things, disorder it. The graceful or ungraceful in things, the fittingness
arises, ignorance prevails, ·self·-interest and passion create and its contrary, the amiable and unamiable, vice,
disturbances. And it is bound to be like that in the affairs virtue, honour, shame—all this is based on nothing
of life, while •what interests and engages men as good is but opinion. It is the law and measure. And opinion
thought to be different from •what they admire and praise itself isn’t regulated by anything besides mere chance,
as honest. But with you and me, Philocles, it’s better settled, which varies it as custom varies. Chance makes now
because we have already decreed that beauty and good are this, now that, to be thought worthy, according to the
the same [page 59]. reign of fashion and the power of education.’
Philocles: I remember that you forced me to acknowledge this What shall we say to such a man? How can we represent to
more than once before. And now that I have become such a him his absurdity and extravagance? ·If we do·, will that stop
willing disciple, good Theocles, what I think I need is not so him? Or shall we ask ‘Aren’t you ashamed?’, putting this
much to be convinced as to be confirmed and strengthened. challenge to someone who denies that anything is shameful?
And I hope this last may prove to be your easiest task. T: Yet he derides, and cries ‘Ridiculous!’
T: What gives him a right to make that accusation? If
Theocles: Not unless you help me in it. For this is necessary,
I were Philocles, I would defend myself by asking: ‘Am
as well as appropriate. [He explains that when we have fairly
I ridiculous? how? what is ridiculous? everything? or
arrived at a new opinion it is reasonable for us to look for
nothing?’
confirmation of it, for us ‘honestly to persuade ourselves’].
T: Ridiculous indeed!
Philocles: Then show me how I can best persuade myself. T: So there is such a thing as being ridiculous. The notion
Theocles (raising his voice): Have courage. Don’t be offended of a shameful and a ridiculous in things seems to be right.
that I say ‘Have courage!’ Cowardice is the only thing T: Then how are we to apply this notion? To apply it
that betrays us. What can false shame come from except wrongly would have to be ridiculous. Or will the man who
cowardice? To be ashamed of something that one is sure cries ‘Shame!’ refuse to admit that he is ever ashamed? Does
can’t be shameful must result from a lack of resolution. We he ever blush or seem embarrassed? If he does, then what we
seek the right and wrong in things; we examine what is are dealing with here is quite distinct from mere grief or fear.
honourable, what shameful; and having at last reached a The disorder that he feels ·when he is embarrassed· comes
conclusion we don’t dare to stand by our own judgment, from his sense of •what is shameful and odious in itself,
and are ashamed to admit there is really a shameful and an not of •what is harmful or dangerous in its consequences.
64
The greatest danger in the world can’t generate shame; and T: And now what do you say, Philocles, to this defence
the opinion of all the world can’t compel us to be ashamed if I have been making for you? As you can see, I have based
that opinion isn’t one that we share. We may put on a show it on the supposition that you are deeply engaged in this
of modesty for fear of appearing impudent; but we can’t really philosophical cause, but perhaps you aren’t so, yet. Perhaps
blush for anything except what we •think to be shameful and you see many difficulties in the way of your being so much
•would still blush for even if it didn’t represent the slightest on •beauty’s side that you can make •it your good.
threat to our interests. Philocles: I have no difficulty that can’t be easily overcome.
T: That is how I could defend myself in advance ·against My inclinations lead me strongly this way: for I’m ready to
those who say that virtue is nothing real, a mere matter of concede that there is no real good except the enjoyment of
opinion·. By looking closely •into men’s lives and •at what beauty.
influenced them on all occasions, I would collect enough
evidence to make me think: Theocles: And I am as ready to concede that there is no real
enjoyment of beauty except what is good.
‘Whoever opposes me on this question, I’ll find that he
is in some way adhering to ·the moral ideas· that he Philocles: Excellent! But upon reflection I fear that your
wants to deprive me of. If he is grateful or expects grat- concession doesn’t give me much.
itude, I ask Why? Grateful for what? If he is angry and Theocles: Why?
seeks revenge, I ask What’s going on here? Revenge
on what? On a stone? On a madman? Who would Philocles: Because if I tried to contend for any enjoyment of
be so mad as to want that? And revenge for what? beauty that doesn’t square with your concession, I’m sure
A chance hurt? An accident that wasn’t intended or you would call such enjoyment of mine ‘absurd’, as you did
even thought about? Who would be so unjust as to once before.
want revenge for that?’ [Theocles develops this at Theocles: Undoubtedly I would. What is capable of enjoy-
some length, contending that gratitude, resentment, ment except mind? Or shall we say that body enjoys?
pride and shame are all saturated in thoughts about Philocles: With the help of the senses, perhaps; not other-
what is just or unjust.] wise.
Thus as long as I find men either angry or revengeful, proud
or ashamed, I am safe: for they conceive an honourable Theocles: If beauty is the object of the senses, we need to
and dishonourable, a foul and fair, as well as I do. No be told how and by which of the senses; otherwise it doesn’t
matter how mistaken they are about what is foul or fair, help us in our present situation to bring in the senses. And
that doesn’t block the conclusion I am arguing for: That if unaided body can’t apprehend or enjoy beauty, and if the
•the thing—·i.e. a real, objective distinction between right senses can’t help it to do so, there remains only the mind
and wrong·—exists and is acknowledged by everyone; and that can either apprehend or enjoy it.
that •nature impresses it on us, and it can’t be eradicated or Philocles: That is true, but show why ·‘the senses can’t help
destroyed by any art or counter-nature. it to do so’, i.e. why· beauty can’t be the object of the senses.
65
Theocles: Show me first, please, why, where, or in what you towards the conclusion:] When you think about how one
think it may be so? enjoys
Philocles: Isn’t it beauty that first activates the senses and •friendship, honour, gratitude, open honesty, kindness,
then feeds them in the passion we call ‘love’? and all internal beauty,
•all the social pleasures, and society itself,
Theocles: Say in the same manner that it’s beauty that first
•and everything that constitutes the worth and happi-
activates the senses and then feeds them in the passion we
ness of mankind,
call ‘hunger’. You won’t say that; I can see that it displeases
you will surely allow beauty in the ·virtuous· act, and think
you. Great as the pleasure of good eating is, you won’t call
it worthy to be viewed and re-viewed by the glad mind that
the dishes that create the pleasure ‘beautiful’. . . . You will
is happily conscious. . . .of its own advancement and growth
describe as ‘beautiful in their way’ many of the things from
in beauty.
which the dishes are made; and you won’t deny beauty to
T: (after a short pause): So, Philocles, that’s how I have
the wild field, or to these flowers that grow around us. Yet
lovely as these forms of nature are—the shining grass, or presumed to talk about •beauty to as great a judge and
moss, the flowery thyme, wild rose, or honeysuckle—it’s not skillful admirer of •it as you are. Starting from nature’s
their beauty that draws the neighbouring herds, delights the wonderful beauty, I gladly ventured further in the chase,
browsing fawn, and spreads the joy we see in the feeding and have accompanied you in search of beauty as it relates
flocks. What they rejoice over is not the form but what lies to us and constitutes our highest good when we enjoy it
beneath it, what satisfies their hunger and their thirst. The sincerely and naturally. And if we haven’t been wasting our
form—the beauty—doesn’t amount to anything unless it is time, it should appear from our strict search that there’s
contemplated, judged of, examined, and not merely taken as nothing as divine as beauty. Because it doesn’t belong to
an accidental sign of what appeases appetite and satisfies body and exists only in mind and reason, beauty discovered
the brutish part. Are you convinced of this, Philocles? Or and acquired only by this more divine part ·of us· when it
will you maintain that if the brutes are to have the advantage inspects itself, the only object worthy of itself. ·The only one?
of enjoyment they must also have a rational part? Yes·, for whatever is void of mind is void and darkness to
the mind’s eye. This languishes and grows dim whenever
Philocles: Not so. it is made to linger on foreign subjects, but thrives and
Theocles: Well, then, if brutes can’t know and enjoy beauty has its natural vigour when it contemplates anything that
precisely because they have only senses (the brutish part), it is like itself. That’s how the improving mind, glancing at
follows that man can’t conceive or enjoy beauty through his other objects and passing over bodies and common forms
senses, i.e. through his brutish part; and all the beauty and that have only a shadow of beauty, ambitiously presses
good he enjoys is of a nobler kind and is enjoyed by the help onward to its source, and views the origin of form and
of what is noblest ·in him·, namely his mind and reason. [He order in that which thinks. That, Philocles, is how we can
goes on at some length about the superiority of true beauty improve and become artists in the kind [Shaftesbury’s phrase],
to anything that merely tickles the senses, edging his way learning to know ourselves and to know what the item x
66
The Moralists Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury III/3: Goodness
is such that by improving x we can be sure to advance Section 3: Goodness

our worth, and real self-interest. This knowledge can’t be
acquired by studying bodies or outward forms, pageantries, We then walked gently homewards, it being almost noon;
estates and honours; and there’s nothing admirable about and he continued his discourse.
the self-improving ‘artist’ who makes a fortune out of these. Theocles: •One man presents himself as a hero, and thinks
Our esteem should go to the wise and able man who •cares it the highest advantage of life to have seen war and been in
little about these things and •applies himself to cultivating action in the field. •Another laughs at this attitude, regarding
another soil, building with a material different from stone or it as extravagance and folly; he values his own intelligence
marble; and, having better models to steer by, becomes the and prudence, and would take it for a disgrace to be thought
architect of his own life and fortune, laying within himself the adventurous. •One person works hard and tirelessly to get a
lasting and sure foundations of order, peace, and concord. reputation as a man of business. •Another thinks that this
[Theocles now says that it’s time to ‘leave these uncom- is absurd; he doesn’t care about fame or reputation, and
mon subjects’ and walk back home. Philocles expresses would cheerfully live in a continuous debauch, never leaving
anxiety that, although Theocles had convinced him of his the brothels and taverns where he enjoys (he thinks) his
doctrine, when he (Philocles) was absent from the idyllic highest good. •One values wealth, but only as a means to
countryside they had been walking and talking in he ‘would indulge his palate and eat finely. •Another loathes this, and
be apt to relapse, and weakly yield to that all-too-powerful goes for popularity and a name. •One admires music and
charm, the world’. He continues:] paintings, display-case curiosities and indoor ornaments.
•Another. . . [and so on and so on.] All these go different ways.
Philocles: How is it possible to hold out against it, and
Each censures the others and regards them as despicable.
withstand the general opinion of mankind who have such
And each of them from time to time is despicable in his own
a different notion of what we call good? Truthfully now,
eyes, falling out of favour with himself every time his mood
Theocles, can anything be more odd or out of tune with the
changes and his passions change direction. What is there in
common voice of the world, than the conclusions we have
all this that I should be concerned about? Whose censure
reached in this matter?
do I fear? Who will guide me?
Theocles: Whom shall we follow then? Whose judgment or T: If I ask ‘Are riches good when they are only stored, not
opinion shall we take concerning what is good and what used?’, one answers Yes and the others No.
bad? If all mankind, or any part of mankind, agree in some T: ·To those who answered No, I put the question:· ‘How
consistent view about this, I am content to leave philosophy must riches be used in order to be good?’ There’s no agreed
and follow them. But if not—·i.e. if there’s nothing out answer; they all tell me different things.
there to follow·—why shouldn’t we stick with what we have T: ·Then a further question:· ‘Since riches are not good
chosen? in themselves (as most of you agree), and since there’s no
T: Let us then, in another view, consider how this matter agreement among you about how they can become good,
stands. what’s wrong with my holding that they are neither good in
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themselves nor directly any cause or means of good?’ abjectly surrender one’s sense and manhood—all this must
T: If some people despise fame, and if among those who be bravely endured, and gone through with as casually and
want fame he who desires it for one thing despises it for cheerfully as possible, by anyone who. . . .knows •the general
another, he who seeks it with some men despises it with way of courts, and •how to fix unsteady fortune. I need not
others, what’s wrong with my saying that I don’t know how mention the envyings, the mistrusts, and jealousies. . .
any fame can be called a good? Theocles (interrupting): No truly, you don’t need to! But
T: If some of the pleasure-seekers admire one kind of given how aware you are of this unhappy state, and of the
pleasure and look down on another, ·while for others the suffering it involves (however splendid it may look from the
rank-ordering is reversed·, what’s wrong with my saying that outside), how can you possibly not find the happiness of that
I don’t know which of these pleasures is good, or how any other state, the opposite one? Don’t you remember what we
pleasure can be called good? resolved concerning Nature? Can anything be more desirable
T: If among those who care so much about staying alive than to follow her? Isn’t it through this freedom from our
regard as eligible and amiable a kind of life that others of passions and low interests that we are reconciled to the good
them regard as despicable and vile, what’s wrong with my order of the universe, harmonize with nature, and live in
saying that I don’t know how life itself can be thought a friendship with both God and man?
good? T: Let us compare the goods of the two states. On one
T: In the meantime, I do know one thing for sure: If side, the ones we found were uncertainly good, depending
anyone puts a high value on any of these things, that will on luck, age, circumstances, and mood; on the other side
make him a slave, and consequently make him miserable. we found goods that are certain themselves, and based on
But perhaps, Philocles, you are not yet enough acquainted regarding those others as negligible.
with this odd kind of reasoning. •Manly liberty, generosity, magnanimity—aren’t those
Philocles: You would be surprised at how well I am ac- goods?
quainted with it! I saw that the good lady, your celebrated •The self-enjoyment arising from a consistency of life
Beauty, was about to turn up again, and I had no trouble and manners, a harmony of affections, a freedom from
recognising the fair face of Liberty that I had seen only once the reproach of shame or guilt, and a consciousness
in the picture you drew yesterday of that moral dame [page 22]. of being on good moral terms with all mankind, our
I assure you, I think as highly of her as possible; and I find society, district, and friends—all based purely on
that if I don’t have her help in •rising about these seemingly virtue—can’t we regard that as happiness?
essential goods and •taking a relaxed view of life and of •A mind governed by reason, a temperament human-
fortune, it will be the hardest thing in the world to enjoy ized and fitted to all natural affections, an uninter-
either life or fortune. Solicitude, cares, and anxiety will be rupted exercise of friendship, a thorough openness,
multiplied; and in this unhappy dependency ·on the trashy kindness and good nature, along with constant secu-
‘pleasures’ of fame or fortune or the like·, one has to be servile. rity, tranquility, peacefulness of soul. . . .—aren’t these
To flatter the great, to bear insults, to stoop, and fawn, and always good?
68
•Could one ever dislike these, having grown tired of was the fancy of another man to conquer the world, for just
them? about the same reason. [Erostratus burned down a temple so as
•Does their agreeableness depend on some particular to get his name into history-books; and on that same day Alexander the
age, season, place, circumstances? Great was born.] If this really was the man’s good, why are we
•Are they variable and inconstant? amazed at his conduct? If his fancy was wrong; say plainly
•Does an ardent love and desire for them ever do harm how it was wrong, why the subject wasn’t good for him as
to anyone? he fancied. So there are the options: either
•Can they ever be overvalued? (i) What any man fancies is his good, because he fancies
•Can they be ever taken from us, or can we ever be it and isn’t content without it; or
hindered in the enjoyment of them unless we do it (ii) There is that in which the nature of man is satisfied,
ourselves? and which alone must be his good.
·That last clause is crucial:· How can we better praise the [The point is that your fancy is a shallow and unstable basis for your
goodness of providence than by saying that it has placed our choice, whereas your nature is a deeper and more durable one.] If a
happiness and good in things we can give to ourselves? man’s only good is that in which his nature is satisfied and
can rest contented, then someone who earnestly follows
Philocles: If this is so, I can’t see that we have reason accuse as his good something that a man can be satisfied and
providence of anything. But I’m afraid that men won’t easily contented without is a fool, and so is the man who earnestly
be brought into that frame of mind while their fancy [see tries to avoid as bad for him something that a man can be
Glossary] is so strong, as it naturally is, towards those other easy and contented with. Now, a man who hasn’t burned
movable goods. In short, if we can depend on what is said down a temple may be contented; and a man who hasn’t
commonly, All good is merely as we fancy it. It’s ways of conquered the world may be easy and contented; as he may
thinking that make it. Everything is just opinion and fancy. without having any of those advantages of power, riches,
Theocles: Then why do we act at any time? Why choose, or fame as long as his fancy doesn’t block him. In short,
preferring one thing to another? I suppose you’ll tell me that we’ll find that without any of what are commonly called
it’s because we fancy it, or fancy good in it. Are we therefore ‘goods’ a man can be contented, and on the other side he can
to follow every present fancy, opinion, or imagination of good? have them all and still be discontented. If so, it follows that
if so, then we must follow at one time something that we happiness is from within, not from without. A good fancy is
decline at another; approve at one time what we disapprove the main. And thus, you see, I agree with you that opinion
at another; be perpetually at odds with ourselves. But if we is all in all. [Those last three sentences (‘If so. . . to the end) are exactly
are not to follow all fancy or opinion alike—if it’s allowed as Shaftesbury wrote them.]
that some fancies are true and some false—then we are to T: But what has come over you, Philocles? You seem to
examine every fancy, and there’s some rule or other by which have suddenly become deeply thoughtful.
to judge amongst them. It was the fancy of one man to set Philocles: To tell you truth, I was considering what would
fire to a beautiful temple so as to obtain immortal fame. It become of me if your work turned me into a philosopher.
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Theocles: That would indeed be an extraordinary change! can be explained. Theocles has said that ‘happiness is from within’,
But don’t worry—the the danger is not so great. Experience but he is here exploring where you get to if you reject that and say
shows us every day that people can talk or write philosophy that happiness comes partly from without. It is in that context that
without coming any nearer to being philosophers. he says that values relating to ‘practical affairs and the world’ have to
Philocles: But the very name is a kind of reproach. The word be considered. The spirit of ‘Everything has a price’ comes from the
‘idiot’ used to be the opposite of ‘philosopher’, but people premise that Theocles •doesn’t accept but •is here exploring in a manner
who talk about ‘idiots’ nowadays are usually referring to that becomes increasingly sardonic, almost savage.—But instead of the
philosophers. expected final fierce crescendo, the passage—and the work—tails off by
returning to the question of what is involved in philosophising.]
Theocles: Yet isn’t philosophising what we all do all the time?
We take philosophy to be the study of happiness; and if that’s Philocles: But even this takes one far away from the ordinary
what it is, mustn’t everyone engage in it in some manner way of thinking, and isn’t much of a preparation for practical
or other, whether skillfully or unskillfully? Shouldn’t every affairs and the world.
deliberation concerning our main interests, every correction
of our taste, every choice and preference in life, be counted Theocles: Right! for this also is to be considered and
as philosophising? If happiness doesn’t come purely from well weighed. And therefore this is still philosophy. To
within one’s self, then it comes either from outward things inquire where and in what respect one may be most a loser;
alone or from self and outward things together. If it’s from which are the greatest gains, the most profitable exchanges—
outward things alone, show us what things they are—things because everything in this world goes by exchange. Nothing
that all men are happy to have, and everyone who has them is had for nothing. Favour requires courtship; friendship
is happy. with influential people is made by begging them for it; hon-
ours are acquired through risk; riches through work and
Philocles: No-one is going to accept that challenge!
trouble; learning and accomplishments through study and
Theocles: So if happiness comes partly from self and partly application. The prices for security, rest, and idleness are
from outward things, then each must be considered sepa- different, and it may be thought that the prices for them
rately, and a certain value set on the inward concerns, the are low. What hardship or harm does one have to undergo
ones that depend on self alone. If so—and if I consider to get those goods? It’s only to forgo fame and fortune, to
•how and in what are these to be preferred? do without honours, and to have a somewhat smaller share
•when and on what occasions are they appropriate, of influential friendships. If this is easy, all is well. Some
and when inappropriate? patience, you see, is needed in the case. Privacy must be
•when are they properly to take place, and when to endured, and even obscurity and neglect.—Those are the
yield? conditions. and thus everything has its condition. Power and
—what is this but philosophising? promotions are to be had at one rate; pleasures at another;
[After Philocles’s next sentence we have an uninterrupted speech by liberty and honesty at another. A good mind must be paid
Theocles, running almost to the end of the work. Its apparent oddity for too, just as other things must.
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But let’s be wary, and not pay too high a price for it. Let’s the other? How far are the appetites to be minded, and how
be assured that we are getting a good bargain. far outward things? Give us the measure and rule.—Isn’t
Come on then, let us do the sums. What is a mind worth? this philosophising? And doesn’t everyone do it, whether
What allowance may one handsomely make for it? What can willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly, directly
one well afford it for? [He is ironically asking, in effect, about the or indirectly?
buying price and selling price of a good mind.] You’ll want to know: ‘Where is the difference? Which
If I part with it, or cut it back, I don’t do that for nothing. manner is the best?’
I must set some value on my liberty, some on my inward That is exactly the question that I want you to weigh and
character. And there’s something ·of value· in what we call examine.
‘worth’; something in sincerity, and a sound heart. Orderly You’ll complain: ‘But the examination is troublesome,
affections, generous thoughts, and a commanding reason and I would be better off without it.’
are good things to own and not slightly to be given up. Who tells you this? Your reason, you say, whose force
I have to consider first what may be their equivalent. Will you must yield to.
I do best by letting these inward concerns run as they please, Then tell me: have you properly cultivated that reason of
or would I be better secured against bad luck by •adjusting yours, polished it, taken the necessary trouble with it, and
matters at home, rather than by •making alliances abroad, exercised it on this subject? Or do you expect it to work fully
becoming a friend of one great man after another, steadily as well when it hasn’t been exercised as when it has and is
adding to my estate or my social rank? [In that sentence, ‘at thoroughly expert? Think about mathematics: whose is the
home’/‘abroad’ is a metaphor for the distinction between re-arranging better reason of the two and more fit to be relied on—the
my mind and re-arranging the outside world.] practised mathematician or the reason of someone who is
. . . .Tell me positively: unpractised? And when it comes to the conduct of
•How far I am to go, and why no further? •war,
•What is a moderate fortune, ‘enough to be comfort- •policy,
able’, and those other degrees ·of wealth· that are •civil affairs,
commonly talked of? •marketing,
•Where is my anger to stop? How high may I allow it •law,
to rise? •medicine,
•How far can I commit myself in love? which is better, the practised intellect or the unpractised
•How far shall I give way to ambition? one? And in questions about morality and life, the question
•How far to other appetites? still stands: whose? Mightn’t we agree that the best judge
Or am I to set everything loose? Are the passions to take their of living is the person who studies life and tries to shape it
swing, with no attention being paid to •them but only to •the according to some rule? Or should we regard as the most
outward things they aim at? And if some attention to them is knowing in this matter the person who slightly examines it
needed, tell me plainly: How much to one, and how much to and accidentally and unknowingly philosophises?
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That is how philosophy is established, Philocles. Everyone a conviction that this is best.
must reason concerning his own happiness; what is good for
him, and what bad. ·There’s no question of a choice between ****
reasoning and not reasoning·. The only question is Who At this time we suddenly realised that we had got back home.
reasons best? For even someone who rejects this reasoning With our philosophy ended, we returned to the common
or deliberating activity does it for a certain reason and from affairs of life.
THE END
*****
Shaftesbury was certainly serious about the •content of the two passages given below, but he may have meant their ‘poetic’ and
‘sublime’ •form satirically. His friends hope so.
The prose poem omitted at page 49
Ye Fields and Woods, my Refuge from the toilsome World whose every single Work affords an ampler Scene, and is a
of Business, receive me in your quiet Sanctuarys, and favour nobler Spectacle than all which ever Art presented! O mighty
my Retreat and thoughtful Solitude. Ye verdant Plains, how Nature! Wise Substitute of Providence! impower’d Creatress!
gladly I salute ye! Hail all ye blissful Mansions! Known Or Thou impowering Deity, supreme Creator! Thee I invoke,
Seats! Delightful Prospects! Majestick Beautys of this Earth, and Thee alone adore. To thee this Solitude, this Place,
and all ye Rural Powers and Graces! Bless’d be ye chaste these Rural Meditations are sacred; whilst thus inspir’d with
Abodes of happiest Mortals, who here in peaceful Innocence Harmony of Thought, tho unconfin’d by Words, and in loose
enjoy a Life un-envy’d, tho Divine; whilst with its bless’d Numbers, I sing of Nature’s Order in created Beings, and
Tranquillity it affords a happy Leisure and Retreat for Man; celebrate the Beautys which resolve in Thee, the Source and
who, made for Contemplation, and to search his own and Principle of all Beauty and Perfection.
other Natures, may here best meditate the Cause of Things;
and plac’d amidst the various Scenes of Nature, may nearer Thy Being is boundless, unsearchable, impenetrable. In
view her Works. thy Immensity all Thought is lost; Fancy gives o’er its Flight:
and weary’d Imagination spends itself in vain; finding no
O glorious Nature! supremely Fair, and sovereignly Coast nor Limit of this Ocean, nor in the widest Tract thro’
Good! All-loving and All-lovely, All-divine! Whose Looks which it soars, one Point yet nearer the Circumference than
are so becoming, and of such infinite Grace; whose Study the first Center whence it parted. Thus having oft essay’d,
brings such Wisdom, and whose Contemplation such Delight; thus sally’d forth into the wide Expanse, when I return again
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within myself, struck with the Sense of this so narrow Being, which thou hast adorn’d me. Bear with my venturous and
and of the Fulness of that Immense-one; I dare no more bold Approach. And since nor vain Curiosity, nor fond
behold the amazing Depths, nor sound the Abyss of Deity. Conceit, nor Love of aught save Thee alone, inspires me
Yet since by Thee (O Sovereign Mind!) I have been form’d with such Thoughts as these, be thou my Assistant, and
such as I am, intelligent and rational; since the peculiar guide me in this Pursuit; whilst I venture thus to tread the
Dignity of my Nature is to know and contemplate Thee; Labyrinth of wide Nature, and endeavour to trace thee in thy
permit that with due freedom I exert those Facultys with Works.
The prose poem omitted at pages 55–56
1 O mighty Genius! Sole animating and inspiring Power! Abhorrence. The abject State appears merely as the Way or
Author and Subject of these Thoughts! Thy Influence is Passage to some better. But cou’d we nearly view it, and with
universal: and in all Things, thou art inmost. From Thee Indifference, remote from the Antipathy of Sense; we then
depend their secret Springs of Action. Thou mov’st them with perhaps shou’d highest raise our Admiration: convinc’d that
an irresistible unweary’d Force, by sacred and inviolable even the Way itself was equal to the End. Nor can we judg
Laws, fram’d for the Good of each particular Being; as less favourably of that consummate Art exhibited thro’ all the
best may sute with the Perfection, Life, and Vigour of the Works of Nature; since our weak Eyes, help’d by mechanick
Whole. The vital Principle is widely shar’d, and infinitely Art, discover in these Works a hidden Scene of Wonders;
vary’d: dispers’d thro’out; nowhere extinct. All lives; and Worlds within Worlds, of infinite Minuteness, tho as to Art
by Succession still revives. The temporary Beings quit their still equal to the greatest, and pregnant with more Wonders
borrow’d Forms, and yield their elementary Substance to than the most discerning Sense, join’d with the greatest Art,
New-Comers. Call’d, in their several turns, to Life, they or the acutest Reason, can penetrate or unfold.
view the Light, and viewing pass; that others too may be 2 But ’tis in vain for us to search the bulky Mass of Matter:
Spectators of the goodly Scene, and greater numbers still seeking to know its Nature; how great the Whole itself, or
enjoy the Privilege of Nature. Munificent and Great, she even how small its Parts.
imparts herself to most; and makes the Subjects of her 3 If knowing only some of the Rules of Motion, we seek
Bounty infinite. Nought stays her hastning Hand. No Time to trace it further, ’tis in vain we follow it into the Bodys it
nor Substance is lost or unimprov’d. New Forms arise: and has reach’d. Our tardy Apprehensions fail us, and can reach
when the old dissolve, the Matter whence they were compos’d nothing beyond the Body itself, thro’ which it is diffus’d.
is not left useless, but wrought with equal Management and Wonderful Being, (if we may call it so) which Bodys never
Art, even in Corruption, Nature’s seeming Waste, and vile receive, except from others which lose it; nor ever lose,
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unless by imparting it to others. Even without Change of glorious is it to contemplate him, in this noblest of his Works
Place it has its Force: And Bodys big with Motion labour to apparent to us, The System of the bigger World!
move, yet stir not; whilst they express an Energy beyond our [Philocles writes: Here I must own, ’twas no small Comfort
Comprehension. to me, to find that, as our Meditation turn’d, we were likely
4 In vain too we pursue that Phantom Time, too small, to get clear of an entangling abstruse Philosophy. I was
and yet too mighty for our Grasp; when shrinking to a narrow in hopes Theocles, as he proceeded, might stick closer to
point, it scapes our Hold, or mocks our scanty Thought Nature, since he was now come upon the Borders of our
by swelling to Eternity, an Object unproportion’d to our World. And here I wou’d willingly have welcom’d him, had I
Capacity, as is thy Being, O thou Antient Cause! older than thought it safe at present to venture the least Interruption.
Time, yet young with fresh Eternity. 8 [Theocles continues ‘in his rapturous Strain’: What
5 In vain we try to fathom the Abyss of Space, the Seat Multitudes of fix’d Stars did we see sparkle, not an hour
of thy extensive Being; of which no Place is empty, no Void ago, in the clear Night, which yet had hardly yielded to the
which is not full. Day? How many others are discover’d by the help of Art? Yet
6 In vain we labour to understand that Principle of Sense how many remain still, beyond the reach of our Discovery!
and Thought, which seeming in us to depend so much on Crouded as they seem, their Distance from each other is
Motion, yet differs so much from it, and from Matter itself, as unmeasurable by Art, as is the Distance between them
as not to suffer us to conceive how Thought can more result and us. Whence we are naturally taught the Immensity of
from this, than this arise from Thought. But Thought we that Being, who thro’ these immense Spaces has dispos’d
own pre-eminent, and confess the reallest of Beings; the only such an Infinite of Bodys, belonging each (as we may well
Existence of which we are made sure, by being conscious. presume) to Systems as compleat as our own World: Since
All else may be only Dream and Shadow. All which even even the smallest Spark of this bright Galaxy may vie with
Sense suggests may be deceitful. The Sense itself remains this our Sun; which shining now full out, gives us new Life,
still; Reason subsists; and Thought maintains its Eldership exalts our Spirits, and makes us feel Divinity more present.
of Being. Thus are we in a manner conscious of that original 9 Prodigious Orb! Bright Source of vital Heat, and Spring
and eternally existent Thought, whence we derive our own. of Day! Soft Flame, yet how intense, how active! How
And thus the Assurance we have of the Existence of Beings diffusive, and how vast a Substance; yet how collected thus
above our Sense, and of Thee, (the great Exemplar of thy within itself, and in a glowing Mass confin’d to the Center
Works) comes from Thee, the All-True, and Perfect, who hast of this planetary World!-Mighty Being! Brightest Image, and
thus communicated thyself more immediately to us, so as Representative of the Almighty! Supreme of the corporeal
in some manner to inhabit within our Souls; Thou who art World! Unperishing in Grace, and of undecaying Youth!
Original Soul, diffusive, vital in all, inspiriting the Whole. Fair, beautiful, and hardly mortal Creature! By what secret
7 All Nature’s Wonders serve to excite and perfect this ways dost thou receive the Supplies which maintain Thee
Idea of their Author. ’Tis here he suffers us to see, and even still in such unweary’d Vigour, and un-exhausted Glory;
converse with him, in a manner sutable to our Frailty. How notwithstanding those eternally emitted Streams, and that
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continual Expense of vital Treasures, which inlighten and animated with a sublime Celestial Spirit, by which we have
invigorate the surrounding Winds? Relation and Tendency to Thee our Heavenly Sire, Center
10 Around him all the Planets, with this our Earth, single, of Souls; to whom these Spirits of ours by Nature tend,
or with Attendants, continually move; seeking to receive the as earthly Bodys to their proper Center. O did they tend
Blessing of his Light, and lively Warmth! Towards him they as unerringly and constantly! But Thou alone composest
seem to tend with prone descent, as to their Center; but the Disorders of the corporeal World, and from the restless
happily controul’d still by another Impulse, they keep their and fighting Elements raisest that peaceful Concord, and
heavenly Order; and in just Numbers, and exactest Measure, conspiring Beauty of the ever-flourishing Creation. Even so
go the eternal Rounds. canst thou convert these jarring Motions of intelligent Beings,
11 But, O thou who art the Author and Modifier of these and in due time and manner cause them to find their Rest;
various Motions! O sovereign and sole Mover, by whose high making them contribute to the Good and Perfection of the
Art the rolling Spheres are govern’d, and these stupendous Universe, thy all-good and perfect Work.
Bodys of our World hold their unrelenting Courses! O wise 14 [The prose-poem is interrupted by some conversation
Oeconomist, and powerful Chief, whom all the Elements in which Theocles urges Philocles to watch for, and speak
and Powers of Nature serve! How hast thou animated these up against, anything in this that he thinks is questionable.
moving Worlds? What Spirit or Soul infus’d? What Biass Philocles agrees, and asks him to ‘begin anew and lead me
fix’d? Or how encompass’d them in liquid Aether, driving boldly through your elements’. Theocles then resumes:]
them as with the Breath of living Winds, thy active and Let us begin with this our Element of Earth, which yonder
unweary’d Ministers in this intricate and mighty Work? we see cultivated with such Care by the early Swains now
12 Thus powerfully are the Systems held intire, and kept working in the Plain below.
from fatal interfering. Thus is our ponderous Globe directed 15 Unhappy restless Men, who first disdain’d these peace-
in its annual Course; daily revolving on its own Center: ful Labours, gentle rural Tasks, perform’d with such Delight!
whilst the obsequious Moon with double Labour, monthly What Pride or what Ambition bred this Scorn? Hence all
surrounding this our bigger Orb, attends the Motion of her those fatal Evils of your Race! Enormous Luxury, despising
Sister-Planet, and pays in common her circular Homage to homely Fare, ranges thro’ Seas and Lands, rifles the Globe;
the Sun. and Men ingenious to their Misery, work out for themselves
13 Yet is this Mansion-Globe, this Man-Container, of the means of heavier Labour, anxious Cares, and Sorrow: Not
a much narrower compass even than other its Fellow- satisfy’d to turn and manure for their Use the wholesom and
Wanderers of our System. How narrow then must it appear, beneficial Mould of this their Earth, they dig yet deeper, and
compar’d with the capacious System of its own Sun? And seeking out imaginary Wealth, they search its very Entrails.
how narrow, or as nothing, in respect of those innumerable 16 Here, led by Curiosity, we find Minerals of different
Systems of other apparent Suns? Yet how immense a Body Natures, which by their Simplicity discover no less of the
it seems, compar’d with ours of human Form, a borrow’d Divine Art, than the most compounded of Nature’s Works.
Remnant of its variable and oft-converted Surface? tho Some are found capable of surprizing Changes; others as
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durable, and hard to be destroy’d or chang’d by Fire, or Field the keen terrestrial Particles; whole happy Strifes soon
utmost Art. So various are the Subjects of our Contem- ending in strict Union, produce the various Forms which we
plation, that even the Study of these inglorious Parts of behold. How vast are the Abysses of the Sea, where this soft
Nature, in the nether World, is able itself alone to yield large Element is stor’d; and whence the Sun and Winds extracting,
Matter and Employment for the busiest Spirits of Men, who raise it into Clouds! These soon converted into Rain, water
in the Labour of these Experiments can willingly consume the thirsty Ground, and supply a-fresh the Springs and
their Lives. But the noisom poisonous Steams which the Rivers; the Comfort of the neighbouring Plains, and sweet
Earth breathes from these dark Caverns, where she conceals Refreshment of all Animals.
her Treasures, suffer not prying Mortals to live long in this 19 But whither shall we trace the Sources of the Light? or
Search. in what Ocean comprehend the luminous Matter so wide
17 How comfortable is it to those who come out hence diffus’d thro’ the immense Spaces which it fills? What
alive, to breathe a purer Air! to see the rejoicing Light of Seats shall we assign to that fierce Element of Fire, too
Day! and tread the fertile Ground! How gladly they con- active to be confin’d within the Compass of the Sun, and
template the Surface of the Earth, their Habitation, heated not excluded even the Bowels of the heavy Earth? The Air
and enliven’d by the Sun, and temper’d by the fresh Air of itself submits to it, and serves as its inferior Instrument.
fanning Breezes! These exercise the resty Plants, and scour Even this our Sun, with all those numerous Suns, the
the unactive Globe. And when the Sun draws hence thick glittering Host of Heaven, seem to receive from hence the
clouded Steams and Vapours, ’tis only to digest and exalt the vast Supplies which keep them ever in their splendid State.
unwholesom Particles, and commit ’em to the sprightly Air; The invisible etherial Substance, penetrating both liquid and
which soon imparting its quick and vital Spirit, renders ’em solid Bodys, is diffus’d thro’out the Universe. It cherishes
again with improvement to the Earth, in gentle Breathings, the cold dull massy Globe, and warms it to its Center. It
or in rich Dews and fruitful Showers. The same Air, moving forms the Minerals; gives Life and Growth to Vegetables;
about the mighty Mass, enters its Pores, impregnating the kindles a soft, invisible, and vital Flame in the Breasts
Whole: And both the Sun and Air conspiring, so animate this of living Creatures; frames, animates, and nurses all the
Mother-Earth, that tho ever breeding, her Vigour is as great, various Forms; sparing, as well as imploying for their Use,
her Beauty as fresh, and her Looks as charming, as if she those sulphurous and combustible Matters of which they
newly came out of the forming Hands of her Creator. are compos’d. Benign and gentle amidst all, it still maintains
18 How beautiful is the Water among the inferior Earthly this happy Peace and Concord, according to its stated and
Works! Heavy, liquid, and transparent: without the springing peculiar Laws. But these once broken, the acquitted Being
Vigour and expansive Force of Air; but not without Activity. takes its Course unrul’d. It runs impetuous thro’ the fatal
Stubborn and un-yielding, when compress’d; but placidly Breach, and breaking into visible and fierce Flames, passes
avoiding Force, and bending every way with ready Fluency! triumphant o’er the yielding Forms, converting all into itself,
Insinuating, it dissolves the lumpish Earth, frees the intan- and dissolving now those Systems which itself before had
gled Bodys, procures their Intercourse, and summons to the form’d. ’Tis thus. . .
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20 [Theocles stops because he thinks that Philocles has where vast Sea-Monsters pierce thro’ floating Islands, with
something to say. There is a tiresomely arch interchange on Arms which can withstand the Chrystal Rock: whilst others,
the topics: who of themselves seem great as Islands, are by their Bulk
•Theocles thinks he has become ‘too warm’. alone arm’d against all but Man; whose Superiority over
•He could go on about the ‘soft flames of love’, but Creatures of such stupendous Size and Force, shou’d make
thinks that Philocles is the wrong audience for that. him mindful of his Privilege of Reason, and force him humbly
•An ancient doctrine says that there are periodical con- to adore the great Composer of these wondrous Frames, and
flagrations in which everything is consumed; Theocles Author of his own superior Wisdom.
has no patience with that. 22 But leaving these dull Climates, so little favour’d by
•Philocles wants Theocles to continue, not flying high the Sun, for those happier Regions, on which he looks more
but staying on earth. kindly, making perpetual Summer; How great an Alteration
•Theocles agrees, but insists on resuming his poetic do we find? His purer Light confounds weak-sighted Mortals,
mode, his ‘wings of fancy’ that he needs to fly all over pierc’d by his scorching Beams. Scarce can they tread the
the world. glowing Ground. The Air they breathe cannot enough abate
21 How oblique and faintly looks the Sun on yonder the Fire which burns within their panting Breasts. Their
Climates, far remov’d from him! How tedious are the Winters Bodys melt. O’ercome and fainting, they seek the Shade,
there! How deep the Horrors of the Night, and how uncom- and wait the cool Refreshments of the Night. Yet oft the
fortable even the Light of Day! The freezing Winds employ bounteous Creator bestows other Refreshments. He casts a
their fiercest Breath, yet are not spent with blowing. The veil of Clouds before ’em, and raises gentle Gales; favour’d
Sea, which elsewhere is scarce confin’d within its Limits, lies by which, the Men and Beasts pursue their Labours; and
here immur’d in Walls of Chrystal. The Snow covers the Hills, Plants refresh’d by Dews and Showers, can gladly bear the
and almost fills the lowest Valleys. How wide and deep it warmest Sun-beams.
lies, incumbent o’er the Plains, hiding the sluggish Rivers, 23 And here the varying Scene opens to new Wonders.
the Shrubs, and Trees, the Dens of Beasts, and Mansions We see a Country rich with Gems, but richer with the
of distress’d and feeble Men!-See! where they lie confin’d, fragrant Spices it affords. How gravely move the largest
hardly secure against the raging Cold, or the Attacks of the of Land-Creatures on the Banks of this fair River! How
wild Beasts, now Masters of the wasted Field, and forc’d by ponderous are their Arms, and vast their Strength, with
Hunger out of the naked Woods. Yet not dishearten’d (such Courage, and a Sense superior to the other Beasts! Yet are
is the Force of human Breasts) but thus provided for, by Art they tam’d, we see, by Mankind, and brought even to fight
and Prudence, the kind compensating Gifts of Heaven, Men their Battels, rather as Allies and Confederates, than as
and their Herds may wait for a Release. For at length the Sun Slaves. But let us turn our Eyes towards these smaller, and
approaching, melts the Snow, sets longing Men at liberty, more curious Objects; the numerous and devouring Insects
and affords them Means and Time to make provision against on the Trees in these wide Plains. How shining, strong, and
the next Return of Cold. It breaks the icy Fetters of the Main; lasting are the subtile Threds spun from their artful Mouths!
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Who, beside the All-wise, has taught ’em to compose the the noted Tyrant of the Flood, and Terror of its Borders!
beautiful soft Shells; in which recluse and bury’d, yet still when suddenly displaying his horrid Form, the amphibious
alive, they undergo such a surprizing Change; when not Ravager invades the Land, quitting his watry Den, and
destroy’d by Men, who clothe and adorn themselves with the from the deep emerging, with hideous rush, sweeps o’er
Labours and Lives of these weak Creatures, and are proud of the trembling Plain. The Natives from afar behold with
wearing such inglorious Spoils? How sumptuously apparel’d, wonder the enormous Bulk, sprung from so small an Egg.
gay, and splendid, are all the various Insects which feed With Horror they relate the Monster’s Nature, cruel and
on the other Plants of this warm Region! How beautiful deceitful: how he with dire Hypocrisy, and false Tears,
the Plants themselves in all their various Growths, from the beguiles the Simple-hearted; and inspiring Tenderness and
triumphant Palm down to the humble Moss! kind Compassion, kills with pious Fraud. Sad Emblem of
24 Now may we see that happy Country where precious that spiritual Plague, dire Superstition! Native of this Soil;
Gums and Balsams flow from Trees; and Nature yields her where first Religion grew unsociable, and among different
most delicious Fruits. How tame and tractable, how patient Worshipers bred mutual Hatred, and Abhorrence of each
of Labour and of Thirst, are those large Creatures; who lifting others Temples. The Infection spreads: and Nations now
up their lofty Heads, go led and loaden thro’ these dry and profane one to another, war fiercer, and in Religion’s Cause
barren Places! Their Shape and Temper show them fram’d forget Humanity: whilst savage Zeal, with meek and pious
by Nature to submit to Man, and fitted for his Service: who Semblance, works dreadful Massacre; and for Heaven’s sake
from hence ought to be more sensible of his Wants, and of (horrid Pretence!) makes desolate the Earth.
the Divine Bounty, thus supplying them. 26 Here let us leave these Monsters (glad if we cou’d here
25 But see! not far from us, that fertilest of Lands, water’d confine ’em!) and detesting the dire prolifick Soil, fly to the
and fed by a friendly generous Stream, which, ere it enters vast Desarts of these Parts. All ghastly and hideous as they
the Sea, divides itself into many Branches, to dispense more appear, they want not their peculiar Beautys. The Wildness
equally the rich and nitrous Manure, it bestows so kindly pleases. We seem to live alone with Nature. We view her in
and in due time, on the adjacent Plains. Fair Image of that her inmost Recesses, and contemplate her with more Delight
fruitful and exuberant Nature, who with a Flood of Bounty in these original Wilds, than in the artificial Labyrinths and
blesses all things, and, Parent-like, out of her many Breasts feign’d Wildernesses of the Palace. The Objects of the Place,
sends the nutritious Draught in various Streams to her the scaly Serpents, the savage Beasts, and poisonous Insects,
rejoicing Offspring!-Innumerable are the dubious Forms and how terrible soever, or how contrary to human Nature, are
unknown Species which drink the slimy Current: whether beauteous in themselves, and fit to raise our Thoughts in
they are such as leaving the scorch’d Desarts, satiate here Admiration of that Divine Wisdom, so far superior to our
their ardent Thirst, and promiscuously engendring, beget short Views. Unable to declare the Use or Service of all
a monstrous Race; or whether, as it is said, by the Sun’s things in this Universe, we are yet assur’d of the Perfection
genial Heat, active on the fermenting Ooze, new Forms are of all, and of the Justice of that Oeconomy, to which all things
generated, and issue from the River’s fertile Bed. See there are subservient, and in respect of which, Things seemingly
78
deform’d are amiable; Disorder becomes regular; Corruption mid-way the Mountain, a spacious Border of thick Wood
wholesom; and Poisons (such as these we have seen) prove harbours our weary’d Travellers: who now are come among
healing and beneficial. the ever-green and lofty Pines, the Firs, and noble Cedars,
27 But behold! thro’ a vast Tract of Sky before us, the whose towring Heads seem endless in the Sky; the rest of
mighty Atlas rears his lofty Head, cover’d with Snow above Trees appearing only as Shrubs beside them. And here a
the Clouds. Beneath the Mountain’s foot, the rocky Country different Horror seizes our shelter’d Travellers, when they
rises into Hills, a proper Basis of the ponderous Mass above: see the Day diminish’d by the deep Shapes of the vast Wood;
where huge embody’d Rocks lie pil’d on one another, and which closing thick above, spreads Darkness and eternal
seem to prop the high Arch of Heaven. See! with what Night below. The faint and gloomy Light looks horrid as
trembling Steps poor Mankind tread the narrow Brink of the Shade itself: and the profound Stillness of these Places
the deep Precipices! From whence with giddy Horror they imposes Silence upon Men, struck with the hoarse Echoings
look down, mistrusting even the Ground which bears ’em; of every Sound within the spacious Caverns of the Wood.
whilst they hear the hollow Sound of Torrents underneath, Here Space astonishes. Silence itself seems pregnant; whilst
and see the Ruin of the impending Rock; with falling Trees an unknown Force works on the Mind, and dubious Objects
which hang with their Roots upwards, and seem to draw move the wakeful Sense. Mysterious Voices are either heard
more Ruin after ’em. Here thoughtless Men, seiz’d with the or fansy’d: and various Forms of Deity seem to present
Newness of such Objects, become thoughtful, and willingly themselves, and appear more manifest in these sacred Silvan
contemplate the incessant Changes of this Earth’s Surface. Scenes; such as of old gave rise to Temples, and favour’d
They see, as in one instant, the Revolutions of past Ages, the Religion of the antient World. Even we our-selves, who
the fleeting Forms of Things, and the Decay even of this our in plain Characters may read Divinity from so many bright
Globe; whose Youth and first Formation they consider, whilst Parts of Earth, chuse rather these obscurer Places, to spell
the apparent Spoil and irreparable Breaches of the wasted out that mysterious Being, which to our weak Eyes appears
Mountain shew them the World itself only as a noble Ruin, at best under a Veil of Cloud."-
and make them think of its approaching Period. But here
79

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The Moralists

Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury

Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved

Part II: First day: Conversations among four 13

Part III: Second day: Conversation between two 49

Addendum: Two flowery passages, undoctored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Part I: Why the conversations are being reported

Philocles is writing to his friend Palemon For

Part II: First day: Conversations among four

that is regarded as such a great paradox of faith. If there

that have you even tried to present beyond bare probability? A

Section 5: Believing in miracles report of the most considerable part of mankind.

Part III: Second day: Conversation between two

Section 2: Beauty woods, the rivers, or sea-shores are ordinary run-of-the-mill

labours and arts of these wild creatures, which demonstrate figures—

is such that by improving x we can be sure to advance Section 3: Goodness

The prose poem omitted at page 49

The prose poem omitted at pages 55–56

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